DEBATE AS A PRACTICE THROUGH THE 
PRISM OF THE DISCURSIVE APPROACH
Anja Šerc
University of Ljubljana, Faculty of social sciences 
Introduction
Communication is the thickest social bond, of which existence represents 
and directs the social reality. There can be no talk about the existence of 
society when there is no communication since it enables us to transmit 
and consequentially form the meanings that establish our society/societies 
in a given historical moment. Although there exists a variety of theoretical 
approaches to the meaning of communication and its role in the shaping 
of social reality, some authors share a common framework regarding the 
definition of communication and that is that ‘communication is a symbolic 
process through which the reality is produced, maintained, repaired and 
transformed’
1
.
Different approaches to the study of communication have developed 
through the history and went hand in hand with the social changes. The 
consensus over the impact of communication on the functioning of the 
society has been established; however, there still exists a definitional void 
with respect to the communication/reality divide. Through the history of 
communication studies there have been three prevalent approaches to 
this relationship: reflective, intentional and constructivist. 
This paper will discuss the common points of two different theoretical 
approaches to the study of the role of language and representation. The 
discussion will focus on rhetorical and discourse theory with special 
emphasis on the application of these two approaches in formal debate. The 
primary source of this work lies in Maurice Charland’s work, Rehabilitating
Rhetoric: Confronting Blindspots in Discourse and Social Theory. The 
aim of this paper is not to provide a deeper theoretical reasoning in
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the field of the before mentioned theoretical challenge but rather an 
application of these tw o approaches and their common points on this f orm of 
institutionalised educational discourse. At the end of this analysis I hope 
to offer possible interpretations of the meaning of formal debate as an 
educational practice in the sense of not only the training of methods of 
persuasion but rather as a forum in which critical argumentation can 
prosper. The evaluation of these two approaches is important in the 
sense of a perceived need for critical discourse in public discussions. In 
this sense it becomes important to gain a critical perspective on the object 
of persuasion which presents a step forward from simply gaining skills of 
successful persuasion. My notion is that critical argumentation which has 
its roots in the constructivist paradigm of language/reality relationship can 
provide for this. The main points of this inquiry will focus on concepts that 
are common to these two approaches: power, discourse, communication 
and culture.
Formal debate – where, when, who? 
For the purpose of this analysis I would like to introduce the working 
definition of formal debate. This definition is needed in order to avoid 
dealing with format distinctions and the confusion of formal debate 
with its everyday use as a communication event with varying degrees 
of structure. Since formal debate comes in a variety of formats guiding 
this communication event, the definition has to come in a more general 
form. Definition of formal debate reads for the purpose of this paper as 
communication event in which two or more teams are involved in the 
before established rules, that include time limitations and the structure of 
speech, on a given topic. The position of the teams regarding the position 
on the given topic is set arbitrarily.
Formal debate as we know it today has many historical parallels, 
especially in ancient Greece. Socrates’ dialectics bears obvious similarities. 
It was used to expose errors in the speech of fellow speaker in a given 
forum, the aim of which was to derive to a higher philosophical recognition. 
It was used as a method of pro et contra by which a controversial issue was 
discussed from two opposite standpoints and had questioning time at its 
core (Škerlep, 2004: 37). Discussion in the form of contrasting standpoints 
was a common practice of sophistic performances and their methods of 
education in general (Grimaldi, 1996: 19-43). Formal debate today shares 

