A PATH TOWARDS THE CARTOGRAPHY OF SLOVENE NATIONAL IDENTITY

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Trying to fathom the cartography of national identity and the imaginary community of the nation-state has proven to be a more complex task than many theories suggest. The Slovene case is no exception.[1]

At the very heart of the problem lies the difficulty of defining the modem nation. This is a result of the variety and complexity of the phenomena it denotes, and also of the very nature of scientific thought, above all the tendency to search for universal laws as well as specialisations and limits imposed by methodology. Finding agreed definitions of the key concepts in the field of national/its phenomena as the *conditio sine qua non* of all dialogue, is »perhaps the central difficulty of the study of nations and nationalism«[2] and terminological chaos and linguistic imbroglio one of the »key barriers to understanding.«[3] The (im)possibility to arrive at a satisfactory theoretical definition of nation may lie in the fact that we are dealing with one of the many concepts of which, as declared by Bagehot in 1874, »we know the meaning until someone asks us, but which we cannot simply and coherently explain«,[4] because as Connor recently argued it »is *known* intuitively and unquestionably, a matter of attitude and not of fact«.[5]

The purpose of this paper is to argue that what Slovenes have »known« intuitively is not a matter of attitude from the past immemorial but a cultural artefact created and cultivated through several generations as a response to the concept of a modem nation. This response is intellectually and politically inspired by two main sources, the French Revolution and the Romanticism of Central Europe, while socially and economically based on the modernisation.

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[1] This paper is an outline of a segment of the Ph. D. thesis in progress: Slovenes in Sweden: A Study of Migration and Homeland Identity, 1945-1995. Department of Human Geography, Stockholm University.

[2] Hutchinson, John and Smith, Antony D. (eds.) 1994: *Nationalism.* Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. p. 3f.

[3] Connor, Walker 1994: *Ethnonationalism.* The Quest for understanding. Princeton, New Yersey: Princeton University Press.

[4] Bagehot, W. 1874, as cited in Janjić, Dušan 1988: The Nation. *Razprave in gradivo (Treatises and Documents) 21*: 33-38. Ljubljana: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja. p. 38.

[5] Connor, *op. cit.* 4. Emphasis original.

1. Variations on the concept of a modern nation

The roots

The word nation in itself is older than the modern idea of nation.[6] Over time the term nation took on many of the meanings which characterise modern nations and only gradually acquired a political connotation.[7] During the Enlightenment of the late eighteenth century, coinciding with the establishment of modern states on the ruins of traditional monarchies, the word nation passed into the sphere of ideology and acquired a meaning which legitimised and justified the authority of the state or confirmed its territorial needs and aspirations.[8] With the spread of the doctrine of popular sovereignty, the revolutionary doctrine identifying *le peuple* as the front of all political power, the Third Estate could claim to represent the nation. Conceptions gradually changed so that the very idea of *la nation* came to be almost completely identified with *l'état*. The idea of nation now meant the community based on democracy and political equality of citizens. This implied that the idea of a nation-state, as pointed out by Weber, is frequently confused with the very concept of the state.[9] At the same time grounds were laid for employing nation and state as synonyms, although, as suggested by Connor, the very coining of this hyphenate illustrated an appreciation of the vital differences between them.[10] Indeed, the state »confiscated« the national idea; the meaning of the term shifted to mean people as understood in the Latin word *populus*, thus as membership of a political entity. Since the latter was to be a democratic state, nation was to mean people with equal political rights and obligations. This implied the demand for unity and indivisibility of all people in a historically spatially limited territory, the citizens of which were now to be called Nation. It was not for *ethnos*, or in its Latin twin »nation«, but for *Staatsvolk*, to become the Nation.[11] Or as Just put it: »A people is what it is because it is of its land«.[12]

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[6] *Natio* is the Latin word and stems of *nasci*, meaning to be born. As such it implies some idea of origin which is essentially independent of individual will. Note: the word Nature stems from the same verb.

[7] The term was for example denoting groups with broadly similar linguistic origins irrespective of their geographical dispersion, like »natio anglica«, or occupying a definite territory like »nazione fiorentina«; and during the seventeenth century, came to mean those who ruled. See for example Janjić, *op. cit.* and Snyder, Louis L. 1976: *Varieties of Nationalism: A Comparative Study.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. p. 17f.

[8] Margue, Pierre 1979: *Contre L'État-Nation.* Paris: Editions Denöel. pp. 44-45; Rizman, Rudi 1979: *Marksizem in nacionalno vprašanje.* Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba. pp. 40-43.

[9] Weber, Max 1978: Economy and society: an outline of interpretive sociology, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (transl. by Ephraim Fishoff). Berkeley: University of California Press.

[10] Connor, *op. cit.* 96.

[11] Many intellectuals have been engaged in the battle to properly define terms and neologisms deriving from words like *populus* (L.), *natio* (L.), *ethnos* (Gr.) *civis* (L.) and others. From its early use a complex vocabulary trying to delimit human groups has not been socially neutral, but laid out along dimensions of inclusion and exclusion, difference and otherness, majority and minority, shortly in a duality of »us« and »them« classifications of people, by themselves or by others. While ethnos may mean nation, it does not mean nation-state or state, for which the English word nation has become a near synonym. For more discussion on social/ historical factors of development of the distinction between nation/state and nation/people, see, for example Just, Roger 1989: Triumph of the Ethnos, in *History and Ethnicity* edited by Tonkin, Elizabeth, McDonald, Marion and Chapman, Malcolm, 71-88. London and New York: Routledge; Chapman, Malcolm, McDonald, Marion, and Tonkin, Elizabeth 1989: Introduction - History and Social Anthropology, in Tonkin, Elizabeth, McDon-

Setting the boundaries

It is difficult to describe the stages of transformation of both land and social space into political territories and spaces, but the process of bounding space which started from a modest areal scale has had, as Gottmann has shown, an inherent and enduring tension between two fundamental factors, accessibility and diversity.[13] Geographical space as defined by accessibility, must be continuous in real physiographic and in perceived spatial terms, although conditions of accessibility are diversified by variety of physical and cultural forms and also limited, even if limits vary according to technological advances. Historically the prime role of political subdivision has been to maximise the limited, available space.

Ever since the fifteenth century, though limited and in many respects also finite, European geographical space has also been expanding. In the process, society not only partitioned and diversified geographical space but also organised and regulated it. Territoriality, however, was reasserted as a powerful organisational and behavioural phenomenon only when population began to increase significantly in scale and diversity. This was, as Edward Soja observed, *a cultural and symbolic territoriality* which began with the origins of the cultured primate, though achieving prominence in society only with emergence of the state, and probably its fullest flowering as an organisational basis for society in the formally structured, compartmentalised, and fiercely defended nation-state.[14]

Forms of human political organisation developed from hunting and agricultural communities, leading to the city, the religious civilisation with a God-like king, and the dynastic realm or empire of expanding and inclusive borders. A model of the organisation of the world into mutually exclusive nation states originated in western Europe, where dynastic transactions, prevalence of Christianity and geographical continuity over a very long time produced fairly homogenous populations in the state building cores. This consolidation was largely a consequence of expulsion, flight or voluntary exile of deviant religious minorities.

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the evolving system of nation states, under the impact of a triple Western revolution - in the spheres of the division of labour, administration and culture - involved the formation of a new subjectivity; one based upon identification with *national space* and *political nation* rather than a selfhood rooted solely in a social hierarchy, religious order or local authority.

Constructing a national framework

In the national construction of social space to identify the »nation« with the historical territorial state, common territory and its political framework constitutes a founda-

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ald, Marion and Chapman, Malcolm (eds.) *op.cit.* 1-21; Hobsbawm, Eric J. 1990: *Nations and nationalism since 1780.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[12]Just, *op.cit.* 75.
[13]Gottmann, Jean 1973: *The significance of territory.* Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
[14]Soja, Edward W. 1971: *The political organization of space.* Washington: Association of American geographers Resource Paper Number 8, p. 30.

tion and arena of the many cultural and social changes, involved in the process of »nation building-destroying«.[15] In an attempt to construct cultural homogeneity assimilation of the cultural pool of an established state to the »high culture« was largely done by standardising a single national language through a centrally state-run education system.[16] As suggested in Anderson's view of space and time regarding the modern nation state, »print capitalism« was the principal material condition, »a new way of linking fraternity, power and time meaningfully together«,[17] repeating vernacular print images to become naturalised into a relatively homogenous set of practices of a kind of imagined community. This facilitated spatial, yet extra-experiential identification of the autonomous subject with the larger, linguistically delimited and (rhetorically) equally autonomous body-politic. Integrative and didactic regimes acquired an effective vehicle for information and propaganda which allowed an expansion of capabilities of reflexive monitoring of the state, in Giddens' words the »bordered power-container«.[18]

Moreover, as noted by Williams and Smith, it is the »land« which allows realisation of »goals of sovereignty, fraternity, identity and regeneration«.[19] By concretely expressing the language of power on the land, a constructed field of meanings and symbols is disseminated towards, as Homi Bhabha would put it, the »totalisation« of national culture. In his view of nation as narration Bhabha talks about this antagonistic and ambivalent perspective establishing the cultural boundaries of the nation so that they may be acknowledged as »containing thresholds of meaning that must be crossed, erased, and translated in the process of cultural production«.[20] He refers to social and in a way psychological space, but one could argue the same for the physical space. For, the total homogenisation of national culture involves among others, reconstruction of the geographical area of the nation state, planned according to the visionary of the modernist and progressive. For example, large efforts are aimed at infrastructure construction, with implantation of political symbolism and investment in idealisation of symbolic »national« landscapes.[21]

Just like linking every citizen into national organisation by the principle of the »civic, political religion« of modernisation, through an uniform code of law and educa-

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[15] The argument of »nation-building or nation destroying« was put forward by Walker Connor in his critique of American scholarship school of political development theory with, as he put it, a »catch phrase« nation-building, mainly criticising Deutsch theory of nationalism and social communication. Connor, *op. cit.* 28-67. Whether nations *can* be destroyed, I agree with Seton-Watson, is a subject for dispute. Seton-Watson, Hugh 1977: *Nations & States*. An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism. London: Methuen. p. 2, emphasis original.

[16] Gellner, Ernest 1983: *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. pp. 39 ff.; Weber, Eugen 1977: *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914*. London: Chatto & Windus.

[17] Anderson, Benedict 1983: *Imagined Communities*. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. p. 36.

[18] Giddens, Anthony 1985: *The Nation State and Violence*. Cambridge: Polity Press. p.119 and 210.

[19] Williams, Colin and Smith, Anthony D.: The national construction of social space. *Progress in Human Geography* 7 (4): 502-518, p. 510.

[20] Although Homi Bhabha talks about a nation I think his argument is more valid for a nation-state. See Bhabha, Homi 1990: *Narrating the Nation*, in Hutchinson, John and Smith, Antony D. (eds.) op. cit. 306-312, p. 309.

[21] Mosse, G. 1975: *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars Through the Third Reich*. New York: Howard Fertig. Weber, Eugen *op.cit*; Zelinsky, Wilbur 1988: *From State into Nation: The Shifting Symbolic Foundations of American Nationalism*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

tional system, every corner of territory needs to be linked to the political centre, to be unified by erosion of local loyalties as well as powers of intermediate institutions in order to strengthen political and cultural power of the state. Reshaping social and physical space of a state and taking full ownership requires popular mobilisation, commitment, solidarity and national consciousness. Therefore, as Gramsci observed, the state cannot only act as an instrument of a particular class, but in the name of »national interests«, achieves cultural legitimacy of a hegemony in a process of continuos consensus, balancing the dominant class and other groups.[22] Thus, only when this agreement and conscious attachment of popular »masses« is achieved, have most Frenchmen begun to describe France as their *pays*. Eugen Weber has shown that this conquest was slow, it took as long as »what they were thought came to coincide with experience.«[23] It is only then that the state territory becomes a truly national, externalised expression of collectivity in a project of »homeland« identity creation.

The plurality of cultures

The Enlightenment purported to proclaim true and universal ideas and principles and provided possibilities offered by the social and political applications of scientific thought. Romanticism as a primarily literary-intellectual movement was the Central European reaction to the Enlightenment. Against the universal and timeless, clearly measured logical structure, the reaction glorified the individual, the national, the historical, the inner life and its expression. Feeling, as opposed to the coldness and sterility of reason, held a better claim to the truth. It was the emotional vacuum within the framework of the secular and therefore disorienting values of Enlightenment that Romanticism was able to fill.

