239 Pr egledni znans tv eni članek/ Article (1.02) Bogoslovni vestnik/Theological Quarterly 84 (2024) 2, 239—252 Besedilo pr eje t o/R eceiv ed:05/2024; spr eje t o/ Accep t ed:06/2024 UDK/UDC: 177.61 DOI: 10.34291/B V2024/02/Bor s tner © 2024 Bor s tner e t al., CC B Y 4.0 Bojan Borstner and Jana Vrdoljak Addressing Agape in Relation to Humanity Obravnava agape v odnosu do človeštva Abstract : The paper e xplo r es the Chris tian notion of agape. The main thesis exa- mines ho w lo v e f or one’ s neighbour r e flects one’ s c ompr ehension of humanity and high ligh ts the limits of our under s t anding of humanity . Within the Chris ti- an tr adi tion, ag ape is portr a y ed as a neighbourly lo v e tha t tr anscends the so- cial mores or rules of conduct within a given society. In this paper, agape is situa t ed in the c ognitiv e theor y of emotions and is c onceiv ed as univ er sal hu- man love characterized by the preparedness to acknowledge the common sha- r ed humanity of f ellow human beings and the manif es t a tion of tha t acknowled- gement. The limits of our understanding of humanity will be illustrated throu- gh e x amples of epis t emic injus tice tha t demons tr a t e the f ailur e t o r ec ogniz e someone else’s humanity. Keywords : agape, neighbourly love, self-love, universality of love, humanity, epi- s t emic injus tice Povzetek : Prispe v ek se ukv arja s kr šč anskim pojmo v anjem ljube zni tipa agape. V okviru gla vne t e z e r azisk ujemo , k ak o ljube z en do bližnjeg a odr až a pojmo v anje člo v ečnos ti in hkr a ti tudi meje našeg a r az ume v anja člo v ečnos ti. Znotr aj kr šč an- ske tradicije je agape pr eds t a vljena k ot ljube z en do bližnjeg a, ki pr eseg a meje družbenih norm o zir oma pr a vil v edênja znotr aj določene družbe. Prispev ek agape umešč a v okvir k ognitivne t eorije čus t e v in jo r az ume k ot univ erz alno č lo v e šk o ljube z e n. Me je naše g a r az um e v anja č lo v e č nos ti so ponaz or je ne s pr i- meri, iz k a t erih je r az vidna empis t emična nepr a vičnos t, ki izr až a neuspeh v pr epo zna v anju člo v ečnos ti drug eg a. Ključne besede: agape , ljube z en do bližnjeg a, ljube z en do sebe, univ erz alnos t lju- be zni, člo v ečnos t, epis t emična nepr a vičnos t 240 Bogoslovni vestnik 84 (2024) • 2 1. Introduction “ One c an be a br other only in some thing. Wher e ther e is no tie tha t binds men, men are not united, but merely lined up.” Antoine de Saint-Exupery The basic pr emise of our discussion a ffirms Die trich v on Hildebr and’ s position tha t e v e r y positi v e appr oach t o another per son as a per son c on t ains an elemen t of l o v e (V on Hi l d ebr and 1971). Our f oc al p oi n t wi l l b e th e n otio n of agape, agapi- sm, and the applicability of agape in a broader context that transcends religious c ommunities and r eaches soci e ty . Discussing the univ er sality of lo v e, the notion of solidarity , under s t ood as “ our r ec ognition of one another ’ s c ommon humanity ” (R orty 1989, 189), c annot be o v erlook ed. The article aims t o illus tr a t e tha t agape, or univ er sal lo v e, enables the r ec ognition of another ’ s c ommon humanity . Solida- rity is thus under s t ood as a manif es t a tion of tha t r ec ognition, f os t ering a sense of belonging and mutual support among individuals. Agape i s th e Ch ri s tian n o tio n of lo v e, which de fines the r ela tionship be tw een God and hum anity and be tw een human bei ngs. It i s c oncei v ed as uni v er sal l o v e, as nei ghbourl y l o v e i s not sel ecti- v e and applie s t o e v e r y hum an (W olt e r s t or ff 2 01 5). Lo v e t o w ar d one ’ s ne ig hbour r e flects one’ s under s t anding of humanity and, borr o wing fr om Raimond Gait a’ s (2000) t erminology , highligh ts the limits of one’ s c ompr ehension of wha t it means t o be human. F or Gait a, only (unc onditional) lo v e c an r ec ognise and a ffirm the intrinsic worth of every individual, a quality inherent to them by virtue of their e xis t ence. This in trinsic w orth is not c on ting en t upon e x t ernal f act or s but e xis ts simply by being human. In this respect, Gaita’s account of humanity closely aligns with the ag apeis tic belie f in the in trinsic v alue of e v er y human being. Furthermore, agape pla y s a crucial r ole in addr essing epis t emic injus tice. B y pr omoting an inclusiv e under s t anding of humanity , agape encourages recognising and v alida ting div er se per spectiv es. Situa ting epis t emic injus tice within the lar g er fr ame w ork of social injus tice, Mir anda Frick er (2007) iden tifies t es timonial and hermeneutic al injus tices as f orms of harm in flict ed on individuals’ kno wledg e and under s t anding due t o pr ejudices and s tructur al biases. The se v erity of the in flict ed harm becomes evident only when it is recognised that the capacity for knowledge is a dis tinct human tr ait: “ An y epis t emic injus tice wr ongs someone in their c apa- city as a subject of kno wledg e, and thus in a c apacity essen tial t o human v alue. ” (Frick er 2007, 5) This means tha t when someone e xperiences epis t emic injus tice, it a ff ects not only their unde r s t anding but also their v alue as a pe r son. A pe r son’ s inherent worth and dignity are thus compromised. Through agape, w e c an challen g e and er adic a t e these injus tices b y pr omoting an epis t emic en vir onmen t tha t v alues e v er y one’ s per spectiv es and ackno wledg es the experiences of marginalised groups. Agape’s emphasis on humanity encou- r ag es us t o r e flect on our shar ed e xis t ence and the r esponsibilities tha t arise fr om it. It highlights how all people are interconnected and how our everyday expe- riences and in t er actions enhance our humanity . 