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RETROSPECTION, PROSPECTION AND THE PURSUIT OF AN INTEGRATED APPROACH FOR CHINA'S COMMUNICATION AND JOURNALISM STUDIES

ZHENGRONG HU
DEQIANG JI

Abstract

Transcending a one-dimensional paradigm of globalisation, this article provides a kind of archeological analysis of communication and journalism studies in China. It examines the historical trajectory of the introduction of Western communication theories since the early 1980s, the articulation of Western theories and the initiatives of Chinese intellectuals of the time, and the complex social contexts of a transitional China in which a dominant US-based administrative paradigm has prevailed for decades. As a result of this articulation, communication and journalism studies in current China are widely considered an organic part of the leading paradigm of neoliberalism, and less attention has been paid to seeking alternative paradigms, or at least to rediscovering the distinctiveness of Chinese experience in the global sphere. To point out the limitations of this articulation, the article illustrates the increasing difficulties or misappropriations in using those Western theories to interpret the complex reality of both social and media transformations. A positive relationship between theories and practice prompts social justice and democracy rather than a tendency towards "uneven development" with growing social inequality. Therefore the article contends that China's communication and journalism studies are standing at another historical crossroads today, compared with the time when Wilbur Schramm made his groundbreaking visit to Beijing in 1982. In pursuit of a reorientation in communication and journalism studies in the future, an integrated approach is suggested.

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Introduction

2011 marked a decade of systematic and rapid globalisation for China. As Zhenglai Deng, a Shanghai-based Chinese scholar known for his "world structure theories" noted, the fundamental difference between the years before and after China's accession to the WTO in 2001 is the changing nature of China's identity in a globalised world or, in his terminology, "the world structure" (Deng 2009). There are two stages to this according to his historical criticism. The first occurred at the collapse of the feudal empires at the turn of 20th century, when Chinese intellectuals internalised a West-centered world history and based their ideas of revitalising Chinese civilisation and of rebuilding China as a powerful nation-state in a Western sense on a one-dimensional definition of modernisation, in which progress in science and technology played a key role. In this first stage, in other words, the only way for China to be modernised at the beginning of 20th century was to be a follower of the already powerful West, taking on its lessons and advanced experience in science and technology, and also its social institutions. In the second stage, as China has "reentered" the global system in the 21st century, particularly by being an indispensable and increasingly significant engine for the global market economy, China has become integrated within a new world structure subject to a set of international agreements, such as the WTO. The rules are accordingly well designed and strictly observed, and there is less space for flexibility, negotiation, or even imagination. China therefore changes from an innocent child of Western civilisation to a full member of the world structure. However, the world is neither flat, nor just and democratic, although the defining feature of globalisation is to be "open" to alternatives.

As such, both challenges and opportunities are facing China and its people. A few essential questions, for instance what is the "China model" and how will China influence the world and shift the orientation and structure of globalisation in the future, have been proposed in pursuit of new paradigms when discussing economics, politics, cultural values and society. The same goes for communication and journalism studies. In this sense, we have positioned China's communication and journalism studies in the contexts of globalisation and current social transition. By focusing on their mutual enhancement, the academic pursuit of a new paradigm of communication and journalism studies in China is shown as possible. However, instead of proposing a "scientific paradigm" (Kuhn 1996) for Chinese researchers, which is beyond our capacity and still in need of comprehensive and deep examinations on the historical trajectory of Chinese academia in rapid transition, we aim to provide a tentative approach, which might be called "an integrated approach, "in pursuit of a new epistemology to rebuild theories. This article is thus structured in two sections: (1) a retrospective reflection on three decades of introducing Western communication theories and (2) the difficulties of using Western theories to analyse Chinese practices and the internal contradictions between them. Finally we suggest the development of an integrated approach of communication and journalism studies in an increasingly globalised China.

Opening to the West: Three Decades of Introducing Western Communication Theories

Since the late 1970s, there has been a wave of rebuilding of the social sciences and humanities in post-Cultural Revolution China. Among diverse disciplines or institutionalised knowledge that were claimed to be destroyed during the 10 years of revolution, journalism was representative in terms of its "over-politicisation" in a narrow sense. For the "vanguards" of Chinese intellectuals and journalist practitioners who wanted to change its trajectory and extinguish the "bad memories"of the revolution, the traditional class-based, politicised and instrumentalist Party journalism paradigm was no longer acceptable, nor did it make common sense (Pan and Chan 2003). A new set of ideas, concepts, theories and most importantly the ways of defining news media and their functions in a society were expected to break through. Yet before moving on to the review part, one critical point should be inserted here: history is a continuum, whereas thoughts can be fractured. In this sense, we will pay attention to the common evolution and articulation of Western communication and journalism theories and Chinese local knowledge and practices, instead of considering Western theories as substitutions for traditional Chinese propaganda-based journalism theories.

In May 1982, one of the founding figures of the US-based communication discipline, Wilbur Schramm, who at times is referred to as the father of communication studies, visited China and delivered an introductory lecture on modern communication studies in the main building of the People's Daily, a major organ of China's propaganda system. In the orthodox history of Chinese journalism, even though a number of other Chinese scholars and university departments had already contributed to the introduction of Western communication theories earlier than Schramm's groundbreaking visit, this event was indeed a milestone signaling the end of one age and the opening of a new one. As one of the attendees at that lecture recalled, "This was the first time for Chinese journalism researchers to have direct conversations with Western scholars" (Chen 2006). In a symposium that followed in November 1982, some Chinese journalism scholars compiled a series of handouts elaborating the Western communication theories introduced by Schramm, which formed the basis for the publication of the first communication book in Chinese, a Brief Introduction of Communication Theories, in 1983. Since then, the US-based, developmentalist communication theories which Wilbur Schramm represented have been recognised as the "mainstream" among Chinese journalism researchers and practitioners. At that point it seemed that the traditionally propaganda and class-oriented journalism studies in China entered a new phase, implying a seemingly brand-new age in which the whole system of journalism knowledge and the positions of Chinese scholars in society should be redefined, or some of them even "liberated."

Since the beginning of the revolutionary era in the early 20th century, the traditional Party journalism studies in China were called "Marxist journalism studies" and consisted of three fundamental arguments. First, the source of news reporting is fact, whereby news reporting is not the recovery but the representation of the fact. Second, news organisations and journalist practices are an organic part of a nation's propaganda system. And third, news institutions should represent and

serve the people, not the enemy. In a sense, these points can be summarised in the well-known statement: the news media are an instrument of class struggle to achieve class interests. According to this historical materialist perspective, the modern news media, ranging from printed periodicals and newspapers to the more recent electronic mass media such as radio and television, were cast as instruments of the class struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat. Since the new Republic of China claimed to be a socialist society, news media and journalism must serve the interests of the proletariat, specifically representing the two major classes of workers and peasants, who were the essential components of the term "people" in Chinese society.

In contrast to the principles of Party journalism that occupied the dominant position in China, Wilbur Schramm, with the "mainstream" US-based communication studies, seemingly opened a new window for the Chinese. Journalism could be categorised by its theories and practices of "information" and "communication" as less politicised, while at the same time media "naturally" deserve (or depend on) advertising revenue in the marketplace, so that marketisation is a necessary force in driving local development towards modernisation, especially for developing countries. As China stepped up its role in a globalised world by the end of 20th century, this "emancipation of thoughts" in the form of knowledge coming from the West has penetrated almost every corner of the country. This means that a new recognition that media should function as information carrier as well as economic contributor has arisen and now competes with the notion of Party Journalism at both theoretical and operational levels. A general framework of this new paradigm can be outlined as follows:

First came the developmentalist approach, which was pointed out as early as the 1960s by Schramm in his book Mass Communication and National Development. In his view, news media should and are able to play a significant role in local development. Among all the indicators of developmental achievement, the economy is the most important. News media are considered influential for disseminating innovation and information to help individuals and groups construct a well-run, market-based, national economic system, as well as to support a "democratic" social order by maintaining a platform for exchanging diverse ideas under the theme of pluralism. Yet it is obvious that the ideal of relations between media and society described above is undoubtedly an abstraction from a Western context, regardless of the characteristics of some local political and cultural heritages. Although, as former leader of China Deng Xiaoping proclaimed at the beginning of the rapid and comprehensive marketisation within most of social sectors in the early 1990s, "Development is the absolute principle", questions such as where the development is heading and how development can benefit everyone have been distorted by the "No debates theories" and the entire process of development.

Second, there is a structural, functionalism-based social science tradition. This considers that news media, like other social sectors, play an organic and positive role in maintaining and improving the existing social and cultural order. The four major functions through which media impact on society are: disseminating information, representing public opinion, educating the public, and sustaining culture. Without much consideration of the revolutionary role of media, especially the influence of particular social groups who favor alternative media to propose

alternative social structures and moral requirements, this tradition is inadequate for discussing the possibilities of new media and society relationships outside the framework of liberal democracy. Instead of guiding a particular society towards perfection, news media sometimes have a revolutionary impact on certain social structures, restructuring it when necessary.

Third is an implication of the "natural" relationship between journalism and communication studies and the increasingly growing media industries. There has been a consensus among Western and Eastern media scholars that the very reason for modern media studies emerging in the 20th century was the prosperity of the mass media. This can also be seen as a factor underpinning today's relevant research. The new media industries not only gave birth to a huge economic sector but also incisively shaped the patterns of social communication. No matter whether one agrees with it or criticises it, the commercialised media environment and its institutions where multiple players compete for benefits have been the crucial context for the continuation of journalism and communication studies. Topics like professionalism, autonomy of news media organisations and journalistic innovation cannot be discussed without careful thinking about the commercial forces behind them.

Fourth, as a result of the pervasiveness of the Western approach during the introduction of communication theories in China, there was a tendency to explicitly ignore the country's contemporary socialist history, in which the traditional Chinese Party journalism research direction made sense. It was a "Cold War Mentality" that aimed to rupture history and integrate China's reforms within a West-centered world history. One of the results of articulating Chinese journalism history into a Westernised liberal narrative is that, no matter how much reform there has been within the media and journalism, and no matter how much that reform has deeply shaped the domestic social communication structure, China has first to deal with the dichotomy of freedom and censorship of expression in the narrow sense of political regulation. Furthermore, as the "mainstream" Chinese journalism scholars internalised, and to some extent became disciples of, Western theories, careful examination of contemporary Chinese history in which diverse and different interactions between Chinese society and journalism occur has been marginalised or assumed to be meaningless.

To sum up, the Schramm-symbolised Western communication theories have had a two-fold impact on the transition of communication and journalism studies in Mainland China. After years of isolation, when China opened to the West in the late 1970s on its own initiative, the newly introduced communication theories brought a whole and systematic set of terminologies (information, communication, mass communication, media and media industries, etc.); theories (mainly US-based administrative mass media theories, such as media effects research tradition, audience-centered analysis and some psychological experiments); methodologies (large-scale employment of scientific methods, the division of quantitative and qualitative approaches) and hypotheses (objectivity of information-processing and communication, freedom of market transaction, citizen rights in expression and publishing, election democracy, etc.) into the Chinese academies. This has been coupled with China's accelerated integration into a global market economy, which is increasingly driven by information and media growth. However, while Chinese journalism scholars have transformed themselves into mass communication

researchers within this paradigm, the dynamics of social practices and the particular historic juncture of Party Journalism and Western communication theories in a China that is following the path of economic reform are still posing challenges to the one-dimensional way of thinking. As Hailong Liu, a Beijing-based scholar, pointed out, the balanced introduction and translation of Western communication theories (including both US-based administrative schools and critical schools) and the imbalance of an overwhelmingly emphasising US-based administrative approach, and the simultaneous marginalisation of the critical school imply a biased epistemology (Liu 2006). If we proceed further to explore the social and intellectual backgrounds of this trend, we come upon a historical reality that is hard to leave aside. We categorise this as the "articulation" of particular theories and particular practices in particular contexts.

So far, the complex phenomena of the intertwining of party journalism and market journalism (tabloidisation), the growing public mistrust of the professionalisation in journalism, and institutional corruption within news institutions have shown that the reality of social transition is far more complicated than a shift in the theoretical paradigm.

The Difficulties and Misappropriations of Using Western Knowledge to Interpret China's Case

Despite a "Westward-Looking" developmental strategy involving a paradigm shift in journalism studies and some media practices that have been brought about by the pace of China's globalisation, there have been many difficulties in using so-called "universalised" Western knowledge to guide Chinese journalism and news reporting at both individual and institutional levels. This complication can be attributed to the internal contradiction within the processes of introducing a Western communication paradigm to legitimise China's media and journalistic reforms and imposing a manipulative hegemony on how to define and position the media in a particular nation which took a totally different path in structuring the triangular relationships of state, market and society. Therefore, there are historical facts that each reformer should confront directly when discussing the possibilities ahead. The fact is that China's media and journalistic reforms are distinct from the Western ideals imagined by some, but are a mixture of processes of Westernisation and localisation. Globalisation for China in this sense refers to a "two-way" movement, rather than a "one-way" process of modernisation. A couple of analyses of the contradictory features of China's social and media reforms are provided to illustrate the complexity of the situation.

First of all, China's reform is unsynchronised in terms of the degree of changes within different social sectors. Over the past three decades, China has taken a different path from that of Western capitalist society and Western "modern" social transition. China has been integrated into the process of globalisation ever since the beginning of the "Open-door policy". China's developmental road, however, is different and uneven: a giant population of agriculture and migrant workers coming from disenfranchised agricultural areas into modernisation, rapid urbanisation and a new social stratification. While China's manufacturing industries and financial markets have been overtly integrated with a WTO-ruled global market under an "export-led" policy, the ways of political regulation and social mobilisation are

still dissimilar to those of its Western counterparts. Further, elements of Chinese cultural heritage, Confucian traditions, for example, still have a wide influence on local development and people's recognition and definition of globalisation.

Although, as David Harvey (2005, 2) contended, China has unexpectedly become a member of global neoliberalism since the early 1990s, which "proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade" - and the marketisation of almost every social sector has been an obvious trend - the market in China is still largely controlled by the government. This is exemplified by the strict regulation of the ownership of news media, which continues to be one of the defining features of Party journalism. Ian Weber (2005) described this situation as "controlled commodification": certain limitations and borderlines are imposed on the expansion of commodification and the use of market logic.

On the one hand, the neoliberal shift since the early 1980s is one of the defining features of China's media development. Although neoliberalism in China is different, due to its "Chinese characteristics" (Harvey 2005, 120), the core value of market freedom has been undoubtedly embedded within the media sector. Against this background, we could map the transition of news reporting from "hard" to "soft" and finally arrive at a new form of news narratives – "infotainment"; we could contextualise the urban-based Chinese "civic journalism" (Minsheng Xinwen) and its tremendous influence on social restructuring; and we could also see the integration of mass communication and web-based social networking communication into news reporting, which is changing rapidly.

On the other hand, as domestic witnesses, we have seen an expanding tendency of commodification and marketisation in the media industries, and some media conglomerates have emerged since the mid-1990s to meet the threat claimed from transnational players before the accession to WTO, whereas the Party-state-owned media enterprises are still the dominant forces in the domestic communication system, implying an intensified interaction between the market and the state. This raises a number of questions. How do market and political systems intertwine with each other in media development? Where is legitimacy to be found in such a situation? How do the socialist legacies shape people's attitudes toward globalisation and media development? And to what extent has the Western paradigm of journalism and communication theories gained a solid base among both academic circles and practitioners? It is difficult to say whether we have come to the end of transition, or whether we are standing at the starting point of further reforms.

In the terrain of media reform, it has been widely acknowledged that media content and media organisations are only in part able to challenge the hegemony of the existing political regime, and only the political regime can opt for changes. Any changes in ownership and journalistic operation must be contained within the existing institution of Party journalism. Although market-based journalism since the 1980s – evening tabloids, for example – has achieved great prosperity at the economic level and great impact at the cultural level, and although market-oriented media reform has been considered broadly as the liberation of journalism in China, each step "forward" toward a market democracy is under systematic monitoring by the Party-state leadership. In this sense, the transitional reality in China indeed

has proved what Karl Polanyi (2010, 272) emphasised, that markets and economies are embedded in society and culture. The market only works within particular social and cultural relations, which shape the scope and scale of marketisation. Based on this view, the unsynchronised social reform that has occurred in China is understandable.

Secondly, the attempt to use Western communication theories to interpret China's communication phenomena has to deal with the various co-existing stages of development, or in David Harvey's terminology, with "uneven geographical development" (2005, 87), which is one of the outcomes of neoliberalisation at both regional and global levels. So far, despite its rapid nationwide urbanisation, China still has a giant population in agriculture that lives in rural areas, for which media access is far more important than how to consume media contents for entertainment. The same problem faces millions of migrant workers who used to be peasants and who have chosen temporarily to move into urban areas where they can get jobs, mostly as manual labor, (for instance, construction workers), and can earn a better income than they can from farming. The commercialised media are less important to them than getting a formal contract and getting paid on time by the companies they work for, not the tabloid stories about their living difficulties that are offered by urban-based commercialised journalism to entertain the cities' middle classes. In a nutshell, the increased stratification of the Chinese population should be considered a key issue surrounding media reform by media and journalism scholars.

Another tendency of the uneven development in China is the growing gap between urban centers and rural peripheries. As cities are the best space for capital accumulation in terms of their capacity to concentrate labor and other means of production, China has since the early 1990s prioritised urban areas in both short-term and long-term development policy. Huge public and foreign investment has been directed towards important coastal and inland cities in order to build urban infrastructure such as a public transport, housing, education and medical care systems, facilitating business and other commercial-related social groups. The cities are thus privileged, no matter how the whole national economy may suffer, and how high the social cost of this sort of biased developmental model may be; cities will always be the first to be aided by the government and by public subsidy. In contrast, the rural areas, where most but largely disenfranchised Chinese people dwell, bear the burden of supporting an urban-centered economic system, coupled with relatively biased pricing, household registration and other long-standing political and economic instruments upheld by the central, provincial and municipal governments. The uneven development, in this case, amounts to the uneven redistribution of national wealth and other critical resources between urban and rural districts.

Among the social resources, media access is a typical one. Because the unprecedented process of commercialisation has pushed media reform in an irreversible direction, both state-owned media organisations and partly-privatised media-related companies have been flooding into big cities, in which abundant business opportunities can be found. Not only basic services but also unlimited value-added products have been the targets for media entrepreneurs. In addition, the government prioritises cities in public investment so as to support commercial activities and to attract international cooperation, also in the information and communica-

tion industries. As a result, in the cities most citizens enjoy better information and communication infrastructure and services, such as high-speed internet, digital and multichannel TV as well as a mobile telecommunication network of high quality, based on the alliance of government and companies, while the rural areas are increasingly in short supply of public support to improve local media and IT services. In this case, studying the great divide between urban centers and rural peripheries in getting basic and advanced information and communication access is far more crucial than scholarly work that focuses only on city issues.

Geographically, the coastal Eastern area is much more developed than the inland and Western districts in Mainland China. This is the result of a strategy historically chosen by the Chinese leadership during the process of social reform. Because the coastal East enjoys numerous geographical and cultural advantages in exchanging goods and ideas with the Western worlds, a number of cities, provinces and specifically designed administrative zones in Eastern China have risen to become the most developed regions in the country. Some of them are even listed among the most developed areas in the world, for instance, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Beijing, Shenzhen, the Yangzi River Delta and the Pearl River Delta. From a global capitalist perspective, these cities and regions are better seen as manufacturing and financial bases for the whole world market economy, rather than the singular components of a particular country. However, on the other hand, what is the situation in the rest of China, in those western provinces and inland cities and villages? Are they also the beneficiaries of the reform process or are they, on the contrary, dispossessed by the developed East through the same structural bias that has occurred between urban and rural areas? The history of thirty years of reform has so far shown what David Harvey termed "accumulation by dispossession" (2003, 137), in which the process of modernisation has resulted with the same distinction between East and West within China.

We have discussed the diverse social outcomes of the developmentalist modernisation of China and its accelerated globalisation that have had a profound impact on Chinese society. Rather than becoming an ideal of society as postulated by a Western paradigm of development, the complexities that have emerged during the historical processes are far beyond the capacities of Western theories to deal with. In this sense, instead of following the mainstream Western paradigm – for example, doing more concrete research into the media effects and urban-based audience behavior that is aimed at improving marketing and advertising strategies for media-related companies in order to direct China towards an imagined ideal of Western society - responsible scholarly work should shift attention to the uneven character of China's development, in which journalism, and in particular media communications, can play a key role to revitalise some fundamental principles of justice and to democratise the relations between regions and class strata.

As Chris Patten (2006, 9) noted, "for any liberal pluralist the comparative performances of India and China in the future will be a test of the correctness of our political philosophy." In the discussion of the intertwining of Party line and bottom line in Chinese media reform, Yuezhi Zhao (1998) contended that "as China struggles for democratisation in media communication, an important question needs to be asked about the adequacy of a Western liberal model as a normative ideal, regardless of its feasibility in China." These words were written more than

ten years ago, but the inquiries Zhao mentions are still at the center of debate in both academic circles and public opinion in China.

Furthermore, we must include the distinct historical and cultural background of China in any discussion. Since 2009, the Chinese central government has launched a huge project to expand the influence of Chinese news media on the global stage and to make China's voice better heard in international journalism. This entire expansion project is wholly funded by government subsidies. Without much consideration of getting economic benefits from the global media market, the project, as the leader of Xinhua News Agency Congjun Li argued in 2011, is designed to reconstruct a New World Media Order. Specifically, "we need a mechanism to coordinate the global communications industry, something like a "media UN." Of particular interest here is what Li said about the purpose of this project, which carried echoes of the NWICO (New World Information and Communication Order) proposed by the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1970s within the framework of UNESCO. If China does not intend to be a commercial empire in global communication industries as its Western counterparts have done very successfully, the orientation of China's media expansion remains to be discovered. If Xinhua is not designed to be another AP and Reuters in international journalism, what it will be in the future has definitely gone beyond a one-dimensional definition of developmentalist modernisation and globalisation. Since China has announced an ideal of building a "harmonious world," has China's intent to create a "harmonious society and harmonious world" also imposed theoretical difficulties for using Western paradigms to interpret China's rise? How are these ideas different from the strategies used by Western counterparts who got to the place of being a superpower in history? The answers cannot be given at present, but the questions themselves indeed open up space for paradigm and theoretical innovations. Besides, parallel to the media's "Going-out" policy, China's culture export has also been experimenting for years. Hundreds of Confucius Schools and Chinese programs supported by the Chinese government have been established in Western universities. To evaluate the influence of those cultural institutions in today's world also goes beyond the paradigms that China borrowed from the Western contexts.

As Hui Wang – a prominent Chinese public intellectual, known for his outstanding studies on contemporary Chinese literature and intellectual history – once insightfully noted, over hundreds of years in contemporary Chinese history, a handful of epistemological dichotomies have played a key role in framing Chinese intellectuals' worldviews, for example among others, Empire and Nation-State, East and West, Tradition and Modernity, underdeveloped and developed (Wang 1997). This binary epistemology assumes that merely borrowing a narrative structure from a West-centered worldview can lead to a meaningful and suitable identification for China in the world. But the reality is far more complicated. When Chinese intellectuals internalise Western knowledge and modes of thinking, they also have to face some aspects of history that are contradictory to a West-centered worldview, which undervalues the identity of China. After all, China was a country exploited and colonised by the West-centered global capitalist world. How does this kind of legacy shape the view through which Chinese think of modernity and development?

Therefore, a new paradigm or, at least a new approach, is needed to open eyes and shift attention on China's historical transition within a globalised world. The

first step forward is to critically examine the dominant Westernised epistemology which, after all, uses methodologies that are based on the existing West-centered political, economic and communication order and are shaped by Western history and values. It is time to use a macroscopic lens for Chinese media and journalism studies to look for alternative paradigms for future studies concerning the real identity of China in an open process of globalisation.

De-westernizing Media and Journalism Studies

So far it is still hard to say that there is an emerging Chinese paradigm of communication and media studies as well as journalism studies. But the fact is that we have seen that tremendous changes have taken place not only in the realm of information and communication technologies but also in the social structure. Taking the Chinese version of Twitter, Weibo, as an example, the single year of 2011 saw a rapid growth of Weibo users while the forms of traditional mass and internet-based journalism are changing accordingly. During some influential social events in the Mainland, the high-speed train crash in Zhejiang province, for example, Weibo has been the major channel for revealing the facts, sharing emergent information and social mobilisation. Some Chinese journalism and communication scholars even contend that such a wide usage of Weibo technology and the derived social interaction pattern is an actual communication revolution – the "Wei Revolution" (Yu 2011). The challenges this brings to Chinese daily lives lie at different levels and already go beyond people's capacity of imagination. We are not going back to a technological determinism, but the ever-changing relations between technology, market, politics and society have questioned the validity of the existing system of communication and journalism studies. Based on this concern and the historical trajectory of containing both Western and Chinese theories in a reformed China, we want to propose [an academic attempt in pursuit of] a new approach suitable for communication and journalism studies in the future.

This new approach is certainly not a complete creation, but a synthesised macroscopic view of historical analysis, epistemological rethinking and recombination of theories and practices in the modern Chinese context. In her article "Rethinking Chinese Media Studies: History, Political Economy and Culture," Yuezhi Zhao argues from a transcultural, global, political-economic point of view of communication that there are five "Rs" that are significant to revitalise domestic Chinese social processes in media studies: re-root the area in history, re-embed the area in the social terrain, re-define agency, re-engage with meaning and community and finally re-claim utopian imaginations (Zhao, 2009). Following Zhao's proposal, Hong Kong-based media scholar Linchuan Qiu calls for a "re-introduction of class back into Chinese communication studies" (Qiu, 2010). By class, he refers to a theoretical category that works through the history of capitalist social transition. Based on these concerns of shifting communication and media studies from a Western hegemony to a more domestic-based historical approach there is a need for a new integrated approach that combines both Western and Eastern local knowledge within a context of the deepening globalisation. Most importantly, a de-westernising innovation of media and journalism studies depends upon a consideration of the theoretical aspects of domestic issues, a comprehensive historical analysis of the processes of globalisation, and a solid understanding of a particular society in its own identity (Zhengrong et al., 2013).

A paradigm shift in journalism and communication studies is not only needed theoretically but is occurring in practices. What Chinese scholars and those international scholars who have an interest in China issues urgently need to do is to make active and responsible responses, rather than holding to frameworks and theories that have already been shown to be not appropriate.

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CHINA'S QUEST FOR "SOFT POWER": IMPERATIVES, IMPEDIMENTS AND IRRECONCILABLE TENSIONS?

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Abstract

From establishing Confucius Institutes all over the world to mounting an advertising blitz in New York's Times Square, the Chinese state's multifaceted endeavour to strengthen its "soft power" has been highly visible and the subject of much recent political, journalistic, and scholarly attention. This paper locates the Chinese state's "soft power" quest within historical and geopolitical contexts and explores the profound contradictions in its underpinning political economy and cultural politics. While this campaign's state, industry, professional and moral imperatives appear self-evident and there are converging elite and popular interests in the project, its structural impediments seem to be insurmountable. Furthermore, there are irreconcilable tensions between a drive to pursue an elitist, technocratic, and cultural essentialist approach to global communication and a capacity to articulate and communicate an alternative global political and social vision that appeals to the vast majority of the world population in a deeply divided and crises-laden domestic and global order.

