

## SLOVENSKO VOJAŠKO LETALSTVO DANES IN ČEZ 20 LET

### THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES AIR FORCE: NOW AND 20 YEARS IN THE FUTURE

**Povzetek** V članku Slovensko vojaško letalstvo danes in čez 20 let nas avtor skozi kratko zgodovino vojaškega letalstva v Sloveniji popelje do trenutnih karakteristik slovenskega vojaškega letalstva. V nadaljevanju avtor s pomočjo dejstev slovenske vojaške obrambne politike in fokusiranja Slovenske vojske (SV) na bataljonske bojne skupine predlaga karakteristike v razvoju slovenskega vojaškega letalstva, ki morajo poleg vloge podpore bojnim enotam SV temeljiti na združenih funkcijah, kot so poveljevanje in kontrola (PINK); ognjena podpora; premik in manever; zaščita in vzdržljivost združenega bojevanja. Najpomembnejše vprašanje pa je, kaj je treba narediti, da bodo te karakteristike oblikovane na temeljih združenih funkcij. Vsekakor ima slovenska obrambna politika, podprta z vojaškim načinom mišljenja, pomembno vlogo pri postavitvi teh značilnosti.

**Ključne besede** *Slovensko vojaško letalstvo, karakteristike, zavezništvo, združene funkcije.*

**Abstract** This article, ‘The Characteristics of the Slovenian Armed Forces Air Force (SAFAF)<sup>1</sup>: now and 20 years in the future’, will lead us through a brief history towards the characteristics of today’s Slovenian Armed Forces Air Force. In addition, the article will, with the help of the Slovenian security policy through the Slovenian Armed Forces, whose focus is on Battalion Battle Groups, present the future characteristics of the Slovenian Armed Force Air Force, which, besides fulfilling a supporting role, should be built on a foundation of the joint functions – command and control (C2);

<sup>1</sup> *In this article, we will use the English term ‘Slovenian Armed Forces Air Force’, instead of ‘Slovenian Military Aviation’, because so far the decision-making policy personnel have still not clearly defined which translation would be more appropriate for the Slovenian case. Furthermore, even the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) itself does not clearly define this riddle. This can be correlated with this article’s underlying thesis of ‘still searching for an identity’. Which definition is more appropriate, the Air Force or Military Aviation, could be also be a topic for a further article.*

intelligence; fire power movement and manoeuvres; protection; and sustainment – of joint warfare. However, the key question is: what decisions should be made and what action taken to get us from here to there? Slovenian security policy, supported by a military way of thinking, plays the key role, and is the enabler for building new future characteristics based on joint functions.

**Key words** *Slovenian Armed Forces Air Force (SAFAF), characteristics, alliance, joint functions.*

**Introduction** Everything which can be operationally related to the air domain of the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) is presently centralized in the 15<sup>th</sup> Wing of the SAF. The 15<sup>th</sup> Wing, in terms of combat forces, falls under the Combat Support Forces of the SAF. The 15<sup>th</sup> Wing is also the representative of the Slovenian Air Component in terms of the Combined Joint Task Forces concept (CJTF) (MoD, 2016).

The SAF is a very young force, which consequently means that the SAF Air Force (SAFAF) is still fighting a battle for its existence and seeking its identity within the SAF. Seeking an identity will be presented in the first part of the article, along with the other three characteristics present in the SAFAF today. In the second part, the article will focus on its future characteristics 20 years ahead, and the foundations on which we should base mid- and long-term plans. In the third part, the article will focus on proposals for what to do to reach these goals. This will lead us towards the article's thesis, which is that the future character of the SAFAF should be shaped towards our national needs adjusted for our allies' joint functions, because the present character of the SAFAF yearns for an identity which would enable its existence inside the SAF's organization. Furthermore, it is time for the civilian authorities to recognize their role in establishing a level of military effectiveness which will provide the required national security and fulfil Slovenia's obligations in an efficient NATO alliance.