The Romantic philosophers and rebels made a clear distinction between nations, which they defined as communities or moral and cultural groupings, and *stato nazionale*, a term they brought into popular usage as a state which comes into being as a result of the triumph of the *principio di nazionalita*, which they held to be the highest principle in life of the people.[24]

Such an intellectual conception can be seen as a *ressentiment*, of (French) »civilisation and progress« and the assumption of their universal validity. This resentment being a mixture of envy, reaction against and aspiration toward the material advantages and ideological primacy of French and English models of the time. Herder, Rousseau's German disciple and one of the main inspirers of the German Romantic movement and historicism as a philosophical outlook, proposed an alternative view of human development. He attacked the assumption that the historical self-development of humanity was a unilinear process, leading to the high and dominant point of European

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[22] Salamini, Leonardo 1981: *The Sociology of Political Praxis*. An introduction to Gramsci's theory. London, Boston and Henley: Routledge & Kenan Paul. pp. 71-125.

[23] Weber, Eugen *op.cit.* 46. The term *pays*, awkward and untranslatable, as Weber points out, has fundamental significance of »native land«. It applies more to local than to national territory, but it is above all an entity whose members have something in common, experience, language, a way of life. It reflects more cultural than administrative divisions.

[24] Chabod, Frederico 1974: *L'idea di nazione*. Bari: Editori Laterza. pp. 22f.

culture. »The very thought of a superior European culture is a blatant insult to the majesty of Nature,« he wrote in his major unfinished work. [25] In Herder's view, humanity had its roots in and derived its values from a number of cultures. He spoke of specific and variable cultures of different nations and periods, moreover of social and economic groups within a nation. According to Isaiah Berlin, Herder set in motion an idea that every people and every age could be »truly understood and judged only in terms of its own scale of values.«[26]

With Herder culture became plural which represented a decisive innovation. Application however was exceptionally complicated. Firstly, as suggested by Raymond Williams, it was used as an attack on what was seen as the »mechanical« character of the emerging civilisation, both in its abstract rationalism and »inhumanity« of current industrial development; secondly to distinguish between »material« and »human« development, politically shifting between radicalism and reaction and in the confusion of major social changes, often fusing elements of both; and thirdly, to emphasise traditional cultures including the new concept of *Volk*.[27]

It should be noted here, though it only adds to already complicated and much disputed relationship between culture and civilisation, that at the end of the nineteenth century the same kind of distinction between »material« and »spiritual« development with a reversal of terms, culture being material and civilisation spiritual, was made by Alexander von Humboldt, one of the founding fathers of modern geography. In general, however, the opposite distinction has been dominant and to speak of »cultures« in the plural has indeed become common twentieth century sociology and anthropology, and by extension in general use. Chapman, McDonald and Tonkin, for example, state that »perhaps social anthropology's major intellectual contribution in the twentieth century« has been »the observations that other people's truths are contained in their own classifications and understanding, and that our own culture offers no self-evidently privileged standard of verity«.[28] The question of whether there is any context-free truth left at the end of exercise has of course, become an issue of many disciplines, among them the philosophy and sociology of science.[29]

Furthermore, in the contemporary ideological constellation, when the glorification of post-modern »culture« at the expense of modern »civilisation« is again fashionable, it would be, as proposed by Slavoj Žižek, theoretically productive to arrange into a semiotic square the two oppositions: culture-primitivism and civilisation-barbarism. This means that culture and barbarism do not exclude each other. The opposite of barbarism is not culture but civilisation. In other words culture in itself, as long as it is affirmed in its opposition to civilisation, sets free barbaric potential, as for example exemplified by Hegel when he speaks of *Barbarismus der reinen Kultur*. The barbarism of this century as it was committed, took place within the nation which glorified its culture against superficial Anglo-Saxon and French civilisation. Those who planned and directed the

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[25] Herder as cited from Ideas on th Philosophy of the History of Mankind (1784-91), in Williams, Raymond 1976: *Keywords*. A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. Fontana/ Croom Helm. p. 79.

[26] Berlin, Isaiah 1976: *Vico and Herder*. London: The Hogarth Press. p. xxii.

[27] Williams, Raymond *op. cit.* 76-82.

[28] Chapman, Malcolm, McDonald, Marion, and Tonkin, Elizabeth *op. cit.* 10.

[29] See also Medved, Felicita 1992: Ali so rezultati znanosti objektivni ali ideološke konstrukcije? *Znanje za razvoj*. Ljubljana: Delo. October, 1992.

»final solution« of Jewish question were the same persons who after a hard day's work enjoyed Beethoven's string quartets, supreme achievements of a German culture.[30]

The »Pufendorf tradition«

Apparently it was Herder who coined the word *Nationalismus*, yet, according to Berlin, he was not a »nationalist«, and his idea of »belonging« was posed as a social not as a political idea.[31] His main contribution to political ideas, Birch has observed, was to have emphasised the emotional importance to human beings of their membership of a distinct cultural group, and the desirability of basing political authority upon such groups.[32] As argued by Früchwald, Herder was a son of the Enlightenment who perceived the building of a *Kulturnation* by language as a duty of the state. As he did not believe in gradual automatic development he described the three layers of nation-building as the »Pufendorf tradition«: first, building a nation by itself, acknowledging developable characteristics; second, building a nation by institutions such as theatres, academies, libraries, universities; and third, by sporadic but essential copying of other nations.[33]

Almost contrary to Herder's tolerant historicism and both moral and cultural relativism was Fichte's emphasis on aggression and messianic political vision. Herder believed language had an intrinsic value as the expression of *Volk* culture, considering French as a high class dialect, a jargon, yet it was Fichte's conviction »that whenever a separate language is formed.....there a separate nation exists, which has the right to take independent charge of its affairs and to govern itself.«[34]

Consequently, Herder was searching for a »moral fatherland« which could exist in competition with the spiritual and cultural powers of the peoples of Europe and of the world, whereas Fichte considered *Volk und Vaterland* as a carrier and an »IOU« for earthly eternity. The honourable human being could, according to him, only find continuity in his nation and in order to save it he even should be willing to die, so that the nation could live on.[35]

Conclusively, the Enlightenment was the intellectual vanguard of the progressive secularisation of spiritual life, with its cold rationalism resulting in an emotional vacuum. As a reaction to this, the romantic idea of nation was conceived primarily as a socio-cultural value. Nevertheless, it was precisely the export of the American and French revolutions political doctrine of popular sovereignty, that gave the romantic idea of a nation a tremendous impetus. This doctrine then can and should be seen in general terms as a doctrine about the organisation of political authority or good government.

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[30] Cf. Žižek, Slavoj 1991: *For they not what they do*. Enjoyment as a Political Factor. London: Verso. p. 225.

[31] Berlin, Isaiah op. cit. See also Morgenbesser, Sidney and Lieberson, Jonathan 1991: Isaiah Berlin, in *Isaiah Berlin*. A celebration, edited by Edna and Avishai Margalit. 1-30. Chicago: Chicago University Press; and Taylor, Charles 1991: The Importance of Herder, in Margalit, Edna and Avishai (eds.) *op.cit.* 40-63.

[32] Birch, Anthony H. 1989: *Nationalism and national integration*. London: Unwin Hyman. p. 18.

[33] Frühwald, Wolfgang 1986: Die Idee kultureller Nationbildung und die Entstehung derLiteratursprache in Deutschland, in *Nationalismus in vorindustrieller Zeit*, edited by Dann, Otto: 129-142. Munchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag. pp.137f.

[34] Fichte, Johann Gotlieb as cited from Addresses to the German Nation 1845, in Birch *op. cit.* 19 ff.

[35] Frühwald, *op. cit.* 140.

However, it was applied only to particular communities. For the romantics these were the submerged, unspoiled, »authentic« communities, that should be entitled to govern themselves in their own state. In promoting »the Sacred Fatherland in the place of the Holy Church«, as emphasised by Krejčí and Velímsky, the nationalism of the romantic period was therefore able to satisfy a deep socio-psychological need which neither the men of the Enlightenment nor rationalists of any other period were capable of under-standing.[36]

Over the past two hundred years it has become apparent that many communities have moved increasingly towards greater political self-determination. The pace of this process varied from country to country, and also with respect to social groups and strata, until nationalism as a means of collective self-assertion spread over the whole of Europe. Language in the Herderian sense as a means of expression of a *Volk,* indirectly became important, if not central to the modern definition of nationality and to the popular perception of it. One of the main reasons, as set out by Anderson,[37] is that where an elite literary and administrative language exists, however small the size of its users, it can become a strong element of what is often referred to as »proto-national« cohesion. If it creates a community of this intercommunicating elite which coincides with a particular territorial state area or vernacular zone, it can be a model for the as yet non-existent larger community of »the nation«. In the absence of the state standard, in other words the »Queen's language«, the standard of correctness may be established according to the *landsmaal* tradition. A constructed language, especially when printed to become a common language appears to be more permanent and hence by an optical illusion, as Hobsbawm observed, more »eternal« than it really was.[38] Modern national-ism thus goes beyond the objectively instrumental identification of community with language and its communicative role in the reorganisation of economic and political systems, as Deutsch concluded,[39] to the identification of authenticity with a particular language, experientially unique. Fishman has argued that the focus on a vernacular is more than functional a *substantive* hub of nationalism, safeguarding behavioural and sentimental links of speech community in its temporal and spatial framework.[40]

I shall attempt to show in a Slovenian context that via language »peoples without history« voice their cultural history, self-identify their national identity and gradually extrapolate linguistic differentiation to the sociocultural »homeland« of their commu-nity, which in the process aspires towards political independence.

Thus, the crux of the modern nation is the formation of a nation-state. A state pre-supposes the existence of territory. The relationship between a modern nation and the geographical circumscription of its »homeland« as well as political incorporation in the former or the latter is therefore reversible. In either case an identity is asserted between »people« and »territory«. Polemically therefore I can reverse Just's statement putting it

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[36] Krejccí, Jaroslav and Velímský, Vítězslav 1981: *Ethnic and Political Nations in Europe.* London: Croom Helm, p. 61.

[37] Anderson, *op. cit.*, especially 46-49 and chapter 5.

[38] Hobsbawm, *op. cit.* 61.

[39] Deutsch, Karl W. 1966: *Nationalism and Social Communication.* Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: M:I.T. Press. (2nd edition).

[40] Fishman, Joshua A. 1989: Language and nationalism: Two integrative essays. Part II. (1972). *Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective.* Clevedon, Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters 45: 269-367.

as follows: A land is what it is because it is »of« its people. Consequently, the concept of a modern nation is rather than anything else a territorial one.

The self-unfolding of Slovenes

The traumas of modernisation and secularisation disturbed social order in the essentially feudal and largely preindustrial Ruritanias of the 1800s Central European Habsburg empire. Common sentiments of peasants and smallholders arising out of the shared aspects of daily existence following the timely cycles of »agrarian rhythms« and life, frequently expressed in a rich folklore of festivals and customs, were shattered, as also the microcosm of the »real«, the »natural«. Place and nationally bound sense of permanence became a surviving factor in someone's identity, even if a nation was not distinct and had to be (re)built or invented on fragments of history, *Volk* culture and myth.

The historical relationship between nationalism and modernisation has been much discussed. Is nationalism an instrumental response to modernisation, or as Greenfeld recently defined it, a specific conceptual perspective that has defined modernity from sixteenth-century England to nineteenth-century Russia.[41] Why can it not be both?

For Slovenes in the context of the Habsburg empire, transformation from the feudal into centralised administrative and military regime, the reforms of Maria Theresa and the Emperor Joseph II, gave some new hope in future, while the French Revolution and short Napoleonic regime united a part of the Slovene and Croatian lands, adopting the colloquial language of peasants as a legitimate vehicle of official communication and documentation. Changes of this kind disturbed and in a way split up thoughts and feelings which from then on bear a stamp on Slovene cultural, social and political existence. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, combined with a reaction against German and Italian cultural imperialism, in a reciprocal interaction between ideas and structures - the »real«, the imperial and the Western European - the Slovene national identity constituted itself through resistance and defence as something that was being experienced as endangered or lost.

