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NAMESTO UVODA

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Med 24. in 26. novembrom 2006 je na Fakulteti za humanistične študije Univerze na Primorskem potekala mednarodna konferenca o argumentaciji, retoriki, debati in pedagogiki podeljevanja moči, z naslovom *Misliti in govoriti boljši svet*, ki je pritegnila 120 udeležencev iz 19 držav. Konferenca, ki je potekala v soorganizaciji Fakultete za humanistične študije (Koper), Pedagoškega inštituta (Ljubljana), World Debate Instituta (Vermont, Virginia) in Zavoda za kulturo dialoga ZA in PROTI (Ljubljana), je, prvič do sedaj, na istem mestu zbrala strokovnjake s področja argumentacije, retorike, kritičnega mišljenja in pedagogike, z namenom, da izmenjajo izkušnje s sorodnih, a konceptualno vendarle ne povsem enakih področij.

Prispevki s področja argumentacije bodo v knjižni obliki izšli pri založbi SicSat, ki jo izdaja Univerza v Amsterdamu, najboljše prispevke s področja uporabe retorike, debate in kritičnega mišljenja pa smo se odločili objaviti v posebni številki *Šolskega polja*, ki jo imate pred seboj. V zadovoljstvo mi je, da je to že tretja posebna številka na temo Vloga in pomen jezika v vzgoji in izobraževanju, ki je pri bralcih in bralkah naletela na zelo ugoden odmev. Še posebej pa sem vesel, da v njej – prvič sploh – objavljamo prispevke o uporabi retorike, debate in kritičnega mišljenja v izobraževanju. Tudi zato, ker je retorika, z uvedbo devetletke, postala obvezni izbirni predmet, ki priteguje vedno več učencev in učenk, očitno pa tudi učiteljic in učiteljev. Pri tem nikakor ne velja pozabiti, da je Slovenija ena redkih, če ne celo edina država na svetu, ki retoriko ponuja kot samostojen predmet. In da ne bo pomote, govorim o klasični retoriki, katere namen in cilj so pravila organizacije in strukturacije govora oz. besedila, ne o pocestni retoriki raznoraznih »retoričnih šol«, ki so retoriko spravile ob dober glas.

O teh in podobnih rečeh torej teče beseda v pričujoči številki.

DEBATNA ARGUMENTACIJA: ŠTUDIJ PRIMERA TELEVIZIJSKE DEBATNE ODDAJE ZA MLADE

Jerneja Domajnko

Uvod

Govorništvo. Nekoč je bilo tako zelo cenjeno, sčasoma pa se je njegova vrednost vse bolj izgubljala. Ponovno se začne uveljavljati pomen retorike in sredstev prepričevanja v 20. stoletju s prvimi oblikami propagande. Danes poznamo več načinov izobraževanja za prepričljivejše nastope. Enega izmed teh načinov sem natančno preučila tudi v mojem članku, in sicer debatne klube, ki so začeli delovati po slovenskih srednjih šolah v šolskem letu 1996/1997.

Debatnih klubov ne vidim samo kot obliko izobraževanja za prepričljive nastope, ampak predvsem kot inštitucijo, ki prek tekmovanj (debatnih turnirjev) aktivira dijake in dijakinje[1] h kritičnemu mišljenju in jih spodbuja k argumentiranemu zagovarjanju lastnih stališč. Vse prepogosto se namreč dogaja, da se ljudje prepiramo, trmasto vztrajamo pri svojem in ne razumemo, zakaj drugi ne sprejmejo naših stališč, namesto da bi razložili, zakaj tako mislimo, in s tem omogočili, da nas drugi vsaj razumejo, če ne celo sprejmejo naš pogled na svet.

Tako se debaterji v debatnih klubih učijo strpnega prepričevanja v obliki dialoga, s tem pa tudi argumentiranega zastopanja stališč. Debatni strani (zagovorniška in nasprotniška stran) se izmenično trudita prepričati sodnika v natančno odmerjenem času posameznega govora, zato lahko trdim, da je debata oblika dialoga, ki je visoko formalizirana in strukturirana, kar debatne klube približa (pragma-)dialektiki, kjer so udeleženci dialoga zavezani medsebojnim pravilom prepričevanja.

V članku želim raziskovati argumentacijo debaterjev in debaterk. Glavna teza je, da debaterji med sredstvi prepričevanja najpogosteje uporabljajo logos, pri čemer uporabljajo predvsem neformalne oblike argu-

mentiranja. Sodniki morajo med sabo primerjati argumentacijski logiki obeh debatnih strani, kar potrjuje trditev, da je logos v debati najpomembnejši. Za propozicije, o katerih diskutirajo debaterji, ne obstajajo absolutni dokazi (če bi, ne bi mogli debatirati o njih), zato lahko o argumentih, ki jih postavljajo, govorimo kot o sklepanju iz verjetnosti, ki pa ne zahteva strogih logičnih pravil. Tako je za debato skoraj nujna neformalna logika.

V prvem delu članka na kratko opredelim pojem argumenta(-cije). Posebej opišem tudi Toulminov model argumentacije, ki ima osnove v neformalni logiki in je po mnenju mnogih strokovnjakov verjetno najbolj dodelana oblika argumentacije, kar jih poznamo.

V drugem delu se osredinim na to, kaj je debata in kako je povezana z argumentacijo. Vzporednice debati iščem v različnih disciplinah, kot so retorika s prepričevanjem, dialektika in pragma-dialektika.

Na koncu članka analiziram več mladinskih oddaj Tekma, debatna oddaja za mlade, da bi preverila moja predvidevanja na praktičnih primerih. Čeprav te oddaje niso popolnoma enake debatnim turnirjem, so njihov najboljši dostopni približek, saj so shranjene na spletnih straneh RTV Slovenija, debatni turnirji pa, z izjemo nekaterih finalnih debat, sploh niso posneti.

