

NATO OB ŠESTDESETLETNICI: OD HLADNE VOJNE DO MEDKULTURNEGA DIALOGA

NATO AT SIXTY: FROM THE COLD WAR TO INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE

Review paper

Povzetek Namen tega članka je raziskati medsebojno dinamiko okoliščin, ki so vplivale na ustanovitev in razvoj Nata ter potek njegovega razvoja. Podrobneje so predstavljene različne faze in preobrati, značilni za ves proces, kot tudi posamezni vidiki, po katerih ta proces izstopa. Osrednja pozornost je namenjena zavedanju, da je ključno vlogo pri tem imelo mednarodno varnostno okolje, kot tudi, da se je Natu uspelo odzvati na spremembe in se z njimi spoprijeti. Ne samo, da je v obdobju hladne vojne ubranil Zahodno Evropo, temveč je tudi po njem zagotovil varno okolje za evropske integracijske procese. V šestih desetletjih je Nato uspešno uresničeval svoje poslanstvo, hkrati pa preživel tudi burno obdobje sprememb. Vse te napore opredeljujeta dva dopolnjujoča se vidika, in sicer širitev Zaveznitva in njegovo preoblikovanje. Za dosednji razvoj Nata sta značilni dve obdobji visoke in eno obdobje zelo nizke dinamike širitve. Zaradi izjemno zapletenega in negotovega varnostnega okolja ni pričakovati še ene faze nizke širitvene dinamike, temveč kvečjemu nasprotno. Večje izzive, zlasti v procesu odločanja, predstavlja delovanje v oddaljenih delih sveta in Afganistanu. Na prihodnji položaj Nata bi lahko odločilno vplivali odnosi z Rusijo in tako preizkusili njegovo sposobnost za vključitev drugih akterjev na področju upravljanja varnosti, ne samo znotraj zaveznitva, temveč tudi širše.

Nadaljnji interes za članstvo je jasen, hkrati pa vlada precejšnje in nenehno zanimanje za sodelovanje. To dejstvo lahko pripišemo tudi obsegu aktivnosti pod okriljem Zaveznitva, ki vključujejo operacije po 5. členu (kolektivna obramba) in zunaj 5. člena (krizno upravljanje) ter najrazličnejša druga področja (kot na primer človekoljubno pomoč, razoroževanje, politično-vojaške zadeve, znanost, zdravstvena vprašanja, okolje itn.).

Ključne besede *Nato, širitev, preoblikovanje, članstvo, kandidatke, Slovenija.*

Abstract This paper aims to explore the mutual dynamics between conditions, which influenced the establishment and development of NATO, and the way its evolution has been carried out. It exercises a closer look at different phases and turning points, which characterize the whole process, as well as at selected aspects for which this process stands out. We focus on the understanding that international security environment played a crucial role in this process as well as that NATO was capable of reacting to changes and to cope with them. It achieved not only to defend Western Europe during the Cold War era, but also offered secure environment for the Post-Cold War European integration process to be exercised. The organization was able to carry out its mission, but also to survive turbulent changes during the last six decades. Two complementary aspects define this endeavour, namely the enlargement of the Alliance and its transformation.

Two periods of high enlargement dynamics and one of a very low, characterize the development of NATO so far. Due to highly complex and uncertain security environment, we do not expect another phase of low enlargement dynamics, but rather on the contrary. Among major challenges, primarily to the decision-making process, further outreach and Afghanistan stand out. Relations with Russia would decisively define future positioning of NATO and put to test its capability to include other actors in the security management not only within, but also globally.

Further interest for the membership is obvious as well as interest for cooperation remains high and stable. This is also due to the scope of activities, pursued by the Alliance, which includes Article 5 (collective defence) and non-Article 5 (crisis management) operations and also a wide range of other areas (like humanitarian assistance, disarmament, politico-military issues, science, medical issues, environment etc.).

