MEDNARODNA REVIJA ZA JAVNO UPRAVO International Public Administration Review Pravo in javna uprava Law and Public Administration Gostujoči uredniki /Guest Editors Dacian C. Dragos, Polonca Kovač, Francois Lafarge Posebna številka / Special Issue Univerza v Ljubljani Fakulteta za upravo Letnik XII, številka 2-3 junij 2014 volume XU, number 2-3 june 2014 ISSN 2335-3414 Mednarodna revija za javno upravo je znanstvena revija, ki združuje različne discipline, povezane z javno upravo. Obravnava teoretična in praktična vprašanja ter rešitve s področja javne uprave, upoštevajoč upravne, pravne, ekonomske, organizacijske in informacijske vidike delovanja in razvoja javne uprave. The international public Administration Review's mission is to inform the expert public about theoretical and practical issues and solutions in the field of public administration, the present key trends in public administration development both globally and in Slovenia, and to inform readers of major events, consultations, meetings and publications related to public administration. izdajatelj / publisher Fakulteta za upravo, Univerza v Ljubljani / Faculty of Administration, University of Ljubjana naslov uredništva / address of editorial board Univerza v Ljubljani, Fakulteta za upravo Gosarjeva ulica 5, SI-1000 Ljubljana tel.: +386 (0)1 5805-500 faks: +386 (0)1 5805-521 e-pošta / e-mail: mrju@fu.uni-lj.si spletna stran / website: http://www.fu.uni-lj.si/zalozba/mednarodna-revija-za-javno-upravo/ odgovorna urednica / editor Stanka Setnikar Cankar gostujoči uredniki / guest editors Dacian C. Dragos, Polonca Kovač, Francois Lafarge uredniški odbor/ editorial board Aleksander Aristovnik, Manica Danko, Mitja Dečman, Nevenka Hrovatin, Maja Klun, Polona Kovač, Alenka Kuhelj, Anamarija Leben, Rajko Pirnat, Iztok Rakar, Janez Stare, Metka Tekavčič, Ljupčo Todorovski, Mirko Vintar mednarodni uredniški odbor / international editorial board Jon Aarum ANDERSEN (Lillehammer University College, Norway), Stephen BAILEY (Glasgow Caledonian University, Great Britain), Helena BLAŽIĆ (Ekonomski fakultet Rijeka, Sveučilište u Rijeci, Croatia), Robert B. DENHARDT (University of Southern California, USA), Mirjana DRAKULIĆ (Fakultet organizacionih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Serbia), Jürgen HARBICH (München, Germany), Calin HINTEA (Faculty of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences, Babes Bolyai University, Cluj Napoca, Romania), Gyorgy JENEI (Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem, Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary), Theo P.W.M. van der KROGT (eAPAA, European Association for Public Administration Accreditation, The Netherlands), Kveta KUBATOVA (University of Economics Prague, The Czech Republic), Margaret LINEHAN (Cork Institute of Technology, The Republic of Ireland), Paolo MANCINI (University of Perugia, Italy), Alka OBADIĆ (Faculty of Economics and Business, Zagreb, Croatia), Katarina OTT (Institut za javne financije, Zagreb, Croatia), Mirko PEJANOVIĆ (Fakultet političkih nauka Sarajevo, Univerzitet u Sarajevu, Bosnia and Herzegovina), Heinrich REINERMANN (Deutsche Hochschule für Verwaltungswissenschaft, Speyer, Germany), Walter SCHERRER (Economics Institute, University of Salzburg, Austria), Željko ŠEVIĆ (Glasgow Caledonian University, Great Britain), John TAYLOR (Glasgow Caledonian University, Great Britain), Neda VITEZIĆ (Ekonomski fakultet Rijeka, Sveučilište u Rijeci, Croatia), Jacques ZILLER (Università di Pavia, Facoltà di Scienze Politiche, Italy) tehnično uredništvo / tehnical editor prelom / text design Nataša Svržnjak Damijana Keržič oblikovanje / design lektoriranje / editing Branka Smodiš Katarina Puc fotografije / photography tisk / print Mitja Kandare Tiskarna Povše BM, d. o. o. Mednarodna revija za javno upravo je indeksirana v mednarodnih bazah: / The International Public Administration Review is indexed and abstracted in: ECONLIT, PROQUEST - CSA-Worldwide Political Science Abstracts, PROQUEST PAIS International (Public Affairs Information Service), IPSA - International Political Science Abstracts, EGPA - PA@BABEL, EBSCO Publishing, IBSS - International Bibliography of the Social Sciences Vsi članki v Mednarodni reviji za javno upravo so recenzirani. / All articles are peer-reviewed. Uredniška politika je dostopna na / Editorial Policy is available at http://www.fu.uni-lj.si/zalozba/mednarodna-revija-za-javno-upravo/ Revija izhaja štirikrat letno. Več informacij o naročnini na tiskano in e-izdajo na / The Review is published quarterly. More information about subscription to printed edition/e-edition on http://www.fu.uni-lj.si/zalozba/mednarodna-revija-za-javno-upravo/narocilnica/ iSSN 2335-3414 (printed ed.) naklada / edition 150 izvodov/ copies Ponatis in razmnoževanje brez pisnega dovoljenja založnika nista dovoljena / No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without written permission from the publisher. editorial / uvodnik On the manifold interlinks between law and public administration The respective IPAR special issue has been carefully designed to present selected trends and outcomes of participants' research within the "Law and Public Administration" as a permanent study group of the European Group of Public Administration (EGPA) in Brussels. This study group in particular and EGPA in an umbrella support aim at fostering interdisciplinary study of the practice and theory of law in public administration, administrative science and policy on national and European (including EU) perspectives. The group intends to be a meeting place for scholars and practitioners from different fields: lawyers, sociologists, policy analysts, economists and IT experts, working in academia and public institutions, as well as civil servants working in national and supranational institutions and NGOs. The Law and Public Administration study group is a unique place in European scientifically environment where law and public administration specialists from very different backgrounds (professional, academic or geographic) can meet, discuss and share their work. In the last years the group met in Rotterdam (2008), Malta (2009), Toulouse (2010), Bucharest (2011), Bergen (2012), Edinburgh (2013) and will meet again in Speyer (2014). Scholars or practitioners from over 12 countries regularly attend the panel. Beyond the presentation and the discussion on members' papers, the group is also a platform for research on law and public administration. Up to now, several participants have presented research projects (among others on the topics of ombudsmen, on the effectiveness of proceedings in administrative courts, adjudication in administrative procedures and on systems of allocation of limited rights), looking for the involvement of other interested group members. These projects lead to joint activities and, eventually, joint publications. Besides, study group members regularly apply for research grants or visiting scholarships within the study group's network. In 2011, the Group "Law and Public Administration" organized in Vienna, the 4th Trans European Dialogue (TED) involving the two key professional organizations of public administration in Europe - EGPA and NISPAcee. The dialogue tackled a topic neglected for a long time: Law vs. Public Management Revisited, bringing together managers and lawyers to discuss issues of common interest. At annual EGPA events, proposed, accepted and presented papers are available on the conferences' website. As a next step in fostering the cooperation among members and opening up to other contributors, the group is interested in an active policy towards publication of the papers. This will enhance the group visibility and the impact of each paper. Thus, in 2009, the Study group published a special issue of the Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences (guest editors B. Thompson, D. C. Dragos, and B. Neamtu). In 2012, the Proceedings of the Study Group Law and Public Administration (Editors: D. C. Dragos, F. Lafarge, P. Willemsen) were edited, covering a large span of Law and PA subjects written by lawyers, PA specialists, and political scientists, selected following a blind review process. In 2013, the Utrecht Law Review dedicated a special issue to the group (Volume 9, Issue 3, July 2013), on the theme of Theory and Practice of Law in Public Administration and Administrative Justice (guest editors D. Dragos, F. Lafarge, P. Willemsen). The contributions identify problems and suggest solutions concerning important aspects of public administration in various European countries, both from an internal and an external perspective. Again, the papers were fully subjected to a blind peer review process. Finally, continuing this tradition, the papers presented at the EGPA 2013 conference in Edinburgh have been assessed in a double-blind review process and significantly reworked in order to be included in this special issue of the IPAR as scientific articles. The papers in this issue cover a large area of subjects, but all converge towards the relation between - prevailing administrative procedural - law and public administration. Remač, in its contribution on the coordination between Ombudsman and the judiciary, part of his PhD thesis published recently at Intersentia, analyses a fast evolving institution in modern democratic states. The article highlights the main findings and recommendations of a comparative legal research carried out in the area of mutual interrelations of ombudsmen and the judiciary in the Netherlands, England and the European Union. Transparency in public administration with its many facets is one of the main themes of this special issue. Thus, Kovač tackles the procedural aspects of the right to information, from a comparative perspective, emphasizing thus also participatory approach. Based on an analysis of several jurisdictions (USA, Ireland, Sweden, Austria, Germany, Slovenia, Croatia) the author highlights the importance of time limits and of an appeal to an independent body or judicial review, which can contribute to a significantly higher level of implementation of the rights of information. Brink and Marseille continue exploring participatory issues, presenting the findings of a research project on participation of citizens in pre-trial hearings, in selected fields - social security and the civil service. The data indicate that the New Case Management Procedure has the potential to improve the quality of the case treatment. A second article falling within the theme of transparency is written by Dragos, Neamtu and Capraru, and discusses public participation in environmental decision making in Romania, based on the Aarhus convention. The article presents the manner in which the participation pillar from the Aarhus Convention was transposed into the Romanian legislation and how its provisions were applied to a highly controversial case. The environmental issues with special focus on integrated permits in the Netherlands are analyzed by Tolsma, who shows that integration of legislation in the field of environmental law is a growing trend, however questioning whether this specific concept of integrated environmental permitting can be achieved within the constraints of Dutch administrative law. Two articles coming from the Czech Republic deal with issues that are central to the alternative dispute resolution in this country. The first one by Kadečka, Hejč, Prokopova and Venclfček discusses the effectiveness of non-binding Instruments of Protection against Administrative Acts. They show that such tools can have a limited impact due to the absence of devolutive effect and of the independence of the review bodies. In the second article, Skulova, Potešil and Hejč, dwell on the specifics of the remonstrance procedure against decisions made by central administrative bodies. The authors verify the hypothesis whether the institution of remonstrance does reflect the principle of two instances in its entirety, and propose the transformation of remonstrance committees into administrative bodies or administrative tribunal issuing binding acts. A new concept that has received great attention lately, the mediation in public law, is discussed firstly by Goes. He addresses development of legal framework relating to ADR in Belgian public law as a follow up of a more partnerships and consensus oriented relationship between administration and citizens, characterized by reciprocity and dialogue, however with some systemic restrictions within administrative relations. The article by Veny, Carlens, Verbeeck and Warnez in the context of Belgian law refers to specific instances: municipal administrative sanctions and urban planning, presenting additionally to theoretical framework applicative dimensions of the topic. The article concluding the special issue is dedicated to the reform of public administration in Croatia, the newest member of the EU. Đulabić discusses the General Administrative Procedure Act (GAPA), which introduced several novelties in the regulation of general administrative procedure. The author concludes that despite changes to the legal text, the empirical data show that the new GAPA has not resulted in actual changes in everyday public administration. The guest editors would like to express their gratitude to aH contributors to the special issue, and in particular to the reviewers that took the time and effort to assess the submitted papers, as well as to participants to the debates, and to the editors of IPAR for hosting our group's contributions. Special thanks from Dacian Dragos and Francois Lafarge to our colleague Polonca Kovač for her unrelenting efforts towards the realization of this publication. Guest editors: Dacian C. Dragos Polonca Kovač Frangois Lafarge contents / vsebina Milan Remač Coordinating Ombudsmen and the Judiciary? 28 Usklajevanje varuhov človekovih pravic in sodstva: boljše možnosti za posameznike? 1.01 Original scientific article 31 Polonca Kovač Significance of and Comparative Trends in Procedural Regulation of Right to Information 43 Pomen in primerjalni trendi procesnopravne ureditve pravice do informiranja 1.01 Original scientific article 47 Barbara Brink, Albert T. Marseille Participation of Citizens in Pre-Trial Hearings. Review of an Experiment in the Netherlands. 60 Udeležba državljanov v predhodnih postopkih. Pregled poskusa na Nizozemskem. 1.02 Review article 63 Bogdana Neamtu, Dacian C. Dragos, Laura Capraru public participation in environmental Decision Making in Romania 79 Udeležba javnosti pri okoljskih odločitvah v Romuniji 1.02 Review article 81 Hanna Dürtge Tolsma Improving Environmental Permitting Systems: integrated permits in the netherlands 96 Izboljšanje sistemov okoljskih dovoljenj: združena dovoljenja na Nizozemskem 1.01 Original scientific article Stanislav Kadečka, David Hejč, Klara Prokopova, Jiff Venctfček Dispositional Instruments of Protection against Administrative Acts (not in Legal Force) and their Effectiveness 121 Dispozitivna sredstva varstva zoper upravne akte (pred izvršljivostjo) in njihova učinkovitost 1.02 Review article 123 Sona Skulova, Lukaš Potešil, David Hejč Remonstrance Against Decisions Made by Central administrative Bodies in the Czech Republic 141 Ugovor zoper odločitve centralnih upravnih organov na Češkem 1.02 Review article Pieter Goes 143 Legal Framework relating to alternative dispute resolution in Belgian public Law 159 Pravni okvir glede alternativnega reševanja sporov v belgijskem javnem pravu 1.02 Review article Ludo Veny, Ivo Carlens, Bengt Verbeeck, Brecht Warnez 163 Mediation in Belgian administrative practice, with Special Focus on Municipal administrative Sanctions and urban planning 179 Mediacija v belgijski upravni praksi s poudarkom na občinskih upravnih sankcijah in urbanističnem načrtovanju 1.02 Review article Vedran Đulabić 183 New Wine in Old Wineskins: General administrative procedure and public administration reform in Croatia 195 Novo vino v starih mehovih: splošni upravni postopek in reforma javne uprave na Hrvaškem 1.02 Review article UDK: 351.941:351.95 1.01 Original scientific article Coordinating Ombudsmen and the Judiciary? Milan Remač Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance, Utrecht University, the Netherlands milanremac@yahoo.com abstract An ombudsman institution is one of the most rapidly developing institutions in modern democratic states. Ombudsmen can be characterised as individual and impartial investigators of administration and its conduct. They act as dispute resolution mechanisms between the state and individuals and sometimes also as solvers of problems of individuals. In order to assess the quality of administrative conduct they use normative standards against which they assess this conduct. However, all these matters are primarily in the hands of the judiciary. The judiciary, notably administrative courts are the most important dispute resolution mechanisms in modern states that assess the administrative conduct against certain normative standards. Thus ombudsmen and the judiciary can be often seen as institutions having relatively similar competences in a relatively similar area, despite retaining numerous differences. They both are approached by the individuals and they can express their opinions about administrative justice. This paper highlights the main findings and recommendations of a comparative legal research carried out in the area of mutual interrelations of ombudsmen and the judiciary. On the examples of three different legal systems (the Netherlands, England and the European Union) the research discusses the possibility of coordination of relations between the ombudsman and the judiciary in connection with the position of these institutions, with their jurisprudence and ombudsprudence and with normative standards they use in their work. Key words: ombudsmen, judiciary, administrative procedures, coordination JEL: K23, K40 1 Introduction An ombudsman institution is one of the most rapidly developing institutions in modern democratic states.1 Nowadays, only a minor fraction of all states do not have this institution on a national or, at least, on a local level. Usually, they represent the "prolonged hand of national parliaments" in the state administration. In this connection they individually and impartially investigate 1 This paper, as well as the book, uses the term ombudsman also for women working at this post. They do not want to discriminate them but they do it for the sake of consistency of the text. For the same reason they do not use the terms as "ombudswoman", "ombudsperson", "ombudsbody" or "ombuds". Remač, M. (2014). Coordinating Ombudsmen and the Judiciary? Mednarodna revija za javno upravo, XII (2-3), 11-29 the conduct of the administration. While investigating the conduct of the administration they apply normative standards against which they assess this conduct. Generally, they can assess the compliance of administrative conduct against various normative concepts including the law, general concepts such as good administration, proper administration or human rights (Remač, 2013). Ombudsmen also act as dispute resolution mechanisms between the state and individuals. However, they are not the only state institutions that resolve the disputes of discontented individuals. Most countries have other traditional mechanisms that primarily resolve these disputes. These traditional mechanisms are courts and tribunals or, in general, the judiciary. Compared to these traditional mechanisms, ombudsmen generally have several specific competences ("ombudsmen extras") such as own initiative investigations, the ability to make legally non-binding recommendations or the ability to identify and address structural problems within the administration. Relations between ombudsman and the judiciary are nowadays relatively under-researched. One can observe some attempts to investigate these relations in some individual countries (Drago§, Neamtu, & Balica, 2010), but comparative research does not really exist.2 Until now, that is. This was one of the reasons for a PhD research that was carried out between October 2009 and October 2013 at the Montaigne Centre of the Utrecht University. The research was carried out in three completely different legal systems. It includes the legal system of England (common law), the legal system of the Netherlands (continental law) and the legal system of the European Union and specifically the following ombudsman institutions: • the Dutch National Ombudsman, • the UK Parliamentary Ombudsman, • English Local Government Ombudsmen and • the European Ombudsman. The research answered three research questions directly connected with the coordination between ombudsmen and the judiciary, namely: • how are the relations between ombudsmen and the judiciary as state institutions coordinated in the researched systems and what is the content of this coordination? • what is the mutual significance of the reports and the judgments and their content for the other researched institution and what are their interrelations? and • what is the mutual significance of the normative standards of ombudsmen and the judiciary in the researched systems and what are the interrelations between these normative standards? 2 There is comparative research on the ombudsmen included in Kucsko-Stadlmayer (2008) but this particular research compares the ombudsman institutions between themselves and not with the judiciary. In order to answer these research questions in a systematic manner, the research assessed several written sources: • academic writings and articles written about ombudsmen and the judiciary in the researched systems; • presentations and speeches of the researched ombudsmen; • written law, including statutes establishing ombudsmen and their competences;3 statutes establishing the judiciary,4 and sub-statutory rules dealing with the powers of ombudsmen or the judiciary.5 In connection with the part of the research dealing with the European Union the major treaties were researched; • jurisprudence of the courts and tribunals included into the research. In this connection a limitation was adopted as only court decisions from 2005-2013 were closely researched;6 • ombudsprudence of the researched ombudsmen. A time limitation was adopted also in connection with the ombudsprudence as only the "decisions" of ombudsmen from 2005-2013 were closely researched;7 and • other documents adopted and developed by the ombudsmen (annual reports and collections of their normative standards). In order to provide also an empirical direction to the research, a number of interviews were carried out. The interviewed persons were all (at the time of the research) incumbent ombudsmen, various judges from national courts and tribunals and from the Court of Justice of the European Union and various professionals working directly with the researched institutions. From a methodological perspective the research was a combination of traditional legal (desk) research and empirical research, as part of the data was received through interviews or questionnaires. In general, the research used three different systems of ombudsmen-judiciary relations as three different case studies.8 This paper points to the main findings and the conclusions of the research. The validity and accuracy of the individual findings were, among others, ensured by a substantive and comprehensive check of the parts dealing with the different legal systems by academics with an in-depth knowledge of each legal system included in the research. The findings were also presented before an international academic public on several occasions. 3 For example, Dutch 1982 Wet Nationale ombudsman or UK 1974 Local Government Act. 4 For example, Dutch 1975 Wet op de Raad van State or the UK 1981 Supreme Court Act. 5 For example, the UK Civil procedure rules or the UK Pre-Action protocol for judicial review. 6 In some cases, for example, when dealing with the normative coordination between ombudsmen and the judiciary, the research also takes into account older court decisions. 7 In some cases, for example, when dealing with the normative coordination between ombudsmen and the judiciary, the research also takes into account older court decisions. 8 In order to see a complete methodology of the research see, Remač, 2014, pp. 11-24. The findings included in this paper are based on a comparative research of the relations in three legal systems included in the research (England, the Netherlands and the European Union) and they represent a set of final findings of a PhD research published by the publishing house Intersentia in 2014. 2 Coordination between ombudsmen and the judiciary? Generally, ombudsmen and the judiciary exist alongside each other. First of all, the judiciary and ombudsmen are state institutions. They exercise state powers provided for them by the legislator through the law. They exercise these powers in a similar sphere - the sphere of administrative justice.9 If one perceives their roles in a broad fashion it is possible to see that the judiciary and ombudsman exercise their functions as dispute resolution mechanisms between individuals and the (state) administration. In connection with the original relation between individuals and the administration the ombudsmen and the judiciary are both in a secondary position. The judiciary here stands as a traditional dispute resolution mechanism while the ombudsmen are one of the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.10 Based on this presumption, the dispute resolution function of ombudsmen has an alternative and subsidiary character as regards the dispute resolution function of the judiciary. However, it is not just an alternative, as ombudsmen can approach a different aspect of the conduct of the administration or approach the same conduct by the administration while applying different methods and techniques to those of the judiciary, such as informally approaching the administration, trying to mediate the dispute or trying to reach a friendly settlement between the parties to the dispute. Despite the differences between these institutions one cannot overlook their potential similarities and overlaps. These matters then raise several questions relating to the desirability of coordination between these institutions. When applying the basics of Minzberg's organisational theory" to the relations between ombudsmen and the judiciary one has to take into account two fundamental and opposing requirements of this theory: the division of labour into the various tasks and the coordination of these tasks accomplishing the goal.12 If we look at the state as a big "organisation" these two requirements are also visible. Coordination, according to Mintzberg, is based on several mechanisms that should be considered as the most basic 9 The comprehensive definition of "administrative justice" was (until August 2013) applied by the Administrative Justice and Tribunal Council (England) according to which administrative justice includes the procedures for making administrative decisions, the law that regulates decision-making, and the systems (such as the various tribunals and ombudsmen) that enable people to challenge these decisions. See, Principles for Administrative Justice (2010). 10 See, for example, Reif (2004, p.16). 11 See Organisation theory is used to explain tendencies that drive effective organisations to structure themselves as they do. See, Mintzberg (1983, p. 3). 12 Ibid. elements of the structure, the glue that holds organisations together. These mechanisms include mutual adjustment, direct supervision, standardization of work processes, standardization of output, standardization of skills and standardization of norms (Mintzberg, 1979, p. 3). Thus, coordination within this meaning is not perceived as coordination which is only included in formal and legally binding norms. In line with this theory, in this book coordination between ombudsmen and the judiciary is perceived as the managing of cooperative or competitive dependencies between ombudsmen and the judiciary in order to reach common goals. The research recognises three different levels of the coordination of ombudsmen-judiciary relations: the level of institutional coordination, the level of case coordination and the level of normative coordination. The first level (institutional coordination) is the broadest as it covers coordination between ombudsmen and the judiciary as state institutions. This level is connected with the doctrine of the division of powers and the doctrine of checks and balances between the ombudsmen and the judiciary. The second level (case coordination) covers coordination between ombudsmen and the judiciary as dispute resolution mechanisms and institutions that stand between individuals and the state. It is connected with the perception of ombudsmen and the judiciary as checks and balances against executive power. The third level (normative coordination) is the narrowest one. It is only connected with the normative standards applied and developed by these institutions both within and outside their proceedings. It can be perceived from the position of law and morality and law and good administration. The research of these three levels of coordination led in the thesis to several research-based findings and several analyse-based recommendations. 