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A decade ago, communication research was preoccupied with issues relating to transnational media expansion in China and its (potentially democratising) impact on Chinese politics and society. China's accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 marked a pivotal moment in this line of research. Since then, however, there has been a rapid shift in research orientation. Rather than focusing on Western media penetration in China, the Chinese media's "going global" strategies and the global implications of the Chinese State's quest for "soft power" has become the hottest topic of the day.

Analysts within and outside the academy have offered varied perspectives. One of the earliest and widely discussed books on the topic, published in 2007 by Joshua Kurlantzick, a fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations, carries the alarmist title *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World* (Kurlantzick 2007). A September 2010 report prepared for the National Endowment for Democracy explicitly added a darker twist to Kurlantzick's analysis: "As the Chinese government propagates a less-than-free model of journalism and assists undemocratic regimes by supporting media that buttress them, advocates of free media and democratic government should take note" (Farah and Mosher 2010, 26). The scholarly community, meanwhile, has offered sober analysis of China's "soft power" drive. Suisheng Zhao's following assessment is representative: "In spite of its initial success, China's current approach to soft power lacks a contemporary moral appeal and therefore is hardly sustainable in the competition with the United States to inspire the vision of building a free and prosperous world" (2009, 247). Written from a media studies perspective, Wanning Sun (2010) has similarly pointed out the limits of the "transmission view" of communication embedded in China's soft power drive and argued that a more effective approach would call for a "ritual view" stressing the representation of shared beliefs. Affirming the observation that "China's deficit of soft power" ultimately rests in a failure in "the articulation of values that the rest of the world can aspire to and emulate" (Bandurski 2009 cited in Sun 2010, 67), Sun concluded that China's soft power quest might be a "mission impossible."

Behind this cacophony of scholarly and interest group voices are real and imagined shifts in the geopolitics of global communication. U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton underscored this shift in her widely-known testimony in front of the U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities Committee on March 2, 2011: "So we are in an information war. And we are losing that war… Al-Jazeera is winning. The Chinese have opened up a global English-language and multi-language television network. The Russians have opened up an English-language network" (Committee for International Broadcasting 2011). Amidst a growing discourse on U.S. decline and China's rise in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 U.S.-originated global financial crisis, and to the extent that China is still under the CCP's control, China's soft power drive has rekindled a Cold War-era preoccupation with Chinese propaganda on the part of the U.S. political establishment. The topic of an April 30, 2009 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Committee Congressional Hearing was telling: "China's Propaganda and Influence Operations, Its Intelligence Activities that Target the United States, and the Resulting Impacts on U.S. National Security."

Rather than offer yet another assessment on the likely success of China's soft power drive, this paper takes a more holistic approach. After briefly mapping the multiple dimensions of China's soft power drive, I locate it in the historical

contexts, and examine its imperatives, and impediments as well as its potentially irreconcilable contradictions. The analysis foregrounds the conflicting nature of this drive as a manifestation of both the profound domestic tensions in China's ongoing transformation and intense contestations over China's place in a crisis-ridden global capitalist order.

A Brief Overview of China's Soft Power Initiatives

"Soft power," according to Joseph Nye, who coined the term in his 1990 book *Bound to Lead*, is the ability of a country to get what it wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. Suisheng Zhao (2009, 248) cited a Chinese source as saying that the term first appeared around 1997 in Chinese scholarly discourse and has become a popular phrase since 2001. According to him, "China has readily embraced the concept of soft power not only because it is compatible with many aspects of Chinese traditional and strategic thinking but more importantly because the concept offers a ready solution to ease the anxieties around the world about China's rise" (S. Zhao 2009, 248).

There is no question that China's dominant political and intellectual elite have unabashedly embraced this U.S.-originated concept. Concerted efforts at both the policy formation and implementation levels can be clearly documented. In the field of media and cultural policy, this effort can be traced back to the Chinese media industry's "going global" project starting in 2001 in response to Western media entry into the Chinese market, and higher level strategic articulations in key documents such as the January 2006 CCP Central Committee and State Council guidelines on "deepening cultural system reform," and Hu Jintao's report to the 17th CCP National Congress in October 2007 (Y. Zhao 2008). Former CCP propaganda chief Li Changchun's following remarks have been widely cited as a paradigmatic expression of this drive: "In the modern age, whichever nation's communication methods are most advanced, whichever nation's communication capacity is strongest … has the most power to influence the world" (cited in Farah and Mosher 2010, 7).

In practical terms, China's soft power initiatives encompass a whole range of efforts, from the establishment of Confucius Institutes and Classrooms all over the world since 2004 to increased state funding to official media outlets with an explicit objective to expand their global reach, including the widely publicised 2009 announcement of a 45 billion Yuan investment in main state media outlets to strengthen their international news coverage and global presence. Some of the highlights of leading official media outlets' expansionist moves have included: the rapid expansion and the constant re-vamping of CCTV's transnational satellite broadcasting, from the September 2000 launch of CCTV9 as a 24-hour English channel to its April 2010 re-launch as CCTV News, and the February 2012 official launch of CCTV America; Xinhua News Agency's rapid bureau expansion, the relocation of its North American office to Times Square, as well as its July 1, 2010 launch of CNC World, a 24-hour English news channel through satellite and the Internet (Guo 2011; Guo and Lye 2011); China Radio International's (CRI) all-out efforts in overseas landing through local partnerships and its addition of 6 new languages to its broadcasts in September 2009, so that it now broadcasts in 61 languages, the greatest number of languages among all international broadcasters. For its part,

China Daily is both expanding its overseas distribution and its overseas bureaus, while the *Global Times*, a market-oriented subsidiary of the *People's Daily*, launched an English edition on April 20, 2009 to become the second English language national daily. Underscoring the scope of the media expansion drive and the determination to be in the campaign for the long haul, even the CCP's theoretical journal, *Seeking Truth*, launched an English edition in July 2009 in an attempt to "make the core values of the party more understandable to Western societies, especially in the theoretical and academic circles there" (Shanghaiist 2009). To be sure, profitability is not a top concern, and the leaders of this endeavour "are aware that Western readers may give the cold shoulder to the theories and socialist dogma in the magazine"; nevertheless, the main purpose at the outset "is to secure a footing in the Western media and allow the party's voice to be accessed and understood by mainstream Western readers" (Shanghaiist 2009).

There has also been an expressed interest in global media governance. This was most recently articulated in Xinhua Director Li Congjun's June 1, 2011 *Wall Street Journal* article, "Toward a New World Media Order" in which he outlined an imbalance in global information flows and argued that "[w]e need a mechanism to coordinate the global communications industry, something like a 'media UN'." A related effort centres on public diplomacy and officially-sponsored media conferences aimed at improving understanding between Chinese and foreign media. For example, Xinhua News Agency co-hosted a high-profile 2009 World Media Summit in Beijing with leading global media organisations such as News Corporation, AP, Reuters, and the BBC. Yet another dimension is increased media-development assistance to developing countries, from offering media infrastructure such as radio transmitters to content-sharing agreements with foreign media outlets (Farah and Mosher 2010). Finally, China's soft power drive also encompasses professional, educational, and scholarly dimensions, from celebratory news reports on Chinese journalists' professional pride at their final arrival at the hottest global news spots, to a specialised degree program at top journalism schools aiming to train qualified personnel (Guo and Lye 2011, 12), and to the paradigmatic scholarly article on how to improve China's national image abroad and how to increase China's soft power.

Historical Contexts: Continuities and Changes

As I have argued in the context of China's WTO accession, China's post-Mao "openness" was not new from a longer historical perspective. After all, the PRC was open to the USSR and the socialist bloc in the 1950s and it later rivalled with the USSR for leadership in the international communist movement (Y. Zhao 2003, 60). Even since its early days of forging the Chinese revolution, "external propaganda" has always been an integrated part of the CCP's revolutionary strategies. Edgar Snow and other progressive Western journalists were some of the CCP's effective "third party" communicators during the pre-1949 revolutionary era. Moreover, the Cold War era witnessed the great China-USSR ideological debate of 1963-1964, as well as the spread of Maoism as a revolutionary ideology and a "third world" socialist alternative to both Western capitalist modernity and Soviet bureaucratic socialism. Even today, Maoism continues to inspire armed struggles in certain corners of the world, including parts of India, widely known as the world's largest democracy.

However, the embracing of the concept of "soft power" (*ruan shili*) as such is new, along with a profound change in the dominant logic of the CCP's cultural politics from one of "national liberation" to one of "national power." First, that this "made-in-the-U.S.A." terminology has been taken up explicitly by the ruling Chinese elite is significant. In the context of reduced American support for the Voice of America, the Chinese state's appropriation of a strategy offered by Nye to the U.S. state as a sitting hegemon has rightly added fuel to alarmist claims about U.S. decline and Chinese ambition as an aspiring global hegemon.

There has also been a concomitant shift in strategy. Rather than foregrounding ideological contestation between capitalism and socialism, China's current soft power drive, consistent with the CCP's suppression of domestic debates on ideology during the reform era, downplay or even explicitly suppress ideological differences in the global symbolic arena and focus on image-building instead. Similarly, rather than championing a notion of culture as a site of struggle between antagonistic social forces over the fundamental directions of society – after all, Mao named his last revolution the "Cultural Revolution" – the soft power drive foregrounds an (apparently) depoliticised notion of "culture." It is precisely within this context that one can appreciate the celebration of essentialist "Chinese" cultural values such "harmony" and the promotion of Confucius as China's "cultural ambassador" abroad. Concomitantly, there has also been a new and more instrumentalist understanding of culture not as a way of life, but as being "strategic" and "industrial," or even as a resource to be "mined." Fusing culture with business under the new mantra of "cultural system reform," then, is the objective of building up cultural soft power through the market-oriented expansion of Chinese cultural industries. Hollywood as both a capitalistic money-making machine and as the embodiment of American soft power serves as the ultimate model for China's cultural planners. As Yu Hong put it, "not only does the state rhetorically embrace the slogan of soft power, it also supports national champions and market-oriented 'go-out strategies'" (2012, 4). She cited Cai Wu, then Minister of Culture, as saying that although the state "used to see culture in propaganda terms," in the future, "we are going to use culture trade to occupy the market, to increase competitiveness, and to attract audiences" (Hong 2012, 4).

In terms of the mode of delivery, if the Maoist era promoted the ethics of "self-reliance" and emphasised substantive argumentation – the CCP's great ideological debate with the USSR between 1963 and 1964, for example, was executed in the form of nine *People's Daily* editorials – Chinese national image making and soft-power projection, consistent with the logic of neo-liberalised global media production and the consumption of the spectacle, relies on slick productions, technological innovations, private-public partnerships, as well as the mobilisation of domestic and transnational advertising and public relation machines. CNN, for example, was the advertising platform of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce in 2009 and then the Chinese State Council Information Office in 2011. The high-profile Times Square billboard promotion, displayed between January and February 2011 in support of then Chinese President Hu Jintao's tour to the U.S., however, was ordered by the State Council Information Office and produced by the Shanghai Lintas advertising agency, a joint-venture between Guangming Daily and the London-based international advertising agency Lowe & Partners, which in turn is a unit of the Interpublic

Group, one of the world's four largest advertising agency holdings conglomerates. Moreover, contrary to the generic figures of Chinese workers, farmers and soldiers in national image-making in the Mao era, the Chinese nation is now represented by celebrities and successful individuals such as film star Zhang Ziyi, NBA basketball star Yao Ming, pianist Lang Lang, film director John Woo, hybrid rice scientist Yuan Longping and Alibaba founder Jack Ma.

Imperatives: Converging Statist, Market, Elite and Popular Interests

Behind the drive is a convergence of state, industry, elite and popular interests. As reflected in the above-cited article by Xinhua's Li Congjun, the CCP leadership has long perceived an imbalance in global communications and China's weak position in the global symbolic arena. A widely-shared argument has been that China's discursive and cultural power has not been commensurate with its rapidly expanding economic status. The following statement, attributed to Yu Guoming, a leading Chinese media scholar at Renmin University, articulated this argument well: "the strength of our voice does not match our position in the world. That affects the extent to which China is accepted by the world. If our voice does not match our role, however strong we are, we remain a crippled giant" (cited in Guo and Lye 2011, 14). Even more frustratingly for China's ruling elites, as the contradictions of the global economic system intensify and as China becomes more deeply integrated into the system, it seems that China is increasingly being blamed for its domestic shortcomings and global threats, from human rights abuses and media censorship to environmental threats and global resources grabs. Western media coverage of the 2008 Olympics Torch Relay revealed to the Chinese leadership the extent of foreign media "hostility" and the gap between negative Western opinion and the Chinese elite's desire to showcase the country's final restoration to its "rightful" place as a respected and dignified global power. Huang Ping, a researcher with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, put China's new problem in this way: in the first 30 years of PRC history, China solved the problem of being beaten up; in the second 30 years of PRC history, China solved the problem of being hungry; now, China faces the problem of being condemned (Ma 2008). Thus, if it is true that the post-colonial state aimed to "find for 'the nation' a place in the global order of capital, while striving to keep the contradictions between capital and the people in perpetual suspension" (Chatterjee 1986, 68), the Chinese state seems to have done exactly so. But this is a damned place in the global order of capital. Apart from and perhaps precisely because of the mounting global political economic crises that China found itself in after 30 years of global economic integration and break-neck economic development, China has become the target of critique in a global public opinion arena dominated by Western-based transnational corporate media. Above all, the liberal human rights discourse has become the ideology by which the West condemns China (Y. Zhao 2009). To defend China and explain China has become a paramount statist objective.

The media industry's organisational interests and its market imperatives are also quite evident. To the extent that China's state-own media outlets have now all become market-oriented business conglomerates, they share the same expansionist logic that underpins the outward market expansionist imperative of Western

media conglomerates. Thus, outward and global expansion is as much a business strategy of China's state-owned media companies and the results of the dynamics of market competition as a statist mission. As Guo Zhenzhi and Lye Liang Fook put it, China's media organisations are keen to ride on the state-endorsed "going out" strategy "to extend their reach to a wider audience. It is very much about the intense competition among these media players to gain a bigger market share" (2011, i). The Xinhua News Agency's intention to get into the television market, for example, had long been frustrated by the Chinese media system's bureaucratic monopoly because the state's television market regulator, then under the name of State Administration for Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), protects the domestic monopoly of its affiliated CCTV (Y. Zhao 2008). Judy Polumbaum was thus quite correct in characterising Xinhua's expansionist efforts, especially its quest for a television outlet, as "empire-building" (Polumbaum 2009). Taking advantage of the state's soft power agenda, Xinhua eventually managed to establish its television service CNC World by over-stepping the SARFT's authority to obtain permission from the central leadership (Guo and Lye 2011, 5). At the same time, by initially targeting the external market, Xinhua avoided head-on competition with CCTV for the domestic audience at the onset. Thus, as Guo and Lye observed, there is an "often overlooked internal dimension in the Chinese media's 'going out' drive." In fact, leading state media organisations such as Xinhua, CCTV and the People's Daily have turned the statist strategy into "a resource competition game" (Guo and Lye 2011, 11), or a way for them to secure more political prestige and financial resources.

Statist and media organisational imperatives enmesh well with the professional and personal interests as well as the cultural sensibilities of China's upwardly mobile and globalising media managers and professionals. As expressed so powerfully in *River Elegy*, one of the most influential media texts of the 1980s that nurtured a whole generation of Chinese media managers and professionals, China's intellectuals and media professionals have long had a desire to have a genuine dialogue with the West. Such an objective overlaps but cannot be reduced to the statist objective of mobilising Chinese soft power to conquer the hearts and minds of the world. Here again, Polumbaum's observation is pertinent: "In terms of broad objectives, some agencies and actors producing media content aimed at foreigners genuinely hope to explain China's policies and programs to 'outsiders' and engage in conversation with them" (Polumbaum 2009). Moreover, to the extent that members of China's urban middle class, in the context of a rapidly globalising and polarising consumer society, are increasingly casting their gazes outwards (more specifically toward the West), rather than downward, i.e. to communicate with the domestic lower social classes, there are strong reasons why expanding foreign media operations and strengthening external communication – specifically with an elite Western audience – resonate with the cultural sensibilities of media managers and professionals. On a personal level, many of China's state media managers have their single child studying in the West. Some have even migrated to the West themselves or maintained "flexible citizenship" by travelling back and forth between China and Western countries. The media's "going global" strategy thus fits in quite well with the patterns of transnational mobility of Chinese media managers and professionals.

Last but not least are the growing nationalistic sentiments of China's urban middle class as a whole. Here, it is necessary to make an essential, though difficult

and messy, distinction between parochial nationalism or even Chinese chauvinism, and a politics of national recognition and dignity in a global order that continues to be characterised by uneven political economic and cultural relations. As I have written elsewhere (Y. Zhao 2008; 2009), Chinese nationalism is a complicated, fluid, and multifaceted phenomenon. The dominant discourse of nationalism has typically advanced from the perspective of the "national interests" of an aspiring nation aiming to achieve more parity in global power relations. Much of the current discourse on China being in a "weak" position or carrying a "deficit" in the area of soft power is anchored in this realistic framework of increasing China's "comprehensive national power." Some strands of Chinese nationalism also probably express chauvinistic or xenophobic tendencies, perhaps even reflecting "an arrogant overconfidence in the over-privileged" in response to China's economic ascendancy (Sklair 2001, 29).

However, there are also Chinese voices of opposition against the forces of Western hegemony, capitalistic exploitation, and racial prejudice. The transnational Chinese movement in protest against Western media coverage of the unrest in Tibet in March and April 2008 is a powerful manifestation of the desire on the part of Chinese society for its voice to be heard on the global stage. In this movement, the overseas Chinese and China's Internet savvy urban youth of the reform era have taken the lead in defending Chinese sovereignty over Tibet in the realm of global public opinion, in struggling for the dignity of the Chinese nation, and in exposing the Western media for their apparent biases and distortions in their coverage of the protests in Tibet. In the global, media-studies literature, the "active audience" thesis was developed to discredit the cultural imperialism thesis. However, in this case, an active transnational Chinese audience mobilised themselves to fight against what they perceived to be the bluntest manifestations of cultural imperialism and racism in the Western media. As Wang Hui has argued, to simply characterise the whole movement as "parochial nationalism" is clearly to miss its substance, that is, "the logic of the politics of dignity and equality" (Wang 2011, 226) that underpins it.

Thus, the top-down statistic drive of boosting China's soft power at least partially resonates with the bottom-up inspirations of parts of the globalised Chinese middle class, especially its youth. For example, one of the widely circulated You Tube videos, "Tibet Was, Is and Always will Be Part of China," was produced by a second-year Chinese university student studying in Canada. The famous website anti-cnn.com (now known as April Media) was launched by Rao Jing in 2008, then a twenty-three year old Tsinghua University graduate in Engineering Physics and an Internet entrepreneur. Against domestic, liberal-intellectual characterisations of them as belonging to the "fifty-cent party," that is, being paid by the state to put out pro-state online messages, these individuals proudly call themselves members of the "self-financed fifty-cent party" or "the fifty-cent party that packs its own meals" (*ziganwu*). A fuller understanding of China's soft power drive must take into account the complicated and dynamic accommodations and tensions between statist and popular initiatives. Again, Wang Hui is insightful in this regard:

> *Today, when a mainstream Chinese media under the control of a small group nonetheless constantly declares itself to be the voice of the people, the power that the students demonstrated – whatever one thinks of it – provided a powerful instance of just what the voice of the people consisted*

of. This has been a turning point, a point where a new generation of people might gain a new understanding of China and of China's antagonisms and predicaments – it is a moment where one can gain an understanding of China's true position in the world's contemporary order (Wang Hui 2011, 226).

Impediments and Irreconcilable Tensions?

Although the Chinese leadership's strategy has been to stress business and market relations, to foreground an ostensibly depoliticised notion of culture, and to downplay ideological differences, it is simply impossible for China's soft power drive to escape global geopolitics. Nor can it avoid Western ideological resistance. The Chinese information technology company Huawei, for example, has met repeated setbacks in trying to expand its business in the West through acquisitions due to the "national security concerns" of the U.S., Canadian and Australian states. In 2010, when the Washington Post company put up the money-losing *Newsweek* for sale, the Nanfang Daily Group teamed up with Borui, a Chinese private media company, and a group of "pure fi nancial investors," to put in a bid. However, the bid was rejected at the onset, and the reason has nothing to do with the tendered price (Zhu 2010). In the end, Sidney Harman, the 91-year-old audio equipment tycoon and husband of U.S. Congresswoman Jane Harman, was able to buy *News-week*, which he described as a "national treasure," for a nominal amount of just a single dollar (Clark 2010). Clearly, the media business is no ordinary business and money does not always talk, despite all the wishful thinking or pretensions on the part of China's market reformers.

Nor should one underestimate the competitive imperative of the Western media. Here, nothing is more effective than to undermine the credibility of the Chinese media in the global marketplace by continuing to portray them as merely an extension of the Chinese state, or even part of the Chinese intelligence system. Is Xinhua a spy agency? This was an interview question posed to me as a potential expert source by a Canadian journalist in early 2011. Beyond the issue of institutional credibility (Sun 2010; Guo and Lye 2011), a problem that the Chinese media system may not be able to overcome unless and until it reshapes itself in the image of the Western system, the political straitjacket and ideological complicity of the Chinese media make their content hardly appealing to the Western political and intellectual elite, the "opinion leader" strata that China's soft power drive aims to appeal to as a matter of priority.

Moreover, despite growing state investments in expanding China's news-gathering capacities overseas and in improving Chinese journalists' professional competencies, there is still a heavy dependence on the part of Chinese news outlets on Western news agencies such as APTN and Reuters for their coverage of international affairs (Jirik 2008). Behind this is a serious personnel problem. Although the reform era saw an explosion in Chinese journalism schools and although there has also been a steady flow of "sea turtles" – individuals with Western education – back to China, individuals with the perfect combination of foreign language skills, journalistic training and global affairs expertise, remain rare commodities. Moreover, a job in the Chinese state media is still not as desirable as one in government, other sectors of China's transnationalising economy or transnational corporations operating in

China. In short, it remains a challenge for Chinese media organisations to recruit and retain the best available talents to work in their international departments.

Nor does the elitist orientation and blatant class bias of the Chinese media in general fare favourably in projecting an open and inclusive China in the global arena. If one of the objectives of the Chinese soft power drive is to counter the Western media's persistent critique of human rights violations in China, then it is up to the Chinese media to showcase a China where different social classes have flourished, or where "the logic of the politics of dignity and equality" has been extended to "all social relationships in Chinese society, including ethnic relations, and not limited merely to protest against the unfair words of the Western media" (Wang 2011, 226). However, as far as the domestic class orientation of China's soft power projectors are concerned, it is perhaps fair to hypothesise that the China they have in mind is one that has largely excluded its underclass and marginalised populations. For the same reason, the "national interests" that the Chinese media aim to promote abroad are those defined by the dominant political, economic and cultural elite. Ironically, it is the Western media that have often cast themselves as champions of China's lower social classes. This is driven home by the contrast between the Chinese state's Times Square commercial, which features economic, social and cultural celebrities in a highly individualistic fashion, and *Time* magazine's 2009 featuring of Chinese workers as a collective entity on its cover.

This, in turn, raises profound and perhaps irreconcilable tensions in China's soft power drive. To be sure, to the extent that this drive aims to ease global anxieties about China's rise and underscores the Chinese state's commitment to "peaceful development," it constitutes a pro-active and desirable strategy in international politics. However, critics have pointed out that Nye's dichotomous categorisation of the source of power into hard power and soft power is inappropriate (Li 2009, 6). Moreover, to assume that the U.S. has been able to project its "soft power" without the backing of imperialist military and economic power is simply naïve, and worse, an ideological smokescreen for imperial domination. In a sense, the "soft power" concept is based on circular reasoning. Culture, ideology, and values are not inherently attractive, persuasive and appealing in nature. They could result in "resentment, repulsion, hostility and even conflict." On the other hand, "hard power can also produce attraction, appeal, and amenity in certain circumstances" (Li 2009, 4).

Moreover, to the extent that China's soft power drive is also very much a reactive move aiming at counterbalancing external critiques against the negative political and social consequences of China's capitalist integrationist/market-authoritarian developmental pattern, and to the extent that it aims at "image-making" and winning favourable global images for a fundamentally flowed developmental path, this drive is perhaps not only "mission impossible" but also highly problematic, even reactionary in some of its dimensions. To be sure, the Western media have been caught in their own ideological prison in so far as China's protracted post-Mao transformation has posed an ideological challenge to the Western myth that capitalism and liberal democracy go hand in hand. Although many of China's ruling elites desperately want the Chinese state to be seen as a member of the "global community" as defined by the West, the Western media continue to describe it as "the goon state" (*The Economist* 2011). This will continue so as long as the Chinese state remains in its current form, and as long as it acts as an agent of inter-capi-

talist rivalry, trying to advance the interests of domestic Chinese capital vis-à-vis transnational capital. Indeed, whatever gain the Chinese state's image-making and legitimacy-enhancing soft power drive has achieved in the past few years seems to have been undone by early 2012, when the May 14, 2012 issue of *Time* magazine splashed its cover with the title "The People's Republic of Scandal" in the aftermath of the ouster of CCP politburo member Bo Xilai and the human rights drama surrounding the blind legal advocate Chen Guangcheng's escape into the U.S. Embassy. Contrary to Hilary Clinton's fear, the U.S. is not only winning the "information war" with China in these cases but is also able to win unprecedented economic concessions from Chinese state managers in the aftermath of the Bo and Chen scandals (Y. Zhao 2012).

Concluding Remarks

As I discussed at the onset, critics have rightly noted the inability of the Chinese state to articulate an appealing set of values as the biggest problem. I wish to go beyond a nation-state-centric perspective to argue that, in a deeply class-divided and crisis-ridden global capitalist order, the question is not so much about Chinese soft power but a fundamental conflict between competing global political economies and cultural imaginaries. In the final analysis, there is a choice between a Confucius capitalist China that is trying to integrate with a socially and ecologically unsustainable planetary capitalist order and a renewed socialist China that is leading a post-capitalist and post-consumerist, sustainable developmental path as part and parcel of an alternative globalisation. From this perspective, there is also fundamental tension between charming the global elites and winning the hearts and minds of the vast majority of the global population with alternative visions to capitalist globalisation, that is, between the 1 percent and the 99 percent, to borrow from the "Occupy Movement."