Key words *NATO, enlargement, transformation, membership, aspirants, Slovenia.*

Introduction Rarely has a single year been as rich in symbolism as this of the NATO's current anniversary.¹ This, however, does not directly influence NATO's jubilee, although one could say that it at least indirectly broadens the context of its understanding and deepens the demanding side of its contemplation. Still it additionally stimulates and encourages the need to analyse and generalize the Alliance's development and its current as well as future positioning.

This paper aims to explore the mutual dynamics between conditions, which influenced the establishment and development of NATO, and the way its evolution has been carried out. We will have a closer look at different phases and turning points, which to our mind characterize the whole process, as well as at selected aspects, for

¹ In 2009 we also remember 20 years of the end of the Cold War, 50 years of establishing the EFTA, 60 years of the founding of the Council of Europe, 90 years of the Versailles Peace Conference, 220 years of the French Revolution etc.

which this process stands out. In addition to the methods of analysis, generalization and comparison the author also tries to make use of the method of observing through one's own participation (Gilli, 1974)². The first part of this contribution focuses primarily on historical aspects and serves as a point of departure for subsequent elaboration.

Among several reasons for contemplating the case of NATO, the following shall be specifically pointed out: how the organization was able to carry out its mission as well as why and how it managed, at the same time, to survive turbulent changes during the last six decades. If we accept the understanding that the end of the Cold War also means the end of stability and certainty, according to the then international circumstances, we have to also understand the current and future uncertainties to be able to cope with them and face them. For NATO – but also for other actors – this would be of crucial importance.

1 THE APPEARANCE AND ITS CIRCUMSTANCES

The complexity, which arose after the end of World War II, called for international structures which would be able to carry out the universal mission of the newly established UN on a broader regional level and on areas such as security. Additionally to this, it was also the need and aspiration of the Western world to provide its own security against the threat from the East, if we sum up the ideological aspect of the dividing line, which cut Europe in two parts.³ Three decades after the establishment of the Soviet Union, the former WWII ally was, due to ideology which was demonstrated through a totalitarian form of a political system and the way of governance, on the other side geographically, politically and ideologically. The defeat of the Axis, which helped to unite otherwise structurally different WW II Allies, was accomplished and the way to new and divergent confrontation was open.

In the blossoming era of typical nation states the territorial unity and its defence were among top priorities and there was nothing to speak against it also after WW II. The need for achieving stability and security as well as to defend the Western Europe and North America, complementary to its economic development, brought to life the idea of a common defence organization. The North Atlantic area, defined by the territory and nation states between the western coast of North America and the Iron Curtain in Europe, carved out this security umbrella in the Treaty Organization, which was established on April 4 in 1949 in Washington.

² *The author was State Secretary at the Slovenian Ministry of Defence from December 2000 to November 2004. Being a career diplomat, he has been dealing with NATO already for a decade and a half also as a practitioner. Hence, in his paper he tries to contemplate and generalize his and other experiences, gained through numerous discussions with colleagues during the past years.*

³ *Yugoslavia, which formally departed from the Eastern Bloc in 1948, remained a socialist country, outside formal structures, and went its own way. This was demonstrated since mid 1950s in the nonalignment movement, where the country was, along with Egypt and India, its founding member.*

The Treaty laid down basic values, principles and procedural aspects of the organization. Stemming from the UN Charter, the text put forward the three following values, for which NATO stands: “territorial integrity, political independence and security of any of the Parties” (Article 3). Furthermore, as the corner stone principle, Parties agreed “that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all” (Article 5). Such an event shall exercise in their “right of individual or collective self-defence” (ibid.), initiating the assistance to the Party (or Parties) in question. Following to this, an armed attack is deemed to include the territory of any of the Parties as well as the forces, vessels or aircraft of any of them (Article 6). The enlargement process was codified in Article 10 defining that “The Parties may by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty”. Also the possibility to quit the membership was included in the text, stipulating that “After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after” (Article 13) the US Government receives the notice of denunciation of the Party concerned.⁴

