

RAZMERJE MED POEZIJO IN FILOZOFIJO

NOVALISOVE HIMNE KOT ILUSTRACIJA

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UDK 82.0-1:1

Steinerjeva kritika prevlade sekundarnega nad primarnim opozarja, da postane razmerje med poezijo in teorijo problematično, kadar dialog nadomesti hierarhija. Prav hierarhično razmerje med poezijo in teorijo oziroma poskus, da bi teorija v celoti zajela literarni tekst, je v nasprotju s strukturo moderne subjektivitete. Ob Novalisovih Himnah nōči in njegovem filozofskem opusu se prispevek osredotoča na dialoško razmerje med poezijo in teorijo. Od tod se tudi razkrije, da mora literarna veda hierarhično razmerje med obema vztrajno pretvarjati v dialog.

Ključne besede: Novalis, romantiziranje, samozavedanje, teorija poezije, zgodnja nemška romantika

Eno od izhodišč komparativističnega simpozija leta 2005 v Lipici je bila teza o domnevno problematičnem razmerju med teorijo in literaturo v sodobni literarni vedi, kjer se literarni tekst izgublja v plimi sekundarnega – v plimi interpretacij. Prav v tem pojavu vidi George Steiner »simptom« izgube primarnosti, zdrs v »satanski kaos« (Steiner 40, 45), zmago sekundarnega nad primarnim; to je poslej dostopno le še kot pomanjšana in neizprosno razkosana karikatura samega sebe. Križarska vojna proti interpretaciji pa Steinerja vendarle vodi na tanek led. Ko namreč privzema vlogo čuvarja »primarnosti« in estetskega izkustva kot takega ali ko kot edino legitimno interpretacijo umetniškega dela priznava reinterpretacijo v mediju neke druge pesniške govorice, izgublja stik z vlogo refleksije v modernosti. Nevarnost izgube v tem primeru ne pomeni, da se utegne izgubiti nekaj površinskega, pač pa gre prav za nevarnost, da se zabriše zavest o konstitutivni funkciji, ki jo refleksija opravlja v dinamiki subjektivitete od romantike naprej. Deskriptivno-analitični poskusi izrekanja v delu danega neizrekljivega namreč vzpostavljajo neukinljivi hiat med tekstom in interpretacijo, ki naj bi ga interpretacija ali teorija interpretacije upoštevali že v

samem izhodišču,¹ če hočeta zares slediti osnovnim strukturnim potezam subjektivitete v modernosti. Kajti če se interpretacija želi v celoti zlititi s tekstom oziroma s tistim, kar ji v tekstu nenehno uhaja in mora – glede na samo strukturo interpretativnega dejanja – ostati razločeno od nje, se znajde v nevarnosti usodne pretenzije po celovitem zajetju tekstnega smisla, avtorjevega smisla ali recepcije prvega občinstva. Rakavo metastaziranje interpretacij, ki postopoma zasipajo primarni tekst in primarno izkustvo, je zato asimptotična, najnovejša oblika takšne pretenzije.

Steinerjev gnev je vsaj deloma utemeljen, vendar ton njegovega govora napeljuje k nereflektirani obnovitvi romantičnega rekla o poeziji, ki da jo (adekvatno!) razumejo edinole pesniki. Podobno kot rakavo metastazirajoča interpretacija tudi Steinerjev gnev ruši subtilno razmerje med interpretacijo in tekstom; preseči želi hiat med horizontom interpretacije in horizontom teksta. Zato je mogoče skleniti, da je parazitiranje teorije na umetnosti zares simptom, toda ne propada, ampak porušenega razmerja in porušene razlike. Enako problematičen kot poskus teorije, da bi zajela nekaj neskončnega s končnim oziroma odprt sistem opisala s sofisticiranim, toda zaprtim sistemom, je tudi Steinerjev poskus, da bi vzpostavil nasprotno *hierarhijo* in poezijo postavil nad komentar.

Zdi se torej, da je problem ravno vzpostavitev hierarhije. Steinerjevo skiko je mogoče plastično opisati z Lacanovo reinterpretacijo heglovskega razmerja med gospodarjem (poezijo) in hlapcem (teoretskim komentarjem). V tem razmerju je gospodar pripravljen žrtvovati golo življenje, da pridobi svobodo in nepričakovano tudi moč, hlapec pa je voljan žrtvovati svobodo, da ohrani življenje.² Po Lacanu hlapčev problem ni gospodar, pač pa predstava o njegovem neskončnem užitku in fantazma o odloženem nadužitku, ki bi ga bil hlapec deležen v trenutku gospodarjeve smrti. Tukaj se paralela z Lacanovo reinterpretacijo razmerja med hlapcem in gospodarjem neha, kajti hlapec (teoretski komentar) s svojo neizmerno vztrajnostjo po Steinerju do kraja zastrupi gospodarja in se postavi na njegovo mesto. Žal iz tega ne sledi, da si je prilastil gospodarjev užitek. Užitek se hlapcu-gospodarju izmakne, saj gospodar – dokler ostajamo znotraj hierarhičnega odnosa – že v izhodišču ni imel telesa in ga tudi ni bilo mogoče ubiti. Gospodarja je mogoče ukiniti le tako, da se mu dá »aistetično«³ telo, vendar hlapec s tem tvega, da se bo moral odreči lastni zamejenosti in strasti sistematiziranja, ki mu odreja svobodo, a omogoča védenje in s tem življenje. Če hoče hlapec nehati s hlapčevanjem, mora tvegati grozo odtegnitve življenja – toda ali ne bi šele takrat bil zares živ? Teorijo skratka obvladuje groza dehierarhizacije in zaradi tega teoretski komentar pade vsakokrat, ko želi zajeti literarni tekst v celoti; komentar tako rekoč ubije tekst, namesto da bi ga priklical v življenje. Hiat oziroma diferenca med tekstom in interpretacijo mora zato biti izhodiščna predpostavka vsakega govora o literarnem tekstu in hkrati varovalka, ki preprečuje hierarhijo in njeno nasilje.

Proti Steinerjevemu stališču bi se dalo postaviti mišljenje poznega Heideggra o sosedstvu pesnjenja in mišljenja, ki se gibljeta na isti ravnini, saj gre obema za razločitev biti in bivajočega. Zato bistvo njunega sosedstva ni »žlobudrav[a] in kaln[a] mešanic[a] obeh načinov upovedovanja«⁴

(torej ne preverjanje hibridnih teoretsko-literarnih žanrov), pač pa, da oba v govorici zaznata »sicer krhk[o], a jasn[o] diferenc[o]« (Heidegger 205). V dogodju razprta ontološka diferenca razpira bližino pesnjenja in mišljenja ter napoteva k njuni skupni temi – jasnini biti (Heidegger 206). Razlika med pesništvom in mišljenjem pa vendarle obstaja: pesništvo ustanavlja bitnozgodovinsko resnico bivajočega in jo odstira skozi govorico, mišljenje pa tako odstrto bit zapopade.³ Kljub temu Heidegger razmerja med pesništvom in mišljenjem ne razume hierarhično, pač pa ga dojema kot razmerje enakovrednosti.

Pozni Heidegger je mišljenje o biti in govorici kot sredstvu odstiranja biti oblikoval ob Hölderlinovem pesništvu, ki sta ga Lacoue-Labarthe in Nancy neupravičeno »izgnala« iz jenske romantike. Poudariti je treba tole: če se Steinerjeva teza nanaša na polje meta-premisleka literarne vede o sami sebi, potem Heideggrova teza o razmerju med teorijo in literaturo meri na ontološko razmerje med mišljenjem in pesništvom. Premik od Steinerja k Heideggru je premik, ki hierarhijo razvezuje v enakovrednost dialoških partnerjev. Za tezo o dialoškem razmerju med pesništvom in mišljenjem pa se skriva teza o moderni subjektiviteti kot sodelovanju refleksije in občutja.

Če o problemu preiščljujemo v luči modernosti, ne gre podceniti vloge, ki jo je nemška zgodnja romantika igrala tako v premisleku o razmerju med poezijo in filozofijo kot v sami pesniški tematizaciji tega razmerja. Podobno kot gre zaslugo za Heideggrovo naklonjenost pesništvu pripisati Hölderlinovi poeziji, je tudi Manfred Frank apologijo poezije razvil ob izkušnji Novalisovega pesništva in mišljenja.⁴ Kakor je Heidegger moral misliti o govorici in o pesništvu, da bi nazorneje mislil bit in svojo misel izvil iz primeža metafizike, tako je tudi Frank preiščljal o pesništvu nemške zgodnje romantike, da bi mogel spregovoriti o individualiteti⁵ kot obliki izhoda iz metafizike.

Heideggrov in Frankov dialog s poezijo ter pozitivna ocena njenega spoznavnega dometa nista naključje: oba veliko dolgujeta nemški zgodnji romantiki.⁶ Tako Hölderlin v fragmentu *Urtheil und Seyn* (1795)⁷ kot Novalis v zbirki fragmentov *Fichte-Studien* (1795/96)⁸ kritizirata nemški idealizem predvsem tam, kjer si ta v modernemu subjektu prizadeva najti neki trdni temelj, iz katerega naj bi se subjekt v celoti zapopadel. Že Fichte je ugotovil, da se filozofska argumentacija *Grundsatzphilosophie* suče v začaranih krogih in da se refleksijsko pred-postavljeni subjekt z razumom ne more zajeti v celoti; vendar Fichte ni znal najti izhoda iz tega stanja.⁹ Iskanje trdnega temelja subjektivitete je pri Hölderlinu in Novalisu nalezelo na ostro kritiko: vsaka, iz trdnega temelja izpeljana trditev-spoznanje je za Novalisa zgolj navidezna trditev (*Scheinsatz*; prim. *FSt* #1). Še toliko bolj to velja v primeru, ko na refleksijo omejeni subjekt predse postavi sebe kot objekt, ki ga je treba spoznati. Ob teh trditvah pa je potrebna previdnost. Kajti sklep, da razumsko dognana resnica ni trdna resnica, ni posledica antiracionalistične kritike, pač pa kritike reduktivnega samozavedanja. Nemška zgodnja romantika torej goji »različico epistemološkega in ontološkega realizma« (Frank, *The Philosophical* 28), ki podvomi o

absolutni veljavnosti slehernega, zgolj iz refleksijske zavesti izpeljanega spoznanja o subjektu in biti.

Kritiko na refleksijsko zavest omejenega samozavedanja sta Novalis in Hölderlin podprla z jasnim razločevanjem dveh tipov zavesti. Poleg razločujoče in presojojajoče oziroma refleksijske zavesti (*Reflexion*), ki po Hölderlinovi etimološki analizi ustvari prvinski rez (*Ur-Teilung*) in povzroči razcep na subjekt in objekt, obstaja še drugačen tip zavesti. Kant in Fichte je nista mogla odkriti, ker sta vztrajala pri problematičnem pojmu umskega zora; ta je njuno pojmovanje samozavedanja vklepal v t. i. okularno metaforiko in tako vselej (v razmerje) subjekta, ki zre neki objekt. Hölderlin pa govori še o nekem drugem tipu zavesti, ki je (še) ne zaznamuje razcep na subjekt in objekt,¹⁰ pač pa je zanjo značilna neka izvorna domačnost s seboj (*Vertrautheit mit Sich selbst*), ki že vselej ve, ne da bi bila uperjena k objektu. Ta tip zavesti Frank imenuje pred-refleksijska zavest¹¹ in sama bom uporabljala prav ta pojem. Obstajajo pa še drugi izrazi zanjo. Hölderlin zavest, kjer sta »subjekt« in »objekt« v stanju predrazcepne združenosti, poimenuje bit (*Seyn*), kot tisto, česar se še ni dotaknila prasadba/prarez. Novalis na podlagi Jacobijeve filozofije in pietizma govori o občutju (*Gefühl*) oziroma o »občutju sebe« (*Selbst-Gefühl*). Hölderlinovo in Novalisovo razlikovanje pred-refleksijske in refleksijske zavesti za več kot dve stoletji prehiteva Heideggrovo odkritje ontološke difference.¹² To hkrati pomeni, da prav jasno razlikovanje dveh tipov zavesti omogoča jasno zrenje biti, o čemer ne priča le njuna poezija, pač pa o tem govorijo tudi njuni filozofski fragmenti. Novalisova filozofska utemeljitev razmerja in razlike med dvema tipoma zavesti je ostrejša in argumentativno temeljitejša od Hölderlinove. Najzanimiveje je, da so *Fichte-Studien* nastale pred *Himnami nôči*. Je filozofski premislek v tem primeru bil pred poezijo?

Problem samozavedanja je tesno povezan z vprašanjem o razmerju med filozofijo in pesništvom, pa ne le to: zgodovina vrednotenja spoznavnega dometa poezije kaže, da je le-to odvisno od interpretacije samozavedanja. V prispevku se bom najprej osredinila na tisti aspekt *Fichtejevih študij*, ki se posveča problemoma samozavedanja in biti,¹³ nato bom pokazala, kako se te ideje kažejo v *Himnah nôči* in v Novalisovem pojmovanju transcendentne poezije. *Himne nôči* sem za obravnavo izbrala, ker se strinjam z ugotovitvijo Marte B. Helfer, ki v *Himnah* vidi teorijo in udejanjenje romantične lirike, a tudi primer udejanjenja absolutnega subjekta (Helfer 106).

K nereduktivnemu pojmovanju samozavedanja

Za reduktivno, na refleksijsko zavest zamejeno samozavedanje je značilno, da njegova spoznanja privzemajo obliko identitete, zaprto obliko: A je enako A. Toda reduktivnemu samozavedanju uide prav to, česar refleksijska zavest ne more uvideti, to pa je jaz sam v trenutku mišljenja – jaz, ki je pred refleksijo. Nasproti »jaza«, ki ga refleksijska zavest vzpostavi v teoretskem spoznanju, zato vedno stoji tisti pred-refleksijski, refleksiji ne-dani jaz, ki ga je s stališča refleksijske zavesti mogoče poimenovati kar »ne-jaz«.¹⁴ Iz

tega pa za Novalisa sledi tole: vsaka izjava o biti, ki ima obliko sodbe ali identitete (z idejo), je *prividno* resnična, saj namesto biti v celoti spozna samo njen del in tisto, kar se zgolj zdi bit, imenuje z imenom celote (prim. *FSt* #1 in #14).¹⁵ O nezadostnosti refleksijske zavesti govori tudi prvi fragment v Novalisovem *Allgemeine Brouillon*: »Povsod iščemo nepogojeno (*das Unbedingte*) in vedno najdemo samo stvari (*Dinge*).« Novalisova prefinjena besedna igra opozarja, da je spoznana stvar samo okrnina, tako rekoč fosil nepogojenega, ne pa tisto živo, celota, ki jo zares iščemo.

Spoznavno celovitejši pristop k biti Novalisu ponuja poezija, zato že v *FSt* #1 sklene: »Mi identično opuščamo, da bi ga *upodobili* (*um es darzustellen*).« S tem seveda ne meri na deskriptivno zajetje biti, pač pa na posebno moč pesniške podobe, ki more evocirati bit kot tako v celoti. Čeprav upodobitev ne more podati polnosti biti, pa upodobitvi zavoljo delovanja imaginacije verjamemo – prav vera v upodobljeno namreč sproži neki dogodek oziroma kvalitativni preskok od zgolj upodobitve X k nečemu, kar je *to samo*: »[K]ar se *zgodi*, to že je« (*es geschieht, was schon Ist*). V estetskem izkustvu je celovita bit dana na način hipne epifanije, torej v izskoku iz vsakdanjega, ubožnega časa v čas, ki hkrati zajema vse čase in je zato bivanjsko poln. Toda k polnosti biti ne vodi le poezija, pač pa tudi filozofija, kadar bit celovito *pred-stavi* (*stellen es ... vor*), tako da uporabi nekaj radikalno ne-identičnega – znak.¹⁶ Novalis pozneje ugotovi, kako je filozofski premislek možno korigirati, da bi mogel zapopasti bit v celoti.