To be sure, there are emergent intellectual and popular articulations of a renewed struggle for socialism, although they are typically dismissed by domestic liberal intellectuals and the Western media as well as the mainstream Western scholars as "pro-state" and "nationalistic." The popular book *China Rises: Our Future, Destiny and Spiritual Independence* (Mo 2009), for example, argued that it is time for China to move from "connecting with the global track" (i.e. capitalist re-integration) to "changing track," or even compelling the West to "change its track," i.e. to embark on a sustainable developmental path that radically transforms the Western-dominated, "high energy, high consumption and highly exploitative" model of development. *A Just Path for Humanity* (Hu, Wang, Zhou, Han 2011), written by four leading left-leaning scholars, went further with an affirmation of the country's Maoist revolutionary past, a balanced yet critical assessment of thirty years of capitalistic integration, as well as a call for surpassing the capitalist "market society." Concurrently, as He Guimei (2011) has summarised, there has been a growing intellectual ferment over "cultural self-consciousness" and the "China" narrative, that is, a way to re-imagine "China" and the "world" that at the same time transcends the "China versus West" dichotomy and critically engages with the core issues of capitalism, state, nation, and democracy.

Yet it remains a profound challenge for this critical intellectual awareness to become the basis of a new reform consensus in a crisis-ridden China. As I have

demonstrated in my analysis of the communication war over the unfolding political drama centring on Bo Xilai, not only are there deep fissures at both the elite and the popular levels over the future directions of China's transformation and its role in the global society, but there are also complex dynamics of domestic and global media articulations and elite coordination that go beyond national politics and national image-making. In fact, the nation-state-centric "soft power" concept can hardly describe the substantive patterns of domestic and global communication surrounding the Bo Xilai saga (Y. Zhao 2012). Any "soft power" drive that aims to project a unified set of values to the world is doomed to fail when there is not even elite, let alone national, consensus over the future direction of the country and its place in the world.

The point is not about returning to China's "red" past, Maoist "third worldism," let alone the Cultural Revolution, as Bo Xilai's quest for red soft power inside China has been charged. But Confucian values are certainly not going to save China, let alone the world, and it remains necessary for China to come to terms with the revolutionary, egalitarian and internationalist legacies of the Chinese revolution on the one hand, and to engage with the planetary problems of global capitalism on the other. Unless and until China's "soft power" drive is articulated with a critical political and cultural self-awakening, leading to a post-capitalist and post-consumerist, sustainable, developmental path, or is at least reflective of both internal and external debates and struggles between dominant and alternative visions of the global order, it is doomed to be yet another means to enfranchise the Chinese media and cultural segment of what Leslie Sklair has called the "transnational capitalist class." After all, soft power is inextricably linked to class power, and foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy.

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DE-AMERICANISING
MEDIA STUDIES AND THE
RISE OF "CHINDIA"

DAYA KISHAN THUSSU

Abstract

The creation of a global market has not only contributed to the globalisation of Western and, more specifically, American media around the world, but also opened up the media and communication sectors in large and hitherto highly regulated countries such as China and India. The resultant flow of media products from such countries has created more complex global information, infotainment and entertainment spheres. This article examines the increasing importance of China and India in global communication and media discourses and the challenge that the rise of "Chindia" poses for the study of media and communication. It argues that the globalisation of media industries and audiences, combined with the internationalisation of higher education – reflected in the changing profile of both faculty and students – requires a new approach for research and the teaching of media and communication. While global media and their study remain firmly embedded in a Western or, more accurately, American discourse, the new realities of the post-2008 world warrant a re-evaluation of how we define the global. The article concludes by considering what "Chindia" might mean in a de-Americanised media world.

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Digitisation and deregulation have transformed the global media landscape, enabling a quantum leap in the production, consumption and distribution of media products across the continents. The creation of a global market, an outcome of major institutional and technological changes introduced during the 1990s, has contributed to the globalisation of Western and, more specifically, American programming around the world, but also made it possible for a reverse flow of media content from the global South. The free-market ideology that such globalisation championed has opened up the media and communication sector in large and hitherto highly regulated countries such as China and India. The resultant flow of media products from such countries has created more complex global information, infotainment and entertainment spheres.

In this article I want to explore the increasing importance of China and India in global communication and media discourses and the challenge that the rise of "Chindia" poses for the study of media and communication. I argue that the globalisation of media industries and audiences, combined with the internationalisation of higher education – reflected in the changing profile of both faculty and students – requires a new approach for research and the teaching of media and communication. I use the motif of de-Americanisation to suggest the ways in which this discourse can be advanced. The article ends with a few reflections on what Chindia would mean in a de-Americanised media world.

A Media Pax Americana?

Despite the unprecedented growth of media and communication industries in the global South, particularly in such countries as China, India and Brazil, the global media continue to be dominated by Hollywood or Hollywoodised content. As during most of the twentieth century, the US remains today the largest exporter both of the world's entertainment and infotainment programmes and of the computer programming thorough which these are distributed across the increasingly interconnected and digitised globe. The American media's imprint on the global communication space, by virtue of the ownership of multiple networks and production facilities, is well documented. As Table 1 shows, in 2011 four out of the five top entertainment corporations in the world were US-based, evidence of the existence of a Pax Americana, a trend which has become pronounced in the era of digital and networked entertainment. These corporations have benefited from the growth of markets in large Southern countries such as China and India.

Table 1: The Top Five Media and Entertainment Corporations

Company	Where based	Fortune 500 Rank	Revenue $ million	Profits $ million
Vivendi	France	225	38,248	2,911
Walt Disney	US	226	38,063	3,963
Comcast	US	228	37,937	3,635
News Corp.	US	284	32,778	2,539
Time-Warner	US	363	26,888	2,578

Source: *Fortune*, July 2011.

Thanks to America's formidable political, economic, technological and military power, American or Americanised media are available across the globe, in English or in dubbed or indigenised versions. In almost all media spheres the US media giants dwarf their global competitors: from entertainment and sport (Hollywood, MTV, Disney, ESPN) to news and current affairs (CNN, Discovery, Time) and to much-vaunted social media (Google, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter) (UNESCO 2005; Thussu 2006; UNESCO 2009).

These US entertainment and information networks are the movers and shakers of the $1.3 trillion global media and cultural industry, one of the fastest growing in the world, accounting for more than 7 percent of global GDP (UNCTAD 2008). This supremacy is also reflected in the study of media, largely because of the dominance of English as the language of global communication, combined with the fact that the field of communication and media studies emerged in the United States. American communication and media schools have produced the majority of textbooks and journals published in the area, closely followed by Britain.

One result of such a history was that US approaches were adopted in media and communication courses around the world, particularly in the global South, where the "modernisation paradigm" influenced university courses, teaching and research. This liberal tradition of research privileged quantitative work, which was valuable in terms of providing useful data, but less so in analysing the complex political and socio-cultural dimensions of communication in developing countries (Sparks 2007).

As an antidote to such "administrative" research, the Marxism-influenced critical tradition focused on patterns of ownership and production in the media and communication industries, locating these within transnational power structures. However, many critical scholars were constrained by the Cold War ideology, which divided the world into two camps: a capitalist West, led by the United States, and a communist bloc with its centre in Moscow. In such a stark formulation, the authoritarian vs. the liberal media theory shaped the academic discourse. What it failed to take into account was the fact that large, complex countries such as China (the Sino-Soviet rift had taken place in the 1950s) and India (the founding father of the Non-aligned movement) did not fit into this polarised picture of the world.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the demise of such disciplines as "Sovietology" have softened the political edges of critical research, as post-modern, identity-driven media and communication discourses became popular and globalised quickly, entering into hitherto uncharted territories such as China. As capitalism triumphed, the transitional state of the media in the former communist countries of the Eastern bloc alerted scholars such as Downing to re-evaluate Western media theory in view of the political and cultural changes in the European landscape. Downing argued that "to extrapolate theoretically from such relatively unrepresentative nations as Britain and the United States is both conceptually impoverishing and a peculiarly restricted version of even Eurocentrism" (Downing 1996, xi).

With the globalisation of media, scholars began to speak of "de-Westernising" media studies, part of "a growing reaction against the self-absorption and parochialism of much Western media theory" (Curran and Park 2000, 3). Since then, many other scholars have argued for expanding and internationalising media studies, necessitated by the transformation of media and communication in Asia,

the world's most populous region, with some of its fastest growing economies, raising questions about what constitutes the "global" in media and its study (Thussu 2009; Wang 2011).

The Rise of China: Rhetoric and Reality

The peaceful "rise" of China as the world's fastest growing economy has profound implications for the study of global media and communication, taking place in parallel with the transformation of international communication in all its variants – political, intercultural, organisational, developmental and corporate. Since 2006, China has been the largest holder of foreign-currency reserves, estimated in 2012 to be $3.3 trillion. On the basis of purchasing power parity (PPP), China's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will surpass the United States by 2016, making it the world's largest economy, according to the International Monetary Fund (see Table 2).

Table 2: The World's Number 1: China vs. the US (Valuation of GDP based on PPP, in $trillions)

		2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
China		10.11	11.31	12.46	13.74	15.16	16.80	18.67
US		14.52	15.06	15.49	15.99	16.62	17.39	18.25

Source: IMF.

China has demonstrated extraordinary and unprecedented economic growth in the past quarter of a century. When the country opened up to global businesses in the 1980s, its presence in the international corporate world was negligible. By 2011, China had 61 companies in the Fortune Global 500, just behind Japan (68) and the US (133). Moreover, in 2011, three of the top ten global corporations were Chinese: Sinopec (also known as China Petroleum and Chemical Corp), China National Petroleum (founded only in 2002) and State Grid. For long a preserve of Western companies, Chinese corporations now have a regular presence among the Fortune 500 top ten – a trend in evidence since 2008, the year that cracks in the US-supported neo-liberal global financial infrastructure began to appear. Significantly, these companies are in strategic areas – energy, banking and telecommunication – prompting some economists, such as Subramanian, to argue that China has already become the most economically dominant nation and its currency will before long replace the dollar as the world's reserve currency (Subramanian 2011). A 2012 multinational survey conducted by the Pew Center endorsed this position, saying: "In 2008, before the onset of the global financial crisis, a median of 45 percent named the US as the world's leading economic power, while just 22 percent said China. Today, only 36 percent say the US, while 42 percent believe China is in the top position" (Pew Center 2012, 24).

China's success story has many admirers, especially in the developing world, where the Chinese model of a mixture of authoritarian governance and fiscal discipline may be more acceptable (Chan, Lee and Chan 2011). Already there is talk of replacing the "Washington consensus" with what has been termed the "Beijing consensus" (Halper 2010) and this raises questions about global governance under

such a dispensation (Chan, Lee and Chan 2011). As a recent themed issue of the journal China Quarterly on China in Latin America argued:

> *China's officially articulated understanding of its actions in the developing world is a uniform one: 'going out' (zou chuqu), 'mutual benefit,' and 'giving and getting,' all of which is predicated on the principles of mutual respect, absolute state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. Each one of these principles can be empirically questioned, but the broad brush strokes of China's overall understanding of its globalization in the developing world is a relatively coherent one that is then applied to quite different world areas* (Armony and Strauss 2012, 5).

In the creative and cultural industries, too, China has demonstrated very impressive growth, exporting both hard and software for the media and communication industries. China is the world's biggest mobile telephone market, having the highest blogger population, as well as being the largest exporter of IT products (Montgomery 2010). Media and communication equipment exported from China, including mobile telephones, TV sets, computers, game consoles, video equipment, CD and DVD readers and recorders, are available in markets around the globe (UNESCO 2009).

China is investing heavily in its external communication, including broadcasting and on-line presence, as well as in the proliferation of Confucius Institutes across the globe, part of Chinese public diplomacy (Kurlantzick 2007; Wang 2008; Lai and Lu 2012). Chinese President Hu Jintao has stressed the importance of culture: "Culture has become a more and more important source of inspiration for national cohesion and creativity and a more and more significant factor in the competition of national comprehensive power (zonghe guoli) and the Chinese people have an increasingly ardent desire for a richer cultural life" (cited in Zhang 2010, 383).

The Chinese film and television industry has had a global dimension with its audiences in the Sino-sphere, with notable centres like Shanghai, Hong Kong, Taipei, and Singapore (Curtin 2007). Such international hits as Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000), Hero (2002), and House of Flying Daggers (2004) have created a Chinese presence in the global entertainment arena. These products also demonstrate a collaboration with Hollywood marketing and distribution networks, a trend which has been considerably strengthened since then as China has become a lucrative market for Hollywood companies (in 2011, overall Chinese box-office takings crossed the two billion dollar mark). It is thus not surprising that major Hollywood companies including DreamWorks and Fox have been involved in co-production projects.

Global Bollywood and Beyond

Though not growing at the same pace and scale as China, India, the other Asian giant, has also demonstrated a robust annual economic performance in the past decade and is increasingly viewed internationally as an emerging economic and political power (Kumar and Puranam 2011; Nayyar 2012). On the basis of purchasing-power parity, India was the fourth largest economy in 2010, behind Japan, China and the US. However, compared with China's 61, India had only eight corporations in the Fortune 500 list in 2011. The rapid liberalisation, dere-

gulation and privatisation of media and cultural industries in the world's largest democracy, coupled with the increasing availability of digital delivery and distribution technologies, have ensured that Indian content is increasingly visible in the global media sphere (Athique 2012). The most prominent manifestation of Indian content in global media is India's $3.5 billion film industry, which has helped to make the country an attractive tourism and investment destination. "Bollywood" is the world's largest film factory in terms of production and viewership: every year a billion more people buy tickets for Indian movies than for Hollywood films. Indian films are increasingly being watched by international audiences in more than 70 countries (Kaur and Sinha 2005; Thussu 2008; Gopal and Moorti 2008; Rai 2009; Dudrah 2012).

Though India has been exporting films to countries around the world since the 1930s, it was only during the 1990s that Bollywood became part of the "global popular" (Thussu 2008; Rai 2009; Dudrah 2012). The unprecedented expansion of television in the past two decades – from a state monopoly until 1991 to 500 plus channels in 2012 – was a boost for the movie industry, as many dedicated film-based pay channels emerged.

Digitisation and the growing availability of satellite and cable television have ensured that Indian films are regularly shown outside India and with the new digital delivery mechanism, distributed via many different modes, defining popular culture among the 35-million strong South Asian diaspora, scattered in all continents (Athique 2012). One result of such interest was that diasporic film makers such as US-based Mira Nair (director of the 2001 Bollywood-inspired comedy Monsoon Wedding) and the British-based Gurvinder Chaddha (director of the 2002 comedy Bend It Like Beckham and the 2003 film Bride and Prejudice) have set out to make films that bridge Western and Indian popular cinema (Matusitz and Payano 2011; Dudrah 2012).

Another factor which has contributed to the popularisation of Bollywood is the growing presence of Western actors appearing in Indian films. Examples include the British actor Rachel Shelly, who was part of the love triangle in the 2001 commercially and critically acclaimed Lagaan (Land Tax), while British actress Alice Patten was the leading lady in the 2006 hit Rang De Basanti (Colour it Saffron). Indian films were also popular in the Soviet Union and continue to be viewed in Russia (Rajagopalan 2008) and in Japan (Matsuoka 2008). In Germany, mainstream television channels such as RTL regularly screen Bollywood movies dubbed in German. Apart from the diasporic and Western market, Bollywood films have traditionally been popular among other developing countries in Asia, the Middle East and Africa. In Nigeria, musicians of the Ushaq'u Indiya (Society for the Lovers of India) use "vocal harmonies" from Hindi film lyrics and rework them into Hausa versions (Uba Adamu 2010), while in Indonesia, local music has been influenced by Indian musicals (David 2008). Bollywoodised content has even reached Brazil, itself a major producer of popular entertainment. One prominent example is the hugely successful India-themed Brazilian soap opera called "India – A Love Story," screened in prime-time in 2009 on TV Globo, which won an International Emmy Award for best telenovela.

Television contributes to this globalisation process, selling the glitz and glamour of Bollywood to global audiences. The transmission of the annual International Indian Film Academy (IIFA) awards attracts huge audiences internationally. These

mega events, accounting for more than four hours of live presentation ceremonies, peppered with song and dance numbers, are beamed live to audiences both domestic and diasporic. The venues for such events have straddled the globe, beginning with London in 2000, to Sun City in South Africa (2001), Kuala Lumpur (2002), Johannesburg (2003), Singapore (2004,) Amsterdam (2005,) Dubai (2006,) Leeds/Bradford (2007,) Bangkok (2008,) Macao (China) (2009,) Colombo (2010,) Toronto (2011) and again in Singapore in 2012.

According to industry estimates, the Indian entertainment and media industry is worth $29 billion, while exports from its information technology and IT-enabled services have reached $148 billion (UNCTAD 2008; FICCI/KPMG Report 2011; Amin 2011; Karnik 2012). As the UN's Creative Economy Report 2010 recorded, India showed the largest growth in exports of creative goods during 2002-2008 (UNCTAD 2010). In addition to indigenous media products, India is increasingly a production base for transnational – largely US-based – media conglomerates, especially in areas such as animation and post-production services for Hollywood and other media industries. These growing cultural links with the US-dominated transnational media conglomerates also facilitate the marketing and distribution of Indian content (Kohli-Khandekar 2010). As international investment increases in the media sector, after cross-media ownership rules are relaxed, new synergies are emerging between Hollywood and Bollywood: Indian media companies too are investing in Hollywood productions (Kohli-Khandekar 2010; Thomas 2010). The changing geo-political equation in Asia, which has led to a closer economic and strategic relationship between Washington and New Delhi, has given a boost to this process.

This is also the case in India's dynamic news media landscape, with 122 round-the-clock news channels and a strong tradition of English-language journalism. Global news players have entered into partnerships with Indian companies, for example CNN, with CNN-IBN, an English news and current affairs channel, launched in 2005 in association with TV-18 Group, while Times Now, owned by the Times of India Group, ran a joint news operation with Reuters between 2006-2008. Such channels have a global reach and ambition. The richer members of the Indian diaspora – estimated to have a net worth of $300 billion – are tuning in to Indian news channels and on-line news portals to keep abreast of developments (Kapur 2010). There has also been a massive expansion in newspaper circulation: India is the world's largest newspaper market with 110 million copies sold every day, according to the World Association of Newspapers. Many of these newspapers are in the English language, with journalists who can operate in a global media sphere. Indian-born or Indian-origin journalists are increasingly visible in leading international news outlets in the West.

The Other Globalisation: China+India = Chindia

What is the bilateral relationship between the world's two ancient civilisations, with the largest populations and fastest growing economies? Jairam Ramesh, political analyst and currently India's Rural Development Minister, is credited with coining the term "Chindia," a phenomenon representing what has been termed as the "rise of the rest" in a "post-American world" (Ramesh 2005; Zakaria 2008). The idea of this neologism seems to be catching on; a Google search for the word

"Chindia" shows more than 800,000 hits. Any meaningful discussion of global media research ought to take into account the rapid growth of these two large nations with their potential to influence the emerging global scene (Khanna 2007; Meredith 2007; Smith 2007; Engardio 2007; Sheth 2008; Emmott 2008; Sharma 2009; Bardhan 2010; Kaur and Wahlberg 2012; also see the special themed issue of Global Media and Communication, 2010). As Bardhan has noted: "In 1820 these two countries contributed nearly half of world income; in 1950 their share was less than one tenth; currently it is about one fifth, and the projection is that in 2025 it will be about one third" (Bardhan 2010, 1).

As in many other fields, the "rise" of China and India, coinciding with the crisis in the neo-liberal model of US-led Western capitalism, will challenge traditional thinking and research paradigms for international media and communication as power begins to swing away from the West (Kaur and Wahlberg 2012). As one commentator notes: "A seismic shift in the balance of global economic and political power is currently underway as the rise of China and India has increased not only their regional but also their global influence and leverage" (Sharma 2009, 9). The combined economic and cultural impact of China and India, aided by their extensive global diasporas, may create a different form of globalisation, one with an Asian accent (Sun 2009; Kapur 2010; Amrith 2011).

The millennium-old relationship between the two countries has always had a very strong cultural and communication dimension and Buddhism was at the heart of this interaction. The interest in Buddhist philosophy encouraged Chinese scholars, most notably Huen Tsang, to visit such places as Nalanda (an international Buddhist university based in eastern India between the 5th to 12th centuries) to exchange ideas on law, philosophy and politics. Indian monks also visited China on a regular basis and such cultural interactions led to the translation into Chinese of the Sanskrit text Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra (Diamond Sutra), the world's first printed book on paper, published in the ninth century (Sen 2005). These exchanges of ideas and ideologies continued for centuries and even today Buddhism remains a powerful link between the two civilisations.

In modern times, Indian interest in China was most noticeable in such intellectuals as poet-philosopher Rabindranath Tagore (the first non-Westerner to win a Nobel Prize for Literature, in 1913) (see Chung et al 2011). During the Cold War years, the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru coined the slogan "Hindi-Chini, bhai bhai" (India and China are brothers). The 1962 border war following the flight of the Tibetan leader Dalai Lama to India put an end to such exhortations of Asian solidarity against the imperialist West (Zhao 2009). The resultant Sino-Indian schism continues to afflict policy-makers and educated public opinion in India, which fears growing Chinese influence in South Asia (Pant 2012). Apart from the contentious border dispute, both countries also vie for resources and the leadership role of the global South (Cheru and Obi 2010; Mawdsley and McCann 2011; Pant 2012).

And yet there are growing commercial and cultural links developing between the two countries. Trade between China and India – negligible in 1992 – had grown within a decade to $5 billion, and had reached $75 billion by 2011, making India's eastern neighbour one of its largest trading partners. According to industry estimates, this is on course to achieve the target of $100 billion by 2015, although the balance of trade – nearly $20 billion – remains firmly in China's favour. Chinese investment in India – actual and proposed – especially in such sectors as power

and telecommunications, is constantly escalating, estimated to be worth $50 billion. Apart from the business press, these stories of a Chindian globalisation rarely get noticed in the international media and, ironically, not even in the media in China and India.

In popular entertainment, however, Indian content is being noticed in China after a break of many decades. During the Cold War years, Indian films were widely circulated in China, where the escapist musical melodramas were considered by the Communist authorities to be a useful alternative to state propaganda and a cheap substitute for Hollywood. A shortened, digitised and dubbed version of Lagaan was released across 25 theatres in China, the first Indian film to be imported by the China Film Group. The film's music director, A. R. Rahman, also composed the music for the 2003 Chinese film Tiandi Yingxiong (Warriors of Heaven and Earth), the 2004 Chinese official entry for the Oscars. The 2005 Bollywood-inspired Chinese film Perhaps Love – the first musical in that country since the 1950s – was an interesting example of a Chindian cultural product. That Indian films have an audience in China was shown by the box office success there of the 2009 Indian college comedy Three Idiots.

Chindia and Global Media Research

The academic study of media and communication – relatively new subjects in both China and India – is growing rapidly in both countries. By 2012, more than 800 communication and media programmes were being run at Chinese universities, paralleled by the publication of many Chinese language journals in the field, as well as China-related material in international journals. Prominent in the latter category is the Hong Kong-based Chinese Journal of Communication, operational since 2009. In India, the massive growth of the media sector has forced the academic community and policy establishment to encourage and support research and study in this field. This has contributed to the mushrooming of mostly vocational media research institutes, though some critical work is beginning to emerge. China and India offer potentially lucrative markets for students in media and communication, as both countries are large suppliers of postgraduate and research students to Western universities. Already many Western universities are developing new courses and collaborative projects with institutions of higher education in China and India.

The increasing mobility of students and faculty and the organisation of short courses and exchange programmes have also contributed to this intercultural and international communication. However, more often than not these projects are driven by economic and not intellectual considerations. Intellectual curiosity about Chindia is often confined to specialists, at a time when internationalisation should be an integral part of teaching and research in media and communication, given the global nature of the subject and the globalisation of media and communication industries. Such an altered academic environment demands what Appaduari has called "deparochialization of the research ethic – the idea of research itself" (Appadurai 2001, 15).

Can the growth of media and communication studies in Chindia contribute to broadening research concerns and agendas in this relatively new field? Conforming to the social sciences more generally, research in the media and communication arena too has been traditionally influenced by what Edward Said has shown as a

Eurocentric essentialism of thought, where the "other" was imagined or created as part of an ideological discourse, privileging European imperialist epistemology (Said 1978). Such a pervasive Occidental bias constitutes, in the words of Samir Amin, "one dimension of the culture and ideology of the modern capitalist world" (Amin 1989, vii).

The Chindian communication challenge is difficult to analyse within traditional Western-originated and oriented media theory – whether liberal or critical, though both have useful insights to offer (Curran and Park 2000; Hallin and Mancini 2012). This calls for original and innovative research methods and methodological approaches and theoretical interventions as well as a radical re-evaluation of pedagogic parameters, taking historical, cultural and socio-psychological factors into consideration. One research area where a Chindian contribution will be particularly valuable is development communication. China and India have very impressive records of alleviating extreme poverty in recent decades, as a new report from the United Nations attests. Nearly half of the two billion people who have gained access to drinking water, and four out of 10 who have gained access to improved sanitation since 1990, live in China or India (UNICEF & WHO, 2012). However, it is important to emphasise that despite robust economic growth – almost double-digit for nearly a decade in the case of China – both countries continue to have very large numbers of poor and disadvantaged people (Zhao 2008; Kohli 2012). India was the first country to use television for education through its 1970s SITE (Satellite Instructional Television Experiment) programme. New digital media technologies can be deployed to promote the Gandhian notions of community living and sustainable development. China's aid for developing countries in Asia and Africa, especially in such areas as telecommunication, may help to promote a Chinese version of development discourse: the China Great Wall Industry Corporation has been offering expertise and funding to develop satellite and other space programmes. Traditionally, the development discourse has been devised and developed in the West, conforming to a Western sensibility of what constitutes development. Would a Chindian development perspective be less affected by the colonial mindset? Already, in many developing countries in Latin America (Armony, Ariel and Strauss 2012) and Africa (Sauvant et al 2010; Cheru and Obi 2010; Mawdsley and McCann 2011, also see Chan, Lee and Chan 2011 and Lai and Lu 2012) these debates have occupied policy and media agendas.

De-Americanising Media Studies

As noted earlier, the dominant strands of research in global media and communication have traditionally been conducted within a Western, or more accurately, an American framework. The question arises whether such a framework is adequately equipped – both theoretically and empirically – to comprehend the complexity of the Chindian globalisation which challenges established ways of thinking about international media and communication (Abbas and Erni 2005; Miike 2006; Thussu 2009; Curtin and Shah 2010; Wang 2011). In an increasingly mobile and globally networked and digitised world, media and communication studies have been transformed as South-South and increasingly, South-North cultural flows erode US cultural hegemony. It is interesting to speculate what kind of content will be circulating on the world wide web and in which language when

90 percent of Chinese and equally high percentage of Indians get on-line (in 2011, 40 percent of China's and only 10 percent of India's billion plus population were using the Internet) (Internet World Stats 2012). This is particularly striking in the context of India's "demographic dividend": more than 70 percent of Indians are below the age of 30 (Nilekani 2009; Bahl 2010). As their prosperity grows, a sizeable segment of young Indians are increasingly going on-line, producing, distributing and consuming digital media, especially using their skills in the English language, the vehicle for global communication and increasingly for global higher education.

