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Muslim Immigrants in Germany Challenge Integration

*Vprašljiva integracija muslimanskih
priseljencev v Nemčiji*

Abstract: Turkish workers who emigrated from their country to Germany could reunify with their families; and now their descendants live there as German citizens. During turmoils and wars in The Middle East, Africa and Bosnia and Herzegovina many people fled their countries and immigrated to Germany as refugees and asylum seekers. Most of the refugees were Muslim and they all built their own communities, mosques and businesses as Turks had done before. They are Muslims; however, they have different cultures, languages, and denominations. They have had differences among themselves, moreover after decades of living in Germany their successful integration is still a question. We present a historical overview of the integration of Muslims in Germany, discuss the reasons for its failure and highlight the fears that non-Muslims and Muslims face in an increasingly Muslim society. We argue that in the future, society will have to face these fears, not to suppress them, but to take them seriously and find ways to allay them and thus ensure peaceful coexistence between people of different worldviews in a Western multicultural society.

Keywords: migration crisis, Islamism, challenge integration, cultural security, Middle East

Povzetek: *Turški delavci, ki so iz svoje države emigrirali v Nemčijo, so se lahko ponovno združili s svojimi družinami, in danes njihovi potomci tam živijo kot nemški državljani. Med nemiri in vojnami na Bližnjem vzhodu, v Afriki ter Bosni in Hercegovini je veliko ljudi pobegnilo iz svojih držav in so kot begunci ter iskalci azila prispeli v Nemčijo. Večina teh beguncev je bila muslimanske veroizpovedi in vsi so si, tako kot prej Turki, ustvarili svoje skupnosti, mošeje in podjetja. So muslimani; vendar imajo različne kulture, jezike in veroizpovedi. Med njimi so razlike, poleg tega pa je tudi po desetletjih življenja v Nemčiji njihova uspešna integracija še vedno vprašljiva. Predstavljamo zgodovinski pregled integracije muslimanov v Nemčiji, razpravljamo o razlogih za njen neuspeh in izpostavljamo strahove, s katerimi se soočajo nemuslimani in muslimani v vse bolj muslimanski družbi. Zagovarjamo stališče, da se bo morala družba v prihodnosti soočiti s temi strahovi ne zato, da bi jih zatrla, temveč da bi jih vzela resno in poiskala načine, kako jih pomiriti ter tako zagotoviti mirno sobivanje med ljudmi različnih svetovnih nazorov v zahodni multikulturni družbi.*

Ključne besede: migracijska kriza, islamizem, izziv integracije, kulturna varnost, Bližnji vzhod

Introduction

This study intends to address some of the challenging issues regarding Muslims integration in Germany. Very often the reasons for problems of integration are not clearly understood. This incomplete understanding of problems involving integration may lead to the adoption of ineffective policies and practices that, in the long run, will harm the nation in general and the immigrants in particular. Therefore, we must have a clear understanding of this phenomenon. Such an understanding may help to better identify what kind of policies and practices should be pursued and the implications they may have for the society.

This study is divided into four sections. Section 1 states the hypothesis. Section 2 introduces and reviews the related literature, discusses immigration in general, provides information about social and economic conditions, analyses political Islam, and presents integration. Section 3 concludes and summarizes the policy ramifications of this study and its contribution to and its implications for future research. The method in this research is analytical and is based on information in books, immigrant-related journals, and the media analysis.

1 Hypothesis

The process of integrating Muslims into German society has partly failed, creating a climate of mistrust and fear, and leading to the conclusion that Islam's long-term goal is the conquest of the West. This conclusion, which must be taken seriously as it hinders the further process of integration, is the result of the following reasoning: Muslims social and economic deprivations by irrational racism together with acute dissimilarities of cultures and religious teachings of Islam and Christianity prepare the ground for representation of political Islam among radical and moderate Muslims. Muslims believe that Islam is universal, absolute, and perfect and they express its superiority. There are many denominations in Islam which each of them claims to be the genuine Islam following the path of the Prophet Muhammad. They all oppose each other, moreover, they have had a long history of severe fighting and quarrelling among themselves in Islamic countries to take political power. »It is very important to notice



that Islam and specially Shia is a Religion that aspires to grasp authority and governance anywhere the Muslims live, and their goal is to have a state governed by Islamic Sharia.« (Akhavan Azari and Osredkar 2022, 172) We have the essence of Ayatollah Khomeini's thought: »The fact that we are presently unable to establish a complete and comprehensive form of government does not mean that we should sit idle. Instead, we should perform to whatever extent we can, the tasks that are needed by the Muslims and that pertain to the function an Islamic Government must assume.« (Akhavan Azari and Osredkar 2022, 172) Islam is primarily divided into two main branches: Sunni and Shia. Within each of these branches, there are different legal schools of thought (madhabs) that define the methods of interpreting Islamic law. Additionally, Sufism is a spiritual and mystical tradition that exists within both Sunni and Shia Islam, but it is not a separate »sect«; rather, it is more of an approach to religious practice and spirituality. Additionally, Shi'ism can join other groups of Islam in Europe and Sunni that showed they are in touch with School of Jurisprudence and law about Salafis. Many groups of Muslims ultimately want a caliph, a term that applies only to Sunnis and briefly in Shia Islam, they use »Imam« and »Imamate«, so both expressions will be used in Islamic Ideologies.

2 Literature review

2.1 Immigration

After the World War II, Turkish workers immigrated to Germany as »guest workers«. »The majority of Turkish guest workers noticed relatively quickly that it was very difficult to accumulate enough money for making investments in Turkey. At the same time, the bad economic situation in Turkey made a return to Turkey even more difficult.« (Anwar 2004, 95–96) In the beginning, they had no intention to stay in Germany for a long time and they assumed themselves as temporary working men who were saving their wages to go back home. Because of recession during 1970's, the German authorities decided to send those workers to their countries, however, the guest workers preferred to remain in Germany and reunify with their families.



Eventually, the Turkish population began to prepare themselves for a longer stay in Germany and brought their families to the host country. The increasing number of children and women in the environment required a stronger institutionalization concerning religion. They began to establish an organized Islam in Germany to fulfil their own religious needs and to ensure the religious education of their children in the foreign environment. Therefore, several so called »backyard mosques« were established during this time. These activities were organized by mosque associations. With self-initiative, but without large material support, the believers mainly workers founded prayer centres throughout Germany in former factory buildings, office buildings and other places. (Anwar 2004, 95-96)

The spontaneous rise of »backyard mosques« among Turkish immigrants in Germany marks a grassroots response to the spiritual and cultural dislocation of migration. Lacking formal infrastructure, these improvised spaces reflect both resilience and the urgency of preserving religious identity amid foreign sociopolitical contexts. This phenomenon highlights the deep-rooted role of Islam as a communal anchor, while signalling early tensions between informal Islamic structures and Germany's secular integration frameworks, especially as religious life became increasingly institutionalized outside state oversight.