Da bi razumeli Novalisov predlog, se je treba ustaviti ob dveh modusih samozavedanja, refleksiji (*Reflexion*) in občutju (*Gefühl*);¹⁷ prvi je ontološki modus filozofije, kraljestvo ontološkega modusa poezije pa se začenja na meji filozofije (*FSt* #15).¹⁸ Ker poezija evocira celovito bit, ji romantična estetika podeljuje status izvoljene ali kar najvišje dejavnosti človeškega duha. Vendar pa v vsakdanjem, ubožnem,¹⁹ z lakoto po biti zaznamovanem času in v državi, ki kakor kak urni mehanizem²⁰ deluje po brezdušnih zakonih birokracije in zdrave pameti, udejanjenje celovite biti ni možno, saj imamo vedno redukcijo na refleksijo.

Redukcijo samozavedanja na en sam modus Novalis slikovito primerja s poskusom, da bi krog skušali upodobiti s kvadratom. Tej misli v *FSt* #566 sledi sklep o holističnem idealu samozavedanja kot neprenehnega gibanja oziroma osciliranja,²¹ v katerem Novalis prepozna alkimistični kamen modrosti oziroma negativno spoznanje.²² Za celovito bit je torej bistveno udejanjenje obeh modusov samozavedanja *hkrati*, tako da občutje napaja refleksijo in hkrati razgrajuje njene umetne konstrukte. Kot kažejo analize v Frankovi študiji *Prihajajoči bog*, so nemški zgodnji romantiki misel o možnosti celovite biti in celovitega samozavedanja razvijali ob svoji recepciji mita o Dionizu kot bogu nasprotij in bogu, ki je v nenehni transformaciji, a ki ravno v osciliranju od enega nasprotja k drugemu dosega polnost biti. Prihod takšnega boga – tukaj recepcija mita o Dionizu pri nemških zgodnjih romantikih preraste v mit o Dionizu-Kristusu – bi pomenil vnovično udejanjenje celovite biti, s tem pa prehod bogov iz noči in teme (onkraj razuma), kjer so prisiljeni bivati v ubožnem času, v svetlobo in dan. Recepcija mita o prihajajočem bogu se torej napaja v upanju, da bo tisto,

kar trenutno obstaja zgolj na ravni misterijskega kulta, некоč postalo javni obred. Misterijski, v podzemlje potisnjeni kult je seveda poezija, ki v ubožnem času edina vzpostavlja stik z »bogovi«. Brez poezije je polnost biti v ubožnem času možna le kot upanje na prihodnjo, v konec časov umeščeno polnost – ali pa kot spomin na preteklo udejanjenje polnosti. Spomin in upanje, dve različni obliki lakote po biti,²³ je Novalis tematiziral v peti in šesti izmed *Himen nôči*.

Vendar iz Novalisovega premisleka o transcendentalni filozofiji izhaja, da mora poezija »na pomoč priskočiti tam, kjer filozofija diha preplitko« (Frank, *Einführung* 248). Poezija naj torej subvertira diktat refleksijske zavesti, rahlja njene rigidne izdelke; a če je tako, je refleksijo mogoče korigirati.

Toda kako v refleksiji doseči mišljenje tistega, kar je refleksijski zavesti ne-dano, in mišljenje onega, kar je s stališča refleksijske zavesti negativno dano?

Če se mora refleksija najprej dokopati do manjkajočega pola, kamor jo lahko vodi edino občutje, potem je k spoznanju biti možno dostopati le iz doslednega mišljenja difference, se pravi iz jasnega razločevanja dveh tipov zavesti.

Možnost korekcije se Novalisu ponudi z etimološko razlago, po kateri je refleksija oziroma refleksijska zavest vselej zrcaljenje (*Spiegelung*). Vsako refleksijsko spoznanje je *kakor* zrcalna slika sveta in biti,²⁴ kjer je vse na drugi strani, kot bi moralo biti (Frank, *Selbstgefühl* 245).²⁵ Vse, kar se nahaja v refleksijskem spoznanju, je treba še enkrat zrcalno preslikati oziroma preobrniti, da bi ob tistem, kar refleksijska zavest zajame, dobili tudi ono, česar ne zajame. Popačenje biti, ki se zgodi v prvem dejanju refleksijske zavesti, lahko korigira drugo dejanje refleksijske zavesti. To v refleksijo vgradi še eno zrcalo in dobi odsev odseva, s tem pa tisto »ne-dano«. Prav tu je zanimiva poanta: tisto, kar se kaže kot »drugo« dejanje, je v resnici primarnejšo od »prvega« miselnega dejanja, ki preobrne bit v videz (*Sein in Schein verkehrt*). Opisani obrat preobrnitve je Novalis poimenoval *ordo inversus* (Frank, *Selbstgefühl* 245–246).

Ob teh dveh dejanjih refleksije Novalis govori še o dejanju upodobitve kot o svobodnem dejanju (*FSt* #476), prek katerega se daje bit – ne analitično, tako kot v filozofiji, pač pa zares kot neizrekljivo in vsaki predstavitvi izmikajoče se *izkustvo celote*. Če samozavedanja analitično ni mogoče upodobiti, potem je ta problem mogoče rešiti (natanko) tako, da predstavimo njegovo neupodobljivost. Natanko to počne poezija: upodablja čisti Jaz kot neupodobljivo (*Darstellung des Undarstellbaren*)²⁶ oziroma upodablja duha, »notranji svet v celoti«.²⁷ Poezija tako udejanja čas potešene lakote po biti – duhovno sedanjost, v kateri se razpustita (*Auflösung*) tako preteklost kot prihodnost.²⁸ Novalis od tod izpelje posebno teorijo vizualne pesniške *Darstellung*, s pomočjo katere pesnik preobrazi sam jezik in ga napravi tako hitrega, da z njim v mediju poezije lahko upodobi – četudi samo negativno – čisti Jaz.²⁹

Poezija in Dioniz

Dosedanje razmišljanje o samozavedanju kot oscilaciji in nenehnem gibanju je mogoče simbolno ilustrirati z mitom o Dionizu. Dodatek je smiselni, saj je nemška zgodnja romantika na recepcijo tega mita vezala svoje razumevanje funkcije, ki jo poezija opravlja v »ubožnem« času. Poezija je seveda možna le tam, kjer bivajo bogovi, in ker so ti pobegnili pred lučjo (in duhovno slepoto) razsvetljskega razuma, je prostor-čas poezije prav noč. Tukaj želim biti še nekoliko natančnejša: noč je namreč onkraj ali izven (ubožnega) časa in prostora,³⁰ je izven linearnega časa upanja in spomina, pripada ji »vzporedni« duhovni čas, ki je čas bitne polnosti. Polnost biti se tukaj daje kot ek-sistenca, kajti šele biti izven (reduciranega samozavedanja) pomeni biti polno. Ko torej Novalis govori o poeziji noči in mraka,³¹ mu nikakor ne gre za teorijo poezije kot duhovne ali mistične dejavnosti, pač pa prav za stik z »Dionizom«, ki so ga spoštovali tudi ostali zgodnji nemški romantiki.³² »Dioniz« je seveda bog in hkrati ni bog, je simbolna upodobitev celovitega samozavedanja in ontološke polnosti.

Ko pesniki iz običajnega, z lakoto po biti in z reduktivnim samozavedanjem zaznamovanega časa izskočijo v duhovni čas »noči«, stopajo v stik z boštvom Dionizom. In zares: v kraljestvu noči besede vsakdanjega jezika postanejo ambivalentne; kar jezik izreka, ni tisto neizrekljivo, kar evocira. Da bi pesniški jezik pridobil to performativno zmožnost, je seveda potrebno doseči radikalno transformacijo običajnega, vsakdanjega jezika. Prav na takšno transformacijo pa meri Novalisova teorija »romantiziranja« kot »kvalitativnega potenciranja«, s katero pesniški jezik pridobi skrivnostno, hieroglifično, magično moč, tako da vse znano in zamejeno transformira v skrivnostno in neskončno. Takšna transformacija jezika se dogaja le ob kvalitativnem preskoku iz vsakdanjega časa v čas noči kot bitne polnosti, v katerem razum potone v spanec, da bi lahko spoznal »resnico«. Spanec zato ni običajni spanec, pač pa »sveti spanec« (*Heilige Schlaf*, prim. *HN* #2), ki metaforično namiguje na smrt oziroma na mistično smrt, kakršni lahko sledi le novo, polno življenje v »bogu«.

In vendar pesnik Novalis s tem ne meri na *unio mystica*,³⁴ pač pa na takšno raven spoznanja in védenja, ki je kvalitativno višja od suhega razumskega spoznanja in postane možna šele s »filozofsko« smrtjo.³⁵ V filozofski smrti odmre vsakršna reduciranaost na zgolj refleksijsko zavest; smrt parcialnega (fragmentarnega) jaza je zato pravo filozofsko dejanje in začetek prave filozofije (*Hst* #35).³⁶ Kajti šele simbolni sestop v podzemlje in spanec (kot analogon smrti)³⁷ omogoči resnično ljubezen do »hčere noči«,³⁸ ki bo pesnika vodila v večno trajajočo »poročno noč« (*HN* #1), se pravi v večno spoznanje resnice. Mogoče je torej reči, da je za Novalisa filozofska smrt nujno potrebna: refleksijsko postavljeni »jaz« mora skozi smrt, tako kakor Dioniz in Kristus, da bi se prah spremenil v p pelod in se razrasel v organizem, v celoto, v sinji cvet iz romana *Heinrich von Ofterdingen*. Kar je s stališča samozaverovane refleksije potonitev v spanec in noč, to je za pesnika Novalisa prehajanje v budnost.

Toda polnost biti in celovito samozavedanje sta v ubožnem času lahko le nekaj negativno danega, »temna svetloba«. Še več, polnost biti je dosto-

pna zgolj peščici iniciatov-pesnikov, podobno kot so bili dionizijski misterijski kult dostopni le izbrancem. To je velik problem, zato na tej točki zgodnjeromantična recepcija mita o Dionizu oblikuje povezavo z mitom o Kristusu. Pesniški misterij v ubožnem času torej resda udejanja temno svetlobo biti, vendar prav s tem pripravlja in najavlja povratek bogov na svetlobo. Poezija pripravlja in najavlja čas, ko bo bitna polnost dostopna vsem ljudem in bo misterijski kult poezije postal javna religija. A ker je Dioniz misterijsko boštvo, se lahko za Novalisa in jensko šolo vrne edino kot vstali Kristus-Kralj, v čigar kraljestvu bo poezija zadobila status liturgije,³⁹ ki ljudi – državljane kozmosa, kot bi rekli nemški zgodnji romantiki – povezuje v radostno občestvo.⁴⁰ Prav o tem govori *HN* #6, kjer pripoved nenadoma preskoči v perspektivo nekega »mi«, bodočega občestva »siderskih ljudi«.

Bog nasprotij in transformacij v *Himnah*

Glede Dioniza je potrebno poudariti dvoje.⁴¹ Dioniz je bog nasprotij, vsaka njegova pojavna oblika je diametralno nasprotje predhodne, to pa tako, da hkrati opozarja na tisto, kar manjka. Dioniz je tudi bog transformacije, nenehno umira in se rojeva v drugih in vselej drugačnih oblikah. Vsaka njegova oblika je zgolj parcialna oblika-masko nemanifestiranega Enega, le-to pa je v divje vrtečem se (oscilirajočem) zaporedju mask lahko edino negativno dano. Dioniz kot božansko Eno so torej vse manifestacije hkrati; natančneje – Dioniz je divje vrtenje.

Bistveno je tudi razmerje med posamezno reprezentacijo (masko) Dioniza in celoto. Masko je nepopolni del celote; ko nekaj kaže, hkrati prikriva celoto, s tem pa že sama po sebi opozarja na radikalno *neidentiteto* sebe/sebstva in božanstva. S tem da napeljuje proč od sebe, maska namiguje na tisto *pravo* in neizrekljivo, kar se skriva za njo, in šele v tem momentu postane neposredna *upodobitev* resnice. Takšno razmerje med masko in celoto velja tudi za Novalisovo teorijo pesniške *Darstellung*, po kateri pesniški jezik z opozarjanjem na razliko med seboj in neizrekljivim pridobi temeljno skrivnostno, hieroglifsko moč, da kliče k neizrekljivemu. Pesnikove besede so magija (*VF* #32, po Mati 209), ki opazovanje posameznega – mask – zaobrača v zrenje nezamejenega, ki se skriva za njimi.

Razmerje med tistim neizrekljivim, kar poezija evocira, in onim, o čemer govori, je dovolj zanimivo, da ga bom preverila ob *Himnah nôči*. Najprej se bom osredinila na pesniško tematizacijo časa pretekle bitne polnosti skozi spomin in časa prihodnje bitne polnosti skozi upanje/vero. *HN* #5 je recimo poetizirana zgodovina dveh zlatih dob: Dionizove dobe in dobe Kristusovega prvega prihoda. Dioniz tukaj nastopa kot blazni bog uničevanja, a tudi kot prinašalec reda v kaos. Na to drugo razsežnost Novalis opozori, ko Dioniza poveže z Demetro in s tem namiguje na tisti del mita o Dionizu, kjer ta barbarskim Tračanom razodene skrivnosti poljedelstva. Dioniz v *HN* potemtakem simbolno upodablja dve nasprotujoči si maski Enega: ne le transformacije zakrčene, otrdele snovi v brezobličnost,⁴² ampak tudi transformacijo

grobe snovi v obliko, po kateri je simbolno razodeto globlje in celovito – ne pa zgolj razumsko – védenje, kakršno je lastno bogovom.

Po mnenju Manfrieda Franka pa naj bi se Dioniz v *HN* #5 pojavil še enkrat; neimenovani helenski pesnik, ki pride v Palestino, otroku Kristusu daruje svoje srce⁴³ in nato z *od ljubezni pijanim* srcem odide v Hindustan, naj bi namreč ne bil nihče drug kot prav čudežni pevec iz Lidije v Evripidovih *Bakhah*.⁴⁴ Seveda Novalis to izpelje v duhu zgodnjeromantične recepcije mita o Dionizu in Kristusu, ko z daritvijo srca in z ljubezensko upijanjenostjo Dionizovo ekstatično vrtenje spoji s krščansko ljubeznijo. Povezavo med Dionizom in Kristusom pa še dodatno okrepi, ko oba predstavi kot pesnika – tista, ki imata *prijazne ustnice*. S *prijaznih ustnic* pesnika Kristusa-Odrešenika pršijo radosti polne in neizčrpne besede kakor iskre božjega duha.⁴⁵ Vendar pa se Dioniz v *Himnah* prvič pojavi že v *HN* #1, v podobi mogočnega tujca »pomenljivih oči, plavajoče hoje in *ljubko našobljenih blagoglasnih usten* [poudarila A.J.]« (»der herrliche Fremdling mit sinnvollen Augen, dem schwebenden Gange, und *zartgeschlossen*en, *tonreichen Lippen*«). Tujceve blagoglasne ustnice proizvajajo razkošen ton in gradijo podobo mogočnega, Dionizu in Kristusu podobnega moškega z ženskim obrazom. Šele v kontekstu *HN* #1 se torej pokaže, da so prijazne ustnice v *HN* #5 epitet boga-pesnika.

Tujec-Dioniz-pesnik pa je opisan še z enim epitetom: njegova hoja je *schwebende*, lebdeča. Očitno Novalis z izbiro tega Fichtejevega izraza, ki ga je v *Fichtejevih študijah* uporabljal, kadar je govoril o udejanjenju absolutnega jaza,⁴⁶ meri prav na gibanje med dvema nasprotnima poloma. V podtekstu »lebdečega tujca« se potemtakem skriva »opotekajoči se« ali kar (dionizično) »vrteči se«, od sinje plime luči upijanjeni tujec. Njegova hoja združuje nasprotja v neko višjo celoto. Novalis nadgradi učinek vrtenja kot povezovanja nasprotij, ko v drugem odstavku *HN* #1 preskoči v opis kraljestva noči. Kajti naenkrat pripoved iz tretje osebe ednine, s katero je govoril o »tujcu«, preskoči v prvo osebo ednine. Tujec je »jaz«, ki bo dosegel absolutnost šele v kraljestvu noči, ko bo v sebi spojil in povezal vsa nasprotja.

