VSEBINA

Revija *Šolsko polje* je vključena v naslednje indekse in baze podatkov:

Contents Pages in Education
Educational Research Abstracts
International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)
Lingustics and Language Behaviour Abstracts (LLBA)
Multicultural Education Abstracts
Pais International
Research into Higher Education Abstracts
Social Services Abstracts
Sociological Abstracts
Worldwide Political Science Abstracts

UVODNA NOTICA

Igor Ž. Žagar

Tole pisanje bo res zgolj uvodno, predvsem pa samo notica. Ruth Wodak namreč v svojem članku, *Za kaj gre v KAD - pregled zgodovine, pomembnih konceptov in razvoja*, precej natančno razloži, kaj je kritična analiza diskurza, za kaj se zavzema (gre namreč za t.i. »angažirano« teorijo) in kako se je zgodovinsko in teoretsko oblikovala.

Članki, ki sledijo, predstavljajo bodisi dodatne in drugačne osvetlitve kritične analize diskurza s teoretskih izhodišč bodisi konkretne analize z uporabo kritični analizi diskurza lastnega instrumentarija.

V prvo skupino spadata članka Andreje Vezovnik in Igorja Ž. Žagarja. Andreja Vezovnik tako konceptualno primerja dve **teoriji** diskurza (in implicitno nakaže njun morebitni vpliv na **analize** diskurza), Foucaultovo in Laclauovo, Igor Ž. Žagar pa pokaže na nekatere teoretske nedomišljenosti KAD s stališča teorij(e) argumentacij(e), natančneje na nekonceptualizirano in nereflektirano rabo pojma/koncepta *topos*, kakor ga poznamo predvsem iz antične retorike.

Članka Karmen Erjavec in Zale Volčič ter Danijele Majstorović predstavljata izvrstna primera kritične analize diskurza na delu, za nameček tudi na sorodnem področju: gre za vojno v BiH in za njene pravno-upravne posledice. Karmen Erjavec in Zala Volčič tako analizirata medijsko »pokritje« aretacije Radovana Karadžića (predvsem analizo poročanja Televizije Srbije), Danijela Majstorović pa nekatere značilnosti retorike Urada visokega predstavnika mednarodne skupnosti v BiH med leti 1996-2005 (zanimivo, da se obe analizi ogneta uporabi KAD tako ljubih *toposov*...).

Številko sklene analiza Primoža Krašovca o (slovenski) medijski konstrukciji leta 1968, natančneje obeh ključnih »zgodovinskih« dogodkov: študentskega gibanja v Franciji in sovjetske zasedbe Češkoslovaške.

In kaj ima vse to opraviti s šolstvom, se utegne kdo vprašati? S šolstvom, kot ga poznamo in prakticiramo na Slovenskem, na žalost, ne kaj dosti. Bi se pa šolstvo iz kritične analize diskurza (njenega pristopa in metodologije) lahko mnogokaj naučilo za svojo lastno prakso.

Igor Ž. Žagar

ZA KAJ GRE V KAD – PREGLED ZGODOVINE, POMEMBNIH KONCEPTOV IN RAZVOJA[1]

Ruth Wodak

"Onstran opisovanja ali površne aplikacije kritična znanost na vsakem področju postavlja vprašanja, kot so tista, ki zadevajo odgovornost, interese in ideologijo. Namesto, da bi se osredinila na čiste akademske in teoretske probleme, kritična znanost izhaja iz prevladujočih družbenih problemov, s čimer izbere pogled tistih, ki najhuje trpijo, ter kritično analizira tiste, ki imajo moč, tiste, ki nosijo odgovornost, in tiste, ki imajo sredstva in priložnost, da tovrstne probleme rešujejo." (van Dijk, 1986: 4.)

"Da bi iz kritične teorije potegnili zaključke za politično delovanje, si prizadevajo tisti, ki imajo resne namene, in vendar za to ne obstaja noben splošen recept, razen, če ne gre za potrebo po vpogledu v lastno odgovornost." (Horkheimer v: O'Neill, 1979.)

Uvodne opombe[2]

Izraza *kritična lingvistika* (KL) in *kritična analiza diskurza* (KAD) se pogosto izmenjujeta.[3] Pravzaprav se zadnje čase zdi, da ima prednost izraz KAD in da se uporablja za označevanje teorije, ki je bila v preteklosti znana kot KL. KAD pojmuje »jezik kot družbeno prakso« (Fairclough in Wodak, 1997) in kot ključno izhodišče opredeljuje upoštevanje konteksta jezikovne rabe (Wodak, 2000c; Benke, 2000). Še več: KAD posebej zanima razmerje med jezikom in močjo. Danes se izraz KAD nanaša zlasti na kritičnolingvistični pristop pri tistih znanstvenikih, ki kot temeljno enoto komunikacije pojmujejo večje diskurzivne enote besedila. Tovrstno raziskovanje se posebej osredinja na institucionalne, politične, spolne in medijske diskurze (v najširšem smislu), ki pričajo o bolj ali manj očitnih razmerjih boja in konflikta.

Navedeni odlomek dela Teuna van Dijka, ki sem ga uporabila kot uvodni citat, povzema nekatere od nalog in ciljev KL in KAD. Mišljeni so zlasti tisti, ki zaznamujejo medsebojno odvisnost raziskovalnih interesov in političnih obvez v tem, kar van Dijk opiše s sintagmo kritična znanost in kjer

pojem kritičnosti, kot je uporabljen v njegovi programski izjavi, ni izključno teoretski, ampak poudarja običajni pomen »kritičnega, ki ga takšno znanstveno udejstvovanje uteleša«. V tem »kritičnem« duhu želim podati pregled nekaterih temeljnih principov KL in KAD[4] ter kratko predstavitev najuglednejših šol, ki so izšle iz njiju. Heterogenost metodoloških in teoretskih pristopov, ki so zastopani na tem področju lingvistike, je vsekakor usmerjena k potrditvi van Dijkovega stališča, da predstavljata KAD in KL »v najboljšem primeru skupno perspektivo v okviru ukvarjanja z lingvistiko, semiotiko in analizo diskurza« (van Dijk, 1993: 131).

Ta skupna perspektiva se nanaša na izraz »kritičen«, ki v delih nekaterih pripadnikov »kritične lingvistike« kaže sledi vpliva frankfurtske šole ali Jürgena Habermasa (Thompson, 1988: 71ss.; Fay, 1987: 203; Anthonissen, 2001). Vendar se omenjeni izraz danes konvencionalno uporablja v širšem smislu in zaznamuje, kot pravi Krings, praktično povezavo med »družbenim in političnim delovanjem« ter »sociološko utemeljeno konstrukcijo družbe« (Krings et al., 1973: 808), obenem pa dopušča, s Faircloughovimi besedami, »da so v človeških zadevah medsebojna povezanost in vzročno-posledične verige lahko popačene vse do nezmožnosti uvida. Zatorej kritičnost pomeni predvsem omogočiti, da medsebojna povezanost med stvarmi postane vidna.« (Fairclough, 1985: 747; glej tudi Connerton, 1976: 11–39 in glej spodaj.)

KL in KAD lahko torej opredelimo kot disciplini, ki se temeljno ukvarjata z analizo nejasnih, a tudi povsem transparentnih strukturnih razmerij nadvlade (*dominance*), diskriminacije (*discrimination*), moči (*power*) in nadzora (*control*), kot se kažejo v jeziku. Z drugimi besedami: KAD si prizadeva kritično raziskati družbeno neenakost, kot je izražena, signalizirana, določena, legitimirana itd. z jezikovno rabo (ali v diskurzu). Večina pripadnikov kritične analize diskurza bi tako podprla Habermasovo trditev, da je »jezik tudi sredstvo prevlade in družbena sila. Služi za legitimizacijo razmerij organizirane moči. Dokler legitimizacije razmerij moči, /.../ niso artikulirane, /.../ je jezik tudi ideološki.« (Habermas, 1977: 259 in glej spodaj.)

V nasprotju z drugimi paradigmami v analizi diskurza in besediloslovju za KL in KAD predmet raziskovanja niso le besedila (bodisi pisana ali govorjena). Celovita »kritična« obravnava diskurza namreč zahteva teoretski pretres in opis obeh, tako družbenih procesov in struktur, ki so povzročile nastanek besedila, kot tudi družbenih struktur in procesov, v okviru katerih posamezniki ali skupine kot družbeni zgodovinski subjekti ustvarjajo pomene v interakciji z besedili (Fairclough in Kress, 1993: 2ss.). Posledično predstavljajo del celotne KAD nujno trije koncepti: koncept moči, koncept zgodovine in koncept ideologije.[5]

Za razliko od nekaterih raziskav v pragmatiki in tradicionalni sociologiji, kjer so pripadniki kritične lingvistike kontekstualne spremenljivke nekoliko naivno postavili v medsebojno odvisnost z avtonomnimi jezikovnimi sistemi (npr. Kress in Hodge, 1979), se poskušata KL in KAD izogniti vzpostavljanju preprostega determinističnega odnosa med besedili in družbenim. Upoštevajoč stališča, da je nadvlada tista, ki strukturira diskurz,[6] da je vsak diskurz historično ustvarjen in interpretiran, kar pomeni, da je postavljen v čas in prostor, in da strukture oblasti legitimirajo ideologije vplivnih skupin, je s pomočjo kompleksnega pristopa, ki ga predlagajo pripadniki KL in KAD, mogoče analizirati pritiske od zgoraj in možnosti odpora proti razmerjem neenake moči, ki se pojavljajo kot družbene konvencije. S tega stališča vladajoče strukture stabilizirajo in naturalizirajo konvencije, kar pomeni, da so učinki moči in ideologije v ustvarjanju pomena zastrti in da pridobivajo stalne ter naravne oblike: vzeti so kot »naprej dani«. Odpor je zato videti kot prelamljanje konvencij oziroma stalnih diskurzivnih praks v dejanjih »ustvarjalnosti« (Fairclough in Kress, 1993, 4ss.).

Dandanes v KAD brez dvoma obstaja močna kontinuiteta s KL (glej npr. Fairclough in Wodak, 1997; Blommaert in Bulcaen, 2000), ki se je z Rogerjem Fowlerjem, Tonyjem Trewom in Guntherjem Kressom (glej spodaj) razvijala v 70. in 80. letih prejšnjega stoletja zlasti na Univerzi Vzhodne Anglije. Kontinuiteto je mogoče videti predvsem v trditvi, da so diskurzi ideološki in da znaki niso arbitrarni (glej tudi Kress, 1993). Za tekstovno analizo, ki jo je gojila omenjena šola, se je kot najpomembnejša izkazala funkcionalna sistemska lingvistika (glej Halliday, 1978).

Ostale korenine KL in KAD izvirajo iz klasične retorike, besediloslovja in sociolingvistike, kakor tudi iz uporabnega jezikoslovja in pragmatike. Za interpretacijo ali pojasnjevanje tekstov so bili pomembni pojmi, kot so ideologija, moč, hierarhija in spol, ter statične sociološke spremenljivke. Predmeti raziskovanja se razlikujejo glede na različna področja in znanstvenike, ki uporabljajo KAD. Zelo pomembna so postala vprašanja spola, rasizma, medijski diskurzi ali dimenzije raziskovalne identitete (glej Wodak et al., 1999; Blommaert in Verschueren, 1999; Martín-Rojo in van Dijk, 1997; Pedro 1977; Martín-Rojo in Whittaker, 1998; ter številne uvodnike, ki so izhajali v reviji *Discourse and Society*, še zlasti razpravo med Emanuelom Schegloffom in Michaelom Billigom v številkah 2–4, 1999, in 2–4, 2000). Prav tako se med seboj zelo razlikujejo metodologije: od majhnih kvalitativnih študij primerov pa vse do velikih podatkovnih korpusov, ki izhajajo iz terenskih in etnografskih raziskav.

Za začetek: kratka zgodba o oblikovanju "znanstvene skupine somišljenikov"

KAD je kot mreža znanstvenikov nastala v zgodnjih 90. letih prejšnjega stoletja, kot nadaljevanje majhnega simpozija v Amsterdamu januarja 1991. Po naključju in s pomočjo podpore Univerze v Amsterdamu so Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuwen in Ruth Wodak skupaj preživeli dva dneva in imeli čudovito priložnost razpravljati o teorijah ter metodah analize diskurza, še posebej o KAD. Srečanje je vsakemu izmed njih omogočilo, da se je soočil z ostalimi udeleženci v okviru zelo specifičnih in različnih pristopov, ki še danes zaznamujejo različne pristope v KAD (glej prispevke v tej knjigi in pripadajočo literaturo). V tem procesu oblikovanja skupine so bile izpostavljene razlike in podobnosti: razlike glede na ostale teorije in metodologije v analizi diskurza (glej Titscher et al., 2000) in podobnosti v programski smeri, ki bi lahko predstavljala okvir za različne teoretske pristope raznih izobrazbenih in strokovnih poti, kakor tudi šol, iz katerih so prihajali ugledni znanstveniki.

Začetek mreže KAD zagotovo zaznamuje tudi izid van Dijkove revije *Discourse and Society* (1990), pa številne monografije, kot sta *Language and Power* Normana Fairclougha (1989) in *Language, Power and Ideology* Ruth Wodak (1989), ali prva knjiga o rasizmu *Prejudice in Discourse* (1984) Teuna van Dijka. Toda srečanje v Amsterdamu je pomenilo institucionalni začetek poskusnega uvajanja programa izmenjave (triletni program ERASMUS),[7] drugih skupnih projektov in oblik sodelovanja med različnimi znanstveniki ter pristopi, prav tako pa je bilo tudi povod za posebno izdajo revije *Discourse and Society* (1993), ki je združila zgoraj omenjene pristope. Od takrat se je marsikaj spremenilo, tako delovanje kot sodelujoči znanstveniki. Izšle so nove revije, napisanih je bilo lepo število preglednih razprav in danes velja KAD za uveljavljeno paradigmo v lingvistiki.

Vse od prvega srečanja (KAD in KL sta seveda obstajali že prej, a ne v obliki mednarodne, heterogene in tesno povezane skupine znanstvenikov) potekajo letni simpoziji, ki so spremljali nastanek paradigme, za katero je značilno, da jo bolj določata raziskovalni načrt in program kot pa kakšna skupna teorija ali metodologija. Na tovrstnih strokovnih srečanjih sodeluje vse več znanstvenikov, vse več raziskovalcev pa je pričelo preučevati KAD (eden takih je, denimo, Ron Scollon). Znanstveniki z nemškega jezikovnega področja so se konferenc udeleževali redkeje, ker se je kot delovni jezik vedno uporabljala angleščina. Kljub temu so bila stališča Utza Maasa in Siegfrieda Jägra prepoznana in sprejeta v okviru KAD (glej Fairclough in Wodak, 1997;

Titscher et al., 2000). To dejstvo pojasni veliko raznolikost pristopov v pričujoči knjigi, bodisi na teoretski bodisi na empirični ravni, kakor tudi razpon lingvističnih orodij, ki se uporabljajo v analizi diskurza. Pogosta kritika KAD obsega več dimenzij, ki jih v tej knjigi prav tako obravnavamo: hermenevtični pristop k tekstovni analizi; širok kontekst, ki se uporablja za interpretacijo tekstov; pogosto zelo širok teoretski okvir, ki vedno ne ustreza podatkom; eksplicitna politična opredelitev raziskovalcev (za pregled kritike KAD glej Titscher et al., 2000, in prispevek Michaela Meyerja v pričujoči knjigi).

Zgodovina kritične lingvistike in kritične analize diskurza

V 70. letih prejšnjega stoletja se je pojavila oblika analize diskurza in tekstovne analize, ki je prepoznala vlogo jezika v razmerjih strukturiranja družbene moči (obsežen pregled razvoja glej v Anthonissen, 2001). Takrat se je večina lingvističnih raziskav drugod osredinjala na formalne vidike jezika, ki so določali lingvistično kompetenco govorcev in jih je bilo mogoče teoretsko izolirati od posebnih primerov jezikovne rabe (Chomsky, 1957). Tam, kjer so znanstveniki preučevali razmerje med jezikom in kontekstom, tako kot, denimo, v pragmatiki (Levinson, 1983), s poudarkom na govorčevi pragmatični/sociolingvistični kompetenci, so bili stavki in njihove sestavine še vedno obravnavani kot temeljne enote. Precej sociolingvističnih raziskav iz tega obdobja je težilo k opisovanju in pojasnjevanju jezikovnih variacij, jezikovnih sprememb in struktur komunikacijske interakcije, pri čemer so tovrstne raziskave družbeni hierarhiji in moči posvečale omejeno pozornost (Labov, 1972; Hymes, 1972). V tem kontekstu pa je pozornost, ki je bila posvečena tekstom, njihovi produkciji in interpretaciji ter njihovemu razmerju do družbenih impulzov in struktur, dajala znak, da gre za precej drugačno zanimanje za jezik (de Beaugrande in Dressler, 1981; za pregled glej Titscher et al., 2000). Dela, ki so jih objavili Kress in Hodge (1979), Fowler in sodelavci (1979), van Dijk (1985), Fairclough (1989) in Wodak (ur.) (1989), pojasnjujejo in prikazujejo glavne predpostavke, principe in postopke tega, kar je postalo pozneje znano kot KL.

Kress (1990: 84–97) navaja prikaz teoretskih izhodišč in virov za kritično lingvistiko. Pravi, da je bil izraz KL »prirejen precej samoumevno« (1990: 88) iz lastnega družbeno-filozofskega nasprotnega pola in kot oznaka za skupino znanstvenikov, ki so v 70. letih prejšnjega stoletja delali na Univerzi Vzhodne Anglije (glej tudi Wodak, 1996a; Blommaert in Bulcaen, 2000). Do leta 1990 se je pričela oznaka KAD bolj dosledno uporabljati prav v zvezi s takšnim pristopom k lingvistični analizi. Kress (1990: 94) pokaže, kako se je KAD v tem času »pojavljala kot posebna teorija jezika, kot radikalno drugačna vrsta ling-

vistike«. Avtor našteva kriterije, ki označujejo delo na področju paradigme kritične analize diskurza, in obenem prikazuje, kako ločujejo takšno delo od analize diskurza, ki prav tako obravnava politična vprašanja, a na drugačen način. Fairclough in Wodak (1997) sta omenjene kriterije opredelila še podrobneje in oblikovala deset temeljnih principov programa KAD. V okviru prispevkov v pričujoči knjigi lahko najdemo še podrobnejše izpeljave tovrstnih programskih trditev in predlogov.

Številne temeljne predpostavke KL/KAD, ki so ključno zaznamovale zgodnje faze in so bile pozneje v razvoju teorije izpopolnjene, so nazorno predstavljene v Kressovem delu. Med njimi so naslednje premise:

- jezik je družbeni fenomen;

- ne le posamezniki, ampak tudi institucije in družbena gibanja imajo specifične pomene in vrednote, ki so na sistematičen način izražene v jeziku;

- teksti so relevantne enote jezika v komunikaciji;

- bralci/poslušalci v odnosu do tekstov niso pasivni sprejemniki;

- obstajajo podobnosti med jezikom znanosti in jezikom institucij itn. (Kress, 1989).

Kress se osredinja na politično ekonomijo reprezentacijskih medijev: to pomeni, da skuša razumeti, kako raznolike družbe vrednotijo različne načine reprezentacije. Osrednji vidik njegovega dela predstavlja poskus razumevanja oblikovanja individuma kot družbenega posameznika v odgovoru na razpoložljive reprezentacijske vire.

Njegovo trenutno delovno mesto na pedagoškem inštitutu je pomenilo, da se je Kress precej intenzivno posvečal vsebini kurikulov v smislu reprezentacijskih virov in vprašanju, kako te vire rabijo posamezniki v nenehni transformaciji svoje subjektivnosti, v procesu, ki se običajno imenuje »učenje«. Eden od stranskih rezultatov tega raziskovalnega interesa je bilo Kressovo intenzivnejše sodelovanje v odprtih političnih vprašanjih, ki so vključevala tudi kulturno politiko.

Delo Fowlerja in sodelavcev (1979) smo omenili že pri orisu prvih temeljev KL. V svojih mlajših delih Fowler (1991, 1996) ponazarja, kako je mogoče orodja standardnih lingvističnih teorij (različica čomskijanske slovnice iz leta 1965 in Hallidayjeva teorija sistemske funkcionalne slovnice) uporabiti za razkrivanje lingvističnih struktur moči v tekstih. Avtor prikaže, da sistematične gramatične prvine pri ustvarjanju, manipuliranju in naturaliziranju družbenih hierarhij ne delujejo le v novičarskih diskurzih, temveč tudi v literarni kritiki.

Fairclough (1989) predstavlja socialne teorije, ki podpirajo KAD, in (kot že v drugih zgodnjih delih, ki obravnavajo kritično lingvistiko) analizira raznolike primere tekstov, s katerimi ponazarja področje KAD, njegove cilje in metode analize. Kasneje (1992, 1995), kakor tudi v Chouliaraki in Fairclough (1999), podaja razlago in podrobnejšo izpeljavo nekaterih dosežkov KAD in ne prikaže le, kako se je razvil analitični okvir za raziskovanje jezika v odnosu do moči in ideologije, temveč tudi, kako koristna je KAD pri razkrivanju diskurzivne narave velike večine sodobnih socialnih in kulturnih sprememb. Še posebej skrbno je obravnavan jezik množičnih medijev kot mesto moči, boja in tudi kot mesto, kjer je jezik navidezno transparenten. Medijske institucije pogosto trdijo, da so nevtralne v zagotavljanju prostora, ki je namenjen javnemu diskurzu, da nepristransko odražajo stanje stvari in da podajajo poglede ter argumente tistih, ki ustvarjajo novice. Fairclough pokaže na zmotnost takšnih predpostavk in s pomočjo primerov oriše posredniško in konstrukcijsko vlogo medijev.

Že van Dijkovo zgodnje delo s področja besediloslovja in analize diskurza (1977, 1981) kaže njegovo zanimanje za besedila in diskurze kot temeljne enote in družbene prakse. Kot drugi teoretiki kritične lingvistike išče izvore lingvističnega zanimanja v jezikovnih enotah, daljših, kot so stavki, in v pomenu, ki je odvisen od besedila in konteksta. Van Dijk in Kintsch (1983) sta izhajala iz pomembnosti diskurza za preučevanje jezikovnega procesiranja. Njun razvoj kognitivnega modela diskurzivnega razumevanja pri posameznikih se je postopoma razvil v kognitivne modele za razlago konstrukcije pomena na družbeni ravni. V delu *Handbook of Discourse Analysis* je van Dijk (1985) zbral delo različnih znanstvenikov, za katere predstavljata jezik in način njegovega delovanja v diskurzu primarni predmet raziskovanja ali orodje v preiskovanju drugih družbenih fenomenov. Gre za neke vrste dokumentacijo, ki predstavlja vrhunec kritične lingvistike v sredini 80. let prejšnjega stoletja in ki je nato vodila k nastanku novega priročnika. Pomembna so postala nova vprašanja, ki jih bom obravnavala v nadaljevanju.

Van Dijk se posebej obrača k medijskemu diskurzu, kjer ne podaja le lastnih misli o komunikaciji v množičnih medijih (van Dijk, 1986), temveč združuje teorije in aplikacije različnih znanstvenikov, ki jih zanimajo produkcija, raba in funkcije medijskih diskurzov (van Dijk, 1985). Ko kritično analizira različne vrste diskurzov, ki kodirajo predsodek, si van Dijk prizadeva razviti teoretski model, ki bi pojasnil kognitivne mehanizme procesiranja diskurzov (Wodak in van Dijk, 2000). Zadnje čase se van Dijk posveča predvsem vprašanjem rasizma in ideologije (van Dijk, 1998).

Od konca 80. let prejšnjega stoletja je lahko KL veliko bolj specifično in urejeno opisala svoje cilje, raziskovalne interese, izbrane perspektive in metode analize kot do tistega časa. Wodak (1989) našteva, pojasnjuje in ilustrira najpomembnejše značilnosti raziskav kritične lingvistike, kot so se uveljavile v kontinuiranem raziskovanju. Ponavlja se pomen raziskovanja jezikovne rabe v institucionalnih okvirjih, uveden je tudi nov poudarek o nujnosti historične perspektive. Temu je sledila množica raziskovalnih projektov o diskurzivnih praksah v institucionalnih kontekstih, ki so pomagali pri razvoju integrirane teorije kritične analize diskurza (glej prispevek R. Wodak v pričujoči knjigi).

Wodak (1996a, b) prikazuje, kako znanstveniki, ki so se ukvarjali z lingvistiko, semiotiko in analizo diskurza ter imajo različna znanstvena ozadja, delijo skupno perspektivo, kjer igrajo osrednjo vlogo koncepti moči, ideologije in zgodovine. V pregledu razvoja kritične tradicije v analizi diskurza se avtorica navezuje na Hallidayevo lingvistiko, Bernsteinovo sociolingvistiko, kakor tudi na dela literarnih kritikov in socialnih filozofov, kot so Pêcheux, Foucault, Habermas, Bakhtin in Voloshinov. Avtorica podpira stališče ostalih pripadnikov kritične lingvistike, ki verjamejo, da so razmerja med jezikom in družbo tako kompleksna in raznovrstna, da potrebujejo interdisciplinarno raziskovanje.

Znanstveniki se v okviru kritičnega pristopa morda raje posvečajo mikro- ali makrolingvističnim pojavom ali pa jih bolj zanimajo tekstualne, diskurzivne ali kontekstualne značilnosti, pri čemer je njihovo primarno gledišče bodisi filozofsko, sociološko ali zgodovinsko – toda večina študij se sklicuje na Hallidayevo sistemsko funkcionalno slovnico. To nam kaže, da sta razumevanje temeljnih ugotovitev Hallidayeve slovnice in njegov pristop k lingvistični analizi bistvena za ustrezno razumevanje KAD. Za prikaz Hallideyevega prispevka k razvoju KL je treba upoštevati Hallideyevo delo (1978, 1985) kakor tudi delo znanstvenikov, ki so intenzivno delali s Hallideyevo slovnico, a teorije niso le aplicirali, temveč so jo tudi izpopolnili. Bralce posebej opozarjam na dela, kot so Kress (1976), Martin in Hasan (1989), Martin (1992) in Iedema (1997, 1999). M. A. K. Halliday je že leta 1970 poudaril, da obstaja razmerje med gramatičnim sistemom in družbenimi ter osebnimi potrebami, ki jih mora jezik izpolnjevati (Halliday, 1970: 142). Halliday je ločeval med tremi funkcijami jezika, ki so medsebojno nenehno povezane: prvič, ideacijska funkcija, skozi katero jezik posoja strukturo izkušnji (ideacijska struktura je v dialektičnem razmerju z družbeno strukturo in jo tako odraža kot tudi nanjo vpliva); drugič, medosebna funkcija, ki določa razmerja med udeleženci; in tretjič, besedilna funkcija, ki določa kohezijo in koherenco v besedilih.

Še več: teorija argumentacije in retorika sta bili uspešno združeni s funkcionalno sistemsko lingvistiko (glej Reisigl in Wodak, 2001; Muntigl et al., 2000; van Leeuwen in Wodak, 1999).

Spoznanje o tem, da k pomenu teksta prispevajo vsi vidiki komunikacijskega konteksta, in naraščajoče splošno zavedanje v medijskih študijih, da so v tekstih pomembni tudi nebesedni vidiki, sta bolj kot k lingvističnim pozornost preusmerila k semiotičnim elementom v diskurzu. Pionirsko delo o interakciji med verbalnim in vizualnim v tekstih ter diskurzu, kakor tudi o pomenu podob je opravil Theo van Leeuwen. Na tem mestu je treba omeniti predvsem teorijo, ki sta jo uveljavila Kress in van Leeuwen (1996), saj predstavlja koristen okvir za obravnavo komunikacijskega potenciala vizualnih elementov v medijih (glej Anthonissen, 2001; R. Scollon, 2001). Žal v tole izdajo nismo mogli vključiti van Leeuwenovega prispevka in moramo opozoriti na njegovo najpomembnejšo »analizo akterjev« (van Leeuwen, 1996), ki predstavlja sistematičen način analize protagonistov in njihovih semantičnih vlog v diskurzih in različnih zvrsteh.

Van Leeuwen je preučeval filmsko in televizijsko produkcijo kakor tudi Hallidayevo lingvistiko. Njegove glavne objave obravnavajo teme, kot so intonacija didžejev in napovedovalcev novic, jezik televizijskih intervjujev in časopisnega poročanja ter v zadnjem času semiotika vizualne komunikacije in glasbe. Van Leeuwen ločuje dve vrsti odnosa med diskurzi in socialnimi praksami: »Diskurz sam po sebi (kot) socialna praksa, diskurz kot oblika delovanja, kot nekaj, kar ljudje počnejo drug drugemu, drug za drugega ali drug z drugim. In potem je tukaj še diskurz v Foucaultovem smislu, diskurz kot način reprezentacije socialnih(-e) praks(-e), kot oblika vednosti, kot stvari, ki jih ljudje izrečejo o socialni(-ih) praksi(-ah).« (1993a: 193.) »Kritična analiza diskurza,« po van Leeuwenu, »se ukvarja ali bi se morala ukvarjati z obema omenjenima vidikoma, tako z diskurzom kot orodjem moči in nadzora kakor tudi z diskurzom kot orodjem družbene konstrukcije realnosti.« (Prav tam.)

Na duisburško šolo so močno vplivale teorije Michela Foucaulta. Siegfried Jäger se ukvarja z lingvističnimi in ikoničnimi značilnostmi diskurza, pri čemer se osredinja zlasti na »kolektivne simbole« (topoi), ki imajo v besedilih pomembne kohezivne funkcije. Diskurz pojmuje kot tok besedila in govora skozi čas (Jäger, 1993: 6). Diskurzi imajo historične korenine in so prepleteni (*diskursives Gewimmel*). Jäger je razvil zelo ekspliciten raziskovalni program in metodologijo, ki omogoča analizo v številnih korakih. Glavni raziskovalni temi predstavljata diskurz desne stranke v Nemčiji in tudi analiza tabloidov (*Bildzeitung*). (Za daljši pregled *Lesarten* pristopa in duisburške šole glej tudi Titscher et al. 2000.)

Pojem "kritičnega", "ideologije" in "moči"

Tudi pojem »kritičnosti«, ki je vsebovan v programu KAD, razumejo znanstveniki na zelo različne načine: nekateri vztrajajo pri frankfurtski šoli, drugi izhajajo iz pojma literarne kritike, tretji iz Marxovih pojmov (za pregled glej zgoraj ter Reisigl in Wodak, 2001). V osnovi je treba pojem kritičen razumeti kot tak, ki ima do podatkov distanciran odnos, ki podatke vključuje v družbeno, ki eksplicitno zavzema politično stališče in ki se v postopku znanstvenega raziskovanja osredinja na refleksijo lastnega početja. Za vse, ki se ukvarjajo s KAD, je pomembna aplikacija rezultatov, bodisi v okviru praktičnih seminarjev za učitelje, zdravnike in javne uslužbence bodisi v okviru pisanja strokovnih mnenj ali zasnove šolskih knjig. To nas seveda vodi k Horkheimerjevemu stališču, ki sem ga v obliki uvodnega citata navedla na začetku tega prispevka.

Max Horkheimer, ki je bil leta 1930 direktor Inštituta za družbene raziskave v Frankfurtu, je videl vlogo teoretika v tem, da artikulira latentno razredno zavest in jo pomaga razvijati. Naloge kritične teorije so bile pomagati pri spominjanju preteklosti, ki ji je pretila nevarnost, da bo pozabljena, boriti se za emancipacijo, razjasniti razloge za tovrsten boj in opredeliti samo naravo kritičnega mišljenja. Razmerje med teorijo in prakso je bilo pojmovano kot dinamično: ne obstaja nespremenljiv sistem, ki utrjuje pot, po kateri bo teorija vodila človeška dejanja. Horkheimer je verjel, da ne obstaja ena sama raziskovalna metoda, s katero bi bilo mogoče ustvariti končne in zanesljive rezultate o katerem koli danem predmetu raziskovanja, in da z izbiro zgolj enega pristopa k danemu vprašanju tvegamo, da bomo dobili popačeno sliko. Predlagal je, da bi moralo več raziskovalnih metod dopolnjevati druga drugo. Čeprav je priznaval vrednost empiričnega dela, je poudarjal, da le-to ne more biti nadomestilo za teoretsko analizo.

Sklicevanje na prispevek kritične teorije k razumevanju KAD, kakor tudi pojma »kritičen« in ideologija so zelo pomembna izhodišča (za obsežno razpravo o tem vprašanju glej Anthonissen, 2001).[8] Thompson (1990) obravnava koncepta ideologije in kulture ter razmerja, ki se vzpostavljajo med obema konceptoma, kakor tudi določene vidike množične komunikacije. Poudarja, da se je koncept ideologije najprej pojavil v poznem osemnajstem stoletju v Franciji in se torej uporablja približno dve stoletji. V različnih obdobjih so izrazu pridajali različne funkcije in pomene. Za Thompsona se ideologija nanaša na družbene oblike in procese, v okviru in s pomočjo katerih simbolne oblike krožijo v družbenem svetu.

KAD pojmuje ideologijo kot pomemben vidik pri uvajanju in vzdrževanju odnosov neenake moči. KL posebej zanimajo načini, s katerimi jezik posreduje ideologijo v raznolikih družbenih institucijah.

Za Thompsona (1990) je preučevanje ideologije preučevanje »načinov, na katere je pomen konstruiran in sporočan skozi različne vrste simbolnih oblik«. Tak način preučevanja bo raziskal tudi družbene kontekste, v okviru katerih so simbolne oblike uporabljene in razvrščene. Preiskovalec želi ugotoviti, ali tovrstne oblike uvajajo ali vzdržujejo odnose nadvlade. Po Eagletonu (1994) mora preučevanje ideologije upoštevati množico teorij in teoretikov, ki so raziskovali razmerje med mislijo in družbeno realnostjo. Vse tovrstne teorije predpostavljajo, da »obstajajo določeni zgodovinski razlogi, zakaj ljudje čutijo, razmišljajo, si želijo in predstavljajo stvari na način, kot to počnejo« (1994: 15).[9]

Kritične teorije, torej tudi KL in KAD, imajo kot vodniki človekovega delovanja poseben položaj. Prizadevajo si za razsvetlitev in emancipacijo. Tovrstne teorije ne skušajo le opisati in pojasniti, temveč je njihov cilj tudi izkoreniniti prav posebno vrsto prevare. Kljub različnim konceptom ideologije skuša kritična teorija ustvariti zavedanje v delovalcih (*agents*), kako so zavedeni glede lastnih potreb in interesov. To je, seveda, obravnaval tudi Pierre Bourdieu v svojih konceptih »simbolnega nasilja« (*violence symbolique*) in »napačnega spoznanja« (*méconnaissance*). Eden od ciljev KAD je »demistificirati« diskurze s pomočjo dešifriranja ideologij.

Za KAD jezik sam po sebi nima moči – moč pridobi s tem, ko ga izkoristijo vplivni ljudje. To tudi pojasni, zakaj KL pogosto izbere perspektivo tistih, ki trpijo, in kritično analizira jezikovno rabo onih, ki imajo moč, ki so odgovorni za obstoj neenakosti in ki imajo obenem sredstva ter priložnost za izboljšanje pogojev.

Skladno s svojimi predhodniki KAD poudarja potrebo po interdisciplinarnem načinu dela, da bi bilo mogoče pridobiti ustrezno razumevanje, kako deluje jezik, denimo, pri določanju in prenašanju vednosti, organiziranju družbenih institucij ali pri uveljavljanju moči.

Pomemben vidik KAD je tudi predpostavka, da je besedilo zelo redko delo ene same osebe. V besedilih so diskurzivne razlike rezultat pogajanj; obvladujejo jih razlike v moči, ki so deloma tudi same vkodirane v diskurz in zvrst ter so s slednjima tudi določene. Zatorej so besedila pogosto prizorišče spopada v smislu prikazovanja sledi med seboj razlikujočih se diskurzov in ideologij, ki tekmujejo in se spopadajo za prevlado. Značilna lastnost KAD je njeno ukvarjanje z močjo kot osrednjim pogojem družbenega življenja in prizadevanja za razvoj teorije jezika, ki omenjeno izhodišče vključuje kot glavno

premiso. A ne le pojmov moči in spopada; v zvezi s tekmujočimi diskurzi KAD podrobno obravnava tudi intertekstualnost in rekontekstualizacijo.

Moč zaznamuje razmerja v razlikah in pri tem še zlasti učinke razlik v družbenih strukturah. Stalna enotnost jezika in ostalih družbenih stvari na številne načine zagotavlja prepletenost jezika z družbeno močjo: jezik moč indeksira, jo izraža in je vpleten v spor za prevlado ali izzivanje moči. Moč ne izvira iz jezika, toda jezik je mogoče uporabiti za izzivanje moči, za njeno spodkopavanje, za spremembo razporeditve moči v kratko- in dolgoročni časovni perspektivi. Jezik daje na razpolago natančno artikulirana sredstva za izražanje razlik v moči, ki obstaja v družbenih hierarhičnih strukturah. Obstaja zelo malo lingvističnih oblik, ki s pomočjo procesov sintaktične ali besedilne metafore na določeni stopnji niso bile potisnjene v službo izražanja moči. KAD zanimajo načini, kako so lingvistične oblike rabljene v različnih izrazih in manipulacijah moči. Slednje ne signalizirajo le gramatične oblike znotraj besedila, ampak tudi posameznikov nadzor nad družbeno situacijo s pomočjo sredstev besedilnih zvrsti. Pogosto se udejanjanje in izzivanje moči vršita natanko znotraj zvrsti, ki so povezane z danimi družbenimi situacijami.[10]

Kako je del raziskav KAD neposredno in posredno povezan z raziskavami, ki so izšle iz tradicije kritične teorije, postane še posebej očitno, če upoštevamo glavne koncepte, ki jih uporabljajo različna področja KAD, in družbene pojave, na katere se ta področja osredinjajo.

Takšni primeri ustrezajo njihovim pristopom k vprašanjem, kot so:

- kaj določa vedenje;
- kako so diskurzi konstruirani in kako sami konstruirajo družbene situacije;
- kako funkcionira ideologija v družbenih institucijah in
- kako znotraj dane skupnosti ljudje pridobivajo in obdržijo moč.

Prispevki v pričujoči knjigi, še zlasti analiza izbranih besedil, prinašajo nekaj odgovorov na ta vprašanja.

Odprta vprašanja in perspektive

Skozi leta se je v obliki pomembnih raziskovalnih načrtov pojavila vrsta vprašanj, ki še niso bila zadovoljivo obravnavana. Omenili bi radi nekaj ti-

stih, ki so ključna tudi za prispevke v tej knjigi in o katerih v samostojnem poglavju razpravlja Michael Meyer.

1. Operacionalizacija teorij in povezovanje lingvistične dimenzije z družbenimi dimenzijami (problem posredovanja).

2. Nujnost aplikacije lingvistične teorije: pogosto se pri analizi besedil uporablja cela mešanica lingvističnih indikatorjev in spremenljivk, ki v ozadju niso podprti s teoretskimi pojmi in slovnično teorijo.

3. Pojem »konteksta«, ki je pogosto opredeljen bodisi zelo široko ali zelo ozko: koliko informacij potrebujemo za analizo besedil, kolikšen vpliv imajo teorije?

4. Obtožba o pristranskosti: kako so določena branja besedila opravičena in ovrednotena?

5. Inter- in transdisciplinarnost še nista postali integralna dela tekstovne analize.

Ta seznam bi bilo seveda mogoče podaljšati. Pristopi, ki so predstavljeni v tej knjigi, bodo pomagali razjasniti nekatere probleme, ki jih je še treba rešiti, in podali nekaj odgovorov na številna vprašanja, ki so se porodila med analizo diskurza.

Opombe

[1] Naslov izvirnika: »What CDA is about – a summary of its history, important concepts and its developments.« V: Ruth Wodak in Michael Meyer (ur.), *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, str. 1–13. London: Sage, 2001. Prevedla Janja Žmavc. Prevod je objavljen z dovoljenjem Sage Publications Ltd. London.

[2] Tale kratek pregled temelji na dolgotrajnih in obsežnih razpravah, ki sem jih imela s svojimi prijatelji, sodelavci in soraziskovalci kot tudi s študenti. Med njimi želim omeniti in se zahvaliti Rudiju De Cilliu, Martinu Reisiglu, Gertraud Benke, Gilbertu Weissu, Berndu Matouscheku in Richardu Mittenu, s katerimi sem sodelovala v vseh teh letih. Še več, precej idej se je razvilo skozi delo z mojimi študenti. Rada bi se zahvalila Usami Suleimanu, Alexandru Pollaku in Christine Anthonissen za njihov poglobljen vpogled in izpopolnitve kakor tudi za bistroumne pripombe in kritične opazke. Nazadnje bi se rada zahvalila še svoji skupini somišljenikov, o katerih sem pisala, in številnim drugim kolegom, ki jih tukaj nisem mogla omeniti.

[3] V izvirnem prispevku pogosto srečamo akronima CDA in CL, ki se na področju analize diskurza uporabljata za oznako pojmov *critical discourse analysis* in *critical linguistics*. Akronima smo poslovenili v KAD ter KL

in ustrezata slovenskemu prevodu izrazov *kritična analiza diskurza* in *kritična lingvistika* (op. prev.).

[4] Izraza KL in KAD sta nastala neodvisno drug od drugega in nekateri praktiki bodo lahko tako za KL kot za KAD našli skrite točke, v katerih se razlikujeta. V večini primerov lahko za tiste praktike, katerih delo bi bilo mogoče opisati ali z eno ali drugo kategorijo, rečemo, da zasedajo isti »paradigmatični« prostor. Tudi v tem prispevku bomo oba izraza kakor tudi njune izpeljanke, kot so »pripadniki kritične lingvistike« (*critical linguists*) ali »pripadniki kritične analize diskurza« (*critical discourse analysts*), uporabljali izmenoma.

[5] Literature o KL in KAD je ogromno, zato lahko navedem zgolj kratek in s tem tudi zelo poenostavljen povzetek (za obširnejše in natančnejše preglede glej Fairclough in Wodak, 1997; Reisigl in Wodak, 2001; Anthonissen, 2001, ter Blommaert in Bulcaen, 2000).

[6] V habermasovskem smislu bi lahko postulirali, da vsako govorno situacijo »popačijo« strukture moči, še posebej v primerjavi z njegovo utopijo o »idealni govorni situaciji«, kjer se lahko uresniči racionalni diskurz (Habermas, 1969, 1971; Wodak, 1996a, b).

[7] V mreži Erasmus so sodelovali Siegfried Jäger (Duisburg), Per Linell (Linköping), Norman Fairclough (Lancaster), Teun van Dijk (Amsterdam), Gunther Kress (London), Theo van Leeuwen (London) in Ruth Wodak (Dunaj).

[8] V 60. letih prejšnjega stoletja je veliko znanstvenikov v raziskavah jezika privzelo bolj kritično perspektivo. Med prvimi je bil francoski znanstvenik Pêcheux (1982 (1975)), čigar pristop temelji na delih ruskih teoretikov Bakhtina (1981) in Volosinova (1973), ki sta kot izhodišče postavljala integracijo jezika in družbenih procesov. Sam izraz naj bi zasnoval Jacob Mey (1974).

[9] Po frankfurtski šoli obstajajo med znanstvenimi in kritičnimi teorijami razlike v treh dimenzijah (za razpravo glej Anthonissen, 2001). Prvič: razlikujejo se po svojem namenu ali cilju in zato tudi po možnosti načina uporabe. Namen znanstvenih teorij je uspešna manipulacija zunanjega sveta: njihova raba je »instrumentalna«. Namen kritičnih teorij je osveščanje »delovalcev« (*agents*) o prikriti prisili (*coercion*), s čimer jih te prisile osvobajajo in postavljajo v položaj, ko lahko ugotovijo, kje so njihovi resnični interesi. Drugič: kritične in znanstvene teorije se med seboj razlikujejo v njihovi »kognitivni« strukturi. Znanstvene teorije so »objektivizirajoče« v tem, da je z njimi mogoče ločevati med teorijo in predmeti, na katere se le-ta nanaša. Teorija ni sestavni del predmetnega področja, ki ga opisuje. Na drugi strani je kritična teorija »reflektirajoča« v tem, da je vedno tudi sama del predmetnega področja, ki ga opisuje. Tovrstne teorije govorijo deloma tudi o sebi. Tretjič: kritične in znanstvene teorije se razlikujejo po vrsti dokazov, ki določajo, ali so sprejemljive ali ne. Obe vrsti teorij tako zahtevata drugačne oblike dokazovanja.

[10] Nedavna vznemirljiva raziskava Christine Anthonissen o načinih preslepitve cenzure v Južni Afriki v obdobju apartheida podaja množico različnih lingvističnih in semiotičnih strategij moči ter odpora (za obsežno razpravo o konceptu moči glej Anthonissen, 2001).