2.1 Institutional coordination On the level of institutional coordination the research led to the findings connected with the institutional organisation of ombudsmen and the judiciary. Similar to the other two levels of coordination these findings are based on an analysis of ombudsmen-judiciary relations in the Netherlands, England and the EU. The findings presented here are also explained. However, in comparison with the original text of the book the explanations of these findings are more general and do not refer back to the particular legal system or systems where they were found. For more precise and more comprehensive findings, see the findings included in the text of the thesis itself. The first finding on this level is rather obvious. It states that despite their similarities, the ombudsmen and the judiciary are different bodies and that ombudsmen are not only dispute resolution mechanisms. The powers of the judiciary are in principle well known. The judiciary solves disputes between parties in formal procedures that lead to legally binding judgments. The judiciary assesses compliance with the law by using codified or uncodified legal norms. General knowledge concerning ombudsmen is not that extensive. Although they have been around since at least the 1960s one can see that there is a tendency for ombudsmen to reiterate their powers and to underline their independence. Ombudsmen are traditionally perceived as alternative dispute mechanisms in addition to the courts. The research shows that the term "alternative" does not only mean only that a dispute can be solved by ombudsmen or by the judiciary, but also that ombudsmen have some additional competences that distinguish them and their dispute resolution from that of the judiciary. These additional strengths include their own-initiative investigations; the possibility to make non-binding recommendations; the ability to address structural problems of the administration and to highlight them; the potential to develop norms of conduct and guidance for administrative conduct; and, last but not least the discretion of ombudsmen to approach the problem between the individual and the (state) administration in any way that can potentially lead to a solution of the core of this problem. The existence of these powers and their application by ombudsmen points to the fact that they are not identical to the judiciary. These powers are also a sign that an ombudsman institution is not a kind of inferior court. Of course, one should not see ombudsmen as a panacea for aH administrative problems (Remač, 2014, p. 331). The second finding is also rather obvious and shows that the legislator only formally establishes a general institutional framework with powers and competences for the ombudsmen and the judiciary. In the researched systems, ombudsmen were established within the system of a working judiciary. The judiciary as one of the traditional bearers of state powers was provided with the power to resolve disputes between individuals and the (state) administration. It resolves these disputes in connection with the normative concepts of lawfulness or legality.13 The researched ombudsmen, however, resolve these disputes in connection with the normative concepts of good (proper) administration. Different normative concepts of the ombudsmen and the judiciary are determined by the legislator as the general framework where these state institutions exercise their competences and powers. This finding shows that the legislator plays an important role in the existence of these institutions and the division of their powers as well as in setting their frameworks (Remač, 2014, p. 332). The third finding on the level of institutional coordination reveals that the protection and dispute resolution of the judiciary often limit the protection and dispute resolution of the ombudsmen while the protection and dispute resolution of the ombudsmen do not, in principle, limit the protection and dispute resolution of the judiciary. The three researched systems show that 13 The ombudsmen included in the research belong into what can be traditionally described as the "second generation of the ombudsmen". They assess the compliance of the administration against the general concept of good administration, proper administration or they discover maladministration or malpractice in the work of administration. See, Remač (2013). formally the protection offered by ombudsmen is somewhat limited if the judiciary exercises or has already exercised its protection functions. The ombudsmen are often required to halt their investigations (or not to start them at all) if the substance of the complaint has previously been dealt with by the judiciary or is at the time of the investigation currently being resolved by judiciary. Thus despite the different normative frameworks of ombudsmen and the judiciary, they cannot deal with the same substance of the cases simultaneously. Conversely, if the ombudsmen have assessed the substance of the case, the judiciary can generally deal with the case from the position of lawfulness. The research shows that ombudsmen occasionally have discretion to investigate complaints even if their substance has already been assessed by the judiciary, although these situations are not very common.14 A further finding shows that the interaction between ombudsmen and the judiciary follows, almost identically, the framework designed by the legislator and the interpretation of the courts. Beyond this framework, any (formal or informal) interaction between these institutions is only marginal and occurs on an ad hoc basis. Although ombudsmen and the judiciary provide an independent and impartial dispute resolution and for that reason they stand between individuals and the administration, their interaction is very limited, indeed it is almost non-existent. Formally, these institutions stick closely to their spheres of interest and general frameworks. Only rarely do legal provisions expressly enable some form of cooperation between ombudsmen and the judiciary. Because of this, formal interplay and cooperation between them are rather uncommon. So is their informal interplay. The existing communication or cooperation only takes place on an ad hoc basis. It is by no means premeditated. The practice of informal interaction can range from unofficial meetings between judges and ombudsmen at conferences to the official meetings between the presidents of the courts and ombudsmen. This limited interaction is usually explained by different competences, different normative concepts and different working methods. One can also discover a tendency to underline the necessity of complete institutional independence." The last finding on the level of institutional coordination shows that the courts sometimes explain their ability to review the legality of the reports or actions of ombudsmen and that even if they deduce that they have these powers, they generally respect the competences of the ombudsmen. In some systems the courts review the legality of ombudsmen's actions and decisions. This power is usually not provided on the basis of statutory law but the courts derive it from the character of such a legality review. The research shows that the courts are careful when making use of this competence. Nonetheless, if a court can judicially review the actions of an ombudsman the character of their relationship thereby changes. While exercising their functions ombudsmen must then take into account "the court behind their shoulder". Interestingly enough, this power of the courts cannot be understood as an appeal against the reports or any other decisions of the ombudsmen. A judicial review is usually only connected with assessing whether an ombudsman, while reaching his decisions, has acted in a lawful manner. Sometimes the possibility to assess the legality of an ombudsman's actions is connected with cases of the ombudsman's responsibility for non-contractual damage.16 2.2 Case coordination The level of case coordination is directly connected with institutional coordination and with the fact that both institutions act as dispute resolution mechanisms. It covers the possible coordination between the formal results of the deliberating and decision-making processes of ombudsmen and the courts, i.e., the reports and judgments." Here the research demonstrates the following findings. The first finding on this level is that relations between ombudsmen and the judgments of the judiciary as well as the judiciary and the ombudsmen's decisions are regulated only marginally. The legislator only determines the "field of play" for ombudsmen and the judiciary as well as the general rules. Any interconnection between reports and judgments is overlooked although the legislator often limits an ombudsman's ability to control court judgments. The legislator often lays down rules on what type of evidence can be taken into account by the courts while deciding a case. The reports of the ombudsmen are not excluded. Conversely, in the case of ombudsmen this is usually left to the ombudsmen's discretion (Remač, 2014, p. 339.). The second finding argues that when necessary, ombudsmen, while drafting their reports, make cross-references to the case law of the courts (and the law in general). Conversely, however, while drafting their judgments, the judiciary only rarely makes cross-references to the reports of ombudsmen. Neither the ombudsmen nor the judiciary exist in a normative or societal vacuum. In all three researched systems it was possible to discover cases where ombudsmen make cross-references to judgments or to the judiciary. The reasons for such practice can be connected with a need to inform the readers of the reports about the facts of the case; to explain the applicability of the judgment in the ombudsman's investigation or to use the rule previously adopted by the court and by that to support his own findings. Ombudsmen do not assess the quality of the judgments or the findings of the courts. Also the judiciary sometimes makes cross-references to ombudsmen or their reports. The reasons for this are very similar. They either try to inform the readers of the judgments about the facts of the case; to explain the applicability of the report or the powers of the ombudsman in general. Exceptionally, they use the rule previously 16 Ibid., p. 335. 17 Although the report is not the only possible result of the ombudsman investigations, it can be perceived as a general term for the results of these investigations whether they are called investigation reports, draft recommendations or decisions etc. applied by an ombudsman or use his report to support their own findings. In cases where the courts can assess the legality of ombudsmen's actions they make assessment statements about these actions. In general, this practice is ad hoc and it is not premeditated. In this case one can observe a difference in the inquisitorial approach of ombudsmen and the mainly adversarial approach of the judiciary.18 The next finding explains that ombudsmen acknowledge the applicability of judgments for their investigations/inquiries. Sometimes they consider them to be decisive in an investigated case. The judiciary does not ignore the existence of ombudsmen's reports in its proceedings. However, it does not consider them to be decisive for its judgments. This shows that ombudsmen are aware of the judgments of the judiciary. They are aware of them in the same way as they are aware of the statutory law. If necessary, the jurisprudence of the courts (and statutory law) is taken into account. If the court, while assessing the lawfulness of an administrative action finds unlawfulness of this action, it is possible that ombudsmen will find a breach of good administration standards in a substantively similar case. This depends, however, on the connection between lawfulness and good or proper administration. On the other hand, one cannot say that the judiciary is ignorant of the reports of ombudsmen, although it uses them only rarely. The reports of ombudsmen do not have any special status among the evidence submitted to the courts. A report by an ombudsman is in principle not enough for the court to find a breach of law or to award damages." The last finding on the level of case coordination reveals that an individual can rely on ombudsmen's reports in court proceedings and on judgments during an ombudsman's investigation/inquiry. Nonetheless, it is the ombudsmen and the judiciary themselves who decide what authority judgments or reports have in connection with a particular case. The research showed that individuals often rely on ombudsmen's reports in court proceedings and on judgments during investigations by ombudsmen. A priori neither statutory law, nor secondary legislation or the practice of these institutions reject the possibility for individuals to rely on these documents. If such documents are submitted to them, they take them into account. If they are important for the investigation of an ombudsman or the court proceedings these institutions will refer to them. If a report or a judgment is not applicable, the courts or the ombudsmen will explain this. There is a general rule that a judgment which finds that there has been a breach of the law does not directly lead to a report which finds maladministration or improper administration and, vice versa, a report finding maladministration or improper administration does not directly lead to a judgment which finds that there has been a breach of the law. A judgement or a report is but one piece of evidence that should be weighed by the ombudsmen and the judiciary.20 2.3 Normative coordination The third level of coordination, normative coordination between ombudsmen and the judiciary, is connected with the normative standards that they use when assessing the administrative action in question. The basis for the normative coordination is the institutional coordination between ombudsmen and the judiciary and the overlapping character of the normative concepts used by ombudsmen and the judiciary - lawfulness and good (proper) administration. Firstly, the legislator acknowledges the existence of different normative concepts of ombudsmen and the judiciary. The coordination of this matter is left to their practice. In connection with normative coordination the legislator is rather passive. Still, here it does play a certain role as it is the legislator that divides competences between ombudsmen and the judiciary and expressly decides that the judiciary assesses compliance with the law and ombudsmen assess compliance with a general normative concept such as good or proper administration. Although the legislator decides what is law (in a legislative process) it only rarely explains what is good (proper) administration or maladministration. The contents of these terms are left to the practice of the ombudsmen. Only rarely does the legislator or the jurisprudence "help" ombudsmen with the meaning of these terms. Similarly, the legislator is silent on the relationship between normative concepts such as good (proper) administration and lawfulness. It leaves this issue to the mutual practice of ombudsmen and the judiciary and, naturally, to academic interest^1 The second finding on this level reveals that ombudsmen and the judiciary develop their normative standards separately. Nonetheless, during the development of these standards inspiration can be drawn from other, already existing standards. Ombudsmen, as well as the judiciary, have normative functions. Generally, the judiciary can discover new legal principles. These new legal principles can remain as unwritten law or they can be codified in statutory or even constitutional law. The general principles of law are then used as normative standards of the judiciary. The normative function of ombudsmen is connected with the necessity to explain the content of general normative concepts as good/proper administration. This explanation is connected either with the development of the requirements of good/ proper administration, i.e. individual principles of this concept, or with the development of general guidance and recommendations on good/proper administrative conduct. It is evident that ombudsmen actively approach their normative functions through the development of lists of requirements 20 Ibid., p. 342. 21 Ibid., p. 346. for good (proper) administration and the publishing of general guidance documents on good (proper) administrative conduct.22 The third finding has found that one can distinguish a formal and substantive overlap between some normative standards of the ombudsmen and the judiciary. Some of the normative standards of these institutions, however, do not overlap at all. Although the normative standards of ombudsmen and the judiciary have developed independently, one can discover some similarity between these normative standards. This similarity has two different layers. There is formal similarity that is connected with the wording and denomination of the individual standards. And there is substantive similarity that is connected with the content of individual standards. It seems that the majority of these normative standards developed and discovered by the judiciary are in one way or another reflected in the normative standards of ombudsmen. One cannot say that the normative standards of ombudsmen are merely reproductions of judicial or legal principles. The overlap does not stem from the binding power of the standards but from the value that is protected by them. The research proves that these substantively overlapping normative standards protect the same (or at least very similar) general values. The value is included in the general societal ethos. Depending on the importance of certain values, some of them are protected in a "hard way" by the judiciary as well as in a "soft way" by ombudsmen. Still, some of the normative standards do not overlap at all, i.e. the value is protected only by ombudsmen or by the judiciary. This shows that the normative standards of ombudsmen are not entirely identical to the normative standards of the judiciary. They can protect values that remain unprotected by the courts.23 Another finding shows that a breach of the normative standards of the court can be evaluated by ombudsmen as a breach of their normative standards. Despite a substantive overlap between these normative standards, a breach of the ombudsmen's normative standards is only rarely identified by the courts as a breach of their normative standards. The normative standards of ombudsmen and the judiciary differ. Despite their substantive similarity, breaches of these standards do not have the same consequences. A breach of the normative standards of the courts is necessarily a breach of the law and can be enforced. A breach of the normative standards of ombudsmen does not include any such penalty. The difference between these standards is underlined by the fact that a breach of the normative standards of one institution does not always lead to a breach of the normative standards of the other institution. This possibility is however not entirely excluded. In the ombudsprudence one can discover cases where a breach of a legal norm also leads to a breach of an ombudsnorm. However, a breach of an ombudsnorm only rarely directly leads to a breach of a legal norm. This is connected with the character of the normative concept that is protected by ombudsmen. Concepts such as good (proper) administration are more flexible and more comprehensive than lawfulness. These concepts usually cover compliance with the law (including human rights) and compliance with good (proper) administration requirements in a strict sense. In all the legal systems studied it is possible to distinguish between the concept of good/proper administration and the concept of lawfulness. This leads to four different situations in which the administrative conduct in question can be either: Administrative conduct Good or proper Maladministrative or improper Lawful Lawful and proper (good) Lawful but improper (maladministrative) Unlawful Unlawful but proper (good) Unlawful and improper (maladministrative) This scheme 24 shows that there can be a difference between compliance with the law and compliance with ombudsnorms. They are parallel concepts. The conduct of the administration should comply with legal principles as well as with ombudsnorms (Remač, 2014, p. 349.). The last finding reveals that in the case of a substantive overlap, the normative standards of ombudsmen can potentially have a different application than the normative standards of the judiciary. A substantive overlap between the normative standards of the ombudsmen and the judiciary does not mean that the application of these normative standards is the same. In the practice of these institutions one can see that the normative standards of ombudsmen can be applied in a similar fashion as the standards of the courts. In this case the normative standards of the judiciary (legal norms) generally determine a minimum standard of administrative conduct. Theoretically, if an institution is going to act in accordance with this minimum standard, its conduct will be (in this connection) lawful and proper (good). However, one can also discover that the substantively overlapping normative standards can be applied by ombudsmen in a different, more lenient fashion that those of the judiciary. Then the ombudsnorms determine a minimum standard for conduct, at least for the ombudsmen. Then, theoretically, if an institution acts in accordance with the legal standard its actions may not satisfy the requirements of the ombudsman" 3 Recommended Changes of Existing Designs The research shows that the systems of the ombudsmen and the judiciary as it is designed nowadays work. This however does not mean that these systems cannot work better. An analysis of the findings has led to several general recommendations that can potentially improve the mutual work 24 The scheme used in this research has its basis in so called "Ombudskwadrant" developed by the Dutch National Ombudsman. See, Nationale ombudsman (2006, p. 16). 25 Ibid., p. 351. of these institutions but also the chances of individuals in disputes with the administration. In connection with institutional coordination the analysis has led to the following recommendations: 1. The statutory bars barring ombudsmen from investigating complaints if they cover the same facts as applications to the judiciary should be removed. 2. The judiciary should have the competence to refer a case to the ombudsman if it clearly involves maladministration (improper administration) falling short of unlawfulness. At the same time the judiciary should have the competence to inform the ombudsman about possible structural administrative problems. In both cases the ombudsman should have the discretion to investigate these cases. 3. There should be a communication forum where ombudsmen and the judiciary can discuss certain issues connected with improving the protection offered to individuals, their own roles, their different points of view or other matters connected with their functions. These recommendations can lead to a possible improvement in the protection offered to individuals and to the full use of the potential of the judiciary and ombudsmen. First of all, ombudsmen offer additional protection compared to the courts. They assess compliance with a different normative concept than the courts. Because of this they should have the possibility to deal with the substance of the problem from the position of good (proper) administration if the court is already dealing with the substance of the problem from the position of lawfulness. Furthermore, if the judiciary and the ombudsmen were able to refer a part of the problem that is directly connected with a different normative concept to the other body, the problem could be solved from both perspectives (lawfulness and good administration). Clarification concerning the positions of these institutions (especially the powers of the ombudsmen) can lead to a better understanding but also to a better exercise of their powers as well as offering complete protection for individuals. In connection with case coordination the analysis has led to the following recommendations: 1. The judiciary should not a priori reject the facts found by ombudsmen during their investigations. If they are relevant for the pertinent legal question, the judiciary could take them as a starting point in its assessment unless proved otherwise during the proceedings. 2. The judiciary and the ombudsmen should pay more attention to the explanation concerning the importance of the findings of the other institutions for their own proceedings or investigations, if these findings have been raised by one of the parties to their procedures. The results of ombudsmen's investigations and the proceedings of the judiciary, i.e., the reports and judgments, are a formal expression of their work. The reports and their findings are based on the facts that are assessed by meticulous investigations by the ombudsmen. The findings of the ombudsmen are not a priori positive for individuals as ombudsmen try to be impartial and independent. Because of that the facts proven by ombudsmen, if they are referred to during court proceedings, should not be immediately rejected by the judiciary merely because it was only an ombudsman who found them. Individuals often rely on the reports of ombudsmen in proceedings before the court and on judgments during an ombudsman's investigation. For an individual it is often difficult to see (without an explanation) the difference between a report and a judgment. Because of the fact that individuals support their contentions with reports or judgments, the ombudsmen and the judiciary should explain the reasons for their application or conversely their rejection. In connection with normative coordination the analysis has led to the following recommendations: 1. Ombudsmen should constantly (re)develop and apply their normative standards in practice. They should do this for the benefit of the administration, for the sake of clarity and to uphold their standards and for the sake of protecting individuals and society as a whole. 2. Ombudsmen should always refer to and explain the applied and breached normative standards in the findings and/or conclusions of their reports. 3. When developing normative standards which overlap with written law, ombudsmen should follow the meaning of written law. 4. When developing normative standards which overlap with unwritten legal principles, ombudsmen should do this freely; however, their development should take into account the general value that is protected by unwritten legal principles. 5. The judiciary should not overlook the normative standards of ombudsmen, as they may potentially have a positive impact on the development of the law. It is thus necessary for the judiciary to be aware of the normative standards of ombudsmen. The normative standards of ombudsmen and of the judiciary are a manifestation of their normative function. In this area, ombudsmen are more active than the judiciary. This is connected with the flexibility or rather the vagueness of their normative concepts. Because of that they should clearly explain what the content of such a normative concept is. As shown by all three case studies, the development and application of normative standards by ombudsmen and the judiciary is relatively independent. One can imagine that ombudsmen develop and apply their normative standards in a more lenient fashion than the judiciary, i.e. differently. On the one hand, it is necessary for ombudsmen to apply and develop their principles in a more lenient and more flexible way because they evaluate compliance with a general normative concept that is not identical to lawfulness. On the other hand, this normative concept often requires the administration to act in compliance with the law and legal principles. Especially this second point can be used in order to question an ombudsman's leniency. An over-lenient approach by the ombudsman to a normative standard overlapping with written law can lead to uncertainty about the contents of this standard. Ombudsmen as state institutions are naturally bound by the law. Ombudsmen have greater flexibility when developing standards which overlap with unwritten principles of the law. For the sake of clarity concerning their normative concepts, they should refer in their findings to the normative standards used and breached. As the development of the law or of good (proper) administration is far from complete ombudsmen and the judiciary should also pay attention to the normative standards of the other institution as they can be an inspiration for the further development of these normative concepts. 4 Conclusions This article does not give as much information as the book can give, but it provides with findings and recommendations included in the thesis that was published at the beginning of 2014. Nonetheless, it shows that ombudsmen and the judiciary are two different state institutions with their own competences, their own work, their own working methods and their own normative concepts and standards. Despite these differences, they have in common the fact that they resolve disputes between individuals and the administration. They both add to the protection of individuals. They try to solve the problems of the administration (legal or otherwise) and inevitably they add to the trust of individuals in the state. While they exercise their functions one can discover a place for their potential coordination. One can see that there is institutional coordination that rules the competences and roles between these institutions. Here it is not possible to overlook the role of the legislator that actively sets the framework for the work of ombudsmen and the judiciary. The design of the institutional coordination predestines any other type of coordination between these institutions. Because of that, case coordination, coordination linked with the findings of the ombudsmen and the judiciary and normative coordination, coordination of their normative standards are directly connected with their competences. One can imagine a further coordination of the actions of ombudsmen and the judiciary in the sense of mutual cooperation. Such coordination may allow the judiciary and the ombudsmen to use their powers more comprehensively. It can also bring more clarity to their normative standards and enable mutual coordination during their development. Last but not least, it can lead to a better understanding of the different types of protection afforded to individuals and can provide them with a complete assessment of their disputes with the administration. Thus, cooperation between ombudsmen and the judiciary can influence the fulfilment of their roles, the protection of individuals, the development of normative concepts and standards and dispute resolution as such. Ombudsmen and the judiciary as state institutions have their strengths and weaknesses. First of all, the protection of individuals and the dispute resolution provided by the judiciary are often not enough. If this were so, there would not be any need for an ombudsman in the first place. However, individuals often need more than just formal confirmation that they were right and that the administration was wrong. They need their problem to be solved. Ombudsmen can provide additional dispute resolution. They can react to the particular problem and if the administration is willing to cooperate, they can work on its swift and informal removal. Their informal methods of dispute resolution and their non-legally binding problem-prevention recommendations can add to the legally binding assessments of the judiciary. Ombudsmen also have specific powers that can push them beyond the mechanism for solving disputes. For instance, their own-interest investigations and their non-binding recommendations provide a considerable addition to the protection of individuals. They are not only dispute resolution mechanisms. At the same time, one must understand that ombudsmen are not a panacea for the administration. They cannot heal or prevent all its problems. Undoubtedly, they can bring a more "moral" sense to the administration but they can only do this within the limits and competences given to them. Generally, ombudsmen and the judiciary understand that their different roles and different powers allow them to approach disputes from different perspectives. They should however try to understand that only one way of solving disputes is often not enough to solve the problem between an individual and the administration in a comprehensive manner. The first step in this understanding can be reached through broader communication. Such communication can perhaps show that they are not mutual competitors but that they can work together towards general goals within the competences that are given to them. It is not enough to say we do something else and that is why we do not need to cooperate. It is more challenging to say we do something else, but we also keep in mind that our general goals can bring us closer and help us to work better and in the interest of individuals, the administration and society as a whole. Milan Remač read law in P.J. Šafarik University in Košice, Slovakia (19982003), international and European law in University of Amsterdam (20062007). Between 2003 and 2006 he worked at the Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic and between 2007 and 2009 at the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic (Office of the Agent of the Government before the European Court of Human Rights). From 2009 until 2013 he worked on his PhD thesis on the mutual relations between ombudsmen and the judiciary at the Institute of Constitutional and Administrative Law, Montaigne Centre, Utrecht University. During that period he authored and co-authored a number of articles which were published in various journals and anthologies. He taught courses on European administrative law. POVZETEK 1.01 Izvirni znanstveni članek Usklajevanje varuhov človekovih pravic in sodstva: boljše možnosti za posameznike? Ključne besede: ombudsman - varuh človekovih pravic, sodstvo, upravni postopki, usklajevanje Institucija varuha človekovih pravic je ena od najhitreje razvijajočih se institucij v sodobnih demokratičnih državah. Varuhe človekovih pravic lahko označimo za posamične in neodvisne preiskovalce uprave in njenega ravnanja. Delujejo kot mehanizmi za reševanje sporov med državo in posamezniki, včasih pa tudi kot reševalci težav posameznikov. Za oceno kakovosti ravnanja uprave uporabljajo normativne standarde, katerih izpolnjevanje preverjajo. Vendar pa so vse te zadeve primarno v pristojnosti sodstva. Sodstvo in predvsem upravna sodišča so najpomembnejši mehanizem za reševanje sporov, ki ocenjuje upravno ravnanje v primerjavi z določenimi normativnimi standardi. Tako lahko varuha človekovih pravic in sodstvo pogosto označimo za instituciji z relativno podobnimi pristojnostmi na razmeroma podobnem področju, čeprav med njima obstajajo številne razlike. Na oba se obračajo posamezniki in oba lahko izražata svoje mnenje o upravni pravičnosti. V članku so poudarjene glavne ugotovitve in priporočila primerjalno-pravne raziskave, ki je bila izvedena na področju medsebojnih odnosov varuhov človekovih pravic in sodstva. Raziskava na primerih treh različnih pravnih sistemov (Nizozemska, Anglija in Evropska unija) obravnava možnosti usklajevanja odnosov med varuhom človekovih pravic in sodstvom v povezavi s položajem obeh institucij, z njuno prakso in normativnimi standardi, ki jih uporabljata pri svojem delu. Bibliography and references Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council. (2010). Principles for Administrative Justice: Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council. Drago?, D., Neamtu, B. & Balica, D. (2010). The Romanian Ombudsman and its interaction with the courts - an exploratory research. Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences, 31, 58-75. Kucsko-Stadlmayer, G. (Ed.). (2008). European Ombudsman-Institutions: A comparative legal analysis regarding the multifaceted realisation of an idea. Wien: Springer. Mintzberg, H. (1979). The structuring of organizations. Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. Mintzberg, H. (1983). Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations. Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. Nationale Ombudsman. (2006). Verslag van de Nationale ombudsman over 2006 ("Regel is regel"): Nationale Ombudsman. Reif, L. (2004). The Ombudsman Good Governance and the International Human Rights System. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Remac, M. (2013). Standards of Ombudsman Assessment: A New Normative Concept?, Utrecht Law Review, 9 (3), 62-78. Remač, M. (2014). Coordinating ombudsmen and the judiciary: A comparative view on the relations between ombudsmen and the judiciary in the Netherlands, England and the European Union. Morsel: Intersentia. UDK: 659.3:35 1.01 Original scientific article Significance of and Comparative Trends in Procedural Regulation of Right to Information Polonca Kovač Faculty of Administration, University of Ljubljana polonca.kovac@fu.uni-lj.si abstract Any legal right is (more) efficiently pursued if sufficient procedural regulation supports its substantive setting. This article is dedicated to an analysis of procedural regulation of right to information (RTI) since its significance is increasing in terms of developing good governance and good administration within contemporary transparent, open and collaborative society. The comparative analysis of selected countries (USA, Ireland, Sweden, Austria, Germany, Slovenia, Croatia) included herein proves that selected procedural institutions, such as time limits and an appeal to an independent body or judicial review, contribute to a significantly higher level of implementation of the RTI in practice as also indicated by several international studies. In conclusion, the author recommends certain good practices, especially significance of RTI implementation in relation to different authorities in the context of administrative procedure guaranteeing constitutional and supranational transparency principles. Key words: RTI, transparency, comparative analysis, procedural law, administrative procedure, time limit, appeal JEL: K23, K41 1 Introduction The right to information (RTI) has been gaining importance over time. RTI in fact enables the application of two key concepts of modern society, the state, and administration. First, serving as a foundation of the rights of defense of weaker parties against the authorities, access to information contributes to the development of the rule of law as it restricts authoritative power and provides constitutional guarantees to the addressees of the norms. second, by developing good governance and good administration RTI enables, on the one hand, the establishment of a dialogue between the rulers and the ruled, i.e., partnership and the participation of the latter in designing and implementing public policies and, on the other, the transparency and accountability of the bearers of public authorities. However, typically the principle of transparency and/or openness is difficult to categorize, since Kovač, P. (2014). Significance of and Comparative Trends in Procedural Regulation of Right to Information 31 Mednarodna revija za javno upravo, XII (2-3), 31-45 it emerges in different perspectives and legal or policy frameworks and papers as a classical safeguard or/and modern standard (cf. Savino, 2010, pp. 21-30). The modernization of public administration into cooperative open administration is thus both a tool and a target whereby and towards which the state changes the course of public affairs governance from mere administration to integral governance and social progress.1 RTI is regulated in almost half of the countries in the world at the constitutional level and implemented by means of a special law known in most cases as the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or - generally speaking - RTI law, following the first examples in Sweden (1776), Finland (1919), the USA (1966), etc. According to the Global Right to Information Rating (GRTI), 93 countries had special RTI laws in as of 2013. Furthermore, RTI is recognized as a fundamental right by several international documents, including the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, 1953), Council of Europe (CoE) Resolution (77)31 on the Protection of the Individual in Relation to the Acts of Administrative Authorities (1977) and Resolution (81)19 on the Access to Information Held by Public Authorities, the EU Ombudsman's Code of Good Administrative Behavior (2005), and Articles 41 and 42 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2010). However, the above legal acts do not fully concur and differ as to the understanding and regulation of RTI. Resolution 81(19), for instance, underlines that in order to exercise RTI, the necessary means and ways should be provided, namely that RTI should be granted within a reasonable period of time, refusal reasoned and the applicant must be guaranteed judicial protection. This resolution was updated with Rec (2002) 2 on Access to Official Documents, which provided that RTI is to be decided by an independent body and it is necessary to carry out a »public interest override« and »harm test« (Šturm et al., 2011, p. 608). In the event of diverging interests, the burden of proof is on the person opposing disclosure ("reverse FOIA"). Exceptions are allowed, yet not in absolute terms. The article addresses theoretical overview of procedural functions in order to realize RTI as a fundamental human right. However, it is emphasized that procedural regulation inevitably enhances implementation of legal interests pursued by supra- and national substantive law. Even more, certain procedural institutions prove to be a necessity, such as in a case of RTI (de)formalization of applications and acts, time limits set and in particular an administrative-judicial protection of claimants. In order to examine the significance of these elements of RTI, a comparative analysis was carried out in selected countries of different legal traditions (Anglo-Saxon vs. German vs. Central Eastern Europe). Hence, the main research question addressed herein is the 1 For more on good and open administration and related concepts, cf. Nehl, 1999, pp. 13-26; Kovač, Rakar, & Remic, 2012, pp. 26-61; Kovač, 2013, pp. 2-4. The concept of "freedom of information" as a base in the field is broader than the RTI mostly dealt with herein, since RTI laws imply also the obligation to publish specific public information (proactive transparency) and the re-use of information. significance and impact of certain procedural institutions to a (higher) level of implementation of RTI in practice. Taking into account legal theory and empirical findings of comparative analysis, finally, several conclusions and general recommendations on RTI de lege ferenda, irrespective of individual countries, are drawn. 2 The Procedural Regulation's Significance for the Exercise of RTI 2.1 General on the functions of procedure Substantive law alone does not suffice for any right to be fully implemented. Hence, most countries address the procedural aspects of RTI in specific laws, many of them even with additional subsidiary use of the relevant (General) Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The latter certainly makes sense. Namely, an access to public information as such is by definition an administrative matter since individuals, while asserting the right to access data, actually wish to exercise a positive right in their relations with public authorities.2 The importance of procedural regulation or procedural law in general has changed over time, in both theory and practice. The once narrow understanding that procedure - in terms of its content or substantive law - has a merely auxiliary or instrumental nature has indeed been overcome, although even under Roman law only a specific form was given a proper substantive weight. Administrative procedure is specifically a tool for balancing collisions between the public interest and the individual rights and legal interests of the parties. However, specific de iure procedural rights are perceived in procedural and constitutional law as autonomous components of the subject of procedure. Formal legality is therefore necessary to achieve predictability and thus legal certainty and transparency, and administration's awareness of respect for the legitimate expectations and personal dignity.3 As the method affects the result - even in the social sciences despite the limited objectification of scientific verification - one cannot claim that legal procedure as a fact finding and evaluation method is not of crucial importance for the validity of the outcome, i.e., the substance of the decision. The procedure has no a priori determined outcome; at the time it is initiated, the goal is not yet clearly defined as it is influenced over the course of 2 Different countries define administrative relations, procedure, and acts more or less broadly. The German-oriented countries mostly refer to individual administrative decisions or adjudication. Under such doctrine, the main focus in the German circle is on the principle of the administrative act (Hoffmann-Riem et al., 2008, pp. 493, 614). In other countries, e.g., the USA, or at the EU institutions, administrative relations and acts refer to any action by administrative authorities even if it involves rule-making (administrative regulations; cf. Galligan et al., 1998, pp. 17-26; Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth et al., 2011, pp. 336-356). 3 Cf. On evolvement of (administrative) procedure in Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth et al., 2011, pp. 350-354; Hoffmann-Riem et al., 2008, p. 499; Schmidt-Assmann in Barnes, 2008, p. 52; Künnecke, 2007, p. 138; Androjna & Kerševan, 2006, pp. 816-822; Peters & Pierre, 2005, p. 270; Statskontoret, 2005, p. 73; Nehl, 1999, pp. 22, 70; Harlow & Rawlings, 1997, p. 497. the procedure by several unpredictable interactions between the parties and procedural actions (Hoffmann-Riem et al., 2008, p. 488). Hence, the purpose of the procedure is to mitigate the uncertainties regarding the objective, considering that uncertainty is a component of any problem-solving procedure. If the legislature guarantees a public law entitlement, there is no reason not to also provide for a suitable procedure to ensure its effective protection and direct legitimacy, as well as at least indirect pursuit of the public interest (Androjna & Kerševan, 2006, p. 67). The awareness that procedural principles and rules are important for the enforcement of a(ny) right is indeed present. Experience shows that contrary there might be unacceptable paradoxes, such as making a party theoretically entitled to a certain measure, regardless of whether they will in fact enjoy such treatment. As stated by Nykiel et al. (2009, pp. 34-40), procedural issues are "of paramount importance with a view to turning a theoretical entitlement to a measure into an actual right that may be effectively enforced." Indeed - only procedural elaboration of a substantive law right enables the actual enforcement thereof. 2.2 Substantive and procedural aspects of RTI Procedure thus serves the goal it pursues in the sense of implementing the substantive law right that is the subject of procedure. However, in the context of the development of public law, RTI is understood not as a tool but rather as a target of the procedure per se. Administrative procedure, also in the case of RTI, is thus a tool that, on the one hand, enforces the aim of a substantive regulation, while on the other it indicates the manner in which such aim can be achieved. The necessary level of legal regulation of the relations and of the authoritativeness of the cogent law is in fact thought to be a consequence of the expected conflictuality of relations and the scope of interference with the legal status of individual participants, which is why the regulation and the corpus of parties' rights are not necessarily the same in all relations with the administration (cf. Harlow & Rawlings, 1997, pp. 504, 516; Galligan et al., 1998, p. 44; Künnecke, 2007, p. 46). Procedural rules are intended to guarantee that decisions are correct in terms of content and consistent with substantive law, as well as to protect specific fundamental human rights. However, it needs to be considered that not all procedural guarantees, principles, and rules have the same weight as regards the subject of procedure. The relevance of administrative law institutions is inevitably linked to the right that is the subject of procedure: either (according to Schmidt-Assmann in Barnes, 2008, p. 47) situation-based rules or rights that are independent of concrete occasions, such as RTI. To conclude, a necessary "reasonable balance" (Nehl, 1999, p. 11) is to be maintained between the progressive development of procedural constraints and the administrative leeway needed for efficient policy implementation. In such context, importance is also placed on the ratio between the substantive and procedural nature of the rights of parties in procedures. Such a problem is particularly notable in the case of RTI since different legal environments (supra- and national) define RTI sometimes as a substantive right and in other cases as (only) a procedural right, although of the rank of the constitution or international law. Understanding whether the right is considered protected under procedural or substantive law is particularly important when substantive law cannot be properly determined in terms of content (Peters & Pierre, 2005, p. 284). The need for procedural rules is directly proportional to the lack of substantive rules or to the degree of indetermination and discretion (Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth et al., 2011, p. 342). Experience as well as German and Anglo-Saxon theory reveals that it is better to focus on ensuring the correctness of decisions by means of procedure, since the growing complexity of social life and thus the indeterminateness of substantive law are unavoidable and will most probably continue to rise. As a result, procedural rules are being increasingly applied as substantive rules, and the lines between the substantive and procedural nature of the norm are becoming more and more blurred (Galligan et al., 1998, p. 29). In a consequence, some traditional principles and rules of a procedural nature are being subsumed by constitutional or sector-specific administrative substantive law as substantive principles and rules, giving them double or greater protection. These aspects are significantly influenced also by European and national case law.4 Both in the Anglo-Saxon environment and in the EU, RTI began to develop first in terms of rights in individual procedures and APA or sector-specific administrative regulations (in the EU particularly in relation to competition and antidumping, cf. Nehl, 1999, p. 43). Parallel thereto, it acquired considerable constitutional significance as a special and independent right to access general information intensified. The latter served as the basis for the growing importance of procedural safeguards in administrative procedures, mainly in terms of judicial activism. Nevertheless, a distinction needs to be drawn between most often substantive RTI, on one side, and the procedural right to access files in concrete and individual administrative relations on the other. These two rights can be understood either as existing in parallel or overlapping. On the other hand, particularly in Scandinavia and at the EU level, a single unified "right to know" is emerging, including all rights to information (Banisar, 2006, p. 6; Savino, 2010, p. 5; Gotze, 2012, p. 4). What prevails is thus a system where RTI is regulated: 1) by the constitution and RTI law, and parallel thereto 2) by APA, in connection with the constitutional provisions 4 Cf. for instance the ECJ cases Tradax, Cement, and Soda Ash (Case 64/82 Tradax Graanhandel BV v. Commission [1984] ECR 1359. CFI, Joined Cases T-10/92 and Others, SA Cimenteries CBR and Others v. Commission [1992] ECR II-2667. CFI, Cases T-30/91, T-31/91, T-32/91 (Solvay v. Commission), T-36/91 and T-37/91 (ICI v. Commission), [1995] ECR II-1775, II-182, II-1825, II-1847, and II-1901; cf. Nehl, 1999, pp. 28-31, 45-55). See also Schmidt-Assmann in Barnes (2008, p. 52), regarding the ruling of the German Federal Administrative Court of 2003 on a constitutional RTI as guaranteed for any potential participant in a procedure, independent of his/her procedural position and standing. For Slovenia, see Kovač, Rakar & Remic, 2012, pp. 45-47, the relevant constitutional-judicial cases are October 2011) acknowledging the right of access as the one deserving, despite procedural grounding (only), an independent judicial review. on the equal protection of rights and effective legal remedies.5 The US and Sweden model is different: based on the Constitution, RTI is regulated by the FOIA (1966), which is a constituent part of APA (1946) or in Sweden the relevant laws comprise the Constitution itself. However, the second model implies a lack of procedural provisions and a usually relatively low quality rating of RTI Law (Mendel, 2008, p. 101; Banisar, 2006, p. 141; Statskontoret, 2005, pp. 35-43). Given all aspects analyzed we may draw a conclusion: the definition of procedural guarantees in RTI Law or APA is thus an advantage to implement RTI effectively, provided that the formality of the regulation is not too detailed. 3 Comparative Analysis of the Procedural Regulation of RTI in Selected Countries 3.1 Selection and characteristics of countries included in comparative research In order to examine the importance and level of impact of detailed procedural regulation of RTI on the exercise of the right as a subject of procedure, a comparative analysis of several countries was carried out indicating the specifics of national regulations in terms of the openness and quality of regulation in relation to RTI, as assessed by various international organizations. The analysis is based on the assumption that the regulation of procedural issues on time limits and legal protection (appeal) contributes significantly to the implementation of RTI in practice. The analysis thus covers selected countries with different historical and societal backgrounds: • USA and Ireland - the Anglo-Saxon model with a long tradition of openness; • Sweden - the Scandinavian model with long acknowledged transparency; • Germany and Austria - the central model with Rechtsstaat and public interest protection; • Slovenia and Croatia - the post-socialist heritage upgraded following the German model. Mostly two countries within the same group were analyzed to check internal factor of differences, too. 5 Austria applies Article 20 of the Constitution, Auskunftspflichtgesetz (Austrian RTI Law, Gazette No. 287/1987 and amend.) and the Allgemeines Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz AWG (Austrian APA, Gazette No. 51/91 and amend.). Slovenia applies Article 39 of the Constitution and Zakon o dostopu do informacij javnega značaja (the Slovene RTI Law, Official Gazette RS, No. 24/03 and amend.) and Zakon o splošnem upravnem postopku (Slovene APA, Official Gazette RS, No. 80/99 and amend.). The main Croatian regulations include Article 38 of the Constitution, Zakon o pravu na pristup informacijama (Croatian RTI Law, Official Gazette RC, No. 25/13, and the previous law 2003) and Zakon o općem upravnom postupku (Croatian APA, Official Gazette RC, No. 47/09). Table 1: Characteristics of selected countries and national legal acts on RTI Country USA Ireland Sweden Germany Austria Slovenia Croatia Population in mio 303 4.5 9.2 82 8.3 2 4.4 RTI regulated by Constitution Yes, strong protection of freedom of expression Only general rights (equality, etc.), no RTI Yes (the entire Freedom of the Press Act, RTI Law part of the Constitut.) Yes, yet a passive aspect of RTI, Art. 5/1 Yes, Art. 20 Yes, 1991, Art. 39/2 (freedom of expression), depending on legal interest by law Since the 2010 amend. (prior only the press), Art. 38/2 (freedom of expression) RTI Law Part of APA, FOIA since 1966 & amend. FOIA 1997 (amend. 2003) Part of the Constitut. RTI Law 2005, only 15 articles RTI Law 1987 & amend., 8 articles RTI Law 2003 RTI Law 2003, and a new Law in 2013 Application of APA in RTI FOIA is part of APA No No Yes Yes Yes, upon written request Yes GRTI2012/ 93 countries 40th 37th 29th 89th 93rd 3rd 9th Ask Your Gov!/80 countries / / / 15th / 12th 11th Democracy 2012/200 countries 21st 2nd 13th 14th 12th 27th-28th 50th Hence, in terms of good administration four traditions of administrative law may be identified in Europe and broadly: 1) the individual-centered tradition, as in the Ireland, and the USA, 2) the German-Austrian legislator-centered Rechtsstaat, 3) the ombudsman-centered tradition, as in Scandinavia, and 4) additionally, post-communism and some other heritages to be taken into account. The study however has limitations since the RTI implementation depends on a series of other factors, from the general regional culture on openness to RTI tradition in a specific environment.6 3.2 A comparison of time limits and legal protection of RTI regulation Following the initial assumption that procedural regulation contributes to the rate of implementation of RTI, the key aim of the research was to identify whether time limits and legal protection and as key procedural issues to enhance substantive legal right are (more) relevant. Time limits are typical procedural institution (cf. the saying: justice delayed, justice denied), being even a constituent part of the rights to a fair trial and good administration under Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 41 of EU Charter. The requirement 6 Several models or classifications of social and legal environments are relevant in this sense (cf. Schwarze, 1992, p. 1182 etc.; Galligan et al., 1998, pp. 19-25; Peters & Pierre, 2005, p. 260; Statskontoret, 2005, pp. 74-76, etc.). See in particular on administrative culture as a RTI framework in Savino, 2010, p. 13. Due to lack of relevant data central administration-centered group (with France) was not analyzed too. of timeliness is deriving not only from the goal of the efficacy, but also from the Constitution itself (cf. Mendel, 2008, pp. 101, 127; Nykiel et al., 2009, p. 27; Kovač & Virant, 2011, p. 232). Moreover, particularly in the absence of the right of appeal to an independent body, individuals cannot really be said to have a right, but merely a right to have their requests considered (Mendel, 2008, p. 38). Or as put forward by the ruling of the German Constitutional Court of 1969 (Schmidt-Assmann in Barnes, 2008, pp. 52) effective legal protection "constitutes a significant element of the fundamental right as such". An indisputable requirement for the actual implementation of RTI is also a clearly regulated procedure, particularly when the body does not give the applicant access to the information to which the applicant is entitled. The comparison of de iure regulation reveals a significant degree of convergence as regards the type of procedural institutions regulated by procedural rules in relation to RTI. However, in various countries, the material content and especially the implementation of the rules vary significantly as analyzed by a set model of crucial elements, evident in Table 2. 4 Main Findings 4.1 Significance of RTI procedural regulation and its detail rate Procedural regulation in principle contributes to the implementation of RTI. This conclusion can also be drawn from even the rather restricted German and Austrian RTI laws with only 8-15 articles, but with subordinate application of the APA, which substitutes for the lack of procedural rules in RTI law. However, it can be observed that the same degree of formalization is seen as an incentive in one country and an obstacle to the development of open society and RTI implementation in another. But at least in the initial decades, the development of RTI was and still is marked by inverse proportionality - if the procedure was more non-programmed, the legal protection of the weaker parties was or is lower. At several levels, particularly in terms of (endeavors for) membership in international organizations and global comparisons, a convergence may be observed as regards the regulation, the procedure, and RTI implementation. Finally, the countries may be grouped as: 1. traditionally open countries with loose legislation (Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian); 2. legalistically driven countries with consistent implementation (Central European); and 3. legalistically driven countries with best practices, yet with problems in implementation (transitional Eastern European). Table 2: A comparative analysis of selected procedural aspects in national RTI laws 1a ab 2a 22 2a Key procedural RTI aspects Decieioc ddaatinns and pcssiblc exter&nocn Cof&equrcces of administrative sitecce Admiinisteatiec appeal Appeal bcdy and independent status theoecf Aeeess tc ecret USA 20 + 10 days, possible an urgent procedure, special extension in "exceptional circumstances" Lack of a timely response deemed a refusal, but an appeal only by the specific regulations Non-devolutive appeal to head of body asked for information, then direct suspensive court action Partly, with the amendment to APA, the Government Information Office Various courts, according to FOIA/APA, only upon action by applicant within two years Ireland Confirmation of receipt in 10 days, decision in 20 + 20 days, in 15 days on appeal Fiction of refusal and consequent legal protection Non-devolutive appeal to the body itself, then appeal to the IC and direct suspensive court action An independent IC also as an ombudsman and environmental IC and covering data Ssedud No. only "forthwith, or as quickly as possible", practice is correct N/A, problems with deadlines in practice No, directly to court No Administrative court, a special provision that decisions are to be issued "promptly Cenmany One month/20 working days, 2 months for accessory participants no RTI Law, APA yes Yes Federal IC for RTI in data protection, decisions and opinions not legally binding Special administrative dispute Austria 8 weeks without unnecessary delay no RTI Law, APA yes Indirectly according to APA N/A Indirectly administrative dispute according to APA Stoced/a 20 + 30 working days in exceptional circumstances, executability of a decision not prior to the finality Appeal when deemed a refusal, over 60% of appeals on such grounds Yes, appeal and court action are suspensive Nongovernmental IC, separate from the ombudsman, covering RTI and data protection Administrative dispute (Art. 31) (also based on court action by the liable body) and constitutional complain Croctia 15 +15 days, deadline for a decision on appeal 30 days, in some cases 60 or 90 days Appeal when deemed a refusal Since 2012, to an independent body (previously only non-devolutive appeal to the head of the silent body) Since 2013 IC, separate from the ombudsman, covering RTI and data protection Administrative dispute and an administrative complaint, deadline for a decision 90 days from action Thus, the regulatory framework appears to be a necessary and stimulating yet not sufficient factor of development of open and good administration. Some authors (e.g., Mendel, 2008, p. 144) argue on the other hand that precisely as regards procedural guarantees, RTI laws in different countries demonstrate a high degree of consistency - in our case only the in USA and Sweden. But the provisions on the procedure present even more differences than the substantive law definitions of information and exceptions, namely in terms of the formalization of the procedure as a whole, and even more so in terms of the time limits, the requirement that acts be issued in writing, etc. As expected, procedure is more formalized in continental states than in the USA and Scandinavia. This indicates that the impact of legal tradition on the implementation of the law and procedures is very important, not only in the sense of the post-transition gap in the implementation of laws and reforms in the countries of Eastern Europe, but also when comparing the Scandinavian and American openness and sufficiency of general standards with the German-Austrian and EU striving for legalism. 4.2 On importance of time limits set For RTI to be granted or refused Some provisions are particularly important for the implementation of RTI, time limits being at the top of due process doctrine and case law. As regards the deadlines for decisions, thus the regulation in general is rather formalized and practice has shown that setting a time limit is a basis for enforcing a right. For such reason, all RTI Laws, with the exception of the Swedish one, devote considerable attention to time limits and extensions. It is evident on the other hand that these rules develop over time depending on the extent of requests and movement of indicators, such as the number of granted and refused requests within specific time periods. For example, approximately 600,000 applications per year were filed in the USA in 2010-2012 (OIP reports, 2012), yet a significant share thereof were refused owing to various exceptions, which points to the need for more unified regulation in general. Croatia, for instance, amended its law to introduce a special IC because of the low culture among public bodies, which often fail to decide on a matter, with 60% of appeals due to administrative silence. In certain cases there is only a "promptly" or "without undue delay" rule, but in most cases time limit to reveal data requested is 20 days with possible extension in the event of objective circumstances (but should not exceed 30 days, cf. Savino, 2010, p. 30). All the respective countries apply a negative fiction that allows for eventual judicial protection (cf. more in Mendel, 2008, pp. 127, 152; Kovač, 2013, p. 11). The increase in requests and appeals related to RTI is growing, and a good third (e.g., USA, Slovenia) to a half (e.g., Ireland) thereof are granted in all countries despite different regulations and cultures; approximately a third are partially granted, while the ratio between the number of requests and appeals is around 1 % (e.g., around 11,000 v. 600,000 in the USA and 500 v. 51,000 in Croatia). This in particular points to the significance of the procedural regulation of RTI, if one compares the otherwise similar USA and Ireland. The Irish law provides a clear definition of the entire procedure, which leads to as many as 58 % of requests being granted (with an additional 19 % partially granted), while the insufficient procedure in the USA leads to only 37 % of requests being fully granted (with an additional 27 % partially granted). 