Toda noč ni le prostor, kjer se polnost biti udejanja skozi pesniški spomin na zlato dobo, ampak je prostor upanja na vnovični prihod zlate dobe. Upanju sta posvečena sklep *HN* #5⁴⁷ in celotna *HN* #6 z značilnim naslovom »Hrepenenje po smrti« (*Sehnsucht nach dem Tode*). Seveda tu ne gre za samomorilno hrepenenje, pač pa za željo po popolni spojitvi z »nočjo« – za željo po *hieros gamos* pred-refleksijske božanske »noči« in refleksijskega »dneva«. V središču teh podob je ljubezen.⁴⁸ Takšna, v poeziji in sanjah udejanjena svatbena noč pomeni preskok iz ubožnega časa v bližino boga. In prav temu preskoku bi filozofija rekla udejanjenje bitne polnosti in celovitega samozavedanja.

Vendar pa Novalis ne le govori o Dionizu: *Himne* govorijo tako kot Dioniz. Da bi mogel izreči neizrekljivo, pesniški jezik tukaj postaja dionizičen, postaja oscilacija/vrtenje in tako v pesniku kot v bralcu tudi povzroča oscilacijo/vrtenje.⁴⁹ Ta pa ni povzdignjena le v konstitutivni pesniški princip, ampak je po Novalisu tudi bistvo pesniške produktivne imaginacije (*VF* #13).⁵⁰ Vendar pa je le najkvalitetnejša poezija zmožna z vrte-

njem/oscilacijo udejanjiti tisto Eno, ki ga upodablja; s tem pa Eno postane dostopno, ne da bi ga kontempliralo oko uma.⁵¹ Najkvalitetnejša poezija je za Novalisa transcendentalna oziroma organska poezija kot sinteza filozofije in poezije. Duhovni čas poezije⁵² potemtakem pripada samo transcendentalni poeziji, kajti edino ta je zmožna udejanjiti celoviti organizem.⁵³ Lahko bi torej rekli, da so *Himne* praktično udejanjenje Novalisove zamisli o transcendentalni poeziji.

Pesniško udejanjenje polnega samozavedanja v *Himnah*

V *Fichtejevih študijah* je Novalis problem udejanjenja Enega obravnaval ob premisleku o celovitem samozavedanju. Pri tem je si je pomagal s Fichtejevim pojmovanjem glagola *schweben*. A da bi ta pojem mogel reinterpretirati v neprenehno krožno gibanje oziroma dialoško dinamično razmerje med dvema nasprotnima poloma, je moral že v izhodišču jasno razločiti refleksijsko in pred-refleksijsko zavest. Krožnega gibanja, prototipa celovitega samozavedanja, pa v *Himnah* ni tematiziral le z razmerjem med simbolnim dnevom in simbolno nočjo ter s figuro Dioniza-Kristusa, pač pa ga je vtikal v samo strukturo pesniškega teksta. Bistveno vlogo za Novalisovo udejanjenje teorije samozavedanja v pesniški praksi je pri tem odigrala njegova teorija »romantiziranja«, kot jo obravnava v slovitim fragmentu 105 iz zbirke *Vorarbeiten zu verschiedenen Fragmentsammlungen*. Romantiziranje je operacija, ki vse običajno, vsakdanje in zamejeno transformira v skrivnostno, neskončno in neizrekljivo ter ga s tem dvigne na višjo kvalitativno raven. Vendar pa se kvalitativni dvig ne zgodi le na ravni objekta/sveta, ki ga je potrebno romantizirati, pač pa tudi na ravni samega subjekta. V transformaciji se skratka udejanji izkustvo celovite biti, absolutni jaz. Absolutni jaz *par excellence* je za Novalisa pesnik oziroma genij, ki je romantizirani posameznik, oseba na drugo potenco, sestavljen iz več različnih oseb (VF #466). Na ravni pesemskega tkiva tako romantiziranje postane jezikovna praksa potujitve sveta, ki na pesnika in na bralca povratno učinkuje⁵⁴ tako, da vse fragmentarno poveže z (manjkajočim) preostankom in s tem doseže preobrazbo parcialnega v univerzalno.⁵⁵ Poezijo, ki proizvaja negativno védenje oziroma nevednost, Novalis celo imenuje »poezija noči in somraka« (AB #342),⁵⁶ s tem pa misli prav na poezijo sublimnega, ki s svojo nedoločljivostjo omogoča *več kot zgolj* ugodje ob sklenjenem in razumljivem (VF #151). Presežno ugodje izvira iz pesniškega udejanjenja polne biti. Kako je torej Novalis v *Himnah noči* dosegel udejanjenje polne biti v mediju pesniškega jezika?

Novalis romantizira že v HN #3, v kateri tradicionalni interpreti (zmožno) vidijo upesnitev pesnikovega lastnega mističnega izkustva.⁵⁷ Na gričugrobu lirski subjekt žaluje zaradi izgube svoje ljubice (Sophie von Kühn); navdajajo ga misli o nesmiselnosti življenja, ki se mu je doslej kazalo optimistično in radostno, dokler teh predstav ni *porušila* smrt ljubice. Sestop pod zemljo, v smrt (razumsko optimističnega) najavlja »naliv somraka« (*Dämmerungschauer*), vendar naliv prihaja iz sinje dalje, z neba, in ima

paradoksen učinek. Podobno kot je na začetku *HN* #1 »lila« svetloba, naliv teme razklene okove dnevne svetlobe (*des Lichtes Fessel*) in preseka popkovino (*das Band der Geburt*), ki lirski jaz veže – priklepa – na parcialno, zgolj na refleksijsko zavest zamejeno bivanje. Osvobočenčev duh je zato ponovno rojen v svoji celovitosti: lebdi oziroma oscilira (*schwebte*) tako kot Dioniz iz *HN* #1 in v takšnem stanju ga navda vizionarsko spoznanje resničnega pomena »noči«. Da gre tukaj zares za »filozofsko smrt« in za prehod k celovitemu, oscilirajočemu samozavedanju, potrjuje dvoje, na jezikovni ravni udejanjenih transformacij. Začetna otožnost je transformirana v pijačo noči,⁵⁸ ki docela upijani lirski jaz, grič-grob pa se preobrazi v prozorni oblak prahu, v katerem lirski subjekt ugleda *poveljane poteze svoje ljube* (Sophie kot Modrosti).

Podoba je precej kompleksna, saj oblak prahu po eni strani zadrži konotacijo minljivosti (prah si in v prah se povrneš), po drugi strani pa skozi izkustvo smrti mrtva ljubica postane ljubljena Modrost, ki ji v očeh počiva večnost. Prav to ljubico že v *HN* #1 lirski jaz prosi, naj ga preobrazi, da se bo z njo spremešal in bo potem poročna noč trajala večno (*ewig die Brautnacht währt*). Referenca na *Visoko pesem* nedvomno meri na *unio mystica* z Modrostjo-Sophie; vendar pa gre tu – če pesem beremo na ozadju *Fichtejevih študij* – prav za dinamično združitev s celovitim samozavedanjem, ne pa za spojitev z nadbitnostnim. Želja po *unio* z Enim in celovitim jazom iz *HN* #1 postane v *HN* #3 vizionarska upodobitev,⁵⁹ v *HN* #5 in #6 pa se tudi uresniči.

Transformacija v *HN* 3 je torej vizionarska napoved transformacije v celost: noč kot tisto Eno-in-hkrati-dvojno preplavi lirski subjekt, »nočna vznesenost« (*Nachtbegeisterung*)⁶⁰ ga upijani. Hkrati pa se okovi dnevne svetlobe preobrazijo v »iskrečo se nezdroljivo vez« (*funkelndes unzerreißliches Band*), po kateri – platonistično rečeno – se prav vse dobro poveže z vsem. Romantiziranje torej eno »masko« (okove luči) uniči, da bi pod krinko druge »maske«, ki je hkrati ugajajoči privid in upodobitev najvišje resnice, evociralo brezpodobsko Eno. Eno je prav bleščeča nezdroljiva vez med nasprotji (zemljo in nebom, dnevom in svetlobo), po kateri se udejanji ideal celovitega organizma. Romantiziranje tu zares postane zaščitni znak transcendentalne poezije – poezije, ki udejanja organskost posameznika in kozmosa, v *HN* #6 pa tudi človeške družbe. Posledice romantiziranja so v *HN* #3 povsem v skladu s filozofskimi fragmenti: lirski jaz namreč izskoči iz ubožnega časa v »duhovno sedanjost« poezije (*BL* #109) in v njej eksistira: »Tisočletja so kakor neurje odplula v dalje.«

Z romantiziranjem pa je še veliko tesneje povezana ljubezen; ta je pravzaprav nosilka romantiziranja. Videli smo, da Sofija/Modrost razvezuje okove refleksijske zavesti⁶¹ in spleta »bleščečo nezdroljivo vez« med nočjo in človekom. »Bleščeča nezdroljiva vez« ljubezni ne zaslužuje, ampak *posreduje* med refleksijsko in pred-refleksijsko zavestjo ter ju slednjič poveže v eno. S tem pa ljubezen v *Himnah* avtomatično pridobi dinamično, oscilacijsko silo; postane ena od variacij Kristusa – boga, ki je ljubezen (Jn 4,7). Bi nas Novalis rad prepričal, da je ljubezen v *Himnah* pravzaprav mistična ljubezen, o kateri govorijo alegorične interpretacije *Visoke pesmi*?⁶²

V *HN* #4 postane ljubezen »stvariteljska/ustvarjalna ljubezen« (*schaffende Liebe*) in »hčerka noči«. Oba epiteta (maski) se navezuje na *HN* #1, kjer je govor o »nežni ljubici« (*zarte Geliebte*), ki jo pošilja noč, in o »ljubkem soncu noči« (*liebliche Sonne der Nacht*). Kajti nežna ljubica ima stvariteljsko moč, saj iz lirskega jaza ustvari človeka (*mich zum Menschen gemacht*) – iz njega oblikuje absolutni jaz, celovito samozavedanje. V *HN* #5 se analogije ljubezni še zgostijo: ljubezen je ljubezen Kristusa, pesnika-preroka novega življenja, in Marije. Končni učinek ljubezni, ki ljudi dobesedno preplavlja (upijanja kakor poezija, tekoča duša?) s svojim neizrekljivim opojem, z zlatim (dionizičnim?) vinom življenja,⁶³ je preobrazba človeštva v zvezde, v božanska bitja, v jasno manifestacijo tistega, kar je sicer posredovano zgolj prek misterija poezije. Na koncu *HN* #5 ljubezen kot ena sama »večna pesem« postane triumfalno udejanjenje visokopesemske »poročne noči«.

To pomeni, da je ljubezen oziroma ljubezen-poezija v *Himnah* tista sila, ki povzroča romantiziranje teksta, sveta in samega bralca/pesnika. Toda hkrati je prav ta ljubezen še sama podvržena transformaciji: »hčerka noči« slednjič postane »noč« sama, vrne se v »maternico« oziroma v večno poročno noč. Zaključek *HN* #5⁶⁴ je zato mogoče brati v povezavi s *FSt* #555, kjer je oscilacija kot vir simbolne *Darstellung* pravzaprav »mati vse realnosti, realnost sama«.

Dinamično vrteči se postopek združevanja Novalis ponazarja v sami strukturi pesniškega teksta, ko simbolno polje ljubezni nenehno bogati s pomočjo »čarobne paličice« analogije in nanj nanaša nove simbolne plasti. Tako »ljubezen« vase srka vse, česar se dotakne: je Sofija, je Kristus, je neznan pesnik, ki pijan od ljubezni odhiti v Hindustan, in je Marija. Takšno platenje analogij dosega presenetljiv učinek. Vse v pesemskem tkivu je prek ljubezni transformirano in vsaka maska je analogija istega. Preplet mnogoterega se v mediju pesniškega teksta levi v teksturo-mrežo, v kateri analogije vse povezujejo z vsem, tako da končni ali celoviti smisel ostaja neizrečen,⁶⁵ vendar ga je mogoče občutiti.

Romantiziranje in kopičenje analogij v *Hvalnicah* tako evocira to vse-Eno prav v trenutku, ko nalaganje analogij preseže kritično točko in pesniški tekst eksplodira. Takšno makro-romantiziranje je mogoče razložiti z regresijo domišljije v matematičnem sublimnem pri Kantu. Kajti ko zlaganje »opek«/analogij doseže skrajno mejo predstavljivega, se pojavi občutje sublimnega, v katerem se družita frustracija – ker predstavna zavest ne more predstaviti nečesa, kar jo presega – in občutje ugodja, ker je tisto »presežno« dano *per negationem*, kot občutje nečesa, kar je kakor Dioniz vdrlo v refleksijsko zavest in jo preplavilo.⁶⁶

K razmerju med filozofijo in poezijo

Ko je Novalis uvidel, da je razmerje med poezijo in filozofijo temeljni problem, je hkrati ugotovil, da gre tu za vprašanje samozavedanja in strukture subjektivitete v modernosti. Iz tega sledi, da je hierarhiziranje razmerja med

poezijo in filozofijo nasprotno bistvu subjektivitete v modernosti. Princip polnega samozavedanja in absolutne subjektivitete se Novalisu razkrije v dionizičnem »vrtenju«, v nepretrdnem dialoškem gibanju dveh tipov zavesti, od katerih ena stremlji k trdnosti, ki jo skuša pridobiti z oblikovanjem spoznanj o objektih, druga pa rahlja njene pretenzije in ji dovaja pravo, izvorno hrano za njena spoznanja. Najizvirnejša celovitost, s tem pa tudi najvišja oblika samozavedanja, se za Novalisa kar naprej proizvaja – in je negativno dana – v mediju estetskega izkustva.

Frank meni, da je Novalisov premislek o strukturi subjektivitete izzivalen in pomemben celo za sodobni premislek o tem problemu. Iz Novalisove perspektive se za Steinerjevo kritiko »sekundarnega« pokaže tole: če Steiner po eni strani upravičeno kritizira prevlado »sekundarnega« nad primarnim ter hkrati opozarja na nevarnost pozabe primarnega, pa po drugi strani primarnega ne zmore prepričljivo odkopati, ker se tudi sam ujame v zanko hierarhizacije poezije in teorije. Steiner sekundarnemu ne vrne tistega mesta, ki mu pripada v strukturi moderne subjektivitete. Izhod iz krize, o kateri tako ognjevitost razpravlja Steiner, a se iz nje ne more izvleči, torej ni možen, dokler perpetuiramo razmerje statične hierarhije (hlapca in gospodarja), namesto da bi ga preobrnili v razmerje dinamičnega dialoga med mišljenjem in pesništvom. Kolikor komentar in teorija zmagujeta nad literaturo, toliko literarna veda zapada v spoznavno krizo, ko kot *svojo* privzema optiko reduktivnega samozavedanja in nasilja tehnike, s tem pa tudi metod, ki (proti temeljnemu ustroju moderne subjektivitete) ne zmorejo tematizirati in vnaprej všeti hiata med literarnim tekstom in interpretacijo.

(Temu naj dodam še aporetični drugi zaključek. Kaj če Steiner razmišlja dovolj globoko, kaj če njegov premislek o razmerju med poezijo in teorijo ostaja v primežu hierarhije, vendar ne zaradi izgube stika z modernostjo, pač pa, ker se v modernosti po moderni dogaja neka temeljna sprememba? S tem vprašanjem prestopam iz razprave v špekulacijo, ki v bohotenju teorije kot tiste, ki naj prinese varnost in trdnost, vidi reakcijo na rahljanje – toda katero rahljanje? Težko ali nemogoče je ločevati med pred-refleksivno zavestjo, ki rahlja rigidne izdelke refleksivne zavesti, in rahljanjem modernosti same. Odgovor bom skicirala prek vprašanja o tem, koliko je romantiziranje, pretvarjanje zamejenega v brezkončno, za sodobno poezijo sploh še zanimiva pesniška strategija.

