THE FEMALE PHALLUS: On Alfred Kinsey's sexual vitalism, the theo-political reinstatement of the male/female divide, and the postmodern de-finitization of sexualities. J. Edgar Bauer Jawaharlal Nehru University, j.edgarbauer@t-online.de ABSTRACT The study examines anthropology's ongoing neglect of the theoretical challenges posed by Alfred Kinsey's (1894-1956) critique of binary sexuality and his re-definition of sexual difference. Focusing on the universal variability of life and the many-leveled continuities of the sexual, Kinsey propounded a deconstructive approach of sex research conducive to a paradigm shift at the core of sexology that allows grasping sexuality as a matter of individual differences within a continuous scheme of sexual distribution. While Kinsey's disruptive contentions have been mostly disregarded by anthropologists for decades, they continue to incite, on the one side, infuriated reactions from the proponents of a Bible-inspired re-instatement of the clear-cut male/female divide, and, on the other, enthusiastic recognition from post-modern advocates of a queer unsettling and rethinking of traditional conceptualizations of sexuality that operate with closed sets of sexual alternatives. KEYWORDS: anthropology and sexuality, life/vitalism, male/female divide, sexology, sexual categories 'Pour nous, il existe semble-t-il non pas un ou deux sexes mais autant de sexes (cf. Guattari/ Deleuze) qu'il y a d'individus' (Wittig 2001: 107 - 108). 'C'est cela, les machines désirantes ou le sexe non humain: non pas un ni deux, mais n... sexes' (Deleuze and Guattari 1999: 352). 'Ainsi l'humanité dans le temps humain, anti-animal, du travail est-elle en nous ce qui nous réduit à des choses et l'animalité est alors ce qui garde en nous la valeur d'une existence du sujet pour lui-même' (Bataille 1988: 354). ANTHROPOLOGICAL NOTEBOOKS 13 (1): 5-32. ISSN 1408-032X © Slovene Anthropological Society 2007 1. Introduction Eric Wolf's often-quoted depiction of anthropology as '[...] the most scientific of the humanities, and the most humanistic of the sciences' (1974: 88) is hardly validated by the discipline's response to the theoretical challenges posed by sexology and gender studies. Indicatively, contemporary anthropology has mostly shunned revisiting its assumption and implementation of binomial sexual schemes and the ensuing same-sex and other-sex combinatories. Prefiguring this questionable self-reliance, Max Scheler (1874-1928), Helmuth Plessner (1892-1985), and Arnold Gehlen (1904-1976) - the founders of anthropology as a philosophical discipline1 - blatantly ignored the overwhelming evidence against the binary conception of sexuality adduced by Magnus Hirschfeld (1868-1935) in his 'doctrine of sexual intermediaries' (see Bauer 1998/2003, 2007). When anthropology was already well established as a social science in the middle of the twentieth century, an analogous reaction took place with regard to the work of Alfred C. Kinsey (1894-1956). While generally acknowledging the scientific import and cultural impact of Kinsey's reports on male and female sexual behaviour (see Kinsey 1948, 1998),2 the leading social and cultural anthropologists of the time conveniently avoided confronting his deconstructive approach of dichotomous sexual schemes. Despite the early focus on sexuality in studies such as Bronislaw Malinowski's Sex and Repression in Savage Society (1927), later generations of anthropologists who could have benefited from Kinsey's sexological insights consistently neglected his principled disruption of closed sexual schemes, and contented themselves with - at most - supplementing the traditionally-sanctioned sexual binary with an allegedly 'third sex' inclusive of all forms of sexual deviancy. Such half-hearted strategies of theoretical modernization add plausibility to Carole S. Vance's contention that 'anthropology as a field has been far from courageous or even adequate in its investigation of sexuality' (2007: 41).3 The philosophers' main works that may be consulted in this connection are: Scheler 1973, 1976; Plessner 1981, 1983; and Gehlen 1983, 1993. 2 Although the first Report was formally co-authored by two, the second by three of his associates, Kinsey actually wrote almost single-handedly the two volumes. Wardell Pomeroy, one of the coauthors, points out: 'Kinsey did the actual writing himself, dictating the last portions of the Male volume to a stenotypist imported from Chicago. [...] The rest of us read every word, of course, several times over, but relatively few of the suggestions we made were taken. Kinsey always listened attentively to us, and occasionally he nodded his head and agreed, but more often he was convinced that he was right and we were wrong' (1972: 261). In view of the general stance taken in this essay regarding the treatment of sexuality within anthropology, it is significant that Vance also remarks that 'it is perhaps not surprising that the recent development of a more cultural and non-essentialist discourse about sexuality has sprung not from the center of anthropology but from its periphery, from other disciplines (especially history), and from theorizing done by marginal groups' (2007: 42). 