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revus (2016) 29, 61–76
Vojko Strahovnik*
Defeasibility, norms and exceptions: 
normalcy model
The paper discusses the notion of defeasibility and focuses specifically on defeasible 
(moral and legal) norms. First, it delineates a robust notion of the phenomenon of de-
feasibility, which poses a serious problem for both moral and legal theory. It does this 
by laying out the conditions and desiderata that a model of defeasibility should be able 
to meet. It further focuses on a specific model of defeasibility that utilises the notion of 
normal conditions (normalcy) to expound the robust notion of defeasibility. It argues 
that this model fails in its attempt to do this, particularly since it presupposes further 
pertinent norms and we have reasons to doubt if these are defeasible. It thus does not 
allow defeasibility to go “all the way down” in the normative domain and limits it merely 
to a feature of some sort of mid-level norm. In conclusion, it draws lessons from this 
and positions defeasibility models within a more general pluralistic approach to norms.
Keywords: exceptions, normalcy, normal conditions, moral norms, legal norms, pluralism
1 INTRODUCTION
The concept of defeasibility, especially in the legal and moral domains, has 
become an increasingly popular point of discussion in the last couple of dec-
ades.1 Defeasibility is a multi-faceted concept which is used in different senses 
and can be related to various subjects. There are several open questions or di-
mensions in relation to it. First, there are a number of candidates for being de-
feasible, amongst them concepts, norms, norm formulations, rules, standards, 
principles, laws, generalisations, ideals, reasoning, facts, opinions, statements, 
decisions, regulations, kinds, etc.2 For the purposes of this paper, I shall focus 
my attention on defeasible norms, with a prospect that what will be established 
will in general be transposable, in a more or less direct way, to other defeasi-
ble phenomena in close proximity (principles, rules). Next, there are several 
important open questions and diverging views about the origins, nature, and 
scope of defeasibility. And finally, there is the question about the consequences 
of defeasibility for the theoretical aspects of the given normative domain, as 
* vojko.strahovnik@guest.arnes.si | Associate Professor and Research Associate at the Faculty 
of Theology, University of Ljubljana and European Faculty of Law, Nova Gorica (Slovenia).
1 Ferrer Beltrán & Ratti 2012; Guastini 2012; Hooker & Little 2000; Lance, Potrč & Strahovnik 
2009.
2 Chiassoni 2012: 162; Lance and Little 2007.
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well as for normative practice. Answers to these questions vary in the debate 
with deep theoretical disagreements on almost all the said aspects. 
I shall proceed in the following way. After examining briefly some general 
considerations of defeasibility, I delineate a robust notion of defeasibility in re-
lation to the notion of exception. This notion represents a serious problem for 
any theory of defeasibility and defeasible norms, including those formulated 
within moral and legal theory. In delineating the notion, I put forward a num-
ber of conditions and/or desiderata that a model of defeasibility should meet 
(§2). In §3, I focus specifically on a model of defeasibility that utilises notions of 
normal conditions and normalcy to expound my robust notion of defeasibility. 
After presenting examples of a normalcy-based model in the fields of both legal 
and moral norms, I go on to argue that this model fails in its attempt to do this, 
particularly since it presupposes further pertinent norms and we have reasons 
to doubt if these are defeasible. It thus does not allow defeasibility to go “all the 
way down” in the normative domain and limits it merely to a feature of some 
sort of mid-level norm. In conclusion, (§4) some lessons from this debate are 
discussed and briefly related to the traditional pluralistic model of norms. 
2  DEFEASIBLE NORMS AND EXCEPTIONS: 
CONDITIONS AND DESIDERATA
The debate about defeasibility can be situated within a more general debate 
about the relationship between general principles and particular cases, which 
has been present in philosophy since its early beginnings.3 These discussions 
3 In Plato’s dialogue Statesman, we can follow a debate between Socrates and a young stranger 
from Elea about what defines a good statesman, one that would regulate public affairs justly. 
The dialogue also moves to the question of whether it is possible to rule and govern without 
laws. The stranger, in trying to defend the affirmative answer to this question, proposes the 
idea that it is better that a “royal man” governs instead of laws, since “[l]aw can never issue 
an injunction binding on all which really embodies what is best for each: it cannot prescribe 
with perfect accuracy what is good and right for each member of the community at any one 
time. The differences of human personality, the variety of men’s activities and the inevitable 
unsettlement attending all human experience make it impossible for any art whatsoever to 
issue unqualified rules holding good on all questions at all times”. He continues by arguing 
that the one who governs will probably be unable to avoid any general law being put forward, 
and so one “will lay down laws in general form for the majority, roughly meeting the cases 
of individuals . . . under average circumstances”. Nonetheless, both Socrates and the stranger 
agree that, if exceptions to these general norms were to emerge, it would be unwise, unjust, or 
even ridiculous not to correct such cases (Plato Statesman: 294a–b, quoted in Schauer 2012: 
78). A similar proposal can be found in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. “The reason [i.e., that 
justice and equity are not quite the same thing, and that equity can be seen as a correction of 
legal justice; n. VS] is that all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make 
a universal statement which shall be correct. In those cases, then, in which it is necessary to 
speak universally, but not possible to do so correctly, the law takes the usual case, though it 
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focus on the relationship between general norms on the one hand, and par-
ticularities or exceptions on the other, but frequently such understandings of 
exceptions are not radical enough since exceptions are understood to be mere 
side effects of underspecified or incomplete norms, which could in principle be 
somehow avoided.4 But, as I seek to claim, genuine, robust defeasibility under-
stood to be a “serious problem” goes beyond this and includes genuine excep-
tions, which are not such that they could already be properly explicitly included 
in a general norm or fully specified in advance and thus in principle avoided.5
To get an initial grip on the concept of defeasibility, it is common and useful 
to relate it to the concept of an exception in general or to the presence of (the 
possibility) of exceptional cases in particular, i.e. cases which, on the one hand, 
fall under a certain norm or rule, but which, at the same time, have unbefitting 
normative consequences which we tend to exclude these cases from falling un-
der the mentioned norm or rule. Along these lines, Brożek claims that a “rule 
of the form A => B is defeasible iff it is possible that although A obtains, B does 
not follow.”6 The notion of an exception or an exceptional case, as opposed to 
normal cases, is thus one of the hallmarks of defeasibility.
What do we in fact mean when we say that, e.g., a certain norm, rule, rea-
soning or concept is genuinely defeasible? We must add some further amend-
ments to the initial grasp of the concept as described above. I put forward these 
amendments in the form or conditions or desiderata, which will, at the same 
time, serve as a guide in constructing or evaluating a theory of defeasibility. 
Proceeding this way, I do not claim that all of the conditions and desiderata 
must necessarily be met in a straightforward way; another option is to propose 
a suitable accommodation of a given condition or desideratum. 
is not ignorant of the possibility of error. And it is none the less correct; for the error is not 
in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of the thing, since the matter of the practical 
affairs is of this kind from the start. When the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises 
on it which is not covered by the universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails 
us and has erred by oversimplicity, to correct the omission – to say what the legislator himself 
would have said had he been present and would have put his law if he had known” (Aristotle 
NE: 1137a-b). 
4 Dworkin (1977: 24–25), amongst others, maintains such an optimistic view: “Of course a 
rule may have exceptions. ... However, an accurate statement of the rule would take [these 
exceptions] into account, and any that [it] did not would be incomplete. If the list of 
exceptions is very large, it would be too clumsy to repeat them each time the rule is cited; 
there is, however, no reason in theory why they should not all be added on, and the more 
there are, the more accurate is the statement of the rule”.
5 I do not want to deny that there are some who would claim that what defeasibility boils down 
to is precisely such a phenomenon. My debate is framed in the discursive space of views that 
do allow for and in fact support a more robust notion of defeasibility and genuine exceptions. 
Cf. Chapman 1998: 448; Celano 2012.
6 Brożek 2014.
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(I) First, an exception must in a sense be a “genuine” exception, meaning 
that the exception is not merely a consequence of an initially poorly specified 
norm.7 The defeasibility of norms is in this way not merely due to their in-
correct, imprecise, or vague formulation that could in principle be resolved or 
more clearly spelled out on demand. A model must allow for genuine excep-
tions which cannot be specified in advance (genuine exceptions condition).
(II) Second, defeasible norms are not to be associated merely with some kind 
of “rule of thumb” norms, which we can use most of the time, but which we are 
also able, if required, to specify and turn into exceptionless norms. If defeasible 
norms were associated with just this type of norms and exceptions to them, 
they would neither be a particularly interesting phenomenon nor would they 
pose a serious problem. Defeasible norms must in this sense be fundamental, 
full-fledged norms and such that, after them, judgment takes over (as opposed 
to other norms) (fundamentality condition).
(III) Third, a set of possible exceptions must in principle be open, meaning 
that we can never specify all the possible exceptions to a norm and, in turn, 
round the set off. If that were the case, then these exhaustively specified excep-
tions could be built into the norm itself and the norm would cease to be defea-
sible (open-endedness condition). 
(IV) Fourth, a defeasible norm remains the same and retains its normative 
power even when we are able to find an exception to it. In this sense, it “sur-
vives” the exception and can hold in all further, non-exceptional cases. Being 
prepared to abandon or modify a norm when we encounter an exception would 
make the phenomenon of defeasibility fairly empty. Thus, a model of defeasibil-
ity must be such that it leaves the initial norm intact when we come across an 
exception to it. A defeasible norm must survive beyond the point of arriving at 
an exception and remain the same norm as before an exception was identified 
(identity condition).
(V) Fifth, a defeasible norm must be able to remain in “normative space” 
even in the case of an exception and can shed light on the nature of the excep-
tional case or can indirectly influence the final normative solution. A defeasible 
norm must be such that it has a possible normative pull even in exceptional 
cases (possible relevance condition).
(VI) Sixth, defeasibility must go “all the way down” in the normative field 
and include the most basic norms for a given domain (basicity condition). 
(VII) And lastly, a model of defeasibility must preferably be able to cover 
or accommodate the legal domain, morality and other normative domains, 
7 Celano (2012: 281) labells such exceptions as “true exceptions” (as opposed to merely prima 
facie exceptions) and elaborates this concept in the following way: “For a case to qualify as 
a true exception it must not be already provided for in a reasonably detailed and precise 
‘unless ...’ clause attached to the norm”.
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including – although not being limited to – epistemology, aesthetics,8 social 
conventions, and etiquette (generality desiderata). The paper focuses primarily 
on moral and legal norms, hoping that the discussion in hand will at least start 
paving the way for a more general discussion of defeasible norms that I will 
have to leave for some other occasion.
Some of these points about the conditions stated above can briefly be dem-
onstrated with a rather simplified example of a supposedly defeasible moral 
norm N expressed as: “N: Causing pain is morally wrong”. For this norm to 
be defeasible, (i) it must allow for exceptions, i.e., cases of causing pain which 
are not morally wrong, or in which pain is not wrongdoing (e.g., cases of justi-
fied medical treatment where pain is unavoidable or cases of causing pain as 
part of sports activities); (ii) these exceptions must be genuine exceptions in the 
sense that they are not merely a matter of an imprecise, rule of thumb formula-
tion of the underlying fundamental norm N* (e.g., “The unwarranted causing 
of pain is morally wrong.”); (iii) the set of possible exceptions must be open in 
the sense that we cannot reformulate the norm otherwise so as to include all 
the exceptions (e.g., “N**: Causing pain is morally wrong except in cases in 
which this is part of a justified medical procedure or athletic achievement.”); 
(iv) the initial norm N must remain the same and must retain its normative 
power even after stumbling upon an exceptional case in the sense that the next 
time a paradigmatic case of pain-causing pops up it will still render our judge-
ment about its wrongness warranted; and (v) the norm N must remain part of 
normative space and must influence our judgment indirectly (e.g., if there were 
two options available for the performance of a given medical procedure, both 
involving pain, although one substantially less than the other, then N would still 
be part of our judgment about which one is morally optimal). 