The Turkish community in Germany is not unanimous and ideological differences within the community are known to cause tension between the majority Sunni population and the minorities, such as Alawis (an order of Shiite Islam), Sufis or Kurds. The Turkish communities in Germany have not been immune to the new phenomenon of refugee migration. Refugees and political asylum seekers from Turkey often find their way to Germany. (Anwar 2004, 79-80)

Within the Turkish community in Germany, ideological divergence breeds internal tensions-particularly between the dominant Sunni and minority groups such as Alawis, Sufis, and Kurds. This fragmentation is further intensified by the recent wave of refugees and asylum seekers from Turkey, underscoring complex integration challenges.



The immigrants are from the countries which are mostly Muslim populated such as »Albania, Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iran, Islamic Rep., Morocco, Afghanistan, Lebanon Iraq, Pakistan, Tunisia, Syria, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, Eritrea, Bangladesh, Sudan, Libyan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia« (Anwar 2004, 72).

An earlier extrapolation by the BAMF Research Centre shows that between 4.4 and 4.7 million Muslims lived in Germany on 31 December 2015. Their share of the then 82.2 million inhabitants in Germany was between 5.4 % and 5.7 %. Accordingly, the number of Muslims increased by 0.9 million persons between 2015 and 2019 and their share of the total population in Germany increased by around one percentage point. Around 55 % of Muslims come from various other regions of origin. Almost 1.5 million people or 27 % come from an Arabic-speaking country in the Middle East (19%) or North Africa (8 %). The dominant origin country among Arabic-speaking Muslims is Syria with around 729,000 individuals. 19 % of Muslims come from South-East European countries of origin. About 9 % of the Muslims have a migrant background from a non-Arabic speaking country in South Asia. (Pfundel 2021, 3)

The Muslim population in Germany grew notably between 2015 and 2019, reaching nearly 6% of the total population. This demographic is highly diverse, with significant numbers from the Middle East, North Africa, South-East Europe, and South Asia-complicating integration efforts through varied cultural, linguistic, and sectarian backgrounds. Germany's Muslim community is ideologically and ethnically fragmented, comprising various Islamic schools and sects such as Sunni, Shia, Wahhabi, and Ahmadiyya. Diverging interpretations of religious authority and ethnic conflicts-like Kurdish-Turkish tensions-import deep-seated divisions, hindering unity and complicating the broader integration process within Germany's multicultural landscape.

The Muslim community in Germany today includes the majority Sunni Islam (which is divided between national groups); Wahhabism, Alawism, Iranian Shiism, Iraqi Shiism, and a very small Ismaili community; Sufism; Ahmadiyya and various other small sub-groups. Although all these orders within Islam are based on the



Koran, Sharia law, Sunnah, and the Hadith, they have different interpretations and different cultural influences. The main ideological differences within the orders of Islam are, first, regarding religious leadership the difference between Shiites and Sunnis. Other differences, such as the Kurdish-Turkish conflict, are ethnic-based. Liberal Bosnian interpretations of Islam often lead to its rejection from the orthodox Muslim community in Germany. These represent the complex situations that are imported to Germany, causing division within the Muslim community. (Anwar 2004, 75)

As numerous analyses, including the article from the MENA Research Center indicate, significant undercurrents are reshaping Bosnian society, with a growing segment of the population drawn to political Islam. This trend raises concerns about the potential impact on regional stability in the Balkans and neighbouring countries (like Slovenia and Croatia), where fragile political and ethnic balances could be disrupted by the rise of ideological extremism.

2.2 Social and economic conditions

»Between 5.3 and 5.6 million Muslims with a migration background from a predominantly Muslim country of origin live in Germany.« (Pfundel 2021, 3) Germany hosts approximately 5.3 to 5.6 million Muslims with migration backgrounds from Muslim-majority countries, reflecting a significant and diverse demographic whose integration poses complex social, cultural, and policy challenges within a pluralistic society. Employment rates among migrants from predominantly Muslim countries lag behind the general population, with stark gender disparities. Muslim women, particularly, face compounded challenges due to traditional household roles and childcare responsibilities, resulting in the lowest employment rate. These patterns highlight structural and cultural barriers to labour market integration in Germany.

People with a migration background from predominantly Muslim countries of origin are proportionately less likely to be in employment than people without a migration background. While the proportion of employed persons in the 16-64 age group is 53 % among persons with a migrant background from



predominantly Muslim countries of origin, it is 72 % among persons without a migrant background. Comparing employment by religion shows that people who do not belong to any religion achieve the highest employment rate, regardless of their migration background. Hardly any differences appear between Muslims and members of a Christian or other religion from the respective countries of origin. Both among persons with and without a migration background, men are more frequently employed than women. However, the gender differences are greater among people from predominantly Muslim countries of origin: Among people with a migration background, Muslim women have the lowest employment rate (41%). One explanation for this is that they disproportionately often live in households with one or more children. (Pfundel 2021, 11)

Individuals with a migrant background from predominantly Muslim countries also lag in vocational qualifications acquired in Germany. Irrespective of their religious affiliation, the number of people who completed vocational training or university in Germany is significantly lower than that of people without a migrant background (9 % to 59 %). This applies to first-generation immigrants. (Pfundel 2021, 10)

First-generation migrants from predominantly Muslim countries exhibit a stark educational gap in Germany, with only 9% completing local vocational or university training compared to 59% among natives. This disparity severely limits their employment prospects and hinders upward mobility, further complicating successful integration.