4.3 On significance and forms of effective legal protection in a case of RTI Practice in various countries reveals that legal remedies are the very essence of RTI law as well as a tool for enforcing such right. In general, several systems of legal protection of applicants are known throughout the world, either in a formal sense with direct appeal to the court or with an administrative appeal to an independent state body (the Information Commissioner or some other non-governmental agency), or through a (more) non-formal devolutive objection to the head of the body at issue or via the ombudsman (cf. Banisar, 2006, p. 23). Overall, review should be independent, centralized and specialized (Savino, 2010, p. 41). Most countries have formalized legal and judicial protection enshrined in RTI law as well as parallel protection through the ombudsman, or the level of RTI is considered to be very low (Austria). So called non-formal protection can be "afforded" only in countries with a long and solid tradition of openness (such as Sweden). On the other hand, particularly where following the (Eastern European) transition, transparency and other institutions of democracy are yet to be fully implemented in practice (cf. Savino, 2010, p. 4), either as regards legal protection in general or in the event of appeals to an independent body. As regards legal protection, it primarily needs to be underlined that the experience of several countries are more inclined toward administrative than direct judicial protection, provided that the objection procedure is conducted by the body that is to disclose the information (Ireland) or - as a rule - a body that is independent (from government), since it is far more accessible and cheaper to people than the courts and has a proven track record with regard to being an effective way of ensuring RTI. The reasons for an appeal are generally rather broad, from the refusal of an application to the request to submit another one as provided, from excessive costs on. The countries have similar, if not the same, reservations regarding disclosure both in terms of the regulation and administrative and court practice, which is also demonstrated by a large share of appeals on grounds of administrative silence in the USA, Ireland, Slovenia, and Croatia.7 Likewise, it is advisable to consider RTI and exceptions thereto, such as personal data protection (e.g., in Ireland, Slovenia, and Croatia through the same non-governmental appellate body) as directly correlated. 7 Therefore, a major provision of various RTI Laws is that the burden of proof in a dispute is on the public bodies rather than on applicants. Cf. legal protection and separately the status of the appeal body in Bugarič, 2003, p. 120; Mendel, 2008, p. 38; Kovač, 2013, p. 13. However, it should not be disregarded that in view of the separation of powers, practice also shows that only courts really have the authority to set standards and ensure a well-reasoned approach, especially regarding controversial areas and difficult disclosure issues. 5 Conclusion The major guarantee of respect for RTI is a combination of the circumstances in a country or supranational community. Among them, particular importance is attributed to the culture and tradition of transparency in the society, open and good public administration and to adequate regulation of RTI. An accurately prescribed procedure on RTI, setting the rules of the game for applicants and public bodies, is an inevitable aspect of the effectiveness of the implementation of this fundamental right in particular. However, the application of APA, where RTI law does not provide otherwise, appears to be useful both in view of covering all relevant procedural aspects and given the fact that public bodies know such rules and easily observe them. This shows that also the sample countries, such as the USA and Sweden, usually countries considered as most transparent, have problems with openness in practice given the regulatory deficiencies of their generalist legislative approaches (e.g., the lack of an independent appeal body or deadlines). Moreover, in a complex society as ours, there is a need to have a tradeoff between different interests, in particular by means of public interest override and harm tests, which are by the nature of the matter possible only in a procedure that is at least partly formalized. The initial hypothesis of this paper that procedural institutions contribute to a higher level of implementation of RTI in practice is therefore confirmed, especially as regards timely decision-making and legal protection in the event RTI is refused or restricted. Procedural principles and rules are thus among the foundations that contribute to enforcing the importance of RTI in terms of personal dignity and the democracy of modern society. Polonca Kovač finished PhD Studies in 2005 in Faculty of Law Ljubljana. She is employed as a researcher and teacher at the Faculty of Administration in Ljubljana from 2001, as an Associate Professor from 2013. Her main areas of research, in national and international scientific projects, are administrative law and public administration, its reforms/modernization and legal regulation. She has been the author of numerous scientific articles and conferences' contributions (e.g. EGPA, NISPAcee, TED) and monographs (i.e. Legal aspects of public authority (2006), Regulatory Impact Assessment (2009), Development of Slovenian PA 1991-2011, Procedural Dilemmas on use of APA (2012)). She is an active reviewer of several national R&D and High Education Agencies and OECD, SIGMA and ReSPA expert. POVZETEK 1.01 Izvirni znanstveni članek Pomen in primerjalni trendi procesnopravne ureditve pravice do informiranja Ključne besede: pravica do informiranja (RTI), preglednost, primerjava, procesno pravo, upravni postopek, roki, pritožba Vsaka pravica se (bolj) učinkovito uveljavlja, če njeno vsebinsko pravno ureditev podpirajo učinkovita postopkovna pravila. Članek je posvečen analizi procesnopravne ureditve pravice do informiranja (RTI), saj se njen pomen povečuje pri razvoju dobrega vladanja in upravljanja znotraj sodobne pregledne, odprte in sodelovalne družbe. V članku vključena primerjalna analiza izbranih držav (ZDA, Irska, Švedska, Avstrija, Nemčija, Slovenija, Hrvaška) dokazuje, da izbrani postopkovni instituti, kot so roki in pritožba neodvisnemu organu ali sodni nadzor, prispevajo k znatno višji stopnji izvajanja RTI v praksi, kar navaja tudi več mednarodnih študij. V zaključku avtorica priporoča določene dobre prakse, zlasti pomen izvrševanja RTI s strani različnih organov oblasti v upravnem postopku, ki zagotavlja ustavna in nadnacionalna načela preglednosti. references Access Info Europe, Centre for Law and Democracy International Budget Partnership. (2011). Ask Your Government! The 6 Question Campaign, A Comparative Analysis Of Access to Budget Information in 80 Countries. Retrieved 17. 8. 2013, from: http://www.access-info.org/en/budget-transparency/200-6-question-campaign Androjna, V. & Kerševan, E. (2006). Upravno procesno pravo [Administrative Procedural Law]. Ljubljana: GV. Banisar, D. (2006). 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Retrieved 1 December 2013, from: http://www. riksdagen.se/sv/Start/Bestall/Sprakversioner/English---engelska1/ Šturm, L. (Ed.). (2011). Komentar Ustave Republike Slovenije, Dopolnitev A [Commentary on the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, Supplement A]. Brdo: The Faculty of Government and European Studies. The Economist Democracy Index 2012. (2011). Democracy is at a Standstill - A report from the Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved 17 August 2013, from: http://www.eiu.com/public/thankyou_download.aspx?activity=downlo ad&campaignid=DemocracyIndex12 UDK: 347.99(492) 1.02 Review article Participation of Citizens in Pre-Trial Hearings. Review of an Experiment in the Netherlands. Barbara Brink University of Groningen b.brink@rug.nl Albert T. Marseille University of Groningen & Tilburg University a.t.marseille@rug.nl abstract In 2011 the Dutch Central Appeals Tribunal, the highest Dutch court of appeal in legal areas pertaining to social security and the civil service, started consulting the parties of a dispute at an early stage in the procedure, in order to include them in the decisions about the procedural steps to be taken in the settlement of the appeal. One of the underlying rationales is that the involvement of the parties will lead to more acceptance of and contentment with the result. Since the acceptance of court decisions is considered as a criterion for the quality of the procedure, this approach should result in a better quality of the case treatment. In this article the initial results of this new case treatment are presented in the light of expectations from the literature on citizen participation in policy processes of public agencies. The data indicate that the New Case Management Procedure at the Central Appeals Tribunal can lead to an improvement of the quality of the case treatment, by inviting citizens to discuss with the judge about the case treatment. However, the procedure itself does not guarantee this increased quality. Key words: new case management procedure, community involvement, Dutch Central Appeals Tribunal, final dispute resolution JEL: D73, K40 1 Interaction Between Public Institutions and the Public For a few years, the administrative judges in the district courts in the Netherlands have dealt with their cases in accordance with the so called New Case Management Procedure: judicial review cases are put down for hearing as quickly as possible. At the hearing the judge discusses with the parties how the case can best be handled. Ideally, it should be dealt with in a way that is in keeping with the interests of the parties concerned, meets the demands of procedural justice and brings the dispute between the parties to a timely, satisfactory and final resolution. Brink, B. & Marseille, A. T. (2014). Participation of citizens in pre-trial hearings. Review of an experiment in the Netherlands. 47 Mednarodna revija za javno upravo, XII (2-3), 47-61 In the fall of 2011 the Dutch Central Appeals Tribunal, the highest Dutch court of appeal in legal areas pertaining to social security and the civil service, started an experiment to consult the parties of the dispute at an early stage in the procedure, in order to include them in the decisions about the procedural steps to be taken in the settlement of the appeal. One of the underlying rationales is that the involvement of the parties will lead to more acceptance of and contentment with the result. Since the acceptance of court decisions is considered as a criterion for the quality of the procedure, this approach should result in a better quality of the case treatment. In this article the initial results of this new case treatment are presented in the light of expectations from the literature on citizen participation in policy processes of public agencies. First we introduce the Dutch New Case Management Procedure. Before proceeding with a description of the results of the experiment at the Central Appeals Tribunal, we first examine the literature on participation, in order to explore the plausibility of the rationale behind the procedure. Lastly, we explore the initial results of this new case treatment. 2 Participation in Administrative Law Procedures Over the past decade views on the role of administrative courts in the Netherlands have changed. The legal rules have been altered very little if at all, but they are now applied in a different way. Appeals to the administrative court against decisions are made by administrative bodies. Since the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht) came into force in 1994, administrative courts have given judgment on the basis of the notice of appeal. The court's main focus is on the reasons why the appellant disagrees with the decision, and its review of the lawfulness of the contested decision responds to the arguments the appellant has put forward. Aspects of the decision which the appellant has not referred to in the notice of appeal are not considered in the review. The fact that the General Administrative Law Act requires the administrative court to focus on the appellant's grievances when considering the contested decision has made the court more attentive to other interests of appellants. One primary interest of which the court has become more aware is speed. A person who brings an appeal benefits from a prompt decision by the court. For the past ten years or so administrative courts have taken timely decisionmaking very seriously. The result is that appeal cases at district courts are now processed in nine months on average. At Appeal Courts it is clear that cases can be processed even more quickly. In addition to speed, the courts also became interested in final dispute resolution. The aim was for its judgment not only to contain a judgment about the lawfulness of the contested decision, but also to make it as clear as possible what decision would apply in the future. This provides more legal certainty for parties. Powers under the General Administrative Law Act which make it possible to achieve the ideal of final dispute resolution are used more and more frequently (De Graaf & Marseille, 2012). Next, administrative courts became interested in the concept of a dispute, which had traditionally been defined as "a difference of opinion between the parties regarding the lawfulness of the decision being appealed". Due to the rise of alternative dispute resolution, administrative courts increasingly came to realize that parties involved in proceedings before an administrative court may have differing opinions about more than just the contested decision, and that it is quite possible that the actual dispute between the parties is not about the decision on which the court has been asked make a judgment, but about something else altogether. The realization that the "contested decision" and "the dispute between the parties" are not always identical led to the courts becoming interested in alternative solutions for disputes between parties. The focus on speed, combined with the discovery of the range of options for dispute resolution, made administrative courts realize that even though every appeal is against a decision, not every appeal should be dealt with in the same way. Depending on the nature of the decision and the dispute about it, the court should choose in each case which of its powers it should and should not use. The best way for it to make this choice is to involve the parties. Then it can take their wishes into account. Some cases benefit from a thorough preliminary inquiry, others from comprehensive discussion at the hearing, and in other cases the most important thing is to put the parties themselves to work, by giving them the opportunity to provide evidence for their statements, or to give them a chance to consider together whether they can resolve their dispute. As a result of all this, the courts developed the New Case Management Procedure. This method of case management is based upon the underlying rationale that the chance the procedure will result in a final resolution of the dispute between the parties will be greater if the parties are involved in decisions about how the case is managed. If the parties play an active role in discussions about the best way to deal with their case, the court's decisions will be better adapted to the wishes and needs of the parties. Consequently, the parties will be more satisfied with the result, thus increasing the chance that a final settlement of the dispute will be attained. 3 Objective of Participation The last decennia public agencies have actively experimented with the involvement of citizens in public procedures. This interest is most apparent in the public administration literature. Although community involvement can have different connotations, in general it comprises the involvement of citizens in the development or implementation of policies. It means the public agency actively invites citizens and other stakeholders to explore problems and their solutions in a transparent process and, by doing so, on the basis of equality, influence the Anal decision (Van Peppel, 2001, p. 34). Interaction with the community is not a novelty. However, the areas in which people are involved have increased and the modes in which they are involved have changed over the last decades (Stephan, 2005, p. 662). The involvement of the community comes with various promises. On the level of specific programmes, the involvement of the community is believed to lead to an "increasing transparency of public policy implementation" (Stephan, 2005, p. 663). This could then increase the public support for the concerned policy. De Graaf (2007) studied this relation between community involvement in a policy process and the support for the results. He argues that the involvement of people in decision making processes will provide participants with information, allowing them to judge the quality of the decision. In other words, people will come to an informed judgment (De Graaf, 2007, p. 50). An informed judgement will be favourable for the support for the decision and will therefore, subsequently, increase the support for the decision (Teisman et al., 2001, p. 37). According to De Graaf, support can be divided into contentment with the process and contentment with the result. Support can be seen as the sum of both. Van den Bos, however, identifies a causal relation between the two. When citizens experience a just procedure, they will then use this knowledge to evaluate the final decision, resulting in an increase of the support for the decision (Van den Bos, 2007, p. 189). In other words, not only the transparency is important. The availability of information enables people to judge the procedure, and this judgement influences the judgement of the final outcomes. An increase in the support for a decision could lead to a decrease of the costs of the process, because people will not oppose or obstruct the decision making. However, research does not provide evidence for this relation (Urving & Stansburry, 2004, p. 57). If this relation exists, it could prove to be very attractive for policy makers to include citizens when it is expected that people will not easily accept the potential outcome. It could also lead to shorter procedures, since the acceptance of a certain decision might lead to less resistance when the policy is implemented. However, the literature is not clear about this relation either: empirical data show that community involvement can both expect to lead to faster procedures and to delays (Van Peppel, 2001, p. 39). 4 Conditions for Successful participation The involvement of people in policy making does not necessarily result in an increase in support for the policy. A growing body of evidence shows the conditions under which community involvement can lead to successful participation, which would lead to more support for the results of the process. A condition for a successful participation trajectory seems to be the access to accurate information. Accurate information would lead to a (positive) judgement of the procedure. The literature on community involvement specifically mentions importance of informing the participants beforehand on the expected contribution of the various participants. If this is unclear at the start, unrealistic expectations can arise, which can lead to less support (Pröpper, 2009, p. 162). Nevertheless, also other requirements are found, both on the side of the people to be involved as the side of the public agency. Policy processes tend to be complex. Not only due to the complicated processes, also because policy programmes can be based on (advanced) technical knowledge. In order to participate, people need a certain degree of knowledge and skills. Another selecting requirement is the available time to be involved (Stephan, 2005, pp. 674-675). The public agency on the other hand, can facilitate the process by taking into account the way the community learns to participate. Time is therefore also a necessary resource for the agency: the participation trajectory needs to be based upon the time demanded for the adaption (Taylor, 2007). In order to adjust the procedure to this timescale, the organisation requires resources (knowledge and financial resources) to enable this transition (Pröpper, 2009, p. 61). The organisation also needs to be willing to do this: it demands a constructive relation between the various participants (ibid., p. 56). This is not only dependent on the individual involved, but also on the existing work culture within the organisation. It is therefore important to not only adapt the processes of community involvement to the pace of the people, but also to the work processes of the organisation (Bekkers, 2012, p. 186). Specifically for judicial procedures, Van den Bos adds further elements: people have expectations based on own experiences and experiences of others with similar procedures. They want to be treated according these constructed ideas. This emphasises the importance of a consistent procedure over time and between people. Also, participants need to feel they have been given the opportunity to participate sufficiently, equal to the contribution of others. Therefore, within the process, courts need to strive for representation within the process, whereby all stakeholders have the chance to be heard (Van den Bos, 2007, p. 189). 5 The Experiment at the Dutch Central Appeals Tribunal 5.1 Different Kind of Appeals; Specialisation The Central Appeals Tribunal decides on appeals concerning decisions of public authorities about the application / execution of different laws. Almost aH of the appeals are concerned with legislation covering civil servants, invalidity benefits, social assistance, social support, unemployment benefits and sickness and maternity benefits. Most judges working at the Central Appeals Tribunal are specialised in one these six fields. As a consequence, a judge that handles cases about civil servants does not handle cases about invalidity benefits, a judge that handles cases about social assistance does not handle cases about unemployment benefits. 5.2 Differences Between "Regular" Procedures and the New Case Management Procedure In a "regular" procedure, the judge concentrates his attention on the juridical dispute between the citizen and the public authority. Basically he is only interested in the question: is the disputed decision (un)lawful? In the New Case Management Procedure, the judge is supposed to be interested not only in the juridical point of view of the parties of the dispute, but also in their interests. As a consequence, he is supposed to investigate whether the parties of the dispute are involved in a conflict that goes beyond their juridical dispute - and if so, whether it would be helpful to them to talk with each other to try to resolve that conflict. Additionally, the judge is supposed to give the parties of the dispute comprehensive information about the possibilities and limitations of the procedure. As a consequence, it is expected that the judge regularly decides to reopen the preliminary enquiries, granting the parties of the dispute the opportunity to substantiate their arguments concerning the relevant facts. In a "regular" procedure, a case is assigned to a three-judge section. Only if these three judges think the case is very simple, they will refer it to a single judge. In the New Case Management Procedure, cases are assigned to a single judge, who has to decide whether or not to refer it to a three-judge section. 5.3 Participation by the Parties of the Dispute The New Case Management Procedure, as implemented in the experiment at the Central Appeals Tribunal, aims at giving the parties of the dispute more influence on the course of the procedure. This influence concerns three different choices the judge (in the experiment it is always - and contrary to the normal situation in appellate cases - a single judge) has to make at the end of the hearing. 1. The judge has to decide whether the preliminary inquiry has to be reopened. There are two main causes / reasons for reopening: • The parties of the dispute want to try to settle their dispute. By reopening the preliminary inquiry, the judge gives them the opportunity to try to settle their dispute. If they do not succeed, the procedure will be resumed. • One or both parties want to substantiate their arguments concerning the relevant facts. By reopening the preliminary inquiry, the judge grants them that opportunity. After they have collected evidence, the procedure will be resumed. 2. The judge has to decide whether he will come to a decision as soon as possible after the hearing, or that the parties of the dispute have to get a chance to argue their case at a second hearing. 3. The judge has to decide whether the decision on the appeal will be made by himself (a single-judge) or by a three-judge section. The New Case Management Procedure aims at granting the parties of the dispute influence on these three decisions. At the hearing, the judge has to consult the parties about these three choices he has to make. He will decide, but - intentionally - only after consulting the parties. 6 Researching the New Case Management Procedure The research project to evaluate the New Case Management Procedure at the Central Appeals Tribunal consisted of four parts. 1. We collected data about the course of 248 procedures in which the New Case Management Procedure was applied. 35 concerned legislation covering civil servants, 47 invalidity benefits, 65 social assistance, 27 social support, 21 unemployment benefits and 43 sickness and maternity benefits, 10 other legislation. The data that were collected concerned i.e. the length of the hearing, the degree in which the preliminary inquiry was reopened, the outcome of the procedure, the proportion of the procedures in which a second hearing was organized, the proportion of the procedures in which the decision was taken by single-judge or by a three-judge section. 2. We attended twelve hearings. 3. We interviewed the eleven judges that took part in the New Case Management Procedure. 4. We interviewed (by telephone) parties of the dispute: 21 citizens, 65 representatives of citizens, 57 representatives of administrative bodies. 7 Results 7.1 Hearings We attended twelve hearings by four different judges, so we only got an impression of the way judges conducted the hearings. However, we noticed remarkable differences between the hearings of an 'unemployment benefits' judge and the hearings of a "social assistance" judge. The hearing of the "unemployment benefits" judge was "traditional": he seemed to be only interested in clarifying the juridical aspects of the case. He hardly consulted the parties of the dispute about the decisions he had to take regarding the continuation of the handling / management of the case. After an average of 20 minutes, the hearing was over. The hearings of the "social assistance" judge took far more time: on average more than an hour. Besides, this judge extensively discussed with the parties about the way the procedure should be continued after the hearing. Judging by the hearings we attended, different judges give different interpretations of the function of the hearing and of their task with regard to the management of the case and the degree in which the parties of the dispute are to be involved by the decisions about the management of the case after the hearing. 7.2 interviews with Judges We interviewed eleven judges that took part in the New Case Management Procedure. The interviews showed substantial differences between these judges. They specifically addressed the understanding of their duty as a judge in a higher court. Some of the judges we interviewed were of the opinion that one of the most important tasks of higher courts is the development of jurisprudence. They therefore argued that most of the appeals must be decided by a three-judge section, regardless of the preference of the parties of the dispute. Other judges we interviewed stressed that the preferences of the parties of the dispute should prevail, thereby giving less importance to the development of jurisprudence. As a consequence, if the parties of the dispute prefer a decision by the single judge that dealt with the case during the hearing, they will be granted that request, even if the case is important with regard to the development of jurisprudence. Another noticeable difference between judges deals with the understanding of their job. Some of them indicate that, being a judge in administrative law, they are only interested in the question whether the disputed decision is (un) lawful, because their task is to judge the lawfulness of decisions of public authorities. Other judges argue that, as a judge, they are interested in what exactly divides the parties of the conflict, because their task is solving conflicts. It was striking that judges that handle social assistance cases were far more positive about the New Case Management Procedure and their role as "mediator" than the unemployment benefit judges that we interviewed. These judges stressed that their task was constricted to judging the lawfulness of decisions of public authorities. 7.3 Case Management We were curious whether the differences we observed at the hearings we attended, and the different opinions of the judges we interviewed about how they see their job, especially between the social assistance judges and the unemployment-benefit judges, would also be visible by examining the proceedings of the case1. We show four figures about different aspects of the proceeding of the case, in which we distinguish between the social assistance and the unemployment cases. The first figure shows the length of the hearing. Figure 1: Length of the hearing (minutes) 0 social assistance unemployment benefit The figure shows a substantial difference. The average length of a hearing in an unemployment benefit case is 31 minutes, in a social assistance case 75 minutes. The second figure shows to what degree the preliminary inquiry is reopened after the hearing. 