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REVOLUTIONS: CASES OF UNEXPECTED
UTILITIES**

Walter T. CASEY

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COMMON?**

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STRUCTURES IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES –
THE METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE**

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RE-EVALUATING GENDER ROLES AND REVOLUTIONS: CASES OF UNEXPECTED UTILITIES

Walter T. CASEY¹

Women have been a contributing factor of modern revolutions since at least the American Revolution against Great Britain. Yet too often most descriptions and analyses of revolution relegate women to a supporting role, or make no mention of women's involvement at all. This work differs from prior efforts in that it will explore one possible explanation for the successes of three revolutions based upon the levels of women's support for those revolutions. An analysis of the three cases (Ireland, Russia, and Nicaragua) suggests a series of hypotheses about women's participation in revolution and its importance to revolutions' success.

Key words: Women, Revolution, Regime Violence, Frustration-Aggression.

1 INTRODUCTION

In this study I explore the relationship between sex (gender) and revolution. Specifically, I posit that the higher the ratio of women to men in a revolutionary organization, the more likely the success of that organization. This theory derives from an ocular examination of the successes and failures of revolutionary movements in the twentieth century. Casual observation suggests that several successful revolutions, that is, those that overturned the previous order(s) and established a new order, had a relatively high ratio of active female combatants and female non-combatant support. The same observation also suggests failed revolutions had relatively low (or non-existent) levels of female participation within the revolutionary movements' structure and organization.

Beyond relatively few and scattered case studies of individual events and nations, work of this sort has not been published.^{2, 3, 4} While the evidence is difficult to obtain, supporting data do exist. The greatest problem in studying this issue is delineation of terminology and precision of definition. What

¹ Assistant Professor of Political Science, SCORE Research Fellow, BES Fellow, Texas A&M University, CELA, 7101 University Drive, Texarkana, Texas 75503.

² Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988).

³ Carol Andreas, *When Women Rebel* (Westport, CT: Lawrence-Hill, 1990).

⁴ Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Women and War* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

constitutes a revolution? At what point is success assured? What is a combatant or non-combatant? And, what is the threshold ratio that sets successes apart from failures? I address these issues in the next section.

I suggest that a revolutionary organ becomes more “radical” or revolutionary by merely including women. In the cases examined, the established orders allowed little female political participation, and social equality was token or non-existent. On the other hand, the equality given to females within a revolutionary movement tends towards greater parity and equity than that within the social order being assailed. This is, in and of itself, a revolutionary concept for many societies and states.

And unless women desired greater levels of equality, and were frustrated by the state and/or society, such inclusion could not occur. When an obstacle is placed in one path, many may choose another path. This illustrates the dilemma facing enlightened women in a repressive society or state: whether to remain at a standstill, or to choose a novel and revolutionary approach to their problems. The underlying suggestion is that some women who chose the path of revolution may also have had an ulterior motive for wishing its’ success.

The countries and/or rebellions and revolutions that are examined are Ireland, 1926–1921, and 1969–present; Russia, 1917–1921; and Nicaragua, 1977–1983. I also mention that certain revolutions are specifically excluded: the Iranian of 1979, and similar theocratic fundamentalist coups worldwide. I explain these omissions further in the next section. The data used are drawn from the government archives of those countries, and/or from the revolutionary organizations’ archives, letters, and other material. Some of the data may seem suspect, especially when addenda and “new” or “lost” data are included. Where no data exist from states or other internal organs, appropriate social science indicators drawn from international sources are used.

My methodology, as indicated in the title, is simple comparative analysis. No extensively sophisticated data analysis methods are used, as there are no available data of sufficient scope and quality for such systematic analysis. Further, such methods do not seem necessary to the scope of this work. Ocular examination of the refined data will have to suffice. Available data should show a correlation between female participation in the revolutionary movement and revolutionary success.

It is hoped that my research will encourage further work in this area. Much deeper and broader investigation into the phenomenon of revolution must be conducted to completely understand both its origins and effects. At the same time, understanding why females in the populace would join an event of this nature must also be explored with greater depth. While the current literature has made progress toward understanding these events, much more remains to be done.

2 DEFINITIONS

“Revolution is the overthrow of a government by means which are manifestly illegal or unconstitutional within the framework of a given system, and the

substitution of another".⁵ Without the substitution or replacement, what occurs is merely riot, or when on a large scale, rebellion. That is to say: destruction without creation.⁶

To this definition I must add the word *fundamental* to the changes made. The replacement of people or personnel without shifts in policies, ideologies, *et cetera*, is not a revolution. Without such a change, what occurs is merely a *coup d'état*. For the purposes of this work such will not be regarded as revolution.

I would also add the words *rapid* and *violent* to the definition following Samuel Huntington's explanation: "Revolution... is the broad, rapid, and violent expansion of political participation outside the existing structure of political institutions..."⁷ This definition also excludes evolutionary changes such as 'greater inclusion' or 'broadened participation'; *ergo*, amending a constitution to allow a wider suffrage is not a revolution.

This definition deliberately eschews a connection of revolution to the Left, *à la* Theda Skocpol.⁸ While on the surface, many (if not most) revolutions appear creatures of the Left, conservative elements, and those on the Right, have also brought about revolutionary change; whether Nazi Germany in 1933, or Chile in 1973. I resist defining revolution as something wrought by the Left so that I may also exclude class. Properly speaking, females do not in and of themselves constitute a *political* class, and are often (as are men), divided in their political opinions and ideologies.

While substantive change can and does take place over long periods, such slow change also is not a revolution for our purposes. Such transformations as the *Industrial Revolution*, *Economic Revolution*, and the *Agricultural Revolution* of the late medieval period, to list a few, indeed constituted fundamental shifts in the societies affected. However, they were not affected as a result of an individual or collective effort to bring about widespread socio-political change. Nor, were they intended in any wise to bring about political changes or regime shifts. These gradual shifts in types and styles of regimes and states can more properly be attributed to *evolution* when done internally, and when resulting from external forces, may be said to be the result of a global evolutionary process; such as international pressures, war, and so forth.

I include *violence* in the definition because such political change in a nation-state seems possible without some. While the possibility exists for a non-violent revolution, this work does not address those that might be classified under such a definition: the cessation of Communist Party rule in former Soviet-bloc countries such as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and others. Examining the history of revolution suggests that violence seems almost necessary as a guarantor of success.

Given these considerations, I therefore adopt Mehran Kamrava's definition: "...revolutions denote rapid and fundamental changes in political arrangements and leaders, principles, and orientation. ...the transformation

⁵ Alexander J. Groth, *Revolution and Political Change* (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1996).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 274.

⁸ Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). See also Theda Skocpol, "Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilizations," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1984.

of the very political fabric on which a government is based... the basic premises on which political culture is based, and transforms the guidelines and the intricacies by which political conduct is governed... revolutions are mass-based affairs of great magnitude, brought on and carried through by the mobilization of the masses of people against political targets. [A Revolution's] dynamics need to be considered in conjunction with social and cultural developments".⁹

From Kamrava's I derive a similar definition for rebellion, in that the main difference is in that a revolution is successful, while a rebellion may fail. All of the other aspects of revolution are present, however, and maybe even in greater magnitude. Thus a rebellion can be bloodier, more rapid or broader in scope, but if a regime-state is not successfully and substantively changed, there was no revolution. I acknowledge this does not exclude civil strife and war. In the three cases examined, revolution/rebellion led to civil war. The Irish, Russian, and Nicaraguan revolutions led to a bloody and protracted internal conflict. I therefore include civil conflict as a part of revolution.

I divide into two broad categories the types of participants in a revolution: *combatants* and *non-combatants*. I do this for ease of use, well aware of the pitfalls of generalizing. *Combatants* are persons who take up arms in ready preparation for physical confrontation with the intent to use violent means and methods to inflict harm and damage, whether upon persons or property. *Non-combatants* include those persons giving materiel and supplies to combatants, persons who may withdraw from the theatre of action, or are neutral.

A further distinction is needed: those supplying the makings for plastic explosives may seem to be legally as responsible as those who use those weapons, and in the eyes of most societies will be held as accountable if caught. I propose then a sub-categorization for *active non-combatant* (participating on behalf of the revolutionary organization) and *passive non-combatant* (those remaining neutral and not engaging on any group's behalf). A *supporter* of the revolutionary movement would be one who engages in non-material assistance: print and other media distribution, proletarians on sympathy strike, et cetera.¹⁰

For the purposes of this work, revolutionary movement, organization, insurgency, and all associated terms are used interchangeably. I will use *I* as a standard abbreviation for all of these terms where necessary. The abbreviation *R* will signify the regime, government, or state, all of which may also be used interchangeably.

This work also concentrates on the different contributions to revolution based on the biological delineation of male and female rather than the artificial social constructs of gender¹¹ - men and women. Gender roles can and do change over time,¹² and I will show how a "side" benefit of revolution may be

⁹ Mehran Kamrava, *Revolutionary Politics* (Westport: Praeger Press, 1992), 153.

¹⁰ Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, *Exploring Revolution* (London: M.E.Sharpe, 1991).

¹¹ Gender: artificial socially constructed roles ascribed to males and females. Different from sex, which is a biologically determined matter. In use with gender roles: these social constructs can and do change over time, between communities and cultures, and happen as a result of social, economic, political, or theological shifts. (Source: *Commission for the Advancement of Women*, as used by the ILO (International Labour Office of the United Nations General Secretariat), UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women. Now part of the United Nations Development Program), UNRISD (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development), and others).

¹² Christine DiStefano, "Masculinity, Femininity, and Ideology in Political Theory," paper presented at Women's International Studies Forum, Vancouver, 1993.

greater gender equity and sensitivity to women's' needs.¹³ Biological constructs do not appear to change measurably over time,¹⁴ and especially do not change as a result of a successful political revolution, Stalinist pseudo-scientific claims of a "New Soviet Woman" notwithstanding.¹⁵

A note on contemporary Islamic Revolutions: It is argued that many of the new regimes in the world came about as a result of a successful revolution, and that these include Iran and Afghanistan. There are two reasons I do not include them in this work. Firstly, the relative or absolute backlashes that women have experienced, and the (by Western standards especial) repression women experienced under the new regimes in these states, makes a measure of female participation effectively impossible.¹⁶ The data suggest that women may have supported revolution *against* the Shah, for instance, but that the subsequent turn to fundamentalist Islam has made women quiescent.¹⁷ Given that women enjoy little if any political and basic human rights in such cases, and that data are lacking, those cases must be excluded.¹⁸

Secondly, there is exclusion through definition. Given that the civil violence which followed the three cases included here was part of the revolutions final setting, and that Islamic civil strife was so much the shorter or non-existent, those regime changes are necessarily unable to fit the definition. This is not to suggest, by any means, that revolutionary participants in those excluded revolutions did not include women, or that gendered aspects of revolutionary manifestoes were absent, *et cetera*. And that many of those regimes since their revolutions are still footed less-than-concretely suggest some instability emblematic of civil strife – but still not rising to meet the necessary conditions of demarcated definition.

3 THE PROBLEM

As to why some revolutions succeed, and others fail, I posit that the revolutionary organization which maximizes all available resources is the one that has the greatest likelihood of achieving success. In order to properly utilize resources an individual or group must be aware of them or be willing to accept alternate resources. Use of resources also pre-supposes a rational approach to meeting goals; meaning again the willingness to utilize whatever may be necessary to achieve those goals. Collins asserts that human beings pursue goals in a rational manner (but notes that predicting the strategies used in pursuing those goals is impractical).¹⁹ This means that a revolutionary organization will use any means to achieve goals, and that an *I* is more likely to explore alternate or un-examined resources than *R*. To

¹³ Jean-Pierre Beauvais, "The Impact of Nicaragua," in *Crisis in the Caribbean*, eds. FitzRoy Ambursley and Robin Cohen (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983), 73–74.

¹⁴ Although this concept itself is currently under fire as more information becomes available regarding trans-gendered individuals, "multi"-gendered individuals, and so forth. The traditional concept of binary sex categories has suffered some shocks within the medical community as the physical realities of mixed or ambiguous genitalia confront (and confound) physicians and psychologists. For more on this, see Randolph Trumbach, *Sex and the Gender Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1998); Gilbert Herdt (ed.), *Third Sex, Third Gender: Sexual Dimorphism in Culture and History* (New York: Zone Books, 1994) and Tom Laquer, *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).

¹⁵ William Mandel, *Soviet Women* (New York: Anchor Press, 1975).

¹⁶ Jean Bethke Elshtain, "The Problem With Peace," *Millenium*, 17, 3 (1988), 443–444.

¹⁷ Valentine Moghadam, "Gender and Revolution," in *Theorizing Revolutions*, ed. John Foran (London: Routledge, 1997), 135.

¹⁸ C.f., Theda Skocpol, "Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilizations," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1984.

¹⁹ Randall Collins, *Conflict Sociology* (New York: Academic Press, 1974).

support these suppositions, I have adapted the *resource mobilization approach* (RMA). Theorists such as Anthony Downs,²⁰ Charles Tilly,²¹ and others make the assumption that actors in organizations as well as the strategies used are rational and goal-oriented. I have selected three cases that support this approach. I use these cases for several reasons:

- 1) They demonstrate a successful set of revolutions in which the participation of females was recorded in some detail, therefore providing more evidence than usual of female participation.
- 2) They throw onto the empirical table the concept of female involvement in revolutionary activities; which should de-emphasize the andro-centric nature of much prior research.
- 3) They further the research on why and how revolutions happen, and why anyone (male or female) should wish to partake in a revolution.

In what are conventionally considered normal andro-centric societies, an insurgent group which allows, enlists, or actively recruits females is attempting to utilize more available resources; *i.e.*, the roughly half of the populace that is female. With more resources (females), *I* meets its objectives more frequently.

An additional benefit for organizations that include women: through exposing a portion of the female half of the population to the revolutionary ideas and ideals by *inclusion*, the organization is (consciously or not) propagating the ideal of *equality*. Many regimes to which an opposition has formed are androcentric themselves, and often fail to include the female half of the populace in basic political processes.²² A movement making that move is not only making a practical choice, but is demonstrating an egalitarian ideology preference that society as a whole is exposed to. This has the potential for long-term changes which could revolutionize the society.

4 THREE CASES FOR CONSIDERATION

4.1 Ireland

Prior to the Anglo-Norman invasion in 1070, Gaelic women enjoyed a status that few modern democracies can match.²³ Christianity had ended the matrilineal order; women still remained the equals of men legally and politically.²⁴ Women owned their own property, both in and out of marriage; could divorce their husbands for fourteen different reasons, including slander of the woman's sexual performance;²⁵ had their own folk heroines (often presented as role models for both sexes). Women fought alongside men in battle, had their own warrior academy of sorts,²⁶ with warrior women were being treated as equals as late as 1580.²⁷ The Anglo-Norman conquest, Tudor plantations, suppression of the Celto-Gaelic Church all eroded

²⁰ Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957).

²¹ Charles Tilly, *Social Movements, 1768–2004* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2004).

²² There are some exceptions of note: El Salvador in the early 1980's and the Shah's Iran prior to 1979. See James Dunkerly, *The Long War* (London: Junction Books, 1982) and Valentine Moghadam, "Gender and Revolution," in *Theorizing Revolutions*, ed. John Foran (London: Routledge, 1997), 136.

²³ John Darby, *Conflict in Northern Ireland: A Background Essay* (Derry: CAIN, 1999).

²⁴ Jan Canavan, *Womens Struggle Liberates Ireland/Ireland's Struggle Liberates Women: Feminism and Irish Republicanism* (Brooklyn: U.S. office of the Irish Women's History Group, 1999).

²⁵ Some examples include: the male partner impugning a female partner's sexual desires for lengthy foreplay, or the female partner refusing to engage in oral or anal gratification, and so forth.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ E.g., Grainne Mhaol, a famed corsair captain and shrewd business-person, was received 'in state' by Elizabeth I of England and commanded a large cleptocratic organisation under her solo authority.

women's status.²⁸ This did not efface folk histories, and tales of "Queen Maeve" or "Grania the Pirate" are still told to young girls as examples of "goodly Irishwomen".²⁹

These examples were used by rebel leaders as a means to entice female support. The Rising of 1798, for instance, featured women as troops, and as leaders and commanders: Moira McCracken, Patricia Fitz Humbert, and Josephina Cooke, all commanded units of mixed men and women, roughly two-hundred strong each.³⁰ Women served as smugglers for the abortive "Fenian" rising of 1867, and served as informers for the Irish Republican Brotherhood (or IRB, a forerunner of the IRA).³¹

The Easter Rising of 1916 resulted in 450 people, many of whom were civilians dead with over 2,500 wounded. Over 3,500 people were subsequently arrested country-wide although 1,500 were freed after questioning. Some 1,841 of these were interned without trial in England, and 171 were tried by secret court martial resulting in 170 convictions. Ninety were sentenced to death but 75 of these sentences were commuted to life imprisonment. The seven signatories of the proclamation of independence were all executed, much to the outrage of the Irish public who began to revise their opinion of the insurgents to the status of heroes.

During Easter week almost 100 women, members of "*Cumann na mBan*"³² (the IRB women's organization) and the Irish Citizen Army, (ICA) took part in the fighting at the various garrisons in Dublin. In the months prior to Easter Week, women in *Cumann na mBan* and ICA received instruction in first aid, signalling, and weapons in preparation for the revolution. On Easter Sunday, members of *Cumann na mBan*, travelled to different parts of the country to inform Volunteer commanders that the rising would happen Monday. As Volunteers and ICA set out to occupy the various garrisons throughout Dublin, they were accompanied by several dozen women from the ICA and *Cumann na mBan*, joined later by more as news of the rising spread.

Of the estimated 90 women who took part in the rising, thirty-four (including Elizabeth O'Farrell, Julia Grennan and Winifred Carney) were stationed in the GPO. With the exception of Bolands Mills (where De Valera refused to accept any women); a number of women were attached to the main garrisons in the city. In those under the command of the ICA, Connolly ensured that women held senior positions. At St Stephen's Green, Countess Markievicz was second-in-command to Michael Mallin. She, along with Margaret Skinnider (badly injured during the fighting), Madeleine French Mullen, and Nellie Gifford, acted as snipers from the roof of the College of Surgeons. In the City Hall area, Dr Kathleen Lynn, the most senior officer at the outpost, presented the surrender to the British the following day.

Throughout Easter Week, while many of the women of *Cumann na mBan* carried out the essential duties of cooking and nursing the wounded, others undertook the difficult and dangerous task of carrying the numerous vital dispatches between the various garrisons and outposts and the

²⁸ Carol Coulter, *The Hidden Tradition: Feminism, Women, and Nationalism in Ireland* (Cork: Cork University Press, 1993).

²⁹ Jan Canavan, *Womens Struggle Liberates Ireland/Irelands Struggle Liberates Women: Feminism and Irish Republicanism* (Brooklyn: U.S. office of the Irish Women's History Group, 1999).

³⁰ Roger Sanzer, *"We Are But Women": Women in Ireland's History* (London: Routledge, 1993).

³¹ Robert Kee, *The Green Flag* (Aylesbury: Hazell Watson and Viney, 1983).

³² Named for warrior women of Irish mythology. Not to be confused with the post-1973 IRA organization of the same name.

headquarters at the GPO. In addition to gathering intelligence on British troop movements around the city, women ran the huge risk of transporting food supplies as well as ammunition through the many British army checkpoints.

On Saturday, April 29, Nurse Elizabeth O'Farrell carried Pearse's final order of surrender to General Lowe. That evening she toured the garrisons with Pearse's order to surrender. She continued in this duty on the next day.

77 women were arrested as a result of the rising. While many were released within days, five were held longer. Countess Markievicz, court-marched and sentenced to death, had her sentence commuted to penal servitude for life and was released from Aylesbury Prison in June of the following year. In the months after the rising, republican women were to the fore in re-organizing the Republican movement in preparation for a renewed fight. Their contribution to the cause of independence did not go unnoticed by the Irish.

Nor did their contributions escape notice by the British. *His Majesty's Commission of Study in Ireland* from 1926 reveals two important things. One is the extent to which the anti-regime organs were penetrated by informants (especially in the very detailed reports on known members of those groups: the Irish Republican Army, The Irish Volunteers, the Irish United Socialists, among others). More importantly, they also note the large numbers of females participating in those activities. In one sub-report, entitled *Report on the Commission of Surveillance for the Four Provinces, Compiled for the Home Secretary, for the years 1908–1921*, the following breakdown of members is made:

TABLE 1: MEMBERSHIP IN ANTI-REGIME ORGANISATIONS

	I.R.A.		I.V.		I.S.P	
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
Muenster	13204	6206	2200	340	1217	840
Connaught	16240	203	260	16	304	88
Leinster	712	38	1400	204	906	1202
Ulster	11206	682	1128	216	604	816
TOTALS	41362	7129	4988	776	2031	2946
Sum Total:	Male:	48391		Female:	10851	

Source: *His Majesty's Commission of Study in Ireland* (1926).³³

The text which accompanies this table reads in part:

"...and what follows may seem shocking to the Ministers [of the Government], but is of import. *The Irish subjects have gone so far as to allow women of low and ignoble circumstance to engage in violence against H.M. Crown Forces and Officers...*" (italics mine).³⁴

It is possible to assume that for various reasons (over-reporting, underreporting, informers giving erroneous information for money, double agents, and other reasons), there are errors in the number of females reported. Nevertheless, then even a portion of this total number of women is significant. These figures are the highest to be found in the British government's own literature and coincide with the I.R.A.'s own information:

³³ *His Majesty's Commission of Study in Ireland*, from the Archives of the Royal Society, 1926, London and Dublin.

³⁴ Note that the Citizens Army is not included. From examining the documents, it appears that the British considered them to be part of the IRB.

“... approximately 50-60 thousand men, and 10-12 thousand women, at various times and places....engaged the British in the struggle for freedom”.^{35, 36}

A low estimate of the share of women involved would put the ratio of women to men at 10:1, the higher estimate at 1:5. Either way, the revolutionary organs had a superior advantage (mathematically) of women in the field when compared to those forces of the British. The Army Lists for the years 1911–1920 show 280 (total) women employed by the Army in Ireland, none in combatant roles. Most on the List served in secretarial/clerical (235, total), some in radio-operator roles (28), the rest in various other.³⁷

It should not have been that way. Those signatories to the “Ulster Covenant” had included 72,608 women out of the total of 471,414. Of these, 70,202 were identified as wife to a husband whose name preceded, 980 as daughters to a father whose name preceded, the remaining 200 unattached.³⁸ The “Curragh Mutiny” of March 1914 had rallied the “womenfolk” of the Anglo-Irish ascendancy to a vitriolic opposition of the King “...if the King severs from him the ties to Ireland...”, i.e., Home Rule or independence.³⁹

During the Rising women had also been very vocal in their opposition to “...those damned rebels...”-that is, loyal to the Crown- at least until the British began executing the leaders of the rebellion.⁴⁰ That event galvanized both sexes to massive disapproval of the Crown, leading to more repressive measures, and to huge increases in *Fianna Fail*, *Fine Gael*, and *Sinn Féin* enrolments, male and female.⁴¹ Of those Anglo-Irish women who opposed Home Rule and/or independence, there is no evidence of any combatant role.⁴²

These data strongly suggest that the inclusion of women made a difference; Ireland became independent after a time (excepting strong economic ties to the United Kingdom). It is difficult to assess to how great an impact those women who participated made. Current literature makes great political hay out of women’s involvement in the revolution and Civil War,⁴³ appealing to women as potential recruits “following in their sisters paths”.⁴⁴

³⁵ John Murtagh (one of Michael Collins biographers), remarks that “the women proved to be as effective, if not more so, than the men, in many attacks[on the British Forces]...”. See Irish Times for December 17, 1926.

³⁶ Carol Coulter, *The Hidden Tradition: Feminism, Women, and Nationalism in Ireland* (Cork: Cork University Press, 1993).

³⁷ Positions (Archives of H.M. Army, 1990 (1925). See John Darby, *Conflict in Northern Ireland: A Background Essay* (Derry: CAIN, 1999).

³⁸ William Crotty, “Democracy and Change in the Republic of Ireland (and Northern Ireland),” paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 1998.

³⁹ Eamon De Valera, quoting an unnamed Unionist, in Robert Kee, *The Green Flag* (Aylesbury: Hazell Watson and Viney, 1983).

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ De Valera comments in the *Irish Times*: “...Oh, we deliberately sought women to be part of the struggle. We knew the British would never search a woman...[we knew] that the Black and Tans, and Guards Regiments, would be shocked stiff by the sight of a woman firing into them.” Note that this conflicts with his earlier refusal to accept women into his units during Easter week, 1916. See Irish Times from March 20, 1938.

⁴² Brian Maye, *Fine Gael 1923–1987* (Dublin: Blackwater Press, 1993).

⁴³ Jan Canavan, *Womens Struggle Liberates Ireland/Ireland's Struggle Liberates Women: Feminism and Irish Republicanism* (Brooklyn: U.S. office of the Irish Women's History Group, 1999).

⁴⁴ Ailbhe Smith, *Irish Women's Studies: A Reader* (Dublin: Attic Press, 1993).

4.2 Russia

For most of its known history, women had long been treated as chattel, relegated to the *terem*, or seclusion, if they were not peasants. Exceptions such as the Regent Sofya, Tsarina Elizabeth, Tsarina Ekaterina I, and Catherine the Great were truly that; the exception to the societal and legal rules.⁴⁵ Some aristocratic females enjoyed a semblance of power and control, but almost exclusively from the boudoir. But by the early 1900's, women were allowed to own some property, and were lending their weight to *salon*-style discussions and political discourse.⁴⁶

Lenin's 1917 October Revolution is best detailed elsewhere⁴⁷ but one recurring aspect of it bears on this work.⁴⁸ The All Russian Soviet Congress had delayed their meeting until November 7, helping the Bolsheviks prepare for the insurrection on the evening of November 6. Insurgent troops occupied all bridges, railroad stations, post offices and other public buildings. The seat of the Provisional Government was taken without trouble: *Aurora* sat in the Neva and shelled the Winter Palace as insurgents fought against a few ensigns and the all-women "Death Battalion" – all that could be brought to defend the government.⁴⁹

The "Death Battalion" was one of nine all-female Tsarist battalions in 1917, officered by women, usually of the nobility, and enjoying battlefield success. These came about because of:

- 1) The high numbers of desertions from the peasant-conscript army, and,
- 2) The high literacy rate among females in the nurse corps, which became the primary source for female infantry recruits.⁵⁰

As the war lengthened, women gained combat experience, but returned to their homes only to find that socially and even materially things had been better for them at the front. This discontent, coupled with the Russian suffrage movement, convinced many female combat veterans to join anti-regime organizations. By October of 1917, women were firmly ensconced within the Provisional Army, the *Bolshevik* Red Guards, and other military groups. When the Bolsheviks won, Major Maria Botchkareva (the Death Battalion's commander) was congratulated for bravery by both Lenin and Trotsky. That and other all-female units were incorporated into the Red Army *in toto*. Some Cossack regiments also had all-female units, although most were disbanded by 1922.⁵¹

⁴⁵ Bruce W. Lincoln, *Red Victory: Russia's Civil Wars, 1917–1922* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989).

⁴⁶ Sir Donald Wallace Mackenzie, *Russia on the Eve of War and Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

⁴⁷ Such as Harrison Salisbury, *Black Night, White Snow: Russia's Revolutions, 1905–1917* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1981) or the aforementioned Bruce W. Lincoln, *Red Victory: Russia's Civil Wars, 1917–1922* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989). See also Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr M. Nekrich, *Utopia in Power: The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present* (New York: Summit Books, 1986).

⁴⁸ Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr M. Nekrich, *Utopia in Power: The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present* (New York: Summit Books, 1986).

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Major Marya Botchkareva, *My Part in the Great Days of October* (Chicago: Paladin Press, 1995).

⁵¹ GOSARKHIV, "State Archives (of the U.S.S.R.)", locations throughout the former Soviet Union, 1969. Page numbers and other citations unavailable.

TABLE 2: RUSSIAN WOMEN IN COMBAT

Year	Tsarist/White	Anti-Regime
1916	900	4,100
1917	1200	7,260
1918	0	12,000
1919	0	8,200
1920	0	14,200
1921	0	42,000

Source: KRASNYARKHIV (1925).