Broadly speaking, we can detect at least two outstanding phases of the Alliance’s development during the past six decades: the Cold War period (also the Article 5 era) and the current, post Cold War period (the non-Article 5 or out of area). Additionally, we could also mention the next, future phase of the Alliance (the post Article 5 or perhaps even the “advanced outreach era”).⁵ (Comp. Sanfelice di Monteforte, 2009, p. 67)

2 ENLARGEMENT AS A DRIVING FORCE

Much of the post WW II period was characterized by resistance against the enemy from the East. This was necessarily demonstrated in the concentration of the ever-increasing number of conventional forces in Europe, along the dividing line. But this, at the same time, also forwarded all of the internal structural dynamics of NATO towards the preparation for countering possible attack and for developing capabilities for a potential counter attack. One could say that the organization was partially cemented inwards and not much of structural interest was executed outwards. In other words, during the Cold War the enlargement process was, however obvious, still de facto limited to a few remaining countries within the Western Europe. When, from this point of view, the membership quota was fulfilled this dynamics practically vanished.⁶

⁴ This has not been the case so far, contrary to continuously expressed aspirations for membership.

⁵ It would undoubtedly be interesting to note that the Article 5 was never activated during the first period, while its activation took place during the second one (non-Article 5), although not executed in practice (after the 9/11 events).

⁶ Twenty-seven years went by between the second and the third enlargements and seventeen between the next two, while only five between each of the post Cold War ones.

To understand the broader importance of enlargement as a process, one has to bear in mind that “throughout its long history, NATO has rightly considered that the key driver for any successive enlargement should remain the political interest (...)” (Ibid.); understandably, since the Alliance was founded to contain a possible Soviet aggression as well as to provide conditions for the post WW II development of the Western Europe. Nevertheless, military imperatives that heavily influenced the enlargement process, depended on the assessment of the strategic landscape and were basically two: first, geography (access to some key sea areas, the possibility to project power from there, the requirement to keep a geographically coherent air space), and second, what amount of manpower contribution new members would bring as well as whether defence of the territory would imply the deployment from elsewhere or not; it has been broadly accepted, that the Alliance has fulfilled this mission during the Cold War period. (Sanfelice di Monteforte, 2009, pp. 68-69)

The first three enlargements – interestingly, there have been six of them so far, half in each of the two phases – went very well along these criteria: “The first round of enlargement resulted in a significant improvement of the strategic posture of NATO in the South, with a land front easy to defend in depth, thanks to Yugoslav help.⁷ (...) It is fair to say, in sum, that this enlargement (with West Germany – M.J.) was the most convenient, from the military standpoint, for the Alliance. (...) /T/ toward the end of this historical period, NATO strategic posture was much better off than at its inception.” (Ibid.) Perhaps this has also resulted in the use of the same criteria (geography and strategic importance) for the post Cold War enlargements. One of the most important arguments of Slovenian authorities for the membership was to achieve the coherence of the Alliance’s territory: Slovenia’s acceptance would close the territory between Italy and Hungary as well as incorporate the historically strategic important Ljubljana Gap. Slovenia aside (as part of former Yugoslavia it was never a member of the Warsaw Pact),⁸ the immediate post Cold War aspirants strived for the membership “in order to get its protection against a possible resurgence of Russian expansionism.” (Ibid.) Although NATO managed to geographically embrace practically the whole Europe also through the three post Cold War enlargements, these arguments (geography and Russia) do not anymore respond to the current security environment and the nature of its threats. One could even speculate, too, had it been for geography and Russia, it would have been very difficult to prove the existence of the Alliance at all.