Literatura

Anthonissen, C. (2001). *On the effectiveness of media censorship: linguistic, paralinguistic and other communicative devices of media regulation*. PhD thesis. University of Vienna.

Bakhtin, M. (1981). *The Dialogic Imagination.* Austin: University of Texas Press.

Benke, G. (2000). Diskursanalyse als sozialwissenschaftliche Untersuchungsmethode. *SWS Rundschau*, 2, 140–62.

Billig, M. in Schegloff, E. A. (1999). Debate: critical discourse analysis and conversation analysis. *Discourse and Society*, 10, 4, 543–82.

Blommaert, J. in Bulcaen, H. (2000). Critical discourse analysis. An overview. *Annual Anthropological Review* (forthcoming).

Blommaert, J. in Verschueren, J. (1999). *The Diversity Debate*. London: Routledge.

Chomsky, N. (1957). *Syntactic Structures*. s-Gravenhage: Mouton.

Chouliaraki, L. in Fairclough, N. (1999). *Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Connerton, P. (1976). *Critical Sociology. Selected Readings*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

de Beaugrande, R. A. in Dressler, W. U. (1981). *Einführung in die Textlinguistik*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Eagleton, T. (ur.) (1994). *Ideology*. London: Longman.

Fairclough, N. (1985). Critical and descriptive goals in discourse analysis. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 9, 739–63.

Fairclough, N. (1989). *Language and Power*. London: Longman.

Fairclough, N. (1992). *Discourse and Social Change*. Oxford, UK and Cambridge, MA: Polity Press and Blackwell.

Fairclough, N. (1995). *Critical Discourse Analysis: the Critical Study of Language*. London: Longman.

Fairclough, N. in Kress, G. (1993). *Critical discourse analysis*. Unpublished manuscript.

Fairclough, N. in Wodak, R. (1997). Critical discourse analysis. V: Teun van Dijk (ur.), *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction*. Volume 2, str. 258–84. London: Sage.

Fay, B. (1987). *Critical Social Science*. London: Polity Press.

Fowler, R. (1991). Critical linguists. V: Kirst Halmkjaer (ur.), *The Linguistic Encyclopedia*, str. 89–93. London, New York: Routledge.

Fowler, R. (1996). *Linguistic Criticism*, second edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fowler, R., Hodge, G., Kress, G. in Trew, T. (ur.) (1979). *Language and Control*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Habermas, J. (1969). *Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Habermas, J. (1971). *Theorie und Praxis*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Habermas, J. (1977). *Erkenntnis und Interesse*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Halliday, M. A. K. (1970). *The Linguistic Sciences and Language Teaching*. London: Longman.

Halliday, M. A. K. (1978). *Language as Social Semiotic*. London: Arnold.

Halliday, M. A. K. (1985) (1994). *Introduction to Functional Grammar*, first and second edns. London: Arnold.

Hymes, D. (1972). Models of interaction of language and social life. V: John J. Gumperz in Dell Hymes (ur.), *Directions in Sociolinguistics – The Ethnography of Communication*, str. 35–71. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Iedema, R. (1997). *Interactional dynamics and social change; planning as morphogenesis*. Unpublished PhD thesis. University of Sydney.

Iedema, R. (1999). Formalizing organizational meaning. *Discourse and Society*, 10, 1, 49–66.

Jäger, S. (1993). *Kritische Diskursanalyse. Eine Einführung*. Duisberg: DISS.

Kress, G. (ur.) (1976). *Halliday: System and Function in Language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kress, G. (1989). History and language: towards a social account of linguistic change. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 13, 3, 445–66.

Kress, G. (1990). Critical discourse analysis. *Annual Review of Applied Linguistics*, 11, 84–97.

Kress, G. (1993). Against arbitrariness: the social production of the sign as a foundational issue in critical discourse analysis. *Discourse and Society*, 4, 2, 169–91.

Kress, G. in Hodge, B. (1979). *Language as Ideology*. London: Routledge.

Kress, G. in van Leeuwen, T. (1996). *Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design*. London: Routledge.

Krings, H. et al. (1973). *Handbuch philosophischer Grundbegriffe*. Munich: Kösel.

Labov, W. (1972). *Language in the Inner City*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Levinson, S. (1983). *Pragmatics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Martin, J. (1992). *English Text: System and Structure*. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

Martin, J. in Hasan, R. (ur.) (1989). *Language Development: Learning Language, Learning Culture*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Martín Rojo, L. in van Dijk, T. A. (1997). „There was a problem, and it was solved!« Legitimating the Expulsion of »Illegal« Immigrants in Spanish Parliamentary Discourse. *Discourse and Society*, 8, 4, 523–67.

Martín Rojo, L. in Whittaker, R. (ur.) (1998). *Poder-decir o el poder de los discursos*. Madrid: Arrecife.

Mey, J. (1985). *Whose Language?* Amsterdam: Benjamins.

Muntigl, P., Weiss, G. in Wodak, R. (ur.) (2000). *European Union Discourses on Un/employment. An interdisciplinary approach to employment policy-making and organizational change*. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

O'Neill, J. (1979). *Kritik und Erinnerung. Studien zur politischen und sinnlichen Emanzipation*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Pêcheux, M. (1982). *Language, Semantics and Ideology*. London: Macmillan.

Pedro, E. R. (ur.) (1997). *Discourse Analysis*. Lisbon: Macmillan.

Reisigl, M. in Wodak, R. (2001). *Discourse and Discrimination. Rhetorics of Racism and Antisemitism*. London, New York: Routledge.

Scollon, R. (2001). *Mediated Discourse. The Nexus of Practice*. London: Routledge.

Scollon, R. in Scollon, S. B. K. (1979). *Linguistic Convergence: An Ethnography of Speaking at Fort Chipewyan, Alberta*. New York: Academic Press.

Thompson, J. B. (1988). *Critical Hermeneutics*, fourth edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thompson, J. B. (1990). *Ideology and Modern Culture*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Titscher, S., Meyer, M., Wodak, R. in Vetter, E. (2000). *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis*. London: Sage.

van Dijk, T. A. (1977). *Text and Context: Exploration in the Semantics and Pragmatics of Discourse*. London: Longman.

van Dijk, T. A. (1981). *Studies in the Pragmatics of Discourse*. The Hague/Berlin: Mouton.

van Dijk, T. A. (1984). *Prejudice in Discourse: An Analysis of Ethnic Prejudice in Cognition and Conversation*. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

van Dijk, T. A. (ur.) (1985). *Handbook of Discourse Analysis* (4 vols). New York: Academic Press.

van Dijk, T. A. (1986). *Racism in the Press*. London: Arnold.

van Dijk, T. A. (1993). *Elite Discourse and Racism*. Newbury Park: Sage.

van Dijk, T. A. (1998). Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach. London: Sage Publications.

van Dijk, T. A. in Kintsch, W. (1983). *Strategies of Discourse Comprehension*. New York: Academic Press.

van Leeuwen, T. (1993a). Genre and field in critical discourse analysis. *Discourse and Society*, 4, 2, 193–223.

van Leeuwen, T. (1996). The representation of social actors. V: Carmen Rosa Caldas-Coulthard in Malcolm Coulthard (ur.), *Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*, str. 32–70. London: Routledge.

van Leeuwen, T. in Wodak, R. (1999). Legitimizing immigration control. A discourse–historical analysis. *Discourse Studies*, 1, 1, 83–118.

Volosinov, V.I. (1973 (1928)). *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*. New York: Seminar Press.

Wodak, R. (1989). Introduction. V: Ruth Wodak (ur.), *Language, Power and Ideology*, str. i–ix. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

Wodak, R. (1996a). *Disorders of Discourse*. London and New York: Longman.

Wodak, R. (1996b). Critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis. V: Jef Verschueren (ur.), *Handbook of Pragmatics*, str. 207–210. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

Wodak, R. (2000). Does sociolinguistics need social theory? New perspectives on critical discourse analysis. Keynote speech at SS 2000, Bristol, April 2000 (shortened and published in *Discourse & Society*, 2, 3, 123–147).

Wodak, R., de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M. in Liebhart, K. (1999). *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Wodak, R. in van Dijk, T. A. (ur.) (2000). *Racism at the Top. Parliamentary Discourses on Ethnic Issues in Six European States*. Klagenfurt: Drava.

DISKURZ: FOUCAULT, LACLAU TER ZAPOPADANJE DIHOTOMIJE MED DISKURZIVNIM IN ZUNAJDISKURZIVNIM

Andreja Vezovnik

Uvod

V dvajsetem stoletju smo bili v družboslovju in humanistiki nedvomno priča ponovnemu zanimanju za jezik. Rorty (1992) temu pravi »jezikovni obrat« in meni, da pojav vključuje širok nabor vplivov klasičnih jezikovnih analiz, kakršne so Wittgensteinova in Austinova, kot tudi prispevke avtorjev iz fenomenološke tradicije, npr. Husserla in Heideggra. Od šestdesetih dalje pa o pojavu navadno govorimo tudi kot o diskurzivnem obratu, saj je pojem »jezik« od izida Foucaultove *Arheologije vednosti* bolj ali manj zamenjal pojem »diskurz« kot širša pomenska razsežnost jezika. Sodobne teorije in analize diskurza zajemajo vrsto interdisciplinarnih pristopov, ki jim je bolj ali manj skupna preliminarna definicija diskurza: »/D/iskurz je specifičen način sporočanja o svetu ali razumevanja sveta oz. enega izmed njegovih vidikov« (Jørgensen in Phillips, 2002, 1). Diskurz pa, ožje gledano, pomeni tudi »rabo jezika v odnosu do družbenih, političnih in kulturnih oblik – diskurz je jezik, ki odraža družbeni red, ter hkrati jezik, ki oblikuje družbeni red in posameznikovo interakcijo z okoljem« (Jaworski in Coupland, 1999, 3).

Znotraj raznolikih teoretskih tradicij, ki so vplivale na razvoj diskurzivnih teorij, v grobem razlikujemo dve usmeritvi. Prva izhaja iz francoske teoretske tradicije in so jo prevzeli predvsem avtorji, ki se posvečajo kategorijam identitete, subjekta, družbenih sprememb in oblasti. Nekateri se v zvezi z razumevanjem identitete in subjektivnosti navezujejo tudi na psihoanalitične pojme. Druga skupina pristopov pa izhaja pretežno iz analitične filozofije in se osredotoča na performativne značilnosti jezika. Posveča se torej načinom, kako se konstituirajo mnenja, njihovi učinki na govorca in/ali pisca ter na vprašanje, katere retorične tehnike uporabljajo posamezniki v komuniciranju. Ta usmeritev se uporablja predvsem v etnometodologiji, v teoriji govornih dejanj ter v analizi konverzacije. Fairclough (1992,

12–25) jih za razliko od prve kritične usmeritve umešča med nekritične. Čeprav sta usmeritvi različni, ju vendar ne gre pojmovati kot nasprotujoči si in nezdružljivi; delitev je v dokajšnji meri zgolj analitična.

V pričujočem prispevku nas bodo zanimali predvsem pristopi, ki v veliki meri sledijo prvi usmeritvi, torej francoski teoretski tradiciji. V nadaljevanju bomo tako orisali področje teorij diskurza, pri čemer bomo za osnovni kriterij razlikovanja med teorijami in analizami diskurza uporabili njihovo razumevanje dihotomije med diskurzivnim in zunajdiskurzivnim. Zanimal nas bo predvsem pristop, ki ohranja razlikovanje med diskurzivnimi in zunajdiskurzivnimi elementi, pri čemer ima zunajdiskurzivno primat nad diskurzivnim, in pristop, ki omenjeno dihotomijo ukinja ter se zavzema za bolj transcendentalno pojmovanje diskurza. V slednjem primeru neskončno diskurzivno polje določa diskurzivnost vseh objektov v njem, hkrati pa vsakemu danemu konkretnemu diskurzu onemogoča končno prešitje, kar pomeni, da mu onemogoča dokončno fiksacijo pomena v danem diskurzivnem polju (gl. Laclau 2007). Za poudarjanje te delitve je primarno razumevanje ontološke in ontične[1] razsežnosti diskurza. Gre za delitev med diskurzivnim poljem kot ontološkim pojmovanjem, ki ga najdemo v drugem pristopu (predvsem pri Laclauovi esseški šoli), in ontičnim, torej »konkretnimi diskurzi«, s katerimi se skušajo na različne načine ukvarjati predvsem pristopi, ki pri razumevanju diskurza hkrati izhajajo iz Foucaulta in iz Laclaua, pri tem pa sklicevanje na obe teoriji diskurza privede do protislovij. To je predvsem očitno pri šoli, imenovani kritična analiza diskurza (gl. Fairclough 1992, Chouliaraki in Fairclough 1999, Fairclough 2003).[2] Vprašanje je pomembno, ker na področju teorij in analiz diskurza do neke mere še vedno ni povsem jasna razlika med jezikovnim in zunajjezikovnim ter med diskurzivnim in zunajdiskurzivnim, iz česar izhajajo številne nejasnosti pri opredelitvi diskurza, tako na ravni ontološkega kot tudi na ravni ontičnega ali empiričnega. To bo našo razpravo vodilo predvsem k dvema vprašanjema.

Najprej nas bo zanimalo vprašanje odnosa med diskurzivnim in zunajdiskurzivnim, za katerega bi lahko dejali, da ustreza lacanovski delitvi med realnostjo in realnim. Realnost namreč ustreza diskurzivno konstruiranim identitetam objektov, realno pa ostaja tisto, česar ne moremo artikulirati v diskurzu. Lahko bi tudi dejali, da diskurzivnemu polju ustreza lacanovsko simbolno. Ker se naša razprava ukvarja z diskurzi, ki obravnavajo simbolno oz. diskurzivno polje, nas to vodi k drugemu vprašanju. In sicer: na kakšen način lahko analitično ugotavljamo, kako se diskurzi spreminjajo in fiksirajo, ter kako določiti meje konkretnih diskurzov, torej tistih, ki v diskurzivnem polju predstavljajo ontično raven, če predposta-

vljamo, da je struktura vedno necela in nezmožna dokončne totalizacije. Zato bomo razpravo umestili na razpotje med arheologijo Foucaulta, pri katerem bomo obravnavali njegov sistem razpršitve izjav v diskurzivni formaciji kot (nez)možnosti razmejitve diskurzov in njihove totalizacije v dani strukturi, in Laclaua, pri katerem bomo izpostavili pojem praznega označevalca kot elementa totalizacije diskurzivnega polja. Da bi lahko opredelili razliko med obema pristopoma, moramo najprej pokazati, kako Foucault in Laclau, vsak na svoj specifičen način, razumeta diskurz.

Foucaultova dihotomija diskurzivno vs. zunajdiskurzivno

Medtem ko sta strukturalizem in poststrukturalizem, ki pripeljeta do laclauovskega vseobsegajočega pojmovanja diskurza, izhajala iz logike znaka in njegovega prevrata od trenutka dalje, ko niso izpolnjeni pogoji popolnega zaprtja strukture, je Foucaultovo izhodišče drugostopenjska fenomenologija, ki skuša izolirati totalnosti, v katerih poteka produkcija vsakršnega pomena. Klasična fenomenologija se je osredotočala na pomene trditev, tako da je v oklepaj postavila svojo referenco na katerokoli zunanjo realnost. Foucault nadaljuje tako, da pokaže, da pomen sam po sebi predpostavlja pogoje produkcije, ki jih ne moremo reducirati le na njihov pomen. Ta skoraj transcendentalni korak pelje k izolaciji segmenta fenomenov, ki jim Foucault pravi diskurz. Osnovni cilj njegove arheološke analize je ugotoviti, kaj konstituira enotnost in načela koherence neke diskurzivne formacije (Laclau, 1993, 434).

Pri tem je za foucaultovske pristope značilno, da diskurz pojmujejo tako, da ločijo med diskurzivnim in zunajdiskurzivnim. Pri Foucaultu samem pa je pojmovanje diskurzivnega in zunajdiskurzivnega dokaj nedorečeno in vezano predvsem na obdobje njegovega pisanja. Predvsem v arheološkem obdobju diskurze definira kot avtonomne sisteme pravil, ki oblikujejo objekte, pojme, subjekte in strategije tako, da upravljajo s produkcijo znanstvenih trditev. Diskurzi se analitično razlikujejo od praks, institucij in tehnik. V tem smislu se diskurzi nanašajo na zunajdiskurzivne prakse in procese, kot so ekonomske in politične spremembe (Howarth, 2000, 48–9). Zato v arheološkem obdobju opisuje predvsem pravila formacije, ki strukturirajo diskurz. Pri njem zunajdiskurzivni dejavniki vzdržujejo in obdajajo diskurzivne. Ko Foucault razlaga, kaj naj bi bila naloga njegove »arheološke metode«, zapiše, da »/a/rheologija prikaže tudi razmerja med diskurzivnimi formacijami in nediskurzivnimi področji (institucijami, političnimi dogodki, ekonomskimi praksami in procesi)« (Foucault, 2001, 174). Posledično gre razumeti, da zunajdiskurzivni dejavniki vplivajo na oblikovanje diskurzov. Po nekaterih interpretacijah mu prav ta od-

nos pravzaprav omogoča izhod iz strukturalizma in hkrati nagibanje k materializmu, saj je sama ideja institucije kot nediskurzivne vzporedna z Althusserjevo idejo ideoloških aparatov države (Dosse, 1997, 243, 244).

Poleg delitve na diskurzivno in zunajdiskurzivno, ki je pri Foucaultu do neke mere prisotna tudi v genealoškem obdobju,[3] je zanj bistvena tudi nejezikovnost diskurza in izjave kot osnovne enote diskurzivne formacije. V enem izmed intervjujev, objavljenem takoj po izdaji prvega dela *Zgodovine seksualnosti*, npr. pravi:

> M. F.: Kar v splošnem imenujemo "institucija", je vsako bolj ali manj obvezujoče, naučeno ravnanje. Vse, kar v družbi funkcionira kot sistem prisile in ni izjava, skratka vse, kar je v družbi nediskurzivno, je institucija.

> J.-A. M.: Toda institucija je očitno nekaj diskurzivnega.

> M. F.: Morda res, toda za moj projekt dispozitiva ni tako pomembno, da rečemo: to je diskurzivno, to ni. Kaj je med Gabrielovim arhitekturnim načrtom Vojaške šole in njeno gradnjo diskurzivno, kaj pa institucionalno? To bi me zanimalo le tedaj, če zgradba ne bi ustrezala načrtu. Po mojem mnenju takšno prebiranje ni zelo bistveno, še posebej, ker moj problem ni lingvističen. (Foucault, 1991a, 80.)

In res je, Foucault se jezikoslovju na široko izogne. Njegova izjava ni imela nikakršne empirične vsebine, kakršno je mogoče najti v austinovski tradiciji. Njegov pristop se umešča na robove diskurza, tako da se osredotoča na njegove možnosti in učinke, ne pa na njegovo vsebino ali pomen, hkrati pa tudi ne na konkretne propozicije, na katere se osredotoča teorija govornih dejanj. Ker se je Foucault osredotočal zgolj na sistem izjav v diskurzivni formaciji, je zavračal jezikoslovne metode opisovanja jezika. Lahko bi rekli, da je njegovo raziskovanje diskurza filozofsko in ne jezikoslovno. Smer raziskovanja, ki jo začrta v svojem arheološkem obdobju, predstavlja tretjo alternativo tehnikam jezikovne formalizacije – semiotike in filozofske interpretacije oz. hermenevtike; arheologija je umeščena med strukturalizem, ki ji sicer služi kot teoretski okvir, in historični materializem. Zato je diskurz kot osnovna ideja *Arheologije vednosti* pozicioniran med strukturo in dogodkom (Dosse, 1997, 241).

Vendar skušajmo to dilemo nasloviti v okvirih Foucaultovega arheološkega obdobja in bolj sistematično uvedimo nekatere že omenjene temeljne pojme, ki se pri njem vežejo na pojem diskurza. Širše od diskurza Foucault uvaja pojem *diskurzivne prakse*. Gre za celoto anonimnih zgodovinskih stavkov, ki so bili določeni ter so vezani na specifičen čas in prostor. V neki epohi in za dano družbenoekonomsko, geografsko in jezikovno okolje so definirali pogoje izjavljanja oz. izjavljalne funkcije (Foucault, 2001, 128). *Diskurz* je za Foucaulta (2001, 128) celota »izjav, kolikor te izhajajo iz iste diskurzivne for-

macije; diskurz ne formira retorične ali formalne enotnosti, ki je neskončno ponovljiva in katere pojavitev ali rabo bi lahko naznačili v zgodovini; diskurz je konstituiran iz omejenega števila izjav, za katere lahko definiramo celoto pogojev eksistence«. Diskurz torej ne more biti ena sama izjava, temveč gre za verigo ali skupek izjav, ki se v neki dani okoliščini pojavijo o določeni temi oz. v zvezi z določenim dogodkom. Hkrati pa diskurz tudi ni kontinuiteta, ki bi nespremenljivo obstajala v danem časovnem obdobju. Foucault (1991a, 17) je v enem izmed svojih predavanj poudaril, da je treba diskurzu vrniti njegov značaj dogodka. Diskurz je vezan na *dogodek*, torej na njegovo enkratnost in neponovljivost v določenem časovnem ter družbenem kontekstu.

> Biti moramo pripravljeni, da vsak moment diskurza sprejmemo v eruprivnosti dogodka; v tej punktualnosti, v kateri nastopa, in v tej časovni razpršitvi, ki diskurzu omogoča, da je ponovljen, priučen, pozabljen, transformiran, zabrisan tja do svojih najmanjših sledi in daleč stran od vsakega pogleda zakopan v pepel knjig. Diskurza ni treba zvajati na oddaljeno prisotnost izvora; treba ga je obravnavati v igri njegove instance. (Foucault, 2001, 28.)

Pri diskurzu je nesmiselno iskati njegov prvotni ali »esencialistični« pomen, saj gre za dinamično tvorbo, ki proizvaja določene učinke, ki jih je treba podvreči analizi.

Foucaultovo tematizacijo diskurza gre torej razumeti v zgodovinskem kontekstu. Kajti v nekem poznejšem zgodovinskem obdobju se bo pojavil drugačen diskurz oz. *epistema*,[4] ki bo izpodrinil prejšnjega, odprl novo diskurzivno formacijo in proizvedel nova pojmovanja oblasti ter »resnice«, s katerimi se bodo družbene prakse uravnavale na nove načine. Že v *Redu stvari* (1970/1999) je Foucault opredelil tri episteme, ki združujejo diskurzivne prakse Zahoda in ki naj bi unificirale intelektualno produkcijo v treh obdobjih (renesansi, klasicizmu in moderni). Epistema je zanj celota odnosov, ki v določeni dobi združujejo diskurzivne prakse, ki omogočajo epistemološke figure, znanosti in morda tudi formalizirane sisteme (Foucault, 2001, 206). Intelektualna operacija razkrivanja teh osnovnih diskurzivnih strategij je arheologija. Kasneje bo poudaril tudi, da epistema ni temeljna teorija, temveč prostor razpršitve. Je odprto polje odnosov, ki se jih da opisati (Foucault, 1991b, 55). Skladno s to logiko že v *Arheologiji vednosti* počasi opusti pojem episteme, ki je prelome organizirala predvsem v *Redu stvari*, saj se želi znebiti predvsem njene strukturalistične implikacije in posledično v ospredje raje postavi diskurzivno prakso.

Kot smo že nakazali, je, ožje gledano, osnovna raven diskurza *izjava*. Foucaulta (2001, 31) zanima predvsem dojemanje izjave v kontekstu posameznosti njenega dogodka in njenega odnosa glede na ostale izjave. Za-

nima ga tudi, katere druge forme izjavljanja posamezna izjava izključuje. »Opis dogodkov diskurza postavlja /.../ vprašanje, kako pride do tega, da se pojavi takšna izjava in da se na njenem mestu ne pojavi nobena druga?« (Foucault, 2001, 31.) Tako kot na diskurz je tudi na izjavo treba gledati kot na dogodek in jo obravnavati v skladu z njenim zgodovinskim trenutkom. Izjava je kot dogodek edinstvena. Vselej pa odprta za ponavljanje, transformiranje, reaktiviranje (Foucault, 2001, 32). Razlikovati jo je treba od *propozicije*, kot jo razume moderna analitična filozofija, kot tudi od izjave v smislu *govornih dejanj* in *stavka*, kot ju definira filozofija jezika (gl. Deleuze, 2000, 7). Foucault se oddalji od trditve, da je izjava izključno jezikovna enota. Izjava je zanj relacijska entiteta, ki se mora nanašati na sosednja polja ali druge izjave. Nobena izjava ni nerelacijska, vedno je v implicitnem ali eksplicitnem odnosu do neke druge izjave, pri čemer jo tudi reaktualizira. Foucault se osredotoča na tista jezikovna dejanja, ki so lahko vzvod za reproduciranje oblastnih razmerij.[5] Izjava zato ne »visi v zraku«, temveč pripada diskurzivni formaciji, ki definira tudi njeno regularnost (Foucault, 2001, 127).[6]

Diskurzivne formacije so tiste, ki po Foucaultu opisujejo odnose med izjavami. Za poskus opisa odnosov med izjavami Foucault (2001) zavrača štiri hipoteze o načelu poenotenja diskurzivne formacije: referenco na isti objekt, skupen način produkcije izjav, stalnost pojmov in referenco na skupno temo (gl. Foucault, 1991a, 36–42). Za Foucaulta je razpršitev načelo enotnosti, če v njej vladajo pravila formacije oz. kompleksni eksistenčni pogoji razpršenih izjav. Za določanje razpršitve je treba določiti referenčno točko, glede na katero lahko elemente mislimo kot razpršene. Pri Foucaultu lahko govorimo o razpršitvi edino glede na tip odsotne enotnosti, konstruirane okrog skupnega objekta, stila, konceptov in teme (Laclau in Mouffe, 1987, 89).

Posledica prikazanega razmisleka je, da bi morala arheološka analiza pravzaprav opisovati sisteme razpršitve. Da bi zaznali spremembo dane diskurzivne formacije, Foucault (1991b, 56–7) meni, da moramo prepoznati spremembe, ki vplivajo na objekt diskurzivne formacije, na njene operacije, pojme in teoretske možnosti. Prepoznati moramo tudi spremembe, ki zadevajo diskurzivne formacije, torej premik meja, ki definirajo polje objektov; novo pozicijo in vlogo, ki jo zaseda govoreči subjekt v diskurzu; nov način delovanja jezika v odnosu do objektov ter nov način lokalizacije in kroženja diskurza v družbi. Nenazadnje moramo biti pozorni na spremembe, ki hkratno vplivajo na diskurzivne formacije. Opredelitev *diskurzivne formacije*[7] se torej glasi:

/V/ primeru, ko bi lahko med določenim številom izjav opisali podoben sistem disperzije, v primeru, ko bi med objekti, tipi izjavljanja, pojmi in tematskimi izbirami

definirali regularnost (red, korelacije, pozicije in funkcioniranja, transformacije), bomo konvencionalno rekli, da imamo opravka z diskurzivno formacijo – na ta način se bomo izognili besedam, ki so preveč obremenjene s pogoji in konsekvencami ter so tudi sicer neustrezne za označitev neke sorodne disperzije, besedam, kot so "znanost", "ideologija", "teorija" ali "področje objektivnosti.". (Foucault, 2001, 42.)

Vidimo torej, da je tam, kjer je Foucault iskal načela združevanja, pravzaprav našel le razpršitev in prav to je postavil kot središče definicije diskurzivne formacije. Čeprav pa razpršitve ne razume zgolj kot nasprotja unifikacije, temveč nanjo gleda, paradoksalno, kot na *sistem razpršitve* s ciljem, da bi se izognil totalizaciji diskurzivne formacije, saj v *Arheologiji vednosti* prevladuje prav predpostavka o nezamejenosti oz. nerazmejljivosti diskurzov.

Ideja razpršitve pri njem izhaja iz Nietzschejeve kritike klasičnega pojmovanja zgodovine; le-to jasno prevzame v svojem eseju *Nietzsche, genealogija, zgodovina*, ki je v izvirniku izšel leta 1971. V ozadju pravzaprav stoji ideja zavračanja zasledovanja »izvora resnice« v klasični genealogiji. Genealogija mora pokazati heterogenost tistega, kar se kaže kot konsistentno (Foucault, 1994b, 375). Genealogija se ne vrača nazaj v času, da bi onstran razpršenosti pozabe ponovno vzpostavila veliko kontinuiteto. Slediti zapletenemu toku izvora pomeni ohranjati tisto, kar se je zgodilo v njeni posebni razpršitvi, pomeni razkrivati nezgode, odklone, obrate, napake, pomeni odkriti, da v korenu tega, kar spoznavamo, in tega, kar smo, nista resnica in bit, ampak zunanjost naključja (Foucault, 2008, 92–3).

Klasični zgodovinar zapolnjuje manjkajoče podatke tako, da jih postavlja nazaj v kontinuiteto. Z diskontinuiteto pa so meje preučevanih objektov opredeljene in opisane na podlagi njihovih mej ter točk, na katerih se prelamljajo. Tisto, kar je Foucaulta zanimalo, je odpiranje struktur časovnim diskontinuitetam in obratom, ki so determinirali neskončno igro diskurzivnih praks. Arheologija torej pomeni kazanje na te diskontinuitete in prelome, ki vplivajo na njihovo sedimentacijo (Dosse, 1997, 237–9), kajti obstajajo črte sedimentacije, pravi Foucault, a tudi črte »razpoke« oz. »preloma« (Deleuze, 2007, 6).

Diskurz je torej množtvo izjav, ki pripadajo eni diskurzivni formaciji (gl. Deleuze, 2000, 14). Ob tem je vredno opozoriti na tri reči. Prvič: diskurzivna formacija je razpoznana glede na različne ravni, na katerih lahko obstajajo izjave. Drugič: med temi različnimi ravnmi obstaja določena regularnost. Tretjič: posamičen diskurz obstaja v odnosu do obstoja družbenih agentov, praks in njihovih pogojev nastanka, obstoja in spreminjanja. Pri tem družbeni agenti in prakse ne pripadajo diskurzivnemu, temveč različnim ravnem, ki se oblikujejo znotraj diskurza (Brown in Cousins, 1980, 256). Brown in Cousins menita, da ima Foucault resne težave prav

na tem področju, saj diskurzivne formacije in izjave pri njem ne izvirajo iz kategorije jezika niti iz kategorije logike. Pri Foucaultu izjava namreč ni ne formulacija v obliki stavka oz. zaporedja stavkov ne trditev.

Vendar, ali je to nujno slaba odločitev? Prav ta je namreč novost Foucaultove *Arheologije vednosti*, osnovane na Benvenistovi teoriji izjavljanja, ki za predmet ni vzela ne stavkov ne propozicij, marveč izjave, ne besedila diskurza, marveč njegovo godénje. Izjava ni struktura, temveč funkcija obstoja. Ni nekaj, kar bi imelo opredeljene realne lastnosti, temveč čista eksistenca, dejstvo, da se godi bivajoče – govorica (Agamben, 2005, 97–8). Izjava namreč vzpostavlja svoj korelativni prostor, ki ga Foucault imenuje *referencialno.* Tako so npr. *arhivi* sistemi izjav v diskurzivnih praksah, ki vzpostavljajo izjave kot dogodke in stvari. Arhiv je tako splošen sistem formacije in transformacije izjav (Foucault, 2001, 141–2). Arhiv je tudi gmota nesemantičnega, vpisana v vsak smiselni diskurz kot funkcija njegovega izjavljanja, temni rob, ki omejuje vsako konkretno spregovoritev (Agamben, 2005, 101). Vendar Foucault, kljub temu da zavrne konceptualizacijo diskurza v odnosu do jezikovnih in epistemoloških kriterijev, ne poda enoznačne definicije izjave kot osnovnega koncepta, s katerim opredeljuje diskurzivno formacijo. Kot smo videli, je regularnost razpršitve za Foucaulta edino načelo enotnosti diskurzivne formacije, kar pa posledično pušča odprto vprašanje mej med diskurzivnimi formacijami. Tega problema se skuša Foucault lotiti (1991b, 58), ko izhod poišče v razlikovanju med znotraj-, inter- in zunajdiskurzivnimi odnosi med elementi, a tudi ta poskus ne doprinese k rešitvi problema. Kar za Foucaulta (1991b, 58) kasneje postane najpomembnejše, je to, da definira igro odnosov med vsemi temi spremembami. Tako predstavi razdelitev:

1. – znotrajdiskurzivni odnosi med objekti, operacijami in pojmi ene same formacije,

2. – interdiskurzivni odnosi med različnimi diskurzivnimi formacijami, npr. njegova študija v *Redu stvari*, ko je preučeval odnose med naravoslovjem, ekonomijo, slovnico in teorijo reprezentacije, ter

3. – zunajdiskurzivni odnosi med diskurzivnimi spremembami in spremembami zunaj diskurza, npr. njegovi študiji *Zgodovina norosti* (1998) in *Rojstvo klinike* (1994a), v katerih je preučeval medicinski diskurz v odnosu do sprememb v ekonomiji, politiki in družbi.

Skladno s tem si Foucault (1991b, 54) zastavi tudi problem individualizacije diskurzov, ki je v osnovi »rešitev« njegovega problema sistema razpr-

šitve iz *Arheologije vednosti*. Težava, na katero ponovno naleti, je, da je vsak diskurz dinamična tvorba, ki se neprestano spreminja takoj, ko so mu dodane nove izjave (énoncés). Pri tem zanj vseeno obstajajo kriteriji formacije. Navaja dva: kriterij spremembe ali razmejitve in kriterij korelacije. V prvem primeru gre za razmislek v smislu, da lahko definiramo niz okoliščin, ki so bile obenem izpolnjene v točno določenem časovnem trenutku, da so se lahko v njihovem okviru izoblikovali objekti, operacije, pojmi in teoretske možnosti. Prepoznati bi morali, katerih notranjih sprememb so bili zmožni; navsezadnje bi lahko definirali mejo, pri kateri pride do novih pravil formacije. Pri kriteriju korelacije pa razlaga, da je npr. klinična medicina avtonomna diskurzivna formacija, če lahko definiramo niz odnosov, ki jo definirajo in umestijo v odnosu do drugih tipov diskurza (npr. do biologije, kemije, politologije) kot tudi do nediskurzivnih kontekstov, v katerih deluje (institucije, družbeni odnosi, ekonomske in politične konjunkture).

Kar individualizira diskurz, ni enotnost njegovega objekta, niti njegova formalna struktura, niti koherenca njegove pojmovne arhitekture ali njegove temeljne filozofske izbire, temveč niz pravil formacije, ki velja za vse njegove objekte, operacije, pojme in teoretske možnosti. Takoj, ko je mogoče določiti tak niz pravil, lahko govorimo o individualizirani diskurzivni formaciji.

Pri Foucaultu je torej treba na ločevanje med diskurzivnim in zunajdiskurzivnim gledati skozi pojem diskurzivne formacije. Foucault želi opredeliti relacijsko totalnost, ki je podlaga razpršitve izjav v diskurzivni formaciji, vendar jo lahko opredeli zgolj na ravni diskurzivne prakse. Vzrok gre iskati v dejstvu, da Foucault ne povezuje diskurza in njegovih sprememb s splošno kategorijo »zunanjih« dogodkov, ki lahko delujejo kot totalnost – bodisi v obliki »realnega« ali kot vzrok. Zato imamo opravka vsaj z dvema težavama.

Prva zadeva vlogo že omenjenega *dogodka*. Navadno se v družbeni teoriji dogodke poenoti tako, da se jim pripisuje splošne in točno določene lastnosti – obravnava se jih npr. kot realno, materialno, zgodovino, prakso itd. –, s katerimi se opredeljujejo kot zunajdiskurzivno. Vendar Foucault ne naredi jasne delitve fenomenov na diskurzivne in zunajdiskurzivne. Zanj je to vprašanje identitete določene diskurzivne formacije. Tistega, kar iz določene diskurzivne formacije izpade, pa ne razume kot zunajdiskurzivnega. Ker pri Foucaultu ne obstaja natančen odnos med »zunanjimi dogodki« in diskurzom, se pojavi nova težava. Ta zahteva poglabljanje v to, kaj je lahko v določenem zunanjem dogodku (ki lahko vključuje tudi druge diskurze) dano kot objekt določenih diskurzov, kaj sestavlja povezavo med diskurzi in dogodki ter kakšne oblike in omejitve

bo imela ta povezava. Kajti cilja arheološke metode sta ravno ugotavljanje, kateri »zunanji« dogodek je lahko objekt diskurza ter kaj sestavlja povezavo med diskurzom in »zunanjim dogodkom«. Ker bodo zunanji dogodki vedno diskurzivno organizirani, se je treba pri analizi načel organizacije izjav osredotočiti na diskurz in ne na dogodek (Brown in Cousins, 1980).

Gre v osnovi za podoben problem, kot si ga postavlja tudi Laclauova teorija diskurza. Kako torej določiti meje med diskurzi oz. kako se izogniti popolni multicipliteti in konceptualizirati »sistematičnost sistema«? Da pokažemo totalizacijo sistema v sistemu, bi se morali zateči k samoreferenčnemu dejanju. Sistem bi se moral nanašati sam nase, da bi dosegel svojo sistematičnost. V Foucaultovi *Arheologiji vednosti* je problem mej med diskurzi mišljen z vidika razpršitve diskurzivnih dogodkov, torej z opustitvijo misli na tisto, kar je sistemu »zunanje«. Nekoliko drugače je v Laclauovi teoriji diskurza, kjer totalizacijo mislimo skozi prazni oz. hegemonski označevalec, relacije med diskurzi pa skozi pojem antagonizma oz. diferencialnosti njihovih pozicij v diskurzivnem polju. Prav zato bomo na tem mestu izpostavili laclauovsko pojmovanje diskurzivnega kot vseobsegajočega družbenega pojava.

Laclauovo diskurzivno

Družba je za Laclaua v prvi vrsti sedimentirana diskurzivna praksa. Poststrukturalistično pojmovanje diskurza, kot ga razumejo npr. Derrida ter Laclau in Mouffe,[8] ima svoje daljne korenine v transcendentalni filozofiji Kanta (Laclau v: Torfing, 2005, 9). Ne moremo torej mimo Laclauovega (1993, 431) mnenja, da je začetke sodobnih diskurzivnih teorij vsaj deloma mogoče iskati tudi v t. i. transcendentalnem obratu v moderni filozofiji. Vendar pa se klasična transcendentalna stališča vsaj v dveh pogledih močno razlikujejo od sodobnih diskurzivnih teorij. Medtem ko pri tipu Kantove filozofije *a priori* konstituira temeljno strukturo mišljenja, ki transcendira vse zgodovinske variacije, pa so sodobne diskurzivne teorije eminentno zgodovinske in skušajo preučevati diskurzivna polja, ki niso neodvisna od časovnih sprememb, četudi imajo transcendentalno vlogo. To pomeni, da je tok, ki loči »empirično« in »transcendentalno«, nečist, ker je podvržen stalnim premikom. Druga razlika pa je, da je Laclauov pristop k pojmovanju »diskurzivnih polj« in njihove strukture vezan predvsem na saussurjevsko in postsaussurjevsko jezikoslovje.

Teorija diskurza zavrača razliko med diskurzivnimi in zunajdiskurzivnimi praksami. Laclau (1999, 94) poudarja, da je prav zato vedno skušal dr-

žati distanco do Foucaultove opredelitve diskurza v *Arheologiji vednosti*, ker je za Foucaulta »diskurz« le eden izmed mnogih objektov. Za diskurzivno analizo pa je vsak objekt konstituiran kot diskurzivni objekt. »Če ni noben objekt mogoč zunaj vsakokratnih diskurzivnih pogojev nastajanja in je vsako ločevanje med tistimi, čemur ponavadi pravimo jezikovni in vedenjski vidiki družbene prakse, ali napačno ločevanje ali pa bi ga morali kot obliko razločevanja umestiti znotraj družbene produkcije pomena, strukturirane v obliki diskurzivnih totalnosti« (Laclau in Mouffe, 1987, 90). Če analiziramo t. i. nediskurzivne sklope, institucije, tehnike, organizacije, produkcije itn., ne bomo našli le bolj ali manj kompleksnih oblik diferencialnih pozicij med objekti, ki ne izvirajo iz sistemu vnanje nujnosti, ki jih ta strukturira, zato jih je mogoče dojeti le kot diskurzivne artikulacije (Laclau in Mouffe, 1987, 90–1). Z drugimi besedami, opraviti imamo z dvema različnima redoma: z diskurzivnim bivajočim in z zunajdiskurzivno eksistenco. Za razumevanje družbe je pomemben predvsem prvi red, ki pa ne zanika obstoja drugega. Ideja je le, da drugi red ne doprinese k našemu razumevanju logike delovanja diskurza. Z Lacanovimi besedami bi lahko dejali, da Realno ustreza temu, kar ostaja zunaj diskurza oz. polja reprezentacije. Se pravi tisto, česar ni mogoče simbolizirati. Realnost pa ustreza diskurzivni konstrukciji identitete objektov. Realnost je torej to, kar družbeni subjekti konstruirajo tako, da pri tem uporabljajo svoje simbolne in imaginarne vire (Glynos in Stavrakakis, 2004, 204–5).

Laclauova teorija ohranja jasno navezavo na diskurz, čeprav je vpliv ideološkosti diskurza slednjemu notranji, le da ni reduktibilen na svojo ideološko razsežnost (Glynos, 2001, 195). Tako je tudi za Laclaua in Mouffejevo (1990, 100) družbeni prostor diskurziven. Da bi to pokazala, si sposodita Wittgensteinov primer gradnje zidu. Predstavljajmo si, da z zidarjem gradimo zid. V nekem trenutku ga prosimo, naj nam poda opeko, ki jo nato dodamo na zid. Prvo dejanje – prošnja zidarju, naj nam poda opeko – je jezikovno; drugo dejanje – dodajanje opeke na zid – pa je zunajjezikovno. Ali izčrpamo realnost obeh dejanj s tem, ko zarišemo razliko med njima, torej med jezikovnim in zunajjezikovnim? Očitno ne, kajti kljub omenjeni razliki si obe dejanji delita dejstvo, ki omogoči njuno primerjavo – torej to, da sta obe del iste operacije (gradnje zidu). Kako lahko torej označimo totalnost, ki jo sestavljata obe dejanji? Če ta totalnost vključuje jezikovni in zunajjezikovni element, potem ne more biti niti samo jezikovna niti zgolj zunajjezikovna. Biti mora primarnejša od omenjenega razlikovanja. To totalnost, ki vključuje jezikovno in zunajjezikovno, imenujemo *diskurz*. Kljub temu pa diskurza ne pojmujemo kot kombinacije

govora in pisave, kajti oba sta sama po sebi notranja sestavna dela diskurzivne totalnosti.

V nadaljevanju pojem diskurz uporabljamo zato, da bi poudarili dejstvo, da je vsaka družbena konfiguracija pomenljiva. Če na ulici brcamo okrogel predmet ali če brcamo žogo na nogometnem igrišču, je *fizično* dejstvo enako, *pomena* pa sta različna. Objekt je nogometna žoga samo do mere, do katere vzpostavlja sistem odnosov z drugimi objekti. Ti odnosi pa niso dani kot materialni odnosi z drugimi objekti, temveč so družbeno konstruirani. Ta sistematični niz odnosov imenujemo *diskurz*. Diskurzivni obstoj nekega objekta ne pomeni dvoma o njegovi materialni eksistenci. Dejstvo, da je nogometna žoga samo nogometna žoga, dokler je ne postavimo v sistem družbeno konstruiranih pravil, še ne pomeni, da ta žoga ne obstaja kot materialni objekt. Kamen, recimo, obstaja neodvisno od sistema družbenih odnosov, vendar v specifični diskurzivni konfiguraciji lahko predstavlja orožje ali pa umetnino. Zato je diskurz tisti, ki konstituira »subjektno pozicijo« določenega družbenega akterja in ne družbeni akter, ki producira diskurz. Isti sistem pravil, ki okrogel predmet določi za nogometno žogo, tudi iz nas naredi nogometaša (Laclau in Mouffe, 1990, 100–101).

Jezikovni elementi in zunajjezikovna dejanja torej oblikujejo diferencialni in strukturirani sistem pozicij, to je diskurz. Laclau in Mouffe (1987) diskurz razumeta v povezavi z artikulacijo. Artikulacija je vsaka praksa, ki vzpostavlja tako razmerje med elementi, da se njihova identiteta spreminja kot njen rezultat.[9] Strukturirani totalnosti, ki je rezultat artikulacijske prakse, pravita diskurz (Laclau in Mouffe, 1987, 88). O diskurzivni formaciji govorita, kadar se na podlagi nekaterih regularnosti vzpostavljajo diferencialne pozicije (Laclau in Mouffe, 1987, 92). Vendar lahko diskurz kot sistem diferencialnih entitet (oz. *momentov*)[10] obstaja le kot začasno fiksirana oblika. »Razpad« in reartikulacija pomena diskurza sta torej inherentna vsaki diskurzivni situaciji in sta področje, na katerem se konstituira družbena praksa. Temu področju pravimo polje diskurzivnosti. »Ta izraz nakaže obliko svojega razmerja do vsakega konkretnega diskurza: določa nujno diskurzivnost vsakega objekta in hkrati nezmožnost, da bi katerikoli dani diskurz izvedel dokončni šiv.« (Laclau in Mouffe, 1987, 95.)