Group identity usually evolves through communication between participants within a territorial frame. The space-related identity of Slovenes was moulded by the range of the communication network and the intensity of the interacting processes. In the preindustrial era the dominance of localised interactions satisfied the everyday life of a land-bound peasant. The transformation of people's awareness from a locally bound spatial identity to a larger regional and national territorial setting occurred within historical events and often an externally imposed administrative frame.[42]

Slovenes did not live in either a geographically or politically homogeneous unit. The physiography of the Slovene ethnic area is varied, encompassing Alpine and Karst regions, the Pannonian piedmont, a coastal strip, and the Ljubljana and Celovec/Klagenfurt basins. The imperial administrative apparatus divided Slovenes be-

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[41] See Greenfeld, Liah 1992: *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. pp.1-26.
[42] Velikonja, Joseph 1994: The Quest for Slovene National Identity, in *Geography and National Identity*, edited by David Hooson. 249-256. Oxford, UK & Cambridge USA: Blackwell. p. 249.

tween five political jurisdictions and the city of Trieste, each of which included in a varying degree other national groups. In addition to this Austrian domain, some Slovenes lived across the Mura river in Hungary, and yet other inside Venetian Friulia.[43] Each of these geographic and administrative divisions gradually formed an individual cultural, linguistic-dialectic and economic-interest unit. The cleavages between the »Carniolian«, the »Styrian«, the »Carinthian« Slovenes were further aggravated because Slovenes fell under separate ecclesiastical jurisdictions.

Although it is therefore easy to underestimate or exaggerate the collective consciousness of Slovenes before the early nineteenth century, it can be stated with some confidence that they were aware of differences in language and culture between themselves and their German, Italian and Hungarian neighbours. They were »other« if not »self-defined« and also the terms *Slovenci* and *Slovenija* were coming into wide use.[44] Despite a certain identity in the way of conceiving the external world, the process towards an all-Slovene identity was neither fast nor smooth. Indeed until the present day the three levels of space-related identity - local, regional and national -persist in their continual interaction.

The Slovene awareness emerged through written language. The Slovene language attained already during the Reformation, at least for some time, considerable cultural and political significance. The early seeds of literary movement must be attributed to the industriousness of Slovene Protestant reformers, although some manuscripts, like the Freising Fragments from the eleventh century, are of an earlier date. However, despite the well-known 1584 Dalmatin's Bible and also some Slovene Roman Catholic books, which were mainly the literary efforts of the clergy, and some thematic and functional broadening under the influence of the Italian Baroque in the seventeenth century, followed by the pre-romatic Enlightenment movement, a »high« Slovene language did not evolve before the nineteenth century.

Then the Slovene national movement started with a tiny group of intellectuals who had access to education and financial support of the emerging Slovene and also German bourgeoisie. Anton Tomaž Linhart, Valentin Vodnik, Jernej Kopitar, Franc Miklošič and Francé Prešeren to name but a few recognised in their *ethnie* an embryo of the Slovene nation.[45] Expertise and curiosity in combination with enthusiasm from the penetrating ideas of the Enlightenment initiated the recognition of *a* nation in themselves, potentially *the* Slovene nation. With Rousseau, Herder, Mazzini and Goethe as their patrons, they studied history, geography and vernaculars to build up a literary language

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[43] The 1846 Austrian census counted 428,000 Slovenes and Serbo-Croats in Carniola, 92 per cent of its population. According to the same census there were 363,000 (36%) of Slovenes in Styria, 96,000 (30 %) in Carinthia, 128,000 (67 %) in Gorizia and 25,000 (31.5 %) in Trieste. After 1866 27,000 Slovenes remained in Venezia, when it was annexed to Italy and in 1867 45,000 were added to Transleithia by the Ausgleich. Figures quoted in Rogel, Carole 1977: *The Slovenes and Yugoslavism 1890-1914.* East European Monographs XXIV. New York: Columbia University Press. p.121.

[44] The meaning of »Slovene« was not yet clearly defined, at times it meant »Slovene«, at others it was synonomous with »Slav«. Only in the last decades of the nineteenth century the term become widely associated with its present meaning.

[45] Linhart was a historian, Vodnik a poet, Kopitar a linguist and state censor in Vienna from 1810-1848, Miklošič a linguist, and Prešeren a layer and a poet. Extensive exploration into *ethnie* was done by A. D. Smith in his »continuity, but not identity« approach of nation to be or not to be. Gellner notes that from the »ethnic map« of Europe only a few have »survived« to give language and name to a modern nation-state. Smith, Anthony D. 1986: *The Ethnic Origins of Nations.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell; Gellner, *op. cit.*

out of the vocabularies, grammars and syntaxes of the crown lands of Carniola, Carinthia, Styria, Istria and Gorizia.

Scribamus more gentis, laquamur more regionis was the manner of the Slovene literary language construction. Initially it started from the central Slovenian region, based on the Lower and Upper Carniolian vernaculars. Among a handful of language planners the integration of vernaculars into literary Slovene caused much discussion. They did not agree upon methods and emphasis, and mainly two trends were discernible in the 1830s: one culturally oriented toward folk idiom and politically legitimist, the other culturally cosmopolitan and leaning toward liberalism.[46] The appeals of the Illyrian movement to build the »Illyrian« literary language as the common language of South Slavs did not take root in Slovene lands. When the Vienna agreement was signed in 1850, concerning one language for Croatian and Serbian writers, the concept of Slovene as a separate and individual language already gained broad support and led to a synthesis of the Slovene literary language.[47] Nonetheless, it was only in the second half of the nineteenth century, when the *landsmaal*-type literary Slovene, sacrificing the Slovene literary traditions in the peripheral regions, which were less reachable by the printed word, mainly because of the political administrative division, could perform a unifying function, both linguistically as well as sociolinguistically.[48]

Francé Prešeren, who was eventually persuaded to devote his talents to write in Slovene as well as German, and his followers, in my view gave expression to the theory of Herder that poetry as »national thinking« is a sensual power that speaks directly to the heart of the people, convincing them that shattered and worried about material existence as they might be, they are still one people.[49] The spatial definition of their *narod*, as outlined in Prešeren's sonnets, was their society's *habitat*, the soil, terrain and even the stars above, given by God, to cherish and love. Herein they have celebrated the glories and suffered the pains, in this soil-rooted memory gives them the right to inherit and possess it from generation to generation. Therefore they should unite and liberate themselves in their *domovina*.[50]

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[46] See Rogel, *op. cit.* 6-11.

[47] Although the Illyrian movement that occured in several waves, did not succeed in attracting Slovenes, it left some marks on the Slovene language, among them Czech spelling form 1839 and close interaction of linguistic traditions between Slovene and Croatian. The only Slovene of note who accepted Gaj's Illyrism was a Styrian poet Stanko Vraz. See Lencek, Rado L. 1982: *The structure and history of the Slovene language.* Columbia University. Slavica. pp. 251-293. See also note 79.

[48] The contemporary Slovene literary language is in fact artificial, modelled on idealised Slavic pattern and there is a profound discrepancy between its written and spoken form.

[49] Francé Prešeren (1800-1849) was one of those national poets who were apt to express the »essence« of a nation, celebrating the aesthetics and emotional value of the language, semantically inspired by Slovene pietism. His poetry may be seen as a reaction to the new disillusionment by Matternich regime in the period 1814-1848. It is not rare that he is torn between reason and emotion, between universalism and uniqueness, »internationalism« and nationalism associating heritages of the Enlightenment and Romanticism. A typical example is his »A Toast«, presently the Slovene national anthem. Slovene political leaders of different periods, similarly to politicians of diverse ideological strains all around the world, have frequently made use not only of national poetry, but indeed of an appeal to the emotional essence of a nation, triggering it through symbols and metaphors.

[50] *Narod* is derived from the verb »roditi se«, meaning to be born. It is however in some way more precise than the Latin *natio*, as it refers to links of kin. Narod, as used in Slovene cannot be equated neither with the state nor the state population. Although certain territory may be held essential to narod, *narodnost* usually translated as nationality, but frequently also as ethnicity, is abstract word meaning a quality of belonging to a

If sifting among imported concepts of the Western European Enlightenment led Slovene Enlightenment thinkers to rationally investigate the society around them, establishing the foundation of Slovene historical writing, their concept of Slovenia was given a direction and purpose by Slovene Romantics who maintained that the people's culture expressed the real spirit of a nation, »the creative genius of a collective segment of mankind«.[51] At the dawn of the national and social struggles Prešeren and his poems, published at the vital historical moment in 1847, created a national and human testament, encouraging his people in their quest for cultural growth and consolidation, while at the same time strengthening the political will of their leaders. The concept of a Slovene nation merged with the idea of »homeland«; the next logical step was to associate these two with the concept of popular sovereignty.[52]

Realisation of the national principle, however, that nations and states were *destined* for each other,[53] as prophesied by the national politicians of the era, consequently, to be proclaimed the right of »self-determination«, by the time of collapse of Europe's last internal empires, largely depended on military power.[54]

Miroslav Hroch's conceptualisation of nationalism distinguishes three phases of national movements in the Habsburg Monarchy and tsarist Russia: phase A as a period of scholarly interest in national language, history and geography, phase B as a period of national patriotic agitation and phase C in which national movements achieved their success definitively as a mass movement.[55] If one would be inclined to see development of the Slovene national movement in »stages« then the 1848 »spring of nations« marked the beginning of the phase B. Although many, delighted that the old order had been overthrown, celebrated the revolt, few were aware of the issues involved and few even understood the leading political trends of the time. Political activity among Slovenes was not in any sense a mass movement and the overall Slovene participation in the

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nation, and is perceived as detached from territory. It is not assumed to be lost by emigration, or acquired by immigration. Two other distinctions have to be made clear as well. First, *narodnost* does not mean citizenship. Second, the former meaning has to be distinguished from categorisations which came about in the nineteenth century, from legal Austrian terminology, holding narod as being superior to narodnost (in German Nationalität, in Magyar nemzetiseg) with the purpose of denying the status of the former to those categorised as the latter. Post WW II Yugoslavia adopted and further developed this categorisation in legal terminology. *Domovina*, homeland is in Slovene rarely genderised though the word fatherland exists.

[51] Rogel, *op. cit.* 6.

[52] Zwitter, Fran 1947: Narodnost in politika pri Slovencih. *Zgodovinski časopis*. Vol. I. 31-69. pp. 32f.

[53] Gellner, *op. cit.* 4. My emphasis. I found Gellner's definition of nationalism as »primarily a political principle which holds that political and national unit should be congruent« (1983:1), appropriate in this context although his modernist theory stresses the primacy of material conditions and relies on socio-economic explanation of nationalism, and not on its emotional appeal. Some authors consider only nationalism inspired by Romanticism, to be »real« nationalism. See for example Pfaff, William 1993: *The Wrath of Nations*. Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism. New York: Simon & Schuster.

[54] The principle of »self-determination« was proclaimed at the end of European »classical« internal empires, from which Europe has not yet recovered. Wilson's attempt to redraw Europe according to this principle was, to cite Birch, »as everyone now knows, the most disastrous piece of policy-making ever engaged in by a well-intentioned politician«. Birch, *op. cit.* 23. However, one should not forget that it has been proclaimed as the right, by politicians widely separated in ideology and in the Convenant of the League of Nations as well as in the Charter of the United Nations.

[55] Hroch, Miroslav 1992: Language and National Identity, in *Nationalism and empire:* the Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union, edited by Richard L. Rudolph and David F. Good. 65-76. St. Martin's Press in association with the Center for Austrian Studies, University of Minnesota. See also Hobsbawm *op.cit.* 11f.

revolutionary tide of the time was more modest when compared with that of some other subject peoples of the Habsburg empire who were, after all, stronger in every respect.