241 Bojan Borstner et al. - Addressing Agape in Relation to Humanity 2. Agape as Ethical Love Across Traditions Chris tians hold tha t human r ela tions ar e c onnect ed and dependen t on r eligious be- liefs, although the principle of neighbourly love has not always been constructed as unique t o r eligious e thics (Outk a 1976). The c onnection t o the Golden Rule, which is neither e x clusiv ely Chris tian nor r eligious but f ound in some f orm in almos t ev ery e thic al tr adition, c an be made (Blackburn 2001). Usually , ag apism is placed within the domain of virtue e thics, e v en though e thicis ts ha v e not sho wn signific an t in- terest in the ethics of love. One reason is the founding texts’ religious rather than philosophic al na tur e. This is wh y ag apism is oft en pr esen t ed as e thics f or Chris tians and not as univ er sal e thics (W olt er s t orff 2015). Fr ank ena, in his Ethics, places aga- pism within the utilit arian or deon t ologic al domains, under s t anding it as the rule of lov e fr om which the principle of bene v olence (doing g ood) is deriv ed. He ar gues tha t this principle c an be jus tified independen tly of r eligious belie f s and c an be su- pplemen t ed by principles of dis tributiv e jus tice or equality (Fr ank ena 1973). Outk a agrees with Frankena but adds that conceiving benevolence as encouraging good actions and a v oiding harm “ does not e xhaus t wha t ag ape has mean t f or man y in r eligious c on t e xts” (Outk a 1976, 190). Fr ank ena’ s position is ne v ertheless essen tial for our present discussion, as we will defend agapism in a form acceptable to religi- ous and non-religious individuals. According to agapism, seeking someone’s good means pr omoting another ’ s w ell-being as an end in itself . Although agape highlights the universality of love as revealed in neighbourly lo v e, the t erm t oda y is mainly used in the Pr ot es t an t tr adition. Ca tholics ar e mor e inclined to use the term caritas, which c an lead t o ambiguitie s due t o its associa- tion with charity w ork. Some Ca tholic philosopher s, lik e Pieper , V on Hildebr and, and Ortega y Gasset, prefer the term love, aligning with other non-religious phi- losophers. Our discussion considers philosophers’ usage of these terms with an emphasis on the universal meaning of love. Despite the tendency for a precise, transparent term that denotes perfect love – the lov e of God – the ev olution of its meaning , influenced by v arious think er s, has been inevit able. St. Augus tine br ough t ag ape close t o Pla t o’ s lov e of Beauty , “which in v olv es an er otic passion, a w e, and desir e tha t tr anscends earthly c ar es and obstacles. Aquinas, on the other hand, picked up on the Aristotelian theories of friendship and lov e t o pr oclaim God as the mos t r a tional being and hence the mos t deser ving of one’ s lov e, r espect and c onsider a tion. ” (Moseley 2024) This inclina tion t ow ar d delimit a tion lik ely peak ed with Ny gr en’ s sev er e polarisa tion betw een ag ape and er os, leading t o irr ec oncilable e x clusion; now ada y s, the tr end is t ow ar d mor e inclusive conceptions (Str es 2018). Ag apis ts toda y incorpor at e v arious aspects of er os and philia in their philosophical or theological accounts of ag ape (W olt er s torff 2015). 3. Agape: From God to Human and Back to God The literature on agape is abundant. The 20 th century was especially marked by vivid discussions on ag apism, classified as a mov emen t c alled modern da y ag apism 242 Bogoslovni vestnik 84 (2024) • 2 (W olt er s t orff 2015). Ny gr en, one of the mos t fr equen tly cit ed ag apis ts, jux t aposes ag ape t o the Pla t onic c onception of er os in his f amous book Agape and Eros. In his w ork, he c ap tur es the essence of ag ape, s t a ting: “ All lo v e tha t has an y righ t t o be c alled Ag ape is nothing else bu t an outflo w fr om the Divine lo v e. It has its sour ce in God. ‘ God is Ag ape. ’ /…/ Ag ape is a lo v e tha t descends fr eely and g ener ously , gi- ving of its super abundance. ” (Ny gr en 1951, 212) Agape is de fined as spon t aneous and unmotiv a t ed, meaning it is not dir ect ed t ow ar d the righ t eous or t ow ar d those who deser v e it. It is cr ea tiv e in tha t it does not r ec ognise the v alue but cr ea t es it. Ny gr en’ s emphasis on the unm otiv a t ed and g ener ous na tur e of ag ape, which is bl ind t o the v alue of the object, is a r eason f or Soble (1990) t o r eject the c on- cep t of lo v e in the ag apeic tr adition; tha t agape is not r a tiona lly c ompr ehensible because it does not respond to the value of its object. Instead, he proposes his o wn acc oun t of er otic, which is r eason-dependen t and v alue-r esponding. He ri- ghtly presupposes that “people preferred to love, and to be loved, on the basis of a ttr activ e pr operties” (Soble 1990, 18). W e w an t t o be lov ed f or a r eason, worthy of love, and worthy of God’s love. The dis tinction Ny gr en made be tw een ag ape and er os is unsurmoun t able. Aga- pe is an una tt ainable ideal. D´Ar cy made