Internationalising media studies is a strengthening imperative as universities themselves become globalised. China has significantly increased its university sector, encouraging elite foreign universities to set up campuses in the country. In India too, the government is liberalising the higher education sector, opening it to foreign universities. The government has quadrupled the allocation for higher education from barely 0.37 percent to 1.5 percent of the GNP, supplemented by a massive expansion of private education providers, including some of India's top corporate houses with such global brands as Reliance and Tata (the latter gave a gift of $50 million to Harvard Business School, the biggest international donation since the school's founding). A democratic polity has ensured that Indian universities have intellectual autonomy where debate and discussion are the norm, nurturing the "argumentative" Indian (Sen 2005). Unlike other social sciences, media and communication studies were not part of elite university education. As formerly in Britain, university education in India remains an elitist endeavour – media was taught predominantly in a vocational context and since the industry was so small, there were few students and even fewer researchers. However, with the massive growth of media and communication, more and more universities are now taking this field seriously. Indian academia is deeply entrenched in a tradition of argumentation and critical conversation (Sen 2005; Bayly 2011; Kapila 2011; Kumar and Puranam 2011). As Indian media and academia globalise, will this critical mass contribute to critical media studies? Indian scholars and scholars of the Indian diaspora have a good record for pushing the boundaries of research in social sciences, and increasingly in media and communication studies. It may be indicative of such cultural autonomy that despite close economic, political and cultural ties with the US, including widespread use of the English language, most urban Indians do not care for American music, movies and television and only 19 percent like American programming, as against 43 percent of Chinese (Pew Center 2012).

Their interest in China is even more limited and generally negative (Pew Center 2012, 47). In the popular Indian mind, the image of China remains "effectively frozen in time, leaving the dominant public perception of China as it was in the early 1960s – an image of both menace and duplicity" (Uberoi 2011). For the Chinese, India is little more than a curiosity and a noisy and unwieldy neighbour. Restricted people-to-people contact and absence of media coverage in each country of the other (both focused on the West, and on the US in particular) sustains this perception. However, as Isar has suggested, there is increasing demand for "an independent, cross-cultural conversation among the newly affluent and mobile intelligentsias of both countries" (Isar 2010, 281).

The British media sociologist Jeremy Tunstall published a much-cited book in 1977 called The Media Are American. Thirty years later, he came round to the view that such a formulation was not sustainable in a world where America was

one of the many, though still premium, players, appropriately entitling his new book The Media Were American (Tunstall 1977 and 2008). Rohn predicts that if a book on global media is published in 30 years' time, it is "highly probable that it will not have the word 'American' in it at all" (Rohn 2010, 371). This seems unlikely, given the formidable media, information and communication power that the United States wields, especially in the realm of on-line communication – of both apparatus and application.

It is fair therefore to suggest that the Chindia challenge is not going to undermine, at least in the short term, the multi-faceted US domination of the world's media, through what I have elsewhere described as "glocal Americana" (Thussu 2006) but, as Jack Goody has argued, "the Western domination of the world of knowledge and of world culture persists in some respects but has been significantly loosened. Globalisation is no longer exclusively Westernization" (Goody 2010, 125). This would argue for a serious engagement with the emerging communication cultures of Chindia and a concomitant recalibration of the field of media studies.

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CHINA AND THE WORLD'S FIRST FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT:

THE SWEDISH FREEDOM OF THE PRESS ACT OF 1766

LENA RYDHOLM

Abstract

In 1766, the world's first freedom of information act: *His Majesty's Gracious Ordinance Relating to Freedom of Writing and of the Press* was passed in the Swedish Diet, largely through the work of Anders Chydenius. Few people today realise that this had something to do with China. The image of China as a distant utopia, a prosperous and politically stable country, had been created through accounts such as Jean Baptiste Du Halde's four volume *Description géographique, historique, chronologique, politique, et physique de l'empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie chinoise*. In Sweden, politicians Anders Nordencrantz and Anders Chydenius, basing their arguments on Du Halde's descriptions, claimed that the freedom of writing, of the press and of information had been in existence in China since ancient times, and had largely contributed to the wealth and stability of China. In this paper I examine the political pamphlets written by these two Swedish politicians to show how they used China as an example to strengthen the arguments for a Freedom of the Press Act in Sweden.

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Introduction

In 1766, *His Majesty's Gracious Ordinance Relating to the Freedom of Writing and of the Press*[1] was passed in the Swedish Diet. This act allows citizens the freedom of writing, the freedom of the press, and in addition the freedom of information, public access to official documents. Sweden (including Finland at that time), was the first country in the world to incorporate a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in its constitution. Since then, this Act has been revised several times but has remained a founding principle of Swedish democracy. According to Manninen (2006, 18) this Act can partly explain why the European North "has become the world's least corrupt area and, concurrently, exceptionally socially responsible and committed to democratic principles."

Today, most Swedish people take the freedom of speech, of the press and of information for granted. Few can imagine that the passing of this first Act had something to do with China, or rather, a certain image of China in Sweden in the 18th century. Neither Swedish media scholars nor sinologists have taken any interest in this issue in recent years. It came to my attention through a lecture by Prof. Marie-Christine Skuncke (Dept. of Literature, Uppsala University and SCAS, Uppsala).[2] I decided to examine political pamphlets written in the 18th century that contained references to China. I wrote a paper for the conference "Global Media Worlds and China" at Uppsala University in 2011 that has now turned into this article. My study gives an insight into the political influence of the image of China in Sweden on the passing of Sweden's first FOIA. I have examined how an image of China as the land of freedom, of writing and of the press was created in political pamphlets written by two of the most influential advocates of passing a Freedom of Writing, of the Press, and of Information Act in the Swedish Diet of 1765-66, politicians Anders Nordencrantz and Anders Chydenius.

The Swedish Form of Government during the Age of Liberty (1719-1772)

At the beginning of the 18th century, the Swedish King had lost much power due to the costly and disastrous wars of the previous King Karl XII that had greatly reduced Sweden's influence in the region. A new constitution moved power away from the King in favour of a parliament, the Swedish Diet, consisting of four Estates (clergy, nobility, burghers and peasants). There were two parties in the Diet, the conservative Hat party in power and the radical opposition, the Cap Party, which supported the freedom of writing, of information and of the press. At that time, it was forbidden not only to publish texts about the foundations of affairs of the state but even to write down thoughts on such matters on paper for private use (Manninen 2006, 22). All publications were subject to censorship. But State Censor Niklas von Oelreich was quite liberal. Some claim it was because he supported freedom of the press, since he joined the Cap Party in 1765; while others think it was because he got 10 percent of the printing cost of the texts he approved (Virrankoski 1995, 88). Oelreich's liberal treatment of publications played an important role in opinion-making and debate in books and pamphlets published between 1760 and 1772 (Lindberg 2003, 17).

No single doctrine dominated the political debate, but words like freedom, citizen and rights became political slogans (Lindberg 2003, 14, 21). According to

Lindberg (2003, 16-17), there were many competing ideas at the time, and personal interests and efforts, even mere coincidences, may have played a great part in the political decision-making. Anders Nordencrantz and Anders Chydenius were two important political thinkers concerned with both economic theory and the freedom of writing and of the press. Nordencrantz was inspired by contemporary political developments in England and France and by philosophers like Montesquieu, Hume and others (Magnusson 2003, 34), and Chydenius was inspired by Nordencrantz. They both chose China as a major example to support their arguments for the freedom of writing, of the press and of information (Skuncke 2003, 36).

The Image of China in Sweden in the 18th Century

During the Age of Liberty in Sweden, the influence of the image of China became important in Swedish society, culture and politics. The Swedish East India Company shipped porcelain, silk, tea and other popular products from China. King Adolf Fredrik built a "Chinese castle" in the garden of the royal summer palace Drottningholm, as a birthday present for Queen Louisa Ulrika in 1753; "chinoiserie" was in vogue. Even in politics, the image of China came to play an important role. There could be many reasons for Chydenius and Nordencrantz to use China as an example. The image of China's wealth of resources and population had earlier been created in accounts by Marco Polo, Mendoza and others. The most important work on China of in 18th century Europe was the French Jesuit Jean Baptiste Du Halde's monumental *Description géographique, historique, chronologique, politique, et physique de l'empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie chinoise*, published in Paris in 1735 (hereafter abbreviated *Description de la Chine*). The first abridged English version, translated from French by Richard Brookes, was published by J. Watts in London in 1736 as *The General History of China: Containing a Geographical, Historical, Chronological, Political and Physical Description of the Empire of China, Chinese-Tartary, Corea and Thibet, Including an Exact and Particular Account of their Customs, Manners, Ceremonies, Religion, Arts and Sciences* (Löwendahl 2008, 194).[3] Du Halde's *Description de la Chine* in four volumes, almost 3000 pages, is an encyclopedic description of everything important to know about China from the viewpoint of the Jesuits: general history, form of government, administration, official titles, ceremonies, punishment of crimes, military forces, arms, artillery, geography, provinces, minority peoples, neighbouring countries, agriculture, trade, manufacture of silk, porcelain, paper, ink, book printing, religion, mathematics, astronomy, medicine, poetry, extracts from novels and the five classic etc. In *Description de la Chine*, China is a peaceful, prosperous country that has managed to persist for 4000 years, much thanks to the upholding of its ancient laws and customs.

> *China has this Advantage over all other Nations, that for 4000 years, and upwards, it has been govern'd, almost without Interruption, by its own Native Princes, and with little Deviation either in Attire, Morals, Laws, Customs, or Manners, from the wise Institutions of its first Legislators. As the Inhabitants find within themselves every thing necessary for the Convenience and Delight of Life, so wanting no foreign Assistance, they have always affected a Shyness to the Commerce of Strangers* (Du Halde 1736, 2, 1; Transl. in Watts 1741, 2, 1).

Sweden was a monarchy and in that sense similar to China. But the Swedish King's authority was very limited at that time and political power rested largely with the Parliament (Skuncke 2004, 81). Sweden was much less successful in terms of political stability, wealth and population, which explains the interest in using China as an example.

Many Cap party politicians in the early 1760s saw England as a model of freedom of writing and of the press, (since the English office of censor had been abolished, when the Censor Gilbert Mabbot voluntarily resigned in 1649, Manninen 2006, 51). But no law established this freedom in England. In *Description de la Chine*, China, in contrast, appeared to have already included the freedom of expression in its laws: "Notwithstanding the great Power with which the Emperor is invested, the Law allows the Mandarins, whenever he commits any Faults in his Administration, to represent them to him in an humble manner, and to lay before him the Inconveniences which they may occasion in the Government" (Du Halde 1736, 2, 14-15; Transl. in Watts, 2, 17-18). Naturally, such passages in Du Halde's work would appeal to politicians in the Nordic countries advocating the freedom of expression, such as Nordencrantz and Chydenius. But these kinds of statements in Du Halde's work constitute a fraction of all the information he provides on China in these four volumes. In addition, Du Halde himself had censored his source material, letters and memoirs from Jesuits in China. According to Löwendahl (2008, 1, 180): "Du Halde had removed material unsympathetic to the Chinese or to the Jesuits in editing the Jesuits' letters from China, initially in *Lettres édifiantes* and secondly for this *Description.*" In addition, the descriptions of conditions in China in Du Halde's work were quite removed from Chinese reality: "Many sections, including geographical and historical chapters, are altogether inadequate, nor are the accounts of the government and social structure at all satisfactory" (Löwendahl 2008, 1, 180-81).

Finally, using China as an example had the advantage that one's opponents were hard pressed to prove that one was wrong since China was so far away and few, if any Swedish politicians, had actually been there; nor had Nordencrantz and Chydenius. Both these politicians would claim that China already had freedom of writing, of the press and of information. Nordencrantz wrote in a political pamphlet *Oförgripeliga tankar om Frihet i bruk af Förnuft, Pennor och Tryck* [Thoughts about the Freedom to use Reason, Pens and Printing] about the merits of the *Peking Gazette*. Chydenius published the political pamphlet *Berättelse om Chinesiska Skrif-friheten* [An Account of the Chinese Freedom of Writing], elevating the Chinese legal system and the wise Chinese emperors of the past who allowed their subjects the freedom of writing. China was used as an example by both politicians to strengthen their arguments in the debate on the Freedom of Writing, of the Press, and of Information Act in the Swedish Diet of 1765-66. Largely through the work of Chydenius, they were successful.

Nordencrantz and the Freedom of Writing, of the Press and of Information

Anders Nordencrantz (1697-1772) was a successful self-made businessman. After studying trade and commerce in London, he returned with radical ideas about society and economy. In 1729, he became a Diet member of the Burgher Estate. Nordencrantz was a prolific writer of political pamphlets and often had

problems with censorship. In 1730, he tried to publish his economic treatise *Arcana Oeconomiae et Commercii* [The Secrets of Economy and Commerce], in which he also demanded freedom of writing and of the press, but the work was banned by the Censor until that chapter had been removed (Virrankoski 1995, 175). For Nordencrantz, the freedom of writing and of the press was also important for other reasons than his own texts being censored. He argued that history must be made public to avoid repetitions of past mistakes; this would prevent despotism through revealing the cruelty and violence of despotic rulers (Hallberg 2003, 343, f 22). In addition, Nordencrantz feared the power of public opinions based on ignorance and prejudices, and advocated free public debate and freedom of the press to put opinions to the critical test and reveal the truth (Hallberg 2003, 344). He did not, however, want a complete abolition of censorship. The Censor should answer to the Estates instead of to the government (Manninen 2006, 39), and theological works should be censored by the Church.

In 1756, Nordencrantz wrote several political pamphlets. His *Oförgripeliga tankar om Frihet i bruk af Förnuft, Pennor och Tryck* [Thoughts about the Freedom to use Reason, Pens and Printing] was banned by the Censor (Virrankoski 1995, 87). In this pamphlet, Nordencrantz claims that almost all text, except the repulsive, should be published, even state subversive texts, so that their erroneous ideas could be publicly refuted (Virrankoski 1995, 177).[4] Nordencrantz claimed that censorship had "impeded Sweden's development with regard to freedom, security, arts and science and left Sweden more than a hundred years behind other peoples; all this was the doing of a single authority and individual interests that can not withstand light and truth, since the spirits of darkness require darkness."[5] This was criticism directed at the corruption of the Hat Party in power. Nordencrantz was critical of the state subsidies to ineffective industries run or controlled by Hat party members, and the secrecy and inefficiency of the Hat Party that controlled bureaucracy (Lindqvist 1996, 406). His anger with the Hat Party may also have had to do with his personal financial situation. Nordencrantz lost a large part of his fortune, being forced to sell his estate for paper bills of sinking value caused by the inflation policy imposed by the Hat Party (Herlitz 2003, 132). He became a major enemy of the Hat party in the 1760s, when he told the Swedish Diet that the reason for the inflation and dramatically sinking value of the currency was the excessive printing of bills (Herlitz 2003, 131). The Hat Party lost control of the Swedish Diet largely due to Nordencrantz having exposed its protection of certain groups within the Swedish nobility, manipulation of the currency and other faults (Lindqvist 1996, 408-9).

When the Cap Party gained power in 1765-66, Nordencrantz helped stage a deflation policy and punish the officials responsible for the inflation (Herlitz 2003, 132). Nordencrantz was a very active and aggressive politician late into his old age. He continued to write texts criticising individual Hat politicians, accusing them of manipulating the currency for their own personal gain and of being "evil and greedy scammers, thieves and robbers" (Lindqvist 1996, 516).

Nordencrantz and the Image of the *Peking Gazette*

In the 1760s, with the liberal Censor von Oelreich, public opinion started to turn in favour of freedom of writing. In 1761, Nordencrantz's *Oförgripeliga tankar om Frihet i bruk af Förnuft, Pennor och Tryck, samt huru långt Friheten derutinnan i et*

fritt Samhälle sig sträcka bör, tillika med påföljden deraf [Thoughts about the Freedom to use Reason, Pens and Printing, and How Far this Freedom Should Be Extended in a Free Society, along with its Consequences] from 1756 was finally approved for publication (Virrankoski 1995, 87). In this pamhlet Nordencrantz claims that the freedom of writing and of the press provides the most efficient means of a free people to ensure government by reason and righteousness and to prevent corruption.

> *Reason through pens and printing provides the most sophisticated means through which the secret measures used by many free peoples' government to rule in a way that is invisible for the eyes of the people can be uncovered; and even though [the government's] actions are visible, the driving forces behind them are incomprehensible for the general public, but never for the reason accomplished by the aid of pens and printing. These means [pens and printing] are like the apple of the eye, that a free people's legislative authority should cherish, and it should be an essential part of its own authority and interest to be associated with this [the freedom of writing and of the press]* (Nordencrantz 1756, 9).

In this political pamphlet, Nordencrantz used China as a major example of the freedom of the press and of information. He quoted a long passage in French in vol. 2 of *Description de la Chine* about the *Peking Gazette* to praise its merits.

> *In a word nothing can be more instructive, and more capable of keeping the Mandarins in order, and prevent the Faults they might be guilty of, than the Gazette which is printed every Day at Peking, and dispersed from thence into all the Provinces: There is nothing inserted in it but what has reference to the Government; and as the Chinese Government is absolute Monarchy, and the most trifling Affairs are brought before the Emperor, it contains nothing but what may be very serviceable to direct the Mandarins in the Exercise of their Office, and instruct the Learned as well as the Vulgar.*

> *It contains, for instance, the Names of the Mandarins that have been deprived of their Offices, and for what Reason: One for being negligent in gathering the Emperor's Tribute, or for squandering in any way; another because he was too indulgent or too severe in his Punishment; this for his Oppression, that for want of Talents to govern as he ought. If any Mandarin has been raised to a considerable Office or been depressed; or if he has been deprived, for any Fault, of the Annual Pension that he ought to receive of the Emperor, it is immediately put into the Gazette.*

> *It speaks likewise of all Criminal Affairs for which Persons are capitally condemned, and likewise the Names of the Officers who fill the Places of the Mandarins that were removed, as also the Calamities that happened in such and such a Province, and the Assistance given by the Mandarins of the Place in pursuance of the Emperor's Order; it likewise contains the Expences disbursed for the Subsistence of the Soldiers, the Necessities of the People, the Publick Works, and the Benefactions of the Prince; there are also the Remonstrances of the Supreme Tribunals, which have been made to the Emperor concerning his own Conduct, or his Decisions.*

They therein mention the Day that the Emperor tilled the Earth, that they may excite Emulation in the Minds of the People, and inspire those who govern them with a Love of Labour and Application for the Culture of the Fields; they mention likewise the Time of the Convention of the Grandees at Peking, and all the Chief Mandarins of the Tribunals, that they may be instructed in their Duty. There you may find the Law and new Customs that have been established, the Praises and Reprimands given by the Emperor to a Mandarin: For instance, such a Mandarin has not a very good Reputation, and if he does not amend he will be punished.

In short the Chinese Gazette is made in such a manner that it is very useful to instruct the Mandarins how to govern the People as they ought, for which reason they read it constantly; and as it gives an account of all the public Affairs that are transacted in this vast Empire, the greatest part commit to writing their Observations upon things that it contains, which may direct them in their Conduct (Nordencrantz 1756, 15-16; Du Halde 1736, 2, 49-50; Transl. in Watts 1741, 2, 69-71).

Nordencrantz obviously saw the *Peking Gazette* as an effective means for the people to access information, and to monitor the authorities, as well as for the state to control the government officials' behaviour. It is perhaps no wonder that Nordencrantz, being so angry with the Hat party politicians' corruption, would welcome a journal like the *Peking Gazette* in Sweden to publicly expose the lack of virtue, the crimes and the misdeeds of the Hat politicians, these "evil and greedy scammers, thieves and robbers." He would probably want to see them publicly disgraced and punished, just like the Chinese officials in the *Peking Gazette*. However, when Nordencrantz quoted Du Halde's entry on the *Peking Gazette*, he omitted the final lines in Du Halde's text, which are the following:

Nothing is printed in the Gazette but what has been presented to the Emperor, or comes from the Emperor himself; those who have the care of it dare not add a Title thereto, nor even their own Reflections, upon pain of Corporal Punishments. In 1726 a Writer of a Tribunal, and another Writer, who was employed at the Board of the Post-office, were condemned to Death for having inserted Circumstances in the Gazette that were found to be false: The Reason upon which the Tribunal of Criminal Affairs founded their Judgment, was, that he had failed in Respect to his Majesty, and the Law declares that whoever fails in Respect to his Majesty deserves Death (Du Halde 1736, 2, 50; Transl. in Watts 1741, 2, 71).

This final passage in Du Halde's entry about the *Peking Gazette* obviously did not serve the political purposes of Nordencrantz, so he omits the part about censorship. He would not want the Swedish King to become the "supreme censor," to hold the authority held by the Chinese Emperor in this respect. Nordencrantz's discourse on the freedom of writing, of the press and of information in Sweden was based on free public debate, on putting different opinions to the critical test to reveal the truth. This certainly involved the right to publish one's own "reflections" and political views, the right for any citizen to publicly debate any issue. If Sweden were to implement the Chinese laws described in Du Halde's entry about the *Peking Gazette*, that is, that any personal "reflections" were prohibited on pain

of corporal punishment or death-then Nordencrantz, with his large production of aggressive pamphlets full of criticism of the authorities would probably be among the first to be beheaded. Nordencrantz cited only the part of Du Halde's entry about the *Peking Gazette* that suited his political agenda, providing his readers with an idealized view of the *Peking Gazette,* and of the freedom of the press and of information in China at the time.

In Sweden in the 18th century, *Riksdagstidningar* [Diet Journals] were published containing information about decisions made by the Diet, but no political analysis, debate or critique (Manninen 2006, 39) at that time. These journals rather served to strengthen the power and influence of the Diet. The *Peking Gazettes* were bulletins that copied word for word imperial records, imperial edicts and memoranda to the throne and the like, that had been approved for publishing and were provided by the Imperial Grand secretariat; they were published without any alterations and contained no news items written by journalists, and no analysis or debate whatsoever (Fang 1997, 212). The *Peking Gazettes* strengthened the Emperor's power and influence and control of the officials. Nordencrantz probably did not recognise the resemblance between these two bulletins in this regard.

In 1759, Nordencrantz published a memorandum of over 700 pages addressed to the Estates of the Swedish Diet of 1760 in which freedom of the press is the basic notion (Skuncke 2003, 34). In this memorandum, he again uses the *Peking Gazette* as an example in the political debate (Nordencrantz 1759, 242-243). This memorandum was initially banned but was finally approved and about a 1000 copies were distributed among the Estates (Malmström 1900, 13-14), thus making the *Peking Gazette* known to all members of the Estates. The debates about the freedom of writing, of the press and of information in the Diet of 1760-62 led to the publishing of several memoranda to the Diet (Virrankoski 1995, 176-9). But a major change in legislation had to wait for Chydenius and the Swedish Diet of 1765-66.

Chydenius and the Image of China as the Land of Free Trade and Freedom of Writing

Anders Chydenius (1729-1793), a Finnish priest, played a crucial role in the development of the first freedom of writing, of the press and of information act in Sweden. Being a man of the Enlightenment with wide learning, he was not only a priest but also a farmer, and he practiced medicine (Manninen 2006, 22). His political career started with an interest in economic issues. Chydenius was committed to helping the peasants and merchants of his poor home region in Finland to be relieved from trade barriers (Manninen 2006, 32). When the Cap party won the elections, Chydenius became a member of the Clergy Estate in the Swedish Diet of 1765-66 in Stockholm. In the Diet, young Chydenius became "the loudest and most prolific speaker of the Priest stand." (Lindqvist 1996, 421), and published several political pamphlets. In Chydenius's most important work on economic theory, *Den nationale winsten* [The National Gain] of 1765, he advocated free trade and the free market (before Adam Smith's *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*). He was opposed to all kinds of oppression and lack of freedom. Hence he criticised slavery, and in spite of being a priest he also believed in religious tolerance and played a significant part in the Diet of 1779 when the Swedish Religious Freedom Act was passed (Knif 2003, 167).

Chydenius, just like Nordencrantz, turned to a utopian view of China for political arguments. In 1765 he published *Källan til Rikets wan-magt* [The Source of the Impotence of the Kingdom], in which he blamed Sweden's poverty and falling currency on the lack of free trade and claimed that China's wealth could be attributed to the lack of trade barriers (he was eventuallly successful in abolishing some of the trade barriers in Sweden).

> *China is the richest Nation in the entire world, and is therefore an indis-*
> *putable evidence, where Cities have no privileges, and there is no difference*
> *between City and Country trade, therefore the entire country is like a city,*
> *and all cities are like the most wonderful country. There are no Fences*
> *and Customs, therefore the Crown and its subjects each enjoy sufficient*
> *richness* (Chydenius 1765, 5).

When Chydenius had become a Diet member in 1765, he had quickly realised that to achieve political success there was an important prerequisite: the freedom of information, of writing and of the press. To influence the debates and decision-making in the Diet, you needed access to the meeting protocols and records of the Diet and its committees. In his memoirs Chydenius, just like Nordencrantz complains about the secrecy of the Hat Party which made it difficult for the Cap party to gain influence.[6] And, to influence public opinion, the freedom of writing and of the press was required. In his memoirs, Chydenius wrote about the insights he gained from reading Nordencrantz's *Oförgripeliga tankar om Frihet i bruk af Förnuft, Pennor och Tryck*, using Nordencrantz's "apple of the eye" metaphor: "[Nordencrantz's texts] had already opened my eyes, so that I considered it [the freedom of the press P.V.] the apple of the eye of a free country."[7] Nordencrantz's expression is again used in Chydenius's *Berättelse om Chinesiska Skrif-friheten* [An Account of the Chinese Freedom of Writing] (Chydenius 1766, A5).

The memorial on the Freedom of Writing and of the Press was handed in to the Swedish Diet on the 12th of June, 1765, signed by the Finn Anders Kraftman, Cap Party member of the Clergy Estate. According to Chydenius's autobiography and research into the various revised versions of the text, it has been established that the memorial was in fact written by Chydenius (Schauman 1908, 158-9). By not signing the memorial himself, Chydenius could be appointed head of the Diet committee assigned to deliberate and draft an act to be presented to the Diet. The committee included representatives from all the Estates, but Chydenius had no problem in finding striking arguments in the fierce debate in the committee, and later in the Diet (Virrankoski 1995, 183-196).

Chydenius was more radical than Nordencrantz. He argued for the complete abolition of pre-printing censorship (with the exception of religious texts). Just like Nordencrantz, he believed that the truth is gained through free public debate and the competition of ideas and arguments (1765; Schauman 1908, 518-19) and that this method was used in China. He published *Berättelse om Chinesiska Skrif-friheten* [An Account of the Chinese Freedom of Writing] in April 1766,[8] arguing that the cause of China's wealth and happiness of the people was the Chinese freedom of writing. After intense debates in the Diet of 1765-66, Chydenius's hard work paid off. On the 2nd of December 1766, Sweden's first Freedom of Writing, of the Press and of Information Act was passed in the Diet, based on the ideas and formulations by Chydenius in his memorial, and in the protocols and drafts that he had formulated

in the committee (Virrankoski 1995, 193). Except for religious texts, censorship was abolished, official documents became accessible to the public, and the act was even proclaimed part of the Swedish constitution (Virrankoski 1995, 193). According to Schauman (1908, 159-60), the successful passing of this act depended on two major factors: the skilful work of Chydenius in the Diet committee preparing the act and Chydenius's political pamphlet *Berättelse om Chinesiska Skrif-friheten*.