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at least three characteristics with this method; two (or more teams) debate 
a motion from two opposing sides, they try to identify the mistakes in the 
speech of the opposing speaker and they use questioning time for the
purpose of the direct engagement with the opposing speaker. 
Although the role of questioning (also known as cross examination) varies in 
different formats of formal debate it still provides for one of the fundamental 
building blocks of debate in general. The role of questioning in debate 
can be summarized as follows: to destroy material parts of the opponent’s 
case, weaken material parts of the opponent’s case, narrow the debate for 
a more direct clash, and advance one’s case (Copeland, 1995: 10). 
Considering the above mentioned components of formal debate a 
further insight is offered by Toulmin (Toulmin in Škerlep, 2002: 155), who 
talks of argumentation as advocacy and argumentation as inquiry. The 
first is used to describe the advocacy of personal opinions and interests 
of participants which points to the instrumental – strategic rationality of 
participants. By applying this notion of argumentation on formal debate 
we point at the competitive component of an event. Pursuing strategic 
interests of wining is an important element of formal debate, which we 
can not neglect let alone dismiss. The value of this element lies in 
evoking interest through the tension provided by the award system. 
Toulmins’ other notion of argumentation, inquiry, could be applied to 
the second component of formal debate, which is the educational one. 
Invention and application of differentiating arguments on a given topic 
are the ones that create and provide for this component. These two traits 
of formal debate can not however be analyzed in isolation since they are 
and have always been deeply intertwined. The structure of formal debate 
circuit demands from participants to address both components through 
preparing for a certain motion/debate topic in the environment of their 
clubs on one hand and through attending debate tournaments on the 
other. Higher motivation for the preparation process derives from the 
desire to win the competition. Competitions provide the incentive to 
work harder and explore more and in this way these two components 
complement each other. 
The third understanding of contemporary theory of argumentation 
derives stems from audience approach to this social practice. Perelman 
(Perelman, 1993: 26 – 29) distinguishes between persuasion of a particular 
audience and argumentation as the persuasion of a universal audience. 
With that we approach the notion of classical rhetoric which emphasizes 
the role of audience and sets the source of persuasion in audience. The

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role of audience becomes important in analyzing the perception of 
different argumentation practices in formal debate with regard to judges. 
Can we really talk about tabula rasa notion of judges and what are the 
‘appropriate’ arguments one can use in order to win the ‘ballot’?
The ideal of rhetoric?
In the exploration of the meaning of critical rhetoric in the frame of formal 
debate we will follow and evaluate varying definitions of the ideal of 
rhetoric. In dealing with this analysis the emphasis will, above all, be on 
the question whether the usage of rhetorical tools in combination with 
critical argumentation leads to a wider social goal of rhetoric, namely the 
uncovering of the truth. In doing so we will rely on guidances as defined 
by Plato and Foucault. The combination of these two thinkers who stand 
as prominent representatives of two differentiating theoretical fields will 
help us to get closer to the praxis of critiquing. On one hand Plato is used 
as a classical representative of the theory of rhetoric and on the other 
Foucault as a representative of the constructivist paradigm and with both 
thinkers we find concepts related to the practice of formal debate. 
In Phaedrus Plato sets four basic conditions to rhetoric: a speaker 
has to know the truth about the subject, the proof has to have a logical 
structure, a speaker has to pose moral integrity and a speaker has to know 
the psychological traits of their audience. While this conditions treat a 
speaker and audience components of a communication event and are 
still recognised as important today, there is another relevant component, 
namely that of space. Here we turn to Foucault who deals with the 
question of placement constrictions and the application of his notion of 
relevance for critical discourse. His main goal is to prove that the notion 
of truth seeking has to fulfil another requirement, namely that of a free 
environment in which the communication event takes place. His notion
is that ‘The work of profound transformation can only be done in an 
atmosphere which is free and always agitated by permanent criticism’ 
(Foucault, 1982: 34). The hypothesis which we’ll test in this part has two 
components: content and space. At first we will deal with the question 
whether critical argumentation presents a tool for achieving Plato’s ideal 
of rhetoric through the practice of formal debate. The second part will 
deal with the question to what extent (if at all) the forum of formal debate 
presents the environment in which the power relations in the ‘real world’ 