1 Because of the relatively small amount of unemployment cases (21, against 65 social assistance cases), the results presented in this section give an indication of the differences between the two categories. However, we didn't examine whether the differences we found are statistically significant. Figure 2: Reopening preliminary enquiry (%) 25 20 15 10 5 0 social assistance unemployment benefit Again, the figure shows a notable difference. In 14 % of the unemployment benefit cases the preliminary inquiry is reopened after the hearing, in 24 % of the social assistance cases. The third figure shows how often the judge decides to organize a second hearing. Figure 3: Another hearing? (%) 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 social assistance unemployment benefit Again, the figure shows a considerable difference. In 10 % of the unemployment benefit cases a second hearing is organized, in only 3 % of the social assistance cases. The fourth figure shows how often the judge decides to refer the cases to a three-judge section to take the decision on the appeal. Figure 4: Judgment by a 3-judge section 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 social assistance unemployment benefit Again, the figure shows a substantial difference. In social assurance cases, if the outcome of the procedure is a decision by the court, only in 8 % it is a decision by three-judge section. In unemployment benefit cases, in 56 % the decision is taken by a three-judge section. 7.4 Satisfaction of the Parties of the Dispute Do the parties of the dispute appreciate the New Case Management Procedure? We interviewed (by telephone) parties of the dispute about their experiences. We were especially interested in the differences between the hearings concerning different fields of administrative law. Because we only interviewed 21 citizens, we can only make a comparison between the representatives of citizens (65 interviews) and the representatives of administrative bodies (57 interviews). We show two figures that indicate two relevant differences between these two groups. The first figure (figure 5) shows how the representatives react to the following proposition: "The hearing of the New Case Management Procedure is of added value compared to a 'regular' hearing at the Central Appeals Tribunal." If the respondent fully agreed, he scored a '5', if he fully disagreed, he scored a '1'. In the figure, we compare between sickness and maternity benefits (s. b.), invalidity benefits (i. b.) and unemployment benefits (u. b.). Figure 5: Reaction to proposition: NCMP is of added value ■ representative citizen representative publauth. 3,5 2,5 1,5 0,5 lij NCMP of added value NCMP of added value NCMP of added value (s.b.) (i.b.) (u.b.) The figure shows that it depends on the field of administrative law whether the two groups differ. With regard to sickness-benefits cases, both groups fully agree: they think the hearing is - marginally - of more value in the New Case Management Procedure. With regard to social assistance cases, the representatives of the citizens disagree with the representatives of the public authorities: the representatives of the citizens score a 3.74, the representatives of public authorities a 2.69. The second figure (Figure 6) is concerned only with social assistance cases. We asked representatives of citizens and representatives of public authorities whether they were satisfied with certain aspects of the "management" of the hearing by the judge. Did they think the information of the judge about the formal aspects of the hearing was sufficient, did they think the judge asked relevant questions, did he give the parties of the dispute sufficient time to explain their points of view, was he active and involved in the case? Figure 6: Reaction to proposition about the "management" of the hearing by thejudge - representative citizen representative publ.auth. 0 information relevant sufficient time active about the hearing questions On all these aspects, the representatives of citizens were more positive than the representatives of the public authorities. 8 Conclusions Our research leads us to three conclusions about participation of the parties of the dispute in procedures at administrative law courts. First, even when a court decides to grant parties more possibilities to participate, the attitude of individual judges can be a serious obstacle for the realization of participation. A project in which the judge consults the involved parties and then decides which procedure should be followed, implies the judges have the willingness, knowledge and skills to do so. At the Central Appeals Tribunal, the judges that took part in the experiment agreed to let the parties of the dispute participate in the procedure. However, only about half of the judges stood by that agreement. This attitude has influenced the approach they took during the case treatment. This research does not show whether skills and knowledge are important factors for the success of the procedure. Second, participation has an effect on the course of the procedure. When judges consult parties about the choices to be made, decisions on the course of the procedure are influenced. In contrast to the normal procedure, during the New Case Management Procedure, activities of the parties of the dispute take the centre stage. In terms of the theory of development of community involvement, this is an example of the involvement of the public: parties are invited to participate and thereby have a chance to influence the court decisions. Since this is an example of involving the public, we could theorise this approach can lead to an increase in the support for the process and the result. The data shows that this is the case for the citizens. Third, not all the parties of the dispute are enthusiastic. The (representatives of) citizens are more positive than the representatives of public authorities. There are various possible explanations. First, the chance to get involved gives citizens higher expectations about their chances to win the procedure. Another explanation is that the involvement of citizens has the effect described in the literature: involvement leads to an informed judgement of the procedure and the result, which has a positive effect on the judgement of the results. The effect does not occur for representatives of public authorities: their access to information does not depend on the procedure that is followed. This research has not looked into the resources and competences of the participants. The literature shows that this could also be an element of the explanation of the discrepancy. In conclusion, the data gives an indication that the New Case Management Procedure at the Central Appeals Tribunal can lead to an improvement of the quality of the case treatment, by inviting citizens to discuss with the judge about the case treatment. However, the procedure itself does not guarantee this increased quality. In this paper different conditions that can influence the outcome of the procedure have been indicated. Barbara Brink received her doctorate degree from Strathclyde University, Glasgow. She is now a lecturer in Public Administration at the University of Groningen. Albert Marseille received his doctorate degree from the University of Groningen. He is now a professor in Public Administration, in particular the Empirical Study of Administrative Law, at the University of Groningen and professor in the Empirical Study of Administrative Law at Tilburg University. POVZETEK 1.02 Pregledni znanstveni članek Udeležba državljanov v predhodnih postopkih. Pregled poskusa na Nizozemskem. Ključne besede: novo upravljanje postopkov, udeležba in vključitev skupnosti, nizozemski Osrednji pritožbeni tribunal, pravnomočna rešitev spora Leta 2011 je nizozemski Osrednji pritožbeni tribunal, najvišje nizozemsko pritožbeno sodišče za pravna področja, ki se nanašajo na socialno varnost in sistem javnih uslužbencev, v zgodnji fazi postopka začelo svetovati strankam v sporu, z namenom da bi jih vključilo v odločitve o postopkovnih korakih pri reševanju pritožbe v smislu poravnave. To utemeljuje s pričakovanjem, da bo vključitev strank pripeljala do boljšega sprejetja in večjega zadovoljstva z izidom. Ker je sprejetje sodnih odločitev merilo kakovosti postopka, bi posledica tega pristopa morala biti kakovostnejša obravnava primera. V članku so predstavljeni prvi rezultati tega novega načina obravnave v luči pričakovanj iz literature o udeležbi državljanov v procesih obravnave javnih politik. Ti podatki kažejo, da novi postopek upravljanja primerov Osrednjega pritožbenega tribunala, ki državljane povabi k razpravi o obravnavi primera s sodnikom, lahko pripelje do izboljšanja kakovosti obravnave. Kljub temu sam postopek ne zagotavlja večje kakovosti. Bibliography and references Bekkers, V. (2012). Beleid in beweging: achtergronden, benaderingen, fasen en aspecten van beleid in de publieke sector. 2nd ed. Den Haag: Boom Lemma. Bos, K. van den (2007). Procedurele rechtvaardigheid: beleving en implicates. In A. F. M. Brenninkmeijer, M. van Dam, & Y. van der Vlugt (Eds.), Werken aan behoorlijkheid: De Nationale ombudsman in zijn context. The Hague: Boom Juridische Uitgevers. Graaf, L. de (2007). Gedragen beleid. Een bestuurskundig onderzoek naar interactief beleid en draagvlak in de stad Utrecht. Delft: Eburon. Graaf, K.J. de & Marseille, A. T. (2013). Final Dispute resolution by Dutch administrative courts: slippery slope and efficient remedy. In S. Comtois & K.J. de Graaf (Eds.), On Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Independence (pp. 205-218). The Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers. Irvin, R. A. & Stansbury, J. (2004). Citizen Participation in Decision Making: Is It Worth the Effort? Public Administration Review, 64 (1), 55-65. Peppel, R. van (2001). Effecten van interactieve beleidsvormig. In J. Edelenbos & R. Monnikhof (Eds.), Lokale interactieve beleidsvorming: een vergelijkend onderzoek naar de consequenties van interactieve beleidsvorming voor het functioneren van de lokale democratie (pp. 33-49). Utrecht: Lemma, . Pröpper, I. (2009). De aanpak van interactief beleid: elke situatie is anders. 3rd ed. Bussum: Coutinho. Stephan, M. (2005). Democracy in backyards: a study of community involvement in administrative decision making. Environment and behaviour, 37, 662-682. Taylor, M. (2007). Community participation in the real world: opportunities and pitfalls in new governance spaces. Urban Studies, 44 (2), 297-317. UDK: 349.6:342.571(498) 1.02 Review article Public Participation in Environmental Decision Making in Romania Bogdana Neamtu neamtu@fspac.ro Dacian C. Dragos dragos@fspac.ro Laura Capraru hossu.laura@gmail.com Center for Good Governance Studies, Babes Bolyai University Cluj Napoca, Romania ABSTRACT This article researches the manner in which the participation pillar from the Aarhus Convention was transposed into Romanian legislation and how its provisions were applied to a highly controversial case. Thus, the paper will firstly address the general legal framework concerning participation in environmental matters as well as the challenges for the implementation of Aarhus Convention, followed by requirements for effective participation and NGOs involvement in the process. The main conclusion drawn is that public participation is generally seen only as a bureaucratic requirement that both authorities and the developer must meet before the project is adopted. In this context, the NGOs play a crucial role by acting as a real watchdog in identifying deficiencies in the application of the Convention. In order for enhancing implementation the authors emphasize the more proactive role that public authorities should have both with regard to the quality of environmental reports and with applying sanctions coupled with a stronger cooperation with the NGOs in the field. Key words: Aarhus Convention, public participation JEL: K32, L31 1 Overview of the legal framework In Romania, the UNECE Aarhus Convention on Access to Information and the transposal of the Environmental Impact Assessment (henceforth EIA]) and Strategic Environmental Assessment (henceforth SEA) Directives have been completed through the adoption of various legal norms. The very first of these was Order no. 619/1992 on the procedure for establishing the minimum content of the studies and the environmental impact assessment which also envisaged requirements for public information and consultation. Neamtu, B., Dragos, D. C., & Capraru, L. (2014). Public Participation in Environmental Decision Making in Romania. 63 Mednarodna revija za javno upravo, XII (2-3), 63-80 These improvements regarding the provisions for SEA/EIA are aH the result of transposing the EU directives in this field.1 Later on, with the signing and ratification of the Aarhus Convention, Law no. 86/20002 entered into force. However, despite these changes, it was only in 2012 that all the provisions concerning SEA and EIA were fully transposed. The process of openness and transparency in government was further developed with the adoption of Law no. 52/2003, which is the framework law regulating participation to the decision-making process of public bodies and Law no. 554/2004 on the review of administrative acts. The latter one has undergone numerous changes, the last being in 2012 concerning remedies, which reflected various influences originating in the evolution of doctrine of Courts' practice and of European law. During the following years, starting with 2006 there were several legislative efforts of creating a Code for administrative procedure, which was considered highly needed in light of the legislative instability. Among the proposals for the new code there was also one to include the procedural aspects of transparency, or to put it differently to abrogate the transparency law and to maintain only FOIA as special legislation. However this proposal has encountered great criticism from the non-governmental organizations (henceforth NGOs) who consider these two laws of paramount importance for the promotion of democracy and transparency in Romania and that they should remain separate from the general procedural law. 2 Challenges for the Implementation and Application of Aarhus Convention in Romania 2.1 General remarks There are several provisions which regulate environmental policy in Romania as well as various agencies, which administer and enforce law in this field. The main authority is the Ministry of Environment and Forests, which is in charge of, among others: national environmental and water management policymaking, coordination and supervision of other authorities in connection with environmental protection activities, representation in connection with the achievement of Romania's obligations under the environmental protection related EU and bilateral / regional / international requirements. Moving onwards, the National Environmental Protection Agency, which has several regional and county subsidiaries, and the Administration of "Delta Dunarii" Biosphere Reservation are in charge of environmental law implementation mainly regarding coordination of environmental permitting procedures. The environmental law enforcement authority, dealing mainly with verifying 1 SEA Directive 2001/42/EC, EIA Directive 85/337/EEC as amended by Directives 97/11/EC and 2003/35/EC. 2 Published in the Official Journal of Romania no. 224, 22 May 2000. compliance with environmental regulations is the National Environmental Guard with its subordinated local units. Actually many other authorities (e.g., other ministries, water management authorities, public health authorities, local public administration authorities, police authorities) depend on the environmental protection areas and activities. In this context, one of the greatest challenges for the implementation of the provisions of Aarhus Convention is represented by the attitude of the public institutions which consider, especially regarding technical matters that technocrats know best what needs to be done, rejecting in this manner ideas from outside. However, the interaction with NGOs and media representatives, especially in highly publicized cases is slowly bringing a change in public authorities' approach. In Romania, NGOs are in fact the main actors which interact with public institutions in accessing environmental information and exercising their participation rights.3 Moreover, many times they are the ones interested and able to mobilize citizens. Another problem in the mentality of the public authorities is that they don't see environmental laws as a mean towards protecting the environment. The public authorities' attitude towards solving environmental matters is perfectly illustrated by the actions taken in closing down garbage dumps that do not comply with the EU legislation requirements. In rural area, public authorities, which, most of them, lack financial resources and expertise, are silently encouraging citizens to deposit garbage on vacant plots at the outskirt of the communities instead of providing a new dumping facility and applying sanctions to people who do not comply with environmental regulations. The above mentioned aspect is very much connected with another one which hinders implementation - weak administrative capacity at different levels. Administrative capacity is considered by various authors when discussing policy implementation challenges. Thus, administrative capacity at various levels, understood as all different types of resources, human, material, mentalities (Honadle, 2001), is considered the basic step in insuring effective implementation. Concentrating exclusively on the development of the legal framework, the premises for a "strained transparency or openness" are created - inability to cope with transparency and free access to information due to an absence of resources or a misunderstanding of information (Pasquier & Villeneuve, 2007). In the context of European integration, Central and Eastern European countries focused during the public policy making process more on the adoption of the best legislation rather than on its implementation and adaption to the national context. Thus, a "missing link" of the process appeared (Dunn, Staronova, & Pushkarev, 2006). Furthermore, the distance between stated policy goals and 3 According to the statistics of the National Agency for the Protection of the Environment, the majority of persons applying for access to environmental information are NGOs. the realization of such planned goals due to inadequate human and material resources, lack of continuity in government policies and corruption lead to an implementation gap. Furthermore, most of the reforms in the former communist countries took place in a context guided by international actors who provided the principles for good governance and "exported" models of best practice regarding democratic governance, transparency, and citizen participation. Hence, most countries in transition saw the reforms as meeting the requirements of international organizations or the EU in the case of new candidate countries and less as a means toward achieving a more efficient government (Frost, 2003). In Romania this is perfectly illustrated by the manner in which the provisions of EU Directives, including the ones in environmental matters, were transposed into the national legislation, by mimics, although most of the times an adaption to national context would have been required. This leads to highly general and/or unclear legal provisions, which leaves room for discretion and implicitly for abuse from public authorities. 2.2 EIA Procedure and its application The EIA procedure entails some mandatory phases stated in the G.D. no. 918/22 August 2002.4 Article 3 of the G.D. states that purpose of the Environment Impact Assessment, which is about establishing manners of reducing or avoiding the negative effects on the environment of the project assessed, and it determines the decision whether to approve or reject the project. The Environment Impact Assessment procedure has three phases: (a) framing of the project in the EIA procedure; (b) defining the evaluation area and writing the EIA report and (c) analyzing the EIA report. The EIA is to be conducted with the help of the Technical Assessment Committee which is a non-permanent structure of experts designated by the central public authority for environment. Firstly, the author must submit to the local environment authority a Project Presentation Report, containing the description and characterization of the area where the project is to be conducted and the description and the characterization of the project. This triggers the first phase - the framing phase. Based on this project presentation report, the competent authority decides whether they have to proceed with a complete EIA or if the project is small and harmless, they decide that such a measure is not needed and they grant the permit right away. The author has the obligation to inform both the authority and the public about his intention, and the public can make written observations and send them to the environmental authority responsible. 4 G.D. no. 918/22 August 2002 regarding establishing the framework-procedure for evaluating the impact on environment and approving the list of public projects which could be subjected to this procedure. If the authority decides that they do have to go on with the procedure, they enter the second part. This decision can be contested by the public. The public authority, through the Committee, must offer the author of the project a collection of suggestions based on which they should carry on with the EIA study. This is comprised in the second part. Basically, the authorities state which are the most important concerns and the biggest threats, and they ask the project owner to put emphasis on these areas. The author proceeds to create an EIM Report, on the structure offered by the Committee, incorporating all the necessary information. In this report, they must answer the questions that the public addressed during the initial stage of the procedure. When the author submits this report, this second procedure is finished. The last stage entails the review of the report. Here, it is necessary to consult the population, usually using public consultations and debate, but also written comments or complaints. Also, independent expert commissions can create their own report. Finally, it is up to the central environmental authority to assess the quality of the report and to reject it or accept it. If the report is rejected, it must be redone, and of course this entails that the project will not receive the environmental permit. If the report is accepted, the Ministry of Environment must state its decision concerning the environment permit, and make it public both to the author and to the public. 3 The Right to participation in Environmental Matters 3.1 Legal framework for procedural rules applicable to public participation in environmental matters It should be mentioned from the very beginning that there is an important difference with regard to participation rules applicable to normative instruments, plans and programs, and to specific projects. The difference lies in the consultation of the public. While in the classical case of a public authority issuing plans and programs, the authority is also responsible for conducting public participation procedures by itself, in the case of a plan or a project both the initiator and the developer are compelled to obtain feed-back from the public. Furthermore, NGOs have been constantly asking to replace the developer in organizing debates since the developer lacked interest in obtaining the public's feedback according to them. There are three basic regulations which cover the procedural rules applicable to public participation in environmental matters. The first one is Law no. 52/2003 which is a framework law on transparency in the decision-making process of public administration bodies. This law deals both with the publicity rules to be followed during the adoption/drafting of administrative normative acts and the public participation to public debates organized by public administration bodies. One example of the latter is represented by regular proceedings of the local councils or public debates organized in order to discuss various issues, including the draft of a normative act. Secondly, there is Governmental Decision no. 1076/2004 concerning the environmental evaluation for plans and programs and last Governmental Decision no. 445/2009 concerning the evaluation of the environmental impact of certain public and private projects,5 both which transpose the provisions of the EU Directives on SEA and EIA procedures. These three regulations may work together, though with a different purpose. If, according to SEA rules, the environmental assessment is conducted during the drafting/preparation of the plan or program and is finalized before its adoption, the public body must comply with the publicity and participation rules which are generally requested before the adoption of an administrative act if the adoption is done by the government or a ministry. Hence these are procedural participatory rules concerning the SEA procedure and refer explicitly to determining the environmental impact of the program or plan before its adoption. Thus, the applicable rules concern the discussion of the act in its entirety and not just with reference to its environmental impact. 3.2 Requirements for effective participation In Romania, the absence of a compensation mechanism turned public debate into an adversarial confrontation between the supporters of the developers and the public/NGOs. Furthermore, most cases of public participation are seen only as a requirement that both the authorities and the developer are compelled to meet before the project is adopted. The limits of this approach will be further seen when discussing the case study. One step towards improving the participation and implicitly the quality of the debate and the outcome of the consultation is on one hand improving the quality of the environmental reports and of the accredited technical experts hired by the developer. As previously discussed developers are not generally interested in public participation and thus have no incentives in producing high quality environmental impact assessments. Hence, they hire an expert who facilitates the issuing of the development permit and not necessarily the one who does the best job in terms of assessing the environmental impact. Furthermore, according to the legislation in the field, all experts, once accredited enjoy the same level of recognized qualification. Another step should be improving the quality of the environmental report drafted by the public authorities and their greater in-depth scrutiny for the protection of the environment. There are cases when studies do not meet the requirements envisaged by law but they still pass the evaluation done by public authorities. Thus, there is a need for increasing the quality of the entire 5 This last mentioned Governmental Decision is accompanied by a Joint Ministerial Order from 2012 concerning the approval of the implementing methodology. assessment process in order for public participation to go beyond defense and consultation. 3.3 NGOs participation As previously discussed in chapter two, NGOs, either national or in partnership with Green Peace, tend to be more active than citizens. This could be explained by the lack of participatory culture among community members, apathy and distrust in public authorities. The legislation in the field of environmental protection offers NGOs various possibilities to exercise their participation right. According to national legislation and practice, associations, organizations or groups may form the public who, according to SEA legislation, can participate. Moreover, G.D. no. 564/20066 regarding the establishment of the framework for the public's participation to the drafting/adoption of certain plans and programs concerning the environment gives NGOs broad participation rights during the SEA process by granting the decision-making public authorities the competence to identify the relevant public for participating in taking a certain decision. The criteria for this identification, with explicit reference to NGOs, are: their mission and representativeness (e.g. from a geographic point of view) in connection with the plan or policy. Public authorities have tried to limit NGOs' participation registered in one county to the SEA procedure taking place in a different region motivating the lack of concern in that respective matter. EIA procedures make a distinction between the "public", defined above, and the "interested public" defined as to include the public affected or potentially affected by the assessment of the environmental impact and which has an interest in the said procedure.7 In the field of environment protection NGOs are considered to have an interest. 3.4 Timeframes for participation Timeframes are of great importance when discussing participation for at least two reasons. On one hand, if a stage in the process of consultation is very lengthy the number of NGOs and individuals interested and implicitly involved in the case will decrease. On the other hand, very short timeframes (e.g. when impact upon a certain species is assessed) lead to incomplete evaluations. Thus, it is necessary to have reasonable timeframes for public participation. This subchapter aims at analyzing firstly the number of days/ weeks the public has for participation in different phases and secondly the total length of various stages. Henceforth, a selection of provisions concerning various timeframes for public participation from both the framework law 6 Published in the Official Journal of Romania, no. 405, 10 May 2006. 7 According to G.D. no. 564/2006. on transparency in decision-making in public administration and the specific national legislation on EIA and SEA procedures is presented, in order to see whether or not the timeframes can be deemed as reasonable. Transparency in the decision-making of public administration bodies 8 Every time public administrative authorities draft normative acts / instruments, a notice regarding their intention should be communicated to the public, with at least 30 days prior to its discussion and adoption. The notice should also include the possibility of the public to respond - it is necessary to allow at least 10 days for receiving written recommendations from the public. If public debates are organized during the adoption of the normative act, they should take place in no more than 10 days from the moment of the publication of notice comprising the place / date for the public debate. Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure 9 During the screening stage the competent public authority for the protection of the environment needs to identify the interested public within 15 days from the date when it was approached with a request for issuing the environmental agreement10 by the developer of the project, through publication on its website and on the premises of its main building. In three days after a decision is reached with regard to the screening of the project, the public authority posts on its website the draft of the decision and informs the developer about the obligation to inform the public. In its turn, the developer of the project has 3 days to publish the announcement in the local and / or national press, to place it in a public space at his headquarters as well as in the public authority's main building, and to post it on his webpage. The public has then 5 days to make comments concerning the draft project of the screening stage. During the quality analysis of the environmental report stage, the notice regarding the opportunities for the participation of the interested public is posted on the websites of the public authorities responsible for the protection of the environment and those responsible for issuing the approval for development and placed in a visible spot at their headquarters with at least 20 days prior to the date when the public meeting is scheduled. The developer, in its turn, needs to publish 8 Law no. 52/2003 on participation in decision making. 