Linked with their poorer positioning in the education system, the respondents with a Turkish migration background were also found to have lower rates of labour force participation and higher unemployment rates than the other two groups. Compared to the other groups, the second-generation Turks are more often part of the inactive population and are in many cases not looking for a job despite being unemployed. They have a higher rate of youth unemployment, longer time gaps between completing education and first-time employment, and lower incomes. Almost one third



of the women of Turkish origin – predominantly with low qualifications – occupy themselves with unpaid activities that can broadly be described as family work. In sum, it can be established that most of the respondents who are not part of the active labour force possess only low educational qualifications and therefore have few options on the labour market. Furthermore, the unemployment rate correlates with educational status: the lower the educational level, the higher the rate. (Surig 2015, 99)

Turkish-origin migrants in Germany, especially second-generation individuals, face systemic educational disadvantages leading to high youth unemployment, labour inactivity, and income disparity. Low qualifications among Turkish women further entrench this divide, as many engage in unpaid domestic roles. The data confirms a direct correlation between low education and high unemployment, obstructing integration. »Generally, second-generation Turks were least likely to obtain a high educational qualification in Germany.« (Surig 2015, 186) Second-generation Turks in Germany show the lowest attainment of higher education, which directly contributes to elevated unemployment levels. This educational shortfall hinders social mobility and deepens integration challenges, reinforcing a cycle of limited opportunity across generations. »In general, higher education levels were associated with lower unemployment rates.« (Surig 2015, 186) Muslims in Germany have had higher unemployment rate for years because of their lower education, vocational qualification, language problem, though it looks better in recent years by integration of Muslim immigrants into the labour market and low unemployment shown by some new polls. The second and third generation of Turks have had their routine communication in Turkish language, and they prefer not to speak or write in German unless they must.

Over time, many Muslim immigrants in Germany – especially workers from Turkey, the Middle East, and North Africa – developed an informal, simplified version of the German language to meet daily communication needs. This »immigrant German« (often referred to in studies as Kiezdeutsch or working-class German) is not grammatically correct and lacks the structural complexity of standard German. It blends elements of the immigrants' native languages (such as Turkish or Arabic) with basic German vocabulary and local slang. This linguistic development is particularly



common in working-class environments where formal language skills are not essential for the job. For instance, many labourers, shopkeepers, and taxi drivers use a reduced form of German to communicate basic needs, coordinate tasks, or handle customer service. While this simplified language may help with practical survival and daily routines, it often hinders true integration, especially in educational and professional settings. Second-generation immigrants sometimes grow up speaking this hybrid language, which can limit their academic performance and isolate them from both mainstream German society and formal institutions.

Turks have been living on the periphery of the main industrialized areas in Germany. The policies of German authorities on employment and housing pushed Muslim immigrants to gather and live in lower class houses on the outskirts; their economic and social structure gave them the identity of Muslim Turks who could protest socioeconomic deprivations under the flag of Islam.

In recent years, the overall material living situation of people of migrant background has improved, but it is clear that they still face disadvantages in the housing market. This is demonstrated by the fact the households from migrant background, when compared to German nationals, occupy smaller and more run-down apartments. Further, within increasing competition for affordable housing, persons of migrant background still experience discrimination in the housing market. (Anwar 2004, 126)

Despite improvements in material living conditions, migrant populations face persistent housing disparities, occupying smaller and more rundown apartments. Growing competition for affordable housing exacerbates discrimination, underscoring the need for targeted policies to address these inequalities and promote equitable access to housing for all.

The landlords of better residential areas often refused to rent their apartments to Turks. For this reason, they were forced to live in unhygienic, small, and dirty apartments which were often a hundred years old and situated in peripheral areas. The systematic isolation of Turks from the German population represents a starting point for the formation of religious identities living mainly in the



peripheral areas. As Duran Akbulut states, Islam facilitated the life of the Turkish migrants living predominantly in ghetto situations. Through the establishment of prayer areas and gathering places the workers could meaningfully use their spare time. (Akbulut 2003, 59)

Turkish migrants faced systemic housing discrimination, relegated to unhygienic and outdated apartments in peripheral areas. This isolation fostered the development of distinct religious identities, with Islam providing a sense of community and meaning through prayer areas and social gathering spaces in these ghettoized neighbourhoods. Islamic organizations provided crucial social support and stability for Turkish migrants, with mosques serving as refuges and community hubs. These spaces fostered self-help, cooperation, and solidarity among isolated individuals, helping them cope with their challenging circumstances and find a sense of belonging.

The Islamic organizations which appeared during this time developed numerous important social functions for the Turks which had a stabilizing effect. The mosques were, at the same time, a place of refuge and a meeting place. The formation of mosques (in the form of preaching rooms) also constituted a search for self-help and cooperation for those isolated people who were left alone to their fate. (Anwar 2004, 111–112)

Turks' segregation resulted in the revival of their traditional lifestyle and they referred to their own Turkish language, media, customs and Islamic traditions.

»The Islamic cultural centres were established to teach the Turkish children to read the Koran. In Germany, they also provide for everyday social commodities and services such as barber shops, libraries, retail stores, etc. In addition, the federation has established dialogues with other religious communities and political circles in the FRG.« (Anwar 2004, 106–107) Islamic cultural centres in Germany served multiple purposes, including Quranic education for Turkish children and provision of everyday services like barber shops and retail stores. They also facilitated interfaith dialogue

and engagement with political circles, promoting community integration and social cohesion.

»The Muslim community in Germany is divided mainly by language and, therefore, often by national origin, and by religious order. For example, Turkish Sunnis and Arabic Sunnis both have their own mosques and cultural centres, and they nearly never cooperate on joint issues together.« (Anwar 2004, 75) Germany's Muslim community is fragmented along linguistic, national, and theological lines. Different ethnic groups, such as Turkish and Arabic Sunnis, maintain separate mosques and cultural centres. Additionally, Bosnian and Albanian Muslims are perceived as liberal, leading to tensions with more conservative Muslim communities. »Bosnian and Albanian Islam (practiced by Kosovar Albanians) are seen as relatively liberal. The women generally do not wear hijab and there is much less separation between men and women within the religion. They are, therefore, rejected by many Muslims of other nationalities (Rel-News).« (Anwar 2004, 91) Additionally, we see indications even in the backgrounds of radical individuals in Europe that trace back to the Balkans, and these extremist actions and affiliations must be strongly condemned and thoroughly addressed.

There have been sharp differences between cultures and religious rules which cause more segregation in the society. Examples of those differences are the ban on eating pork meat, drinking wine and alcohol and swimming men and women together, and issues such as ritual slaughtering of animals, women's headscarf, call to prayer (Ezan) by loudspeaker, circumcision; in addition, girls' attendance at sexual education and biology classes, their social trips and going to the theatre have interfered with the rules and culture of the host country.

»Another controversy between Muslims and the German authorities involves efforts to engage Muslim girls in sport. As a rule, German schools have three hours of sports instruction each week. But a growing number of schools report that Muslim girls are finding excuses to avoid sport and physical education.« (Herghelegiu 2010, 75) A controversy surrounding Muslim girls' participation in sports instruction in German schools has emerged, with some girls avoiding physical education due to cultural or religious concerns. This issue highlights the challenges of balancing cultural



sensitivity with integration and promoting inclusive physical education practices.