Compare this to those estimated to be in opposition to the Tsar:

TABLE 3: ESTIMATES OF RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONARIES

Year	Tsarist Estimations (Total)	Soviet Estimations: Males	Soviet Estimations: Females
1916	650,000	680,200	281,121
1917	1,228,000	1,330,300	575,000
1918	(Provisional Gov't) 4,288,200	4,000,000*	2,000,000*
1919	N/A	5,220,200	3,200,000
1920	N/A	6,500,000	3,750,000
1921	N/A	7,220,204	4,000,098

*Soviet Estimates are drawn from anecdotal accounts for this year, due to a high incidence of "wanton destruction of records". Source: KRASNYARKHIV (1928);⁵² GOSARKHIV (1969).

The various Allies, in their bid to keep the Bolsheviks out of power, also took note of the number of women fighting for the "Reds". The U.S. Ambassador to Britain telegraphed the U.S. Ambassador to France, saying that "only three or four divisions [of U.S. and Japanese troops] would be needed... ..as local Maximalist authority is tenuous... and *based upon a few hundred peasant women... no more than 1,500 under arms...*" (U.S. State Department, file No. 861.001/1000, January 1918). The U.S. Ambassador to Russia estimated the reports of women "bearing arms to be greatly exaggerated, no more than twenty-thousand in the entire "Death Battalion"... , a number surely exaggerated itself."⁵³

Figures on female participation for 1916–1918 seem corroborated, but later years seem unnaturally high – perhaps mis-recording, or perhaps due to the acknowledged Soviet penchant for minor exaggeration.⁵⁴ Either way, membership in the organizations opposed to the Tsar did include a significant number of females. There were few women in the Tsar's Ministries, excepting secretarial/clerical workers, of which ninety to ninety-five percent were male.⁵⁵ Party rolls for many years are often at odds, as sometimes anyone opposed to the Tsar is considered to be a "non-dues-

⁵² KRASNYARKHIV, "Red Archives and History (of the C.P.S.U.)", locations throughout the former Soviet Union, 1928. Page numbers and other citations unavailable. Much the same as GOSARKHIV, albeit some material superseded or "corrected" (*sic*).

⁵³ U.S.S.D. file 763.72119/987, December 1917. In *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, in Three Volumes*. United States, Department of State, State Department Files, 1931. Cited are from numbers 763.72118/987, 861.00/635, 861.00/761, and 861.00/1000. December 1917–January 1918. Dates are not consistent with numbering schema used. United States Government Printing Office Publication 222.

⁵⁴ Mikhail Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i reformy* (Moscow: Novosti, 1995). Also see Carew R.N. Hunt, *A Guide to Communist Jargon* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1947).

⁵⁵ KRASNYARKHIV, "Red Archives and History (of the C.P.S.U.)", locations throughout the former Soviet Union, 1928. Page numbers and other citations unavailable.

paying Party Member”⁵⁶ and other times considered “bourgeois opportunists”.⁵⁷

In 1977, Soviet scholars examined further the role of women in the revolution, and GOSARKHIV 1977 has this information under “*Women and their Place in the Great October Days and After*”, a compilation of females in combat from 1917-1921, divided into “Red” “White” and “Other”. The total listed is 200,000 in the Red Army, 40,000 Red Partisans, 60,000 guerrillas, zero as “Whites”, and only 4,000 Cossack females under arms. Again, allowing for gross exaggeration, the ratio of “red” to “white” females is significant. These numbers are certainly close to being valid, especially as many units were co-opted into the Red forces.⁵⁸

The data suggest that the inclusion of women among the revolutionary combatants made a difference. Again, it is difficult to assess the immediate and long-term results of female participation. In both relative and absolute terms, females in Russia are better off since 1917, although the progress made has waxed and waned. Literature circulated since by Soviet doctrinaires⁵⁹ and post-soviet apologists⁶⁰ still emphasise the role for women in various struggles, and encourages women’s involvement in global political discourse.

4.3 Nicaragua

A proper history of women in Latin America is almost non-existent.⁶¹ Similar to Russian history, women are relegated to a submissive role while the cult of *machismo* defines acceptable gender roles.⁶² Much of women’s status in Latin America is tied to tradition and the Roman Catholic Church.⁶³ Ironically that same Church, through a new theological approach to social responsibility – Liberation Theology – made emancipation possible for Latin American women, as they individually and collectively struggled against various regimes.⁶⁴ However, whereas the Romanov’s had their excesses, they do not seem to have been driven by them. This is not true of the ruling Somoza’s of Nicaragua.

The excesses of the Somoza family, and those of Anastasio Somoza Debayle⁶⁵ and his cronies in Nicaragua are better documented elsewhere.⁶⁶ These excesses, violent state-imposed terror, and atrocities allowed the *Frente Sandinista Liberacion Nacional* (FSLN) or “*Sandinistas*” to effectively

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ GOSARKHIV, “*State Archives (of the U.S.S.R.)*”, locations throughout the former Soviet Union, 1969. Page numbers and other citations unavailable.

⁵⁸ Bruce W. Lincoln, *Red Victory: Russia’s Civil Wars, 1917–1922* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989).

⁵⁹ N.M.Kiryayev and K.V. Chernenko, *The CPSU and the Building of the Soviet Armed Forces* (Leningrad: GOSPUB, 1975).

⁶⁰ A.S.Zhel'tov and S.K.I'lyin, *Leon Trotskiy, V.I.Lenin, and the Red Army* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1991).

⁶¹ Elisabet Jelin, *Women and Social Change in Latin America* (London: UNRISD & UNESCO, 1990).

⁶² Sarah Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood, *VIVA! Women and Popular Protest in Latin America* (London: Routledge, 1991).

⁶³ Cleo M. Molyneux, *Emancipation or a Different Slavery? Women’s Interests, Politics, and Social Roles in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua* (Amsterdam: CEDLA, 1985).

⁶⁴ Martin Malachi, *The Jesuits: The ‘Society of Jesus’ and the Betrayal of the Roman Catholic Church* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999); see also Tony Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar: The Catholic Church and the State in Latin America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988) or Susan Mainwaring, *The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916–1985* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986).

⁶⁵ To reduce the confusion among the various Somozas I will refer to Debayle as ‘Somoza’, and all others by their first and last name.

⁶⁶ Marianne Marchand, “Latin American Women: Testimonies as Voices of Resistance,” paper presented at International Studies Association annual meeting, Vancouver, 1991. See also Stephen Randall, *Colombia and the United States: Hegemony and Interdependence* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1992).

recruit more and more of their country-persons into their ranks.⁶⁷ By 1979, the FSLN had almost 4,000 well-trained guerrillas under arms. Nearly thirty percent, 900, were female. They had joined in ever increasing numbers from 1969 on. The main reason women gave for joining was Anastasio Somoza's behavior.⁶⁸

The FSLN, or *Sandinistas*, was formally organized in Nicaragua in 1961. It began in the late 1950s as a group of student activists at the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua (*Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Nicaragua–UNAN*) in Managua. Many members were imprisoned for anti-regime activity. Beginning with approximately twenty members in the early 1960s, the FSLN continued grow so that by the early 1970s, the group had gained enough support from peasants and students groups to launch limited military initiatives.

On December 27, 1974, a group of FSLN guerrillas seized the home of a former government official and took as hostages a handful of leading Nicaraguan officials, many of whom were Somoza relatives. With the mediation of Archbishop Obando y Bravo, the government and the guerrillas reached an agreement on December 30 that humiliated and further debilitated the Somoza regime. The guerrillas received a ransom of one-million U.S. dollars, had a government declaration read over the radio and printed in *La Prensa*, and succeeded in getting fourteen *Sandinista* prisoners released from jail and flown to Cuba along with the kidnappers. The FSLN's prestige soared because of this successful operation and also established the FSLN strategy of revolution as an effective alternative to UDEL's policy of peaceful change. The Somoza government responded to the increased opposition with further censorship, intimidation, torture, and murder.⁶⁹

The fragmented opposition to Somoza continued apace during 1978. The *Sandinistas* began to recruit more widely, absorbing more and more females into combat ranks. As one interviewee said: "...very few [women] were in the FSLN. As [Somoza's son] 'El Chiguín' and the EEBI⁷⁰ began to murder more and more, it was easier to recruit [women] to the cause".⁷¹ Another woman related that "...the deaths [of countrymen] had an impact; we [*i.e.*, women] were convinced we had to kill them, so we got guns".⁷²

The Sandinista women were not employed as laundresses, or cooks, but as regular infantry and shock troops, with great effect.⁷³ The regime had employed only a few women in secretarial, clerical, and support roles, none in combatant positions.⁷⁴

⁶⁷ Margaret Randall, *Sandino's Daughters Revisited: Feminism in Nicaragua* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994).

⁶⁸ Marianne Marchand, "Latin American Women: Testimonies as Voices of Resistance," paper presented at International Studies Association annual meeting, Vancouver, 1991.

⁶⁹ Cleo M. Molyneux, *Emancipation or a Different Slavery? Women's Interests, Politics, and Social Roles in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua* (Amsterdam: CEDLA, 1985).

⁷⁰ *Escuela de Entrenamiento Básico de la Infantería*, a Green-Beret styled special infantry, trained by U.S. Army personnel on 'Special Duty' in Managua and elsewhere. Many of its officers received 'augmented' training in psychological operations tactics at the infamous "School of the Americas" (now *Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation*) at Fort Bragg, Georgia.

⁷¹ Margaret Randall, *Sandino's Daughters: Testimonies of Nicaraguan Women in Struggle* (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1981).

⁷² Margaret Randall, *Our Voices / Our Lives: Stories of Women from Central America and the Caribbean* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1995).

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ Jane Jaquette, "Female Political Participation in Latin America," *Social Science Journal*, XXVII, 4 (1990), 474.

The Third Way faction took over the National Palace in March, an attack that electrified the opposition. The humiliation of the dictatorship also affected morale within the National Guard, forcing Somoza to replace many of its officers to forestall a coup. He also had to launch a recruitment campaign to strengthen its rank and file. In December 1978, the FSLN was further strengthened when Cuban mediation led to an agreement among the three FSLN factions for a united *Sandinista* front. Formal reunification of the FSLN occurred in March 1979. After the formal unification of the *Sandinista* guerrillas in March, bold military and political moves changed the FSLN from one of many opposition groups to a leadership role in the anti-Somoza revolt.

On July 17, 1979, Somoza resigned, handed over power to Urcuyo, and fled to Miami. The five-member junta arrived in the city of León a day after Somoza's departure, on July 18. Urcuyo tried to ignore the agreement transferring power, but in less than two days, domestic and international pressure drove him to exile in Guatemala. On July 19, the FSLN army entered Managua, culminating the Nicaraguan insurrection.

The new government inherited a country in ruins, with a stagnant economy and a debt of about \$1.6 billion. An estimated 50,000 Nicaraguans were dead, 120,000 were exiles in neighbouring countries, and 600,000 were homeless. *Sandinista* ranks had ballooned during the final weeks of the insurrection with the addition of thousands of untrained and undisciplined volunteers. These self-recruits with access to weapons were the source of considerable crime and violence. By late 1979, the situation was clearly deteriorating, as petty crime mounted and some *Sandinistas* abused their authority for personal gain.

To end the chaotic situation, FSLN combatants were regrouped into a conventional army framework. At its core were 1,300 experienced guerrilla fighters. Most of the remainder were members of the popular militias and others who had played some role in the defeat of Somoza. Cuban military personnel helped to set up basic and more advanced training programs and to advise the regional commands. The new army, known as the EPS, was placed under the command of Humberto Ortega, one of the nine FSLN commanders and brother of Daniel José Ortega Saavedra, the *Sandinista junta* coordinator.

The *Sandinistas* announced initially that their goal was to build a well-equipped professional military of some 25,000. Their primary missions were to deter attacks led by the United States, prevent a counterrevolutionary uprising, and mobilize internal support for the FSLN. The strength of the EPS increased steadily during the Contra war in the 1980s. The build-up of the regular army depended at first on voluntary enlistments, but later in 1983 a bitterly opposed universal conscription system was adopted. Males between the ages of 17 and 26 were obligated to perform two years of active service followed by two years of reserve status. Service by women remained voluntary. Thousands of youths fled the country rather than serve in the armed forces, and anti-draft protests were widespread.⁷⁵

Before the Somoza overthrow, women had constituted up to 40 percent of the ranks of the FSLN and 6 percent of the officers. Six women held the rank of guerrilla commander in the late 1970s. After the victory women were

⁷⁵ The unpopularity of the draft was believed to have been another factor in the *Sandinista* election defeat in 1990. For more see Wilber A. Chaffee Jr., *The Economics of Violence in Latin America* (London: Praeger Publishers, 1992).

gradually shifted to non-combatant roles or to the *Sandinista* Police. Many women resisted the redeployment, their role becoming a national issue. In compromise, seven all-women reserve battalions were formed, but these were gradually converted into mixed battalions. Women did however constitute half of the neighbourhood *Sandinista* Defence Committees and 80 percent of Revolutionary Vigilance volunteers.

TABLE 4: NICARAGUAN WOMEN OPPOSED TO THE REGIME

Year	Armed	Un-Armed but Supporting
1965	20-30	300-350
1970	52	1,500
1975	280	4000-5000
1979	922	16,000-20,000

Source: CEPAL (1986).

The eventual *Sandinista* victory might, again, be attributable to the use of females in combat, although women soon found themselves pushed out of the political picture, with the new government asking for a more traditional role from their females.⁷⁶ This led to a split among the female party members, and may have contributed to the *Sandinista* demise in the 1990's.⁷⁷

The ideals of the revolution did not last long into the new regime, especially concerning the status of women. Although the *Sandinista* revolution drew thousands of women into public life, encouraged females to work outside the home, spawned a national women's movement, and enshrined gender equality in the national constitution, it left largely intact the values, beliefs, and social customs that traditionally had regulated relations between the sexes.

Another result of the *Sandinista* revolution was that women's share of the labour force rose from 29 percent in 1977 to 45 percent in 1989.⁷⁸ By the 1980s, women predominated in petty commerce, personal services, and certain low-wage sectors such as the garment industry. Peasant women traditionally have performed agricultural labour as unpaid family workers; middle- and upper-class women have a good chance of escaping this trap as they are much less likely to work outside the home and can depend on domestic help for household duties.⁷⁹

5 DISCUSSION AND THEORY

The preceding cases strongly suggest that a high ratio of females in a revolutionary organization may have contributed to its successes. I believe that resource mobilization theory⁸⁰ provides a useful framework within which to explain this phenomenon.⁸¹ I theorize that the participation of women in a revolutionary movement increases the possibility of success by maximizing

⁷⁶ Cynthia Enloe, "Feminist IR and Patriarchal Theorists," *Feminista!*, 4, 1 (1999), 42.

⁷⁷ Michael Lind, *Modern Feminist Theory and International Relations* (Hempstead, NY: Buckman and Sachs, 1999).

⁷⁸ Maria Mies, *Women's Labour Progress, 1900–1995* (London: Zed Press, 1996).

⁷⁹ Marianne Marchand, "Latin American Women's Voices on Democracy and Development," paper presented at International Studies Association annual meeting, Vancouver, 1997.

⁸⁰ John McCarthy and Zald Mayer, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *American Journal of Sociology*, 82, 6 (1977), 1217; also Herbert Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest," *British Journal of Political Science*, 16 (1986), 60–61.

⁸¹ For more on why to use this approach, see Rod Aya, "Theories of Revolution Reconsidered: Contrasting Models of Collective Violence," *Theory and Society*, 8 (1979), 41.

the revolutionaries' utilization of possible resources. Resource mobilization theorists such as Riker,⁸² and Tilly,⁸³ posit that out of an expected resource one can derive maximum utility. Two aspects of the RM approach (as used here) are the regime (my *R*) and those in opposition to the regime (my *I*). These two groups are in contention for "power", that is, control of the state apparatus. The regime typically has greater resources to maintain power, such as capital, means of production, control over personnel, and such.⁸⁴ Those in opposition have fewer and at lower levels of these resources at their disposal, and must thus seek to minimize the regime's control of resources, or gain resources for themselves in order to win.

Here this means the expected usefulness of incumbency in a regime state, when maximized, will be both more useful and more often useful, than the expectations of an insurgent group operating against the same regime-state, when their total utility is maximized. This works well with an expected resource, so that

$$E(U)R > E(U)I,$$

where $E(U)R$ is expected utility of the resource *R* (the regime-state) being greater than the $E(U)I$, the expected utility of resource *I* (an insurgency or rebellion). But, if the resource being used is unexpected, that is, unforeseen by the regime in its use by those in opposition, and where the opposition makes some use of an (at that time) immeasurable resource, can this union of expected and un-expected resources be greater than that of the regime-state?

Thus:

$$\{E(U)I\} \cup \{u(U)G\} > E(U)R$$

where $E(U)R$ is the expected utility of the regime, and $\{E(U)I\} \cup \{u(U)G\}$ the union of the two components of insurgents (*I*) and "unexpected" (*u*) utility of the un-measured group (*G*).

Regime resources are often used more effectively than insurgent's resources: the result of training, experience, traditions, size, supply, logistics, among other factors. But with the addition of an unforeseen or hitherto unused asset the insurgents can be more effective against the regime. I assert that an opposition group will seek to utilize alternate resources previously overlooked.⁸⁵ When the un-tapped resource being used is a potential fifty percent of the population, *i.e.*, the female half, then the utility of the additional resource can possibly be as effective as those of the male insurgents,⁸⁶ allowing insurgents a greater ability to engage the regime on more equal footing. However, this use of a hitherto unmeasured utility well exceeds that which would be expected, in main due to no prior knowledge of the utility of that new resource,⁸⁷ which causes consternation and confusion.

⁸² William Riker, "The Future of a Science of Politics," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 21 (1977), 30.

⁸³ Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (London: Addison Wesley Publishers, 1978).

⁸⁴ See George P. Baker, Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy, "Compensation and Incentives: Practice versus Theory," *Journal of Finance*, 43 (1988), 597; see also Charles Tilly and Chris Tilly, *Work Under Capitalism* Boulder: Westview Press, 1998).

⁸⁵ Fernand Vincent and William LeClere, "Alternate Resources in Resource Mobilization Approaches," in *Sustaining Civil Society: Strategies of Resource Mobilization*, eds. Leslie M. Fox and Bruce S. Shearer (New York: Civicus Publishing, 1997), 64.

⁸⁶ Susan C. Bourque, *Gender and the State* (Albany, NY: SUNY, 1989); also Adrienne Harris and Ynestra King (eds.), *Rocking The Ship Of State* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).

⁸⁷ Wilber A. Chaffee Jr., *The Economics of Violence in Latin America* (London: Praeger Publishers, 1992).

Regime's forces must adapt without being trained to do so, even the officer corps of the regime is caught off its guard. This is documented in the way the Tsar's police reacted to the "Veras (Zasulich)" of the 1880s: bewilderment, confusion, excessive leniency, and most telling, an unwillingness to use the same type of coercive tactics as were in use against their male comrades.⁸⁸ This made female revolutionaries far more useful than their male counterparts.⁸⁹

In Ireland, by 1916, the Special Section of the Royal Irish Constabulary was forced by the public's outcry (in Great Britain) over the treatment of female prisoners to change their tactics and traditions. Thus women were hired to the previously all-male forces to assist in coping with this new threat.⁹⁰ This put the constabulary on a reactionary footing, ceding control of events and situations to insurgents.⁹¹ Simultaneously, the Royal Army was as confused, befuddled, and slipshod in its tactics as the Tsarist police had been.⁹² When confronted with females, it coped in many of the same ways- allowing the female gunrunners, bomb-makers, couriers, *et cetera*- an incredible amount of freedom of movement not afforded to even the 'loyal', law-abiding, male populace.⁹³

In Nicaragua, demonstrations against the Somoza regime were brutally shut down.⁹⁴ Women in these were treated with diffidence (if a peasant), deference (if appearing to be of Spanish descent), or callousness (if appearing to be *mestizo*).⁹⁵ As well, the anti-Somozans, especially the *Sandinistas*, had the advantage of better training in guerrilla tactics than their Russian and Irish counterparts. Partly due to high literacy levels among the leaders, as well as practical field training by Cuban and Soviet experts.⁹⁶ They were able to create and use of entire battalions of female guerrillas.⁹⁷ Outside of the formal structure, the regime treatment of women also encouraged females to support anti-Somoza factions in material and non-material ways, on a scale greater than that of either of the previous examples.⁹⁸

Why would women join these risky movements that endanger surety, safety, and might fail? Such movements are novel and rational responses to situations and opportunities in a society, seen as an innovative form of political participation, and often create their own resources as they evolve.⁹⁹ To join one is a rational act for those who have been previously marginalized

⁸⁸ A.S. Zheltov and S.K. I'lyin, *Leon Trotskiy, V.I. Lenin, and the Red Army* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1991).

⁸⁹ V.V. Turchenko, *Consolidation of Success in Battle* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1961); also Sharon McDonald, "Boadicea: Warrior, Mother, and Myth," in *Images of Women in Peace and War*, eds. Sharon McDonald, Pat Holden and Shirley Ardener (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 45-46.

⁹⁰ John Bowman, *De Valera and the Ulster Question* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).

⁹¹ Eamon Phoenix, *The Nationalist Movement in Ireland 1914-1928, doctoral dissertation* (Belfast: Queens University, 1998).

⁹² Robert Lee Miller, Rick Wilford and Freda Donoghue, *Women and Political Participation in Northern Ireland* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 1996).

⁹³ Paul Compton, "The Conflict in Northern Ireland: Demographic and Economic Considerations," in *Economic Dimensions of Conflict*, eds. S.W.R.d.A. Samarasinghe and R. Coughlan (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991), 39.

⁹⁴ CEPAL, "La Mujer en Movimiento Democracia: America Latina y el Caribe: una aproximacion a un estudio." UNRISD, 1986, Santiago, Chile (English version, 1990, Madrid, Spain).

⁹⁵ L. Gonzales, *Women Organising for Change* (Rome: ISIS, 1995).

⁹⁶ Marianne Marchand, "Latin American Women's Voices on Democracy and Development," paper presented at International Studies Association annual meeting, Vancouver, 1997.

⁹⁷ The author is personal friends with a former FSLN gun-runner who began her career with them at the age of 9, in early 1977. She now resides in the U.S. and is a LPA. She has publicly emphasized multiple times the very point I am attempting to make here.

⁹⁸ William Rowe and Vivian Schelling, *Memory and Modernity: Popular Culture in Latin America* (London: Verso, 1991).

⁹⁹ Sergei Mamay, *Theories of Social Movements and Their Current Development in Soviet Society* (Moscow: CSAC, 1999).

or ignored by society,¹⁰⁰ so joining can maximize their own status. This action fits five of Kitschelt's¹⁰¹ six propositions, so:

- 1) That individuals know what they want to accomplish through collective action;
- 2) That individuals calculate cost/benefit ratios of participation;
- 3) That although frustrations with society may be ubiquitous, revolutionary leaders and followers transform amorphous demands or wants into organized movements, with rational goals;
- 4) That beyond normal resources such as capital, labour, and so on, others that fit the revolutionary movement, such as solidarity and legitimacy, shape means and goals; and,
- 5) Those movements are better able to be responsive rather than reactive; they are not bound to co-optation nor institutionalization- as are those within the regime.

6 HYPOTHESES

My first hypothesis is that, *ceteris paribus*, the greater the ratio of women to men within a revolutionary movement, the greater will be the possibility that that revolution will achieve its goals. The opposite would also be true. That is, other factors held constant, the higher the level of women supporting the regime, the lesser the levels of support for the opposition. Concomitantly, there will be a sector of the female populace that remains non-committal or neutral. If the regime is not making formal use of females for the regime's purposes, then the maximum utility derived will come only from the use of the male populace. If the insurgency makes use of the female population, its total effectiveness is greatly enhanced, and the more women are employed for the cause, the more effective will be the cause and its purposes in reaching the total population.

Thus, (the effectiveness of) $R > \text{(the effectiveness of)} I$, until the ratio of $f:m$ (female to male membership) within I increases, drawing away the prior tacit support for R from the female populace. As $f:m(I)$ increases, so does the possibility of success. This ratio is affected by the neutral uncommitted population so that $f:m(R)$ and $f:m(I)$ can both change if neutrality levels change correspondingly.

My second hypothesis is concerned with *why* a woman or group of women would choose to join an anti-regime organization. It is simpler, less risky, and more certain when one remains indifferent or neutral to the current regime, offering token vocal support when called upon to do so.¹⁰² When presented with the revolutionary movement "face to face", it is safer to again be indifferent, or offer token support.¹⁰³ Neutrality minimizes risk and one may

¹⁰⁰ Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rationalchoice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

¹⁰¹ Herbert Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest," *British Journal of Political Science*, 16 (1986), 63.

¹⁰² Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Viking Press, 1965). See also Ralph C. Elwood, *Russian Social Democracy in the Underground* (Assen: Van Gorcum & Company, 1974); Chris Bamberg, *Ireland's Permanent Revolution* (London: Bookmarks Printing, 1990); James DeFronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1991).


¹⁰³ Helen Safa and Jennifer Nash, *Women and Change in Latin America* (South Hadley, MA: Bergin & Garvey, 1980).

come out reasonably well, no matter the outcome,¹⁰⁴ which presents a *free rider* dilemma.¹⁰⁵

To escape the free rider problem, women who actively support a revolutionary cause do so because of the expectation that their risk will result in real benefits: an improvement in wages, living conditions, parity in the workplace, political equality, *et cetera*,¹⁰⁶ a reduced version of a cost-benefit analysis. In many cases, what is at risk may seem to be of no value or consequence; *i.e.*, “things cannot get any worse” – yet some may view it as “(my participation) will make things better”. The anecdotal evidence supports these assertions¹⁰⁷ but many in these cases also expressed notions of ‘the romance’ of revolution,¹⁰⁸ and revenge.¹⁰⁹ This might be called the “frustration” hypothesis (*F*), that is, as frustration with the regime-state increases, more women will join revolutionary movements. Thus, as *F* (Regime, Frustration with) increases, *f:m* ratio increases in *I*.¹¹⁰

My third hypothesis is that the act of inclusion of women into an androcentric society such as a revolutionary organization is a radical step; that is, a move towards equality, conscious or not.¹¹¹ As they accept females into its rank-and-file, and as that information becomes known to the society outside, both the society and insurgency become more egalitarian.¹¹² Females in society, observing the insurgency from afar, and quite possibly coveting equality on any level,¹¹³ may therefore become frustrated with the regime and more available for recruitment into revolutionary organizations.¹¹⁴ Thus, as *f:m* reaches toward a parity, *F* increases, and *f:m* in *I* increases, and so forth. The three hypotheses support one another, to some degree evolving over time- as in Figure 1:

FIGURE 1: HYPOTHESES



where t_1, t_2, t_3 , and so on, are points in time, and *iR* is the initial reaction of the regime to insurrectionary activity.

¹⁰⁴ Wilber A. Chaffee Jr., *The Economics of Violence in Latin America* (London: Praeger Publishers, 1992).

¹⁰⁵ Robert O. Keohane, “International Relations Theory: Contributions of a Feminist Viewpoint,” *Millennium*, 18, 1 (1989), 245–247. Compare his use of this approach to Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action - Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

¹⁰⁶ Joan W. Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” *American Historical Review*, XCI (1986), 1068.

¹⁰⁷ For some others perspectives on this, see the previously cited Ralph Elwood and Margaret Randall. See also George Truby, “The Position of Women During the Rebellion,” *Women’s Studies International Forum*, 12, 1 (1989), 73; Marianne Tetreault, *Women and Revolution* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998) or Dorothy Dinnerstein, “What Does Feminism Mean?,” in *Rocking The Ship Of State*, eds. Adrienne Harris and Ynestra King (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 19.

¹⁰⁸ Eduardo Santana and Lisa Perrone, *La Mujer en America Latina* (Asuncion, Paraguay: UNITAR/UNRISD, 1996).

¹⁰⁹ Helen Safa and Jennifer Nash, *Women and Change in Latin America* (South Hadley, MA: Bergin & Garvey, 1980).

¹¹⁰ Donald Taylor and Fathali Moghadam, *Theories of Inter-Group Relations: International Socio-Psychological Perspectives* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1994).

¹¹¹ Joyce Gelb, *Feminism and Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

¹¹² Ibid., see also Anne Marie Goetz, *State and Woman* (London: Pandora Press International, 1995).

¹¹³ William S.P.B. Holloway, *Gender and the Production of Subjectivity* (London: Methuen Press, 1985).