Prehod od elementov do momentov nikdar ni popolnoma izpeljan, saj so vse družbene oblike oz. diskurzi kontingentni. Spontano vprašanje, ki se nam tu poraja, je, kako je kakršnakoli identiteta ali družbena oblika sploh mogoča. Prvi odgovor predvideva vpeljavo *vozlišč* (Lacanovi *point de capiton*), ki ponazarjajo strukturacijo elementov v pomenske sisteme momentov v določenem diskurzu. Vsak diskurz se vzpostavi kot prizadevanje po

obvladovanju polja diskurzivnosti. Prav tem privilegiranim diskurzivnim točkam teh delnih utrditev Laclau in Mouffe (1987, 95) pravita vozlišča. Gre za privilegirane označevalce, ki utrdijo pomen določene označevalne verige. Logiko diskurzivne strukturacije Laclau (1996a) kasneje razlaga tudi z vpeljavo kategorije *praznega označevalca*,[11] ki se razvije iz Gramscijeve prispodobe modernega vladarja,[12] ki pri njem služi kot mit za poenotenje kolektivne volje. Je torej »politična ideologija, ki ni izražena niti kot oblika hladne utopije niti kot naučeno teoretiziranje, temveč z oblikovanjem konkretne fantazije, ki deluje na razpršenem in razdrobljenem ljudstvu tako, da to vznikne in organizira svojo kolektivno voljo« (Gramsci, 1971/2003, 126).

Kot smo že pokazali, v teoriji diskurza polje družbenega nikoli ne more biti zaprto in politične prakse skušajo zapolniti prav to manjkajoče zaprtje. Čeprav je končnost, zaprtost oz. univerzalnost družbenega nemogoče doseči, se potreba po tem ne zmanjša, temveč se vedno kaže s prisotnostjo svoje odsotnosti (Laclau, 1996a, 53).

> /V/ situaciji radikalnega nereda se "red" kaže kot odsoten; postane prazen označevalec, označevalec odsotnosti. V tem smislu lahko različne politične sile tekmujejo v poskusu predstavljanja svojih partikularnih ciljev kot nosilcev funkcije zapolnitve ... Politika je mogoča, ker se konstitutivna nezmožnost družbenega lahko samoreprezentira samo skozi produkcijo praznih označevalcev. (Laclau, 1996a, 44.)

Artikulacija političnega diskurza je torej možna le okrog praznega označevalca, ki nastopa kot vozlišče. Z drugimi besedami: manko se pokaže kot nujna značilnost vozlišča oz. kot pomemben pogoj možnosti za njegov hegemonski uspeh (Howarth in Stavrakakis, 2000, 9). Prazni označevalci pokažejo, da v označevalnem sistemu obstaja mesto, ki je v temelju nereprezentabilno. V tem smislu je zmeraj prazno, toda to je praznina, ki jo lahko označimo, saj imamo opraviti s praznino znotraj označevanja. Npr. de Manova analiza Pascalove ničle govori prav o tem. Ničla je odsotnost števila, toda s poimenovanjem te odsotnosti to »ničlo« spremenimo v »enko« (Laclau, 2008, 95).

Teorija diskurza temelji na ontološkem razlikovanju med diskurzivnim poljem naddoločenih identitet in prizadevanjem različnih političnih projektov, da bi konstruirali končne ter zamejene diskurze (Howarth, 2004). Diskurz se oblikuje v hegemonskih bojih, ki želijo prek artikulacije pomenov in identitet vzpostaviti moralno, intelektualno in politično vodstvo. *Hegemonske prakse* so zato tipična oblika dejavnosti diskurzov, ki vključuje artikulacijo različnih identitet in subjektivitet v skupen projekt. Rezultat teh projektov so *hegemonske formacije* diskurzov, ki si prizadevajo iz vrste različnih razpršenih in dislociranih elementov oblikovati nove

oblike družbenega reda (Howarth in Stavrakakis, 2000, 14). Lastnost hegemonije je ustvarjalna artikulacija, torej politična konstrukcija določene družbene formacije, ki nastane iz različnih elementov. Tovrstna ustvarjalna artikulacija nasprotuje videnju družbe kot zaprte in homogene totalnosti in je zato ključen napad na sociologizem in ekonomizem (Dallmayr, 2004). Ker odnosi niso totalizirajoči, izhajajoč iz Gramscija, tudi hegemonija ni »nekaj, kar lahko imamo«, temveč je tip političnega razmerja, saj je obče polje vznika hegemonije polje artikulacijskih praks. To je polje, na katerem se elementi niso kristalizirali v momente. V zaprtem sistemu relacijskih identitet, v katerem je pomen vsakega elementa utrjen, ni prostora za hegemonsko prakso. Prav zato hegemonija predpostavlja necelost in odprtost družbenega, torej je mogoča le na področju, na katerem vladajo artikulacijske prakse (Laclau in Mouffe, 1987, 114).

Za hegemonistično artikulacijo sta zato potrebna dva pogoja: navzočnost antagonističnih sil in nestalnost meja, ki te sile ločijo. Teren, na katerem je mogoče tako prakso utemeljiti kot hegemonsko, konstituira navzočnost širokega območja plavajočih elementov in možnost njihove artikulacije v nasprotne tabore. To implicira, da se ti tabori nenehno na novo opredeljujejo (Laclau in Mouffe, 1987, 115). Osnovni cilj vsakega hegemonskega projekta je konstruiranje in stabiliziranje vozlišč, ki oblikujejo temelje konkretnih družbenih redov, tako da artikulirajo čim več plavajočih označevalcev.

Pri tem je za Laclaua in Mouffejevo osrednjega pomena to, da razvijeta substantivna razumevanja Derridajevih dekonstrukcij. Eden temeljnih poudarkov je pravzaprav argument nezmožnosti obstoja družbe oz. odprtost sleherne strukture. Poudarek temelji na Derridajevem pojmovanju strukture kot decentralizirane.[13] Po Laclauu je namreč vsak strukturni sistem omejen in vedno obkrožen s presežkom pomena, ki je nezmožen vladati. Tovrstni presežek moramo razumeti v smislu signifikacije. Posledica je ultimativna nezmožnost fiksiranja katerega koli pomena ali identitete (Norval, 2005, 91–2). Vsak poskus stabilizacije pomenov je torej hegemonsko dejanje, ki pa je le začasen trenutek artikulacije. Kajti če se hočemo trdno zasidrati v artikulaciji kot temeljni kategoriji na področju hegemonije, se moramo najprej odpovedati temu, da bi družbo pojmovali kot temeljno totalnost njenih parcialnih procesov (Laclau in Mouffe 1987, 79, 81).[14]

Idejo odprtosti strukture teorija diskurza vpelje z Derridajevim pojmom *nedoločljivosti*. Za Laclaua je vprašanje odnosa med dekonstrukcijo in hegemonijo vezano na nedoločenost potrebe po stabilizaciji tistega, kar je v osnovi nestabilno. Laclau meni, da je dekonstrukcija relevantna pri

dveh razsežnostih političnega. Prva je ideja političnega kot institutivnega momenta družbe, druga pa je ideja nedokončanosti vsakega dejanja nekega političnega instituta (Norval, 2005, 92). Dekonstrukcija kaže na konstitutivno nedoločenost, radikalno nezaključenost ali netotalnost tekstualnih, institucionalnih, kulturnih, družbenih in ekonomskih struktur. Hkrati pa je hegemonija teorija odločitve,[15] ki se zgodi na »terenu nedoločenosti«. Tega odpira prav dekonstrukcija in je potemtakem pravzaprav način, na katerega lahko začnemo misliti politike dekonstrukcije (Critchley, 1995, 21).

Laclau (1996b, 60) meni, da sta dekonstrukcija in hegemonija dve osnovni razsežnosti ene in iste teoretsko-praktične operacije. Hegemonija zahteva dekonstrukcijo: brez radikalne »nedoločenosti« strukture, ki jo izvaja dekonstrukcijska intervencija, bi se veliko slojev družbenih odnosov kazalo kot bistveno povezanih z neko neizogibno logiko, in tako ne bi obstajalo nič, kar bi se dalo hegemonizirati. Vendar tudi dekonstrukcija potrebuje hegemonijo, torej teorijo odločitve, ki je lahko samo hegemonska, ker je, prvič, samoosnovana,[16] drugič, ekskluzivistična,[17] saj zatira alternativne odločitve, in tretjič, je s tem tudi notranje razcepljena, saj je hkrati oboje; *ta* odločitev in *odločitev* kot taka. Pri tem je pomembno poudariti, da Laclau ne pravi, da obstaja radikalna odsotnost pravil in da so vse odločitve popolnoma svobodne.[18] Pri tem namreč misli, da je »nedoločenost« pravzaprav strukturirana »nedoločenost«, torej ni preprosto neomejena, saj imamo vedno opraviti z delno destrukturacijo neke strukture (Laclau, 1996b, 57). Če povzamemo: za Laclaua vprašanje odnosa med dekonstrukcijo in hegemonijo vznikne v kontekstu »nedoločenosti« in ob potrebi po stabilizaciji vsega, kar je v osnovi nestabilno (Norval, 2004, 143).

Sklep

Kot vidimo, imamo tako pri Foucaultu kot pri Laclauovi teoriji diskurza opraviti predvsem z razumevanjem logike družbenega kot sedimentirane oblike diskurzivnih praks. Logika družbenega nam omogoča, da označimo določene družbene prakse in režime v določenih družbenih domenah. Laclau razvije pojem družbene logike, da bi opredelil splošni vzorec koherentnosti diskurzivne prakse. Zanj družbena logika pomeni sledenje pravilom in s tem vključuje sistem izjav, torej pravil, ki rišejo horizont, znotraj katerega so določeni objekti reprezentirani, drugi pa izključeni. Pri tem pojem diskurzivne formacije razume tako, kot ga razlaga Foucault v *Arheologiji vednosti*, torej tako, da zavrne štiri hipoteze, ki zadevajo načelo enotnosti določene diskurzivne formacije (Glynos in Howarth, 2007, 139).

Ker smo se odločili, da bo naša analiza družbenega potekala na ravni izjava – diskurz – diskurzivna formacija, se moramo vsaj za trenutek vrniti k Foucaultu in vpeljati dopolnitev tistega dela njegovega razumevanja diskurza, ki se nanaša na pojmovanje diskurzivne formacije. Pri tem naj spomnimo, da so izjave, ki pripadajo neki diskurzivni formaciji, lahko jezikovne oz. empirične, kot jih razumejo npr. pragmatika, kritična lingvistika, kritična analiza diskurza itd., ali od jezika abstrahirane in abstraktne, kot jih razume Foucault.

Kot smo pokazali, Foucaultova ideja o regularnosti razpršitve izjav v diskurzivni formaciji na koncu pripelje v slepo ulico. Regularnost razpršitve – torej stalnost zunanjih odnosov med elementi, o katerih ne moremo misliti na način osnovnega načela ali strukturacije – je problem. Kajti če je regularnost v razpršitvi edino načelo enotnosti diskurzivne formacije, potem ostaja odprto vprašanje mej med diskurzivnimi formacijami (Laclau, 1993, 435), obenem pa tudi vprašanje, kako to regularnost razpršitve vsaj začasno totalizirati in s tem omogočiti njeno empirično raziskovanje. Z Laclauom lahko zapopademo obe dilemi. Regularnost razpršitve je potrebno najprej misliti v smislu relacij diferenc med izjavami ali diskurzi, kar neposredno vodi v prej omenjeni pojem praznega označevalca, ki deluje kot začasni totalizator diskurzov, prisotnih v diskurzivnem polju.[19] Če se prazni označevalec spremeni v plavajočega, potem tudi struktura razpade in odpre se možnost za vznik nove.

Skladno z zapolnjevanjem te Foucaultove vrzeli totalizacije se pravzaprav zelo približamo Laclauovemu »plavajočemu označevalcu«, ki kroži po strukturi in jo s tem, ko se spremeni v prazni označevalec, ki je artikulacija zahtev začasno fiksiranih diskurzov oz. členov neke ekvivalenčne verige, totalizira. Ker prazni označevalec zabriše partikularnosti v verigi, s tem v sistem vpelje tudi zunanji ali negativni element, ki omogoča konstituiranje verige. Pri tem pa »praznost« označevalca še vedno simbolizira nezmožnost dokončne totalizacije strukture. Diskurzi so torej v tesni navezavi z antagonizmom in hegemonijo, ki sta temelja razumevanja družbenih odnosov v teoriji diskurza ter pogoj nezmožnosti zaprtja družbe. Ta se kaže tudi kot nestalnost diskurzov, ki se v danem trenutku artikulirajo okrog nekega vozlišča. Diskurz je parcialna fiksacija pomena, diskurzivno polje pa se nanaša na vsakršen dejanski ali potencialni pomen, ki se lahko artikulira v določen diskurzivni red. Z drugimi besedami: diskurz ostaja pojem, ki definira pomene v določeni domeni, in se vedno oblikuje tako, da izključuje druge možne pomene v celotnem možnem spektru pomenov, ki mu pravimo *polje diskurzivnosti.* Polje diskurzivnosti je prostor, v katerem se vršijo an-

tagonistične pozicije med diskurzi. Polje diskurzivnega je torej polje vseh pomenov, ki niso vključeni v določen diskurz. Pojem je nujen, ker poudarja kontingenco in nedoločenost temeljne odprtosti strukture, ki nastane z njeno dislokacijo. Celotno hegemonsko polje je namreč v osnovi kontingentno. Vsaka začasna fiksacija oz. točka prešitja pa je vedno znova podvržena antagonizmu in možni reartikulaciji določenega hegemonskega razmerja.

Za Laclaua je vse elemente mogoče razložiti le s pomočjo igre razlik samih. Glede na to, da imamo opraviti s povsem razlikovalnimi identitetami, moramo določiti celoto, znotraj katere so te identitete konstruirane kot različne. Ker pa Laclau ne predpostavlja nujnega središča strukture, morajo totalizirajoči učinki izhajati iz vzajemnega delovanja razlik samih. Če imamo torej razlikovalno celoto, mora biti njena totalnost navzoča v vsakem posameznem dejanju pomenjenja. Vendar če hočemo totalnost razumeti konceptualno, jo moramo ločiti od nečesa Drugega, kar ni ona sama, in s tem doumeti njene meje. Ker pa totalnost že sama po sebi zaobseže vse razlike, bi ta druga razlika, ki naj bi proizvedla zunanjost in šele omogočila konstruiranje totalnosti, bila glede na slednjo notranja in ne zunanja. Torej nezmožna totaliziranja. Edina možnost za resnično zunanjost je v tem, da zunanjost ni še en nevtralni element, ampak je izključeni element. Element, ki ga totalnost iz sebe izloči, zato da se lahko konstituira in zariše svoje meje. Vsi diskurzi se torej oblikujejo nekje med logiko ekvivalence in logiko razlike. Na mestu totalnosti torej odkrijemo to napetost sámo. Kar dobimo na koncu, je neuspela identiteta. Ta totalnost je torej objekt, ki je nemožen in hkrati nujen (gl. Laclau, 2008, 63–4; 2007, 41–50).

Če sedaj strnemo. Tako Foucault kot Laclau se upirata popolnemu zaprtju sistema in totalizaciji strukture. Vendar pa v njunem pristopu obstaja pomembna razlika. Foucault govori o regularnosti razpršitve, a na način, da ne predpostavlja (diferencialnega) odnosa med diskurzi kot elementi strukture, ki bi le-to naredili mogočo za empirično analizo. Foucaultovsko iskanje rešitve v regularnosti razpršitve je paradoksalno, saj njegov razmislek ostane na ravni dialektičnega obrata. Z zavrnitvijo svojih štirih hipotez namreč ostane na ravni zavrnitve konstituiranja strukture okrog referenčne točke (dogodka, stila, koncepta, teme), a le tako, da jih premakne iz polja »zunanjosti« v polje imanence. Vendar ga ravno to pripelje nazaj v slepo ulico, iz katere je pravzaprav iskal izhod. Zato se zdi bolj smiselna zgoraj opisana Laclauova perspektiva, ki relacije med diskurzi misli na način diferencialnih pozicij, kar mu omogoča, da diskurze naredi dostopne za empirično analizo, saj je njihova začasna totalizacija možna preko praznega označevalca, hkrati pa mu igra med razliko in ekvivalenco omogoča, da na ontološki ravni strukturo razume kot odprto in kontingentno.

Opombe

[1] V prispevku bomo razločevanju med ontičnim in ontološkim sledili tako, kot ga je opredelil Heidegger, ki je v delu Bit in čas (1997) trdil, da se raziskovanje ontičnega osredotoča na določene tipe objektov in entitet, ki so umeščeni v določeni domeni ali »regiji« fenomenov, medtem ko raziskava ontološkega zadeva kategorični predpogoj za take objekte in njihovo raziskovanje. Npr. če v različnih kontekstih analiziramo konstrukcijo nacionalne identitete in če pri tem pojem nacionalne identitete privzemamo kot danega, potem je raziskava ontična. Če pa se raziskovanje osredotoča na temeljne predpostavke, ki določajo, kaj razumemo kot identiteto in kako se lotevamo študije tega fenomena, ter se sprašujemo o njenem obstoju, potem lahko rečemo, da je raziskava ontološka (gl. Glynos in Howarth, 2007, 109).

[2] Žal na tem mestu nimamo prostora, da bi se natančneje spuščali v teoretske in metodološke nekonsistentnosti kritične analize diskurza (KAD), zato se bomo v pričujočem prispevku namesto na kritiko KAD osredotočili na teoretske probleme, iz katerih te nekonsistentnosti izhajajo.

[3] V genealoškem obdobju se je Foucault oddaljil od raziskovanja odnosa med diskurzivnimi in zunajdiskurzivnimi praksami in se osredotočil zgolj na diskurz, tako, da je o njem razmišljal skozi telesnost. Genealogija se torej osredotoča na odnose med oblastjo, vednostjo in telesom.

[4] Pojem se pojavi v Redu stvari in pomeni zgodovinski a priori, ki utemeljuje vedenje in diskurze in je zato pogoj možnosti vznika nekega diskurza v določeni epohi.

[5] Tukaj je Foucault verjetno želel izpostaviti, da cilj njegove analize niso govorna dejanja kot taka, temveč da ga znotraj izjave, ki je pri njem širša od jezikovne izjave, zanimajo predvsem jezikovna dejanja, ki določajo razmerja moči.

[6]   Izjava in diskurz torej ne pripadata subjektu. Foucault (1991b, 58) poudarja, da ni ničesar takega kot inertni diskurz, ki je skorajda že zamrl, in na drugi strani suvereni subjekt, ki bi s tem diskurzom lahko manipuliral, ga prirejal, obnavljal; temveč da subjekti diskurza tvorijo del diskurzivnega polja, v katerem imajo tudi svoje mesto in vlogo. Diskurz ni mesto, kamor bi subjektivnost vdrla, temveč je prostor diferenciranih subjektnih pozicij in subjektnih vlog. Foucault odnosov med subjektom in diskurzom ne naslavlja tako, da bi se implicitno ali eksplicitno skliceval na zavest govorečega subjekta, niti tako, da bi diskurz povezoval z zavedno ali nezavedno voljo njegovega avtorja (Foucault, 1991b, 59).

[7] Diskurzivna formacija je v osnovi Pêcheuxov pojem. Diskurzivno formacijo definira kot »tisto, kar v dani ideološki formaciji, tj. z določene pozicije z dano konjunkturo, ki jo determinira status medrazrednega boja, determinira, 'kaj je lahko in kaj mora biti izrečeno'« (Pêcheux v: Fairclough, 1995, 40).

[8] Pristop, ki izhaja iz Laclauovega kroga, bomo imenovali teorija diskurza.

[9] Artikulacije, ki se zgodijo v antagonističnih bojih, so opredeljene kot hegemonske. Diskurz pa je strukturirana totalnost, ki je rezultat artikulacijske prakse (Laclau in Mouffe: 1987, 88).

[10] Laclau in Mouffe ločita elemente in momente. Ko so elementi artikulirani v določeno formacijo, dobijo status momenta. Kajti nobena artikulacija ni končna in vsak moment lahko po njenem razpadu ponovno preide v element.

[11] Kategorije praznega označevalca ne smemo zamenjevati s kategorijo, ki ji Laclau pravi plavajoči (floating) označevalec. Status plavajočih označevalcev se veže na nepopolnost prehoda elementov v momente. Status elementov je status plavajočih označevalcev. Ta njihova lastnost prežema vsako diskurzivno, tj. družbeno identiteto (Laclau in Mouffe, 1987, 96). Kategoriji praznega in plavajočega označevalca sta strukturno različni. Prvi zadeva konstrukcijo identitete takrat, ko je obstoj stabilne meje privzet kot dan, drugi pa skuša prepoznati logiko premika te meje. Kljub temu pa v praksi razlika med pojmoma ni tako velika. Oba sta hegemonski operaciji. Situacija, v kateri bi bila relevantna zgolj kategorija praznega označevalca s popolno izključitvijo plavajočega momenta, bi bila situacija, v kateri bi imeli popolnoma nepremično mejo – nekaj, kar je težko predstavljivo. Nasprotno pa bi bili priča prav tako nemogoči situaciji, ko bi imeli popolnoma psihotičen univerzum, ki bi nastopil, ko bi imeli samo plavajoče označevalce, ki ne bi bili niti delno fiksirani. Zato moramo plavajoče in prazne označevalce razumeti kot različni, analitično ločljivi razsežnosti, in to prav v vsakem razumevanju hegemonske konstrukcije (Laclau, 2005, 133).

[12] Gramsci (1971/2003) je nekaj svojih političnih spisov objavil pod naslovom Moderni vladar. V njih se je ukvarjal z Machiavellijevim delom Vladar. Čeprav je Machiavelli delo namenil vladarju Toscane, takrat je bil to Lorenzo de' Medici, je po Gramscijevem branju delo ciljalo na oblikovanje kolektivne volje pri italijanskih ljudeh. Posledica naj bi bila »ljudska država« in ne država, ki bi ji vladal le en vladar. Vladar je tako le simbol idealnega vodstva, torej teoretska abstrakcija. Pravi vladar ne more biti neki posameznik, temveč je to lahko le (revolucionarna) stranka, ki s svojimi zahtevami stremi k univerzalnosti.

[13] Derrida (1978, 278–93) meni, da je metafizično pojmovanje strukture vedno predvidevalo fiksnost središča, okrog katerega so se organizirali ostali elementi strukture. Vendar Derrida pokaže, da je celotna zgodovina pojma strukture pravzaprav niz oz. sosledje substitucij enega središča z drugim. Posledično središče zavzame različne oblike in poimenovanja. Zgodovina metafizike in zahodne misli je torej zgodovina metafor in metonimij, skozi katere se reproducira metafizika prisotnosti. Sama struktura pa ni nič drugega kot niz substitucij oz. repeticij ali bolje iteracij. Zato moramo razumeti, da je središčnost strukture vedno že zamenjana s strani svojega substituta. Substitut pa ne more zamenjati samega sebe in kot posledica nastopi zavedanje, da središča pravzaprav ni. Središče torej ni fiksirani lokus, temveč funkcija oz. neke vrste ne-lokus, v katerem se preigrava neskončno število substitucij znakov. Afirmacija pa ne pomeni izgube središča, temveč prej obstoj ne-središča, saj se obrača stran od iskanja izvornega pomena.

[14] Vsako prakso, ki vzpostavlja razmerje med elementi, tako da se njihova identiteta spreminja kot rezultat artikulacijske prakse, imenujemo artikulacija. Strukturalni totalnosti, ki je rezultat artikulacijske prakse, pravimo diskurz;

diferencialnim pozicijam, če so artikulirane v diskurzu, pa moment. Element je vsaka razlika, ki ni diskurzivno artikulirana v smislu, da ta element še nima diferencialne pozicije v diskurzivni totalnosti, ko pa jo pridobi, postane moment (Laclau in Mouffe, 1987, 88–9).

[15] Če logiko apliciramo na Laclaujev pojem političnega, potem je zanj teren nedoločljivosti (torej manjko v strukturi) posledica destrukturiranega družbenega polja, ki nastane zaradi dislokacije v strukturi. Torej polja, v katerem je nastal dvom o neki politični logiki. Potemtakem je odločitev v teh okoliščinah nedoločenosti povsem politično dejanje.

[16] Kar pomeni, da je ne določa neko zunanje pravilo, temveč odločitev izumi pravilo samo.

[17] Kar pomeni, da v trenutku odločitve avtomatično izključi ostale alternative.

[18] Tako imamo na eni strani svobodo, ki ni moja svoboda, temveč je svoboda strukture, ki me je konstituirala kot subjekt. Na drugi strani pa je svoboda, ki je moja svoboda, tista, ki se izogne tako pastem spinozovske svobode, reducirane na zavest nujnosti, kakor sartrovske svobode človeka, ki izbira, ko nima več nobenega razloga za izbiro, lahko je svoboda strukturne napake – to je dislokacije. Toda v tem primeru dvoumnost dislokacije okuži svobodo samo. Svoboda osvobaja in zasužnjuje, je radostna in travmatična, rešilna in pogubna (Laclau, 2007, 25).

[19] Če totalizacijsko instanco iščemo v Foucaultovi misli, potem se moramo oddaljiti od njegove arheologije in se osredotočiti na genealoško obdobje, ko se Foucault oddalji od prej opisanega pojmovanja izjave kot temeljne enote diskurza in analize epistem ter uvede pojem dispozitiva. V svojem arheološkem obdobju, v Redu stvari ter v Arheologiji vednosti, Foucault govori o epistemah, vednosti in diskurzivnih formacijah, kasneje, v genealoškem obdobju, pa o dispozitivu, ki je zanj v svojem bistvu strateški, saj predpostavlja, da deluje na način manipuliranja z razmerji sil. Dispozitiv se vpisuje v igro oblasti in je veliko splošnejši od episteme, je specifično diskurzivni dispozitiv za razliko od dispozitiva, ki je diskurzivni in nediskurzivni, z dosti bolj heterogenimi elementi. Z uvedbo dispozitiva želi Foucault torej stopiti onstran diskurza (Foucault, 1991a, 79).

Literatura

Agamben, G. (2005). *Kar ostaja od Auschwitza: arhiv in priča.* Ljubljana: Založba ZRC.

Brown, B. in Cousins, M. (1980). The Linguistic Fault: the Case of Foucault's Archaeology. *Economy and Society* 9, 3, 251–278.

Chouliaraki, L. in Fairclough, N. (1999). *Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Critchley, S. (1995). On Derrida's Spectres of Marx. *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 21, 3, 1–30.

Dallmayr, F. (1987). Hegemony and Democracy: A Review of Laclau and Mouffe: Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. *Philosophy and Social Criticism.* 13, 3, 283–296.

Deleuze, G. (1995). Po čem prepoznamo strukturalizem? V: *Sodobna literarna teorija: zbornik,* ur. Aleš Pogačnik, 41–64. Ljubljana: Krtina.

— (2000). *Foucault*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

— (2007). Kaj je dispozitiv? *Problemi* 45, 8/9, 5–14.

Derrida, J. (1978). *Writing and Difference*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Dosse, F. (1997). *History of Structuralism: Volume 2: The Sign Sets, 1967-Present.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Fairclough, N. (1992). *Discourse and Social Change.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

— (1995). *Critical Discourse Analysis.* London: Longman.

— (2003). *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research.* London, New York: Routledge.

Foucault, M. (1991a). *Vednost – Oblast – Subjekt.* Ljubljana: Krt.

— (1991b). Politics and the Study of Discourse. V: Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon in Peter Miller (ur.), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentability,* str. 53–86. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

— (1993). *Zgodovina seksualnosti 3: Skrb zase.* Ljubljana: Škuc.

— (1994a). *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception.* New York: Vintage Books.

— (1994b). Nietzsche, Genealogy, History. V: *Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology,* ur. James D. Faubion, 369–392. New York: The New Press.

— (1970/1999). *The Order of Things.* London: Routledge.

— (2001). *Arheologija vednosti.* Ljubljana: Studiorium Humanitatis.

— (2008). Nietzsche, Genealogija, Zgodovina. V: *Vednost – Oblast – Subjekt.* Michel Foucault. Ljubljana: Krtina.

Glynos, J. (2001). The Grip of Ideology: a Lacanian Approach to the Theory of Ideology. *Journal of Political Ideologies* 6, 2, 191–214.

Glynos, J. in Stavrakakis, Y. (2004). Encounters of the Real Kind. Sussing Out the Limit of Laclau's Embrace of Lacan. V: Simon Critchley in Oliver Marchart (ur.), *Laclau: A Critical Reader,* str. 201–216. London and New York: Routledge.

Glynos, J. in Howarth, D. (2007). *Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory.* Londona and New York: Routledge.

Gramsci, A. (1971/2003). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks.* New York: International Publishers.

Heidegger, M. (1997). *Bit in čas.* Ljubljana: Slovenska matica.

Howarth, D. (2000). *Discourse.* Buckhingam – Philadelphia: Open University Press.

— (2004). Hegemony, Political Subjectivity and Radical Democracy. V: Simon Critchley in Oliver Marchart (ur.), *Laclau: A Critical Reader.,* str. 256–276. London and New York: Routledge.

Howarth, D. in Stavrakakis, Y. (2000). Introducing Discourse Theory and Political Analysis. V: David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval in Yannis Stavrakakis (ur.), *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change,* str. 1–23. Manchaster and New York: Manchaster University Press.

Jaworski, A. in Coupland, N. (1999). Introduction: Perspectives on Discourse Analysis. V: Adam Jaworski in Nikolas Coupland (ur.), *The Discourse Reader,* str. 1–44. London: Routledge.

Jørgensen, M. in Phillips, L. (2002). *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method.* London: Sage.

Laclau, E. (1993). Discourse. V: Robert E. Goodin in Philip Pettit (ur.), *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy,* str. 431–437. Oxford: Blackwell.

— (1996a). *Emancipation(s).* London: Verso.

— (1996b). Deconstruction, Pragmatics, Hegemony. V: Chantal Mouffe (ur.), *Deconstruction and Pragmatism,* str. 47–68. London: Routledge.

— (1999). Politics, Polemics and Academics: An Interview by Paul Bowman. *Parallax* 5, 2, 93–107.

— (2005). *On Populist Reason.* London and New York: Verso.

— (2007). *Emancipacija/emancipacije.* Ljubljana: Založba ZRC.

— (2008). *O populističnem umu.* Ljubljana: Sophia.

Laclau, E. in Mouffe, C. (1987). *Hegemonija in socialistična strategija: k radikalni demokratični politiki.* Ljubljana: Partizanska knjiga.

— 1990. Post-Marxism without Apologies. V: Ernesto Laclau (ur.), *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time,* str. 97–134. London, New York: Verso.

Norval, A. (2004). Hegemony After Deconstruction: the Consequences of Undecidability. *Journal of Political Ideologies* 9, 2, 139–157.

— (2005). Theorising Hegemony: Between Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis. V: Lars Tønder in Lasse Thomassen (ur.), *Radical Democracy: Politics Between Aboundance and Lack,* str. 86–102. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Rorty, R. (1992). *The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method: With Two Retrospective Essays.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Torfing, J. (2005). Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments, and Challenges. V: David Howarth in Jacob Torfing (ur.), *Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance,* str. 1–32. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Igor Ž. Žagar

The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), pioneered by Ruth Wodak (see Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart, 1999; Wodak, van Dijk, 2000; Wodak, Chilton, 2005; Wodak, Meyer, 2006; Wodak, 2009), is one of the major branches of critical discourse analysis (CDA). In its own (programmatic) view, it embraces at least three interconnected aspects:

> »1. 'Text or discourse immanent critique' aims at discovering internal or discourseinternal structures.

> 2. The 'socio-diagnostic critique' is concerned with the demystifying exposure of the possibly persuasive or 'manipulative' character of discursive practices.

> 3. Prognostic critique contributes to the transformation and improvement of communication.« (Wodak, 2006: 65)

CDA, in Wodak's view,

> »is not concerned with evaluating what is 'right' or 'wrong'. CDA ... should try to make choices at each point in the research itself, and should make these choices transparent.1 It should also justify theoretically why certain interpretations of discursive events seem more valid than others.«

> »One of the methodical ways for critical discourse analysts to minimize the risk of being biased is to follow the principle of triangulation. Thus one of the most salient distinguishing features of the DHA is its endeavour to work with different approaches, multimethodically and on the basis of a variety of empirical data as well as background information.« (Wodak, 2006: 65)

One of the approaches DHA is using in its principle of triangulation is argumentation theory, more specifically the theory of *topoi*. Being a philosopher by formation, working within the field of argumentation theory

and pragmatics, I will concentrate on this specific aspect: how *topoi* (and, consequentially, argumentation theory, are used in DHA as one of the most influential schools of CDA (curiously, other approaches (e.g. Fairclough (1995; 2000; 2003) or van Leeuwen (2004; 2008; van Leeuwen, Kress, 2006)) don't use *topoi* at all).

Within argumentation theory, Wodak continues,

> »'*topoi*' or '*loci*' can be described as parts of argumentation which belong to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable premises. They are **the content-related** warrants or 'conclusion rules' which connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion, the claim. As such, they justify the transition from the argument or arguments to the conclusion (Kienpointner, 1992: 194).« (Wodak, 2006: 74)

We can find the very same definition in *Discourse and Discrimination* (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 75), in *The Discourse of Politics in Action* (Wodak, 2009: 42), in Michal Krzyzanowski's chapter »On the 'Europeanisation' of Identity Constructions in Polish Political Discourse after 1989«, published in *Discourse and Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe* (Galasinska and Krzyzanowski, 2009: 102), and in John E. Richardson's paper (co-authored with R.Wodak) »The Impact of Visual Racism: Visual arguments in political leaflets of Austrian and British far-right parties« (manuscript, p. 3), presented at the 2008 Venice Argumentation Conference[2]. In addition to the above definition, Richardson (2004: 230) talks of *topoi* »as reservoirs of **generalised key ideas** from which specific statements or arguments can be generated«. Surprisingly, both definitions take the concept of *topos/topoi* as something self-evident, generally known and widely used, as, for example, *bread, table, engine, to write, to clean up*, and many other everyday obviousnesses.

Also, one could wonder about the purpose of the two definitions: are *topoi* »content-related **warrants**« or are they »generalised key **ideas**«? Because warrants are much more than (just) ideas, they demand much more to be able to secure the transition from an argument to a conclusion than just being »generalised ideas« (namely, a certain structure, or mechanism, in the form of an instruction or a rule). While ideas, generalised ideas, lack (at least) a kind of mechanism the warrants seem to poses in order to be able to connect the argument to the conclusion.

But, let us proceed one step at a time.

In the publications I've mentioned above[3], we get to see the lists (reservoires?) of the(se) *topoi*. In the chapter »The Discourse-Historical Approach« (Wodak, 2006: 74) we read that »the **analyses** of typical content-related argument schemes can be carried out **against the background** of the **list of *topoi*** though incomplete and not always disjunctive«, given in the following table:

1. Usefulness, advantage

2. Uselessness, disadvantage

3. Definition, name-interpretation

4. Danger and threat

5. Humanitarianism

6. Justice

7. Responsability

8. Burdening, weighting

9. Finances

10. Reality

11. Numbers

12. Law and right

13. History

14. Culture

15 Abuse.

In Richardson (2008, p. 4) we get exactly the same list of *topoi*, but this time they are characterised as »the most common *topoi* which are used when **writing or talking about** '**others**'«, specifically about migrants.

In *The Discourse of Politics in Action* (Wodak, 2009: 44) we get the following list of »the most common *topoi* which are used when **negotiating specific agenda in meetings, or trying to convince an audience of one's interests, visions or positions**«:

1. *Topos* of Burdening

2. *Topos* of Reality

3. *Topos* of Numbers

4. *Topos* of History

5. *Topos* of Authority

6. *Topos* of Threat

7. *Topos* of Definition

8. *Topos* of Justice

9. *Topos* of Urgency

In *The Discourse of Politics in Action* we can also find *topos* of challenge, *topos* of the actual costs of enlargement (of EU), *topos* of belonging, and *topos* of 'constructing a hero'. Here the analyses of typical content-related argument schemes (as found in discourse) are not just carried out »against the background of the list of *topoi*«, but some parts of discourse »gain the status of *topoi*« (*topos* of the actual costs ...). So, as far as the (ontic) status of *topoi* is concerned, we got a bit further: there isn't just a list of *topoi* that can serve as the background (for the analysis), more *topoi* can be added to the list. And, presumably, if *topoi* can be added to the list, they can probably also be deleted from the list. Unfortunatelly, in the publications I am talking about, we get no epistemological or methodological criteria as to how this is done, i.e. why, when and how certain *topoi* can be added to the list, or why, when and how they can be taken off the list[4].

The most puzzling (and, for the very same reason, illuminating) list of *topoi* can be found in Krzyzanowski (2009: 103). In his article we get the »list of **the** *topoi* **identified** in the respective corpora« (the national and the European one - IŽŽ). Here they are:

Topoi in the national corpus

1. *Topos* of national uniqueness

2. *Topos* of definition of the national role

3. *Topos* of national history

4. *Topos* of East and West

5. *Topos* of past and future

6. Modernisation *topos*

7. *Topos* of the EU as a national necessity

8. *Topos* of the EU as a national test

9. *Topos* of the organic work

10. *Topos* of Polish pragmatism and Euro-realism

Topoi in the European corpus

Topos of diversity in Europe

Topos of European history and heritage

Topos of European values

Topos of European unity

Topos of Europe of various speeds

Topos of core and periphery

Topos of European and national identity

Topos of Europe as a Future Orientation

Modernatisation *topos*

Topos of the Polish national mission in the European Union

Topos of joining the EU at any cost

Topos of preferential treatment.

How these *topoi* were »identified«, and what makes them »**the** *topoi*« (not just simply »*topoi*«), we don't get to know; Krzyzanowski just lists them as such. Is there another list that helped them identify? If so, it must be very different from the lists we have just mentioned. Maybe there are several different lists? If so, who constructs them? When, where, and especially, **for what purpose and how**? Is there a kind of a grid, conceptual or in some other way epistemological and/or methodological that helps us/ them do that? If so, where can we find it? And how was it conceptually constructed? And if there isn't any grid, how do we get all these (different) lists of *topoi*? By casuistry, intuition, rule of a thumb? And when we (finally) do get those lists, do they ever change (and how), or are they here to stay (and why)? Are they universal, just general, or maybe only contin-

gent? Judging from the lists we have just seen there are no rules or criteria, the only methodological precept seems to be: »anything goes«!

In philosophy (of science), from 14th century onward, we have something called Occam's razor. It could be phrased as *Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem*, which could be roughly translated as »entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity.« Or in alternative version: *Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate,* which translates as »plurality should not be posited without necessity.«

In the lists of *topoi* we have just browsed (through), Occam's razor was, no doubt, left without work. We've seen identical/similar bundles of *topoi* for different purposes or occasions, we've seen different bundles of *topoi* for identical/similar purposes or occasions, we've seen different bundles of *topoi* for different occasion, and we've seen pretty exotic bundles of *topoi* for pretty particular/singular purposes. Which leads us to a key question: can **anything** be or become a *topos*? And, consequentially, what actually **is** a *topos*?

But before we try to answer these questions, let us have a look at how these *topoi* are used in the respective works.

In *Discourse and Discrimination* (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 75) as well as in »The Discourse-Historical Approach« (Wodak, 2006: 74), we can find the following definition of the *topos* of advantage (many more *topoi* are listed, of course, but for the purpose of this article, I can only discuss a few):

> »The **topos** of advantage or usefulness can be paraphrased by means of the following conditional: if an action under a specific relevant point of view will be useful, then one should perform it (...) To this **topos** belong different subtypes, for example the **topos** of 'pro bono publico' ('to the advantage of all'), the **topos** of 'pro bono nobis' (to the advantage of us'), and the **topos** of 'pro bono eorum' ('to the advantage of them').«

And then the definition is illustrated by the following example:

> »In a decision of the Viennese municipal authorities (...), the refusal of a residence permit is set out as follows:

> *Because of the private and family situation of the claimant, the refusal of the application at issue represents quite an intrusion into her private and family life. The public interest, which is against the residence permit, is to be valued more strongly than the contrasting pri-*

vate and family interests of the claimant. Thus, it had to be decided according to the judgement.«

If a *topos* is supposed to connect an argument with a conclusion, one would expect that a reconstruction would follow, namely, what is the argument (in the quoted fragment), what is the conclusion (in the quoted fragment), how the above mentioned *topos* is connecting the two, and where is the analysis (of the quoted fragment). Unfortunatelly, all these elements are missing (including the analysis); the definition and the quoted fragment are all there is.

It is also interesting to follow, how the working of *topoi* is described (especially in *Discourse & Discrimination* which is the most thorough in this respect): *topoi* are mostly »employed« (p. 75), or »found« (p. 76), when speaking about their supposed application in different texts, but also »traced back (to the conclusion rule)« (p. 76) or »based on (conditionals)« (p. 77), when speaking about their possible frames of definitions. How *topoi* are »based on (conditionals)«, or »traced back (to the conclusion rule)«, and how these operations relate to argument(s) and conclusion(s) that *topoi* are supposed to connect is not explained.

Let us have a look at another example, this time from *Discourse of Politics in Action* (Wodak, 2009: 97):

> *»Among MEPs[5] no one cluster characteristics is particularly prominent; however, most MEPs mention that member states share a certain cultural, historical and linguistic richness that binds them together, despite differences in specifics; **this topos** of diversity **occurs in most official speeches** (Weiss, 2002). Among the predicational strategies employed by the interviewees, we see repeated **reference** to a common culture and past (**topos** of history, **i.e. shared cultural, historical and linguistic traditions; similar social models**) and a common present and future (i.e. European social model; 'added value' of being united; a way for the future). Morover, if identity is to some extent 'based on the formation of sameness and difference' (**topos of difference; strategy of establishing uniqueness**; Wodak et al., 1993: 36-42), we see this in the frequent refferal to Europe, especially in terms of its social model(s), as* not *the US or Asia (most prominently, Japan).«*

Let us try to reconstruct the »topological« part of this analysis.

Three *topoi* are mentioned: *topos* of diversity, *topos* of history and *topos* of difference. Surprisingly, only the *topos* of history is listed and explained in the list of *topoi* on p. 44: »*Topos* of History - because history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation.« The absence of the other two should probably be accounted for with the following explanation on pages 42-43:

> »These *topoi* have so far been investigated in a number of studies on election campaigns (Pelinka and Wodak, 2002), on parliamentary debates (Wodak and van Dijk, 2000), on policy papers (Reisigl and Wodak, 2000), on 'voices of migrants' (Krzyzanowski and Wodak, 2008), on visual argumentation in election posters and slogans (Richardson and Wodak, forthcoming), and on media reporting (Baker et al., 2008).«

But in the study »on visual argumentation in election posters and slogans«, for example, the(se) *topoi* are not discussed at all, they are presented as a **fixed list of names (of *topoi*)**, without any explanation of their functioning, while the authors (Richardson and Wodak) make occasional reference to their names (not to the mechanism of their functioning), just as Wodak does in the above example from *The Discourse of Politics in Action*. In argumentation theory, such an »approach« would be called *fallacy of circular reasoning (petitio principii)*.

Furthermore, *topoi* are characterised as (Wodak, 2009: 43) being applied »to justify and legitimize positions by **providing** '**common-places**', instead of substantial evidence«, or »some *topoi* are **used as appeals** to human rights, to democracy or to justice«, or »*topoi* are used to **promote** such **typical ambiguities**, which serve as quasi-argumentative shortcuts linking unclear moves in negotiations, decision-making and so forth.« How all these rather different characterisations are linked to the definition of *topos* as a warrant connecting the argument with the conclusion is, once more, not explained, that is all the analysis we get (as far as *topoi* are concerned).

If, again, *topos* is to serve the purpose of connecting an argument with a conclusion (as respective works emphatically repeat), one would expect at least a minimal reconstruction, but there is none. What we see could be reconstructed as reffering to *topoi* or evoking them or simply mentioning them, which mostly serves the purpose of legitimating the (already existing) discourse and/or text analysis, but gives little analytical or theorethical added value in terms of argumentation analysis.