Understanding the Islamic concept of haram ('forbidden') is essential for democratic societies because it reveals the depth of cultural and ideological differences that can challenge the core values of liberal democracy. In Islamic thought, haram is not simply a personal moral guideline, it often comes with collective enforcement, legal implications, and strong emotional or spiritual consequences. Practices like banning alcohol, music, gender mixing, or criticism of religion are not just discouraged, but are considered acts that must be rejected and sometimes punished. This worldview can clash directly with democratic principles such as personal freedom, freedom of expression, gender equality, and the secular rule of law. When a community collectively adheres to and seeks to implement haram-based rules within a democratic society, it can create parallel norms, challenge integration, and even disturb social harmony. Therefore, to understand how haram shapes behaviour, law, and identity it is necessary to grasp the deeper ideological differences between Islamist thought and democratic values, and to respond to them thoughtfully and consistently.

Haram (/hə'ra:m, hæ'ra:m, ha:'ra:m, -'ræm/; Arabic: حَرَام, ḥarām, [ħa'ra:m]) is an Arabic term meaning »forbidden« (Al-Modarresi 2017). Haram refers to what is forbidden or illegal, according to Islamic law. There are several things that Muslims consider haram, including, for example:

- 1) financial and economic practices: Islam forbids gambling and bribery. The Qur'an addresses these prohibitions in several verses, including: Gambling (Q 2:219) and Bribery (Q 2:188; 5:42);
- 2) religious beliefs and doctrines: certain theological beliefs are explicitly condemned in Islam: Polytheism (Q 21:29; 79:24-25); the Trinity (Q 2:22); the rejection of the Qur'an (Q 2:41);
- 3) cultural and social conduct: rebellion against the Islamic government or the Imam is also prohibited (Q 49:9);
- 4) forbidden foods and drinks: Islamic dietary laws clearly forbid pork (Q 5:3); wine and intoxicants (Q 2:219; 5:90). Khamr (intoxicants made from honey, wheat, barley, or corn) is considered haram if consumed in quantities that intoxicate. As one online source explains, »In Quran 5:90-91 and 5:93-94, wine is linked with



gambling and divination with arrows as an abominable creation of Satan« (Oxford Reference [n.d.]). »Drinking alcohol is considered haram, or forbidden, in Islam. As proof of the prohibition, Islamic scholars and Muslim religious authorities typically point to a verse in the Quran, the Muslim holy book, that calls intoxicants ‘the work of Satan’ and tells believers to avoid them.« (Apnews.com 2024);

- 5) arts and entertainment: some Islamic scholars and communities consider instrumental music and poetry to be inappropriate or haram. For example: »Some Muslims believe musical instruments are haram and only vocals are allowed, but the performer must be of the same gender as the audience.« (Magrini 2005, 270) Similarly, the Qur’an warns about poets: »As for the poets, they are followed by the straying people.« (Q 26:224);
- 6) commentary from contemporary Islamic finance: »Gambling is another fundamental prohibition in Islamic financial system« (Blossom Finance 2020).

There are hundreds of acts, foods, drinks, sexual, political, security, financial and economic, cultural, social, ethical-educational, devotional, and religious behaviours which are haram. Violators who do those forbidden categories of actions will be fined, imprisoned, lashed, or executed.

2.3 Political Islam

The immigrant environment in Germany has changed due to the family reunification process in the 1970s. In the beginning of the decade, the first Islamic associations which operated as so-called Cultural and Solidarity Associations (Kultur- und Solidaritätsvereine) were founded by the Turkish believers. Milli Görüs founded Islamic federations whose members began to organize demonstrations and larger meetings for Islamic festivities. (Anwar 2004, 98)

Germany's immigrant landscape shifted in the 1970s with family reunification, sparking the formation of Islamic groups like Milli Görüs. These organizations enabled Muslims to collectively celebrate Islamic events and assert their identity, influencing Germany's cultural and religious diversity.



Family reunification brought forth the issues of »assimilation«, »separation«, »marginalization«, and »integration«.

All these organizations, including those which had been forbidden in Turkey, began establishing their in situations in Germany anew. The bases of these revitalization processes were mosque associations which were the legal bodies representing the religious institutions. This principle of organization was a compromise between the tradition of foundations being the form of local Muslim infrastructures, German legal frameworks, and interests of the religious factions and groups involved. (Anwar 2004, 97)

Islamic organizations banned in Turkey re-emerged in Germany through mosque associations, adapting to German legal frameworks and local needs.

Milli Görüs was not alone: After the 'Islamic Revolution' in Iran, an extremist wing under Cemalettin Kaplan grew and founded in 1984 the Federation of Islamic Association and Communities (ICCB). The Milli Görüs movement established a new umbrella organization as the Union of New World Vision in Europe (AMGT) in 1985. After 1995, Milli Görüs in Europe was reformed again. For questions of belief the IGMG, the Islamic Federation Milli Görüs, became responsible, for issues of money and real estate the European Mosque Building and Aid Federation was established. (Anwar 2004, 102)

The Islamic movement in Europe diversified with the rise of organizations like Milli Görüs and the Federation of Islamic Association and Communities. These groups underwent restructuring, with Milli Görüs establishing distinct entities for theological and financial matters, reflecting the complexity of Islamic identity in Europe.

Different Islamic organizations and their mosques are subsidized by their proponents and some authorities abroad. Their ultimate goal is to gather millions of Muslims under the flag of Islam and to legitimize their own Islamic traditions and rules in Germany.



Today, the IGMG has 514 mosque communities in different European countries. The total number of the local entities amounts to 2,200. Around one fourth of these mosque communities are in Germany. The IGMG has around 87,000 members and an entire community size of around 230,000 (according to the IGMG internet site: www.igmg.de). The number of members in Germany is estimated to be around 27,000 (Der Spiegel, 24. September 2001, 32). (Anwar 2004, 102–103)

Historically, mosques have always been Muslims fortifications where they could do prayer, preach, and get more united against the wicked and injustice. Muslims who attend the mosques enjoy their Imams praising Islam and censuring all other religions and ideologies. Those moderates who attend their mosques even once a year are definitely the devotees of Islam, however they prefer not to expose their heartfelt sympathy in the wrong time. In the time of political turmoil, the moderates join their Islamist brothers.