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do not condition the power of the argument in this environment. At the 
end of this article I’ll analyze through the prism of critical argumentation
which goal is primary; the quest for truth or the possibility of a free 
revaluation of ideas. 
An analysis will encompass the analysis and synthesis of secondary 
sources. In this part I’ll rely on the work of post-structuralisms, new wave 
of theory of rhetoric and lectures of debate coaches.  
Symbolical production of reality
Carey characterizes the production of reality as a ‘miracle we perform 
daily and hourly’ (Carey, 1992: 29). The production of reality presents the 
first step in the circle of constant changing of meanings that shape our daily 
reality.  The main role in this process is occupied by symbols through which 
we ‘represent reality’ and which ‘represent for reality’, In the first instance 
we talk about the system of representation
2
 of reality through shared 
symbols (language, signs, images) which form meaning that we 
consequentially decode in accordance with the prevailing cultural codes.
In the second instance we talk about transcriptions of reality that are 
manifested as symbols through which the reality is pictured so that the 
symbols stand on the place of reality they represent (Hall, 2004: 37). 
The production of reality, however, is not a process that would stand 
independently. Mere talk about reality is in a way an oxymoron since by 
talking about reality we at the same time transmit certain meanings and 
offer our insights about it. We talk about reality which we can neither 
comprise nor exceed. In spite of constant fluidity of meanings a certain 
concession to a ‘prevailing meaning’ is necessary in order to function and 
cooperate in the society. The same is true with debate. In order to engage 
in a meaningful practice, the participants need to establish certain rules 
guiding this communication event and they need to understand the ideas 
presented. As already indicated above the meanings change, have 
a certain measure of fluidity which presents the second step in the 
process of the construction of meanings, namely the renewal of meanings. 
This step relies on the component of time, the analysis of which shows
that the prevailing meanings of social groups change through time 
as a consequence of constant criticism and attacks. A new practice that 
developed in formal debate recently is critiquing. While accepted as an 
established practice of argumentation in US formal debate circuit it still 

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has not gained momentum in Europe. The establishment of its 
meaning can only happen through challenging the established ideas and 
representations and introduction of new forms. Why?
The maintenance of certain representations and its meaning depends 
heavily on constant ‘regeneration and resumption of its authority’ (Carey, 
1992: 30). But the process does not stop here. Certain representations 
wane and with this a certain vacuum emerges which has to be filled 
up with new representations, which consequentially form new 
meanings. The revaluation of established ideas is present everywhere.
With the emergence of new social movements, distrust in the established 
forms of political representation, rise of apolitical youth and the ever 
greater fluidity of meanings the need for new forms of argumentation is 
established, if even only in the sphere of formal debate. With this step we 
close the circle of representation and the formation of meanings. 
Formal debate can be applied to this circle as interpretation of reality 
through preset rules that are grounded in the theory of rhetoric. With this 
form of application we move away from looking at debate as a social 
practice as such and analyze the application of critiquing through this 
social practice. Further analysis will focus on the understanding of the 
circle of representation in a given ‘debate round’. The forum of formal 
debate represents a laboratory environment for analyzing this practice of 
argumentation since it is established through given rules which enable all 
participants an equal starting ground. And it is precisely this rule security 
that in a way offers an ideal place for the confrontation and revaluation of 
ideas. In the continuation of this paper the focus will be on different types 
of critiques; critique of language and its meaning, the critique of discourse 
and its implications and the critique of the presentation itself
3
.
On the representation of reality
The identification of the source of meaning becomes crucial in our 
understanding of the reality production process. Three main approaches 
have developed through the years and their main point of differentiation
is identification of the source. These three main approaches are the 
reflective, the intentional and the constructivist approach. The reflective
approach sets the source of meaning in the material object itself by 
which the language becomes a mere reflection of the reality, the language 
merely imitates the truth. The second approach grounds meaning in the 