2. Anthropological misprisions of Kinsey's work In the rather uneventful reception of Kinsey's work within anthropology, it is doubtless significant that Edgar Gregersen dedicated his impressive anthropological survey of Sexual Practices to the memory of Alfred C. Kinsey, whom he epitomizes as 'still the most spectacular light in the history of the study of human sexuality' (1984: [2]). Discussing the sexologist's Wirkungsgeschichte, Gregersen pertinently indicates that 'there still remains virtually nothing even remotely approaching a Kinsey Report for any non-western society. Anthropologists, however, tend to be quite free with their criticism of the work of the Kinsey team' (ibid.: 37). This attitude is well illustrated by Kinsey's contemporary Margaret Mead (1901-1978), who, despite her voluminous study titled Male and Female (1996), disregarded Kinsey's attempts to disrupt binary schemes of sexual distribution. Obviating any in-depth discussion of Kinsey's ground ideas, Mead stated that 'the principle things that make the Kinsey [Male] report a cultural phenomenon of sorts are two: its scale and the amount of publicity it has received, not its findings' (1948: 58). On these assumptions, she went on to expatiate on what she considered Kinsey's mechanistic reduction of sex to 'the category of a simple act of elimination' (ibid.: 61). Complementary to Mead's assertion that Kinsey's view of sex is 'excremental rather than sacramental' (ibid.: 64) is her contention that the sexologist obliterates the interpersonal context and biological significance of sexuality for the sake of 'quantification, justification by numbers, atomization' (ibid.: 67).4 In contrast with Mead's prevalently idiosyncratic assessments, Gilbert Herdt seems to be one of the first anthropologists to have sensed the critical import of Kinsey's focus on sexual categorizations. In this regard, he acknowledges that Kinsey - that great quantifier of American sexuality, who was trained in zoology -could well understand the difficulties involved in the classification of [sexual] acts, as we see when he remarked that it is the human mind, not nature, that classifies (1994a: 15). Notwithstanding his recognition of Kinsey's epistemological perceptiveness, Herdt proceeds to portray the sexologist as an [...] unerring dimorphic thinker, who never questioned the idea of male and female as a fundamental classification of humans, even as he helped to deconstruct the received biologism of homosexual and heterosexual in sexual study (ibid.). As to the genesis of Kinsey's shortcomings, Herdt suggests that his notion of human sexual types constitutes '[...] a survival of the realistic zoological penchant of nineteenth-century thought in twentieth-century thinkers' (1994b: 35). Regardless of their brevity, Herdt's objections betray an astounding misprision of the decisive role taxonomy played in Kinsey's grasp of the sexual uniqueness of individuals. 4 For a brief depiction of Mead's contentions and critical strategies in this regard, see Jones 1997: 579580. 3. Sexual uniqueness Only recently, a pioneering collection of essays titled Out in Theory. The Emergence of Lesbian and Gay Anthropology has sought 'to situate gay and lesbian anthropology in the larger history of the discipline' (Lewin & Leap 2007: 5). In her contribution to the volume, Gayle Rubin is keen to acknowledge '[...] the enormity of the contributions of Kinsey' (2002: 55), and asserts that 'Indiana University, where the Kinsey Institute was located, served as major intellectual loci for redefining sexuality and resituating sexual deviance' (ibid.: 22). In her further elaborations, Rubin underscores the importance and influence not only of Kinsey's distinction between sexual acts and named sexual identities (ibid.: 57), but also - and perhaps more importantly - of his postulation of the heterosexual/homosexual continuum and the anti-dualistic stance it implies (ibid.: 37, 57). Despite her lavish praise of the sexologist, however, Rubin neglects - not unlike Herdt - the relevancy of Kinsey's taxonomic approach of nature to his sexological apprehension of the individual. In view of Herdt's and Rubin's oversights, it is all the more significant that Bill Condon, the writer and director of the critically acclaimed motion picture Kinsey (see Feld 2004: 215-16), stressed the significance of the sexologist's oeuvre for contemporary reassessments of sexual individuality. As Condon asserted in a 2004 interview, 'Dr. Kinsey was a scientist who tried to categorize everyone [...] and then used that process to prove that everyone was different' (Feld 2004: 216). Moreover, Condon maintained: Kinsey's basic idea, if you were to put it in a nutshell, is that everyone's sexuality is unique. Having collected over a million gall wasps, he discovered that none of those tiny insects was identical to another. He then took that notion of individual variation and applied it to human sexuality. The problem, as he saw it, was that, though we're all different, we all need to feel part of the group to feel reassured that what we do is normal. But there's no such thing as normal - there's only common or rare. That's all that Kinsey was trying to figure out: what was common and what was rare (ibid.: 224). Whereas in Herdt's estimate Kinsey merely mirrors the pervading dualisms of Western thought in his allegedly classificatory zeal, Condon salutes his disruptive strategies against taxonomical closures on behalf of the categorially non-subsumable individual: '[...] that's what's so moving about Kinsey. He was always speaking out for the individual' (ibid.: 225). Corroborating Condon's views, Rob Feld, the interviewer, contributed in due course the illuminating comment: 'By using the mob's own tendency to categorize and label, Kinsey subverted that very process by showing its impossibility' (ibid.: 216). 