There are several models of defeasibility which try to capture the core of its 
facets related to exceptions as revealed above (e.g., utilising the notions of inde-
terminacy, vagueness, open-texture, etc.). One of the most prominent models is 
the one that focuses on the notion of normalcy. I shall now turn to this model 
to see how it helps to elaborate the understanding of defeasible norms and if it 
meets the said conditions and desiderata. 
3  DEFEASIBILITY AND NORMALCY
One way to spell out the defeasible nature of a given norm is to state that it 
only holds in normal conditions or in normal circumstances.9 Besides utilising 
the notion of normalcy, authors sometimes talk of “privileged conditions”, “typ-
8 Cf. Strahovnik 2004.
9 Celano 2012: 285–287.
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ical conditions”,10 “what standardly, or normally happens”,11 “paradigmatic”12 
cases or central cases. The basic idea behind all of them is the same. A given 
norm applies only within a set of normal circumstances, which are such that 
they cannot be explicitly fully stated and included in the norm as such. Such 
a proposal seems to be well in line with the above highlighted connection be-
tween defeasible norms and genuine exceptions, since exceptions represent ex-
actly those cases which fall outside the scope of normal conditions. 
In what follows, I shall first focus more closely on two particular models 
of defeasible norms that employ such a normalcy condition. The first model 
is proposed by Bruno Celano and is aimed at norms in general, although it 
concerns mostly legal norms and originates from within the debate about le-
gal defeasibility. The second model is proposed by Mark Lance and Margaret 
Little primarily for the domain of moral norms, but this model could also be 
transposed to norms in general. These models are supposedly complementary 
and Celano explicitly appeals to the latter model as a supplement to his own 
proposal.
Celano puts forward his proposal as part of his defence of limited particular-
ism13 concerning norms. He begins with considering potential response strate-
gies to the possibility of conflicting norms and therefore the need to allow for an 
“exception” with respect to at least one norm involved in this conflict. First, he 
rejects the specificationist approach, which proposes that, when norms conflict 
with each other, all “we have to do is specify (that is, suitably restrict the domain 
of application of) at least one of the norms, or the relevant norm, so that, thanks 
to the inclusion of further conditions within its antecedent [...] the conflict – or 
10 Lance and Little 2007; 2008.
11 Celano 2012: 284.
12 Celano 2012: 286.
13 For readers unfamiliar with the debate between generalism and particularism, this is a brief 
recapitulation of the main views and concepts. Particularism regarding a given normative 
domain (e.g., morality) is a view characterised by a negative attitude towards principles, norms 
and rules. Moral particularism can thus be associated with a simple thesis that there are no 
moral principles or with a more elaborate claim that ‘the possibility of moral thought and 
judgment does not depend on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles’ (Dancy 
2004: 73). Moral thought need not consist in the application of moral principles to cases, and 
the morally perfect person is not to be regarded as a person of principle. The opposite view 
is generalism claiming that the moral status of an action is determined by its falling under a 
general moral principle or rule. Parallel to this debate, atomism and holism (also labelled as 
contextualism) are views about reasons. Atomism claims that reasons are context insensitive, 
meaning that they always function (count for or against) in the same way. Holism, on the 
other hand, claims that reasons are context sensitive, that they can vary in their relevance and 
strength, and that they can additionally be combined with each other in ways that go beyond 
a mere addition model (e.g., two reasons which would separately count for a given action, can 
– if present together – represent a reason against it. Particularism is usually combined with 
holism and generalism with atomism.
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the unsatisfactory verdict – eventually vanishes”.14 What we seem to be doing 
is enriching, refining, qualifying and grasping the subtleties of the initial norm, 
thus treating it as defeasible. But the problem lies, first, in the implausibility of 
insisting that we are still dealing with the same initial norm even after many 
amendments have been made and exceptions recognised. Second, there is the 
danger of an in-principle impossibility of specifying all the exceptions. 
Achieving a fully specified ‘all things considered’ norm, thereby ruling out the 
possibility of further, unspecified exceptions (apart from those already built into 
the norm itself) would require us to be in a position to draw a list of all poten-
tially relevant properties of the kind mentioned. And this, we have seen, is mis-
conceived.15 
Celano also rejects a similar approach to defeasibility which regards excep-
tions as always already implicitly included or provided for by a norm. A given 
norm is thus just a sort of shorthand for a more complex norm that lies in the 
background and can – if needed – be brought to the foreground. But this ap-
proach fails for the same reasons since it understands exceptions not as true 
exceptions – not as real “holes” in the norm – but as some sort of prima facie 
exceptions that allow for the filling in of the holes. 
According to Celano, one must thus accept a moderate sort of particular-
ism in order to do justice to (the possibility of) conflicts of norms and genuine 
exceptions. In line with this, he proposes an understanding of norms as defeasi-
ble conditionals supplemented by a “normalcy condition”. The reason why this 
position is labelled as moderately particularistic – as opposed to radical par-
ticularism – is the so-called normative flatness worry. The leading idea is that 
radical particularism cannot properly account for the thought that some con-
siderations are more central than others, in the sense that we recognise some 
reasons are “normally” relevant and more central than others.16 The normalcy 
14 Celano 2012: 270.
15 Celano 2012: 276.
16 The “moral flatness” worry was raised in moral theory by several authors (McNaughton 
and Rawling 2000: 273; Crisp 2000: 36; Bakhurst 2000: 167; McKeever and Ridge 2006: 4; 
Celano 2012: 283) and can be summarised in the following way. Given the holism of reasons, 
a set of morally relevant features of an action is open, which means that any feature could 
be morally relevant and can stand as a reason for or against an action. Furthermore – given 
the particularistic thesis – this set of features cannot be ordered by general principles. But 
why does morality seem to be nevertheless ordered? Why do we think that morally central 
features very often have to do with, e.g., causing pain and suffering, sincerity, honesty, keeping 
promises, benevolence, dignity, etc.? All that moral particularism can say is that some features 
are often more relevant than others and that is all. It cannot capture the idea of them being 
“central” in a way to morality. The moral landscape painted by particularism is flat. In order to 
avoid this charge, particularism must offer us “some way to distinguish those considerations 
which normally and regularly do provide reasons of a certain valence (e.g. pain) from those 
that normally and regularly do not provide reasons (e.g. shoelace colour). For absent some 
such distinction, particularism threatens to flatten the moral landscape by suggesting that 
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condition is thus supposed to work both ways, i.e., allow and account for the 
possibility of genuine exceptions, as well as provide some sort of “basic pat-
terns” in the normative domain. Here is the core of Celano’s proposal:
Norms are defeasible conditionals liable to true exceptions, i.e. conditionals such 
that the consequence follows, when the antecedent is satisfied, under normal 
circumstances only. The crux of the matter is, of course, how is the qualification 
‘normally’ (‘in normal circumstances’, etc.), to be understood? Here, it seems, nor-
malcy includes, but does not boil down to, the notion of what happens, or holds, 
‘in most circumstances’.17
He is well aware that this proposal is not without problems. Nevertheless, he 
leaves it open and appeals to the work of Lance and Little as it provides more 
details for such a model of normalcy. 
I shall now turn to the Lance and Little model (addressing specifically moral 
norms or principles, although similar considerations could be put forward for 
norms in general). Lance and Little are primarily concerned with the function-
ing of reasons in general, and with the variability of moral reasons in particu-
lar. They employ the notion of privileged conditions, in which a given reason 
‘behaves normally’, as opposed to conditions which are not privileged and in 
which a reason can change its moral relevance.18 The model is committed to 
deep moral contextualism: the right- or wrong-doing, and good- or bad-mak-
ing features of actions vary in contexts in ways that preclude codification by 
exceptionless principles. A full-fledged recognition of exceptions to moral gen-
eralisations does not mean that the picture of morality that one must accept 
is entirely free from any important kind of generalities. The sharp divide be-
tween generalism and particularism results in the following consequence: their 
respective views about the nature of explanation are either too strict or too nar-
row. According to these views, genuine explanatory reasons must be governed 
by universal exceptionless principles. 
An alternative model of explanation figuring defeasible norms and excep-
tions is offered, a model that covers non-moral ground as well. The features of 
such acts as promise-keeping, lying, inflicting pain or being kind are the build-
ing blocks of everyday morality that entertain an intimate connection with their 
moral import (as core moral reasons that can de-flatten the moral normative 
insofar as they might provide reasons all considerations are on par” (McKeever and Ridge 
2006: 45). If we try to isolate the fundamental worry, we can recapitulate it in the following 
manner. The moral non-flatness requirement says that any moral theory must somehow 
account for the fact that some considerations or features of acts are more central to morality 
than others. Amongst particularists, Dancy as its prominent defender put forward a proposal 
that introduces the notion of a default reason to deal with the flatness worry (cf. Dancy 2000: 
137; Dancy 2004: 112–113). 
17 Celano 2012: 285.
18 They defend the model in a series of papers, Lance & Little 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008.
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landscape). They are genuine explanatory features of the moral status of acts 
and may be captured within defeasible generalisations. Defeasible norms (e.g., 
“Defeasibly, lying is wrong”, Defeasibly, killing is wrong” or “Defeasibly, causing 
pain is wrong”) are introduced through the notion of privileged conditions. A 
more general formulation of such principles is: 
“Defeasibly, for all actions x: if x is A, then x is wrong/you ought not to do x.”
                                                        or 
“In privileged conditions, for all actions x: if x is A, then x is wrong/you 
ought not to do x.” 
This model thus argues that some features of acts can entertain an intimate 
connection with their moral import and are genuinely explanatory of the moral 
status of acts, although it allows for exceptions.19 The singling out of a connec-
tion between a particular descriptive feature of such acts as “causing pain” and 
the negative moral import of this feature which is neither necessarily universal 
nor pervasive nor usual can be done by saying that, defeasibly, causing pain is 
wrongdoing. 
When a defeasible generalisation faces an exception, something has gone off 
course – the context has relevantly changed in respect to privileged conditions, 
and our moral understanding must track this. There are several types of such 
defeasibility dynamics, such as the paradigm/riff, justificatory dependence, and 
idealisation/approximation.20 Moral understanding is the understanding of the 
structure of moral privilege and exceptions. One must understand the nature of 
a certain feature in privileged conditions, and when outside such a context, the 
19 The same holds in other areas as well. For example, the non-moral generalisation “Fish eggs 
develop into fish” is a defeasible generalisation. It is not that most fish eggs develop into fish 
(quite the opposite is true since most of them end up as food for other animals). Something 
else is captured by this particular generality. One should read it as follows: “Defeasibly, 
fish eggs develop into fish” or “In privileged conditions, fish eggs develop into fish”, where 
privileged conditions are defined as conditions that are particularly revealing of the nature of 
the thing in question or of a broader part of reality in which the thing is known (Lance and 
Little 2008: 62).