this poin t clear: “ God is Agape. There is nothing human or per sonal /… / nor c an be on this in t erpr e t a tion. In the elimina- tion of Eros man has been elimina t ed. ” (D´Ar cy 1947, 71) P ope Benedict XVI r ec onciles the t ension be tw een ag ape and er os in his en- cy clic al le tt er “Deus Carit as Es t ” . God´s lo v e t o w ar d us is not only giving but also sear ching: “Love embraces the whole of existence in each of its dimensions, including the dimension of time. It c ould har dly be other wise, since its pr omise lo- ok s t ow ar ds its de finitiv e g oal: lo v e look s t o the e t ernal. Lo v e is indeed ‘ ecs t as y ’ , not in the sense of a momen t of in t o xic a tion, but r a ther as a jo- urney, an ongoing exodus out of the closed inward-looking self towards its liber a tion thr ough self -giving. ” (Benedict XVI, 2005) In line with Pieper (1997), w e c ould sum up these v arious e xpr essions in the f ollo wing de finition of lo v e: “ T o lo v e means t o be inclined t o r ejoice in the per- f ection, in the g oodness or in the happiness of another . ” 4. Love as an Emotion This pr eliminar y de finition is not f ar a w a y fr om K an t ’ s position of lo v e as a ma tt er of fulfilmen t and not of duty – necessit a tion: “Wha t is done fr om c ons tr ain t, how e- v er , is not done fr om lo v e. ” (K an t 1991, 203) On the one hand, K an t belie v es tha t e thi c al r easoni ng shou l d n ot i n v o l v e emotion s b ec au se th e y ar e n ot c on tr ol l abl e, as if w e w er e passiv e bear er s of its whims. K an t ’ s notion of emotions is v ery similar t o the St oic’ s notion of emotions, which Nussbaum succinctly describes as: “Lik e 243 Bojan Borstner et al. - Addressing Agape in Relation to Humanity the gusts of wind or the currents of the sea, they move, and move the person, but ob tusely , without vision of an object or belie f s about it. ” (Nussbaum 2001, 24–25). On the other hand, K an t belie v es tha t emotions should be s triv ed f or . Ho w is it possible to strive for something one cannot control? This seems to be a contra- diction, but K an t off er s an e xplana tion. Fir s t, he sa y s tha t lov e is w orth the s trug gle bec ause it is g ood. Sec ond, the fulfilmen t of duty t o w ar ds one’ s neighbour cr ea t es l o v e: “/…/ Do g ood t o y our f ello w man, and y our bene ficence wi ll pr oduce l o v e of man in y ou. ” (K an t 1991, 203) It is as though emotions ar e ne v ertheless pr e- dictable and, under certain circumstances, “producible”. In this case, benevolent c onduct is a f ertile gr ound f or lo v e t o t ak e place. Wh a t, th en , ar e emo ti o n s ? T h e s ci en ti fi c c o mmu n i ty h as n o u n i v er s al l y accep- t ed de finition of emotions (Sc ar an tino and de Sousa 2021). Ho w e v er , w e c an sa y tha t the y ar e socially c ons tr uct e d me n t al s t a t e s. Emotions pla y a piv ot al and in- se par able r ole in a pe r son’ s lif e , e xpr e ssing the r e la tionship be tw e e n one se lf , the w orld, and the tr anscenden t (Cen t a 2018). T oda y , emotions ar e no long er s truc- tur ally opposed t o r eason (Sc ar an tino and de Sousa 2021). Nussbaum, in her analy sis of emotions, c omes t o the f ollo wing de finition: emo- tions ar e “in t ellig e n t r e sponse s t o the per cep tion of v alue ” (Nussbaum 2001, 1) and “the y ar e oft en c omple x belie f s about an in t en tional object ” (27–28). Emoti- ons link us to items we consider important for our well-being but do not fully c on tr ol. “ The emotion r ec or ds tha t sense of vulner ability and imperf ect c on tr ol. ” (43) Sin ce emotions e xpr ess the v alue and the import ance of an e x t ernal object in a person’s life, they should be part of ethical reasoning. “We cannot plausibly o mi t th em, o n ce w e ackn o wl ed g e th a t emo tio n s i n cl u d e i n th ei r c o n t en t j u d g e- men ts tha t c an be true or f alse, and g ood or bad guides t o e thic al choice. ” (1) 5. Neighbourly Love, Self-Love, and Selfishness F ollo wing the c ognitiv e theor y of emotions, lo v e is an e xpr ession of the object ’ s v alue. Pieper de v eloped the idea tha t lo v e is the a ffirma tion of the object and e x c it e m e n t o v e r it s e xis t e nc e w it h his a naly sis of t he c he e r : “H o w w onde r ful t ha t y ou e xis t! It ’ s g ood tha t y ou e xis t; it ’ s g ood tha t y ou ar e in this w orld! I w an t y ou t o e xis t!” (Pieper 1997) Ther e f or e, the belo v ed one is a chosen one. All this culmi- na t es in the r ec ognition of the v alue of the belo v ed object. Ho w e v er , speaking of the object’s value, the possibility of an object of no value quickly comes to mind. Pieper is a w ar e of this and ar gues tha t pr e f er en tial lo v e r e v eals the univ er sal cha- racter of love that expands toward all living beings. Kierkegaard 1 w as alr eady a w ar e of the pr oblem of pr e f er en tial lo v e tha t c on- tradicts neighbourly love, which is conceived as love that does not know any pre- 1 Kierk eg aar d’ s e thics is en tir ely God-orien t ed, and in this r eg ar d, his c oncep tion of lo v e t o w ar d one’ s neighbour is also shaped: “To love someone means to help them love God.” (Žalec 2016, 282) 244 Bogoslovni vestnik 84 (2024) • 2 ferences. Neighbourly love perceives everyone as equal – even ourselves. Accor- ding to Kierkegaard, love, as a mark of eternity, is unchangeable and devoid of