As far as the enlargement dynamics is concerned, things radically changed in the beginning of the 1990s. The majority of newly established countries (or those, regaining their independency) explicitly expressed their ambition to join NATO (Jazbec, 2001, pp. 11-19). It could be rather easy to argue that this fact actually did

⁷ *The same author also adds the following conclusion: “In fact, as some recently released documents have shown, since 1951 there has been a secret bi-lateral pact between Yugoslavia and the United States, already developed at the military staff level, whereby the government of Yugoslavia committed itself, in case of aggression from the East, to fight on NATO side.” (Ibid.) Compare also Bebler (2009).*

⁸ *One can assume that this is also the reason why Slovenia never used the so-called Russian factor as an argument for NATO membership.*

not surprise politicians and bureaucrats at the Alliance's Headquarters, but what is much more important is that it offered a primary opportunity to the organization to not only rethink its *raison d'être*, but to grab a rare historical opportunity. A huge group of aspirant countries⁹ encouraged (and perhaps also forced) policy planners to start the process of the post Cold War enlargement. This came out later on also as the complementary process of transformation of the Alliance.

Three rounds of the post Cold War enlargement during the last decade and a half almost doubled the number of members (from 16 in 1982 to 28 in 2009) and exercised additional structural pressure on the efficiency of the decision making process.¹⁰ At the same time the changed security environment forced the Alliance to transform and reorganize itself, both its administrative and military structures. The need for higher efficiency, faster and smoother response as well as a different type of field outreach resulted in an almost unprecedented internal dynamics, never seen before. As a matter of fact, the structural dynamics impregnated the Alliance and practically paved the way forward.

We present the discussed enlargement process and its dynamics (members and year of accession) in Table No 1.

Table No 1:

Membership Dynamics

1949	1952 (3)	1955 (3)	1982 (27)	1999 (17)	2004 (5)	2009 (5)
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States	Greece Turkey	Federal Republic of Germany	Spain	Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland	Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia	Albania Croatia
12	2	1	1	3	7	2
12	14	15	16	19	26	28

⁹ NATO at that time consisted of 16 members, while in the early 1990s 10 – 15 countries expressed the ambition to join the Alliance.

¹⁰ Some argue that the first post cold war enlargement took place in the autumn of 1990 with the membership of the East Germany (comp. Bebler, 2009). We, however, share the opinion, that this could not be counted as an enlargement, since East Germany de facto joined NATO after and as a result of German reunification, and not after going through the membership procedure as such.

If we have a look at the time frame of enlargement, three periods were to emerge out of it, namely: two times so far the Alliance has grown extensively in a rather short time, while there was a long period of almost standstill dynamics in-between. During the first six years (the establishment plus two enlargements) the Alliance expanded to 15 members and during the last decade it expanded by 12 members (through three rounds). In the meantime, from 1955 to 1999, during 44 years the Alliance grew by only one single member (Spain in 1982). The period of extremely low enlargement dynamics dominates more than two thirds of the Alliance's history. Furthermore, as far as the criteria, procedures and the duration of the admission process in each enlargement are concerned, one could also notice, that during the first period the admission process was short, while during the second period an obvious expansion of this process is evident. (Comp. Bebler, 2009)

The general nature of this dynamics is presented in Table No 2.

Table No 2:

Time Span of
Membership
Dynamics

No of Years	0	3	3	27	17	5	5
No of Members	12	2	1	1	3	7	2

This would bring us again to the already expressed finding, namely, that during the Cold War period the Alliance expanded to the region of Western Europe, for the defence principle. When this was practically fulfilled, the process came to a standstill, i.e. its dynamics remained in the back stage. The Alliance focused its activities on the structural upgrading of numerous projects and processes, which helped enhance and strengthen primarily its defence capabilities in numerous areas. The end of the global bipolarisation as well as the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact brought the issue of enlargement again on the agenda almost over night.