20 There are cases in which a defeasible generalisation tracks paradigm cases, which are, in this 
sense, privileged. This is the case with, e.g., “Defeasibly, chairs are things we sit on”, and there 
are riffs of this paradigm as in the case of ornamental chairs. The moral case would be the case 
of pain as defeasibly wrongdoing, but it would not be so in the case of athletic achievement. In 
other cases, there is a justificatory mutual dependence of privileged and non-privileged cases 
in the sense that we must appeal to privileged cases in order to explain and understand what is 
going on in a non-privileged case (e.g., lying and lying as part of the Diplomacy game; pleasure 
and sadistic pleasure). And lastly, there could be an idealisation-approximation relation, as in 
the case of the ideal gas law pV = nRT and the actual behaviour of actual gases. The example of 
similarly defeasible moral is the norm that in the Kingdom of Ends (full information, genuine 
autonomy, basic trust) people are owed the truth. (Lance and Little 2008: 64–73).
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relation of the last context to the first one, the compensatory moves required, 
and the acceptability of various deviations.21
It seems that this model of defeasible norms gives us what we are looking for, 
i.e., a model of norms that would allow for genuine exceptions and, at the same 
time, de-flatten a given normative landscape. Now, I want to mount a challenge 
to this model of normalcy. This proposal of defeasible norms either fails to de-
flatten the normative landscape or succeeds in this task, but only at the expense 
of positing more basic and plausibly indefeasible norms. I shall not pursue 
the first horn of this dilemma, although there are arguments that cast serious 
doubts about the success of this proposal in this regard.22 What I want to do is 
to initially grant that the model succeeds in de-flattening the normative land-
scape, i.e., in making a distinction between core and other marginal reasons, 
and consequently finding a sufficient number of so-called defeasible reasons 
and norms that would function as basic normative building-blocks. 
But it seems that this is so only at a cost of reducing this distinction to a 
distinction between basic and derivative reasons, and thus seemingly limiting 
defeasibility to the level of mid-axiom norms. In particular, the proposed model 
seems to collapse to a model according to which a given consideration together 
with normal (privileged) conditions delimits a central and apparently invariable 
reason and appeals to a more basic norm which has full explanatory power, or in 
which normal (privileged) conditions include reference to further reasons and 
21 Lance and Little 2008: 64–68.
22 McKeever and Ridge (2006: 60–72) put forward quite a forceful argument in this direction. 
First, one can label reasons capturable in defeasible generalisations as paradigmatic reasons 
and others as non-paradigmatic. The argument assumes that the best way to capture the 
paradigmatic vs. non-paradigmatic distinction is via an explanatory asymmetry account of 
this distinction employed by Little and Lance. Cases that fall outside privileged conditions are 
explanatorily dependent on how a particular consideration functions in a normal case when 
the conditions are privileged. By contrast, there is no such dependence going the other way. 
E.g., pain is normally bad or a reason against an act, but this is not the case when, e.g., pain 
is constitutive of athletic challenge and accomplishment where it shifts its polarity (Lance 
and Little 2006: 319). One must understand that normally pain is something bad in order to 
understand how it functions in the case of athletics, and not the other way around. It seems 
that the proposed model is useful only for the reason that we have one valence in privileged 
conditions and the opposite valence in non-privileged conditions. But the proposed model is 
not successful with reasons that sometimes lack moral relevance. “For it will be true of any 
consideration whose status as a reason can sometimes be defeated that we can adequately 
understand why it is not a reason here only if we understand how it can be a reason elsewhere. 
For to understand why something is not F here we must in general have some idea of how 
it can be F elsewhere if it can. If this is enough for a consideration to qualify as an instance 
of asymmetric reasons then any consideration whose status as a reason can ever be defeated 
will qualify as an instance of asymmetric reasons, and that makes the distinction far less 
interesting than it first appeared.” (McKeever and Ridge 2007: 67). It further seems that some 
core reasons might be non-paradigmatic, and that not all peripheral reasons need to be non-
paradigmatic.
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norms. For instance, it is not merely lying or telling someone something untrue 
which is normatively central from a moral standpoint, but honesty, sincerity 
and deception are. The intermediate conclusion is thus that the normalcy-based 
model of defeasible norms enables one to explain or justify an exception to the 
initial norm as an exception only by appealing to some further pertinent norm. 
If one looks closer at the examples proposed by Lance and Little, it does indeed 
seem that this is the case. 
For example, in relation to a norm that lying is defeasibly or in normal cir-
cumstances wrong the model refers to examples in which lying is not wrongdo-
ing (e.g., in circumstances of playing the Diplomacy game or in circumstances 
when a Nazi officer bullies you into revealing the location of his next targeted 
victim). The way in which these cases can be understood is that privileged condi-
tions are those that do a lot of both normative and explanatory work in respect of 
why lying is wrongdoing in “normal” cases, but not in the mentioned ones. This 
is so since the space of privileged conditions is further shaped with basic moral 
considerations, consisting of such notions as consent, fidelity, justice, honesty 
and the like. And it is this large chunk, including invariant moral reasons and 
norms, which pops up in an explanation of the moral status of a certain feature 
and, in turn, of the whole act. This then just transposes the question whether 
these background basic normative considerations are defeasible or not. 
If we look more closely at some of the mentioned examples, this worry be-
comes apparent. In the case of lying, the model claims that “intentionally tell-
ing a falsehood” is not wrong “when done to Nazi guards, to whom the truth is 
not owed”,23 or it is not wrong because a particular person is “not worthy of the 
truth” since “part of what it means to take something to be a person […] is to 
understand the creature as belonging to a kind that defeasibly has a claim on our 
honesty. Situations in which one takes something to be a person but not worthy 
of honesty are inherently riffs, as it were, on the standard theme of person.”24 
Thus, in such cases, one can plausibly claim that what actually functions as a 
reason in this and other cases is a combination of certain features of action and 
privileged conditions, which make reference to some further, more basic rea-
sons and seemingly indefeasible norms. But are these pertinent norms which 
are appealed to in explaining or justifying exceptions to the original norms 
themselves defeasible? Admittedly, our appealing to norms has to stop some-
where, with judgment taking up the slack. But the normalcy model of defeasi-
bility must then provide further reasons for these more basic norms to also be 
defeasible and for them to be part of the same normalcy model, i.e., for their 
defeasibility to also be explained and elaborated by appealing to normal condi-
tions.
23 Little 2001: 34, emphasis mine.
24 Lance and Little 2007: 153, emphasis mine.
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Vojko Strahovnik
Lance and Little anticipate the objection raised above. They reply that this 
rising to a higher level of abstraction (e.g., from lying to honesty, or form caus-
ing pain to cruelty) might seemingly offer us a more stable ground and order 
when it comes to the invariability and indefeasibility of reasons and norms. 
They respond by claiming that, (i) in making this move, one loses something 
important, namely the intimate connection that lying itself has to moral wrong-
ness, that “being a lie” is the main driving force behind such an action being 
wrong; and (ii) that, even on a higher or thick moral level, the normative do-
main is full of exceptions, which are revealed in statements such as “it hurts so 
good” or “sometimes you must be cruel to be kind”. Therefore, even seemingly 
indefeasible considerations, such as cruelty or honesty, are not invariant moral 
reasons and might figure only in defeasible norms. 
This first point is crucial to all attempts that combine variability with moral 
generalities, since they must convince us that what functions as a moral reason 
in a given case is really variable and that the rest of what a moral principle refers 
to is not a part of this reason. As far as the intimate connection between simple 
moral reasons and the rightness or wrongness of acts is concerned, we must ask 
ourselves what does the explanatory work. Maybe we often cite such things as 
“telling a lie” or “keeping one’s word” as reasons, but if privileged conditions for 
such considerations encompass such things as honesty, sincerity and fidelity, 
the question of their role is justified. When privileged conditions change into 
non-privileged ones, these considerations are exactly those that we employ in 
our explanation of why a case is deviant or defective in relation to the standard 
one. And it further seems that they do not simply function as enablers and disa-
blers of initial reasons, but are employed as basic reasons themselves.
Regarding the second point, most of such talk must be understood to be 
metaphorical. If we must sometimes be “cruel to be kind”, then it is most prob-
ably not the cruelty itself that makes our action kind or be the ground of its 
moral rightness. Let us imagine a more detailed case. Let us say that I have to 
give my friend an honest opinion about her project or action, and that I know 
that it would be painful for her to hear, but, on the other hand, it would spare 
her the frustration in the long run. In this sense, I shall be cruel to her or bru-
tally honest, but, at the same time, this is the only way of convincing her to 
give up some actions and maybe spare her the future disappointment and pain. 
In this sense, we can say that I have to be “cruel to be kind”. Nevertheless, the 
“cruelty” here involved is not a reason that contributes to the moral rightness 
of my action. If there was a way of convincing my friend that was not cruel but 
just “plainly kind”, then it would be morally wrong, even horrible to pick the 
first option. We can never be cruel just to be cruel and get away with it morally. 
Another way to respond to a case such as this would be to claim that the ques-
tion of the role of cruelty simply does not arise at all since this is not a case of 
73Defeasibility, norms and exceptions: normalcy model
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cruelty. The situation is similar with respect to the “it hurts so good” statement 
that Lance and Little appeal to and other similar cases.
 All this reduces the proposal to understand defeasibility in terms of normal-
cy to a point when the model allegedly must accept at least some basic, indefea-
sible norms. Given the examples above, one can conclude that the “normalcy” 
approach does not go “all the way down” in the normative domain. In the end, 
it allegedly presupposes at least some basic, invariable and indefeasible norms 
effective in the background of the normative domain, serving as a line of de-
marcation between normal circumstances or privileged conditions on the one 
hand, and exceptional or unprivileged ones on the other. In this way, the model 
does not meet either the fundamentality condition or the basicity condition.25 
4  DEFEASIBLE NORMS AND PLURALISM
Such models of defeasibility as those developed by, e.g., Celano, Tur,26 and 
Lance and Little are attractive models, but their limits are manifested in the fact 
that the defeasible norms which they propose have to be understood against a 
normative background of basic reasons that we appeal to in deciding what the 
relevant case is or in our interpretations of a given norm and the normalcy of 
the conditions. It seems that, irrespective of the way in which we work out the 
defeasibility structures of defeasible norms, their models must appeal to some 
wider set of basic (moral, legal, etc.) considerations related to norms which re-
side in the background and illuminate the exceptions. Normalcy-based defea-
sibility is thus limited to surface or mid-level norms only. In §2, I have put for-
ward a number of conditions and desiderata for a model of genuine defeasibil-
ity. Then, I have presented a model based on the notion of normalcy, and have 
shown that it fails to meet some of them and that defeasibility within it does not 
reach “all the way down” in the normative domain, and nor does it include the 
most basic norms.
One lesson to learn from this is that one can plausibly proceed by develop-
ing an account of defeasibility which explicitly includes an appeal to a wider 
25 In this discussion, I have mostly focused on moral norms, but the same applies to defeasible 
legal norms. One possible way out of this conundrum is proposed by Guastini (2012). For 
Guastini, both defeasibility and axiological gaps are related to axiological judgments made 
by interpreters of norms. Furthermore, defeasibility is not a special feature of legal principles 
or norms; defeasibility is not an objective property of norms which is already there before we 
start to interpret them. Our axiological judgments employed in interpretation are thus neither 
the consequence of some objective defeasibility of the rule itself nor a genuine, interpretation-
independent normative gap, but the origin or cause of interpretative defeasibility. This, in 
the end, includes some basic, indefeasible reasons and norms, such as justice. Cf. Strahovnik 
2012; 2013.