Opredelitev argumentacije

V Malem leksikonu logike je argument definiran kot skupek misli ali stavkov, katerih resničnost je preverjena in ki dokazujejo kakšno drugo misel ali stavek (Ule, 1997: 55). Huber in Snider ga definirata kot »... proces v komuniciranju, v katerem uporabimo logiko, da vplivamo na druge (Huber in Snider, 2006: 2).« Šuster pa, da je »/A/rgument /.../ način oblikovanja prepričanj, s katerim pridobivamo nova spoznanja, preiskujemo, kaj je res in kaj ne, zagovarjamo dejanja in odločitve, kritiziramo teze in stališča, iščemo najboljša pojasnila za dogajanja v svetu in nas samih (Šuster, 1998: 16).« Če vse skupaj povzamem:

Argumentacija je oblikovanje trditve, ki je na razumen način podprta z razlogi, dejstvi ali primeri, ki pripeljejo do določenih zaključkov z namenom vplivanja na druge – na njihovo spreminjanje mnenj, stališč ali vedenja.

Torej, če je namen argumentiranja vplivanje na druge – kar je hkrati namen prepričevanja – lahko sklenemo, da je argumentacija bistveni sestavni del prepričevanja. Ni pomembno, kolikokrat in kako glasno ponavljamo trditev, argument nastane šele z dodatnimi informacijami, ki jih

občinstvo vidi kot navajanje razlogov (Broda-Bahm, Kempf in Driscoll, 2004: 185). Pri tem si pomagamo z logičnim sklepanjem (argumentom) in dokažemo, da premise podpirajo sklep (Uršič in Markič, 2003: 73). Pravi argument nastane šele takrat, ko navajamo razloge za (oz. proti) resničnost neke trditve skupaj z razlogi, zakaj je ta trditev resnična (Šuster, 1998: 34–36).

V presoji, ali je argument dober, nas po mnenju Šusterja zanima, v kolikšni meri dane premise utemeljujejo sprejetje sklepa. Prvo merilo je resnica premis, in sicer tista resnica, v katero občinstvo verjame, saj mora občinstvo verjeti v premise, da jih bo imel argument možnost prepričati (Šuster, 1998: 47). Enako meni tudi Perelman, ko pravi, da se mora govornik najprej prepričati, da je poslušalstvo sprejelo njegove premise, saj lahko argument, ki ni prilagojen občinstvu, izzove negativno reakcijo (Perelman, 1999: 135). Tako je argument več kot samo logika. Je sklepanje, ki ga motivira želja po sprejetju trditev pri občinstvu (Broda-Bahm et al., 2004: 185–186). Kot tak je argument več kot prepričevanje, saj zahteva tudi uporabo logike in razlogov. Ljudje lahko »prepričamo« s silo ali z denarjem, vpliv na dejansko spremembo obnašanja, mišljenja in prepričanj pa dosežemo z argumentom, ki vsebuje dobre razloge za spremembo (Broda-Bahm, 2004: 186).

Glede na povedano do sedaj, je argument nekaj več od prepričevanja in je tudi nekaj več od logike. Je vmesno področje med prepričevanjem in logiko, saj je skupek logike, ki jo motivira cilj prepričati, in prepričevanja, ki ga spremlja logično utemeljevanje. To lahko skiciramo z naslednjo skico (Broda-Bahm et al., 2004: 186):

Pri tem velja nekoliko bolj izpostaviti izraz neformalna logika, ki ne zahteva matematične natančnosti, temveč je skupek splošnih pravil dobrega sklepanja in vključuje subjektivnost, verjetnosti in opredeljuje utemeljevanje v večini situacij, v katerih se znajde človek. To pa zato, ker učinko-

vitost prepričevanja temelji na razumevanju občinstva in ne na standardih absolutne resničnosti (Broda-Bahm et al., 2004: 187–188). Tudi Groarke trdi podobno: »Zanimanje za občinstvo, ki se poudarja v nekaterih pristopih neformalne logike, povezuje tradicionalno razlikovanje med logiko in retoriko.« (Groarke, 2006) Torej, argument je vezni člen med retoriko in logiko, saj mora biti oblikovan po meri občinstva, hkrati pa mora vsebovati razumske kriterije.

Toulminov model argumentacije

»Model spominja na silogistični model deduktivnega sklepanja v klasični logiki, a je kot pristop t. i. 'neformalne logike' bistveno bolj fleksibilen (Škerlep, 2001: 553).« V klasičnem silogizmu oz. dedukciji (formalna logika) morata biti obe premisi resnični, da bi bil sklep resničen, kar pogosto ni dosegljivo, saj je skoraj vsako premiso mogoče izpodbijati.

Osnovni elementi argumenta, kot naj bi jih navajal Aristotel, so: dve premisi (glavna in stranska) in sklep – gre za običajni silogizem. Vendar pa moramo vsako trditev zagovarjati, če je izpostavljena dvomu, kar pomeni, da običajni silogizem ne zadošča. Takrat moramo navesti dejstva (D) in jih predstaviti kot osnovo za našo trditev (C). Naslednji korak pa ni navajanje novih podatkov, temveč dokazovanje, da je povezava med podatki in trditvijo ustrezna – s pomočjo utemeljitve (W), ki je v primerjavi s podatkom bolj implicitna oz. hipotetična. Odvisno od vrste utemeljitve pa je, če gre za sklep, ki logično nujno sledi iz premis ali pa je samo verjeten, kar označujemo z naslednjim elementom argumenta – s kvalifikacijo (Q). S pogoji zavrnitve (R) izrazimo okoliščine, v katerih utemeljitev ne drži, s podporo (B) pa dodamo dodatno moč utemeljitvi (Toulmin, 1964: 96–104). Tako moramo sklep dokazati in ne izpeljati iz premis. Ali kot pravita Driscoll in Zompetti (2005: 31): »V Toulminovem modelu trditve ne moremo dokazati, če niso dokazane osnove.«

Louise Cummings trdi, da je splošno sprejeto, da premise argumenta delujejo tako, da dajejo argumentu določeno stopnjo podpore za zaključke s pomočjo dokazov (Cummings, 2003: 164). Taka je tudi Toulminova trditev, saj so po njegovem mnenju trditev, podatek in utemeljitev ogrodje argumenta, dodatni elementi pa so kvalifikacija, podpora ter rezervacija, kar grafično zgleda tako (Toulmin, 1964: 96–104):

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┌─────────────────────┐                          ┌────────────────────────────┐
│   DEJSTVA (D)        │ ───────────────────────▶ │ torej, … KVALIFIKACIJE (Q),│
└─────────────────────┘                          │      TRDITEV (C)           │
         │                                        └────────────────────────────┘
         ▼                                                     │
┌─────────────────────┐                                        ▼
│   ker/saj …         │                          ┌────────────────────────────┐
│   UTEMELJITEV (W)   │                          │   razen če …               │
└─────────────────────┘                          │   POGOJ ZAVRNITVE (R)      │
         │                                        └────────────────────────────┘
         ▼
┌─────────────────────┐
│   zaradi …          │
│   PODPORA (B)       │
└─────────────────────┘
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(Toulmin, 1964: 104)

Torej, zadostni elementi, ki sestavljajo prepričljiv argument, so: trditev, podatek in utemeljitev (Broda-Bahm et al., 2004: 191). Ostale elemente Toulminovega modela pa navajamo, v kolikor je to treba za razumljivost argumenta (Škerlep, 2001: 555).