This resulted in three consequent processes. First, the need for stability and security of broader Europe gained on its importance, since the end of the Cold War resulted also in new destabilization of the wider eastern part of the continent. Second, a deep and extremely demanding process of the restructuring of defence systems in Europe took place. In its eastern part, former socialist armies and defence system were practically dismantled and built from scratch, while in its western part transformation started from territorially oriented to reaction oriented (for more on this Jazbec, 2002, pp. 38-42 and Kotnik, 2002). Main aspects of this process have been the rightsizing of the armed forces (size and structure), defence capabilities and defence resources (human and financial) as well as the question of capabilities as a whole (deployability in particular). Third, since the countries emerging or regaining their statehood after the change in 1989, were rather weak militarily, the enlargement notion gained much on political importance. This whole picture was primarily a complex and an

evolving reflection of changes in the security environment. The enlargement process up to 1990s rested on its static, what resulted in its defence orientation. The enlargement afterwards, though, stemmed from its dynamics. Therefore we could distinct two major enlargement patterns in the history of the Alliance (more on this in Bebler, 2009): the first one primarily driven-driven and the second one driven by defence and political ambition.

Having in mind a group of aspirant countries, mainly from the Western Balkans (comp. Jazbec, 2007 as well as Watkins and Gligorijević, 2009)¹¹ and Eastern European neighbourhood, including the Caucasus, the question arises, what could be the next pattern. Generally speaking, it would primarily depend on the future development of NATO and fulfilment of the membership criteria by a given country. Additionally, one can expect that enlargements after 2010 will take place in a quite complex and uncertain environment (Friedman, 2009), as well as having in mind a more obvious global role of NATO (although for the time being not clearly defined, what this could encompass). Still, we do not tend to see the next phase of a decrease in the enlargement dynamics.

Furthermore, the profundity of the swift change in the international community after the collapse of the Berlin Wall shows that NATO as a structure, built more than half a century ago in a totally different environment, offered crucial assistance in the integration of new states which emerged or regained statehood during this period: “NATO provided the stability that helped Europe to integrate. For ex-communist states, NATO has been a stepping stone into the EU.” (Have combat, 2009). This unique complementarity, when NATO enlargements preceded those of the EU, has “significantly reduced the likelihood of a conventional large-scale war in Europe – a historic achievement.” (Salonius-Pasternak, 2007, p. 8) The way this integration was managed helped to start the process of transformation of these structures, but also showed the way forward in their adaptation to new circumstances. For NATO this has reflected in its process of transformation, which is, complementary and parallel to the enlargement, the key driving force of its contemporary conceptualisation.

3 THE TERRITORY AND BEYOND

During the period of the first 40 years of the Alliance it was rather easy to formulate and exercise its territorial determination. Nothing stood against it and it seemed a highly appropriate solution to the then stable and generally pretty much secure international circumstances. Also at the beginning of the 1990s things did not look much different from this point of view. This impression was additionally bolded by the inaugural meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, attended by foreign

¹¹ *The first next member shall be the Republic of Macedonia, which completed its accession process, together with Albania and Croatia. However, it hasn't been included in the membership because of the name dispute and the blockade from Greece, introduced at the Bucharest Summit in spring of 2008. According to the promise from this summit the candidate country will be accepted upon decision of NAC, once the dispute is solved. For more, see Kosanic, 2009.*

ministers and representatives of 16 NATO member countries as well as 9 Central and Eastern European countries in late December 1991.¹² Their ambition was to enter the Alliance, what fit in the proven defence sample.

As the former Soviet Union dissolved and war in Yugoslavia was progressing, it became obvious that the rebirth of nationalism and the increased appearance of intrastate conflicts are changing the reality and perception of security. Its management via defence tools, i.e. within the territorial membership frame, was put to test when it appeared that not the members but the neighbourhood was seriously in jeopardy. Since this could also indirectly threaten the Alliance, it affected the way it operated so far in pursuing its mission. The breach of basic values, which NATO stands for (democracy, human rights, the rule of law etc.), in particular during the war in Bosnia, brought the Alliance to its first operation outside its territory. This showed to be the most important change in the history of the organization and of its mission. It has above all proved to be a complementary one to the core mission. When a few years later the activity of the same kind was repeated in Kosovo, the experience resulted in expanding the collective defence of the Alliance with out-of-area operations.¹³ At the same time a change to the so-called expeditionary modus originated. It was obvious in both of the mentioned cases that the EU was not in the position to put forward a solution. We could put this in other words: it was obvious in both cases that the EU has not developed tools, which would enable it to efficiently exercise its ambition of a security and defence player.¹⁴