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speaker who consciously creates meaning and if we follow this approach 
‘lays the meaning on the world’ (Hall, 2004: 45). Both approaches have 
suffered great criticism which foremost stems from the fact that language 
is a social good with socially shared meanings which always have to be 
thought of in a wider social context (Hall, 2004: 44 – 47). The analysis of 
these consequences
4
 becomes the argumentative battleground in which 
participants confront their ideas about the meanings engaged in a certain 
representation. 
Constructivists
5
 meet debaters
The foundation of this approach lays in the notion that all language is 
public and social – by that it denies the notion that the meaning could 
stem from either people or objects themselves. The representatives of this 
field claim that ‘the meaning is not mediated by the world itself but 
rather in the language codes or any other system that we use for the 
representation of our concepts’ (Hall, 2004: 46). Language and the 
conceptual map form two interrelated systems of representation that work 
together in the process of meaning construction (Hall, 2004: 38). The primary
characteristic of each culture is a common language that enables the 
transmission of meanings between members of a certain culture and 
through shared meanings creates a social reality. 
The arguments that stem from this contingency of language have 
gained ground also in formal debate. They are grounded in the analysis 
of a certain speech act and its use of language that connotes a certain 
ideological stance. The most common examples of such a language use 
include the language of development, the sexist use of language, ‘third 
world language’ (Morgan – Parmett, 2001). 
McGee writes about ideographs
6
 which he sees as ideologically 
defined terms in a certain ‘text’ that need to be analysed. As an example 
he discusses the term ‘equality’. There is no pre-defined meaning for this
word in today’s society; the word is given its meaning through its use in 
describing a certain phenomena. The word carries meaning as long as 
this meaning is acceptable for certain audience. In different historical 
periods the term ‘equality’ doesn’t carry the same meaning since its 
meaning changes with the situations through which we define ‘equality’
as a common denominator of a given moment. In spite of changes in 
the meaning this word retains a common value basis as a foundation of 

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situations that carries this word as a common denominator (McGee, 1999: 
431). Also with the use of the term ‘development’ in a speech act there 
can’t be talk about the ‘harms of the speech itself’ but has to be dealt 
with in a wider social context, where wider social meanings are attached 
to it and linked with praxis that defines that meaning. That leads to the 
identification of harmful consequences. Bare prohibition of a certain 
language use does not offer an answer to the implications that this kind 
of language causes. But the use of these terms as a foundation of 
argumentative analysis can be very successful since it offers a comparative 
review of different meanings in different situations. 
The answer, however, still lies in social practices, which are the 
foundation of the meaning. Historical analysis of the changes in the 
meaning plays an important part in answering the questions related to 
the role of these ‘ideographs’ and can be linked to the presentation of the 
fluidity of meanings as described by Carrey. This kind of analysis paints 
the picture and questions the Truth. McGee agrees with the thesis that 
the meaning of the prevailing ideographs depends upon the prevailing 
ideology of a given historical moment and stresses the importance of a 
precise definition and description of that ideology. He also relates to the 
concept of ideology and defines it as ‘a political language composed of 
slogan – like terms signifying collective commitment’ (McGee, 1999: 435). 
Formal debate through the use of constructivist framework can be seen 
as a practical analysis of prevailing ideology since it questions collective 
responsibilities of a certain social group in a given historical moment. If 
we now return to the before mentioned usage of the term ‘development’ 
that is present in the majority of political discourse that deals with state 
relations then we can observe and criticize the social relations that 
abound from this. The role of critical rhetoric is therefore to revaluate 
the social responsibilities of different social groups, in this case, the 
responsibilities of the majority population that are harmed by this kind 
of language use and use argumentative structure to point to the linkage
between the sole use of language and its consequences in the real 
world. The end goal is to analyse the way in which a certain use of language
harms in each and every situation. It is (ab)used since it reproduces 
the power relations that produced its meaning today (in the case of 
‘development’ the way it reproduces the system of inequality between 
states in the system of international relations). 
This form of analysis bares close connection to critical discourse 
analysis that we turn to now. 