Slovenska sodobna poezija se je v osemdesetih in devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja začela čedalje bolj posvečati resničnosti konkretnega sveta in izkušnji vsakdanjega življenja (Debeljak, Zupan, Semolič).⁶⁷ V zadnjih nekaj letih je v njej zaznati elemente naracije (Zupan, Semolič, Mozetič) in posebne strategije organiziranja pesemskega tkiva, ki funkcionirajo kot zaščita krhkega in nestabilnega lirskega jaza. Bolj kot da bi evocirala tisto neizrekljivo v modernem smislu, pesem tukaj postaja evokacija neizrečene krhkosti lirskega jaza. Ambivalenten primer, kjer je pesem hkrati nosilka neizrekljivosti in neizrečene krhkosti, pa je pesem *Akordi* Primoža Čučnika (7–12). Podoba rekreativnega drsalca se tu razpira v podobo človeka, ki se – zavedajoč se možnosti zdrsa – drsa po biti. Vendar pa drsalec dosega bitno polnost šele, če in ko privzema popolnoma vsakdanjo podobo rekre-

ativnega drsalca; šele ta zamejena in nalašč banalna podoba namreč omogoča igrivo in hkrati zaresno lovljenje ravnotežja med izkušnjo uzavešene krhkosti in izkušnjo neizrekljive polnosti.⁶⁸ Čučnikova pesem nedvomno ustvarja vrtenje, ki ga Novalis postavlja kot postulat polnega samozavedanja. Koliko se to vrtenje dogaja na način, ki ni romantiziranje, ampak nemara logaritmiranje, pa se mora šele pokazati.)

OPOMBE

¹ Takšno stališče zagovarja Frank v svoji, na podlagi Schleiermacherjeve hermenevtike in teorije teksta postavljeni teoriji interpretacije. Prim. Frank, *The Subject* 23–97.

² Glede razmerja med gospodarjem in hlapcem pri Lacanu sem si pomagala z Dolarjem (31–38).

³ Gl. Hribar 176–184.

⁴ Frankov odnos do poezije po drugi strani precej dolguje poznemu Heideggru (Frank, *Einführung* 22–29). Za dokaj ostro kritiko Frankovega navezovanja na Heideggra gl. Beiser 66. Pozni Heidegger naj bi namreč bil vzrok za to, da je Frank zanemaril vlogo platonskega razuma v nemški zgodnji romantiki, v njeno interpretacijo vnesel »nepotrebn element obskurantizma ter jo znova napravil ranljivo za stare obtožbe antiracionalizma«.

⁵ Pojem je analogen Vattimovemu šibkemu subjektu.

⁶ Pri istem viru se napaja tudi eshatološka oziroma odrešeniška funkcija, ki jo je poeziji podelila meščanska družba 19. stoletja. Prim. Gadamer 83–84 in Iser 18–19.

⁷ Objavljeno v Frank, *Selbstbewußtseinstheorien* 26–27.

⁸ Ključni odlomki o samozavedanju so objavljeni v Frank 1993, *Selbstbewußtseins-theorien* 56–69. Kadar ni označeno drugače, Novalisove filozofske fragmente citiram po angleškem prevodu Jane Kneller, prim. Novalis, *Fichte*, in po italijanski kritični izdaji Novalis, *Opera*. Številka ob oznaki *Fichtejeve študije* (FSt) se bo v prihodnje nanašala na številko fragmenta. Podobno bom citirala tudi fragmente iz drugih zbirk.

⁹ Več o tem gl. Frank, *Uvod*.

¹⁰ Gl. Frank, *Selbstbewußtseinstheorien* 26.

¹¹ Ta pojem Frank prevzame iz Sartrovega spisa *Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi*, ki razlikuje »cogito cartésien« in »un 'cogito' pré-réflexif« kot pogoji prvega. Prim. Sartre 368.

¹² Frank opozarja, da so problemi samozavedanja, subjektivitete in biti pravzaprav inačice istega problema in da je v Novalisovem mišljenju samozavedanja vseskozi neka paralela mišljenju biti. Prim. Frank, *Einführung* 252.

¹³ Novalis je bil še pred dvajsetimi leti kot filozof popolnoma neznan (Frank, *Einführung* 257) ali pa so ga, kot D. Henrich, obravnavali kot povsem povprečnega filozofa. Frank na tej točki kritizira Henricha in ugotavlja, da so *Fichtejeve študije* eden najtežjih tekstov v nemški filozofiji. Gl. Frank, *Einführung* 248.

¹⁴ Podobno misel najdemo tudi pri Hölderlinu, gl. Frank *Selbstbewußtseinstheorien* 26: »V pojmu sodbe/delitve je že vselej prisoten pojem vzajemnega odnosa subjekta in objekta, ki si stojita nasproti, hkrati pa je nujno predpostavljena celota, katere del sta subjekt in objekt. 'Jaz sem jaz' je najprikladnejši primer tega pojma izvirne delitve kot teoretske izvirne delitve, kajti v praktični izvorni delitvi Jaz nasprotuje ne-Jazu, ne pa samemu sebi.«

¹⁵ *FSt* #1: »Bistvo identitete se pusti predstaviti samo prek navidezne trditve« (»Das Wesen der Identität läßt sich nur in einen Scheinsatz aufstellen.« Nav. po Frank, *Selbstbewußtseinstheorien*, 56.) Gl. še *FSt* #234.

¹⁶ *FSt* #1: »Ali pa ga predstavimo prek njegove ne-bit, s pomočjo ne-identičnega – z znakom – [tako da uporabljamo] določeno stvar za enakooblično določujočo stvar« (»Oder wir stellen es durch sein Nichtseyn, durch ein Nichtidentisches vor – Zeichen – ein bestimmtes für ein gleichförmig bestimmendes [...]«.) (Frank, *Selbstbewußtseinstheorien* 56).

¹⁷ Glede občutja sebe (*Selbst-Gefühl*) kot izvora jaza pri Novalisu Frank poučarja, da to ni nasledek neposrednega odseva nekega samodelovanja, temveč nasledek učinkovanja biti (*Wirkung des Seins*), ki ni več razumljena kot nezavedno ustvarjeno delo 'absolutnega jaza'. Spoznanje biti je možno le v občutju Gl. Frank, *Selbstgefühl* 39–40.

¹⁸ *FSt* #15: »Filozofija je izvorno občutje. Filozofske vede spreminjajo zrenje tega občutja v pojem. [...] Meje občutja so meje filozofije. [...] Kaj je torej občutje? Opazovati ga je mogoče le v refleksiji/odsevu – a duh občutja je takrat že odsoten.« (»Die Philosophie ist ursprünglich ein Gefühl. Die Anschauungen dieses Gefühls begreifen die philosophischen Wissenschaften. [...] Die Grenzen des Gefühls sind die Grenzen der Philosophie. Das Gefühl kann sich nicht selber fühlen. [...] Was ist denn ein Gefühl? Es läßt sich nur in der Reflexion betrachten – der Geist des Gefühls ist da heraus.«) (Po Frank, *Selbstbewußtseinstheorien* 65).

¹⁹ S takimi epiteti so nemški zgodnji romantiki označevali dobo razsvetljenstva in meščansko, k dobičku uperjeno družbo.

²⁰ Metaforo mehanizma je uporabil Kant v prvi Kritiki, da bi opisal delovanje čistega uma. Schiller jo je (metaforo) v *Pismih o estetski vzgoji* prenesel na kritiko birokratske države, kjer načelo legalnega privzame podobo brezdušnega mehanskega funkcioniranja, ne da bi imelo legitimacijsko pokritje pri državljanih. Legalistična država z zakoni zatira posameznikove gone, zato njeni državljan niso svobodni ljudje. Po drugi strani tudi gonom predan človek ni svoboden človek. Sredstvo za udejanjenje polne in svobodne individualnosti, v kateri bi goni in spoštovanje razumskih zakonov omogočili izgradnjo/vzgojo (*Bildung*) posameznika kot celovitega človeka, vidi Schiller v estetski vzgoji oziroma v umetnosti. Metaforo mehanizma v spisu *Krščanstvo ali Evropa* uporabi tudi Novalis, ko govori o mlinu (*eine Mühle an sich*), ki melje samega sebe in je neskončno stvarjenjsko glasbo kozmosa pretvoril v monotono škripanje. Prim. Novalis, *Cristianität / Christenheit* 98.

²¹ Prim. *FSt* #555: »Vsa bit, bit na splošno, ni nič drugega kot biti svoboden – oscilirati med skrajnostma, ki se bosta nujno združili in se bosta nujno razločili. [...] Jaz-stvo ali ustvarjajoča moč imaginacije, oscilacija – določa, ustvarja skrajnosti, med katerima se dogaja oscilacija – To je prevara, vendar zgolj v kraljestvu običajnega razumevanja. Sicer pa je to nekaj docela realnega, kajti osciliranje, njegov vzrok, je tisti vir, mati vse realnosti, realnost sama«.

²² *FSt* #566: »Brezkončna svobodna dejavnost v nas vznikne zaradi naše nezmožnosti, da bi dosegli in spoznali absolutno. To absolutno, ki nam je dano, je mogoče zgolj negativno spoznati, vse dokler delujemo in ugotavljamo, da tega, kar iščemo, ni mogoče doseči z dejanjem. To bi lahko imenovali za absolutni postulat. Vsako iskanje enega načela bi bilo kakor poskus, da bi s kvadratom upodobili krog. / Nenehno gibanje. Kamen filozofov. Negativno spoznanje [...].« Po Novalis, *Fichte* 168.

²³ Gl. Frank, *Einführung* 264–265.

²⁴ Prim. *FSt* #14: »Kar refleksija najde, se zdi, da je že tu – značilnost svobodnega dejanja.« (»Was die Reflexion findet, scheint schon da zu seyn – Eigenschaft eines freyen Actus.«) Po Frank, *Selbstbewußtseinstheorien* 64.

²⁵ *FSt* #63: »Podoba je vedno obrnitev biti. Kar je na desni strani neke osebe, je v podobi na levi strani«. Po Novalis, *Fichte* 40. Podobno tudi v *FSt* #107. Nav. po Novalis, *Fichte* 50. Gl. še Frank, *Einführung* 253.

²⁶ *Fragmente und Studien* 1799–1800 [FS], #671; nav. po Mati 237.

²⁷ *FS* #553, po Mati 233. Podobno v *FSt* #637.

²⁸ *Blüthenstaub* (Ätheaum, I, maj 1798) [Bl], #109. Po Novalis, *Opera* 407.

²⁹ Gl. Helfer 83–84.

³⁰ Številka ob oznaki *Himne noči* [HN] se nanaša na posamezno himno. Gl. *HN* #2: »aber zeitlos und raumlos ist der Nacht Herrschaft.«

³¹ Allgemeines Brouillon [AB], #342. Po Mati 157.

³² Prim. Frank, *Prihajajoči bog* 9–19, 176–256.

³³ *Vorarbeiten zu verschiedenen Fragmentsammlungen* [VF], #105. Prim. tudi *VF* #207, #230, #278: Novalis pojma romantiziranje tukaj ne uporablja, vendar govori natanko o tem procesu. Gl. še *FS* #688 (po Mati 237) in *FS* #533, kjer Novalis govori o poeziji kot *Darstellung* notranjega sveta v njegovi celovitosti (po Mati 233).

³⁴ Mistična smrt pomeni smrt vsega, kar oddaljuje od boga, zato za mistike šele v kenotičnem izpraznjenju vznikne popolno spoznanje boga.

³⁵ Prim. *Hemsterhuis-und Kant-Studien* (1797) [Hst], #35.

³⁶ Gl. Mati 110.

³⁷ O analogiji smrti in spanca gl. *VF* #442. Spanec-smrt ima krepčilen oziroma poživljajoč učinek. Novalis s tem namiguje na resnično življenje, na udejanjenje celovitega jaza, ki se udejanji v smrti-spancu jaza-maske.

³⁸ *HN* #3: »Es war der erste, einzige Traum – und erst seitdem fühl ich ewigen, unwandelbaren Glauben an den Himmel der Nacht und sein Licht, die Geliebte.« Hči noči je tu očitno Sofija kot Modrost; to je tudi ustrezna posledica v *Hst* #35 zapisane misli o samousmrtitvi kot pravemu filozofskemu dejanju, ki omogoča pravo *philo-sophio*, ljubezen do modrosti.

³⁹ Prav vse tukaj dolgujem Frankovim analizam, prim. Frank, *Prihajajoči bog* 9–19.

⁴⁰ Ravno na to bratstvo se navezuje skrivnostno privzetje prve osebe množine v *HN* #6. Z njim Novalis apelira na udejanjenje holističnega ideala ne le na ravni posameznika, ampak tudi na ravni človeške družbe/države, narave in kozmosa kot »organizma«. O vplivu *Naturphilosophie* na nemško zgodnjo romantiko gl. Beiser, *The Romantic*. Toda ali bi poezija kot javna državna religija sploh še bila poezija z estetsko intenco? Vprašanje ni neposredno povezano s problemom, ki ga obravnavam v članku; v grobem pa osnovne teoretske smernice za odgovor ponuja Jauß, ko razpravlja o ideološkem zavzetju estetskega izkustva.

⁴¹ Zgodbo navaja Frank, *Prihajajoči bog*. Za Nonusovo zgodbo o Dionizu-Zagreju prim. Vrečko 184–185.

⁴² Temu so posvečeni tisti deli *HN* (zlasti *HN* #1–#3), ki govorijo o svetem prehodu v noč, spanec in v podzemlje. Dioniz tukaj ni upodobljen, pač pa je navzoč kot princip.

⁴³ *HN* #5: »unter Hellas heiterm Himmel geboren, kam ein Sänger nach Palestina und ergab sein ganzes Herz dem Wunderkinde.«

⁴⁴ Frank, *Prihajajoči bog* 13–14.

⁴⁵ *HN* #5: »Unerschöpfliche Worte [...] fielen wie Funken eines göttlichen Geistes von seinen freundlichen Lippen«.

⁴⁶ *FSt* #555 in #566.

⁴⁷ Gl. konec *HN* #5: »Na svatbo kliče smrt – Svetlo žare luči – Devic je zvrhan vrt – Za olje sile ni – / Iz dalj naj zvonko seže / Tvoj dih zdaj vse do nas / In zvezdam molk razveže / V besede zven in glas« (Novalis, *Svet* 16). (»Zur Hochzeit ruft der Tod – / Die Lampen brennen helle – / Die Jungfrau sind zur Stelle – / Um Oel

ist keine Noth – / Erklänge doch die Ferne / Von deinem Zuge schon, / Und ruften uns die Sterne / Mit Menschenzung' und Ton.«) Reference na smrt in poročno noč v navedeni v zadnji kitici *HN* #5 je nujno brati v navezavi na *HN* #1: »noč si mi oznanila za življenje – iz mene si naredila človeka – prežari z ognjem dušnim mi telo, da v srcu iskro zlijem se s teboj in večno noč poročna naj traja« (Novalis, *Svet* 8). (»du hast die Nacht mir zum Leben verkündet – mich zum Menschen gemacht – zehre mit Geisterglut meinen Leib, daß ich luftig mit dir inniger mich mische und dann ewig die Brautnacht währt.«)

⁴⁸ *HN* #6: »Nizdol nas k Jezusu bodreče, / K nevesti kliče vera – / In glej: vse žalostne, ljubeče/ Že odeva pled večera./ In sen nas bo rešil iz okov/ In dahnil nas pred božji stol« (Novalis, *Svet* 20). (»Hinunter zu der süßen Braut, / Zu Jesus, dem Geliebten – / Getrost, die Abenddämmerung graut/ Den Liebenden, Betrübten. / Ein Traum bricht unsre Banden los/ Und senkt uns in des Vaters Schooß.«)

⁴⁹ Sinonimni pojem za oscilacijo so tudi metafore, povezane s tokom, fluksom. Prim. *VF* #231 in *VF* #441, kjer se o poeziji govori kot o *tekoči duši*.