One could say that two aspects came out of this newborn experience. Firstly, it became obvious that NATO, due to drastically changed security environment and in of absence of similar so efficient actors, has to move beyond the pure territorial / collective defence principle, which characterized its first four decades. And secondly, it pointed to a possibility that membership as such could cease to be the only and primary criteria for offering defence. Both of this aspects go well along the current notion in international affairs that territory is important, but it's values what stand out in any case. It perhaps also shows that membership is only one – though formally most important – structural part of the integration process. However, integration ambition should have also other ways of being demonstrated, which should reach beyond membership. Speaking in terms of globalisation, membership should preferably stick to a closer regional frame, while global outreach should try to rest on loose but flexible tools of synergic cooperation.

From this point of view, one could see three possible explanations for the Alliance's future development: "(1) NATO institutionally wants to continue leading crisis management operations, and as the EU is assuming more responsibility for operations

¹² *Representatives of Slovenia, Croatia and other states, which emerged out of former Yugoslavia, did not attend, since none of these countries was recognized at that time and except for Slovenia, war was spreading around the area of the former socialist state.*

¹³ *It is also important to bear in mind that with its first two out-of-area operations the Alliance stood in defense of Muslim populations in two countries.*

¹⁴ *Both experiences also push the EU forward in creating such tools.*

in Europe, the Alliance is focusing where there is more need; (2) the unexpectedly heavy requirements of the Afghanistan operation mean that NATO needs more commitments; and (3) a desire by some members to give NATO a global political role.” (Salonius-Pasternak, 2007:27) Hence, the Alliance moved from purely collective defence (defending territory) to complement this with defending values (out-of-area operations) and further on – or more precisely expressed – to securing individuals as holders of these values.

4 CHALLENGES AND THEIR FRAME

One would hardly say that NATO faces other challenges than the rest of the major international players. Generally speaking, this would then mean that we should take into account a set of security threats or challenges, which have dominated global environment recently, having in mind the fact that the current composition of security is rather complex and complicated, while its perception includes various areas of human existence and activities. We try to present them comparatively and structurally in Table No 3 (comp. Jazbec, 2008).¹⁵

Table No 3:

Structural
Comparison
of Current
Security
Threats

Seven Dimensions	Six Clusters	Seven Aspects
Economic	Economic and social threats (incl. poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation)	Uncertainty
Food	Inter-State conflict	Unpredictability
Health	Internal conflict (incl. civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities)	Combined
Environment	Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons	Universal
Personal	Terrorism	Complex
Community	Transnational organized crime	Dispersed
Political		Interdependent

We could say that during the Cold War main threats derived from the possibility of military destruction (inter state wars), whilst the current security threats derive primarily from internal (intra state) conflicts as well as from the global environmental context. They endanger above all economic and social aspects of contemporary societies (poverty, diseases, health etc.). They target primarily individuals, and in particular children, women, elderly and disabled. Additionally to this, weak democratic institutions offer a fertile ground for corruption, organized crime and

¹⁵ For seven dimensions compare Axworthy, 2001:4, for six clusters compare *A more secure world*, 2004, and for seven aspects compare Buzan et al, 1998, Friedman, 2009, Gärtner et al, 2001, Jazbec, 2002 etc.

trafficking, which together with environmental issues (air, water, food) presses for new, global and cross – agency approach in facing them.