In other words, since our war of independence, the Republic of Slovenia (RS) has been evolving throughout its 25 years of life, and consequently so has the SAF and especially the SAFAF. We do not have our own independent legacy, which has already evolved, matured, and been maintained in our core security principles, to drive our security policy. Focusing on the Air Force, this will be briefly presented from Edvard Rusjan's time, through two important dates for Slovenian military aviation, to the young independent country and the still evolving SAFAF and its search for an identity within the SAF.

Additionally, the world in which we are living is changing drastically. Ideologically-driven conflicts are spreading throughout Europe and there is no guarantee that they will bypass the RS. Consequently, the civilian authorities should take more serious steps towards our national policy and clearly define the role of the SAF – what they expect from it – and consequently lose their political interference and allow the

SAF and the SAFAF to develop their effectiveness through joint functions which are supported by military thinking – ‘It is better to be a warrior in a garden than a gardener in a war’ (Japanese proverb) – proper financing, and long term personnel management.

## 1 HISTORY OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES AIR FORCE

Slovenian aviation history starts at the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century, when Slovenian aviation pioneer Edvard Rusjan, six years after the Wright brothers, designed, constructed, and flew the first motor-powered aircraft in central Europe (six different types). Unfortunately, because of his enthusiasm for flying, his life ended prematurely in January 1911 (Slovenia.si, 2003), but despite that his legacy has continued throughout recent history. Until 1991, Slovenian airmen were always a part of combined military aviation forces – the Austro-Hungarian Empire; the State/Kingdom of Slovenians, Croats, and Serbs; the Kingdom of Yugoslavia; and finally, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Between Rusjan’s death and 1991, the first important date came just after World War I (WWI), when Slovenian nationals formerly serving in the Austro-Hungarian military created and organized two aviation squadrons to fight for the northern Slovenian border, under the command of General Maister. The Slovenian pilots Vilko Peternelj and Franc Zupancic conducted the first Slovenian reconnaissance and combat flights against Austrian military forces on January 12<sup>th</sup>, 1919, which after 1991 became the official Slovenian Military Aviation day. The second important date in Slovenia’s military aviation history was June 28<sup>th</sup>, 1991, during the War of Independence, when a Slovenian pilot and a technician (Joze Kalan and Bogomir Sustar) escaped from the Yugoslav People’s Army to the Slovenian Territorial Defence Forces with a Gazelle Yugoslavian military helicopter (Lipic, 2016). This enabled the young Slovenian military forces to establish the first officially-recognized Slovenian Military Aviation unit, named the 15<sup>th</sup> Brigade of Military Aviation (15<sup>th</sup> BRMA) on June 9<sup>th</sup>, 1992.

With the establishment of the 15<sup>th</sup> BRMA, the SAFAF was born. Unfortunately, as in all new organizations, the SAF and the SAFAF went through an unavoidable time of challenges and issues related to identity. During the 25 years of development, shaping and reshaping of the SAF, the SAFAF’s story was like a lover’s novel between the SAFAF and Slovenian military policy. In the first ‘chapter’, beginning in 1992, the SAFAF went through establishment, growth, and prosperity to its first major reorganization when it was disbanded in 2004. The second chapter began on November 4<sup>th</sup>, 2004, when the 15<sup>th</sup> BRMA was disassembled to make three units (the Air Force School, Helicopter Squadron, and Maintenance Squadron) under three different commands (Command for Doctrine, Development, Education, and Training; Force Command; and Logistics Command). The third chapter started in 2006, when political and military leaders realized the confusion which the previous transformation had created in the chain of command in relation to the sustainment of the SAFAF, and reunited the military aviation units, with additional air surveillance and air defence units, under one command, called the Brigade of Air Defence and