When I speak of reconstruction, what I have in mind is (at least) a minimal syllogistic or enthymematic structure of the following type (as an example, I am using one of the topics from *The Discourse of Politics in Action* (Wodak, 2009: 132-142), namely the problem of EU enlargement):

1) If a specific action costs too much money, one should perform actions that diminish the costs. (*Topos* connecting argument with conclusion)[6]

2) EU enlargement costs too much money. (Argument)

3) EU enlargment should be stopped/slowed down ... (Conclusion)

A real case in point of such hunting for *topoi* is the analysis we find in Krzyzanowski (2009: 104). First he gives an example from one of his corpora, then he provides an analysis:

Example:

> »As General de Gaulle said, 'one's geography cannot be changed and one can only change one's geopolitics'. Two dictators, Hitler and Stalin, changed our geography. Yet, with help of democratic institutions of the West and also thanks to a democratic rebirth in the East, we have been changing our geopolitics on our own in the recent years. Our current endeavours to join NATO and the European Union, our efforts to create new shapes of the regional politics, shall be seen as crucial, yet only as fragments of construction of a new, just and solid-based European order (PS-13: 2).«

Analysis:

> »The fact that it is the *national* and not any other form of history which is eventually invoked in discourse constitutes an attempt typical of the constructions of national identities and identifications. In turn, the *topos of East and West* emphasises another strictly national aspect of the first corpus in question. It includes a set of elements of pre-1989 political language which very strongly emphasised the differences that existed between Europe's East and West and which reinforced the devisions introduced by the post-Second World war geopolitical order. Accordingly, this *topos* **seeks** (!) a unique placement of Poland above the devisions of East and West, and thus (**heading back** (!) into

the *topos of national uniqueness*) reinforces Poland's attractiveness *vis-a-vis* the European Union: it **argues** (!) that Poland has a unique role as a 'bridge' between Europe's East and West. Then, the *topos of past and future* also **constructs** (!) Polish national identifications, yet within the dichotomy between collective 'scope of experience' and 'horizon of expectations' (Koselleck, 1989). While this *topos* is used to emphasize that the Polish past might have been troubled and negative (...), it **insists** (!) that the Polish 'European' future will be almost entirely   positive and peaceful.

Unlike the previously **elaborated** (sic!) *topoi*, the *topos of modernization* clearly stands out and **reaches beyond** (!) the constructions of national identification. It **focuses** (!) mostly on presenting the European Union as carrying some unique modernising force which would help reform Polish state and society. The *topos* of modernisation is therefore frequently tied to the *topos of the EU as a national necessity* and to the *topos of the EU as a national test* of which both construct the 'power' of the Union over Poland in a similar way. By implying that the Union is characterised by some unique principles and standards of social and political organisation (...), the *topos* of modernisation, contrary to the previous ones, constructs a very positive image of the Union to the detriment of Poland, which is portrayed in a negative way.«

Surprisingly, we learn that *topoi* in this rather long excerpt are »elaborated«, while Krzyzanowski doesn't even gloss (on) them, let alone define them or give a possible pattern of their functionning (as Reisigl and Wodak do in the first part of *Discourse and Discrimination*). In his analysis, the words and phrases that are labeled *topoi* not only do not serve to connect the arguments and the conclusions, but act on their own: they can be arguments and conclusions, sometimes even both (actually, it is rather difficult to identify what arguments and conclusions could be in this text). Even more, they are clearly and openly antropomorphized, since they »seek«, »head back«, »argue«, »construct«, »insist«, »reach beyond« and »focus« (if we stay with the quoted part of the article).

In their seminal work *Traité de l'argumentation - La nouvelle rhétorique* (1958/1983: 112-113), Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca bitterly commented on the degeneration of rhetoric in the course of history, but what we have just seen in the above quote is not just degeneration, but pure vulgarisation and abuse of one of the most important rhetorical

concepts, the concept of *topoi*. So, it is probably high time that we answer the crucial question: what **are** *topoi*?

It is quite surprising that none of the quoted works even mention the origins of *topoi* (theory), their extensive treatment in many works and the main authors of these works, namely Aristotle and Cicero. And I have already mentioned that the definition, borrowed from Kienpointner, does not come from them either (i.e. Aristotle and Cicero)..

All this is even more surprising because it is today almost a commonplace (a topos of its own, if I may say so) that for Aristotle a *topos* is a **place** to look for arguments (which is true), a heading or department where **a number of rhetorical arguments** can be easily found (which is true as well), and that those arguments are ready for use – which is a rather big misunderstanding. According to Aristotle (and above all, according to many of his commentators), *topoi* are supposed to be of two kinds: general or common *topoi*, appropriate for use everywhere and anywhere, regardless of situation, and specific *topoi*, in their applicability limited mostly to the three genres of oratory (judicial, deliberative and epideictic; but we will come to that later). Or, as Aristotle (Rh. 1358a31-32 1.2.22) puts it: »By specific topics I mean the propositions peculiar to each class of things, by universal those common to all alike«.

The Aristotelian *topos* (literally: 'place', 'location') is an **argumentative scheme**, which enables a dialectician or rhetorician to construe an argument for a given conclusion. The majority of Aristotle's interpreters see *topoi* as the (basic) elements for enthymemes, the rhetorical syllogisms.[7] The use of *topoi* or *loci*, as the Romans have called them, can be traced back to early rhetoricians (mostly referred to as *sophists*) such as Protagoras or Gorgias. But, while in earlier rhetoric *topos* was indeed understood as a complete pattern or formula, a ready made argument that can be mentioned at a certain stage of a speech (to produce a certain effect, or even more important to justify a certain conclusion) – an understanding that also prevailed with the Renaissance -, most of the Aristotelian *topoi* are **general instructions** allowing a conclusion of a **certain form** (**not content**), to be derived from premises of **a certain form** (**not content**). That is why I emphasized that a rather widespread conviction that Aristotelian *topoi* were places where ready to use arguments could be found was a big misunderstanding. In fact, it is even more the other way round.

If we look at the list of common *topoi*, usually attributed to Aristotle[8]:

Common *Topoi*	Special *Topoi*
Definition	Judicial
Genus / Species	justice (right)
Division	injustice (wrong)
Whole / Parts	Deliberative
Subject / Adjuncts	the good
Comparison	the unworthy
Similarity / Difference	the advantageous
Degree	the disadvantageous
Relationship	Ceremonial
Cause / Effect	virtue (the noble)
Antecedent / Consequence	vice (the base)
Contraries	
Contradictions	
Circumstances	
Possible / Impossible	
Past Fact / Future Fact	
Testimony	
Authorities	
Witnesses	
Maxims or Proverbs	
Rumors	
Oaths	
Documents	
Law	
Precedent	
The supernatural	
Notation and Conjugates	

and if we compare them with the list of his categories (from *Metaphysics*):

Substance

Quantity

Quality

Relation

Place

Time

Position

State

Action

Affection

it becomes pretty obvious that Aristotle derived his common topics from his categories. While categories represent the most general (and basic) relations between different entities in the world (and are, therefore, metaphysical in nature), the common topics (i.e. *topoi*) represent the most general (and basic) relations between concepts, notions, or words representing (or denoting) these different entities in the world. That is why Aristotle **could** present them as a »list« (though it really wasn't a list in the sense DHA is using the term): because they were so very general, so very basic, that they **could have been** used in every speech or writing. Intentionally or not. Which is not the case with the DHA lists of *topoi* we have been discussing above: these *topoi* can not be used in just any situation, but in rather particular situations, especially the *topoi* »identified« by Krzyzanowski (in that regard they could be classified not as common *topoi*, but more likely as specific *topoi*, something Aristotle called *idia* (*idia* could be roughly translated as »what is proper to...«; »what belongs to...«)). Also, this »list« of common *topoi* wasn't there for possible or prospective authors »to check their arguments against it«. This »list« was there for general use, offering a stock of (possible and potential) common *topoi* for (possible and potential) future arguments (and speeches).

Here is a short (and schematic) overview of how Aristotle defines the mechanics and the functioning of *topoi* and their parts in his *Topics*, a work that preceded *Rhetoric*. We have to start with a few definitions.

Problems (what is at stake, what is being discussed) are expressed by *propositions*. Every *proposition* consists of a *subject* and *predicate(s)* that belong(s) to the subject. These *predicates* (usually referred to as *predicables*) are of four kinds: *definition, genus, property*, and *accident*:

»*Definition* is a phrase indicating the essence of something.« (T. I. v. 39-40)
»A *genus* is that which is predicated in the category of essence of several things which differ in kind.« (T. I. v. 32-33)
»A *property* is something which does not show the essence of a thing but belongs to it alone and is predicated convertibly of it.« (T. I. v. 19-21)
»An *accident* is that which is none of these things ... but still belongs to the thing.« (T. I. v. 4-6)

And here is how Aristotle describes the role of these *predicables* and their interdependence:

»Now the bases of **arguments** are equal in number and identical with the subjects of **reasonings**. From **arguments** arise '**propositions**', while the subjects or reasoning are '**problems**'. Now every proposition and every problem indicates either a **genus** or a **peculiarity** or an **accident**; for the **differentia** also, being **generic** in character, should be ranged with the **genus**. But since part of the **peculiarity** indicates the **essence** and part does not do so, let the **peculiarity** be divided into the two above-mentioned parts and let that which indicates the **essence** be called a '**definition**', and let the remaining part be termed a '**property**' in accordance with the nomenclature usually assigned in these cases.« (T. I. iv. 15-23)

These are the theorethical and methodological **preliminaries that lead us to** *topoi*, not yet the *topoi* themselves! To be able to select subject appropriate claims (premises for concrete (context-dependent) reasonings) from this pool of (potential) propositions, we need *organa* (tools). Aristotle distinguishes four:

»The means by which we shall obtain an abundance of **reasonings** are four in number:

    1) the provision of **propositions**,

    2) the ability to distinguish in how many senses a **particular expression** is used,

    3) the discovery of **differences** and

    4) the investigation of **similarities**.«

<div align="right">(T. I xiii. 21-26)</div>

Strictly speaking, we are still not dealing with *topoi* here, though very often and in many interpretations[9] the four *organa* as well as the four *predicables* **are** considered to be *topoi* (in the case of *predicables* maybe even **the** *topoi*).

Another complicating moment in this respect may be that Aristotle described *topoi* as »empty places« where concrete arguments, for different purposes, can be found. And even if it sounds paradoxical, it is quite logical: if those places weren't empty, allowing for each concrete matter to be moulded in them, but already filled up, they just wouldn't be common anymore, and we wouldn't be able to use them for each and every subject-matter, but just in that one described and defined with the concrete content of a particular premise.

As one of Aristotle's ambiguous characterizations of *topos* says – and he has given many, not always very consistent one with another - (Rhet. 1403a17-18 2.26.1): »I call the same thing element and *topos*; for an element or *topos* is a heading under which many enthymemes fall«. It is important to emphasize that by 'element' Aristotle doesn't mean a proper part of the enthymeme, but a general form under which many concrete enthymemes of the same type can be subsumed. According to this definition *topos* is a general argumentative form or pattern, and concrete arguments are instantiations of this general form. Or as *Auctor ad Herennium* puts it (3-29.15ss): *loci* are the background, and concrete arguments are *imagines* (images) on that background.

In the *Topics* Aristotle actually established a very complex typology of *topoi* with hundreds of particular *topoi*: around 300 in the *Topics*, but just 29 in the *Rhetoric*[11]. Two important sub-types of his typology are;

a)   *topoi* concerning opposites, and

b)   *topoi* concerning (semantic) relationships of 'more and less'.

Here are two examples:

Ad a)

> *If an action Y is desirable in relation to an object X, the contrary action Y' should be disapproved of in relation to the same object X.*

> This **is** a *topos* (as Aristotle would have formulated it). And **this** is **its application to a concrete subject matter** that can serve as a general premise in an *enthymeme* (*topos* can't):

> »If it is desirable to act in favor of one's friends, it should be disapproved of to act against one's friends.«

Ad b)

> *If a predicate can be ascribed to an object X more likely than to an object Y, and the predicate is truly ascribed to Y, then the predicate can even more likely be ascribed to X.*

> Once more, **this** is a *topos*. And **this is its application to a concrete subject matter** that can serve as a general premise in an *enthymeme* (*topos* can't):

> »Whoever beats his father, even more likely beats his neighbour.«

These examples may sound kind of square and flat nowadays. But here are a few Aristotelian *topoi* that could well be used in critical discourse analysis (instead of just checking the possible arguments »against the background of the list of *topoi*«). They are not »common truths«, or »generally accepted probabilities«, but a kind of precepts for finding and testing these »common truths« or »generally accepted probabilities«:

»For **philosophic** purposes we must deal with propositions from the point of view of **truth**, but for purposes of **dialectic**, with a view to **opinion**. Propositions must always be taken in their **most universal form**.« (T. I. xiv. 30-31)

»One commonplace is to look whether your opponent has assigned as an **accident** something which belongs in some other way.« (T. II. ii. 34-36)

»Another commonplace is to make **definitions** both of the accident and of that to which it belongs, either of both separately or one of them, and then see if anything untrue has been assumed as **true** in the **definitions**. For example, to see if it is possible to wrong a god, **you must ask, what does** '**wrong**' **mean**?« (T. II. ii. 30-34)

»Furthermore, if a term is used with more than one meaning and it has been stated that it belongs to or does not belong to something, we ought to demonstrate one of the several meanings if it is impossible to demonstrate both.« (T. II iii 23-26)

It should be pretty clear by now, I think, that we can distinguish two ways in which Aristotle frames *topoi* in his Topics. Even more, *topoi* in the Topics would (usually) be twofold, they would consist of an instruction, and on the basis of this instruction a rule would be formulated:

1)   Instructions (precepts): »Check whether C is D.«

2)   Rules (laws): »If C is D, then B will be A.«

Instructions would (usually) check the relations between the four *predicables* (*definition, genus, property, accident*), and upon this check up, a kind of a rule would be formulated that could - applied to a certain subject-matter - serve as a general premise of an *enthymeme*.

Topoi therefore serve as heuristic devices, and can be of three types:

1) Some *topoi* instruct one to examine, for instance, whether »the contrary of A holds of the contrary of B«, if B is A is to be proved.

2) Other *topoi* consist merely of such an introductory label and an example of the type of argument in question. Here the introductory label

is apparently meant to guide as associative process that might lead to an argument rather than to give a precise description of a premise to be used in a rhetorical syllogism.

3) A third group provides no logical analysis or characterization of a possible type of argument. Aristotle occasionally acknowledges that he is drawing on useful material he found in contemporary handbooks.

What is especially important for our discussion here (i. e. the use of *topoi* in critical discourse analysis) is that though they were primarily meant to be tools for finding arguments, ***topoi* can also be used for testing given arguments**. Which seems to be a much more critical and productive procedure than testing hypothetical arguments »against the background of the list of *topoi*«. But to be able to do that, DHA analysts should

1) **clearly (unequivocally) identify and formulate arguments and conclusions in a given discourse fragment**, and

2) show how (possible) *topoi* relate to these arguments.

In the DHA works quoted in the first part of our article, neither of the two steps was taken.

This is how *topoi* were treated in the *Topics*. But when we turn from the *Topics* to the (later) *Rhetoric*, we are faced with the problem that the use (and meaning) of *topos* in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is much more heterogeneous than in the *Topics*. Beside the *topoi* which perfectly comply with the description(s) given in the *Topics*, there is an important group of *topoi* in the *Rhetoric*, **which contain instructions for arguments not of a certain form, but with a certain (concrete) predicate** (for example, that something is good, honorable, just, etc.).

In *Rhetoric* **1358a2-35 I.2** Aristotle distinguishes between general/common *topoi* on the one hand and specific *topoi* on the other. In that same chapter, he explains the sense of 'specific' by saying that some things are specific to physics, others to ethics, etc. But **from chapter I.3 on he makes us think that 'specific' refers to the different species of rhetoric, so that some *topoi* are specific to deliberative, other to epideictic, and still others to judical speech**. While he is inclined to call the general or common *topoi* simply *topoi*, he uses several names for the specific *topoi* (*idiai protaseis, eidê, idioi topoi*). Therefore, it may be tempting to call the specific *topoi* 'material' and the common *topoi* 'formal'. But in doing so we may easily overlook that **some of the common *topoi* (in chapters II.23-24) are not all based on those formal cate-**

gories on which the *topoi* of the *Topics* rely (the four predicables)**. Most of them are 'common' only in the sense that they are not specific to one single species of speech, but to all of them** (Aristotle calls those *koina*, »what is general, common«). Some of them offer strategic advice, for example, to turn what has been said against oneself upon the one who said it. For this reason, it would be completely misleading to say that the functions of common *topoi* and specific *topoi* (i.e. *idia*) are complementary, insofar as the common *topoi* **offer the logical form to a content that has been provided by the specific ones** (*idia*).

With Romans *topoi* became *loci* (which is a great »improvement« for the speakers of Romance languages ...), and Cicero literally defines them as places, as »the home of all proofs« (De or. 2.166.2), »pigeonholes in which arguments are stored« (Part. Or. 5.7-10) or simply »storehouses of arguments« (Part. Or. 109.5-6). Also, their number was reduced from 300 hundred (in *Topics*) or 29 (in *Rhetoric*) to up to 19 (depending on how we count). Here is a list of Cicero's *loci* corresponding to the *topoi* in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* B 23 (Rubinelli, 2009: 143):

Topos from opposites: *Locus ex contrario*

Topos from correlatives

Topos from grammatical forms of the same word: *Locus ex coniugatis*

Topos from the more and the less: *Ex comparatione maiorum*

<div align="center">Ex comparatione minorum</div>

Topos from the belonging on a similar degree: *Ex comparatione parium*

Topos from definition: *Definitio*

Topos from division: *Partium enumeratio*

Topos from induction: *Ex similitudine*

Topos from a [previous] judgement: *Loci extrinseci*

Topos from the parts: *Partitio*

Topos from the consequence: *Ex adiunctis*

Topos from analogy: *Ex similitudine*

Topos from looking at contradictions: *Ex repugnantibus*

Topos from the cause: *Ex efficientibus rebus*

Topos from the meaning of a name: *Notatio*

Although the list correlates pretty much (though not completely) with Aristotle's list from the *Rhetoric* B 23, there is a difference in use: this is **a list of concepts** that may trigger an **associative process** rather than a collection of (implicit) rules and precepts reducible to rules, as the *topoi* in Aristotle's *Topica* are (as we have seen). In other words, Cicero's *loci* mostly function as **subject-matter indicators** and ***loci communes***[12]. Or, in Rubinelli's words (2009: 107):

> » A *locus communis* is a ready-made argument that, as Cicero correctly remarks, may be transferable (...) to several similar cases. Thus, the adjective *communis* refers precisely to the extensive applicability of this kind of arguments; however, it is not to be equated to the extensive applicability of the Aristotelian *topoi* /.../. The latter are 'subjectless', while the former work on a much more specific lever: they are effective mainly in juridical, deliberative and epideictic contexts.«

But being ready-made, doesn't mean that they prove anything specific about the case that is being examined, or that they add any factual information to it. As Rubinelli puts it (2009: 148):

> »... a *locus communis* is a ready-made argument. It **does not guide the construction of an argument**, but it can be transferable to several similar cases and **has the main function of putting the audience in a favourable frame of mind**.«

Which brings us a bit closer to how *topoi* are used in DHA. In the works quoted in this paper, the authors never construct or re-construct arguments from the discourse fragments they analyse by invoking *topoi* - despite the fact that they are repeatedly defining *topoi* as connecting arguments with conclusions -, they just hint at them with short glosses (not even definitions). And since there is no reconstruction of concrete arguments on the basis of *topoi*, hinting at certain *topoi*, referring to them or just mentionning them, can only serve the purpose that could be described as »putting the audience in a favourable frame of mind.« »Favourable frame of mind« in this respect would mean invoking or directing reader's attention to a »commonly known or discussed« topic, but without explicitly phrasing or reconstructing it, so the reader can never really know what exactly the author had in mind and what exactly he/she wanted to say.

Let us jump from the old rhetoric to the new rhetoric now, skiping more than 2000 years of degeneration of rhetoric, as Chaim Perelman puts it in his influential work *Traité de l'argumentation - La nouvelle rhétorique*.

Commonplaces (*topoi*) are caracterised by their extreme generality, says Perelman (1958/1983: 112-113), which makes them usable in every situation. It is the degeneration of rhetoric and the lack of interest for the study of places that has led to this unexpected consequences that »oratory developments« - as he ironically calls them - against fortune, sensuality, laziness, etc., which school exercises were repeating *ad nauseam* became qualified as commonplaces (*loci, topoi*), despite their extremly particular character. By commonplaces we more and more understand, Perelman continues, what Giambattista Vico called »oratory places«, in order to distinguish them from the places treated in Aristotle's *Topics*. Nowadays, commonplaces are caraterised by banality which doesn't exclude extreme specificity and particularity. These places are nothing more than **Aristotelian commonplaces applied to particular subjects**, concludes Perelman. That is why there is a tendency to forget that (common)places form an indispensable arsenal in which **everybody who wants to persuade others** should find what he is looking for.

And that is exactly what is happening in DHA approach to *topoi*. Moreover, the works quoted in the first part of the article give the impression that DHA isn't using the Aristotelian (or Ciceronian) *topoi*, but the so called »literary *topoi*« as developed by Ernst Robert Curtius in his *Europaeische Literatur und Lateinisches Mittelalter* (1990: 62-105). And what is a literary *topos*? Well, already oral histories passed down from pre-historic societes contain literary aspects, characters, or settings which appear again and again in stories from ancient civilizations, religious texts and even more modern stories. These **recurrent (and repetetive) motives** or *leitmotifs* would be labeled literary *topoi*. »They are intelectual themes, **suitable for development and modification at the orator's pleasure**«, argues Curtius (1990: 70). And *topoi* **is** one of the expressions Wodak is using as synonyms for *leitmotifs* (2009: 119):

> »In the analysis of text examples which were recorded and transcribed I will first focus on the **leitmotifs, which manifeste themselves in various ways: as *topoi***, as justification and legitimation strategies, as rules which structure conversation and talk, or as recurring lexical items ...«

For the *New Rhetoric* (Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958/1983: 113) *topoi* aren't defined as places that hide arguments, but as very general premises that help us build **values and hierarchies**, something Perelman, whose background was jurisprudence, was especially concerned about. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca therefore distinguish two main types of

techniques of argumentation: **schemes of association and schemes of dissociation** (a dichotomy that turned out as very handy in latter applications and analyses within argumentation theory). Let us have a quick look at the associative schemes:

Associative schemes

I. Quasilogical arguments:
1. Contradiction and incompatibility
2. Identity and definition
3. Tautology
4. Rule of justice
5. Argument of reciprocity
6. Argument of transitivity
7. Inclusion of the part in the whole
8. Division of the whole into its parts
9. Argument by comparison
10. Argument by sacrifice
11. Probabilities

II. Arguments based on the structure of reality
A. Sequential relations
1. Cause-effect
2. Pragmatic argument
3. Means-ends
4. Argument of waste
5. Argument of direction
6. Unlimited development

B. Relations of co-existence
1. Person-act
2. Argument from authority
3. Speech-speaker
4. Group-member
5. Act-essence
6. Symbolic relation

C. Double hierarchy
D. Differences of degree/order

An attentive reader will no doubt notice that most of the subtypes of class I are based on well-known semantic relationships from the Topical tradition: opposites, identity, similarity and part-whole/genus-species. However, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca introduce an interesting case of identity-relationship called 'rule of justice'. The rationale of this special/new argument scheme is in a warrant that asks for identical treatment of entities or situations that can be subsumed under one and the same category.

Another novelty is to be found under I.10: arguments of sacrifice are supposed to increase the value of a goal by comparing it with the great effort, which has been invested to achieve it. And the gist of subtype I.11 lies in a presumption that some entities are considered to be similar enough to justify quasi-probabilistic inferences.

If we turn to the class II, we find three innovations: II.4 is used to argue against stopping before the goal of an action has been reached because of the energy already invested for performing the first stages of the action. II.5 is used to predict a definitive (disastrous) endpoint of a chain of causes and effects. And finally, II.6 also concerns predictions about chains of causes and effects, but in a positive way (unlimited development). So, in a way, the *New Rhetoric* is moving from (more) formal to less formal use.

But, in opinion of many argumentation theorists, *The New Rhetoric* has three main deficiencies:

1) Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca do not develop sufficient criteria for the distinction between sound and fallacious arguments.

2) They rarely provide explicit reconstructions of arguments, despite their clearly expressed intention to reconstruct their internal structure.

3) They don't develop systematic criteria for the demarcation of argument schemes, and they don't even claim that they are mutually exclusive.

In other words, Perelman left *topoi* on a somewhat descriptive level, and exactly the same could be said for the *Discourse-Historical Approach* within CDA[12].

But, in contrast to DHA, Perelman has made some very interesting and important observations regarding the role and the use of *topoi* in contemporary societies. He argued that (Perelman 1983: 114) even if it is the general places that mostly attract our attention, there is an undeniable interest in examining the most particular places **that are dominant in different societies and allow us to characterize them**. On the other side, even when we are dealing with very general places, it is remarkable

that for every place we can find an opposite place: to the superiority of lasting, which is a classic place, we could oppose the place of precarious, of something that only last a moment, which is a romantic place.

And this repartition gives us **the possibility to characterize societies**, not only in relation to their preference of certain values, but also according to the intensity of adherence to one or another member of the antithetic couple.

This sounds like a good research agenda for CDA, as far as its interest in argumentation is concerned: to find out what views and values are dominant in different societies, and **characterize these societies by reconstructing the topoi that underlie their discourses**. But in order to be able to implement such an agenda - an agenda that is actually very close to DHA's own agenda -, DHA should dismiss »the list of (prefabricated) *topoi*« that facilitates and legitimizes its argumentative endeavor somehow beforehand (the *topoi* are already listed, we just have to check our findings against the background of this list of *topoi*), and start digging for the *topoi* in concrete texts and discourses.

How does it achieve that?

Curiously enough, the same year that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca published their *New Rhetoric*, Stephen Toulmin published his *Uses of Argument*, probably the most detailed study of how *topoi* work. I say »curiously enough« because he doesn't use the terms »*topos*« or »*topoi*«, but the somewhat judicial term »warrant«. The reason for that seems obvious: he is trying to cover different »fields of argument«, and not all fields of argument, according to him, use *topoi* as their argumentative principles or bases of their argumentation. According to Toulmin (1958/1995: 94-107), if we have an utterance of the form, »If D then C« – where D stands for data or evidence, and C for claim or conclusion – such a warrant would act as a bridge and authorize the step from D to C (which also explains where Manfred Kienpointner's definition of *topos* comes from: not from Aristotle but from Toulmin). But then, a warrant may have a limited applicability, so Toulmin introduces qualifiers Q, indicating the strength conferred by the warrant, and conditions of rebuttal (or Reservation) R, indicating circumstances in which the general authority of the warrant would have to be set aside. And finally, in case the warrant is challenged in any way, we need some backing as well. His diagram of argumentation looks like this:

```
┌─────────────┐         ┌─────────────┐   ┌─────────┐
│ Grounds,    │         │ Qualifier   │   │ Claim   │
│ reasons of  │─────────│             │───│         │
│ evidence    │         │             │   │         │
└─────────────┘         └─────────────┘   └─────────┘
        │                      │
   ┌─────────────┐      ┌─────────────┐
   │ Warrant     │      │ Rebuttal    │
   │             │──────│             │
   └─────────────┘      └─────────────┘
        │
   ┌─────────────┐
   │ Backing     │
   │             │
   └─────────────┘
```

It is worth noting that in Toulmin's diagram, we are dealing with a kind of 'surface' and 'deep' structure: while data and claim stay on the surface, as they do in everyday communication, the warrant is – presumably because of its generality – »under the surface« (like the *topos* in enthymemes), and usually comes »above the surface« (only) when we try to reconstruct it. And how do we do that, how do we reconstruct a warrant?

What is attractive and useful about Toulmin's theory is the fact that he is offering a kind of a guided tour to the center of *topoi* in six steps, not just in three. All he asks is that you find/identify the claim or the standpoint of the text or discourse you are researching, and then (mostly for the beginners) he provides a set of five questions that lead you through the process.

If we return to our semi-hypothetical example with the *topos* of actual costs (of enlargement) (Wodak, 2009: 132-142):

1) If a specific action costs too much money, one should perform actions that diminish the costs.

2) EU enlargement costs too much money.
    ───

3) EU enlargment should be stopped/slowed down ...

and »translate« it into the Toulmin model, we could get the following:

Claim EU enlargement should be stopped/slowed down ...

What have you got to go on?

Datum EU enlargement costs too much money.

How do you get there?

Warrant If a specific action costs too much money, one should perform actions that diminish the costs.

Is that always the case?

Rebuttal No, but it generally/usually/very often is. Unless there are other reasons/arguments that are stronger/ more important ... In that case the warrant doesn't apply.

Then you can't be so definite in your claim?

Qualifier True: it is only *usually*... so.

But then, what makes you think at all that if a specific action costs too much money one should perform actions ...

Backing The history (of EU) shows...

If the analysis (text analysis, discourse analysis) would proceed in this way[13] - applying the above scheme to concrete pieces of discourse each time it wants to find the underlying *topoi* - the »lists of *topoi* in the background« would become unimportant, useless and obsolete (as they, actually, already are). Text mining (if I may borrow this expression from computational linguistics) would bring text's (or discourse's) **own *topoi*** to the surface, not the prefabricated ones. And these *topoi*, which would be the product of a concrete empirical analysis, could **then** indeed be compared with a (possible) list of »historical« *topoi* in the background. For contrastive or other reasons, depending on the analysis in question.

Therefore, if DHA really wants to make choices at each point in the research itself, and at the same time make these choices transparent (as it claims it does), taking all these steps (in finding the *topoi*) would be the only legitimate thing a credible and competent analysis should do. If DHA wants to incorporate argumentation **analysis** in its agenda, of course.

Notes

[1] All emphases (bold) in the article are mine (IŽŽ).

[2] The paper was recently published in *Critical Discourse Studies* 6/4 (2009), under the title »Recontextualising fascist ideologies of the past: right-wing discourses on employment and nativism in Austria and the United Kingdom«. In this article, I will be referring to the manuscript version.

[3] There are many more, I've just limited my analysis to the most recent ones.

[4] Let alone the fact that there is no (theoretical) explanation why there should be list(s) at all.

[5] Members of the European Parliament (IŽŽ).

[6] It is worth noting that each *topos* can (usually) have two »converse« forms. Therefore the phrasing of this *topos* could also read: »If a specific action costs too much money, this action should be stopped«, depending on the context, and/or on what we want to prove or disprove.

[7] An important and more than credible exception in this respect is Sara Rubinelli with her excellent and most thorough monograph on *Topoi, Ars Topica, The Classical Technique of Constructing Arguments from Aristotle to Cicero*, Argumentation Library, Springer, 2009.

[8] This table is an extrapolated and reworked version of the *topoi* listed in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* B 23. It was taken from an excellent website on rhetoric, S*ilva Rhetoricae* (http://humanities.byu.edu/rhetoric/Silva.htm).

[9] See Rubinelli, 2009: 8-14.

[10] The 29 *topoi* in the *Rhetoric* cannot all be found among the 300 *topoi* from the *Topics*. There is a long-standing and heated debate about where these 29 *topoi* come from, and how the list was composed. Rubinelli (2009: 71-73) suggests that their more or less »universal applicability« may be the criterion.

[11] Which is probably due to the fact that Cicero was selecting and using *loci* in conjunction with the so-called *stasis* theory (or issue theory). What is *stasis* theory? Briefly (and simplified), the orator has to decide what is at stake (why he has to talk and what he has to talk about): 1) whether something happened (or not); 2) what is it that happened; 3) what is the nature/quality of what happened; 4) what is the appropriate place/authority to discuss what has happened. And Cicero's *loci* »followed« this repartition.

[12] It should be emphasized, of course, that DHA is not an argumentation theory *per se*, it is just using argumentation (or some parts of it).

[13] Our sample analysis is, of course, purely hypothetical.

References:

Aristotle. (1989). *Topica* (Transl. by E. S. Forster). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Aristotle, (1991). *Art of Rhetoric* (Transl. by J.H. Freese). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Cicero, M. T. (2003). *Topica* (Transl. by T. Reinhardt). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Curtius, R. E. (1990). *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Fairclough, N. (1995). *Critical discourse analysis: the critical study of language*. Harlow: Longman.

Fairclough, N. (2000). *Discourse and Social Change*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Fairclough, N. (2003). *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*. London/New York: Routledge.

Galasinska, A. and Krzyzanowski, M. (eds.). (2009). *Discourse and Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kienpointner, M. (1992). *Alltagslogik*. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.

Perelman, Ch. and Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1983). *Traité de l'argumentation. La nouvelle rhétorique*. Bruxelles: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles.

Reisigl, M. and Wodak, R. (2001). *Discourse and Discrimination. Rhetoric of Racism and Antisemitism*. London/New York: Routledge.

Richardson, J. E. (2004). *(Mis)Representing Islam: the racism and rhetoric of British Broadsheet newspapers*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Richardson, J. E. and Wodak, R. (2008). The impact of visual racism: Visual arguments in political leaflets of Austrian and British far-right parties. (Manuscript. Paper presented at the 2008 Venice Argumentation Conference).

Rubinelli, S. (2009). *Ars Topica. The Classical Technique of Constructing Arguments from Aristotle to Cicero*. Berlin: Springer.

Toulmin, S. (1995). *The Uses of Argument*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

van Leeuwen, Th. (2004). *Introducing Social Semiotics*. London/New York: Routledge.

van Leeuwen, Th. (2008). *Discourse and Practice. New Tools for Critical Discourse Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

van Leuween, Th. and Kress, G. (2006). *Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design*. London/New York: Routledge.

Wodak, R. (2009). *The Discourse of Politics in Action*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wodak, R. and Chilton, P. (eds.). (2005). *A New Agenda in (Critical) Discourse Analysis*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (eds.). (2006). *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Sage.

Wodak, R. and van Dijk, T. (eds.). (2000). *Racism at the Top*. Klagenfurt: Drava.

Wodak, R., de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M. and Liebhart, K. (1999). *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

JOURNALISTIC (RE)PRODUCTION OF HISTORY: TELEVIZED COVERAGE OF RADOVAN KARADŽIĆ'S ARREST IN SERBIA

Karmen Erjavec

Zala Volčič

Introduction

On July 21 2008, Serbian media scene was chocked by event still hunting the Serbian community: the arrest of Radovan Karadžić. He was captured as Dragan Dabić in Belgrade, where he was cultivating a long white beard, practicing alternative medicine, was a regular health magazine contributor and even gave public lectures. According to the Serbian radical party, he is »the greatest Serbian hero«, but former UN ambassador Richard Hoolbrooke calls him »a European Osama bin Laden«. A day after his arrest, the television program entitled »Television Serbia on Radovan Karadžić« showed on Television Serbia (TS) achieved the highest ratings of any program in Serbia (Gledanost RTS, 2008). Serbian electronic media have been for decades one of the crucial producers and reproducers of dominant nationalistic ideology (Milivojević, 1996; 2007). As many authors point out (Milivojević, 2007; Milošević, 2008), the nationalistic framework still characterizes most prime-time television programs in Serbia.

In the Serbian context, poets have traditionally played a crucial role in invoking nationalistic sentiment, and in this respect the political ascendance of the nationalist poet and a politician Radovan Karadžić was not as exceptional as it might have been in other national contexts. Serbian leaders have long had poetic ambitions, and poets have played an important role in the national political imaginary (Žarković, 2008).[1] Specifically, many scholars also point to the nostalgic sentiments expressed in Serbian nationalistic poetry – these offer simplistic ideals in order to avoid confronting the realities of daily life. Nostalgic sentiments can, as Boym argues, express both love of the past and hate of the Other (Boym, 2001). Karadžić was notorious for inciting Serbian troops with his speeches and

poems full of nostalgic sentiments for Greater Serbia.[2] In his own poetry, the butchery he had led against »the Turks«– Bosnian Muslims – was openly expressed.[3] As Čolović (2002) points out, »exile, destruction, death, and return to a forsaken homeland« as well as »hatred« are themes that commonly feature in his works and actions. The titles of his poems are illustrative here: *Goodbye, Assassins*, *A Man Made of Ashes*, and *War Boots*. Čolović (2002: 34) calls Karadžić's poetry »war-propaganda folklore« that transfers »conflicts from the sphere of politics, economy and history into the extrapolated sphere of myth.« The role of poets in the war of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia has led Slavoj Žižek to famously declare that »instead of *the military-industrial complex*, we in post-Yugoslavia had the *military-poetic complex* personified in the twin figures of Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić« (Žižek, 2008: 17). This article explores the ways in which TS's journalists covered Karadžić's arrest, arguing that it complemented the aestheticization of politics enacted by his poetry. In this regard, we might supplement Žižek's account by noting the way in which the forms of forgetting, idealization, and nostalgia that characterized nationalist poetry were reproduced for mass audiences by the electronic media, creating a military-poetic-media-entertainment complex.

The first part of this paper introduces some historical frameworks and theoretical investigations. We briefly deal with Boym's »reflective« and »restorative« definitions of nostalgia – she distinguishes between two narratives of nostalgia that frame feelings of dislocation differently, since they both try to understand how we relate to a collective home (41). In the second part, we present a study which uncovers how TS's journalists exploit and further incorporate a particular social event (in our case, Karadžić's arrest) into nationalistic and a »restorative nostalgic« discourse. The research is based on critical discourse analysis (the analysis of recontextualization and the analysis of representation of social actors) (Fairclough, 1992; Van Leeuwen, 1996; Wodak, 1996, 2006). We argue that TS, while covering Karadžić's arrest, constructed a nationalistic discourse that invoked nostalgia for the prospect of the creation of Greater Serbia. Any connections between Karadžić, the Serbs, and especially the current government with war crimes in BH were brushed aside. This nostalgia for Greater Serbia, we argue, exemplifies a political paradox in Serbia: at the same time that information on the historical atrocities of the former Yugoslav regimes and of Serbia's role in these atrocities was being made available to the Serbian public, nostalgia for selected cultural aspects of the Serbian past is growing as well. The conclusions offer some observations directed towards answering how to refine theories of memory, nostalgia, and

journalistic/media culture in ways that might help to challenge the manipulation of popular discourses by those who seek to exacerbate the forms of nationalism, racism, and historical hatred that have divided the region.

The historical- political background

In 1986, the Serbian Academy of Science and Art prepared a *Memorandum* – a long list of Serbian grievances against their position within the Yugoslav federation – which articulated the need for a collective mobilization of the Serbs throughout Yugoslavia. Slobodan Milošević, a Serbian president from 1990-2000, reproduced historical and scientific data for the construction of the ideology of Greater Serbia. Its crucial vision was the idea that all ethnic Serbs need to live in the same state (MacDonald, 2002).

In BH Milošević's vision of Greater Serbia was literally carried out by Karadžić. It was in 1990 that Karadžić, at the time working at Sarajevo city hospital as a psychiatrist, helped to set up the nationalistic Serbian De-mocratic Party (SDS). SDS was formed in response to the rise of Croatian nationalistic parties in BH, and dedicated to achieve the goal of Greater Serbia – to ethnically cleanse different areas of the country of any non-Serbs. BH's first free, multi-party elections in November 1990 were won by three dominant nationalist parties and they all immediately engaged in endless quarrels over what course the country should follow. In 1991, when Bosnian parliament held a session on the referendum for Bosnian independence, Karadžić famously declared:

> If the Republic of Bosnia votes for independence the Serb paramilitari-es will make the Muslim people disappear, because the Muslims cannot defend themselves if there is war (in Williams and Scharf, 2002: 43).

Less than two years later, Radovan Karadžić declared the creation of an in-dependent Serbian Republic of BH (later renamed *Republika Srpska*) with its capital in Pale, a suburb of Sarajevo. He pronounced himself as the head of the state. Karadžić's political party, openly supported by Milošević, mo-bilized and organized the Bosnian Serbs in fighting against Bosnian Mu-slims (Bosniaks) and Croats in BH. The war in BH escalated in April 1992, when Bosnian Serbs started to besiege Sarajevo for 43 months, shelling Bosniak forces, and also terrorizing the civilian population with a relen-tless bombardments and sniper fire (MacDonald, 2002). Karadžić sought to eradicate any non-Serbs living in the city. Bosnian Serb forces – assisted by paramilitaries from Serbia proper – committed war crimes, including

ethnic cleansing, establishing concentration camps, destroying property, and massacring numerous sectors of the civilian population (97,207 civilian deaths) (*Population losses in Bosnia and Herzegovina 92-95,* 2007).

In his many public speeches Karadžić vigorously advocated the creation of a homogeneous Greater Serbia »by violence«, while he often skilfully related to specific historical events where Serbs had been positioned as »betrayed victims«. He used nostalgic practices, such as a constant focus on Serbian »old-centuries« warrior identity, as crucial mechanisms through which the very idea of »Serbianness« was reified. Karadžić was also well known for publicly celebrating the crimes against the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, claiming these were committed in the name of Greater Serbia (MacDonald, 2002). For example, on 15 October 1995 in RS parliament, Karadžić publicly stated that he does not regret the »radical mission« in Srebrenica and defined the massacre as the »defence against the Turks« (Repe, 2008: 45).[5]

On December 14 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement brought an end to the Bosnian war and divided BH into two entities: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (with 51% of the territory) in which mostly Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats live, and Republic Srpska (with 49% of the territory) populated almost exclusively by the Bosnian Serbs. Ironically, as many point out, the Agreement legalized Karadžić's politics and his Serbian enclave, Republic Srpska (Repe, 2008). Today, this political entity is almost ethnically pure, and functions as a state within a state, having its own parallel political institutions (Verdery and Burawoy, 1999). Karadžić succeeded where other Serbian politicians had failed (i.e. Milošević) – he has, *de facto,* enlarged the territory of Serbia while creating a Serbian state in BH. In that way he has at least partially, realized the myth of Greater Serbia (Repe, 2008).

During the arrest of Karadžić, the political situation in Serbia was tense and deeply divided. For example, on July 29 2008 the demonstrations against Karadžić's arrest were organized by all nationalistic oppositional political parties, including the Serb Radical Party. The crowd of roughly 15,000 members screamed and chanted his name, while singing »Karadžić is a hero of all heroes.« On Facebook, his advocates created various groups such as »Free Radovan Karadžić«, and »Freedom for Radovan Karadžić« to mobilize support. At the same time, death threats against the Serbian president Borislav Tadić were waged, framing him as a Serbian traitor and Serb hater.

Theoretical background

Collective Nostalgia

Nostalgia has been often understood through medical metaphors. Stewart (1993) characterizes nostalgia as a social disease, and Boym (2001) sees nostalgia as »the incurable modern condition« (xiv). The world nostalgia envisions is different from what would be created only from collection of memories.

Nostalgia can be experienced in private as well as in public spaces. According to Davis (1979: 122–123), private nostalgia is fuelled by particular, even intimate, personal memories of an individual; collective nostalgia relies on collective/public images, symbols, and signs available to many within the same historical and socio-cultural context. Collective nostalgia is available to larger communities (e.g. ethnic groups, nations) and is often used in order to forge a collective sense. As such, public nostalgia dwells in the content of the group's history, and exploits the group's cultural symbols. In this sense it becomes possible that different symbols help to trigger the nostalgic and nationalistic sentiment. For example, the Chetniks' (Serbian Serb nationalist guerrillas who fought against Nazi occupiers and Tito's partisans during the 2nd World War) iconography, frequently displayed during public events, provoked nostalgia for Greater Serbia.

Boym conceptualizes nostalgia into »reflective« versus »restorative« one. She defines »reflective« one as a more critical one, since it calls the truth into doubt. In writing about nostalgia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Boym argues that restorative nostalgia »attempts a transhistorical reconstruction of the lost home,« while reflective nostalgia »thrives in *algia*, the longing itself, and delays the homecoming – wistfully, ironically, desperately« (xviii). Moreover, restorative nostalgia »does not think of itself as nostalgia, but rather as truth and tradition,« while reflective nostalgia » rests on the ambivalences of human longing and belonging and does not shy away from the contradictions of modernity« (xviii). On one hand, a reflective mode of nostalgia provides both a complicated emotional state and a complex relation to history. Reflective nostalgia is based on cultural memory, but it is concerned with individual and historical time. In this way, reflective nostalgia allows for the endorsement of a specific identity narrative characterized by personal memories of the collective history. On the other hand, restorative nostalgia occupies the sphere of those concerned with reconstruction of the past in the sense of *the restoration* of origins and tradition (Boym, 2001: XV). In their extreme forms, the advocates of restorative nostalgia are engaged in the »anti-modern myth-making of

history« (XV), usually to be found on the right of the political continuum. Often, they are in favour of the re-establishment of nostalgic practices that are held to be markers of their group identity (Boym, 2001: 41). At the level of everyday life the results of this view are observable in the pedantic restoration of monuments of the group's »historical past«, changing the names of streets and public spaces to reflect »our tradition«, rewriting of history in public discourse, etc. all in order to construct and support one single narrative of national origin. Instances of this type of nostalgia are easily found in the policies and acts of nationalistic parties all over former Yugoslav states (Volčič, 2007). Or, specifically in the Serbian case, during the rallies in support of Karadžić and against his extradition to The Hague, many carried Karadžić's and other nationalistic-historical figure's photos, sung songs about Greater Serbia and demanded renaming of the streets in different Serbian cities after Karadžić and other Serbian nationalistic-historical figures (Repe, 2008). In that way, the re-articulation of Greater Serbia as a homeland of Serbs took place. The fantasy is to replace old symbolic names with the names of Serbs associated with the vision of Greater Serbia. Such symbolism feeds the nostalgic sense of longing for some golden times and hope for the return of the late 1980s and early 1990s, when Serbia still had a strategic power and control over most parts of former Yugoslavia. However, the important element of the nostalgic sentiment is that its objects are not available in the present. The point is that nostalgia is only experienced in the present, but only in relation to things from the past, which by the definition can never be again.