emotions, which ar e subject ed t o chang e. Ther e f or e, ther e is no place f or sen ti- men t ality . Kierk eg aar d in tr oduces the notion of duty bec ause only duty secur es lov e ag ains t ev ery chang e (Kierk eg aar d 1949). Ther e is only one duty: t o lov e others as we love ourselves. Kierkegaard goes as far as to impose that one should give no preference, for example, to one’s spouse over one’s neighbour . As though equality is a tt ainable only if all the pr e f er ences and emotional a tt achmen ts in pe r sona l r e la tionship s ar e abolishe d. W olt e r s t or ff (2 0 1 5 , 3 6 ) be lie v e s t ha t “t he r e is some thing in humane about insis ting tha t w e mus t so r e f orm our na tur al lo v es that our love overall for any person is equal to that for any other”. Furthermore, Cady writ es tha t Kierk eg aar d’ s c oncep tion of lo v e “r equir es tha t individuals v o- luntarily give up their social and economic superiority if they desire to love God in acc or dance with the Chris tian ideal” (Cady 1982, 253). Kierk eg aar d has put so much e ff ort in t o jus tif ying his belie f tha t all men ar e equal, y e t he has a pr oblem demons tr a ting ho w lo v e manif es ts itself in this w or- ld. He e v en claims tha t the lif e of lo v e is hidden (Kierk eg aar d 1949, 7) and tha t it is absolut ely impossible t o know with cert ain ty if some deed is done out of selfless lo v e or if the r e is som e othe r hidde n m otiv e be ne a th it: “/…/ the r e is nothing , no ‘thus’ , about which it c an unc onditionally be said tha t it unc onditionally pr o v es the pr esence of lov e, or tha t it unc onditionally pr ov es tha t the lov e is not pr esen t. ” (12) Not e v en the self -sacrificia l aspect of lo v e leads t o w ar d the amelior a tion of inequalities in the w orld bec ause it is motiv a t ed b y the desir e t o c ome close t o God; or , as Cady (1982, 259–260) puts it: “f or Kierk eg aar d, self -sacrificial lo v e is not aimed a t f os t ering human solidarity; on the c on tr ar y , self -sacrifice es t ablishes the pr op er r ela tionship be tw een the self and God which occur s apart fr om c on- nections t o other humans. ” One of the reasons why Kierkegaard rigorously rejects any proof of the presen- ce of love in this world may be his suspicion that self-love is veiled in the garment of l o v e. F or Ki erk eg aar d and man y other s, sel f -lo v e i s denot ed as sel fish and, the- r e f or e, e thic ally unaccep t able or illegitima t e. The a w ar eness of the acquisitiv e human c ondition is tr oublesome f or man y ag apis ts. It m ak e s it e as y t o f all in t o a tr ap and c onde m n it as se lfishne ss. De spit e the a w ar eness of the sec ond gr ea t c ommandmen t ’ s a ffirma tion of self -lo v e as a giv en r eality of human na tur e, Barth insis ts tha t lo v e mus t ha v e someone else or some thing else t o lo v e: “Lo v e mus t alw a y s ha v e an opposit e, an object. It is only an il lusi on tha t w e c an be an object of lo v e t o our selv es. ” (Barth 1956, 388) Simi- larly, Frankfurt approached the issue of self-love and argued that to love anything a t al l , o n e mu s t fi r s t l o v e o n esel f . E v er y l o v e i s o b j ect -o ri en t ed [x l o v es y] (F r an- kfurt 2006, 86), y e t the discussion on self -lo v e r emains disput able: “It is one thing to say that the agent is unable to love others without loving himself, another that lo ving them is simply a w a y of lo ving himself . ” (Outk a 1976, 287) 245 Bojan Borstner et al. - Addressing Agape in Relation to Humanity 6. Agape as Love for Others The w e ll-be ing of ot he r s is a pr im e in t e r e s t of ag a pism . Out k a (1 9 7 6 , 2 1 4 ) de sc r i- bes neighbourly lo v e as f ollo w s: Iden tific a tion with the in t er es ts of another , r eg ar dless of their a ttr activ eness or wha t the y ha v e t o off er , and independen t of the r ecipr ocity of the r ela tionship. A par ticular se nse of mutuality as shar e d me aning within a c on t e x t of c ommu- nal intelligibility. Outk a’ s in t erpr e t a tion of agape as a type of lo v e tha t is indiff er en t t o the v alue of its obje ct and inde pe nde n t of r e cipr ocity is r oot e d in the ag ape ic tr adition. A similar poin t is made b y W olt er s t orff (2015, 23), who s t a t es tha t neighbourly lo v e “is not about the obje ct of lo v e (ne ighbour ), but a spe cial k ind of lo v e ” . F ollo wing Outk a, he de fin es agape as care, adding that benevolence is not an appropriate t erm bec ause its c on t empor ar y meaning o v erlook s the r equir emen ts of jus tice. On the other hand, care incorporates respect for the recipient and does no wrong t o an y one. “Car e c ombines seeking t o enhance someone’ s flourishing with see- king to secure their just treatment,” but it should not be understood as merely pr o viding f or someone’ s needs (101). Mer ely thinking about or desiring a per son’ s w ell-being is insufficien t f or it t o be c onsider ed c ar e. The success or f ailur e of pr o- moting a per son’ s g ood is also irr ele v an t. It ma y seem s tr ang e t o assert tha t the e nd r e sult doe s not m a tt e r , but fr om a de on t olog ic a l pe r s pe c tiv e , t his holds t r ue . A per son’ s e ff ort t o pr omot e another ’ s g ood ma y f ail f or tw o r easons: either all a tt emp ts ar e ine ff ectiv e, or the a tt emp ts pr oduce un w an t ed or e v en adv er se