Chydenius' Pamphlet on Freedom of Writing

Berättelse om Chinesiska Skrif-friheten: Öfversatt af danskan [An Account of the Chinese Freedom of Writing: Translated from Danish] is a political pamphlet that consists of two parts: a dedication written by Chydenius and a translation from Danish into Swedish by Chydenius of the entry "Om Frihed at skrive" [About the Freedom of Writing] in Friderich Lütken's Chapter 1, "Nogle Chinesiske Stats-Regler og Oeconomiske Maximer eller Skikke: Uddragne af le Pere du Halde" [Some Chinese Rules of State and Economic Maxims or Customs: Extracts from Father Du Halde] in *Oeconomiske Tanker till hoiere Eftertanke* [Economic Ideas for Deeper Reflection] (Lütken 1759, 8-21).

According to Schauman (1908, 491), Lütken was an important writer of economic theories in Denmark at the time, who had problems with the censorship and had therefore translated and re-worked parts of Du Halde's *Description de la Chine* to promote the freedom of writing in Denmark. When comparing Lütken's text with Du Halde's, there are indeed passages in Du Halde's vol. 2 that have been re-worked and used in Lütken's work (as discussed in Examples 2 and 3 below), passages that in turn were translated into Swedish by Chydenius in his pamphlet.[9]

Berättelse om Chinesiska Skrif-friheten, begins with a dedication to "His Royal Highness Prince Gustaf Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Svea," who later became King Gustaf III of Sweden. In the dedication (1766, A2-A5), Chydenius asks the Prince, whom he addresses as "merciful master," "precious Prince" etc., to look mercifully upon the suggestions in his pamphlet. In this dedication, he stated his arguments for learning from the Chinese. According to Chydenius, China was the wealthiest country in the world with regard to commodities and population, and the reasons for China's wealth, the happiness of its people and the persistence of its government through millennia had nothing to do with habits, climate or fertility, as most European might think. These, according to Chydenius, were mere coincidences. Chinas success had been achieved through quite simple measures advocated by its rulers that, according to Chydenius, would have the same effect if implemented in any kingdom. One of these measures, often scorned by rulers, but which to the contrary had strengthened the throne in China, was the freedom of writing. According to Chydenius, the freedom of writing, as introduced in his pamphlet, had become "en ögnasten" ["the apple of the eye," using Nordencrantz's expression] of the constitution of China. He signed the dedication: "With the deepest reverence until my last breath remaining, Your Royal Highness's most obedient and faithful servant, Anders Chydenius" (1766, A5). Chydenius was wise to try to enrol the Prince's support for the freedom of writing, though this obviously was to no avail. In 1772, King Gustav III managed to overthrow the constitution and with it the first Freedom of Writing, of the Press and of Information Act made possible by Chydenius's work, replacing it with a new Act that restricted press freedom. But the Act of 1766 formed the foundation for subsequent laws in 1809-12 (Virrankoski 1995, 196).

The main part of *Berättelse om Chinesiska Skrif-friheten* consists of Chydenius's translation of Lütken's "The Freedom of Writing," which in turn is based on a few passages in vol. 2 of *Description de la Chine*. More than one quarter of Du Halde's vol. 2 (1736, 2, 459-738) consists of an "imperial collection."[10] It contains statements, instructions and the like by certain emperors and admonitions by certain wise ministers concerning good or bad government and so on. Certain passages in this collection are accounts of emperors encouraging their ministers to counsel them, or even criticise the government, and the emperor himself, if they find faults. The main part of Lütken's text consists of a selection of such examples from the collection that he used to argue for the freedom of writing in Denmark. Chydenius in his turn used his Swedish translation of Lütken's text to strengthen his argument in the debate about the freedom of writing and of the press in Sweden. When I compared the passages in Du Halde's original text in French with Lütken's translations of these passages into Danish and finally with Chydenius's translation of Lütken's Danish versions into Swedish, it is evident that both Lütken and Chydenius used their source in a way that suited their political agenda, thereby helping to shape a certain image of the freedom of writing in China in Denmark and in Sweden.

Analysis of Three Examples in the Translations by Lütken and Chydenius

Considering the scope of the article, I have included only three examples. A systematic comparison of all the relevant passages in Du Halde's, Lütken's and Chydenius's texts can no doubt reveal more interesting features (the investigation could also be extended to include comparisons with Du Halde's Western and Chinese sources). However, the three examples below suffice to show that a certain form of the freedom of expression in China described in *Description de la Chine* went through several revisions on its way through Lütken's Danish translation, and then through Chydenius's Swedish translation of Lütken's text, before it reached the Swedish readers. The abbreviated or re-worked "translations" by Lütken and Chydenius were adapted to their political purposes, to the political debate in the Nordic countries and to the intended readers.

Example 1. When comparing Lütken's *About the Freedom of Writing* with *Description de la Chine*, it is evident that Lütken did not simply translate a particular section but has summarised the parts of a chapter or document that suited his agenda. This first example comprises the very first lines in the second chapter of Du Halde's vol. 2., dealing with the authority of the Chinese Emperor.[11]

> *There is no Monarchy more absolute than that of China: The Emperor has an absolute Authority [here a line in Du Halde's French original is missing in Watts's translation that could be translated as: "and to judge by appearances, he is a kind of divinity"], and the Respect which is paid to him is a kind of Adoration; his Words are like so many Oracles, and his Commands are as strictly and readily executed as if they came directly from Heaven; none are admitted to speak to him but on their Knees, not even his elder Brother, unless he commands it to be otherwise; nor any, but the Lords that accompany him, are allowed to stand before him, and to put one Knee only to the Ground when they speak to him. […]the Mandarins,*

the Grandees of the Court, and the Princes of the Blood not only prostrate themselves in the Presence of the Emperor, but they do it also before his Chair or Throne, and every thing that is for his Use, kneeling down even before his Habit or his Girdle (Du Halde 1736, 2, 10-11; Transl. in Watts 1741, 2, 12-13).

Lütken re-worked this passage from the French original by Du Halde (1736, 2, 10-11).

The emperors of China are absolute sovereigns and have absolute power in all respects: and the people are obedient, easily led, contented and hardworking, and have a completely divine esteem for their emperor, so the emperors surely can do whatever they please, so long as they observe the Laws and comply with the Constitution.

But their ancient Chronicles prove with innumerable examples that, things have never gone well for those who have transgressed them [the laws], and that things have always gone well as long as the rulers have observed the laws. And there is nothing that more pacifies the people than the observing of the Laws.

And since one of the most important parts of the Laws or Constitution is this: that the ruler must be prepared to listen to and receive petitions[…] (Lütken 1759, 8-9).

Lütken obviously had no interest in advocating that the Danish King be admonished in a similar way to the Emperor of China, that people should regard his every word as an order from Heaven, and that he should have everyone kneel down before him when speaking, or even prostrate themselves before his personal effects. Lütken simply roughly translated the two initial lines about the emperor's authority and a few words about the "divine esteem" for the emperor. Then he added the rest himself about the obedient Chinese population and so on, claiming that the ancient historical records in China (which he does not specify and had obviously not read in the original) show that the fate of the emperors depended on whether they abided by the laws and the constitution, and in particular the law pertaining to the freedom of writing. Lütken used and re-worked Du Halde's text in a way that suited his political agenda, to promote the freedom of writing in Denmark, through showing that this had existed in China since ancient time, and was crucial for the fate of the emperor himself (and consequently also for the Danish monarch). Basing his arguments on Du Halde's work, he continues to claim that the wise emperors of China had allowed "that anyone may freely and clearly petition the emperor about what anyone regarded as useful for the Emperor to know" (Lütken 1759, 9).

Chydenius then translated Lütken's version of this very first passage of Du Halde's chapter 2 about the emperor's authority, quoted above, word by word from Danish, without considering the French original. Judging from Chydenius's translation of Lütken's text, he had no problem reading and translating contemporary Danish, which was very similar to Swedish, but he saw fit to make a few changes. Lütken (1759, 8) wrote: *"Keiserne af China ere Enevolds herrer, og have en uomskraenket Magt i alle Maader"* [The Emperors of China are Absolute Sovereigns and have Absolute Power in all Respects]. Chydenius (1766, 9) then translated:

"Kejsaren i China är en EnvåldsHerre, och äger värkligen en aldeles oinskränkt magt" [The Emperor of China is an Absolute Sovereign and Really Possesses Completely Absolute Power]. Chydenius thus changed plural to singular: "the Emperors" in Lütken's line became "the Emperor." He then replaced the word *have* [have] in Lütken's line for the stronger verb *äger* [possesses]. Then he added a few words, the grade adverbs *värkligen* [really] and *aldeles* [completely], which added substantially to the force of the statement. Finally, he omitted the last few words in Lütken's sentence *i alle Maader* [in all respects].

I presume that Chydenius took the liberty to insert and subtract a few words to make the text and its argument more appealing to his intended readers. In this, and other sentences, he used pathos to appeal to his reader's emotions, especially to the future King of Sweden, to whom he had dedicated the pamphlet. This particular sentence is the first line of the main text in the pamphlet, the first line that meets the Prince's eye after the dedication. It appears that Chydenius wanted to emphasise that even though the Chinese Emperor was an absolute monarch who "really possesses completely absolute power" (unlike the Swedish King at that time), the Chinese Emperor still observed the law of the freedom of writing in China, that he listened to the voices of his people and obviously did not consider this an infringement on his authority. (Had Chydenius not removed the words "in all respects," it could have appeared somewhat contradictory, since with these citizen rights the monarch obviously did not "really possess completely absolute power" in "all respects"). Chydenius was careful in shaping the translation to suit his political agenda, using pathos to persuade and convince.

Example 2. Lütken chose to translate and re-work several passages in the "Imperial Collection" in Du Halde's vol. 2, providing instances of wise Emperors encouraging their officials to write or speak freely about matters of the State and thereby appearing to promote the freedom of writing. One such example is when "the Emperor *Vou ti* [Wudi, Emperor Wu]," in Du Halde's version, makes the following statement:

> *Here you see, Ta fou [dafu=senior officials], what my wishes are. As you are well versed in the most ancient antiquity, instructed in the foundation of the government of our ancient wise Princes and in all the recourses upon which depend the fortunes and misfortunes of the Empires: I do not at all doubt that you will give me great enlightenment on all that. But what I recommend to you is that in order to instruct me better, you shall proceed with order, without embracing too many things at the same time, without mixing up the matters, treating first one subject and then another, always proceeding step by step, and in every matter be well aware of what is most essential and most useful. Whatever you may have noticed in all the Officials of the Empire, like failing in virtue, failing in honesty, lack of zeal or enforcement, indicate it to me without omitting anything, and what regards my person, express yourselves freely, without disguise, without circumlocutions, and do not at all fear any unfortunate reprisals. Devote yourselves incessantly to drawing up a detailed memorandum. When it is ready, I will read it (*Du Halde 1736, 2, 475; Transl. by J. Enwall).

In this passage in *Description de la Chine*, the Emperor instructs his senior officials on how to write memoranda to him with advice on how to govern. Obviously, the Emperor is tired of elaborate memoranda that never seemed to get to the point, written by officials showing off their eloquence and learning. What the Emperor desires are short, well-structured and to the point memoranda with useful information. He also invites his senior officials to report on other officials that behave immorally, dishonestly and so on. The Emperor even invites them to criticise him (regardless of this "generous" offer, it is doubtful that the officials dared to do so, and no such instance is reported in this passage in Du Halde's text). Lütken, again, did not bother to translate this entire passage from Du Halde's work:

> When the Emperor Vou ti wants to confirm this freedom [referring to the freedom of writing, according to Lütken], he says: "Do not think that I will be content with idle talk: I want to know the truth: Do not let either esteem or fear hold you back from speaking with frankness; since it is our will. Withhold me nothing, and when it concerns my own Person, speak freely, without hypocrisy and circumlocution, and fear no disfavor (Lütken, 1759, 12-13).

Lütken summarised only the content in this passage that suited his political agenda, without giving any clue to the context in *Description de la Chine*. In Du Halde's work, this passage contains instructions to officials on how to write memoranda, not to be printed and available to the public, but to be read by the Emperor himself. This has nothing to do with a general freedom of writing and of the press for each citizen that Lütken advocated in Denmark; it concerned simply the "Freedom of senior officials to write memoranda to the Emperor."

Nor does Lütken hesitate to put words in the Emperors mouth, such as the forceful warning by the Emperor in the quote above: "Do not think I will be content with idle talk: I want to know the truth." A forceful imperative like this by the Chinese Emperor would obviously have a stronger impact on readers in Denmark than the actual polite and detailed instructions by the Emperor on how to write memoranda concerning content and structure in Du Halde's original. In addition, the Emperor in Du Halde's text requires not specifically the absolute "truth" but what is "essential and useful." Lütken's choice of words here may be crucial for the debate in Denmark. A major argument in the debate on the freedom of writing and of the press in the Nordic countries by its advocates, centred on how this freedom would allow for the competition of ideas and arguments to reach the "truth," and how public debate might wipe out ignorance, prejudices and erroneous ideas when openly confronted by the "truth."

Finally, the Emperor's instruction in Du Halde's text to report on indecent and dishonest fellow officials is omitted by Lütken. It probably would not benefit Lütken's discourse on the freedom of writing and of the press in Denmark at that time that officials should be encouraged to use this freedom to turn each other in to the authorities.

This short and forceful passage in Lütken's version was probably exactly to Chydenius's taste and suited his political agenda perfectly, since he did not alter a single word when translating it (1766, 14). He did not have the opportunity to compare Lütken's translation with Du Halde's original, or if he did, he chose to ignore all the discrepancies.

Example 3. Another passage in *Description de la Chine* that Lütken included, is a "public statement" in which "Emperor Hiao ven ti [Xiaowendi, Emperor Xiaowen]" asks for advice (Du Halde 1736, 2, 474).

> *Our intention is such, and we strongly wish that our subjects, from our highest Officials to the smallest, the simple literati, the merchants, the artisans and others, explain to us what they think is advantageous for the State, and capable of contributing to the happiness of the peoples. Even what they may consider as faulty in the present government and especially what to them seems to be able to harm good manners and virtue. I recommend them all, not only not to hide anything of that kind from me, but also to explain themselves freely and without circumlocutions. What I demand is not beautiful and long discourses, but good short and solid memoranda, so that I can look into them by myself. It shall be so much easier for those who will give them to me, to avoid the mistakes capable of offending me, and for me to draw the usefulness that I hope for in my instruction* (Du Halde 1736, 2, 573-574, transl. by J. Enwall).

Obviously, "Emperor Hiao ven ti," just like "Emperor Vou ti" in Example 2, is instructing his officials to avoid elaborate "beautiful and long speeches," and instead write "short and solid memoranda." Lütken translated this passage as follows:

> *Likewise, the Emperor Hiao ven ti invites everyone [to do] the same[freely make petitions to the Emperor], when at the end of his command he says thus: It is therefore our serious intention and wish that all our subjects, from the premier to the basest, freely should reveal to us all that they consider to be beneficial for us to know, to be able to promote the happiness of our subjects. Conceal nothing from me, and speak right out about everything: be brief and without artificiality, so that I may myself investigate it and make use of it* (Lütken 1759, 14).

Again, Lütken summarises but gives the impression that it is a translation of the exact words by the Emperor, turning it into a short, forceful imperative. Again, Lütken omits the context and does not mention that this "freedom of expression" concerns the writing of memoranda, not to be printed or public, merely to be read by the Emperor himself. It is again not a question of a general freedom of the press. Lütken also substitutes the word "officials" in "from our highest officials to the smallest" in *Description de la Chine*, for "subjects" and translates "all our subjects, from the premier to the basest," thereby giving the impression that this concerns a freedom of writing and of the press for every citizen of China. But even if the Emperor is asking all his subjects for advice (as in the title of the document in Du Halde's original (1736, 2, 573), the Emperor in the quote above is basically instructing his officials how to write memoranda. And considering that even the minimal literacy rate in ancient China was extremely low, few others than the well-educated officials would be able to write a memorandum to the Emperor. Lütken obviously chose his words carefully in order to reinforce his political arguments for freedom of writing and of the press for each citizen in Denmark.

Lütken also omits the part about what is "advantageous for the State" in Du Halde's version, and translates only "contributing to the happiness of the peoples." And, just as in Example 2 above, he consistently omits the part about allowing

officials to report on errors by the present government and criticise their faults. He probably realised that this would not be an attractive feature of the freedom of writing and of the press for Danish politicians and government officials. They rather needed to be convinced about the merits of the freedom of the press, and not fear that such a freedom would open up for criticism of themselves.

Chydenius in turn provides a word-for-word translation of Lütken's text with just a little change of words in the initial line. Lütken (1759, 14) wrote: "Likewise, the Emperor Hiao ven ti invites everyone [to do] the same [freely make petitions to the emperor], when at the end of his command he says thus …" Chydenius (1766, 15) then translated: "Likewise, the Emperor Hiao ven ti demands the same thing, when at the end of his ordinance he states thus …" By replacing the word the Emperor "invites" with the Emperor "demands," Chydenius again makes the Emperor's statement more forceful. In addition, Chydenius replaces the word "command" in Lütken's text with "ordinance," in Swedish "förordning."[12] By choosing to use the word "ordinance," Chydenius would like to give the impression that this was not some kind of random command issued by the Emperor but rather a statutory text, that the freedom of expression was part of Chinese law. So what started out as basically a "public statement" with a "recommendation" by the Emperor in *Description de la Chine* to his officials on how to write "good short and solid memoranda" with "useful" information, had by the time it reached Chydenius through Lütken turned into a statutory text, an "ordinance" about the freedom of expression for all citizens.

One may ask how representative these passage in Du Halde's work, which Lütken, and then Chydenius used for their political propaganda, really are. These kinds of statements by emperors encouraging their officials to offer advice on state matters, to criticise the government or even the emperor himself, in memoranda written to the throne, constitute a fraction of the almost 3000 pages in Du Halde's four volumes. (And there are plenty of examples of emperors not acting so wisely). The passage about the "Emperor Hiao ven ti" in Example 3, for instance, is followed by a chapter which relates how the "Emperor Suen vou ti" [Xuanwudi, Emperor Xuanwu] was presented with a chicken that had four wings and four legs (Du Halde 1736, 2, 574-575). The Emperor then asked his senior official how to regard this matter, who immediately saw this as an omen, a sign that something in the Kingdom was not right. He advised the Emperor that great disaster and trouble would occur if the Emperor did not change his ways of governing. The Emperor followed this advice. This passage was naturally omitted by Lütken. Nor would this episode have appealed to Chydenius, who argued that the truth was obtained through the competition of arguments and ideas in public debate and print. The fact that the appearance of a deformed chicken could qualify as evidence against a certain way of governing in China, would hardly have impressed Chydenius's political adversaries in the Swedish Diet at the time of the debate on the freedom of the press. Relating such an incident would rather tarnish the image of the wise and enlightened rulers of China and diminish the credibility and impact of *Berättelse om Chinesiska Skrif-friheten.*

Conclusion

In this article I have shown how the Swedish 18th-century politicians Anders Nordencrantz and Anders Chydenius (and Chydenius's source the Danish writer

Lütken) used the descriptions of China in Du Halde's *Description de la Chine* to create an image of China as a land of freedom of writing, of the press and of information in order to promote the freedom of writing, of the press and of information in Sweden (and Lütken in Denmark). Nordencrantz "copy-pasted" only parts of the information about the *Peking Gazette* in *Description de la Chine* in his political pamphlet *Oförgripeliga tankar om Frihet i bruk af Förnuft, pennor och Tryck.* He omitted the parts that would have been detrimental to his political agenda, such as the information of the penalties for expressing any kind of reflections on government issues in China, which was also recorded by Du Halde. Through the dedication of his pamphlet and by adding, omitting or substituting words when translating Lütken's already severely distorted version of Du Halde's work, Chydenius shaped an image of China that fitted his political agenda, the Swedish debate at the time and the intended readers. His use of pathos made the text's argument more appealing to one most important intended reader, the future King of Sweden. In *Berättelse om Chinesiska Skrif-friheten* Chydenius created an image of China in which all China's wealth, perseverance and wise rule, the well-being of the Chinese people, of the Chinese empire, and even of the Emperor himself, rested largely on an ancient law of the freedom of writing, of the press and of information, that the Swedish Crown Prince and Diet should also be wise to accept.

This image of China was very far from the reality of authoritarian 18th-century China. Initially, this image was created by Du Halde, a work in itself quite removed both from the original Chinese and Western sources and the Chinese reality, since it presents a highly selective and biased image of conditions in China. And every step in the citing, or translation of Du Halde's work, through Danish, and then into Swedish, moved the image of China even further away from contemporary Chinese reality and more towards an image of China that served the political purposes of the writers of these political pamphlets, Anders Nordencrantz and Anders Chydenius.

So a distorted image of China as being the foremost land of the freedom of writing, of the press and of information, based on writings by French Jesuits, and adapted and used as political argument by politicians in Sweden (and Denmark) in the 18th century, contributed to the passing of the first Freedom of Writing, of Press and of Information Act in the Swedish Diet, the first FOIA in the world. Globalisation as we know it is far from a new phenomenon. Conceptions as well as misconceptions about other cultures and political systems have shaped our values, politics and societies in more ways than we imagine.

Acknowledgments

Notes:

1. Available in English translation by Peter Hogg (2006). All other translations from Swedish and Danish sources into English in this paper were made by the author unless otherwise stated.

2. Professor Skuncke has published several articles on this topic, for instance: "Kina var viktigt för 1700-talets Sverige" [China was important for 18th century Sweden] (2002) and "La liberté dans la culture politique suédoise au XVIII siècle" (2003).

3. The first complete translation of Du Halde's *Description de la Chine* was printed for Edward Cave in London in 1738 (Löwendahl 2008, 190).

4. However, when one of Nordencrantz political opponents published a criticism of one of his books, Nordencrantz was furious and demanded that the critic be punished by the court system for "slandering a Diet member in public print" (Lindqvist 1996, 34).

5. Nordencrantz's statement in a political pamphlet denied printing in 1756, quoted by Lindqvist (1996, 407-8).

6. Anders Chydenius's *Sjelfbiografi* [Autobiography] (1780, 434) quoted by Virrankoski (1995, 179).

7. Ibid.

8. *Berättelse om Chinesiska Skrif-friheten* was printed by Lars Salvius, probably in the beginning of April 1766, since it is introduced in *Lärda Tidningar* [Erudite journals] No 30, 1766, by Salvius on the 17th of April (Virrankoski 1995, 187, f 32).

9. The author and title of the Danish original text are never mentioned in *Berättelse om Chinesiska Skrif-friheten,* but when comparing the text it is obviously a translation from Lütken's work. Neither Lütken's work, nor *Berättelse om Chinesiska Skrif-friheten* are mentioned in Löwendahl's (2008) bibliography *Sino-Western relations, conceptions of China, cultural influences and the development of sinology: Disclosed in Western printed books 1477-1872*.

10. According to Löwendahl (2008), pp 389-612 in vol. 2 of *Description de la Chine* (1735) are based on Xu Qianxue's *Yuxuan guwen yuan jian*. The "Imperial collection" section was not included in Watts's English editions.

11. These first lines in the original: "Il n'y a jamais eu d'Etat plus monarchique que celui de la Chine: l'Empereur a une autorité absolue; & à en juger par les apparences, c'est une espèce de divinite: Le respect qu'on a pour lui, va jusqu'à l'adoration" (Du Halde 1736, 2, 10).

12. The entire line in Swedish: "Likaledes yrkar Kejser Hiao ven ti på det samma, då han i slutet af sin Förordning yttrar sig således"(Chydenius 1766, 15).

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"BRAND CHINA" IN THE OLYMPIC CONTEXT

COMMUNICATIONS CHALLENGES OF CHINA'S SOFT POWER INITIATIVE

SUSAN BROWNELL

Abstract

The Beijing 2008 Olympics were widely considered to be China's moment for improving its national image worldwide. However, the consensus both inside and outside China was that although the Olympics succeeded in advancing an image of an emerging powerful, prosperous, and well-organised nation, the message was hijacked by interest groups critical of government policies on human rights and Tibet, who were more successful in putting forward their positions in the international media than the Chinese government was. The article analyses the communications challenges that created obstacles for genuine dialogue on sensitive issues. In its post-Olympics assessment, the Chinese government acknowledged the weakness of China's voice in international (especially Western) media and responded with a planned US$6 billion investment for strengthening its foreign communications capacity as part of its "soft power" initiative (first called for by President Hu Jintao in 2007).

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For the eight years from the time that Beijing announced its bid for the 2008 Olympic Games until the conclusion of the games, observers both inside and outside China widely considered the Beijing 2008 Olympics to be China's moment for improving its national image worldwide. Beneath this attention to "national image" lay a power struggle. Politicians in the developed West, international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and occasionally even members of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) itself hoped to leverage the Chinese leadership's concern about their national image into pressure that could accelerate political reforms. The Chinese leadership, on the other hand, hoped to use the games as a tool in China's "soft power" initiative to extend its global influence. The medium for the struggle was the huge communications platform provided by the global press coverage surrounding this media-event. The result of this convergence of medium, event, and actors was a situation in which national governments, NGOs, the IOC, and the Beijing Olympic Organising Committee (BOCOG) were drawn together into a field of heated contests over putting forward their messages in the mass media.

Caught in the middle were the international media, who generally knew only what the actors wanted them to know and as a result often ended up serving the agendas of the actors who possessed the superior communications strategies. However, ultimately what occurred in the realm of communications was largely ineffective in bringing about the political reforms that the China critics desired, and may have set back political transformation by several years. The most immediate and evident legacy of this contest was not a decision by the Chinese leadership to initiate political reform but a decision to make a massive investment of US$6 billion dollars to strengthen its foreign communications capacity.

This article is critical of the tendency to misrecognise the degree of influence that the field of communications actually possesses. This misrecognition is enabled in part by research methods that only analyse communications and not the power structures that underlie them. This essay utilises a social science approach focusing on the social construction of knowledge. The author is a China scholar and anthropologist who has been engaged in China since 1985. She was in China for the year leading up to the Olympics, as well as for four months during the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai. This paper is based on work with Chinese organisers of these media events; interviews of IOC members and staff and review of internal IOC documents; interviews with members of Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Reporters without Borders and other NGOs, and the United Nations Office of Sport for Development and Peace; and extended discussions with an Associated Press (U.S.) reporter specially assigned to the Beijing Olympics. From 2008 to 2011, the author conducted more than 30 hours of interviews with Hein Verbruggen, the Chairman of the IOC's Coordination Commission for Beijing (CoComm) – and an IOC member until 2008 – and was allowed to review all of the Commission's files. The paper also draws on her extensive contact with the media, since she was interviewed by about one hundred journalists from more than twenty countries, and was a guest commentator on the morning preview show "17 Days" for China Central Television during the games. This essay is primarily based on discussions with people in the form of ethnography and interviews – including interviews with journalists themselves - combined with a review of the media and publicity that these people produced.