¹¹⁴ Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

As F and $f:m$ both increase, the utility of females within the revolutionary organization increases, as the organization finds novel uses for them. And as pointed out earlier, a woman's political utility is at that point unknown to the regime; the female's usefulness may actually be much greater than her male counterpart's from the moment she is accepted.¹¹⁵ It is possible that the percentage of women in an organization could reach higher than that of men. The frustration many felt with the Somoza regime appeared to have caused such an influx of combatant females into the *Sandinistas* that separate battalions of women were formed to handle their large number.¹¹⁶ Similarly, the Bolsheviks formed all-female mortar companies, cavalry squadrons,¹¹⁷ and two known regiments of shock-troop infantry.¹¹⁸ The Irish, while not formalizing female's roles initially¹¹⁹ instead included all females that petitioned into their various flying squads and columns.^{120, 121}

7 INTERPRETING THE EVIDENCE

I stated previously that only the most basic methodology would be used. Ocular examination shows a correlation between women's combatant participation and regime failure. The exact reasons for this relationship are not as clear, but an understanding of political frustration may account for some of this.¹²² Not only have regimes been surprised by their contact with female insurgents, but it seems as if many scholars have been caught unawares as well.

The three cases presented above suggest strongly that female participation is very important for revolutionary success. Presented here are only three cases, and it is possible that not all cases of revolution fit this model as seen below in Figure 2. My hypothesis (high $f:m(I)$ results in higher success) should also be as true for the opposite- that low $f:m(I)$ will result in revolutionary movement failure, such as in Ukraine (1919- c. 1949).¹²³

There are some problems with this argument. First, there are cases of revolutionary success where low $f:m(I)$ has prevailed- Iran, Afghanistan, and Algeria.¹²⁴ Second, there are cases where high $f:m(I)$ did not result in

¹¹⁵ Adrienne Harris, *Por Mujer?: The Victimization of Women in Brazil*. Paper prepared for UNESCO, Madrid, 1989.

¹¹⁶ Margaret Randall, *Sandino's Daughters: Testimonies of Nicaraguan Women in Struggle* (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1981), see also Margaret Randall, *Our Voices / Our Lives: Stories of Women from Central America and the Caribbean* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1995).

¹¹⁷ D.A. Voropayev and A.M. Iovlev, *The Struggle of the CPSU in Creating Military Cadres* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960).

¹¹⁸ M.V. Frunze, *M.V. Frunze: Selected Works*. Essays attributed to Frunze, edited by the staff of the Frunze Academy, 1965.

¹¹⁹ Not until 1973 did the Irish Republican Army (IRA) form all-female units. These are known collectively as *Cumann na mBan*. Their purpose is similar to other all-female units in other revolutionary and terrorist organizations: some actual combat and a great deal of recruitment focus. See Louise Ryan, "Women Without Votes: the Political Strategies of the Irish Suffrage Movement," *Irish Political Studies*, 9 (1994), 125.

¹²⁰ George Truby, "The Position of Women During the Rebellion," *Women's Studies International Forum*, 12, 1 (1989), 75.

¹²¹ Bob Purdie, "Was the Civil Rights Movement a Republican/Communist Conspiracy?," *Irish Political Studies*, 3 (1989), 33-41; also Louise Ryan, "Women Without Votes: the Political Strategies of the Irish Suffrage Movement," *Irish Political Studies*, 9 (1994), 126.

¹²² Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

¹²³ Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change And National Consciousness In Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (London: MacMillan, 1987).

¹²⁴ Valentine Moghadam, "Gender and Revolution," in *Theorizing Revolutions*, ed. John Foran (London: Routledge, 1997), 126.

success, such as in El Salvador in the 1980's.¹²⁵ The following figure shows this problem:

FIGURE 2: PROBLEMS OF PROOF

Revolution Fails	Revolution Succeeds
(<i>low f:m</i>) Example: Ukraine	(<i>low f:m</i>) Example: Iran
(<i>high f:m</i>) Example: El Salvador	(<i>high f:m</i>) Example: Ireland, Russia, Nicaragua

The discrepancies in my cases and those above may not lie with the inclusion of females *per se*, but rather with the utilization of any (unexpected) utility; of which female participation is but one example. If other compensating utilities are used, then they may adjust for not using female participation, the ratio of women to men (either *I* or *R*) would not matter. I suggest that understanding the use of alternate resources may be the key to comprehending the success of a revolutionary organization. As with female participation, studies of revolution may have not explored this issue far enough.

Participation of the population is an essential element for a revolution's success, but anecdotal evidence aside, the evidence does not prove that the participation of women is a necessary condition for revolutionary success. The study of revolution seems fraught with such "false grails".¹²⁶ To ascertain whether the involvement and participation of an isolated or particular segment of a populace is proper for the study of revolution is beyond the scope of this paper.

Another issue is, of course, the data themselves. My examination of early Soviet data showed that the figures given for participation were inconsistent, often reflecting momentary politics and ideology (compare KRASNIYARKIV and the later GOSARKIV for various years).¹²⁷ The figures for Ireland have also been argued over, with observers of differing ideologies interpreting them in distinctive ways.¹²⁸ The case of Nicaragua is less disputed, quite possibly because the events are nearer in time and were somewhat better observed than the others.

As more evidence comes available, perhaps more sophisticated methods may be employed. Understanding the relationship that may exist between female participation and revolutionary success will need more than anything else a greater comprehension of *why* females would engage in this sort of behaviour.^{129, 130} There are hints and clues in the anecdotal evidence, but they are not sufficient.

¹²⁵ James Dunkerly, *The Long War* (London: Junction Books, 1982); Valentine Moghadam, "Gender and Revolution," in *Theorizing Revolutions*, ed. John Foran (London: Routledge, 1997), 126.

¹²⁶ Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (Toronto: Vintage Books, 1938).

¹²⁷ GOSARKHIV, "State Archives (of the U.S.S.R.)", locations throughout the former Soviet Union, 1969. Page numbers and other citations unavailable. Also KRASNYARKIV, "Red Archives and History (of the C.P.S.U.)", locations throughout the former Soviet Union, 1928. Page numbers and other citations unavailable.

¹²⁸ Valerie Morgan and Grace Fraser, *Women and the Northern Ireland Conflict* (Derry: CAIN, 1999).

¹²⁹ Christine Sylvester, "Progress," *Differences*, 2,1 (1991), 135. See also Christine Sylvester, *Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Post-Modern Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) and Christine Sylvester, "Autonomy and Obligation in IR," in *Gendered States*, ed. Spike V. Peterson (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press Associates, 1998), 210.

The study of revolution and its motivations also suffer from the "victor mentality" problems. That is to say, the winners write the histories, often glossing over their mistakes, and minimizing any negative connotations. Witness the frequent changes in Soviet history of the 1917 Revolution. Losers in these events tend towards a defensive apologism; failing to record or acknowledge mistakes, and shifting blame among former comrades or upon outside factors.

There are also questions about the validity of studying such phenomena. Research into the area of women's participation is often liminalised,^{131, 132} and thus an obstacle to conducting research.¹³³ Further, within the scope of women's studies are arguments over *how* to approach research question;¹³⁴ this infighting allows others to continue scorning the study of women's issues.¹³⁵ These issues are not insurmountable.¹³⁶ Until such time as more data become available for examining the issue of female participation in revolutions more fully, the empirical study of revolution seems lacking.

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¹³⁰ John Lofland, to this end, suggests that the RM approach use "four operational and strategic decisions... ..to empiricize this type of research". See John Lofland, "CBSM: Collective Behavior and Social Movements," *Mobilization*, 4, 1 (1998), 1–16.

¹³¹ Cynthia Enloe, "Feminist IR and Patriarchal Theorists," *Feminist!*, 4, 1 (1999), 45–46.

¹³² Christine Sylvester, *Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Post-Modern Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

¹³³ Gita Sen and Caren Grown, *Development, Crisis, and Alternative Visions: Third World Women's Perspectives* (New Delhi: DAWN Institute, 1985).

¹³⁴ Maria Mies, *Women's Labour Progress, 1900–1995* (London: Zed Press, 1996).

¹³⁵ Michael Lind, *Modern Feminist Theory and International Relations* (Hempstead, NY: Buckman and Sachs, 1999); see also Mayra Buvinić, *What Does Progress Mean?: Measuring the Effects of Western Influences on Female Indigenous Populations in the Third World* (London: UNIFEM, 1998); Mayra Buvinić and Sally Yudelman, *Socio-Anthropological Pollution: The Super-Imposition of Unwanted Cultures* (Belfast: Barnham & de Lacy, 1996). See also Ann J. Tickner, *Gender in International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

¹³⁶ Maria Mies, *Women's Labour Progress, 1900–1995* (London: Zed Press, 1996).

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"BETTER" RATHER THAN "MORE" DEMOCRACY? CITIZENS' PERCEPTIONS OF DIRECT VS. REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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In the light of increasing claims for a more accountable political representation on the background of what is perceived a crisis of representative democracy, this discussion paper examines citizens' perceptions of direct vs. representative democracy. It first provides a historical contextualisation by exploring the evolution of the process of reintroduction of direct democracy in modern era as a complement to representative democracy, and the dynamics of comparative global trends in increase of implementation of instruments of direct democracy. These "path dependence" aspects are then correlated in a detailed comment on a recent comparative study of citizens' perceptions of direct democracy that demonstrated complex idiosyncrasies of particular European polities, but also important common characteristics i.e. the prevailing support for direct democracy in all considered Western states and the interdependence of citizens' perceptions of direct and representative democracy, as well as the decisive impact of the political representatives' attitude toward direct democracy on citizens' perceptions of the latter.

Key words: Direct Democracy, Political History, Post-Communist Europe, Path Dependence.

1 INTRODUCTION

In the context of overall economic, financial, social, environmental and political crisis, public criticisms of representative democracy and claims for political alternative, essentially focused on reintroduction or reinforcement of direct democracy (in absence of new ideological and ruling concepts), have been made increasingly prominent and even put forward in recent protest actions and movements across the globe. Although it appears that citizens are eager to take sovereignty back in their hands from their representatives,

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this eagerness may not necessarily reflect neither a reaction to the current crisis alone nor it is necessarily consistent with greater political awareness, civic education and readiness to engage in active citizenship practices in contemporary “knowledge societies”.

This discussion on public perceptions of direct democracy vs. representative democracy will be based in part on a cross-national study by Bowler, Donovan and Karp that, while exploring citizens’ attitude towards direct democracy in affluent democracies, also presents some noteworthy conclusions on citizens’ perception of representative democracy.²

In a study that included 11 EU Member States (“old” as well as post-Communist democracies), USA, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Switzerland, the authors demonstrated that substantial enthusiasm for direct democracy in studied polities “may reflect what people find lacking in representative democracy as much as it reflects interest in a more participatory version of democracy”. Approval for direct democracy is therefore not coming primarily from people who are politically engaged and wish for “more democracy”, i.e. public participation in decision-making processes, but at least as much from people who are not necessarily interested in politics but feel a strong urge to control and correct the ways representative democracy is currently functioning. The results of the study demonstrated furthermore that “the most consistent factors predicting interest in additional opportunities to participate are political distrust and the idea that citizens must “keep watch” on their Government”.

Since collected data originate from a period prior to the current crisis and the authors of the study only superficially probed into the causes for detected prevailing citizens’ position, I am first going to verify their argument on the background of historical reintroduction and evolution of implementation of direct democracy worldwide aiming at a possible detection of path dependence indicators.³ Since the authors explain the outcomes of their study primarily by procedural varieties in direct democracy regulations, I am going to address these in comparison. Second, I am going to comment on the outcomes of the study done by Bowler *et al.* to demonstrate correlations between attitudes of political elites and public perceptions of direct democracy based on political practices pertaining to direct democracy in some of the countries included in the study. An explanation of these correlations will be attempted based on Lijphart’s model of democracies determined by behaviour of their political elites.⁴

2 DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Instruments of direct democracy are remnants of the earliest era of democracy. Following the adoption of modern representative democracy referenda and plebiscites have been rather few in between, with however, notable exceptions.

In the early period of (theory of) modern democracy the size of polities and the slowness of communication rendered direct participation of citizens in

² Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan and Jeffrey A. Karp, “Enraged or Engaged? Preferences for Direct Citizen Participation in Affluent Democracies,” *Political Research Quarterly*, 60, 3 (2007), 351–362.

³ See Paul Pierson, “Path Dependence, Increasing Returns, and the Study of Politics,” *American Political Science Review* 94, 2 (2000), 251–267.

⁴ See Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” *World Politics*, 21, 2 (1969), 207–225.

public decision-making processes rather unfeasible. Enlightenment political theorists and practitioners such as American Founding Fathers considered direct rule of the people an unwelcome possibility although the people were established sovereign and the first modern referendum was held in Massachusetts in 1787, when the settlers first opposed a constitutional proposal.⁵

In general, the middle class that was taking political power over from the aristocracy of the *ancients régimes* did not trust uneducated masses. A failed attempt in this direction represented the 1793 French Constitution, which was to regulate a form of inner federalization and inclusion of citizens into public assemblies for direct participation in decision-making processes; the majority of assemblies' votes would then prevail in decisions at the national level. This Jacobin constitutional proposal that aimed at concretising and upgrading the Declaration on the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 was introducing general suffrage for men and a new concept of sovereignty of the people instead of the nation. Albeit it was approved by a referendum,⁶ it was however, never implemented for the short existence of the Jacobin regime. Under the influence of republican arguments advanced by conservative E. J. Sieyes, another model prevailed instead that was explicitly representative.⁷ In that model, in place and in absence of the sovereign - the nation, elected representatives were the ones in charge of legal initiative, the debate on the latter and the decision making process.⁸ The deflection from direct democracy was understandable in the light of French Revolution's final character as a bourgeois revolution – the new division of power had finally been determined by the bourgeois elites in the name of the people. While in the United States of America the form of representation and sovereignty of the people became a matter of an early solid social consensus, France had been tormented for more than a century following the French revolution by the conflict on optimal inclusivity of political participation that had a lasting destabilisation effect on French politics.

Direct democracy got a bad name early on in the 19th century, as a technique of autocratic Bonapartist power. Napoleon Bonaparte had his domination of the Consulate approved by a plebiscite in 1800 as well as the establishment of the Empire in 1804; the will of the people was not expressed at the polls at that, as the French had two weeks to cast their public vote at municipal quarters to support then popular ruler. Napoleon III continued with similar practices when he had the coup of 1851 legitimised by a plebiscite and another plebiscite organised to establish the Second Empire in the constitution of which plebiscite had an important part.⁹ Subsequently, French politicians and political theorists regarded direct democracy as incompatible with representative democracy; only in early 1930s this viewpoint started to

⁵ Vlado Sruk, *Leksikon politike* (Maribor: Obzorja, 1995), 278.

⁶ Of seven million registered voters, three million abstained, supposedly due to the vote being public.

⁷ Urbinati, Nadia, *Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 163.

⁸ François Hamon, *Referendum, primerjalna študija* (Ljubljana: DZS, 1998), 18.

⁹ Differentiation between referendum and plebiscite has not yet become a matter of interpretative consensus. Kaufman identifies plebiscite as a non-binding top-down initiative by the Government or the Head of State that is meant to reinforce or save their position. It is therefore not about taking but about legitimising decisions. "Unfortunately, plebiscitary and direct-democratic popular vote procedures are often confused, as can be illustrated by the fact that the common term "referendum" is used to describe both of these fundamentally different procedures. By doing so, we obscure the concept of direct democracy and in addition to that, perhaps unintentionally, discredit direct democracy by association with the use of plebiscites by all kinds of dictators and authoritarian regimes." See Bruno Kaufman, Rolf Büchi and Nadja Braun, *The IRI Guidebook to Direct Democracy in Switzerland and Beyond* (Köniz: Ast & Jacob, Vetsch AG, 2010), 89.

change.¹⁰ However, at that time new counterarguments for implementation of direct democracy began to emerge on the other side of the Rhine.

Parliamentary elections in Germany at the end of 1933, the first under the rule of the National Socialist Party, could be interpreted as a plebiscite since voters had no longer any opposition to opt for. Simultaneously, a referendum was held on Germany's exit from the League of Nations. German voters almost unanimously approved of this decision, while turnout was extremely high (over 96 percent; 3,3 million voters however, voted nil in protest at these parliamentary elections). In 1934 almost 90 percent of voters approved at another referendum the Hitler's proposal to merge the position of Chancellor and the President of the State. Elections in German Parliament in 1936 were also a plebiscite since voters only approved of its single-party composition and "gave permission" to Hitler to occupy Rhineland. Turnout was again high and the pressure on voters merciless – National Socialist Party had samples of "correct" voting forms to voters' information cast from zeppelins! The last "parliamentary" elections in Germany under Nazi regime were in 1938, while a referendum was also held on annexation of Austria (where elections took place as well). Turnout was almost 100 percent, in Austria even slightly higher than in Germany.¹¹

Following World War II an increasing number of Constitutions included regulations pertaining to direct democracy, yet few states actually resorted to these instruments while attempts at abuse of popular decisions continued to take place. Presidents, governments, even dictators tied vote of confidence to a referendum result – and some had to step down. Charles de Gaulle for example tied his presidency to the constitutional referendum of 1969 that was to bring about decentralisation of France and a reform of the Senate, were it approved.¹² General Pinochet was swept from power by a referendum in 1988, by which he intended to prolong his rule for additional eight years, after he had legitimised the military junta in Chile by a referendum eight years earlier. A referendum on economic and political reforms in Communist Poland in 1987 weakened the government of the General Jaruzelski and opened way to the collapse of the communist regime two years later.¹³

3 DIRECT DEMOCRACY: PROCEDURAL VARIETIES

"Variety" is the master descriptor for contemporary referendum legislations. As every democratic state adapted its political system to the specifics of its political culture, direct democracy instruments have been procedurally interpreted accordingly. Public participation in decision making processes can be self-evident at some places and a mere theoretical possibility elsewhere, if practically insurmountable legal obstacles have been raised in the way of its implementation.

Referendum, the principal instrument of direct democracy, is a randomly organised variation of general elections with a yes-or-no vote on mostly "closed" questions as opposed to "open" choice of candidates or party

¹⁰ Raymond Carré de Malberg, "Considérations théoriques sur la question de la combinaison du référendum avec le parlementarisme," *Revue du droit public*, (1931), 225.

¹¹ Dieter Nohlen and Philip Stöver, *Elections in Europe: A data handbook* (Berlin: Nomos, 2010), 762.

¹² François Hamon, *Referendum, primerjalna študija* (Ljubljana: DZS, 1998), 19.

¹³ Agata Fijalkovski, *From Old Times to New Europe: The Polish Struggle for Democracy and Constitutionalism* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), 112.

candidate lists proposed at elections.¹⁴ Contemporary regulative models include mandatory, binding and/or consultative referendum with further divisions as to who is the initiator of the law/legal proposal that is subject of popular consultation/decision, and who initiates the referendum itself. States around the world adopted various combinations of solutions in this area. Referendum may be binding in case the Parliament is to adopt any constitutional law and the Parliament then also initiates referendum (like in Australia, Denmark, Ireland and Switzerland). Binding referendum can also follow citizen initiative on any constitutional matters, for example in Switzerland and California. In the latter, a referendum is also binding following any legal initiative by citizens. Consultative referendum may be initiated by the Parliament like in Great Britain or Sweden; by the Head of State like in France (upon a Government proposal) or in Romania (autonomously). A referendum initiative may come from a certain number of Members of the Parliament like in Denmark or Slovenia, or from the citizens directly in order to postpone or annul an already adopted legal act like in Italy or Slovenia. A referendum can be called for by local authorities like in Switzerland or Italy or by a combination of these like in Ireland or in Massachusetts.¹⁵

In German federal Land of Bavaria a citizen initiative will only lead to a referendum, if 10 percent of signatures (almost one million) are collected in 14 days at State administrative offices. According to the 1973 referendum legislation in Austria 100,000 signatures need be collected in one week, also at certain times in certain places only. When there was an attempt to depose President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in 2004, his political opponents were required to collect signatures of 20 percent of voters in merely 4 days. In the United States the threshold of signatures required for a referendum initiative varies from 2 percent of voters in North Dakota to 15 percent in Wyoming.

Some states have left the impact of the turnout upon the validity of the popular decision open, while others have determined the minimum quorum that renders the referendum valid. In Italy for example, half a million signatures suffices for a referendum initiative to be implemented, yet the decision needs be approved by at least 50 percent turnout.¹⁶

Another important variety in referendum procedures is related to whether they are exclusively controlled by the Parliament and the Parliament thus renounces to its exclusive legislative power by its own decision, or the Parliament's legislative authority is effectively checked by other institutions that can also initiate a referendum such as the Head of State in a semi-presidential or presidential system (not necessarily, Croatia for example represents an exception).

There are rather few democracies that have provided for frequent implementation of citizen referendum initiative, the most inclined to direct democracy being Switzerland (over 400 referenda held since 1874), the USA (where referenda are regularly implemented in 24 federal states), Italy (38 national referenda on 65 issues held since 1970) and Ireland (33 national referenda held since the first constitutional referendum in 1937).

¹⁴ Not exclusively, there have been several so called multiple choice referenda as well. They are quite common in Switzerland; there have been two in Sweden, while in Australia in 1977 voters were summoned to a referendum to choose the national anthem out of four options. In such referenda a convincing support for one of the proposals may represent a problem.

¹⁵ François Hamon, *Referendum, primerjalna študija* (Ljubljana: DZS, 1998), 31.

¹⁶ Bruno Kaufman, Rolf Büchi and Nadja Braun, *The IRI Guidebook to Direct Democracy in Switzerland and Beyond* (Köniz: Ast & Jacob, Vetsch AG, 2010), 87.

TABLE 1: DIRECT DEMOCRACY WORLDWIDE SINCE 1793

Period	Europe	Asia	Americas	Oceania	Africa	Total	Average
1793-1900	58	0	3	0	0	61	0.6
1901-1910	14	0	0	4	0	18	1.8
1911-1920	21	0	3	5	0	29	2.9
1921-1930	36	1	2	6	0	45	4.5
1931-1940	40	0	7	6	0	53	5.3
1941-1950	36	2	3	11	0	52	5.2
1951-1960	38	13	3	5	9	68	6.8
1961-1970	44	22	4	7	19	96	9.6
1971-1980	116	50	8	14	34	222	22.2
1981-1990	129	30	12	7	22	200	20.0
1991-2000	235	24	76	15	35	385	38.5
2001-2010	167	30	44	22	35	298	29.8
Total	934	172	165	102	154	1,538	7.1
Share (%)	60.8	11.3	10.9	6.8	10.2	100	

Source: Bruno Kaufman, Rolf Büchi and Nadja Braun, *The IRI Guidebook to Direct Democracy in Switzerland and Beyond* (Köniz: Ast & Jacob, Vetsch AG, 2010), 208.

Judging from the data on organization of referenda in world regions, the implementation of instruments of direct democracy spread worldwide after World War II and it has since then been on a general, if unsteady, increase. This increase is to be attributed to the creation of a number of new states and democratisation processes following decolonisation, as well as to the consolidation and/or crisis of representative democracy in the West. Implementation of referenda in Africa and Asia saw the most intensive increase in the period of decolonisation between 1950s and 1980s. A particularly substantial general increase is evident in the 1970s – in that decade the number of referenda in Europe tripled compared to the former decade, while it doubled in other world regions. Another substantial general increase in number of referenda took place in the 1990s, the most intensely in both Americas, while in Europe the number doubled again and other regions followed the trend except for Asia. In early 21st century a decrease is evident worldwide. This dynamics falls in line with global political changes of the last sixty years: the liberalisation and the crisis of corporatism (in Europe) in the 1970s that politically mobilised increasingly active citizens, followed by the collapse of authoritarian regimes and dictatorships and subsequent reinforcement of democracy in Central/South America and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and early 1990s, while Asian democracies were already focused on the neoliberal economic project; and finally the global trend of neo-conservatism in early 21st century resulting in a decrease of frequency of referenda in the West in particular, while renewed interest in direct democracy in Asia and Oceania is evident.

In the modern era then, the implementation of referendum has increased by twenty times globally. All in all, over 1,500 national referenda have been held so far. This number may appear rather high and direct democracy to be evolving. However, 1,500 referenda may alternatively appear a rather modest achievement, considering the existence of over 200 states, the great majority of which claim to be a form of democracy; after all, during the entire period considered only seven referenda took place per year worldwide. Most of countries thus do not make use of instruments of direct democracy although legal regulation is provided for.

4 “BETTER” RATHER THAN “MORE” DEMOCRACY?

As mentioned earlier, in 2004 Bowler, Donovan and Karp conducted an extensive study on public perceptions of direct democracy in 16 countries.

The outcomes demonstrated that “people found lacking in the performance of representative democracy [rather] than they reflected demands for a fully participatory version of democracy. Although we do find that expectations for more opportunities to participate are associated with greater support for using direct democracy, our results also demonstrate that the most consistent factors predicting interest in additional opportunities to participate are political distrust and the idea that citizens must “keep watch” on their government”.¹⁷

Authors’ principal conclusion was that “support for having “more” opportunities to participate is motivated by distrust of government, as well as the belief that a citizen has a duty to keep a watch on their government. ... The most consistent result in cross-national findings, how-ever, is that people who are suspicious of government expect more opportunities to participate. Overall, we find people support direct democracy to better control discretion delegated to their representatives”. Or, as Hibbing and Theiss-Morse noted on citizens’ attitude in the United States, their “sourness toward government does not stem from the fact that they want to be more involved, but from the fact that they feel as though they need to be involved even though they would rather not be”.¹⁸

TABLE 2: PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN SIXTEEN NATIONS

	Strongly agree (%)	Agree (%)	Neither agree nor disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Strongly disagree (%)
Australia	44	37	11	6	3
Germany	35	46	10	7	2
Spain	27	51	15	6	1
Czech Republic	26	38	23	10	4
Switzerland	22	62	12	4	1
New Zealand	22	49	18	8	3
United Kingdom	19	48	23	8	2
Canada	19	47	21	11	2
Latvia	19	43	27	8	3
Slovenia	19	27	19	18	16
Finland	18	37	23	17	6
Netherlands	16	50	20	11	4
Slovakia	16	40	24	15	5
Austria	15	48	23	11	2
United States	12	52	27	8	1
Hungary	10	30	32	20	8

Source: International Social Survey Program (ISSP) Citizenship module (2004).¹⁹

For the purpose of this discussion paper I extracted and aggregated some data from the study that focus specifically on the situation in the European Union. Europe champions direct democracy by far compared to other world regions (see Table 1) yet that is primarily due to Switzerland, which I therefore left out. On the other hand, I expanded the table with some additional data for contextual clarification.

¹⁷ Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan and Jeffrey A. Karp, “Enraged or Engaged? Preferences for Direct Citizen Participation in Affluent Democracies,” *Political Research Quarterly*, 60, 3 (2007), 360.

¹⁸ John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, *Stealth Democracy: Americans’ beliefs about how government should work* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 227.

¹⁹ Respondents were asked, “Thinking about politics in [COUNTRY], to what extent do you agree or disagree: Referendums are a good way to decide important political questions?” Countries include Austria (AS; 937 participants), Australia (AU; 1,777 participants), Canada (CAN; 1,149 participants), the Czech Republic (CZ; 1,274 participants), Finland (FIN; 1,226 participants), Germany (GER; 1,234 participants), Great Britain (GB; 763 participants), Hungary (HUN; 934 participants), Latvia (LAT; 934 participants), the Netherlands (NL; 1,583 participants), New Zealand (NZ; 1,260 participants), Spain (SP; 2,176 participants), Slovakia (SLA; 1,012 participants), Slovenia (SLO; 1,015 participants), Switzerland (SWI; 1,020 participants), and the United States (US; 1,378 participants). See Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan and Jeffrey A. Karp, “Enraged or Engaged? Preferences for Direct Citizen Participation in Affluent Democracies,” *Political Research Quarterly*, 60, 3 (2007), 352.

TABLE 3: PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN TWELVE NATIONS: "REFERENDUMS ARE A GOOD WAY TO DECIDE IMPORTANT POLITICAL QUESTIONS."