Aviation. The organization changed again, for the fourth time, in 2013, when the SAF relocated Ground Air Defence to ground units and established the 15<sup>th</sup> Wing of the SAF, which is combine from the 15<sup>th</sup> Wing Command, 151<sup>st</sup> Rotor-Wing Squadron, 152<sup>nd</sup> Fixed-Wing Squadron, 153<sup>rd</sup> Maintenance Squadron, Air Force School, 16<sup>th</sup> Air Surveillance Battalion, and 107<sup>th</sup> Logistical Battalion. In total, the 15<sup>th</sup> Wing is comprise of approximately 650 airmen with school type/general aviation type fixed-wing and rotor-wing aircraft, medium type Utility Helicopters (UH), Light Attack Aircraft (LAAs), Short-take off-landing Transport Aircraft, and Light Transport Aircraft (LTA), with additional 3D ground-stationed Long Range Radar and ground Mobile Short Range Radar, combined in a Constant Report Centre (CRC) capable of 24/7 surveillance of Slovenian Airspace under the command of the 16<sup>th</sup> Command and Reporting Center. The 15<sup>th</sup> Wing is also responsible for one renovated military airbase (Cer-klje AFB), whose renovation/construction is currently coming to an end, which is capable of host-nation support for multiple squadrons/NATO type forces.

## 2 THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF TODAY'S SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES AIR FORCE

What clearly distinguishes the SAFAF is that it has always been an all-volunteer force, from independence in 1992 to today, despite the fact that the SAF was a conscript force until 2004, when the Republic of Slovenia joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and changed to an all-volunteer force. This has enabled the SAFAF to continue its development, which began from sketches in 1991, when it had just one ex-Yugoslavian National Army helicopter (a Gazelle), despite the never-ending story of significant reorganizations (again, four times in 25 years) and significant reductions in the military budget from 2010 when the recession in Slovenia started. Presently the SAF operates with 0.91% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (in 2010, at its peak, it was 1.61%) which is currently allocated in the percentage ratio 82:16:2 (personnel: operations and maintenance of force: procurement and development) (MoD, 2016, pp54-56) instead of the standard ratio of 50:30:20 (MoD, 2011). In other words, in the past few years the SAF has been struggling for survival, which is especially recognized in the 15<sup>th</sup> Wing because expenses in aviation and the sustainment of its capabilities are normally two to three times higher than infantry units such as the SAF Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) (GŠSV, 2014).

The second characteristic can be found in the way in which the SAFAF Professional Military Education and Training (PME&T) systems are created and organized. The general education of SAF personnel is provided in civilian institutions – high school for Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and Universities for Officers. Once they successfully finish civilian education, all NCOs and Officers go through basic military training and afterwards proceed towards the specialized Professional Military Education and Training (PME&T) which is required to successfully conduct their work. This is where air force personnel PME&T is distinctively different from others, because airmen's basic PME&T is synchronized with civilian aviation

education and training according to the Civilian Aviation Authorities (CAA). The CAA's fundamentals come from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) – equivalent to the US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA). In other words, the SAFAF School is organized similarly to the civilian Aviation Training Organization (ATO). Consequently, all air personnel licensing is based on civilian licences/ratings and then upgraded to military requirements (licences/ratings) which are under the Military Aviation Authority (MAA).

This leads us to the third characteristic, the three levels of control established after the SAFAF joined the NATO alliance. The first level represents internal national inspection, the subject of military inspections and controls by the higher command, the Inspectorate of the Republic of Slovenia for Defence, (National Assembly, 2004) and the MAA (GŠSV, 2012). The second level represents external national inspection, the subject of civilian inspection and control by the Civilian Aviation Authority (National Assembly, 2010). The third level is international, the subject of military inspection and evaluation from the NATO organization (MZZRS, 2004) and members of the Joint Fire Support Executive Steering Committee (JFSESC) (Golden, 2015).