e f- f ects. Wh a t ma tt er s i s “ actin g ” : “ On l y i f o n e actu al l y seek s t o h er g o o d o r seek s her righ t is one c aring about the per son. ” (103) Caring is not a passiv e deliber a ti- o n b u t an activ e en g ag emen t f o r th e g o o d o f a p er s o n , wh i ch ma y n o t yi el d th e an ticipa t ed r esults. W olt er s t orff in tr oduces his acc oun t of c ar e-ag apism, acc omp anied b y a se t of rules tha t enable activ e c oncern f or another ’ s w ell-being while adhering t o the r equir emen ts of jus tice. A ques tion arises r eg ar ding the accep t ability of the rules, particularly with the thir d rule, wher e W olt er s t orff a tt emp ts t o jus tif y imposing evil on someone without wrongdoing them morally. Is this even possible? We be lie v e it is not. He se e ms t o ack no wle dg e this, as he wr ot e an additional r emark c alled the A ttitudinal c or ollar y: “ One is ne v er t o t ak e deligh t in imposing e vil (di- minution in flourishing) on someone; when necessar y t o do so , one is t o do so with r eg r e t ” (130). The c on fus ion arises with the ques tion of necessity . When is it necessar y t o impose e vil? Does necessity imply mor al jus tific a tion? Additional- ly, what role does the feeling of regret play in following this rule? It certainly does not mitig a t e the e vil done. The mer e f eeling of r egr e t arises fr om the r ealisa tion that evil has occurred. If not anyone else, then at the very least, the evildoer expe- riences r egr e t, which harms themselv es (if not other s) bec ause of a guilty c onsci- ence. Thus, the diminution of flourishing is imposed on a t leas t oneself (if not other s). Ag apeic lo v e c ould not jus tif y e vil. It w ould jus t not be lo v e an ymor e. 246 Bogoslovni vestnik 84 (2024) • 2 7. Wrongdoing, Evil and the Role of Remorse Most ethicists and ordinary people believe that wrongfulness is a fundamental aspect of an e vil action. It appear s tha t f or an action t o be c onsider ed e vil, it mus t a t leas t be wr ong. Ho w e v er , this per spectiv e is, due t o a v arie ty of r easons, not univ er sally agr eed upon (Calder 2022). Some under s t and it mer ely as a “ se v er e degr ee of mor al c ondemna tion” (Gait a 2004, 11). Some e thicis ts w ould lik e t o r eplace it with a mor e g ener al e xpr ession, fr ee of r eligious c onnot a tions. Other s understand it as a basic and unavoidable category that is intrinsically linked to a specific notion of g oodness (11). Gait a’ s c oncep tion of e vil “ depends on a sense of the preciousness of human life transformed by the love of saints” and “requires a c oncep tion of pr eciousness viola t ed” (XXV). The w or d “pr eciousness” denot es a quality similar to “sacred” in a religious context, emphasising the importance of the sain tly lo v e tha t r e v eals the inher en t w orth of e v er y human being (XXV). Only sain tly lo v e c an r ec ognise and tr ea t those who ar e a fflict ed, such as per sons with severe mental illness or the most monstrous murderers, with dignity, respect and without condescension. It is only through saintly love that their complete humani- ty c an be a ffirmed. (Gait a 2000). In the Pr e f ace of A Common Humanity, he writ es: “ Although I fully ackno wledg e tha t it is our r eligious tr adition tha t has spo- k en mos t simply (and perhap s mos t deeply) about this when it declar ed th a t al l h u man b ei n gs ar e sacr ed , I thi n k th a t th e c o n cep tion of th e i n d i- viduality I ha v e be en articula ting /…/ c an s t and inde pe nde n tly of spe cula- tion about superna tur al en tities. Wha t gr ew and w as nourished in one place, I sa y , migh t t ak e r oot and flourish else wher e. ” (2000, XX) The understanding of the essence of human existence can be deepened by re- ligious beliefs, but it does not necessarily have to rely on belief in supernatural en tities. Th e c oncep t of the sanctity of hu man l i f e c an be meani n gfu l an d ap pl i- cable in various contexts. Evil is most clearly evident in remorse, which is an unwelcome companion in human liv es; f or Gait a, 2 it is the mos t lucid r ec ognition of wr onging someone, though it is not the only way evil manifests. “My God, what have I done? How could I have done it? Those are typical accents of remorse. They do not express an emotional r eaction t o wha t one has done, but a pained, be wilder ed – or per- hap s be tt er , inc r edulous – r ealisa tion of the full meaning of wha t one has done. ” (Gait a 2004, XXI) “My God, what have I done?” is a cry of pain and anxiety, a poignant expressi- on of shame ful c on fr on t a tion with the pr of ound r ealisa tion tha t one has c aused harm to others. There are no words to console a repentant person in that moment. Ne v ertheless, Gait a off er s a f e w sar c as tic self -r epr oaches: I have violated the social contract agreed behind the veil of ignorance. 2 F or further e xplana tion of cert ain aspects of Gait a’ s position on emotions, epis t emic, and mor al virtues, see Str aho vnik 2016; 2018. 