⁵⁰ Novalis tukaj privzame Fichtejevo pojmovanje oscilacije, vendar ga reinterpretira in ga prenese na polje umetniškega ustvarjanja, s čimer hkrati preseže nekatere zmotne elemente v Fichtejevi misli. Gl. Novalis, *Opera* 452 (spremno besedilo G. Morettija).

⁵¹ Dostavek je izjemno pomemben. Pri takšnem, negativno danem Enem, gre namreč za to, da je absolutni in celoviti jaz dostopen sebi že pred postavljanjem dejanjem refleksijske zavesti. Ta »celota« je dostopna v »občutju« – oziroma predrefleksijsko, v *Vertrautheit* s seboj, kot bi rekel Manfred Frank. Prav ta odmik od okularne metaforike pa temeljno razlikuje Novalisa od Fichteja. S tega stališča bi se dalo kritizirati Helferjevo, ki vztraja, da Novalisova teorija *Darstellung* ohranja okularno metaforiko in se niti malo ne odmakne od Fichtejevega pojmovanja *schweben*. Gl. Helfer 113–114.

⁵² O duhovnem času poezije gl. *Blüthenstaub* (»*Athenäum*«, I, maj 1798) [B1] #109.

⁵³ *VF* #43 in #47 (oboje tudi v: Novalis, *Svet* 200) ter #48. V *VF* #43 je podana definicija transcendentalne poezije kot organske poezije: takšna poezija torej udejanja celoto, organizem. Na transcendentalno poezijo se posredno nanašajo še *VF* #32 (»Če se filozof zameji na urejanje in razporejanje, pesnik razvezuje sleherni vez.«), #40, #42, #242.

⁵⁴ S tem Novalis anticipira Iserjev sklep, da konstitucija tekstnega smisla povratno deluje tudi kot konstitucija subjekta, v kateri se na površini pokažejo sicer nedostopne vsebine subjektivitete. Prim. Iser 243–245.

⁵⁵ *VF* #31, po Mati 209. O romantiziranju gl. op. 30.

⁵⁶ *AB* #342; po Mati 157. V tem fragmentu Novalis aplicira Kuzančevo *docta ignorantia* na udejanjenje absolutnega jaza, s tem pa negativno teologijo transformira v poezijo noči. Razlika med mističnim in pesniškim negativnim spoznanjem celote je hermenevitična, v grobem jo opiše nasprotje med nadbitnostnim (*hyperousios*) in absolutnim jazom.

⁵⁷ Prim. recimo Haywood 52–77. Več o tem gl. Helfer 194, op. 16.

⁵⁸ Tukaj še enkrat spominjam na definicijo poezije kot tekoče duše, s katero se je moč upijanjiti. Gl. *VF* #441.

⁵⁹ Helferjeva opozarja, da je *Klingsohrjeva zgodba* hkrati preroška *Darstellung* in nujna *Darstellung* (Helfer 92–93), saj najavlja udejanjenje resnice v 2. delu *Heinricha von Ofterdingena*, kjer vsaka stvar predstavlja samo sebe (Helfer 103). Razsežnost preroške *Darstellung* najdemo tudi v *Himnah*.

⁶⁰ Ta opoj napovedujeta tako prva kot druga himna. Prim. *HN* #1: »Nas mar mamiš tudi ti, temna noč? /.../ Omamni balzam ti kaplja iz roke, iz makovega šopka.«

(Novalis, *Svet* 7). Gl. *HN* #2: »Ne čutijo te v zlatem kipečem grozdju – v čudežnem olju mandljevcev in v rjavem makovem mlečku« (Novalis, *Svet* 8–9). V *HN* #4 pa beremo: »Ali mar nima vse, kar nas opaja, barve noči? /.../ Še malo in / Vezi razvežem./ Opit ljubezni/ V naročje ležem. /.../ O! Vpij me preljuba, / Mogočno me zdrami, / Da sen me zaziblje, / Ljubezen omami. / Oživljen ves čutim, / Da smrt me preveva, / In v eter mi kri, / V balzam spuhteva« (Novalis, *Svet* 11). Prim. tudi Novalis, *Schriften* 139.

⁶¹ *HN* #4: »a kar je posvetil dotik ljubezni, se bo razvezano po skrivnih poteh pretočilo v deželo onkraj in se tam zlilo z zaspalimi v ljubezni, kakor se pomešajo vonjave med seboj« (Novalis, *Svet* 10). Prim. tudi Novalis, *Schriften* 137.

⁶² O tem Ricoeur in LaCocque 428–476 in 387–427.

⁶³ Tukaj imamo mrežo referenc, ki spleta vezi med zlatim groznim sokom (*HN* #2), Dionizom (»bog[om] v vinu«, *HN* #5), in liturgičnim obhajanjem s Kristusovo krvjo (*HN* #5).

⁶⁴ *HN* #5: »Ljubezen vre z neba, / Ločitve več ne žanje. / Kot večni val morja/ Nas ziblje čarno planje. / Vse – ena noč slasti, / Le pesem – večna saga, / In sonce vseh poti / So božja lica blaga« (Novalis, *Svet* 17–18). Prim. Novalis, *Schriften* 153.

⁶⁵ Če Novalisove filozofske fragmente beremo kot enovit korpus, je učinek podoben: Novalis gradi gosto mrežo analogij (mask Enega), s pomočjo katerih tekst oziroma korpus fragmentov postane povezanost vsega-v-Enem. Fragment je za Novalisa pesniška oblika filozofskega mišljenja; je redukcija – delec prahu, ki opozarja na svojo nedokončanost. Toda v trenutku, ko prah umre, postane pelod: sproži oscilacijo imaginacije, tako da se iz njega razvije organizem – sinji cvet neba. Prim. *AB* #339, nav. po Mati 154: »Vsak prah je pelod – cvetna čaša je nebo.«

⁶⁶ Za analizo regresije domišljije pri Kantu gl. Makkreel 67–87. Da je Novalisova teorija negativne *Darstellung*, kakor jo na podlagi predhodnega premisleka v Fichtejevih študijah praktično razvija v *Himnah*, podobna Kantovi teoriji sublimnega, opozarja tudi Helferjeva: »the Hymns' 'representation of the unrepresentable' is an implicit instantiation of the negative *Darstellung* of the Kantian sublime poesy, a poesy of the Infinite [...]« (Helfer 116).

⁶⁷ O tem gl. J. Kos 191–192.

⁶⁸ Gl. Čučnik 7–12.

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THE RELATION BETWEEN POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY

NOVALIS' *HYMNS* AS AN ILLUSTRATION

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UDK 82.0-1:1

George Steiner's criticism of the triumph of the "secondary" over the "primary" shows that the relationship between poetry and theory becomes problematic whenever dialogue is replaced by hierarchy. The very structure of modern subjectivity is jeopardized whenever the relation between poetry and theory becomes hierarchical or when theory tries to capture the literary text in its entirety. Focusing on Novalis' poetic and philosophic opus, this paper asserts that literary criticism should be aware of hierarchical structures in the methods it uses, and should transform the hierarchical relation between poetry and theory into a dialogic relation.

Keywords: Novalis, romanticizing, self-consciousness, theory of poetry in early German Romanticism

One of the emphases of the comparative literature symposium at Vilenica (Lipica) in 2005 was upon the supposedly problematic relation between theory and literature in contemporary literary studies, whereby the literary text becomes lost in the flow of the secondary – the flow of interpretations. George Steiner sees in this phenomenon a "symptom" of a loss of primacy (Steiner 38–39), of a slip into the "Satanic chaos" (Steiner 44), of the victory of the secondary over the primary, which is henceforth available only as a diminished and inexorably dismembered caricature of itself. The crusade against interpretation, however, leads Steiner onto thin ice. When he undertakes the role of protector of "primacy" and esthetic experience as such, or when he acknowledges reinterpretation by means of some other poetic language as the only legitimate interpretation of a work of art, he loses contact with the role of reflection in modernity. The danger here is not of the loss of something superficial, it is the danger of obliteration of the consciousness of the constitutional function that reflection performs in the dynamics of subjectivity from Romanticism onwards. Descriptive-analytic

attempts to pronounce through the given unsayable establish an unsurpassable gap between the text and the interpretation, which the interpretation or the theory of interpretation should consider from the very beginning¹ if it really wants to follow the basic structural features of subjectivity in modernity. If the interpretation wishes to merge completely with the text or with what keeps slipping away from it in the text and must, due to the very structure of the interpretational act, remain separated from it, the interpretation finds itself in danger of the fatal pretension of a complete capture of the sense of the text, the sense of the author and the reception of the text by the public. The cancer-like metastasizing of interpretations, which gradually fill up the primary text and the primary experience, is therefore the asymptotic, newest form of such pretension.

To a certain extent Steiner's anger is legitimate, but the tone of his speech leads to an unreflective revival of the Romantic conception of poetry as something that only poets can (adequately!) understand. Similar to the cancer-like metastasis of interpretation, Steiner's anger destroys the subtle relation between the interpretation and the text, seeking to overcome the gap between the horizon of interpretation and the horizon of the text. Therefore it is possible to conclude that the parasitizing of theory on arts is a symptom – albeit not of ruin, but of a destroyed relation and a destroyed difference. Similarly problematic to the attempt of a theory that would encompass something infinite with something finite, describe an open system with a sophisticated but closed system, is Steiner's attempt to establish an opposite hierarchy and set poetry above commentary.

It seems that the actual problem is the establishment of a hierarchy. It is possible to clearly describe Steiner's conception in terms of Lacan's reinterpretation of the Hegelian relation between the master (poetry) and the servant (theoretical commentary). In this relation the master is prepared to sacrifice life to gain freedom and unexpectedly also power, while the servant is willing to sacrifice freedom to save life.² According to Lacan, the servant's problem is not the master, but the idea of the infinite enjoyment (*jouissance*) of the latter and the phantasm of a future surplus of enjoyment that the servant would experience in the moment of the death of the master. The parallel with Lacan's reinterpretation of the relation between the servant and the master stops here, because the servant (theoretical commentary) with its immense persistence, according to Steiner, poisons the master and takes his place. Unfortunately, this does not result in the servant appropriating the master's enjoyment. Enjoyment cannot be attained by the servant-master, because the master – while we stay within the hierarchical relation – did not have a body from the very beginning and could not be killed. The master can be eliminated only by assigning him an esthetic body, but by doing so the servant risks having to give up his own limitation and his passion for systematization, which deprives him of freedom, but enables knowledge and therefore life. If the servant wants to stop serving, he has to risk the terror of the withdrawal of life – but would this not make him truly alive? The theory, in short, is pervaded by the terror of dehierarchization and because of this the theoretical commentary wanes each time it attempts

to encompass the literary text as a whole: the commentary basically kills the text instead of bringing it to life. The gap or the difference between the text and the interpretation therefore has to be the opening premise of every discussion about a literary text, and at the same time protection, which prevents hierarchy and its violence.

Against Steiner's position it is possible to place the thinking of the later Heidegger about the proximity of poeticizing and thinking, which move on the same level, both attempting to distinguish Being from existence. Thus the essence of their proximity is not a "garrulous cloudy mixture of two modes of saying" (*geschwätzigen trüben Mischung beider Weisen des Sagens*, and so not the examining of hybrid theoretical-literary genres), but for them each to sense in the speech "a delicate yet luminous difference" (*eine zarte, aber helle Differenz*; Heidegger, *Unterwegs* 184, 185). The ontological difference opened in the circumstances in turn opens the distance between poeticizing and thinking, and directs the clarity of Being to their joint darkness (Heidegger, *Unterwegs* 185). Nevertheless, the difference between poetry and thinking exists: poetry creates and, in the clarity through speech, it discloses the historical truth of existence and the truth of its Being, whereas thinking comprehends this disclosed Being.³ Nonetheless, according to Heidegger, the relation between poetry and thinking is not hierarchical, but is a relation of equality.

The later Heidegger formed his thinking on Being and on speech as a means of disclosing Being, using Hölderlin's poetic, which was unjustifiably "banished" from Jena Romanticism by Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy. It is important to emphasize that, if Steiner's thesis refers to the field of meta-thinking of literary studies about itself, then Heidegger's thesis about the relation between theory and literature points to the ontological relation between thinking and poetry. The move from Steiner to Heidegger is the move that dissolves hierarchy into an equality of partners in the dialogue. Behind the thesis about the dialogic relation between poetry and thinking hides a thesis about modern subjectivity as a cooperation of reflection and feeling.

If we think about the problem in the light of modernity, we should not underestimate the role that early German Romanticism (*Frühromantik*) played both in the thinking of the relation between poetry and philosophy as well as in the poetic thematization of this relation. If the credit for Heidegger's inclination towards poetry goes to Hölderlin's poetry, Manfred Frank similarly developed his apology of poetry through the experience of Novalis's poetic and thinking.⁴ As Heidegger had to consider speech and poetry to think of Being more clearly and to be able to wrench his thought from the grip of metaphysics, Frank considered the poetry of early German Romanticism to be able to talk about individuality⁵ as a way out of metaphysics.

Heidegger and Frank's dialogue with poetry and a positive evaluation of its cognitive range are no coincidence: they both owe a lot to early German Romanticism.⁶ Both Hölderlin in his fragment *Urtheil und Seyn* (1795)⁷ and Novalis in the collection of fragments *Fichte-Studien* (1795/96)⁸ particularly criticize that feature of German idealism that attempts to find a stable ground in the modern subject, from which the subject would wholly

comprehend itself. Already Fichte realized that philosophical argumentation, *Grundsatzphilosophie*, goes around in circles and that the reflectively pre-supposed subject cannot be wholly encompassed with the intellect; but Fichte could not find a way out of this state.⁹ The search for a stable ground of subjectivity in Hölderlin and Novalis encountered severe criticism: each statement-cognition derived from a stable ground is, for Novalis, only an illusory statement (*Scheinsatz*, cf. *FSt* #1). This is even more true in the case when the subject, reduced to reflection, sees itself as an object that should be cognized. With these affirmations, however, caution is required. The conclusion that intellectually ascertained truth is not solid truth is not an antirational criticism, but it is a criticism of reductive self-consciousness: in early German Romanticism a “version of epistemological and ontological realism” (Frank, *The Philosophical* 28) is present, which questions the absolute validity of each cognition of the subject and Being, derived exclusively from the reflexive consciousness.

Novalis and Hölderlin consolidated the criticism of self-consciousness reduced to reflexive consciousness with clear a differentiation of two types of consciousness. Apart from differentiating and estimating or reflexive consciousness (*Reflexion*), which according to Hölderlin’s epistemological analysis creates the original cut (*Ur-Teilung*) and causes the split into subject and object, a different type of consciousness exists. Kant and Fichte could not find it because they persisted with the problematic concept of intellectual intuition. This enclosed their understanding of self-consciousness in an “ocular metaphors,” and with this always into the relation of the subject that looks at the object. Hölderlin also speaks about another type of consciousness that is not (yet) marked by the split into subject and object,¹⁰ but is characterized by some original homeliness with itself (*Vertrautheit mit Sich selbst*), which *has* always *known* without being directed towards the object. Frank calls this type of consciousness “pre-reflexive consciousness,”¹¹ and I myself will use the same notion. There are also other expressions to denote it. Hölderlin names this consciousness, in which the “subject” and the “object” are in the state of a before-split union, Being (*Seyn*), as something that has not yet been touched by the primary judgment/primary cut. On the basis of Jacobis’ philosophy and pietism, Novalis talks about feeling (*Gefühl*) or “feeling of oneself” (*Selbst-Gefühl*). Hölderlin and Novalis’ differentiation between pre-reflexive and reflexive consciousness outdistances Heidegger’s ontological difference by two centuries.¹² This on the other hand means that the very clear differentiation of two types of consciousnesses allows a clear look at Being, which is not only proved in their poetry, but also in their philosophical fragments. Novalis’ philosophical argumentation of the relation and difference between the two types of consciousness is sharper and argumentatively more thorough than Hölderlin’s. The most interesting thing is that *Fichte-Studien* was created before the *Hymns to the Night*. Did the philosophical thinking in this case occur before the poetry?