The Debate

The Beijing 2008 Olympics were the most-watched Olympic Games ever, and probably the most-watched event in human history. Approximately 70 percent of the world's population, 4.7 billion viewers, accessed television coverage (BOCOG 2008, 129). Some 94 percent of the Chinese population of 1.3 billion tuned in at some point during the Games. In the US, the games ranked as the most-viewed television event ever (Nielsen 2008a, b). A total of 32,278 journalists (26,298 accredited and 5,980 unaccredited) from around the world covered the Games, the largest contingent for any event ever (BOCOG 2008, 123). A total of 61,700 hours of television coverage of the Games aired around the world in 220 countries and territories. They were the first Games to have global digital coverage, with 153 million people watching live broadcasts online. The IOC's free digital channel on YouTube received 21 million views in 78 territories across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East (IOC 2009, 1).

The Games provoked an international debate about the political system of the host country that had not been seen on such a scale since, perhaps, the Berlin 1936 Olympics. In its risk assessment in 2007, the IOC had identified 28 NGOs that had announced plans to highlight political issues in the lead-up to the Games; the most active were considered to be Amnesty International, Reporters without Borders, Students for a Free Tibet, Coalition to Investigate the Persecution of Falungong, Support the Monks, and Save Darfur Coalition.[1] Riots broke out in the Chinese province of Tibet in March 2008, and shortly afterwards the Secretary-General of the NGO Reporters sans frontières (Reporters Without Borders) disrupted the Olympic torch-lighting ceremony in Ancient Olympia by unfurling a banner depicting handcuffs in place of the five Olympic rings. Although not all the details are publicly known, it appeared that the Central Tibetan Administration, the administrative organisation under the spiritual leadership of the Dalai Lama, organised international protests under the umbrella of the International Tibet Support Network (Saunders 2008). The Tibet-related protests merged with other protests, disrupting the international torch relay in London, Paris, and San Francisco.

An idea of the scale of the debate can be gleaned from the numbers generated by a search of the terms "Beijing" AND "Olympic*" AND "human rights" (and equivalent in other languages) in major world media in the LexisNexis Academic database. In the period from one month before the opening ceremony to the day after the closing ceremony (8 July to 25 August 2008), a search in the database produces a total of 5243 items: English (1938 items), German (1220), French (1004), Dutch (590), Italian (325) and Spanish (166). Although the database does not allow searches in non-Roman alphabets, the global scope of the debate is indicated by articles in English-language publications in Asia, Central and South America, Israel, and South Africa. The 1938 reports on human rights in English constituted only 6 percent of the 33,665 Anglophone items called up by the search terms "Beijing" AND "Olympic*" (Brownell 2012, 308). The vast media coverage of the Olympics is also put into perspective when one considers that another important event that would shape the future policies of the other global superpower was going on at the same time – the U.S. presidential election. However, the word "Obama" in the same time frame only pulls up 7,839 articles, or less than ¼ of the articles on the Olympics.[2]

Media in Hong Kong and Taiwan devoted a great deal of attention to these issues, but due to government censorship on the topic of human rights inside China, the few reports that did appear criticised the debate taking place outside China. A search in a Chinese database using the Chinese equivalents of "human rights" and "Beijing Olympics" calls up twenty articles in July and August.[3]

The Importance of Communications

The interviews and archival research revealed that for all of the major actors, the debate about human rights was primarily conceived of as a question of *communications* rather than *policy*. This included the Chinese central government, the IOC, BOCOG, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Reporters Without Borders.

Soft Power and Brand China

Actually, in the years before the Beijing Olympics, China's foreign communications policy had been greatly influenced by the works of two Americans. Joseph Nye's concept of "soft power" had gained attention after the publication of his book by that title in 2004, which discussed the growing importance of soft power – co-option and attraction – rather than "hard power" – the use of coercion and payment – in international relations. This American input also augmented a long-term strategy among China's East Asian rivals. In the mid to late 1990s, first Japan and then South Korea had implemented government policies for promoting the "cultural industry" as a means of increasing their international influence (Yim 2002).

In February 2007, former *Time Magazine* Foreign Editor and then-partner at Kissinger Associates, Joshua Cooper Ramo (2007), wrote a report for a British thinktank, the Foreign Policy Centre. It was entitled *Brand China.* It observed that many Chinese intellectuals were discussing the concept of soft power and stated, "China's greatest strategic threat today is its national image." He argued that China's perception of itself did not correspond to the world's perception of it, that the outside world's perception was disconnected with reality due to China's rapid changes of the last decades, and that the perception of a "China Threat" was a danger to China's own interests. He suggested, "Thinking about national image doesn't come easily for Chinese," and proposed that thinking about China as if it were a "brand" might help China communicate a clearer image of itself. He put forward several proposals that were later implemented after the Beijing Olympic Games in the government effort that will be described below.

Eight months later, President Hu Jintao advocated for strengthening China's soft power in his address to the 17th Party Congress, the main occasion on which the President lays out future policy orientations. In his address, President Hu said, "Culture has become a more and more important source of national cohesion and creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strength … enhanc[ing] culture as part of the soft power of our country [will] better guarantee the people's basic cultural rights and interests."[4]

All of these developments converged around the Beijing Olympics to produce a general consensus both inside and outside China that the Olympic Games could be a vehicle for improving China's national image and strengthening its global soft power. Ramo's report was supported by Hill and Knowlton, the prestigious inter-

national communications consulting firm hired by the IOC right after the success of Beijing's bid. It had moved from the IOC to BOCOG in 2006, and was working for BOCOG when Ramo's report came out. Ramo would later serve as the expert commentator for NBC television's broadcast of the Olympic opening ceremonies. One critic from the far right summarised these connections by noting:

> *Kissinger, who has been the ChiCom's [Chinese Communism's] best asset since the days of Chairman Mao, accompanied President Bush to the Beijing Games and strategically placed the manager of his Kissinger & Associates Beijing operations, Joshua Cooper Ramo, as NBC's "China expert" for the Games. Together with Hill & Knowlton, they helped the PRC's Propaganda Department make sure that when the world wasn't being legitimately dazzled by the genuine achievements of Michael Phelps, Usain "Lightning" Bolt, or Nastia Liukin, they were being stupefied by flashy spectacles, choreographed travelogues, and gushing commentary on the wonders of today's China* (Jasper 2008).

Ramo's report did not mention human rights or any other sensitive topic, and with its use of Chinese characters and its recitation of Chinese history, it appears to have been written for a Chinese audience rather than an Anglophone one. It was a *communication about communication*, not about the real issues. In this sense it was an example of a position often adopted by the foreign organisations working with the Chinese government on issues of national image, including the IOC. These organisations were not in a position to exercise much if any influence on government policies and actions, so they did not directly pressure the government on human rights issues, and indeed the consulting firms would probably not be hired if they did. So they could only provide recommendations to the Chinese government on *how to communicate*, not *how to act*.

It was widely agreed that human rights issues were one of the major obstacles to China in its attempt to improve its national image, but this issue was largely ignored in the background research on the promotion of China's national image through the Olympics that was conducted in three key point research projects commissioned by the National Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Science, which is administered by the Central Propaganda Department of the Communist Party. These grants are the government's way of channelling academic research in directions that serve its needs. The first relevant Olympic project was the 2003 project entitled "Improving China's International Position and Reputation through the 2008 Olympic Games." The Beijing Sport University won the bid for this project and in April 2007 published the results in *Research on Improving China's International Position and Reputation through the 2008 Olympic Games* (Yang et al. 2008). Its 65 chapters contained thorough summaries of the issues that had provoked negative media reports in past Olympic Games, such as delays in venue completion, transportation problems, media information glitches, and terrorist acts. The lesson that Beijing learned was that these particular problems should be avoided at all costs. Since the late timeline for venue construction had been the major public relations disaster for Athens, the host of the previous summer Games, timely venue completion was a top priority. Ultimately, Beijing avoided all of these typical problems, perhaps the first-ever host city to succeed in doing so. However, since the host

country's government itself had not been a hot issue for recent Olympic Games, there were few historical lessons about how to handle that issue. The analyses of Western media coverage of the Beijing Games since 2001 indicated that "political" issues – as they are called in China – would dominate coverage.[5] The recommendations in this report emphasised the importance of treating the media and other important opinion-makers well.

The chapter "Avoid Political and Economic Risks with a High-Level Strategy" does have a section that discusses the risk that the "human rights" problem will become even more sensitive. As is required by the Chinese censorship standard, the article puts "human rights" in scare quotes, implying that the issue does not actually exist. Its recommendations include "avoid separatism and internal disorder."

The second key point project was the 2006 project "Construction of the Humanistic Concept, Social Value and National Image of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games," which was awarded to the People's University. Through this project and elsewhere, the People's University promoted its concept of the "Cultural Olympics." They argued that research shows that culture constitutes the core of China's national image, and "therefore in the construction of a national image, we should hold the line on "Cultural China," in order to make the idea of "Cultural China" into the core theme for dialogue between China and the international community in Olympic discourse" (People's University 2008).

The third relevant key point project was the 2005 project, "The Design of China's National Image in Communications with the Outside World," which was awarded to the Foreign Communications Research Centre, a unit administered by the Foreign Languages Publishing Bureau, which is in turn under the Party Central Committee. The major results of this project, which involved scholars in communications at China's top universities, were published in April of 2008, *Communication of a National Image*. Among the 60 chapters, there is not one specifically on the Beijing Olympics. The chapters that touch upon the Olympics agree that Olympic Games are an excellent opportunity to promote a national image; but they use the examples of the Tokyo 1964 and Seoul 1988 Olympic Games as models for promoting a positive image, and they do not offer the possibility that the Games can promote a negative image (Zhou 2008).

And so three years of government-funded analysis by the academic researchers who did the background research on national image in the Olympic Games and made policy recommendations did not even directly address the issues considered most problematic in the West.

Chinese Government Position on Human Rights

The sports scholars, philosophers, and members of non-communist parties who were developing these documents were not likely to address such a sensitive topic as human rights, because they were not empowered to do so.

China was admitted to the UN in 1971 and began its policy of opening up to the outside world in 1978, in the midst of the Cold War. It immediately encountered criticism from the West on human rights issues. Paramount leader Deng Xiaoping laid down a guiding principle that was created then and is still in effect: "national sovereignty is much more important than human rights." The leadership's uncompromising standpoint is that no interference in the party-state's sovereignty over

its territory will be tolerated in the name of "human rights" (Wu 2007, 357-8). Criticism by other nations of China's human rights record or policies toward Tibetans is considered interference in internal affairs and an attack on national sovereignty.

China's constitution guarantees the usual fundamental political rights found in liberal democracies. However, the Cold War's politicisation of human rights left a legacy that still exists today in the fact that the Chinese leadership has considered human rights primarily as a problem of foreign communications rather than of domestic policy. In recent years it does seem that there has been an increasing number of voices acknowledging that human rights is a concept that might have internal benefits, and a passage explicitly using the Chinese phrase for "human rights" was first included in the revision to the Constitution in 2004. Nevertheless, the government agency most active in the human rights realm is a communications organ, the State Council Information Office, which is simultaneously the Office of Foreign Propaganda of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Its function is to act as the media conduit between China and the outside world, and one of its official responsibilities is to "be responsible for introducing the state of affairs of the development of China's human rights endeavour to the outside world and to organise and initiate exchange and collaborative activities with the outside world in the realm of human rights."[6] The Information Office did not appear to take any proactive communication measures on Olympic issues, except for the "Olympics" link on the English version of the China Human Rights Webpage, which did not contain even *one* article that discussed human rights in conjunction with the Olympics. There was one article about the failure of the German Parliament to pass a boycott resolution, taken as proof of China's progress in human rights (China Human Rights Webpage 2008). The Chinese version of the webpage did not even have an "Olympics" link.

The Chinese government tightly controls interchange with the outside world in official settings, so the Information Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were responsible for establishing messages on sensitive political issues, and neither the Olympic bid committee (BOBICO) nor BOCOG were empowered to do so. Since neither was empowered to speak about human rights, in press conferences they held to the official position that sport should be separate from politics, and political questions should be addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the U.N., and other such organisations.

The memoirs of two of the most influential figures in Beijing's bid show how this division of labour played out during Beijing's Olympic bid in 2001. He Zhenliang, China's senior IOC member, and Yuan Weimin, former Minister of Sport and Executive Director of the BOBICO, both believed that "human rights problems" were an excuse that Western governments and public opinion used to attack China because they were threatened by its rapid development. The message that they put forward during the bid contest was that China's human rights situation is currently the best it has ever been, although of course much work remains to be done. The Olympic Games would help them better solve human rights problems. Yuan Weimin stated in his story of the bid process, "If we proactively spoke about this problem, it was possible that it would 'draw fire upon us' and bring trouble" (Brownell 2008, 143; Liang 2008; Yuan 2009, 80).

The question of whether or not to orally mention "human rights" in the bid presentation before the IOC Session in Moscow was considered very carefully.

Although He and Yuan favoured proactively raising the issue, which would demonstrate confidence, some members of the bid committee were very persistent in opposing mention of human rights, and discussions became increasingly heated. At one point someone said, "If we can't even dare to mention the two words 'human rights,' then what are we bidding for?" (Brownell 2008, 243; Yuan 2009, 82). Forty-eight hours before the bid presentation the question was not yet decided when Li Lanqing, the Vice Premier, arrived in Moscow and an emergency meeting was held. Li declined to mention human rights in his address to the Session, but eventually Beijing Mayor Liu Qi was able to secure agreement from him that he himself could do it (Brownell 2008, 243). The final result was that in his speech to the Moscow Session, Mayor Liu said:

> I want to say that the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games will have the following special features: They will help promote our economic and social progress and will also benefit the further development of our human rights cause. They will promote an exchange of rich Chinese culture with other cultures. They will mark a major step forward in the spreading of the Olympic Ideals.[7]

This message formed the prototype that could be repeated to the media; thus, the later statements by the other bid team members were all variations on this theme.

The published memoirs by He and Yuan do not even mention the P.R. firm that was hired by BOBICO, Weber Shandwick. It was credited by *USA Today* and Reuters with bringing about Beijing's win with its sophisticated and aggressive public relations strategy, which disengaged human rights from the bid. A triumphalist account by the firm stated, "WSW had affirmed the efficacy of public relations as a tool that can positively influence global discourse and harmony" (Holmes 2002).

Afterwards, individuals from other high-powered communications firms such as Hill and Knowlton, Ogilvy and Mather, and IMG – then the most influential firm in sports marketing – stated that they had provided advice on the bid. Quite a few top international consulting firms were working with various Chinese partners, and with the IOC, in the context of the Beijing Olympics, and they were frequently credited in the media with having great influence over the Chinese organisers or public opinion. However, interviews with the people in BOCOG, the Chinese government, or the IOC who were engaged in the real work of organising the Olympic Games, revealed that they considered these communications firms to be of limited effectiveness. Assessments of their work ranged from feelings that a firm was almost totally ineffective, to feelings that a firm was effective in liaison work with the media or as an intermediary between BOCOG and the IOC. At both BOCOG and the IOC there was a feeling of frustration that their messages had not had a strong position in the mass media, along with the conclusion that this was a goal that communications firms were incapable of realising for various reasons – some due to the nature of communications, and some to external factors beyond their control.

The IOC's Position

In the case of BOCOG, it is questionable how much of the advice from Western-based communications firms was actually utilised, but the presence of these international firms served the purpose of assuaging concerns about the Chinese commitment to communication. Based on discussions with IOC members and staff,

it appears that the IOC's vote for Beijing in 2001 placed priority on the fact that the Games would be held outside the West in a country that had never hosted them. If there were IOC members who believed the Games would improve the human rights situation in China and voted for Beijing on that basis, they were probably a very small minority. However, it does appear that it was important that BOBICO had demonstrated a commitment to implementing best practices in communications. Many of the IOC members had been through Beijing's first bid for the 2000 Olympics in 1993, only four years after the 1989 Tian An Men incident. There had been a big public relations gaffe during the IOC Session in 1993, when the Vice Mayor of Beijing had been shown on Australian television making a careless statement that China could respond to the U.S. House of Representative's resolution against Beijing's bid by boycotting the Atlanta 1996 Olympics. In 2001 Chinese politicians were a bit better prepared to function in a media-saturated environment, although the bid committee members were continually nervous that they would slip up. Furthermore, the Chinese bid committee itself showed understanding of the importance of the issue to many IOC members, and they demonstrated that they were up to the task of handling the media scrutiny that they would face if they got the Games. The influential Canadian IOC member Dick Pound recalled that in 1993 the bid team had been "surly and defensive" on the topic of human rights, but in 2001, "They were a lot more cosmopolitan. They had people who spoke much better English, they had some very high-powered P.R. communications and advice, and the presentation was slick in the way we expect those presentations [to be] in this day and age. It was really quite different from the first one in 1993."[8] However, from the memoirs of He and Yuan published years later, we now know how narrowly China passed the test of their ability to communicate about human rights in 2001.

Hein Verbruggen was the IOC's liaison with Beijing as Chairman of the Coordination Commission, a committee of 18 IOC members and staff that met with BOCOG annually to assess the Games preparations. From the very beginning, Verbruggen believed that "communication" would be the main challenge of the Games: in his follow-up letter to the Coordination Commission after its first meeting in 2002, he wrote, "On this subject, we all share the view that it will be the main issue in the coming years."[9] The topic of communication comes up repeatedly throughout the records of the Coordination Commission, where it is clear that a better communication strategy is considered the remedy for the criticism endured by the IOC and Beijing over human rights issues.

Human Rights Advocacy Groups

Amnesty International. In Spring 2008 Verbruggen engaged in a public conflict with Eduard Nazarski, the Director of Amnesty International Netherlands, in the Dutch media over Amnesty's "Broken Promises" theme for their Olympic campaign. Amnesty asserted that Beijing had broken the promise that it made to improve human rights when it was bidding for the games. As described above, such a promise was never clearly articulated or intended. When the controversy was discussed with Nazarski, his response was:

> *[F]or the public discussion and for the promise the IOC made, I'm not sure whether we would have to check into legal contracts that they had with whomever. They just made a public announcement that said, "Well,*

the human rights would improve, and we have an understanding with the Chinese government that it will be" – and that's enough later to say, "Hey, what did you say in April 2001, and what's the reality now? And why are you now not repeating what you said then?"[10]

Human Rights Watch. On the same point, Minky Worden, the Public Relations Director of Human Rights Watch, stated that express promises were made voluntarily by the Chinese government in order to get the Games, which were "like a contract." When pressed about whether she had studied the actual legal contracts, she stated that she had done some work on the candidature file, but since their interest is in openness and transparency, they are "looking for obvious things to pick up." She also concluded that it was the right decision to give China the Games because it gave her organisation a chance to spotlight human rights abuses in China.[11]

Reporters Without Borders. Jean-François Julliard, the Secretary-General of Reporters without Borders who unfurled the pro-Tibet banner during the torch-lighting ceremony in Ancient Olympia, stated that they had decided to conduct a protest at the ceremony in order to "ensure that freedom of press would be on the front page."[12]

International Tibet Support Network. The pro-Tibet groups were particularly media-savvy. A well-researched report in the Globe and Mail revealed that in May 2007, the Central Tibetan Administration (the "government in exile" headed by the Dalai Lama and located in Dharamsala, India) put together a meeting in Brussels of all the major Tibet organisations, which number in the hundreds and are organised under a Washington-based group, the International Tibet Support Network. At the meeting they decided that the Olympics should be the single focus of their activities, and they hired a full-time organiser from Students for a Free Tibet for the Olympic-disruption campaign. This group is also headquartered in Washington D.C., has 650 chapters around the world, and was perhaps the leading group in the Olympic protests. The campaign director sent letters to 150 organisations providing detailed instructions on how to organise disruptions of the international torch relay. The executive director of Students for a Free Tibet told a reporter:

> *The Chinese government wants something from this; they want world acceptance. That's why they're taking the risk of inviting the world in for these Games. They want to be part of the club and to be liked. And our job as young activists is to deny them this, to tell them that their approach to Tibet is going to cost them something, it'll cost them face. And loss of face is the most serious thing we can deliver* (Saunders 2008).

In sum, the international NGOs that continually drew the attention of the media to human rights issues considered the issues from the point of view of a publicity campaign. As indicated by the number of media reports on the topic, they were very successful in gaining media exposure for the human rights issue, sometimes at the expense of other equally valid issues. To give one example, the search terms "Beijing Olympics" and "legal reform" in the LexisNexis Academic (World News) database do not pull up any articles in the time period used for the previous search, even though significant legislation in multiple areas from anti-corruption to media freedom to intellectual property protection was enacted in the context

of the Games, and was one of the realms most likely to contribute to lasting social change in China.[13]

Communication about Communications in the Absence of Real Power

The Coordination Commission had been defined as a technical commission, so "political issues" were not discussed *as such* in its meetings with BOCOG. Instead, they were defined as "communications" issues. Communication about sensitive issues in the name of "communications" provided a neutral ground for discussing what otherwise could have been considered "political issues" outside the purview of CoComm. BOCOG's "communications" effort was one of the few aspects of the preparatory work that was frequently criticised and marked with a "yellow" card in the progress dashboard produced annually (almost everything else got a green, indicating no problem; almost nothing got a red, indicating a warning).

The problem was not the day-to-day work of the Department of Media and Communications. That department, which employed several people whose skill in crisis communication had been honed in the SARS epidemic of 2003, handled the tasks handed to them in a competent manner. The department was not prepared for the breadth of questions that media would ask, and replies about political issues either had to be handed off to other government agencies, or answers requested from them, which sometimes led the foreign media to complain about their slowness. From the IOC's perspective, the problem was bigger than that – the Beijing Olympic Games were being severely criticised in the media, and their Chinese counterparts did not seem able to mount an effective response.

Due to domestic media censorship and – more importantly – due to the fact that most Chinese people are much more concerned about issues such as government corruption than they are about civil rights, most Chinese people were not very aware of the issues and specific cases raised in the Western media by Western-based NGOs. Chinese employees of BOCOG who liaised with the international media were also not especially well-informed on the issues raised, since their job was to refer such questions to the relevant government agency and then relay the reply back to the journalist. The result of this structure of communications was that the debates about political issues largely functioned as a publicity campaign to raise awareness among the public in the developed West and did not create channels for genuine dialogue between Chinese and Western publics (Brownell 2012).

Since BOCOG was not empowered to answer the political questions, what was needed was a person who would be the "face of the government," but there was no designated single spokesperson on these issues. Top government leaders did not regularly issue press statements on the political issues – such statements generally came from a range of lower-level functionaries; they did not write op-eds to be placed in leading international media; they did not appear on evening talk shows; and, with some exceptions, they did not accept interviews. In short, the Chinese government did not function in the current public relations paradigm. This was true of their engagement with the domestic media, but even more so with the international media. In short, there was a lack of a communications strategy for dealing with the media, particularly crisis communications that could integrate the central and municipal governments, BOCOG, and the IOC.

Verbruggen stated that over the years, he repeatedly hammered on the importance of communications for maintaining the image of the Olympic Games, the "Olympic Brand." In summarising his eight-year experience as Chairman of CoComm, he said:

> Then at the end of this I would like to plead for a little conclusion… [T]he Chinese did an excellent job for themselves in organizing the Games and in receiving the foreigners with the smiling faces and everything you want, but I wish they had done the same excellent job in communication before the Games.[14]

Olympic China National Image Ad

While everything discussed above had been going on in the context of the Olympic preparatory work, the Information Office was involved in a separate effort, which involved a different group of intellectuals in the field of communications whose core was located at the Communication University of China. The question of China's national image, apart from the Olympic Games, had been the subject of a fair amount of intellectual work. The thick report funded by a key point grant that was mentioned previously, *Communication of a National Image*, involved this circle of researchers.

It is likely that Li Dongsheng was a key figure behind the Information Office's effort to produce a 90-second television commercial for "China" at the end of 2007, targeted for CNN and BBC. He was simultaneously a member of the Party Central Committee, Vice Minister of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, and – more to the point here - Deputy Director of the Central Propaganda Department, chief of BOCOG's Media and Communications Coordination Group,[15] and president of the China Advertising Association.

The difficult eight-month birthing process of the "Olympic China National Image Ad" indicates that there may have been resistance in the top echelons of leadership toward developing more proactive communications with the outside world. The ad had been approved at the start of 2007, but due to internal debates, it was shelved for almost one year until December. It was finally pushed through at the last minute before the end of the fiscal year while the allocated funding was still available. It was aired on CNN and BBC on August 8, the day of the Olympic opening ceremony. Its release had been delayed from the original planned date of April due to the torch relay protests in March and the devastating Wenchuan earthquake in May. Leading intellectuals and figures in the advertising world had been mobilised to support it via a long article entitled "Raise China's Face – Where is China's National Image Ad?," which appeared in November 2007 in *Modern Advertising Magazine*, a publication of the China Advertising Association of which Li was president (Shi and He 2007). The article was written with the help of scholars at the Communication University of China and demonstrated the widespread support of the heads of China's major advertising firms for producing a national image television advertisement. One of the people interviewed in the media who echoed the ideas found in this article was a P.R. consultant to BOCOG. One section, "Using the Opportunity of the Olympics to Build a National Image," reviews the risk of negative media coverage but, like the other publications mentioned above, it does not develop a communications strategy for responding to it.

Thanks to a recommendation by Luo Qing (Eileen Luo) at the Communication University of China, I was invited to be the only non-Chinese on the panel of academics that evaluated the bid presentations by eight of the top advertising agencies with offices in China. The project was not ultimately awarded to one of the advertising firms, but instead to a production team formed by the Information Office. The final product was essentially a tourism ad that abandoned any attempt to project an image of China to the outside world as was initially intended. From what I observed in the bid presentations, I can understand why this happened. The multinational firms did not have a good enough understanding of China to produce something that Chinese people would feel was true to China, and seemed oblivious that some of the themes that they had selected were highly controversial within China, such as the design of the National Theatre in Beijing by the French architect Paul Andreu. The Chinese firms did not have a good enough understanding of the international audience to produce something that would appeal to them and produced images suggestive of government propaganda campaigns, and seemed equally oblivious to themes that were controversial outside China, such as the Beijing-Tibet high speed railway. The Hong Kong-based firms struck a better middle ground, but ultimately the challenges of communicating an image of China that would be acceptable inside China, in a way that a Western audience would find attractive, seemed insurmountable.

At the time, we were told that we were making history, because for the first time China was reaching out to the world to try to shape its image, rather than waiting for the world to come and understand it. The staff from the Information Office involved in the process seemed to feel that it was an extremely important first step. They had also been very nervous about including a foreigner in the process and were afraid that I would not look favourably upon the government control exercised over the process. It seemed illogical for Chinese people to choose the best communications strategy without testing the idea on foreigners, but it was clear that in the first place they had to please their leaders and the domestic audience rather than a foreign audience. So in December 2007 the Information Office had already expressed that it knew it was not effective in communicating a positive image of China to the world, echoing what Hein Verbruggen had been saying for several years.