9 Governmental Decision no. 1076/2004 concerning the environmental evaluation for plans and programs and last Governmental Decision no. 445/2009 concerning the evaluation of the environmental impact of certain public and private projects. 10 In Romanian acord de mediu - administrative act issued by the competent authority for the protection of the environment in which the conditions and/or the measures for the protection of the environment that need to be followed upon the development of the project are outlined. in 3 days upon receiving the notice mentioned earlier, in the national or local press, to post it on his website / at his headquarters or the headquarters of the authority for the protection of the environment, and/or on the billboard placed at the project's site. The interested public can make recommendations up until the date of the public meeting (the public has at least 20 days). There are also shorter deadlines for the public to respond during this stage - 5 days to make comments regarding the notice for the granting of the environmental agreement to the developer. Strategic Environmental Assessment Procedure11 During the screening procedure, the initiator of the plan publishes in the mass media, twice, at a 3 days interval, and posts on his website the initial version of the plan, its nature, the starting of the screening procedure, the place/hour where the initial version can be found, and the possibility to make comments in writing at the headquarters of the authority for the protection of the environment, no later than 15 days from the date of the last / second notice. The competent authority for the protection of the environment also notifies the public about the starting of the screening phase by a post on its website and the possibility to make comments in the 10 days following the posting of the notice. The final decision is notified to the public by posting it on the website of the competent authority for the protection of the environment and by its publishing by the initiator of the plan in mass media (in no more than 3 days after the decision is made). During the completion stage of the plan and the drafting of the environmental report, the initiator of the plan publishes in the mass media, twice, at a 3 days interval, and posts on his website the draft plan, the completion of the environmental report, the place/hour where the public can review them and the possibility for the public to issue written proposals to both the initiator's and the competent authority's headquarters in 45 days from the date when the last notice was published. The initiator has the same publicity obligations as described previously with regard to organizing a public debate on the draft plan, including the environmental report. The debate cannot be held any sooner than 45 days (60 if the plan has a trans-boundary effect) from the moment the notice is published. The above excerpts from national legislation reveal a relative correlation between the various timeframes for publicity and public participation in relation to environmental matters. Thus, according to all three, public institutions, competent authorities for the protection of the environment, 11 Governmental Decision no. 1076/2004 concerning the environmental evaluation for plans and programs and last Governmental Decision no. 445/2009 concerning the evaluation of the environmental impact of certain public and private projects the initiator of a plan / program and the requester of an environmental agreement for certain projects have short deadlines to comply with publicity obligations. Hence, they usually have three days to notify the public with regard to a certain decision made or to post a draft version of a specific document on their webpages and at their headquarters. On the other hand, the public usually has fifteen days and in certain cases ten days to make comments. Furthermore, public debates are announced between twenty and forty-five days in advance. There are also studies, conducted at the national level, which looked at the total number of SEA procedures conducted from 2004 to 2010 (UNDP) Table 1 and Table 2 below summarize this information. Table 1: Number of SEA procedures with a time period greater than one year (for each development region, which at their turn include 4-5 counties) Length Bucuresti Cluj Bacau Craiova Pitesti Galati Sibiu >1 year 4 9 8 13 11 46 39 >2 years 0 0 1 1 3 5 11 >3 years 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 >4 years 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 Source: UNDP, pp. 26-27. Table 2: Mean values for the time periods necessary for the completion of different stages in the SEA procedure Stages Average number of days Bucuresti Bacau Cluj Craiova Galati Pitesti Sibiu Timis National From notification to public debate 337 196 320 283 201 216 263 290 263 From public debate to environmental approval 33 67 42 62 78 33 87 40 55,7 The entire procedure 370 264 362 345 272 253 348 297 314 Source: UNDP, pp. 27. For EIA procedures, a sample of authorities and projects was examined by the same authors and the results were similar (UNDP, p. 30). Thus, the average duration for completing the EIA procedure from notification to the issuance date of the environmental permit is 237. For specific projects, the shortest timeframe was 37 days, at the regional branch of the National Agency for the Protection of the Environment Bacau, which also registers the project with the highest duration of EIA, 766 day. The highest average duration was registered in Bucharest with 311 days. However, these timeframes are relevant only if compared with what happens in other countries. Hence, Romania generally has timeframes shorter than the average EU 27. Stakeholders have formulated various opinions on the length of these procedures. On one hand, developers usually complain that they take very long. On the other hand, NGOs argue the same with the exception of cases when the impact upon certain species is assessed. For this later case NGO representatives consider longer timeframes necessary. In the end, no matter how big or small, the timeframe should allow a thorough evaluation of the environmental impact. 4 Case Study: the Rosia Montana Mining Project Rosia Montana represents (McGrath, 2013) "[...] the story of the small village that has triggered Romania's biggest uprising since the demise of communism in 1989 - with protesters out on the streets in 75 cities worldwide: from Bucharest to London, New York to Shanghai." Furthermore, the decisions adopted in this case and its final resolution will definitely have a great impact on future cases such as shale gas, which is another project under discussion in Romania. In an article from The Guardian, one of the leaders of the protest against the Rosia Montana gold exportation, declared (Ciobanu, 2013) "Rosia Montana is the battle of the present and of the next decades [...] People today [.] ask for an improved democratic process, for adding a participatory democracy dimension to traditional democratic mechanisms." 4.1 General context Rosia Montana12 gold exploitation has been a highly controversial development project in Romania due to the degree of toxicity of the substances which shall be used in the process of extracting gold (Justice and Environment, 2011) by Rosia Montana Gold Corporation (RMGC), the current developer. The project started in 1995 and is still in its preliminary phase of approval because of serious opposition from the civil society. The process has been a very lengthy one and involved a series of stakeholders both from the side of the developer and that of the NGOs. A short presentation of the actions taken by both parts will provide a general overview of the matters." In 1995, the Romanian public company Minvest and the Canadian private company Gabriel Resources Limited formed the partnership called Rosia 12 Rosia Montana area comprises 4 mountains and several villages from the communes Rosia Montana and Bucium in Transylvania, Romania. 13 For drafting this brief chronology the following sources were used: (1) Alburnus Maior (2) Gabriel Resources Project (3) the open letter "The Romanian State - captive at Rosia Montana?' which a group from the Economical Sciences Academy wrote to the President, Parliament and Government. For the period 2008-2012 information were gathered using the press monitoring technique. Montana Gold Corporation for exploiting the old mine and leftover gangs from the Rosia Montana area. In 1999, Minvest received a license for exploiting the old mine at Rosia Montana and one year later it transferred the license to RMGC, action which was contested since a state-owned company cannot transfer the license to a private company. In the same year, the NGO Alburnus Maior14 was formed and in 2003 it started its first court action against Minvest for illegal drilling in the Carnic Massif, being also supported by the Romanian Academy, which declared itself against the mining project, and Greenpeace which began its protests. In July 2002, the Local Council adopted the General Urbanism Plan (PUG) and the Zoning Urbanism Plan (PUZ), both documents being necessary for RMGC to initiate the procedures for starting the project. These documents were deemed illegal in 2005 by the Alba Iulia Tribunal and in 2008, 2010 and 2012 by the Alba Iulia Court of Appeal after the Local Council or the County Council repeatedly granted new certificates to RMCG. Furthermore, in March 2004, the Environment Protection Agency from Alba issued an archaeological discharge certificate for the Carnic Massif which was challenged in court by Alburnus Maior and found illegal by Alba Iulia Court in 2005 and irrevocably annulled by Brasov Court of Appeal. In 2005, RMGC submitted the Project Presentation Report for the Rosia Montana Mining Project to the Environmental Protection Agency in Alba. This triggered the initiation of the Environment Impact Assessment procedure. Around 120 NGOs and individuals expressed their intentions to participate in the EIA. In February 2006, Alburnus Maior issued a document entitled "Undermining Rosia Montana?" accusing the state authorities of favoritism in this project. In April, the Romanian Minister for Environment Protection met the EU Commissioner for Environment and, at this occasion declared that the EIA procedure in the Rosia Montana project was suspended, the reason being that the PUG and PUZ were not valid. Only a month later RMGC submitted its EIA report. In the following period, several public consultations occurred both in Romania and Hungary and Alburnus Maior presented its own version in an Independent Expert Analysis. In 2007, Alba Iulia court declared the illegality of 192 drilling points in the Rosia Montana and Bucium Communes. In 2012, the Government announced that any decision about the Rosia Montana Project will be postponed until fall of 2012, after the parliamentary elections. In 2013, the Government tried to initiate in Parliament a Law for the sole purpose of this project, but due to street manifestations the adoption was postponed. The solution envisaged now is to deal with the project within a more general Law of the mining industry. 14 Alburnus Maior is in fact the name of Rosia Montana during the Roman Empire, when it was founded as a mining town. What is striking however about this entire process is the lack of participation of the general public in the decision making of the government regarding the Rosia Montana mining. Hence, there were no consultations regarding finding the best-agreed solutions on this issue. Even since 2003 two different sides, which confronted each other, were established. On one hand, there were NGOs and environmental activists, who gradually gathered more and more supporters from the public. They have continuously protested against the mining project by taking matters to various Courts and organizing massive street protests. On the other hand, there were politicians and mining companies, who were advocating job creation, financial investment and above all the lack of negative effect of the mining process. In this confrontation, the media was used by both parties to promote their views. International media reported this process as: "through aggressive PR and media campaigns the parties set to profit are doing all they can to pacify, oppress, and deceive opposition to the mine" (McGrath, 2013) and that "protesters [...] have skillfully kept the public informed and engaged via Facebook".15 4.2 Legal provisions applicable to the Rosia Montana case The main law in force at the beginning of the Rosia Montana Mining Project Assessment was the Environment Protection Law no. 137/1995. This law clearly states in Article 8(6) that public or private projects which may have a significant impact on the environment must pass through the EIA procedure. Furthermore, Article 12(3) states that consulting the public in such projects is mandatory. The legal documents which regulate the EIA procedure in Romania are the Government Ordinances no. 863 and no. 864 of 26 September 2002, issued by the Ministry of Environment. One of the ordinances approves the EIA procedure and the other approves its methodology. In 2003, the law on transparency of decisions in public administrations, Law no. 54/2003, was issued and represented another very important tool for citizens. This piece of legislation clearly states that citizens have the right to ask for any public information and they should be given an answer in an appropriate timeframe. Another important piece of legislation was the Governmental Decision establishing the procedure of environment evaluation for plans and projects. All these were active in December 2004, when RMGC submitted the necessary documents for starting the EIA procedure. In July 2005, another very important Governmental Decision was added to the current legislation, which basically transposes the provisions of the Aarhus Convention, by stating that the public has the right to be informed and to receive information when they request it, concerning the state of the environment and the effects of 15 Ibidem. different projects with impact of environment. The most interesting part about the Romanian environment legislation is the fact that this document that applies the Aarhus Convention actually holds no provision whatsoever on the right of the public to participate in decision making. The document that does contain provisions connected to that is the Minister Order no. 864 of 26 September 2002 approving the EIA procedure. Nevertheless, a lot of focus is placed on the transborder interested parts and less on the citizens of the country. Thus, the way the Aarhus Convention was translated to national legislation has been flawed. A more refined regulation concerning the EIA emerged in 2004 - the G.D. no. 1076/2004.16 4.3 Abiding by the provisions of the Aarhus convention As previously stated, the mechanism that controls whether the Convention was respected or not is the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee (ACCC).17 A complaint was filed to this body by Alburnus Maior on the 5th of July 2005 and it was solved by the Committee on the 16 April 2008 (Compilance Committe, n.d.). According to this document two of the three pillars of the Aarhus Convention were breached, namely access to information and participation of the public in decision-making. The right to participate was breached on three accounts. Firstly, when the EIA procedure began, the competent authority failed to inform individually all the participants that subscribed to the process. They only published the documentation on their website. According to the Convention, all the interested parties should have been duly notified especially since some of the parties do not speak Romanian, they could not get the necessary information from the website. Secondly, Alburnus Maior contested the fact that the written complaints in the scoping phase were not included in the inquiries for the applicant. Third, the organization complained about the quality of the public debates. The biggest shortcomings of these debates were that they were not conducted in all affected localities (for example in the Bucium commune), that the moderators were not impartial, that the timeframe for a speaker was insufficient and that the author simply did not answer the questions for the floor, just trying to make propaganda for the project. Also, the organization complained that the minutes of the meetings were taken incorrectly by the Ministry of Environment and by RMGC and these discrepancies can be noticed if one compares the videos with the written reports. The last complaint was again that some of the questions addressed by the participants in the public debates were not answered or even acknowledged later on by the author of the project." 16 The Governmental Decision no. 176/2004. 17 The entire documentation of the process, as well as the rulings can be found on a webpage of the Aarhus Convention. 18 All of these accusations and complaints can be found in the document Alburnus Maior (2007). 76 International Public Administration Review, Vol. XII, No. 2-3, 2014 5 Final Considerations The research has provided an overview of the importance granted by each stakeholder to environmental matters. As stated in the beginning of this article the public authorities view participation as a hassle, something they need to comply with by doing the minimum required by law. Implicitly, the quality of their work (e.g. drafting environmental reports, organizing debates) is in most cases very low. The debates unfolded at Rosia Montana has also been about economic interests over environmental matters, an aspect which is very often in seen in developing countries, where environmental matters are very often considered secondary in relation to economic development opportunities. Furthermore, the research has once again reinforced the idea of NGOs' importance in public participation and decision making and the decisive role played by them in mobilizing citizens and taking concrete actions. Thus, in order for enhancing the implementation of Aarhus Convention, the authors emphasize the more proactive role that public authorities should have both with regard to the quality of environmental reports and with applying sanctions coupled with a stronger cooperation with the NGOs in the field. Bogdana Neamtu is Associate Professor within the Public Administration Department at Babes Bolyai University, Cluj Napoca, Romania. Her academic background includes a BA in public administration (2002) and a M.A. in European law (2003) from Babes Bolyai, as well as a M.A. in urban planning from Michigan State University, USA (2006). She obtained her PhD in sociology in 2008, with a topic on urban growth management in Romania. Her publications include 4 chapters in international books, one book as single author and 2 co-edited, over 20 articles in journals. Dacian C. Dragos is Jean Monnet Professor of Administrative and European Law; former Vice Dean and then Acting Dean of the Faculty of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences (2008-2012); Scientific Coordinator of the Commission for drafting the Administrative Procedure Code of Romania (2006-2008) and Expert in the Commission for drafting the Administrative Code (2010-2011). Member of the Presidential Commission for Analyzing the Constitutional System of Romania (2008-2009). Chair of the "Law and Administration' Panel of the European Croup of Public Administration (since 2010). His research publications include 2 edited international books, 10 Chapters in international books, 5 books in Romanian as single author and 4 in collaboration, over 30 papers in scientific journals. Laura Capraru is an associate researcher within the Center for Good Governance Studies, Babes - Bolyai University, Cluj. Her academic background includes a B.A. in Political Science (2006) and a M.A. in European Studies (2009) from the University of Bucharest, Faculty of Political Science. In 2012, after having completed a research visit at Utrecht University, Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance, she obtained her PhD in Political Science from the University of Bucharest with the thesis "Romanian Ombudsman: practice and powers". Her publications include one book as single author, two chapters in books, one of them international and four articles. POVZETEK 1.02 Pregledni znanstveni članek Udeležba javnosti pri okoljskih odločitvah v Romuniji Ključne besede: Aarhuška konvencija, udeležba javnosti Članek raziskuje, kako je bil steber sodelovanja javnosti iz Aarhuške konvencije prenesen v romunsko zakonodajo in kako so bile njene določbe uporabljene v zelo spornem primeru. Članek najprejobravnava splošni pravni okvir sodelovanja v okoljskih zadevah kot tudi izzive uvajanja Aarhuške konvencije in zahteve za učinkovito sodelovanje in vključenost nevladnih organizacij v proces. Glavna ugotovitev je, da se na sodelovanje javnosti na splošno gleda samo kot na birokratsko zahtevo pred sprejetjem projekta, ki ji morajo zadostiti tako organi oblasti kot nosilec projekta. Tukaj imajo nevladne organizacije ključno vlogo, da delujejo kot dober nadzornik pri identifikaciji pomanjkljivosti uporabe konvencije. Avtorji poudarjajo, da bi bila za izboljšanje izvrševanja konvencije potrebna bolj proaktivna vloga javnih organov glede kakovosti okoljskih poročil in izvajanja sankcij ter boljšega sodelovanja s področnimi nevladnimi organizacijami. Bibliography and references Aarhus Convention. (n.d.). Retrieved 11 January 2014, from http://www.unece. org/env/pp/cc.html Alburnus Maior. (n.d.). Retrieved 11 January 2014, from: http://rosiamontana.org Alburnus Maior. (2007). How not to conduct an EIA. Submission to the Aarhus Convention Compliance Comittee. [Online] at http://www.rosiamontana.ro/ ANNEX_EIA/annex2.pdf Ciobanu, C. (2013). Romanians mobilise in protest against gold mine plans. The Guardian. [Online]. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/sep/17/ romanians-mobilise-gold-mine Compilance Committe. (n.d.) Aarhus Convention. Retrieved 11 January 2014, from http://www.unece.org/env/pp/compliance/Compliancecommittee/15Ta bleRomania.html Dunn, W.N., Staronova, K., & Pushkarev, S. (2006). Implementation: The missing link. In W. N. Dunn, K. Staronova, & S. Pushkarev (Eds.), Implementation: The Missing Link in Public Administration Reform in Central and Eastern Europe (pp. 43-62). Bratislava: NISPAcee. Frost, A. (2003). Restoring faith in government: Transparency reform in the United States and the European Union. European Public Law, 9 (1), 87-104. Gabriel Resources Project. Retrieved 11 January 2014, from: http://en.rmgc.ro/ media/quick-facts.html Governmental Decision. [Online] at http://www.ce-re.ro Honadle, B.W. (2001). Theoretical and practical issues of local government capacity in an era of devolution. Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy,31 (1), 77-90. Justice and Environment. (2011) Banning Cyanide. Banning Cyanide from Mining in the European Union. Legal Analysis. Retrieved 11 January 2014, from: http:// www.justiceandenvironment .org/_files/file/2011%20cyanide%20analysis. pdf Pasquier, M. & Villeneuve, J. P. (2007). Organizational barriers to transparency: A typology and analysis of organizational behavior tending to prevent or restrict access to information. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 73 (1), 147-162. McGrath, S. (21.10.2013). Rosia Montana and Dirty Politics. The Huffington Post, [Online]. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/stephen-mcgrath/rosia-montana-and-dirty-p_b_4123235.html United Nations Development Programme. UNDP. (n.d.). Effectiveness of environmental impact assessment in Romania and simple means to improve it. [Online]. Retrieved 11 January 2014, from: http://www.undp.ro/libraries/ projects/Effectivness_of_EIA_in_Romania_01.pdf UDK: 349.6(492) 1.01 Original scientific article Improving Environmental Permitting Systems: Integrated Permits in the Netherlands Hanna Dürtge Tolsma Department of Administrative Law and Public Administration University of Groningen, Netherlands h.d.tolsma@rug.nl abstract Environmental law originally developed in a fragmented way (sectoral legislation protecting water, soil or air). This fragmented approach towards environmental protection caused problems. Citizens and businesses applying for a permit are confronted with a range of procedures with a variety of different time limits, assessment criteria and legal remedies. Comparative law research shows that the integration of legislation in the field of environmental law is a growing trend. Policymakers feel the necessity to integrate decisionmaking in order to optimise the protection of the environment. The first part of this article contains a brief overview of the concept of an integrated process for the granting of environmental permits. The second part discusses the idea of environmental model 4 permit, which has been put forward in the Netherlands. It is questionable if this specific concept of integrated environmental permitting can be achieved within the constraints of Dutch administrative law. Key words: environmental permitting, integrated approach, integrated environmental permit, rule of purpose-specific powers JEL: K23, K41 1 Introduction Integrated environmental permits is a topical issue in many countries such as Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, the General Act on Environmental Permitting introduced in October 2010 radically changed the legal framework of environmental permits.1 Until then, environmental permits were split up over a variety of laws and regulations. Citizens and businesses seeking a permit were confronted with a range of procedures entailing a variety of different time limits, assessment criteria and legal remedies. The GAEP is intended to address these problems through the procedural integration of permits. One step further is the idea of a so-called 1 In Dutch: Wet algemene bepalingen omgevingrecht (Wabo), stb. 2008, 496. Tolsma, H. D. (2014). Improving Environmental Permitting Systems: Integrated Permits in the Netherlands 81 Mednarodna revija za javno upravo, XII (2-3), 81-98 "model 4" permit system which refers to a single integrated assessment framework.2 An advantage of one single integrated assessment framework is that the competent public authority will be able to consider various aspects of the law (such as the environment, nature conservation and spatial planning) in their totality, unimpeded by the constraints of a variety of different assessment frameworks. This would be in line with the "integrated approach" of the Industrial Emissions Directive at EU level. A number of legal problems have been identified in the literature in relation to this permit model.3 In the first place, it is assumed that an integrated framework will have undesirable consequences in terms of judicial review. The integration of various aspects of environmental law in a single assessment framework will probably result in a fairly broad formulation of the aspects (such as "protection of the physical living environment") under which light a permit application will have to be evaluated. Such a vague, general formulation of the public interest to be protected will give rise to considerable constraints for the courts when reviewing decisions on permit applications. Reduced judicial review also entails the risk that the granting of permits will become more arbitrary. Public authorities will acquire more freedom to use their own discretion, and this could make it easier to ignore certain specific aspects that have been integrated in the broad assessment framework. In the third place, integrated permitting might adversely affect legal certainty. If public authorities have more discretion when balancing interests, it becomes more difficult to determine in advance what weight will be given to which interests, and this is undesirable from a legal protection point of view. These legal problems relate to the Dutch rule of purpose-specific powers (specialiteitsbeginsel), comparable to the German Bestimmtheitsgebot* This fundamental principle of public law requires that the legislator should formulate precise substantive norms as to content and purpose of administrative authority. The central question is: Can integrated environmental permits (the idea of "model 4") be achieved within the conditions of the Dutch rule of purpose-specific powers? In the first part the discussion on integrated environmental permits in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands will be presented. This comparative law study will provide knowledge about the extent to which the (proposed) law provides for substantive integrated environmental permits (Section 2). In the second part the permitting model 4 will be evaluated in the light of the Dutch rule of purpose-specific powers (Section 3-4). The article concludes with some final remarks (Section 5). 2 Kamerstukken II, 2004-2005, 29 383, nr. 18. Four models are described in this letter to the Lower House. 3 For example: Schlössels (2006, pp. 153-169). 4 The rule of purpose-specific powers also means that a public authority may only exercise a power in the framework of the legislation on which that power is based. This principle is therefore also comparable with the principle of conferred powers, a general principle of Union Law. 2 Concept of Integrated Environmental Permitting This section contains a brief overview of (proposed) legislation in the field of integrated environmental permits at the EU level and in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. This part of the research will give insight into the concept of integrated environmental permits and, in particular, the "model 4" environmental permit considered in the Netherlands. 