	(Strongly) agree (%)	Neither agree nor disagree (%)	(Strongly) disagree (%)	Number of national referenda (in recent history)	Trust in Parliament ("I trust" vs. "I don't trust" in %)*	Trust in Political Parties ("I trust" vs. "I don't trust" in %)*
Germany	81	10	9	No nat. referenda	39 vs. 54	13 vs. 83
Spain	78	15	7	6 nat. referenda	48 vs. 43	26 vs. 66
United Kingdom	67	23	10	6 nat. referenda	37 vs. 54	15 vs. 78
Netherlands	66	20	15	1 nat. referendum	49 vs. 47	34 vs. 60
Czech Republic	64	23	14	1 nat. referendum	18 vs. 75	10 vs. 85
Austria	63	23	13	3 nat. referenda	51 vs. 33	23 vs. 71
Latvia	62	27	11	11 nat. referenda	21 vs. 71	6 vs. 85
Slovakia	56	24	20	7 n. referenda	25 vs. 67	9 vs. 85
Finland	55	23	23	1 nat. referendum	68 vs. 30	26 vs. 70
Slovenia	46	19	34	21 nat. referenda	36 vs. 53	17 vs. 76
Hungary	40	32	28	12 n. referenda	38 vs. 52	18 vs. 70

Source: Eurobarometer (2004–2011). The missing percentage accounts for undecided.

Although there is positive perception of direct democracy prevailing in all countries, substantial differences in the level of support (ranging from 81 percent supporters in Germany to 40 percent supporters in Hungary out of national total) are interpreted by authors of the study as stemming from procedural specifics.²⁰ I have demonstrated at length the existence of these procedural varieties in Chapter 3, yet if that alone were to explain varied levels of public support of direct democracy, the Netherlands, where national referendum is not provided for, and United Kingdom could not show an almost equal level of support, let alone Germany and Switzerland (see Table 3). The difference between consolidated and "new" democracies cannot account for the fact that there is only 40 percent approval in Hungary and 64 percent in Czech Republic (higher than in Austria). Neither can the North-South divide be used to interpret the almost equally high rate of support in Spain and Germany at the top of the list. Surprisingly, there seems to be no straightforward correlation with the discontent with political representation as the data on (dis)trust in political institutions from the same period demonstrate. Why then in some states citizens perceive of direct democracy as good and less so elsewhere?

If we first consider the top half of countries with the highest approval of direct democracy, Germany, Spain and United Kingdom, the three at the very top are federalized. Few national referenda there does not mean that direct democracy is being repressed, since a significant number of referenda are organized at the regional (five in Spain and nine in United Kingdom) and local level (over 200 per year in Germany). Moreover, national and regional referenda in Spain and United Kingdom have primarily addressed issues related to their federal organization (British devolution referenda, Spanish referenda on regional autonomy). While, according to Lijphart, these democracies do not correspond to the definition of consociational democracies as Switzerland does, with regard to direct democracy they seem to act along consociational lines, using it to diffuse conflict before it extends to the national level. As Lijphardt argues, the aim of consociational approach "is not to abolish or weaken segmental cleavages but to recognize them explicitly and to turn the segments into constructive elements of stable

²⁰ Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan and Jeffrey A. Karp, "Enraged or Engaged? Preferences for Direct Citizen Participation in Affluent Democracies," *Political Research Quarterly*, 60, 3 (2007), 352.

democracy". Segmental autonomy therefore creates self-rule on issues that impact life within the own subgroup, but at the same time counteracts overarching centrifugal forces by reducing interference by the other groups to the bare minimum".²¹ The correlation between consociationalist approach and positive perception of direct democracy may explain the fact that Germany and Switzerland display a practically equal level of support of direct democracy, and would also account for the other two consociational democracies in the upper half of the list, the Netherlands and Austria where referenda are non-existent or extremely rare.²² Similarly, in Czech Republic referenda are being frequently organized only at the local level with local councillors accounting for 75 percent of referendum initiatives on mostly environmental levels;²³ perhaps for this approach to local democracy as well, Czech political elites have been the most successful among all post-Communist states to come close to a consociational democracy.²⁴

Implementation of direct democracy as a welcome complement to representative democracy at the level that cannot impact overall national political stability and can legitimize political representation in citizens' view - without bringing about unpredictable changes in inter-party power relationships - seems to result therefore in high public approval of direct democracy. In fewer words, even oppositional political elites seem to be in consensus on the fact that predictable and controlled direct democracy outcomes can benefit them by providing citizens with the illusion they are not entirely powerless, and thus mitigate general public distrust in political institutions.

In the bottom half of the list we find post-Communist states with a high number of national referenda held, except for Finland. Finns have only held one referendum in recent history that they were bound to, the EU accession referendum in 1994. Finnish constitution provides for referendum at the local level only and there have been over fifty of those after World War II. However, local referendums that can be called for by municipal authorities or by citizens' collecting 5 percent of signatures are merely consultative and although citizen initiatives mostly concern mergers or divisions of municipalities, "local councils have departed more than was expected even from fairly clear-cut referendum results. This clearly tends to diminish popular trust in the importance and usefulness of referendums of a consultative nature".²⁵

In their comparatively short independent democratic history, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary have had the highest number of national referenda organised in the group. Latvian voters were called to the polls eleven times in the last 20 years. They got to vote on Latvian independency (1991), secession from the Soviet Union (1991), pension system reform (1999 and 2008), legislation on citizenship (1998), EU accession (2003), security laws

²¹ See Didier Caluwaerts, Caluwaerts, Didier. *How prudence comes about: a new institutional interpretation of consociationalism*, ECPRNET 2010. Available at <http://www.ecprnet.eu/databases/conferences/papers/311.pdf> (October 2012), 7.

²² In the 2nd Republic, three referenda have been carried out: on nuclear power in 1978, on Austria's accession to the European Union in 1994 and on genetically modified organisms in 1997. Butler, David and Austin Ranney (ed.), *Referendums Around the World: the Growing Use of Direct Democracy* (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1994), 90.

²³ Tauchen, Jaromír. "Local Referendum in the Czech Republic – History and Present Days," *Journal on Legal and Economic Issues of Central Europe*, 1, 1 (2010): 52–55.

²⁴ Radomir Špok, Vera Rihačková, Tomáš Weiss, Vladimír Bartovic and Jeanne Dromard, *Místní referenda v České republice a vevybraných zemích Evropské uni* (Praga, Vydal Institut pro evropskou politiku EUROPEUM, 2006), 15–21.

²⁵ Council of Europe, Steering Committee on Local and Regional Authorities, *Local Referendums: report (Local and Regional Authorities in Europe No. 52)* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1993), 55.

(2007), constitutional amendments (2008 and 2011), dissolution of the Parliament (2011) and the establishment of Russian as a second official language (2012). The latter, with 71 percent turnout and 75 percent votes against the proposal, prompted Latvian political leaders to start discussions on constitutional amendments to modify referendum regulations. At present, anyone who can collect the signatures of 10 percent of the electorate in support of proposed legislation can initiate a referendum.

The 12 referenda in post-Communist Hungary were in 1989, 1990, 1997, 2004 and 2008. The number of referendum initiatives presented to the National Election Commission rose from 23 in the period 1989–2011 to 48 in 2006 alone.²⁶ Beside the EU and NATO accession, Hungarian voters were asked to decide on issues related to the former Communist regime and on privatisation of hospitals. At the “super referendum” in 2008 they voted on payment of hospital treatment, payment of GP visits and school tuitions i.e. dissolution of public health and education systems. The outcome of this referendum brought radical changes in Hungarian politics. The ruling coalition fell apart, the Prime Minister resigned a few months later, the popularity of the Socialist Party, major partner of the socialist-liberal coalition, hit bottom. The 2008 referendum also initiated an extensive debate in Hungary on the institutional aspects of the referendum, focusing on whether the people’s will could overwrite the program of the democratically elected government, how far could the Constitutional Court go in the interpretation of referendum questions and whether referendum was used as a weapon in party politics.²⁷

In Slovakia, referenda may be called on by citizens collecting 350,000 signatures, while the Parliament and the Head of State also have the referendum initiative. A referendum must be held within 30 days following the call and the Constitutional Court must rule on the appropriateness of the referendum questions (according to a 2001 constitutional amendment adopted due to a number of referendum initiatives considered topically inappropriate). Six referenda were held since independence in 1993 and five of them failed due to insufficient turnout (50 percent being required quorum). The highest turnout was at the EU accession referendum in 2003 (52.1 percent), which was also an obligatory ratification instrument according to the Slovak constitution. In 1997 the then Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar called for a referendum on direct presidential elections, which enabled him to take over as acting Head of State and grant controversial amnesties. The 2010 referendum on a package of reforms was spearheaded by Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) party that launched a petition for a referendum on excessive privileges enjoyed by the country’s political elite. Although the six proposed measures—including stripping lawmakers of immunity from prosecution, downsizing the Parliament, and setting a price limit on government cars—attracted overwhelming support, only 22.9 percent of the country’s 4.3 million eligible voters made it to the polls. Critics charged that given Slovakia’s past form with referenda, spending 7 million Euros on the vote was lavish.²⁸

Slovenia’s Constitution and legislation regulate referenda pertaining to constitutional revisions, legislative referenda and referenda on establishment of a local community. These are all binding, yet a consultative referendum

²⁶ Pal Reti, “Using or Misusing Direct Democracy? Global Forum on Modern Direct Democracy, 13. – 16. September 2009, Seoul, Korea. Available at http://www.iri-europe.org/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/15-Reti.pdf (October 2012).

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ See The Economist. *Slovakia’s Voters: However*, The Economist Online, 20 September 2010. Available at http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2010/09/slovakias_referendum (October 2012).

can also be called for. A national referendum can be called for by at least 30 out of 90 members of the Parliament, by a citizen initiative backed by 40,000 voters' signatures or by the government. In independent Slovenia, there were 20 national and local binding and consultative referenda so far, addressing various issues.²⁹ Between the 1990 referendum on Slovenia's secession from the Socialist Yugoslavia and 2003 there were three referenda of which the most controversial was the previously mentioned 2001 referendum on artificial fertilization of single women. Then there were six referenda in 2003 alone, including the ones on Slovenia's accession to European Union and NATO. Approximately a referendum per year followed, and Slovenian voters got to decide on topics such as reorganization of public television and the Slovenian Railways and the insurance companies or again, on the regionalization model. In 2010, another referendum followed on public television³⁰ as well as the referendum on the arbitration agreement on the maritime border between Slovenia and Croatia. In 2011 there were three referenda initiated by the opposition that ended up weakening the government to the point of stepping down and making way for the first preliminary parliamentary elections so far.

To back the assumption that frequent national referenda are not a post-Communist idiosyncrasy and do not necessarily result in high approval of direct and representative democracy, the Italian example may be telling, although there are no data available on Italian public opinion on direct democracy in the 2007 study by Bowler *et al.* Since 1974, Italians voted on 65 very diverse issues at very frequent "super referenda" usually asking several questions, as well as at two constitutional referenda. However, in several cases of legal issues rejected at the referendum, namely party financing or electoral system modifications, the government soon adopted a very similar law, thus ignoring popular will. As a consequence, Italians seem no longer to indulge in such ritualistic direct democracy as no referendum has reached the required 50 percent quorum since 1997. According to the 2004 Eurobarometer, the public (dis)trust in the Italian parliament was 31 percent vs. 51 percent, and 20 percent vs. 71 percent for political parties, quite comparable to the situation in considered post-Communist countries.

5 CONCLUSION

Direct democracy has been gradually and inconsistently gaining ground worldwide after World War II as a complement to political representation. Initial distrust and negative perceptions of direct democracy were based on now irrelevant historical circumstances. Moreover, the Swiss example and others demonstrate numerous benefits of implementation of direct democracy as a complement to the representative system. Negative perceptions of direct democracy on the other hand, reflect inadequacies in greatly varying referendum regulations as well as a lasting distrust, even contempt of political elites towards the citizens. Both negative and positive public perceptions of direct democracy are closely interconnected with citizens' perceptions of representative democracy although not in a linear, inverse symmetrical fashion.

²⁹ Kristan, Ivan. *Večina in prag udeležbe na referendumu, Več neposredne demokracije v Sloveniji – da ali ne*, Ljubljana, 11 March 2002, conference at the National Council of Republic of Slovenia. Available at http://www.ds-rs.si/2MO/dejavnost/posveti/besedila_pos/pos11-3-02_Kristan.htm (October 2012).

³⁰ In 2004 the conservative coalition government introduced legislation on public television and the centre-left opposition called for a referendum. When centre-left coalition presented another legal framework for public television, conservative opposition promptly called for another referendum in 2010.

Political representatives shape these perceptions by adopting specific legal regulations on direct democracy on the one hand and on the other hand, by their attitude toward the very purpose of direct democracy. Bowler *et al.* rightly pointed at procedural differences as a possible explanation for different levels of public support of local democracy, yet the interpretation of direct democracy by political elites i.e. how they employ instruments at hand must be added to the equation. Explanation for varieties in these interpretations can then be sought for in particular form of democracy and particular political culture of each country. To answer my own question, current claims for “more” (direct) democracy should be interpreted and addressed as claims for a “better” representation.

While there is no direct correlation between support of local democracy and levels of (dis)trust in political institutions, citizens’ perceptions of direct democracy appear to be more positive in consociational democracies or centrifugal democracies that employ direct democracy at sub-national levels mostly to appease potential societal conflict, and keep referenda far in between and topically focused on the most fundamental societal issues such as modification of borders, regional autonomy and constitutional reforms. On the other side, heterogeneous societies with opposing political elites such as Slovenia, Hungary and Slovakia have seen abuse of direct democracy with too frequent referenda on non-essential issues and subsequently, citizens created a less positive perception of direct and representative democracy. Twenty-one national referenda, of which so many were controversial and instrumental in bringing about disillusionment in democracy, in twenty years of Slovenia’s history were a matter of choice, not inexperience: Slovenia copied the referendum legislation after Denmark where there were 13 referenda in the last 60 years, of which six were related to the European integration processes, three on the modification of voting age and one on constitutional changes.³¹ Or, as Belko and Kopeček concluded in the case of Slovakia, “*the institute of referendum has become one of the important instruments (mis)used by parties in political competition. Its use by other - non-party - participants proved to be unrealistic. Its legal regulation in the Slovak Constitution led to the situation when its application produced more problems than it solved. Thus, from the standpoint of its significance, it effected the consolidation of the Slovak democracy in a rather negative way*”.³²

Is low support for direct democracy in plural societies with oppositional political elites only an evolutionary stage so to speak and these perceptions may turn positive when their political elites evolve toward more responsible coalitional behaviour patterns? ISSP plans for another module on citizenship in 2014 and comparison with the 2004 data will be most interesting, considering all economic and political transformations that observed countries have meanwhile been subjected to.

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³¹ Folketinget. *Denmark&EU, 2006*. Available at http://www.euo.dk/euo_en/dkeu/referenda/ (October 2012).

³² Marijan Belko and Lubomir Kopeček, “Referendum in theory and practice: the history of the Slovak referendums and their consequences,” *Central European Political Studies Review*, 2–3 (2003).

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IMPROVEMENTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON EUROPEAN ENERGY POLICY IN THE YEARS 2007–2011

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Energy is a fundamental good for all countries. How is it possible to secure energy supply? What are the energy sources to choose from? How is it possible to optimize resources' use? How is it possible to reduce the environmental impact of energy exploitation? How is it possible to reduce energy costs? The answers to these questions are influenced by economic and political reasons. Moreover, EU Member States have another question to answer: what are the advantages from highly-integrated energy policies? The aim of this article is to describe the actions the European Commission has been taken to foster energy integration since 2007, by comparing the objectives and the results achieved. It will emerge that common action in the field of energy can provide Member States with convenient answers both from an economic and a political perspective. Despite not having achieved all objectives, the EU seems to have chosen the right path.

Key words: Common Energy Policy, Energy Choices, European Union, European Integration, Internal Market.

1 INTRODUCTION

Within the European Union the debate on increasing the coordination and on a full integration of national energy policies has been conducted since the sixties. It is difficult to give a clear definition of what a common European energy policy is, but I find that a good one was given by D'haeseleer in article published in 2006:

"A Common European Energy Policy should thus be the road map for implementation of the mission concretized by

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the *strategic goals or objectives* set by the EU authorities towards the sort of energy future desired for the Union (i.e., to make the energy *vision* of the EU become a reality). A CEEP must define measures for implementation, and as such, it must provide '*constraints or boundary conditions*', on the one hand, and '*incentive*', on the other hand, to satisfy the set strategic goals and objectives (as well as how to measure their achievement at EU and MS level)".²

Priorities have often changed as well as the importance attached by stakeholders, first of all Member States, to single aspects of energy integration. In the last thirty years, three clear and shared priorities have been outlined:

1. enabling Member States to secure their supply at a reasonable low price;
2. fostering the integration of a common market for energy and energy infrastructures;
3. tackling climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, improving energy efficiency and developing alternative energy sources.

These priorities have been described in the energy strategy brought forward by the European Commission (from now on: Commission) in 2007.³ The present article aims at analysing the expected results, to find out what has been achieved in the last four years. Since a new proposal for a European energy strategy was published in September 2011,⁴ similarities and differences between the two proposals will be explained, to understand if and what has been done to reach the above-mentioned objectives and if the new strategy is a new version of the previous one. The economic and financial crisis will be considered as well, because it has changed Member States' priorities regarding energy issues and has threatening European solidarity since its onset in 2008. Therefore, from a methodological point of view, this article is based on a comparison between the above mentioned strategies. Also previous published analysis of the attempts to develop a common and coordinated action in the energy sector have been taken into account, both for the past (e.g. Daintith and Hancher's analysis⁵) and the present situation (e.g. Behrens and Egenhofer's analysis⁶).

2 PROPOSALS AND OBJECTIVES OF 2007

The Commission illustrated its vision of the energy sector in the Green Paper on energy published in 2006⁷ and in the Energy Package published in 2007, which also contains the Communication *An Energy Policy for Europe* presenting the key objectives based on quantitative data. The European Council (from now on: Council) approved the proposed objectives at the meeting held in March 2007. Emissions should be reduced by 20 percent by 2020 compared to 1990 levels. This goal was presented as a contribution to

² William D. D'haeseleer, "Reflections on a Common European Energy Policy," *European Review of Energy Markets*, 1, 3 (2006), 15.

³ See *An Energy Policy for Europe*. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/doc/01_energy_policy_for_europe_en.pdf (January 2007), 1.

⁴ See *On security of energy supply and international cooperation – The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders*. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52011DC0539:EN:HTML:NOT> (February 2012).

⁵ Terence Daintith and Leigh Hancher, *Energy Strategy in Europe: the Legal Framework* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986).

⁶ Arno Behrens and Christian Egenhofer, *Energy Policy for Europe: Identifying European Added-Value* (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies, 2008).

⁷ See *Green Paper on energy*. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc=COMfinal&an_doc=2006&nu_doc=105 (May 2008).

negotiations with developing countries, which were debating about reducing their emissions by 30 percent. The EU was committed to further reduce its emissions by 10 percent if an agreement was to be reached. In addition, the document recommended halving emissions by 2050, implying 60-80 percent reduction in industrialised countries by that year. Regarding security of supply, the Commission proposed two goals: reducing oil and gas import dependency and reducing imports in general. On diversification, the Commission stated: "It remains important for the EU to promote diversity with regards to source, suppliers, transport routes and transport methods".⁸

Only diversification would enable Member States to reduce the political and economic risks of energy dependence. Moreover, the document pointed out that the European Union should become a leader in renewable technologies, thereby creating jobs and improving European competitiveness in the international energy market. As Alario⁹ claims, the document does not contain a specific definition of the "energy mix" necessary to meet the objectives. That should not surprise, since the situation in 2007 was more confused than during previous crises. During the crisis of oil prices in 1985, gas became a competitive option from an environmental point of view and because it cost less and was able to meet the demand of electricity. Indeed, gas resources were considered to be plentiful and sufficiently diversified. Moreover, experts believed that gas (and oil) long-term prices would have remained low. These assumptions together with liberalization of energy market led to a steep rise of gas consumption, making it the fastest-growing energy source after renewable energy. The situation began to change in 2000 and in 2003, when oil price soared, thereby leading to a drastic reduction of gas competitiveness. Today, as in 2007, the electricity produced in a coal-fired power plant is more economical than the one produced in a gas power plant, not considering the costs of CO² emissions. The situation explains why coal has increasingly been used at an international level recently, especially in Asia. The decision of the EU to rely on gas led to a new dependence on gas imports. Yet Europe cannot simply return to coal, because that will interfere with policies on climate change. The possible scenario is a further increase in gas consumption and a minimum increase in coal consumption, unless the latter is combined with a complex system of capture and storage of CO² emissions. At the time of negotiations, coal producer countries and coal consumer countries were arguing endlessly, with the former willing to boost productions; a situation often witnessed during the debates on European energy policy. In addition, new Member States had joined producer countries, first and foremost Poland, which has a long tradition in the coal mining sector. This explains why an agreement on the role of gas and oil in the energy mix could not be reached at a Community level and why the Communication *An Energy Policy for Europe* is not clear on that.

Another element needs to be considered: nuclear energy. In the EU, it amounted to 15 percent of energy consumption and more than 30 percent of electricity production in 2007.¹⁰ In theory, nuclear power was a good option to meet the goals set by the energy policy. Yet it was strongly opposed by public opinion in several Member States. Citizens were concerned about

⁸ See *An Energy Policy for Europe*. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/doc/01_energy_policy_for_europe_en.pdf (January 2007), 1.

⁹ Juan Alario, "An efficient, sustainable and secure supply of energy for Europe: global and European policy perspectives," *EIB Papers*, 12, 1, (2007), 108–112.

¹⁰ Goran Floridan, *I tentativi di creazione di una politica comune europea in materia di energia tra gli anni '60 e gli anni '70. Tesi di laurea specialistica* (Università degli Studi di Padova, Facoltà di Scienze Politiche, 2008).

security of nuclear plants and radioactive waste disposal. On nuclear energy as well, Member States failed to reach a consensus. Given the situation, what actions should the European Union have taken to meet its objectives with the greatest possible consensus? Alario believes that there were two shared options, which would have enabled the EU to secure its supplies and tackle climate change: energy efficiency and renewable energy. His stand is confirmed by the decision of the Council, taken in March 2007,¹¹ to call on Member State to produce 20 percent of energy from renewable sources. The national energy plans should have been approved at European level, since an agreement on the costs of the project was not achieved. The Council emphasized the need to increase energy efficiency, which would have led to reduce energy consumption by 20 percent by 2020. Theoretically, meeting the objectives would have led to 20 percent reduction of CO² emissions produced by the energy sector. Accomplishing it was not easy, mainly because renewable energy was and is expensive. The main argument in favour of public policies supporting renewable energy is based on the assumption that financing research and development in this field, at a time in which the market of renewable energy is not fully developed, will reduce the costs of renewable energy in the medium and long-term.

In the document presented in 2007, the Commission identified three main political objectives for the development of EU energy sector:

- sustainability, i.e. environmental objectives;
- security of supply;
- competitiveness.

The document provoked an intense debate at European level whether or not the objectives were appropriate. Unlike the seventies, the debate did not dwell upon dispute over national interests, but upon the existing differences between the energy policies of Member States. Such differences could not be removed; therefore Member States should find solutions to overcome them. The think tank Bruegel based in Brussels carried out an interesting analysis based on the possible balancing variables among the three objectives set by the Commission.¹² According to researchers, the Commission considered the objectives to reinforce each other. Yet Member States gave them different importance. Such differences needed to be recognized to establish a robust framework to convince Member States of the necessity of a common European approach. National energy policies were indeed aligned with the objectives proposed by the Commission, albeit focusing mostly on one leaving out the others. Indeed, each Member State faced endogenous factors such as geographical location, availability of domestic energy resources, and preference for nuclear energy. Such complexity led to the heterogeneity of national energy markets, hampering the equal achievement of the three objectives by all Member States.

By reading the Commission's Communication is immediately clear that not only did it fail to identify the discrepancies among its objectives, but it also suggested that all three reinforce each other. These assumptions could not possibly contribute to a fruitful debate. Indeed, the perspective changes according to the definition provided for the three objectives. For instance, if competitiveness is defined as overall long-term economic efficiency, there are not problems with the other two objectives. If, however, competitiveness

¹¹ *European Council Presidency Conclusions*. 8/9 March 2007. Available at <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st07/st07224-re01.en07.pdf> (May 2007).

¹² Lars-Hendrik Röller, Juan Delgado and Hans W. Friederiszick, *Energy: Choices for Europe* (Brussels: Bruegel, 2007), 9–15.

is defined as industry profitability, problems arise. If industry is forced to increase its environmental standards, this will result in an increase of costs, thus decreasing its competitiveness on international markets. If competitiveness is defined in terms of consumer interest (which is one of the standards used by the EU to measure competitiveness) there will be trade-offs. Renewable energy was and still is more expensive than conventional energy sources, thus increasing the cost of energy for consumers, even though environmental standards are pursued. At the same time, renewable energy is highly desirable than some conventional sources, when taking into account consumers' health. In other words, if the three objectives are defined widely enough, contradictions among them do not exist, as argued by the Commission. Yet the benefit of broad definitions to tackle practical problems remains to be assessed.


Time is another important variable which was not defined clearly. The choices made had long-term consequences. Is it acceptable to pollute and then make the next generation pay for it? Is it necessary to increase investment in biomass to be energy independent in the future? Clearly, environmental costs cause short-term price increase; on the other hand, early investments enable future sustainable growth. In the long term, all three objectives converge: long-run economic efficiency can be obtained by meeting the environmental objectives and, at the same time, it ensures security of supply, provided that security is considered as access to resources at low prices. Yet converging would only be reached in the long term.¹³

I would like to insist on the three objectives, because only by knowing what the Commission meant, will it be possible to evaluate the energy strategy as a whole. The objective competitiveness has been criticised for being too vague or even misleading. The Communication describes what the term competitiveness entails: concern about high prices and the associated transfers, investments, jobs and innovation and the knowledge-based economy. Moreover, all the concerns should be consistent with the social dimension of Europe, at least in the long term. Clearly, such a broad definition of competitiveness could not resolve the contradictions, which was aimed to address, but it was necessary to obtain political support from Member States. Competitiveness is closely associated with economic efficiency, a situation where products are manufactured at the lowest cost possible and their allocation among consumers is optimized. Defined statistically, economic efficiency is obtained when current prices are close to current marginal costs. If focused on consumers, short-term prices, products quality and variety are the relevant measures of economic efficiency.¹⁴ In this case, the discrepancies with the other two objectives of the Commission were remarkable. The same applies when considering dynamic efficiency, which relates to a situation in which consumption and investments are optimized over time. For example, low prices in the short term may reduce the incentives to invest in future capacities.

¹³ Goran Floridan, *I tentativi di creazione di una politica comune europea in materia di energia tra gli anni '60 e gli anni '70. Tesi di laurea specialistica* (Università degli Studi di Padova, Facoltà di Scienze Politiche, 2008).

¹⁴ Damien J. Neven and Lars-Hendrik Röller, "Consumer surplus vs. welfare standard in a political economy model of merger control," *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 23 (2005), 829–831.

FIGURE 1: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE IN ENERGY IN 2007



Source: European Commission.¹⁵

Consider the objective sustainability. In the energy field it means sustainable growth. The Commission's environmental objectives mainly focus on the evolution of CO² emissions (which were included in the Kyoto Protocol) as well as on acid emissions. Another issue was the share of renewable energy in the energy mix, that is to say the share of water power, combustible renewables, wind and solar energy. Other environmental concerns, such as radioactive waste management, were not explicitly included within the objectives, probably because an agreement to bridge the gap between the requests of Member States in favour of nuclear energy and those of the Member State against it could not be reached.

The third objective presented in the Communication was security of supply, a recurrent goal, included in all official documents on energy policy since the sixties - the actions taken in the last forty years have hardly been effective in tackling the problem. What exactly does security of supply mean? When studying security of supply, only a number of elements are analyzed (limited resources, insufficient investments in infrastructure and new exploitation, blackouts, terrorism, political blackmail). Supply security is divided into resource adequacy and operating reliability, even though in recent years a few experts have disagreed about that.¹⁶ By operating reliability experts refer to adequate investment in infrastructure (for example power plants) and good operation of the network to balance supply and demand. The 2003 blackout in Italy is an example of lack of operating reliability. On the other hand, resource adequacy means reliable access to primary resources and is therefore linked to the external dimension of the European energy policy. The EU is therefore compelled to tackle two main issues: significant parts of the supply network are located outside its borders and many producer countries are characterized by unstable or undemocratic regimes. In such environment security of supply not only depends on the economic rationale,

¹⁵ Key facts and figures on the external dimension of the EU energy policy. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2011:1022:FIN:EN:PDF> (January 2012), 1022 final.