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What is there in discourse that is not right?
The definition of discourse that will be used in this part derives from 
M. Foucault (Foucault in Hall, 2004: 65), who expands the field of the 
construction of meaning from language to discourse. Discourse, as 
defined by Foucault, is ‘a group of statements which provide a language for 
talking about – a way of representing the knowledge about – a particular 
historical moment… Discourse is about the production of knowledge 
through language. But… since all social practices entail meaning, and 
meanings shape and influence what we do – our conduct – all practices 
have a discursive aspect (Hall in Hall, 2004: 65). The production of 
knowledge is important from the standpoint of the directions of a certa-
in society that provide commonly acceptable definitions of conduct in 
each situation. Discourse makes sense out of our everyday practices and 
guides our conduct in them. The discourse analysis focuses on  which and 
in which way concrete rules influence the realization of ideas, carrying 
out of practices, the way we define reasonable ways of talking about a 
given subject. But above this, it also focuses on the way other discourses 
are excluded from this framework, the way in which certain themes, 
content and practices are made meaningless. Both sides, exclusion and 
framing, bare substantial consequences on concrete social consequences
because of the influence of discourse on the formation of social 
functioning of social relations. 
The question of knowledge is of crucial importance for Foucault 
and his discussion of discourse since he understands it as inseparably 
intertwined with power relations. Knowledge, in his opinion, has always 
been a consistent part of systems for the supervision of social behaviour 
in practice (Hall, 2004: 68). Foucault also denies Truth as absolute and 
provides it with an anti-pole of the regime of truth, a code through which 
it is shared by a certain social formation about a given social phenome-
na that guides mechanisms and instances that enable the differentiation 
between true and false statements. Foucault derives from this 
conceptualization of power, that is not just negative and suppressive 
but also productive and all-encompassing and which he gives a name of 
micro-physics of power that carries with it concrete consequences for 
the body (Foucault in Hall, 2004: 69–71). But it needs to be emphasized 
that there can never be talk about just one discourse, that would thread 
through all conceptualizations of a certain social phenomena. Instead 
of just one discourse there is a ‘variety of discourses’, that are mutually 
intertwined, as is exposed by Burr (Burr, 1998: 50). 

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The formations of identity through discourse, the sense of belonging 
to different groups together form the texture of individuals’ identity. Out 
of the formation of prevailing social practices that form the system of 
the capitalistic economy real consequences for the individual in the 
society derive. Burr stresses that there can be no talk about a ‘coincidental’
choice about one’s own role in the society, since it is created for us 
through the prevailing discourses, which with their prevailing practices 
and prescriptions form and re-affirm that reality (Burr, 1998: 54). 
The construction of critical argument in this case is directly linked 
to the explanation of consequences that are transmitted and defined by 
the prevailing power relations through the formation of defining social 
practices. With this practice of argumentation debaters follow the idea of 
constructivist, who claim, that the models of representation should focus 
on wider social implications that derive from representations and not just
with the sole text as the source of meaning (Hall, 2004: 64). Through the 
application on formal debate the stress is on ‘not just the sole text’ by 
which the introduction of critical arguments offers a step back from 
classical methods of argumentative analysis and introduces a new field of 
argumentation. This group of arguments moves away from the message 
and attributes it with a new source of meaning.  The main question with
this form of analysis is what people do with their speech and/or text 
and what they wish to accomplish with it. This theoretical approach, that 
stresses the importance of discourse gives meaning foremost to the 
analysis in the way in which ‘accounts are constructed and bring about 
effects for the speaker or writer’ (Potter and Wetherell, Edwards and 
Potter, Potter and Reicher in Burr, 1998: 47). This is done through accepted 
forms of argumentation as defined by informal logic. 
First we have to expose the ‘hidden’ assumptions of opponents, 
which in this case relates to the identified discourse and assumptions 
that it entails. If we turn away here from classical notion of assumption 
and turn to Barthes, that defines an assumption as captured in wider 
ideological frames through which we read off meanings. These 
assumptions are never explicitly proven (which is also true for the 
tradition of informal logic) but form a pool of meanings through which
we read of the ‘real meaning’. Debate is about reading off different 
meanings, about constructing the ideas around a given subject area and 
is always open to different interpretations. But not all meanings are 
accepted as equally valid. Critiquing does not just provide for another 