Preden pa se lotim analize argumentov v debati, želim na kratko predstaviti, kaj je debata in kako je povezana z argumentacijo.

Debata in argumentacija

Argument kot sredstvo prepričevanja lahko pričakujemo v vsakem sporu, v katerem dve (ali več) strani zagovarjajo med seboj nasprotujoča si stališča. Gre za soočenje nasprotnih mnenj in izmenjavo argumentov, v katerih vsaka stran želi upravičiti svoje stališče ('pro') in zavrniti nasprotno ('contra'), pa naj bo to parlamentarna, sodna … debata ali nastop na televiziji. Cilj debate je prepričati občinstvo (oz. sodnika), ki igra vlogo razumnega razsodnika, v razpravi pa ne sodeluje (Šuster, 1998: 60). Debatna trditev je vedno kontroverzna téma tako kot pri ostalih oblikah argumentativnih razprav (Hitchcock, 2002: 298). To so debatne trditve, o katerih razumni ljudje nimajo enakega mnenja, zato lahko o njih debatiramo (Driscoll in Zompetti, 2005: 3).

Vendar pa debata ni le oblika izražanja, je tudi oblika prepričevanja, ki lahko vodi v spremembo mišljenj ali mnenj (Driscoll in Zompetti, 2005: 3). Tudi Grabnar meni, da sta retorično znanje in spretnost nepogrešljiva za vsako družbo in vsako demokracijo (Grabnar, 1991: 12). Čeprav se je

demokratični proces od antičnih časov precej spremenil, pa se debata na-
daljuje in je še vedno nujna dejavnost za demokracijo, saj se še vedno raz-
pravlja o tem, kaj je sprejemljivo, kaj preudarno in kaj najboljše za družbo
(Driscoll in Zompetti, 2005: 3). To pa sovpada s Hitchcockovo trditvijo, da
je argumentativna razprava močna kulturna praksa, ki ima potencial spre-
minjati ignoranco v znanje ter predsodke v sodbe, ki so podprte z razlogi
(Hitchcock, 2002: 298).

Do podobnega zaključka lahko pridemo tudi z van Eemerenovo in
Houtlosserjevo (2000: 387) trditvijo, da argumentacijska govorna dejanja
ne potekajo v družbenem vakuumu, ampak med dvema ali več stranmi,
ki nimajo istega mnenja in so med sabo v interakciji, kar se mi zdi zelo
primerna definicija debate: Debata je argumentacijsko govorno dejanje,
ki poteka med dvema ali več stranmi, ki nimajo oz. ne zastopajo istega
mnenja in so med sabo v interakciji.

Kot taka je debata podobna dialektiki, saj se veliko bolj poslužuje
argumentativnih praks, podobno kot se dialektika bolj poslužuje argu-
mentacije kot retorika. Poleg tega je namen retorike prepričati pasivno
občinstvo, v dialektiki in debati pa gre za prepričevanje nasprotnika, ki
je razumski in zahteva utemeljeno prepričevanje (Leff, 2000: 243). Tako
v tekmovalni debati pred prepričljivostjo nastopa prednjači logična pre-
pričljivost, saj zmaga tista skupina, ki je imela najboljšo argumentacijsko
logiko (Skrt, 2004; Snider; Driscoll in Zompetti, 2005).

Sklenem lahko, da je izmed vseh konstitutivnih elementov prepriče-
vanja v tekmovalni debati najpomembnejši logos, saj debata uči debaterje,
da uporabljajo logiko kot prvo orodje analize (Skrt, 2004: 2). To ne pomeni,
da sme dober govorec zanemariti ostale elemente prepričevanja; pomeni
le to, da debaterji dajejo poudarek kritičnemu presojanju nasprotnikovih
trditev ob istočasnem upoštevanju pravil dobrega nastopa (primerna ube-
seditev idej). Tako je debata podobna retoriki in pragma-dialektiki, ki ne
zanemarjata sredstev predstavitve (Leff, 2000: 248).

Če pogledamo, katere discipline vključuje debata, lahko hitro ugoto-
vimo, da je dejansko dobra osnova za učenje prvin argumentirane razpra-
ve, saj vključuje argumentirane govore, kar pomeni, da temelji na retoriki
in prepričevanju (posameznikov govor, nastop, vključevanje logosa, tudi
etosa in patosa). Osnove debate lahko najdemo tudi v dialektiki, saj gre
za neke vrste dialog – zagovarjanje teze in na drugi strani njeno naspro-
tovanje (Slob, 2002: 182). Elementi dialektike, ki sta jo razvila Johnson in
Blair, se opazijo v zavračanju nasprotnikovih argumentov in racionalnem
prepričevanju v opcijo, ki jo sami zagovarjajo (Leff, 2000: 248). Še najbolj

pa je podobna pragma-dialektiki, ki je vezni člen med dialektiko in retoriko (van Eemeren in Houtlosser, 2001; van Eemeren in Houtlosser, 2000; Krabbe, 2000). Do izraza pride predvsem v obliki dialoga v navzkrižnem spraševanju (v debatnem formatu Karl Popper) in vmesnih vprašanjih (ostale oblike debatnih formatov).

DEBATA

Broda-Bahm in drugi (2004: 186) v svoji knjigi predstavijo argument kot vmesni člen med prepričevanjem in logiko. To skico sem si tudi sama sposodila, da nazorneje prikažem debato, kot jo razumem sama, saj se discipline, ki sestavljajo debato, medsebojno prepletajo. Argument in dialektika sta vezni člen med (neformalno) logiko in prepričevanjem oz. retoriko; pragma-dialektika pa je vez med retoriko in dialektiko, torej tudi med prepričevanjem in argumentom. Vse omenjeno je združeno v debati, s središčnim poudarkom na argumentu.