26 Tur 2001.
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Vojko Strahovnik
set of an evaluative, axiological or normative background of basic normative 
considerations. In the domain of moral normativity, such a model is proposed 
by moral pluralism understood in the following way. Traditional moral plu-
ralism27 builds on the notion of basic moral reasons which can be captured 
by general, indefeasible norms (e.g., principles specifying prima facie duties). 
Together with what is morally relevant in a given situation prima facie duties 
jointly determine the moral status of an action. A final assessment of an actual 
duty requires careful consideration, the weighing of reasons and seeing how 
they fit together (judgment). 
There has been quite a lot of controversy over just how exactly we could 
understand the notion of prima facie duty proposed by W. D. Ross and the men-
tioned relation between prima facie duty and an actual duty. One of the more 
plausible suggestions or interpretations is that in terms of basic moral reasons 
that we shall employ here. According to this understanding, basic prima facie 
duties (Ross’s famous list of seven duties includes: fidelity, gratitude, reparation, 
beneficence, justice, self-improvement and non-maleficence) are best under-
stood to be basic moral reasons or considerations that are always morally rel-
evant and count for or against an action. Given their thick moral descriptions, 
they seem indefeasible. Besides this basic list, Ross also employs so-called de-
rivative or complex prima facie duties. My suggestion is that we could under-
stand these derivative prima facie duties to represent derivative moral reasons 
and to be prime candidates for mid-level defeasible norms that we often employ 
in our ordinary moral thought. Let us have a look at an example. Ross claims 
that duties, such as obeying the laws of one’s county, are derivative, comprising 
one or more basic prima facie duties; in the case of the mentioned duty these 
are a prima facie duty of gratitude for the goods that an individual receives from 
his or her country, a prima facie duty of fidelity emerging out of an implicit 
agreement of living with others in the same country by some shared rules and a 
prima facie duty of benevolence since obeying laws contributes to the common 
good.28 The same applies to our prima facie duty not to lie or to keep the prom-
ises we have given. Both are grounded in the basic prima facie duty of fidelity. 
Ross also refers to such derivative prima facie duties as media axiomata that 
represent a helpful way of applying general moral norms related to prima facie 
duties in particular types of situations.29 What we have here is a model of de-
feasible norms which is explicit about the normative background consisting of 
basic, indefeasible norms. The claim is not that these basic norms cannot come 
into conflict (allowing for conflict between norms that cannot be resolved by 
appealing to some further meta-principle is one of the key posits of pluralism) 
27 Ross 1930; 1939.
28 Ross 1930: 27–28.
29 Ross 1939: 190.
75Defeasibility, norms and exceptions: normalcy model
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and that occasionally we are faced with exceptions to prima facie duties, but that 
these exceptions are related to a dimension of a given prima facie duty ending 
up also being an actual, final duty.
This model is thus similar to the normalcy-based approaches that I have in-
vestigated, although it does differ from them in that it explicitly recognises basic 
indefeasible norms, which explicitly limits normalcy-based defeasibility to the 
mid-level of the normative domain. Accordingly, one way to look at the argu-
ments presented above is that they aim to collapse normalcy-based approaches 
to a more general pluralist approach, claiming that defeasibility is a feature of 
basic or fundamental norms and that we do not need indefeasible norms within 
such a model. 
In more general terms, we can thus distinguish between two fundamentally 
different views about the possibility of “codification” of a given normative do-
main. On the one hand, there is generalism, which combines the possibility of 
codification and a deductive model of normative thought, and, on the other. par-
ticularism, which rejects the possibility of (the complete) codification of a given 
domain of normativity. The pluralist approach seems to sit between these two 
approaches. Within the latter, normalcy-based defeasibility can be interpreted 
as a consequence of the structure of normative pluralism and the norms within 
it, and is plausibly understood in relation to an indefeasible normative and axi-
ological background which stands in relation to particular cases of judgment.
—Acknowledgment.— I would like to thank the audience at the Genoa-Slavic Seminar 
in Legal Theory (Genoa, 11–12 December 2014) for a lively discussion based on a draft 
of this paper. While preparing the paper, the remarks of two anonymous referees, as well 
as an ongoing discussion of these issues with Terry Horgan and Matjaž Potrč, have been 
very helpful.  
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Vojko Strahovnik*
Uklonljivost, norme in izjeme:  
model normalnosti 
Članek se ukvarja s pojmom uklonljivosti, s posebnim ozirom na uklonljivost moralnih 
in pravnih norm. Na začetku začrtamo grob oris pojava uklonljivosti, ki je zahteven izziv 
tako za moralno kot tudi za pravno teorijo. Opozorimo na pogoje in primerjalne pred-
nosti, ki naj bi jih izpolnjeval oz. imel model uklonljivosti. Nadalje se v članku osredoto-
čimo na svojstven model uklonljivosti, ki uporablja pojem normalnih pogojev (normal-
nosti) da bi zajel omenjeni pojem uklonljivosti norm. Trdimo, da temu modelu pri tem 
spodleti, posebej z vidika predpostavke nadaljnjih pomembnih norm, za katere imamo 
upravičene razloge za dvom, da so prav tako uklonljive. Tako ta model ne dopušča, da bi 
uklonljivost segala do samih temeljev zadevnega normativnega področja in omeji zna-
čilnost uklonljivosti na norme na srednji ravni. V zaključku poudarimo  nekaj naukov te 
razprave in jih umestimo v širše polje pluralističnega pristopa k normam.
Ključne besede: uklonljivost, izjeme, normalnost, normalni pogoji, moralne norme, 
pravne norme, pluralizem.
1 UVOD
Pojem uklonljivosti, posebej na področju moralnosti in pravnosti, posta-
ja v zadnjih desetletjih vse bolj pomemben predmet zanimanja in razprav.1 
Uklonljivost je raznolik pojem, ki ga rabimo v raznovrstnih pomenih in ga po-
vezujemo z različnimi predmeti. Tem njegovim raznovrstnim razsežnostim pri-
tiče tudi več odprtih vprašanj. Najprej, gre za vprašanje po tem, kaj je uklonlji-
vo, pri čemer lahko govorimo o pojmih, normah, oblikovanostih norm, pravilih 
merilih, načelih, zakonih, posplošitvah, idealih, razlogovanjih, dejstvih, mne-
njih, izjavah, odločitvah, predpisih, vrstah ipd.2 Za namene tega članka se bom 
osredotočil na uklonljive norme, v upanju, da bo vsaj del ugotovitev v splošnem 
mogoče bolj ali manj neposredno prenesti tudi na druge uklonljive pojave v 
njihovi bližini (pravila, načela). Nadalje, obstaja več pomembnih odprtih vpra-
šanj glede izvora, bistva in obsega uklonljivosti. In ne nazadnje, pomembno je 
vprašanje o posledicah uklonljivosti tako za teoretične razsežnosti izbranega 
* vojko.strahovnik@guest.arnes.si | Docent in znanstveni sodelavec na Teološki fakulteti 
Univerze v Ljubljani in na Evropski pravni fakulteti.
1 Ferrer Beltrán & Ratti 2012; Guastini 2012; Hooker & Little 2000; Lance, Potrč & Strahovnik 
2009.
2 Chiassoni 2012: 162; Lance in Little 2007.
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Vojko Strahovnik
normativnega področja kakor tudi za samo normativno prakso. Odgovori na ta 
vprašanja se v razpravi razlikujejo in glede večine omenjenih vidikov nahajamo 
temeljna teoretska nestrinjanja. 
Nadaljevanje sledi takole. Po hitrem pregledu nekaj splošnih premislekov o 
uklonljivosti v nadaljevanju začrtam odporno pojmovanje uklonljivosti, ki je 
tesno povezano s pojmom izjeme. Takšno pojmovanje pomeni posebej zahte-
ven problem za vsako teorijo uklonljivosti in uklonljivih norm, vključno s temi, 
ki so oblikovane za moralno in pravno teorijo. Ob začrtanju takšnega razume-
vanja je podan niz pogojev/zahtev in primerjalnih prednosti, ki naj bi jim to 
zadostilo (§ 2). V 3. razdelku se posebej osredotočim na model uklonljivosti, ki 
gradi na pojmu normalnosti in normalnih pogojev, da bi zajel odporen pojem 
uklonljivosti. Predstavitvi primera tega modela za polji pravnih in moralnih 
norm sledi argumentacija, da takšen model pri tem ni uspešen, posebej zato, 
ker predpostavlja nadaljnje pomembne norme, pri katerih imamo upravičene 
razloge za dvom, da so prav tako uklonljive. Tako ta model ne dopušča, da bi 
uklonljivost segala do samih temeljev zadevnega normativnega področja, in 
omeji značilnost uklonljivosti na norme na srednji ravni. V zaključku (§ 4) iz-
postavim nekaj naukov te razprave in jih umestim v širše polje pluralističnega 
pristopa k normam.
2  UKLONLJIVE NORME IN IZJEME: POGOJI 
IN PREDNOSTI
Razprava o uklonljivosti se umešča v splošnejšo razpravo o odnosu med 
splošnimi načeli in posameznimi primeri, ki je v filozofiji prisotna že od njenih 
zgodnjih začetkov.3 Ta razprava se osredotoča na odnos med splošnimi norma-
3 V Platonovem dialogu Država lahko sledimo dialogu med Sokratom in mladim tujcem iz 
Elee o tem, kar opredeljuje dobrega državnika, ki javne zadeve opravlja pravično. Razprava 
se dotakne tudi vprašanja, ali je možno vladati brez zakonov. Tujec, ki poskuša zagovarjati 
pritrdilen odgovor na to vprašanje, predlaga pogled, da je bolje, če vladajo kraljevski možje, 
ne pa zakoni, ker »zakon nikoli ne bo mogel naenkrat zaobjeti tega, kar je najimenitnejše in 
najpravičnejše za vse, in ukazovati tega, kar je najboljše. Nepodobnost med ljudmi in (njiho-
vimi) dejavnostmi ter dejstvo, da tako rekoč nikoli nobena od človeških stvari ne miruje, ne 
dopuščajo, da bi katerakoli veščina tako rekoč v čemerkoli kadarkoli izrekala kakšno enostav-
no (pravilo), ki bi veljalo za vse primere in za ves čas.« Nadaljuje s trditvijo, da se bo vladajoči 
najverjetneje težko izognil postavitvi splošnih zakonov in tako jih bo postavil »za množico 
in za večino primerov ter predpisal zakon nekako tako, da bo veljal za posameznike na splo-
šno in v grobih obrisih, najsi (zakone) zapisuje ali pa jih postavlja na osnovi nezapisanih, 
domovinskih običajev«, toda tako Sokrat kot tujec se strinjata, da če se pojavijo izjeme k tem 
splošnim zakonom, ne bi bilo niti modro niti pravično, celo nesmiselno, da v tem primerih 
splošnih zakonov ne bi dopolnili (Država 294a–b, navedeno v Schauer 2012: 78). Podoben 
predlog najdemo tudi v Aristotelovi Nikomahovi etiki. »Vzrok temu [tj. da blagohotnost in 
pravičnost nista povsem eno in isto, ampak blagohotnost lahko razumemo kot nadrejeno pra-
vičnosti oz. kot korekcijo konvencionalne pravičnosti] je dejstvo, da je vsak zakon splošnega 
79Uklonljivost, norme in izjeme: model normalnosti 
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mi na eni strani in posamičnostmi oz. izjemami na drugi, toda v njenem okviru 
razumevanje samih izjem pogosto ni dovolj korenito, saj se izjeme razumejo 
kot zgolj obrobna posledica ne dovolj dorečenih ali opredeljenih norm; kot ne-
kaj, čemur bi se načeloma lahko tudi izognili.4 Toda, vsaj tako bom zagovarjal, 
pristna in odporna uklonljivost, ki jo razumemo kot zahteven problem, sega 
onkraj tega ter vključuje pristne izjeme, ki niso takšne, da bi jih bilo mogoče 
že ustrezno izrecno vključiti v splošne norme ali pa jih že vnaprej v popolnosti 
izpostaviti ter bi se jim tako lahko načeloma tudi izognili.5 
Pojem uklonljivosti za izhodiščno razumevanje pogosto in uporabno pove-
zujejo s pojmom izjeme, posebej z možnostjo prisotnosti izjemnih primerov, 
tj. primerov, ki po eni strani spadajo pod določeno normo ali pravilo, hkrati pa 
imajo neželene ali neustrezne normativne posledice, glede na katere jih potem 
izključimo iz obsega omenjene norme ali pravila. V skladu s takšnim pogledom 
Brożek trdi, da je »pravilo oblike A => B uklonljivo, če in samo če je možno, da 
čeprav A obstaja/velja, B ne sledi«.6 Ideja izjem in izjemnih okoliščin je tako 
eden izmed znakov uklonljivosti. 