Federation of the Islamic Cultural Centres (Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren e.V.) Süleymancılık this is the oldest Islamic organization in the Federal Republic of Germany. This organization was founded because of the necessity of religious care for Turkish guest workers. For a long time, this necessity was neglected by the official authorities. (Anwar 2004, 106)

Two prominent Islamic organizations in Germany are the Federation of Islamic Cultural Centres (Süleymancılık) and DITIB (Turkish High Office for Islam). While Süleymancılık emerged to address the spiritual needs of Turkish guest workers, DITIB represents official Turkish Islam, adhering to secular principles and state control.

Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği – DITIB (Turkish High Office for Islam) was established in 1985 in Cologne under the special direction of the highest religious authority Turkish Diyanet İşleri Bakanlığı (DIB) (Directorate for Religious Affairs) and works together with Turkish ambassadorial and consular agencies. DITIB represents the official Islam in Turkey, under the control of the state.



It rejects the Sharia. DITIB holds itself to the laical principles and a strict separation from church and state. (Anwar 2004, 108–109)

Nearly 100,000 Germans have converted to the Islam especially due to the binational marriages (Zentrum für Türkeistudien 1999, 113). They are often organized in Muslim associations established by German Muslims. One of these is the German Muslim-League (Deutsche Muslim-Liga) It is one of the oldest Muslim organizations in Germany and was founded in 1952 in Hamburg. (Anwar 2004, 73)

In Germany, around 100,000 converts to Islam often join Muslim associations. However, these communities face Islamophobia, manifesting in discrimination, negative media coverage, and violence, prompting concerns over mosque attacks and highlighting the need for greater understanding and acceptance of Muslim identities. »Islamophobia in Germany refers to the set of discourses, behaviours, and structures which express feelings of anxiety, fear, hostility, and rejection towards Islam and/or Muslims in Germany.« (Richardson 2012, 7) Islamophobia can manifest itself through discrimination in the workforce, negative coverage in the media, and violence against Muslims. »Various Islamic groups in Germany have expressed concerns over the attacks targeting mosques.« (Muslim News 2017)

In Germany, violent attacks have been progressively increased on refugees. Racially prejudiced agitation is also on the rise, whether on the social networking website or on the highway. The online theatricals also lead to actual attacks on immigrants and their shelters. In the year 2014, 247 violent attacks have been counted on refugee accommodations. These also include 36 detention centres that could be reported. Moreover, 81 attacks on individuals were also counted. According to BKA (Bundeskriminalamt) transl. Federal Criminal Police Office, the number of violence and propaganda accusations had increased by more than double as compared to the previous year. The attacks are mostly spread regionally. Additionally, Berlin, North Rhine Westphalia, and Saxony as the top runners, most of the federal states are represented several times. (Amadeo Antonio Foundation 2014)



A survey was conducted by YouGov on the part of *Zeit Online* in which 49% of the respondents expressed that they had an understanding of the ongoing demonstrations in Germany. This sustains sympathy for the demonstrators of the anti-Islamic movements. According to the survey, 73% of the federal residents were concerned about the fear of radical Islamists in Germany. (*Zeit Online* 2014) In 2024 and 2025, Germany experienced terrorist attacks linked to Islamic ideology in Solingen on August 23, 2024, where 3 were killed and 8 injured; in Magdeburg on December 20, 2024, where 6 were killed and at least 299 injured; and in Munich on February 13, 2025, where 2 were killed and dozens injured.

»Security officials estimate that approximately 3,500 Arab militants live in Germany and that they raise significant sums of money for Islamic organizations, including Osama bin Laden's 'al-Quaida' and the Palestinian group 'Hamas'. There are also several networks providing counterfeit documents and safe haven for militants.« (Anwar 2004, 192) All these incidents may stem from the incompetence of officials, governments, or the personal and family issues of these individuals, as well as their knowledge or ignorance of their chosen religion, and must be thoroughly investigated and their reasons scrutinized. However, the inability to distinguish and analyse these cases in a democratic country, and facing violent and provocative situations with individuals who hold radical and terrorist views or conceal their violent tendencies, is a sign of insufficient knowledge and inadequate support for security systems and judicial processes.

Terrorist attacks by Muslim extremist groups have sparked new outbreaks of anti-Muslim behaviour in Germany. Following terrorist attacks, the head of the CDU for Niedersachsen, Christian Wulff, called for video surveillance in mosques to combat the terrorist threat in Germany. Without hesitation, a direct link was made between terrorists and the people that by name only, share the same faith and are living in Germany. (Anwar 2004, 142)

While much of the discussion around integration focuses on policy and state responses, it is equally important to examine the role of Muslim immigrants themselves in the integration process. Many immigrants adopt new behaviours, develop simplified or hybrid forms of language for daily communication, and actively participate in the labour market and education



systems. However, their integration efforts are not uniform and can vary depending on ethnic background and the legal school of Islam (madhhab) they follow. These internal differences influence attitudes toward gender roles, secular norms, and civic engagement. Recognizing these variations can help policymakers and the public better understand the diverse strategies of adaptation among Muslim communities and avoid treating them as a monolithic group.

These distinctions make it difficult to refer to »the Islam« in Germany. The existence of a multitude of groups with specific theological and political interests is a sign of real multiculturalism but it also makes it difficult for the German authorities to find a discussion partner which is involved in all issues. Moreover, some of the Islamic groups do not recognize other Islamic groups as being real Muslims (regarding Alevites and Ahmandiyya) and even refuse a dialogue with them. Even the »Islamkonferenz« founded in 2006, which includes many of these groups, was unable to develop a unitary view on important issues regarding the Muslim presence in Germany. (Herghelegiu 2010, 54)

Germany's diverse Islamic landscape, with various groups holding distinct theological and political views, complicates dialogue with authorities. Some groups even dispute the legitimacy of others, hindering unified representation and consensus, as evident in the challenges faced by the Islamkonferenz, established in 2006.

2.4 Integration

The 1951 Geneva Convention, as defined by the UNHCR, considers a refugee to be someone who has a fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, and is outside their country of nationality and unable or unwilling to avail themselves of their country's protection. Asylum seekers, on the other hand, are individuals who have left their country of origin, sought international protection, applied to be recognized as refugees, and are awaiting a decision from the host government.