The problem of self-consciousness is closely connected to the question of the relation between philosophy and poetry, but not only this: the history

of valuation of the cognitive range of poetry shows that the latter is dependent upon the interpretation of self-consciousness. In this essay I will first concentrate on the aspect of *Fichte Studies*, which deals with the problem of self-consciousness and Being,¹³ and then I will show how these ideas are represented in the *Hymns to the Night* and in Novalis' comprehension of transcendental poetry. I have chosen the *Hymns to the Night* for the discussion because I agree with the assessment by Marta B. Helfer, who sees in the *Hymns* the theory and realization of the Romantic lyric, but also an example of realization of the absolute subject (Helfer 106).

Towards an Unreductive Comprehension of Self-consciousness

It is characteristic of reductive self-consciousness, limited to reflexive consciousness, that its apprehensions adopt a form of identity, a closed form. A is identical to A. What escapes reductive self-consciousness is exactly what reflexive consciousness cannot realize, and this is the self itself at the moment of thinking – the self that is before reflection. Therefore opposite to the “self,” which the reflexive consciousness establishes in theoretical cognition, always stands that pre-reflexive self, not given to reflection, which could be named “non-self” from the point of view of reflexive consciousness.¹⁴ For Novalis this results in the following: each assertion about Being, which has the form of a statement or identity (with an idea), is *apparently* real because instead of Being as a whole it apprehends only part of it and what only seems to be Being is called with the name of the whole (cf. *FSt* #1 and #14).¹⁵ The insufficiency of reflexive consciousness is also discussed in the first fragment of Novalis' *Allgemeine Brouillon*: “Everywhere we look for the unconditioned [*das Unbedingte*] and we always find only things [*Dinge*].” Novalis' sophisticated pun points out that the apprehended thing is only a truncation, a fossil of the unconditioned, and not the living, the wholeness that we are really looking for.

In poetry Novalis finds an approach to Being that is cognitively more whole. Thus already in *FSt* #1 he concludes: “We abandon the identical in order to represent it” (*um es darzustellen*). By this he does not allude to the descriptive encompassing of Being, but to the special power of poetic image, which can evoke Being-as-such wholly. Even though the representing of it thus cannot offer the fullness of Being, we believe in the image because of the activity of our imagination – the very belief in the representation activates an occurrence or a qualitative passage from the mere representation of X to something, which *is this itself*: “What occurs, already is” (*es geschieht, was schon Ist*). In the esthetic experience the whole Being is given in the manner of instant epiphany – that is, in the leap from everyday-like, indigent time into the time that encompasses all times and is therefore existentially whole. It is not only poetry, however, that leads to the wholeness of Being, but also philosophy when it *pre-sents* (*stellen es ... vor*) Being wholly, using something radical, non-identical – a sign.¹⁶ Later

on Novalis realized how philosophical thought could be corrected in order to comprehend Being as a whole.

To understand Novalis' proposal we should consider two modes of consciousness, reflection (*Reflexion*) and feeling (*Gefühl*),¹⁷ the first one is the ontological modus of philosophy, whereas the kingdom of the ontological modus of poetry begins on the border of philosophy (*FSt* #15).¹⁸ Because philosophy evokes the whole Being, the Romantic esthetic confers upon it the status of the elected or of the highest activity of the human spirit. However, in everyday, indigent¹⁹ time, marked by hunger for Being, and in a state, which works like a clock mechanism²⁰ according to the soulless laws of bureaucracy and common sense, the realization of the whole Being is not possible because there is always the reduction to reflection.

Novalis beautifully compares the reduction of self-consciousness to one sole modus with the attempt to square a circle. This thought in *FSt* #566 is followed by the conclusion about a holistic ideal of self-consciousness as a perpetual motion or oscillating,²¹ in which Novalis recognizes the alchemistic stone of wisdom or negative cognition.²² For a whole Being the realization of both modi of self-consciousness *simultaneously* is therefore crucial, so that the feeling feeds the reflection and simultaneously decomposes its artificial constructs. As analyses in Frank's *The Coming God* show, the early German Romantics were developing the thought of the possibility of a whole Being and a whole self-consciousness along with their reception of the myth of Dionysus as the god of opposites, and the god that is in perpetual transformation, but it is in this very oscillating from one opposite to another that he reaches the wholeness of Being. The arrival of such a god – here, the reception of the myth of Dionysus by the early German Romantics evolves into the myth of Dionysus-Christ – would signify a resumed realization of the wholeness of Being and with this the passage of the gods from the night and the dark (beyond the intellect), where they are forced to live in an indigent time, into the light and the day. The reception of the myth of the arriving god is based on the hope that what now exists only at the level of a mysterious cult will some day become a public ceremony. The mysterious cult, pushed into the underground, is of course poetry, which in the indigent time is the only one to make contact with the “gods.” Without poetry the wholeness of Being in indigent time is possible only as a hope in a future wholeness, placed at the end of time – or as a memory of the past realization of wholeness. Memory and hope, two different forms of hunger for Being,²³ were thematized in the fifth and sixth of Novalis' *Hymns to the Night*.

Nevertheless, from Novalis' reflection on transcendental philosophy it follows that poetry has to “come to the assistance of philosophy when the latter breathes too shallowly” (Frank, *Einführung* 248). Poetry should therefore subvert the dictate of reflexive consciousness and soften its rigid products but, if this were so, reflection could be corrected. However, how to reach, in reflection, the thinking of what is non-given to reflexive consciousness, and what is from the point of view of reflexive consciousness only negatively given? If reflection first has to reach the missing pole,

where only feelings can take it, then it is only possible to approach the cognition of Being from a consistent contemplation of difference – that is to say, from a clear distinction between the two types of consciousness.

The possibility of correction is offered to Novalis by an etymological explanation, in which reflection or reflexive consciousness is always a mirroring (*Spiegelung*). Each reflexive cognition is *like* a mirror image of the world and of Being,²⁴ and this is why this image is the opposite of Being (Frank, *Selbstgefühl* 245).²⁵ Everything that is in the reflexive cognition should be reflected back or inverted, to also obtain, along with what reflexive consciousness encompasses, what it does not encompass. The distortion of Being, which happens in the first act of reflexive consciousness, can be corrected by the second act of reflexive consciousness, which builds another mirror into the reflection and obtains the reflex of the reflex and along with this the “non-given.” Moreover, this is an interesting point: what appears as the “second” act is in fact more primary than the “first” mental act, which inverts Being into illusion (*Sein in Schein verkehrt*). Novalis called the described turn of the inverted *ordo inversus* (Frank, *Selbstgefühl* 245–46).

Along with these two acts of reflection, Novalis also discusses the act of representing as a free act (*FSt* #476), through which Being is given – not analytically as in philosophy, but truly as an unsayable and, to every imagining, fleeing *experience of wholeness*. If self-consciousness cannot be represented analytically, then the problem could be solved by presenting its unrepresentability. This is exactly what poetry does: represents the true Self as unrepresentable (*Darstellung des Undarstellbaren*)²⁶ or represents the spirit, “the entire inner world.”²⁷ Poetry thus realizes the time of the satisfied hunger for Being – the spiritual present, in which both the past and the future dissolve.²⁸ From this Novalis derives a special theory of a visual poetic *Darstellung*, which helps the poet transform language itself and make it so immediate that it could be used in the medium of poetry to represent – even though only negatively – the pure Self.²⁹

Poetry and Dionysus

The earlier thinking about self-consciousness as an oscillation and perpetual movement can symbolically be illustrated by the myth of Dionysus. This addition makes sense because early German Romanticism linked its thinking of the function poetry performs in “indigent” time to the reception of the myth. Poetry is of course only possible where the gods live, and because they have escaped from the light (and spiritual blindness) of the enlightened intellect, the place-time of poetry is the night. Here I would like to be a little more accurate: the night is beyond or outside (indigent) time and place,³⁰ it is outside the linear time of hope and memory, a “parallel” spiritual time belongs to it, which is the time of the fullness of Being. The fullness of Being here presents itself as ex-sistence, because only being outside (of the reduced self-consciousness) means being whole.

When Novalis discusses the poetry of night and dusk,³¹ he does not refer to the theory of poetry as a spiritual and mystical activity, but to the contact with “Dionysus,” who was also held in high esteem by other early German Romantics.³² “Dionysus” of course is a god and at the same time is not a god, but a symbolic representation of whole self-consciousness and ontological fullness.

When poets spring from the common time, marked by hunger for Being and by reductive self-consciousness, into the spiritual time of the “night”, they come into contact with the deity Dionysus. Moreover, in fact, in the kingdom of the night the words of everyday language become ambivalent; what the language says is not the unsayable that it evokes. For poetic language to acquire this performative ability, it is of course necessary to achieve a radical transformation of common, everyday language. Moreover, it is this transformation to which Novalis’ theory of “romanticizing” as a “qualitative intensification,”³³ through which poetic language acquires a secret, hieroglyphic, magical power, transforming all the known and limited into secret and infinite, refers. Such transformation of language happens only in the qualitative passage from everyday time to the time of the night as a wholeness of Being, in which the intellect sinks into sleep to recognize the “truth”. This sleep therefore is not common sleep, but a “holy sleep” (*Heilige Schlaf*, cf. *HN* #2), which metaphorically alludes to death, or the mystical death, which is followed only by a new, full life in “god.”

The poet Novalis does not, however, refer to *unio mystica*,³⁴ but to the level of cognition and knowledge, which is qualitatively higher than arid intellectual cognition, and becomes possible only with “philosophical” death.³⁵ In philosophical death every reduction to the reflexive consciousness dies; the death of the partial (fragmentary) self is thus a real philosophical act and the beginning of real philosophy (*HSt* #35). Only the symbolic descent into the underground and into sleep (as analogue of death)³⁶ allows the true love for the “daughter of the night”³⁷ that will lead the poet into the everlasting “wedding night” (*HN* #1); that is to say, into the eternal cognition of the truth. It is possible then to say that for Novalis philosophical death is indispensable; the reflexively posited “self” has to go through death like Dionysus and Christ for the dust to become pollen and grow into an organism, into a wholeness, into the blue flower from the novel *Heinrich von Ofterdingen*. What from the point of view of self-confident reflection is sinking into sleep and into the night, for the poet Novalis is becoming awake.

However, in indigent time fullness of Being and whole self-consciousness can only be something negatively given, a “dark light.” Further, the fullness of Being is only accessible to a handful of initiator-poets, the way the mysterious cults of Dionysus were accessible only to the chosen. This is a major problem and that is why at this point the early Romantic reception of the myth of Dionysus establishes a connection with the myth of Christ. The poetic mystery in indigent time does realize the dark light of Being, but it is with this that it actually prepares and announces the return of the gods to light. Poetry prepares and announces the time when the fullness

of Being will be accessible to all people and the mysterious cult of poetry will become a public religion. However, because Dionysus is a mysterious deity, for Novalis and the Jena school he can only come back as a resurrected Christ-King, in whose kingdom poetry will obtain the position of liturgy,³⁸ which binds people – the citizens of the cosmos, as the early German Romantics would put it – together into a joyful community.³⁹ Moreover, this is exactly what *HN* #6 talks about, when the narrative suddenly shifts into the perspective of a “we,” the future community of “sidereal people.”

The God of Opposites and Transformations in the *Hymns*

With regard to Dionysus, it is important to emphasize two things.⁴⁰ Dionysus is the god of opposites, and each of the forms in which he appears is diametrically opposed to the previous one, in such a way that it also draws attention to what is missing. Dionysus is also a god of transformation: he is constantly dying and being born again in other, always different forms. Each of his forms is only a partial form – a mask of the non-manifested One, which in the wildly rotating (oscillating) sequence of masks can only be negatively given. Dionysus as a divine One is therefore all the manifestations at once; more accurately – Dionysus is a wild rotation.

The relation between an individual manifestation (mask) of Dionysus and the whole is also very important. A mask is an incomplete part of the whole; when it is showing something it is at the same time hiding the whole. With this the mask itself already draws attention to the radical *non-identity* of itself/selfness and the deity. By directing away from itself, the mask alludes to the *real* and unsayable that hides behind it, and only in this moment the mask becomes a direct *representation* of truth. The relation between the mask and the whole is also valid for Novalis' theory of poetic *Darstellung*, according to which the poetic language, by pointing to the difference between itself and the unsayable, gains the basic secret, hieroglyphic power to call to the unsayable. The poet's words are magic (*NS* II, 533, #32), which turns the observation of the particular – the masks – into the glaring/staring at the unlimited that hides behind them.

The relation between the unsayable, which poetry evokes, and what poetry discusses is interesting enough for me to examine in the *Hymns to the Night*. To start with, I will concentrate on the poetic thematization of the time of the past fullness of Being through memory and the time of the future fullness of Being through hope/belief. *HN* #5 is, for example, a poetized history of two golden eras: Dionysus' era and the era of Christ's first coming. Dionysus here appears as a mad god of destructiveness, but also as a deliverer of order into chaos. Novalis points out this second feature when he links Dionysus with Demeter and with this he refers to that part of the myth of Dionysus in which Dionysus reveals the secrets of agriculture to the barbaric Thracians. Dionysus in *HN* therefore symbolically represents two opposite masks of the One: not only the transformation of the shrunk, rigid substance into formlessness,⁴¹ but also the transformation of the rough

substance into form, through which the deeper and more whole – but not only intellectual – knowledge proper to gods is symbolically revealed.

According to Manfred Frank, Dionysus appears one more time in *HN* #5; the unnamed Hellenic poet that comes to Palestine, offers his heart to the child Christ,⁴² and then goes off to Hindustan with a heart *drunk of love* could be nobody else but the miraculous poet from Lydia from Euripides' *Bacchae*.⁴³ Novalis of course derives this in the spirit of the early Romantic reception of the myth of Dionysus and Christ, when with the offering of the heart and the love drunkenness he merges Dionysus' ecstatic whirling with Christian love. He reinforces the connection between Dionysus and Christ by presenting them both as poets – the ones with *friendly lips*. The inexhaustible word, the gladdest of messages, fell like the sparks of a divine spirit from the *friendly lips* of the poet Christ-Savior.⁴⁴ However, Dionysus appears in the Hymns already in *HN* #1, in the image of the powerful stranger with "sense-filled eyes, with gliding gait and *gently-closed, rich-toned lips* [emphasis mine]" (*der herrliche Fremdling mit sinnvollen Augen, dem schwebenden Gange, und zartgeschlossenen, tonreichen Lippen*). The foreigner's closed, yet rich-toned, lips produce a magnificent sound and build up the image of the powerful man, resembling Dionysus and Christ but with a woman's face. Only in the context of *HN* #1 does it become clear that the friendly lips in *HN* #5 are an epithet for the god-poet.

The stranger/Dionysus/poet is described by one more epithet: his step is *schwebende*, floating. By choosing this term, which he used in *Fichte Studies* when discussing the absolute self,⁴⁵ Novalis alludes to the moving between two opposite poles. In the subtext of the "floating stranger" hides a "staggering" or just a (Dionysian) "whirling stranger, drunk on the blue tide of light. His step joins the opposites into a higher wholeness. Novalis upgrades the effect of whirling into a connection of opposites when, in the second paragraph of *HN* #1, he shifts into the description of the kingdom of the Night. Suddenly the narration in the third person singular, which he used to discuss the "stranger," becomes first person singular. The stranger is the "self," who will reach the absolute only in the kingdom of the Night, when he merges and connects all the opposites together in himself.

However, the night is not only the space where the fullness of Being is realized through the poetic memory of the golden age, it is the space of hope for the second coming of the golden era. The end of *HN* #5⁴⁶ and the entire *HN* #6, entitled *Longing for Death* (*Sehnsucht nach dem Tode*), are dedicated to hope. This of course is not a suicidal longing, but the desire for a complete merger with the "Night" – the desire for *hieros gamos* of the pre-reflexive divine "Night" and the reflexive "day." The center of these images is love.⁴⁷ Such a wedding night, realized in poetry and dreams, represents a jump from indigent time to the vicinity of god. Moreover, this jump is what philosophy would name the realization of the fullness of Being and the wholeness of self-consciousness.