4. Kinsey's 'individuals' Condon's views on the overall demarche of Kinsey's sexology are suggestive of a careful reading of texts mostly disregarded, but highly relevant to the epistemic premises of his research and œuvre. Indeed, Condon clearly draws in his elaborations on a text that was published under the title Individuals by Cornelia Christenson at the opening of her Kinsey biography, and is considered to be the first exposition of Kinsey's 'sexual philosophy' (Gathorne-Hardy 1999: 152). Despite being originally only an address delivered by Kinsey as president of the Indiana University chapter of Phi Beta Kappa to its newly elected members in 1939, the text in question offers an indispensable hermeneutical key for determining the ground assumptions of his sexology. As Christenson underlines, [...] this brief statement, written when he had spent twenty years studying gall wasps and was just embarking on the study of sex, epitomizes the philosophy that underlay all of Kinsey's work. As a taxonomist he was impressed by the limitless variety of living creatures, whether gall wasps or human beings, and by the scientific and social import of recognizing their differences (1971: 3). In his speech, Kinsey highlights the universal variability of life and remarks that the endless re-combinations of biologic characters in different individuals '[...] swell the possibilities to something which is, for all essential purposes, infinity (1971a: 5; emphasis added). On these premises, Kinsey goes on to make a decisive critical assertion: 'The failure to recognize this unlimited nonidentity has, even in biology, vitiated much of our scientific work' (ibid.). Although the text does not mention explicitly the sexual variability of human beings, it is apparent that Kinsey's axioms regarding the 'multiplicity of types which range continuously' (ibid.: 8) are not only directly applicable to sexual taxonomy, but conducive to the disruption of 'dichotomous classifications' pervasive in sexology.5 Against the backdrop of Kinsey's clearly formulated stance, Herdt's depiction of the sexologist as a 'unerring dimorphic thinker' evinces itself as groundless. 5. Natural continuities and classificatory conveniences Despite the ongoing questioning of the male/female divide throughout the humanities and social sciences, anthropology has evinced little interest in exploring and assessing Kinsey's subversive outlook and findings. Disinclined to undertake close readings of Kinsey's biological, entomological, and sexological writings, his few commentators and critics within the discipline have mostly overlooked the critical potency inherent in the postulation of a natural sexual continuum as opposed to the clear-cut distributional schemes of binomial sexuality. As though sensing the need to guard against such possible misprisions, Kinsey stressed in the Male volume that reality is a continuum (1948: 647) and that '[...] the continuum [...] is the reality in nature' (ibid.: 656). Moreover, on the assumption that '[...] only the human mind invents categories and tries to force facts into separated pigeon - holes,' Kinsey refers to the living world as 'a continuum in each and every one of its aspects' (ibid.: 639). Although the following Female volume was no less critical of the tendency of '[...] the human mind [...] to dichotomize in its classification of phenomena' (1998: 469), Kinsey conceded that, at times, pragmatic considerations make it necessary to implement dichotomous schemes. Elaborating in a significant passage on physiological and psychological distinctions, Kinsey asserts that such 'distinctions can never be sharp, and they probably do not represent reality; but they are convenient distinctions Furthermore, Kinsey points out toward the end of his address: 'Scholarly thinking as well as the laymen's evaluation still needs to be tempered with the realization that individual variations shape into a continuous curve on which there are no sharp divisions between normal and abnormal, between right and wrong' (1971a: 9). to make, particularly in regard of human behavior' (ibid.: 642). Thus, despite his general scepticism vis-à-vis categorial compartmentations and his insistence on their artificial character,6 Kinsey eventually recurs to such disjunctive conveniences at decisive junctures of his sexology. In this regard, the most prominent locus is obviously the ur-binomial to which the very titles of the sex Reports appeal: that between Male and Female. Given the radical consequences of criticizing '[...] the tendency to categorize sexual activities under only two heads, and [the] failure to recognize the endless gradations that actually