Sojenje in sodniki na debatnih turnirjih

Za debato je značilen formalen okvir z natančno določenimi pravili, ki so vsem udeležencem znana vnaprej (Šuster, 1998: 60). Tem formalnim pravilom debate lahko poiščemo vzporednice v dialektičnem diskurzu, ko se pravila vzpostavijo in postanejo veljavna s konvencionalnim dogovorom med udeleženci razprave. Lahko gre za dogovor, lahko pa veljajo tudi nenapisana pravila. Ta pravila omogočajo zunanjemu opazovalcu – v primeru formalne debate je ta opazovalec sodnik – da ovrednoti razpravo (Slob, 2002: 183).

Tudi pragma-dialektična teorija postavlja napadanje in obrambo stališč v kritični diskusiji v kontekst skupnih pravil razprave, ki začnejo veljati šele, ko jih sprejmejo zagovorniki in nasprotniki. Pri debati so ta pravila eksplicitna, v razpravah pa ponavadi udeleženci samo predvidevajo, da si delijo skupna pravila in taka pravila dobijo status konvencij, h katerim sta strani zavezani med razpravo (van Eemeren in Grootendorst, 2003: 372).

Na debatnih tekmovanjih so sodniki tisti, ki ocenjujejo in s tem učijo debaterje, kaj velja kot dober in prepričljiv govor. V debati je ponavadi sodnik en sam, v polfinalu in finalu pa je njihovo število večje (Snider: 9). Vendar pa sodnik ne sme ocenjevati na podlagi lastnih stališč do določene téme ali na podlagi predhodnega znanja, saj se predvideva, da ne kaže naklonjenosti določeni skupini ali določeni strani. Odločitev temelji na tem, katera skupina je svojo nalogo opravila bolje – zagovarjala lastne trditve in zavračala nasprotnikove. Torej, omejiti se mora na to, kar so debaterji dejansko rekli, ne glede na to, če obstajajo boljši argumenti, ki pa v debati niso bili izrečeni (Driscoll in Zompetti, 2005: 60–62).

Pragma-dialektika predvideva zagovarjanje in obrambo stališč v kritični razpravi, dokler nasprotnik popolnoma ne sprejme stališča zagovornika (van Eemeren in Grootendorst, 2003: 373). To seveda na debatnih tekmovanjih ni mogoče, saj je čas omejen, zato sodnik daje na tehtnico tiste *pro* in *contra* argumente, ki so jih debaterji v določenem času predstavili. Tako je naloga sodnika v izobraževalni debati, da odloči, katera stran – zagovorniška ali negacijska – je bila med debato prepričljivejša (Driscoll in Zompetti, 2005: 7). Ocenjujejo argumentacijo, kakovost podpor, organizacijo govorov in slog. Zmaga skupina, katere argumentacijska logika je boljša in doslednejša (Skrt, 2004: 17). Tudi Wells meni, da je naloga sodnika v debati ocenjevati umetnost argumentiranja posameznika (Wells, 2005: 76–77). Čeprav sodniki točkujejo posamezne govore, pa je končna odločitev o zmagi odvisna od skupine kot celote. Tako naj bi v tekmovalni debati zmagala skupina z najboljšimi idejami in argumenti, čeprav imajo nasprotniki bolj tekoč slog in prepričljivejši nastop (Driscoll in Zompetti, 2005: 61), kar je še en dokaz, da v ocenjevanju debatne prepričljivosti prevlada logos.

Oblike argumentacije v debati

Najsplošnejši obliki sklepanja sta indukcija in dedukcija. Čeprav je induktivno sklepanje bolj vsakdanje, deduktivno pa bolj matematično, se v de-

bati pojavljata obe obliki. Je pa res, da se v debati pogosteje uporabljajo induktivni argumenti, saj so deduktivni argumenti dobri le, če temeljijo na absolutnih ugotovitvah – te pa je v družboslovju težko najti. Poleg tega je problem deduktivnih argumentov v debati v tem, da moramo spodbijati resničnost ene izmed premis, če želimo zavrniti argument. In kakor hitro je ena premisa argumenta produkt induktivnega razmišljanja – tudi če je zgrajena po principu deduktivnega silogizma – je celoten argument induktiven. Težava induktivnih argumentov pa je v njihovi nepopolnosti. Ne glede na to, koliko dejstev navajamo, še vedno obstaja možnost, da sklep ne bo resničen – bo pa toliko bolj verjeten, če bo v njem zajetih več možnih dejavnikov (Driscoll in Zompetti, 2005: 29–31).

V debati se uporabljajo tudi argumenti z analogijo. Debaterji, ki uporabijo analogije, neko sporno situacijo primerjajo s tako, ki ni sporna, ter računajo, da bodo sodniki prišli do enakega zaključka glede obeh situacij. Analogije so pogosto prepričljive in retorično učinkovite, vendar pa so vedno ranljive zaradi odvisnosti od primerjave, ki se lahko spodbija. Nekoliko težje je spodbijati stvarne analogije, saj lahko nasprotniki pri simboličnih analogijah hitro zatrdijo, da so primerjave absurdne (Driscoll in Zompetti, 2005: 32–33). Prav tako je nevarnost pri uporabi analogij v obstoju pomembnih razlik med primerjanima stvarema (Broda-Bahm et al., 2004: 214).

Argumenti iz primerov so zelo podobni agrumentom, ki temeljijo na analogiji, saj gre za neke vrste primerjave. Zato je tak argument tudi zelo odvisen od induktivne logike, saj debaterji ponujajo dokaze iz nečesa, kar je znano in ni sporno, za nekaj, kar ni znano. Vendar pa je tovrsten argument tako kot indukcija odvisen od omejenih števil primerov, ki so lahko prepričevalni, hkrati pa sami ne utemeljujejo stanovitnih zakonov. Če zakon, ki ga utemeljujejo primeri, ni univerzalen, ne more nihče z gotovostjo trditi, da bo veljal v situaciji, ki jo prikazujejo debaterji (Driscoll in Zompetti, 2005: 33). Zato lahko le redko z gotovostjo uporabimo ta argument, tako kot so redki univerzalni zakoni, oziroma je za tovrstno sklepanje treba uporabiti primere, za katere lahko trdimo, da so tipični predstavniki kategorije, o kateri debaterji govorijo (Broda-Bahm, 2004: 211).