Serbian (Nationalistic) Journalism

The media, and especially television, were among the crucial tools of the war effort in all former Yugoslav republics, and controlled by the nationalistic and populist forces, inciting ethnic hatred and denigrating the democratic opposition. In Serbia, during the 1990s, there was a dominant professional ideology of a so-called »nationalistic journalism.« There are a lot of elements characteristic of this journalistic discourse (De la Broose, 2003; Milivojević, 1996, 2007; Milošević, 2008; Suša, 2005): »us-*versus*-them« dichotomy, »my-nation-right-or-wrong« version of reporting, substantiation of the myths of superiority of the Serbian nation in relation to the other nations of the former Yugoslavia, and forging a sense of national pride and patriotism.

Changes in media policy came after the fall of Milošević's regime in October 2000, and ended the dominance of state television, but the poli-

cy changes still remain incomplete. The changes regulating the television were carried out chaotically, without any clear policy or legal frameworks. The new government recognized the importance of state television and slowed down the changes. TS, according to Milivojević (2007) does not play an explicit propagandistic role any more, since it does not use militant exclusionary practices and national hysteria. However, as many scholars note (e.g. Erjavec and Volčič, 2007; Milivojević, 2007; Suša, 2005), despite the fact that TS attempted to transform itself into a public service institution, TS does work as a state television, since it is not independent from governmental structures and it still predominately reproduces dominant political discourse. Milivojević (2007) asks a crucial question as to how TS should confront the traumatic past of the nation, since TS itself helped to legitimate, normalize and institutionalize a particular war culture that supported the expansionist and nationalist politics of the Serbian regime.

Method: Principles of recontextualization and representation of social actors

The mainstream research on media discourses in recent years has been focused on a broad framework of a critical discourse analysis, which is concerned with diverse issues such as the projection of power through discourse, the instantiation of dominance and inequality in discourse, the ideological underpinning of discourse and discourse's affiliation with social change (Fairclough, 1989, 1995a, 1995b; 2003; van Dijk, 1988, 1989, 1993).

Fairclough (2003) and Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) adopt Bernstein's (1990) definition of recontextualization as a representation of social events. In the process of recontextualization, social events are not merely repeated. Rather, they are transformed in their new setting, perhaps through the addition of new elements, or through the deletion of others. In connection, Tannock (1995: 454) suggests that we can only ascertain whether nostalgia is progressive or regressive if we examine what has been excluded from a representation of the past. In his words, we need to »center essentially on what has been edited out of the nostalgic text – on the conflicts of interest and differences of position that are occluded, on the social groups and relations that are cut out of the picture, on the hidden values that may, intentionally or not, be in the process of being legitimated« (Tannock, 1995: 457).

The arrangement of events may change in the new context, or some elements may be substituted for others. While recontextualization often invol-

ves the suppression and filtering of some meaning potentials of a discourse (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999), it is also a process which may expand meaning potential, through additions to, and elaborations upon, the previous text. As Bernstein claims, particular social fields, and networks of social practices, have been associated with »recontextualizing principles« (Bernstein, 1990). These are specific »principles« according to which they incorporate and re-contextualize social events. These principles underlie differences between the ways in which a particular type of social event is represented in different fields, networks of social practices, and genres. Fairclough (2003: 139–140) develops the following principles: Presence (e.g. which elements of events, or events in a chain of events, are present/absent, prominent/background?), Arrangement (e.g. how are events ordered?), Abstraction (e.g. what degree of abstraction/generalization from concrete events?), and Additions (e.g. what is added in representing particular events – explanation/legitimizations (reasons, purposes), evaluation?). Critical discourse analysis also sees recontextualization in terms of a dialectical colonization/appropriation. Recontextualization is a specific kind of a dialectic that appropriates and colonizes discourses from different spaces and times (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). The concept of appropriation accentuates the fact that, even in the process of colonizing, a new discourse enters potentially transformative relationships with existing discourses in the recontextualizing context. In this respect, our study attempts to uncover how Serbian national television appropriated Karadžić's arrest into a nationalistic discourse, while helping to create a specific type of nostalgic nationalism.

In order to identify TS's recontextualization, we also analyze how TS represented the main social actors, i.e. who is included within the »us« realm and who is positioned as »them«. As Hodge and Kress (1993) argue, one of the central discursive strategies in ideological struggles relies on the construction of in-and-out group identities using discursive means. We adopt Hall's »discourse of difference« (1989: 913) as the most effective method to think through binary positions.

Data

We analyzed all 78 news items broadcast on all TS news programs from 21 of July (the day of Karadžić's arrest) up until 30 of July, 2008 (the day when Karadžić was sent to The Hague). Why this particular time-frame? As argued, it was during this period that the political situation in Serbia was intense, since the majority of opposition strongly challenged the president, government,

and institutions responsible for the arrest. Demonstrations in support of Karadžić were organized every day. On the 30 July 2008, the situation started to calm down, since Karadžić was sent to The Hague. Why the focus on this particular medium? We've analyzed TS's news program precisely because it is still the most watched program in Serbia, known for its pro-government orientation. Thus, the analysis of its program can help to explain official government politics (Milivojević, 2007; Tanasić, 2008). TS broadcast two special news programs (on Tuesday, the 22 July 2008 between 20.15 and 24.00; and Wednesday, the 23 July 2008 between 20.15 and 22.00) focusing on the arrest of Radovan Karadžić, called »Radovan Karadžić – Myth and Reality«, both having extremely high ratings of 60% (roughly 2.5 million viewers) in Serbia. The rest of the news programs (11.45-12.15, 17.00-17.25, 19.30-20.15) also enjoyed high ratings (*Gledanost RTS*, 2008). Within a whole analyzed news program, in terms of genres, the news reports dominated (56 items), followed by short interviews (9 items), news items (8 items) and statements (5 items). We analyzed all news items as a whole, since they present primary information to more than half of Serbian population (Tanasić, 2008; *Gledanost RTS*, 2008). Thus, we try to reveal how the most popular television news program in Serbia represented Karadžić's arrest and incorporated, re-articulated and appropriated it within representation of Serbian past and present. First, we follow a macro-structure analysis of recontextualization's principles to find out how TS represented Karadžić's arrest. Additionally, we employ a micro-analysis of the representation of the main social actors.

TV Serbia's recontextualization of Karadžić's arrest

(A) Presence and absence of elements of chains of events

Which chains of events were present, or absent, in television news dealing with Karadžić arrest? The analysis has indicated that TS broadcast the following recurring themes of the Karadžić's arrest:

A.   The life of Radovan Karadžić as Dragan Dabić;

B.   Karadžić's arrest as one of the crucial obligations and defining principles for Serbia on its path towards the EU;

C.   The details of Karadžić's arrest, and the legal procedures of the arrest;

D.   Karadžić's family;

E.   The legal procedures in the Hague Tribunal and the descriptions of Karadžić's future life in the prison;

F.   Different reactions of politicians to Karadžić's arrest;

G.   Karadžić's biography;

H.   Protests against the Karadžić arrest;

I.   Death threats against the Serbian president, ministers, and journalists favouring Karadžić's arrest.

Overall, the expressed nostalgia infused the ways in which other themes were represented, and it served as a kind of glue to connect the dominant topics. Specifically, nostalgia here is put to use in a variety of ways. Firstly, the analysis has showed that the most prominent theme has been Karadžić's hidden life as a fugitive.[4] TS has focused on his life as Dragan Dabić, his new physical appearance, clothing, speech, psychological state of mind, his alternative medicine interests, new love life, his shopping habits, his visiting of a »Crazy house« café, his writing for the alternative medicine journal »Healthy life,« his Web page, public lectures on energetic therapy, and his Croatian holidays. In a way, Karadžić becomes a commercial-nationalist media product, a political commodity sold to audiences.

The next most covered theme – also in quantitative terms – was devoted to a Serbian foreign policy towards the West, the European Union (the EU) and the International Community. Serbs have had a complex and traumatic relationship with the West. The longevity of the wish to be European, Western, or, on the other hand, the desire to preserve Serbian authenticity in opposition to the West has been noted by many scholars (Popov, 2000). For the advocates of civil society, the West signifies the source of the political and economic reforms that Serbia should undergo. For others, it represents a neo-imperialist threat to the Serbian state and culture. In this model, the West means either salvation or imperial domination. But for all who use it, »the West« remains a statement of future political intentions and a statement of national identity. Ironically, despite TS's selective coverage of the arrest, it has represented the event as a point of departure for Serbia in its cooperation with the West – for which Serbia should be rewarded with some concrete support and investments from the EU. TS's coverage further focused on minor details of the arrest: the legal procedures, the political consequences for Serbia, and the reactions of Serbian elites and Karadžić's family. TS emphasized the reactions of politicians to Karadžić's arrest, especially the representatives of the EU, the USA, NATO, the UN, Republic Srbska, BH, Croatia, Monte Negro, Russia and the main Serbian political parties. Different statements from Karadžić's close collaborators and »ordinary people« alike were recorded, expressing emotional desire and nostalgia for Greater Ser-

bia. They similarly celebrated the fact that during the BH war Karadžić partly realized Serbian dreams for Greater Serbia.

Moreover, the news reports speculated about how the trial in The Hague will take place in detail, and envisioned a life in a prison cell in Scheveningen for the once powerful and popular nationalist leader. The anticipatory portrayals of Karadžić's ignominious future is at the same time a nostalgic one, insofar as nostalgia is often triggered by images of grandeur in ruin (Boym, 2001). The pathos of the ruin, in other words, takes shape against the background of the splendour of the shadow of past glory cast by the wreckage of the present. In our case, Karadžić as once-great leader in decline. The everyday protests, organized to support Karadžić, have played a prominent role. The news programs also covered the death threats against the Serbian president, and some pro-European ministers, and journalists. Every day, TS repeated a short biography of Karadžić's life.

However, in order to recontextualize the analysis, it's more important to explore which chains of events were *not* represented (Fairclough, 2003). TS neglected to cover Karadžić's war crimes although they are widely acknowledged among local and foreign scholars (e.g. Čolović, 2002; Popov, 2000; MacDonald, 2002; Repe, 2008). The elision of history as a war criminal can be seen as a distinctly nostalgic practice, since restorative nostalgia clearly represents an idealized version of the past. When describing the main reasons for Karadžić's arrest, TS did not cover the crime-against-humanity charges of the Hague Tribunal against Karadžić. Instead, it focused only on the legal reasons for the arrest: »a significant step towards Serbia's EU membership« (22 July 2008, TV News), »enormous pressures from the Hague Tribunal and the EU« (24 July 2008, TV News) and »a Serbian ticket to finally enter European Union« (26 July 2008, TV News).

The analyzed news items completely ignored, for example, the complex theme of Serbian responsibility for the delayed arrest of Karadžić. Many crucial questions were not addressed, such as, who actually knew about Karadžić's whereabouts, who was helping him, and why the arrest came so late? Also, why does the current government refuse to offer access to secret archives that could help to answer the above questions?

Why has TS represented Karadžić's arrest in such a thematically imbalanced way? TS adopted the same (nostalgic) nationalistic principles for the construction of nationalistic discourses as in the past, i.e. refusal of acknowledgement after the wars, a denial of responsibility and a repression of memory (Broose, 2003; Milivojević, 2007; Milošević, 2008; Suša, 2005). Kammen's description of nostalgia as »history without guilt« (1991: 6) is

particularly pertinent in this regard. It can be argued that TS neglected negative information precisely because any reference to war crimes could question the myth of Greater Serbia. Furthermore, any critical coverage of the past could remind the Serbs about their negative role during the BH war. TS presented Karadžić's arrest as a Serbian shift towards the EU – and, in that, positioned a project of »joining the EU« as a positive process, something that brings Serbia closer to the EU, and to its »modern roots.«

(B) Arrangement

How has TS »ordered« and »arranged« the main events of Karadžić's arrest? As argued above, the biography of Karadžić was reported in a linear way, following historical events, but lacking any interpretation of the events. A typical segment from TS's program is illustrative here:

1. Radovan Karadžić was born in 1945 in Petnjica village, near Nikšić. In 1960 he moved to Sarajevo, where he met his wife, Ljiljana. He finished his BA in medicine, and became a psychiatrist in a city hospital. He was intensively involved with politics from 1989...

    On 12 May 1992, he became a president of Republic Srpska. He was a president until the 30 June 1996. The same year, in 1996, he left the political public life and gave the presidential power to vice-president of RS, Biljana Plavšić. In October 2004 he published his book *Miraculus of the Night.*

                    (22 July 2008, »Radovan Karadžić – Myth and Reality«)

Similarly, the events around Karadžić's arrest followed chronological order, with no additional explanations or interpretations:

2. Radovan Karadžić was arrested on the 21 July in Belgrade. After the initial hearing, the investigative judge of Serbia's special court on war crimes Milan Dilparić decided that Karadžić would be extradited to The Hague Tribunal.

    A day after the arrest, Serbia's minister for UN Tribunal relations, Rasim Ljajić and war crimes prosecutor of the Belgrade County Court, Vladimir Vukčević showed the journalists a new photograph of Radovan Karadžić. He was living in New Belgrade under the false name of Dr. Dragan Dabić, while practicing alternative medicine.

On the 22 of July, the protests to support Radovan Karadžić were organized in Belgrade by the Serbian Radical party, and other right-wing organizations.

On the 23 of July, copies of different official materials from Serbian Army meetings were found in the apartment where Radovan Karadžić was hiding.

On the 29 of July, dozens of supporters of Serbian Radical Party showed their solidarity with Radovan Karadžić, while protesting against his arrest on the Belgrade's Republic Square.

In the morning, the lawyer of the former president of the Republic of Srbska claimed that he did not file an appeal against Karadžić's transfer to the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague. He will attempt to prolong Karadžić's transfer. (30 July 2008, TV News)

First, then, the analysis shows that the coverage of the events of Karadžić's life, arrest and legal process followed a chronological order, representing these events as a sequence of connected and linear events. This form of reconstruction gives the events a specific meaning, since it differs from news-story conventions (presenting time-movement in terms of causes and effects). It also avoids explicit interpretation of any events (Bird and Dardenne, 1997), because it doesn't follow time in terms of cause and effect. Journalists use this chronological narration as a strategic ritual in reporting, since it insulates them from accusations of bias or distortion (Bird and Dardenne, 1997; Johnson-Cartee, 2005). The journalists attempt to legitimize their »objectivity« through presentation of facts, reliable sources, expert opinion, accuracy and fairness. However, while using strategic ritual in reporting, objective treatment of fact and deference to official sources, journalists function as uncritical conduits for military and government opinion instead of fulfilling their normative role as »watchdogs«.

The second most important effect of chronological narrative, besides naturalization, is the dramatization of events, whereby journalists attempt to attract viewers and with that, high ratings. Also for Serbian media, sensational tendencies proved commercially expedient, and commercial imperatives of media organisations generate cultural content that reduce social and cultural complexities. When TS reported crucial events from either Karadžić's political career and/or his arrest, TS has used the so-called »arrangement« principle in order to construct a belief in objective reporting: it created a linear connection between the events to offer only one interpretation of the events. In that,

Karadžić has been (only) the president of Republic Srpska (and not a war criminal), and now they have arrested him. While employing this particular principle, TS contributes to the masking of the responsibility of the Serbs for the crimes committed in BH. It continues to cultivate the myth of an innocent Serbia, propagating the thesis that Serbs have always been victims of some external enemy, conspiring to annihilate them. In that way, Karadžić is positioned as someone who acted strongly to revenge past wrongs. TS attempts to erase the Serbian crimes in BH that were committed in the name of Greater Serbia, with the political, military, economic support of the majority of the Serbs (Čolović, 2002; MacDonald, 2002; Popov, 2000; Repe, 2008).

(C) Abstraction/Personalization

What types of abstraction and generalization dominated the analyzed TS news programs? The arrest of Karadžić was generalized in two ways. First, the already limited coverage of Karadžić's war crimes was portrayed in »a relative way«, framed in terms of moral equivalence (see example 3) and described not as intentional acts but as »accidents.«

3. A journalist: What war crimes did Radovan Karadžić commit? What is he responsible for?

   Vladislav Jovanović: We have to know that it wasn't only Karadžić who's been involved. Other presidents were participating, too, but they were not sent to The Hague. /.../ Accidents happened on all sides... and these have much deeper causes. (July 23 2008, »Radovan Karadžić – Myth and Reality«)

In the above response, the source implicitly acknowledged that Karadžić is guilty of crimes, but he has generalized them (»others were involved«) and relativized them (»in a war, this kind of thing happens – everyone was doing it«). This practice remains a crucial strategy for representing war crimes (for more, see Wodak, 2006). Moreover, the source used the term »accident«, which is a typical euphemism in Serbian nationalistic discourse (Luković, 2002): it transposes criminal acts into the unintentional realm of chance, thereby refusing to acknowledge that war crimes were also committed by Serbs. The use of the notion »an accident« is illustrative – since an accident can happen without an intentional cause by some external »objective« force. Because the journalist did not challenge the re-

lativization of crimes or at least, demand an additional explanation, an implicit agreement with the source of information was established.

TS claimed that Karadžić's arrest means a shift towards the EU path for Serbia – it attempted to frame the significance of Karadžić arrest as fulfilling the EU's requirements and thereby rendering Serbia deserving of being rewarded by the EU (see example 4).

4. Goran Svilanović, former Yugoslav minister of foreign affairs claimed that we the Serbs have now proven to the world that we are finally on the path towards entry into the European Union. He added that Serbia has to be rewarded by the EU. The EU has to cease its attempts at blackmail. (July 23 2008,«Radovan Karadžić – Myth and Reality«)

TS has used the »reverse« principle here. Personalization can be defined as a preference for or focus upon the individual actor(s) and human interest angles in events, while downplaying institutional and political considerations that establish their social context. Many authors claim that increased media personalization results from the values embedded in television (e.g. Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999; Swanson and Mancini, 1996). In this regard, the commercial and political values of entertainment take precedence over the public service ideals of journalism. Especially because of its visual nature, television tends to focus on personalities rather than on abstract entities such as parties and groups (Peri, 2004). Furthermore, the effect of personalized news is to decontextualize news events and especially to overlook structural power relations (Johnson-Cartee, 2005). The consequence is also to naturalize war, through the breakdown of war into episodes, or series of events, each reported and described largely in isolation. This logic serves to conceptualise war as disconnected »events« rather than as an ongoing political and military process. The »human story« becomes separated from the military-political policy of war, and the past. In a sense, restorative nostalgia is implicitly used here as »truth and tradition« – TS restores its vision of the golden past as a stable construct.

In the analyzed news stories, the focus on drama, visual spectacle, human-interest stories and personalization means a focus on one person only – that is, a heavy emphasis on Karadžić to the exclusion of other social actors and the social context that helped to frame Karadžić's life. All of this results in the construction of a narrative suggesting that Karadžić worked independently, without official Serbian state support. This meaning gets reinforced by the use of the word »only« (see example 5).

5. Only his nephew knew about Radovan Karadžić's life as Dragan Da-
   bić. Dragan Karadžić: We usually talked in female voices, using female
   pronunciation, in order to deceive possible eavesdroppers. (23 July
   2008, TV news)

TS's coverage of Karadžić's political life in the Republic Srpska during the
1990s also focused strictly on Karadžić only – as if he had acted in isolati-
on, disconnected from other social actors and isolated from the historical
and political situation. The aim here is to represent Karadžić as a strong,
skilled leader, a Serbian »warrior,« contributing to the idea of Greater Ser-
bia, while at the same time establishing a sense of distance from the cri-
mes for which he had been held responsible (see example 6).

6. Aleks Buha: ... It was only Karadžić who knew exactly what was going on
   in BH at the time. And he should be credited for helping to create a Ser-
   bian state in BH. (July 23 2008, »Radovan Karadžić – Myth and Reality«)

The employment of the abstraction/personalization principle served
to relativize Karadžić's crimes, and to position Serbs in a positive light.
Furthermore, it represented Karadžić's arrest as the ticket that will allow
Serbia to enter the EU.

(D) Additions

What was added in the TS's representation of the events about Karadžić's
arrest? And were there different explanations/legitimizations and evalu-
ations of the arrest? TS journalists have, through their selection of inter-
viewers, nostalgically evaluated the war in BH as a victory, in which »the
Serbs have finally achieved Serbian territory in Bosnia« or as »partly fulfil-
led dreams of Greater Serbia.« For example:

7. Milan from Čačak claims: This was a big victory for the Serbs. Kara-
   džić made our dreams real! Honour to him! The only problem still
   ahead of us... is that the Serbs in Bosnia are limited only to the territo-
   ry of Republik Srpska. But at least we have that. I say this in a loud and
   proud way! I am proud of this. People are scared to say this, but I am
   not... (24 July 2008, TV News)

But on the other hand, journalists evaluated Karadžić's arrest as a crucial obli-
gation that needs to be fulfilled, in order to receive rewards from the EU:

8. Zoran Pavlović declared: European Union plays politics of negotiati-
    ons. They have to reward us for this arrest – for example, they have to
    formally cancel visas for Serbian citizens, they have to accept Serbia
    into the EU candidature, and have to provide access to the EU finan-
    cial sources, such as different funds. Serbia needs to advance towards
    joining the EU. (July 22 2008, »Radovan Karadžić – Myth and Reality«)

This arrest should also »help to improve the image of Serbia within the In-
ternational Community« (24 July 2008, TV News). Thus, the representati-
on of Karadžić's arrest was used to brand Serbia on the international map
– to convey a message that Serbia »is creating a spiritual link with Europe
and is coming to share the common European value system. It is now a
modern, civilized state, eager to join EU« (23 July 2008, TV News).

The representation of social actors

The ways in which main actors are represented serves chiefly as an affir-
mation of the ideology. Our analysis of social actors shows that TS used
the binary oppositions: »we« versus »them.« Many scholars dealing with
Serbian media propaganda show how, during the 1990s, the discourse of
difference was a crucial element in nationalistic media discourse (e.g. De
la Broose, 2003; Milivojević, 1996). The »production of Serbian enemies«
was taking place during the end of the 1980s, whereby a whole spectrum
of various enemies within and outside the Serbian borders was produced,
from the very specific to the ethereally abstract, from the individual to the
collective, from both the past and the present.
    We counted all actors (n= 41) who were represented in the coverage as
a »we« group. Specifically, in Table I, we introduce those actors, who appe-
ared at least 20 times in all 78 news items (since some actors were rarely
mentioned). A common characteristic here is that all the »we« social actors
were positively represented, and were – except Karadžić – »collectivized«
(Van Leeuwen, 1996: 50). This was accomplished not only through the use
of the first person plural »we« (see example 9), but also through terms like
»Serbia/Serbian nation« (see example 10), and »our nation« (see example
12). The »we« group discourse strategy attempts to assure that the positive
image of Serbia/Serb prevails as homogeneous and consensual.

Table I. Inclusion of social actors into »we«-group

Actor(s) of »we«-group	Frequency
Serbia	221
(Radovan) Karadžić	202
Serbian nation	98
Serbian government	69
Serbian citizens	21

9. We, the Serbs, have now proven that we respect the international law. Serbian enemies cannot comprehend that the Serbs are successful in fulfilling the international requirements. (23 July 2006, TV News)

10. We have successfully proven to the International Community that the Serbian nation now meets all the criteria. The processes of modernization and Europeanization will follow. (22 July 2008, TV News)

11. Our strategy is to adopt a process of Europeanization and to preserve Serbian territorial integrity, including Kosovo as a part of Serbia. Our nation will defend Kosovo and will never allow Albanians to steal from us this Serbian cradle. (29 July 2006, TV News)

12. Velimir Ilić: Despite following the international orders and despite paying our dues, the EU and the Hague Tribunal treat Serbia unfairly, and this will also happen in the case of Karadžić. Do not have your hopes up. /.../ Tribunal is destroying Serbia. (30 July 2006, TV News)

Similarly, the »them« group was coded in a particular way. As Table II shows the words »Serbian enemies« were frequently used in order to construct an unspecified and anonymous group of »them«. Van Leeuwen (1996: 51) defines this act as an »indetermination.« In this case, it serves the purpose of inclusion of different social actors into a group of »Serbian enemies« and, consequently, the construction of a positive »we« group. In these binary oppositions, Serbia appears as a »stronger«, »better«, »more victorious«, »more successful«, i.e. a superior nation. It's clear here how nostalgia mobilizes unity, registers disappointment with the present by framing »Others« and positing alternative worlds that can exclude.

The »them« and the »Hague Tribunal« are constructed as the big »Other« and are both positioned as the main threats to the Serbian identity. They are both framed as destroyers of the Serbs. Additionally, the Kosovo Albanians continue to be the Serbian Other: they are represented as thieves, waiting to »steal« »the cradle of Serbia« (see example 11). They continue to be framed as eternal Serbian enemies (Popov, 2000) and the representation of Kosovo

as the »cradle of Serbia« continues to remain at the heart of the Serbian nationalistic imaginary (Erjavec and Volčič, 2009; Popov, 2000).

The Hague Tribunal becomes a Serbian »new« Other (see example 12) not only because of demands to arrest Karadžić and other military leaders, such as Mladić and Hadžić, but also because Milošević died there.

Table II. Inclusion of social actors into »them«- group

Actor(s) of "them"-group	Frequency
Serbian enemies	77
The Hague Tribunal	88
Kosovo Albanians	63
The European Union	59
International Community	20

The International community and the EU become relatively newly and differently represented social actors. In the coverage, the international community means different international organizations, such as UN, NATO, The Hague Tribunal and the European Union. International community and the EU in particular are depicted as not understanding the Serbs and as continuously blackmailing Serbia (for example, Karadžić is not enough – now Mladić and Hadžić are wanted, too). For the EU, a metaphor »Fortress Europe« is used, pointing to the restrictive laws, policies and practices resulting in the exclusion of non-citizens.

However, this representation is not exclusively negative, since Serbia wants to, at least on the surface, fulfil these requirements and offer full cooperation with the Hague Tribunal (Torov, 2008). The construction of Serbia's superior status in relation to the International community and the EU is more implicit than it is in relation to the other actors, but is visible in TS's statements of expectation – Serbia deserves to be rewarded by the EU (see examples 13).

13. The arrest of Karadžić means the fulfilment of all EU requirements; it means a ticket to enter the EU. They demanded that from us... and we fulfilled the obligations, since they told us we cannot even start a negotiation process. /.../ we gave them Karadžić, but now they want Mladić! The pressure from the EU is even stronger now. /.../ However, Serbia needs to be rewarded for Karadžić's arrest. (23 July 2008, »Radovan Karadžić – Myth and Reality«)

Interestingly, the former Serbian enemies, Bosniaks, formerly one of the crucial social actors belonging to »them« group during the 1990s wars, were largely ignored during Karadžić's arrest (see, for example, Erjavec and Volčič, 2007; MacDonald, 2002; Popov, 2000). Despite the fact that TS cites three different politicians from BH about Karadžić's arrest, Bosni-

aks are not represented in any other context – neither as enemies, nor as victims. Perhaps this ignorance comes from the unwillingness to connect Karadžić and the Serbs with crimes committed in Bosnia.

Specifically, we also tried to find out *how* Karadžić is referred to in the news items. Naming and labelling of a politician is not only a descriptive usage of linguistic resources, but can be indicative of the social processes and practices embedded in the communicative situation regarding, for instance, the social and political position of this leader within society. The names used by the TS to refer to Karadžić are a case in point. For the analysis we counted all the words (n= 178) referring to Karadžić. Because there was a diversity of words, they are arranged into sub-sections, grouped in terms of semantic fields and presented according to their numerical presence.

Table III. Lexicalization of Radovan Karadžić in the news items

Semantical field	Word	Frequency
Karadžić's life as Dragan Dabić		103
	Alternative doctor/ doctor of alternative medicine	32
	Bio-therapist/energy-therapist	20
	Poet and a musician	19
	(Dr.) (Dragan) Dabić	10
	Friendly neighbour	9
	Bohemian	8
	Lawyer	5
The Hague Tribunal		22
	Most sought after fugitive	19
	Victim of The Hague Court/Tribunal	3
Nation/country		16
	Most Serbian Serb	7
	Strongest Serbian hero	6
	Hero of the heroes	3
Family relationships		16
	Brother	5
	Uncle	4
	Father	4
	Husband	3
Politics		15
	Successful/capable politician	8
	Leader of Bosnian Serbs	4
	Former president	3
Violent conflict		6
	War criminal	3
	Murderer	2
	European Osama bin laden	1

In TS's coverage, the emphasis is on the semantic field of Karadžić's life as Dragan Dabić. The use of words, such as »alternative doctor«, »bioenergetic«, »poet«, »musician«, »friendly neighbour«, and even »a lover« (see example 14), shows that TS attempted to explicitly position Karadžić as a nice, warm, friendly, emotional, loving, and intelligent man, who possesses some spiritual powers and cannot really be »a war criminal.«

14. Karadžić has been extremely intelligent and creative human. People perceived him as a bio-energetic, a therapist, a friendly neighbour, a poet and a musician. /.../ the editor of the newspaper *Healthy Life*, for which Karadžić contributed essays, claimed that he was bohemian. /.../ His colleagues say that he had a lover, a brunette called Mila. (23 July 2008, »Radovan Karadžić – Myth and Reality«)

On the other side, there are only three names referring negatively to Karadžić (»war criminal«, »murderer«, and »European Osama bin Laden«), published five times altogether. Because of journalistic attempts to present the coverage as »objective«, the news stories also had to include negative opinions from Western media and politicians (see example 15).

15. Richard Holbrooke declared: This is a historical day. A European Bin laden has finally been arrested. (22 July 2008, TV News)

TS covered predominately positive evaluations of Karadžić (for example, »the greatest Serbian hero«), as stated by Serbian nationalistic politicians:

16. Secretary General of Serbian Radical Party Aleksandar Vucić claimed: The Government arrested the greatest Serbian hero. (22 July 2008, TV News)

TS also positioned Karadžić within family relations, in order to portray him as a good husband, father, brother and uncle (see example 17).

17. Radovan was an exceptional uncle – says his nephew Dragan. (28 July 2008, TV News)

The analysis also reveals that TS covered Karadžić as a great politician. A statement from an »ordinary man« connotes that Karadžić is a good politician because he has gained territory for the Serbs. In the following report, similar implicit nostalgia for Greater Serbia can be detected:

18. Radovan Karadžić was an extremely capable politician, who really conquered more territory that historically belonged to the Serbs. Not like some other Serbian politicians. (22 July 2008, TV News)

Discussion and Conclusion

In this article, we attempted to explore how Karadžić's arrest was represented by TS's journalists. They still practice a so-called »nationalistic journalism«, which borrows its tactics from nationalistic ideology. Particular nostalgic sentiments were used, co-opted and appropriated by TS's journalists, in order to achieve political goal of channelling specific interpretations about the past and present. In that sense Svetlana Boym's insight that nostalgia is the "romance with one's own fantasy" (2001: xiii) is a very accurate description of the relationship between the nostalgic sentiment as employed by TS. We argue that TS' journalists used restorative nostalgia in ways that served both commercial and state interests, consolidating its place in an emerging synergy between government and market that we described, drawing on Žižek, as forming a military-poetic-media-entertainment complex. In TS's discourse, nostalgia for Greater Serbia was present amidst the evidence of crimes committed in its name. Moreover, Karadžić was portrayed as a leader who has at least partly realized Serbia's expansionist goals and made it possible for Serbs in BH to live together.

TS's journalists reproduced a specific type of nationalistic discourse – one which uses strategies of suppression of sensitive themes, including coverage of or reference to war crimes. Overall, TS glossed over contradictory elements that could compromise the ideal vision of Great Serbia. Nostalgic nationalism, as expressed in TS coverage of Karadžić's arrest requires some kind of a disappointment in order to re-create the idealized nostalgic construction of the past community it hopes to achieve in the future. This type of nostalgia functions as the search for continuity (Tannock, 1995). The renewed possibility of the future depends upon a strong narrative of return. TS's narrative articulates unity in terms of loss, by invoking nostalgia for a romanticized notion of Serbian unity in the past – a wholeness of community experience that has been eradicated by unjust external forces. Karadžić was predominately represented in a positive light: on the one hand, as a hero and a strong politician, and on the other, as a bio-energetic, a poet and a family man with a new identity. Any connections between Karadžić, the Serbs, and especially the current government with war crimes in BH were brushed aside. Thus, TS's journalists incorporated Karadžić's arrest into the predominant nationalistic discourse. They recontextualized pre-existing discourses to reproduce nationalism for a new, "pro-European" politics. They covered the "historical arrest" of Radovan Karadžić without serious attempt to confront the

traumatic past and reconcile with it. In that, nostalgia employed by TS's journalists exploited popular culture with its entailed "banalities" of everyday life.

Notes

[1] Serbian epics has always been a symbol of a national imagination (Čolović, 2002). Nationalist discourse wants to establish that a nation has always existed and in doing so often articulates and reinterpretes already existing discourses and other available cultural material, to convey a particular sense of belonging (ibid.).

[2] Greater Serbia generally and in this paper specifically refers to the specific idea within *Serbian nationalism* – whose goal it is to unite all Serbs and Serbian lands in one state. Greater Serbia generally and in this paper specifically refers to the specific idea within *Serbian nationalism* – whose goal it is to unite all Serbs and Serbian lands in one state (MacDonald, 2002).

[3] Serbian nationalists name the Muslims in former Yugoslavia »the Turks« (Erjavec and Volčič, 2007). In this example, Bosniaks are called »the Turks«.

[4] Also in quantity terms, the largest number of news programs (more than half) has been devoted to the secret life of Radovan Karadžić as Dragan Dabić.

References

Bernstein, B. (1990). *The Structure of Pedagogic Discourse.* London: Routledge.

Blumler, J. G. and Kavanagh, D. (1999). The third age of political communication: Influences and features. *Political Communication,* 16, 2, 209-230.

Boym, S. (2001). *The Future of Nastalgia.* New York: Basic Books.

Chouliaraki, L. and Fairclough, N. (1999). *Discourse in Late Modernity.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Čolović, I. (2002). *Politics of Identity in Serbia*. New York: New York University Press.

Davis, F. (1979). Nostalgia, Identity and the Current Nostalgia Wave. *Journal of Popular Culture,* 11, 4, 414–24.

De la Broose, R. (2003). *Political propaganda and the plan to create a 'State for all Serb*. Reims: University of Reims.

Erjavec, K. and Volčič, Z. (2007). The Kosovo battle. *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics,* 12, 1, 67-86.

Erjavec, K. and Volčič, Z. (2009). Rehabilitating Milošević. *Social semiotics,* 19, 2, 125-147.

Fairclough, N. (1989). *Language and power.* London: Longman.

Fairclough, N. (1995a). *Critical discourse analysis*. London: Longman.

Fairclough, N. (1995b). *Media discourse*. London: Arnold.

Fairclough, N. (2003). *Analyzing discourse*. London: Routledge.

Faktor plus. (2008). from http://www.faktorplus.co.yu/ (4. 8. 2008).

Gledanost RTS. (2008). from http://www.rts.co.yu (24. 8. 2008).

Hall, S. (1989). *Ideologie, Kultur, Medien*. Hamburg: Argument.

Hodge, R. and Kress, G. (1993). *Language as Ideology*. London: Routledge.

Havlena, W. J. and Holak, S. L. (1991). "The Good Old Days": Observations on Nostalgia and Its Role in Consumer Behavior. In: R. H. Holman and M. R. Solomon (Eds.), *Advances in Consumer Research*, pp. 323-329. Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research.

Johnson-Cartee, K. S. (2005). *News Narratives and News Framing*: *Constructing Political Reality*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Judah, T. (2000). *The Serbs: History, myth and the destruction of Yugoslavia*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Kammen, M. (1991). *The Mystic Chords of Memory*: *The Transformation of Tradition in American Culture*. New York: Knopf.

Luković, P. (2002). Srbija: Polemika o soočenju s preteklostjo. *MediaWatch* http://mediawatch.mirovni-institut.si/bilten/seznam/15/svet/ (24. 8. 2008).

MacDonald, David B. (2002). *Balkan Holocausts?* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Milošević, A. (2008). Parlamentarni izbori 2008. *Dosje o medijima*. http://www.nuns.org.yu/dosje/24/04.jsp (24. 8. 2008).

Milivojević, S. (1996). Nacionalizacija svakidasnjice . In: N. Popov (Ed.), *Srbska strana rata* , pp. 33-49. Beograd: Republika.

Milivojević, S. (2007). Srbija: Molk ne zabriše preteklosti. *MediaWatch*, http://mediawatch.mirovni-institut.si/bilten/seznam/15/svet/ (24. 8. 2008).

Peri, Y. (2004). *Telepopulism*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Pola-pola oko izručenja. (2008). www.smmri.co.yu (24. 8. 2008).

Popov, N. (2000). *The Road to War in Serbia*. Budapest: CEU Press.

Repe, B. (2008). Primer Karadžić. *Mladina*, 31, 25 June 2008, 42-45.

Statistics Bulletin. (1991). Sarajevo: Republic's Bureau for Statistics.

Suša, G. (2005). *The Return of Hate Speech*. Oxford. New York: Basil Blackwell.

Swanson, D. and Mancini, P. (Eds.) (1996). *Politics, media and modern democracy*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Tanasić, N. (2008). Dva mita. http://www.nspm.org.yu/kulturnapolitika/2008_tanasic3.htm (24. 8. 2008).

Tannock, S. (1995). Nostalgia Critique. *Cultural Studies*, 9, 3, 453-464.

Torov, I. (2008). Banalizacija zločina. http://pescanik.net/content/view/1780/80/ (24. 8. 2008).

van Dijk, A. T. (1988). *News as discourse*. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.

van Dijk, T. A. (1989). Mediating racism: The role of the media in the reproduction of racism. In: R. Wodak (Ed.), *Language, power and ideology*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

van Dijk, T. A. (1993). Principles of critical discourse analysis. *Discourse & Society*, 4, 2, 249-83.

van Leeuwen, T. (1996). The Representation of Social Actors. In: C.R. Caldas-Coulthard and M. Coulthard (Eds.), *Texts and Practice*: *Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*, pp. 32-70. London: Routledge.

van Leeuwen, T. and Wodak. R. (1999). Legitimizing immigration control. *Discourse Studies*, 1, 1, 83–118.

Verdery, M. and Burawoy, K. (1999). *Uncertain Transition*: *Ethnographies of Change in the Postsocialist World*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Volčič, Z. (2007). Yugo-nostalgia: Cultural Memory and Media in the former Yugoslavia. *Critical Studies of Media Communication*, 24, 1, 21-38.

Williams, P. R. and Scharf, M. P. (2002). *Peace With Justice? War Crimes and Accountability in former Yugoslavia*. Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield.

Wodak, R. (2006). History in the making/The making of history. *Journal of Language and Politics*, 5, 2, 125-154.

Žarković, D. (2008). Seselj u svakoj kuci. *Vreme*, August 7, 2008, p. 5.

Žižek, S. (2008). The Military-Poetic Complex. *London Review of Books*, August 17, 2008, p. 17.

THE VOICE OF AN AGENDA-SETTING AUTHORITY - CONTENT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISCOURSE OF THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Danijela Majstorović

1. Introduction

After the Bosnian war 1992-1995, the international community (IC) established a strong presence in the country and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) was entrusted as the most powerful international body and 'final authority in theatre' regarding the implementation of Dayton and subsequent accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) into the European Union (EU). The OHR was created under the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH (Dayton Peace Agreement) of 14 December 1995 to oversee implementation of civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement. The mission of the HR, also a Special Representative of the EU, is »to work with the people of BiH and the International Community to ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth BiH) is a peaceful, viable state on course to the EU integration.«

   If press releases' »only raison d'etre is to be retold...as accurately as possible, preferably even verbatim, in news reporting« (Jacobs, 1999: xi) and if its function is to compete for the mercy of different journalistic gatekeepers, then OHR's press releases are quite a peculiar genre. Due to the position of this institution in BiH, they are guaranteed news and they immediately affect citizens or politicians. As such, they have the full power of perlocution (Searle, 1975) as they immediately impact the public and political life in BiH. Their newsworthiness is not decided by the BiH journalists as their audience-directedness is inevitable, but by the concrete power of the OHR given by the Bonn Declaration[1] and its subsequent interpretation. Their sole production and publication assure their appearing in the Bosnian print and broadcast news; they precede the news, and this

makes it difficult for to define its already hybrid generic qualities (Majsto-rović, 2006: 131). In terms of its urgency and newsworthiness, press relea-ses of the High representative very much resemble royal decrees, except that today the Internet has replaced heralds. As only a small percentage of the BiH public uses the Internet[2], these press releases were meant to be picked up by the news media, and they because of the supreme role of the HR, they made it into the central news without much competition, particularly the HR's decisions on laws and removals.

The qualitative content analysis of the Office of the High representati-ve (henceforth OHR) in Bosnia presents a preliminary insight in this large body of texts (Majstorović, 2006) primarily through its most frequent the-mes between 1996-2005. It is not however a media content analysis as the paper's objective was not to measure the actual time given to the news on something that a HR did or said, but to see how and what this organization communicated to BiH public. If two press releases like the ones below

> In order to protect the Office of the President of the RS as an institution and the legitimate interest of the people of RS, the HR **has removed** Nikola Poplašen from the Office of the President of RS and **forbids** him to exercise any of the rights, privileges, and authorities of that Office. 5 March 1999

> The High representative, Paddy Ashdown, today **issued** a decision removing Nikola Grabovac from his position of Minister of Finance for the Federation of BiH. Mr. Grabovac and his Ministry have been implicated in the AM Sped affair yet the Minister has refused to accept final political responsibility for the actions or inactions of his Ministry and step down from this position. "High representative **removes** Nikola Grabovac", 14 June, 2002

were published on the OHR's website or communicated at a press con-ference, most likely, they would make it to the central BiH news becau-se of its domestic affairs importance. On another lever, an international official's removing a legitimately elected president of an entity would also be indicative of the two power relations: a) the role and authority of the OHR prescribed by the Dayton Peace Agreement and b) the OHR's agen-da-setting capacity in Bosnian and Herzegovina's public sphere shaping and contextualizing BiH's reality.

To examine how such discourse was possible in this particular spatio-temporal dimension, I will first provide contextual arguments on how such unprecedented authority was made possible and how the OHR's agenda-setting role became visible through the dictate of prominent topics such as democratization and transition in BiH. Secondly, I will define what this agenda-setting capacity has meant and how this shaping and recontextu-

alizing was actually done through discourse. Thirdly, I will show how the High representative (HR) used language to exert power in constructing democratization and transition, two most important IC objectives in BiH, through a selection of particular discourse topics.

2. Toward an interdisciplinary research agenda: discourse, politics and communication

Although the language of democratization appears universal, its content today is a highly ideological one that qualifies liberal democracy in the states of Eastern Europe and justifies the interference of Western institutions into their domestic affairs (Chandler, 2000:7). The IC's presence in BiH was on one hand the result of the numerous wars and contention in the Balkans and one could argue that it was *needed* as such. On the other hand, the IC mandate and actions have stepped out of line defined by Dayton, by being overtly authoritarian, situating this discussion in the realm of postcolonial[3] and globalist theories (Flowerdew, 1997, Todorova, 1997).

Press releases fall into the register of political communication, or political discourse, as could the entire international community's talk in BiH, and Wilson (2001: 398) warns of this danger when he says 'all *analyses* of discourse are potentially political, and, that on one level, '*all* discourse analysis is potentially political'. This study does not claim that discourse-analytical approach means reducing a social problem to its linguistic or communicative aspects; the language used by the High representative when talking about BiH or addressing the BiH citizens is the language of a dominant elite that struggles for primacy with languages of other, competing elites (the state, political parties, nongovernmental sector etc..) in the BiH public sphere.

OHR's press releases up until 2005 and later have been central in the mainstream BiH media discourse which is socially constructing BiH realities. Although professional activities are characterized by special languages, access to which is usually restricted to members of a given profession (Lakoff, R., 1990, Tannen, 1990), and political leaders use these languages 'to exert power over the general public and develop support for their policies' (Kress, 1995 in Flowerdew, 1997: 454-455), the OHR's discourse is not just 'any' institutional or professional discourse. It is relevant and worth studying because of the High Representative's enormous influence in BiH even in 2009 as this organization was supposed to lead the country

into a new era of its development, from socialism to capitalism, from post-war democratization into transition, from 'Dayton to Brussels'.

Any media text analysis can be seen as an analysis of cultural texts and Kellner (2003) proposes a useful three-pillar cultural research structure consisting of:

- Political economy and production of culture (cultural texts) through studying ownership of media conglomerates, which subsequently means ownership of messages;

- Cultural texts such as pamphlets, ads, and even OHR's press releases. Textual analyses such as content analysis and discourse and critical discourse analysis (CDA) explain these texts through concepts of ideology, discourse type, narratives, semiotics, topics, formal linguistic characteristics etc.