The bottom line is that despite starting from scratch in 1992, and enduring through turbulent times (reorganizations and fiscal constraints), the SAFAF has something worth showing. For example, SAFAF has conducted peacekeeping missions (SFOR & KFOR), (MoD, 2012), a successful NATO standardization evaluation (national CRC, (15. PVL, 2015), and a national Forward Air Controller (FAC) programme (NATO FAC ST, 2014); been an active part of the NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS or NATO IADS) and various national and international exercises (NATO and USA forces)(15. PVL, 2015); and is now an indispensable part of the national Civil Protection and Disaster Relief (search and rescue, medical evacuation/transportation, transplant, firefighting, etc) organization. (GŠSV, 2013) In addition to this, the 15<sup>th</sup> Wing is advancing towards short-term development which is currently underway, such as the NATO MEDEVAC tactical evaluation (TACEVAL) (GŠSV, 2015) or accreditation of national Air Ground Operation Support (AGOS) Schoolhouse according to the Joint Terminal Attack Controller Memorandum of Agreement (JTAC MOA), and the NATO Standardization Agreement 3797 (STANAG 3797) and Allied Tactical Publication 3.3.2.2 (ATP 3.3.2.2) (GŠSV, 2014).

### **3 FUTURE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES AIR FORCE**

Unfortunately, according to the mid- and long-term plans, the SAF will not develop its potential in military aviation, as can be seen from the following quote: “Military capabilities exceeding national capacity or ambitions will be provided within the alliance or on the basis of bilateral and multilateral international agreements.” (RS MoD, p. 32). This means that air superiority over Slovenian airspace will be provided by the NATO alliance. The second major factor related to the development of the

SAFAF's capabilities is that "the SAF will ensure dual-use capabilities to support the system of protection against natural and other disasters." (RS MoD, 2011, p32). The third major factor is that the primary combat units used to fulfil national needs will be Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). These will provide the battalion level units (BBGs) needed to fulfil Slovenia's obligations to NATO, such as quick reaction forces in time of crises (MORS, 2016). SAF airpower should be adjusted accordingly, primarily to support the SAF BCTs. This support should be focused on the development of capabilities which would enable interoperability within the SAF, interoperability between the national border or national security forces (the SAF, the national police force and the national Civil Protection and Disaster Relief organization), and interoperability between the different NATO forces. In other words, long-term plans should develop those characteristics of the SAFAF which would support joint functions based on interoperable capabilities, primarily to support BCTs and BBGs – an interoperable C4ISR network which is supported by intelligence air assets with movement and manoeuvres air assets supporting the sustainment, protection, and fire power power dedicated mainly to ground units.

Firstly, the SAFAF should focus on centralized command, distributed (flexible) control, and decentralized execution. The SAF and the SAFAF should therefore develop capabilities based on a digital network which would allow the active participation of ground forces during the processes of planning and execution of air tasks through their representatives. At the same time, these technological capabilities should provide an active connection to allied operational C4ISR networks, which would enable the active participation of SAFAF in the joint operational environment. In other words, it would facilitate the joint function of command.

Secondly, the SAFAF should focus on tactical air mobility, which would enable 24/7 air assault/drop/supply by utility helicopters with attack capabilities dedicated to company level units. These tactical air mobility capabilities should be used for national domestic interests as well as for international needs, according to allies' needs. At the same time, the SAFAF should enable mid-range air transport/supply with LTAs primarily dedicated to the units used in international security and peacekeeping missions. These capabilities would provide the SAF with national independence in functions of movement and manoeuvres in the international environment.

Thirdly, the SAFAF should develop Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities enabled by tactical level or hand-held Remote Pilot Aircraft (RPAs) and operational level RPAs with limited strike capabilities – a function of intelligence – which could, through the C4ISR active allied connection, enable joint functions of intelligence.

Fourthly, the SAFAF should focus on LAAs with strike capabilities in the permissive and contested environment (JFS ESC, 2016). Their primary role would be the support of BCTs/BBGs with fire power in relation to BCTs/BBGs movement and manoeuvres. At the same time, LAAs would be used in the process of PME&T

(receiving/maintaining the certification/qualification level of proficiency of JTACs and SAF AGOS Schoolhouse, Air Defence (AD) personnel, Weapon Control Officers (WCO), CRC unit etc.) and support of other units (from BCTs level exercises down to platoon level exercises, calibration of ground based radar, etc.).

These four characteristics would enable the SAFAF to support the overall SAF in their core mission and purpose, which originates in the long-term plans and national security policy. The next logical question is which actions should be taken in the next 20 years to reach the established goal? But before this paper continues towards the proposed path for the 2036 development goal, it must answer the question of why the SAF and the SAFAF are currently struggling for their existence.