Nevertheless, when the revolution came, Slovenes were, due to the work of the cultural nationalists, more a nation than they had been. And once the literary language was self-identified as the single most important factor of Slovenes as a social and cultural community, the national movement and its linguistic programme were due to extend by formulating new aims. Only when culturally intellectualised vernacular is mastered by members of the given group, however small, does it become equal to the language of the *Herrschaft*. Gaining legitimacy by its language quality the »Cinderella« nation aspired to external recognition of its language and territorial entity in which it was spoken. And the more explosive the language problem was, the more the language became a central symbol of Slovene national identity and cultural independence. Language assumed an ideological role and nationalism turned political. For it was the state which had to be manipulated if »nationality« was to become a »nation«, or even if its existing status was to be safeguarded against assimilation. Because the linguistic diversity which was irrelevant to administrative unity, as Weber pointed out in his study about the modernisation of rural France, became significant when it was »perceived as a threat to political - that is, ideological - unity«.[56]

The deeper reasons for the political role of the language and culture however should be sought in the processes of social and economic transformation, especially after serfdom was abolished. If a nation, as defined by Deutsch, is »a product of a complementary communication«,[57] then communication is impossible without a standardised language. The process of modernisation advanced social mobility and communication; a growing number of people become literate, and the choice of the official language and the medium of education determined which individuals or groups had access to better jobs. The educated Slovenes did in fact often use a different language at work, and could do so in greater numbers as they assimilated into the dominant language. In a long time perspective of »inter-ethnic continuum«, especially with Germans it was not unnatural for many Slovenes to merge with their German compatriots since they possessed fewer cultural tools with which to maintain their identity, especially when rising socially. At the same time it cannot be said that Germans remained uninfluenced by Slovenes. Nevertheless, assimilation or denationalisation as well as the political emancipation of the subject peoples is a complex phenomenon that can perhaps be best studied from the perspective of a collective psychology rooted in shifting socioeconomic relationships.[58] However, when the culturally intellectualised mother tongue already strengthened national consciousness, the political programme was set to abolish »public/private« life bilingualism. For educated Slovenes it became a matter of honour, prestige and loyalty and could therefore represent an instrument to bring about the cultural entity that covered internal differentiation and conflicts of society. For prospective proto-élites, as Fishman noted, the vernacular has been not only of »theoretical« interest

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[56] Weber, *op. cit.*

[57] Deutsch, *op. cit.*

[58] For a fine analysis of simultaneously centripental and centrifugal forces acting on the development on Carinthian Slovene national consciousness see Suppan, Arnold 1978: Zwischen Assimilation und national-politischer Emanzipation. Die Kärntner Slovenen vor und im Ersten Weltkrieg. *Österreichische Osthefte*, 20: 292-382.

but very much an instrument of power - for themselves and for the people.[59] On the other hand, the leaders mainly came from the lower strata of the social structure; they were barely becoming »urban« people and had little political experience or education in a civic society. They could hardly set out political argumentation or slogans calling for civil rights. Cultural demands were closer and more understandable to them and to the groups they had to address in their appeals.

Therefore, the 1848 first Slovene political programme contained demands for unification of fragmented territory into one kingdom or crownland to be called *Slovenija* with an assembly in Ljubljana; the introduction of Slovene in schools and in government administration, and the independence of Austria from Frankfurt. The latter demand was posed because it soon became clear that in the name of national self-determination German liberals were attempting to include those Austrian territories which had been a part of German Confederation in a greater German Union. Slovene territories were especially coveted as they could provide Great Germany with access to Trieste and the sea.[60] Three centres of political agitation were formed. Forty-four intellectuals in Vienna, led by Slavicist Fran Miklošič, presented a list of demands to the Carniolan Estates. In Ljubljana Janez Bleiweis, the conservative editor of the first political Slovene newspaper, also called for the unification of all Slovenes, while political clubs of students in Graz and Vienna produced petitions to the Emperor.[61]

The few Slovene nationalists were unable to find a strong support.[62] The Slovene peasant population, as Pleterski has illustrated in the Carinthian context, had lively opinions about the abolition of manorialism, but the social structure itself largely excluded ties to political liberalism.[63] While demands for the abolition of the old system could only be based upon natural law, support for the radical democratic idea of unified Slovenia involved a sense of individual rather than collective national consciousness. As Barker rightly observed, at this point the handful of Slovene nationalists »had no effective weapon to draw from the arsenal of history.«[64]

The recovered monarchy in 1849 published a constitution as it had promised, but it provided for a completely centralised empire though it nominally at least recognised the principle of equality for all peoples and the inalienable right of preserving and cultivating one's nationality. The gains of nationalities were however minimal. In the absence of an administrative frame for what has been emerging as Slovenia, the advocacy stayed within cultural manifestations. The decade of the Bach police régime was hardly a suitable milieu for nationalist political activity, even as Rogle put it for »political amateurs

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[59] Fishman, *op.cit.* 272.

[60] Apih, Josip 1888: *Slovenci in 1848. leto.* Ljubljana: Matica Slovenska. p. 76.

[61] *Ibid.*; Zwitter, *op. cit.*

[62] The Unified Slovenia programme is by some Slovene historians referred to as the minimum program. The maximum program rested on political Illyrism, was somewhat less defined and had even less popular support. Even those who were active politically in 1848 remained divided, not only on this issue but also on the issue of the Unified Slovenia as well as on the question of a German union. See For example Rogle, *op. cit.*

[63] Pleterski, Janko 1965: *Narodna in politična zavest na Koroškem. Narodna zavest in politična orientacija prebivalstva slovenske Koroške v letih 1848-1914.* Ljubljana: Slovenska matica. See also Barker Thomas M. with the collaboration of Moritsch, Andreas 1984: *The Slovene Minority of Carinthia.* East European Monographs. New York: Columbia University Press.

[64] Barker, *op.cit.* 59

loyal to Austria«.[65] The first map that traced territorial framework of Slovene lands with Slovene place-names, having been produced in 1853 by Peter Kozler, was confiscated.[66]

However, the national awakening continued. It was mainly the struggle for the Slovene language in the schools and churches of hundreds of villages and in local administration, led by schoolmasters, priests and local journalists. And those, like the Father Slomšek, who condemned the revolution, considering popular political movements illegitimate but believed that use of the mother tongue was related to eternal salvation, made important advances in stimulating a sense of national identity among the people.[67] Supported by small Slovene but also German capitalists and by the Church, publishing enterprises arose and the national awakening reached its peak in the creation of libraries, theatres, reading clubs - *čitalnice* and sport societies, self-organised at a communal level, reflecting the organisational resources available to the people, but also the increasing eagerness and vogue.

The awareness of a common and unified language among the majority of Slovenes coincided with the transformation of the communication system, especially with the major innovation by the completion of the Vienna-Trieste railway in 1857. The economic evolution towards a market economy meant the beginning of a new system that reached beyond localised, self-contained economic, social and cultural patches, gradually integrating them in larger than regional entities. One-day journeys from »home« to nearby towns, were subsequently followed by migration to distant urban centres, and also extensive emigration abroad. Increased travel, interacting with a drive for cultural uplift, began to link people and regions that for centuries had lived separately, in spite of the external appearance of unification under the Habsburg political power. Velikonja has rightly emphasised that the once stable local identities, which satisfied the common need to »belong« for most people, and accepted foreign rule, its language, demands and rules as a necessary evil, began to accept a higher awareness, something between the homely local area and enormous empire.[68] This was the territory of the emerging linguistic and sociocultural area of the Slovenes. Thus, the administrative divisions which in 1848 were questioned only by a few, began to be questioned by many more.

Losing leadership in Central Europe, Austria was forced to alter her policy at home. In the 1860s the regime embarked upon a series of experiments regarding the constitutional structure of the Empire. The October Diploma of 1860, the regime's first attempt at a new constitution, put forth a federalist solution based on the old crownlands and granted for an imperial diet of limited powers. It was soon succeeded by the centralistic 1861 February Patent, which gave the empire a bicameral legislature but which permitted the German bourgeoisie to predominate.[69]

In the absence of Slovene political parties, Carinthian Andrej Einspieler in collaboration with Matija Majar, proposed to unify the Slovenes by joining together two historic units, the Kingdom of Illyria and the Duchy of Styria, that might be called »Inner Austria«.[70] This so-called »Maribor programme« of 1865 was never adopted, it is how-

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[65] Rogel, Carole 1977: *The Slovenes and Yugoslavism 1890-1914.* New York: Bouder. p. 18.

[66] Peter Kozler, *Zemljovid Slovenske dezzele in pokrajin*, 1853.

[67] Zwitter, *op.cit.* 38ff.

[68] Velikonja, *op.cit.*, 249f. and 252.

[69] For details see Macartney, C. A. 1968: *The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918.* London: Chapter 11.

[70] Rogel, *op.cit.* 19f.

ever interesting since it attempted to give historic validity to its claims, while the 1848 Unified Slovenia programme put forward demands based on »ethnic« claims.

Slovenes were directly affected by the 1867 *Ausgliech*, in which Hungarians were accommodated. When Austria lost Venetia in 1866, about 27,000 Slovenes in Slovene Venezia (Benečija) were left in Italy; with the Compromise 45,000 were assigned to Hungarian part of the monarchy.[71] This meant that at the time when the drive for Slovene unification was under way, significant sectors of territory and their inhabitants, ethnically Slovene, came under the jurisdiction of external authorities.[72]

Slovenes scored a few initial successes concerning the demands of the official use of Slovene made in 1848. In connection with the petition of the Slovene deputies to the *Reichsrat* in 1867, the demands to implant Slovene as an official language were approved for Lower Styria and for Carniola.[73] The development in Carinthia and the Littoral however became much more complicated. Efforts towards teaching at all grade levels and Slovene administration were only partially successful, thwarted by Germanisation in the former and, after 1920, by Italisation in the latter. Slovene nationalism was thus for a long time a struggle about language in »office and school«.[74]

In addition, since 1848 the central concern of Slovene leaders had been to bring all Slovenes into one unit. The Austrian Empire has been assumed to be the larger political framework. After 1867 this was no longer necessarily the case. As Baker pointed out, by sacrificing pro-imperial forces in the interests of the two *Herrenvölker*, Francis Joseph opened the doors to centrifugal forces. Although some guarantees were given to the Slavs, as the February Patent was extended and made perpetual for Cisleithian Austria, they proved to be insufficient. The politically weaker nationalities wanted the door of autonomy to open all the way.[75]

Slovenes continued working toward an all-Slovene programme and, due to the developments in Europe, seriously began to consider the likelihood of Austria's demise. After the 1867 promulgation of the *Vereinsgesets*, an important legal change by which broader segments of the population were enabled to organise on a national political basis, the all-Slovene programme made new progress. Emanating from Lower Styria for the purpose of drumming up popular enthusiasm large outdoor meetings - *tabori*- were held in all provinces. They are considered to be the first real example of popular Slovene political activity and indeed the attendance was high in both towns and countryside. This may be because attention was given to economic problems, but some would regard these meetings as a kind of national plebiscite in favour of a United Slovenia.[76]

From the 1870s however, alternative ideas of bringing together Slovenes with the southern Slavs appeared among some Slovenes, resulting mainly from their conviction of Slavs having been betrayed by the Germans and Magyars. The beginnings of these

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[71] Zwitter, Fran 1967: The Slovenes in the Habsburg Monarchy. Austrian History Yearbook, Vol.III, Pt.2. 159-188.

[72] Velikonja, *op.cit.* 250.

[73] Barker, *op.cit.*

[74] The struggle for the Slovene university for example, included in the demands of the 1848 political programme, took almost hundred years, only to be established in 1920. Not surprisingly though since especially universities as Hobsbawn rightly observed for the nineteenth century, became the most conscious champions of nationalism. His argument however, is equally valid for other times and places.

[75] Barker, *op.cit.* 66-69.

[76] Melik, Vasilij 1969: Slovensko narodno gibanje za časa taborov. *Zgodovinski časopis*, XXIII: 75-88.

ideas may be looked for in the short-lived annexation of Croatian and Slovene lands to the Napoleonic »Illyrian« provinces. However short this period was (1809-14), it left its mark. The Napoleonic regime is remembered for its attempt to implement some measure of peasant emancipation, general equality under law, and freedom of speech, including native language newspapers. Politically more significant, however, was the administrative structure and the complementary assumption about national identity. As Velikonja expressed it, »the Slovene territory and its people were never the same again«.[77]

Furthermore, Lampe holds an opinion that the subsequent impact of this period of French theory and practice, what Anderson identifies as »new nationalism«, is to be found primarily in the leftist Yugoslav ideologies of the early twentieth century and the administrative structures introduced after both world wars by the Yugoslav governments.[78] While this can be debated, even more so can the influence of the French regime on the Illyrian movement, a trend that most strongly developed in Croatia. Illyrism which was initially a cultural and linguistic movement got many impulses from German Romanticism, Russian Slavophilism and Czech Panslavism. Later it took on different (re)interpretations, one of them being the Yugoslav option.[79]

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the political constellation gradually assumed a mature form in the Carniolian context. Socio-economic, ideological and national elements coalesced. Slovenes gained control in the provincial diet and from 1883 until the collapse of monarchy the political scene was dominated by two parties: the clerical-conservative Slovene People's Party and the liberal Progressives. They both stood for Trialism,[80] the former with their motto »all for religion, home and the Emperor«[81] with

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[77] Velikonja, *op.cit.* 250.

[78] Lampe, John R. 1994: The failure of the Yugoslav national idea. *Studies in East European Thought*, 46, 1-2: 69-89. p. 74; Anderson, *op.cit.* 191-195.