V družboslovju vzrok in posledica nista tako jasna kot v naravoslovnih znanostih, še vedno pa so po mnenju Driscolla in Zompettija najmočnejši logični argumenti odvisni od analize vzroka in posledice, od serije logičnih sklepov. Težava pa se pojavi, ko bi morali debaterji izločiti vse nebistvene dejavnike oz. če bi bilo treba vključiti večje število vzrokov in posledic, pa jih niso – ker niso vedeli, da obstajajo, ali ker niso imeli časa,

da jih vse izpostavijo. Tako kot v vseh oblikah sklepanj, ki temeljijo na indukciji, je tudi v argumentu vzroka in posledice pomanjkljivost, saj lahko nasprotniki hitro usmerijo verigo dokazovanja k drugačnemu vzroku za posledico (Driscoll in Zompetti, 2005: 34). Gre za sklepanje, v katerem obstoj ali sprememba neke stvari odraža obstoj ali spremembo neke druge stvari (Broda-Bahm et al., 2004: 211).

Argument avtoritete ni najbolj priporočljiv za debato, saj lahko vsaka stran najde kakšnega strokovnjaka, ki podpira njihove trditve (Driscoll in Zompetti, 2005: 36). Trditve strokovnjakov še ne dokazujejo ničesar, vsaj dokler niso podprte z razlogi (Šuster, 1998: 182). Tako se v debati ali kjerkoli drugje, kjer je potrebno sklepanje, odsvetuje uporaba argumentov avtoritete, saj kaj hitro navedemo protiargument – drugo avtoriteto ali ugotovitev, da neka trditev še ni nujno resnična, če tako verjame nekaj ljudi, naj so strokovnjaki ali laiki. Če pa navedemo trditve strokovnjakov skupaj z dejstvi in statistikami ter razložimo, kaj to pomeni za nas, je argument avtoritete lahko dober (Huber in Snider, 2006: 74). Broda-Bahm in drugi pravijo: »... argument ni nikoli učinkovit brez dobrih razlogov ...« (Broda-Bahm et al., 2004: 223).

Še najbolj pa se prekrivata debata in Toulminov model argumentacije. Toulminova trditev se ujema s pozicijo debaterja, ki govori za resolucijo oz. proti njej. Podpore iz Toulminovega modela so argumenti ali dokazi, ki jih med debato debaterji podajajo (Driscoll in Zompetti, 2005: 31). Tako kot po Toulminu tudi v debati podpore potrebujejo utemeljitev, do Toulminovega elementa zavrnitve pa pride s strani nasprotnikov, ko skušajo dokazati, da argument ne drži.

Argumentacija v oddaji »Tekma, debatna oddaja za mlade«

Naštela sem veliko prednosti, ki si jih po mnenju različnih strokovnjakov s področja debate pridobijo debaterji. Sedaj pa želim predstaviti še na primeru slovenskih debaterjev, kako se ti izražajo in na kakšen način podpirajo svoje trditve.

Za analizo sem si izbrala tri mladinske oddaje Tekma, debatna oddaja za mlade, ki jih je predvajal drugi program TV Slovenija. Deset oddaj je bilo na programu ob ponedeljkih v aprilu, maju in juniju, njim pa so sledile še ponovitve v juniju, juliju in avgustu. Gre za oddajo, v kateri so nastopali debaterji iz slovenskih srednjih šol. Vsebina oddaje je bila debata, kakršno se prakticira na debatnih turnirjih. Razlika med debato na turnirjih

in debato v oddaji Tekma je bila v dolžini govorov – govori v Tekmi so bili krajši zaradi predvidene dolžine oddaje – in v tem, da sta po navzkrižnem spraševanju postavila vprašanje tudi gosta, poznavalca téme. V vsaki oddaji je bila predstavljena druga téma, ki sta jo skupini zagovarjali oziroma ji nasprotovali. Kdo bo témo zagovarjal in kdo ji bo nasprotoval, pa je bilo odvisno od žreba, ki je določil strani že dober teden pred oddajo.

Tabela 1: Primerjava poteka in dolžine govorov v oddaji Tekma in na debatnih turnirjih

KAJ?	Tekma:	Debatni turnir:
– govor 1. govorca/-ke zagovorniške skupine	2 minuti in 30 sekund	6 minut
– navzkrižno spraševanje	1 minuta	3 minute
– govor 1. govorca/-ke negacijske skupine	2 minuti in 30 sekund	6 minut
– navzkrižno spraševanje	1 minuta	3 minute
– govor 2. govorca/-ke zagovorniške skupine	2 minuti	5 minut
– navzkrižno spraševanje	1 minuta	3 minute
– govor 2. govorca/-ke negacijske skupine	2 minuti	5 minut
– navzkrižno spraševanje	1 minuta	3 minute
– govor 3. govorca/-ke zagovorniške skupine	2 minuti	5 minut
– govor 3. govorca/-ke negacijske skupine	2 minuti	5 minut

Metodologija in vzorec

Na neresnice in nesmiselnosti trditev določene skupine mora opozoriti nasprotniška skupina. Kar ocenjuje sodnik, je argumentacija – logos (Driscoll in Zompetti, 2005: 60–62). V tem članku sem se tudi sama postavila v vlogo debatne sodnice in preučevala načine argumentacije debaterjev v oddaji Tekma. Tako sem se osredotočila samo na logos, ki je osrednji fokus vsakega sodnika v tekmovalni debati. Natančneje, omejila sem se samo na določen del logosa – metode sklepanja, oblike in vrste argumentov, ki jih uporabljajo debaterji. Podrobnejše analize (pragma-)dialektične narave logosa v tekmovalni debati se nisem lotila, saj mi prostor, namenjen za članek, tega ne dopušča.