¹⁶ Paul Joskow, *Supply security in competitive electricity and natural gas markets*. Prepared for Beesley Lecture, 25th October 2005, London, United Kingdom.

but also on political objectives difficult to manage. In an idealized world in which supply markets are competitive and private companies compete to gain access to resources, a competitive European market would maximize supply security by optimizing investment in resource development and supply allocation. However, market failures do exist. They are caused by the monopolistic market structure in producer countries and by political interference from local politicians as well as consumer countries (for example China). Abusing natural resources to reach political goals is having damaging economic consequences. Even though such tactics do not maximize economic profits, government-controlled monopolists may reduce production well beyond the limit monopolists not controlled by government can accept, with the aim of obtaining political concessions. It has happened several times since the seventies. Needless to say that, from this point of view, security of supply causes serious concern.

Before the Communication of 2007, energy policy was closely linked with environmental policy, which led to the adoption of an important Decision¹⁷ concerning mechanisms for monitoring greenhouse gas emissions and for implementing the Kyoto Protocol. Member States were required to formulate, publish and implement national programmes as well as a common programme to limit and reduce their emissions, starting from sources of pollution, and to eliminate greenhouse gases through ad-hoc investments. This topic was included in the Directive¹⁸ adopted in 2003, aiming at establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance within the Community. Each Member State had to formulate a national plan fulfilling the criteria of the annex III of the Directive, indicating the number of allowances provided. Operators failing to surrender sufficient allowances to cover the emissions they produced during the preceding years by 30th April were liable for the payment of an excess emissions penalty. The system did not produce good results and faced a first crisis in 2006, when it became clear that the allowances had been distributed generously by Member States, under the Commission's surveillance. In the Green Paper published in 2006, the Commission identified six key areas where action was needed to improve the common energy situation:

- the internal market;
- improvement of security of supply;
- reduction of greenhouse gas emissions;
- diversification of the energy mix;
- improvement of energy technologies;
- common external policy on energy.

To accomplish the internal energy market, the Commission proposed the creation of a European grid code, a priority interconnection plan, a European energy regulator and new initiatives to ensure common rules and open and competitive networks.

To ensure security of supply, the Commission proposed to establish a European Energy Supply Observatory and to review the existing legislation on oil and gas compulsory reserves, thus enabling the system to manage

¹⁷ Decision No 280/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 concerning a mechanism for monitoring Community greenhouse gas emissions and for implementing the Kyoto Protocol. OJ 2004. L49. 1-8. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004D0280:EN:HTML> (January 2012).

¹⁸ Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC. OJ 2004. L275. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:275:0032:0032:EN:PDF> (January 2012).

potential supply disruptions. The definition of a new more sustainable, efficient and diversified energy mix should have been based on the Strategic EU Energy Review, which should analyse all the advantages and drawbacks of different sources of energy, from coal to nuclear power. Regarding new technologies, a strategic plan was proposed. Concerning external relations, the Commission suggested a plan to establish a pan-European Energy Community, as well as a regulatory framework, new partnerships with EU partners, Russia included, and a new common mechanism to enhance coordinated response capabilities in the event of external energy supply crises.

The new energy strategy presented by the Commission in 2007, which has been examined previously, is link with the 2007 Communication on climate change,¹⁹ which limits the temperature increase to 2°C. The Communication contained a complete evaluation of the probable consequences of greenhouse gas emissions Europe had to face. The comprehensive analysis took into account all concerns on the subject and led to the publication of numerous Communications in 2006: on energy efficiency,²⁰ renewable energy,²¹ renewable electricity,²² biofuels,²³ sustainable power generation from fossil fuels,²⁴ the European Strategic Energy Technology Plan,²⁵ the internal market,²⁶ nuclear energy,²⁷ the priority interconnection plan.²⁸ Moreover, a report on energy sector enquiry was published.²⁹ A comprehensive analysis of the documents is complex. Yet it is worth underling that, for the first time, the Commission sought to tackle all energy issues, linking them to climate change. Indeed, environmental issues were the core of the problem. The Commission's plans to reduce emissions have

¹⁹ *Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Limiting global climate change to 2 degrees Celsius - The way ahead for 2020 and beyond.* COM (2007) 2. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52007DC0002:EN:HTML> (January 2012).

²⁰ *Communication from the Commission - Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: Realising the Potential.* COM (2006) 545. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52006DC0545:EN:HTML> (January 2012).

²¹ *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Renewable energy road map - Renewable energies in the 21st century: building a more sustainable future.* COM (2006) 848. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52006DC0848:EN:HTML> (January 2012).

²² *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Green Paper follow-up action Report on progress in renewable electricity.* COM (2006) 849. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52006DC0849:EN:HTML> (January 2012).

²³ *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Biofuels Progress Report - Report on the progress made in the use of biofuels and other renewable fuels in the Member States of the European Union.* COM (2006) 845. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52006DC0845:EN:HTML> (January 2012).

²⁴ *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Sustainable power generation from fossil fuels: aiming for near-zero emissions from coal after 2020.* COM (2006) 843. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52006DC0843:EN:HTML> (January 2012).

²⁵ *Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Towards a European strategic energy technology plan.* COM (2006) 847. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52006DC0847:EN:HTML> (January 2012).

²⁶ *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Prospects for the internal gas and electricity market.* COM (2006) 841. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52006DC0841:EN:HTML> (January 2012).

²⁷ *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Nuclear Illustrative Programme Presented under Article 40 of the Euratom Treaty for the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee.* COM (2006) 844. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52006DC0844:EN:HTML> (January 2012).

²⁸ *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Priority interconnection plan.* COM (2006) 846. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52006DC0846:EN:HTML> (January 2012).

²⁹ *Commission staff working document accompanying the Communication from the Commission - Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors (Final Report).* SEC (2006) 1724. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52006SC1724:EN:HTML> (January 2012).

already been illustrated. A number of experts criticise them and Dehousse³⁰ identifies some core issues. Firstly, the Commission seemed to doubt about the effectiveness of its proposals: it thought its plan to have 50 percent success rate and linked it to the actions taken in developing countries. A greater sharing of the burden at European level would have been advisable. Secondly, the EU did not address the reasons which led to the failure in meeting the objectives of the Kyoto Protocol. On this subject, a report³¹ published by the European Environment Agency in 2006 underlines the link between energy and environment issues. The document explains that, to a large extent, progress has been made by new Member States, as a result of a profound economic restructuring before and after the accession. On the other hand, old Member States (EU-15) have shown limited progress, because the consequences of technological improvement were wiped out by an increase in energy consumption. Clearly, technological improvement alone is not enough; it needs to be linked with actions on the effects of energy demand. The report highlights a worrying fact: the EU performance has worsened since 2000, when oil prices have returned to increase.

In 2007 the EU was still dependent on fossil fuels, which accounted for 79 percent of the total. Even though renewable energy, for example wind energy, had slightly grown in the latest years, it made up only 3 percent of primary supply (2 percent of which was water power). Oil was still predominant in transport, whereas gas and coal in energy production. In 2004 domestic oil production fulfilled only 20 percent of requirements, while natural gas 46 percent. Regarding solid fuels, domestic production amounted to 61 percent, 62 percent of which was coal and 38 percent brown coal. Nuclear energy met 15 percent of domestic energy needs and biomass 4 percent. Net energy imports accounted for 52 percent of gross energy consumption in 2004.³² According to the data, energy dependence can be tackled and overcome with a joint action and a long-term strategy.

3 PROGRESS OF THE ENERGY PLAN OF 2007

Four years ago the EU did not have a global energy policy and the 2007 Energy Action Plan enabled the creation of various initiatives, legislation and increased public awareness; it also contributed to changing the political energy framework. Moreover, the plan showed that promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency, modernizing and expanding transnational network, promoting gas security of supply, developing energy technologies and creating a functioning energy market are measures now taken at European level. The Action Plan led to concrete results such as the adoption of the Third Internal Energy Package, of the Climate and Energy Package (especially the Directive on renewables and the Review of the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading), of the Directive on nuclear security and of the Strategic Energy Technology Plan. In addition, legislation on energy efficiency has been adopted and progress has been made in the field of major regional infrastructures.

The Third Internal Energy Package imposed the conditions for the full functioning of the internal market and for competitiveness, allowing

³⁰ Dehousse, Franklin, Sami Andoura, Niels B. Bekkhus, Renaud Dehin and Karel Van Hecke. "Towards a Real European Energy Policy?" *Studia diplomatica*, 60, 2 (2007), 20–21.

³¹ See European Environmental Agency. *Energy and environment in the European Union – Tracking progress towards integration*. EEA Report no. 8, 2006.

³² See Eurostat, *Panorama of Energy: Energy Statistics to Support EU Policies and Solutions* (Brussels: Eurostat statistical books, 2007).

consumers and businesses wider options, lower energy prices, more transparency and competition and better security of supply, thus improving transmission networks and encouraging investment. In addition, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), based in Ljubljana, was founded to coordinate the cooperation among national energy regulators. The creation of regional energy markets³³ is paving the way for greater market integration in the near future. A competitive and effective internal energy market is pivotal in meeting the EU energy and environmental objectives set for the long term. It ensures efficient energy supply and removes monopolies. An important debate was launched in 2008³⁴ on the infrastructures needed to complete the internal energy market and one year later the Council approved the Commission's proposals. Moreover, the new Regulation on notification of infrastructure investments should enhance investment monitoring and transparency.

In recent years the Commission has adopted several documents on all issues related to energy policy, to encourage progress in the priority sectors mentioned in the strategy of 2007. Since the last document discussed in this article is the Communication adopted in September 2011³⁵ on energy cooperation with third countries, recent progress regarding the external energy policy needs to be summarized.

Between 2007 and 2011 the EU made significant progress on the existing cooperation with third countries on energy. The cooperation with Western Balkans countries was promoted within the framework of the Energy Community Treaty. Dialogue has improved with Central Asian and Middle East Countries, with Iraq, China, Russia, Brazil, the United States and the African Union. Energy cooperation dealt with common interest matters such as regulating infrastructure development, developing environmentally sustainable policies and joint projects (research and development in biofuel sector). Moreover, the EU strengthened the cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to promote security and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The partnership has been developed within the framework of Euratom agreements in accord with international partners. Progress was also made regarding the participation of Turkey, Moldova and Ukraine in the Energy Community.

At the same time, the EU engaged more actively in the activity of international organizations dealing with energy issues, such as the International Energy Forum and the International Energy Agency (IEA). The Union also strengthened its cooperation with organizations of which is not a member, for example OPEC. The EU commitment with the G8 Forum led to the foundation of the International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation. Lastly, energy plays a great role in EU trade negotiations, both bilateral (for example with Ukraine) and multilateral (the access of Kazakhstan to the WTO).

³³ Such as the Pentalateral Forum in Northern Europe, the Heptalateral Forum in Central and Eastern Europe, or MIBEL in the Iberian peninsula.

³⁴ See *Green Paper: Towards a Secure, Sustainable and Competitive European Energy Network*. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008DC0782:EN:NOT> (January 2009).

³⁵ See *On security of energy supply and international cooperation – The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders*. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52011DC0539:EN:HTML:NOT> (February 2012).

4 2011: NEW STRATEGY FOR EXTERNAL ENERGY RELATIONS

The EU external energy relations are pivotal to the completion of the internal energy market. Past experience showed that bilateral relations between Member States and third-country energy suppliers cause a fragmented internal market and hamper security of supply and competitiveness. A new legislative framework has been introduced to ensure a simpler access to infrastructures and greater competitiveness of supply security. The cut-off date decided by the Council to complete the gas and electricity internal market is 2014. Rapid action is therefore needed to solve the existing problems in the external market. This situation is frame of reference for the Communication *On security of energy supply and international cooperation – The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders* presented by the Commission in September 2011, which is assessed in this chapter. The legal framework for the common energy policy has changed since the previous Communication on external energy relations. The Lisbon Treaty identified clear energy objectives, which have been further developed in the Europe 2020 strategy.³⁶ It is now acknowledged that the UE will not succeed in achieving the objectives, unless it really focuses on improving external relations.

In addition to the issues related to the external energy policy, which were included in the documents analysed until now, the latest Communication underlines the need to cooperate with developing countries to promote more sustainable energy consumption. Therefore, the EU sets the target to include sustainable energy issues in development cooperation policy. Indeed, improving access to energy sources in developing countries can reduce inequality. Such actions will enable Europe to minimise sudden supply disruption and will promote transparency on the international energy market. The above mentioned objectives were agreed upon by the competent EU and African Ministers in Vienna in September 2010.

Strengthening the external energy policy was already a priority illustrated in the strategy Europe 2020 and it was confirmed by the Council in February 2011.³⁷ The Commission's Communication published in September 2011 underlined the key elements for further development:

- building up the external dimension of the internal energy market;
- strengthening the existing partnerships with third countries for secure, sustainable and competitive energy;
- improving access to sustainable energy for developing countries;
- better promoting EU policies beyond its borders.

The Communication describes each point in detail. It is worth reminding that the common energy market heavily depends on imports. Therefore, in the EU's best interests, energy market should be as open and transparent as possible. Otherwise the EU will be vulnerable to price volatility and political instability of the exporting countries. The external energy policy needs to reflect the interconnectedness of the internal market and the interdependence of Member States. To meet this goal, the Commission proposes to set up an information exchange mechanism on bilateral


³⁶ EUROPE 2020 A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. COM (2010) 2020 final. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010DC2020:EN:HTML> (January 2012).

³⁷ See *European Council Conclusions*, 4 February 2011. Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119175.pdf (June 2011).

agreements between Member States and third countries, to improve transparency. In addition, the Commission supports bilateral negotiations between the European authorities and third countries if one or more energy objectives are debated upon. Moreover, national energy networks need to be integrated with the systems of neighbouring countries, to diversify sources and supply routes. On the subject, the Commission recalls its Communication *Energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond*,³⁸ which dealt with the issue. A recurrent topic is the need to diversify gas and oil supply and to fasten the opening of the “Southern Corridor”, while enabling the continuous functioning of the existing gas infrastructures from Eastern countries and supporting the rehabilitation of the Ukrainian gas transmission network. The Commission proposes a tri-partite cooperation with Russia and Ukraine to ensure gas supplies through the “Eastern Corridor”. The dialogue with Southern Mediterranean countries is still necessary to promote joint projects in the field of renewable energy, especially solar energy. The Commission proposes the creation of regional partnerships in third countries to encourage the development of a market for renewable energy by 2020. The Commission aims at encouraging third countries to invest in ambitious projects on energy efficiency and renewable energy.

Another issue is improving integration of energy markets with neighbouring countries. Concrete results can be obtained concluding negotiations with Switzerland, aimed at full integration of electricity markets, and extending the cooperation with candidate countries. The most important dialogue is with Russia: the existing Partnership for Modernisation³⁹ should be fully implemented and combined with joint projects on energy efficiency and on the development of clean energy technology. Lastly, the Commission suggests negotiating a new agreement, requesting Russia to implement the EU Energy Roadmap 2050.⁴⁰ Russia is indeed a key player in the Baltic region to maintain energy balance: the EU is entering into a technical agreement with Russia and Belarus on the management of electricity networks in the region.

FIGURE 2: EXTENSION OF THE EU ENERGY MARKET TO THE NEIGHBOURHOOD



Source: European Commission (2011).⁴¹

³⁸ *Communication de la Commission au Parlement Européen, au Conseil, au Comité Économique et Social Européen et au Comité des Régions. Priorités en matière d'infrastructures énergétiques pour 2020 et au-delà - Schéma directeur pour un réseau énergétique européen intégré.* COM (2010) 677 final. Available at [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SPLIT_COM:2010:0677\(01\):FIN:EN:PDF](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SPLIT_COM:2010:0677(01):FIN:EN:PDF) (January 2012).

³⁹ Launched at EU-Russia Summit, 1 June 2010.

⁴⁰ Which was published only on the 15 December 2011.

⁴¹ *Key facts and figures on the external dimension of the EU energy policy.* Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2011:1022:FIN:EN:PDF> (January 2012), 1022 final.

The EU's main objective is to deepen the existing dialogues with energy suppliers to ensure stable and secure supplies. In the future, the EU needs to extend dialogue with renewable energy producer countries, thereby easing the achievement of its environmental goals and its objectives on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Extended dialogues should improve the international energy governance and energy efficiency in the medium term. To succeed, the EU should invite the United States, Japan and other industrialized countries to pool efforts, especially in developing low carbon technologies. Dialogue has already improved within the EU-US Energy Council. More effort is needed both in developing low carbon technologies and in enhancing cooperation between US and EU scientific institutions and laboratories; Japan should be included and low carbon technologies should be promoted in China, Brazil, India and South Africa. The reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and pollution level can only be achieved cooperating with industry, which has to participate systematically in the EU dialogues with strategic partners.

FIGURE 3: ENERGY SUPPLIERS OF THE EU




Source: European Commission (2011).⁴²

Protecting the environment implies promoting concrete actions to increase security standards during energy production and transport, first of all in the field of nuclear energy. According to the Commission's proposals, the EU needs to ensure that nuclear power plants in neighbouring countries meet the highest level of nuclear safety. Moreover, cooperating with the IAEA, the Union needs to ensure that the highest nuclear safety standards are made legally binding worldwide. In addition, it needs to review the Euratom agreements to have them covering the issues of nuclear waste, nuclear fuel and nuclear technical and financial cooperation.

⁴² Ibid.

FIGURE 4: NUCLEAR ENERGY AROUND THE EU



Source: European Commission (2011).⁴³

Safety of oil and gas activities is equally important. The Commission suggests the creation of regional offshore regulators, possibly including OPEC, to facilitate the adoption of the highest safety measures concerning hydrocarbon production and transport.

A more coherent approach by the EU and Member States is already bringing benefits in multilateral energy organizations. However, better results can be achieved by improving coordination between external strategies of Member States. For this purpose, the Commission will establish a Strategic Group for International Energy Cooperation, composed of representatives of Member States and relevant EU services. Their job will be supported by regular joint reviews of EU cooperation with third countries on a country or regional basis. The EU will improve cooperation with the International Energy Agency, especially regarding technology cooperation and market analysis, to ensure the EU maintains its leading role in the global energy governance. The EU cooperation projects need to be known and acknowledged in the third countries. Therefore, the post-2013 financial framework should assure that security, sustainability and access to energy programmes will be financed and linked with external relations policy. Adequate information on energy programmes undertaken by the EU with third countries will enable the exchange of best practice and the support of joint energy programmes. The comprehensive system of EU energy partnerships necessarily require differentiation and flexibility to adjust to relations with third countries and international organizations. The table below, published by the Commission in the Communication, summarizes the different types or relations with the EU partners.

⁴³ Ibid.

TABLE 1: A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO ENERGY PARTNERSHIPS

	With our neighbours / market integration partners	With our key energy suppliers and transit countries	With key energy players worldwide	With developing countries
Scope	All issues covered by the EU energy policy	Wide range of issues of common interest such as security of supply/demand, industrial cooperation, trade and investment issues...	Focus on priority issues like research and innovation, low carbon technologies, energy efficiency, standards...	Low emission development strategies, Energy access, policy and regulatory frameworks, promotion of Energy generation and transmission, renewable energy...
Instruments	Energy Community Treaty	Strategic energy dialogues	Ad hoc energy cooperation	Ad hoc energy cooperation
	Instruments under the European Neighbourhood Policy, crisis response instruments, and/or specific partnership and cooperation agreements, covering inter alia energy Energy Charter Treaty		Other applicable instruments	Instruments under the EU development policy and, where relevant, crisis response instruments
	Trade Agreements			

Source: European Commission (2011).⁴⁴

5 CONCLUSIONS

The EU energy policy is based on three objectives: security of supply, competitiveness and sustainability. Since environmental issues are relevant, sustainability has to be understood both in its economic and environmental dimension. These objectives are expensive and sometimes also politically difficult to achieve, but they are easily achievable if the energy policies are highly-integrated, because a common approach facilitates the negotiation with the third countries on energy supplies, take advantage of economies of scale and scope, and prevent individual-country failures (in the sense of market failures). In a period of strong financial crisis also these considerations have to be taken in account. Over the years, the Commission has presented numerous proposals for integrated energy policies in Member States, the majority of which have not been achieved. The strategy of 2007 is important as it laid the foundation for other initiatives, among which the strategy Europe 2020 which is already successful. Not all initiatives have been implemented yet, but at least authorities intend to do so. The Communication *On security of energy supply and international cooperation* included many proposed yet not fulfilled ideas of the 2007 strategy; in addition, it set new goals and provided stakeholders with instrument to achieve them. The review conducted in 2010 of what had been achieved in the previous three years and what remained to be done, drew attention to the sectors in need of enhanced action. The EU is establishing itself as global leader in the struggle against climate change, promoting renewable and

⁴⁴ See *On security of energy supply and international cooperation – The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders*. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52011DC0539:EN:HTML:NOT> (February 2012).

clean energy sources and willing to cooperate with all global players from industrialized to developing countries. The ultimate objective is providing Europe with necessary energy without altering the world environmental balance and without engaging in a world battle to secure the existing energy sources. The medium and long-term success of the strategy remains to be assessed. The reason why some objectives have not yet been implemented is that the Member States sees energy policies as strongly linked to national sovereignty and they are reluctant to loose power in such a strategic sector. The current financial crisis would probably accelerate the process of integration also in the energy sector, because an integrated policy is more cost effective. Moreover, secure supplies at sustainable prices are easily to be achieved if negotiated by the EU as a whole than by the single Member States. Also energy infrastructure and research in the field of renewable energy sources will probably need to be co-financed by communitarian funds. Undoubtedly, the EU has engaged in a forward-looking process, with the hope that its objectives will be fulfilled.

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WHAT DO CRISIS AND THE MILITARY SYSTEM HAVE IN COMMON?

Vladimir PREBILIČ¹

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The cyclical crises in the 20th century, stemming primarily from the economic and financial sector and subsequently spreading into all of the social systems, have also influenced the military subsystem. In such circumstances the military subsystem as a major user of budgetary resources would be under a twofold pressure: the diminishing resources would call for profound or even radical changes of its dimension and quality, while on the other hand the crisis would usually involve an increased security risk, which would in turn involve the increasing demands being imposed on the military system. The Slovenian version of the global economic crisis, which broke out in 2008 as a financial crisis in the USA and Europe, resulted in a radical decrease of budgetary resources intended for the military system, which had been professionalised. One of the first economy interventions of the state involved a reduction of the military budget in the amount of 25 percent. The crisis hinders the stability and especially the development of the military system, and due to their size and lack of flexibility the military systems are not capable to adapt quickly. Nevertheless, in none of the cases can we discern any examples of increased aggressiveness towards the internal public, which demonstrates the traditional loyalty of the army in this space.

Key words: economic crisis, financial crisis, Great Depression, military system, defence spending, Yugoslavia, Slovenia.

1 THEORETICAL GROUNDS

To understand the complex interplay between a global financial crisis, national and international responses to it and the overall implication this has for national defence spending we need to first look at the basic terminology and economic theory. There is no precise definition of “financial crisis,” but a

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common view is that disruptions in financial markets rise to the level of a crisis when the flow of credit to households and businesses is constrained and the real economy of goods and services.² The origins of the financial crisis that started in mid-2007 lie in the mounting losses in subprime mortgage markets which triggered disturbances throughout the international financial system. The subprime crisis triggered a reassessment of financial risk that encompassed other markets, including leveraged loans, takeover financing, credit derivatives and commercial paper. In this changed atmosphere, many market participants became reluctant to extend credit, either because they could not judge the prospective borrower's financial condition with any confidence, or because they were unsure what the assets in their own capital base would bring, should they be forced to liquidate them to cope with unexpected losses.³ This in turn had trickledown effect and heavily impacted the national economies over the next years, with effect still being felt, especially in European countries.

The first wave of global financial crisis in the fall of 2008 was somewhat delayed in Europe, but the effects of the second and third waves have created a perfect economic storm that has upended European finance and politics. These conditions have led to growing unemployment and social unrest, the fall of a number of governments, and increasing pressures to reduce discretionary governmental spending, including for defence and foreign assistance.⁴ Tight fiscal circumstances over the next five years will require cuts in force levels, capabilities, and readiness, as well as deferred procurements, further eroding overall European military capabilities already suffering from two decades of underinvestment. European governments have undertaken major reduction in their structures, and defence spending has been flat or slightly declining over the past two decades.⁵

Economically burdened nations are now compelled to restructure budgets to cope with the current crisis and reflect new fiscal realities. Most countries have opted for a reassessment and subsequent reduction of their defence budget. Defence strategies have been revised, military doctrines supplemented or changed, hot debates were in European governments and parliaments but the outcome was more or less the same: doing less with less. This paper will look at the theory behind defence cuts, how defence cuts are being implemented in the biggest defence spending nations and will conclude with a deeper look at the defence cuts and defence budget situation in Slovenia.

² Mark Jickling. *CRS Report for Congress; Containing Financial Crisis*, 2008. Available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34412_20081124.pdf (November 2012), 2.

³ Mark Jickling. *CRS Report for Congress; Containing Financial Crisis*, 2008. Available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34412_20081124.pdf (November 2012), 3.

⁴ The EU-27 will most probably experience an average annual economic growth rate of 1.5 percent through 2013 with continuing risk of a double-dip recession and weak growth by historical standards through at least 2015. Debt will grow from 80 percent of GDP in 2010 to more than 100 percent of GDP by 2015 without policy changes. On these facts many European countries will face severe macroeconomic imbalances, including large output gaps, high unemployment, wide fiscal deficit, and the need to exit from exceptionally loose monetary policy. Furthermore, demographic trends will result in an increase in the ratio of pensioners to taxpayers what will lead to a sustainability gap. Demands on public resources to support aging populations will decrease GDP growth of the EU-27 from 2.4 percent to 1.7 percent per year through 2020. See Stephen Flanagan et al, *A Diminishing Transatlantic Partnership? The impact of the financial crisis on European defense and foreign assistance capabilities* (Washington D. C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2011), VI.

⁵ Total defense spending among 37 European countries examined has fallen from €251 billion to €218 billion between 2001 and 2009. Per-soldier spending in these countries has increased from above €73 thousand to more than €91 thousand during the same period, with relative shift of spending toward equipment and operations and maintenance and away from personnel and infrastructure. See Stephen Flanagan et al, *A Diminishing Transatlantic Partnership? The impact of the financial crisis on European defense and foreign assistance capabilities* (Washington D. C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2011), VIII.

1.1 Economic theory

However in economic theory there is less agreement whether cutting defence budgets is economically sound for the countries in the long run. Economic Debate in the US suggests that in the short run, cuts in defence spending are likely to have disruptive effects on the U.S. economy. Productive resources—both labour and capital—must shift out of defence-related industries and into nondefense industries. The adjustment costs that this shift entails are likely to restrain economic growth as the defence cuts are implemented. Therefore if anything in the short term defence cuts are expected to have a negative effect on a countries economy.

Economic theory is less clear, however, about the likely long-run consequences of reduced defence spending. The neoclassical macroeconomic model (a simple version of which is presented by Barro)⁶ assumes that all goods and services are produced by the private sector. Rather than hiring labour, accumulating capital, and producing defence services itself, the government simply purchases these services from the private sector. Thus, according to the neoclassical model, the direct effect of a permanent \$1 cut in defence spending acts to decrease the total demand for goods and services in each period by \$1. Of course, so long as the government has access to the same production technologies that are available to the private sector, this prediction of the neoclassical model does not change if instead the government produces the defence services itself.

A permanent \$1 cut in defence spending also reduces the government's need for tax revenue; it implies that taxes can be cut by \$1 in each period. Households, therefore, are wealthier following the cut in defence spending; their permanent income increases by \$1. According to the permanent income hypothesis, this \$1 increase in permanent income induces households to increase their consumption by \$1 in every period, provided that their labour supply does not change. However, the wealth effect of reduced defence spending may also induce households to increase the amount of leisure that they choose to enjoy. If households respond to the increase in wealth by taking more leisure, then the increase in consumption from the wealth effect only amounts to \$ $(1-a)$ per period, where a is a number between zero and one: That is, the increase in wealth is split between an increase in consumption and an increase in leisure. In general, therefore, the wealth effect of a cut in defence spending acts to increase private consumption, and hence total demand, by \$ $(1-a)$ per period.