[79] Between 1829-35 dr. Ljudevit Gaj, publisher and editor of »Danica ilirska« worked out the orthographic reform of the Croatian language, based on widely used sstokavski dialect. He pleaded for the right to use Croatian, since the official start to the transition from Latin to Madyar across all of the Hungarian crown lands was introduced in 1827. In Serbia which in the meantime gained considerable autonomy from its titular Ottoman rulers, Vuk Karadžić also worked on reforming štokavski dialect and distrusted Illyrian movement. Gaj's Illyrism enetually became associated with Count Draškovic's program for Illyrian political union (1832) which would have included most Slovene territories. Vienna, unclear as to the nature of Croat South Slav national activities, felt politically pressed by these demands and feared the orientation towards Serbia. After 1843, the term Illyrian was officially forbidden. Adherents thereafter started to use the word »Yugoslav«, which at the time, according to Rogel, had primarily »ethnic« rather than political connotations. See Rogel, *op. cit.* 12. Illyrian idea was later essentially reinterpreted into two main trends. One may be called »Greater Croatia state right concept«, with its chief exponent Ante Starčevic, the other the »Yugoslav concept«. Yugoslavism, promoted by Bishop Ivan Juraj Strossmayer, and formulated as an ideological system by another Catholic priest and a historian, Franjo Rački, was the integrationist ideology of the Croatian nation, as well as a supranational concept. Relationship between the two components of this ideology was therefore unstable and also came into conflict with Serbia's national aspirations.

[80] The conversion of the dualistic Austro-Hungarian state into a trialistic entity, through the recognition of South Slavs as equal partners. The term was employed by the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, but his position in regard to it was vague. Among respective positions of Slovenes, Croats and those Serbs involved, views differed from person to person and over time.

[81] In Slovene »Vse za vero, dom, cesarja«. The daily »Slovenec« also carried this motto. Clericals and the clergy acted as a united body in Slovene politics, directing Slovene programme that was nationalistic, but strict in its Catholic orientation. Both could easily merge with the Austrian idea. For the priest Janez Evangelist Krek, who largely contributed to the Slovene Catholic thought, the nation was an extension of the family unit within which the essential God-given dignity of each human being was nurtured. He was inclined toward Christian Socialism: »National sentiment is a part of social feeling«. Quoted in Rogel, *op.cit.* 128.

more conviction. So did also, though later established and much weaker, the Social Democrats.[82]

Slovene Clericals developed a pro-Austrian Southern Slav national programme, to counter German and Russian threats, and had largely agreed that the best association was with Croats of the Empire. For some of them, particularly Janez Evangelist Krek, Germany symbolised liberalism, capitalism and its perversion of individualism. In his view, the centralised secular state advocated by German liberals had become a political goal of capitalism and would soon conclude that Trieste and the Adriatic coast was indispensable to the continued development of the German economy. On the other hand, to oppose Slovene liberals who had raised the issue of idealising »Mother Russia«, Krek saw the Russian church and the Russian imperial regime as having forced an inferior culture upon those Slavs who had become Orthodox. Clericals felt the clear solution was to extend the benefits of Western Catholicism with its superior culture and high degree of civilisation to the deprived Orthodox. Moreover, it was Austria's purpose and her mission to defend Western Christianity. That is, as they claimed, where the Austrian idea really evolved, binding together the Austrian peoples, including the Slovenes.[83]

Slovene Liberals who became more unified only in the 1890s, mainly because of Clerical opposition, had their political base in the middle class. Ljubljana mayors, Ivan Hribar and Ivan Tavčar, in the first decades of the twentieth century devoted much effort to modernise the town and to create the foundation of a Slovene middle-class capitalism, believing that only a thriving commercial class could make realistic political and national demands in a modern world. They opposed socialism, but got on quite well with the Slovene Clericals. Nurturing the ideal of a rational, secular, creative and free-thinking man, who expressed his freedom through literary efforts, most viewed German-ising as a violation of free expression. Their Slavism, however, was Russophile. The essential rationale of Slovene liberal Pan-Slavism was that in search of national identify Slovene Pan-Slavs had always taken pride in being members of a greater linguistic family. It was clear that Russian language achieved exceptional heights of creative expression and in following them small Slavic peoples could ensure their freedom from the bonds of German culture. What Liberals had in mind politically with regard to Slavic solidarity was never explicitly stated. In any case they could not find Liberal Croats with whom they could work, and had closer relations with Czechs. Still, on the eve of W.W.I they were calling for an Austro-Slav federation and for Austro-Russian friendship.[84]

Social democrats were not a monolithic party, but rather a forum in which those who could not or would not conform to liberal or conservative party allegiances could

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[82] The background to Carniolan political development is more complex than indicated above. Major internal dissension among Slovenes, between liberals and clerical conservatives however occurred at the noted point. In Carinthia and Trieste the Slovenes managed to avoid major internal split because they had to consider the overwhelming strength of the opposing nations. Consult on this, among others: Gestrin, Ferdo and Melik, Vasilij 1966: *Slovenska zgodovina od konca osemnajstega stoletja do 1918.* Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije, pp. 259-269; Zwitter, Fran 1964: Slovenski politični preporod XIX stoletja v okviru evropske nacionalne problematike. *Zgodovinski časopis,* 18: 75-153; Arnez, John A. 1958: *Slovenia in European Affairs; Reflections on Slovenian Political History.* New York: Studia Slovenica; Rogel, *op.cit.*

[83] For more detail see Rogel, *op. cit.* 28-39.

[84] *Ibid.* 40-50.

express their views. The national policy of the »Yugoslav social democratic party« as the party was called, was socialist. They were essentially Austro-Marxist, and the group of »Masarykites« endorsed the revisionism of Eduard Bernstien. For some nationalism was synonymous with the Slovene class struggle against the non-Slovene oppressor. The Brno Congress of the Austrian party in 1899 favoured preserving the Empire, as federalism based on »national« units. Etbin Kristan, however, offered an alternative, proposing that party should work toward a two-level federalisation, one administrative, the other national, relating to cultural matters. The latter involved the »principle of personality« which has since been widely associated with Renner. In 1907 Henrik Tuma advocated expansionist »Yugoslavism« and viewed economic and geographical realities as sufficient reasons for the Austro-Balkan unit. In the controversial 1909 Tivoli resolution Kristan, however, called for the »complete« national unification of Yugoslavs.[85]

In spite of these programmes, South-Slavism in the Serbian sense as well as Panslavism were not major forces among Slovenes and should not be given undue emphasis. Even the revived debate on cultural Yugoslavism did not achieve any real accord. The Slovenes were captured for the Yugoslav idea only by the sweep of events of the first World War, and the *Preporod* group of young students and Slovene writer Ivan Cankar were alone to advocate a formation of an independent Yugoslav state. However Cankar believed that the Southern Slavs should regard each nation and its respective culture as being equal. Only on this basis could the Yugoslav idea fulfil itself. [86]

In 1917 Slovenes were among those who called for a federal reorganisation of the Habsburg monarchy. A club of Slovene, Istrian and Dalmatian delegates, led by the Slovene cleric Anton Korošec in the Viennese parliament, presented the »May Declaration« which called for a self-governing state, comprising all South Slavic regions of the empire, based on the principle of nationality, yet remaining under the Habsburgs. Croatian groups in Hungary acceded to the Manifesto. Out of desperation the Vienna government finally worked up the reconstitution of the Empire on an autonomous federal basis, indeed exactly what the perspicacious had advocated back in 1848. But the »Austrian solution« was already hopeless. The South Slavs of the empire proclaimed independence of the state of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. At the same time Italy was already occupying land assigned to it as a war reward by the secret Treaty of London. Feeling threatened and being internationally unrecognised, the self-proclaimed state, almost in panic, asked for Serbian military assistance.

In the unfolding of events following the painful birth of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS), the Slovenes were distributed among four different »nation-states«.[87] The 1921 constitution of the Kingdom of SHS split the Slovene lands into two administrative units, further hindering the attempts at integration, while the 1931 constitution of Yugoslavia recognised the Slovene entity in Dravska banovina. However, at the same time the drive for total Yugoslav integration became the guiding principle of

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[85] *Ibid.* 51-62.

[86] *Ibid.* 102-117.

[87] 1. The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was recognised on the presumption that they constituted a single nation of three names. In the light of the time they were called a »race of three tribes«. Consequently, in 1929 Kingdom was renamed to Yugoslavia. 2. Northern Carinthia was acquired by Austria in one of the 1920 »classical« plebiscites. 3. Around 350,000 or a quarter of then Slovene population lived on lands given to Italy as a war reward by the secret London agreement (1915), confirmed by Rapallo Treaty (1920), resulting in exodus of Slovenes in the inter-war period. 4. Some Slovenes remained in Hungary.

»homogeneous« Yugoslavia, Only »national« political parties were recognised and existence and activities of provincial institutions were weakened. Nevertheless, the internal consolidation of Slovenes continued, though the links with Slovenes in neighbouring states were weakened. The Yugoslav authorities had little interest in »co-nationals« abroad, while at the same time regimes in Austria and Italy towards national minorities were restrictive and assimilationist.[88]

In summary, for centuries the existing mosaic pattern of small entities derived from the short distance interaction of territorial and social behaviour, slowly gave way in the nineteenth century to a larger interactive system, based on the transformation of the communication system and the beginnings of the capitalist economy. The geography of spatial integration, and the economic, social and cultural connections made the expansion of identity from local to regional and to national Slovene possible, but did not succeed in generating a »Yugoslav« identity. Literary figures, initially influenced by imported ideas, played a prominent role as creators, planners and, together with teachers and priests, as disseminators of the Slovene literary language and promoters of the »discovery« of the national homeland. Successive political attempts failed to bring into reality the aspiration for Slovenia, which remained unrecognisable on the political map or in the administrative vocabulary until 1945. Through all the years of detriment, culture provided Slovenes with some form of continuity of the cartography of national identity.

After 1945 most Slovenes were united into a pseudo-statehood in the form of the socialist republic of Slovenia in the Yugoslav federation.[89] Communist power and peace was posed at a very high price and left Slovenes ideologically divided with autonomy under the communist regime being severely restricted.[90]

This vacuum resulted in a hunger for culture and its insignia in language and literature, art and architecture, shaping further action and fantasy and thereby seeking a substitute for political unity. Disillusioned, occasionally giving up hope of their own political nation, and even doubting in themselves and their own homeland, culture remained the driving power in the Slovenes' quest for self-realisation, and indeed was a substitute for the lack of political independence.

2. The paradox of the modern nation

The nature of the modern nation is a paradox. On the one hand, the nation designates modern community delivered from the traditional »organic« ties, a community in which the pre-modern links tying down the individual to a particular estate, family or religious group are broken. The traditional corporate community is replaced by the modern nation-state whose constituents are citizens: people as abstract individuals. This state, »a legal and political organisation with the power to require obedience and loyalty

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[88] Velikonja, *op.cit.* 251.

[90] The mass westward flight of various military groupings and civilians occured in the course of April and May 1945. Some were repatriated to Yugoslavia, only to be massacred within hours of their arrival. An estimated 10,000 were Slovenes. Consult on this Tolstoy, Nikolai 1986: *The minister and the massacres.* London: Century Hutchinson.

from its citizens«.[91] is now to be superimposed over ties of blood, the familial, religious and regional authority. From this perspective the term »nation« means a purely political, rationalised and secularised arrangement with a system of liberties, rights and obligations as well as a type of authority. As such it is not a property of any particular group. Its democratic <u>aims</u> set at horizons of *liberté, égalité et fraternité* are indeed grounded in universalism and humanism. Nevertheless, in the self-understanding of the nineteenth-century democracies, democracy and nation-state became viewed as nearly identical entities. In other words, democracy could not but be interpreted as the political arrangement of a particular »nation«, or rather, in accordance with its Greek heritage, »demos« was identified with »ethnos«.[92]

On the other hand the nation concept can never be reduced to a network of purely symbolic identifications with rituals and emblems like flags and anthems. There is always a kind of »surplus of real« that sticks to it. To define itself, national identity must appeal to the materiality of »common roots« and of »blood and soil«. The Canadian case of »the roots of the future« may be very illustrative. For even an immigration country like Canada, constituted by a consensus among civil servants, has been recognising that the concept of citizenship as the binding force of the world's first multiculturalism legislation, passed in the late 1980s, does not suffice for a »poetic national soul«.[93] As Dominique Schnapper has aptly expressed it in another context, »Sovereignty and citizenship are fictions«.[94] Citizenship, a matter of obligations and reciprocal benefits, demands solidarity.[95] It also implies general suffrage, thus defining *demos,* and conscription, which demands an emotional attachment and loyalty to country, *la patrie.*[96] Therefore, »nation« can be seen as a premodern »leftover« which functions as an inner condition of modernity. However, the most important form into which »organic inventory« aspires to transform itself within the modern, post-traditional universe of the substanceless Cartesian subjectivity, in order to give a nation at the same time a formalised, legalistic account and a feel of mystical blessing is culture. As indicated by Gellner culture is »an elusive concept....deliberately left undefined.«[97]

The crucial point is to conceive both aspects in their interconnection, in the junction of Nature and Culture to the point of the Lacanian notion of »suture«.[98] The modern nation, a European phenomenon, arrived when the empires declined. Unlike the King

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[91]Seton-Watson, *op. cit.* 1.