#### **4 WHY WE ARE WHERE WE ARE?**

The main reason can be found in Brigadier General Branimir Furlan's article, "Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness: the Slovenian Case." His hypothesis is that "unresolved problems in the first-generation civil-military relations, as well as the deviation within the second, require from the military a constant reprisal of its performance, leading to a risk of reducing legitimacy, credibility, and the ability to execute its core mission" (Furlan, 2012). In his article, he starts with an exploration of the arguments, such as, what does it mean for control to be objective, and what does a form of subjective control mean? Then he proposes a definition of military effectiveness, which is not just to win wars, but to actually understand the military role and mission and be "capable of transforming political guidance into effective military actions and responses" (Furlan, 2012). In the third part, he determines the area of analysis between civilian authorities, provided for military effectiveness, and the armed forces, an established effective combat force (mission analysis, strategic guidance, personnel management, equipping [material acquisition], financing training and education, readiness, and operations). The bottom line is that in the Slovenian case military education is the only area where the SAF enjoys professional autonomy. Everywhere else, the subject of control is influenced by the civilian authorities (Furlan, 2012). The reason for this is the legacy of mistrust which was inherited from the previous system and the power which the Yugoslavian National Army (YNA) had in it.

#### **5 DECISIONS AND ACTIONS NEEDED TO GET FROM TODAY'S SITUATION TO THE PROPOSED FUTURE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES AIR FORCE**

This year Slovenia is marking 25 years of its existence and it is time to change our mentality away from fear of the executive branch of government and its restrictive national policy towards the police and the military. The government should realize that we have national military forces to serve our young independent nation. The next step towards acceptance of military culture within the civilian sector of government

is for politicians to realize their responsibilities towards maintaining the security environment, by providing security forces for the protection of their citizens. The times of the Cold War are long gone. We are living in a world where conventional deterrence has failed, a fact which has been clearly recognizable during the last decade in relation to activities in the Middle East and North Africa, which have subsequently brought consequences into the heart of Europe – Afghanistan and the Iraq war, and the Arab or Spring revolution in Arabic countries such as Libya and Syria being prime examples. On the other hand, the role of military leadership is to emphasize the government's responsibilities, which are carried by civilian leaders, and to stress the importance of government policy for strategic national security which is provided by military forces. Policy makers should recognize the dynamics related to the world security environment where states and non-state actors compete for world order and their influence on it. Despite the fact that the Republic of Slovenia will not directly influence its will and shape the world security environment, the RS should be prepared to defend its national interests and its sovereignty.

An immediate and current example of today's security challenges is the example of controlling the mass migrations from the Middle East into Europe, where the SAF has helped to provide national border protection (MORS, 2016). In the future, the SAFAF could provide sufficient ISR capabilities for border protection, as well as mobility and manoeuvres of the SAF forces and their sustainment. At the same time, if border security drastically worsens, the SAFAF could provide basic security for the SAF forces and citizens of the RS with its integrated national C4ISR network, supported by ISR air assets, air mobility assets and eventually air attack assets. In other words, Slovenia could more easily and quickly detect danger with military air assets which have mounted ISR observation/targeting pods or RPAs. For example, fixed-wing capabilities enable larger border coverage in the same amount of time with less manpower and at the same time, they provide greater coverage into the adversary's territory, beyond the range and capabilities of ground units. At the same time, SAFAF air assets could provide a greater concentration of SAF forces in the area of interest through their movement and manoeuvres function. Finally, the SAFAF could provide firepower from the air to secure our forces on the ground.