The Wake-Up Call

The Beijing Olympic Games were a wake-up call for the top leadership. In December 2008, Li Changchun, the propaganda chief of the Communist Party of China (CCP) and a senior member of the Politburo Standing Committee, made an important speech acknowledging China's weakness in foreign communications and outlining the plan to strengthen its "communications capacity." After praising China's journalists for their outstanding work during the difficult year of 2008, which included the snow disaster in the south, the unrest in Tibet, the Wenchuan earthquake, and the Beijing Olympics, he said (echoing Ramo's report, *Brand China*):

> *At the same time, we must observe that while our economy and society have been rapidly developing and our international standing has continuously improved, our communications capacity has not correspondingly adapted to the demands of our socioeconomic development…It is of vital importance to*

strengthen our communication capacity domestically and internationally, it is of vital importance to the overall interests of China's opening-up and modernization, it is of vital importance to our international influence and international standing, it is of vital importance to the rise of China's soft power, it is of vital importance to the standing and influence of China's media in international public opinion (Li 2008).

To address the deficiency in China's international communications, the central government invested a sum of US$6 billion in international media, with the goal of exponentially increasing the amount of content that China's media could deliver internationally as well as the size of the audience they could reach. It was decided that new technology was not only the wave of the future, but also the best way to get around the West's control of the conventional media of television and print. Therefore the biggest initiative was the creation of CNTV.cn, an online TV portal for China Central Television (CCTV), which was launched on December 28, 2009. It is now possible to watch all nine channels of CCTV live on the internet or on a mobile device in the U.S. The website reportedly received US$29.4 million in government investment. One of the most important platforms was the news platform, which offered 24-hour around-the-clock news. It was targeted at correcting the perceived bias of Western news media by "passing on the true situation of the original on-the-spot news in a well-rounded way." It also aimed to "assemble opinion leaders" and offer a "space for grassroots conversation" where the "people's online voice" could be heard, functioning as a platform where "China has influence" (CCTV 2009a; Sun 2010).

CCTV's television broadcasting was also expanded internationally through individuated arrangements with overseas providers. At the end of 2009, CCTV programs could be seen by 132.48 million households in 140 countries and territories, and 300 international media were using CCTV signals. Arabic and Russian broadcasts had also been added in that year. In addition to CCTV, in July 2009 Xinhua News Agency began collaboration with more than ten European broadcasters to transmit 90 minutes of English-language television news programs in a selection of supermarkets, as well as on television screens outside various Chinese embassies in Europe. China Radio International (CRI) rapidly increased to 117 international FM radio partners and 32 AM radio partners in Asia, Africa, North America, Europe, and Oceania. *China Daily*, the English-language paper that has traditionally been the government's foreign propaganda newspaper, launched a second paper intended to have more popular appeal, the *Global Times*. Same-day editions of the *China Daily* were made available in five major U.S. cities (CCTV 2009a; Sun 2010). In Houston – which has one of the largest Chinese communities in the U.S. – free editions of *China Daily* were distributed every Friday on the doorstep of homes in some areas off and on for periods of several months.

In December 2009, a "Made in China" television advertisement debuted on CNN Asia and had a six-week run on cable networks in the United States, Europe and Asia. The theme of the ad was "Made in China, made with the world": it highlighted the collaboration between overseas designers and Chinese firms to produce high-quality goods (CCTV 2009b).

During President Hu's state visit to the U.S. in January 2011, a second "China National Image Ad" was shown on the big screen in Times Square and on CNN, which highlighted accomplished Chinese citizens.

Conclusions

In the years leading up to the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, serious issues that deserved deep discussion were frequently reduced to a contest of publicity campaigns, disconnected from the reality on the ground. The materials produced by the Western-based communications and advertising firms tasked with communicating an image of China to the outside world revealed only superficial understanding of the substantive issues facing either China or the Olympic Games, which was compounded by their Western-centric viewpoints. Although they were frustrated by what they considered biased reporting in the media, neither the IOC nor BOCOG identified the reliance on communications firms as a problem because they provided the valuable skill of expertise in reaching the media, i.e. they were skilled in the medium if not the message.

I believe that, at a deeper level, all of this attention to China's national image was underlain by a harsher reality. Beneath it lay the desire of influential Westerners and perhaps of some high-ranking Chinese, too, to push forward political reforms. Because Henry Kissinger, the IOC, and the large communications firms did not have the capacity to directly influence policies on Tibetans, property evictions, freedom of speech, and the other key issues, they could only pressure China to improve its national image instead, leaving unspoken the real measures that would accomplish this goal. This returns us to the start of this article, which described how, until recently, Chinese leaders had considered human rights to be the West's way of controlling China, and had not believed that either the concept or the critics had a capacity to bring positive gains to China. When the imprisoned dissident Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010, he became the first recipient who was not represented at the award ceremony. Most observers in the West felt that this was a P.R. disaster for China's image. Certainly it seems to indicate that the government effort to strengthen China's soft power through investments in the *form* of its messages has not been accompanied by reforms in the *content.* "The medium is the message" appears to be a major lesson that the Chinese government took away from its Olympic experience – if it is, then it may be that they learned it while working with the large number of international partners who provided advice and services up to and after the Beijing Olympics.

Postcript: The World Expo Shanghai 2010

For six months from May to October 2010, China hosted its second mega-event, the World Expo Shanghai 2010. Measured by the number of visitors, it was the biggest mega-event in human history – 73 million spectators passed through its gates. Having studied the Beijing Olympics experience carefully, the Shanghai government and the Expo Coordinating Bureau felt that they were ready with communications strategies and a crisis communication plan exceeding what Beijing had had. But they hardly needed it: Shanghai Expo did not attract nearly as much media attention as the Olympics had. In discussions with both Chinese and international journalists, they complained that there was "no story." But one reason there was no story was that Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Reporters without Borders had decided not to use the World Expo as a platform for attracting media attention, mainly because the timing was too close to the Beijing Olympics. Publicity campaigns on the scale that they conducted leading

up to 2008 are expensive and time-consuming. Equally important, they have to be careful not to fatigue their audiences and donors. There is a reputational risk in being seen as ineffective in solving the problems that they raise. They have to consider their images, too.

Acknowledgements

Notes:

1. IOC, "Protests and the Olympic Games," 14 December 2007. CoComm Files.

2. The English count is based on the Major World Publications (English) Database. Other languages were input into the Non-English Language News, World Library Database.

3. Search terms input into "theme" window were *Beijing aoyun* AND *renquan*. <www.cnki.net> Retrieved 9 May 2011.

4. Hu Jintao, *Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in all: Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 15, 2007*. <http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm> Retrieved June 9, 2012.

5. Certainly there was criticism of governments at previous Games, but for various reasons the issues had not become global issues. The Okinawan protests against U.S. occupation during the torch relay for the Tokyo 1964 Olympics gained little attention outside Japan; the U.S. boycott of the Moscow 1980 Olympics and the U.S.S.R. boycott of the Los Angeles 1984 Olympics reduced the media attention to the Games inside the boycotting countries.

6. 中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室网站［Website of the People's Republic of China State Council Information Office], March 13, 2006, translation by the author. <http://www.scio.gov.cn/jbqk/xwbjs/200603/t95734.htm> Retrieved January 18, 2008.

7. BOCOG Official Website, "Mr. Liu Qi's speech," <http://en.beijing2008.cn/spirit/beijing2008/candidacy/presentation/n214051410.shtml> Retrieved May 19, 2011.

8. Dick Pound, phone interview, 27 April 2011. Pound was ineligible to vote because Toronto was a candidate city.

9. Letter from Hein Verbruggen to Members of the Coordination Commission, Salt Lake City, 14 February 2002, files of the Coordination Commission.

10. Telephone interview March 2, 2011.

11. Minky Worden, telephone interview, 13 April 2011; see website at <www.china.hrw.org>.

12. Telephone interview, July 18, 2011.

13. In the book edited by Minky Worden for Human Rights Watch, the two chapters on legal reform are the only two chapters that take a comparatively optimistic and positive outlook (Cohen 2008, Roth 2008). The search terms "Beijing Olympics'" and "intellectual property law" pull up 24 articles.

14. Interview, Maison du Sport, Lausanne, Switzerland January 12, 2010.

15. Shadow "leadership small groups" composed of top leaders in the central government oversaw the work of the major BOCOG departments.

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"CHINA GOING OUT" OR "THE WORLD GOING IN"?

THE SHANGHAI WORLD EXPO 2010 IN THE SWEDISH MEDIA

GÖRAN SVENSSON

Abstract

Public diplomacy, nation branding and soft power are the theoretical notions used in this analysis of the Shanghai Expo 2010 and its reception in the Swedish media. This article studies the full coverage during 2010 of the Expo in the four main Swedish dailies. First, a general overview of the reports is presented and then a focused analysis of how the media texts deal with (a) reasons for arranging/participating (b) representation of China/Sweden (c) reporting about outcomes of the Expo and (d) reporting on the international exhibition phenomena. The major conclusion of the study is that Expo 2010 contributed to China's "going global'" strategy in a specific way; rather than being used as a vehicle for China "going out'" in the world, it became a vehicle for Sweden, and the world, "going in" to China. Another observation discussed is that the international exhibition form was used to de-mediate interactions and relations, offering situated meetings in a unique event context as a node for further mediated communication.

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Introduction

The 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing helped to communicate images of a transforming China to the world. The world media reported from the games in great detail and also covered the preparation for this global event, including political protest and disturbances of the Torch Relay (Qing and Richeri 2010). The games also helped to catalyse a new approach to international communication in China, where huge investments in the production and distribution of news, television and radio through both analogue and digital platforms assured a Chinese media presence on the global media scene (Brownell 2013). This policy change was most evident in 2009, when 45 billion Yuan was allocated to develop Chinese state media and international news (Zhao 2013).

In the same year, Shanghai and China were preparing for a second global event, Expo 2010 in Shanghai. With the participation of 190 countries this exhibition attracted 73 million visitors during its six months of operation (SOU 2011). The expo grounds, with its pavilions and activities, became yet another "ephemeral vista" (Greenhalgh 1988) where a world of flaneurs could stroll, meet and talk, being sublimely impressed (Nye 1994) by the stunning feats of mankind assembled and condensed in this enclosed time-space. The World Expo in Shanghai 2010 is an example of a specific social and cultural form of communication – the general international exhibition (Rydell 1984; Findling and Pelle 1990; Allwood 2001). From the Crystal Palace exhibition of 1851 and up to Shanghai 2010, this form has become institutionalised in a specific way and since 1928 has been formalised under the Bureau International des Expositions, which registers and thereby consecrates this kind of event.[1] Economic, political, cultural and social interests are blurred in these events as states, companies, civic organisations and individuals participate in the event with mixed and sometimes conflicting motives. How the interests of the arranging country and the participating countries, and their representatives, are articulated is a main issue in these events. Being an event bound to a specific place and time, this form of communication and the reception of the exhibition are dependent on the combined experience of visitors on the spot and the international and global mediation of the event.

Expo 2010 was an important stage in the communication of images of China to the world. This article addresses the representation and reception of the Shanghai Expo 2010 in Sweden, and the analysis links questions about the form and role of public diplomacy, nation branding and soft power to the world exhibition as a site and form of communication and interaction. The main result presented is that Expo 2010 was not a way for China to become more present and visible in the world through the mediation of the event. Instead, it was the participating countries, in our case Sweden, which were in focus in the media reports. The Shanghai Expo 2010 was, in this sense, not about China "going out" in the world but about the world '"going in'" to China. It is also claimed that the Shanghai Expo 2010 was not a new way of appropriating the international expo form but rather the reverse. The event served to de-mediate the new conditions of global communication, politics and commerce by refocusing attention on the experience of being there and on the capacity to open up China for new international relations and contacts.

The New Public Diplomacy, Nation Branding, Soft Power and the International Exhibition

Public diplomacy is the term most often used for analysing how states communicate with publics in the international arena (Snow and Taylor 2009) and the new public diplomacy is a term used to describe the new conditions facing international relations dealing with new actors in international and global policy processes, new communication conditions and the geopolitical situation post 9/11 (Pamment 2011, 46-51). According to Cull (2008, 32), public diplomacy can be divided into five kinds of practices: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy and international news broadcasting. The basic idea of public diplomacy is the openness in the process and that it entails communication between political leadership/ government and foreign publics. Listening means surveying and collecting relevant information from the environment and making use of it in designing public diplomacy. Advocacy means all the communicative efforts that are made to make points or policies known to external publics. Cultural diplomacy is the use of arts and all kind of culture to build relations between countries such as arranging art exhibitions, cultural events or language education. Exchange diplomacy is the practice of sending citizens overseas for periods of study and acculturation and reciprocally receiving citizens from foreign countries. International news broadcasting is the use of radio, television or the Internet to reach foreign publics (Cull 2008, 32-36).

New public diplomacy is a catch-all word for the challenges that established ways of doing public diplomacy are faced with. Linked to politics, it addresses all the new actors and stakeholders in global and international policy processes. International communication is no longer, and may never have been, carried out between states or representatives of states. International organisations, NGOs, private organisations (companies and interest organisations) and individuals have new roles to play in policy processes, now often seen as processes of governance. In this respect, new public diplomacy is challenged to coordinate the communication between these actors rather than communicating to them. Public diplomacy may develop into a communication that goes from one public to another public (Snow 2010, 91-92).

Digital communication and the media offer new tools and practices for collecting, sorting, analysing and distributing information. Listening to the world is enhanced by digital surveillance technology and new tools for analysing Internet and digital media of all kinds. Social media also become relevant as an area for listening to what is said about a country.

New media also bring new tools for advocacy. Not only public relations and spin are making use of the press, radio and TV; their digital versions, accessed using computers, smart phones and reading tablets, are also being used and monitored. The interactive features of digital media also bring in the public to respond to or participate in the communication process. The Swedish Institute introduced the idea of curating micro-blogging into public diplomacy, and state websites of countries are developing into social media. Besides public diplomacy activities a plethora of information and services of relevance for a country are available on the Internet through, for instance, Google, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter or Wikipedia. Among the five forms of public diplomacy that Cull uses, international broadcasting is

probably the one undergoing the greatest change at the moment. Global television broadcasting and news for a global audience is no longer an issue for the West. CNN, BBC World News and Al Jazeera are now under competition from CCTV International and Russia Today. To what extent CCTV International and Russia Today are the mouthpieces of their respective governments is an issue that will not be addressed in this article. In the case of CCTV International, its use of program formats, forms of journalism and audience address gives it an international style of news-making comparable to the news flow coming from CNN or the BBC. Digital distribution also makes it possible to add new channels and to distribute radio over the Internet.

Nation branding can be seen as the business version of the public diplomacy issue. It deals essentially with the ways states can attract tourists and investment capital, but also with the nation brand as an asset for export. Public diplomacy and nation branding go together in that they articulate the political and economic aspects of international communication relations. Nation branding has the economy in focus and uses the relative image and reputation of a country to design policies and strategies to attract tourists and capital and to enhance exports (Anholt 2007). Since these economic goals are also vital political goals in growth-oriented state economies, especially under neo-liberal-influenced political regimes, the close link between public diplomacy and nation branding becomes obvious. This close connection between the economic and the political goals also holds for China. Developing the Chinese economy makes nation branding relevant, and sustaining the political system through this economic development brings in the public diplomacy aspect.

A third way of approaching international communication relations between states is through the idea of soft power. This concept was developed by Joseph S. Nye and is succinctly described as "the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. A country's soft power rests on its resources of culture, values, and policies" (Nye 2008, 94). Public diplomacy and nation branding are closely tied to the idea of soft power. Nation branding is more linked to the economic relations between countries (exports/imports/tourism) and in that respect also to hard economic power, but it also has essential aspects of information, communication and culture built into its practices. Tourism is the obvious example where experiences are created through visits to places and interaction with people in these places. The work and the communication surrounding exports and imports are also processes where such meetings and communication across state borders take place and identities, images and experiences are made and shared. The trade in cultural goods and the values they carry are another aspect of soft power connected to exports and imports. Hollywood's movies and their global impact and the generally ideological impact of cultural goods are an important aspect of soft power.

All five practices of public diplomacy fall under the soft-power term, but in different ways. Listening and advocacy can be seen as intelligence and strategic communication under the state agency umbrella. Cultural and exchange diplomacy together establish an arena where culture and people interact in new patterns. International news broadcasting brings in journalism and new forms of process journalism and network journalism where user- generated content and the participation of users becomes more important. All theses practices highlight the

political aspect of soft power, but we can also see that the political goals support the economic goals. Being a country that is informed, heard, present and part of multiple kinds of exchange can also translate into the economy. To articulate public diplomacy and nation branding so that they enhance the soft power of a state can be seen as the main, and magic, goal of strategically successful international communication linked to a state.

Finally, how are world and international exhibitions to be seen in the light of public diplomacy, nation branding and international soft power? International exhibitions can be considered the testing ground, archetype and undifferentiated practice of all three, the first modern and international complex social and cultural form where economic, political and cultural values and goods are mixed and where products, politics and people interact, juxtaposing mutual understanding and strategic action. In the beginning, the international exhibition was conceived as a competition between nations in culture and progress, just like the Olympics. From 1851 to 1900, a series of monumental exhibitions were arranged in Europe and the USA. These exhibitions were signs of extreme modernity during the latter half of the 19th century. In the 20th century, world and international exhibitions were held all over the globe under the control of the BIE, but during the latter part of the century world exhibitions were questioned as being too costly and an inefficient way of using funds available for public diplomacy and nation branding for developing soft power (e.g. Seville 1992, Hannover 2000). The reason was that the components of the international exhibition had been permanently institutionalised in different forms of public diplomacy, trade fairs and tourism marketing. The temporary and ephemeral vistas of the exhibition had been replaced by the permanent and systematic organisation of communication by states, companies and private bodies during the 20th century, especially in the final decades of the century.

So why should China hold a world exhibition, as this mode of communication seems to be outdated – an innovation of the 19th century? And what impact could we expect the Expo to have abroad in the 21st century, this globally connected and digitally communicating century? By studying the reports in Swedish dailies, this article will give preliminary answers to these questions.

The Case – Expo Reports in Four Swedish Dailies

The coverage of the Shanghai World Expo during 2010 in the four main national dailies in Sweden was analysed; all the articles mentioning the Expo during this year (before, during and after the event) were covered. A general overview of the publicity was produced, and a comparison was made between two kinds of dailies, up-market and down-market, in terms of volume, date of publication and type of contents. Four specific questions were also asked about the representation of China and Sweden in the texts: (a) How are the reasons for arranging and participating in the event reported? (b) How are China and Sweden represented in the reports – with a focus on the event itself, or with a focus on the context of the event? (c) How are the outcomes of the exhibition reported – for Chinese and Swedish interests? (d) How do the reports address the world exhibition as a cultural form of communication?

Based on the answers to these questions, the possible impact of the expo reception in Sweden on Chinese public diplomacy, nation branding and soft power will

be discussed, together with the use of the world exhibition as a form of communication.

Method and Material

The dailies that were studied are *Dagens Nyheter*, *Svenska Dagbladet*, *Aftonbladet* and *Expressen*.[2] *Dagens Nyheter (DN)* and *Svenska Dagbladet (SvD)* are subscribed morning papers with a national distribution. Having this national readership makes them the two biggest national morning papers in Sweden. The editorial ambition of the dailies is to offer high-quality news with a broad coverage of different topics. Printed in the night but read in the morning, they will be called the morning dailies in this text. *Aftonbladet (AB)* and *Expressen (Exp)* are more popular tabloid dailies covering news and events of the day in a more sensationalist manner. Both focus on sport, celebrities and entertainment in their mix of news. They are printed in the morning and read during the day and evening and for that reason are called evening papers in Sweden.[3]

Table 1: Circulation and Reach of the Four Newspapers, 2010

Title	Mean circulation	Reach Sunday	Reach Weekday
Aftonbladet	320,200	1,112,000	1,130,000
Dagens Nyheter	298,200	898,000	858,000
Expressen including *GT och Kvällsposten*	286,500	990,000	1,112,000
Svenska Dagbladet	192,800	515,000	493,000

Source: Upplage- och Räckviddsutveckling 2001-2010.

These four dailies were chosen because they have a national coverage and are in that respect the four most important Swedish dailies as possible carriers of information about Expo 2010 to Swedish readers.

The articles were collected by using two databases – Retriever and Presstext[4] – and searching these full text databases of the dailies from 2010. Three search strings were used: "expo 2010," "shanghai" and "world exhibition*"[5]. For comparison, a search for the word "China" was also made.

Table 2: Search Query and Results

Title	"expo 2010"	"shang-hai"	"world exhibi-tion*"	Relevant Hits	Rele-vance level 1	Rele-vance level 2	Rele-vance level 3	"China"
DN	6	151	49	31	8	13	10	1,225
SvD	11	201	53	45	16	18	11	1,299
AB	4	83	25	19	5	7	7	395
Exp	4	134	29	24	6	12	6	512
Sum	25	569	156	119	35	51	33	3,431

The three search terms gave a result of 750 texts. By reading and comparing all these texts, a total of 119 relevant texts were then selected for further analysis. The basic criteria for this selection were that the text should make an explicit reference to the Shanghai 2010 Expo.

Three levels of relevance were then introduced to further classify the articles. The first level was articles in which the Shanghai Expo was only mentioned, but where it was clearly out of focus; 33 texts were categorised in this way. On the second level of relevance, articles that fully, mainly or in a substantial way referred to the Expo were coded; 51 texts were given this level of relevance. On the third level of relevance were the main pieces, the longer articles, in different journalistic genres, describing, commenting or discussing the Expo event in a more extensive way; 35 articles were identified in this category. All the 119 texts were read and analysed and hence contribute to the result of this study.

When designing the study, a conscious choice was made to focus on the articles that mention Expo 2010. This means that we cannot report how China in general was represented in the dailies studied during 2010. On the other hand, the study covers all that was published about the Expo. Further studies, widening the scope of analysis, are needed. The articles in this study could be compared with a sample of articles referring to China. In addition, further comparisons with the media coverage of China in other countries should also be made[6].

An Overview of the Publicity

World Expos being major international events, they should be of interest for national dailies with an aim to cover international issues. The Expo was expected to attract 70 million visitors, which it surpassed by 3 million, and since Sweden also participated, we should expect coverage of both the event and the Swedish participation. But how much publicity can a global event of this kind generate in national dailies? During 2010, China was mentioned in more than 3,000 texts in the four dailies, but only a small proportion of the texts, 3.5 percent, made explicit reference to the Expo. One of the striking results of our investigation is this comparatively low number of articles referring to Expo 2010 – just 119 in the four dailies during the whole year.

The event was reported in all four dailies, but with a distinct difference between the morning and evening dailies. The morning dailies had a more extensive coverage while the evening dailies presented a thinner description of the event. The media representation of a planned event can be divided into the before, during and after phases. In this case, the event had a six-month time span, starting on 1st May and ending on 31st October 2010. Taking into account that the three phases consisted of four, six and two months respectively, we would expect the publicity to focus on the six months of the actual event, because this is the longest phase, but

Table 3: Phases of the Publicity Process

Title	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III	Relevant	L1	L2	L3
DN	9	15	7	31	8	13	10
SvD	13	27	5	45	16	19	10
AB	5	14	0	19	5	7	7
Exp	5	17	2	24	6	12	6
Sum	32	73	14	119	35	51	33
%	27	61	12				
Expected	33	50	17				

also because we would expect the event to generate news from activities. The four dailies published roughly according to such expectations. Both the morning and the evening dailies have the expected ratio of publicity before the event, but the evening papers focus most of their attention on the event as it is unfolding. *Aftonbladet*, for instance, did not mention the Expo after the closing day, and *Expressen* only had two texts for this phase.

The content of the coverage can be summarised in the following way: general information about the event, reporting on the Swedish preparation, opening days, reporting on the programme in and visits to the Swedish pavilion and summing up with closing figures and prizes awarded. Following the three levels of relevance, we can once again see a difference between the evening and morning dailies. The morning dailies give a fuller representation of how the Expo was prepared and conducted. They also briefly report on the closing of the Expo. The evening dailies do not give the event the same amount of attention; they have fewer articles and shorter texts, except in one area of coverage: their focus on royalties and the young member of the Swedish royal family visiting China and the Expo.

Expressen. In *Expressen* we find only two long articles giving more detailed information or views on the event and six articles reporting on the visit of the Crown Princess of Sweden. Among the former two texts, one is a letter to the editor written by a Swedish government representative, the other one a news article about a Swedish government delegation and its visit to China and the Expo. Both of theses texts have a Swedish perspective. They are about Sweden or offer a Swedish perspective on relations with China. The reports on the Crown Princess also have a clear Swedish focus, but one of the articles also conducts a discussion on how the diplomatic relations between Sweden and China are to be handled, bringing the representation of China into the reports.

Aftonbladet. In *Aftonbladet* we find three articles that can be considered central to how the paper generally covered the event and four articles focusing on the Crown Princess's visit. Among the general articles, the first is a news article describing a Swedish government delegation visiting China and the Expo, the same as *Expressen* wrote about. The second article is a feature-oriented travel article, urging travellers to go to Shanghai to experience the city and Expo 2010. The third article is a commentary on the event, written by one of Sweden's most famous journalists/authors. In this article he puts Expo 2010 in the context of the history of exhibitions and also gives his view on the event and China. Four articles report from the Crown Princess's visit to China and the Expo. In these articles there is a focus on Sweden and the royalties, but we also find a discussion on how the diplomatic relations with China are to be handled in the light of Liu Xiaobo being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. These reports are a mix of celebrity journalism and political journalism, questioning China's actions and how the Swedish royalties should act in the situation. *Aftonbladet* tracks this story as it unfolds during the royalties visit to China.

Dagens Nyheter **and** *Svenska Dagbladet.* The morning dailies give the event more attention throughout the process. Both of them carry articles describing how Sweden is preparing for participation in the Expo. They also publish articles about Shanghai and China opening up towards the world and publish reports from the opening days of the Expo. Later follow reports on the program and visits to the

Swedish pavilion. Both also carry a feature article in the travel sections about the event during the Expo. *Dagens Nyheter* also contains one news article summing up the event from a Swedish perspective. In contrast to the evening papers, the link between the Nobel Peace Prize and the Expo is only made in one article in *Svenska Dagbladet*. The other article has the story of Liu Xiaobo, but it is not connected to the Expo. The reason is that only one of the morning papers reports on the Swedish royalties visiting China and Shanghai.

The general impression from reading all these texts is that most of the articles report and discuss Sweden and how Swedish interests were promoted in China during the Expo. But how was China itself represented in the dailies?

Reasons, Images, Outcome, and the Expo Form

The analysis of how China was represented is based on the 35 articles giving the most in-depth description of the event. The representation of China will also be compared to the representation of Sweden.

Reasons for Arranging and Participating in the Event

The event is seen as a "gigantic party for the return of China as a super power" in one of the morning dailies.[7] The same article also claims that Expo 2010 in China has been given the same status as the 2008 Olympics. In a feature article on Shanghai it is claimed that this is an occasion for China to show the world, and especially the Chinese people, the influence that China has in the world.[8] World expos are "gigantic events of propaganda for the arranging country," according to one of the columns in an evening paper, "to show the political and economic ambitions, its capacity, technical and cultural skills and often also the hopes carrying into the future."[9] Each arranging country tries to outdo the preceding expos, according to the columnist.