247 Bojan Borstner et al. - Addressing Agape in Relation to Humanity - I ha v e ruined m y bes t chances of flourishing. - I ha v e viola t ed the r a tional na tur e of another . - I have diminished the stock of happiness. - I ha v e viola t ed m y fr eely chosen principles (2000, XXI). Gait a highligh ts a c ommon fla w in major e thic al theories with these cynic al r e- sponses. Oft en rule- or principle-orien t ed, these theories emphasise f eelings of guilt only when ther e is a viola tion of the mor al c ode . The y fr equen tly o v erlook “the individual who has been wronged and who haunts the wrongdoer in his re- mor se ” (XXIII), f ailing t o r e c og nise the in tr insic w or th of indiv iduals. In c on tr as t, remorse represents a person-centred form of moral insight that reveals not just the wr ongness of the act but also its impact on the in trinsic v alue of the a ff ect ed person. R emor se is not mer ely an enc oun t er with ethic al r eality; it embodies the Socr a tic r eality of e vil (62). This Socr a tic per spectiv e sug g es ts tha t if w e truly under s t and what evil is, we cannot commit it, as doing so would have profound consequences on our sense of self . Gait a under sc or es this in tr ospectiv e dilemma with the self -e x a- mining ques tion: “ Wha t bec omes of us when w e do it? ” (62). The Socr a tic e thic al ideal, which posits tha t it is pr e f er able t o suff er e vil than t o c ommit it (Pla t o 1997, 816), closely aligns with Chris tian e thics, which acknowledg es the pot en tial f or e vil within us. We are aware of our capacity to commit evil and aspire to be free from it, unbur dened b y its w eigh t. As e xpr essed b y W eil: “ W e ar e all c onscious of e vil within our selv es; w e all ha v e a horr or of it and w an t t o g e t rid of it. Outside our sel- v es, w e per ceiv e evil in tw o dis tinct f orms: suff ering and sin. But in our f eeling about our own na tur e the dis tinction no long er appear s, e x cept abs tr actly or thr ough r e- flection” (W eil 1951, 189). W eil’ s acknowledg emen t of our pot en tial f or evil and our r ejection of it r esona t es with Gait a’ s emphasis on r emor se. The ability to recognise evil demonstrates the limits of our understanding of wha t it means t o be a human being. Mor eo v er , an y a ttitude tha t c on v e y s c onde- scension lack s, in his vie w , the r ec ognition of the other per son’ s humanity . 3 8. Humanity and Epistemic Injustice Humanity is fundamentally grounded in recognising and respecting each individual’ s in trinsic w orth and dignity . In this c on t e x t, epis t emic injus tice under- mines this r ec ognition by mar ginalising or dismissing people’ s knowledg e and experiences, denying them their full human value. Epis t emic injus tice is situa t ed within the br oader fr ame w ork of social injus tice. It concerns one group’s control, power, and dominance over another. Miranda Frick er under s t ands social po w er as the c apacity t o c on tr ol the actions of other s, which c an be e x er cised either activ ely or passiv ely by specific social ag en ts or 3 In th i s r eg ar d , S w an t o n ( 2010) w o u l d agr ee wi th h i m, as sh e c o n tr as ts gr ace ( c o n cei v ed as a vi rtu e o f univ er sal lo v e) with c ondescension. 248 Bogoslovni vestnik 84 (2024) • 2 s tructur ally (Frick er 2007, 13). E v er y ins t ance of epis t emic injus tice wr ongs some- one in their c apacity as a kno w er and, c onsequen tly , in a c apacity tha t is essen ti- al t o their huma n w orth (5). Essen tially , it is an injus tice done t o someone e xpli- citly based on their ability as a kno w er or in f orman t (1). Epis t emic injus tice de- grades and deprives a person of dignity, which can be understood as dehumani- sa tion. Ther e f or e, addr essing the issue of epis t emic injus tice is primarily an e thi- c al and only sec ondarily a politic al pr oblem (8). Frick er dis tinguishes be tw een t es timonial and hermeneutic al injus tice. T es ti- monial injus tice occur s when t es timon y is not accept ed as cr edible due t o the listener’s prejudice against the speaker. Fricker provides an example of racism in the poli ce f or ce , wher e a black per son’ s t es timon y is dismissed due t o their skin c olour . On the other hand, hermeneutic al injus tice occur s when someone is un- f ai rl y d i sad v an t ag ed d u e t o g ap s i n c ol l ectiv e i n t erp r e tiv e r esou r ces, wh i ch i mp e- de the under s t anding of cert ain social e xperiences. This f orm of injus tice r ela t es to how people interpret their lives. Fricker cites the example of a woman experi- encing se x ual har assmen t in a cultur e tha t lack s a c oncep t f or it (Frick er 2007, 1). The victim suff er s fr om some thing she c annot articula t e. 4 Jose Medina (2013) emphasises the import ance of c ollectiv e r esis t ance ag ains t epis t emic injus tice, adv oca ting f or a community -driv en appr oach tha t amplifies mar- ginalised v oices. R eg ar ding Frick er ’ s (2007, 159) account of a pur ely s tructur al notion of hermeneutical injus tice that ent ails no culprit, he s tr ongly disagr ees and highlights the import ance of individuals accepting c ollectiv e epis t emic r esponsibility . One not able e x ample of not only hermeneutic al injus tice but also of hermene- utic al her oism 5 is pr o vided b y Gait a (2000), who r ec oun ts his e xperience as a y o- ung man in the early 1960s w orking in a p s y chia tric hospit al. The arriv al of a nun and her beha viour t ow ar d the p s y chia tric pa tien ts not only pr of oundly mo v ed him but also in fluenced his per spectiv e on humanity . Some of the pa tien ts ther e w er e incurable and had lost everything that gives life meaning. Their nearest family member s had not