

Rado Riha**The Transcendental Subject and its Dawider**

Key words: Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, the Copernican turn, transcendental subject, void

The aim of this essay is to provide an answer to the question of knowing whether it is possible to find in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* a figure of the subject that would not be solely reduced to a function in the constitution of the object. Is Kant's "Copernican turn" truly a turn towards the subject or is it rather simply a detailed elaboration of the theory of the object, a theory with two voids: the void of the transcendental subject and the void of the transcendental object? The answer elaborated in this essay is the following: in the first Critique there is indeed a figure of the subject that is not solely the subject of the object, but is rather the subject for which the object is not only a *vis-à-vis* but also a part thereof, although a constitutively subtracted part. While this curious object, which the author proposes to call a trans-empirical, makes the constitution of the subject possible, it remains for the latter something that is radically *Dawider*.

Rado Riha**Transcendentalni subjekt in njegov Dawider**

Ključne besede: Kant, Kritika čistega uma, kopernikanski obrat, transcendentalni subjekt, praznina

Članek išče odgovor na vprašanje, ali je mogoče v Kantovi *Kritiki čistega uma* najti podobo subjekta, ki bi bil še kaj drugega kot subjekt v službi konstitucije objekta. Je Kantov »kopernikanski obrat« res obrat k subjektu, ali pa je njegova rezultat samo podrobno razdelana teorija objekta, ki jo spremljata dve praznini, praznina transcendentalnega subjekta in praznina transcendentalnega objekta? Odgovor članka se glasi: v prvi *Kritiki* je res mogoče najti podobo subjekta, ki ni le subjekt objekta. Je subjekt, ki mu objekt ne stoji več nasproti, ampak je njegov del. Toda od subjekta odtegnjeni del. Čeprav ta nenavadni objekt, ki ga članek imenuje *transempirično*, omogoča konstitucijo subjekta, ostaja zanj nekaj, kar mu je radikalno *Dawider*.

Dirk Setton**The Capacity to Sustain Receptivity Spontaneously:
Imagination in Kant's Theory of Experience**

Key words: Kant, spontaneity, receptivity, imagination, self-affection

One problem that is fundamental for a theory of experiential judgment resides in the question of how to understand the unity of spontaneity and receptivity that is essential