Kaj pravzaprav mislimo s tem, ko na primer zatrdimo, da je določena nor-
ma, pravilo, sklepanje ali pojem pristno uklonljiv? K začrtanemu začetnemu 
razumevanju moramo dodati še nekaj dopolnil. Ta dopolnila bom podal v obli-
ki pogojev in prednosti, ki bodo hkrati tudi vodila pri gradnji in vrednotenju 
teorije uklonljivosti. S tem ne trdim, da mora biti neposredno zadoščeno prav 
vsem pogojem ali da mora imeti teorija vse prednosti. Druga možnost je, da je 
teorija uklonljivosti zmožna ustrezno prilagoditi omenjene vidike. 
značaja, konkretni primeri pa so takšni, da jih ni mogoče vselej zaobseči z nekim splošnim 
določilom. Kjer pa so potrebna splošna določila, ki pa ne morejo vsega povsem pravilno za-
jeti, se zakon tako prilagodi, da upošteva večino primerov, čeprav se zaveda, da so pri tem 
možne tudi napake. Vendar zavoljo tega zakon ni nič manj pravilen; zakaj napaka ni v zakonu 
in tudi ne v zakonodaji, ampak v sami naravi stvari. Takšno je pač obilje tega, kar se v življenju 
lahko dogodi. Kadar zakon nekaj na splošno določa, v danih okoliščinah pa se zgodi nekaj, 
kar v splošnem določilu ni predvideno, tedaj je pravilno, da se popravi pomanjkljivost, kjer 
nas je zakonodajavec pustil na cedilu, tako kot bi jo bil popravil tudi sam zakonodajavec in 
sprejel ustrezno določilo v svoj zakon, če bi bil navzoč in če bi vedel za ta konkretni primer«. 
(Aristotel NE: 1137a-b). 
4 Med drugimi Dworkin zastopa tak optimistični pogled: »Seveda imajo lahko pravila tudi iz-
jeme ... Toda natančna formulacija pravila bi [te izjeme] vzela v račun in vsaka, ki jih ne bi, 
ne bi bila zaključena. Če je seznam izjem zelo dolg, bi jih bilo preveč okorno ponavljati vsa-
kokrat, ko omenimo pravilo. Vseeno pa ni nobenih teoretičnih razlogov, zakaj jih ne bi mogli 
dodati pravilu, in več ko dodamo izjem, bolj natančna je formulacija pravila.« Dworkin (1977: 
24–25).
5 Ne želim zanikati, da nekateri ne trdijo, da je omenjeni pojav prav to, kar zadeva uklonljivost. 
Moja razprava je zasnovana v okviru pogledov, ki dopuščajo in dejansko tudi zagovarjajo 
bolj odporno razumevanje uklonljivosti in pristnih izjem. Prim. Chapman 1998: 448; Celano 
2012.
6 Brożek 2014.
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(I) Prvič, izjema mora biti »pristna izjema«, kar pomeni, da ne sme biti zgolj 
posledica začetno slabo formulirane norme.7 Uklonljivost normam tako ne na-
stopi zgolj zaradi njihovega nepravilnega, nenatančnega ali nejasnega formu-
liranja, ki bi lahko načeloma bilo tudi bolj jasno. Model uklonljivosti bi moral 
dopuščati pristne izjeme, ki jih ne moremo izrecno izpostaviti vnaprej (pogoj 
pristnih izjem).
(II) Drugič, uklonljivih norm ne smemo istovetiti zgolj z nekakšnimi pravili 
»čez palec«, ki jih lahko uporabljamo večino časa, a smo jih po drugi strani – če 
je to potrebno – pripravljeni tudi podrobneje opredeliti in jih spremeniti v brez-
izjemne norme. Če so uklonljive norme povezane zgolj s takšno vrsto pravil, 
potem ne bi predstavljale posebej zanimivega in težkega vprašanja. Uklonljive 
norme morajo biti v tem smislu osnovne, polnokrvne norme, na podlagi kate-
rih potem oblikujemo sodbe (pogoj osnovnosti). 
(III) Tretjič, nabor oz. množica možnih izjem mora biti v načelu odprta, kar 
pomeni, da ne moremo nikdar izpostaviti prav vseh izjem in na ta način zapreti 
te množice. Če bi se slednje zgodilo, potem bi te taksativno naštete izjeme lahko 
vgradili v normo samo in na ta način ne bi bila več uklonljiva (pogoj odprtosti). 
(IV) Četrtič, uklonljiva norma ostane enaka in ohrani svojo normativno 
moč tudi v primeru, ko ji najdemo izjemo. V tem smislu »preživi« to izjemo 
in velja za vse nadaljnje, neizjemne primere. Če bi bili pripravljeni opustiti ali 
spremeniti norme v primerih, ko najdemo izjemo, potem bi to precej izpraznilo 
pojem uklonljivosti. Torej mora biti model uklonljivosti tak, da ohranja izvorno 
normo nedotaknjeno, ko naredimo izjemo. Uklonljiva norma mora preživeti 
onkraj te točke izjeme in ostati enaka norma kot prej (pogoj identitete).
(V) Petič, uklonljiva norma mora biti takšna, da lahko ostane del »normativ-
nega prostora« tudi v primeru izjeme in lahko osvetli bistvo izjemnega primera 
ali pa posredno vpliva na celostno normativno določitev primera. Uklonljiva 
norma mora torej biti takšna, da lahko ima moč tudi v primeru izjeme (pogoj 
možne pomembnosti).
(VI) Model uklonljivosti mora biti tak, da uklonljivost sega vse do temeljev 
normativne domene in vključuje tudi najbolj temeljne norme (pogoj temeljno-
sti).
(VII) In nazadnje, model uklonljivosti naj bi bil takšen, da bi lahko prilago-
dil tako pravno področje kakor tudi moralnost ter preostala normativna podro-
čja, vključno s spoznavno teorijo, estetiko, družbenimi normami in bontonom 
(zahteva splošnosti). Članek se sicer osredotoča na moralne in pravne norme, 
7 Celano  (2012: 281) takšne izjeme označi kot »prave oz. resnične izjeme« (v nasprotju z zgolj 
prima facie izjemami) in ta pojem razloži na naslednji način: »Da bi bil primer resnična izje-
ma, mora biti tak, da ga ne moremo že vnaprej zajeti v dostavku 'razen če …' k začetni normi«.
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stremi pa k temu, da bi to lahko bil tudi prvi korak k utiranju poti za bolj splo-
šno razpravo, ki pa jo moramo pustiti ob robu za drugo priložnost. 
Nekatere izmed teh točk v zvezi z navedenimi pogoji lahko kratko ponazori-
mo z – zelo verjetno preveč poenostavljenim – primerom domnevno uklonljive 
moralne norme, ki jo lahko izrazimo kot N: Povzročanje bolečine je moralno 
napačno. Da bi bila ta norma uklonljiva, mora (i) dovoljevati izjeme, tj. prime-
re povzročanja bolečine, kjer to ni moralno napačno oz. v katerih povzročanje 
bolečine ne prispeva k moralni napačnosti dejanj (npr. v primeru upravičenega 
zdravljenja, kjer se bolečini ne da izogniti, ali za bolečino kot del športnih de-
javnosti); (ii) te izjeme so pristne izjeme v smislu, da ne gre le za nenatančno 
oblikovano pravilo čez palec, ki bi nadomeščalo bolj osnovo in natančno normo 
(npr. N*: Neupravičeno povzročanje bolečine je moralno napačno.«); (iii) nabor 
možnih izjem je odprt v smislu, da ne moremo drugače preoblikovati izhodišč-
ne norme na način, da bi vključevala vse izjeme (npr. N**: Povzročanje bolečin 
je moralno napačno, razen v primerih, ko je del upravičenih medicinskih pose-
gov ali športnih dejavnosti.«); (iv) izhodiščna norma mora ostati enaka in mora 
ohraniti svojo normativno moč tudi v primeru izjeme in bo tako naslednjič, ko 
se pojavi običajen primer povzročanja bolečine, temu določila tak normativni 
status; (v) norma N lahko ostane del normativnega prostora in lahko vpliva na 
našo presojo na posreden način (npr. če imamo na voljo dve enako učinkoviti 
možnosti za določen medicinski poseg, ki bi obe vključevali bolečino, vendar 
ena bistveno blažjo, bi bila N še vedno vključena v našo moralno presojo o mo-
ralno najboljši izbiri). 
Obstaja več modelov uklonljivosti, ki poskušajo zajeti jedro njenih zgoraj iz-
postavljenih vidikov, povezanih z izjemami (npr. modeli, ki se sklicujejo na poj-
me nedoločenosti, nejasnosti, odprte teksture itd.). Eden najbolj uveljavljenih je 
model, ki se osredotoča na vidik normalnosti oz. običajnosti. V nadaljevanju se 
posvetimo temu modelu in pretresemo, kako nam pomaga razviti razumevanje 
uklonljivih norm in ali zadosti zgoraj podanim pogojem in zahtevam. 
3  UKLONLJIVOST IN NORMALNOST
Eden izmed načinov, kako izpostaviti uklonljivo naravo norme, je, da za-
trdimo, da norma velja le v normalnih pogojih oz. v normalnih okoliščinah.8 
Poleg pojma normalnost avtorji mestoma govorijo tudi o »privilegiranih po-
gojih«, »tipičnih pogojih«9, o tem, »kar se običajno ali načeloma dogodi«,10 o 
8 Celano 2012: 285–287.
9 Lance in Little 2007; 2008.
10 Celano 2012: 284.
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»paradigmatskih«11 ali osrednjih primerih. Jedrna ideja je pri teh predlogih 
enaka – posamezna norma je takšna, da velja le za niz normalnih okoliščin, ki 
pa so takšne, da jih ne moremo izrecno določiti in v celoti vključiti v normo 
samo. Takšen predlog se zdi skladen z opisanim odnosom med uklonljivimi 
normami in pristnimi izjemami, saj so izjeme ravno tisti primeri, ki izpadejo iz 
obsega normalnih pogojev. 
V nadaljevanju se ožje osredotočimo na dva konkretna modela uklonljivih 
norm, ki se sklicujeta na takšen pogoj normalnosti. Prvi je model Bruna Celana, 
ki sicer meri na norme na splošno, a izvira iz razprave o pravni uklonljivosti. 