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arrangement of ideas, but offers an interpretation of how these 
interpretations came into being.  
Representation works according to Barthes through two different, 
but in way related concepts; first is the connection between the signifier 
and the signified, through which the signs are related and form a simple 
denotative meaning. In this case we would talk about the structural 
analysis of argument that addresses only the structure of the argument 
and exposes the logical fallacies. But Barthes does not stop here and 
connects this denotative level with the second level in which this sign is 
attached with the second line of signifiers, namely the wider ideological
idea. This second level is identified by Barthes as a myth (Barthes in 
Hall, 2004: 90). The process of critiquing identifies the ‘ideographs’ and 
exposes its hidden meaning.  Schuster (Schuster 2003) stresses the 
importance of the identification of assumptions, rather than words. It is 
the assumption behind the word that is bad, not the word itself. As an 
example she talks about the discourse of development assistance. Of a 
crucial importance is the identification of practices and ways of thinking 
since they rely on ‘wrong’ perceptions about international relations (myth 
of the fair distribution), the perception of the ideal of development, not 
naming certain practices although the discourse implicates them but 
never explicitly talks about them. This leads to the second point of this 
form of analysis, namely the connection of the identified assumption with 
its harmful consequences. This step is primarily based on content analysis. 
It is important foremost in the sense of confronting two ideas that rarely
meet in real life since they diametrically oppose each other and are 
discussed from different positions of power. In the forum of formal 
debate the component of power relations looses its strength since the 
strength of the protagonist of the idea does not lay in their social power. 
Power is replaced with the force of reason, which is grounded in the 
argumentative usage of knowledge that is not bound with any other 
relations. 
The third step of the critical argument construction deals with the 
implications of argument. With this, the strategies of how to construct it 
can go into different directions. Snider lists three most important ones: the 
opponents have never properly identified the problem, the opponents 
will never solve the problem because of their assumptions about it or 
from working out of these assumptions, and bad consequences will follow 
(Snider, 2006). With this step the goal of critical rhetoric is addressed, that 
is according to McKerrow, to give an opportunity to include one’s own 

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insights into the practical interpretation of social consequences 
(McKerrow, 1999: 442). Schuster and Meany analyze the language of ‘Third 
World’ and the hidden assumption of hierarchy of civilizations and the 
practical consequence of creating relations of inferiority and superiority 
(Schuster and Meany, 2002: 188). The strength of an argument in this 
situation can be detached from the strength that the umbrella discourse in 
real life possesses and can be revaluated on the basis of the confrontation 
in this given situation. Because of the preset rules in this communication 
event and because of the argumentative tools that are used to prove a 
given standpoint, there can also be no talk about the prevalence of pathos 
in the persuasion process. With this notion we approach Foucault’s 
notion of the ‘ideal, critical space’. 
Through argument structure, that reveals the assumptions entailed in 
the argument and which are indirectly linked to the power relations, and 
the introduction of practical implications we also follow McKerrow. He 
claims that it is not enough to just identify the ‘wrong discourses’, but also 
to structure arguments in a way which identifies the integration of power 
and knowledge in a certain discursive practice. Only through this can the 
role of the power/knowledge relation as constitutive of social practices be 
identified (McKerrow, 1999: 451). 
In round critical argument structure
We have revised the structure of the critical argument referring to the 
use of language and discourse. The in-round use of these arguments 
looses some of the above mentioned complexities and is adapted to 
avoid some of the theoretical pit falls. Let’s revise the structure of these 
arguments and make them work for the praxis, one which can be used and 
consequentially achieve all the theoretical assumptions of using these 
arguments. In order to do so some basic assumptions of critical argument 
must be proven and here is where the paper turns back to debate theory 
(Meany and Schuster, 2002: 192). 
• The proposition team makes assumption x (involves identification of 
the proposal of the affirmative team)
• Assumption x is bankrupt (or dangerous, or patently silly, or 
shamefully weak...) for the following reasons… 
• Because we successfully criticize the identified assumption x we win 
the debate because… 