2.1 EU: Industrial Emissions Directive An integrated system of prevention and control of pollution was recommended in the early '90s because of the recognition that regulation over the release of substances into one environmental medium (e.g. air, land, water) can result in shifting the substance to another medium. The fragmented approach in law and policies towards pollution control (focusing on each medium separately) was considered both ineffective and inefficient. At the EU level, the IPPC Directive (96/61/EC) marks a shift from single-medium to multi-media legislation by implementing an integrated approach towards pollution control. The preamble states in recital 9: "[...] this Directive establishes a general framework for integrated pollution prevention and control; whereas it lays down the measures necessary to implement integrated pollution prevention and control in order to achieve a high level of protection for the environment as a whole; whereas application of the principle of sustainable development will be promoted by an integrated approach to pollution control." In 2010 the IPPC Directive is rearranged with six other Directives into the Directive on Industrial Emissions (Directive 2010/75/EC). Chapters I, II and VII of the IE Directive correspond to a large extent to the content of the IPPC Directive. On the whole there are no major changes with regard to the integrated approach. The core of the integrated approach is regulated in chapter II of the IE Directive. The IE Directive prescribes an integrated approach to the prevention and control of activities listed in Annex I to the directive (such as energy industries, chemical industry and metal industry). The integrated approach is realised through a permit. Member States must take the necessary measures to ensure that no installation or combustion plant, waste incineration plant or waste co-incineration plant is operated without a permit (Article 4 IE Directive). Article 14 and 15 of the IE Directive require the application of emission limit values and/or equivalent parameters or technical measures based on BAT (Best Available Techniques) in combination with case-specific considerations which account for the technical characteristics of the installation concerned, its geographical location and the local environmental conditions. These requirements imply a process of weighing and balancing environmental interests in order to achieve an integrated decision (technology based approach). The substantive integration can be achieved through case-specific trade-offs (BAT - requirements against site - specific technical, geographical and environmental factors) and generic environmental trade-offs (BAT -based emission standards and environmental quality standards) (Bohne & Dietze, 2004, pp. 200-201). Information on BAT is exchanged between Member States and Industries through BAT reference documents published by the Commission (Article 13). The BAT conclusions in these documents are the reference point for setting the permit conditions (Article 14(3)).5 If the BAT conclusions do not cover all potential environmental effects, the competent authority has the task of determining the BAT itself for the specific case on which it bases the permit. Public authorities may deviate from emission levels associated with the best available techniques as laid down in BREF documents (Article 15 (4)). However, the possibility of taking specific circumstances into account is limited. Deviation is only allowed in specific cases, on the basis of an assessment of the environmental and economic costs and benefits taking into account the technical characteristics of the installation concerned, its geographical location and the local environmental conditions. It is important to note that the IE Directive does not require that Member States combine sectoral environmental laws or integrate sectoral permits in a single environmental permit. In order to guarantee an effective integrated approach Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that the conditions of, and the procedures for the granting of the permit are fully coordinated where more than one competent authority or more than one operator are involved or more than one permit is granted (Article 5(2) IE Directive). 2.2 Germany: Integrierte Vorhabengenehmigung In Germany, the idea of creating a comprehensive Environmental Code (Umweltgesetzbuch, UGB) persisted for a long time.6 A centerpiece of this Environmental Code would be the integrated project authorisation model (integrierte Vorhabengenehmigung, iVG). After years of preparation (starting in the 1970s) a draft proposal was presented to parliament in 2008. However, the Federal Government was ultimately unable to agree on a common draft (Scheidler, 2009, pp. 173-176). Eventually only a reduced reform of environmental law took place and currently the idea of an Environmental Code is no longer on the political agenda (Müggenborg & Hentschel, 2010, p. 961). However, for the purpose of this research it is relevant to discuss the proposed integrated project authorisation model. The intended result of the integrated environmental permit was to end the many differences of permit proceedings. Proceedings are combined, harmonised and simplified. According to the explanatory memorandum the permit proceeding will become more transparent, clear and simple 5 Compared to the IPPC Directive, the IE Directive establishes a stronger legal role for BAT conclusions. 6 See for a description of the development of the UGB for example Knopp (2009, pp. 121-125). (Begründung des Entwurfs zu E-UGB-I, p. 22). The integrated project authorisation model is regulated in Chapter 2 of the UGB I.7 The integrated project authorisation model contains elements of substantive integration with regard to the immissionrechtliche and wasserrechtliche permit. The integrated project authorisation model provides for procedural integration of permits that have nothing to do with the protection of the environment (such as the building permit). The assessment frameworks for these permits are separated (no single assessment framework). The procedural integration of these permits follows from § 59 Abs. 1. UGB I. § 59 Abs. 1. UGB I: "Die Genehmigung schließt andere das Vorhaben betreffende behördliche Entscheidungen ein, insbesondere öffentlich-rechtliche Genehmigungen, Zulassungen und Verleihungen mit Ausnahme von planerischen Genehmigungen, die in einem Verfahren mit Öffentlichkeitsbeteiligung erteilt werdern, Planfeststellungen, Zulassungen bergrechtlicher Betriebspläne und behördliche Entscheidungen auf Grund atomrechtlicher Vorschriften". 2.3 Belgium: omgevingsvergunning On 19 April and 19 July 2013 the Regional Government of the Flemish Region of Belgium approved a draft Act to introduce an Environmental Permit (omgevingsvergunning). Before this approved draft there had already been proposals to integrate the permit dealing with the operation of activities and installations that can potentially have an impact on the environment and the building permit in one integrated environmental permit. The objective of these proposals was to improve the functioning of the procedural link (koppelingsmechanisme) in practice between these two permits. The former proposals were intended to integrate the assessment of the building permit within the proceedings for an environmental permit.8 The result of this integrated proceeding was that there was one decision yet resulting in two legal permits. However, none of the earlier proposals were adopted by Parliament. The approved draft first will go to the legislative section of the Council of State and is expected to be adopted by Parliament in 2014. According to the explanatory memorandum (Mvt. Voorontwerp van decreet betreffende de omgevingsvergunning, p. 5), the integration of proceedings means the organisation of a permit system in which a global assessment of the environment (milieu), planning and building takes place in one integrated proceeding (one application, one public examination, one piece of advice and 7 See E-UGB-I. The UGB 2009 consist of five books and an introduction Act: Allgemeine Vorschriften und vorhabenbezogenes Umweltrecht (UBG I), Wasserwirtschaft (UGB II), Naturschutz (UGB III), Nichtionisierende Strahlung (UGB IV), Handel mit Berechtigungen zur Emission von Treibhausgasen - Emissi-onshandel (UGB V) Einführungsgesetz zum Umweltgesetzbuch (EG UGB). 8 Voorstel van Decreet Stuk 2181 (2003-2004) - nr. 1 and Voorstel van Decreet Stuk 688 (2005-2006) - nr. 1. Both proposals bear a close resemblance. Earlier, in the eighties of the last century, the integration of both permits was also discussed as a result of a draft proposal. However, the final draft the proposal of an integrated permit was dropped. One of the arguments in discussion against the integration was "the different nature of these permits" (both proposals contain explanatory remarks which refer to this history). one permit). The main advantage of an integrated assessment is, according to the explanatory memorandum that it leads to more efficiency in the decisionmaking process and better permits in terms of quality (Mvt. Voorontwerp van decreet betreffende de omgevingsvergunning, p. 10). From the Articles 4 and 5 of the draft it follows that the Environmental Permit integrates the permit dealing with the operation of activities and installations that can have an impact on the environment (milieuvergunning), the building permit (steden-bouwkundige vergunning) and an allocation permit (verkavelingsvergunning). The draft proposal is designed in a way that the scope of the Act can be broadened with the use other permits. It has to be noted that only procedural rules are integrated. The substantive rules will not be integrated into one assessment framework and therefore will remain sectoral. The substantive sectoral rules can be found in the spatial planning act (Vlaamse Codex Ruimtelijke Ordening) and the general rules environmental policy Act (decreet algemenebepalingen milieubeleid). 2.4 Netherlands: omgevingsvergunning In 2010, the Dutch General Act on Environmental Permitting introduced the single environmental permit. In the legislative process four models of environmental permitting were described in a letter to the Lower House (Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 29 383, nr. 18). Models 1 and 2 were based on coordination of different permits. Models 3 and 4 are directed at integrating various permit systems. The main difference is that within a model of integration, one public authority is ultimately responsible. The legislator gave its preference to a model of integration. A system of integrated permit is not totally new in the Netherlands. With the adoption of the Dutch Environmental Management Act in 1993, five permits and two exemptions had already been integrated into a single environmental management permit. Yet the scope of this Environmental Management Act was quite limited, as not all possible permits in the field of environmental law were integrated. The environmental management permit has been absorbed by the GAEP. The environmental permit of the GAEP applies to the demolition, construction, establishment or use of a physical facility. The activities that fall within the scope of the GAEP are typically location-specific projects, which have an impact on physical environment (air, water, soil, wildlife, biodiversity, landscape and cultural and historical elements). It concerns permits such as derogations from obligations of the land-use plan, planning permissions on the Dutch Spatial Planning Act and permits to modify or demolish a protected building under the Dutch Monuments and Historic Building Act 1988. Also, a number of permits required under provincial and municipal by-laws such as advertising display permits and permits for construction, using or changing street access are integrated in the GAEP. Not all the 25 integrated aspects have to be assessed if an application is filed. The scope of the assessment depends on the specific activities that the permit is applied for. Most of the environmental permits are included, but not all. The water permit, for example, is still not included. Model 3 At present, the GAEP provides a model 3 permit system. The difference between the model 3 and 4 system is the way the assessment framework is shaped. Model 3 has also been referred to as "integration with partitions". This means that the competent public authority evaluates an application for a single environmental permit on the basis of an assessment framework that consists of the sum of the individual, separate assessment frameworks in the various permit systems that have been incorporated in the new permit system. For example, a person wants to build a house and therefore needs a building permit and a derogation from obligations of the land-use plan. In this case, the assessment framework of the single environmental permit contains the sum of the two former assessment frameworks that are now incorporated in the GAEP. This means that the assessment itself is the same as before. The modernisation of the permit system will not introduce new or different standards. Model 4 During the legislative process of the GEAP the government's intention was to realise a model 4 permit system in the near future. Model 4 refers to a single integrated assessment framework. An advantage of one single integrated assessment framework is that the competent public authority will be able to consider various aspects of the law (such as the environment {milieu), nature conservation and spatial planning) together, unimpeded by the constraints that having a variety of different assessment frameworks brings. The assumption is that separate assessment frameworks lead to suboptimal decisions from the perspective that the environment should be seen and protected as a whole. The legislator did not elaborate the idea of the model 4 environmental permit in the legislative process. It can be said that the details of this concept are rather hazy (Tolsma, 2012, pp. 82-89). There are, for example, no practical cases that illustrate the problem that can be solved with a model 4 environmental permit. One of the few examples given in literature runs as follows: A plant is located in a building that is indicated as an ancient building on the basis of the Monuments Act. The building needs to be adjusted as a result of changes in the production process of the plant. The rules to protect ancient buildings form an obstacle for the requirements on the basis of environmental legislation. Currently, the environmental permit has to be declined as now the assessment frameworks (protection of monuments and protection of environment) are strictly separated. A model 4 could be shaped in a way that the public authority has power to weigh and balance the aspects of protection of monumental building and environment and decide what is best in the light of "protection of the physical living environment". A trade-off between monumental protection and environmental protection could be possible.9 The government's intention of introducing one integrated assessment framework has been welcomed by industry and even by environmental groups (Van den Broek & Rutteman, 2005, pp. 546-549). Some authors have even argued in favour of more far-reaching integration with other aspects, such as water (Van den Broek, 2006, pp. 136-140). There was also support for a model 4 permitting system in the Dutch Lower House. A motion has been adopted in which members of the Lower House have requested that the government present proposals on the substantive integration of assessment frameworks, in a single assessment framework, to the Parliament at that time.i" At this moment the model 4 environmental permit is still under discussion. The government is now working on a fundamental system change by restructuring Dutch environmental, spatial and planning law into one Environmental Planning Act. A first draft legislative proposal will be delivered in 2013.11 According to the current plans the government has no intention to realise a model 4 environmental permit." However, scholars still argue in favour of the model 4 environmental permit (Backes, 2012). 2.5 Comparison A comparison between the models of integrated environmental permits described in the sections 2.1-2.4 leads to the following observations: 1. The scope of the Industrial Emissions Directive is limited to the installations listed in Annex I of the directive and by the emissions released into air, water or land during normal operation or through accidents at the installation. The focus is on prevention and control of pollution from these major installations. This means that the construction of installations as well as environmental effects not resulting from emissions (e.g. interference with nature and landscape, impairing the functioning of eco-systems) are not subject to the integrated approach under the IPPC Directive. A model 4 permit has a much broader scope; aspects such as spatial planning and nature conservation are included in a single assessment framework. There are many interests with different natures that need to be protected by the environmental permit. 2. The scope of the proposed substantive integration in the integrierte Vorhabengenehmigung in Germany is in line with the Industrial Emissions 9 This example is based on the tekst of Uylenburg, 2007, p. 59. 10 Handelingen II 2007/08, nr. 34, p. 2618; Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 30 844, nr. 24 (motion members Koopmans en Vermeij). 11 Coalition agreement Brüggen slaan 29 October 2012, p. 38. 12 Toetsversie Omgevingswet, 28 February 2013. Directive and therefore limited compared to the idea of the model 4 permit in the Netherlands. 3. The current integrated environmental permit in the Netherlands (model 3) as well as the proposed legislation in Germany and Belgium contains a procedural integration of permit applications in the field of spatial planning or building requirements. The decision-making process results in a single permit, but the assessment frameworks (the substantive rules) remain separated. To sum up, the idea of realising a model 4 environmental permit can be qualified as highly ambitious. This is due to the broad intended scope of the single integrated assessment framework. The single assessment framework is not limited to industrial effects on the environment (such as waste, air pollution and noise) but also concerns spatial planning, nature conservation etc. 3 The Model 4 permit Discussed in Dutch Literature The integration of various aspects of environmental law in a single assessment framework will probably result in a fairly broad formulation of the aspects (such as "protection of the physical living environment") in which a permit application will have to be reviewed. The public authority will have more freedom in weighing the interests involved and the variety of different assessment frameworks no longer forms an obstacle to such an integrated assessment. The question is how such a broad assessment framework exactly relates to the Dutch rule of purpose-specific powers. This fundamental principle of Dutch administrative law requires of the legislator that it sufficiently specifies the authority conferred on the administration by providing substantive norms. Schlössels has listed a number of arguments to underpin the necessity of this rule (Schlössels, 1998, pp. 127-132): • it serves the legislator's prerogative to legislate; • legitimises administrative authority; • provides a guideline to the judiciary when testing the legality of administrative action; • enhances the transparency of administrative organisation and the effectiveness of the decision-making process. Some scholars take the view that the introduction of a vague and broad formulation of the assessment criteria of the environmental permit (such as "protection of the physical living environment") leads to irresponsible adverse effects in the light of the rule of purpose-specific powers. The safeguarding aspect of this principle will come under pressure (Schlössels, 2006, pp. 153-169; Uylenburg, 2006, pp. 155-166; Blomberg, Michiels, & Nijmeijer, 2005, p. 5). They point out a number of legal problems such as reduced judicial control, arbitrariness in the balancing of interests by public authorities and diminished legal certainty for individuals and businesses. Other scholars (Backes, 2012, Chapter 3; Van den Broek, 2012, pp. 134-145; Van Hall, 2000, pp. 138-159) are of the opinion that a model 4 permit is in line with the rule of purpose-specific powers, under the condition that the assessment criteria in the light of which a permit application will have to be reviewed, are sufficiently concrete. Various solutions to the possible legal problems are conceivable. For example, an explicit, detailed assessment framework would clearly indicate which aspects should be taken into consideration, and to what extent, in a decision on an application for an environmental permit. This would make it easier to ensure that certain aspects were not ignored. To ensure greater legal certainty and predictability, it would also be possible to lay down further criteria with which a public authority would have to comply when exercising its powers. 4 Review in the Light of the Dutch Rule of Purpose-specific Powers 4.1 Assessment framework The question arises how to examine whether or not a model 4 permit leads to irresponsible effects on the safeguarding function of the rule of purpose-specific powers. What kind of method of legal research should be used? In the Dutch literature concerning the model 4 permit, I could not detect a clear approach. In my view a normative assessment framework is necessary in order to review model 4 in the light of the rule of purpose-specific powers. The rule of purpose-specific powers is directed at the legislator. In the Netherlands there is, however, no constitutional law that contains a duty for the legislator to give account to the amount of specificity of administrative powers. The Dutch rule of purpose-specific powers, directed to the legislator, is not codified and is not subject of judicial review.13 Compliance with this rule can therefore not be enforced. It is here where the Dutch system differs from German law. The German constitution contains the so-called Bestimmtheitsgebot in Art. 80 (1) of the Grundgesetz. This provision, that sets substantive criteria, can be judged by the Bundesverfassungsgericht and runs as follows: "Durch Gesetz können die Bundesregierung, ein Bundesminister oder die Landesregierungen ermächtigt werden, Rechtsverordnungen zu erlassen. Dabei müssen Inhalt, Zweck und Ausmaß der erteilten Ermächtigung im Gesetze bestimmt werden. Die Rechtsgrundlage ist in der Verordnung anzugeben. Ist durch Gesetz vorgesehen, daß eine Ermächtigung weiter übertragen werden kann, so bedarf es zur Übertragung der Ermächtigung einer Rechtsverordnung." 13 It has to be noted that rule of purpose-specific powers also implies that a rule of administrative law may only be applied within its own well-defined scope and, as a result, may not be used to achieve objectives outside that scope. This element of the rule of purpose-specific powers is subject of judicial review. By virtue of Art. 3:3 of the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht) a public authority may not use its power to make a decision for any other purpose than that for which the power has been given. It should be noted that the case law of the Bundesverfassungsgericht does not provide a framework with clear detailed standards that can be used for judicial review. From an analysis of the case law only some very general guidelines can be discerned. For example, the deeper the infringement of the administration upon people's rights and freedoms, the more specific the formulation of administrative authority should be (Schlössels, 1998, pp. 119-122). A research question that examines whether or not a model 4 permit is in line with the rule of purpose-specific powers is not very useful. This kind of a question is difficult to answer because of the nature of legal principles in general. What are the exact borders of this rule of purpose-specific powers? How compartmentalised should administrative law be precisely? Principles have a certain legal weight or value, but this legal weight or value is not something that can be objectively defined.14 In general it can be said that the broader the public authority's assessment of permit criteria are, the more the safeguarding function of the rule of purpose-specific powers will decline (less legal certainty, less judicial review). When we apply this simple rule, we can conclude that a model 4 permit will definitely lead to adverse effects on the safeguarding functions of rule of purpose-specific powers. Are these effects also irresponsible? To answer this normative question I will use the concept of the democratische rechtsstaat as an assessment framework. This concept is closely related to the Rechtsstaatsprinzip and the principle of the rule of law. The assessment framework of the democratische rechtsstaat (hereafter referred to as "democratic constitutional state") is elaborated by Schlössels & Zijlstra (2010) in their handbook of Dutch administrative law. The democratic constitutional state consists of different principles, including the rule of purpose-specific powers. It is the government's duty to optimise all principles of the constitutional state. When principles collide, the government has to look for an option made up of the best mixture of those principles. In that case the government needs to consider if compensation for potential negative effects is possible. The Dutch rule of purpose-specific powers has led to a divided and compartmentalised administration. In the field of environmental law this means that in some instances several permits are required for one single activity (several proceedings, different sets of rules to follow and sometimes even several competent public authorities). This is not only inconvenient for the public, but also for the administration. It must be noted that in the Netherlands the problem of compartmentalised administration also occurs in other fields of law, such as social welfare. According to the legislator, 14 See the well-known distinction between principles and rules, made by Dworkin. Rules have a nature of all or nothing. When a juristic fact occurs, and a rule is valid, the legal effect automatically follows. Legal consequences do not automatically follow from a principle. There is room for consideration. This also means that when two principles are conflicting, it is not clear witch one should prevail in a certain case. It depends on the facts. See Dworkin (1977, pp. 31-39). the solution is more discretion for public authorities to decide on a case by case basis. Obviously, the same legal questions related to the rule of purpose-specific powers arise in this field of law.15 In practice, the effects of the rule of purpose-specific powers seem to be colliding with the principles of efficiency and effectiveness^6 This leads to the following question in need of an answer: are the potentially negative effects on the safeguarding functions of the rule of purpose-specific powers, that result from the model 4 permit, necessary for reaching an optimal balance in relation to the principles of efficiency and effectiveness? 4.2 review of Model 4 permit Is an environmental model 4 permit a more efficient and effective means necessary for reaching a better system of environmental permits in the Netherlands? In my view the need for a model 4 permit has not been established by the legislator or in literature. It is not clear to me what problem needs to be solved. There is for example no empirical data (an analysis of practical cases) underpinning the necessity of this permit model. The main goal of the GEAP is to make it easier for citizens and businesses to obtain permits. Other aims mentioned as a reason for integrating permits are to reduce the administrative burden and promote cooperation between and within public authorities. With the current model 3 permit system in the GEAP, which provides for procedural integration, proceedings already are combined, harmonised and simplified. The model 4 permit seems to be based on the holistic idea that the environment should be seen and protected as a whole. The assumption is that a high level of environmental protection can be reached with an integrated approach. Looking at the experiences with the IPPC Directive, it is questionable as to whether we really need these substantive integrated assessment frameworks. Although there is a lack of empirical data on the practical implementation of the IPPC Directive, there are signs that permits involving trade-offs between different environmental media are rare. Bohne's research shows (Bohne, 2008a, pp. 30-33) that national permit systems' potential for substantive integration is relatively low. He concludes that therefore substantive integration is likely to occur even less in actual permit decisions. Another outcome of his research (Bohne, 2006, p. 550) is that the problem of pollution shifting from one medium to another is not often experienced in the practice of decision-making. Public authorities only deal with it from time to time. The same conclusions can be found in earlier research (Castelein et al., 1998) on the environmental permit of the Environmental Management Act in the Netherlands. One possible explanation given at that time was that there were 15 See Vonk & Tollenaar (2012, Chapter 1). 16 Schlössels and Zijlstra underline that efficiency and effectiveness also can be qualified as principles of the democratic constitutional state. This view clarifies to their opinion that these aspects also form a part of the normative assessment of government's measures. no general criteria available for public authorities to make a cross-medial assessment. Another possible explanation could be that the public authorities are just not capable of making an integrated assessment followed by a decision (Osterhuis, Peeters, & Uylenburg, 2007). In the Netherlands the public authority usually uses general environmental guidelines (milieurichtlijnen) to set the permit conditions (Leemans, 2008). These guidelines are mostly provided by the government to provide technical and scientific knowledge. Standardisation is another motive for providing model conditions. As a consequence, case-specific considerations will not be taken in to account in the evaluation of a an application. Bohne states (Bohne, 2008b, p. 327): "It seems that the intellectual fascination of resolving cross-media pollution problems, and the political drive of the British Government to export its previous Integrated Pollution Control (IPC) system to Europe rather practical needs explain to a large extent why holistic integrated permitting is so high on the political agenda in the EU, and only of marginal practical relevance for national permitting authorities." As long as there is no empirical data to underpin the necessity of a model 4 permit, the undermining of the safeguarding functions of the rule of purpose-specific powers cannot be justified. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the first empirical data on the permitting model 3 in the Netherlands show that in practice most applications for an environmental permit concern only a single activity. The impression that is given by this research is that applications for a single permit for multiple activities are rare. One possible explanation is that citizens and businesses seeking a permit still have to get used to the new model 3 permit, introduced in 2010 (Uylenburg, 2012, pp. 54-56). Another reason might be that for some projects it is difficult to prepare an application for a single permit for several activities (Borgen et al., 2012). Development of complex projects takes place in different phases over a period of time. Therefore, the preparation of an application for one single permit for the whole project is neither realistic nor useful. These findings from empirical research conflict with the original starting point of the GEAP which is to make applications easier for citizens and businesses. These first experiences with model 3 permits give rise to the question of whether or not we even need a model 3 permit. More in-depth empirical research is necessary to gain better insight in the reasons why citizens and businesses seeking a permit seem to prefer separate permits instead of one single permit. In my view the Netherlands is not ready for a model 4 permit system given that it is questionable whether even the procedural integration of permits (model 3) leads to a more efficient and effective system of environmental permits. 