Novalis speaks not only *about* Dionysus: the *Hymns* speak like Dionysus. To say the unsayable, the poetic language here becomes Dionysian, it becomes an oscillation/whirling and it produces oscillation/whirling in the

poet and the reader as well.⁴⁸ Oscillation is not only elevated into the constitutive poetic principle but, according to Novalis, it is also the essence of poetic production (NS II, 525, #13).⁴⁹ Only poetry of the highest quality, however, is able to realize through the whirling/oscillation that One that it represents; with this the One becomes approachable without being contemplated by the eye of the intellect.⁵⁰ For Novalis, the poetry of the highest quality is transcendental or organic poetry as a synthesis of philosophy and poetry. The spiritual time of poetry⁵¹ therefore belongs only to transcendental poetry because it is the only one able to realize the whole organism.⁵² We could say that the *Hymns* are a practical realization of Novalis' idea of transcendental poetry.

Poetic Realization of the Full Self-consciousness in the *Hymns*

In *Fichte Studies* Novalis dealt with the realization of the One along with his reflection on the whole self-consciousness, using Fichte's notion of *schweben*. However, to reinterpret this notion into a continuous circular or dialogic movement between two opposite poles, from the very beginning he had to make a distinct difference between the reflexive and pre-reflexive consciousness. He not only thematized the circular movement – this prototype of the whole self-consciousness – in the *Hymns* with the relation between the symbolic day and night and with the figure of Dionysus-Christ, but he interwove it into the very structure of the poetic text. A crucial role for Novalis' realization of self-consciousness in the poetic tissue was played by his theory of "romanticizing," as discussed in his famous fragment 105 of the collection *Vorarbeiten zu verschiedenen Fragmentsammlungen*. Romanticizing is an operation that transforms all the common, everyday-like, and limited into the secret, infinite, and unsayable, elevating it to a higher level of quality. However, the qualitative rise does not happen only at the level of the object/world, which needs to be romanticized, but also at the level of the subject itself. In the transformation, the experience of the whole Being, the absolute self, is realized. The absolute self *par excellence* for Novalis is a poet or a genius, who is a romanticized individual, a person to the second power, constituted from several different persons (NS II, 645, #466). At the level of poetic tissue, such romanticizing becomes a linguistic practice of making the world foreign, which has a retrospective effect on the poet and the reader,⁵³ who connect all the fragmentary parts with the (missing) remaining part and thus reach the transformation of the partial into the universal.⁵⁴ Novalis even calls the poetry that produces negative knowledge or lack of knowledge the "poetry of the night and dusk" (AB #342).⁵⁵ This refers to the poetry of the sublime, which with its indefiniteness enables *more than just* comfort with the determined and the intelligible (NS II, 559, #151). The transcendent comfort comes from the poetic realization of full Being. How, therefore, did Novalis reach the realization of full Being by means of the poetic language?

Novalis already romanticizes in *HN* #3, which the traditional interpreters (wrongly) see as the embodiment of the poet's own mystical experience.⁵⁶ On a hill-grave the lyrical subject mourns the loss of his beloved (Sophie von Kühn); he contemplates the meaningless of life, which had been optimistic and happy until these notions *were ruined* by the death of his beloved. The descent into the underground, into death (intellectually optimistic), foretells the "twilight spectacle" (*Dämmerungschauer*), but the spectacle is coming from blue distances, from the sky, and has a paradoxical effect. Similar to the "pouring" of the light at the beginning of *HN* #1, the downpour of the night opens up Light's chain (*des Lichtes Fessel*) and cuts the birth bond (*das Band der Geburt*), which links/enchains the lyrical self to a partial existence, limited only to the reflexive consciousness. The spirit of the individual is thus reborn in its wholeness: he floats or oscillates (*schwebte*) like Dionysus in *HN* #1 and in this state they are filled with the visionary cognition of the true meaning of "the night." Two transformations, realized at the linguistic level, prove that this is truly a "philosophical death" and the passage to the whole, oscillating self-consciousness. The initial sadness is transformed into the drink of the night,⁵⁷ which inebriates the lyrical self, while the hill-grave is transformed into the transparent cloud of dust, in which the lyrical self sees the *glorified features of his beloved* (Sophie as Wisdom).

The image is quite complex because the cloud of dust on the one hand keeps the connotation of transitoriness (dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return), on the other hand through the experience of death the dead lover becomes beloved Wisdom, with infinity resting in her eyes. It is this lover that already in *HN* #1 the lyrical self asks to transform him, so that he can mix with her and the wedding night may last forever (*ewig die Brautnacht währt*). The reference to the *Song of Songs* undoubtedly alludes to the *unio mystica* with Wisdom-Sophie; but this – if we read the poem on the basis of *Fichte Studies* – is a dynamic merging with the whole self-consciousness, and not a union with godhead. The desire for *unio* with One and the whole self in *HN* #1 becomes a visionary representation in *HN* #3⁵⁸ to be brought to effect in *HN* #5 and #6.

The transformation in *HN* #3 is thus a visionary announcement of the transformation into wholeness: the Night as the One-and-at-one-time-double floods the lyrical subject, the "night rapture" (*Nachtbegeisterung*)⁵⁹ inebriates him. On the other hand, the Light's chains change into a "glittering and unrippable bond" (*funkelndes unzerreißliches Band*), through which – platonically speaking – everything connects with everything else. The romanticizing thus destroys one "mask" (the Light's chains) to evoke under the veil of another "mask," which at the same time is a delightful apparition *and* the representation of the highest truth, the imageless One. One is the glittering and unrippable bond between the opposites (earth and sky in *HN* #3, day and light in *HN* #1), through which the ideal of a whole organism is realized. The romanticizing here becomes the trademark of transcendental poetry – the poetry, which realizes the organic unity of the individual and the cosmos, and in *HN* #6 also of human society. The consequences of the

romanticizing in *HN* #3 are in complete accord with philosophical fragments: the lyrical self, in fact, jumps out of the indigent time into the “spiritual present” (*eine geistige Gegenwart*) of poetry (*NS* II, 461, #109) and exists in it: “Millenniums have sailed off to the distances like a storm.”

Love is even more strongly linked to romanticizing; it is actually the bearer of romanticizing. We have seen that Sophia/Wisdom unties the chains of reflexive consciousness⁶⁰ and interweaves the “glittering and unrippable bond” between the night and man. The “glittering and unrippable bond” does not enslave love, but it *mediates* between reflexive and pre-reflexive consciousness and eventually links them into one. This way love in the *Hymns* automatically gains a dynamic, oscillating force; it becomes one of the variations of Christ – god, who *is* love (John 4:7). Would Novalis like to convince us that love in the *Hymns* is actually a mystical love, the one discussed in the allegorical interpretations of the *Song of Songs*?⁶¹

In *HN* #4 love becomes “creational/creative love” (*schaffende Liebe*) and the “daughter of the Night.” Both epithets (masks) refer to *HN* #1, where Novalis mentions the “tender lover” (*zarte Geliebte*), sent by the Night, and the “Night’s lovely sun” (*liebliche Sonne der Nacht*). The tender lover has creational power because, out of the lyrical self (*mich zum Menschen gemacht*), she creates man – she forms the absolute self, the whole self-consciousness. In *HN* #5 the analogues of love become even more numerous: love is the love of Christ, the poet-prophet of the new life, and Mary. In the end, love literally floods people, it inebriates them with the golden (Dionysian) wine of life,⁶² and it finally transforms them into stars, into divine beings. This way the divinized humanity turns into a clear manifestation of what is given only through the mystery of poetry. At the end of *HN* #5 love as an “eternal poem” becomes the triumphant realization of the “wedding night” from the *Song of Songs*.

This means that love or love-poetry in the *Hymns* is the force that causes the romanticizing of the text, the world, and the reader/poet themselves. However, at the same time this love itself is subject to transformation: the “daughter of the Night” eventually becomes the “Night” itself; she returns to the “womb” or to the eternal wedding night. The end of *HN* #5⁶³ can thus be read in the connection with *FSt* #555, where oscillation as the origin of the symbolic *Darstellung* is actually the “mother of all reality, reality itself.”

Novalis illustrates the dynamically whirling process of uniting in the very structure of the poetic text, when he constantly enriches the symbolic field of love by means of the “magic stick” of analogy, adding new symbolic layers to it. “Love” thus sucks in everything it touches: it is Sophia, it is Christ, it is the unknown poet that inebriated by love runs to Hindustan, it is Mary. This layering of analogies leads to a surprising effect. Everything in the poetic tissue is transformed through love and every mask is the analogy of the same. The web of varieties changes through the poetic text into the net, in which the analogies connect everything with everything else, and the final or whole meaning remains unsayable,⁶⁴ but can be felt.

The romanticizing and the piling up of analogies in the *Hymns* thus evokes this all-One in the very instant when the piling up of analogies

overcomes the critical point and the poetic text explodes. Such macro-romanticizing can be explained by means of the regression of imagination in the mathematical sublime in Kant. When the piling up of the “bricks”/analogies reaches the outermost limit of the representable, the feeling of the sublime appears, in which there is a union of frustration – because the representational consciousness cannot represent something that surpasses it – and the feeling of comfort because the “beyond” is given *per negationem*, as a feeling of something that has broken into reflexive consciousness like Dionysus and flooded it.⁶⁵

The Relation between Philosophy and Poetry

Novalis brought the relation between philosophy and poetry to the level of a fundamental problem, when he linked it to the problem of self-consciousness and to the fundamental structure of subjectivity in modernity. What derives from this is that the hierarchizing of the relation between poetry and philosophy is against the essence of subjectivity in modernity. The principle of full self-consciousness and absolute subjectivity is revealed to Novalis in the Dionysian “whirling,” in the continuous dialogic movement of two types of consciousness, one of which aims at steadiness and tries to reach it by forming cognitions about objects, while the other softens the pretensions and conveys the real, original food for its cognitions. The most original wholeness, and along with it the highest form of self-consciousness for Novalis is being constantly produced – and is negatively given – by means of the esthetic experience.

Frank thinks that Novalis’ reflection about the structure of subjectivity is also challenging and important for a contemporary reflection on this problem. From Novalis’ perspective, Steiner’s criticism of the “secondary” is problematic: if, on the one hand, he legitimately criticizes the predominance of the “secondary” over the primary and at the same time he points out the danger of forgetting the primary, he cannot convincingly dig out the primary because he himself falls into a snare of hierarchizing poetry and theory. Steiner does not return the secondary to the place it deserves in the structure of modern subjectivity. The exit from the crisis, which Steiner discusses so passionately, without being able to disentangle himself from, therefore is not possible until we perpetuate the relation of static hierarchy (of the servant and master) instead of turning it into the relation of dynamic dialogue between thinking and poetry. Inasmuch as commentary and theory are winning over literature, literary studies are falling into a cognitive crisis in which they adopt the optic of reductive self-consciousness and the violence of technology as *their* optic, which (against the basic structure of modern subjectivity) cannot thematize and in advance include the gap between the literary text and the interpretation.

I should also add to this an aporetic second ending. What if Steiner does think deeply enough? What if his reflection about the relation between poetry and theory does not remain in the grasp of hierarchy because of the

lost connection with modernity, but because in modernity after modernism a basic change is happening? With this question I leave discussion to start speculation, which sees in theory, celebrating itself as the bringer of safety and stability, a reaction to softening – but which softening? It is difficult or impossible to differentiate between pre-reflexive consciousness, which softens the rigid products of reflexive consciousness, and the softening of modernity itself. I will illustrate the answer with the help of the question about the extent to which romanticizing, transforming the limited into the infinite, is still an interesting poetic strategy for contemporary poetry.

In the 1980s and 1990s contemporary Slovenian poetry started to concentrate on the reality of the concrete world and on the experience of everyday life (e.g., Debeljak, Zupan, Semolič).⁶⁶ In recent years it is possible to detect elements of narration (e.g., Zupan, Semolič, Mozetič) and special strategies of organizing the poetic tissue, which function as a protection of the brittle and unstable lyrical self. More than evoking the unsayable in the modern sense, a poem here becomes the evocation of the unpronounced brittleness of the lyrical self. An ambivalent example, in which the poem is the bearer of both the unsayable and the unpronounced brittleness, is the poem *Accords* by Primož Čučnik. The image of a recreational ice-skater opens into the image of a man that – aware of the possibility of slipping – skates on Being. However, the ice-skater only reaches the fullness of Being if and when he adopts the completely everyday-like image of a recreational ice-skater; only this limited and consciously banal image allows a playful and at the same time serious catching of the balance between the experience of conscious brittleness and the experience of unsayable fullness.⁶⁷ Čučnik's poem creates the whirling that Novalis places as the postulate of full self-consciousness. Further analyses and a larger corpus of work are necessary to establish whether contemporary poetry still uses the "whirling" technique in the sense of Novalis' romanticizing. Perhaps instead of romanticizing, contemporary poets transform the un-known and mysterious into something that in fact is very well known, even banal. In fragment #105 (*VF*), Novalis gives a special name to this technique: he calls it logarithmizing.

Translated by Teja Pribac Brooks

NOTES

¹ This position is advocated by Frank in his theory of interpretation, based on Schleiermacher's hermeneutics and textual theory.

² Regarding the relation between the master and the servant in Lacan, I have used Dolar, 31–38.

³ Cf. Hribar, 176–184.

⁴ Frank's position on poetry on the other hand owes a lot to the later Heidegger (Frank, *Einführung* 22–29). For a fairly severe criticism of Frank's reference to Heidegger, cf. Beiser (66). The later Heidegger is supposed to be the reason for Frank's neglect of the role of platonic intellect in early German Romanticism, and

his injection of “an unnecessary element of obscurantism into *Frühromantik*, which makes it vulnerable to all the old charges of antirationalism.”

⁵ The notion is analogous to Vattimo’s weak subjectivity (*il soggetto debole*).

⁶ The eschatological or redeeming function, applied to poetry by 19th-century middle class society, derives from the same origin; cf. Gadamer (83–84) and Iser (6–7).

⁷ Published in Frank (*Selbstbewußtseinstheorien* 26–27).

⁸ The key pieces about self-consciousness are published in Frank (*Selbstbewußtseins-theorien* 56–69). Unless otherwise stated, I quote Novalis’ philosophical fragments from the English translation by Jane Keller; cf. Novalis, *Fichte*.

⁹ For more about this, cf. Frank (*Introduction*).

¹⁰ Cf. Frank (*Selbstbewußtseinstheorien* 26).

¹¹ Frank adopts this notion from Sartre’s essay *Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi*, which differentiates between “cogito cartésien” and “un ‘cogito’ pré-réflexif” as a condition for the first; cf. Sartre (368).

¹² Frank points out that problems of self-consciousness, subjectivity, and Being are actually varieties of the same problem and that in Novalis’ thinking about self-consciousness there is always a parallel to the thinking of Being; cf. Frank (*Einführung* 252).

¹³ Twenty years ago Novalis was either still completely unknown as a philosopher (Frank, *Einführung* 257) or was considered, as by Henrich, an average philosopher. At this point Frank criticizes Henrich and states that *Fichte Studies* is one of the most difficult texts in German philosophy; cf. Frank (*Einführung* 248).

¹⁴ The same thought could also be found in Hölderlin, cf. Frank (*Selbstbewußtseinstheorien* 26): “Within the notion of judgment/division there has always been present the notion of an interdependent relation between the subject and the object, which stand opposite to one another, while at the same time a wholeness is necessarily presupposed, which the subject and the object are part of. ‘The self is the self’ is the most convenient example of this primary division as a theoretical primary division because in a practical primary division the Self is opposed to the non-Self and not to the Self itself” (»Im Begriffe der Theilung liegt schon der Begriff der gegenseitigen Beziehung des Objekts und Subjekts aufeinander, und die nothwendige Voraussetzung eines Ganzen wovon Object und Subject die Theile sind. ‘Ich bin Ich’ ist das passendste Beispiel zu diesem Begriffe der Urtheilung, als Theoretischer Urthelung, denn in der praktischen Urthelung setzt es sich dem Nichtthich, nicht sich selbst entgegen«).