exist' (1948: 650), Kinsey seems to have no more cogent explanation orjustification to offer for reverting to the old sexual binary than the constraint to organize new knowledge utilizing historically predetermined, and thus lastly inadequate instrumentalities. Since Kinsey never recanted his views on the pervasiveness of natural continuity, the groundwork of his sexology is marked by a tensional field whose resolution would necessitate the thorough dismantlement of the binomial divide that constellates the two sex Reports. While the scope of this self/deconstructive task is clearly beyond the argumentative deployments of Kinsey's published work, his incipient articulation of the problem is sufficient to convey what Paul Robinson terms Kinsey's 'extreme nominalist position' (1977: 68) and James Jones his 'radical antiessentialism' (1997: 531). 6. A new distributional scheme of behavioural sexuality The parallel chapters of the sex Reports titled 'The Heterosexual-Homosexual Balance' (see Kinsey 1948: 636-55; Kinsey 1998: 468-76) comprise what can be considered the epistemic core of Kinsey's views on behavioural sexual difference. Discussing the relation between the sexual continuum and its possible partitions, Kinsey points out in the corresponding chapter of the Male volume: While emphasizing the continuity of the gradations between the exclusively heterosexual and exclusively homosexual histories [i.e. the empirical sources of the Report], it has seemed desirable to develop some sort of classification which could be based on the relative amounts of heterosexual and of homosexual experience or response in each history (1948: 639). The resulting classificatory scale based on both psychological reactions and overt experience includes seven gradations depicted as follows: 0 = Exclusively heterosexual with no homosexual. 1 = Predominantly heterosexual, only incidentally homosexual. 2 = Predominantly heterosexual, but more than incidentally homosexual. 3 = Equally heterosexual and homosexual. 4 = Predominantly homosexual, but more than incidentally heterosexual. 5 = Predominantly homosexual, but incidentally heterosexual. 6 = Exclusively homosexual (ibid.: 638). 6 Kinsey's contentions in this respect correspond mutatis mutandis to his views concerning the artificiality and provisoriness of taxonomy as expressed in his 1936 treatise on Cynips: 'The maintenance of a system of higher categories is still warranted as a classificatory convenience. Even if it must be a system of artificial conventions, it is a means of cataloging knowledge. The importance of the classificatory function of taxonomy increases with every increase in the number of described species and in our understanding of their biology. We need a system of even greater complexity than was needed in any earlier stage of the science' (1936: 60; bold type in the original). Although the basic seven-fold partition7 has the advantage of differentiation and nuance over the merely binomial sexual distribution, Kinsey does not ignore the inadequacies of his own alternative scheme when applied to the concrete diversity of individuals. On the contrary, he unequivocally relativizes its merits in a pregnant passage of the Female volume: While the scale provides seven categories, it should be recognized that the reality includes individuals of every intermediate type, lying in a continuum between the two extremes and between each and every category on the scale (1998: 471).8 In light of Kinsey's distributional paradigm, both the postulation of '[...] merely two types of individuals, heterosexual and homosexual,' and '[...] the characterization of the homosexual as a third sex' (1948: 647) lose whatever theoretical forcibleness they might have had in the past. Since, moreover, no categorial compartmentation can do justice to the profusion of sexual varieties in the continuum Kinsey's new scale does not pretend to be a definitive substitute for the binomial scheme, but only a heuristic - and thus lastly provisory - improvement. While superseding the behavioural sexual binary by offering a more differentiated pattern (ibid.: 642) for tackling the complexities of concrete sexualities, Kinsey's seven-fold scheme is ultimately designed to efface itself in the face of the individual. 7. Taxonomy and individual differences In view of Herdt's objections against the dimorphic patterns Kinsey allegedly inherited from nineteenth-century zoology, it seems appropriate to recall that the sexologist considered having attained his decisive deconstructive insights not despite his taxonomical outlook as a biologist, but thanks to it. As the leading expert of his generation in the hymenoptera family of Cynipidae, Kinsey assumed from early on the standpoint that the infinite re-combination of the biological traits in any given species renders possible the emergence of radically unique individuals. Thus, in correspondence with the seminal ideas expressed in his Phi Beta Kappa address (1971a: 5), Kinsey declared in the Male volume that '[...] the technique of this research has been taxonomic' (1948: 16). Moreover, he remarked that his reiterations concerning variation and variability (see Kinsey 1948: 21, 195, 203, 209, 506, 515, 521, 533, 537, 582) were designed to reinforce the 'most important fact' of individual difference, in accordance with his ground contention that [.] modern taxonomy is the product of an increasing awareness among biologists of the uniqueness of individuals, and of the wide range of variation which may occur in any population of individuals (ibid.: 17). The depiction of the basic scale is very similar in both Reports (see Kinsey 1998: 470). However, the Female volume includes a supplementary gradation termed 'X' that encompasses individuals who '[...] do not respond erotically to either heterosexual or homosexual stimuli, and do not have overt physical contacts with individuals of either sex in which there is evidence of any response' (ibid.: 472). 