5 Conclusion Environmental law developed originally in a fragmented way. As a result, citizens and businesses applying for a permit are confronted with a range of procedures with a variety of time limits, assessment criteria and legal remedies. It is assumed by policymakers that the fragmented approach in law and policies is both ineffective and inefficient. An integrated approach is necessary in order to achieve a high level of protection for the environment as a whole. At EU level the integrated approach towards pollution control is implemented by means of permits. A comparison of integrated environmental permit models at EU level, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands leads to the observation that the idea of a so called "model 4" permit system can be qualified as highly ambitious. This permit model considered in the Netherlands refers to a single integrated assessment framework with a much broader scope when compared to the integrated approach of the Industrial Emissions Directive (which is focused on prevention and control of pollution from major installations). The single assessment framework of the model 4 permit contains many interests with different nature that need to be protected by the environmental permit (aspects such as spatial-planning and monumental protection are included). The question discussed in Dutch literature is how such a broad assessment framework relates exactly to the rule of purpose-specific powers. This fundamental principle of administrative law requires of the legislator that it sufficiently specifies the authority conferred on the administration by providing substantive norms. A single assessment framework with a fairly broad formulation of the aspects in the light of which a permit application will have to be reviewed, will definitely have an adverse effect on the safeguarding elements of this principle. A normative legal question is however, whether or not model 4 will have adverse effects on the safeguarding of the rule of purpose-specific powers. In this article I use the concept of the democratische rechtsstaat as an assessment framework, which is comparable to the principle of the rule of law and the Rechtsstaatsprinzip. The democratic constitutional state consists of different principles, including the principle of the rule of purpose-specific powers. It is the government's duty to optimise all principles of the constitutional state. When principles collide, the government has to look for an optimum combination of those principles. An adverse effect on one of the principles can be justified when this leads to a better balance with other principles. In practice, the effects of the rule of purpose-specific powers seem to be colliding with the principles of efficiency and effectiveness. Are the adverse effects on the safeguarding functions of the rule of purpose-specific powers that result from the model 4 permit necessary for reaching an optimal balance in relation to the principles of efficiency and effectiveness? Looking at the experiences with the IPPC Directive, it is questionable as to whether we really need these substantive integrated assessment frameworks. Furthermore, the first experiences in the Netherlands with the current model 3 permit, introduced in 2010 (one application, one competent authority, one single permit) gives the impression that citizens and businesses seeking a permit are not using the possibilities of one single permit and still seem to prefer separate permits. Currently, the need for a model 4 permit has not been established by the legislator nor in literature. Dr. H. D. Tolsma (Hanna) is Assistant Professor in the Department of Administrative Law and Public Administration at the University of Groningen. She received her PhD in 2008 on a thesis concerning legal aspects of the use of mediation by administrative authorities during the decision-making process. She worked as a postdoc on the research project "Integrated environmental permitting: an exploration of the legal possibility 's" sponsored by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO). Her publications mainly relate to environmental law and administrative (procedural) law. She is a Member of the Advisory Committee for Objections of the Province of Drenthe and an honorary judge at the District Court in the North of the Netherlands. POVZETEK 1.01 Izvirni znanstveni članek Izboljšanje sistemov okoljskih dovoljenj: združena dovoljenja na Nizozemskem Ključne besede: okoljska dovoljenja, pristop združitev, združeno okoljsko dovoljenje, pravilo sektorske pristojnosti Okoljsko pravo se je prvotno razvijalo razdrobljeno, s sektorsko zakonodajo, ki je ščitila vodo, zemljo ali zrak. Takšen pristop k varstvu okolja povzroča težave. Državljani in podjetja, ki uveljavljajo dovoljenja za posege v okolje, se srečujejo z vrsto postopkov z različnimi roki, merili presoje in pravnimi sredstvi. Primerjalno-pravna raziskava kaže, da se zakonodaja na področju okoljskega prava vedno bolj združuje oziroma povezuje. Oblikovalci politik čutijo potrebo, da bi povezali postopke odločanja zaradi optimizacije varstva okolja. Prvi del članka vsebuje kratek pregled koncepta združenega postopka za izdajo okoljevarstvenih dovoljenj. Drugi del obravnava zamisel o okoljskem modelu 4 za dovoljenja, ki je bil predlagan na Nizozemskem. Vprašanje je, ali je ta specifični koncept izdajanja okoljevarstvenih dovoljenj mogoče izvesti v okviru omejitev nizozemskega upravnega prava. Bibiliography and references Backes, Ch. W. (2012). Integraal en flexibel omgevingsrecht - droom of drogbeeld. Naar een nieuw omgevingsrecht, Preadviezen Vereniging voor Bouwrecht, 40, 31-51. Blomberg, A. B., Michiels F. C. M. A., & Nijmeijer, A. G. A. (2005). Vergunningverlening in het omgevingsrecht: naar stroomlijning of integratie? Tijdschrift Omgevingsrecht, 1, 3-11. Bohne, E. (2006). The Quest for Environmental Regulatory Integration in the European Union. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International. Bohne, E. (2008a). The implementation of the IPPC Directive from a comparative perspective and lessons for its recast (Part I). Journal for European Enviromental & Planning Law, 5 (1), 1-33. Bohne, E. (2008b). The implementation of the IPPC Directive from a comparative perspective and lessons for its recast (Part II). Journal for European Enviromental & Planning Law, 5 (3), 319-338. Bohne, E. & Dietze, D. (2004). Pollution Prevention and Control in Europe Revisited. European Environmental Law Review,13 (7), 198-217. Borgers, H. C. et al. (2012). W@BO. Een evaluatie van gebruikerservaringen met de Wabo en het Omgevingsloket online. AT Osborn. Castelein, A. et al. (1998). Meer dan de som der delen? Een onderzoek naar de aard van de afwegingen bij de opstelling van milieuvergunningen, Achtergrondstudie ECW, nr. 34. Dworkin, R. (1977). Taking rights seriously. Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press. Knopp, L. (2009). Umweltgesetzbuch - ein Trauerspiele ohne ende? Umwelt und Planungsrecht, 4, 121-125. Leemans, T. C. (2008). De toetsing door de bestuursrechter in milieugeschillen (diss. Leiden). Den Haag: BJu . Müggenborg, H. & Hentschel, A. (2010). Neues Wasser- und Naturschutzrecht. Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 14, 961-967. Oosterhuis, F. H., Peeters, M. G. W. M., & Uylenburg, R. (2007). Het beoordelingskader van de IPPCrichtlijn. Implementatie, interpretatie en toepassing, STEM 2007/1. Scheidler, A. (2009). Die anstehende Neuordnung des Umweltrechts nach dem Scheitern des Umweltgesetzbuch. Umwelt und Planungsrecht, 5, 173-176. Schlössels, R. J. N. (1998). Het specialiteitsbeginsel: over de structuur van bestuursbevoegdheden, wetmatigheid van bestuur en beleidsvrijheid (diss. Maastricht). Den Haag: SDU Uitgevers. Schlössels, R. J. N. (2006). De ondraaglijke lichtheid van het specialiteitsbeginsel. Iets over integratie van bestuursbevoegdheden, coördinatie van besluiten en rechtsbescherming.In A. W. Heringa et.al. Het bestuursrecht beschermd (pp. 153-169). Den Haag: SDU Uitgevers. Schlössels, R. J. N. & Zijlstra, S. E. (2010). Bestuursrecht in de sociale rechtsstaat. Deventer: Kluwer. Tolsma, H. D. (2012). Omgevingsvergunning model 4 een stap dichterbij met de Omgevingswet? Tijdschrift Milieu & Recht, 2, 82-89. Uylenburg, R. (2006). De omgevingsvergunning en het specialiteitsbeginsel. In K. J. De Graaf, A. T. Marseille, & H. B. Winter (Eds.), Op tegenspraak(Damen-bundel) (pp. 155-166). Den Haag: BJu. Uylenburg, R. (2007). De omgevingsvergunning en de grenzen aan integratie In Aan degrens van de milieuvergunning, Vereniging voor milieurecht 2007-5. Uylenburg, R. (2012). De omgevingsvergunning in een nieuwe habitat. In Naar een nieuw omgevingsrecht (Preadviezen Vereniging voor Bouwrecht nr. 40), (pp. 53-72). Van den Broek, J. H. G. (2012). Bundeling van omgevingsrecht (diss. Maastricht). Deventer: Kluwer. Van den Broek, J. H. G. & Rutteman, J. (2005). Bedrijfsleven en milieubeweging steunen Wabo. Tijdschrift Milieu & Recht, 9, 546-549. Van den Broek, J. H. G. (2006). Kroonjuwelen met scherpe randjes. Tijdschrift Omgevingsrecht, 4, 136-140. Van Hall, A. (2000). Belangenafweging in de wet op de fysieke omgeving. In A. Driesprong et.al., Lex aquarum, Liber amicorum. Opstellen over waterstaat, waterstaatswetgeving en wetgeving, opgedragen aan J.H.A. Teulings (pp. 138-159). Den Haag: Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat. Vonk, G. J. & Tollenaar, A. (Eds.) (2012). Lokale verzorgingsstaat: nieuwe uitdagingen voor de sociale rechtsstaat. Bestuursrecht & Bestuurskunde Groningen 2012. UDK: 342.9:343.155 1.02 Review article Dispositional Instruments of Protection against Administrative Acts (not in Legal Force) and their Effectiveness This Article resulted from specific research project of Masaryk University No. MUNI/A/0896/2012 "Effectiveness of Instruments of Protection against Administrative Acts which are not in Legal Force" Stanislav Kadečka stanislav.kadecka@law.muni.cz David Hejč david.hejc@law.muni.cz Klara Prokopova klara.prokopova@mail.muni.cz Jiff Venctfček venclicek@mail.muni.cz Department of Administrative Studies and Administrative Law Masaryk University - Faculty of Law, Brno, Czech Republic ABSTRACT Public administration is often implemented through the issuing of public acts of a unilateral and binding character. Within public administration, however, legal instruments by which those for whom the administrative acts are binding can defend themselves against any illegality or irregularity of the mentioned administrative acts, are also (must be) provided. The existence and proper effectiveness of these legal instruments can be regarded as a necessary part (sine qua non) of the democratic rule of law. The paper is concerned with the so-called dispositional legal instruments of protection against the administrative acts which are not yet in legal force and their effectiveness. Article's major finding consists in fact, that the effectiveness of dispositional instruments of protection could be limited by absence of devolutive effect, or guarantee of independence in organizational arrangement between first and second instance administrative bodies. Key words: legal remedy, appeal, remonstrance, comments, objections JEL: K41 Kadečka, S., Hejč, D., Prokopova, K., & Vencliček, J. (2014). Dispositional Instrume nts of Protection against Administrative Acts (not in Legal Force) and their Effectiveness 99 Mednarodna revija za javno upravo, XII (2-3), 99-122 1 Foreword It is important to reflect the split of public administration (PA) into two basic branches: • Non-authoritarian (care) administration is performed in the same (private law) legal forms as private administration. The public authorities performing non-authoritarian administration are in the same, respectively equal, position as private individuals. • On the other hand, authoritarian administration is performed in typical forms of public law and its results are mainly acts of public authority, respectively administrative acts, which have a unilateral and binding character. This arrangement expresses the superiority of the administrative authorities over the addressees of these authoritarian acts. It is a typical manifestation of the authoritarian character of PA (Prucha, 2007, p. 60 and subsequent). It is the nature of "authoritarian" administrative acts that they interfere with the rights and duties of individuals independently of their own will (it is an unequal relationship). It is therefore essential to ensure the protection of individuals whenever these acts suffer from defects requiring their amendment or cancelation. Hence, PA (administrative law) offers (must offer) various means of protection to persons whose individual rights could be endangered through defective administrative acts. This paper deals only with those means of protection against "authoritarian" administrative acts that are at the exclusive, claimable disposal of their addressees. That is especially because precisely these means of protection and their standards are essential for the protection of individual rights and its effectiveness, which can be regarded as a necessary part (sine qua non) of the democratic rule of law. It is also important that those means of protection described above are constructed to correct defects in administrative acts before they come into force and before their enforceability. They can be submitted against issued administrative acts and, in some cases, against administrative acts before they are issued (against proposed content). The outlined means of protection in the legal order of the Czech Republic are called • appeals, • remonstrances, • objections and • comments and their application primarily depends on the concrete legal form of the (challenged) administrative act: • appeals and remonstrances against individual administrative acts; • objections and comments against hybrid administrative acts. The main goal of this paper is to analyse, individually and also through comparison, the outlined means of protection (of subjective public rights) and their effectiveness. This analysis is focused generally on these means and also specifically on their application by the PA section of State Monument Care (SMC) in the Czech Republic. The main reason for this is that there are significant disputes in this sector of PA between public interest in the protection of cultural heritage and the private interests of individuals, especially in terms of free disposal with their property. PA in the section on SMC causes significant and unilateral cases of interference in individual rights and duties. These cases, established through "authoritarian" administrative acts, can be extreme, particularly if they are directed against owners of real estate. For all these reasons section of SMC includes all mentioned means of protection and therefore it is ideal for highlighting our conclusions. The outlined means of protection play an important role in the protection of individual rights and it is necessary to ensure their operational capability and effectiveness. The article works with hypothesis that outlined means of protection lack principle of independence, which lower their effectiveness. For the verification of this hypothesis the empirical method and theoretical methods of description, analysis, synthesis and comparison have been used. 2 Appeal and / or Remonstrance Against Individual Administrative Acts No PA system can be considered perfect. It is therefore the task of the legislation to create, and of PA to apply, a sufficiently effective system of protection from administrative decisions that exceed the outlined limits. If such a failure in PA occurs, it is necessary to avoid or minimize any negative impacts on specific individuals and public interests as quickly as possible. 1 In practice, this assumes the existence of some sort of system that allows public bodies to be alerted to their errors, and that also imposes corresponding obligations. This task can be fulfilled in many ways and the Czech concept of appeal (remonstrance) is just one of them. 2.1 Appeal in Czech legislation and practice Appeal is a broadly applicable means of protection. It mainly targets the merits of a decision but, with certain exceptions, also procedural decisions. The Czech Administrative Procedure Code (APC) generally states that 1 If administrative protection does not lead to redress, appellant is usually entitled to bring a legal action to administrative court. However, exhaustion of remedies, which offers PA, is necessary condition for judicial review. Exhaustion of remedies is contrary to English legal system, rather absolute, than discretionary bar to the jurisdiction of administrative courts (BIBBY, 1995, p. 11). a participant may lodge an appeal against a decision except when otherwise provided by statute.2 It is evident that the conditions for appeal are not restrictive. However, the possibilities of appeal are limited by the fact that new proposals and evidence can be used in an appeal procedure only if they could not be applied in the first instance, without any fault of the appellant.3 Due to the principle of legal certainty, an appeal can only be submitted before a decision comes into force (this is why it is labelled an ordinary means of protection). Submitting an appeal has two major effects: • Suspensive effect means that a challenged administrative decision cannot acquire legal force or enforceability until the end of the appeal procedure. A person who defends himself against an administrative decision achieves short-term protection merely by submitting an appeal. At this moment, the public authority that issued the challenged decision can reconsider its opinions regarding whether it will comply with the opinion of the appellant in full. Such a possibility is particularly useful when the administrative body realizes that it made a mistake, meaning that it will not be necessary to carry out the appeal procedure. • Devolutive effect means that the appellate administrative authority is usually the immediate superior public authority to the one that issued the challenged administrative decision.4 It is important to highlight that an appeal reviews not only the legality of an administrative decision, but also the correctness of the discretion embodied in such a decision. This review can be conducted even beyond the objections expressed by the appellant, but in some cases it is only possible in cases concerning a public interest (Skulova, 2012, p. 249). One issue directly connected to research into effectiveness is the question of how an appellant public authority can deal with an appeal. We have to mention in particular the possibility of amending the original administrative decision (unless it is a decision by a self-governing entity). The appellant public authority can also revoke the original decision, return the whole case for new proceedings, and express a binding legal opinion. The question is whether this unduly prolongs the proceedings, especially if the case is returned more than once. Although such cases are probably rare, they cannot be excluded. Moreover, the appellant public body cannot change an administrative decision to the detriment of an appellant, unless there is another appellant with differing interests. 2 Section 81(1) Act No 500/2004 Coll., Administrative Procedure Code (of the Czech Republic). 3 This principle is inapplicable in proceedings imposing administrative punishments. Such an exemption is necessary because Czech PA deals with administrative proceedings, which mean criminal charges according to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is highly desirable to establish higher standards for this kind of proceedings, including the possibility to submit new evidence at any time. 4 Section 89 Act No 500/2004 Coll., APC. 2.2 Problems relating to appeal The outlined Czech appeal system presents some specific problems. Firstly, the Czech appeal authorities cannot be considered as independent or somehow semi-independent.5 There are many interconnections between the appellant public authority and public authorities of first instance, the existence of which is in many cases just an expression of the vertical deconcentration of state powers. Although this arrangement usually does not arouse any doubts in the Czech legal environment, there are significant differences in comparison to the common law approach to appeal tribunals (Morgan, 2012, p. 161). We assume that the independence of the appellate authority is one of the important factors that may affect the overall effectiveness of this means of protection. It cannot be considered as effective if the legal organization of the appellant system allows the exertion of any pressure from non-legitimate interests on the decision-making authority. We defined the efficiency of the appeal system according to the quickness and helpfulness of its protection to an individual's rights and public interests. Yet if the appellant authority is not independent, it is significantly harder to say that there is no prejudice, and even when only these questions arise, a smooth process cannot be presumed. In addition, the appellant process is not even remotely effective if there really is prejudice and illegitimate means of review, because it cannot lead to any intended solution. 6 Unfortunately, the Czech Constitutional Court refuses to acknowledge any deeper importance of public authorities' independence and states: "[...] for the decision-making process of public authorities it is logical to presume impartiality, not independence."7 We suppose that the lack of independence causes disruption in terms of equality of weapons, and public interests take precedence during decision-making at the expense of individuals' rights. We believe that the principle of two-instance proceedings is genuinely meaningful, but it has to be organised with proper care. It is obvious that the PA cannot be substituted by administrative courts, especially if there are some parts of administrative decisions that are outside judicial review. We asked regional Czech offices for information about appellant proceedings. We were able to collect relevant data from more than half of the respondents 5 In English legal system appeals to tribunals belong between mechanisms which permit individuals to pass their matters to independent third party (Elliot, 2011, p. 454). In Czech legal system appeal cannot be considered as one of these mechanisms, but there is access to judicial review and also ombudsmen, both with real guarantees of independence. 6 "Thus, in the planning field effective appeal procedures are essential if appellants and objectors are to feel that their case has been fairly considered." (Neil, 1988, p. 5) 7 Decision of the Czech Constitutional Court from 25/6/2009, No II. ÙS 1062/08. in the area of cultural monument care, representing about 500 appeals.8 In approximately 38 % of cases the original decision was revoked and the proceedings were returned to first instance. In another 32 % the challenged administrative decision was fully confirmed. In less than 14 % of all cases the decision was changed by the appellate authority. In 6.5 % of all cases the decision was revoked and the proceedings halted. The other ways of dealing with appeals remained marginally represented (see Graph 1. Graph 1: results of appeal proceedings Source: Data obtained upon request from regional offices of the Czech Republic. Unfortunately, we could not yet collect sufficient data that would allow meaningful comparisons of appeal with other Czech means of protection. There were only about 3 % of cases subject to appeal and afterwards also by review, which is one of the extraordinary Czech means of protection (see Graph 2). 10 % of these cases were revoked by review despite a previous appellant procedure (see Graph 3). However, we also found out that in these cases the appeals were dismissed because of their lateness or inadmissibility. There was only one case in which a public authority revoked its own decision despite it being previously confirmed in an appellant procedure. The authority did so after the complainant submitted an action to an administrative court. The number of submitted actions was very low, yet applicants were successful in fifty per cent of these cases. 8 Unfortunately, respondents were not able to provide data about the whole amount of first-instance decisions. We consider this fact as a significant problem of Czech public administration, which lowers possibility of outer control. These data are necessary for recognising share of challenged decision. Hence we were not able to research efficiency of appeal in this regard. But we were able to research effectiveness according to the manner of resolving appeal (the same applies to remonstrance in next chapter). Graph 2: Decisions challenged by review after appeal _3% M - Decisions challenged only by appeal 97% Decisions challenged by both review and appeal Source: Data obtained upon request from regional offices of the Czech Republic. Graph 3: Appeal vs. review 10% ■ Review confirmed result of appeal - Review did not confirm 90% result of appeal Source: Data obtained upon request from regional offices of the Czech Republic. The obtained data show the following conclusions: 1. Appellate administrative authorities confirmed first-instance decisions in about 32 % of all cases. 2. At the same time it was not shown that means of protection other than appeal provide significantly different results. 3. It was shown that if the appellant public authority reveals some failure it returns it for a new procedure twice as frequently as it changes it. Yet it has to be noted that appellate administrative authorities probably do not have the capacity to change all undesirable decisions. 4. According to the opinion of the appellant public authority, first-instance decisions are defective in almost 60 % of all challenged cases. 5. According to the opinion of administrative courts, second-instance decisions are defective in almost 50 % of all challenged cases. If the 50 % success rate for actions against administrative decisions was also confirmed in a larger sample of data, it would surely be a warning sign that the appeal system in the Czech Republic is not very efficient and produces a large amount of defective decisions. 2.3 Remonstrance in Czech legislation and practice A special means of protection against decisions by public authorities at the central level of state administration in the Czech legal environment is called remonstrance. It also can be applied against an administrative decision that is not in force and it has a suspensive effect, however it has some necessary specifics. The nature of the matter means that it is not possible to delegate the decisionmaking process about remonstrance to some higher authority, simply because there is none. It requires other solutions for many procedural questions, which are otherwise based on the devolutive effect. This is the main reason why Czech legislation distinguishes between appeals and remonstrances. Remonstrance is exclusively decided on by the head of the central authority that issued the challenged decision. This fact practically excludes the principle of two-instance proceedings at the central level of state administration.9 On the other hand, remonstrance proceedings include the obligatory consideration of the case in front of a remonstrance commission that should consist mostly of professionals not employed by the affected central public authority. The remonstrance method combines reconsideration and appeal. The Czech APC also expressly states that provisions about appeal should be proportionally used for remonstrance (Hendrych, 2012, p. 389). Proceedings in front of remonstrance should also be proportionally conducted according to the provisions of the APC on proceedings in front of a collegial authority, even if the remonstrance commission cannot be considered as an administrative authority in the true sense. The opinion of the remonstrance commission is not binding and is only a kind of recommendation for a head of a central administrative authority. A commission meeting can only be attended by its members and record keeper. According to law, practice establishes its own procedure and it became usual for a person with knowledge of the first-instance proceedings to refer to the members of the remonstrate commission, which starts its proceedings after this person leaves the room (Mates, 2007). Nevertheless, a non-binding opinion from the remonstrance commission is obligatory and it should primarily act by force of their arguments (Jemelka, 2013, p. 520). Whether the head of the central administrative authority decides to respect the opinion of the remonstrance commission or not, proper justification of the decision must be provided. The APC provides several ways for dealing with a submitted remonstrance, largely based on the application of provisions about appeal. However, 9 Decision of the Czech Supreme Administrative Court of 15/1/2001, No 6 A 1 1/2002. some possibilities are controversial, as is the power to return a case for new proceedings, because it is sometimes considered contrary to the sense of remonstrance. 2.4 Problems relating to remonstrance The first problem to point out is that the remonstrance commission cannot be considered independent even if it includes an element of professionalism. The appointment, but also recall, of individual members of this commission is the exclusive power of the head of the central administrative authority and can be performed without any significant restrictions. Therefore it is questionable to what extent the final opinion of the remonstrance commission reflects the true opinion of its members. Maintaining the independence of the remonstrance commission could be quite a difficult task. We appreciate the legislators' effort at professionalization. On the other hand, the Czech APC does not propose anything more than that the members of the commission should be "experts". Yet there is no mention about the specialization of these experts or any other interpretation regarding this provision, so the choice of the head of the public body can be quite broad. The main question asked is whether remonstrance could be considered a full means of protection. We believe that this is at least controversial without major requirements relating to the independence of the remonstrance commission. As mentioned above, administrative courts cannot substitute for PA, especially if their power to review "factual findings" is very limited. Although it is not possible to establish a clear boundary between the review of "factual findings" inside of discretion and between the legality of decisions, this only emphasizes the need for the effective investigation of administrative decisions by PA.10 It means that deficiencies in the area of review by PA cannot be ignored just because there are still administrative courts present (Macur, 1992, p. 50). It is obvious that two-instance administrative proceedings are of significant importance. However, the Czech Constitutional Court has the following opinion: "[...] the absence of a two-level procedure is not in and of itself unconstitutional [...]."" 10 Czech approach to importance of dividing matters of law and facts is to some extent similar with English approach. (Griffith, 1973, p. 146) We also believe that PA bodies are usually more appropriate for dealing with factual findings than courts. However, Czech PA system did not develop organized system of some administrative tribunals, which could combine independence and fast, cheap, informal and expert mass administrative justice. (Craig, 2012, p. 231) In Czech constitutional system it is not possible to establish fully independent administrative appeal tribunals. Similar tribunals could be established as a part of executive, but not a part of PA. It means that in Czech legal system these tribunals cannot be named as „administrative". Potential establishment of these tribunals outside PA would cause double-tracking, which is criticised by some Czech (or Slovak) legal scientist. 11 Decision of the Czech Constitutional Court from 26/4/2005, No Pl. ÙS 21/04. For the purposes of our research we asked the Czech Ministry of Culture to provide information about remonstrance proceedings in some areas of cultural monument care. The obtained data show that remonstrances were applied against 1.3 % of more than eight thousand administrative decisions issued by the Ministry of Culture. The Ministry of Culture resolved 36 % of all applied remonstrances through reconsideration. The second instance confirmed the decision of the first instance in 44 % of all remonstrance proceedings. Graph 4: Results of remonstrance proceedings 50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 44,0% 11 7