- Audience analysis (audiences are seen as heterogeneous and multiple): audience members are recipients of texts, which mean different things to different people, and cultural studies is interested in how audiences receive them.

This research has to do with the second pillar as a preliminary step for a thorough CDA approach whose advantages were helpful in later more detailed analyses of the OHR press releases. As a press release is a borderline genre between interpersonal and mass communication (Jacobs, 1999: 31), press release can be viewed as a genre or even media channel with a strong albeit not yet fully realized meaning potential.

3. Contextualizing the IC role in BiH- A Job without Alternative

The 'new democracies' were seen as dysfunctional for many reasons such as deep cultural barriers and Bosnian democratization as a needed 'noble experiment' (Denitch, 1996: 60). There are different opinions about international involvement in BiH, but they are mainly divided into those who think there was no other alternative and those who think although there may have not been alternatives, the actual democratization process has been catastrophic. Because of so much blood spilt in the name of nationalistic ideals, some critics say Western outsiders 'are far better representatives of the genuine interests of the Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian peoples and states than their patriotic leaders' (Denitch, 1996: 32). The pretext for this is that new democratic societies are just inept, with 'remarkably few legal, political, and

civic skills...deep-seated prejudice...and have yet little willingness to recon-ceptualize their prejudices or anxieties in language familiar to Westerners' (Fine, 1996: 559). Both of these opinions favor international intervention in BiH, which is seen as a course of action 'without an alternative'.

More recent and rather different opinions emerged later critiquing the 'noble experiment' as 'a mockery of any meaningful concept of de-mocracy' and a 'grotesque parody of democratic principles' (Carpenter, 1997 in Chandler, 2000: 158, 190). Paddy Ashdown has received much cri-ticism regarding his colonial-style politics, 'running Bosnia like Raj', and 'making much greater use of his untrammeled powers as a 'benevolent despot' than his predecessors (Traynor, 2003). The critique of the 'evan-gelic belief' in imposing democracy from above and its similarities with the British East India Company was a theme of Knaus and Martin's article 'Travails of the European Raj' (2003).

With a great deal of caution and diffidence there has, however, been some systematic critique against the OHR policy in the realm of internati-onal relations but little in discourse and media studies. Western politicians have been blamed for their lack of accountability to BiH citizens. They have been forcing statehood upon the divided Bosnian ethnic groups at all costs and at the expense of society. Ten years after Dayton, there is no 'positive peace', as a form of cooperation and integration (Galtung, 1968 in Roach, 1993), but 'negative peace', as a mere lack of organized violen-ce between the main ethnic groups. A more detailed insight into the ina-dequacies of the Western efforts in terms of society building in Bosnia and Herzegovina and their subsequent inability to guarantee the BiH stability is given by Yordan (2003), who says the initial intervention of the EU and USA were led by their personal interests and not humanitarian ideals.

> American negotiators wrote the GFA with the assistance of Western Europeans and Russian diplomats. While the parties to the peace talks could debate these provisions, they were not allowed to make any substantive changes. Through diplomatic arm twisting, the U.S. forced the parties to sign the peace agreement, even though some of its provisions contradicted their self-interest. In the end, the GFA can be seen as an instrument of conflict settlement, rather than one of conflict resolution. It did not permit the leaders of ethno-national group to negotiate an ending to their war and it did not provide an incentive for Bosnia's political leaders to address the very problems that had led them to war. Instead a settlement was forced upon them, angering many of Bosnia's politicians and stripping them of their right to create a society that best represents their needs and interests (Yordan, 2003: 62).

The Dayton Peace Agreement (GFA) in newly built Bosnian state was designed to stop the war and introduce capitalism and democracy as a

new sort of modernity. But insisting on a market economy, without the social cohesion, which was shown in a World Bank's study (Yordan, 2003), is not and cannot be a guarantee of a self-sustaining peace. »As a result, the success of the present peace building operation should not be solely gauged by how much the economy grows, by how many bills are passed by the legislature, or by how many pro-GFA supporters are elected to public office (Yordan, 2003: 63). »Indeed, one of the major faults of the peace process is that international diplomats are not accountable to Bosnia's citizens and their policies often disregard the opinions of the country's political leaders« (Yordan, 2003: 71).

This lack of consideration for the BiH political subjects, while running a policy that eventually has to result in a modern state, and legitimizing ethno-nationalist leaders and their separatist politics while at the same time pursuing the idea of a strong state of BiH are probably two largest paradoxes of the OHR discourse which have subsequently created two very opposing and confusing messages to BiH citizens. To impose laws regulating civilian life without civic participation[4], to create packets of laws aimed at strengthening 'jobs and justice' without input of BiH politicians (Knaus and Martin, 2003: 1), to ignore the country's historic commonalities, multiculturalism, memory and emancipatory potentials of the socialist Yugoslav past in a monologic imposition of liberal-democratic Bosnianhood from above without any plans of restoring the country's genuine and full sovereignty; these are acts of colonization. These acts have been justified by the lack of democracy in BiH and have also been recontextualized as necessary steps for democracy and Europeanization, which is a rather circular logic. Even the concept of democracy has been an ideologically loaded one being upheld as »a universal aspiration...difficult to obtain outside the developed and mature democracies of the West« (Chandler, 2000: 17). They behaved as if BiH was a clean slate on which liberal Western values were simply to be inscribed.

An unprecedented amount of control resting with the HR has produced discursive relations of power and inequality between the participants and has also, as a result, affected their identities and social roles particularly when it comes to the noted lack of agency for BiH citizens and 'progress from the above' (Knaus and Martin, 2003: 68). This apparent progress is »no longer measured by free elections and constitutional frameworks, but on the basis of alleged cultural distinctions or ill-defined assessments of civil society...(which) has led to an increasingly qualified acceptance of liberal democracy in states outside

the West...and the international regulatory bodies which are now overseeing the political process in the new democracies« (Chandler, 2000: 4).

The OHR's mandate was strengthened in 1997 by the Bonn Peace Implementation Council powers[5], an ad hoc created body aiming to follow the implementation of GFA. The Bonn Declaration gave the HR the power to propose and adopt legislation when conflict among politicians stalled the legislative process, and to dismiss politicians who worked to prevent or delay the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. Carlos Westendorp, the second High representative who originally campaigned for the expanded mandate, and his successors Petritsch and Ashdown, have rewritten or imposed over 100 laws, spanning economic, social, political, and judicial issues, and have removed over eighty individuals from public office[6]« (Yordan, 2003: 61). Today, that number is over 150 individuals; only in June 2004, the HR Ashdown removed and conditionally removed around 60 individuals from their public positions. In May 1999, Westendorp said to *Wall Street Journal*: »Yes, this disregards the principles of sovereignty, but so what? This is not the moment for post-colonial sensitivity...The problems of the region will only be solved when we have introduced a general respect for democracy and the rule of law« (Westendorp, 1999 in Chandler, 2000:201). In August 2009, in their rehabilitation process, some 53 were repealed by the current High Representative Valentin Inzko, as they were no longer seen to be a threat to peace implementation, institutional integrity or democracy.

4. Delineating the OHR discourse: the scope and the truth

The discourse of the international community in BiH is vast and includes texts produced by other international organizations such as OSCE or UN IPTF, Dayton Agreement, press reports and public addresses to name but a few. After Dayton, which not only established international control over military forces on the ground but also put into practice a new, post-Cold War, international agenda for long-term peace-building. This new role for international institutions is increasingly described as *democratization*...a major international experiment in political engineering in BiH. (Chandler, 2000: 1-2). Although the role of the OHR was initially established to create long term peace and democracy, the OHR's discourse was pregnant with discursive formations that were to be reenacted well before they were dialogically articulated, surpassing and exceeding the formal boundaries of the Dayton. This analysis seeks to outline elements of discursive construction of democratization and transition in the country by identifying and

discussing prevailing discourse topics. Establishment of the OHR after Dayton, with its actions and interactions, is seen as a semiotic act in which the final word and interpretation of everything related to transition and future European integrations in Bosnia rests with the HR.

Although discourses on democratization and transition have blurred boundaries, democratization or the so-called 'post-war period', conditionally speaking, began in 1996 and ended in 2000, when the transition stage began which still continues today. The OHR-style democratization and, more recently, Europeanization discourses are rarely criticized except from an extremely nationalistic point of view. In a world where 'social power is based on privileged access to socially valued resources, such as wealth, income, position, force, group membership, education or knowledge power' (Van Dijk, 1993a: 254), it seems that BiH citizens either don't have or don't have enough of such power given the little resistance to OHR's activities during the period. The reasons are plentiful: weak public opinion, corrupted and discredited politicians who are using populist rhetoric, the historical legacy of the Balkans as the Other, or mistrust and insecurity aggravated by the poverty typical for any post-war society.

This type of discourse-as-social-interaction presumes subject positions and through occupying them both the OHR and BiH citizens become what they are. In the same way, occupation of the aforementioned subject positions, i.e. the dominant (OHR) and the dominated (BiH citizens), reproduces and temporarily fixates a certain social order that, wrongly, appears to be commonsensical. In this situation, BiH politicians, although sometimes appearing hesitant to attract votes, cannot but agree to the OHR's decisions which creates a culture of dependence. Via its Internet portal, the OHR informed the public, used strategies of positive self – and negative other-presentation (Majstorović, 2006), sanctioned, brought legislation or otherwise promoted political stances. To make their dominance more efficient, the OHR also used all modern communication resources available from press officers, through press releases and press conferences where their statements appear in various frames and recontextualizations (Bernstein, 1990), such as extradition of war criminals to ICTY framed as a necessary precondition for entering the EU or frequent appeals to intellectuals to help BiH accept the changes and transition.

5. Analyzing the data: definition of topic/theme

Discourse topics are crucial for understanding of text and talk (Van Dijk, 1997: 10). It is »an intuitively satisfactory way of describing the unifying principle which makes one stretch of discourse 'about' something and the next stretch 'about' something else« (Brown and Yule, 1983: 70). For these reasons, the key rule in defining them was centrality of some propositions and concepts in relation to others (Tomlin, Forrest et al. in Van Dijk: 1997a). The study of semantic macrostructures of a text may show how propositions are ordered in hierarchical networks of importance, relevance or conceptual dominance (Van Dijk, 1993b: 33). Themes or topics are primarily realized in headlines or lead paragraphs and they »define the overall coherence or semantic unity of discourse, and also what information readers memorize best from a news report« (Van Dijk, 1998: 248). The semantic representation cannot be systematically 'reduced' to produce the discourse topic representation is provided; instead, one is required to go back to the original text and »make up a sentence which appears to summarize the main points in the piece of text, and then translate this sentence into a semantic representation« (Brown and Yule, 1983: 109).

To identify topics and not the amount of airtime, I needed to become familiar with the corpus and then use corpus linguistics methodology. The data were downloaded from the OHR's website by means of Teleport Pro and then processed by Wordsmith Tools software whereby two wordlists were created: a wordlist of the entire corpus and a wordlist comprising of headlines. These were compared with the reference corpus wordlist, which was Charles Dickens's *Great Expectations* and some other texts in my textual archive, which made up a reasonably big list for calculating keyness[7]. I identified recurrent topics by investigating the contents of all the texts in the corpus and came up with a list that to a great extent coincided with the topics that were discussed in the HR's special reports to the UN General secretary[8]. Then, to corroborate these findings, I analyzed headlines of over 1400 press releases between 1996-2004 and partly 2005, as these were the most direct way of addressing the BiH public, and came up with a similar list of key words that coincided with the previously defined topic category[9].

This reason why I combined the two calculations was because this methodology proved in many ways problematic: the keyword analyses were not clear-cut in the sense that they yielded a lot of function words. Another problems with the content analysis method was that it included a great deal of overlap between the topics as some fell into multiple catego-

ries. If there was a topic that would fit in more than one category, I included it in multiple categories[10] and provided charts for every topic's annual distribution in Appendix 2. Interestingly enough, the keyword analysis showed a significant number of direct speech acts (Searle, 1975) or explicit semi-performatives (Jacobs, 1999)[11] and due to their prominence, I decided to establish a separate 'performatives' category. These speech acts, when it comes to the HR, are almost all directives with full power of perlocution[12].

It was also problematic to decide if the discourse of the OHR started immediately upon Dayton in late 1995, in 1996 when it technically started, or in 1998, when the first decisions on removals and laws on national insignia were passed? After the Office was formed in 1995, the OHR started with official press releases in 1996. The first releases were far fewer, less sophisticated and looked more like news reports. With the Bonn Powers and the strengthened OHR's mandate in December 1997, Petritsch's and Ashdown's press releases sounded more similar to political and viceregal speeches (Kaminsky and Etz, 1999). The discourse of the ensuing High representatives, Schwarz-Schilling, Lajčak and Inzko, were not analyzed in this paper.

6. Research findings

The results obtained by looking at keywords of the entire corpus in comparison to the reference corpus were as follows[13]:

1. Wordsmith List of Keywords from the entire corpus (the first 20)

N	WORD	FREQ. UKUPNA.TXT	%	FREQ. POREDBA1.TXT	%	KEYNESS	P
1	THE	44,063	9.45	37,991	5.13	8,167.2	0.000000
2	REPRESENTATIVE	3,591	0.77	28		6,543.0	0.000000
3	BIH	2,884	0.62	26		5,221.9	0.000000
4	HIGH	3,873	0.83	472	0.06	4,854.9	0.000000
5	WILL	3,575	0.77	788	0.11	3,457.6	0.000000
6	BOSNIA	1,916	0.41	33		3,344.9	0.000000
7	HERZEGOVINA	1,728	0.37	27		3,036.3	0.000000
8	BRCKO	1,247	0.27	0		2,372.7	0.000000
9	FEDERATION	1,193	0.26	9		2,172.6	0.000000
10	OHR	1,108	0.24	5		2,048.9	0.000000
11	IMPLEMENTATION	1,017	0.22	12		1,815.8	0.000000
12	RS	1,001	0.21	14		1,770.2	0.000000

N WORD	FREQ.	KIKILIKI.TXT %	FREQ.POREDBA1.DOC	%	KEYNESS	P
13 DISTRICT	927	0.20	14		1,631.5	0.000000
14 AUTHORITIES	904	0.19	22		1,533.1	0.000000
15 AGREEMENT	892	0.19	28		1,473.5	0.000000
16 PEACE	855	0.18	27		1,411.3	0.000000
17 LAW	1,787	0.38	573	0.08	1,343.7	0.000000
18 COUNCIL	870	0.19	49		1,320.1	0.000000
19 INTERNATIONAL	1,220	0.26	289	0.04	1,129.1	0.000000
20 REPRESENTATIVE	674	0.14	22		1,108.1	0.000000

2. Wordsmith List of keywords from the press releases' headlines (the first 20)

N WORD	FREQ.	KIKILIKI.TXT %	FREQ.POREDBA1.DOC	%	KEYNESS	P
1 REPRESENTATIVE	494	3.71	4		2,761.1	0.000000
2 HIGH	522	3.92	58	0.03	2,597.1	0.000000
3 BRCKO	197	1.48	0		1,115.3	0.000000
4 BIH	190	1.43	26	0.01	919.8	0.000000
5 OHR	158	1.19	5		849.9	0.000000
6 STATEMENT	94	0.71	9		471.5	0.000000
7 DISTRICT	85	0.64	1		469.8	0.000000
8 LAW	111	0.83	37	0.02	465.8	0.000000
9 SUPERVISOR	77	0.58	0		435.3	0.000000
10 FEDERATION	60	0.45	3		315.3	0.000000
11 IMPLEMENTATION	57	0.43	1		312.1	0.000000
12 COUNCIL	58	0.44	3		304.2	0.000000
13 RS	65	0.49	14		295.3	0.000000
14 MEETS	51	0.38	0		288.2	0.000000
15 COMMISSION	52	0.39	1		284.0	0.000000
16 ON3	23	2.42	1,608	0.76	280.7	0.000000
17 MOSTAR	49	0.37	0		276.9	0.000000
18 OF	704	5.28	5,570	2.64	261.1	0.000000
19 WELCOMES	46	0.35	0		259.9	0.000000
20 APPOINTS	42	0.32	0		237.3	0.000000

Few addresses to the HR were found in the corpus, or other-people quotations, which justifies this assumption. Some of the topics identified have not even made it into the 'keywords' as can be seen in the examples below. *Srebrenica* and *Hague Tribunal*, two very important topics of today, didn't even make it to the top twenty keywords. They became more pro-

minent after 2000, or in the 'transition' phase, whereas they had been almost completely erased from the discourse of previous years.

Chart 1

Srebrenica

Chart 2

Hague Tribunal (ICTY)

Because keyword list 2 showed a number of explicit semi-performatives[15], I decided to establish a special chart of 'direct speech acts' (*Chart 3*), as in these texts the HR 'condemned, congratulated (Dayton anniversaries, 8th of March, Easter), expressed condolences, criticized, warned, or 'was disturbed' regarding the situation in BiH. During Wolfgang Petritsch's times (1999-2002), there were a lot more 'socializing' speech acts (commemorating, commiserating, wishing a happy holiday) and when it came to

Paddy Ashdown's discourse (2002-2005), there were more sanctions and removals.

Chart 3

Direct speech acts

Removals of BiH officials and the HR's introduction of legislation, immediately to become the law, were seen as separate topics. Chart 4a shows that removals of officials were most frequent in 1999, which is not true, as this charts is based on the number of published *press releases that dealt with removals*, and not *the number of removed individuals*. Removals were most frequent in 2004 (see *chart 4.b*), but there weren't that many press releases talking about each individual removal: the HR would remove 60 individuals just in one press release.

Chart 4a

Removals

Chart 4b

25 topics were identified in over 1400 texts and their annual distribution is provided in Appendix 2:

1. Refugees, return, collective centers;

2. Diplomacy, HR's visits abroad, EU integrations;

3. Territories, police, army, intelligence, airports;

4. BiH courts and legislation;

5. High representative and BiH politicians/politics;

6. ICTY (the Hague tribunal);

7. OHR and HR's decisions, laws, occupying premises;

8. Removals;

9. Social issues (health care, education, POW, culture);

10. Property issues and claims;

11. Events, openings;

12. Srebrenica;

13. Assaults and crime;

14. Reintegration and reconstruction, energy, resources;

15. Elections;

16. Media;

17. Human rights;

18. Brčko district;

19. Economy and inter-entity cooperation;

20. OHR bureaucracy;

21. Region;

22. Donations;

23. State symbols and insignia, citizens' documents;

24. Addresses to the OHR

25. Corruption, drugs, trafficking.

This preliminary content analysis showed that most prevalent topics are those about the OHR's communication with local and international politicians, Peace Implementation Council, UN (*Diplomacy, HR's visits abroad, EU integrations*), or topics such as *Brčko district*, *property claims* and *social issues*. Topics were analyzed not so much in terms of their prominence but more as trends, e.g. the property claim issues related to displaced people, for instance, entered the discourse in 1998, peaked in 2002, when the HR Petritsch brought a packet of laws related to this subject. Later, there was a decline of their topical prominence in 2004, as people mostly managed to reclaim their property or to resolve their property issues in another way.

Chart 5

Going back to 1996 and the 1st HR, Carl Bildt, there were fewer removals, laws etc., which is logical given that 1996 was the first post-war year. Some press releases also announced that local politicians did not fully understand what they were supposed to do or how to act so they would even 'forget' to show up at meetings.

> For the second week in a row, Republika Srpska Prime Minister Gojko Kličković failed to turn up at the meeting of the Joint Interim Commission this afternoon. This was in spite of explicit undertakings to come and in spite of the time and place of the meeting being agreed. "Statement by the High representative Carl Bildt", June 25, 1996

The most dominant topics were refugees, elections, then a novelty in BiH, regulation of property claims and so forth. As in 1997, there were more assaults and criminal incidents, but also more talks on the reintegration and restructuring of the country; a trend that declined in later years. As was seen earlier, topics such as 'Srebrenica' and 'ICTY' had been introduced whereas they did not exist prior to 2000 and their frequency was steadily growing towards 2004.

1998 was a year of high increase in decision making in terms of the state symbols and insignia relevant to the BiH state identity such as license plates, first passports, the flag, the coat of arms, the currency etc. After local politicians could not agree about these things, the HR of the day 'had' to make these decisions as well. The year 1997 marks an increase in direct speech acts, a trend that more or less continued until 2005. Speech acts of 'congratulation', be it New Year, 8th of March, or Dayton anniversary, were most frequent during Wolfgang Petritsch's time. In comparison with other HRs, Petritsch seemed to have a more personal and warmer tone but he also removed people, annulled decisions and issued edicts. Judging by their verbal acts, the power to make and freedom to interpret laws, meetings with the highest international and BiH officials, and the decisions published in the RS or Federation Official Gazettes, the HRs generally behaved more like BiH presidents than international envoys.

> The High representative, Carlos Westendorp, yesterday issued a Decision suspending the power of authorities in both Entities to re-allocate and dispose of certain types of socially-owned land... The High representative has taken this Decision after extensive research and consultation as to the problematic nature of the current legislation and the misapplication... His Decision is effective as of May 26, 1999, and shall be published in the Official Gazettes of the Entities. "Decision on Socially-Owned Land", 27 May 1999

> The High representative, Wolfgang Petritsch, today met with a senior delegation from the European Commission's Directorate for External Relations, headed by the Director, Mr Reinhardt Priebe. The delegation is visiting Bosnia and Herzegovina to discuss assistance to the country within the EU's five-year Regional and Country Strategy. "High representative meets European Commission delegation", 20 July, 2001

Petritsch was the one who tried to deny the claims of protectorate in BiH by introducing the concept of 'ownership', or a sense that Bosnians should be accountable for what was happening in their country. 'Ownership' initially planned to 'give people the feeling that this is their country' by allowing Bosnian leaders more say (Kaminski and Etz, 1999), but the problem was that Petritsch was very choosy which leaders he felt should have a say (Chandler, 2000: 202).

In terms of removals and decision making for 'obstructing Dayton' or for 'the lack of cooperation with ICTY', the content analysis has shown Paddy Ashdown to be the most active HR. That trend had two peaks: in 2002 when Ashdown came to power, and especially in 2004 with more and more individuals removed without any public disclosure of the supporting evidence and with a general lack of transparency. To illustrate the much debated 'removals', here is a typical format of a removal decision, which later on became much more formal and ritualized and had greater reference to the powers enabling a HR to do it[16]. The 'removal' trends can be seen in Chart 6.

> The High representative has written this morning to Dragan Čavić, Vice-Chairman of the SDS, notifying him of his decision to remove him from office in the newly elected Republika Srpska Assembly, using the authority vested in him by the Bonn Peace Implementation Council. Mr Čavić is also barred indefinitely from holding further official positions in BiH. "High representative removes SDS vice-Chairman Čavić from Office", October 08, 1998

Chart 6.

7. Depths of critical discourse analysis versus breadths of content analysis

Content analysis has been very helpful for definition of topics, but even results obtained cannot sufficiently account for the subtler ideological processes in texts. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) can give more detailed explanations of such relations and therefore is a logical continuation of any content analysis; where a content analysis gives breadth and general feeling, a CDA framework provides depth of details of vaguer notions such as ideologies, beliefs, coercion but also strategies of representation, mitigation and justification encoded in the actual language use. While content analysis tells us if a removal happened it doesn't tell us how it happened, i.e. how it was constructed in the text. The text below:

> You will be aware that at the request of the High representative the NATO Secretary General and the SACEUR have authorized SFOR to occupy and control a number of Broadcasting Facilities in the RS. This action took place this morning. This action was taken following the grotesque distortion of the press conference with Judge Louise Arbour, which was broadcast by SRT on Sunday, 28 September. The High representatives recommendation was made on the basis of the mandate given to him under the terms of the Sintra Declaration specifically paragraph 70 which empowers him to act against any media outlet whose output is in persistent and blatant contravention of either the spirit or letter of the Peace Agreement. The apology and rebroadcast of Judge Arbour's interview by SRT was, although welcome, frankly too little too late. In our statement last night we made it clear that further action was under consideration. "NATO Secretary-General and SACEUR at the request of the HR authorized SFOR to occupy and control a number of Broadcasting Facilities in the RS", October, 1, 1997

is about an act of SFOR's occupation of the broadcasting facilities. It can be coded as a topic 'OHR decisions, laws, occupying premises' but no content analysis would reveal that such a decision was presented as completely commonsensical at the time. SFOR, at the request of the HR Westendorp, committed the act of open coercion as a result of the Republic Srpska's main media 'distorting' Louise Arbour's press conference broadcast followed by a journalist's commentary. The year 1997 was certainly not the prime time of BiH media's objectivity and professionalism and although the SRT, perhaps reluctantly, came with an apology, this was still considered to be 'frankly too little too late'. Through the combination of an adjunct expressing the speaker's attitude followed by a metaphor with a condescending overtone, OHR made a case and justified a military seizure of SRT on the premises of bad journalism legitimizing it as a threat to Dayton and democratization. Not only did this language speak of a one-time sanction but of a contingency

plan in case similar things happened in the future enacted in a semi-performative of warning committing to 'further action...under consideration'.

In the following paragraph, it is not stated what powers or international provisions authorize the OHR and SFOR to act and occupy the premises of a bank that has been involved in illegal business operations. If BiH citizens were to construct their social identities from this text, they would be even more passivized seeing that none of the local police or authorities are mentioned, and would probably be misled to believe that the OHR has the power to do it and will do it instead. The linguistic choices used to describe this joint activity are particularly interesting as there are traces of military/secret service discourses (e.g. the operation was well-planned and well-executed, SFOR maintained a safe and secure environment, there was no outside-interference etc.).

> Early this morning, representatives of the Office of the High representative, with the strong support of SFOR, entered the main branch of Hercegovačka Banka in Mostar, retrieving documentation required by the Provisional Administrator, Toby Robinson. The operation was well-planned and well-executed. While SFOR was maintaining a safe and secure environment, the needed bank records and vaults were secured. There was no outside-interference." High representative welcomes operation securing records of Hercegovačka Banka", April, 18, 2001

A great deal of OHR's main topics dealt with removals and bringing new legislation which were justified with the negative Other representation of BiH politicians by distinguishing between the good (European) and the bad (Balkan) principle:

> "The Balkans as a pejorative term have returned to themselves, and among the Balkan nations there is a competition over which one belongs to the Balkans, which means is lost, and which one has managed to escape the dirt, corruption and hatred of the Balkans and can be counted as a part of Europe, that means of civilization." This also goes for Bosnia and Herzegovina... I believe this is the only way in which BiH can become a democratic, self-sustaining and self-confident state. This is the essence of *Europeanization*. "The HR discusses Protectorate in DANI, This is not our country", 3 March 2000

In his discussion of the Bosnian protectorate, the HR Petritsch quotes an Austrian source, Karl Markus Gauss, who happens to be a Balkans expert. This is also a hortatory report as it implicitly prescribes a norm through a set of descriptions of what the norm is. As Petritsch himself is considered to be an expert on the Balkans, Gauss's credibility and critical statements about BiH are not brought into question. After the quotation, Petritsch says 'it is the only way for BiH to become a democratic, self-sustaining and self-confident state' and that this is 'the essence of Europeanization.'

Argumentation schemes/higher level semantic relations	Rhetorical devices/linguistic means	Examples
negative other-representation	presupposition: The Balkan used to mean something bad and now it is true again	The Balkans *as a pejorative term have returned to themselves...*
negative other-representation	irony: Who would compete to become a member of something that is bad? implicature: one who belongs to the Balkans is lost	and among the Balkan nations there is *a competition* over which one belongs to the Balkans which means is *lost*
positive Europe representation	topos of comparison (those belonging to the Balkans and those who have escaped), presupposition: the Balkans is dirty, corrupted and full of hatred, negative semantic context	and which one has managed to escape *the dirt, corruption and hatred of the Balkans* and can be counted as *a part of Europe, that means of civilization*

The sentence 'the Balkans as a pejorative term' presupposes the long-term negative legacy of the Balkans, which 'has again returned', which is a rather personal and ungrounded individual authority claim. The metaphor of competition over who 'belongs to the Balkans' is used in an ironic sense whereby the already negative semantic context surrounding the Balkans-as-synecdoche is stressed to create an even further distance from the region and its entailments for who would compete to stay in its *dirt* and *corruption*. The elaboration of this claim in the following sentence is also interesting because a value judgment is made between the *lost* and *uncivilized* who remain in the Balkans and those who have escaped its *dirt, corruption and hatred* and can be counted as *a part of Europe, that means of civilization*. This is a hegemonic meaning-making; in the HR's words Europeanization, under the international community's terms and supervision, becomes *the only way* in which BiH can become democratic, self-sustaining, and self-confident. The biblical reference of salvation is also tacitly present: the verb *escape* (*escape-* succeed in getting away or breaking free from, flee) is connected with getting away from something negative or binding while the noun *escape* is synonymous with *flight* (noun) and translates into Serbian as 'save oneself'. By this analogy 'escaping the Balkans' could translate as an act of salvation.

While there is little self-criticism in the OHR discourse, there is a lot of negative other-presentation. The more negatively presented BiH or its politicians are, the longer and more justifiable the mandate of the IC and

OHR. Through negative other-presentation, the OHR usually provides an alternative reflected through western, liberal-democratic values, claiming it is only done 'in the BiH's citizens' best interest.'

> *In an unprofessional manner* and with very few exceptions, local media have conducted a campaign of disinformation, *if not an outright smear campaign*, based on *biased, incomplete or simply wrong information* with the apparent goal to confuse and alarm the public..."Textbook Review in the Canton of Sarajevo", 4 November 1998

In this example, the HR justifies its role by assigning the chronic inability and negligence to the local politicians. This is a very general statement, but there are some interesting lexical choices to discuss. Deadlines have not been met, commitments have not been fulfilled etc. so the situation is total chaos and the HR is needed to put the place in order. In the paragraph below, local politicians are not regarded as people of authority nor are they respected.

> I could produce a long list of deadlines that have not been met, commitments that have not been fulfilled, minutes of important meetings during which the officials of this country have done nothing but to bicker and squabble and play babble games. "New Year's Message to BiH Citizens", 31 December 1999

Politicians are ascribed 'feminine qualities': they 'do nothing but bicker, squabble and play babble games.' Aside from the OHR's discourse being chauvinistic in general, here are some collocations for *bicker, squabble* and *play babble games.* from the Internet and traditional dictionaries such as Merriem-Webster and Collins Cobuild.

> e.g. Though the two women *bicker* and tease each other, they are obviously old friends.

> The women *bicker*, prattle, and flirt like characters out of Tennessee Williams or Eugene O'Neill.

> e.g. My four-year-old *squabbles* with his friends.

> Here are 8 tips for keeping the child *squabbles* away this season.

> In reality, today's misguided parents even interfere in their child's *squabbles* with other children.

> e.g. Mona *babbled* on and on about her new boyfriend.

> Baby Annabel makes realistic mouth movements and sucking sounds when drinking from her bottle, she *babbles* and giggles and when you rub her tummy.

> Crystal just sits a few feet away smiling sadly as she *babbles*.

Given these verbs' collocates, they primarily seem to refer to arguing over petty things while *bicker* and *squabble* as near synonyms seem to collocate a lot with women. *Babble* refers to uttering words in an incoherent way but can also imply 'irrelevant or foolish utterance,' which , when used for men, can imply a lack of seriousness and even masculinity.

8. Conclusion

The ways in which Bosnian reality is shaped and modeled from the outside are very disputable in terms of the power relations at work, while BiH still lacks strong public opinion which is respected, measured, and on the basis of which politicians and their constituents should act. This preliminary research puts some of these problems in perspective, providing context and opening space for further discourse analytical investigations especially since 14 years after Dayton BiH society is still fragile with the OHR still present. To do a solid analysis of discourse as social interaction that would account for discourses, processes and participants, one needs to respect triangulation consisting of heavy contextualization from other disciplines, careful linguistic methodology but also a series of more detailed textual analysis. For media texts, content analysis can be used as a preliminary, but it cannot fully account for the many and complex strategies of political communication.

Notes

[1] Bon Peace Implementation Council Declaration of 1997 further extended the Dayton powers of the HR. It is an extensive 26-page list of internationally prepared legislative measures...(which) covered policy-making powers at both state, entity and municipal level; intervening in order to regulate policy on housing, education, the legal system. citizenship, travel, the constitution, refugee return, policing, the media, electoral regulation, economic reconstruction and regional relations...extending right down to requirements for the Bosnian sports teams at the Winter Olympics in Nagano, Japan (PIC, 1997b, section II, 3)« (Chandler, 2000: 157).
[2] Estimated internet penetration in BiH was around 20, 3 in 2007. (http://www.internetworldstats.com/euro/ba.htm)
[3] Postcolonialism is used here to refer to the Third World countries and the Balkans are also considered in this category.
[4] See press release »Textbook Review in the Canton of Sarajevo«, 4 November 1998 at www.ohr.int

[5] See Appendix 1

[6] See Appendix 2

[7] Key words are obtained by comparing the words in the text with a reference set of words usually from a larger corpus. Any word which is found to be outstanding in its frequency in the text is considered 'key'.

[8] OHR's own categorization of topics, in their rapports to other foreign organizations, can be seen, for example, in the 14th Report by the High representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to The Secretary-General of the United Nations, 16 July 1999, **APRIL - JUNE 1999**, available at www.ohr.int

[9] Their annual distribution was provided in Appendix 3.

[10] For example, when a press release was titled 'Brčko supervisor, Henry L. Clarke, halts privatization in Brčko district', 14 August 2001, we would put it in three categories: 'Brčko', 'economics', and 'OHR decisions, laws, occupations'.

[11] These are .e. verbs in past simple used by the HR such as removed, welcomed, imposed etc. Due tot he prominence of self-quotation and 1st and 3rd person self reference typical for press release genre (Jacobs, 1999), the conclusion was these actions referred to the HR.

[12] In speech acts theory (Searle, 1969, 1975, Austin, 1978), an illocutionary act implies the performance of an illocution such as, for example, declaring a removal of a person (directive speech act). Where illocution is an act performed *in* saying something, in contrast to a locution as an act *of* saying something, eliciting an answer is an act performed *by* saying something, which Austin calls perlocution. By saying that he removes an individual, the individual in real life is removed and that means that OHR's word is the law and that illocutions (and locutions) also have the immediate power of perlocution.

[13] To calculate keyness, I compared the entire corpus with the reference corpus list, which yielded a lot more function words and general words and nouns from the general register. In the second list, I compared press release titles as they almost always contained a verb. This proved to be the most relevant way of testing because of the corpus size. When I cross-referenced both of these lists, I found that a number of key words were present in both, at least the first 20 or so, and modal verb *will* made it to the 'very high' fifth place (this modal did not occur as a key word in the titles' list), so I included it here.

[14] Verschueren (1999) uses the term explicit *semi-performatives* to include performatives (illocutionary speech acts), which are not 1st person present tense.

[15] Example of more ritualized 'removal' and other decisions can be found at www.ohr.int under the link *HR's decisions*.

References

Brown, G. and Yule, G. (1983) *Discourse Analysis*. Cambridge, London, Portchester Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press.

Chandler, D. (2000) *Faking Democracy After Dayton*. London: Pluto Press.

Denitch, B. (1996) *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia* (revised edn). London: University of Minnesota Press.

Fairclough, N. (1989) *Language and Power*. London: Longman.

Fairclough, N. (2005) 'Transition' in Central and Eastern Europe. *British and American Studies* Timisoara: University of Timisoara 11/2005, pp. 9-34.

Fine, K (1997) 'Fragile Stability and Change: Understanding Conflict During Transitions in East and Central Europe'. *Presenting Conflict in the Post-Communist World*. Chayes, A. and Handler Chayes, A. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, pp. 541-589.

Flowerdew, J. (1997) 'The Discourse of Colonial Withdrawal: A Case Study in the Creation of Mythic Discourse'. *Discourse and Society* 8 (4): 453-477.

Jacobs, G. (1999) *Preformulating the News*. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Kaminsky, M. and Etz, W. (1999) 'Viceroy Petritsch Strives to Make Hobbled Bosnia Into 'Viable State'. *Wall Street Journal*, 27 December.

Keenan, E. O. and Schieffelin, B. (1976) *Topic as a Discourse Notion* in (ed). C.N.Li

Kellner, D. (2003) ' Cultural studies, multiculturalism, and media studies'. in Dines, G. and Humez, J.M. ed. (2003) *Gender, Race, and Class in Media* 2nd edition (pp.9-21). London, New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Knaus, G and Martin, F. (2003) 'Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina: Travails of the European Raj'. *Journal of Democracy*, Vol 14 (3), 3 July.

Lakoff, R. (1990) *Talking Power: The Politics of Language in our Lives*. New York: Basic Books.

Majstorović, D. (2006a) *A Discourse Analysis of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina- English Text and Local Context*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Banja Luka.

Roach, C. and Galtung J. (1993) *Communication and Culture in War and Peace*. London: Sage Publications.

Searle, J.R. (1969) *Speech Acts*. London: Cambridge University Press.

Searle, J.R. in Gunderson, K. (1975) 'A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts'. *Language*, *Mind*, *and Knowledge*. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of science, vol VII. University of Minnesota Press.

Tannen, D. (1990) *You Just Don't Understand: Women and Men in Conversation*. New York: William Morrow.

Traynor, I. (2003) 'Ashdown running Bosnia like a Raj'. *Guardian*, 5 July.

Todorova, M. (1997) *Imagining the Balkans*. London: Oxford University Press.

Van Dijk, T. (1993a) 'Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis'. *Discourse and Society* 4 (2): 249-283.

Van Dijk, T. (1993b) *Elite Discourse and Racism*. London, New Delhi, Newbury park: Sage Publications Inc.

Van Dijk, T. (ed.). (1997) *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction: Discourse as Structure and Process and Discourse as Social Interaction:* Vol.1 (1997a) and Vol.2 (1997b) London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage.

Van Dijk, T. (1998) *Ideology - A Multidisciplinary Approach*. London: Sage.

Verschueren, J. (1999) *Understanding Pragmatics*. London, New York: Arnold.

Volosinov, V.N. (1973) *Marxism and the philosophy of language*. New York: Seminar Press.

Westendorp, C (1999) 'Lessons Bosnia Taught Us'. *Wall Street Journal*, 19 May.

Yordan, C.L. (2003) 'Society Building in Bosnia: A Critique of Post-Dayton Peacebuilding Efforts'. *Seaton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*. Summer/Fall 2003.

www.ohr.int

www.internetworldstats.com/euro/ba.htm

Appendix 1: PIC Bonn Conclusions, 10 December 1997

... The Council welcomes the High representative's intention to use his final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of the Agreement on the Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement in order to facilitate the resolution of difficulties by making binding decisions, as he judges necessary, on the following issues:

a. timing, location and chairmanship of meetings of the common institutions;

b. interim measures to take effect when parties are unable to reach agreement, which will remain in force until the Presidency or Council of Ministers has adopted a decision consistent with the Peace Agreement on the issue concerned;

c. other measures to ensure implementation of the Peace Agreement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Entities, as well as the smooth running of the common institutions[1]. Such measures may include actions against persons holding public office or officials who are absent from meetings without good cause or who are found by the High representative to be in violation of legal commitments made under the Peace Agreement or the terms for its implementation.

---

1   This provision is very vague and it is up to the HR to interpret it as he sees fit.

Appendix 2– distribution of discourse topics by the years 1996-2004 (charts)

Chart 1

**Refugees, return, collective centers**

1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
5	7	12	9	6	8	6	3	1

Chart 2

Diplomacy, HR abroad, EU

1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
6	3	1	10	15	25	25	8	6

Chart 3

Territories, police, military, intelligence, airports

1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
1	3	5	12	4	7	9	16	13

Chart 4

BiH courts and legislation

Chart 5

HR and BiH politicians, politics

Chart 6

OHR's decisions and law s, occupying premises

Chart 7

Social issues

Chart 8

Property issues

Chart 9

Events, openings

Chart 10

Assaults

Chart 11

Reintegration and reconstruction, energy, resources

Chart 12

Elections

Chart 13

Media

Chart 14

Human rights

Chart 15

Brèko district

Chart 16

Economy and interentity cooperation

Chart 17

OHR bureaucracy

Chart 18

Region

Chart 19

Donations

Chart 20

State symbols and insignia, citizens' documents

Chart 21

Corruptions, drugs, trafficking

'68 KOT HKRATNA KRIZA EVROPSKEGA ZAHODA IN VZHODA

Primož Krašovec

Članek izhaja iz raziskave Oblikovanje, razvoj in raba pojma Evrope v slovenskih časopisih v drugi polovici 20. stoletja, ki poteka na Pedagoškem inštitutu od februarja 2008. V teku raziskave, ki temelji na kritični analizi diskurza časopisnega poročanja,[1] se je leto '68 pokazalo kot posebej pomembna in prelomna letnica. '68 označuje sredino med jugoslovansko prekinitvijo s sovjetskim modelom socializma leta '48 in njegovim propadom '89, in če je bil leta '48 Titov ne Stalinu še drzna poteza, s katero je Jugoslavija tvegala mednarodno izolacijo in marginalizacijo (preveč socialistična za Zahod, preveč zahodna za Vzhod Evrope), je bila leta '68 – v času največjih uporov tako proti kapitalizmu v zahodni kot proti državnemu socializmu v vzhodni Evropi – jugoslovanska pot v socializem, ki je (vsaj deklarativno) temeljila na socialistični demokraciji in delavskem samoupravljanju, dejanska alternativa težavam in socialnim nemirom, s katerimi sta se srečevala tako zahodni kot vzhodni blok. Bila je alternativa[2] tako nasilju pariške policije in aroganci gaullističnega režima kot nasilju intervencijskih čet varšavskega pakta in birokratskemu avtizmu sovjetskega režima v prelomni zgodovinski situaciji – ko se je zaradi padanja stopnje profita končala zlata doba kapitalistične (keynesianske) socialne države in začela socialna agonija, ki je v Evropi trajala do poraza delavskega gibanja in vzpona thatcherizma v začetku osemdesetih, obenem pa se je začel krhati tudi državni socializem sovjetskega tipa, ki pa je zdržal nekaj let več kot zahodna socialna država (Hobsbawm, 2004; Harvey, 2009).

V nadaljevanju nas bo zanimalo, kako je bil zamišljen ta alternativni, demokratični socializem in iz kakšnega koncepta Evrope je izhajal. Razmišljanje bo potekalo ob dveh primerih, ko sta režima na vstaje in iskanje poti v demokratični socializem odgovorila z nasiljem, v Parizu maja in v Pragi avgusta '68. Na koncu se demokratični socializem kot alternativa v Evropi ni uveljavil, zlom tako socialnega kapitalizma kot državnega socializma je nadomestil neoliberalni model – a morda lahko za nas danes, v

času zatona neoliberalnega modela, ko lahko le-ta svojo vladavino ohranja le s čedalje bolj odkritim nasiljem, poskusi iskanja demokratičnega socializma izpred štiridesetih let predstavljajo naš informbiro, prve negotove, še v besede in podobe preteklosti zazrte korake proti alternativi današnjemu neoliberalnemu barbarstvu.

Kriza evropske civilizacije med študentskim uporom in generalno stavko (Evropa v poročanju Dela in Dnevnika o razrednih bojih v Parizu maja 1968)

Kaj hoče današnja mladina?

Poročanje o študentskem uporu v Parizu se v Dnevniku začne 4., v Delu pa 5. maja 1968. Dnevnik začne s poročilom o demonstracijah v Latinski četrti, Delo pa s poročilom o zaprtju Sorbonne. Medtem ko je poročilo Dnevnika precej skopo in navede le nekaj najosnovnejš dejstev, Delo že v prvem poročilu precizira osnovne tematike in akterje, ki prevladujejo tudi v naslednjih nekaj dneh poročanja. Glavna akterja v Delovem poročilu sta študenti in policija, celotno dogajanje pa je, vsaj na začetku poročanja, strukturirano okrog te opozicije. V članku se kar trikrat ponovi sintagma »srdit spopad«, študentske akcije so označene kot »nemiri«, ravnanje policije pa kot »surovo«. Poudarjeno je, da hočejo s policijskim nasiljem »oblasti onemogočiti delovanje levo usmerjene študentske mladine« (Delo, 5. 5. 1968: 1). To je prvi, zadržan in previden, poskus artikulacije politične in socialne problematike.

Vse do 20. maja se poročanje v Delu osredotoča na opozicijo med dvema glavnima družbenima akterjema, študenti in policijo, in na temo nasilja (spopadov, bojev, aretacij, smrti) – še posebej je ta način način poročanja prevladujoč do 14. maja, do začetka splošne stavke v Franciji. Podobno je v Dnevniku, le da so tu v ospredju še nekateri simboli, ki označujejo revolucionarnost študentov (barikade) in je policijsko nasilje še bolj eksplicitno obsojeno (s pridevniki, kot je »brutalnost«). Delo je namreč nekoliko bolj zadržano in se v obsodbi policijskega nasilja bolj zanaša na empirične podatke, na številke in dejstveni tip poročanja. Dnevnik v nekaj člankih med 9. in 15. majem poda refleksijo študentskega upora in policijskega nasilja, potem pa 20. maja, nekaj dni kasneje kot v Delu, v ospredje pride splošna stavka ter delavsko-socialna problematika. Ker v Delu ni posebej izražene refleksije študentskih uporov in prevladuje zadržano, dejstveno poročanje in posredno obsojanje policijskega nasilja (z uvajanjem akterjev, kot so »ogorčena javnost«, »kritičen francoski tisk«

ipd.) brez jasno in neposredno opredeljenih političnih stališč ali podpore, se bomo pri analizi političnih pogledov jugoslovanskih časopisov na študentski upor v Parizu maja '68 opirali na omenjenih nekaj komentarjev iz Dnevnika.