8 The parallel passage in the Male volume reads: 'It should be emphasized again that the reality is a continuum, with individuals in the population occupying not only the seven categories which are recognized here, but every gradation between each of the categories, as well. Nevertheless, it does no great injustice to the fact to group the population as indicated above' (Kinsey 1948: 647). Even fifteen years after the 1939 address, Kinsey insisted on his basic insights regarding individual difference in a brief passage included in the Female report under the heading 'The Combination of Variables' that runs: The sexual history of each individual represents a unique combination of these variables [ranging from the incidences and frequencies of erotic response to the sources of sexual outlet.] There is little chance that such a combination has ever existed before, or ever will exist again. We have never found any individual who was a composite of all of the averages on all of the aspects of sexual response and overt activity which we have analyzed in the present volume. This is the most important fact which we can report on the sexual histories of the females who have contributed to the present study (1998: 543). By assuming '[...] that the phenomenon of variability is universal in the living world' (1971a: 7), and that '[...] individual variation [...] is the most persistent reality in human sexual behavior' (1998: 538), Kinsey was setting forth the coordinates of a new conception of sexual difference beyond the male/female dichotomy and its ad hoc supplements. Since re vera only individuals constitute warranted excisions within the sexual continuum, their subsumption under any predetermined, finite set of sexual categories can claim at most the status of purposive provisionalness. 8. Individuals, acts, and sexual categories If continuity is - as Kinsey contends - pervasive in nature, then sexuality in all its descriptive layers counters the male/female dichotomy that dominates Western thought and the sexology it has brought about. Given the Reports' programmatic concentration on the behavioural layer, however, the thorough dissolution of the many-layered sexual disjunction was bound to remain, in the last resort, out of their reach. It is thus first and foremost for reasons of method that Kinsey circumscribed his critical task to the disruption of the exclusive heterosexual/homosexual combinatories of individuals subsumed under the male/female dichotomy. In his arguments against the '[...] all-or-none proposition, as heterosexual-ity and homosexuality have ordinarily been taken to be' (1948: 661), Kinsey underscores that '[...] there is every gradation between complete homosexuality and complete heterosexual-ity' (ibid.: 664), whereby these gradations are not designed to serve as '[...] marker[s] of identity' (Jones 1997: 530) of human beings. Critiquing the unwarranted subsumption of individuals under categorial schemes, Kinsey points out in the Male volume: It would encourage clearer thinking on these matters if persons were not characterized as heterosexual or homosexual, but as individuals who have had certain amounts of heterosexual experience and certain amounts of homosexual experience. Instead of using these terms as substantives which stand for persons, or even as adjectives to describe persons, they may better be used to describe the nature of the overt sexual relations, or of the stimuli to which an individual erotically responds (1948: 617). Accordingly, Kinsey asserts in the Female volume that terms such as masturba-tory, heterosexual or homosexual '[...] are of value only because they describe the source of the sexual stimulation, and they should not be taken as descriptions of the individuals who respond to the various stimuli' (1998: 447). On these premises, the term homosexual, for instance, is used throughout the volume 'primarily to describe relationships, and [...] not [...] to describe individuals who were involved in those relationships' (ibid.; italics in the original). By restricting the use of the term 'the homosexual' (or, alternatively, 'the heterosexual') to designate either a specific component in the sexual history of individuals or a determinate factor in their erotic constitution (see Kinsey 1948: 261, 396, 397, 617, 657),9 Kinsey detached the individual from the constrictions of categorizations, and therewith paved the way for his key contention regarding the 'omniphile' (Condon 2004: '88.'),10 polymorphous sexuality of all human beings. Hinting at his principled critique of sexual repression through culture, Kinsey wittily remarked in this connection: Considering the physiology of sexual response and the mammalian backgrounds of human behaviour, it is not so difficult to explain why a human animal does a particular thing sexually. It is more difficult to explain why each and every individual is not involved in every type of sexual activity (1998: 451). 