Drugi model je predlog Marka Lancea in Margaret Little, ki sta ga prvenstveno 
oblikovala za moralne norme, vendar ga lahko posplošimo tudi na preostale 
norme. Modela sta skladna med seboj in Celano posebej poudari tudi, da je 
zadnji model dopolnitev njegovega predloga. 
Celano predstavi svoj model kot del zagovora omejenega partikularizma12 
glede norm. Ta zagovor začne s premisleki o možnih strategijah odziva na pri-
mere norm, ki so med seboj v konfliktu, zato moramo pri tem narediti izjemo 
vsaj glede ene izmed vpletenih norm. Najprej zavrne t. i. specifikacijski pristop; 
ta predlaga, da vsakič, ko si pravne norme nasprotujejo, je vse, »kar moramo 
storiti, to, da specificiramo (tj. ustrezno omejimo domeno rabe) vsaj eno izmed 
vpletenih norm, tako da bo – na način vključitve dodatnih pogojev v njen pro-
rek oz. antecedens – to nasprotje ali pa neustrezen zaključek na koncu koncev 
izginil«.13 Zdi se, da na ta način bogatimo, dodelamo, izpilimo, omejimo ali za-
jamemo prefinjenost prvotne norme ter jo tako razumemo kot uklonljivo. Toda 
prava težava je že v predpostavki, da gre še vedno za isto, začetno normo tudi 
po tem, ko prepoznamo vse te izjeme in dopolnitve. Nadaljnja težava je nevar-
nost, da nikoli ne bomo mogli določiti prav vseh izjem.
11 Celano 2012: 286.
12 Za bralce, ki razprave med generalizmom in partikularizmom ne poznajo podrobneje, je tukaj 
kratek povzetek poglavitnih idej in pojmov. Partikularizem za izbrano normativno področje, 
npr. moralnost, je pogled, ki zavrača načela, norme in pravila. Tako ga lahko povezujemo 
s preprosto tezo, da ni nobenih moralnih pravil, ali pa z bolj pretanjeno tezo, da sama 
»možnost moralne misli in presoje ni odvisna od zagotovitve ustreznega nabora moralnih 
načel« (Dancy 2004: 73). Moralna misel ne sestoji iz uporabe moralnih načel na primerih 
in moralne osebe ne povezujemo nujno z načelnostjo. Nasproten pogled je generalizem, ki 
trdi, da moralni status dejanja določa moralno načelo ali pravilo. Vzporedno s to razpravo 
nahajamo razliko med atomizmom in holizmom (tudi kontekstualizem) glede razlogov. 
Atomizem razlogov trdi, da razlogi niso občutljivi za kontekst, kar pomeni, da vedno delujejo 
na enak način (govorijo v prid ali proti dejanju). Holizem po drugi strani trdi, da so razlogi 
občutljivi za kontekst in lahko spreminjajo svojo pomembnost in moč ter se nadalje spajajo z 
drugimi razlogi na način, ki presega golo seštevanje (npr. dva razloga, ki vsak zase govorita v 
prid določenemu dejanju, a lahko – ko sta prisotna skupaj – pomenita razlog proti dejanju). 
Omenjeni pogledi so običajno združeni v dveh zavojih, atomizem z generalizmom in holizem 
s partikularizmom. 
13 Celano 2012: 270.
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»Da bi dosegli v celoti specificirano, celostno normo in s tem izključili možnost kakr-
šnih koli nadaljnjih, neopredeljenih izjem (poleg tistih, ki smo jih že vgradili v nor-
mo samo), bi od nas zahtevalo, da smo zmožni sestaviti seznam vseh morebitnih po-
membnih lastnosti te vrste. To pa je, kot smo videli, zgolj naša zmotna predstava«.14 
Celano prav tako zavrne podoben pristop k uklonljivosti norm, ki izjeme 
razume kot že implicitno vsebovane v sami normi. Dana izhodiščna norma je 
tako zgolj neke vrste bližnjica za bolj zamotano normo, ki je v njenem ozadju in 
ki jo – če je treba – lahko izpostavimo. Toda tudi temu predlogu spodleti zaradi 
podobnih razlogov, kajti izjem ne razume kot pristnih izjem, kot pravih »lu-
kenj« v sami normi, ampak zgolj kot nekakšne prima facie izjeme, ki dovoljujejo 
zapolnitev lukenj v normi. 
Celano trdi, da moramo zato sprejeti partikularizem določene vrste, da bi 
lahko prilagodili možnost konflikta med normami, in pristnih izjem. V skladu 
s tem predlaga razumevanje norm kot uklonljivih pogojnikov, ki jih dopolnimo 
s »pogojem normalnosti«. Razlog, zakaj je to stališče opredeljeno kot zmerni 
partikularizem – v nasprotju s skrajnim partikularizmom –, je v t. i. težavi nor-
mativne sploščenosti. Glavna ideja je v tem, da skrajni partikularizem ne zmo-
re prilagoditi ali pojasniti misli, da so nekateri premisleki bolj osrednji kot pa 
drugi, v smislu, da nekatere razloge razumemo kot bolj običajno pomembne in 
osrednje kot pa druge.15 Pogoj normalnosti naj bi tako opravljal dvojno delo, tj. 
dovoljeval možnost pristnih izjem, hkrati pa zagotavljal določene vrste »osnov-
nih vzorcev« za normativno področje. Tukaj je jedro Celanovega predloga:
Norme so uklonljivi pogojniki, ki so lahko podvrženi pristnim izjemam, tj. pogojniki, 
iz katerih ob izpolnjenem proreku posledice sledijo zgolj v normalnih okoliščinah. 
14 Celano 2012: 276.
15 Izziv »moralne sploščenosti« je izpostavilo več avtorjev (McNaughton in Rawling 2000: 273; 
Crisp 2000: 36; Bakhurst 2000: 167; McKeever in Ridge 2006: 4; Celano 2012: 283) in ga lahko 
povzamemo na naslednji način. Glede na holizem razlogov je množica moralno pomembnih 
značilnosti dejanj načeloma odprta, tako da je lahko moralno pomembna katerakoli značil-
nost dejanja in pomeni razlog za dejanje ali proti njemu. Nadalje, glede na tezo partikulariz-
ma te množice ne moremo zajeti v nabor splošnih načel. Zakaj se potem moralnost vseeno 
zdi tako urejena? Zakaj menimo, da so moralno osrednje značilnosti povezane npr. s povzro-
čanjem bolečine in trpljenjem, iskrenostjo, poštenostjo, držanjem obljub, dobrotnostjo, do-
stojanstvom itd.? Vse, kar lahko partikularizem odgovori, je to, da so nekatere značilnosti pač 
pomembne pogosteje kot druge, in tako ne zmore ujeti te zamisli »osrednjosti« za moralnost. 
Zato je moralna pokrajina sploščena. Da bi se lahko izvil iz te zanke, mora partikularizem 
ponuditi »neki način, da lahko razlikujemo med značilnostmi, ki običajno in redno pomenijo 
razloge določene usmerjenosti (npr. bolečina), in drugimi, ki običajno in redno ne pomenijo 
razlogov (npr. barva vezalk). Kajti brez takšnega razlikovanja partikularizem splošči moralno 
pokrajino na način, da predlaga, da so vse te značilnosti – če lahko pomenijo razloge – na 
isti ravni.« (McKeever in Ridge 2006: 45). Osrednjo težavo lahko povzamemo na naslednji 
način. Zahteve moralne nesploščenosti: vsaka moralna teorija mora na neki način prilagoditi 
dejstvo, da so nekatere značilnosti naših dejanj moralno bolj osrednje kot druge. Dancy kot 
zagovornik partikularizma na ta izziv poda odgovor tako, da predlaga uvedbo pojma privze-
tega (cf. Dancy 2000: 137; Dancy 2004: 112–113). 
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Osrednje vprašanje je seveda, kako lahko razumemo to omejitev 'normalno' (normal-
ne okoliščine ipd.). Zdi se, da v tem primeru normalnost vključuje (ni pa nujno ome-
jena zgolj na to), kar drži 'v večini primerov'.16 
Celano se zaveda, da takšen predlog vzbuja tudi številne pomisleke, ampak 
pušča ta vprašanja odprta in se hkrati sklicuje tudi na model Lancea in Littlove 
za več podrobnosti takšnega modela normalnosti.
Zdaj se bomo posvetili temu modelu, ki se sicer prvenstveno osredotoča na 
moralne norme in načela, lahko pa te premisleke podamo tudi za norme na 
splošno. Lance in Littlova pozornost najprej namenita delovanju razlogov, po-
sebej spremenljivosti moralnih razlogov. Hkrati vpeljeta pojem privilegiranih 
pogojev, v katerih se določen razlog »obnaša normalno«, v nasprotju s pogoji, ki 
niso privilegirani in v katerih lahko spreminja svojo pomembnost.17 Ta model 
je tako zavezan globokemu moralnemu kontekstualizmu, tj. stališču, da se zna-
čilnosti dejanj, glede na katere jih lahko označujemo kot moralno pravilna ali 
napačna, dobra ali slaba, s kontekstom spreminjajo na način, ki ga ni mogoče 
z upraviljenjem zajeti v nabor brezizjemnih načel. Vendar takšno pripoznanje 
izjem k moralnim splošnostim še ne pomeni, da moramo sprejeti tudi podobo 
moralnosti kot povsem prosto kakršnihkoli splošnosti. Globoko zarezana vrzel 
med generalizmom in partikularizmom je posledica preveč strogega in ozkega 
pogleda na naravo razlage. Glede na takšen pogled morajo biti pristnorazlagal-
ni razlogi takšni, da jih obvladujejo obča brezizjemna načela.
Zato ponudita drugačen model razlage, ki vključuje uklonljive norme in iz-
jeme in ki ga lahko razumemo tudi izven področja moralnosti. Npr. značilnosti 
dejanja, kot so držanje obljub, laganje, povzročanje bolečine ali prijaznost, so 
temeljni gradniki običajne moralnosti, ki so intimno povezane z njihovo mo-
ralno pomembnostjo (kot temeljni moralni razlogi so v vlogi razploščitve po-
krajine moralne normativnosti). Hkrati so to pristno razlagalne značilnosti mo-
ralnega statusa dejanj, ki jih lahko zajamemo v uklonljive splošnosti. Uklonljive 
norme, npr. »Laž je uklonljivo moralno napačna (oz. Uklonljivo, laž je moralno 
napačna)« ali »Povzročanje bolečine je uklonljivo moralno napačno«, lahko 
vpeljemo prek pojma privilegiranih pogojev. Bolj splošna oblika takšnih načel 
je tako naslednja:
»Uklonljivo in za vsa dejanja x, če je dejanje x A, potem je x moralno napačen oz. ne 
smemo storiti x.«
ali
»V privilegiranih pogojih in za vsa dejanja x: če je dejanje x A, potem je x moralno 
napačno oz. ne smemo storiti x.«
16 Celano 2012: 285.
17 Takšen model predstavita in zagovarjata v nizu člankov (Lance in Little 2005; 2006; 2007; 
2008).
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Ta model tako zatrjuje, da so izbrane značilnosti dejanj takšne, da so tesno 
povezane z njihovim moralnim prispevkom, in so tudi pristno razlagalne za 
moralni status dejanj, čeprav so dovoljene izjeme.18 Če želimo izpostaviti pove-
zavo med določeno opisno značilnostjo dejanj, kot je npr. povzročanje bolečine, 
in negativnim moralnim prispevkom te značilnosti, ki ni niti nujno obči niti 
prevladujoč ali celo običajen, potem lahko to zatrdimo na način, da je povzro-
čanje bolečine uklonljivo takšno, da prispeva k moralni napačnosti dejanja. 