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• They fundamentally misunderstand the problem
• The misidentification of the harm undercuts any appeal to solvency
• Their proposal is part of the problem, rather than part of the solution 
• Their problem will at least be unable to ameliorate the problem, 
at worst their proposal will make things worse. (Schuster and Meany, 
2003: 192–193)
Some questions at the end: analysis of debate as a social practice 
The analytical benefit of the theory of rhetoric derives from the tools 
it offers for the exposure and analysis of ‘the structure of reason’ in 
discourses that shape the reality of our day. The interpretive analysis is 
also important in the theory of discourse, since it enables the analysis of 
the structure of organization and the selection of the presented meanings 
(Charland). While the contribution of this tool for the analysis of 
presentation ‘in a debate round’ has been presented above, this section 
deals with the possibilities these tools offer for the analysis ‘from the 
outside’; for the analysis of debate as an independent presentation, as an 
individual social practice. 
If debate is to have an emancipatory potential, it has to fulfil certain 
standards, not just in the sense of content, but also in the sense of its own 
structure. McKerrow in his analysis of critical rhetoric talks about this 
structure and stresses the danger of the lack of communication power, 
which consequentially leads to the prevalence of the ‘rhetoric of elites’. 
His thesis is, that the symbolic power of communication as a praxis has 
to be re-appropriated by the ‘marginalized’ if they want to gain power. 
But under the conditions in which the ruling elite control spaces of 
communication this can not happen. So in order to regain the symbolical 
power the rhetoric of ruling elite has to be replaced with heterodoxical 
rhetoric of these groups (McKerrow, 1999: 456). Is debate a place that 
contributes to this goal?
The achievement of this goal heavily depends upon the ability to 
freely develop discourses that bear the potential for transformation in an 
open environment, where the power of discourse does not depend on 
its real power in the world out there. While the world will not change 
because of one debate round, this social practice still bears substantial 
consequences for the people involved. Two questions are important in 
this regard. Does formal debate empower the already prevailing lines 

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of discourse and help them to regenerate in the environment of formal 
debate? And does it equip the already privileged individuals in our society 
with even more social skills? And if this is all true, where is the place of 
formal debate in the sense of its role as a social practice? 
The aim of this section is not to offer any final answers to the 
questions posed above, but to look into critical theory in order to find 
questions that could help answer these questions. The questions can 
be found in Charland, who revaluates the theory of rhetoric from the 
standpoint of critical theory and asks questions to the communication 
event from the outside. He poses questions to the theory of rhetoric in 
the sense of agent, content, occasion and audience. When analysing 
debate as a social practice through the prism of critical theory, the 
questions Charland poses are as follows; Why a certain speaker? (Is 
there a gender bias? Is there a prevalence of any social group? Who is 
excluded?) Why this occasion? Why a certain topic? (Are the topics 
really set arbitrarily? Are there any topics that are excluded?) Whose 
interests are represented? Which audiences are excluded? (In what way? 
Are there separated competitions?) and Is discourse adapted to the/because 
of  audience? (Charland, 1999: 472). While these questions have already 
been addressed to a certain extent (notably at the Istanbul Conference), 
they offer a good starting point for the analysis of debate as a social 
practice in the light of critical theory. 
Although debate has only a limited reach (debate clubs) it is still 
necessary to evaluate and study the trends that determine it in a given 
moment. Charland with his synthesis of critical theory and the theory of 
rhetoric offers an important insight into this field. Instead of evaluating 
debate solely in the sense of attributing it with certain potentials, these 
potentials need to be revaluated in the sense of achieving their goals 
which help to identify it as a social practice, which is not solely the purpose 
in itself, but also for the society in a wider sense. 
Conclusion 
The power of a given theory depends upon its articulation, places of 
articulation in the power of its presentation. It is my opinion, that post 
-structuralism presents an important contribution to our understanding 
of society, social relations and the relations of power that form our 
understanding. But the power of articulation still heavily depends upon 