9. The many-layered continuities of the sexual Given the scarcity of close readings of Kinsey's main theoretical articulations, it is not surprising that hardly any critical attention has been paid to the methodological circumscription of his research and the resulting theoretical shortcomings in his treatment of non-behavioural sexual continuities. Despite his innovative application of taxonomical insights to the study of human sexuality and his acknowledgement of the continuity inherent in all its descriptive layers, Kinsey did not envisage the dismantlement of the binary conception of the pre- and para-behavioural sexual layers that contribute to the configuration of the individual's sexual ethology. Notwithstanding the overall anti-dualis-tic thrust of his sexology, Kinsey barely reflected on the male/female disjunction referred to in the very titles of the two sex Reports, and apparently never considered dealing with the issue in the books he planned to work on after the publication of the Female volume (see Kinsey 1948: 7; Pomeroy 1971: 445-48). Even when reviewing the history of sexology, Kinsey was keen to highlight earlier treatments of behavioural continuity, but easily overlooked previous efforts -especially those of Magnus Hirschfeld (see Bauer 2002, 2006a, 2006b) - to challenge the 9 It should be remarked, however, that Kinsey is not always consistent with his own stipulations, since at least on one occasion he uses expressions such as 'homosexual individuals,' and 'heterosexual/ homosexual male[s]' (1948: 632). Nevertheless, upon consideration of the immediate context, it becomes apparent that these expressions are meant to designate heterosexually or homosexually experienced individuals. The pagination of Condon's 'Script' does not follow the general pagination of the book. The 'Script' has been inserted between pp. 230 and 339 with a pagination of its own running from '1.' to '108.' For the sake of clarity, all references made in the text to the page numbers of the 'Script' will be followed by a period (as in the original) and set in quotation marks. binomial distribution of somatic sexuality.11 Kinsey's inadequate account of the biologic complexities that underlie sexual behaviour is most conspicuous, when, in a discussion of the term 'bisexual,' he contents himself with the imprecise - and thus misleading - assertion that there is no correlation between the bisexual behaviour of individuals and the occurrence of 'both masculine and feminine qualities within their single bodies' (1948: 657). Unwilling to question systematically the dichotomies of corporeal sexuality, Kinsey was not in a position to elucidate the problematic links between his hypothetization of clear-cut male and female objects of sexual response, on the one hand, and the postulation of behavioural gradations that bridge the allegedly dichotomous sexes, on the other. Since Kinsey never explored in depth the bio-sexual variability he assumed in principle, he tended to revert to dichotomous assumptions that allowed him to depict the continuous diversity of sexual behaviours as expansible combinatories of two mutually exclusive somatic sexes. 10. Dichotomous sexuality and the female phallus Notwithstanding the deficiencies and ambiguities in his treatment of the bio-sexual continuum, Kinsey provided specific facts and arguments clearly designed to undermine the binomial divide of corporeal sexuality. In this respect, his elaborations on female sexuality are especially relevant. While contending that the female cannot maintain her arousal without physical stimulation, and that therefore her response to psychosexual stimuli differs from that of the male (see Kinsey 1998: 688),12 Kinsey asserted that men and women 'are alike in their basic anatomy and physiology' (ibid.: 641). He underscored furthermore that 'the anatomic structures which are most essential to sexual response and orgasm are nearly identical in the human female and male' (ibid.: 593). As regards their few ascertainable differences, Kinsey maintained that these 'are associated with the different functions of the sexes in reproductive processes, but they are of no great significance in the origins and development of sexual response and orgasm' (ibid.). Anticipating this strand of argument, Kinsey had already drawn attention in an earlier passage of the Female volume to the fact that '[t]he embryonic phallus becomes the penis of the male or the clitoris of the female' (ibid.: 572). More importantly, he reminds his readers that 'the clitoris [...] is the phallus of the female' (ibid.: 574), and goes on to mention speculations on the sexual response of a 'female who had a phallus as large as the average penis' (ibid.: 573; emphasis added). 