A theoretical framework that has been used frequently when understanding immigrants' adaptation to the new society is Berry's (1997) conceptual framework of immigrants' acculturation to the host society and it includes four strategies: assimilation – when individuals do not wish to maintain their cultural identity and seek daily interaction with other cultures; separation – when individuals hold on to their original culture and wish to avoid interaction with others; marginalization – when there is little cultural maintenance or having relationships with others; and integration – when there is maintaining of one's original culture while engaging in daily interactions with other groups (Berry 1997). Considered to be the best approach, integration is a two-way process and can only be successfully pursued by migrants when the host society is open and inclusive in its orientation towards cultural diversity (Berry 1997). Inclusiveness means that refugees should be provided with equal access to housing, health care, education, training, and employment. (Robila 2018, 2)

Refugees' level of integration and adaptation depends on several factors, including premigration experiences, the departure process and the post-arrival experiences and environment. Many refugees and asylum seekers have experienced severe pre-migration trauma, including mental and physical torture, mass violence and genocide, witnessing the killings of family members and friends, sexual abuse, kidnap of children, destruction and looting of personal property, starvation and lack of water and shelter. (Craig, Jajua, and Warfa 2009)

Refugees' integration and adaptation are influenced by premigration trauma, departure experiences, and post-arrival environment. Many face severe challenges, including violence, torture, loss, and displacement, which can have lasting impacts on their mental and physical well-being. »The departure is also a complex endeavour, many times associated with life threatening risks.« (Robila 2018, 3)

»Although arrival in a safe place provides initial relief, frustration sometimes develops as new problems emerge, such as family separation, language barriers, legal status, unemployment, homelessness, or lack of access



to education and healthcare (Craig, Jajua, and Warfa 2009).« (Robila 2018, 3) Here the question arises whether Germany has been prepared to treat all those immigrants properly and, as the host society, could it be open and inclusive to provide refugees with 'equal access' to housing, health care, education, and employment.

Immigrant integration refers to the incorporation of new elements (immigrants) into an existing social system. Integration is a multi-dimensional concept, including structural integration, socioeconomic aspects of integration referring to education, employment and social and cultural aspects referring to cultural adjustment, shared norms, and social contacts of immigrants with natives (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000). Structural and cultural dimensions of integration are strongly related, migrants with good social positions (high education, stable job) having more informal contact with the society (Dagevos 2001; Odé 2002). Refugees become involved in a range of economic, social, and cultural transnational activities (e.g., sending remittances) (Al-Ali, Black, and Koser 2001, 615–634; Snel, Engbersen, and Leerkes 2006, 265–284). (Robila 2018, 10)

Most Muslim immigrants have suffered mental and physical torture experience, moreover, some need to be treated by psychiatrists for years or decades. Have the mental health professionals been sufficiently mobilized and equipped to focus on helping all those patients?

Immigrant integration involves incorporating newcomers into the existing social system, encompassing structural, socioeconomic, and cultural aspects. Refugees face challenges, including trauma, racism, and institutional barriers, highlighting the need for adequate mental health support and inclusive host societies.

Studies on obstacles to refugee integration in the European Union indicated that some of the major impediments to integration they experienced were the racism and ignorance experienced at both the personal and institutional levels (Mestheneos and Ioannidi 2002, 304–320; Zetter, Griffiths, and Sigona 2005, 169–181). Personalities of refugees appeared to be another critical factor



in the ability to be accepted in the new host society. (Robila 2018, 11)

Employment is crucial for migrant integration, facilitating social interactions, language learning, and confidence building. Refugees who work adjust better to the host society, while unemployment and underemployment hinder integration, often leading to downward professional mobility and skill mismatch.

Employment is the most important factor in securing the integration of migrants into society as it enables interactions, increases opportunities for learning the local language, and provides the opportunity to build a future and to regain confidence (Phillimore and Goodson 2006, 1715–1736). Refugees who are working adjust more easily to the host society than those who are unemployed (Bloch 1999; 2000, 160–190; Shields and Wheatley-Price 2003). Inability to locate work and underemployment are the most significant barriers to the successful integration of refugees into society (Bloch 2004, 160–190; Feeney 2000). Refugees struggle to locate employment commensurate with their skills, and as a result, the process of integration is often associated with downward professional mobility. (Robila 2018, 11)

While integration is a multi-dimensional concept, therefore the country which accepts refugees needs to be fully equipped with all kinds of assistance. Failure in each dimension of integration causes severe complications. »Germans have become more intolerant of Islam in recent years and have developed a prejudiced opinion of Muslim immigrants, a new study has revealed. A total of 57% of Germany's non-Muslims said in Nov. 2014 that they perceived Islam as a threat – a rise of 4% since 2012, according to a representative poll conducted for the Bertelsmann Foundation.« (Anadolu agency 2015) »A total of 61% of Germans said they believed Islam was not compatible with life in the Western world, representing a 9% increase from 2012. 40% said that they did not feel at home in their own country because of what they perceived to be the 'Islamization' of the nation.« (Anadolu agency 2015) Tensions surround Islam's place in Germany, with many questioning its compatibility with Western values. This sentiment fuels concerns about integration, while debates around Sharia



law and constitutional adherence continue. In contrast, many Muslims in Germany express strong support for democratic principles. »Islamic groups want Sharia law in Germany.« (Bild 2009). »Chancellor Angela Merkel said on Wednesday Muslims must obey the constitution and not Sharia law if they want to live in Germany, which is debating the integrating of its 4 million strong Muslim population.« (Brown 2010)

In the dictionary definition, democracy »is government by the people in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised directly by them or by their elected agents under a free electoral system«. In the phrase of Abraham Lincoln, democracy is a government »of the people, by the people, and for the people« (U.S. Department of State's Bureau 2007). Many Muslim thinkers argued that Islam and democracy were incompatible due to, firstly, the Islamic concept of the absolute sovereignty of God – they believed that ideas of the sovereignty of the people in a democracy contradicted this fundamental principle; secondly, in Islam, the law was defined and promulgated by God and that God's law, the Sharia, could not be altered by elected parliaments; and thirdly, the concept of parliaments as sources of law was seen as blasphemous (Voll 2007). The German chancellor, Angela Merkel, has courted growing anti-immigrant opinion in Germany by claiming the country's attempts to create a multicultural society have »utterly failed«. Speaking to a meeting of young members of her Christian Democratic Union party, Merkel said the idea of people from different cultural backgrounds living happily »side by side« did not work (The Guardian 2010).

In the recent months, we were encountered by thousands of people, mostly Muslims, protesting, fighting, and burning flags in the streets of some cities of Germany concerning the Gaza-Israel war. According to the news, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said that Iran bore responsibility for helping Hamas in launching attack on Israel. He continued that Hamas, and its activities must be banned in Germany and »anyone who glorifies Hamas or uses its symbols is committing an offence in Germany« (Bundesregierung.de 2023).

