

Simon Hajdini

What's the Difference? Kant and Lacan

Key words: difference, Hegel, object, reflection, speculation, space, subject, time

In line with the aim of this issue of *Filozofski vestnik*, which proposes to rethink the importance of Kantian philosophy for contemporary debates on the concepts of the subject and the object, I attempt to develop the consequences of one of Kant's "conceptual monsters", namely that of *transcendental reflection*. Initially, I will follow Kant's line of thought, which – however – will immanently lead to a certain theoretical deadlock, or "contradiction", which in turn will open up the possibility of a passage from (Kantian) reflection to (Hegelian-Lacanian) speculation, and thus also to a notion of *the subject* that is at odds with Kant's argument but comes to light the moment we push the argument to the extreme of its consequences.

Simon Hajdini

V čem je razlika? Kant in Lacan

Ključne besede: razlika, Hegel, objekt, refleksija, spekulacija, prostor, subjekt, čas

Skladno z zastavkom pričujoče številke *Filozofskega vestnika*, ki si prizadeva preiskati vrednost kantovske filozofije za sodobne diskusije o subjektu in objektu, bomo skušali izpeljati konsekvence enega v vrsti kantovskih »konceptualnih monstrumov« – *transcendentalne refleksije*. Pri tem bomo v izhodišču sledili Kantovi izpeljavi, ki pa nas bo docela imanentno, se pravi pod pogoji, ki jih definira Kant sam, privedla do določene teoretske zagate, do »protislovja«, ki bo odprlo možnost prehoda od (kantovske) refleksije k (heglovski-lacanovski) spekulaciji in s tem k pojmu *subjekta*, ki se sicer upira Kantovi zastavitvi, a vznikne, brž ko jo priženemo dovolj daleč.

Zdravko Kobe

The Epigenesis of Morality.

Kant's Moral Philosophy between Canon and Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals

Key words: Immanuel Kant, Christian Garve, morality, happiness, worthiness, moral philosophy, theory of action, obligation, willing

The paper examines the development of Kant's moral philosophy at the time of *Critique of Pure Reason*. By relying mostly on the so-called reflections, it argues that in the middle of the 1770s Kant was in possession of a rather comprehensive theory of morality as worthiness to be happy, built upon the universalisation of happiness and leading immanently to a moral theology. Even before the publication of *Critique* this conception was,

mainly due to a closer definition of the concept of happiness that now included intellectuality, freedom, and self-satisfaction, reformulated into a system of the epigenesis of happiness out of the laws of freedom. The reflections from the early 1780s suggest the existence of yet another phase, as this conception was further developed into a system of the epigenesis of pure morality which, by drawing a pronounced parallel between cognition and action, now tried to establish the unconditional obligation by examining the *a priori* conditions of the unity of the willing of a finite rational being. Although the project appears highly promising, inherently consistent, and outwardly in complete agreement with the framework of a critical theory of cognition, it was unexpectedly given up – presumably under the influence of Rousseau and possibly as an overreaction to Garve. But since according to the author the final version of Kant's moral theory basically implies a pre-critical subject of action, the paper concludes by suggesting that a truly consequent reconstruction of critical moral philosophy requires a reintroduction of the elements once given up by Kant.

Zdravko Kobe

Epigeneza moralnosti.

**Kantova moralna filozofija med Kanonom in
Utemeljitvijo metafizike nravi**

Ključne besede: Immanuel Kant, Christian Garve, moralnost, srečnost, vrednost biti srečen, moralna filozofija, teorija delovanja, zavezujočnost, hotenje

V članku je prikazan razvoj Kantove moralne filozofije v času okoli *Kritike čistega uma*. Iz rokopisne zapuščine je mogoče sklepati, da je sredi sedemdesetih Kant razpolagal s podrobno teorijo moralnosti kot vrednosti biti srečen, ki je temeljila na poobčenju srečnosti in je samodejno vodila k moralni teologiji. Še pred izdajo *Kritike* se je ta teorija – na podlagi podrobnejše opredelitve pojma srečnosti, ki je zdaj vključevala razumskost, svobodo in samozadovoljstvo – razvila v nauk o epigenezi srečnosti iz zakonov svobode. Toda to še ni vse. Refleksije z začetka osemdesetih navajajo k obstoju še ena razvojne stopnje, ko se je ta nauk preoblikovala v sistem epigeneze čiste moralnosti, ki je na podlagi vzporednosti med spoznavanjem in delovanjem skušala utemeljiti brezpogojno zavezujočnost izhajajoč iz apriornih pogojev enotnosti hotenja končnega umnega bitja. Čeprav je bil program videti notranje konsistenten in navzven v skladu z okvirnimi zahtevami kritične spoznavne teorije, je bil nato – pod očitnim vplivom Rousseauja in verjetno kot pretiran odziv proti Garveju – nepričakovano opuščen. Toda ker po avtorjevem prepričanju Kantova končna moralna teorija v osnovi izhaja iz nekritičnega pojmovanja delujočega subjekta, se članek zaključi s tezo, da je treba za dosledno rekonstrukcijo kritične moralne filozofije poseči nazaj po gradivu, ki ga je nekoč razvil in opustil Kant sam.