visit ed them f or y ear s. The medic al per sonnel oft en tr ea t ed them brut ally . Only a f e w p s y chia tris ts s triv ed t o impr ov e pa tien ts’ c onditions, appealing t o the inalienable di gnity of those pa tien ts. He admir ed these doct or s, who were considered naïve and foolish in the eyes of their colleagues. That per- cep tion chang ed with the arriv al of a nun’ in the w ar d: “In her middle y ear s, only her viv acity made an impr ession on me un til she t alk e d t o the pa tie n ts. The n e v e r y thing in he r de me anour t o w ar ds the m – the w a y she spok e t o them, her f acial e xpr essions, the in fle xions of her 4 Str aho vnik (2018) pr o vides an e x ample fr om Slo v enia a ft er the WWII, wher e the killings and pr osecu- tions pr e v en t ed the victims and their r ela tiv es fr om being hear d or e xpr essing their e xperiences. These victims w er e, t o some e x t en t, “hermene utic ally mar ginalised” – “tha t is, the y participa t e unequally in the pr actices thr ough which social meanings ar e g ener a t ed” (Frick er 2007, 6). 5 Medina speak s of the import ance of hermeneutic al her oes as “ e xtr emely c our ag eous speak er s and lis t ener s who de f y w ell-en tr enched c ommunic a tiv e e xpect a tions and dominan t hermeneutic al per spec- tiv es, and ag ains t all odds ar e lucky enough t o chang e (or a t leas t disrup t) hermeneutic al tr ends as t o mak e r oom f or ne w meanings and in t erpr e t a tiv e pr actices” (Medina 2012, 111). 249 Bojan Borstner et al. - Addressing Agape in Relation to Humanity body – contrasted with and showed up the behaviour of those noble p s y chia tris ts. She sho w ed tha t the y w er e, despit e their bes t e ff orts, c on- descending , as I t oo had been. She ther eb y r e v ealed tha t e v en such pa ti- ents were, as the psychiatrists and I had sincerely and generously profes- sed, the equals of those who w an t ed t o help them; but she also r e v ealed tha t in our hearts w e did not belie v e this. ” (Gait a 2000, 18–19) The nun’s behaviour, which showed no trace of superiority or contempt, reve- aled tha t despit e their bes t e ff orts, Gait a’ s and his c olleagues’ a ttitudes t o w ar d the pa tien ts w er e c orrup t ed b y c ondescension. Ther e is no place f or c ondescen- sion in genuine human kindness, care, or other forms of love. Gaita does not know whether the fact that she was a nun was of any impor- t an ce. Wh a t w as essen tial f o r h i m w as h er b eh a vi o u r – l o v e i s th e o n l y b eh a vi o u r tha t has “the pow er t o r e v eal the true humanity of those whose a ffliction had made their humanity in visible” (20). Her lo ving disposition enabled her t o ackno- wledg e their humanity , challenging the pr e v ailing epis t emic injus tices arising fr om stereotypes and prejudices. This example shows how agape can counteract epi- s t emic injus tices and enc our ag e an en vir onmen t wher e mar ginalised v oices ar e validated and respected. Giv en tha t w e ha v e men tioned the inability t o r ec ognise and ackno wledg e the humanity of another, let us consider an extreme with the following example, whi- ch Gaita uses to illustrate the limits of our understanding of humanity – the case of Eichmann in Jerusalem. Could anybody recognise the humanity of a person gu- ilty of c ommitting a crime ag ains t humanity? Gait a is c on vinced tha t only sain tly love could achieve this. Regardless of the repulsiveness of the thought, recognising Eichmann’ s humanity does not diminish the horr or s of his actions. This under s t an- ding f or ces us t o c on fr on t unc om f ort able truths about our c apacities f or mor al f ailur e. On the other hand, Gait a w an ts t o assert tha t the v alua tion of human pr e- ciousness is based on the human ability to bond and is, therefore, only possible if solidarity and compassion are already present in the human community. 9. Universality of Love and the Freedom of Choice Gaita highlights the fallacy of the major ethical theories. Should they, therefore, be r eject ed, r earr ang ed, or r eplaced b y a diff er en t e thic al theor y? Iv an Illich of- f er s an in t er es ting per spectiv e on the t opic of lo v e in his r e fusal t o be e thic ally bound b y duty . He criticises an y a tt emp t t o use po w er , e v en f or socially jus tifiable r easons, t o arr ang e social r ela tions acc or ding t o the idea of a g ood socie ty . In his view, a duty toward one’s neighbour disables the possibility of an ever surprising and personal encounter with another human being. He delivers his exegesis of the Parable of the Good Samaritan to epitomise his account. The story originates from the New Testament, where the Pharisees come to Jesus t o ask him the f ollo wing ques tion: “ Who is m y neighbour? ” He ans w er ed 250 Bogoslovni vestnik 84 (2024) • 2 th em wi th th e w el l -kn o wn P ar ab l e o f th e Go o d S amari t an (L k 10:25-37). A man is travelling down Jericho and gets robbed on the way. He lies, beaten, at the side of the road. A priest comes by, and a Levite comes by as well. They both see him, but the y cr oss t o the other side of the r oad and c on tinue on their w a y . Then c o- mes a Samaritan, an outsider, a stranger, and, even worse, an enemy. He sees the wounded man, takes pity on him, cares for his wounds and brings him to an inn. Aft er finishing his s t or y , Jesus ask ed the lis t ener s: “ Who do y ou think w as a ne- ighbour to the wounded man?” They replied, “The one who had mercy on him.” Illich would respond, “The one who chose to be his neighbour.” A typ i c al i n t erp r e t a tio n i s f ar r emo v ed fr om th e fr eed o m of ch o i ce. S w an t on , for example, claims that “if an enemy or a criminal lies bleeding at one’s doorstep, a virtue of univ er sal lov e (basic human kindness or charity) r equir es tha t one c ome t o his aid and not, out of malice, ha tr ed, indiff er ence, or c allousness, lea v e him ther e bleeding ” (S w an t on 2010, 156). Illich w ould lik ely agr ee tha t helping a blee- ding person is an act of kindness or charity, but he would not want to regulate it, as it would lack the spontaneous, free, and personal interplay between people. Tha t is wh y he off er s a ne w per spectiv e on the s t or y: “My neighbour is who I cho- ose, not who I have to choose. There is no way of categorizing who my neighbour ough t t o be. ” (Ca yle y 2005, 81) Wha t is Illich willing t o sa y is tha t “ ough t ” c an be under s t ood onl y as an in vit a tion. Nothing c an guar an t ee tha t w e will r espond t o the in vit a tion. Not e v en s trict r egula tion c an ensur e w e will not look a w a y and neglect our “duty”. The analysis shows that the meaning of the concept of love is not determina- t ely giv en but is a subject of c ons t an t tr ans f orma tion. The aspects of diff er en t kinds of lo v e, such as r oman tic, pa t ernal, and neighbourly lo v e, ar e embodied in agape. Its man y la y er s enable each tr ans f orma tion t o highligh t the diff er en t cha- r act eris tics. Agape, or universal love, fundamentally recognises another human being’s worth and dignity. Gaita demonstrated that some quality in the object of love must be recognised as common humanity to be acknowledged. Therefore, we could say that agape or uni v er sal lo v e is a) a pr epar edness (in S w an t on’ s me- aning of the notion) t o ackno wledg e the shar ed humanity of another human be- ing and b) a manif es t a tion of tha t ackno wledg emen t. This ackno wledg emen t (be it c ar e or bene v olence) should not be withdr a wn based on other merits (such as virtue, a ttr activ eness, or a ff ection) or the lack ther eof in the object of lo v e. 10. Conclusion The notion of agape is understood as universal human love. Comparing agape with eros and philia demonstrates that agape does not exclude but encompasses all dimensions of human existence and should not be limited to a framework of God’ s lo v e f or humanity . One of the signific an t issues with the selfless na tur e of agape is its r ela tionship with self -lo v e, as addr essed in the Great Commandment. Ther e ar e theologians, such as Barth (1956), who find self -lo v e unaccep t able, whi- 251 Bojan Borstner et al. - Addressing Agape in Relation to Humanity le other s, lik e Kierk eg aar d (1949), jus tif y it within the c on t e x t of human equality . Fr a nk fur t (2 0 0 6 ) a r g ue s t ha t se lf -lo v e should be se e n a s a funda m e n t a l c ondition for the capacity to love others. Though agapists generally agree that agape should be understood as universal human lo v e, the y diff er in their de finition. S w an t on (2010) de fines univ er sal lo v e as a) a pr epar edness t o be bene ficen t and b) the actual manif es t a tion of bene fi- cence. W olt er s t orff (2015), on the other hand, de fines agape as c ar e – an activ e concern for the well-being of another person, which also considers the demands of jus tice. He appr oaches the ethics of lov e fr om a deon t ologic al per spectiv e, which Gait a (2000) criticises, along with other major e thic al theories, f or neglec- ting the notion of r emor se in their acc oun ts. Illich (2010; Ca yle y , 1992) t ak es a diff er en t appr oach: he r ejects the rules tha t impose oblig a tions and emphasises the essen tial elemen t of lo v e – fr eedom. Acc or ding t o his per spectiv e, the per- v er sion of the rules is e viden t in W olt er s t orff ’ s jus tific a tion of e vil, which is ar gu- ed t o be unjus tifiable. E vil is vie w ed as an una v oidable possibility or un w an t ed out c ome in r ela tionship s. Illich also discusses vulner ability , noting tha t the other ma y n o t r esp o n d t o a c al l o r accep t an i n vi t a tio n t o c on n ect wi th a s tr an g er . S i mi- larly, Cordner highlights the importance of vulnerability in genuine respect for other s: “No a ttitude of mine c an c oun t as g enuine r espect f or another unless I am pot en tially vuln er able be f or e him or her in cert ain w a y s. ” (Cor dner 2002, 158) In Gait a’ s vie w , the r ela tionship with a s tr ang er c an be under s t ood as an inability t o recognise and acknowledge shared humanity, which can be placed in a broader c on t e x t and ser v e as an e x ample of epis t emic injus tice, as e x t ensiv ely discussed by Fricker. The article discu ssed agape as ethical love, not merely as a personal virtue ca- pable of transcending the impersonal levels of ethical theories but also as a con- cep t tha t e xt ends be y ond individual mor ality t o activ ely participa t e in shaping and transforming society. References Barth, Karl. 1 9 5 6 . Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of the Word of God . V o l . 1 . Ed i n b r o u g h : T . & T . Clark. Benedict XVI. 20 0 5. 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