Therefore, generally speaking, we could notice a fundamental change in the way international, in particular social events and trends, are structured and function. This is primarily due to the highly increased development of communication and transportation technology, which orbited the proliferation of information and media influence as well as the possibility to commute and migrate (Brzezinski, 2009, Jazbec, 2005 and 2006, Reiter, 2003). Their consequences for security architecture and policymaking are all-encompassing, broad and deep. They de facto bring the world together and push for complementary activities of global actors within the frame of a possible global governance. Understanding this global frame means also bringing closer concrete challenges, which NATO faces today because of what it is, what its mission is and how does it act. These challenges rest *via facti* within the above-presented global viewpoint and refer directly to the Alliance itself.¹⁶ It is our impression they could be observed as internal and external priorities, with two particular points that stand out.¹⁷

Internal priorities or challenges refer directly to the Alliance’s capability to plan and act. They are from one point of view the results of different international environment, but from another one primarily the consequence of the enlarged membership. The external ones derive from the dynamics of the global environment and differ along the timeline. However, they are interdependent and firmly bound together, as Kupchan observes: “NATO at 60 has to make some tough decisions on Russia, consensus and reach.” (2009)

A brief, summary-like presentation as well as comparison of the challenges discussed follows in Table No 4.

Table No 4:

Challenges
for NATO

Internal	External
Capabilities	Afghanistan
Structures	Russian Federation
Decision making process	Enlargement
Transformation	Dealing with new threats
New Strategic Concept	Transatlantic link
Collective defence	Global outreach

¹⁶ Compare Have Combat, 2009, Jazbec, 2009.b, Keller, 2009.a, Kupchan, 2009, Scheffer, 2009.a and 2009.b etc.

¹⁷ Methodologically speaking it would be difficult to make such a clear divide between complexity of challenges and their different types. However, a certain level of mechanical division has to be brought in for the clarity of the present discussion.

Two comments should be added to the above presented. First, as far as the main challenges are concerned, Afghanistan and Russia stand out. Second, there is a general question of the future development of the Alliance.

Referring to the first one, there is, however, a clear need to introduce an explicit distinction in the nature of this categorization. Afghanistan is perceived as one of the main security threats nowadays. This is particularly due to a variety of numerous components, which produce this rather unique result (like weak state institutions, a terrorist harbour along its border with Pakistan, extremely poor living conditions /physical, social, educational etc./, drug production etc.). Combined with threats deriving from the situation in Pakistan (weak state in a possession of nuclear weapons), the statement is clear. Regarding Russia, it could be quite clear that relations between the Alliance and the successor of the Soviet Union present a huge challenge (Comp. Khudoley, 2009 as well as Sanfelice di Monteforte, 2009). But here the nature of this challenge is of completely different kind. We would understand it as a need to find the way of mutual, long-term and global cooperation in facing contemporary security threats. This relation should advance from a rather low (or formal) level of cooperation up to now to flexible engagement, which would lead to further, deeper and mutual integration of Russia in the security management as well as of cooperation between the two players.

Referring to the second one, a rather clear vision of the Alliance's future mission is to be developed. After the big bang enlargement of 2004, voices could be repeatedly heard from some of the then new members, in particular after the war in Georgia in August 2008, that NATO should focus more, if not primarily on its core mission, i.e. collective defence. This in general terms responds to the fact that through "the most recent enlargements the Alliance has also come to include a large number of states that still regard security far more traditionally and regionally compared to some of the older Alliance members." (Salonius-Pasternak, 2007: 10) At the same time, though, since mid 90s of the previous century, NATO is developing its out-of-area operations leading to a simple fact that "NATO is already a global player." (Ibid. p. 26) The idea of its global outreach presents one of highly desirable trends for NATO, seen in this way by many outsiders as well as by not less many insiders. We would strongly argue for further transformation of the Alliance, not only as far as its internal challenges are concerned, but also for its external ones. The Alliance should remain strongly anchored in its core mission (collective defence of its territory), which would consequently allow it to follow in a more focused manner already expressed global political (dialogue) and security (beyond territory) aspects.¹⁸

Last but not least, the NATO of today presents a much different organization than that of yesterday. This is far from being purely a rhetorical statement. Starting rather soon after the end of WW II as a group of twelve Western countries, driven by the territorial defence principle, today it offers its core frame to twenty-eight members.

¹⁸ This could be of significant importance also in carving out its relations with Russia.