Secondly, if politicians recognized their role and responsibilities towards national security, and had a clear and realistic acceptance of the security environment in which we live, RS politicians would lose the argument for neglecting the financial support of the SAF. On the contrary, RS politicians would strive towards the NATO-recommended 2% of national GDP. The fact is that the military needs financial resources for its development. Military development requires 20% of the defence budget to be dedicated to the acquisition of and research into the military equipment which would enable the SAFAF to develop the characteristics proposed in the plan for 2036. Unfortunately, it is an illusion to expect a change next year, or even within the next few years. In the next three to five years, financial resources will be spent on the consequences of the negligence of the SAF's development. The government's plan is to slowly increase the military proportion of GDP to 1.03% by 2020. If we

transform these percentages into numbers, it means that the defence budget will increase by approximately 40 million euros each year until 2020 (RS MoD, 2016). The problem is that today the SAF already needs around 10 million per year just to sustain the current military equipment which is essential to maintaining minimum effectiveness (Planet Siol, 2016). According to the General Staff, the SAF needs around 50 million euros of extra funding this year to be able to function with minimal effectiveness. Additionally, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) recognizes that the SAF would need an additional 200 million euros in order to be able to function effectively according to expectations (Nova 24TV, 2016). Hopefully, the government will also recognize the seriousness of this issue and take appropriate steps and actions towards the most needed positive financial corrections.

Thirdly, the SAFAF should reshape and upgrade its civilian-based PME&T programmes with more military-based ones. This means that the military part of the PME&T must be taken to a higher level. At the moment, we could argue that the mind-set of military pilots is set for the civilian environment. They are more than proficient in civilian regulations and flying experience in civilian commercial airspace. On the other hand, as a result of young armed forces with limited military experience, the SAFAF's military potential is still under development for example, the SAFAF does not at the moment execute any night live firing training, but is entirely based on live simulations. The problem lies in the national civilian aviation and environmental regulations. At the same time, if the new generation of pilots were able to overcome the old philosophy, based on flying technique – how good are you at acrobatic flying – by a new philosophy which is oriented towards military procedures – how good are you at following the right TTPs according to the circumstances – then now is the time to turn the basic PME&T philosophy more towards the military one. For example, the philosophy of flight safety in civilian aviation is oriented towards cancelling the mission if circumstances indicate certain level of danger; in the military world, the philosophy is not oriented towards cancelling the mission but towards how to execute it in the safest way.

Fourthly, the SAF and the Slovenian government should take a different approach towards government human resources policy and personnel management in the SAF. The RS invests a lot in air personnel, compared to some other government and military personnel. For example, if a pilot has flown 1000 flying hours on a certain type of aircraft which costs approximately 2500 euros per operational flying hour, it means that the SAF has invested at least 2.5 million euros in him or her. Consequently, the SAF and the RS government should adjust the national human resources policy to secure its investments in air personnel, but unfortunately, this is not the case with the present national human resources management policy. At the very least, they could learn from previous examples. Between 2004 and 2008, the SAFAF lost around a third of all its flight personnel because military pilots, engineers, and technicians chose to leave the armed forces, preferring to work for civilian companies. The result was the loss of a generation; the generation which today should be taking over almost all command positions in the 15<sup>th</sup> Wing (Squadron

Commanders and Staff or Sector Commanders) and other high ranking positions in the SAF General Staff. Consequently, the flying units face an inability to sustain required and established capabilities. With a better national economic situation, when air companies will prosper again, this bad scenario for SAF or SAFAF could happen again. Additionally, the SAF and the Slovenian government must realize that creating new air personnel is not a task which can be achieved overnight. For example, to become a pilot, besides successfully completing a civilian degree, medical selection, flying selection, and basic military training, you must go through basic flight training, and professional flight training over a time period of between three and five years – it varies due to the lack of solid financial support, which is consequently shown in military weapons acquisitions or PME&T related to gaining/maintaining pilot licensing and ratings. After this, they are still senior pilots, with limited experience in military TTPs, and the investment in the pilots is only just beginning to be recovered. To be experienced, you need time and the process cannot be skimmed, because of life-dependent safety issues. Because of this, the SAF and the Slovenian government must devise some long-term personnel management policy which would enable the required capabilities to be sustained over time.