[92]Cf. Medved, Felicita 1993: Swedish Multiculturalism: the Case of Slovene Immigrant Organizations. *Geographica Slovenica 24*: 93-104. Ljubljana: Institute of Geography of the University of Ljubljana.

[93] Medved, Felicita 1993: Québec, un détail majeur, in *Gerum* 19, 129-169. Umeå: Umeå University. Department of Geography. p.135; and Medved, Felicita 1995: *Québec, »la nation« within grasping distance of its »destiny«?* Paper presented at the Centre for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Relations Research Seminar. Stockholm University.

[94]Schnapper, Dominique: *The Idea of Nation.* Paper at the conference »Etnicitet och Social mobilisering«. Umeå, 25-26 November 1994. Unpaginated.

[95]On citizenship see for example: Hammar, Tomas 1990: *Democracy and the Nation State.* Research in Ethnic Relations Series. Avenbury; Brubaker, Rogers (ed.) 1989: *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America.* New York: University Press of America and Marshall Fund of the United States; Brubaker, Rogers 1992: *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany.* Cambridge, MA; London, England: Harvard University Press.

[96]The concept of *patria* as identified with political-territorial loyalty has its own distinctive history that will not be traced here. Still, contemporary nationalism weighs heavily upon the meaning of patriotism.

[97] Gellner, *op. cit.* 43.

[98] Cf. Žižek, *op. cit.*

with whom the cultural-symbolic function immediately coincides with a natural deter-
mination, making all other subjects lose their roots in some preordained organic social
body, a nation must, so to speak, create itself. This is what I believe/experience na-
tionalism to be about.

The cosa nostra syndrome

Contemporary academic discussions of nationalism have mostly treated it as a force
in the modernisation and development of a political society to fit it into the progressive
conception of historical evolution, in order to demonstrate that it is transitional or non-
essential. The proponents of the modernist school see nations and nationalism as off-
shoots of modernity. They depart from economic bases of society and often view eth-
nicity as fundamentally instrumental. More social and sociobiological approaches claim
that nations and nationalisms are perennial or primordial. »Perennialists« point to the
antiquity of collective cultural ties and sentiments, whereas proponents of primordial-
ism see nations and ethnic communities as natural units of history, in its sociobiological
version genetically determined through what van der Berghe has called »kin selection«
and »inclusive fitness«. This latter version can be paralleled with the so called
»territorial imperative«, still another approach to the study of nationalism proposed by
Robert Ardrey which sees »patriotism« not as something taught but as biologically
innate.[99]

Most frequently different adjectives and prefixes of nationalisms, nationalists as
well as nations are categorised in series of dual oppositions like for example state/ terri-
torial/ rational /civic versus cultural/ ethnic/ organic/authoritarian to name but a few.
There is a tendency to see the twin routes, *à la francaise* and *Gründlichkeit*, to the for-
mation of modern nations as to produce two ideals of the nation.[100] This is a restrictive
reading of the modern nation; which deducts from the legitimising principles of na-
tionalism as territory/democracy or history/ethnicity and agents who acted as an *ersatz*
deity. In this context it is hardly relevant who has been the educator/manipulator of the
cultural change towards its standardisation and patriotism; the bureaucratic, centralising,
»rational« state or the more utopian new priesthood of some Romantic intellectuals, or
for that matter the »new bourgeoisie« of the »post-modern/Cold War« era, in order to
bring state-to-nation or nation-to-state. What is crucial however is that political future
as opposed to cultural past, modernism as opposed to historicism, territorial as opposed
to ethnic, both build on the *cosa nostra* syndrome of *historic national territory* and
national culture.

Williams and Smith propose that nationalism may be viewed as the dominant mode
of politicising space by treating it as a distinctive and historic territory.[101] Simultane-

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ously, however, nationalism is a politicisation of culture by treating it as a distinctive culture, holding it at the most (re)productive position, materially to set the boundaries of national cultural geography, and »spiritually« through bounding, not as much the »biological«, as the gaining, preserving and constantly reformulating higher symbolic orders of sharpening collective identity, preserving it from threats of »the others.«

The first type takes *a priori* territory of the state as its basis, with a jurisdiction also strictly bound as a basis of inclusion/exclusion of community of citizens. But the Republic inherited the territorial unit of a cultural jigsaw. For the purpose of achieving cultural homogeneity and national unity - which is perceived as the expression of a general will - the state-nation becomes a mass education and construction enterprise never ceasing to incorporate groups and territories within the borders of the state that are considered by themselves, or by those who claim to speak for them, to belong to the nation.[102] However, the more abstractly the concept of state-nation is presented, the less one notices discrepancies between theory and practice. For example, if one assimilates certain ideas one is French - the citizen, is an abstract approach to being and feeling which are something concrete. It is invention imposed upon the »real«,[103] Therefore the newly arrived immigrants, integrated into a community of theoretically equal cannot be a part of *pays réel* as they do not share the same meanings, values, myths and symbols as the majority of citizenry. Even the assimilated, in an hour of national humiliation or political hysteria, can easily be declared and treated as hidden and potentially dangerous aliens. For indeed the Greek model of democracy and of *polis* was quite imperfect. It comprised the notion of barbarian. As declared by Hegel in 1821, »the civilised nation is conscious that the rights of barbarians are unequal to his own and treats their autonomy as only a formality.«[104] The multicultural cityscapes of the post-modern era are celebrated in the from of newly-arrived spices or even occasionally through appreciated »primitive« handicrafts, degrading them to mere superficialities for the benefit of making »our« places more loveable to live in and for the sake of the nation's dominant »ethnos« pleasant »intensities«.[105] The image of the Stockholm metropolitan symbol of the Globe for example, the architectural dream come true, to become a mosque, however is the physical materialisation of the cultural influx, therein often perceived, to paraphrase Petöfi, as an ulcer on the body of the homeland. Metaphorically speaking, the principle of *ius soli*, based in the principle of fraternity and its perceived condition, has in so far failed to surmount the myth of *ius sanguinis*.

However it is exactly what the West has made so much its own affair, or even property: territoriality, citizenship, legal codes and even political culture, the western na-

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[102] Cf. Seton-Watson *op.cit.* 3 and Medved, 1992: Novi regionalizem in evropska integracija. *Znanje za razvoj.* Ljubljana: Delo. February, 1992. Seton-Watson when referring to nationalism as organised political movement depicts two generally sought aims of such movements; the independence and national unity. The former is »the creation of a sovereign state in which is the nation is dominant,« the latter the incorporation within the frontiers of this state of all groups which are considered by themselves, or by those who claim to speak for them, to belong to the nation. I extend the argument to territories, if a territory is defined as an area over which persons or institutions exercise some degree of explicit control.

[103] Cf. Weber, Eugen *op.cit.*, especially 95-114.

[104] Hegel 1821, cited by Birch *op. cit.* 29.

[105] »Intensities« are a whole new ground of emotional ground tone, which can best be grasped by a return to older theories of the sublime. Jameson, Fredric: Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. *New Left Review* 1984: 146: 53-92. p.58.

tionalism's ability to redefine the environment as a distinctly political territory, which, when diffused became an idea of other national formations. What remains true is that historical-geographical situations, the histories as *res gestae*, unlike myths, have indeed been different.[106] One could agree with Bell, that »what a nation remembers of itself.... is a major source of its political culture«.[107] To construct a »political culture«, the problem of achieving cultural and social integration, unity with a sense of cohesion and territorial roots to legitimate »homeland« as a set of borders, becomes an exercise of remembrance of a selected combination of episodes of history, myths and symbols, immune to revision unless for immediate consumption. Even more so, when the strongly American held view, in itself not nationalistic, that people should be free to govern themselves, foreign rule being illegitimate through the principle of self determination, becomes a part of a »dream« ever since »the Inquiry« started to draw state borders out of maps and files of statistics on national groups« concentrations, and when practical problems occurred urged the individualistic device of a plebiscite or referendum. This, I agree with Pfaff, differenciates Central and Eastern European nationalisms from those in Western Europe as well as in other parts of the world. Since defining communities entitled to govern themselves has never been solved - for how indeed can one define *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*' [108] - when sociological, cultural or institutional concepts do not suffice, political practice seems to hold on a nation best defined as »a society which either governs itself, has done so in the past, or has a credible claim to do so in the not-too-distant future«.[109] For, as Hobsbawn argued, »the real »nation« can only be recognised *a posteriori*.«[110] Therefore it presupposes the existence of nations before they acquire political expression. This circularity implies the logic of fantasy which, as I shall argue on the case of the late twentieth-century Slovene nationalism, ties together the temporal and spatial »auto-poetic« logic of the Nation.

The nexus of space-time-being

Modernisation as with all social processes arises primarily from the historical and geographical dynamics of modes of production, unevenly developed across different regional social formations, inscribing different historical geographies. It is a continuous process of societal restructuring that is periodically accelerated to produce a significant recomposition of the ontological nexus of space-time-being in their concrete forms. Berman has described this change in the nature of modernity, as a mode of vital experience...of space and time, of the self and others, of life's possibilities and perils - that is shared by men and women all over the world...[111] From the turbulent period between

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[106] On history as *res gestae, rerum gestarum* and other meanings, see for example Gerner, Kristian 1994: Stat och etnicitet i europeisk tradition. *Invandrare &Minoriteter* 5-6: 21-28, p. 22.
[107] Bell, D.V.J. 1992: *The Roots of Disunity*. A study of Canadian Political Culture. Toronto: Oxford University Press. p. 5.
[108] A famous phrase of Ernest Renan's 1882 lecture. See reprint in Hutchinson, John and Smith, Antony D. (eds.) *op. cit.* 17-18.
[109] Birch *op. cit.* 6.
[110] Hobsbawm *op.cit.* 9.
[111] Berman, Marshall 1982: *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air*. The Experience of Modernity. New York: Penguin Books. p.15.

1830 and 1850 which Hobsbawm termed the age of revolution, until the present times, the spatio-temporal rhythm of modernisation has undergone three or even four identified synchronic crises affecting almost all societies simultaneously. In each of these, restructuring of the ways of seeing and of interpreting space and time in economic, political and cultural life has occurred, resulting in crucial rewriting of the world political landscape. Taking us towards the approaching *fin de siècle*, the international system is again in a search of a »new world order« and there is competition between the logic of economics or, as Jameson declared, the cultural logic of late capitalism, entailing globalisation, interdependence and regional integration and that of politics in which the present reality of fragmentation seems to be getting the upper hand.[112]

The reconstruction of national identities in the epoch of simultaneity and juxtaposition, as Foucault calls it, re-emerges out of complexities, paradoxes and uncertainties. The ways in which people seek to find some security and permanence in what Harvey has coined the »time-space compression« of modern social life, locked in the kaleidoscope of global and local, the universal and particular, space and place is, once again often destructive, return to the place-bound sense of geopolitics and destiny, essentially captured in the philosophy of Being, suffused with spatial memory, over the transitoriness of Becoming. When the past equilibrium of the Cold War is no longer valid and the »new world order« is an utopian dream, it is difficult to grasp a world where, as Marx once said and Berman so vividly described, »all that is solid melts into air«. It appears to be only »us-here-now« capable of transforming the disorientation and disintegration. Still and all, in the midst of the void of values the perception of »us-here-now« is just like the object called »space-time« in the universe we look at. In the past and the future light cones it is seen as it was in the past.[113]

The auto-poetic logic of the Slovene nation

The Slovene nationalism revives as a response to the particularities of contemporary political-economic and cultural processes, filling a similar socio-psychological need as in the romantic period, accompanied by aestheticization of politics. In the latter appeal to mythology and ritual has a strong role to play. The structure of the myth corresponds to the voyage into the past where the nation is already present at its own conception. In nationalist ideology,[114] as Žižek observed, the fantasy construct is a way for the subject to fill out the »missing link« of its genesis, by enabling it to retreat into the past and

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[112] On long waves of capitalist and regional development, periodicity and spatialisation see for example: Jameson, *op.cit.* 78. Mandel, Ernest 1980: *Long waves of capitalist development.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Marshall, Michael 1987: *Long Waves of Regional Development.* London: Macmillan. Soja, Edward W. 1989: *Postmodern Geographies.* The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory. London, New York: Verso, especially Chapter 1. Harvey, D.1989: *The Condition of Postmodernity.* Oxford: Basil & Blackwell

[113] The comparison of space and time in physics and geography is, in my view, stimulating. A popular text on space and time in theoretical physics can be found in Hawking, Stephen W. 1988: *A Brief History Of Time.* London: Bantam Books. Chapter 2.