Za analizo sem si naključno izbrala tri različne oddaje Tekma. Ključnega pomena pri moji izbiri je bila želja, da analiziram različne ekipe in jih med seboj primerjam, kar pa ni bilo tako enostavno, saj so štirim kvalifika-

cijskim krogom sledili četrtfinale, polfinale in finale, v katerih so se ekipe ponavljale. Na koncu sem si za analizo izbrala oddaje, katerih ponovitve so bile na sporedu 26. 6. 2006 (Turbofolk poneumlja ljudi.), 17. 7. 2006 (Splav je sprejemljiv.) in 24. 7. 2006 (Brezplačno presnemavanje glasbe z interneta je sprejemljivo.). V ta namen sem naredila dobesedni zapis vseh govorov posamezne oddaje. Ker sem se omejila zgolj na preučevanje argumentov, sem iz zapisa izpustila navzkrižna spraševanja, prispevke in pogovore z gosti, saj mi niso koristili za analizo.

Indikatorji in hipoteze

Šuster pravi, da »... vsako izražanje mnenja še ni argument« (Šuster, 1998: 29). V poglavju o argumentu sem argumentiranje definirala kot oblikovanje neke trditve, ki je na razumen način podprta z razlogi, dejstvi ali primeri, ki pripeljejo do določenih zaključkov z namenom vplivanja na druge – na njihovo spreminjanje mnenj, stališč ali vedenja.

Ker se v analizi ne želim osredotočati na vpliv argumentiranja na druge ljudi, temveč na sestavo argumenta, bom za potrebe nadaljnjega dela skrčila definicijo argumentiranja oz. argumenta. Torej, argument je neka trditev, ki je na razumen način podprta z razlogi, dejstvi ali primeri, ki pripeljejo do določenih zaključkov. Moja definicija argumentiranja se ujema s Toulminovim modelom argumentacije, katerega ogrodje so trditev, utemeljitev in sklep (Toulmin, 1964: 99).

Čeprav teoretiki debate trdijo, da je debata v debatnih klubih formalizirana, je sklepanje v debati manj formalno in ne zahteva strogih logičnih pravil (Šuster, 1998; Skrt, 2004; Snider, 2006; Slob, 2002; Driscoll in Zompetti, 2005). Zato vsa moja predvidevanja temeljijo na tezi, da se v debati uporablja neformalne oblike logike. Ker je po Škerlepu (2001: 553) Toulminov model argumentacije del neformalne logike, je moje prvo predvidevanje:

Hipoteza 1: Debaterji se poslužujejo Toulminovega modela argumentaci je pogosteje kot klasičnega silogizma.

Vprašanja, ki mi bodo pomagala pri določanju Toulminovega modela argumentacije, so:

1. So navedeni vzroki in/ali posledice?
 1 – NE
 2 – DA

2. So navedeni primeri?
 1 – NE
 2 – DA

3. So navedene podobnosti, vzporednice, primerjave?
 1 – NE
 2 – DA

4. So navedene trditve strokovnjakov, znanih ljudi, podatki raziskav?
 1 – NE
 2 – DA

5. Ali so dejstva, podatki, trditve utemeljeni (ker, saj ...)?
 1 – NE
 2 – DA

6. Je sklep izražen?
 1 – NE
 2 – DA

Odgovori na prva štiri vprašanja bodo pokazali, ali v posamezni argumentaciji obstaja eden izmed nujnih pogojev za Toulminov model argumentacije – dejstva. Če je vsaj en odgovor na prva štiri vprašanja pozitiven, pomeni, da so dejstva navedena in je prvi pogoj za Toulminov model argumentacije izpolnjen.

S petim in šestim vprašanjem preverjam obstoj ostalih dveh nujnih elementov za Toulminov model argumentacije – obstoj utemeljitve in sklepa. Če obstajajo tako dejstva kot utemeljitev teh dejstev in sklep, potem je to pravi argument, v nasprotnem primeru pa je lahko samo razlaga, pogojnik ali slab argument avtoritete. Ostali elementi Toulminovega modela argumentacije niso potrebni za dobro argumentacijo, zato tudi nisem preverjala, ali jih debaterji v svojih govorih uporabljajo.

Ker ne morem že vnaprej izključiti možnosti, da imajo argumenti obliko klasičnega, verižnega ali hipotetičnega silogizma (čeprav je to malo verjetno, saj gre za zelo formalno strukturirano obliko argumenta), doda-

jam vprašanja, ki bodo v tekstu identificirala elemente formalne oblike argumentacije:

7. So vse premise eksplicitno izražene?
    1 – NE
    2 – DA

8. Ali premisam sledi sklep, ki je izpeljan iz njih?
    1 – NE
    2 – DA

9. Je sklep eksplicitno izražen?
    1 – NE
    2 – DA

Če so premise in sklep eksplicitno izraženi in so postavljeni tako, da sklep sledi premisam, potem lahko rečem, da gre za klasični silogizem. Da bi prišla do te ugotovitve, bom uporabila odgovore na vprašanja 6., 7. in 8. – za silogizem so potrebni pozitivni odgovori na vsa tri vprašanja.

Če so premise ali sklep samo nakazani (negativen odgovor na vprašanji 7. in 9.), potem lahko sklenem, da je tisti argument entimem. Nujni pogoj za obstoj entimema je, da je sklep izpeljan iz premis, s tem da mora biti eden izmed drugih dveh pogojev (premise ali sklep) jasno izražen, drugi pa samo nakazan.

Z enakimi vprašanji bom preverjala tudi predvidevanje

hipoteze 2: Najpogostejša oblika argumentiranja debaterjev je entimem.

Entimem je oblika argumenta, ki se uporablja v retoriki, saj ni potrebno navajanje vsake premise oz. vsakega koraka v sklepanju (Šuster, 1998: 43). Ponavadi se izpušča premise, ker so splošno znane (Uršič in Markič, 2003: 30). Čeprav je entimem skrajšana oblika silogizma, ki je del formalne logike, ga uvrščam bolj k neformalni logiki, saj ne potrebuje vseh elementov formalne strukture argumenta – jasno izpostavljenih tako premis kot sklepa. Poleg tega je čas govorov v oddaji Tekma omejen. Zato se debaterji in debaterke v dveh minutah ne morejo ukvarjati z eksplicitnim izpostavljanjem vsake premise in raje izkoristijo čas za dodatne argumente.

Hipoteza 3: Debaterji utemeljujejo svoje trditve.