¹⁵ *FSt* #1: “The essence of identity can only be presented as an illusory proposition” (»Das Wesen der Identität läßt sich nur in einen Scheinsatz aufstellen,« in *NS* II, 104, *FSt* #1); cf. also *NS* II, 179–180, *FSt* #234. Cf. Novalis, *Fichte* 77–78: “Truth is the whole – illusion [*Schein*] only the fracture – the half that seems to be the whole and is not – the former [truth] [is] the positive, the latter the negative quantity.... Representation without intuition is illusion and vice versa. There are concepts and ideas but no mere representations.... The illusion in our cognition arises from the elevation of the half to the whole – or from the halving of the indivisible, of that thing whose *being just consists in* the composition, from the unnatural (immanence and transcendence), or from rounding off and division.”

¹⁶ *NS* II, 104, *FSt* #1: »Oder wir stellen es durch sein Nichtseyn, durch ein Nichtidentisches vor – Zeichen – ein bestimmtes für ein gleichförmig bestimmendes ...« Cf. Novalis *Fichte*, 3: “Or we represent it through its ‘non-Being’ [what is not], through a non-identical [what is not identical to it] – a sign – [using] a determined thing for an isomorphic determining thing.”

¹⁷ With regard to the feeling of oneself (*Selbst-Gefühl*) as the origin of self in Novalis, Frank emphasizes that this is not a result of the direct reflex of some self-

operation, but a result of the effecting of Being (*Wirkung des Seins*), which is not understood as an unconsciously created work of the "absolute self" anymore. The cognition of Being is only possible through feeling; cf. Frank, *Selbstgefühl* 39–40.

¹⁸ NS II, 113–14, *FSt* #15: »Die Philosophie ist ursprünglich ein Gefühl. Die Anschauungen dieses Gefühls begreifen die philosophischen Wissenschaften.... Die Grenzen des Gefühls sind die Grenzen der Philosophie. Das Gefühl kann sich nicht selber fühlen.... Was ist denn ein Gefühl? Es läßt sich nur in der Reflexion betrachten – der Geist des Gefühls ist da heraus.« Novalis, *Fichte*, 13: "Philosophy is originally a feeling. The philosophical sciences conceptualize the intuitions of this feeling.... The borders of feeling are the borders of philosophy.... What then is a feeling? It can only be observed in reflection – the spirit of feeling is then gone."

¹⁹ These are the epithets that the early German Romantics used to denote the period of illumination and middle class, profit-oriented society.

²⁰ The metaphor of the mechanism was used by Kant in his first Critique to describe the operation of pure reason. In his *Letters upon the Esthetic Education of Man*, Schiller transferred it to the criticism of the bureaucratic state, where the legal adopts the image of a soulless mechanic functioning without having been legitimized by the citizens. The legalistic state suppresses the instincts of individuals by means of the laws, and therefore its citizens are not free people. On the other hand, a person ruled by instincts is not a free person either. In esthetic education or the arts Schiller sees the means to realize a full and free individuality, in which instincts and respect for the laws of the intellect would achieve development/education (*Bildung*) of an individual into a whole person. The metaphor of mechanism is also used by Novalis in his essay *Christianity or Europe*, when he discusses the mill (*eine Mühle an sich*) that grinds itself and has transformed the infinite creational music of the cosmos into a monotone creaking; cf. Novalis (*Novalis Werke* 508).

²¹ NS II, 266, *FSt* #555. Cf. Novalis, *Fichte* 164–165: "All being, being in general, is nothing but being free – oscillating between extremes that necessarily are to be united and necessarily are to be separated.... I-ness or productive power of imagination, the oscillating – determine, produce the extremes between which oscillation occurs – This is a deception, but only in the realm of ordinary understanding. Otherwise it is something thoroughly real, because the oscillating, its cause, is the source, the mother of all reality, [is] reality itself."

²² NS II, 270, *FSt* #566. Cf. Novalis, *Fichte* 167–168: "Unending free activity in us arises through our inability to attain and know an absolute. This absolute that is given to us can only be known negatively, insofar as we act and find that what we seek cannot be attained through action. This could be called an absolute postulate. All searching for a single principle would be like the attempt to square the circle. / Perpetual motion. Philosophers' stone. / (Negative knowledge)"

²³ Cf. Frank, *Einführung* 264–265.

²⁴ NS II, 112, *FSt* #14: »Was die Reflexion findet, scheint schon da zu seyn – Eigenschaft eines freyen Actus;« cf. Novalis (*Fichte* 12): "What reflection finds, appears already to be there – a property of a free act."

²⁵ NS II, 142, *FSt* #63; Novalis, *Fichte* 40: "The image is always the inversion of Being. What is to the right of the person is to the left in the image." This is similar in NS II, 153, *FSt* #107, quoting Novalis (*Fichte* 50); cf. also Frank, *Einführung* 253.

²⁶ NS III, 685, *Fragmente und Studien* 1799–1800 [FS], #671.

²⁷ NS III, 650, *FSt* #553: »Poësie ist Darstellung des Gemüths – der innern Welt in ihrer Gesamtheit;« similarly in NS II, 283, #637.

²⁸ *Blüthenstaub* (Ätheum, I, May 1798) [Bl], #109. NS II, 461.

²⁹ Cf. Helfer, 83–84.

³⁰ The number beside the sign *Hymns to the Night* [HN] refers to individual hymns. Cf. HN #2: »aber zeitlos und raumlos ist der Nacht Herrschaft.«

³¹ Allgemeines Brouillon [AB], #342. »Poësie der Nacht und Dämmerung« NS III, 302.

³² Cf. Frank, *Der kommende* 21–22, 245–342.

³³ NS II, 545, *Vorarbeiten zu verschiedenen Fragmentsammlungen* [VF], #105. Cf. also NS II, 568, VF #207, NS II, 575, VF #230; NS II, 590, #278: Novalis does not use the notion of romanticizing here, but he discusses exactly this process. Cf. also NS II, 685, FSt #688 and NS II, 650, FSt #533, where Novalis discusses poetry as a *Darstellung* of the inner world in its wholeness: »Poësie ist Darstellung des Gemüths – der Innern Welt in ihrer Gesamtheit.«

³⁴ Mystical death means the death of everything that stands between the soul and godhead; for the mystics, kenosis is the necessary condition for the complete cognition of god.

³⁵ Novalis II, 374, *Hemsterhuis-Studien* (1797) [HSt], #35.

³⁶ On the analogy of death and sleep cf. NS II, 622, VF #442. Death-sleep has an invigorating or refreshing effect. With this Novalis alludes to real life, to the realization of the whole self, which becomes realized in the death-sleep of the self-mask.

³⁷ HN #3: »Es war der erste, einzige Traum – und erst seitdem fühl ich ewigen, unwandelbaren Glauben an den Himmel der Nacht und sein Licht, die Geliebte.« The daughter of the Night here is obviously Sophia as Wisdom; this is also the adequate consequence of the thought in HSt #35 about self-execution as a real philosophical act, which enables true *philosophia*, or love of wisdom.

³⁸ I owe all of this to Frank's analyses; cf. Frank, *Der kommende* 17–21.

³⁹ It is to this brotherhood that the secret adoption of the first person plural in HN #6 refers. It serves Novalis to appeal to the realization of the holistic ideal not only at the level of an individual but also at the level of human society/state, nature and cosmos as an "organism." On the influence of *Naturphilosophie* on early German Romanticism, cf. Beiser (*The Romantic*). However, could poetry as a public state religion still be poetry with an esthetic purpose? The question is not directly connected to the problem I discuss in the essay; in a rough way, the theoretical directions are given by Jauss in *Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics*, when he discusses the ideological conquest of the esthetic experience.

⁴⁰ The story is provided by Frank, *Der kommende* 17–21. For Nonnus' story about Dionysus-Zagreus, cf. Vrečko 184–185.

⁴¹ The parts of HN (especially HN #1–#3) that discuss the divine passage into the night, sleep, the underground, are devoted to this.

⁴² HN #5: »unter Hellas heiterm Himmel geboren, kam ein Sänger nach Palestina und ergab sein ganzes Herz dem Wunderkinde.«

⁴³ Frank, *Der kommende*, 9–10.

⁴⁴ HN #5: »Unerschöpfliche Worte ... fielen wie Funken eines göttlichen Geistes von seinen freundlichen Lippen.«

⁴⁵ FSt #555 and #566.

⁴⁶ NS I, 151, HN #5: »Zur Hochzeit ruft der Tod – / Die Lampen brennen helle – / Die Jungfrauen sind zur Stelle – / Um Oel ist keine Noth – / Erklänge doch die Ferne / Von deinem Zuge schon, / Und ruften uns die Sterne / Mit Menschenzug' und Ton« ("Death summons to the wedding, / The lamps burn brightly – / The virgins stand in place – / There's no need for oil – / If the distance would only sound / With your procession – / And the stars would only call to us / With human tongues and tone"). The references to death and the wedding night in the quote and the last stanza of HN #5 must be read in relation to NS I, 133, HN #1: »du hast die Nacht mir zum Leben verkündet – mich zum Menschen gemacht – zehre mit Geisterglut meinen Leib, daß ich luftig mit dir inniger mich mische und dann ewig die Brautnacht währte« ("you called the Night to life for me, – humanized me – tear my body with spirit fire, so I can mix with you more inwardly, airily, and then the wedding night will last forever).

⁴⁷ NS I, 157, HN #6: »Hinunter zu der süßen Braut, / Zu Jesus, dem Geliebten – / Getrost, die Abenddämmerung graut/ Den Liebenden, Betrübten. / Ein Traum bricht unsre Banden los/ Und senkt uns in des Vaters Schoß« (“Down now to the sweet bride, on / To Jesus, to the beloved – Comfort, evening’s darkling greys / To the loving, to the grieving. / A dream will break our fetters off, / And sink us forever in our Father’s lap”).

⁴⁸ Here Novalis adopts Fichte’s comprehension of oscillation but he reinterprets it and transfers it to the field of artistic creation, which helps him to overcome some mistaken elements in Fichte’s thought. Cf. Novalis, *Opera* 452, with an essay by Moretti.

⁴⁹ Synonyms for oscillation are also metaphors linked to the flow, flux. Cf. NS II, 575–76, VF, #231, where life is referred to as a stream (*Strom*). In NS II, 621, VF #441 poetry is referred to also as a *flowing soul* (*eine flüssige Seele*).

⁵⁰ The addition is very important. With such a negatively given One, the absolute and whole self is accessible to itself even before the positioning act of the reflexive conscience. This “wholeness” is accessible through “feeling” – or pre-reflexively, in the *Vertrautheit* with itself, as Manfred Frank would put it. It is in this shift from ocular metaphors that Novalis essentially differs from Fichte. From this point of view, it would be possible to criticize Helfer, who insists that Novalis’ theory *Darstellung* preserves ocular metaphors and does not shift at all from Fichte’s *Schweben*; cf. Helfer 113–114.

⁵¹ On the spiritual time of poetry, cf. *Blüthenstaub* in NS II, 461, Bl #109.

⁵² NS II, 535, VF #43; NS II, 536, #47 and #48. Here we can find the definition of transcendental poetry as organic poetry: Such poetry thus realizes a wholeness, an organism. Indirectly NS II, 533 and VF #32 also refer to transcendental poetry: »Wenn der Philosoph nur alles ordnet, alles stellt, so löbte der Dichter alle Bande auf« (“While the philosopher limits himself to editing and arranging, the poet unveils each bond”). The same also applies for NS II, 534, VF #40; NS II, 535, VF #42; NS II, 581, #242, 30–36.

⁵³ With this Novalis anticipates Iser’s conclusion that the constitution of the meaning of the text reflexively also works as a constitution of the subject, in which the inaccessible contents of subjectivity are also shown on the surface; cf. Iser, 157–159.

⁵⁴ NS II, 533, VF #31.

⁵⁵ NS III, 302, AB #342. In this fragment Novalis applies Nicholas of Cusa’s *docta ignorantia* to the realization of the absolute self, thus transforming negative theology into the poetry of night. The difference between mystical and poetic negative cognition of the wholeness is hermeneutic; it is roughly described by the opposition between the super-essential (*hyperousios*) and the absolute self.

⁵⁶ Cf., e.g., Haywood 52–77. For more on this topic, cf. Helfer 194, fn. 16.

⁵⁷ Here I would like to recall again the definition of poetry as a fluid soul, which could be used to become inebriated; cf. NS II, 621, VF #441.

⁵⁸ Helfer points out that *Klingsohr’s story* is both prophetic *Darstellung* and necessary *Darstellung* (Helfer 92–93) because it announces the realization of the truth in the second part of Heinrich von Ofterdingen, where each thing represents itself (Helfer 103). The extension of prophetic *Darstellung* can also be found in the *Hymns*.

⁵⁹ This potion is announced by both the first and the second hymn; cf. NS I, 131, HN #1: »Hast auch du ein Gefallen an uns, dunkle Nacht?... Köstlicher Balsam träuft aus deiner Hand, aus dem Bündel Mohn« (“Do you stupefy us too, dark night?... Stupefying balsam is dropping off your hand, off the bunch of poppies;” cf. NS I, 133, HN #2: »Sie fühlen dich nicht in der goldenen Flut der Trauben – in des Mandelbaums Wunderöl, und dem braunen Saft des Mohns« (They don’t feel you in the grapes’ golden flood – in almonds’ wonder oil – in poppies’ brown juice”). NS

I, 137 and 139, *HN* #4 reads as follows: »Trägt nicht alles, was uns begeistert, die Farbe der Nacht?... Noch wenig Zeiten, / So bin ich los, / und liege trunken / Der Lieb' im Schoß. /... / O! sauge, Geliebter / Gewaltig mich an, / Daß ich entschlummern / Und liebe kann./ Ich fühle des Todes / Verjüngende Flut, / Zu Balsam und Äther/ Verwindelt mein Blut« (Doesn't all that inspires us wear the colors of the Night? /... / For ever so little time / I have been free, / And lie drunk / In Love's lap. /... / O! Breathe me, Love / Ravish me, / So I can pass on to sleep / And to love. / I feel death's / Renovating tide / Transform my blood / To balm and ether”).

⁶⁰ “but what became holy through the touch of love, that runs freed through hidden channels where it, like breezes, mixes with loves that have passed on to sleep;” cf. also *NS* I, 137, *HN* #4.

⁶¹ On this Ricoeur and LaCocque 263–303, 235–363.

⁶² Here we have a net of references that weaves a bond between the golden juice of the grapes (*HN* #2), Dionysus (*ein Gott in den Trauben*, *NS* I, 143, *HN* #5), and the liturgical celebration with the blood of Christ in the act of donation of the heart to the child-Jesus (*NS* I, 147, *HN* #5).

⁶³ *HN* #5: “The love is freely given, / There's no dividing left. / The whole life billows on / Like an endless sea. / Just one night of ecstasy – / An eternal poem – / and all our sun's / God's face;” cf. *NS* I, 153, *HN* #5.

⁶⁴ If we read Novalis' fragments as a uniform corpus the effect is similar: Novalis builds a thick net of analogies (the masks of One), by means of which the text or corpus of fragments becomes the connection of everything-in-One. A fragment for Novalis is the poetical form of philosophic thinking; it is a reproduction – a piece of dust, which draws attention to its incompleteness. However, in the instant when dust dies it becomes pollen: it starts the oscillation of imagination and an organism develops out of it – the blue flower of the sky; cf. *NS* III, 301, AB #339: “Alle Asche ist Blütenstaub – der Kelch ist der Himmel.”

⁶⁵ On the analysis of the regression of imagination in Kant, cf. Makkreel. Also, Helfer points out that Novalis' theory on negative *Darstellung* – the way he practically develops it in the *Hymns* on the basis of a previous reflection in *Fichte Studies* – is similar to the Kantian theory of the sublime: “the Hymns' ‘representation of the unrepresentable’ is an implicit instantiation of the negative *Darstellung* of the Kantian sublime poesy, a poesy of the Infinite...” (Helfer 116).

⁶⁶ On this cf. Kos 191–192.

⁶⁷ Cf. Čučnik 7–12.

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