Osnovno vprašanje je »Kaj hoče mlada generacija?« – glede na to, da so »cilji, za katere so se nekdaj borili na barikadah in umirali, večinoma že uresničeni« in da je »standard višji, kot so ga imele prejšnje generacije« (Dnevnik, 9. 5. 1968: 7). Poudarek je torej na vrednotah materialnega standarda, blagostanja in socialnih pravic, zato se zdi študentski upor, vsaj na prvi pogled, nerazumljiv. To je tudi razlog za pozno refleksijo, saj s postrevolucionarne socialistične perspektive, kjer je (v Jugoslaviji kot delu polperiferije svetovnega kapitalističnega sistema – Arrighi, 1985) boj potekal predvsem za nacionalno osvoboditev, državno suverenost ter socialne pravice kot pogoje za postopni družbeni napredek in razvoj. Prvi poskus refleksije v Dnevniku ostane pri vprašanju zakaj revolucionarne metode, kot je poulični boj, če so revolucionarni cilji, vsaj kot jih razume jugoslovanski tisk tistega časa, že uresničeni? Šele v zadnjem stavku komentator tvega odgovor: »Mladina je objekt te družbe, ne pa subjekt, ki soodloča,« torej je problematika zastavljena kot vprašanje demokratične participacije. Naslednji komentar, 12. 5., se ukvarja s študentskimi protesti v Italiji. Tu je politična vsebina študentskih bojev že nekoliko natančneje artikulirana – po skromnih začetnih zahtevah po reformah sistema štipendij ali po prenovi študentskih domov prihajata vse bolj v ospredje zavračanje skorumpirane in samozadostne predstavniške demokracije in iskanje novih form demokratične politike. Tretji poskus refleksije, 15. 5., prepozna novost in invencijo politike študentskih uporov, ki se ne ozira več na stare politične forme in kategorije ter poudarja globalni značaj študentskega gibanja, povezan z naraščanjem števila študentov po svetu in z njihovo vse bolj vidno družbeno vlogo. Obenem pa poda pokroviteljsko kritiko politične artikuliranosti uporniških študentov: »Protest mlade generacije gre iz srca in iz globin duše. Ta protest še ni kanaliziran, nima svojega programa, niti svojega imena« (Dnevnik, 15. 5. 1968: 7) – tu bi lahko ugovarjali, da je težava prej v tem, da je novost »programa« uporniških študentov nevidna s perspektive klasičnih socialističnih političnih idej in programov –, a poudari novost, prelomnost tega »pojava«. Dnevnik tako eksplicira in celo reflektira svojo zagato pri obravnavanju študentskih protestov – prepozna jih kot nekaj radikalno novega, a ni pripravljen svojega političnega konceptualnega aparata prilagoditi tej novosti ter lahko tako le prepozna, da se politike teh protestov ne da zgrabiti z obstoječimi političnimi koncepti. Zato se zadovolji z moralno refleksijo kot substitutom za politično.

Delo ne gre tako daleč in, vse do zadnjega dne maja '68, ostane pri strogo dejstvenem tipu poročanja, ki omenjene zagate sploh ne eksplicira. Tako se poročanje Dela vrti izključno okrog empiričnega povzemanja bojev med študenti in policijo, kar je pospremljeno z velikimi fotografijami policijskega nasilja (ena izmed njih je opremljena z napisom »divjaštvo pariške policije« - Delo, 12. 5. 1968: 1). Edina politična gesta Dela je obsojanje policijskega nasilja, medtem ko se eksplicitne in reflektirane politične opredelitve do dogajanja vzdrži. Tako so članki v Delu v prvi polovici maja precej kratki (a podatkovno bogati); poročanje o študentskih protestih tudi prostorsko ne dominira. Poročila in vesti o njih so sicer vedno na prvi strani, a v prvi polovici maja ne vsak dan (le kadar se poroča o večjih izbruhih nasilja in pouličnih spopadih, drugače niso *newsworthy*) in ne kot glavna novica dneva (to mesto si delijo s poročili o poteku vietnamske vojne in mirovnih pogajanjih med ZDA in Vietnamom, ki istočasno potekajo v Parizu). Gre torej za solidarnost s pariškimi študenti *proti* policijskemu nasilju, ki je predstavljeno kot absolutno nesprejemljivo, in ne za solidarnost z njihovimi političnimi cilji in metodami (ki so Delu, tako kot Dnevniku, precej skrivnostni), oziroma za kritiko policijske represije svobodnega političnega delovanja kot antidemokratične, medtem ko demokratični eksperimenti in inovacije uporniških študentov niso posebej tematizirani. Tako v Delu kot v Dnevniku denimo ni citatov iz govorov študentskih voditeljev ali izvečkov iz programskih tekstov uporniških študentov, kar je drugače ustaljena praksa pri poročanju o prelomnih političnih dogodkih (to je posebej očitno na primeru časopisnega poročanja o okupaciji Češkoslovaške, ki vsebuje ogromno izvlečkov Tita, Dubčka in drugih pomembnih politikov ter deklaracij, izjav in drugih političnih tekstov). Daniel Cohn-Bendit in Rudi Dutschke se pojavita le kot pasivna akterja, kot žrtvi političnega preganjanja in diskreditacije ali prepovedi vstopa v Francijo.

Obenem pa je policijsko nasilje edino, kar so jugoslovanski časopisi, vsaj v tej prvi fazi dogajanja, v fazi študentskega upora, v francoski oziroma zahodni družbi pripravljeni kritizirati; kot piše v zgoraj omenjenem komentarju, je visok standard že dosežen, torej vsebina študentskega upora ostaja uganka. To pomeni tiho pristajanje tudi na kapitalizem, če ta le vsebuje demokratično ureditev, visok standard in socialne pravice – predmet kritike je le nedemokratičen »eksces« te ureditve, policijsko nasilje nad svobodo izražanja in svobodo političnega delovanja. Kot bomo pokazali kasneje, v analizi poročanja jugoslovanskih časopisov o okupaciji Češkoslovaške, gre za povojno evropsko ureditev, ki temelji na skupnem antifašističnem boju ter miru, ki ga je nasledil. V tej zgodovinski situaciji, ko so glavna grožnja povojnemu evropskemu miru imperialistične težnje Sovjetske zveze, je vrednota

demokracije pri pisanju o evropskih zadevah pomembnejša od vrednote socializma (v pomenu ekonomske ureditve) in Zahod zaveznik Jugoslavije kljub različnim pogledom na ekonomska vprašanja. Boj za miroljubno ko-eksistenco in demokracijo suspendira problematizacijo zahodnega kapita-lizma – vse do začetka splošne stavke v Franciji.

Kriza povojne evropske ureditve

Poročila Dela in Dnevnika o študentskem uporu v Franciji dogodek zelo hitro internacionalizirajo. Že 8. maja je v Delu natisnjen članek, v katerem je omenjeno, da so se s francoskimi študenti solidarizirali belgijski in nem-ški. V kasnejših, zgoraj navedenih, komentarjih v Dnevniku je poudarjen globalni značaj študentskega upora (omenjajo se študentske demonstra-cije v Zahodni Nemčiji, na Švedskem, v ZDA, pa tudi v Španiji, Alžiriji, Egiptu, Tuniziji in na Poljskem). Znotraj tega umeščanja študentskih prote-stov v globalni kontekst je pomemben moment poudarjanje »zahodnosti« protesta, denimo »zanimivo je, da je do študentskih demonstracij prišlo v najbolj razvitih deželah Zahoda«, kar predpostavlja določeno distanco tako do študentskih protestov (še posebej če upoštevamo, da v Delu in Dnevniku v maju '68 ni poročil o hkratnih študentskih akcijah in gibanju v Jugoslaviji) kot do Zahoda samega – kot da bi bili tako študentski upor kot kriza, ki ga je sprožila, stvar izključno Zahoda (skupaj z nekaterimi ekso-tičnimi arabskimi državami in – »celo«, kot začudeno piše v članku – Polj-sko, a so te eksotične države v poročanju marginalno zastopane oziroma zgolj površno omenjene).

Način poročanja torej izvzema Jugoslavijo (in celoten socialistični, vzhodni del Evrope) iz obravnave problematike – študentski upor je stvar Zahoda. Delitev na Zahod in Vzhod je v tem momentu pomembnejša od skupne kategorije Evrope in Vzhod je (kar je danes nezamisljivo) upora-bljan afirmativno v razmerju do Zahoda, pretresenega od krize in uporov. Če so bili študentski upori prva velika problematizacija povojne evropske ureditve – oziroma, kot piše Dnevnik, je bilo povojno obdobje »obdobje, ko je mladina še verjela v državo pravičnosti, v šolo za vse, v Združeno Evropo«, nato pa »se je polagoma izkazalo, da je vse to le neuresničljiva utvara« (Dnevnik, 12. 5. 1968, 22) –, se Jugoslavija oziroma »Vzhod« v poro-čanju o študentskih uporih izvzema tako iz tega procesa dezluzionizacije kot iz krize, ki je pripeljala do rušenja iluzij in družbenih nemirov. Gre torej za razcep znotraj Evrope na Zahod, ki je verjel, da je mogoče razre-dna protislovja ukrotiti in umiriti znotraj kapitalistične družbene ureditve

z določenimi reformami ter koncesijami delavskemu razredu, a mu to ni uspelo in zato sedaj doživlja krizo in socialne pretrese, ter na Vzhod, ki je krenil po pravilni poti socializma in ni imel nobenih iluzij o »pravičnem« kapitalizmu ter se je tako tudi izognil aktualni krizi. Ta delitev postane še posebej očitna, ko poglavitna tematika v drugi polovici maja niso več študentski protesti, temveč delavski boj in splošna stavka v Franciji. Prvi Delov komentar na temo študentskih uporov (»Pariška komuna študentov 68«), ki se pojavi šele 31. maja (vsa besedila na to temo prej so novice, vesti in poročila), je obenem še zadnji članek, ki študentske proteste umešča v kontekst krize vrednost in civilizacije ter generacijskega prepada ...

Po 14. maju, ki prinese prvo poročilo o začetku splošne stavke, se način poročanja močno spremeni. Najprej je stavka še definirana v razmerju do študentskih protestov, kot odgovor na policijsko nasilje nad študenti (kar je tudi dotedanja osnovna interpretacijska matrica študentskega upora), nato pa se premakne v drugo problemsko polje, v polje razmerja med delom in kapitalom, tj. razrednega boja. Tako Delo že 17. maja poroča o zasedbah tovarn in zapiranju direktorjev v pisarne z zahtevami po socialnem zavarovanju in višjih plačah. Dvajsetega maja je v Delu, v članku z značilnim naslovom »Usodni dnevi za V. republiko«, problematika še dodatno zaostrena. Članek namiguje na potencialno revolucionarno situacijo, ko morda le reforme ne bodo dovolj (»zastavlja se vprašanje, ali bo sedanja kriza dobila samo svojo socialno profesionalno rešitev, ali tudi politično«), zgodovinsko umesti situacijo kot prvi večji povojni delavski upor v Zahodni Evropi, kar maje vero v povojno kapitalistično socialno državo (»vsekakor takega stanja glede delavskih akcij v Franciji še ni bilo od leta 1936 dalje, ko je prišla na oblast vlada ljudske fronte Leona Bluna«) ter poudarja odločnost, številčnost in organiziranost delavcev (»delavci so zasedli glavne točke v gospodarstvu, prometu in komunikaciji ter postavili vlado pred hudo preizkušnjo«, »očitno je, da se milijoni delavcev tokrat ne bodo zadovoljili z minimalnimi materialnimi ugodnostmi in z obljubami delodajalcev, ki jim ne verjame nihče več« - Delo, 20. 5. 1968: 1).

Šele z delavsko zahtevo po spremembi načina produkcije – oziroma s potencialnostjo te spremembe, ki se zarisuje v radikalnosti in množičnosti delavskih akcij, čeprav zahteva po revoluciji s strani delavcev ni izrečena, je pa, po drugi strani, očitna iz simbolov (rdeče zastave, slike Maa in Cheja) in retorike študentov –, tudi politika študentov dobi svoj smisel. Iz naslednjega, nekoliko daljšega citata je razvidna dialektika med delavsko in študentsko politiko (študenti so prvi, ki zahtevajo revolucijo, a šele z množičnim delavskim gibanjem ta dejansko postane mogoča, tako da šele

splošna stavka postavi študente v antikapitalistični kontekst in omogoči Delu, da jih preneha obravnavati kot pasivne žrtve policijskega nasilja ali naivne oznanjevalce krize smisla, vrednot ali civilizacije, temveč kot aktiven politični subjekt):

> "V Franciji je že slišati napovedi o usmeritvi francoske družbe v povsem novo smer. Odpor študentov proti kapitalističnemu sistemu je zajel široke družbene plasti. Odločenost delavskega razreda, da bo na miren način ali drugače prevzel svojo usodo v lastne roke, je prav tako deležna čedalje širše podpore pri raznih slojih prebivalstva. Značilno je, da so pobudniki te smeri mladi ljudje – študentom in srednješolcem so se pridružili mladi delavci in kmetje. Protagonisti novega časa že začenjajo poudarjati nujnost neposredne demokracije in samoupravljanja." (Delo, 20. 5. 1968: 1)

Klasičen socialistični ideološki horizont predvideva krizo, do katere bodo pripeljala notranja protislovja v kapitalističnem produkcijskem načinu in v kateri bodo glavno zgodovinsko vlogo prevzeli delavci ter izvedli komunistično revolucijo. Zato je bil začetek krize in upora, do začetka splošne stavke, za jugoslovanske medije neintelegibilen in so o njem lahko poročali le na način krize vrednot, smisla in civilizacije ali strogo dejstveno, kot o spopadu med študenti in policijo. Delavske akcije tako obenem naredijo zgodovinsko situacijo razumljivo (»Aha! Gre za strukturno krizo kapitalizma!«) in legitimizirajo družbene boje, ki potekajo znotraj nje (študentski boj kot nekoliko prezgoden in še ne popolnoma ozaveščen antikapitalistični upor, ki mu da vsebino in legitimnost šele povezava z delavskim bojem). Za izvedbo te miselne operacije je bilo seveda nujno zamolčati hkratne študentske boje v socialističnih državah (posebej v Jugoslaviji) ali pa je bilo slednje treba obravnavati kot eksotično posebnost (študentski protesti na Poljskem).

Dvajsetega maja, ko stavkajo in zasedajo tovarne že milijoni francoskih delavcev, postane delavski upor glavna tema prvih strani tako Dela kot Dnevnika. Študentski upor prej nikoli ni dominiral na prvih straneh, z izjemo fotografij, ki so prikazovale spektakularno policijsko nasilje. Z delavskim uporom je drugače, o njem se, za razliko od študentskega upora, poroča vsak dan na vrhu prvih strani – kar je ravno nasprotno od današnje zgodovinopisne in popularno-kulturne obravnave maja '68, kjer so v ospredju študentski nemiri in se na delavsko razsežnost dogajanja pozablja – in članki so veliko daljši in izčrpnejši kot prej. Nova struktura politične situacije omogoči jugoslovanskim časopisom, da le-to interpretirajo v starih okvirih in s svojim običajnim političnim konceptualnim aparatom. Namesto prejšnjega skromnega dejstvenega poročanja in nekoliko zmedenih improvizacij nastopijo resne analize. Začne se tudi aktivacija klasič-

nih individualnih akterjev – državnih voditeljev, pomembnih funkcionarjev, voditeljev strank, ministrov – ter citiranje in povzemanje njihovih izjav in govorov. Delavski upor se naslavlja na državo in govori v ekonomsko-družbenih kategorijah, kar je okvir politike, ki je domač tudi tedanjemu (in sedanjemu) medijskemu diskurzu, ki ga je študentski upor, ki ni stopal v dialog z državo (razen posredno, preko spopadov z represivnim aparatom države) in je govoril v nerazumljivem jeziku, nekoliko presenetil.

Ko v ospredje časopisnega poročanja pride delavski upor, so stvari spet na svojem mestu, razumljive in interpretabilne. Vzpostavita se dve veliki in antagonistični skupini akterjev: francoska država oz. politični vrh in leva opozicija, ki vključuje opozicijske stranke v parlamentu, sindikate in delavsko gibanje. Poročanje o dogajanju v Franciji se razširi in postane osrednja tema Dela in Dnevnika, a na račun študentskega gibanja, ki se na njunih straneh pojavlja vse manj.

Evropa, zgodovina in politični subjekti

Tudi po začetku splošne stavke Dnevnik najprej še nekaj dni poroča predvsem dejstveno. Enaindvajsetega maja je bil na sedmi strani, ki je bila drugače namenjena komentarjem, objavljen obširnejši članek, ki prinaša le podatke o številu stavkajočih delavcev in metodah stavke (zasedanje tovarn, zapiranje direktorjev v njihove pisarne) ter našteva panoge, ki jih je stavka zajela. Dodan je še opis vpliva stavke na vsakdanje življenje v Franciji, ni pa opisov ali citatov delavske politike, njihovih zahtev in razglasov. Značilna ocena politične situacije je:

> "Političnih posledic stavke še ni mogoče oceniti. Predsednik de Gaulle se je včeraj znova posvetoval z ministroma za socialno skrbstvo in notranje zadeve, ki kasneje nista hotela povedati niti besedice o tem, kaj so se pogovarjali. Iz predsedniške palače so samo sporočili, da se de Gaulle ne namerava obrniti na narod pred 24. majem."

Politike se torej ne da razbrati niti iz delavskih akcij samih – da bi izvedeli kaj o politiki, moramo krotko čakati pred vrati predsedniške palače in se vmes zadovoljiti s skromnim dejstvenim poročanjem. Ponovno so edini legitimni politični akterji državno vodstvo, predsednik, ministri in voditelji strank. Tudi delavci se v časopisnem poročanju ne kvalificirajo kot avtonomni in legitimni politični subjekti, njihove akcije sicer premaknejo težišče poročanja od moralnih premislekov k političnim (tema postane legitimna politična tema, medtem ko poročanje o študentskem uporu slednjega ne obravnava kot politični dogodek), a delavske množice, tako kot

študentske, ostanejo neme – tisti, ki naj bi delali zgodovino, o njej ne smejo govoriti. Za to je potrebno počakati na nastop državnega vrha.

Poročanje o razrednih bojih v Franciji se v naslednjih dneh nadaljuje z opisi parlamentarnega teatra – šele, ko se v zgodbo vključi tudi ta, dobi poročanje obliko običajnega in popolnega političnega poročanja. Dokler so o dogodku molčali uradni francoski politiki, so molčali tudi časopisi oziroma so se omejevali na dejstveno poročanje in nekaj moralnih spekulacij. Premik od študentskega upora k množični delavski stavki je dogodek legitimiral kot pravo in ustrezno politično temo, počakati je bilo treba le, da spregovorijo pravi in ustrezni politični akterji. V Dnevniku se začnejo po 22. maju pojavljati citati govorov pomembnih francoskih politikov in podrobni opisi dogajanja v francoski vladi ter parlamentu. Gre za dva kriterija, ki se ju drži »objektivno« poročanje o politiki (kot nečem, kar je, za razliko od nespornih in objektivnih družbenih ter naravnih dejstev, nujno kontaminirano z ideologijo in »spolitizirano« - Krašovec, 2009) – mesto politike sta lahko le vlada in parlament oziroma izvršna in zakonodajna veja državne oblasti in edini legitimni politični akterji so člani vlade in parlamentarci (ter njihovi ustrezni ekvivalenti v socialističnih ureditvah). Diskurzivna strategija nevtralnega poročanja o politiki je torej stroga omejitev področja politike na delovanje državnega vrha in števila posameznikov, ki lahko legitimno govorijo o politiki, na profesionalne politike, ki zasedajo mesta v vladi ali parlamentu. Nevtralno poročanje o politiki je pravzaprav dejstveno poročanje o poteku političnih procesov v vladi in parlamentu določene države – in ker je velik del politike tudi govorjenje, so del dejstev, o katerih se poroča, tudi citati iz izjav in govorov uradnih politikov. Nevtralni časopisi lahko »politizirajo« le skozi usta uradne državne politike – če ta molči, kot se je zgodilo v Franciji v prvi polovici maja, jim ostane le navajanje številk in drugih empiričnih podatkov, števila aretiranih študentov in ranjenih policajev, števila stavkajočih delavcev in zasedenih tovarn. Šele uradni politični vrh je pristojen situacijo interpretireti – in če gre, kot v našem primeru, za konfrontacijo med političnim vrhom in političnimi subjekti iz ljudstva, lahko slednji nastopajo le v podrejeni, sekundarni, pasivni vlogi, kot statisti v parlamentarnem boju, v katerem vladajoča gaullistična koalicija predstavlja *status quo*, medtem ko leva parlamentarna opozicija predstavlja neme delavce in študente.

Poročanje se do konca maja nadaljuje na način opisovanja dogajanja v parlamentarnem teatru. Medtem ko zahteve, deklaracije in politične prakse upornih študentov in delavcev niso bile deležne posebne pozornosti, je dolgočasno in predvidljivo parlamentarno mletje podrobno opisano;

medtem ko večina študentskih in delavskih organizacij ter posameznikov v poročanju ni navedena poimensko, na način individualnih akterjev, so stranke in njihovi pomembnejši člani pedantno popisani in našteti. Iz sicer skromno dejstvenega, a vseeno poročanja o dejanskih zgodovinskih dogodkih se poročanje spremeni v spremljanje parlamentarnega lutkovnega gledališča, kjer so dejanski družbeni boji zastopani oziroma reprezentirani. O študentskem uporu se še naprej poroča kot o uličnem spektaklu, ki naj bi bil usmerjen predvsem proti vladi, kot reakcija na vladno politiko (politični akterji iz ljudstva v nevtralnem poročanju lahko nastopajo le kot reakcija na vladno politiko, kot gola negacija oziroma protest – politiko lahko dela le državni vrh, ljudstvu je, v perspektivi nevtralnega poročanja, dopuščeno le, da to odobrava ali ob tem negoduje), ne pa kot subjekt lastne, afirmativne in avtonomne politike. Tako je iz poročanja izpuščeno vse, kar je bilo v dogodkih maja '68 v Parizu novega in politično prelomnega: oblike politične organizacije, ki so se formirale na zasedenih univerzah in v tovarnah, teorija, ki se je tam producirala, ter predvsem nove politične perspektive in koncepti, ki sta jih obe gibanji proizvedli – kritika tovarniške discipline in družbe dela, predelava marksizma, ki ni več temeljil na valorizaciji dela, problematizacija tradicionalnih družbenih (medspolnih, družinskih, prijateljskih) odnosov, poskusi oblikovanje komunistične politike, ki ni več vezana na državo ali delovno mesto, kritika tako zahodnega kapitalističnega kot vzhodnega partijsko-birokratskega izkoriščanja in zatiranja ... Jugoslovanske časopise diskurzi upornih delavcev in študentov zanimajo le, vkolikor jih lahko prevedejo v zahteve po samoupravljanju in neposredni demokraciji,[3] kar je sicer na najsplošnejši ravni res, a umanjka podrobnejša obravnava teh diskurzov, ki bi lahko razjasnila, kaj je bilo v celotni situaciji dejansko novega in zgodovinsko prelomnega.

Namesto tega si sledijo poročila o izjavah Pompidouja, de Gaulla, Mitteranda idr., ki govorijo znotraj starih političnih konceptov in liberalno-demokratskih klišejev. Delo te klišeje sicer res sproti problematizira in kritizira, a le znotraj okvirov uradne socialistične kritike zahodnega kapitalizma[4] (kar je sicer samo po sebi precejšen preboj; kot bomo videli kasneje, pri analizi poročanja o okupaciji Češkoslovaške, je zahodni demokratični socializem pogosteje perciprian kot taktični zaveznik proti agresivni zunanji politiki Sovjetske zveze kot nevarnejši nasprotnici pravega socializma) – tako je sicer kritiziran »malomeščanski sistem Zahoda« in je možnost revolucije na Zahodu obravnavana odobravajoče, a obenem niso enaki kritiki podvrženi elementi »malomeščanstva« v Jugoslaviji sami. Francoska

študentsko-delavska kritika ni videna kot nekaj, kar zadeva tako Zahod kot Vzhod Evrope, kot nekaj, kar problematizira ureditev socialne države v obeh, tako kapitalistični kot socialistični različici – fetišizem dela in napredka, konservativne družbene mikroodnose, državno birokratsko administriranje življenj državljanov, institucije zapiranja in discipliniranja ...

S tem se jugoslovanski časopisi sicer postavljajo v napredno pozicijo glede na kapitalistično demokracijo in deloma povzamejo nekatere zahteve delavskega gibanja v Franciji,[5] a ostajajo znotraj klasičnega horizonta socialistične politike – odločilen je ekonomski boj, v katerem je glavni cilj emancipacija delavskega razreda, ki bo po procesu svoje osamosvojitve emancipiral tudi vse ostale razrede in uresničil brezrazredno ter brezdržavno, torej resnično svobodno družbo – komunizem. A problem, ki je očiten že v predstavitvi zaporednega razvoja razrednih družb (antično suženjlaštništvo, fevdalizem, kapitalizem) v *Komunističnem manifestu* (Engels in Marx, 1976), je, da revolucionarne spremembe produkcijskega načina nikoli niso izvedli zatirani in izkoriščani tistega sistema: antičnega suženjlaštništva niso ukinili sužnji, temveč barbari, fevdalizma niso ukinili tlačani, temveč meščanstvo, razred, ki se je pojavil na novo in uveljavil nove ekonomske forme, in prav tako kapitalizma ni uspelo zrušiti delavskim gibanjem, čeprav so ta v svojem boju dosegla pomembne socialne in politične pridobitve, predvsem na področju materialnega standarda in delavskih pravic tako na demokratično-kapitalističnem Zahodu kot na socialističnem Vzhodu. Kot je slutil že Lenin (1977) v kritikah ekonomizma in v odgovorih na kritike (da njegova oblika politike ni delavska razredna politika), povzetih v sloviti doktrini o poklicnih revolucionarjih, in kot je očitno iz osvobodilnih vojn ljudstev Jugoslavije, Kitajske, Vietnama idr., ki so jim same materialne razmere ter konkretne naloge v osvobodilnem boju narekovale (v praksi, če že ne vedno v ideologiji in retoriki) odstopanja od klasičnih socialističnih doktrin in receptov, je za zrušenje in ukinitev kapitalizma potreben vdor *novega* razreda v zgodovino (klasična delavska gibanja so lahko ostala le pri reformizmu v okvirih kapitalizma, zato so Leninove intervencije v polemiki proti ekonomizmu in spontanizmu ter koncept partije kot avantgarde ključnega pomena). Morda so bili tudi uporni študentje v Parizu – skupaj s svojimi tovariši od Mehike do Kitajske – poskus oziroma zametek takšnega novega razreda, a tega se s perspektive klasične socialistične politike ni dalo videti.

2. Evropa, mir in demokratični socializem (Evropa v poročanju Dela in Dnevnika o okupaciji Češkoslovaške avgusta 1968)

Evropa v mitu socializma

Diskurz poročanja Dela in Dnevnika o okupaciji Češkoslovaške leta 1968 je strukturiran kot spopad dveh nasprotnih si ideoloških perspektiv, dveh antagonističnih »branj« mita socializma – demokratičnega, humanega, naprednega socializma (politična in ideološka perspektiva Jugoslavije in Češkoslovaške) ter birokratskega, avtoritarnega, etatističnega socializma (politična in ideološka perspektiva Sovjetske zveze in drugih držav, ki so sodelovale v okupaciji Češkoslovaške). Strukturo tega spopada in način, kako skupni mit socializma določa in omejuje obe omenjeni ideološki perspektivi, smo analizirali drugje (Krašovec in Žagar, 2008), tokrat nas bo bolj zanimala vloga Evrope v tem diskurzu, oziroma, kako deluje in na kakšen način se pojem Evrope umešča v omenjeni spopad in kakšno je njegovo razmerje do obeh antagonističnih ideoloških perspektiv. »Pojem« je zaenkrat seveda le provizorična oznaka brez teoretskih pretenzij – kaj natanko, tj. katero »diskurzivno dejstvo« je Evropa v diskurzu poročanja jugoslovanskih časopisov o okupaciji Češkoslovaške, moramo še ugotoviti.

V poročanju o okupaciji Češkoslovaške je mit socializma predstavljal osnovni ideološki horizont, dogodek okupacije pa prelomno zgodovinsko situacijo, ki lahko ogrozi obstoj socializma kot takega, ki lahko torej uniči sam referenčni okvir zamišljanja in prakticiranja socializma. Posledično je bil diskurz poročanja o okupaciji zastavljen zelo ostro in usodno: namesto pluralnosti ideoloških perspektiv, ki jih običajno omogočajo moderni miti,[6] sta ostali le dve, diametralno nasprotni in antagonistični, in vsaka se je poskušala vzpostaviti kot tista, ki bo lahko, v dani zgodovinski situaciji, rešila socializem pred uničenjem. Apokaliptična vizija je bila namreč lastna obema perspektivama. Tako so zagovorniki naprednega socializma trdili, da bo le-tega uničila praksa uveljavljanja vojaške moči, s katero poskuša birokratski sistem ohraniti svojo problematično različico socializma pri življenju, medtem ko so zagovorniki birokratskega socializma trdili, da bo do uničenja socializma privedla ravno demokratizacija, saj naj bi bila slednja le krinka za kontrarevolucijo.[7] Usodnost situacije in preteča nevarnost uničenja socializma sta množico heterogenih ideoloških perspektiv znotraj mita socializma zreducirali na dve radikalno antagonistični in obe sta poskušali v medsebojnem spopadu pokazati, da ena od njiju ne sodi v mit socializma, ter jo izriniti iz skupnega ideološkega horizonta.

Pri tem sta se obe[8] perspektivi sklicevali na resničnost svojega in lažnost nasprotnega socializma. Šlo je torej, če uporabimo Foucaultovo (1991: 57-77) terminologijo, za formacijo režima resnice, v katerem mehanizmi pridobivanja vednosti znotraj horizonta specifične, socialistične racionalnosti vladanja in uveljavljanja te vednosti kot resnice niso bili linearni in enostavni, temveč predmet boja med naprednim, demokratičnim in birokratskim, avtoritarnim socializmom. Obe perspektivi, ki sta pretendirali na mesto nove racionalnosti vladanja, sta izhajali iz skupne zaloge vednosti, ki jo je predstavljal mit socializma (teorija Marxa, Engelsa in drugih komunističnih teoretikov, politična praksa Lenina ter mednarodnega delavskega gibanja, komunistična »branja« razsvetljenskih teoretskih in demokratičnih političnih idej – svobode, pravic, vladavine ljudstva, emancipacije itn. –, boj proti imperializmu in fašizmu, iskanje nekapitalistične ekonomske ureditve, vprašanje države itn.), a je bil vsak element te skupne zaloge vednosti v boju obeh perspektiv drugače oziroma nasprotno interpretiran. Šlo je torej za to, kateri izmed antagonističnih socialističnih modelov racionalnosti vladanja bo uveljavil svoje načine branja klasičnih tekstov, svoj način reševanja vprašanja države, svoj model delavskega nadzora nad produkcijskimi sredstvi, svojo prakso ljudske demokracije itn., in sicer kot racionalnost vladanja socializma na splošno, ki bo sposobna odrejati resničnost in lažnost znanstvenih ter filozofskih spoznanj, načinov vladanja, pisanj zgodovine itn.

Po Foucaultu socializem nima posebne, sebi lastne racionalnosti vladanja oziroma vladnosti – ima le posebno zgodovinsko in ekonomsko racionalnost: »Dejansko, in to je pokazala zgodovina, lahko socializem deluje le povezan z drugačnimi tipi vladnosti /prevedel P. K./« (Foucault, 2008: 92). Realno obstoječi socializmi so se po Foucaultu tako povezovali ali z liberalno racionalnostjo vladanja ali pa z racionalnostjo vladanja, ki je zgodovinsko predhodila liberalni, s hiperadministrativno racionalnostjo vladanja policijske države, ki je bila značilna za Evropo sedemnajstega in osemnajstega stoletja. Foucault dodaja, da je nenehno preizpraševanje, ali gre za resničen ali lažen socializem, kar je tudi predmet naše analize, ravno učinek odsotnosti avtonomne socialistične racionalnosti vladanja, ki jo nadomešča nenehno preverjanje zvestobe klasičnim tekstom (Foucault, 2008: 92-94). To obenem nastopa kot simulacija avtonomne socialistične racionalnosti vladanja, ki skriva, da je jugoslovanski socializem (deloma) pripet na liberalno racionalnost vladanja, sovjetski pa (deloma) na racionalnost vladanja policijske države, da ne gre za popolno zgodovinsko in politično novost, temveč za predelavo že obstoječih političnih konceptov, načel, postopkov in načinov organizacije.

Evropa v tem kontekstu nastopa kot zunanji posrednik, kot element mediacije, ki prihaja izven skupne zaloge vednosti, izven komunističnega »kanona«. Že v utemeljitvenem tekstu tega kanona je komunizem opredeljen kot sicer evropski pojav, a kot nekaj, kar nasilno prekinja običajen tok evropske zgodovine, kar radikalno prelamlja z dotedaj obstoječimi družbenimi in političnimi formacijami ter ideologijami – kot pošast, ki hodi po Evropi (Engels in Marx, 1976). Na vrhuncu krize in razcepa znotraj realno obstoječega socializma se Evropa vrne kot posrednik, kot vmesni člen, ki ni del nobene izmed ideoloških perspektiv, ki sestavljata poročanje o okupaciji Češkoslovaške, a omogoča prehod iz ene v drugo oziroma predstavlja minimalni pogoj za njun dialog, četudi je ta antagonističen in destruktiven. Oziroma, natančneje rečeno, ravno zato, ker je ta dialog antagonističen in destruktiven, mit socializma ne more predstavljati pogoja zanj – saj poskušata obe nasprotni si ideološki perspektivi dokazati, da druga pravzaprav ne temelji na skupni mitski podlagi, da so njene reference na elemente skupne zaloge vednosti neupravičene in lažne ter da bi morala zapustiti skupni ideološki horizont –, zato je potrebno, da bi bil antagonistični dialog, katerega namen je uničenje ene izmed obeh perspektiv, sploh mogoč, uvoziti element od zunaj – in ta element je Evropa.[9] Mit socializma tako predstavlja skupno zalogo referenčne vednosti, odreja osnovno strukturo tega ideološkega dialoga in mu postavlja meje, medtem ko je Evropa uvoženi zunanji posredovalni element, ki ga omogoča. Omogoča ga na dva osnovna načina – kot element razlikovanja (delitve na demokratični Zahod in socialistični Vzhod) in kot element povezovanja, spajanja (Evropa obenem označuje oziroma zgošča tisto, kar je skupno tako Zahodu in Vzhodu – antifašistični boj med drugo svetovno vojno in povojno ureditev, ki temelji na ideji miru).

Evropa in delitev na Vzhod in Zahod

Evropa se v poročanju o okupaciji Češkoslovaške redko pojavlja sama, skoraj vselej je v konjunkciji z vrednoto miru[10] (evropski mir), ki izvira iz antifašizma oziroma povojne ureditve Evrope. Tako se retroaktivno vzpostavlja poseben diskurzivni prostor, v katerem je mogoče pisati zgodovino, osredotočeno na omenjeni osnovni vrednoti. V tej perspektivi je druga svetovna vojna ključni dogodek, povojni mir pa ključni proces v zgodovini tako skonstruirane Evrope. Takšna Evropa je nujni pogoj diskurzivne konstrukcije demokratičnega socializma, kar je sintagma, ki označuje tako pozitivno vsebino jugoslovanske in češkoslovaške »poti v socializem« (ljudska demo-

kracija) kot njuno razliko od sovjetskega, avtoritarnega modela socializma. Če sledimo Foucaultu (2008: 92-94), bi bila jugoslovanska in češkoslovaška politika leta '68 ravno poskus spajanja zgodovinske in ekonomske racionalnosti socializma z liberalno racionalnostjo vladanja – za razliko od sovjetskega socializma, ki se je pripenjal na racionalnost vladanja policijske države. Takrat prevladujoča ideološka delitev geografskega prostora Evrope je bila, po liniji družbene ureditve, delitev na socialistični Vzhod in kapitalistični Zahod. Konstrukcija Evrope antifašizma in miru je bila, v jugoslovanskem ideološkem kontekstu, način, kako preseči to delitev in biti obenem del obojega – Zahoda (demokracija) in Vzhoda (socializem). Strategija preseganja delitve Vzhod – Zahod je bila sklicevanje na skupno zgodovino – tako zahodne demokracije kot komunisti Vzhoda so se skupaj borili proti fašizmu, ga premagali ter skupaj ustvarili novo Evropo, Evropo miru. Tisto, kar torej druži del Zahoda in del Vzhoda, je antifašizem in antimilitarizem.

Linija, po kateri se deli geografski prostor Evrope, je v tej novi diskurzivni konstelaciji premeščena: ne več Vzhod – Zahod, temveč nasilne in nenasilne družbeno-politične ureditve. Kot nasilne so eksplicitno označene države okupatorke (implicitno pa v ta nabor sodijo tudi tedanje fašistične in vojaške diktature na Portugalskem, v Španiji in Grčiji), tako da sta nasilna oziroma militaristična tako del Vzhoda kot del Zahoda. Poudarek tako ni več na družbeni oziroma ekonomski ureditvi (socializem ali kapitalizem), temveč na političnem sistemu (demokratični ali avtoritarni) ter na načinu vodenja mednarodnih odnosov (diplomacija, miroljubnost, spoštovanje mednarodnega prava, pravica narodov do samoodločbe, suverenost držav in ozemeljska integriteta proti militarizmu, ekspanzionizmu in samovoljni agresiji).[11]

Eksplicitne zgodovinske paralele z nacistično zasedbo Češkoslovaške leta 1939[12] vzpostavljajo zgodovinsko kontinuiteto med bojem za mir proti nasilnima, agresivnima in militarističnima fašizmu in nacizmu med drugo svetovno vojno ter sodobnim nasilnim, agresivnim in militarističnim sovjetskim modelom socializma. S tem premikom perspektive je skupen element Jugoslavije in Češkoslovaške na eni ter Sovjetske zveze in njenih zaveznic na drugi strani – da vse vsebujejo socialistično družbeno-ekonomsko ureditev – potisnjen v ozadje; tisto, kar je poudarjeno, so njihove medsebojne razlike. Gre torej za nov pogled na zgodovino Evrope: ne vzporeden, heterogen in antagonističen razvoj dveh gospodarskih sistemov, socialističnega in kapitalističnega, ki rezultira v delitvi Vzhod – Zahod, temveč vzporeden, heterogen in antagonističen razvoj politike miru in militaristične politike (zgodovinsko dejstvo vojaške okupacije utemeljuje zgodovinsko primerjavo med nacistično Nemčijo nekoč in Sovjetsko zvezo danes).

V boju proti fašizmu so se v času druge svetovne vojne s socialističnimi silami združile tiste kapitalistične sile, ki so bile demokratične (saj je fašizem ravno primer nedemokratičnega, avtoritarnega in militarističnega kapitalizma). Tako je demokracija drugi element oziroma druga ključna vrednota, ki omogoča in strukturira novo delitev, ki v jugoslovanskem časopisnem poročanju o okupaciji Češkoslovaške nadomešča takrat uveljavljeno in prevladujočo delitev Vzhod – Zahod: demokratične (in miroljubne) proti avtoritarnim (in militarističnim) silam. Družbeno-ekonomska ureditev je v tej perspektivi neodvisna od osnovne usmeritve v zunanji oziroma mednarodni politiki – tako socializem kot kapitalizem sta lahko tako miroljubna kot militaristična. Obenem pa je med političnim sistemom in načinom vodenja mednarodne politike vzpostavljen odnos nujnosti – demokracija (tako socialistična kot kapitalistična) je nujno miroljubna, medtem ko je avtoritaren politični sistem (tako sovjetski socializem kot fašizem) nujno militaristčen in agresiven. S tem se ideološko retroaktivno legitimira spajanje z liberalno racionalnostjo vladanja (demokracija), saj to, v dani ideološki perspektivi, predstavlja edini možni način ohranjanja zgodovinske tradicije antifašizma in boja za mir, ki ju vsebuje ta nova diskurzivna konstrukcija Evrope.

Obenem pa ta diskurzivna konstrukcija Evrope in zgodovinske kontinuitete z antifašizmom omogoča kritiko sovjetske okupacije kot izdaje antifašistične tradicije in zavrnitev kritik (ki jih je na Jugoslavijo in Češkoslovaško naslavljal tisk držav okupatork) o kontrarevolucionarni naravi zavezništva s kapitalističnim Zahodom ter zavrnitev kritik demokratičnih reform v Jugoslaviji in Češkoslovaški.[13] Retorika, s katero SZ in njene zaveznice opravičujejo okupacijo ČS, namreč vztraja pri stari delitvi na kapitalistični Zahod in socialistični Vzhod, znotraj katere je vsako preseganje te delitve izdaja revolucionarne preteklosti (v perspektivi SZ in njenih zaveznic iz varšavskega pakta evropski Vzhod vzpostavlja zgodovinska kontinuiteta socialističnih revolucij, začenši z oktobrsko, Zahod pa zgodovinska kontinuiteta »kapitalistične reakcije«), kar pomeni, da je vsako, četudi – kot v našem primeru – začasno in situacijsko, zavezništvo z Zahodom popuščanje kapitalizmu in opuščanje pozicij socializma.[14] Premestitev osi socialistični Vzhod – kapitalistični Zahod na delitev demokratična in miroljubna Evropa proti avtoritarni in militaristični Evropi ter nadomestitev družbeno-ekonomske ureditve in prisotnosti/odsotnosti socialistične revolucije kot ključnih kriterijev delitve s tradicijo miru, antifašizma in demokratične politične ureditve pomenita premik perspektive, ki omogoča zavrnitev omenjene legitimizacije okupacije ČS in kritike jugoslovanske in češkoslovaške poti v socializem. V ideološki perspektivi SZ in držav

zaveznic je socialistična družbeno-ekonomska ureditev nujno vezana na točno določeno politično ureditev (ki jo jugoslovanski mediji označujejo kot etatistično in birokratsko[15]). Zveza med politiko in ekonomijo je deterministična, socialistična družba mora nujno imeti za svoj politični sistem centralizirano policijsko državo, kar pomeni, da je vsakršna reforma v smeri demokracije v političnem polju obenem nujno znak popuščanja na družbeno-ekonomskem področju, se pravi: znak ukinjanja socializma in uvajanja kapitalizma. Premik v smeri demokracije na političnem področju nujno vsebuje svoj korelat v ekonomiji (oziroma, natančneje, premik v smeri demokracije je samo površinski znak globjih premikov v ekonomiji), saj sta, v tej ideološki perspektivi, demokracija in kapitalizem prav tako deterministično in nujno povezana kot socializem in policijska država.

Zasuk perspektive, ki ga naredijo jugoslovanski mediji v poročanju o okupaciji ČS, pa razmerje med politiko in ekonomijo ravno osvobodi te rigidne determiniranosti ter postavi demokracijo kot politično izbiro in rezultat boja za svobodo, kot nekaj, kar ustvarjajo ljudske množice, in ne kot preprost neposredni proizvod kapitalističnega ekonomskega sistema, ki le prikriva njegovo nepravičnost.[16] Demokracija v jugoslovanski ideološki perspektivi ni več nujno vezana na katerikoli ekonomski sistem in tudi ne pomeni toliko formalnih značilnosti ureditve političnega sistema, temveč prej osnovno načelo njegovega delovanja in organizacije[17] – takšna pozicija ji omogoča tako potencialno kritiko zahodne, »formalne« demokracije, kjer je udeležba ljudstva prej stvar rituala kot dejanske participacije pri političnem odločanju, kot tudi kritiko avtoritarnosti sovjetskega političnega sistema ter potencialno tudi avtoritarnosti nekaterih kapitalističnih držav (Španija, Portugalska, Grčija) – in obenem tudi osnovno načelo delovanja ekonomije.