Tako predvidevam, ker morajo debaterji trditve utemeljiti in podpreti, če želijo prepričati sodnika (Šuster, 1998; Driscoll in Zomeptti, 2005; Snider, 2006; Skrt, 2004). Pravzaprav je celotna debata izmenjava argumentov in ne mnenj ali idej. Torej, če niso navedena niti dejstva niti njihova utemeljitev ter povezava s sklepom, potem ne moremo govoriti o argumentu. Iz tega sledi, da so pravi argumenti tisti, ki so utemeljeni (pozitiven odgovor na 5. vprašanje).

Pri argumentih, za katere bom ugotovila, da so pravi argumenti, bom preverjala, za katero vrsto argumentov gre. Po mnenju Perelmana ima argument z zgledom velik pomen v metodologiji Karla Poppra (Perelman, 1999: 106). Debatni format, kot ga poznamo v Sloveniji, pa temelji prav na tej metodologiji – celo imenuje se debatni format Karl Popper. Poleg tega pa so dokazi (dejstva, primeri ...) po mnenju Huberja in Sniderja dominantni element argumentacije (Huber in Snider, 2006: 71). To pomeni, da se tudi najpogosteje uporabljajo. Broda-Bahm in drugi pa trdijo, da je sklepanje iz primerov eden izmed najlažjih vzorcev sklepanja (Broda-Bahm et al., 2004: 209). Ponavadi se poslužujemo najlažjih poti, zato sem predvidevala, da je tako tudi v debati in postavila naslednjo hipotezo:

Hipoteza 4: Najpogostejša vrsta argumenta debaterjev je argument iz primerov.

Že za ugotavljanje prve hipoteze bom izločila vse primere, v katerih ne obstajata hkrati sklep in utemeljitev. S pomočjo na novo pridobljene spremenljivke bom ugotovila, katera dejstva zadostujejo hkratnemu pogoju sklepa in utemeljitve. Tako bom dobila argumente – iz vzrokov, z zgledom, z analogijo in argumente avtoritete.

Če debaterji omenjajo vzroke in/ali posledice (1. vprašanje, odgovor DA), potem uporabljajo argument iz vzrokov. Če navajajo primere (2. vprašanje, odgovor DA), potem je to argumentacija z zgledom. Primerjave (3. vprašanje, odgovor DA) kažejo na argumentacijo z analogijo; statistični podatki, trditve znanih ljudi (4. vprašanje, odgovor DA) pa so indic argumenta avtoritete. Pri tem je potreben tudi pozitiven odgovor na 5. vprašanje, s katerim identificiramo dober argument in ga ločimo od razlage, pogojnika in neutemeljenega argumenta avtoritete.

Več strokovnjakov s področja argumentacije (Šuster, 1998; Driscoll in Zompetti, 2005) trdi, da je v vsakdanjem življenju, v družboslovju, naj-

pogostejše induktivno sklepanje, saj ne zahteva absolutne dokazljivosti premis. Tudi v debati – oz. še posebej v debati – ni namen dokazovanja v resničnost premis, temveč dokazovanje, katera izmed trditev je bolj veljavna v določenem primeru in bolj razumsko prepričljiva. Tako menim, ker debata temelji tudi na teoriji dialektike, ki poudarja sklepanje na podlagi verjetnosti – induktivno sklepanje.

Poleg tega debaterji razpravljajo o kontroverznih temah oz. o temah, o katerih (razumni) ljudje nimajo enakega mnenja, kar omogoča debato (Hitchcock, 2002; Driscoll in Zompetti, 2005). V takih temah je težko najti absolutno resnične trditve za katerokoli stran. Deduktivni argument pa je lahko samo resničen ali ne. Druge možnosti ni. In ker ne dopušča dvoma o (ne)pravilnosti zaključka, če so premise (ne)resnične, nadaljnja debata sploh ni možna (Slob, 2002: 181). Zaradi tega je indukcija močno orodje vplivanja na prepričanja drugih ljudi (Huber in Snider, 2006: 105). Zato sem tudi sama predvidevala, ali drži:

hipoteza 5: Debaterji pogosteje uporabljajo induktivno sklepanje kot deduktivno.

Vprašanji, ki bosta identificirali, za katero metodo sklepanja gre, sta:

10. Gre za sklepanje iz splošne resnice na posamičen primer?
    1 – NE
    2 – DA → dedukcija

11. Gre za sklepanje iz posameznega primera na splošno zakonitost?
    1 – NE
    2 – DA → indukcija

V dodatno pomoč pri določanju argumentov mi bodo indikatorji premis in sklepov, ki so jih identificirali različni preučevalci argumenta (Šuster, 1998; Birckenbach in Davies, 1997; Liu, 2004; Uršič in Markič, 2003).

Premise v stavku sledijo izrazom:
    – glede na to, da ...
    – saj ...
    – kajti ...
    – ker ...
    – kot kaže ...
    – razlogi za to so ...;

sklep pa običajno stoji za izrazi:

> – torej ...
> – zato ...

– to dokazuje ...

– kar pomeni, da ...

– zaradi tega ...

– lahko sklepamo, da ...

– iz tega sledi, da ...

Preverjanje hipotez

Število vseh analiziranih primerov je bilo 51. Najprej sem ugotavljala, v koliko primerih se pojavlja Toulminov model argumentacije, kolikokrat klasični silogizem, entimem in verižni ali hipotetični silogizem. Torej, najprej sem preverjala hipoteze 1, 2 in 3.

Tabela 2: Oblika argumenta

	Toulminov argument (osnovni)	Klasični silogizem	Entimem	Verižni silogizem
N	23	0	30	0
%	45,1	0,0	58,8	0,0

Iz *Tabele 2* lahko razberemo, da je osnovnih oblik Toulminove argumentacije (dejstva, sklep in utemeljitev) v analiziranih primerih oddaje Tekma res več kot klasičnih silogizmov. Klasičnega silogizma nisem mogla zaslediti niti v enem izmed primerov, saj že prvi pogoj – obstoj vseh premis – ni bil izpolnjen niti v enem primeru. Toulminova oblika argumentacije pa se pojavi v 23 primerih, kar je 45,1 % vseh primerov, zato lahko trdim, da se v oddaji Tekma osnovni Toulminov model uporablja pogosteje kot klasični silogizem, kar je bila moja *hipoteza 1*.