## Conclusion

To sum up, the Slovenian government, together with the SAF and the SAFAF, currently faces some serious challenges which must be solved to open the path to the twenty-year development plan. These issues can be overcome, especially if they are taken seriously by politicians. The RS was able to establish and develop its own Air Force capabilities, which after 25 years possess certain characteristics which have developed, based on circumstances. If the RS was able to develop the SAFAF from nothing to a level where it is taking an active part in NATO peacekeeping operations, there is no doubt that the SAFAF could follow the path of development and shape its 2036 characteristics in a way that would actively support the national and international security challenges. In other words, the development of its 2036 characteristics is dependent on the will of politicians and the national government, because the civilian authorities in the Slovenian case have a big impact on the efficiency of the SAF, and in the end politicians have the ‘scissors and paper’ in their hands to provide the basic financing of the changes. The Slovenian government and the SAF’s leaders must realize that the new security issues which have been created during the last couple of decades, in the majority of cases, are impossible to solve without capabilities/functions through the third dimension – air and space. The risk, and potential costs related to it is much higher than without them. If our security policy dictates that we seek air superiority – freedom from attack from the air and freedom to attack from the air – through alliance, it does not mean that we should neglect the possibilities which the third dimension enables in modern warfare. The bottom line is that the future character of the SAFAF should be shaped towards the national needs, adjusted for allies’ joint functions, because the present character of the SAFAF yearns for an identity which would enable the SAFAF’s existence inside the SAF organization, and at the same time, it is finally the time for the civilian authorities to sober themselves and recognize their role in establishing the military effectiveness which will provide the required national security and fulfil Slovenia’s

obligations towards the NATO alliance. The Dean of the Air Command and Staff College from USAF University, Dr. Forsyth, always proclaims that "history is a conversation the past has with the present about the future." Who knows, if the national economy blooms and the civilian authorities recognize their role, maybe even thoughts of the procurement of 5<sup>th</sup> generation military systems, which today are not even on a list to be discussed, could be possible.

## Bibliography

1. 2013 Government Communication Office, Official gateway to the information on Slovenia. *Slovenia.si*, Your gateway to information on Slovenia. Edvard Rusjan, the Pioneer Slovenian Aviator. 2003. <http://www.slovenia.si/society/science/slovenian-scientists/edvard-rusjan-the-pioneer-slovenian-aviator/> (accessed February 17, 2016).
2. 15. Polk Vojaskega Letalstva (15. PVL). Porocilo o uresnicenju Poslovnega plana za leto 2014. Cerklje ob Krki: 15. Polk Vojaskega Letalstva, 2015.
3. Furlan, B., 2012. Branimir. "SAGE Journals." *Armed Forces & Society*. December 27, 2012. [afs.sagepub.com/content/39/3/434.full.pdf+html](http://afs.sagepub.com/content/39/3/434.full.pdf+html) (accessed Januar 21, 2016).
4. Goldfein, L. D., 2015. *Coordinated Implementation of Joint Fire Support Executive Steering Committee Action Plan Memorandums of Agreement for Joint Terminal Attack Controller (Ground) and Joint Forward Air Controller (Airborne)*. Washington DC: The Joint Staff, 2015.
5. Drzavni zbor Republike Slovenije. Zakon o obrambi - uradno precisceno besedilo (ZObr-UPB1). Ljubljana: Uradni list Republike Slovenije, številka 103/04 z dne 23.9.2004, 2004.
6. Drzavni zbor Republike Slovenije. Zakon o letalstvu - uradno precisceno besedilo (ZLet-UPB4). Ljubljana: Uradni list Republike Slovenije številka 81/2010 z dne 15.10.2010, 2010.
7. Generalstab Slovenske Vojske (GŠSV). 1. Dopolnilo Ukaza, št. 0100-68/2014-46 z dne 28.10.2014 za delo v Slovenski vojski za leti 2015 in 2016. Ljubljana: Generalstab Slovenske Vojske, 2014.
8. Generalštab Slovenske Vojske (GŠSV). Informativno glasilo Ministrstva za obrambo. 15 let sodelovanja Slovenske vojske v mednarodnih operacijah in misijah. Ljubljana: Ministrstvo za obrambo, 2012.
9. Generalstab Slovenske Vojske (GŠSV). Ukaz za imenovanje zacasne delovne skupine za vzpostavitev FAC/JTAC sole SV (AGOS SV). Ljubljana: Generalstab Slovenske Vojske, 2014.
10. Generalstab Slovenske Vojske (GŠSV). Ukaz za pripravo zmogljivosti SV za preverjanje po standardih TACEVAL. Ljubljana: Generalstab Slovenske Vojske, 2015.
11. Generalstab Slovenske Vojske, Vojaski letalski organ. Operativni priročnik letalskih enot in zračne obrambe Slovenske vojske. Ljubljana: Ministrstvo za obrambo, 2012.
12. Generalstab Slovenske Vojske (GŠSV). Ukaz za sodelovanje in delovanje 15. PVL pri zasciti, reševanju in pomoci ob naravnih in drugih nesrecah. Cerklje ob Krki: 15. Polk Vojaskega Letalstva, 2013.
13. Joint Fire Support Executive Steering Committee. *Concept of Operations for Joint Close Air Support (JCAS)*. Unclassified - For Official Use Only, US Joint Staff, 2016.
14. 15. Polk Vojaskega Letalstva (15. PVL). Obisk predstavnikov NATO-ve agencije za podporo v 16. CNKZP. Cerklje ob Krki: 15. Polk Vojaskega Letalstva, 2015.
15. Lipic, L. "ProQuest." *15th Air Force Brigade of the Slovenian Army*. n.d. <http://search.proquest.com.aufric.idm.oclc.org/docview/274800312/fulltext/F512FBF0EC> (accessed Februar 16, 2016).
16. M.P. Nova 24TV. Februar 24, 2016. [nova24tv.si/slovenija/ministriceva-potrtila-veliko-krizo-v-slovenski-vojski/](http://nova24tv.si/slovenija/ministriceva-potrtila-veliko-krizo-v-slovenski-vojski/) (accessed Februar 27, 2016).