Economic theory indicates that these defence cuts are likely to restrain economic growth in the short run as productive resources shift out of defence related activities and into nondefense industries. Economic theory is less clear, however, about the long-run consequences of reduced defence spending. Ireland and Otrok⁷ found that models that assume that the Ricardian equivalence theorem holds find that a permanent decrease in defence spending decreases aggregate output in the long run. On the other hand, models that assume that Ricardian equivalence does not apply predict that a permanent decrease in defence spending increases output in the long run, provided that the proceeds from the spending cut are used to reduce the federal debt.

⁶ Robert J. Barro, *Macroeconomics* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1984).

⁷ Peter N. Ireland and Cristopher Otrok, "Forecasting the Effects of Reduced Defense Spending," *FRB Richmond Economic Review*, 78, 6 (1992), 2.

When great budgetary pressure is growing, there is a tendency for the defence debate to be dominated by tribalism that might be manifested in two ways. First, what might be termed as service tribalism or inter-service rivalry, is result of sometimes rather unedifying bargaining process which service has more military competence and therefore should not lose the financial resources.⁸ Such approach leads into competitiveness between military services and can have irreparable consequences for military organization as a whole. With other words, this is a death blow to the esprit de corps and the end of cooperation and interoperability as modern and needed military doctrines for meeting new challenges to peace and security in nowadays world.

The second is represented by campaign tribalism, which embraces not only the demand that current operations should be undertaken seriously, with both the right equipment and the requisite level of political support, but also the idea that these campaigns represent the final, defining moment in the history of strategic thought.⁹ This understanding of modern armies is indirectly questioning the modern military doctrines and strategies: what is a prime goal of national defence systems and where should they be employed to preserve the security of a state? Were governments successful in presenting the importance and role of European forces in Afghanistan? Are the extreme efforts of European soldiers far from the homeland understood and supported by political and national legitimacy? Because of this more and more European militaries are changing into expeditionary forces, light, deployable and manoeuvrable for the needs of the missions but disregarding the constitutional based obligations of military forces – defence of the homeland. That leads to constantly reduced public support to the defence systems and therefore no understanding for defence expenditures needed for safely conducting the obligations while on the missions.

Therefore no taboos in the process of auditing the military system should be present. Every area of it must be carefully examined and value determined. Otherwise the imposition of efficiency savings across the board would be nonsensical and further cuts might reduce rather than enhance the value and efficiency of the system.

1.2 Reducing defence spending

Economically burdened nations of whom many EU members¹⁰ are now compelled to restructure budgets to cope with the current crisis and reflect new fiscal realities. Most countries have opted for a reassessment and subsequent reduction of their defence budgets. Government efforts to stabilize and reinvigorate their national economies raises the question of how these adjustments will affect defence expenditures and the manner in which governments will seek to achieve national and international security goals.¹¹

⁸ Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman, "National Defense in the Age of Austerity," *International Affairs*, 84, 4 (2009), 737–738.

⁹ Ibid., 738.

¹⁰ Given the current economic climate, especially in terms of the consolidation and cleaning up of public finances, as well as a particularly unstable international context, European states should nonetheless feel that it is very much in their interests to 'Europeanise' policies in which the benefits of joint spending has no equivalent in terms of what can be done at the national level. See Fabio Liberti (ed.), *Defense spending in Europe: Can we do better without spending more?* (Paris: Notre Europe, 2011), 9.

¹¹ European countries are today faced with the dilemma of having to shed certain capabilities in order to modernize others. As a result defense catalogues of most European armies look like half-empty bookshelves. This is not just a problem facing small and medium sized countries. Even Britain and France, Europe's strongest military powers, have recognized the fact that no single European state can

When hitting the fact of cutting the defence budget, many questions arise but one is especially hard to answer: shrinking personnel or cutting the equipment costs.¹² Both may have immediate results but they are interlocked and especially in case of personnel would have long lasting consequences.

Most countries, the United States of America as the biggest defence spender included, have opted for budget cuts and scaling down of their defence capabilities. With the US projected defence cuts totalling more than \$450 billion over the next 10 years. Actually, describing it as a cut is a misnomer. The plan actually calls for an *increase* in the national security budget over the next decade – but it would scale back the 18 percent boost previously set for that period. That means Obama's proposed changes will shift such spending less than one percent annually. If approved, the change would be much smaller than the genuine reductions that followed the Korean War (20 percent), the Vietnam War (30 percent) and the Cold War (30 percent).¹³ But some cuts will still have some direct and indirect impacts on national economies. Panetta announced on January 12 that around 7,000 U.S. troops in Europe will be removed – around 9 percent of the total there. Other officials have predicted that the permanent overall size of the Army and the Marines will shrink beyond the 5–8 percent cuts the Pentagon had previously planned. According to industry contractors, the Pentagon has signalled that the slowdowns will mostly affect troubled major weapons programs, such as the Air Force's F35 jet fighters and aerial tankers, the Navy's new aircraft carriers, and the Army's development of a new ground combat vehicle. The Air Force's Global Hawk drone program – which has had major cost overruns and poor reliability – is slated for early termination, but most other cancellations will involve smaller programs. Already a number of major defence projects are being cut or are under serious threat in the US including the F-22, new helicopters, next-generation armoured vehicles and high-technology naval vessels.¹⁴

However this cycle of defence budget reduction seems to be very much driven by the public opinion and less by the actual decrees in the need for defence capabilities as was the case with the defence spending reductions that followed the end of the Cold War. That said some of the defence capabilities that are being cut have been outdated for some time, such as the

afford to buy, develop and operate every category of armament. See Asle Toje, *The EU, NATO and European Defense – A slow train coming* (Paris: European Institute for Security Studies, 2008), 12–13.

¹² Defense equipment is extraordinarily costly because of various reasons: first is the fact, that initial purchase costs must be considered only as the initial ones where the costs of sustainability through the service life shouldn't be disregarded. Second, the biggest savings are made when entire weapon system is removed from service rather than the traditional salami-slicing of all weapon systems. Third, defense should no longer subsidize industry and be forced to accept unnecessary costs and inefficiencies. See Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman, "National Defense in the Age of Austerity," *International Affairs*, 84, 4 (2009), 750–752.

¹³ As Obama made clear in a brief speech while standing with Panetta on January 5, "the growth in the defense budget will slow, but the fact of the matter is this: It will still grow". See Jeffrey R. Smith, *Will Cutting the Defense Budget Leave America at Risk?* *The Atlantic*, 2012. Available at <http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/01/will-cutting-the-defense-budget-leave-america-at-risk/252010/> (November 2012).

¹⁴ Lockheed Martin Corp, the largest U.S. weapons maker, urged Congress to act quickly to avert an additional \$500 billion in defense cuts that would begin in January, warning that uncertainty about the future was dampening investment and hiring across the industry. Lockheed Chief Executive Bob Stevens told the Senate Aerospace Caucus the very threat of the cuts, which would double \$487 billion in cuts already planned for the next decade, was already having a chilling effect on industry. Tom Captain, head of aerospace and defense industry research at Deloitte, said the industry accounted for about 2.2 percent of U.S. gross domestic product and supported more than 3.5 million direct and indirect jobs. Captain said he hoped that educating lawmakers and the public about the consequences of further defense spending cuts would help "cut through the fog" and encourage Congress to take other actions to cut the deficit. See Andrea Shalal, *Lockheed to Congress: Find Cuts Elsewhere*, 2012. Available at <http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/03/15/Lockheed-Find-Cuts-Elsewhere.aspx#page1> (November 2012).

UK Aircraft Carrier Ark Royal that was decommissioned in March of 2011 following the 2012 Strategic Defence and Security Review. Despite the decrease in some countries the total world military expenditure in 2010 reached \$1,630 billion, representing 2.6 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) or \$236 for each person. Spending was 1.3 percent higher in real terms than in 2009 and 50 percent higher than in 2001.¹⁵ Other than in times of war or grave national emergency, it has been usual for the British defence budget to be tightly constrained. At the times of financial crisis, however, the downward pressure on defence spending can become very severe. In the 1930s, the pressure led to the adoption of the "infamous 10-year rule" and in the late 1940s, when the post-war economy was in a parlous state and before the Cold War had begun to drive defence spending upwards, defence struggled hard.¹⁶ The Ministry of Defence has to lay off 54,000 staff by 2015, in an effort to reduce expenditure by £4.1 billion. The Ministry of Defence is in the process of cutting 25,000 armed forces personnel and 29,000 civilian staff by 2015. This will represent of a 10–15 percent real cut in the defence budget over the next six years. On top the MoD could be looking at a reduction of around 20–25 percent in total service personnel numbers by 2019.¹⁷ As such these defence cuts are the biggest since the end of the Cold War.¹⁸ But the more or less steady reduction in the size of the armed forces has been felt disproportionately. For all three services, senior officer positions have not been reduced as were junior commissioned and non-commissioned ranks. The outcome is a significant level of grade inflation, with the result that the cost per individual member of the armed forces has increased since the end of the Cold War. This is no doubt exacerbated by the many allowances and entitlements based partly on rank.¹⁹ Based on that new UK Strategic Defence Review call for 8 percent cuts in defence spending over next four years and then levels off, but further cuts after 2014 are likely. This will reduce the UK possibility of unilateral joint military operations but will retain enough conventional military capability to be the lead coalition nation in a small-scale foreign contingency or make significant contribution to a US and/or NATO-led mission.²⁰ Quite comparable situation is in France. The 2008 French White Paper on defence had already called for sharp reductions in the number of French forces from 270,000 to 225,000 with corresponding budgets cuts over the subsequent six to seven years. The 2011 budget plan calls for a further 3 percent reduction in defence spending through 2013. Paris is committed to being in a position to simultaneously field 30,000 soldiers deployable within 6 months for a period of one year for a major operation, a 5,000-strong reserve on permanent operational alert, and up to 10,000 troops available for territorial defence.²¹ Military personal cuts partly caused by reforms are underway in

¹⁵ Sam Perlo-Freeman et al, *SIPRI Yearbook 2011, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Solna: SIPRI, 2011), 157–159.

¹⁶ Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman, "National Defense in the Age of Austerity," *International Affairs*, 84, 4 (2009), 733.

¹⁷ Malcolm Chalmers, *A Question of Balance? The Deficit and Defence Priorities* (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2010), 10.

¹⁸ The head of the National Audit Office, Amyas Morse, said the MoD needed to adopt a "more targeted approach" to implementing the cuts, adding: "The department has acted decisively, but runs the risk that it will lose skills that it needs, worsening the current skills shortage." See BBC, *Defense spending cuts risk military skills, warns Whitehall watchdog*, 9 February 2012. Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-16950709> (November 2012)).

¹⁹ The number of brigadier equivalent posts has fallen only by 10 percent despite the size of the armed forces falling by 39 percent. See Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman, "National Defense in the Age of Austerity," *International Affairs*, 84, 4 (2009), 746–747.

²⁰ The UK is committed to maintaining a self-supporting brigade-sized force (6,500) capable of being deployed anywhere in the world and sustained indefinitely. See Stephen Flanagan et al, *A Diminishing Transatlantic Partnership? The impact of the financial crisis on European defense and foreign assistance capabilities* (Washington D. C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2011), VIII.

²¹ *Ibid.*, VIII.

Germany. A major reform effort to abolish conscription and cut troop levels from 250,000 to 180,000 once appeared to be on track to provide a promising example for other European countries with similar force structures. However, the difficulties of pursuing a comprehensive force overhaul in times of financial distress are becoming more and more apparent. The reforms efforts may be at risk and while they could enhance overall readiness and effectiveness of the Bundeswehr, a number of acquisition cuts will further constrain capabilities for high-end operations. The percentage of German forces that are deployable and sustainable is quite low compared to other NATO countries, but there is some support for increasing the number of rapidly deployable, high-quality forces for expeditionary mission from 7,000 to 10,000 or 15,000.²²

2 CRISIS AND THE MILITARY IN THE KINGDOM OF YUGOSLAVIA 1929–1938

The "Great Depression", following the Wall Street "Black Friday", also engulfed Europe as early as in 1929.²³ Kingdom of Yugoslavia was seriously affected by the crisis a year later and in 1931 the situation has been exacerbated. Imposed restrictive measures are necessary.²⁴ Simultaneously, since 1931, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes shared a profound internal instability with the other countries of the European southeast. The parliamentary system and national authorities were weak and unstable due to the dispute between Croat's and Serb's political elites, far exceeding the mere political aspects. The King as the sovereign made a bold and risky move: with a soft coup he took over the control of the parliamentary system, appointed a man he trusted as the Prime Minister, amended the constitution and outlawed the "tribal" national parties.²⁵ This did not allow the state to avoid the economic crisis. Production dwindled and then the crisis spread to agriculture, which represented the most vital part of the Yugoslav economy.²⁶

During this crisis the Army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was forced to come to terms with a programme of saving after the recession had resulted in the reduction of budgetary resources in the beginning of the 1930s. When preparing the budget for the year 1933, the Parliament on 20th September 1932 passed a law reducing income from all state employees, including officers, reduced earnings by 20 percent.

The new legislation on the structure of the Army was implemented at the same time as the changes in the constitutional and political life. The King as the supreme commander sought to modernise the Army as soon as he had taken over the power. The task was to be carried out by general Milan Nedić, who was prevented from doing so because of the resource shortage and the resistance of the other generals, especially the group led by the guard division commander, general Petar Živković. Only urgent changes in the formation development were made. However, the basic infantry formation

²² Ibid., IX.

²³ Mark Jickling. *CRS Report for Congress; Containing Financial Crisis*, 2008. Available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34412_20081124.pdf (November 2012).

²⁴ Neven Borak et al, *Slovenska novejša zgodovina 1848–1992; Od programa Zedinjena Slovenija do mednarodnega priznanja Republike Slovenije: 1848–1992* (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2005), 473–474.

²⁵ Ibid., 321–327.

²⁶ Miloš Vučković, *Uticaj svjetske privredne krize 1929–1932 na privredu stare Jugoslavije* (Beograd: SANU, Balkanološki inštitut, 1976), 197–227; Žarko Lazarević, *Kmečki dolgovi na Slovenskem: socialno-ekonomski vidiki zadolženosti slovenskih kmetov 1848–1948* (Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče, 1994), 44.

was not modernised. Divisions as the basic military formations still consisted of up to 40,000 troops, and their expected concentration in the event of mobilisation took 30 days. The transformation of the divisions into more mobile units fell through in 1935, also due to the inability to procure a significant number of motor vehicles.²⁷ Until 1941 these formations were reduced to a size of 27,000 to 28,500 men, while their concentration now took 12 days. Around 50 percent of all servicemen were in the infantry. During peacetime 57 infantry, 10 cavalry, 38 artillery and 7 special regiments were deployed at 16 division areas, and these operated in 5 army areas.

However, the circumstances resulting from the Great Depression were a decisive factor. The Yugoslav state budget was reduced drastically. Consequently the military budget, otherwise amounting to approximately 25 percent of the total budget, was also reduced. The effects of reduced budget were short and longer term. Military procurement – in terms of frequency as well as quality – was also reduced. The purchase of uniforms was reduced and the diet of soldiers was introduced one vegetarian day a week. One of the most evident measures was a significantly smaller number of drafted recruits (by as much as 30 percent) in the years from 1932 to 1934. Even later the military authorities would often send the servicemen for lengthy leaves.²⁸

The professional part of the Army, especially the officer corps, did not suffer severely because of the crisis. In 1931 it amounted to around 14,500 people, 6,741 of whom were officers. The mass retirement of more than 40 generals and 80 senior officers in the spring of 1929 was not caused by the crisis. Instead the King wanted to ensure the loyalty of the generals and the officer staff. He saw the Army as a means of supporting his regime, but according to his own assurances he did not want to politicise it or involve it into politics.²⁹ Professional officers and non-commissioned officers were forbidden from being politically active in any political parties or "tribal organisations". However, this could not prevent them from having contacts with individual political groups, or even from being part of the forbidden and thus illegal Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Examples of radicalisation and even communist ideas appeared among the officers. Between 15 and 17 April 1932 a group of younger officers attempted to overthrow the Maribor garrison, but failed. Ten officers were arrested, one officer committed suicide, and another was sentenced to death and executed. The "Maribor Rebellion" was the "worst form of undermining the military discipline" throughout the state's existence.

In October 1934, still in the middle of the Great Depression, King Alexander was assassinated in Marseilles. After his death the military reforms kept failing one after the other, not only because of the economy but also due to the resistance of the traditionalist decision-makers among the generals. General Petar Živković, who also became the Minister of the Military and Navy from 1934 to 1936, re-established himself once again as a guarantor of the Army's unity as well as its traditionalism.³⁰ At the same time the state had to be prepared for potential military operations. The question of the defence against Italy was at the forefront. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia only had one

²⁷ Mile Bjelajac, *Vojska kraljevine SHS/Jugoslavije 1922–1935* (Beograd: INIS, 1994), 83.

²⁸ Ibid., 81–89. According to the National Health Service data it was 45 percent of recruiters insufficiently developed for military service. See also Neven Borak et al, *Slovenska novejša zgodovina 1848–1992: Od programa Zedinjena Slovenija do mednarodnega priznanja Republike Slovenije: 1848–1992* (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2005), 479.

²⁹ Mile Bjelajac, *Vojska kraljevine SHS/Jugoslavije 1922–1935* (Beograd: INIS, 1994), 134–147.

³⁰ Ibid., 171–172 and 181.

superior neighbour, hostile throughout its existence. Exactly during the economic crisis it managed to ensure somewhat less strained relations with Italy, but only for a short period between 1932 and 1934. This military-political situation resulted in the defence doctrine of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. However, already in the 1920s it had protected itself from other less dangerous opposing states (Hungary, Bulgaria) by entering into a military pact called *Little Entente* (with Czechoslovakia and Romania) and military alliance with Turkey and Greece called the *Pact of Balkan Agreement*.³¹ Therefore its doctrine was traditionally based on the offence. The same goes for its military operative plans, which, however, were simultaneously based on the presumed defence against Italy. In 1932, in order to improve the defence from the Kingdom of Italy, it decided to construct fortified defence lines just behind the borders in accordance with the European trends at the time. The first analyses and preparations for the fortification of the so-called "Western Front", a defence line from the Karavanke mountain range to the Kvarner Bay, date back to as early as 1926, but the final decision on the construction was adopted by the Yugoslav Army general headquarters in 1935. The construction of the fortified line was only possible when the state got a loan of 5 billion dinars from France, since regular budgetary resources were insufficient.³² The military budget for 1935 is to reach the sum of 1,666 billion dinars and 513 million dinars in the extraordinary expenses.³³ Thus the state political interests resulted in focused investment of additional resources and additional state borrowing.

3 CRISIS AND THE MILITARY IN THE SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA 1979–1991

In the end of the 1970s Yugoslavia found itself in a crisis caused by external aspects (Second Oil Crisis, increasing prices of oil, and more expensive loans) and especially by the internal factors (inefficient system of "agreed economy", ineffective investment in industrial capabilities and social infrastructure). Yugoslavia had engaged in a period of cheap credit in the years 1974–1978 by about \$14 billion in order to achieve faster economic development. The burden of credit return it soon became too heavy. In 1979, the International Monetary fund called on Yugoslavia to implement the program, which will be to ensure financial stability, only under these conditions is intended to support the rescheduling of loans, which at that time, with interest, amounted to about \$20 billion. The initial economic crisis swiftly turned into a social and political crisis,³⁴ especially because the system crisis coincided with the change of generations in the very rigid state authority structure. The death of the charismatic historical leader Josip Broz Tito also had a detrimental effect on the military structures.³⁵

³¹ Damijan Guštin and Vladimir Prebilič, "Strategic military (mis)planning in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 1918–1941," in *Strategic planning for war*, ed. Tomaž Kladnik (Ljubljana: General Staff of Slovenian Army; PDRIU, Military Museum, Defensor, 2008), 38–52.

³² Zvezdan Marković, *Vojska Kraljevine Jugoslavije in utrjevanje zahodne meje na Slovenskem 1937–1941, Diploma paper* (Ljubljana: Faculty of Arts, 1995), 102–112; Velimir Terzić, *Slom Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1941. Uzroci i posledice poraza* (Beograd, 1983), 151–156. 40 companies and 52 battalions worked on the fortification. In 1939 this meant 30,000 and in 1940 even 60,000 labourers.

³³ *La Yugoslavie d'aujourd'hui* (Belgrade: Publie par le Section de la presse au Ministere des affaires etrangeres, 1935), 170.

³⁴ Neven Borak et al, *Slovenska novejša zgodovina 1848–1992; Od programa Zedinjena Slovenija do mednarodnega priznanja Republike Slovenije: 1848–1992* (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2005), 1151–1153.

³⁵ Neven Borak et al, *Slovenska novejša zgodovina 1848–1992; Od programa Zedinjena Slovenija do mednarodnega priznanja Republike Slovenije: 1848–1992* (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2005), 1148–1150; see also Dušan Bilandžić, *Jugoslavija poslije Tita* (Zagreb: Globus, 1986), 84–90.

For the Yugoslav People's Army the crisis mostly implied a reduction of budgetary resources for the Army, allocated from the federal budget, as well as for the Territorial Defence (another component of the armed forces), also financed from the budgets of the republics and municipalities amounting to 0.5 percent of GDP. Initially the Army attempted to make up for the budgetary resource shortage by seeking internal resources – partly by increasing self-supply (economy, farms, land holdings), and largely by increased sales of weapons and military equipment to the other non-aligned states.

In the late 1970s the military structures acquired relative independence, also reflected in the automatic allocation of a guaranteed percentage of budgetary resources. The weakness of the supreme command contributed significantly to this independence, since the collective presidency succeeding Tito as the supreme commander could not force its authority upon the generals. The important role of the Army was also strengthened by the geopolitical situation of the state – the existence of Yugoslavia outside of both Pacts, reaching the Yugoslav borders, making the defensive readiness of the state very important. However, the 1981 uprising in Kosovo, finally stifled by a Yugoslav People's Army intervention, called for a different orientation of the military structures, forced to also focus on the "internal enemy". The weapons of the Territorial Defence of Kosovo (a section of the armed forces) were confiscated, and Albanian recruits became suspicious in advance.³⁶

In 1982 the military leadership started altering the strategic concept of the state's defence. However, the system of the total national defence was preserved. A concept of defending the vital strategic directions – or theatres of operations – was drawn up, and at the operative level the Territorial Defence was subordinated to the Yugoslav People's Army to a greater degree than before. Defence now focused on the western part of the state, against the NATO. The reorganisation of the Yugoslav People's Army into several army areas corresponded to the new deployment. At the same time the number of armed soldiers was reduced. However, since the political elites of the republics opposed this, most resolutely in the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, the reorganisation was only carried out as late as in 1987. The republics especially resisted the reorganisation due to the position of the Territorial Defence, changed with this reform.³⁷

Furthermore, the Army had to face the increasingly tense relations within the leading political circles, mostly divided according to their adherence to the republics, to reformists or supporters of the return to classic socialism. Due to these conflicts as well as because of the actions of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia during its internal disputes and the standpoints of the Yugoslav People's Army leadership in the conflicts between the republics, the Yugoslav People's Army, which had previously ensured the state integrity, now gradually became a party in the political clashes. Already in the early 1980s the Yugoslav People's Army opted for an internal intervention should the regime or the state be threatened.³⁸ First the Yugoslav People's Army leadership had to face the Slovenian political elite, which tried to preserve its own autonomy and the republic's state-political

³⁶ Viktor Meier, *Zakaj je razpadla Jugoslavija* (Ljubljana: Sophia, 1996), 20–24; Branko Mamula, *Slučaj Jugoslavija* (Podgorica: CID, 2000), 11–53.

³⁷ Branko Mamula, *Slučaj Jugoslavija* (Podgorica: CID, 2000), 60–75 and 88–89; Martin Špegelj, *Sjećanja vojnika* (Zagreb: Znanje, 2001), 71–93.

³⁸ Viktor Meier, *Zakaj je razpadla Jugoslavija* (Ljubljana: Sophia, 1996), 68–69; Branko Mamula, *Slučaj Jugoslavija* (Podgorica: CID, 2000), 51 and 89; Jože Pirjevec, *Jugoslavija: nastanek, razvoj ter razpad Karadževićeve in Titove Jugoslavije* (Koper: Založba Lipa, 1995) 384.

autonomy by reforming the socialist regime. As it was, the dominant centralist approaches to putting an end to the crisis kept pushing Slovenia into a corner. The relations between Slovenia and the Yugoslav People's Army were also strained due to the disputes with regard to the concept of military doctrine reform and the diminishing role of the Territorial Defence. Despite the fact that the majority of the generals did not support the Serbian nationalism, they sought and gradually found an ally in it due to common interests. "The idea of a single centralist Yugoslavia, controlled by the Serbs, also suited the ideas of most generals".³⁹ Since the Slovenian political leadership tolerated (or even encouraged) the public discussion of these problems, after almost twenty years the military was also criticised publicly. Not used to public discussion, the military saw the criticism as "attacks against the Yugoslav People's Army" and required the prosecution of authors of critical articles.⁴⁰

The military leadership was very touchy in its reactions to any proposals for political solutions outside of the official system. Within its ranks the Yugoslav People's Army adhered to a stricter version of Yugoslav socialism (communism) and doctrine of consistent Yugoslavism through "brotherhood and unity". Its primary purpose until as late as 1990 was to use its authority to preserve the existing political system and federal state. Non-communist political groups were seen and treated as the "internal enemy". However, problems kept increasing with the unsteady progression of the democratisation process, until in the spring of 1991 these political parties finally won the democratic elections in Slovenia and Croatia, thus taking over the power.⁴¹

Consequently the military structures became directly involved in the political struggle within the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the disputes between the political leaderships of individual republics with regard to political, economic and social system reforms, and adopted a completely negative attitude towards the nascent democratic alternative. Thus they became either the target or the sought-after ally in the on-going political struggles. Since the spring of 1988,⁴² when this attitude was demonstrated publicly, and until the dissolution of the state, the Army changed from an important part of the state system to, above all, a strong and important participant in the political conflicts. At the same time it was susceptible to the economic crisis as it was heavily dependent on the state budget. Some republics, including Slovenia, resorted to the only option they had to oppose the Army as the main budget user: they refused to confirm the federal

³⁹ Viktor Meier, *Zakaj je razpadla Jugoslavija* (Ljubljana: Sophia, 1996), 96.

⁴⁰ Igor Ž. Žagar and Peter Tancig, "Napadi na JLA: kdaj, kje, kako – in če sploh. Prvi del, "Časopis za kritiko znanosti, (1988); Igor Ž. Žagar and Peter Tancig, "ZSMS in napadi na JLA - vsestransko neuspelo srečanje" in *Kompendij za bivše in bodoče politike ali Popotovanje od Krškega do Portoroža*, ed. Ingrid Bakše (Ljubljana: RK ZSMS, 1989), 211–219.

⁴¹ Neven Borak et al, *Slovenska novejša zgodovina 1848–1992; Od programa Zedinjena Slovenija do mednarodnega priznanja Republike Slovenije: 1848–1992* (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2005), 1283–1284.