Demokracija tako ni le politično – in na tej točki začneta jugoslovanska ideološka perspektiva in zgodovinska praksa pomembno odstopati od preproste sheme o pripetosti socializma na že dovršeno in prej obstoječo racionalnost vladanja, ki jo na navedenem mestu predlaga Foucault –, temveč tudi družbeno in ekonomsko načelo. Delavsko samoupravljanje pomeni ravno udeležbo in soodločanje delavcev pri upravljanju podjetij. V jugoslovanski perspektivi sintagma demokratični socializem ne ukinja le rigidne enosmerne determiniranosti politike po ekonomiji, temveč aplicira tudi oba člena (tako demokracijo kot socializem) tako na ekonomijo kot na politiko. Tako politični kot ekonomski sistem sta tako demokratična kot socialistična – ekonomski sistem Jugoslavije je delavsko samoupravljanje, kar ga ločuje tako od kapitalistične dominacije nad ekonomijo na Zahodu kot od državne na Vzhodu, medtem ko je njen politični sistem ljudska demokracija, kar ga prav tako ločuje tako

od formalne demokracije Zahoda kot od avtoritarne partijske vladavine na Vzhodu. Aplikacija demokracije tako na ekonomijo kot politiko omogoča zavezništvo z Zahodom na liniji skupne antifašistične zgodovine in zavezanosti miru v zunanji politiki ob ohranjanju razlike do Zahoda ter obenem omogoča zavrnitev kritik z Vzhoda in formulacijo kritik le-tega (ter obenem – če se za to pokaže potreba, kot v primeru delavske vstaje v Franciji – Zahoda).

Evropa in kritike fašizma, militarizma in imperializma

Antifašistični boj je bil osnova jugoslovanske državnosti in njen konstitutivni zgodovinski moment, za razliko od Sovjetske zveze, kjer je ta moment predstavljala oktobrska revolucija. Ostale socialistične države vzhodne Evrope je ob koncu druge svetovne vojne osvobodila sovjetska Rdeča armada, medtem ko je Jugoslavijo osvobodilo njeno lastno ljudstvo ob podpori zahodnih zaveznikov. Tako je določen kompromis, določeno zavezništvo z Zahodom vpisano že v samo konstitucijo Jugoslavije, čeprav se je ta konstituirala kot socialistična država. Obenem pa socialistična Jugoslavija ni, tako kot Sovjetska zveza, nastala samo iz socialistične revolucije, temveč iz kombinacije socialistične revolucije in antifašističnega boja. In ravno v tem je glavna razlika med sovjetsko in jugoslovansko ideologijo: za sovjetsko je konstitutiven boj proti kapitalizmu, za jugoslovansko pa boj proti fašizmu.

Demokracija (v splošnem evropskem ideološkem kontekstu) nastopa kot osnova skupnega antifašističnega boja vseh zaveznikov in (v specifično jugoslovanskem kontekstu) kot množični ljudski boj za svobodo. Mir v zunanji politiki je ekvivalent demokraciji v notranji, osnovne vrednote jugoslovanske zunanje politike pa neposredno izhajajo iz antifašistične, ne sovjetske revolucionarne tradicije (tu je tudi glavna razlika med obema v pojmovanju socialistične zunanje politike): te vrednote so suverenost držav, pravica do samoodločbe, pravica do samostojne poti v socializem, nevmešavanje v notranje zadeve drugih držav, miroljubna koeksistenca[18] itn. Nasprotje tega so vrednote avtoritarnosti (kot nasprotja demokracije) in nasilja (kot nasprotja miru), kar je oboje pripisano Sovjetski zvezi in njenim zaveznicam. V jugoslovanski perspektivi gre pri okupaciji za neposredno kršenje povojne ureditve Evrope, ki temelji na miru. Militarizem in agresija v zunanji sta prikazana kot neposredna učinka avtoritarnosti in dominacije v notranji politiki.[19] Os neposrednega določanja je torej premaknjena: če v sovjetski perspektivi neposredno določanje poteka na osi ekonomska – politična ureditev (in socializem nujno izključuje demokracijo, ki naj bi bila le maska kapitalističnega izkoriščanja), v jugoslovanski

poteka na osi notranja – zunanja politika. Nedemokratičnost v notranji nujno privede do nasilja v zunanji politiki in, obratno, demokratičnost v notranji pomeni zavezanost miru v zunanji politiki. Kritika okupacije Češkoslovaške je tako obenem nujno tudi kritika sovjetske notranje politike, kritika militarizma pa nujno tudi kritika avtoritarnega birokratizma.

Čeprav pri poročanju jugoslovanskih časopisov o okupaciji Češkoslovaške prevladuje kritika sovjetskega tipa socializma in njegove zunanje politike (neposredno povezane oziroma določene z avtoritarnostjo njegove notranje politike), je ta kritika še vedno podana s stališča (alternativnega) tipa socializma. Ne gre torej za običajno hladnovojno denunciacijo socializma v kontekstu ideološkega dvoboja med »vzhodnim blokom« in »svobodnim svetom«, temveč za diskurz, ki presega to ideološko delitev in vzpostavi novo ideološko perspektivo – perspektivo demokratičnega socializma. Ta perspektiva omogoča in obenem zahteva kritiko obojega, tako zahodnega kapitalizma kot vzhodnega birokratskega socializma. Če je osnova sodobne Evrope in edino upanje za njeno prihodnost dejansko mir, mora biti »mir« – oziroma sklop vrednot, ki so zgoščene v pojmu Evrope (demokracija, svoboda, mir, nenasilje) in ki izhajajo iz boja proti fašizmu kot paradigmatskega boja za svobodo proti vsem oblikam nasilja – osnova tako zunanje (miroljubna koeksistenca, spoštovanje suverenosti držav), notranje (demokracija) in tudi ekonomske politike, kar pomeni samoupravni socializem, saj je kapitalizem, prav tako kot sovjetski etatistični paternalizem, oblika ekonomskega nasilja. Tako demokratični in samoupravni socializem pomeni edino ureditev, ki v vseh svojih instancah (zunanja politika, notranjepolitična ureditev, ekonomski sistem) izhaja iz antifašističnih načel in je edina dejansko evropska ureditev ter mora kot tak postati model razvoja za prihodnost, saj predstavlja edini izhod iz krize tako »malomeščanskega modela« Zahoda kot sovjetskega avtoritarnega socializma.[20] Oba modela se v trenutku, ko demokratične ljudske težnje ogrožajo njuno (ekonomsko ali politično) hegemonijo, zatekata k nasilju, k uporabi represije, h kršitvi evropskih vrednot. Po drugi strani pomeni demokratični socializem združitev obeh naprednih tendenc evropske zgodovine, socializma kot socialne in demokracije kot politične osvoboditve, in sicer tendenc, ki sta se združili v antifašističnem boju na področju Jugoslavije, kar daje Jugoslaviji posebno mesto v tej koncepciji evropskih vrednot in v zamišljanju prihodnosti Evrope. Le demokratični in samoupravni socializem je dejansko povsem antifašistična in v celoti evropska družbeno-politična ureditev, zato lahko sebe vidi in postavlja kot model razvoja vse Evrope (vse ostale družbeno-politične ureditve, ki v

sebi ohranjajo momente takšnega ali drugačnega nasilja, lahko prinesejo le uničenje in propad). A ta razvoj ni prikazan mehanično, kot eshatološka nujnost, temveč kot nujnost nenehnega boja proti vsem oblikam nasilja in dominacije; sklicevanje na zgodovino dolgotrajnega in krvavega boja proti fašizmu predstavlja inspiracijo za aktualne boje proti njegovim nasilnim in avtoritarnim elementom, ki so preživeli drugo svetovno vojno.

Če demokratični in samoupravni socializem predstavlja kombinacijo vseh najpomembnejših evropskih vrednot (mir, ekonomska in politična svoboda), je zgodovinski fašizem njegovo neposredno nasprotje, saj kombinira vrednote, ki so nasprotne temu, kar jugoslovanski časopisi v času okupacije Češkoslovaške diskurzivno konstruirajo kot pozitivne evropske vrednote – fašizem je nasilen, imperialističen in uničevalen, njegovo gospodarstvo in politika temeljita na prisili in zatiranju. Zelo shematično in poenostavljeno prikazano bi štirje osnovni tipi družbeno-političnih sistemov v tej perspektivi izgledali takole: demokratični socializem (svoboda tako na področju politike kot ekonomije), demokratični kapitalizem (politična svoboda, a ekonomsko nasilje), avtoritarni socializem (politično nasilje, svoboda v ekonomiji), avtoritarni kapitalizem oz. fašizem (nasilje tako v politiki kot v ekonomiji). Demokratični socializem tako predstavlja idealni tip družbeno-politične ureditve, fašizem najslabši mogoči model, sovjetski socializem in zahodna demokracija pa sta hibridna modela (kjer tudi njuni svobodni področji nista povsem »čisti« – zahodni demokratični sistemi so »formalni«, reproducirajo kapitalistično izkoriščanje itn., medtem ko se avtoritarnost sovjetske politične vladavine odraža tudi v etatističnem nadzoru in prisili v ekonomiji –, a sta v načelu pozitivni). Povedano s Foucaultovo terminologijo: socializem, povezan z liberalno racionalnostjo vladanja (ki ima povratne učinke na njegovo ekonomsko – samoupravljanje – in zgodovinsko – antifašizem – racionalnost), se v dani zgodovinski situaciji (kmalu po študentskih uporih in generalni stavki v Franciji, tj. po krizi demokratičnega kapitalizma, in v času okupacije Češkoslovaške – tj. ob krizi avtoritarnega socializma) poskuša vzpostaviti kot najracionalnejši model družbeno-politične ureditve, a poskuša hkrati vzpostaviti avtonomno racionalnost vladanja (ravno pomanjkanje le-te je Foucault na navedenem mestu očital realno obstoječemu socializmu), ki temelji na političnih invencijah partizanskega boja. Ugotovitev, da je »kljub hudemu udarcu, ki ga je ta agresija prizadejala socializmu, očitno, da se v tem trenutku odpirajo novi vidiki in novo obdobje samoupravnega socializma in neposredne demokracije« (Delo, 26. 8. 1968: 3) pomeni ravno to: iskanje avtonomne demokratično-socialistične politike kot izhoda iz krize

tako demokratičnega kapitalizma kot avtoritarnega socializma ter iz novih oblik dominacije in nasilja, kar obe krizi prinašata.

Opombe

[1] Metodologija vsebuje pregledovanje tako časopisnih člankov kot vizualnega gradiva (fotografije, karikature) in prostorske semiotike (koliko prostora je namenjenega čemu, kaj je na prvi strani itn.) v poročanju Dela in Dnevnika o nekaterih prelomnih, kriznih dogodkih v Evropi v zadnjih petdesetih letih.

[2] Bila je alternativa na način, kot ga je formulirala Rosa Luxemburg (1977: 827): »Prihodnost človeštva bo socializem ali barbarstvo«.

[3] Podkrepljeni tudi s Sartrovo intelektualno in moralno avtoriteto: »Prihodnost more biti le socializem, povezan z demokracijo. Omenil je tudi samoupravljanje kot izhod iz sedanjega položaja /.../« (Delo, 22. 5. 1968: 1.)

[4] »CGT in KPF še nista trenutno v avantgardnem položaju razvoja« (Delo, 22. 5. 1968: 1); »že zdaj je jasno dvoje: da bo do precejšnjih sprememb v stilu francoske politike in družbene strukture prišlo, če ne po tej, pa po drugi poti, in da je razvoj v tej deželi že močno prehitel parlamentarno govorništvo« (Delo, 23. 5. 1968: 1) – to je tudi edini primer, ko Delo kritizira »parlamentarno govorništvo«, a svojega poročanja vseeno ne prilagodi novi politični situaciji in novim političnim akterjem –; »Francija je v težkih krčih odhajanja starega in mehkem vrtincu prihajanja novega« (Delo, 27. 5. 1968: 1), opozarjanje na antikomunizem gaullistov 30. in 31. maja …

[5] »Samoupravljanje je postalo aktualna parola v današnji Franciji. /.../ 'Naš poudarek je predvsem na delavskem samoupravljanju v skladu z delavsko demokracijo' /.../« (Delo, 30. 5. 1968: 1) Slednje je tudi eden izmed redkih primerov, ko besedo dobi delavski aktivist, a še to verjetno le zato, ker so njegove besede v sozvočju s tedanjo vladajočo jugoslovansko ideologijo, ker se jih da neposredno razumeti v prevladujočem umevanju politike in njenih zaželenih ciljev. Morda najpomembnejši sklep pričujoče raziskave je zato, da se napredni elementi v nevtralnem poročanju, ki je nadvse rigidno in v celoti pristaja na horizont politike, kot ga zarisuje vsakokratna vladajoča ideologija, lahko pojavijo le naključno, kadar obstajajo napredni elementi tudi v vladajoči ideologiji in »politični kulturi« – takrat jih nevtralno poročanje strokovno »povzame«.

[6] Teorijo mita na splošno ter njegove ambivalentnosti in potencialnega političnega pluralizma, ki ga omogoča v moderni politiki, povzemamo po: Močnik, 2006: 1–25. Za bolj natančno opredelitev mita socializma in dveh nasprotnih si perspektiv znotraj njega gl. Krašovec in Žagar, 2008.

[7] »TASS trdi: 'Praga nas je nujno klicala na pomoč. To zahtevo so poslali zaradi nevarnosti, s katero preti ČSSR kontrarevolucija.'« (Delo, 21. 8. 1968, prva posebna izdaja: 1)

[8] Sovjetska perspektiva oziroma perspektiva tiska držav napadalk nam je bila dostopna le preko ponatisov in citatov v Delu in Dnevniku, a je tudi

iz omejenih virov očitno, da je tisk držav napadalk uporabljal po strukturi enake, čeprav po ideološki usmeritvi nasprotne diskurzivne strategije.

[9] Da bi preverili, ali je uvoz zunanjega posredovalnega elementa nujen pojav ob krizah velikih mitov ali le specifičen način, s katerim se je znotraj mita socializma v specifični zgodovinski situaciji leta 1968 ideološko artikulirala takratna kriza, bi bilo potrebno več raziskav. Zato bomo zaenkrat uvoz zunanjega posredovalnega elementa obravnavali kot poseben primer.

[10] »P/retnja stabilnosti in miru v Evropi«, »zaščita evropskega miru«, (Delo, 21. 8. 1968, p.p.i.: 1), »usoda miru v Evropi« (Dnevnik, 22. 8. 1968: 2), »s tem sta ogrožena mir in varnost v Evropi« (Dnevnik, 23. 8. 1968: 2) itn.

[11] »Prepričani smo, da le enakopravni, odprti in demokratični odnosi, ki izhajajo iz načela proletarskega internacionalizma, lahko prispevajo k utrjevanju akcijske enotnosti socialističnih sil in poglabljanju najširše enotnosti vseh revolucionarnih in naprednih demokratičnih sil v boju proti imperializmu, za mir, nacionalno neodvisnost, napredek in socializem.« (Delo, 22. 8. 1968: 1)

[12] »Dramatična noč v Pragi, ko je ČSSR doživljala drugi München.« (Delo, 22. 8. 1968: 1)

[13] »Kontrarevolucionarji, ki jih spodbujajo in podpirajo imperialisti, si prizadevajo priti na oblast.« (Delo, 24. 8. 1968: 2)

[14] »'Bratska pomoč socialistični Češkoslovaški' je spravila v bes imperialiste in reakcionarne kroge, ki so si na tihem želeli obnovitev kapitalizma v Češkoslovaški /.../ Vse je bilo pripravljeno, da se država Čehov in Slovakov odtrga od družine socialističnih narodov in da se obnovi mračna kapitalistična preteklost.« (Delo, 23. 8. 1968: 2)

[15] »S/tari birokratsko-etatistični okviri /.../ zbirokratizirani etatistični sistem /.../ birokratske težnje /.../ stalinistične metode /.../« (Delo, 25. 8. 1968: 2)

[16] Za nekoliko natančnejšo obravnavo funkcije vrednot svobode in demokracije v sovjetski ideologiji tistega časa gl. Krašovec in Žagar, 2008: 75.

[17] »Ker smo demokratična družba, ker imamo demokratsko partijo ter demokratski centralni komite /.../« (Delo, 25. 8. 1968: 2)

[18] »/N/jene /Zveze komunistov Jugoslavije/ politike za obrambo neodvisnosti in enakopravnih odnosov med narodi /.../« (Dnevnik, 22. 8. 1968: 2) »/Predsedstvo mestne konference Socialistične zveze delovnega ljudstva/ je zahtevalo spoštovanje pravice suverene socialistične države, da samostojno in v skladu z voljo delovnega ljudstva oblikuje socialistične odnose.« (Dnevnik, 22.8: 5) »Vselej smo podpirali boj za osvoboditev in neodvisnost.« (Dnevnik, 23. 8. 1968: 2)

[19] Gl. povzetek govora Svetozarja Vukmanovića na deseti seji CK ZKJ (Delo, 25. 8. 1968: 2).

[20] »V takšnem položaju je zgodovinska odgovornost socialističnih sil prav v tem, da razvijajo nov koncept o mednarodnih odnosih in demokraciji.« (Delo, 25. 8. 1968: 2)

Literatura

Arrighi, G. (1985). *Semiperipheral Development: The Politics of Southern Europe in the Twentieth Century*. London: Sage.

Engels, F. in Marx, K. (1976). *Komunistični manifest*. Ljubljana: Komunist.

Foucault, M. (1991). *Vednost – oblast – subjekt*. Ljubljana: Krt.

Foucault, M. (2008). *The Birth of Biopolitics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Harvey, D. (2009). *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hobsbawm, E. J. (2004). *Zanimivi časi*. Ljubljana: Sophia.

Lenin, V. I. (1977). Kaj delati? V: *Izbrana dela I.*, Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba.

Krašovec, P. in Žagar, I. Ž. (2008). »Napredni« proti »birokratskemu« socializmu. *Šolsko polje*, 19, 3 in 4, 57–76.

Krašovec, P. (2009). Dvojno delo ideologije, avtonomija novinarstva in politika nevtralnosti. V: Krašovec, P. in Žagar, I. Ž. (ur.), *Medijske politike v postsocializmu*, Ljubljana: Pedagoški inštitut.

Luxemburg, R. (1977). Kaj hoče Spartakova zveza? V: *Izbrani spisi,* Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba.

Močnik, R. (2006). *Julija Primic v slovenski književni vedi*. Ljubljana: Sophia.

POVZETKI/ABSTRACTS

ZA KAJ GRE V KAD – PREGLED ZGODOVINE, POMEMBNIH KONCEPTOV IN RAZVOJA
Ruth Wodak

Prispevek vsebuje pregledni prikaz razvoja kritične analize diskurza in kritične lingvistike ter pojasnjuje njuno navezavo na tradicijo kritičnih teorij in Hallidayeve sistemske funkcionalne lingvistike. Predstavljeni so temeljni teoretski principi in koncepti KAD in KL, kakor tudi ugledne šole in njihovi predstavniki, ki so izšli iz obeh teoretskih smeri.

Ključne besede: kritična analiza diskurza, kritična lingvistika, kritično, ideologija, moč

WHAT CDA IS ABOUT - A SUMMARY OF ITS HISTORY, IMPORTANT CONCEPTS AND ITS DEVELOPMENTS
Ruth Wodak

The article presents an overview of development of critical discourse analysis and critical linguistics and explains how they are related to the tradition of critical theories and Hallidayan systemic functional linguistics. Basic theoretical principles and concepts of CDA and CL are presented as well as the prominent schools and scholars, who emerged from both theoretical paradigms.

Key words: critical discourse analysis, critical linguistics, critique, ideology, power

DISKURZ: FOUCAULT, LACLAU TER ZAPOPADANJE DIHOTOMIJE MED DISKURZIVNIM IN ZUNAJDISKURZIVNIM
Andreja Vezovnik

Prispevek načenja vprašanje dihotomije med diskurzivnim in zunajdiskurzivnim in jo obravnava v perspektivi Heideggrovske delitve med ontično in ontološko ravnijo. Ukvarja se s problematizacijo Foucaultovega razumevanja diskurza v njegovem arheološkem obdobju. Pri tem se osredotoči na njegovo paradoksalnost ideje o regularnosti razpršitve izjav v diskurzivni formaciji in pokaže na problem individualizacije diskurzov na empirični ravni. Kot alternativo foucaultovski 'rešitvi' ponudi Laclauovo teorijo diskurza, ki omenjeno dihotomijo ukinja, saj diskurzivno dojema kot vseobsegajoči družbeni pojav pri tem pa logiko diskurzivnega polja razlaga skozi totalizacijsko instanco - praznega označevalca. Osrednji problem Foucaultove teze prispevek zaznava v dejstvu, da Foucault odnosov med diskurzi ne pojmuje kot odnosov razlik, kar mu, za razliko od Laclaua onemogoča misliti sistem diskurzov na ravni ontičnega.

Ključne besede: diskurz, diskurzivno, diskurzivna formacija, izjava, prazni označevalec

DISCOURSE: FOUCAULT, LACLAU AND UNDERSTANDING THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN THE DISCURSIVE AND THE EXTRA-DISCURSIVE
Andreja Vezovnik

The contribution raises the issue of the dichotomy between the discursive and the extra-discursive and deals with it in the Heideggerian perspective of the division between the

ontic and the ontological level. It deals with Foucault's understanding of discourse in his archaeological period. It focuses on the paradoxic idea of the regularity of dispersion of the statements within a discursive formation and brings up the problem of how to individualize different discourse on the empirical level. As an alternative to the foucaultian 'solution' the contribution offers Laclau's theory of discourse which abolishes the dichotomy mentioned above. Laclau's notion of discourse is perceived as an ubiquitous social phenomenon while the logic of discursive fields is interpreted through the totalizing instance of the empty signifier. The central problem of Foucault's thesis is that, unlike Laclau, he does not think the relations between discourses as differential relations. This in fact makes for Foucault impossible to think the system of discourses on the ontic level.

Keywords: discourse, discursive, discursive formation, statement, empty signifier

TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
Igor Ž. Žagar

Topos (*topoi* in pl.) is one of the most widely used concepts from classical argumentation theory (Aristotle, Cicero). It found its way not only in philosophy, sociology, anthropology and linguistics, it found its way in everyday life and everyday conversation as well.
In this article, I will examine the role that *topoi* play in Critical Discourse Analysis. Starting with definitions from Aristotle and Cicero, contrasting them with new conceptualisations by Perelman and Toulmin, and examining the superficial use of *topoi* in everyday conversation, I will try to show that Critical Discourse Analysis (especially Ruth Wodak's Discourse-Historical Approach) relies mostly on simplified, unreflected use of *topoi* (as found in everyday use), thus neglecting much more productive, theoretical elaborations of the concept.

Key words: *topoi*, warrant, rhetoric, argumentation, Critical Discourse Analysis

TOPOSI V KRITIČNI ANALIZI DISKURZA
Igor Ž. Žagar

Topos (množinsko *topoi*, v slovenski različici tudi *toposi*) je eden od najbolj uporabljanih konceptov iz klasične teorije argumentacije (Aristotel, Cicero). Uveljavil se je ne le v filozofiji, sociologiji, antropologiji in lingvistiki, temveč tudi v vsakdanjem življenju in konverzaciji.
V tem članku bom raziskal vlogo, ki jo *toposi* igrajo v kritični analizi diskurza. Začenši z definicijami Aristotela in Cicerona, primerjavo z novimi konceptualizacijami Perelmana in Toulmina, in osvetlitvijo površinske rabe *toposov* v vsakdanji konverzaciji bom skušal pokazati, da se kritična analiza diskurza (zlasti diskurzivno historični pristop Ruth Wodak) v glavnem opira na poenostavljeno, nereflektirano rabo *toposov* (kakršno najdemo v vsakdanji rabi) in s tem zanemarja veliko produktivnejše, teoretske razdelave tega koncepta.

Ključne besede: *topoi* (*toposi*), utemeljitev, retorika, argumentacija, kritična analiza diskurza.

NOVINARSKA (RE)PRODUKCIJA ZGODOVINE: TELEVIZIJSKO POKRIVANJE KARADŽIĆEVE ARETACIJE V SRBIJI

Karmen Erjavec in *Zala Volčič*

Aretacija bivšega političnega in vojaškega voditelja bosanskih Srbov Radovana Karadžića v juliju 2008 je pritegnila veliko pozornosti mednarodne skupnosti in ponudila priložnost srbski javnosti in medijem, da razmislijo o vlogi Srbije med jugoslovanskimi vojnami v 1990-tih. Karadžić je kot predsednik samooklicane Republike srbske v Bosni in Hercegovini obtožen genocida in zločinov proti človeštvu, storjenih v letu 1995. Na podlagi kritične diskurzivne analize (analiza rekontekstualizacije in analiza reprezentacije družbenih akterjev), trdiva, da so novinarji Televizije Srbija pri poročanju o aretaciji Karadžića reproducirali nacionalistični diskurz tako, da so obudili nostalgijo za Veliko Srbijo. Pri tem so prikrili vsako povezavo med Karadžićem kot posameznikom in Srbi na splošno, še posebej pa povezavo sedanje vlade z vojnimi zločini, obenem pa slavili Srbijo kot superiorno nacijo, ki napreduje v vstopanju v Evropsko unijo.

Ključne besede: zgodovina, nacionalizem, novinarstvo, Televizija Srbija, kritična diskurzivna analiza

JOURNALISTIC (RE)PRODUCTION OF HISTORY: TELEVIZED COVERAGE OF RADOVAN KARADŽIĆ'S ARREST IN SERBIA

Karmen Erjavec and *Zala Volčič*

The arrest of former Bosnian Serb political and military leader Radovan Karadžić in July 2008 triggered a wide-spread interest within international community and provided the opportunity for the Serbian public and its media to reflect upon the role of Serbia during the 1990s Yugoslav wars. Karadžić was as a president of the self-proclaimed Serbian republic within Bosnia and Herzegovina. He was accused for genocide and crimes against humanity in 1995. On the basis of critical discourse analysis (the analysis of recontextualization and the analysis of representation of social actors), we argue that Television Serbia's journalists, while covering Karadžić's arrest, reproduced a nationalistic discourse by invoking nostalgia for Greater Serbia in ways that concealed any connection between Karadžić specifically, the Serbs in general, and especially the current government with war crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time this discourse celebrated Serbia as a superior nation as it progressed toward inclusion in the European Union.

Keywords: history, nationalism, journalism, Television Serbia, critical discourse analysis

GLAS OBLASTI, KI (VZ)POSTAVLJA DNEVNI RED – VSEBINSKE ZNAČILNOSTI DISKURZA URADA VISOKEGA PREDSTAVNIKA MEDNARODNE SKUPNOSTI V BOSNI IN HERCEGOVINI

Danijela Majstorović

V članku skušamo prikazati nekatere značilnosti retorike Urada visokega predstavnika mednarodne skupnosti v BiH med leti 1996-2005. Študija predstavlja model kritične analize diskurza za izbrani korpus (sporočila za javnost), ki temelji na triangulaciji, pri čemer združuje in kontekstualizira perspektive mednarodnih odnosov, postkolonialne teorije, vsebinske analize, korpusnega jezikoslovja in tekstualne analize ter obenem podaja

kritično refleksijo narave diskurza v procesu analize kakor tudi metodoloških vprašanj in problemov. V študiji opisujemo ozadje, v okviru katerega se je lahko uveljavil tovrstni paternalistični in avtoritarni diskurz, prav tako osvetljujemo najbolj izstopajoče ideologije, ki jih je mogoče zaslediti v tekstih.

Ključne besede: kritična analiza diskurza, vsebinska analiza, Urad visokega predstavnika mednarodne skupnosti v Bosni in Hercegovini, diskurz, politična komunikacija

THE VOICE OF AN AGENDA-SETTING AUTHORITY- CONTENT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISCOURSE OF THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Danijela Majstorović

This paper presents an effort to show some characteristics of the Office of the High Representative's rhetoric in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1996-2005. The study provides a model for a possible triangulated critical discourse analysis of the selected corpus (press releases) by combining contextualization from an international relations perspective, postcolonial theory, content analysis, corpus linguistics and textual analysis critically reflecting the nature of the discourse under analysis, and main methodological issues and concerns. It describes the background in which such a paternalistic and authoritarian discourse was possible but also points out at the salient ideologies located in the texts.

Key words: critical discourse analysis, content analysis, Office of the High Representative, Bosnia and Herzegovina, theme, discourse, political communication

'68 KOT HKRATNA KRIZA EVROPSKEGA ZAHODA IN VZHODA
Primož Krašovec

Evropa je postala na svojem teritoriju prevladujoč politični koncept šele z agitacijskimi diskurzi, ki so spremljali njeno združevanje v Evropsko unijo na začetku devetdesetih let dvajsetega stoletja. Pred tem, v času njene "razdruženosti", je to mesto prevladujočega političnega koncepta, ki je določal razumevanje in zamišljanje evropskega političnega prostora, zasedala delitev na (z nekaj napakami) demokratični Zahod in socialistični Vzhod. V razvoju koncepta Evrope po ponovni združitvi Nemčije in ostalih procesih evropske integracije – ki je vključevala tudi integracijo prej heterogenih evropskih političnih diskurzov v enoten diskurz nove, združene Evrope z ukinitvijo revolucionarnih diskurzov, ki so ta prostor prej delili na dvoje – ima leto '68 posebno vlogo, saj so množične vstaje hkrati problematizirale tako zahodno kot vzhodno obliko družbeno-politično ureditve tedanje Evrope. V tej krizi se je Evropa pokazala kot dedinja skupnega antifašističnega boja zaveznikov in kot potencialni prostor razvoja demokratičnega socializma kot družbe prihodnosti. Danes, v času integrirane Evrope, se politična zgodovina Evrope v drugi polovici dvajsetega stoletja pogosto prikazuje kot boj in končni triumf svobodnega sveta nad socialističnim "totalitarizmom". Namen naše analize je pokazati, da je bila politična dinamika tega časa veliko bolj kompleksna.

Ključne besede: Evropa, Zahod, Vzhod, socializem, demokracija

'68 AS PARALLEL CRISIS OF BOTH EUROPEAN WEST AND EAST
Primož Krašovec

Europe has, within its territory, become a dominant political concept only with the emergence of discourses that propagated its unification into EU at the beginning of the nineties. Before that, in times when Europe was still divided, the role of the dominant political concept, which determined the understanding and imagining of the European political space, belonged to the division between (with a few errors) democratic West and socialist East. During the development of the concept of Europe after the reunification of Germany and other processes of European integration - which also included the integration of previously disparate European political discourses into a united discourse of the new, unified Europe by the way of termination of revolutionary discourses, which have before divided this space into two – year '68 has a special role, since massive insurrections occuring at that time problematised both Western and Eastern type of socio-political ordering of the then Europe. During this crisis Europe emerged as a heiress of the common antifascist struggle and as a potential space for the development of democratic socialism as a society of the future. Today, in times of the unified Europe, the political history of the post-war Europe is often represented as a struggle and a final triumph of the free world over socialist "totalitarianism". The aim of our analysis is to show that political dynamic of that era was much more complex.

Keywords: Europe, West, East, socialism, democracy

AVTORJI/AUTHORS

Ruth Wodak

Ruth Wodak je od leta 2004 zaslužna profesorica in predstojnica diskurzivnih študij na Univerzi v Lancastru, kamor se je preselila z Dunaja, kjer je bila od 1991 redna profesorica za uporabno jezikoslovje na Univerzi na Dunaju. Za svoje delo je prejela več nagrad, leta 1996 med drugim tudi prestižno Wittgensteinovo nagrado, namenjeno vrhunskim raziskovalcem. Kot gostujoča profesorica je gostovala na številnih svetovno znanih univerzah (Stanford, Minnesota, Georgetown, Washington D.C., Uppsala). Je članica uredniškega odbora številnih lingvističnih revij, sourednica revije *Discourse and Society*, urednica revije *Critical Discourse Studies* (skupaj z Normanom Faircloughom, Philom Grahamom in Jayjem Lemkejem) in revije *Journal of Language and Politics* (skupaj s Paulom Chiltonom). Je avtorica in so-avtorica več kot 40 knjig, urednica 46 monografij in avtorica več kot 300 člankov. Njene zadnje objave vključujejo *The Discourse of Politics in Action: Politics as Usual, 2009; English Language: Description, Variation and Context*, 2009 (skupaj z J. Culpeperjem, F. Katamba, P. Kerswillom, T. McEneryem (ur.)); *Europe in Crisis: The European Public Sphere and National Media in the Post-War Period*, 2009 (skupaj z A. Triandafyllidou in M. Krzyzanowskim (ur.)); *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, 2009 (2. revidirana izdaja (2001); skupaj z M. Meyerjem (ur.)); T*he Discursive Construction of National Identity*, 2009 (2. revidirana izdaja, 2001; skupaj R. De Cillia, M. Reisiglom in K. Liebhart). Glavna področja njenega raziskovanja zajemajo razvoj teoretskih pristopov v diskurzivnih študijih (kjer združuje etnografijo, teorijo argumentacije, retoriko in funkcionalno sistemsko lingvistiko), študije spolov, jezik v/in politiki(-a), predsodki in diskriminacija.

Ruth Wodak has been Distinguished Professor and Chair in Discourse Studies at Lancaster University since 2004 (personal chair). She moved from Vienna, Austria, where she was full professor of Applied Linguistics, University Vienna (from 1991 to 2004). She has received many awards including Wittgenstein Prize for Elite Researchers (1996). She also holds many visiting professor-ships (Stanford, Minnesota, Georgetown, Washington DC, Uppsala). She is a member of the editorial board of a range of linguistic journals, co-editor of the journal *Discourse and Society* and editor of *Critical Discourse Studies* (with Norman Fairclough, Phil Graham and Jay Lemke) and of the *Journal of Language and Politics* (with Paul Chilton). She is an author and co-author of over 40 books, and published 46

edited volumes, and over 300 journal papers. Her recent publications include: *The Discourse of Politics in Action: Politics as Usual*, 2009; *English Language: Description, Variation and Context*, 2009 (with J. Culpeper, F. Katamba, P. Kerswill, T. McEnery (eds.)); *Europe in Crisis: The European Public Sphere and National Media in the Post-War Period*, 2009 (with A. Triandafyllidou and M. Krzyzanowski (eds.)); *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, 2009 (2nd revised edition (2001); with M. Meyer (eds.)); *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*, 2009 (2nd revised edition (2001); with R. De Cillia, M. Reisigl and K. Liebhart). Her main research agenda focus lies on the development of theoretical approaches in discourse studies (combining ethnography, argumentation theory, rhetoric, and functional systemic linguistics); gender studies; language and/in politics; prejudice and discrimination.

Andreja Vezovnik

Dr. Andreja Vezovnik je zaposlena kot raziskovalka in asistentka na Fakulteti za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani. Ukvarja se s teorijami diskurza in različnimi pristopi k analizi diskurza, vprašanjem političnega antagonizma in predstavništva ter z logiko kolektivne identifikacije. V svojih empiričnih raziskavah se je največ posvečala fenomenu novega očetovstva in konstrukcije slovenstva. V času doktorskega študija se je izpopolnjevala pri prof. Ernestu Laclauu na Northwestern University in se udeležila več mednarodnih simpozijev ter objavila več znanstvenih člankov na temo teorije in analize diskurza.

andreja.vezovnik@fdv.uni-lj.si

Dr. Andreja Vezovnik is currently employed as a researcher and teaching assistant at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. Her main focus is on discourse theories and different approaches to discourse analysis, on issues of political antagonism and representation, and on the logic of collective identification. In her empirical research she mainly focused on the phenomenon of new fatherhood, and on the construction of *Slovenianess*. Under the invitation of Ernesto Laclau she spent a period at Northwestern University as a pre-doctoral visiting scholar, attended several international symposiums, and published scientific papers on discourse theory and discourse analysis.

andreja.vezovnik@fdv.uni-lj.si

Igor Ž. Žagar

IGOR Ž. ŽAGAR studied philosophy, sociology, and linguistics in Ljubljana, Paris, and Antwerp. He received his doctoral degree in Sociology of Culture from the University of Ljubljana. He is Professor in Rhetoric and Argumentation (University of Maribor), and a Senior Research Fellow (Head of the Centre for Discourse Studies) at the Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana, Slovenia. He lectured in Belgium, United States, Italy, China, United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Spain, Russia, and Poland.
Žagar's interests lie in pragmatics (speech act theory, (critical) discourse analysis), philosophy of language, argumentation, and rhetoric. He is (co) author and (co)editor of twelve books, and over a hundred articles.
Address: Educational Research Institute, Gerbičeva 62, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia. E-mail: igor.zagar@guest.arnes.si, igor.zzagar@gmail.com,
WWW: www.igorzagar.net.

IGOR Ž. ŽAGAR je študiral filozofijo, sociologijo in lingvistiko na univerzah v Ljubljani, Parizu in Antwerpnu. Doktoriral je iz sociologije kulture na Univerzi v Ljubljani. Je redni profesor retorike in argumentacije(Univerza v Mariboru) in znanstveni svetnik (predstojnik Centra za diskurzivne študije) na Pedagoškem inštitutu v Ljubljani. Predaval je na univerzah v Belgiji, Združenih državah Amerike, Italiji, na Kitajskem, Nizozemskem, v Združenem kraljestvu, Španiji, Rusiji in na Poljskem.
Žagarjeva področja zanimanja so pragmatika (teorija govornih dejanj, (kritična) analiza diskurza), filozofija jezika, argumentacija in retorika. Je (so)avtor in (so)urednik dvanajstih knjig in preko sto člankov.
Naslov: Pedagoški inštitut, Gerbičeva 62, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenija. E-naslov: igor.zagar@guest.arnes.si, igor.zzagar@gmail.com,
WWW: www.igorzagar.net.

Associate Professor Dr. Karmen Erjavec

University of Ljubljana
Faculty of Social Studies
Kardeljeva pl. 5
SI-1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
phone: ++01-5805-264
fax: ++01-5805-110
e-mail: karmen.erjavec@fdv.uni-lj.si

Karmen Erjavec is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, where she teaches Journalistic and Media History, Theory of Journalistic Discourse, Media, Culture and Society and Media Education. Her main research interests are the media and minorities; children's and youth's media consumption and the quality of journalism, topics on which she has published a number of articles and books (*The Journalistic Quality* (1999); an article Eastern European media representation of the discrimination against the Roma in *Discourse and Society* (2001, 12:6), 'Media construction of identity through moral panic' in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (2003, 29:1), 'Beyond advertising and journalism' in *Discourse and Society* (2004, 15:5), and 'Hybrid Public Relation News Discourse' in *European Journal of Communication* (2005, 20:2).

Karmen Erjavec je izredna profesorica na Fakulteti za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani, kjer poučuje predmete kot Novinarska in medijska zgodovina, Mediji, kultura in družba ter Vzgoja za medije. Raziskovalno se ukvarja z mediji in manjšinami, medijsko potrošnjo pri otrocih in mladostnikih in kakovostnim novinarstvom. Na te teme je napisala številne članke in knjige, vključno z »Eastern European media representation of the discrimination against the Roma« v *Discourse and Society* (2001, 12: 6), »Media construction of identity through moral panic«, v *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (2003, 29: 1), »Beyond advertising and journalism«, v *Discourse and Society* (2004, 15: 5) in »Hybrid Public Relation News Discourse« in *European Journal of Communication* (2005, 20: 2).

Dr. Zala Volčič

Postdoctoral Fellow
Centre for Critical and Cultural Studies
Forgan Smith Tower
University of Queensland
Brisbane Qld 4072, Australia
e-mail: z.volcic@uq.edu.au
phone: +61 7 3346 7409
fax: +61 7 3365 7184

Zala Volčič is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre for Critical and Cultural Studies at the University of Queensland, Australia. She teaches Mass Communication Theory, Communication for Social Change, and International Communication. She is interested in the cultural consequences of nationalism, capitalism, and globalization, with a particular emphasis on international communication, media and cultural identities. Her research seeks to connect media with work in journalism, media studies, cultural geography and nationalism studies. She has published numerous books and articles, including 'The notion of »The West« in the Serbian National Imaginary' in *European Journal of Cultural Studies* (8: 2); 'Yugo-nostalgia: Cultural Memory and Media in the former Yugoslavia' in *Critical Studies of Mass Communication* (2007: 24: 1) and 'Former Yugoslavia on the World Wide Web: Commercialization and Branding of Nation-states' in the *International Communication Journal, Gazette* (2008, 70:5).

Zala Volčič je podoktorska raziskovalka na Centru za kritične in kulturne študije Univerze Queensland v Avstraliji. Poučuje predmete kot Teorija množičnega komuniciranja, Komuniciranje za družbeno spremembo in Mednarodno komuniciranje. Raziskovalno se ukvarja s posledicami nacionalizma, kapitalizma in globalizacije, s poudarkom na mednarodnem komuniciranju, mediji in kulturno identiteto. V študijah povezuje raziskovanje medijev z novinarskimi in medijskimi študijami, kulturno geografijo in nacionalističnimi študijami. Objavila je številne knjige in članke, vključno z »The notion of 'The West' in the Serbian National Imaginary«, v *European Journal of Cultural Studies* (8: 2), »Yugo-nostalgia: Cultural Memory and Media in the former Yugoslavia«, v *Critical Studies of Mass Communication* (2007: 24: 1) in »Former Yugoslavia on the World Wide Web: Commercialization and Branding of Nation-states«, v *International Communication Journal, Gazette* (2008, 70: 5).

Danijela Majstorović

Danijela Majstorović je leta 2000 diplomirala iz angleščine. Vse od leta 1996 je poučevala angleščino na različnih ravneh (od začetnih tečajev do univerzitetne ravni) ter kot stalna in občasna prevajalka sodelovala z različnimi mednarodnimi organizacijami v Bosni (Nadzorna misija Evropske unije, Organizacija združenih narodov, Svetovna banka idr.). Kot podiplomska študentka je v letih 2001-2003 obiskovala School of Telecommunications na Univerzi v Ohiu in magistrirala iz medijskih študijev in dokumentarne produkcije. Od leta 2001 je bila zaposlena kot asistentka na Oddelku za angleščino Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Banja Luki, kjer je leta 2006 doktorirala s tezo »Discourse Analysis of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina - English Text and Local Context« (»Analiza diskurza Urada visokega predstavnika mednarodne skupnosti (OHR) v Bosni in Hercegovini – Angleški tekst in lokalni kontekst«). Od septembra do decembra 2006 je bila gostujoča raziskovalka na Univerzi v Lancastru.

Režirala in producirala je dva feministična dokumentarna filma: *Counterpoint for Her/Kontrapunkt zanjo* (o žrtvah spolne trgovine) in *Dream Job/ Sanjska služba* (o bosanskih ženskah v medijih); prav tako je avtorica številnih člankov, kjer obravnava vprašanja reprezentacije, analizo diskurza, medije in film, ter avtorica monografije z naslovom *Discourse, Power and the International Community* (2007). Trenutno je zaposlena kot docentka in predstojnica Oddelka za angleščino Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Banja Luki, kjer predava angleško lingvistiko/analizo diskurza, komunikacijo in kulturne študije.

Danijela Majstorović received her BA in English language and literature in July 2000. Since 1996, she has taught English at various levels from beginner's to university and worked as a full and part-time translator/ interpreter for various international organizations in Bosnia such as EC Monitoring Mission, United Nations, World Bank etc. From 2001-2003, she was a graduate student at Ohio University's School of Telecommunications majoring in media studies and documentary production.

Since 2001, she has also been working for the Faculty of Philosophy's English department as a teaching assistant and received her PhD degree in September of 2006 defending a thesis titled »Discourse Analysis of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina - En-

glish Text and Local Context«. From September-December 2006, she was a visiting academic researcher at Lancaster University.

She has directed and produced two feminist documentary films: *Counterpoint for Her* (about victims of sex trafficking) and *Dream Job* (about Bosnian women in the media), and has written several articles dealing with issues of representation, discourse analysis, media and film as well as a monograph *Discourse, Power and the International Community* (2007). She currently works as an assistant professor and department head of the University of Banja Luka Faculty of Philology's English department, where she has taught courses in English linguistics/discourse analysis, communication and cultural studies.

Primož Krašovec

Primož Krašovec (1979) has a bachelor's degree in journalism and sociology of culture and is currently a PhD student of sociology of everyday life at the Faculty of Social Science, University of Ljubljana. He works as a researcher at Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana. He is the author of several scientific and many journalistic articles on contemporary mass media discourses, as well as numerous book and film reviews, political interventions and some theoretical treatises. His main research interests include Marxist theory of ideology, epistemology of historiography, histories of 20th century revolutions and recent transformations of capitalist mode of production (especially those concerning work and everyday life).

Primož Krašovec (1979) je diplomirani novinar in sociolog kulture, trenutno doktorski študent sociologije vsakdanjega življenja na Fakulteti za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani. Zaposlen je kot raziskovalec na Pedagoškem inštitutu v Ljubljani. Je avtor nekaj znanstvenih in mnogih publicističnih člankov o diskurzih sodobnih množičnih medijev kot tudi številnih knjižnih in filmskih recenzij, političnih intervencij in nekaj teoretskih razprav. Njegovi glavni raziskovalni interesi so marksistična teorija ideologije, epistemologija zgodovinopisja, zgodovina revolucij 20. stoletja in nedavne spremembe kapitalističnega načina produkcije (predvsem tiste, ki zadevajo delo in vsakdanje življenje).

ZAHVALA