Ko se uklonljiva splošnost sreča z izjemo, se je nekaj pomembnega spre-
menilo, tj. kontekst se je odmaknil od privilegiranih pogojev in naše moralno 
razumevanje mora slediti tem spremembam. Govorimo lahko o več vrstah ta-
kšnih uklonljivih sprememb, kot npr. paradigma/odklon, upravičenjska odvi-
snost, zglednost/približek.19 Moralno razumevanje je tako razumevanje privi-
legiranosti in izjem. Najprej moramo razumeti to, kako je značilnost povezana 
s privilegiranimi pogoji oz. kakšna je njena narava v takih pogojih in kakšna je 
nato v primeru izjeme, kakšna je povezava med prvim in drugim kontekstom, 
kakšne prilagoditve so potrebne in kakšni odkloni so sprejemljivi.20
Zdi se, da nam takšen model uklonljivosti ponuja to, kar iščemo, tj. model 
norm, ki dovoljujejo pristne izjeme in hkrati razploščijo normativno pokrajino. 
V nadaljevanju pa bomo opisali izziv za ta model. Temu modelu uklonljivih 
norm bodisi ne uspe razploščiti normativne pokrajine bodisi je pri tem sicer 
uspešen, ampak zgolj na način, ki predpostavlja bolj temeljne in zelo verjetno 
neuklonljive norme. Tu se prvi veji dileme ne bomo posvečali, naj omenimo le, 
da so bili podani prepričljivi argumenti v njeno podporo.21 Želimo izhodiščno 
18 Podobno velja tudi za druga področja. Npr. nemoralna splošnost »Ribje ikre se razvijejo v 
ribe« je uklonljiva splošnost. Ne gre za to, da bi se večina ribjih iker razvila v ribe (pravzaprav je 
res ravno nasprotno, saj jih večina postane hrana drugih živali). V tej splošnosti je zajeto nekaj 
drugega in brati jo moramo kot »Uklonljivo, ribje ikre se razvijejo v ribe« ali »V privilegiranih 
pogojih se ribje ikre razvijejo v ribe«, pri čemer so privilegirani pogoji opredeljeni kot pogoji, 
ki so še posebej pomenljivi glede narave same stvari (ribjih iker) in širšega odseka stvarnosti, 
kamor stvar umeščamo (Lance in Little 2008: 62). 
19 So primeri, v katerih uklonljive splošnosti sledijo paradigmatskim primerom, ki so v tem 
smislu privilegirani, kot je to v primeru »Uklonljivo so stoli namenjeni sedenju«, in kot 
odklon od te osrednje teme lahko razumemo okrasne stole. Moralni primer je primer 
bolečine kot uklonljivo slabe, vendar ne v primeru športnega dosežka. V drugih primerih 
se lahko upremo na razlagalno odvisnost med privilegiranimi in neprivilegiranimi pogoji, 
v smislu, da se moramo sklicevati na privilegirane primere, da bi lahko razložili in razumeli, 
kaj se dogaja v neprivilegiranih primerih (npr. laž in laž v primeru igre Lažnivec ter užitek 
in sadistični užitek). In nazadnje, lahko gre za odnos med vzornostjo in približkom, kot je to 
v primeru idealnega plina in zakona pv = nrt ter dejanskega obnašanja realnih plinov, ali v 
primeru, da v kraljestvu ciljev (polna informiranost, pristna avtonomija, temeljno zaupanje) 
ljudem dolgujemo resnico (Lance in Little 2008: 64–73).
20 Lance in Little 2008: 64–68.
21 Sean McKeever in Michael Ridge predstavita več prepričljivih argumentov v tem smeri 
(McKeever in Ridge 2006: 60–72). Najprej, razloge, ki jih lahko zajamemo v uklonljive 
splošnosti, poimenujeta paradigmatični razlogi in preostale razloge neparadigmatični razlogi. 
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dopustiti, da temu modelu uspe razploščiti normativno pokrajino, tj. zarisati 
razliko med temeljnimi in obrobnimi razlogi ter da najti zadosti takšnih uklon-
ljivih norm, ki tvorijo osnovne normativne gradnike.
Toda zdi se, da mu to uspe zgolj na način, da to razlikovanje zvede na raz-
likovanje med temeljnimi in izpeljanimi razlogi ter tako omeji uklonljivost na 
raven norm oz. aksiomov srednje ravni. Podrobneje, predlagani model se pre-
tvori v model, glede na katerega določena značilnost skupaj z normalnimi (pri-
vilegiranimi) pogoji zameji določen temeljni in dozdevno nespremenljiv razlog 
ter se s tem sklicuje na bolj osnovno normo, ki ima razlagalno moč in se nanjo 
sklicujejo tudi normalni (privilegirani) pogoji. Npr. ni zgolj laganje oz. govor-
jenje neresnice to, kar je normativno osrednje s stališča moralnosti, ampak so 
to iskrenost, poštenost in prevara. Vmesni sklep je tako, da modelu uklonljivih 
norm, utemeljenem na normalnosti, uspe razložiti oz. upravičiti izjemo k pr-
votni normi zgolj na način, da se sklicuje na določeno nadaljnjo normo. Če 
pobližje pogledamo primere, ki jih podata Lance in Littlova, se nam ta pogled 
potrdi.
Npr. v povezavi z lažjo kot uklonljivo, v normalnih pogojih moralno napač-
no, se ta model sklicuje na primere, v katerih laž ni moralno napačna oz. pri-
speva k moralni napačnosti dejanja. Med drugim gre za primere laganja v igri 
Lažnivec ali ko nas nacistični zločinec ustrahuje, da mu izdamo, kje je njegova 
naslednja žrtev. Vendar lahko te primere razumemo le tako, da opravijo veliko 
normativnega in razlagalnega dela v povezavi s tem, zakaj je laž moralno na-
pačna v normalnem primeru, ne pa v omenjenih. Tako je zato, ker je prostor 
privilegiranih pogojev tak, da ga oblikujejo bolj temeljni moralni premisleki, 
kot so pristanek, zvestoba, pravičnost, iskrenost in podobno. In tako je ta večji 
kos, ki vključuje nespremenljive moralne razloga in norme, tisti, ki nastopa v 
razlaga moralnega statusa določene značilnosti in s tem tudi celotnega dejanja. 
Argument predpostavlja, da je najboljši način razumevanja te razlike razlaga prek razlagalne 
asimetrije, ki jo uporabita tudi Littlova in Lance. Primeri, ki stojijo zunaj privilegiranih 
pogojev, so razlagalno odvisni od tega, kako določena značilnost deluje v okviru pogojev, ko 
so ti privilegirani. V nasprotni smeri ni takšne odvisnosti. Npr. bolečina je običajno razlog 
proti dejanju, vendar ne, ko je del športnega izziva in dosežka, ko zaobrne polarnost (Lance in 
Little 2006: 319). Najprej moramo razumeti, kako je običajno bolečina nekaj slabega, da lahko 
razumemo, kako deluje v primeru športnega dosežka, ne pa tudi obratno. Zdi se, da je tako ta 
model uspešen le za primere, ki imajo določeno valenco v privilegiranih pogojih ter nasprotno 
valenco v neprivilegiranih, ne pa tudi za razloge, ki jim včasih valenca sploh umanjka. »Kajti 
potem bo res za vse premisleke, katerih status je kdaj lahko uklonjen, da lahko ustrezno 
razumemo, zakaj niso razlog tu, le tako, da razumemo, zakaj in kako so razlog drugje. Kajti, da 
bi razumeli, zakaj nekaj ni F tukaj, moramo v splošnem imeti dojem tega, kako je lahko – če 
sploh – F drugje. Če je to dovolj, da nekaj štejemo kot primer asimetričnega razloga, potem se 
vsak premislek, katerega status je lahko kdaj uklonjen, šteje kot primer asimetričnega razloga, 
in to dela razlikovanje precej manj zanimivo, kot se je obetalo na začetku.« (McKeever in 
Ridge 2007: 67). Nadalje, zdi se, da so nekateri jedrni razlogi lahko neparadigmatični, na 
drugi strani pa tudi, da ni nujno, da so vsi obrobni razlogi neparadigmatični.  
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Tu se zdaj zastavi vprašanje o uklonljivosti ter temeljnih moralnih premislekih, 
ki se nahajajo v ozadju.
Če nekaj omenjenih primerov pogledamo še pobližje, se ta pomislek ja-
sno razkrije. V primeru laganja ta model trdi, da »namerno izrekanje nere-
snice« ni napačno, »ko to storimo nacističnim zločincem, katerim resnice ne 
dolgujemo«,22 ali pa ni moralno napačno v zvezi z osebo, »ki ni vredna resnice«, 
kajti »del tega, kaj pomeni pripoznati nekoga kot osebo […] pomeni pripozna-
vati jo kot nekoga, ki uklonljivo ima zahtevo, da smo do nje iskreni. Situacije, v 
katerih nekoga pripoznavamo kot osebo, ampak kot takšno, da ni vredna iskre-
nosti, so v svojem bistvu odkloni od prepoznavne teme osebe.«23
Tako lahko za te primere smiselno rečemo, da je to, kar dejansko igra vlo-
go razloga, sestav določenih značilnosti dejanj in privilegiranih pogojev, ki pa 
se nadalje sklicujejo na bolj temeljne razloge in dozdevno neuklonljive norme. 
Torej na to, ali so te norme, ki razlagajo in upravičujejo izjeme k prvotnim nor-
mam, tudi same uklonljive. Seveda se mora sklicevanje na norme na eni točki 
ustaviti in preostalo delo opravi naša presoja. Toda model uklonljivosti, ki gradi 
na normalnosti, mora ponuditi dodatne razloge oz. argumente, da so tudi te 
temeljne norme uklonljive in da tudi te sledijo enakemu modelu uklonljivosti, 
torej da lahko tudi njihovo uklonljivost razložimo in utemeljimo s sklicevanjem 
na normalne pogoje.
Lance in Littlova vnaprej predvidita naš zgornji ugovor. Njun odgovor je, 
da nam takšen dvig na višjo raven splošnosti (npr. od laganja kot izrekanja ne-
resnice do iskrenosti ali od povzročanja bolečine do krutosti) dozdevno zago-
tovi nekoliko trdnejše temelje, kar zadeva nespremenljivost in neuklonljivost 
razlogov in norm. Njun odziv je dvojen; (i) s tem korakom dviga na višjo raven 
izgubimo nekaj pomembnega, in sicer tesno povezanost med npr. laganjem in 
moralno napačnostjo v smislu, da je »biti laž« poglaviten razlog, zakaj je dejanje 
napačno; (ii) tudi ta višja, bolj debela raven normativnega področja je takšna, 
da je polna izjem, ki jih razkrivajo izjave, kot sta »tako zelo dobro boli« ali »vča-
sih moraš biti krut, da si prijazen«. Tako tudi domnevno neuklonljivi premisle-
ki, kot sta krutost ali iskrenost, niso nespremenljivi razlogi in ji lahko zajamemo 
zgolj v uklonljive norme.