⁴² The open conflict between the leadership of the Yugoslav People's Army and the Slovenian political leadership broke out in March 1988. At the military council session on 25 March the generals accused Slovenia that due to the passivity of its leadership the so-called counter-revolution had been allowed to develop there, which could result in a military intervention. The Slovenian political leadership opposed such accusations sharply and reproached the Army indirectly with tendencies to carry out a military coup. Because the military leadership was unable to secure the support for an actual intervention with the indecisive Yugoslav Party elite, which otherwise opposed the Slovenian reformism, in the spring and the summer of 1988 the security structures of the Yugoslav People's Army tried a non-commissioned officer and three civilians, accusing them of revealing military secrets. The reaction of the nascent Slovenian civil society was forceful, and the protest was supported by around 100,000 people. The rigidity of the military structures offended the national feelings of the general Slovenian population, which resulted in a swift formation of the political opposition and radical standpoints of the Slovenian population, seeking the solutions for the crisis outside Yugoslavia.

budget. After considerable and prolonged efforts of the federal structures even Slovenia agreed to a new way of financing the Army, thereby losing the option of influencing its basic financing directly. The rekindled Albanian unrest in Kosovo in February 1989 called for another intervention by the Yugoslav People's Army. Even more importantly, due to the involvement in this problem the military leadership and the Serbian political authorities led by Slobodan Milošević became increasingly connected. Similarly the Yugoslav People's Army also wanted to intervene when the Republic of Slovenia adopted certain constitutional amendments in 1989.⁴³

In the following months the Army had to withdraw somewhat. It was forced to take part in the new government of the reformist Ante Marković, since this was the only way to ensure its continued social and economic positions and privileges, even if somewhat reduced in scope. However, intimately it never came to terms with the political situation in Slovenia and Croatia, where new political parties were at the helm. The problem of depoliticising the Army, undertaken by the new leaders of these two republics, may have been acknowledged by the generals in principle, but even after the actual dissolution of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in January 1990 they did nothing to solve it.⁴⁴ The other goal of both republics – namely, the development of Yugoslavia into a confederation or the formation of independent states – contributed to the situation. The Army leadership refused to take any part in these options or in the possibility to establish the armed forces of both republics. Meanwhile, its threats contributed to Slovenia and Croatia making a priority of developing their own defence forces by combining their security, police and military forces, which was even legal in the context of the total national defence system through a flexible legal interpretation of the defence and security legislation.⁴⁵

The final period from the end of 1990 to the announced attainment of the Slovenian and Croatian independence in June 1991 was marked by the possibility of the generals themselves taking over the power in Yugoslavia, either through a softer or more radical coup, and by the search for political solutions to the state-wide crisis, heading towards an armed internal conflict more and more openly. In January the military leadership attempted to exert pressure against the Slovenian and Croatian leadership by stopping the establishment of their autonomous military formations and demanding the surrender of weapons and dissolution of "paramilitary formations", especially the military units of the Republic of Croatia. In March of 1991, after putting an end to the demonstrations of the Serbian opposition by acting openly and deploying tanks, the generals of the Yugoslav People's Army tried to make the presidency of Yugoslavia declare a state of emergency – a soft version of a coup d'état. But without the support of the State Presidency Army did not intervene. It only intervened after the Slovenian and Croatian independence had been declared in June 25th of 1991, and even then in a limited extent and unprofessionally.⁴⁶

⁴³ Viktor Meier, *Zakaj je razpadla Jugoslavija* (Ljubljana: Sophia, 1996), 175; Raif Dizdarević, S. Bianchini and Aziz Hadžihasanović, *Od smrti Tita do smrti Jugoslavije: svjedočenja* (Sarajevo: OKO, 1999), 235–274.

⁴⁴ Viktor Meier, *Zakaj je razpadla Jugoslavija* (Ljubljana: Sophia, 1996), 157–212; Martin Špegelj, *Sjećanja vojnika* (Zagreb: Znanje, 2001), 97–99 and 110–112.

⁴⁵ Janez Janša, *Premiki: nastajanje in obramba slovenske države 1988–1992* (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 1992), 35–46; Martin Špegelj, *Sjećanja vojnika* (Zagreb: Znanje, 2001), 119–158 and 192–194.

⁴⁶ Neven Borak et al, *Slovenska novejša zgodovina 1848–1992; Od programa Zedinjena Slovenija do mednarodnega priznanja Republike Slovenije: 1848–1992* (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2005), 1315–1320.

4 ECONOMIC CRISIS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEFENCE BUDGET OF SLOVENIA, 2008–2012

The global economic crisis, which started in 2008 as a financial crisis in the USA and in Europe, also manifested itself in the Republic of Slovenia soon thereafter. The onset of the crisis took place in time for the elections and consequently the change of government in the autumn of 2008. In the years preceding the outbreak of the crisis the defence system had drawn up a development-oriented vision of the future of the military sector, characterised by the recent introduction of the professional army in 2004 and the ambitious program of its outfitting.

With a defence budget of only €536 million, Slovenia is one of the minnows in Europe, easily outspent by all of its neighbours. Moreover, the global crisis has forced the Slovenian Ministry of Defence (MNSD) to make drastic cuts to the annual defence spending planned in its 'Mid-Term Defence Plan' (MTDP) for 2007–2012. Although the defence budget increased by an annual average of 9.2 percent over the period 2001–2008, 2009 and 2010 saw successive sharp cuts as the economic downturn deepened. Slovenia has been growing further away from meeting the NATO requirement of spending 2 percent of GDP on defence before 2014, with defence spending coming in at only 1.52 percent of GDP in 2009 and falling to 1.47 percent in 2010, despite falling GDP growth. Frequent spending cuts have mainly hit procurement. In late July 2011, the Slovenian government has proposed a further seven percent cut to the national defence budget under draft plans submitted to the country's parliament. The government had already approved a reduced budget for 2011. If this additional cut is accepted, defence spending will have fallen by €95.5 million or 20 percent compared with 2010, Slovenian Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials told Jane's. This would represent a figure of €412.3 million for 2011. According to the final draft supplementary budget, defence expenditure would represent 1.32 percent of GDP in 2011.⁴⁷

Under the Mid-Term Defence Plan (MTDP), defence expenditures were originally planned to reach 2 percent of GDP in 2009. However, a combination of higher than expected economic growth in 2006 and 2007 and parliamentary cuts to the spending plan means that this target was not reached. Defence spending grew by just 5.36 percent in 2009, significantly lower than the 2001–2008 average of 9.2 percent, and shrank by nearly 20 percent in 2010.⁴⁸ Following Slovenia's NATO accession in 2004, Slovenian defence spending has been directed predominantly towards programs related to its transformation away from a conscript-heavy force to a fully professional NATO-compatible service. The key planning document is the MTDP for 2007–2012, which has emphasized force restructuring and improved mobility and sustainability. The most significant trends under the MTDP were: normalization of procurement spending to bring it under the main budget; a stabilizing of personnel costs at around €210 million; and a major increase in operational funds, which were to be more than doubled

⁴⁷ Sentinel Security Assessment – The Balkans. *Defence Budget (Slovenia)*, August 2011. Available at <http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Sentinel-Security-Assessment-The-Balkans/Defence-budget-Slovenia.html> (November 2012).

⁴⁸ Sentinel Security Assessment – The Balkans. *Defence Budget (Slovenia)*, August 2011. Available at <http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Sentinel-Security-Assessment-The-Balkans/Defence-budget-Slovenia.html> (November 2012).

from €70 million in 2005 to €180 million by 2010.⁴⁹ However, since the MTDP was released, the increase in operational funds appears to have been scrapped, with Major General Alojz Steiner announcing in May 2009 that the army would have to cope with a cut of 19 percent to its operational budget. It seems likely that the number of battalions will be reduced. Efforts are also underway to bring procurement spending under the main budget. Recent ministry activity includes the purchase of new combat vehicles for €438 million; stabilizing personnel costs at around €210 million; and increasing funds for operations from €70 million in 2005 to €180 million by 2010. The mid-term Defence Plan for 2007–2012 initially anticipated defence expenditures reaching 2 percent of Slovenia's GDP by 2009; however, Slovenia will unlikely be able to achieve this mark before 2014. To reach that level of spending, the defence budget would have to be increased by between 8 and 16 percent over that period.⁵⁰

The economic downturn has compelled the Slovenian Defence Ministry to make draconian reductions in defence spending. In March 2009, as the economic crisis worsened Defence Minister Ljubica Jelušič announced that the defence budget would be further cut and would only grow by 5.36 percent compared to 2008. In April 2010, a new national Security Strategy was adopted, but in light of the current financial situation, the implementation of its ambitions seems unlikely. By 2015, Slovenia wants to be able to field up to 750–1,000 troops for one year. Besides downsizing, the main axes of reforms are to achieve an all-professional force and to modernize equipment through increased defence spending with increased investment. Capability priorities are C2, deploy ability, mobility, combat effectiveness, sustainability and survivability. Recent ministry activity includes the purchase of new combat vehicles for €438 million; stabilizing personnel costs at around €210 million; and increasing funds for operations from €70 million in 2005 to €180 million by 2010.⁵¹

FIGURE 1: MILITARY EXPENDITURE OF SLOVENIA

Convention:

US\$ m. = Million US dollars; . . = Data not available or not applicable, () = Uncertain figure, [] = SIPRI estimate.
th. = thousand; m. = million; b. = billion

Military expenditure figures in local currency is presented according to the financial year of the country in question. Figures in constant US dollars and as a share of GDP are presented by calendar year.

Military expenditure of Slovenia																								
		In local currency (m. euros)																						
		Start of financial year: January																						
Year	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	
Value	[95.5]	[109]	[128]	166	186	194	209	208	207	275	328	360	396	413	485	506	566	571	578	
		In constant (2009) US\$ m.																						
Year	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	
Value	[530]	[455]	[442]	504	517	496	495	466	424	520	577	601	637	650	744	749	793	792	788	
		As percentage of gross domestic product																						
Year	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	
Value	[2.2]	[1.8]	[1.7]	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.6		

Source: Sam Perlo-Freeman et al, SIPRI Yearbook 2011, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Solna: SIPRI, 2011).

⁴⁹ Vladimir Prebilič, "Von der Staatsgründung bis zur EU- und NATO-Mitgliedschaft: permanente Reformierung der slowenischen Streitkräfte?", in *Strategische Wende - Technologische Wende: die Transformation der Streitkräfte am Übergang zum 21. Jahrhundert*, eds. Rudolf Jaun and Michael Olsansky (Zürich: Militärakademie and der ETH, 2008), 32.

⁵⁰ Sentinel Security Assessment – The Balkans. *Defence Budget (Slovenia)*, August 2011. Available at <http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Sentinel-Security-Assessment-The-Balkans/Defence-budget-Slovenia.html> (November 2012).

⁵¹ Ministry of Defence. *Annual Report for 2010*, Ministry of Defence, 2011. Available at http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/LP_MO_2010.pdf (November 2012), 59-64.

Due to the victory of the right-middle coalition at the early elections of December 2011 the Minister of Defence was also replaced. The first measure undertaken by the new Minister was finding new possibilities for defence budget cuts and internal rationalisation. Consequently in March 2012 the new staff plan of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia came into force, providing for the decrease of the number of employees in the administrative part of the Ministry from 1,378 in 2008 to 1,265 until the end of 2012. To date the number of employees in this sector of the Ministry has been reduced by 60. The reduction of the members of the Slovenian Army has not been envisioned in this plan, meaning that this number will also remain at the level of 7,600 people in the future.⁵² The new Minister of Defence mostly sees reserves in the income received by the Ministry employees, since these already represent as much as 63 percent of the budget.⁵³ Savings in the field of defence will also be urgent in the future. Therefore resources in the amount of only €440 million are foreseen for the year 2012 after the budget revision, representing 1.24 percent of gross domestic product. The real decrease in gross domestic product in the same year by more than one percent should also be taken into account. This seriously affects the Slovenian Army staff's level of fighting morale and motivation already achieved, since the expenses for the equipment (which is a result of the new weapons systems purchased due to the tasks in the context of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance) have increased fourfold, while the salaries have remained the same for several years. Consequently a soldier's average monthly salary amounts to as little as €700 per month and most members of the Slovenian Army see participation in the missions where their salaries increase to €3,300 as a great opportunity.⁵⁴ Naturally, however, the participation in the missions cannot and should not be the only motive to seek employment in the Slovenian Army, since according to the Constitution the primary mission of the defence forces is to ensure security and defence of the state, especially in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia.

5 CONCLUSION OR WHAT DO DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC CRISIS HAVE IN COMMON?

In fact, there is no official or even widely-accepted criterion for distinguishing between a recession and a depression. In the United States, a recession is officially defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (a committee comprised largely of academic economists)⁵⁵ as a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales. As such, recession represents a period of general economic decline; typically defined as a decline in GDP for

⁵² Ministry of Defence. *With the implementation of the organisational and staff changes of the administrative part the reorganisation of the Ministry of Defence was complete*, Ministry of Defence, March 2012. Available at http://www.mo.gov.si/nc/si/medijsko_sredisce/novica/article/12029/5751/ (November 2012).

⁵³ J. S. S., Delo.si. *Hojs: the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia could save by reducing the salaries*, Delo, March 2012. Available at <http://delo.si/novice/politika/hojs-na-mors-bi-lahko-privarcevali-z-znizanjem-plac.html> (November 2012).

⁵⁴ Jana Zupančič. *Vojsko menda še vedno potrebujemo*, Nedelo, 22 April 2012. Available at <http://www.delo.si/novice/varcevalni-ukrepi/vojsko-menda-se-vedno-potrebujemo.html> (November 2012).

⁵⁵ The Business Cycle Dating Committee at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) provides a better way to find out if there is a recession is taking place. This committee determines the amount of business activity in the economy by looking at things like employment, industrial production, real income and wholesale-retail sales. They define a recession as the time when business activity has reached its peak and starts to fall until the time when business activity bottoms out. When the business activity starts to rise again it is called an expansionary period. By this definition, the average recession lasts about a year.

two or more consecutive quarters.⁵⁶ A recession is typically accompanied by a drop in the stock market, an increase in unemployment, and a decline in the housing market. A recession is generally considered less severe than a depression, and if a recession continues long enough it is often then classified as a depression. There is no one obvious cause of a recession, although overall blame generally falls on the federal leadership, often either the President himself, the head of the Federal Reserve, or the entire administration. A recession begins just after the economy reaches a peak of activity and ends as the economy reaches its trough. Between trough and peak, the economy is in an expansion. Expansion is the normal state of the economy; most recessions are brief and they have been rare in recent decades. The start and end dates are determined by the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). It is a popular misconception that a recession is indicated simply by two consecutive quarters of declining GDP, which is true for most, but not all recession. NBER uses monthly data to date the start and ending months of recessions.

Before the Great Depression of the 1930s any downturn in economic activity was referred to as a depression. The term recession was developed in this period to differentiate periods like the 1930s from smaller economic declines that occurred in 1910 and 1913. This leads to the simple definition of a depression as a recession that lasts longer and has a larger decline in business activity. Depression therefore represents the lowest point in an economic cycle characterized by (1) reduced purchasing power, (2) mass unemployment, (3) excess of supply over demand, (4) falling prices, or prices rising slower than usual, (5) falling wages, or wages rising slower than usual, and (6) general lack of confidence in the future. Also called a slump, a depression causes a drop in all economic activity. Major depressions may continue for several years, such as the great depression (1930–1940) that had worldwide impact.

So how can we tell the difference between a recession and a depression? A good rule of thumb for determining the difference between a recession and a depression is to look at the changes in GNP. A depression is any economic downturn where real GDP declines by more than 10 percent. A recession is an economic downturn that is less severe.

There is a very old joke which says a recession is when your neighbour loses his job, a depression is when you lose yours. This plays to the widely accepted contemporary belief that a depression is simply a particularly severe recession. By this yardstick, the last depression in the United States was from May 1937 to June 1938, where real GDP declined by 18.2 percent. If we use this method then the Great Depression of the 1930s can be seen as two separate events: an incredibly severe depression lasting from August 1929 to March 1933 where real GDP declined by almost 33 percent, a period of recovery, then another less severe depression of 1937–1938. The United States hasn't had anything even close to a depression in the post-war period. The worst recession in the last 60 years was from November 1973 to March 1975, where real GDP fell by 4.9 percent. Countries such as Finland and

⁵⁶ In the UK recessions are generally defined as 2 successive quarters of negative growth (or 6 months). In time, the other rules of thumb were forgotten. Some economists prefer a definition of a 1.5 percent rise in unemployment within 12 months. This definition is unpopular with most economists for two main reasons. First, this definition does not take into consideration changes in other variables. For example this definition ignores any changes in the unemployment rate or consumer confidence. Second, by using quarterly data this definition makes it difficult to pinpoint when a recession begins or ends. This means that a recession that lasts ten months or less may go undetected.

Indonesia have suffered depressions in recent memory using this definition. Nevertheless, there are two criteria for distinguishing a depression from a recession a depression is either a decline in real GDP of more than 10 percent, or a contraction in real GDP which lasts more than three, or four, years.⁵⁷

But when discussing the recession and/or depression, certain other facts have to be highlighted though. Especially changes in the societies where psychological and confidence aspects are often neglected. For example, if the expectation develops that economic activity will slow; firms may decide to reduce employment levels and save money rather than invest. Such expectations can create a self-reinforcing downward cycle, bringing about or worsening a recession. Consumer confidence is one measure used to evaluate economic sentiment. The term animal spirits has been used to describe the psychological factors underlying economic activity. Economist Robert J. Shiller "...refers also to the sense of trust we have in each other, our sense of fairness in economic dealings, and our sense of the extent of corruption and bad faith. When animal spirits are on ebb, consumers do not want to spend and businesses do not want to make capital expenditures or hire people".⁵⁸ The recession and/or depression are tightly connected to the values that might be eroded, challenged and also changed. The deepening social gap may expose these things even more and social cohesion that enables the existence of each and every society is fading away. So, in extreme situation the members of such societies are losing the trust in state and its institutions what decrease the legitimacy of the elected representatives. And it is very appropriate to pose the question: which are the most important pillars of modern state and which embodied the national identity as the backbone of the nation? There are several sectors of the state and defence and within the military in definitely one of them.

In theoretical terms, military identity is closely related to the notion of military tradition and is subordinated to the concept of national identity in terms of its contents. Hence, in order to understand it, the definition of national identity ought to be stressed: "... , which is composed of similarities and differences, is a manner in which individuals or collectivities differ in comparison to other individuals or collectivities".⁵⁹ When speaking of national identity, we thus refer to the sum of the factors that determine the array of similarities and differences that is unique, irreplaceable and inalienable. National identity is the core of a nation, its essence and the sense of its existence. Since one can agree with the fact that most of the nations have in their historical development become nation-states and have therefore set up their own and internationally recognized state formations, it makes perfect sense to understand military identity as tied to the national one. A military system represents the rampart of a nation's existence; hence a military identity has a specific relationship with a national identity. National identity is a heightened and materialized essential component of otherwise broader national awareness.⁶⁰ The latter is formed during longer historical periods, offers the ability of identification to individuals and social groups and is inseparably interrelated with a territory inhabited by a certain nation. It is exactly the

⁵⁷ Saul Eslake. *What is the difference between a recession and a depression?*, 23 November 2008. Available at <http://clubtroppo.com.au/2008/11/23/what-is-the-difference-between-a-recession-and-a-depression/> (November 2012).

⁵⁸ Robert J. Shiller. *Animal Spirits Depend on Trust: The proposed stimulus isn't big enough to restore confidence*, 2012. Available at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123302080925418107.html> (November 2012).

⁵⁹ Mirjana Ule Nastran, *Sodobne identitete v vrstincu diskurzov* (Ljubljana: Sophia, 2000), 3.

⁶⁰ Stane Južnič, *Identiteta* (Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, 1993), 320.

territorial component that is the easiest to identify with and is an important factor influencing a national identity either indirectly or directly. However, it must be taken into consideration that national identity could only have taken shape no earlier than in the time nations were forming, regardless of its frequent referrals to “glorious past”, which was raised to the status of an element of national consciousness in the form of myths and historical memory.

Many sociologists and politicians reached the fact on economic crisis. It is clear that it represents also the crisis of values and to a certain degree the crisis of national identity. Defence system and military organization are founded on the exact these values that are challenged by the recession and/or depression. Honesty, sacrifice for the state and the nation, valour, bravery, tolerance, comradeship and cooperation are foundation of all military systems around the globe, because one can't survive the challenges in the battlefield without them. Therefore we'll argue, that un-transparent defence cuts may not only irreparably damage the system designed for our safety, but indirectly represent silent consensus when listed values are being attacked. But how can we be victorious in this difficult struggle against the recession and/or depression without existence of these values among the nation?

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COMPARISON OF ELECTORAL MANIFESTOS' ISSUE STRUCTURES IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES – THE METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Samo KROPIVNIK¹

From methodological perspective we address a substantive question of political science research. What are similarities and differences in issue structures in contemporary democracies? Issue structures are recognized on the basis of the content of national electoral programmes (manifestos) in the period from 1992 to 2003. In analyses, we use multivariate clustering methods first to obtain groups of countries as aggregates of manifestos and then to obtain groups of manifestos. Eventually countries are categorised drawing on the importance of four different types of manifestos in a country. The results are, whenever possible, graphically presented as line graphs, dendrograms and a galaxy. We find out that only in some countries manifestos clearly belong to one dominant type, and therefore only these countries make sense as aggregates of manifestos in comparative studies. Unfortunately for studies taking countries merely as aggregates of manifestos, the heterogeneous countries are in majority.

Key words: political party program, elections, issue positions, issue domains, MARPOR, comparative studies, country profiles, Euclidean distances, Galaxy, agglomerative hierarchical clustering, k-means clustering.

1 POLITICAL PARTY MANIFESTOS AND ISSUE STRUCTURES IN SOCIETIES

Political party manifestos (electoral programmes, party programmes or electoral manifestos; we use all these terms as synonyms) play a significant

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role in electoral democracies, directly in electoral campaigns² and in broader sense as a constitutive part of a political system.³ They recognize the importance of critical issues, develop a party position on them, set the course of actions a party will take if elected, unite a party internally and, last but not least, advise party activists and supporters as well as inform the general electorate.⁴ In party manifestos, political and policy ideas, positions and goals are recorded, publicised and documented for analysis. Therefore comparisons among national party manifestos expose similarities and differences among countries in issue structures and even in cleavages that form the core of political science comparative studies.⁵

In Europe, parliament party manifestos have been systematically collected since 1979. Their content has been coded, and the data are available for analysis (project MARPOR, previously MRP and CMP).⁶ Each parliamentary party programme is characterised according to its match with a standardised set of carefully selected, precisely defined and theoretically relevant issue positions. Subsequently, position codes are merged in seven mutually exclusive and theoretically exhaustive domains that are defined in Table 1.⁷ Obviously, for each document, contextual data are also available on political party, party family, country and election year.

TABLE 1: ISSUE DOMAINS AND ISSUE POSITIONS (CODES)

Domain 1: External Relations	
101 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive	410 Economic Growth
102 Foreign Special Relationships: Negative	411 Technology and Infrastructure: Positive
103 Anti-Imperialism: Positive	412 Controlled Economy: Positive
104 Military: Positive	413 Nationalisation: Positive
105 Military: Negative	414 Economic Orthodoxy: Positive
106 Peace: Positive	415 Marxist Analysis: Positive
107 Internationalism: Positive	416 Anti-Growth Economy: Positive
108 European Integration: Positive	
109 Internationalism: Negative	Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life
110 European Integration: Negative	501 Environmental Protection: Positive
	502 Culture: Positive
Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy	503 Social Justice: Positive
201 Freedom and Human Rights: Positive	504 Welfare State Expansion
202 Democracy: Positive	505 Welfare State Limitation
203 Constitutionalism: Positive	506 Education Expansion
204 Constitutionalism: Negative	507 Education Limitation
	Domain 6: Fabric of Society
Domain 3: Political System	601 National Way of Life: Positive
301 Decentralisation: Positive	602 National Way of Life: Negative
302 Centralisation: Positive	603 Traditional Morality: Positive
303 Governmental and Administrative Efficiency: Positive	604 Traditional Morality: Negative
304 Political Corruption: Negative	605 Law and Order: Positive
305 Political Authority: Positive	606 Social Harmony: Positive
	607 Multiculturalism: Positive
Domain 4: Economy	608 Multiculturalism: Negative
401 Free Enterprise: Positive	
402 Incentives: Positive	Domain 7: Social Groups
403 Market Regulation: Positive	701 Labour Groups: Positive
404 Economic Planning: Positive	702 Labour Groups: Negative
405 Corporatism: Positive	703 Agriculture: Positive
406 Protectionism: Positive	704 Middle Class and Professional Groups: Positive
407 Protectionism: Negative	705 Minority Groups: Positive
408 Economic Goals	706 Non-Economic Demographic Groups: Positive
409 Keynesian Demand Management: Positive	

² E. g. David Farrell and Rudiger Schmitt-Beck (eds.), *Do Political Campaigns Matter?* (New York: Routledge, 2002) and John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (2nd edition)* (New York: Longman, 1995).

³ E.g. Richard S. Katz, *Democracy and Elections* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) and Susan C. Stokes, "Political Parties and Democracy," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2 (1999), 243–267.

⁴ See Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Richard I. Hofferbert and Ian Budge, "A Theory of Democratic Policymaking," in *Parties, Policies and Democracy*, ed. Hans-Dieter Klingemann et al (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 240–270; Ian Budge and Michael Laver, "Policy, Ideology and Party Distance: Analysis of Election Programmes in 19 Democracies," *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 11, 4 (1986), 607–617; Ian Budge and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Mandates and Policy Outputs: US Party Platforms and Federal Expenditures," *American Political Science Review*, 84 (1990), 111–131. See also David Robertson, *A Theory of Party Competition* (London: John Wiley & Sons, 1976) and Richard Rose, *Do Parties Make a Difference (2nd edition)* (London: Macmillan, 1984).

⁵ Importance of issue structures and cleavages in societies is put forward in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967). See also Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Vol. 1* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

⁶ See Andrea Volkens et al, *The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR)* (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), 2012).

⁷ For detailed description of data creation process see Annika Werner and Andrea Volkens, *Manifesto Coding Instructions (3rd fully revised version)* (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, 2009).

Domains shares are the most characteristic and most valuable feature of the dataset since when considered jointly, domains exhaustively cover existing national (country specific) policy and political issues and simultaneously offer universal comparison in time and space (e.g. among policy arenas, among countries). They have been created for this purpose and their validity has been repeatedly evaluated and confirmed in various comparative studies.⁸

2 THE AIM AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH

Drawing on the MARPOR dataset, comparisons can be carried out between national political parties competing for votes in a certain election year or even throughout longer periods with more election cycles involved.⁹ More ambitiously, countries (national policy arenas) can be compared on the basis of domain shares recognized from national political parties' manifestos. In national electoral arenas, political parties compete with each other, and thus they unavoidably react to each other. Therefore, their manifestos ideally reflect their own goals as well as their responses to initiatives of other major parties. Only when manifestos are combined in a national collection of issue positions they have the potential to comprehensively describe a country's specifics in a domain structure.

What we claim and intend to demonstrate in the paper is that in order to describe competently and comprehensively the issue structure content of electoral campaigning in any country in comparison with others, one has to consider both a) the country level, i.e., aggregated shares of domains in the analysed countries and b) the party programmes level, i.e., exact shares of domains in each party manifesto involved. The latter is required to estimate differences between programmes in a country in order to realize how the nationalization (or modernization) of party manifestos has progressed so far.¹⁰

In our empirical study,¹¹ we begin with comparisons among countries as aggregates of manifestos and focus on Slovenia¹² as a referential unit whenever required. Since Slovenia became an electoral democracy only in 1990, we limit the study to the period between 1990 and 2003, the latter being the last election year for which complete MARPOR data are available at the time of writing this paper. We employ graphically presented country profiles (line graphs) and hierarchical agglomerative clustering procedures (dendrograms) to both give a general overview and to recognise similarities and differences between Slovenia and the other fifty countries that participated in the project during the period analysed. Next, in order to take

⁸ See e.g. Ian Budge et al, *Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945–1998* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) and Hans-Dieter Klingemann et al, *Mapping policy preferences II: estimates for parties, electors, and governments in Eastern Europe, European Union, and OECD 1990–2003* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Additional studies are documented on project website, see Universität Mannheim, MZES. "Projekt Euromanifestos", Universität Mannheim. Available at <http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/projekte/manifestos/> (24 March 2012).

⁹ Simona Kustec Lipicer and Samo Kropivnik, "Dimensions of party electoral programmes: Slovenian experience," *Journal of Comparative Politics*, 4, 1 (2011), 52–75.

¹⁰ C.f. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967).

¹¹ The data collection and a part of the analyses were completed in the framework of the research project, "Pre-election campaign and democratic evolution of state and society," conducted at the Centre for Political Science Research at the Institute of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana and financed by the Slovenian Research Agency (1/5/2009–30/4/2012).

¹² For characteristics of electoral competition see e.g. Danica Fink-Hafner, "Slovenia," *European Journal of Political Research*, 42 (2003), 1078–1086 and Simona Kustec Lipicer, "Volilna kampanja na lokalni ravni: poskus konceptualno-metodološke opredelitve na primeru Slovenije," *Lex localis*, 5, 1 (2007), 105–122.

differences inside countries into account, we return to original (basic, not aggregated) units of analysis and cluster individual party manifestos (almost 1300 units in the selected period) into groups (ideal types) using hierarchical agglomerative clustering methods and K-means clustering method. In a contingency table the obtained groups are split according to the manifestos' countries of origin to estimate variation inside countries. Furthermore, we employ Euclidean distances to present relations between Slovenia and all other countries in a Galaxy, a graphical format developed for that purpose. The central (referential) country is represented as the Sun and all other countries are represented as different planets allocated around the Sun proportionally to Euclidean distances. Countries (i.e., planets) are depicted according to the issue domains structure of their manifestos, taking into account the type and the level of homogeneity, which are both recognized drawing on the results of cluster analyses of manifestos.