The motives for Swedish participation are described as strengthening the image of Sweden in China, building a platform for developing deeper business relations with China and highlighting Swedish values.[10] Marketing the country and developing new opportunities for Swedish companies to make business are also stressed.[11] The main target groups for this campaign are decision-makers and educated, young, urban people. In one of the evening papers the visibility motive is highlighted again; economic development combined with issues of sustainability and corporate social responsibility are also pointed out as potential areas of cooperation between Sweden and China, the headline even claiming that "We can make China a better country."[12] A precise summary of the Swedish motives is expressed in another evening paper article, describing a visit from a Swedish government delegation: "The purpose is to strengthen cooperation with China in areas of innovation, green technology, entrepreneurship and corporate social responsibility."[13] In the other evening paper, the economic motive is also paramount and it is pointed out that China is evolving into one of the most important markets for Swedish companies.[14]

The conclusion to be drawn is that reports on Chinese motives for arranging the Expo are out of focus and the Swedish participation, and the motives for this, is what is in focus. As we have seen, there are a couple of explicit mentions of possible Chinese motives, but in most cases this is voiced by the writing journalist. In terms of the kinds of motives mentioned, we see that economic motives are predominant.

Representation of China and Sweden in the Reports

In the material we find no article giving a close or extensive description of the Chinese pavilion or the Chinese program of the Expo. The theme of the Expo is mentioned, *Better city – Better life*, but this stands as a very general descriptor, mainly developed when it comes to the Swedish participation. Two articles published before the Expo opened put the Expo in its social context. In *Svenska Dagbladet* the context is business and how Shanghai and China are opening up towards the rest of the world.[15] Here the Expo is framed from the perspective of global economy. In *Dagens Nyheter* a feature article focuses on Shanghai, containing interviews with people from Shanghai that contextualise the event. In this article the Expo is framed "from the man-in-the-street" and the everyday life of Shanghai. One of the morning papers also reports from the first week of the Expo, presenting seven images from the Expo. Three of these seven pictures are connected to the Chinese presentation – the opening ceremony, the Chinese pavilion and the Chinese minorities' participation in the Expo.[16]

Two articles in the material put the event in a critical context. The first is about the Swedish government delegation coming to China and what kind of critique and discussion they will be able to voice.[17] "Swedish tigers don't talk in China" is the headline of this article,[18] in which a comparison is made with the 2008 Olympics and the international critique concerning human rights in China. The article claims that there is a growing self-censorship among researchers and writers in the West. A point is also made in the article that all the material exhibited in the Swedish pavilion has been monitored and approved by Chinese arrangers. The second article, focusing on the conflict about Chinese politics, deals with the Chinese reaction to Liu Xiaobo being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. This took place in the same week as the Crown Princess of Sweden, Victoria, and Prince Daniel made a visit to China and the Expo.[19] A diplomatic crisis developed and the public diplomacy of the Expo was put to test. The Swedish royalties are not supposed to give their opinion in cases like this; the politicians and diplomats should, but the Swedish press put them under pressure to react publicly. Instead of only focusing on the Crown Princess's visit to the Expo and China, a parallel story about human rights in China developed in the Swedish media. This was also reported on a daily basis for five days in the evening paper *Expressen*. Its competitor, *Aftonbladet*, had the political angle on the first day but abandoned it for an angle focusing on royalty, fashion, and business opportunities, neglecting the link to the controversy around Liu Xiaobo.

Most of the articles analysed are news items and therefore of a more factual character. Besides one letter to the editor published in *Expressen*, we find views represented in columns, especially in *Svenska Dagbladet*. In three columns the author reflects over the Expo, calling it "a gigantic Chinese ego boost"[20] and claiming that the event does not have popular support and is being staged for the new leadership to show its power to the world and the citizens.

Since so many of the texts deal with the Swedish participation, we will also give a brief overview of how Sweden was represented in the articles. The theme of the Swedish program was "The spirit of innovation," linking this to issues of social welfare and sustainability. This theme was spelled out in several articles before the Expo opened. One article gave a full overview of how the Swedish pavilion would

be used, room by room.[21] During the Expo, parts of the Swedish program were reported back, in connection with visits from Swedish government representatives and royalties. Reading the morning papers, you get a rough, but more or less complete, image of how the Swedish participation was planned and conducted. That kind of overview, however, does not exist for the Chinese program or pavilion.

The only other country, besides China and Sweden, given special attention by the dailies was Denmark. The use of the *Little Mermaid* and the move from Copenhagen to Shanghai was covered by all the dailies. The Danish pavilion was also mentioned in several of the articles before and during the Expo. There was also a short summary of the Danish campaign published in one of the dailies.[22] The success story of Expo 2010 seems to have been the Danish decision to move the *Little Mermaid* from Copenhagen to Shanghai for the Expo. All four dailies cover that story, but in a brief and humorous way. Short texts about the Norwegian and Finish participation are also represented in the material, showing that the proximity of the Nordic countries seems to matter when deciding what to publish about the event.

The Outcomes of the Exhibition Reported – for Chinese and Swedish Interests?

A columnist in *Aftonbladet* claims that international exhibitions have left permanent traces in the arranging city, and that also applies to Shanghai. The construction of new highways, tunnels, bridges and the huge underground system with 140 stations is such a visible trace of the Expo, remaining in Shanghai and China after the event.[23] The Chinese pavilion was the biggest building in the Expo area, and it will also be kept on the site. In a news article written on the first days of the Expo, a Chinese researcher claims that the pavilion will be forgotten in a couple of years and expresses another wish: he wants the expo to be remembered for giving Shanghai a theory of sustainable development for the next generation, with the insight that "we must use less energy and start using bikes again, not taking the car to work."[24] In the same article a person from Shanghai says that he is impressed by the Expo: "it shows the strength of China as a nation."

The Swedish pavilion hoped to attract a huge number of visitors, making Sweden visible and developing relations with China. According to the Swedish arrangers this was also achieved; around 3 million visitors came to the pavilion.[25]

The World Exhibition as a Cultural Form of Communication

The world expo is a meeting place and a place for communication across borders of different kinds. In the preceding questions we have studied how arranging countries and participating countries plan and perform the event. An expo can also be thematised (a) as a destination for tourists (b) as an event to organise and govern and (c) as a cultural form to learn from and reflect over.

Three of the dailies published articles about the Expo in their travel sections. In *Aftonbladet* the focus was on Shanghai and the Expo was just used as the temporary reason for visiting Shanghai. One of the main reasons for going there is to shop cheaply, also expressed in the headline "Shop yourself all the way to hot Shanghai." This very positive article ends by stating that "In this cool, futuristic city of Shanghai it is fun to be a visitor." In *Svenska Dagbladet* the travel piece is a presentation and review of some of the most important pavilions on the site. The

focus here is entirely on the Expo.[26] *Dagens Nyheter* makes use of one Swedish visitor who shares his experiences from the Expo with the readers. "I liked the exhibition, but I thought I would have time to see more. I wish I could have spent a week there," the visitor says in the article.[27]

A second approach to the expo phenomenon is to focus on the arrangement and how it is organised. In the material studied there is only basic information on the Expo 2010 organisations, most often used as background material in a very short, factual text. In a few articles there are references to the project and how it has been carried out. In the four dailies there were no article presenting the work of BIE, Bureau International des Expositions. Their work and role are evidently not newsworthy in the Swedish press.

The history of the international exhibition is addressed in three texts – among all the 119. Only one of these texts was classified as a major text.[28] In a short column the architecture of the expos is commented upon[29] and another short column presents personal experiences of going to expos. The amount and the depth of reflection linked to the world expo as a cultural form is indeed limited in the four main Swedish national dailies.

Implications for Chinese Public Diplomacy, Nation Branding and Soft Power

Four conclusions can be drawn from the study. First, reporting on Expo 2010 was on a low level, when compared to other major global events like the Olympics. Covering the Expo was a much smaller story than covering the Olympics. However, the morning dailies did report on all three phases (before, during and after) and thus gave a general representation of Expo 2010. The tabloids mainly reported during the event. Second, the focus in the publicity was on Sweden and Swedish interests and it was framed using a Swedish perspective on China. Neither the Chinese pavilion nor the Chinese program for the Expo was presented in the media studied. Reasons for arranging the Expo are mentioned but not dealt with in depth or at length. More detailed and extensive descriptions of the Swedish pavilion and parts of the Swedish program were found. It is also when Swedish visitors, celebrities, the king and members of the royal family come to China, Shanghai and the Expo that the dailies report, especially the tabloids. The reports from the tabloids are also given a popular character by focusing on the looks, feelings or plans of the royalties. Third, China and the image of China were weakly represented in the articles. Most of the articles also use an uncritical and non-confrontational way of representing the event. Only two of the major articles had a critical view on the event. Reporting the Expo seems to be linked to a non-confrontational way of reporting and editing. Fourth, almost no reporting addressed issues pertaining to the cultural form of the international expo. What the expo form stands for, its history or its future were not on the agenda for the Swedish dailies.

Following these conclusion, what kind of impact can be expected on Chinese public diplomacy and nation branding? In terms of nation branding, neither Expo 2010 nor China was fully presented in the dailies. When partially presented, they emerged as an economic wonder and a cheap shopping paradise. In terms of public diplomacy the event was framed as a case of Swedish, not Chinese, public diplomacy. This is also underscored by the way the Swedish project at Expo 2010 was

designed and performed. There was never any intention to reach a Swedish target audience; instead, it chose to focus on target groups at the Expo and target groups in China using the Internet and Chinese media publicity (SOU 2011, Appendix 7 and 9). Nevertheless, 700 articles were written in the Swedish press, 119 of which are analysed in this study (SOU 2011, 171-172). Here we see journalistic norms at work, framing and telling the story from a domestic perspective – about Sweden to Swedes. All this suggests that Expo 2010, as used by Sweden and represented by the main Swedish dailies, did not contribute so much to a Chinese "going out" strategy as to a World "going in" strategy.

Finally, the question about the use of the international exhibition will be addressed. In an analysis of Expo 2010 Björner and Berg (2012) argue that it offered a space for developing "practices of communification" where community building takes place under exceptional circumstances, creating unique experiences, and for that reason it has a potential for building strong business relations. They also point out that the expo event seems to be a well-suited platform for business and companies to make use of in the coming years. The international exhibition is a kind of event where interaction and communication create unique common experiences, laying the ground for future contacts and cooperation. What is striking in this conclusion is that Expo 2010 was not only the scene for enacting or screen for projecting media dreams of the future – mechanical, analogue or digital. What was essential for the Swedish participation was also the importance that VIP guests were given (Björner and Berg 2012, 42). The exclusive and personal meeting at a unique event is at the heart of this co-ordinated creation of community, in business, politics and other areas. Using the international exhibition in this way can be interpreted as a de-mediation of new media and digital media forms. The use of the Internet, social media and digital communication technology becomes de-mediated by the situated meetings, offering a body of actions and events to attach to the future play of mediated sign and meaning. Instead of focusing on representation and meaning, the use of the exhibition form turns towards action and coordinated action. The tracks of our actions come to define the future direction of our common acts.

Chinese soft power lies in the possibility to develop common tracks of and directions for action and to make them significant nodes of meaning. Expo 2010 attracted 73 million visitors and made history as the most visited expo ever. It attracted a huge business interest from Sweden, but it must be doubted if this stands for a general "communification" of the relations between Sweden and China, Swedes and Chinese. Beyond the communities of business awaits the establishment of communities of the common people or of the multitude of the publics of China, Sweden and the World.

Notes:

1. http://www.bie-paris.org.

2. *Göteborgs-Posten*, GP, with a circulation of 228,200 copies is bigger that *Svenska Dagbladet*, but since GP has a regional profile it was not used in this study.

3. *Aftonbladet* and *Expressen* are called "evening papers" (kvällstidningar) in Swedish, even though they are printed and distributed the same morning or during the day. The "morning papers" are printed in the evening and distributed during the night/morning to subscribers. Both kinds of dailies are for sale in shops and kiosks during the day.

4. Retriever gives access to *Svenska Dagbladet* and *Aftonbladet* and Presstext give access to *Dagens Nyheter* and *Expressen*.

5. The search used the Swedish search string "världsutställning*.".

6. See for instance Sparks, Colin. 2010. Coverage of China in the UK national press, *Chinese Journal of Communication*, 3, 3, 347-365. Of interest is also the 2011 special number on media coverage of China, *Chinese Journal of Communication*, 4, 3, 251-364.

7. *Svenska Dagbladet* 100522, En svensk tiger i Kina.

8. *Dagens Nyheter* 100430, Shanghai ställer ut för världen.

9. *Aftonbladet* 101031, Hermans historia. Albert Einstein – bland de första på Liseberg.

10. *Svenska Dagbladet* 100107, Blågula idéer i Shanghai; *Dagens Nyheter* 100430, Shanghai ställer ut för hela världen.

11. Dagens Nyheter, 100412, Sverige satsar för att synas i Shanghai.

12. *Expressen* 100430, Vi kan göra Kina till ett bättre land.

13. *Expressen* 100521, Maud: Kungen är fantastisk. Näringsminister om affärsbesöket i Kina.

14. *Aftonbladet* 100524, Ska få pippi på Sverige.

15. *Svenska Dagbladet* 100410, Shanghai öppnar sig för världen.

16. *Svenska Dagbladet* 100505, Gigantisk utställning invigd i Kina.

17. *Svenska Dagbladet* 100522, En svensk tiger i Kina.

18. This caption contains a play of words where "tiger" in Swedish means both the animal and keeping quiet/not disclosing secrets.

19. *Svenska Dagbladet* 101012, Politik inte tabu under Kinaresan.

20. *Svenska Dagbladet* 100427, Expon en gigantisk kinesisk egotripp.

21. *Dagens Nyheter* 100205, Pippi ska sälja Sverige på världsutställningen.

22. *Expressen* 101121, Jungfruresan över. Den Lille Havfrue hemma efter sagoäventyret i Kina.

23. *Aftonbladet* 101031, Hermans historia. Albert Einstein – bland de första på Liseberg.

24. *Dagens Nyheter* 100430 Shanghai ställer ut för hela världen.

25. *Dagens Nyheter* 101029, Svenska paviljonen lockade tre miljoner.

26. *Svenska Dagbladet* 100905, Största utställningen i världen.

27. *Dagens Nyheter* 100801, Hela världen i Shanghai.

28. *Aftonbladet* 101031, Hermans historia – Albert Einstein – bland de första på Liseberg.

29. *Aftonbladet* 100214, Shanghajad till propagandaspåret.

30. <http://www.ts.se/Pdf/Upplagestatistik/TS-upplage-och-rackviddsutveckling-2010.pdf>

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Svenska Dagbladet (SvD) 1/1 2010-31/12 2010, 45 articles.

ZHENGRONG HU

DEQIANG JI

POGLED NAZAJ IN NAPREJ TER TEŽNJA PO CELOSTNEM PRISTOPU H KOMUNIKACIJSKIM IN NOVINARSKIM ŠTUDIJAM NA KITAJSKEM

Članek premošča enodimenzionalno paradigmo globalizacije in ponuja neke vrste arheološko analizo medijskih in novinarskih študij na Kitajskem. Proučuje zgodovinski potek uvajanja zahodnih komunikoloških teorij od zgodnjih 1osemdesetih, artikulacijo zahodnih teorij in pobude kitajskih intelektualcev tistega časa ter zapletene družbene okoliščine tranzicijske Kitajske, v kateri je desetletja prevladovala ameriška administrativna paradigma. Kot rezultat te artikulacije so medijske in novinarske študije v današnji Kitajski pogosto razumljene kot organski del vodilne paradigme neoliberalizma, manj pozornosti pa je bilo namenjene iskanju alternativnih paradigem ali vsaj ponovnemu odkrivanju posebnosti kitajskih izkušenj v globalni sferi. Da bi opozoril na omejitve take artikulacije, članek predstavi vedno večje težave ali napačno rabo teh zahodnih teorij za pojasnjevanja kompleksne realnosti tako družbenih kot medijskih transformacij. Pozitiven odnos med teorijami in prakso spodbuja socialno pravičnost in demokracijo, in ne teži k »neenakomernemu razvoju« z naraščajočo družbeno neenakostjo. Zato članek izraža prepričanje, da se medijske in novinarske študije na Kitajskem danes nahajajo na novem zgodovinskem križišču, primerljivem s časom Schrammovega prelomnega obiska Pekinga leta 1982. V prizadevanju za preusmeritev medijskih in novinarskih študij v prihodnje, avtorja predlagata integralni pristop.

YUEZHI ZHAO

PRIZADEVANJE KITAJSKE ZA »MEHKO MOČ« VODILA, OVIRE IN NESPRAVLJIVE NAPETOSTI?

Od vzpostavitve Konfucijevih inštitutov po vsem svetu do bleščečega oglaševanja na Times Squareu v New Yorku je bilo večplastno prizadevanje kitajske države po krepitvi njene »mehke moči« dobro vidno in predmet precejšnje politične, novinarske in znanstvene pozornosti. Članek umešča prizadevanje kitajske države za »mehko moč« v zgodovinski in geopolitični okvir in raziskuje globoka protislovja v podpornih politični ekonomiji in kulturnih politikah. Medtem ko državni, gospodarski, strokovni in moralni imperativi kampanje delujejo kot samoumevni in se v projektu povezujejo elitni in popularni interesi, pa se zdijo njene strukturne ovire nepremostljive. Poleg tega obstajajo nepomirljive napetosti med prizadevanjem za elitni, tehnokratski in kulturno-esencialistični pristop h globalnemu komuniciranju in sposobnostjo artikulacije in komuniciranja alternativne globalno-politične in družbene vizije, ki naslavlja veliko večino svetovnega prebivalstva v globoko razdeljeni in s krizo obremenjeni domači in svetovni ureditvi.

99 POVZETKI

DAYA KISHAN THUSSU

DEAMERIKANIZACIJA MEDIJSKIH ŠTUDIJ IN VZPON »KINDIJE«

Vzpostavitev svetovnega trga ni prispevala samo h globalizaciji zahodnih in posebej ameriških medijev po svetu, temveč je tudi odprla medijske in komunikacijske sektorje v velikih in doslej zelo reguliranih državah, kot sta Kitajska in Indija. Posledični pretok medijskih izdelkov iz teh držav je ustvaril bolj kompleksne globalne informacijske, informacijsko-razvedrilne in zabavne sfere. Članek proučuje vedno večji pomen Kitajske in Indije v svetovnih komunikacijskih in medijskih diskurzih ter izziv, ki ga za študij medijev in komunikacij predstavlja »Kindija«. Trdi, da globalizacija medijskih industrij in občinstev v kombinaciji z internacionalizacijo visokega šolstva – ki se odraža v spreminjajočem se profilu fakultet in študentov – zahteva nov pristop pri raziskovanju in poučevanju medijev in komuniciranja. Medtem ko svetovni mediji in študij le-teh ostajajo trdno zasidrani v zahodnem – natančneje, ameriškem – diskurzu, nova resničnost sveta po letu 2008 zahteva ponovno oceno tega, kako definiramo globalno. Članek zaključuje z obravnavo vprašanja, kaj bi lahko pomenila »Kindija« v deamerikaniziranem medijskem svetu.

LENA RYDHOLM

KITAJSKA IN PRVI ZAKON O SVOBODI INFORMIRANJA NA SVETU

ŠVEDSKI ZAKON O SVOBODI TISKA IZ LETA 1766

Leta 1766 je bil v švedski skupščini predvsem po zaslugi Andersa Chydeniusa kot prvi na svetu sprejet zakon o svobodi informiranja: Njegovega Veličanstva milostljivi odlok o svobodi pisanja in tiska. Malo ljudi se danes zaveda, da je imelo to kaj opraviti s Kitajsko. K podobi Kitajske kot daljne utopije, cvetoče in politično stabilne države, so največ prispevala dela, kakršno je bilo Geografski, zgodovinski, časovni, politični in fizični opis kitajskega cesarstva in kitajske Tatarske Jeana Baptista Du Haldeja v štirih zvezkih. Na Švedskem sta politika Anders Nordencrantz in Anders Chydenius s svojimi trditvami, utemeljenimi na Du Haldejevih opisih, dokazovala, da je svoboda pisanja, tiska in informacij na Kitajskem obstajala že v antičnih časih in je v veliki meri prispevala k blaginji in stabilnosti Kitajske. V prispevku avtorica proučuje politične pamflete, ki sta jih pisala omenjena švedska politika, da bi pokazala, kako sta uporabljala Kitajsko kot primer za krepitev argumentov v prid zakonu o svobodi tiska na Švedskem.

SUSAN BROWNELL

»ZNAMKA KITAJSKA« V OLIMPIJSKEM KONTEKSTU KOMUNIKACIJSKI IZZIVI KITAJSKE POBUDE ZA »MEHKO MOČ«

Olimpijske igre v Pekingu leta 2008 so na splošno veljale za priložnost Kitajske za izboljšanje svoje nacionalne podobe pred celotnim svetom. Kljub temu pa je tako znotraj kot izven Kitajske prevladalo soglasje, da je Olimpijskim igram sicer uspelo posredovati podobo o nastajajoči močni, cvetoči in dobro organizirani državi, vendar je bilo sporočilo zlorabljeno s strani interesnih skupin, kritičnih do vladnih politik na področju človekovih pravic in v Tibetu, ki so bile bolj uspešne od kitajske vlade v posredovanju svojih stališč mednarodnim medijem. Članek proučuje komunikacijske izzive, ki so ustvarili ovire za resnični dialog o občutljivih vprašanjih. Kitajska vlada je v svoji post-olimpijski oceni priznala šibkost kitajskega glasu v mednarodnih (predvsem zahodnih) medijih in odgovorila z načrtom za 6 milijard dolarjev vredno investicijo za krepitev svojih eksternih komunikacijskih zmogljivosti kot del pobude za »mehki moč«, ki jo je prvi predstavil predsednik Hu Jintao leta 2007.

GÖRAN SVENSSON

ALI »GRE KITAJSKA VEN« ALI »SVET PRIHAJA NOTER«? SVETOVNI EXPO 2010 V ŠANGHAJU V ŠVEDSKIH MEDIJIH

Javna diplomacija, nacionalni "branding" in mehka moč so teoretski pojmi v tej analizi šanghajskega Expa 2010 in njegovega dojemanja v švedskih medijih. Članek proučuje celotno poročanje o Expu v letu 2010 v štirih glavnih švedskih dnevnikih. Najprej je predstavljen splošen pregled poročil in nato natančna analiza o tem, kako medijski teksti obravnavajo (a) razloge za posredovanje/sodelovanje (b) predstavljanje Kitajske/Švedske (c) poročanje o rezultatih Expa in (d) poročanje o pojavih na mednarodni razstavi . Glavna ugotovitev raziskave je, da je Expo 2010 prispeval h kitajski strategiji globalizma na poseben način. Expo 2010 namreč ni služil Kitajski kot nosilec za njen »odhod v svet«, pač pa kot nosilec, preko katerega sta Švedska in svet »vstopila« v Kitajsko. Naslednja ugotovitev je, da je bila forma mednarodne razstave uporabljena za demedijatizacijo interakcij in odnosov, s ponudbo srečanj umeščenih v okvir edinstvenega dogodka kot vozlišča za nadaljnje medijatizirano komuniciranje.

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NAVODILA ZA AVTORJE

Priprava rokopisov

Rokopise pošljite na naslov uredništva po elektronski pošti v formatu Microsoft Word/Windows. Če uporabljate drugačen urejevalnik besedil, shranite dokument v formatu Word. Zaradi lažjega anonimnega recenziranja naj bodo imena in naslovi avtorjev v posebnem dokumentu.

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Naslovi naj bodo kratki, jasni in ne daljši od sto znakov. Lahko uporabljate večje in mastne črke za ločevanje med različnimi ravnmi naslovov, vendar jih ne številčite. Naslovi prvega in drugega reda naj bodo v svoji vrsti, naslovi tretjega reda pa na začetku odstavka pred prvim stavkom.

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Vsaka tabela ali slika naj bosta na posebnem listu za seznamom citiranih del. Imeti mora zaporedno številko in kratek naslov. V besedilu naj bo označeno, kam je treba uvrstiti tabelo ali sliko ("Vstavi Tabelo 1 / Sliko 1"). Uporabljajte orodje za oblikovanje tabel v programu Word.

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Za bistvene opombe ali navajanje neobičajnih virov uporabite opombe na koncu članka in jih označite z zaporednimi številkami, ki so nadpisane na ustreznih mestih v besedilu.

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Avtor naj bo predstavljen s polnim imenom in priimkom, institucijo, v kateri je zaposlen, in e-naslovom. Zahvale naj bodo zapisane na koncu besedila pred opombami.

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Članek v revijah

Novak, Janez. 2003. Naslov članka. *Javnost-The Public* 10 (volumen), 3 (številka), 57-76 (strani).

Knjiga

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Poglavje v knjigi

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Navajanje internetnih virov

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Recenziranje

Uredništvo uporablja za vse članke obojestransko anonimni recenzentski postopek. Članke recenzirata dva recenzenta. Urednik lahko brez zunanjega recenzenta zavrne objavo neustreznega članka.

NOTES FOR AUTHORS

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Manuscripts should be submitted electronically as e-mail attachments to the Editor in Microsoft Word for Windows format. If you are using another word-processing program, please save the file as Word for Windows documents. To facilitate blind review, names and affiliations of authors should be listed on a separate file.

Maximum length of articles is 50,000 characters (8,000 words). Single space your text, use preferably 12-point Times Roman and a ragged (not justified) right margin. Indent the first line of each paragraph with a single tab and use only one hard return between paragraphs. Do not lay out (design) your manuscript. Do not format text beyond the use of italics or, where necessary, boldface. Do not use headers and footers.

Headings in articles should be concise and descriptive and should not exceed one hundred characters. A few basic formatting features (larger font, bold) should be used to make clear what level each heading is. Major sub-heads should appear on a separate line; secondary sub-heads appear flush left preceding the first sentence of a paragraph. Do not number headings and subheadings.

Material quoted directly from another source should be in double quotation mark or set in a separate paragraph in italics with increased indent when longer than 300 characters.

Each table or figure must appear on a separate page after the Reference List. It should be numbered and carry a short title. Tables and figures are indicated in the manuscript in the order of their appearance ("Insert Table 1 / Figure 1 about here"). Use the table feature in Word to create tables.

References, Notes, and Citations

References within the Text

The basic reference format is (Novak 1994). To cite a specific page or part: (Novak 1994, 7-8). Use "et al." when citing a work by more than three authors (Novak et al. 1994). The letters a, b, c, etc. should be used to distinguish different citations by the same author in the same year (Kosec 1934a; Kosec 1934b). Use "n.d." if the publication date is not available.

Notes

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Author Notes and Acknowledgements

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Reference List

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Journal Article

Novak, Janez. 2003. Title of Article. *Javnost-The Public* 10 (volume), 3 (number), 57-76 (pages).

Book

Novak, Janez and Peter Kodre. 2007. *Title of the Book: With Subtitle.* Place: Publisher.

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Electronic Citations and References

Information that you get from the Internet should be documented, indicating the date of retrieval. Novak, Janez. N.d. Global Revolution. <http://www.javnost-thepublic.org/>

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