17. *Ministrstvo za obrambo Republike Slovenije (MORS). Predlog - Srednjeročni obrambni program Republike Slovenije. Ljubljana: Vlada Republike Slovenije, 2016.*
18. *Ministrstvo za obrambo Republike Slovenije (MORS). Slovenska vojska. Februar 24, 2016. <http://www.slovenskavojska.si/odnosi-z-javnostmi/porocila-za-javnost/novica/nov/slovenska-vojska-z-enakimi-nalogami-podpira-resevanje-migrantske-situacije/> (accessed March 11, 2016).*
19. *Ministry of Defense Slovenian Armed Forces. Structure. n.d. <http://www.slovenskavojska.si/en/structure/> (accessed February 17, 2016).*
20. *Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve Republike Slovenije (MZZRS). Severnoatlantska pogodba - listina o ratifikaciji deponirana 29. marca 2004, s cimer je RS postala članica NATA. Ljubljana: Uradni list Republike Slovenije - Mednarodne pogodbe številka 5/2004 z dne 29.3.2004, 2004.*
21. *NATO Forward Air Controller Standardization Team. NATO Formal Standardization Visit Report by the NATO Forward Air Controller Standardization Team (FST). Ramstein-Miesenbach, Germany: NATO HQ Allied Air Command, 2014. Defence,*
22. *Republic of Slovenia Ministry of. Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the Slovenian Armed Forces up to 2025. Ljubljana: Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia (No. 99/2010, dated 7 Dec 2010), 2011. 32.*
23. *STA. "Slovenski vojski za vzdrževanje in oskrbo manjka devet milijonov evrov." Planet Siol.net. Februar 16, 2016. [www.siol.net/novice/slovenija/2016/02/slovenska\\_vojska.aspx?format=json&hide\\_hf=1&os=wf&ver=1.0](http://www.siol.net/novice/slovenija/2016/02/slovenska_vojska.aspx?format=json&hide_hf=1&os=wf&ver=1.0) (accessed Februar 27, 2016).*