3 COUNTRIES AS AGGREGATES OF MANIFESTOS

In the table below (Table 2) average issue domains shares in the period from 1990 to 2003 are calculated from the MARPOR database for each country. The shares are modified so that their sum is always 100 percent in order to enable comparisons between countries. This is achieved by excluding uncoded sentences, i.e., sentences without any issue-oriented content, such as general statements, introductory remarks etc. On average, there were 8 percent of uncoded sentences in a program. The last row of the table shows the average shares for all countries combined.


TABLE 2: AVERAGE ISSUE DOMAINS SHARES IN 51 ANALYSED COUNTRIES IN THE PERIOD FROM 1990 TO 2003¹³

	EXTERNAL RELATIONS	FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY	POLITICAL SYSTEM	ECONOMY	WELFARE AND QUALITY OF LIFE	FABRIC OF SOCIETY	SOCIAL GROUPS
Albania	7.70	14.24	9.90	22.00	14.30	10.38	21.48
Armenia	10.07	10.74	9.22	22.17	13.87	18.44	15.48
Australia	2.44	3.87	17.86	29.52	23.47	9.79	13.06
Austria	7.79	9.93	15.86	20.89	25.65	9.12	10.76
Azerbaijan	14.76	18.16	6.75	12.53	18.87	23.31	5.61
Belorussia	6.16	17.19	2.17	24.60	19.15	16.39	14.36
Belgium	8.34	7.43	21.09	16.14	26.87	10.28	9.84
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5.53	22.45	4.47	21.26	17.01	20.51	8.78
Bulgaria	7.70	8.19	10.84	25.40	19.57	16.84	11.45
Canada	5.71	8.32	13.55	26.46	22.28	15.54	8.15
Croatia	8.95	14.74	15.21	16.02	23.52	13.51	8.04
Cyprus	12.67	3.41	14.76	15.01	29.71	6.66	17.77
Czech Republic	9.53	9.70	12.36	21.45	22.38	14.98	9.60
Denmark	12.96	4.38	7.48	18.43	23.83	20.83	12.09
Estonia	7.34	6.91	10.69	22.48	28.61	15.92	8.06
Finland	6.54	4.87	8.29	22.84	35.17	11.80	10.89
France	11.31	9.87	7.59	19.06	29.01	12.07	11.10
Georgia	13.24	12.26	12.24	26.39	16.33	12.48	7.07
GDR	9.93	20.73	3.35	14.62	27.92	6.39	17.07
Germany	15.13	5.79	7.46	19.34	26.35	8.82	17.10
Great Britain	10.67	6.17	15.49	15.45	28.24	12.37	11.61
Greece	14.11	8.56	16.33	18.10	25.68	8.04	9.19
Hungary	7.29	7.10	11.48	23.94	22.97	12.95	14.27
Iceland	9.81	2.68	9.61	20.54	35.19	5.23	16.95
Ireland	7.94	5.56	10.67	26.37	32.09	9.59	7.79
Israel	20.94	3.81	2.20	18.25	17.31	31.29	6.20
Italy	6.51	7.55	25.56	22.51	19.02	10.00	8.85
Japan	20.40	6.32	29.16	21.59	13.54	2.47	6.53
Latvia	7.98	5.42	9.54	22.24	27.36	17.86	9.62
Lithuania	6.88	9.01	11.91	21.16	20.11	15.66	15.27
Luxembourg	6.55	7.08	9.97	22.81	32.13	7.62	13.84
Macedonia	10.50	14.49	6.28	25.80	16.43	16.57	9.93
Malta	4.85	6.61	17.51	22.09	33.16	5.74	10.05
Moldova	7.73	6.97	17.38	20.46	16.70	14.27	16.50
Montenegro	9.81	21.74	12.47	17.87	14.12	12.95	6.04
Netherlands	9.00	6.75	12.17	19.86	27.50	13.45	11.28
New Zealand	2.96	5.22	7.77	22.18	37.42	12.34	12.12
Norway	13.88	7.54	6.64	21.90	32.38	10.56	7.10
Poland	6.83	9.32	15.15	24.27	19.82	13.12	11.49
Portugal	8.85	6.95	12.92	21.82	34.18	4.38	10.91
Romania	7.24	12.74	6.56	24.76	22.18	11.28	15.24
Russia	7.48	6.87	17.11	25.26	16.13	17.26	9.89
Serbia	9.61	15.25	16.12	15.07	11.18	24.17	8.60
Slovakia	8.44	8.43	11.71	21.23	24.03	17.90	8.25
Slovenia	5.36	7.95	12.22	15.24	34.51	10.99	13.74
Spain	10.47	6.21	19.07	25.68	18.91	6.81	12.84
Sweden	12.41	8.04	3.25	23.57	37.66	7.13	7.96
Switzerland	9.68	8.28	8.96	20.38	24.02	20.08	8.59
Turkey	4.48	8.85	23.78	28.31	16.38	5.00	13.20
Ukraine	7.44	12.13	11.86	22.62	21.57	14.18	10.21
United States	17.25	4.87	15.55	16.74	18.17	19.35	8.07
AVERAGE	9.28	9.17	12.49	21.40	23.32	13.49	10.85

¹³ Extracted and recalculated from Andrea Volkens et al, *The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR)* (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), 2012).

Issue domains shares for e.g. Slovenia can be easily read from the table. It is clear that the domains shown are not equally important (i.e., if a domain share in a document is taken as the indicator of importance). The economy domain and welfare and quality of life domain are overrepresented and external relations, freedom and democracy, and fabric of society domains are more or less underrepresented (according to an ideal 14.3 percent share in the case of uniform distribution). Apart from that basic description, we cannot make any conclusions regarding commonness or uniqueness of the domain structure of Slovene manifestos. Taken separately domains have no substantial meaning. Clearly, we have to compare them with the overall structure (average) and further to all other countries. Figure 1, depicting national profiles and the average profile of domains importance, is created for that purpose. The Slovene profile is red and all other profiles are black. Among the black profile lines, the thick line shows the average profile.

FIGURE 1: NATIONAL PROFILES, SLOVENE PROFILE AND THE AVERAGE PROFILE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE DOMAINS (focused graphical presentation of Table 2)



Graphical presentations convey more pieces of information at the same time and enable multiple comparisons on various levels.¹⁴ Figure 2 readily shows that there is quite a variation in national profiles and that although the Slovene profile is not very different from the average profile, its specific characteristics cannot be neglected. Its most distinctive features are a considerably higher share of welfare and quality of life domain and substantially lower shares of external relations and economy domains. Regarding all three distinctive domains, the Slovene profile is quite extreme in comparison with other countries. Only Sweden and New Zealand pay more attention to the welfare and quality of life domain; only Australia and New Zealand pay less attention to the external relations domain; and Azerbaijan alone to the economy domain (these countries are recognized as shown in Table 2).

Apart from these Slovene characteristics, less obvious distinguishing features can be recognized only by more detailed and more formal analyses. Among them, direct comparisons domain by domain to determine particularities are straightforward and could be performed drawing on Table

¹⁴ Gary T. Henry, *Graphing Data. Techniques for Display and Analysis* (London: Sage, 1995); see also Edward R. Tufte, *The Visual Display of Quantitative Information* (Cheshire, CT: Graphic Press, 1983).

2, in the same way as demonstrated above for the most obvious Slovene specific characteristics.

However, a more productive method is to employ a measure of profiles (countries) similarities or dissimilarities according to all seven domains taken jointly. Among possible measures, Euclidean distance¹⁵ proved ideal for the purpose as it captures resemblances and differences in profiles in a way that is similar to the human eye and mind. It pays less attention to small differences and puts more stress on large differences. For example, small differences in all seven domains will result in lower Euclidean distance between two profiles than an exact match in six domains and a noticeable difference in one domain, even if a noticeable difference is much smaller than the sum of the seven small differences in the first case. Euclidean distance precisely and realistically captures differences in profiles and expresses them as numerical values that can be used for more formal comparisons among manifesto issue domains structures in different countries.


Furthermore, drawing on Euclidean distance and employing clustering methods,¹⁶ we are able to uncover patterns, i.e., recognizable and relevant combinations that draw more attention to certain issue domains and less to others, which are typical of certain countries. In other words, we not only can realize how similar each country is to others but also can put together those countries that are very similar to each other: countries in a group have to be as similar as possible and groups (types) as different (unique) as possible. Because this is a problem of optimization, both statistical and conceptual criteria affect the final solution and we understand the involvement of conceptual criteria to be an advantage. Thus, we can create a relevant typology of party manifesto structures, associate each country with the most appropriate type, and realize a country position in a type (group) as being more central, more peripheral or anywhere in the middle. In the case of agglomerative hierarchical clustering, a country membership and position can be understandably presented in the form of an agglomeration tree (dendrogram), i.e., a popular graphical presentation of a clustering procedure and result. To our knowledge, there is no other single approach or multivariate method that conveys that many relevant pieces of information in so condensed and straightforward form.

In the dendrogram below, countries are clustered according to their average issue domains structures on the basis of squared Euclidean distance (large differences become even more important) and the Ward method (balanced clustering criteria that respect group homogeneity and between-groups differences).

¹⁵ See e.g., Richard A. Johnson and Dean W. Wichern, *Applied Multivariate Statistical Analysis* (London: Prentice Hall, 1992).

¹⁶ Regarding the method description and clustering notions we refer to *ibid.*

FIGURE 2: AGGLOMERATIVE HIERARCHICAL CLUSTERING TREE OF COUNTRIES



The dendrogram shown in Figure 2 yields the following:

First, it is reasonable to distinguish from two to five types of countries. However, three types seems to be the most balanced solution, as two are too superficial, four are too close to three or five, and five adds another small group to the previous four groups, among which one is already small.

Second, one group is always the same. The most stable group is composed of thirteen countries at the bottom of the dendrogram. Since all countries have joined the group at a low level of dissimilarity, the group is very homogeneous. Only on a very low level of dissimilarity (which is irrelevant) can we recognize four subgroups.


Third, Slovenia is in the most stable and homogeneous group. Inside the group, it most resembles Finland and New Zealand, followed by three subgroups of countries, the first including Luxemburg, Ireland, Portugal and Malta, the second France, Norway and Sweden and the last Germany, Iceland and Cyprus.

Fourth, next from the bottom to the top of the dendrogram shows the least stable group, which becomes a group in the case of the three-group solution and splits in two subgroups in the case of the five-group solution. Clearly it is less homogeneous. The members comprise eleven countries from Israel to Albania (from the bottom of the dendrogram up).

Fifth, the largest group includes twenty-seven countries from Estonia to Japan (listed from the top down) and splits into two unequal subgroups in the case of the four- or five-groups solutions. It is a large and a heterogeneous group.

To enable recognition of the character of each type (group), typical (ideal or average) profiles indicating the importance of issue domains in each group are presented in the graph below. The average profile of all countries is included as well.

FIGURE 3: PROFILES OF THREE TYPES OF COUNTRIES AND THE AVERAGE PROFILE




Differences between the groups and the average as well as differences among the groups are modest; however characteristics of the types can be recognized. The most stable group (the one including Slovenia), presented by the red profile, is the most specific because of the highest and most exposed average share of the welfare and quality of life domain in party manifestos, accompanied by lower shares of the fabric of society, freedom and democracy and political system domains. Clearly, for the countries in the “red” group, welfare and quality of life domain topics are the most important issue. The least stable group, presented by the green profile (including eleven countries in the middle of the dendrogram), is characterized by the highest share of two domains, namely the freedom and democracy domain and the fabric of society domain. In contrast to the first group, welfare and quality of life issues are the least important for the “green” countries. The largest group of countries, presented by the orange profile, is close to the average (obviously, due to the size) and is specific only because of the highest (but not very eye-catching) interest paid to the political system topics.

4 COUNTRIES AS COMPILATIONS OF MANIFESTOS

The classification of countries on the basis of average shares of issue domains provides fundamental information for comparisons among countries but ignores differences inside countries, i.e., the level of nationalization or modernization of party manifesto structures. It is important to determine whether all party manifestos are similarly structured and therefore almost identical to the average structure that credibly represents a country, or manifestos demonstrate significantly different structures and consequently the average is nothing more than an artificial construct that doesn't truly represent a country. In order to take the differences inside countries into account, in the second step of the study we return to original (basic, not aggregated) units of analysis and cluster individual party manifestos (almost 1300 units in the selected period) into groups (ideal types) using hierarchical agglomerative clustering method in the same way as we did before using countries as units of analysis.


FIGURE 4: AGGLOMERATIVE HIERARCHICAL CLUSTERING TREE OF PARTY ELECTORAL PROGRAMMES



The dendrogram above shows that the four-group solution is the most balanced and reasonable. Two- and three-groups solutions are too superficial since it is obvious that quite different groups are still joined together, five is too close to six, and the six-groups solution appears to be too particular since only a few manifestos split from two of the previous four groups, and the levels of dissimilarity are quite low. Additionally, the four-group solution has been confirmed by K-means method, as the largest drop in Ward criterion function arises when four groups replace three groups. Further, the solution (i.e. the classification of manifestos into four groups) has been optimized by K-means method.

Average importance profiles of the issue domains of each group are presented in the graph below to enable recognition of each type's character in the same way as in the case of countries (Figure 3). The average profile of all manifestos (nearly identical to the average of countries) is also included.

FIGURE 5: PROFILES OF FOUR TYPES OF PARTY MANIFESTOS AND THE AVERAGE PROFILE



Differences between groups and the average as well as differences among groups are now far more substantial, and type characteristics can be recognized more clearly.

Regarding their interpretation, three profiles are the same as profiles of groups of countries shown in Figure 3. As before, the red profile represents the group of manifestos with the highest average share of welfare and quality of life domain. As the Figures 3 and 5 show both red profiles appear to be almost the same, which indicates that the group of manifestos highly resembles the group of countries. Notably, the “red” group is the largest one, containing 488 documents. The green profile is also very much the same as shown in Figure 3, i.e., it is characterized by the highest share of two domains, namely the freedom and democracy domain and the fabric of society domain. However, noticeably, in the case of clustering manifestos, the type has a more distinctive character since differences from the average profile and from the profiles of other groups is now far more obvious. The group contains 235 party programmes, which makes it a middle-sized group. Although the third, orange group of manifestos does not stand out in Figure 3, it also becomes far more distinctive in Figure 5 as the group's interest paid to the political system domain topics is now more distinguishing. However, with 162 documents, it becomes the smallest group.

The fourth, blue profiles new and typical only of manifesto clustering. Notably, the blue group is the second largest group, containing 408

manifestos, so it cannot be overlooked in any case. Its main characteristic is the highest share in the economy domain, but in general, the blue profile is slightly less distinctive and closer to the average.

In the contingency table below (Table 3), the obtained four groups of manifestos (columns) are split according to the origin countries of the manifestos (rows) both to estimate differences in manifesto structures inside countries and to categorize countries according to in-country characteristics of manifesto structures. The cells contain row percentages and the total is shown in the last row.

Countries (rows) are arranged according to the three types of countries previously established (Figures 2 and 3). Country type is marked in front of country name in a consistent colour, as shown in Figure 3: 1/in red for welfare and quality of life country type; 2/ in green for freedom and democracy plus the fabric of society country type; and 3/ in orange for political system country type.

The country's name is written in a colour consistent with its in-country characteristic type of manifesto structure (same colours as in Figure 5). Also the column headings in Table 3 are shown in the same colours: red for welfare and quality of life manifesto type; green for freedom and democracy plus fabric of society manifesto type; orange for political system manifesto type; and blue for economy manifesto type. If a country cannot be categorized in a single category because it has two characteristic types of manifestos, both colours are used (half of the name is in one colour, and the other half is in the other colour). However, the first part of the name is in the dominant characteristic type colour. If a country cannot be categorized because of the lack of distinctive characteristics, its name is printed in black.

In-country characteristics of manifesto type are recognized by row percentages to describe the relative impact of a manifesto type in a country. Cells containing high row percentages are filled with colours. Red, orange and yellow are used to indicate an absolute dominance (a majority) of a certain type of manifesto on different intervals: red is used for extremely high shares, making all other types irrelevant (70 percent or more); dark orange is used for very high shares on a slightly lower interval, making all other types hard to affect the country type (60 percent to 70 percent); and yellow is used for high shares on an even lower interval that allows other types to be relatively influential (50 percent to 60 percent). All other shares representing the relative prevalence of a certain manifesto type in a country are coloured grey if they are at least 10 percentage points higher than the total.

The final recognition of in-country characteristics of manifesto type, i.e. the categorization of countries, is based on a subjective estimation of the importance of a manifesto type in a country, which draws on both the absolute supremacy of a type on different levels and on the relative over-presence of manifesto types (one or more).

TABLE 3: COUNTRIES BY TYPES OF MANIFESTOS

MANIFESTO TYPE	WELFARE AND QUALITY OF LIFE	ECONOMY	POLITICAL SYSTEM	FABRIC OF SOCIETY + FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY	NUMBER OF MANIFESTOS 1990 - 2003
COUNTRY					
1/Slovenia	73.3 %	10.0 %	6.7 %	10.0 %	30
1/New Zealand	80.0 %	20.0 %			25
1/(Malta)	100.0 %				4
1/Portugal	77.3 %	22.7 %			22
1/Luxembourg	70.0 %	30.0 %			10
1/Sweden	79.3 %	20.7 %			29
1/Norway	81.0 %	19.0 %			21
1/Iceland	75.0 %	20.0 %	5.0 %		20
1/Cyprus	70.0 %		30.0 %		10
1/Finland	64.7 %	20.6 %	2.9 %	11.8 %	34
1/France	63.2 %	21.1 %		15.8 %	19
1/Germany	63.2 %	36.8 %			19
1/Ireland	50.0 %	50.0 %			18
2/GDR	86.7 %	6.7 %		6.7 %	15
2/Bosnia-Herzegovina	12.9 %	19.4 %		67.7 %	31
2/(Azerbaijan)	22.2 %	11.1 %		66.7 %	9
2/Israel	27.3 %	12.1 %		60.6 %	33
2/(Belorussia)	28.6 %	28.6 %		42.9 %	7
2/Macedonia	8.0 %	40.0 %	8.0 %	44.0 %	25
2/Montenegro	8.3 %	25.0 %	25.0 %	41.7 %	24
2/Serbia	17.1 %	17.1 %	25.7 %	40.0 %	35
2/Armenia	17.6 %	52.9 %		29.4 %	17
2/Albania	5.4 %	62.2 %	13.5 %	18.9 %	37
2/Romania	35.3 %	44.1 %		20.6 %	34
3/Japan	6.3 %	31.3 %	62.5 %		32
3/Croatia	27.3 %	21.2 %	30.3 %	21.2 %	33
3/Italy	12.5 %	45.8 %	37.5 %	4.2 %	48
3/Russia	8.3 %	52.8 %	22.2 %	16.7 %	36
3/Turkey	9.5 %	57.1 %	33.3 %		21
3/(Moldova)	25.0 %	50.0 %	25.0 %		4
3/Belgium	54.1 %	8.1 %	32.4 %	5.4 %	37
3/Greece	52.9 %	17.6 %	29.4 %		17
3/(United States)	12.5 %		37.5 %	50.0 %	8
3/Great Britain	70.8 %	12.5 %	12.5 %	4.2 %	24
3/Netherlands	62.1 %	27.6 %	6.9 %	3.4 %	29
3/Estonia	55.2 %	20.7 %	3.4 %	20.7 %	29
3/Hungary	53.8 %	23.1 %	7.7 %	15.4 %	26
3/Latvia	53.3 %	26.7 %	3.3 %	16.7 %	30
3/Austria	47.8 %	30.4 %	17.4 %	4.3 %	23
3/Spain	3.3 %	66.7 %	30.0 %		30
3/Australia	22.2 %	55.6 %	16.7 %	5.6 %	18
3/Bulgaria	17.9 %	53.6 %	3.6 %	25.0 %	28
3/Czech Republic	18.8 %	50.0 %	9.4 %	21.9 %	32
3/Canada	26.7 %	40.0 %	13.3 %	20.0 %	15
3/Georgia	17.2 %	44.8 %	17.2 %	20.7 %	29
3/Lithuania	20.8 %	45.8 %	4.2 %	29.2 %	24
3/Denmark	41.2 %	29.4 %		29.4 %	34
3/Switzerland	45.5 %	22.7 %	4.5 %	27.3 %	44
3/Ukraine	29.4 %	32.4 %	5.9 %	32.4 %	34
3/Poland	29.3 %	39.0 %	12.2 %	19.5 %	41
3/Slovakia	33.3 %	35.9 %	7.7 %	23.1 %	39
TOTAL	37.7 %	31.6 %	12.5 %	18.2 %	1293

Table 3 reveals the following information:

First, starting from previously established groups of countries, the first group marked as 1/ and characterized as the welfare and quality of life domain group proved to be very well founded and perfectly stable. For the second time, all thirteen countries are categorized as a group, and the dominance of the welfare and quality of life issue domain is in all cases absolute and on a high scale at mostly over 70 percent (red cells). The only less convincing case is Ireland, where we observe a 50/50 split between the group specific domain and the economy domain. The second group, marked as 2/ and labelled the freedom and democracy and the fabric of society domains group becomes less definite and less stable since only three out of eleven countries are categorized in the same group on the basis of a convincing absolute dominance of the characteristic two domains (orange cells). One is included on the basis of their relative prevalence (grey cell); four are split between the type and other types, and the final three are categorized in another group (one, i.e., GDR clearly in the welfare and quality of life domain group with 86 percent of characteristic domain

manifestos). In the case of the third group, marked as 3/ and named the political system domain group, the evidence is even weaker. Only two countries can be categorized in the same group, one on the basis of the absolute prevalence of political system domain manifestos and the other on the basis of their relative over-presence. Among the others, seven are split between this type and another type, sixteen are categorized in one of the other three types, and two remain uncategorized (there is not even a relatively higher segment of any type).

Second, the welfare and quality of life group as well as the freedom and democracy and fabric of society domains group show new members. The first of the two includes more new countries, and as a rule they enter with an absolute dominance of the characteristic domain type (red, orange or yellow cells), and only two are split between manifesto types. The second group has fewer new countries and typically they join with merely relative over-presence of the type (grey cells). The political system group has no new members, but it loses a great number of countries due to their relocation into the other three groups. The fourth group, the economy domain group, materializes from the previous freedom and democracy and fabric of society domains group of countries and from the weakening political system domain group. The economy domain type of manifesto prevalence is absolute (orange and yellow cells) as well as relative (grey cells).

Third, twelve countries cannot be categorized in a single type since party manifestos belong to two significant types. Additionally, two countries cannot be classified since their manifestos express no pattern. These results do not occur when countries are classified on the basis of an average manifesto structure (so they are overlooked).

Fourth and finally, based on previous points, it is safe to conclude that a categorization of countries drawing on the classification of party manifestos yields better results than a classification of countries on the basis of their average manifesto profiles. The results of both procedures are reasonably similar only in the case of the welfare and quality of life group, although this group gains new country members with clear crucial domain dominance, which were misclassified when the countries were clustered. Additionally, when countries are categorized on the basis of the influence of in-country types of party manifestos, countries of the same type can be distinguished and presented according to the strength of their link to a type, i.e., according to the level of prevalence of a manifesto type, which is expressed in Table 3 as different cell colours. Moreover, countries can be categorized as split between types, which is a unique but very realistic feature. Similar is true for uncategorized countries.

5 APPLYING THE RESULTS – THE GALAXY

To employ features described in the last paragraph and provide a clear, conclusive picture of the manifesto structures of Slovenian parliamentary parties in comparison with those of other countries, we depict a galaxy i.e. a graph developed for that purpose. The central (referential) country, in our case Slovenia, is shown as the Sun and all other countries are shown as different planets allocated around the Sun proportionate to Euclidean distances. Countries (planets) are depicted according to their manifesto domain structures, taking into account the type and the level of homogeneity, both of which are recognized drawing on clustering results for the manifestos. The countries (planets) are coloured according to their prevailing types of manifesto structures as follows:

- red for the welfare and quality of life domain group;


- green for the freedom and democracy and fabric of society domains group;
- orange for the political system group;
- blue for the economy domain group;
- grey for the two uncategorisable countries.

If there is more than one characteristic issue domain, a country name is written in the colour of the other, as a rule the less characteristic one.

Different shapes of planets represent different levels of manifesto structure homogeneity in a country, which can also be taken as an indicator of the strength of the country's categorization:

- a circle is used for the highest homogeneity (absolute dominance of a single manifesto structure type with an over 70 percent share);
- a triangle stands for high homogeneity (absolute dominance of a single manifesto type with a 60 percent to 70 percent share);
- a square represents modest homogeneity (absolute dominance of a single manifesto type with a 50 percent to 60 percent share and the absence of any other over-presented type);
- a rhombus is used to indicate modest variety (relative prevalence of a single manifesto type with a share at least 10 percentage points higher than the total and the absence of any other over-presented type);
- a star represents a clear split in manifesto types (two types of manifestos are characteristic for a country).

FIGURE 6: THE GALAXY WITH SLOVENIA AS THE REFERENTIAL COUNTRY



Drawing on the Galaxy shown in Figure 6 and comparing Slovenia with other countries, one can recognize Slovenia as a country with a clear dominance of parliamentary party manifestos that favour the welfare and quality of life

domain. Most Slovenian party manifestos, more than 70 percent, are classified as emphasizing the welfare and quality of life domain (red circle). Therefore, Slovenia can be categorized as a country with a homogenous party manifesto structure that is strongly associated with the welfare and quality of life issues (a strong and unmistakable case of group membership). Countries that are most similar to Slovenia are Luxemburg, Great Britain and New Zealand. All three are strong cases of belonging to the welfare and quality of life domain type (red circles). The next two similar countries are Finland and Netherlands, both belonging to the same welfare and quality of life manifesto type, but the characteristic domain prevalence is lower (red triangles). The further from Slovenia we move, the less welfare and quality of life type countries and the more heterogeneous countries we find. Readers can interpret other countries categorisation and their level of similarity with Slovenia in the same manner as the graph speaks for itself.

6 CONCLUSION

The clustering approach has enabled us to compare party manifestos as both individual documents and country aggregates. It has also provided a method to estimate the level of similarity between units of interest on both levels of comparison and in general.

From methodological perspective, the strong points of the applied approach can be summarized as follows:

First, political party manifestos and countries are analysed according to all seven issue domains simultaneously in a multivariate manner- the opposite would be to consider each domain separately.

Second, Euclidean distance represents a very realistic view of the level of similarity or difference between units (countries or manifestos), which is close to what we understand as distance in everyday life. In addition, clustering algorithms use Euclidean distance in an easy to understand way and produce vivid graphical outputs, which make the research results both comprehensible and convincing. The opposite would be to use latent concepts and rather abstract notions of covariation in multidimensional space, which are difficult to comprehend for less empirically oriented scholars.

Third, in our quest for the best classification we can choose among different suggested solutions from more general to more precise (less types equals less in-group homogeneity and more differences among groups, while more types equals less differences among groups and more homogeneous groups). In defining the best solution, i.e., one that is subjectively considered the most balanced, we can (and we usually have to) apply additional, contextual and theoretical criteria (e.g., the minimum size of average differences in percentage points that we understand as a difference and don't neglect in interpretations). The use of contextual and theoretical principles together with statistical indicators leads to more convincing results.

Fourth, in our case the clustering results on the level of manifestos are used to categorize countries, drawing on our understanding of the size and the meaning of structures of in-country manifesto types.

Fifth, in line with the prevailing Euclidean space based analyses, the Galaxy (Figure 6) vividly summarizes the results and enables a focused comparison of a selected country with all other countries without any falsification. The opposite would be, e.g., any kind of projection of multiple space into two dimensions.

In more substantial manner, regarding past, present and future political science manifesto studies of comparisons among countries, the most important conclusion is that in some countries manifestos belong to one dominant type, and therefore these countries make sense as aggregates of manifestos. These countries are authentically represented by an average issue domains structure. On the contrary, in other countries, manifestos (parties) are clearly split between types. Therefore, analysing such countries as aggregates of manifestos doesn't make sense because the structures of their manifestos are too different. Moreover, an average structure inadequately represents actual issue structure. Unfortunately for studies taking countries as aggregates of manifestos, the latter, i.e. the heterogeneous countries are in majority.

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