Now Hamas is listed as a terrorist organization by the EU, and it is an offence to use its symbols. Germany is in trouble. From the crowd of people who are not indifferent to what is happening and who are concerned



about the common future of society, troubling questions are emerging, such as: »Are all those thousands of people especially pro-Hamas or are many of them just ordinary apolitical Muslims? How is Germany deciphering those Muslim protesters by labelling them all pro-Hamas? How have those thousands pro-Hamas 'terrorist organizations' been living among you Germans for years? How do you recognize that 'Gaza' is not the cause of ordinary Muslims? How couldn't your university professors who are all experts on Islam predict such turmoils in Berlin?« Of course, they have always been advising on peaceful coexistence with Islamic states together with the bright successful integration in the future. But we must stop pretending that this bright common future is assured, because the problems of Muslim integration are growing.

Conclusions

The rapid growth of Muslim immigrants' population in recent years in Germany makes it urgent to examine the issue of integration seriously. Different people from countries with different cultures, languages, denominations have gathered in Germany, therefore it is natural to encounter numerous difficulties in the society. Most of those Muslim immigrants are German citizens now and they have been trying to construct and rebuild Germany as a progressive country. Authorities in Germany are the most responsible for the failure or success of integration of Muslim immigrants in all its dimensions. It is an obligation for the authorities to study and examine all aspects of integration which both sides of society as native Germans and immigrant Muslims are involved in. Educating Germans from primary school how to treat immigrants, foreigners and the people from different race, culture and religion humanly must be in the vanguard of educational programs.

Muslim immigrants should understand that they are newcomers to a country, and they can enjoy living there and learn about a new society and culture. Muslim immigrants must be educated not to interfere with other people's opinions and cultures. Religion must be a private matter of the individual. There are different mosques and organizations in Germany and Muslims who attend these places show their own inclination to a specific ideology in Islam. Most mosques and organizations are maintained



by Islamic states and these Islamic states try to sustain their interest in Germany. Many Muslims believe that Islam is a »perfect universal« religion and its teachings in the Qur'an are absolute. Radical Muslims believe that all societies should act according to Islamic rules and commandments. They condemn all those who do »Haram« and they are willing to try these violators in Islamic courts. Islamic laws are transcended from God to his prophet. Whoever declines to obey those laws must be punished. Hijab (head scarf) must be worn by women and girls in countries which implement Sharia, and whoever does not wear Hijab will be punished according to Sharia. Whoever commits »Haram« must be punished. We have witnessed some citizens being stabbed or beheaded by a terrorist shouting »Allahu Akbar« (God is Greatest). That terrorist is trying to eliminate people who do »Haram« and in his vision he is performing God's ordinance, moreover he is speaking with his God. He has been taught how to eliminate offenders. Moderate Muslims should be much more careful not to slip into extremism in addition condemn it.

In *World Watch Monitor* Raymond Ibrahim examines »from the start, the veracity of the prophet was tied to his military and temporal successes. The Islamic conquests, whereby Islam's invading armies conquered much of the Old World from India in the east to Spain in the west were especial proof that the Islamic way, the Sharia, was the right way. The West's conquest and subsequent colonization shook this paradigm to its core, causing the majority of nominal Muslims to turn to the West and essentially westernize.« (Ibrahim 2013b) Raymond Ibrahim in this section and article shows that when Muhammad was merely preaching as a prophet, he gained few followers; but once he took on the role of a warlord-attacking and plundering those who rejected him-his military victories and the distribution of war booty attracted many more followers, leading the Arabians to accept his message. He examines »The Koran itself contains a number of anti-Christian verses. These include Koran 5:73, 'Infidels are they who say Allah is one of three', a reference to the Christian Trinity; and Koran 5:17, 'Infidels are they who say Allah is the Christ, [Jesus] son of Mary' (see also Koran 4:171). To be referred to as an infidel (that is, a 'kafir') is to be categorized as an enemy of Islam, who must be either eliminated or subjugated (Koran 9:5 and 9:29).« (Ibrahim 2013a, 20)



In *Theo terrorism vs. Freedom of Speech: From Incident to Precedent*, Paul Cliteur examines the fundamental conflict between democracy and theocracy, particularly in the context of freedom of expression. »According to the jihadist, there is a sharp contrast between democracy and theocracy. A theocracy is government by God ('theos'). Democracy, on the other hand, is government by the people ('demos').« (Cliteur 2019, 85) He highlights that, according to jihadist perspectives, there is a sharp contrast between democracy government by the people (»demos«) and theocracy government by God (»theos«) and in Chapter 1, Cliteur references the fatwa issued by Ayatollah Khomeini, which called upon »all zealous Muslims of the world« to execute the death sentence against Salman Rushdie, his publishers, and translators. »The fatwa by Ayatollah Khomeini informing 'all zealous Muslims of the world' that Salman Rushdie, his publishers, and his translators were 'sentenced to death'. Khomeini exhorted all zealous Muslims to execute this verdict.« (Cliteur 2019, 125) This decree exemplifies the extreme measures taken by religious zealots to suppress dissenting voices and enforce theocratic norms.

Those Muslims who seek for Sharia assume that all economic, political, and cultural problems in all societies will be solved by an Islamic government. In 1979, Iran's modern pro-West government was toppled by people with the leadership of an Islamic charismatic leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, who could get 97% votes of all the extremists and moderate Muslims for establishing the Islamic State. »This is the first day of God's government in Iran,« said Khomeini, decreeing that it become a national holiday. Joyous gun bursts and chanting of »Allah is great« were heard throughout Tehran far into the night. The interior minister said more than 98% of the electorate voted and 97% said yes to the Islamic republic. (Koven 1979) Ultimately, the yearning for »multiculturalism« besides »living side by side« will be denied by the belief of »universality and absolute perfection« of Islam while stipulating their own favourable perfect universal Islamic society governed by Sharia which demands obedience to its laws for all cultures. Are these fears justified or are they just prejudices that need to be dispelled? We are sure that much scientific research will need to be done in the future to support or disprove these fears. However, regardless of the outcome of the research, we are convinced that this fear exists as a problem that should not be ignored but must be solved mutually in a calm and intelligent way.



The last problem, which we believe must be highlighted and solved together, is the duplicity of Western politics, which on the one hand looks for extremists in their own countries, and on the other hand supports extremism abroad. The political arena of the West and its Muslim immigrants have been changing qualitatively since the beginning of the Gaza-Israel war. The Muslims demonstrate themselves in protests and turmoils. There have been reports of violence in London, Berlin, Washington, Los Angeles, and some other cities all over the world. Now, Muslim immigrants find themselves surrounded by the coalition of Israel and the West.