Prva točka je ključna za vse poskuse združevanja spremenljivosti in mo-
ralnih splošnosti, saj nas morajo prepričati, da je to, kar igra vlogo razloga v 
določenem primeru, zares spremenljivo in da vse drugo, na kar se morebitno 
moralno načelo nanaša, ni del tega razloga. Glede tesne povezave med izbranim 
preprostim moralnim razlogom in moralno pravilnostjo ter napačnostjo dejanj 
se moramo vprašati, kaj opravlja razlagalno delo. Morda se resda pogosto skli-
cujemo na značilnosti, kot sta »laganje« ali »držanje obljube«, kot razloge, toda 
22 Little 2001: 34 (poudarek V. S.).
23 Lance in Little 2007: 153 (poudarek V. S.).
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če so privilegirani pogoji takšni, da kot premisleke vsebujejo stvari, kot so po-
štenost, iskrenost in zvestoba, potem se lahko vprašamo po njihovi vlogi. Ko se 
privilegirani pogoji spremenijo v neprivilegirane, so prav to tisti premisleki, na 
katere se sklicujemo v naši razlagi, zakaj je primer odklonski ali popačen glede 
na običajnega. In nadalje se zdi, da ti premisleki ne igrajo zgolj vloge omogoče-
valcev ali onemogočevalcev prvotnega razloga, ampak se nanje sklicujemo kot 
na same razloge.
Glede druge točke; večino takšnega govora moramo razumeti metaforično. 
Če moramo ob priložnosti »biti kruti, da bi bili prijazni«, v tem primeru zelo ver-
jetno krutost ni tista, ki stori dejanje prijazno ali moralno pravilno. Zamislimo 
si nekoliko bolj določen primer. Npr. prijateljici moram podati iskreno mnenje 
o njenem projektu ali dejavnosti in vem, da bo to moje mnenje zanjo boleče, 
ampak da ji bo hkrati dolgoročno tudi prihranilo številna razočaranja in težave. 
V tem smislu bom do nje krut oz. kruto iskren, vendar je to hkrati edini način, 
da jo od tega odvrnem oz. prepričam, da opusti načrte, ki zanjo ne bodo pri-
nesli nič dobrega, ter jih prihranim razočaranje in bolečine. Prav v tem smislu 
lahko rečemo, da »moram biti krut, da bi bil prijazen«. Kljub temu pa »krutost«, 
ki je tukaj vključena, ni razlog, ki prispeva k moralni pravilnosti mojega deja-
nja. Če bi bil hkrati na voljo tudi drug, nekrut oz. zgolj prijazen način, da jo 
prepričam v isto, potem bi bilo pravzaprav moralno napačno, celo grozljivo, če 
bi izbral prvi način. Zdi se, da nikoli ne moremo biti kruti samo zato, da bi bili 
kruti, in bi bilo to moralno sprejemljivo. Še drug način, kako se odzvati na zgor-
nji primer, pa je ta, da takšnih dejanj sploh na razumemo kot primere krutosti. 
Enako tudi za »tako zelo dobro boli« in druge podobne primere, ki jih navedeta 
Lance in Littlova. 
Vse to ta predlog razumevanja uklonljivosti v okvirih normalnosti zvede na 
točko, kjer se zdi, da mora tak model sprejeti vsaj nekatere temeljne, neuklonlji-
ve norme. Glede na zgornje primere lahko sklenemo, da pristop »normalnosti« 
ne sega vse do temeljev normativne domene. Na koncu se izkaže, da so vsaj 
nekatere temeljne, nespremenljive in neuklonljive norme, ki delujejo v ozadju 
normativnega področja in označujejo mejo med normalnimi okoliščinami oz. 
privilegiranimi pogoji na eni strani ter izjemnimi in neprivilegiranimi na drugi. 
Na ta način ne zadosti pogojema temeljnosti in osnovnosti.24 
24 V razpravi sem se prvenstveno osredotočil na moralne norme, ampak podobno velja tudi 
za pravne norme. Eno izmed rešitev takšne zagate je predlagal Guastini (2012). V okviru 
te rešitve so uklonljivosti in vrednostne praznine tesno povezane z vrednostnimi sodbami 
razlagalca norm. Nadalje, uklonljivost ni posebna značilnost pravnih načel ali norm; ni 
objektivna lastnost teh norm, ampak se vzpostavi šele z razlago. Vrednostne sodbe razlagalcev 
tako niso posledica določene objektivne uklonljivosti norme same ali pa pristne normativne 
vrzeli, ki bi bila neodvisna od razlage, ampak so izvor oz. vzrok razlagalne uklonljivosti. Ta 
navsezadnje vsebuje določene temeljne, neuklonljive razloge in norme, kot je npr. pravičnost. 
Prim. Strahovnik 2012; 2013.
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4  UKLONLJIVE NORME IN PLURALIZEM 
Modeli uklonljivosti, kot so jih razvili npr. Celano, Tur25 ter Lance in Little, 
so zanimivi, vendar se kot njihova omejitev razkrije to, da uklonljive norme ra-
zumejo na normativnem ozadju temeljnih razlogov, na katere se sklicujemo, ko 
presojamo o določenem primeru oz. o razlagi določene norme in normalnosti 
pogojev. Zdi se, da se mora takšen model ne glede na to, kako določimo uklon-
ljive strukture uklonljivih norm, sklicevati na določeno širšo množico temelj-
nih (pravnih, moralnih ...) premislekov, povezanih z normami, ki so v ozadju 
in osvetljujejo izjeme. Uklonljivost, ki temelji na normalnosti, je tako omeje-
na na površinske norme ali na norme na srednji ravni. V § 2 smo predstavili 
nabor pogojev in prednosti, ki jim mora zadostiti model pristne uklonljivosti. 
Nato smo predstavili model, ki temelji na pojmu normalnosti, ter pokazali, da 
ne more zadostiti nekaterim izmed njih in da v njegovem okviru uklonljivost 
ne sega do samega dna normativnih področij in ne vključuje najbolj temeljnih 
norm. 
Eden izmed naukov na podlagi tega je lahko, da model uklonljivosti začne-
mo razvijati tako, da izrecno vključuje sklicevanje na širšo množico vredno-
stnega ali normativnega ozadja s temeljnimi normativnimi premisleki. Za po-
dročje moralne normativnosti takšen model pomeni moralni pluralizem, ki ga 
lahko razumemo na naslednji način. Tradicionalni moralni pluralizem26 gradi 
na temeljnih moralnih razlogih, ki jih lahko zajamemo v splošne, neuklonljive 
norme, npr. v načela, ki opredeljujejo prima facie dolžnosti. Te skupaj z moralno 
pomembnimi značilnostmi izbrane situacije določajo moralni status dejanja. 
Ob tem so za končno določitev naše dejanske dolžnosti seveda pomembni po-
zoren premislek in tehtanje razlogov ter videnje, kako se ujemajo (sodba).
Številne razprave se ukvarjajo z vprašanjem, kako ustrezno razumeti pojem 
prima facie dolžnosti, ki ga je predlagal W. D. Ross, in kako razumemo odnos 
med prima facie in dejansko dolžnostjo. Ena bolj prepričljivih razlag se opira 
na pojem temeljnega moralnega razloga in uporabili jo bomo tudi tukaj. Glede 
na takšno razumevanje prima facie dolžnosti (Rossov seznam takšnih dolžnosti 
vključuje zvestobo, hvaležnost, popravo, dobrotnost oz. blagohotnost, pravič-
nost, neškodovanje in samoizboljšanje) jih razumemo kot temeljne moralne 
razloge oz. premisleke, ki so vedno moralno pomembni in govorijo v prid ali 
proti dejanju. Glede na njihov širok moralni opis se zdijo neuklonljive. Poleg 
tega temeljnega seznama je Ross vpeljal tudi t. i. izpeljane ali sestavljene prima 
facie dolžnosti. Naš predlog gre v smeri, da lahko te izpeljane prima facie dol-
žnosti razumemo kot te, ki pomenijo uklonljive razloge in so tako kandidati za 
uklonljive norme na srednji ravni, ki jih pogosto uporabljamo v naši moralni 
25 Tur 2001.
26 Ross 1930; 1939.
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Vojko Strahovnik
misli. Poglejmo si primer. Ross je trdil, da je dolžnost spoštovani zakone države 
izpeljana dolžnost, ki sestoji iz ene ali več temeljnih prima facie dolžnosti, v tem 
primeru iz prima facie dolžnosti hvaležnosti za dobra, ki jih prejmemo od drža-
ve, prima facie dolžnosti zvestobe, ki izhaja iz neizrecne zaveze glede skupnega 
življenja z drugimi v državi in skupnih pravil, ter prima facie dolžnosti dobro-
tnosti, saj spoštovanje zakonov prispeva k skupnemu dobru.27 Podobno velja za 
prima facie dolžnosti, da ne lažemo ali da držimo svoje obljube. Obe temeljita 
na temeljni prima facie dolžnosti zvestobe. Ross takšne izpeljane prima facie 
dolžnosti opredeli tudi kot media axiomata, ki so uporaben način, kako splošne 
moralne norme temeljnih prima facie dolžnosti uporabimo v konkretnih pri-
merih.28 Tako smo zdaj zarisali model uklonljivih norm, ki izrecno pripoznava 
normativno ozadje, sestavljeno iz temeljnih, neuklonljivih norm. Pri tem pa ne 
trdimo, da si te temeljne norme ne morejo nasprotovati (pripoznanje, da lahko 
najdemo konflikt med temeljnimi normami, ki ga ne moremo razrešiti s skli-
cevanjem na kakšno nadaljnjo, metanormo, je eden izmed stebrov pluralizma) 
in da moramo dopustiti tudi izjeme glede temeljnih prima facie dolžnosti, toda 
v tem primeru so izjeme povezane s tem, da ni nujno, da temeljna prima facie 
dolžnost določa tudi našo končno, dejansko dolžnost.
Ta model je torej podoben pristopom, ki temeljijo na normalnosti in ki smo 
jih obravnavali zgoraj, vendar se od njih razlikuje po tem, da izrecno priznava 
temeljne, neuklonljive norme in izrecno omejuje uklonljivost na temelju nor-
malnosti na norme na srednji ravni normativnih področij. Eden izmed možnih 
pogledov na zgornje argumente je tako, da je njihov namen zvesti modele nor-
malnosti na bolj splošen pluralistični pristop, pri čemer pa opustijo tezo, da je 
uklonljivost značilnost temeljnih norm in da v okviru tega modela ne potrebu-
jemo nobene predpostavke neuklonljivih norm.
V splošnem lahko tako razločimo dva temeljno različna pogleda na možnost 
upraviljenja določenega normativnega področja, in sicer ne eni strani genera-
lizem, ki združuje upraviljenje in deduktivni model normativne misli, ter na 
drugi strani partikularizem, ki zavrača možnost (celostnega) upraviljenja polja 
normativnosti. Pluralistični pristop se nahaja v vmesnem območju.
V njegovem okviru lahko modele uklonljivosti, ki temeljijo na normalno-
sti, razumemo kot posledico pluralistične normativne strukture in norm v tej 
strukturi, prav tako pa ga razumemo kot v odnosu do neuklonljivega normativ-
nega in vrednostnega ozadja, ki je povezano z posameznimi sodbami.
27 Ross 1930: 27–28.
28 Ross 1939: 190.
91Uklonljivost, norme in izjeme: model normalnosti 
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—Zahvala.— Rad bi se zahvalil občinstvu na konferenci Genoa – Slavic Seminar in 
Legal Theory (Genova, 11. in 12. december 2014) za živahno razpravo o tem prispevku. 
Pri pripravi končne različice prispevka so mi bile v veliko pomoč tudi pripombe dveh 
anonimnih recenzentov, prav tako pa tudi razprava o teh temah s Terryjem Horganom 
in Matjažem Potrčem. 
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