11 Without referring to Hirschfeld or Kinsey, Betty Roszak has elaborated in a noteworthy essay titled 'The Human Continuum' on the reasons why the masculine/feminine dichotomy should be overcome on both the biological and psychological levels. In the concluding passages she points out: 'There is a good biological basis to this [Platonic] myth [of the androgyne]; although the sexes are externally differentiated, they are still structurally homologous. Psychologically, too, the speculations of George Groddek are apt: "Personal sex cuts right across the fundamental qualities of human nature [...]." The dichotomizing of human qualities can thus be seen as a basic error in men's understanding of nature. Biologically, both sexes are present in each' (1969: 306). For a critique of this contention, see Robinson 1977: 114-15. Kinsey's striking depiction of the clitoris of an adult woman as a female phallus contrasting with the male penis, as well as his memorable dismantlement of the Freudian postulation of a non-clitoral, vaginal orgasm (ibid.: 582-84)13 reflect his grasp of morphologic and physiologic homologies between the allegedly binomial sexes as tokens of the biological male/female continuum,14 whose critical implications, however, he counterproductively neglected at decisive junctures of his sexology. Against this backdrop, it is no wonder that Kinsey - despite his pregnant clues concerning sexual continuities - failed to conclude from his own premises that the so-called physical intersexes do not constitute mere exceptions to the traditional sexual-distributional binary, but reveal ad oculos the need of its definitive supersedure. Instead of drawing upon his collected case histories to reinforce a thorough deconstruction of the binary conception of the pre-behavioural layers of sexuality, Kinsey mostly operated with a binomial scheme of somatic sexuality that underlies the sexual variability of the 'psyche' and its ascertainable responses and behaviour. 11. The transsexual challenge Not assuming the challenge posed by his own postulation of the natural continuum of sexuality, Kinsey went at times beyond the mere heuristic use of dichotomous 'conveniences,' and actually fell back on binomial sexual conceptualizations not only in salient passages of his two Reports. Demonstrably, he also resorted to dichotomous schemes when providing private advice concerning sex change surgery. In a letter addressed to a prospective transsexual in 1951 Kinsey wrote: 'A male cannot be transformed into a female through any known surgical means. In other words, it would be very hopeless to attempt to amputate your male organs and implant a vagina,' adding: 'We humans are either heterosexual or homosexual' (quoted in Jones 1997: 622). Contradicting his own ground premises, Kinsey's advice not only leaves unquestioned the male/female and heterosexual/homosexual binaries, but seems to re-invest them with their validity of old. As though he had never postulated the sexual polymorphousness of all human beings, the gradations in sexual response, and the distinction between sexual acts and individual, Kinsey argues within a clearly disjunctive framework of other-sex and a same-sex hy-postatized combinatories, and implicitly reduces the transsexual problem at stake to an issue of mere sexual attraction or orientation. Thus, his further advice reads: There is no disgrace to being in the latter category [of homosexuals] and a great many important successful people have been homosexual. If you cannot adapt yourself to a heterosexual existence in which you 13 It is relevant to note in this regard that the third and last part of the Female volume was devoted -as Pomeroy underscores - 'to something we would not have been able to do in the first book, that is, comparing male and female response and behavior. These chapters [of the third part] were perhaps the book's outstanding contribution, since they constituted a body of original scientific research not available anywhere in the literature before' (1972: 331). For the penis/clitoris homology among spider monkeys as supporting evidence in this connection, see Kinsey 1998: 574. adopt the role of a male, I would certainly advise you to go to London and to find a homosexual colony [...]. Fighting the problem, hoping for physical transformation is certainly not a satisfactory solution (quoted in Jones 1997: 622).15 Some years later, in 1955, Kinsey counselled an American soldier who was also considering a sex change operation. According to Jones, 'Kinsey advised against it [...]. No operation, he insisted, could make a man into a woman' (1997: 622).16 This second case is all the more relevant for it reveals Kinsey's unchanged stance on the transsexual issue, even after having met and extensively interviewed two years before, in 1953, Christine (formerly George) Jorgensen, an ex-GI who had had in Copenhagen one of the earliest successful sex-change operations on record (see Gathorne-Hardy 1999: 391-92; Bullough 1994: 217-21). Despite remembering warmly her encounter with Kinsey in Bloomington, she wrote in her autobiography that he '[...] left [her] with the impression that he believed his books on sexual behavior were the definitive ones, and there was not much left to be said on the subject' (Jorgensen 1968: 202). Apparently, Kinsey's principled contentions regarding sexual individuality and the continuum of sexuality played no role in their exchanges, for not even the bio-psychological and biographical complexities of the very forthcoming Christine Jorgensen sufficed to move Kinsey to disavow the sexual disjunctions that the most critically radical passages of the two sex Reports had set out to debunk. 