During the Arab Spring, particularly in Syria, a report from the Tony Blair Faith Foundation's Centre on Religion & Geopolitics, as cited in *The Guardian* on December 20, 2015, states that »more than half of the rebel fighters in Syria opposing President Bashar al-Assad are sympathetic to Islamic State views« (Guardian 2015). Some rebels, initially driven by moderate ideals, gradually adopted extremist views. The 1979 Iranian Revolution exemplifies this phenomenon, with Islamist groups emerging as dominant forces, as documented in sources like Britannica. In Sudan, the Islamist government led by Omar al-Bashir implemented Sharia law in the late 1980s, leading to significant human rights abuses and marginalization of non-Muslim populations. In Afghanistan, the Taliban's rise to power in the 1990s was marked by a strict implementation of Sharia law, resulting in severe restrictions on women's rights, freedom of speech, and other basic human rights. More recently, the Islamic State (ISIS) has sought to establish a caliphate across the Middle East, imposing its own interpretation of Sharia law on territories under its control. This has led to widespread human rights abuses, including executions, enslavement, and forced conversions. These examples illustrate the complex relationship between Islam and politics, highlighting the potential for extremist interpretations of Islamic law to be used to justify authoritarianism and human rights abuses. In Surah An-Nisa (Q 4:34), the overall meaning of the section »[and] those women whom you fear their rebellion, admonish them, then abandon them in bed, and strike them« advises men to admonish, then avoid sharing a bed with, and finally strike their wives if they fear their disobedience, which is in sharp contrast with democratic values of gender equality and non-violence in relationships.



In *Crucified Again*, Raymond Ibrahim tells the story of how Islam's foundational texts promote a theology of conquest. Citing a well-known hadith, he writes: »I have been commanded to wage war against mankind until they testify that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah.« (Ibrahim 2013a, 20) »If they do so, their blood and property are protected.« (20) And »there are literally hundreds of similar Islamic texts enjoining Muslims to fight non-Muslims until the latter either convert or pay tribute and live in submission.« (20) He argues that such commands, repeated in both the Qur'an and hadiths, reveal that Islam's treatment of non-Muslims either conversion, paying jizya, or war is not circumstantial but doctrinal. In the opening section of *Not Peace but a Sword: The Great Chasm Between Christianity and Islam* (2013), Robert Spencer writes that apostasy from Islam is punishable by death, a view consistently upheld by both traditional Islamic jurisprudence and contemporary scholars. He states, »Whoever changed his Islamic religion, then kill him... killing an apostate is killing someone who deserves to die.«

A true Muslim is the one who does not commit »haram«, but respects and obeys Sharia. Sharia with some interpretations extends into many aspects of private life such as dress codes and hair styles. »True Islam« means the implementation of Sharia (Islamic law). The experiences in most Islamic states unveil that all the people living under Sharia are obliged to conform with it. It is significant to notice that some Muslim women and girls while living in the West justify and boast about covering their hair of their own freewill, however they are very well aware that women and girls living under Sharia in Islamic countries have no choice and they are obliged to cover their hair by veils compulsorily, or else they will be prosecuted. Germany is now encircled by millions of Muslim migrants who aspire for »True Islam« and feel strange in German culture and democracy. The deep sleep of Germany has turned into a nightmare.

Islam has become part of Western society, and it is a fact that we must urgently consider while planning our future existence. Western culture and its democracy should be evaluated and compared to Sharia and Islamic culture. Both sides may find the answers to their questions at the negotiating table with the help of intellect. Many Westerners worry that the migrant Muslims have hidden appetites to take overpower in the West which again breeds mistrust and resistance that potentially creates the



conditions for violence. Muslims and non-Muslims will have to take a step back to reconcile our cultures if possible, so that we can take two steps forward together as a multicultural society.

It is urgent to face up to the fears and prejudices that are often the basis for triggering violence and war which have occurred time and again throughout history. Any group or ideology which creates extremism and violence must be condemned as each may be ashamed of their past or present extremism. Political intervention of the extremist ideologies and states hinders the integration of the Muslim immigrants living in the West.

Germany together with its Western allies have been assembling, buttressing and bolstering the extremist Muslim states for decades, however they now find themselves fallen into their own laid snare.

For example, many German politicians have publicly expressed support for Iranian protesters and the democratic movement in Iran. They have applauded calls for democracy, freedom, and human rights, and even granted symbolic support, such as hosting activists and providing visas. However, in practice, very little has been done to apply actual political or economic pressure on the Iranian regime. Despite strong words, tangible actions remain limited. The German newspaper WELT published a critical article titled *The Protests in Tehran and the Silence of the German Chancellor*, noting that Chancellor Olaf Scholz has only made brief comments about the protests in Iran, and that Germany has failed to take concrete steps or impose serious sanctions on the regime. Authorities in Germany are responsible not to assist economically and politically those Islamic extremist states. Integration will not be fulfilled by dual opportunistic policies of the West. By applauding Islamic extremists abroad and at the same time by looking for »bad Muslims« inside Germany, integration will be wishful thinking. Extremist Muslims should be condemned anywhere. There have been reports by the news agencies that antisemitic incidents are visible in schools and demonstrations held by Muslims in different cities of Germany the way that Bojan Pancevski wrote the title of the article in the *Wall street journal: Antisemitism among Muslim Migrants Unsettles a Germany Haunted by the Holocaust*. There were different interviews with Muslim demonstrators that they claimed they were expecting to have a government run by »Sharia« (Islamic law) in Germany and other countries



in Europe when their population grows. German police have raided the Islamic center of Hamburg suspicious of being in connection with the terrorist Hezbollah Organization (BBC News Agency 2023) There has been a warning on high alert of Islamist terrorist activities recently (DW Agency news 2023). Some German universities in different cities have had kinds of cooperations with »Qum University of Religions and Denominations« which is connected to Islamic Revolutionary Guard of Iran (DW Agency News 2023) The expenses of those relations and cooperations of the universities are burdened on the German taxpayers.

These turmoils by Muslims are not the first nor the last, they are the vanguard of a new era in the EU. It is wise and worth to learn from the invaluable experiences relevant to the integration of the Muslim immigrants in Germany and the EU should carry out a profound review of their previous immigration and integration policies, moreover, learn from the experience of the experienced.



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