[114] Hugh Seton-Watson doubts whether nationalism deserves to be called an ideology. William Pfaff claims that nationalism is not an ideology, however, he makes an important point claiming that nationalism occupies the moral and emotional ground otherwise held by political ideology. Seton-Watson op. cit. 445; Pfaff, *op. cit.* 14.

appear as its own cause. The past is »trans-coded« as Nation, »an imagined political community« that already existed and to which we are supposed to return through a liberation struggle. Furthermore, in this »auto-poetic« system, the synchronous symbolic order fills the void of nation«s »origins« by means of narration.[115]

Through nationalist »geography of representations«[116] layers of accumulated experiences, memories, myths and thoughts constituting the sophisticated strata of national (sub)consciousness are submitted to a profound revisioning as *Memoria*, a process of fantasy making. The collapse of dual distinction of fact and fiction, of history and myth, reality and symbolism provided nationalism not only to achieve collective consciousness and internal solidarity of the national population, but as well, as I have tried to outline earlier, to make sense to the outside »international« community.

In the process of auto-emancipation from a »spiritual homelessness«, which the failure of the building of the communist project left behind, as Rein Ruutsso[117] has recently argued in an Estonian context, the historical dimension of identity serves as an orientational element of the new self-construction of individual, regional and national-collectivistic identity. It gives practical life a temporal and spatial frame and matrix, a conception of space in the course of time.

Literature on nation-building and nationalism has highlighted that traditions related to national cultures are recent in origin, »invented« in the period of intense nation-building and often associated with particular geographical locations. These places frequently take on a mythical value for the national population and acquire hegemonic status and image as heartlands of a collective cultural consciousness.[118]

Slovenes had never governed themselves independently but were, save for a short period, in the medieval rudimentary state of Carantania. As a precedent of a political tradition, the legal character of the principality of Carantania was invoked, proof of which was supposedly furnished by the ceremony of the ducal installation.[119] Basing themselves on a selection of modern historical research, Slovene patriots and propa-

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[115] Dieter Hombach detects outlines of the same so-called »auto-poetic« logic in contemporary systems theory, a symbolic structure organised around the »missing link« as point of its inherent limit. The main effort in formalising the »auto-poetic« systems is to transform their starting initial conditions by means of retroactive »trans-coding.« See Hombach, Dieter 1990: *Die Drift der Erkenntnis*. München: Raben Verlag and cf. Zzizzek, *op.cit.*

[116] I use here the term »geography of representations« as widely used in francophone social science. The concept owes much to Piaget and refers to the manner in which human beings presently perceive something based upon an accumulated set of experiences and memories; and represent, imagine and value this phenomenon in verbal, written, mental or graphical form. Harvey inspired by Lefebvre, captures the history of conceptions of space and time in a three-dimensional »grid« of spatial practices: material spatial practices, representations of space and spaces of representation, characterised as the experienced, the perceived and the imagined. See for example Bailly, Antoine S. 1993: Spatial Imaginary and Geography: A Plea for the Geography of Representations. *GeoJournal* 31 3: 247-250 and Harvey, *op. cit.* Chapter 13.

[117] Ruutsoo, Rein 1995: The perception of historical identity and the restoration of Estonian national independence. *Nationalities Papers*, 23, 1: 167-179. p. 167.

[118] Smith, *op.cit.*; Anderson, *op.cit.* ; Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T.(eds.) 1983: *The invention of tradition*. Cambridge; Johnson, Nuala C 1993: Building a nation: an examination of the Irish Gaeltacht Commission Report of 1926. *Journal of Historical Geography*, 19, 2: 157-168.

[119] A short review and a list of main works on the history of medieval Carantania to that date can be found in Barker, *op.cit.* See also Wolfram, Herwig 1991: Karantanija med vzhodom in zahodom (Caranthania between the East and the West. Avars, Bavarians and Lombards in the 8th and 9th Century). *Zgodovinski ccasopis* 45: 2: 177-187.

gandists of the first decades of the twentieth century reinforced the popular memory of Carantania, creating a national shrine for its people. One of the claims to Carinthia, both in 1918 and again in 1945, was justified on the constitutional character of Carantania, in its core on the »holy ground« of the Celovec/Klagenfurt basin. The government of Yugoslavia stated that:

»The first Slovene state - Carantania - was situated on this territory. Slovene Carinthia was the center of this state, to which the rich traditions of the Slovene people are bound; it was in the Middle Ages the cradle of the Slovene state independence and of the Slovene people.«[120]

In the second half of the 1980s during the struggle towards the independence and international recognition of Slovenia in 1991, the necessary resource for the elaboration of a democratisation programme was found most quickly by turning to the past. However, strategy and tactics employed did not make claim to the »cradle of the Nation«, but emphasised the democratic tradition of Carantania as the state of the Slovenes. The formulated »democratic« historical identity has become a resource to mobilise history in the endeavour of society as an entity of material, mental and social structures reacting against what has been perceived to be imposed »non-historical«, »non-authentic« economic, social and cultural deformation. »We«, the Slovenes not only had an independent state of our own, »the first Slav state«, but a democratic state as proven by the procedure of ducal installation, a tradition which substantially contributed to the development of Western parliamentary democracy. Therefore, it is natural that after a millennium of oppression and lost freedom we have to liberate ourselves, revive democracy and restore independence. Mobilised citizenry stimulated by this dimension of identity on a collision course with contemporary reality of Yugoslavia expressed itself in »new awakening« and self-determination. It also rather identified with the West as opposed to the non-democratic and authoritarian Balkans. In the popular sense there was nothing »nationalistic« about breaking away from something that was anyway dying, even less so when it became clear that this was only possible through national statehood. Furthermore, in a process more than century old the 1990 referendum in support of independence and the declaration of sovereignty of Slovenia in 1991 were understood as concluding acts by which the Slovene nation achieved its internal self-assertion. To aid recognition within »the family of nations«, however, comprehension, interpretation and mediation of the medieval democratic state with skilful diplomatic offensive in a political atmosphere promoting democracy and market economy in Eastern and Central Europe, made sense to the international community's demands in the framework of tautological circularity enabling them to grasp the inevitable present of a small »non-historic« peoples.

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[120] As quoted in Barker, *op.cit.* 206, from the Memorandum of the Government of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia on Slovene Carinthia, the Slovene Frontier Areas of Styria and the Croats of Burgenland.

Jugoslavenstvo à la brotherhood and unity

The complexity and failure of the »brotherhood and unity« Yugoslav modernist project launched by the communist system after W.W.II have been extensively debated recently. I shall outline just some of the important perspectives.

Nation-building in this area developed out of the weaknesses of two empires, the Habsburg and the Ottoman, and the increasingly active presence of great European powers further complicated situation. The whole region entered the game of nation-states at the stage when state apparatuses had become greatly extended, and the need for an »imagined community« communicative framework that could become a source of taxes, soldiers, and legitimation correspondingly increased. Separate nationalisms as Serbian, Croatian, Slovene and »Yugoslav« were therefore all essentially unitary. Because they came late more emphasis was placed on cultural-ethnic homogeneity, reaching its extreme in World War II and the civil war (1941-1945), and in the 1990s.

The essential requirement for the first state bearing the name Yugoslavia to survive, as indeed also for the second, was some form of political agreement between Croats and Serbs. The collapse of such an agreement, in spite of the 1939 *Sporazum* that afforded Croatia an internal autonomy, creating a confederal island in the middle of a centralised regime, set no federal precedent for the second Yugoslavia.[121]

The Communists claimed to represent all nationalities rather than simply defend one group. The first of four constitutions (1948, 1953, 1963 and 1974) set down a federal framework, seeking to reconcile two competing principles, the ethnic with the civic, but filled it with the unitary substance of party power and presumed fading of national differences. It acknowledged »four equalities«, of individual citizens under law, of six republics, and five South Slav nations, with Bosnian Muslims identified as a separate group.[122] Federalism, however, is not a political ideology, but a way of sharing political power among different peoples within a state. It is a belief that different peoples do not need states of their own to enjoy self-determination and that people who share geography, economic space and some history may agree to share a single state, while retaining substantial degrees of self-government over matters essential to their identity as peoples. Communist leaders did not provide implementation of equalities proclaimed because they were confident that their Yugoslav national idea, *jugoslovenstvo* of brotherhood and unity, would make balancing arrangements unnecessary. Lampe claims that federation was not the Yugoslav national idea until the 1960s. It was instead an idea that a single Yugoslav nationality supposedly already existed and could be called forth to support a viable nation-state.[123] Still in 1988, the Military Council, an advisory body to the Minister of Defence, made a statement that Yugoslavia is »a *unitary* federal country.«[124]

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[121] Cf. Lampe, *op.cit.* 80-83.

[122] The fourth was the presumption of equal contribution to the Partisan war effort by all the nations. Bosnian Muslims were recognised as a nation in 1971 census. Hungarians, Albanians or Italians and others who had a »mother country« in an another state were categorised as *narodnosti* - nationalities. Other groups as »other ethnic groups«. See for example Yugoslav ethnic censuses.

[123] Lampe, *op.cit.*

[124] Magass, Branka: *The Destruction of Yugoslavia*. London, New York: Verso. p.143. Emphasis original.

The Yugoslavism was based not only on the principle of proletarian international-ism, but also on experiences from W.W.II. One was that the Nazi machine was defeated, the other was to discredit all narrow ethnic nationalisms. Communists were the winners of the civil war, workers and peasants together struggling against bourgeois nationalists supported by reactionary religious elements. The assumption was that both national and religious identities would cease to be significant in a socialist society.

The revision of the constitution in 1953, after the break with Soviet Union provided some decentralisation and weakening of the centrally planned economy thereby placing more economic power and control of the media and education in the hands of republics and local party leaders. At the same time it charted a non-Soviet course, subsequently known under the name of Titoism: self-management in domestic economy and non-alignment in foreign affairs. The 1964 constitution proclaimed self-management as devolution of power from central planners to the factory floor, and presupposed the »withering away of the state.« The mid-1960s liberal reform had severe consequences because of structural changes. Yugoslavia opened the door to labour emigration but also to tourism. The distribution of economic resources and investment funds became a daily debate in party circles and among the people. Slovenia and Croatia claimed they received fewer foreign currencies than they generated, which escalated into the 1971 revolt. The 1974 constitution ratified liberum veto for all republics and both autonomous provinces. The national bank and army remained the only federal institutions.