Additionally to this, several groups of aspirants, partners and cooperative countries form its global network with different levels of intensity. These are as follows:

- 28 member countries
- 18 PfP members in Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia
- 7 members of the Mediterranean dialogue
- 3 MAP countries (2 new members, however, in transition to force goals system)
- NATO – Russia Council
- NATO – Ukraine Commission
- Global partners like Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea
- Various forms of cooperation with countries like China, India, and Pakistan.

NATO currently performs its activities at eight locations in three geographical regions (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Darfur, the Mediterranean Sea, and along the coast of Somalia). These activities include different forms of membership, partnership, dialogue, cooperation and assistance.¹⁹ One could also say that the Alliance exercises interaction within the area of two billion people (half of billion within the membership space), where also three world religions communicate (Roman-Catholic, Orthodox and Islam). This would not mean that NATO is engaged in the intercultural dialogue, but it quite convincingly presents the scope of its activities in the Post-Cold War period. Overall, “in its security manager role, crisis management, humanitarian assistance, disarmament, and a forum for discussing politico-military issues are all tasks NATO engages in” (Salonius-Pasternak, 2007, p. 33), including activities in areas like science, medical issues, environment etc.

To sum up, the development of the time, geographical and cultural span, which determined the emergence of NATO in the past and that of today, shows how deep, broad and basic the evolution of the Alliance has been. From ideologically driven Cold War to flexible and loose matrix of the era of intercultural dialogue, which both offered different challenges and threats but also oriented the transformation and initiated new tools, the organization managed to continuously fulfil its mission. It has managed to stick to the defence of a territory, but also complement it with an ambition of securing values and protecting individuals.

Conclusion Our aim in this paper was to explore mutual dynamics between the conditions, which influenced the appearance of NATO, and its evolution. We tried to present and argue the understanding that international security environment played a crucial role in this process as well as that NATO was capable of reacting to changes and to cope with them. Obviously, the organization was able to carry out its mission, but also to survive turbulent changes during the last six decades. According to our mind, two complementary aspects define this endeavour, namely the enlargement of the Alliance and its transformation.

¹⁹ Salonius-Pasternak describes them as those of NATO-members, MAP-aspirants, NATO Response Force, Other Operations, Training/Defence Reforms and General/“Practical” cooperation. (2007, p. 25)

Basically, two different and major phases could be noticed in the organization's development, stemming out of the nature of its dynamics and growing structural complexity. During the first six years it expanded to fifteen members, while during its previous decade it expanded by twelve members. In between, there is a time span of four decades and a half, during which only one new member joined the Alliance. Therefore, two periods of high and one period of a very low enlargement dynamics have characterized the development of NATO so far. In any case it is interesting to observe that both the first and the last decade so far share the same level of high enlargement dynamics, although their circumstances differ much. During the former the deterrence-driven provision of security dominated, while during the latter a high level of uncertainty prevailed.

However, due to a highly complex and uncertain security environment, impregnated above all with new, combined and unpredictable threats, we do not expect another phase of low enlargement dynamics, but rather on the contrary. Among the major challenges, internal as well as external could be observed. They are intertwined and refer primarily to the decision-making process, further outreach and Afghanistan. Still, relations with Russia would decisively define future positioning of NATO and put to test its capability to include other actors in the security management not only within the organization, but also globally.

One can notice a further interest for the membership; at the same time the interest for cooperation remains high and stable. This would mean that the scope of activities, pursued by NATO, is welcomed and appreciated. They include Article 5 (collective defence) and non-Article 5 (crisis management) operations as well as a wide range of other areas (like humanitarian assistance, disarmament, politico-military issues, science, medical issues, environment etc.). This illustrates that NATO has evolved from a driven-driven regional player to a global security manager.

Since NATO succeeded not only to defend Western Europe during the Cold War era, but also offered secure environment for the Post-Cold War European integration process, this could be its most important message at the sixtieth anniversary, holding for sure also its global attractiveness.

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