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DEBATE AS A PRACTICE THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE ...
the material relations of power. While it has gained  momentum in 
academic sphere where it holds a status of recognized theoretical 
approach, its practical application still remains practically unrecognized. 
The majority of social practices still depend on the positivistic analysis 
of social relations, which has concrete social and material consequences. 
The usage of critical theory for the purpose of contributing to its academic 
reach seems reasonable in many ways. The practical application of critical 
argumentation (although in a limited reach) offers alternative answers 
of the taken for granted truths, that are otherwise used in education and 
offer alternative world views. On the other side, this kind of argumentation 
offers for critical theory a practical way of thinking about the application 
and its usage in the communication events which are still today closed for 
this way of argumentation. 
While debate is primarily dedicated to the exploration of the 
rhetorical tools of analysis of the wider social themes, I believe that 
it is necessary to move away from the sole focus on audience. This is 
important in order to offer public revaluation of norms and to 
consequentially ascribe debate with emancipator potential. Because 
of the incorporation of debate into social practices also the meaning, 
values and ideas of post-structural theory gain importance in analyzing 
and understanding of social relations. Here I would like to turn once 
again to Burr, who exposes the importance of the inter-relation of 
discourse from its real, material events; discourses emerge in things 
that people say or write, and the meaning of things depends on its 
usages in the discursive framework in which they appear. This constant 
dynamics of interpretation that takes place within a given historical 
moment then becomes a source of changes and negotiation about 
meanings that are created through these discourses. Only constant 
negotiation leads to changes, that (though not always) result in social 
progress. The framework of formal debate offers ‘laboratory 
environment’ for the negotiation about meanings that are a part of 
the reality outside of this communication event. The use of tools of 
argumentation and the theory of rhetoric offer important foundation for 
the realization and negotiation about the prevailing opinions since they 
structure the communication event according to certain rules, that make 
content more understandable. 
In my opinion formal debate should stand for more than just another 
school of speaking and offer alternative channels of gaining knowledge 
and the use of critical argumentation in the sense of combining the two 

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ŠOLSKO POLJE 
 LETNIK XVIII 
 ŠTEVILKA 1/2
theoretical approaches mentioned above. The reluctance to new forms of 
argumentation is understandable, but should not hinder the development 
of debate through these channels as well. The structure of formal debate 
activity offers the possibilities of idea revaluation that we too many times 
lack in the real world even if it does so in a limited range for a limited 
amount of people. Therefore it is even of a greater importance not to 
close the channels to new ideas and approaches and not to just repeat the 
prevailing ideas.
Notes 
[1]  The author in this section refers to: Weber, Durkheim, de Tocqueville, 
Huizinga, Burke, Duncan, Portman, Kuhn, Berger, Geertz and the Chicago 
School (Carey, 1992: 23)
[2] ‘That is because it consists, not of individual concepts, but of different 
ways of organizing, clustering, arranging and classifying concepts, and of 
establishing complex relations between them’ (Hall, 2004: 37)
[3] Sometimes the boundaries between the different types of critique are vague. 
The critiquing of language bears similarities with the critique of discourse, 
since the discourse is marked with certain words and is intertwined with the 
critique of thinking and values, since words and discourses rely on a certain 
value and thought set.   
[4] ‘Our private, intended meanings, however personal to us, have to enter into 
the rules, codes and conventions of language to be shared and understood’ 
(Hall, 2004: 45). If we follow the intentional approach then we could never 
find meaning of the concept of love in its material form, and consequentially 
never derive to a common understanding which we could all (or at least the 
majority) agree upon.
[5] Here we follow the thought of Foucault and his discursive approach to 
language. 
[6] An ideograph is an ordinary-language term found in political discourse. It is 
a high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular 
but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal’ (McGee, 1999: 435). A similar 
notion is found in Mouffe and Laclaus ‘empty signifiers’.

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