12. Sexual histories and the dismantlement of sexual normalcy Kinsey's lack of understanding for the specific quandaries of transsexual individuals is all the more striking since the major impact he achieved on Western intellectual history and mores ensued from the incontrovertible ascertainment of sexual diversity based on the case histories of thousands of individuals he and his collaborators had interviewed since 1938. Widely acknowledged as 'Kinsey's most brilliant creation' (Robinson 1977: 44), the interview was a highly sophisticated and adaptable method designed to obtain all sexual information available to the memory of the interviewee in an average of two hours.17 While Kinsey had set himself as goal to collect 100,000 sexual histories, he actually never got even near that number.18 Of the 18,000 individual histories taken over a period of eighteen years, Kinsey secured approximately 8,000, and his three associates Wardell Pomeroy, Jones refers to: 'ACK [i.e. Alfred C. Kinsey] to Anon[ymous], May 5, 1951, KIA [i.e. Kinsey Institute for Research in Sex, Gender, and Reproduction Archive, Indiana University, Bloomington].' Jones refers to: 'ACK to Anon., Oct. 10, 1955, KIA.' For the abbreviations, see previous note. Concerning Kinsey's 'technical devices of interviewing,' see Kinsey 1948: 47-59. While the Male volume was dedicated 'TO the twelve thousand persons who have contributed to these data' (Kinsey 1948: iii) and the Female volume 'To the nearly 8000 females who contributed the data on which this book is based' (1998: v), it is only the first of the two dedications that ends on a decidedly expectant note: 'AND TO the eighty-eight thousand more who, someday, will help complete this study' (1948: iii). Clyde Martin, and Paul Gebhard were responsible for the remainder (see Pomeroy 1972: 4, 137). Of all the interviewees, the most memorable seems to have been a sixty-three years old man - '[...] quiet, soft-spoken, self-effacing - a rather unobtrusive fellow' (ibid.: 122) - whose history took Kinsey and Pomeroy seventeen hours to get. As Pomeroy records, [.] this man had had homosexual relations with 600 preadolescent males, heterosexual relations with 600 preadolescent females, intercourse with countless adults of both sexes, with animals of many species, and besides had employed elaborate techniques of masturbation. He had set down a family tree going back to his grandparents, and of thirty-three family members he had had sexual contacts with seventeen. His grandmother introduced him to heterosexual intercourse, and his first homosexual experience was with his father (ibid.). Among the staggering sexual proficiencies of this interviewee was his ability '[...] to masturbate to ejaculation in ten seconds from a flaccid start' (ibid.), an ability which he calmly demonstrated to the interviewers to counter their disbelief.19 Apart from the data based on personal histories and covering all imaginable varieties of sexual behaviour, Kinsey gathered information coming from sources as diverse as sexual calendars and diaries, photographic collections, toilet wall inscriptions, sado-masochistic materials and mammalian studies (see Kinsey 1948: 73-4; 1998: 83-97). Given that the sex Reports were based on the statistical analysis, systematization and correlation of a profusion of data, their relevancy lay primarily - as Cornelia Christenson has pointed out - '[...] in the fact that science for the first time had been provided with a wide, systematic, and detailed body of knowledge on human sex activity' (1971:125). From then on, the disquieting fact could no longer be obviated that sexology - differing from historical religions and traditional morality - has no reassurances to offer as to what is sexually normal or abnormal behaviour. For this reason and in view of his pleas for sexual tolerance, it seems appropriate to underscore that Kinsey's theoretical instrumentalities fell short of grasping and assessing the alterations effectuated by medical and aesthetic technologies of the body on the purportedly naturally given sex. Disregarding the old Aristotelian insight into the ways in which cpúoiq surpasses itself in and through y, Kinsey seems to have been at a loss for an adequate response to the challenges posed by the emergence of the transsexual phenomenon.20 13. Statistics and individuality In assessing the results of the two Reports, it is indispensable to keep in mind Kinsey's own caveats regarding the scope and limits of his statistical findings. In the Male volume, 19 For further elaborations on this case, see Jones 1997: 507-512; Gathorne-Hardy 1999: 220-26. 20 ' In Protrepticus 11 (W.D. Ross) Aristotle asserts: lil^eTlCd yap ofjTf|V T£XV1"|V f) cpuoit; aAAa airrf) Tf)V cpuaiv, Kai ecrriv erri tco porinsTv Kai ia napaAeinotieva rflq cpuaecoq avarrAripouv. ra ijev yap eoikev arini Suvaanai 6i' auTrjc; r] cpuaiq snrrsAsiv