Tito's death in 1980 coincided with the rising economic crisis. The Party had to find a new internal balance after the departure of its charismatic president, but its leadership proved weak and divided in response to the first waves of economic troubles and to the accumulation of national, economic and social frustrations that exploded in Kosovo in the spring of 1981. At the same time the initially hidden scope of the economic problems and of foreign debt was made public. Roots of the economic problem were structural. Extractive industry along with other infrastructure investments such as agriculture, transport, energy and health were systematically neglected, while processing industry mostly financed by foreign loans depended on imported raw materials and technology. In an attempt to deal with the economic crisis, Yugoslavia became entangled between the demands of the International Monetary Fund and socialism.[125] The decline of living standards was drastic, the number of strikes doubled every year throughout the 1980s. Divergence between the Communist Party and the workers and severe strain on the political cohesion of the country's economic policies produced powerful tendencies toward regional fragmentation, putting a question mark over Yugoslavia's very existence. The politics of national chauvinism, especially in Serbia and Macedonia, was often systematically fanned by party and state functionaries. In a set of increasingly open struggles for the political control of constituent parts, Milošević became the undisputed leader of Serbia in 1987, while in 1988, Slovenia escaped what looked like a military coup. The crushing of the Kosovo demonstrations following a hunger strike by

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[125] The party managed to cobble together the so-called Long-Term Programme of Economic Stabilisation and Development, the first in a series of a kind of compromises how to deal with the economic crisis. The crude monetarism of the IMF terms meant nothing but further trouble for Yugoslav economy, and termination of the self-management. For more detail see among others Magass, *op.cit.*; Bartlett, Will 1992: Foreign Trade and Stabilization Policy in a Self-Managed Economy: Yugoslavia in the 1980s, in *Yugoslavia in Transition. Choices and Constraints* edited by John B. Allcock, John J. Horton and Marko Milivojević. 328-263. New York, Oxford: Berg.

a thousand miners in February 1989 and the termination of regional autonomies were so crude that any prospect of reconciliation with other republics on Serbia's terms was discredited.[126]

Slovenia, my country

According to Edvard Kardelj, the principal theoretician/ideologue of Yugoslav Communism, the Slovene nation would - in line with Marxist interpretation of history - eventually be internationally integrated in the new world order of communism. In spite of this interpretation which became the principal teaching of post war era, and in spite of the fact that Slovenes were quite successfully integrated into the Yugoslav political system, »class consciousness« which was supposed to surpass national affiliation as well as any territorial attachments never succeeded in taking firm hold among Slovenes. Society was polarised into Communists and a more silent majority of »negative identification« with the system. Degrees of identification with different levels of space-related identities always existed in the minds and attitudes of individuals, conditioned by life experiences and aspirations. Nevertheless, culture and partly religion remained forms of social symbolisation of the »we«-feeling identity. Besides, the creation of a Slovene national identity has always taken place within the context of larger political units. It had already been a historical tradition and strategy of Slovenes »to render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's« while through the medium of a distinctive language to create sub-state level institutions to stand between the state and individual. Their precise form has varied over time, from a parish identity in the nineteenth century to peace movements in the 1980s, but they have always acted as the focus of common action and identity. It is precisely this political culture that made Slovene nationalism no less faint than others in the post-war Yugoslavia, but one that took a very specific form.[127] Identification of Slovenes with Yugoslavia was an export commodity rather than anything else.

Slovenia had an advantage of being socially and economically more developed than other parts of Yugoslavia, partly due to its geographic position. With the so-called quaternary, if not tertiary, sector of economy developing relatively well, and gradual media and advertising liberalisation, new class fractions expanded, contributing to the growth of the »new bourgeoisie«. This acquisition of the means for consumption, saw the rise of a flexible economy in the neighbouring western and central European regions, with the outstanding example of the »united colors« of Benetton marketing niche, reminding them of particular qualities of Slovenia. Slovenes became aware they could have a different agenda concerning economic policy, in which individual and private entrepreneurship establishing small and medium-size companies would be more flexible than

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[126] The federal paramilitary police that moved into Kosovo, without Slovenes who were in support of miners, used tear gas and automatic weapons. Belgrade, after the crush of demonstration throughout Kosovo, celebrated the new republican constitution with street music, fanfares and free refreshments, and Yugoslavia's new prime minister Ante Marković congratulated Milošević. In Kosovo, no public funerals and mourning were allowed. No one was held responsible for shootings. Yugoslavia was fast becoming as perceived in Slovenia a lawless and barbarous country.

[127] See also Allcock, John B. 1992: Rethorics of Nationalism in Yugoslav Politics, in Allcock, John B. Horton, John J. and Milivojević, Marko (eds.) *op.cit.* 276-296. pp. 287ff.

large socialist enterprises. With increasing economic, political and social instability in Yugoslavia coupled with stronger tendencies towards centralisation and reduction of national rights, this fact became strongly emphasised by the emerging »new« generation of political and professional élites, who acquired experience of the working the system and learned how to exercise power. They assessed the social and political context in which economic development without sacrificing cultural specificity could be achieved, by generating the nationalist movement in the direction of integrating social and economical struggle with the nationalist aims. In 1988, the Slovene party leader Milan Kučan advocated a reform from above, in the direction of greater political pluralism and »mixed economy«. In his view »Yugoslavia that was not socialist and democratic was not possible.[128]

In the shaping of a new, effective and positive identity, the reconciliation among Slovenes for national unity and co-ordinated activity to reach a consensus on goals and ways of achieving them proceeded as opportunities arose. In an interplay of desires for solid social values to live by and roots in a stable and coherent socio-spatial past, at the same time embracing abundant possibilities of modern life, of economic, social and personal growth, the élites could achieve a coalition of different groups, seeking a firm »identity« in the globalisation of everyday life that »spreads all our identities all over the map«[129] by appealing to allegiance to the »national conscience« and to the »homeland«. With emphasis on prestige and image, the forces of culture as both explanations and loci of active struggle turned to aesteticisation of politics, both persons as places.

It was particularly the academic élite, gathered around the literary journal *Nova revija* some of whose arguments resembled those of the nineteenth century, and the youth journals *Mladina* and *Katedra* that became involved in the debates surrounding definitions of Slovene identity, statehood and its future. Although democracy, civil society and market economy were their main arguments, they ensured that defence of the Slovene language as the cornerstone of the education system against the erosion through Yugoslavisation came high on the political agenda.

Moreover, the defence of the charismatic mother tongue once again became a matter of honour and political prestige, especially at the 1988 military court trial in Ljubljana. The Slovene Four, three *Mladina* journalists and a pacifist sergeant of the Yugoslav People's Army, accused for handling a secret military document, insisted on using Slovene as opposed to Serbo-Croat. The latter was the only communication language in the Yugoslav military forces and was largely resented by Slovenes. Under this particular circumstance it became a symbol of political, that is national, oppression. The violation of the defendants right to be tried in their own language in the capital of Slovenia and before a military tribunal, against the express demand both of defendants and of all popular and official bodies was not just a unitarist provocation; it was understood as a

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[128] Delo, 5 November 1988. Reply to Janez Janša's open letter. In 1988, Slobodan Miloševic on the other hand clamoured for an authoritarian state in the language of populist nationalism, heavily relying on »enemies« - found in the Albanian population and on the editorial boards of student and youth journals. With the collapse of Federal Party authority and developments in Kosovo and Slovenia a third option to emerge could be military rule. Mr. Kučan became the fist and present president of the Republic of Slovenia.

[129] Bennan, Marshall *op. cit.* 35.

sign of things to come.[130] The Slovene language therefore became a symbol of liberty and human rights, cultural protest being formulated into political action for democracy and civil society. A spontaneous mass solidarity with the victims, the chief co-ordinator of this democratic movement being the then-established Committee for Protection of Human Rights, soon turned into a »people's trial« of the Army itself. This mass character of mobilisation can be explained by the conviction that the republic barely escaped a military coup. Rumours that the Army had planned widespread arrests of Slovene intellectuals and activists in the meantime proved to have a solid foundation. One of the four, Janez Janša with skilful aestetisation of his personality with the help of part of the media, made substantial political capital. Emerging as a »winner« on the political scene, he later become the first Slovenian Minister of Defence, largely responsible for the successful resistance against the Yugoslav army in June 1991.

The trial, which made clear the limits of the republican leadership's power and confirmed the Federal state's refusal to defend the constitutional status of the Slovene language, had a large significance for further political development. The episode of the trial became to be conceptualised in terms of the »militarisation of the Yugoslav state« and of the »civil society« of Slovenia. The use of the language emerged as a symbol of the nature of this structural conflict. The future of Slovene independence was thus seen to depend upon the integrity of republican institutions in terms of the concept of civil society. In 1989 Slovenia proclaimed a new constitution for eventual confederalism or secession, giving the republic legislative sovereignty. At the same time, the collapse of Communist regimes across Eastern and Central Europe removed the last rationale for even a socialist regime, followed by free elections. Lengthy negotiations within the federation failed to produce an acceptable compromise.

If socio-spatial dialectic is thought in terms of dynamics of culture and, in the potential connection between projects of space-shaping and advertising encouraging specific spatial practices, then these actions were among the most powerful processes in moulding people's consciousness of Slovenia, »our homeland« and the recreation of the sense of the *Kulturgemeinschaft Mitteleuropa*. For example, the extensive advertising campaign under the slogan *Slovenija, moja dežela*[131] started in the early 1980s. With clean, idealised »romantic« landscapes of countryside and kind, hard working people, this campaign came in the time of the environmentalist, »green« movement, clearly sending the message of a return to nature and unspoiled beauty. This country is to be »mine« because it is different from the rest of the state as »we« are different from »them«. Putting it like this, the »republican« identity is not exclusively ethnic but opened to widening and to an integration of identity by those who accept it. At the same time the »national« action for the financial support of the »Yugoslav ski-pool«, which consisted of Slovenes, was launched with tremendous success, strengthening national pride with successes on the world sport scene. The construction of the built environment, by revitalisation of old town cores as well as construstion of private

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[130] Of course, this was not the first time that such a violation occurred. The use of Serbo-Croat was quite common in trials of Kosovo Albanians who at the time formed around 80 per cent of political prisoners in Yugoslavia.

[131] »Slovenia, my country«. *Dežela* means both country and countryside. Note: In the spring of 1995 an advertising could be observed along the roads of Croatian Istria under the slogan *Neka moja Istra blista* - Let my Istria shine.

single houses, turned away from the modernist, the massive and the »socialist« to emphasising aesthetics, the historical and the vernacular in order to provide community-life outlook and the Central European atmosphere, not only as a matter of a status symbol but as a matter of national distinction.[132] Some parallels with Carl Schorske's *Fin-de-siécle Vienna* can certainly be drawn.[133]

Closing a Circle

Within a historical framework, centuries-long discrepancies between the layout of administrative territorial organisations and cultural content shaped the attitudes of Slovenes trying to assert their »loyalty« and with it their own identity. The self-creation of a Slovene national identity in a two-centuries long interwoven process of intellectual, social and political awakening embraced ideas of Enlightenment and dreams of Romanticism. In the process of affirmation through all turbulent periods of reinterpretation of space in national and political life, the »nationalised« strip of land of the nation state has not become the »ethnic area« of Unified Slovenia, but the territorial unit of the republic as defined in post-World War II Yugoslavia.

If one accepts Anderson's depiction of nationality or nation-ness as well as nationalism as »cultural artefacts that, once created... became »modular,« capable of being transplanted... to a variety of social terrains to merge and being merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations«[134] and also considers the three phases of Herder's »Pufendorf tradition«, then the Slovene discourse of the Nation acquires this significance by building itself and by the import of ideas and practices, both western as well as eastern, civic and cultural, and individualistic as well as collective. In this way nationalism closes the circle, with the Nation-state coming into being, but by this very closure introduces a supplementary one.[135]

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
[132] Needless to add, in the new state projects on the landscapes continue with large national and multinational investments in the traffic and telecommunication infrastructure.

[133] Schorske, Carl E. 1980: *Fin-de-siècle Vienna*. New York: A.A. Knopf.

[134] Anderson, *op. cit.* 4.

[135] Hobsbawm, drawing from Hroch's model, has argued that national movements achieved their success definitively as mass movements. However, as I have tried to argue here, it is inherent in the nature of the modern nation that the »definitive success« of nationalism transforms itself into what is sometimes referred to as the »inner eight«.

Povzetek

Korak k kartografiji slovenske narodne identitete

Članek je razdeljen na dva dela. Prvi išče korenine pomena koncepta modernega naroda, kot sta ga v ideološki superstrukturi artikulirali Francoska Revolucija in Srednjeevropska Romantika in skuša opisati stopnje transformacije geografskega in družbenega prostora v politično omejene teritorije kot oblike organizacijskega in vedenjskega fenomena. Kulturna in simbolična teritorialnost, ki je našla pomembno mesto s pojavom države, resnično »zacveti« šele z organizacijsko bazo družbe v formalno strukturirane in kruto branjene nacionalne države.

Drugi del članka izpostavlja paradoks modernega naroda kot političnega racionaliziranega in sekulariziranega aranžmaja abstraktnih državljanov, ki čeprav negira materialnost »organskega«, v fikciji suverenosti in državljanstva z eluzivnim konceptom kulture sloni prav na inventarju skupnih korenin, porekla in historičnega ozemlja. Zatorej sodobne teorije nacionalizma, ki kategorizirajo nacionalizme, nacionaliste in narode v nekakšne dvojne opozicije, bodisi da izhajajo iz modernistične šole in ekonomske baze družbe ali iz sociološke in socio-biološke, ponujajo le restriktivno branje naroda.

Članek zaključuje z mislijo, da se z ustanovitvijo države Slovenije, »definitivni uspeh« nacionalizma transformira v novi krog, neločljivo »vrojen« v koncept in prakso modernega naroda.