Tabela kaže tudi na to, da Toulminov model ni najpogosteje uporabljana oblika argumentacije, temveč je to entimem, saj so ga debaterji uporabili v več kot polovici primerov (58,8 %). Še najbližje tej številki je Toulminov model argumentacije (45,1 %), medtem ko med analiziranimi primeri ni bilo niti klasičnega niti verižnega ali hipotetičnega silogizma. Tako lahko z veliko gotovostjo trdim, da so najpogostejša oblika argumen-

tacije za debaterje (vsaj v oddaji *Tekma*) entimemi, kar je bila moja *hipoteza 2*.

Primer nepopolnega verižnega silogizma, ki je v mojih podatkih zaradi svoje nepopolnosti entimem, lahko zasledimo v oddaji, ki je bila na sporedu 26. junija 2006. Če bi Petra navedla manjkajoče dele, ki so zapisani v oklepajih, bi lahko govorili o primeru verižnega silogizma:

»Če naj ti bo glasba všeč, jo moraš razumeti ...«

(Če jo želiš razumeti,) »... je potrebno poglobljeno razmišljanje ... le-te.«

Torej: »Če /.../ o njej (glasbi, op. a.) ne razmišljaš, ti glasba ne more postati všeč.«

Glede na to, da se moja definicija argumenta ujema z osnovnim Toulminovim modelom argumentacije, lahko iz *Tabele 2* razberemo tudi, da je bilo v vseh analiziranih primerih samo 23 pravih argumentov – z dejstvi, utemeljitvijo in sklepom – kar je manj kot polovica vseh primerov. Zaradi tega moja *hipoteza 3* ne velja na primeru Tekme, saj so debaterji utemeljili in podprli svoje argumente z dejstvi v samo 45,1 % vseh primerov.

Razlog lahko iščem v času trajanja govora, ki je precej krajši od tistega, katerega so vajeni – na turnirjih imajo na voljo 6 ali 5 minut, medtem ko so v oddaji lahko govorili samo 2 minuti in pol (prvi govorci, ostali celo pol minute manj). Drugi razlog, zakaj je manj kot polovica primerov pravih argumentov, pa je lahko v samih govorcih, ki ne znajo utemeljevati svojih trditev, kar bi lahko ugotovila s primerjavo istih govorcev na turnirju in v oddaji *Tekma*.

Tabela 3: Vrsta argumenta

	Argument vzroka	Argument z zgledom	Argument z analogijo	Argument avtoritete
N	13	10	7	5
%	25,5	19,6	13,7	9,8

Število argumentov avtoritete je tisto število, ki pove, koliko je utemeljenih argumentov avtoritete, in ne, koliko je argumentov avtoritete, ki samo navajajo trditve strokovnjakov ali ugotovitve različnih raziskav. Iz *Tabele 3* lahko razberemo, da je utemeljenih argumentov avtoritete 5. Primer utemeljenega argumenta avtoritete navaja Ožbej v oddaji o splavu (17. julij 2006): »Ženske ne izkoriščajo splava. To lahko povejo tudi zdravniki, saj ta

poseg ni ravno rožnat ...« Avtoriteta so zdravniki, utemeljitev pa je tisti del, ki pojasnjuje, zakaj gre verjeti zdravnikom, da ženske ne izkoriščajo splava – ker »poseg ni rožnat«.

Najpogostejša vrsta argumentov – vsaj v oddaji Tekma – pa je argument vzroka (25,5 % vseh primerov) in ne argument z zgledom (19,6 % vseh primerov), kot sem predvidevala v *hipotezi 4*. Mogoče lahko iščemo razlog za napačno domnevanju v načinu, kako so bile postavljene same debatne resolucije. Vse tri analizirane resolucije (Turbofolk poneumlja ljudi, Splav je sprejemljiv, Brezplačno presnemavanje glasbe z interneta je sprejemljivo) so take vrste, da debaterji s pomočjo posledic lahko pokažejo na prednosti svojih trditev in na slabosti nasprotnikovih. Tudi Driscoll in Zompetti trdita, da so najmočnejši logični argumenti odvisni od analize vzroka in posledice, čeprav se pogosteje uporabljajo za dokazovanje v fiziki (Driscoll in Zompetti, 2005: 34).

Če seštejemo število vseh argumentov iz *Tabele 3*, dobimo število 35, ki je večje od števila, ki sem ga dobila za število argumentov (23). To pa zato, ker je vsak (Toulminov) argument lahko vseboval več različnih vrst dejstev, ki so podpirala argument. Na primer, argument vzroka je lahko hkrati vseboval statistične podatke, kar ga je avtomatsko uvrstilo tudi k argumentom avtoritete. Tak primer je na primer Teotov drugi argument (24. julij 2006): »... leta 2003, ko so podjetja v Ameriki, ki prodajajo 85 % vseh CD-jev na njihovem trgu, povišala nezakonsko toliko cene, da so svoje uporabnike v treh letih oškodovale za kar 480 milijonov dolarjev.« Statistični podatek je »85 % vseh CD-jev«, vzrok je povišanje cen, posledica pa oškodovanje uporabnikov.

Liu trdi, da v dejanskih retoričnih situacijah ne obstajajo oblike argumentov, kot so predstavljene v teoriji, saj se morajo prilagajati specifičnim kontekstualnim ali situacijskim potrebam (Liu, 2004: 44). Zato je število Toulminovih argumentov manjše od števila, ki sem ga dobila s seštevanjem posameznih vrst argumentov, saj v resničnosti idealnotipski primeri iz teorije ne obstajajo, ampak so njihova mešanica.

Zadnja hipoteza je bila namenjena preverjanju metode sklepanja, ki jo uporabljajo debaterji. Zanimalo me je, ali se res bolj poslužujejo indukcije, kot sem predvidevala v *hipotezi 5*.

Tabela 4: Metoda sklepanja

	Indukcija	Dedukcija	Skupaj
N	35	2	37
%	68,8	3,9	72,5

Tabela 4 prikazuje števili induktivnih in deduktivnih metod sklepanj v oddaji *Tekma*. V 37 primerih sem s pomočjo 10. in 11. vprašanja lahko določila, za katero metodo gre, v ostalih primerih pa ne – ali se ni dalo razumeti sklepa ali pa ni šlo niti za sklepanje s splošnih zakonitosti na posamezne primere niti za sklepanje s posameznih primerov na splošne resnice. Vsekakor pa je opazna razlika med odstotkoma induktivnega sklepanja (68,8 %) in deduktivnega sklepanja (3,9 %) v prid indukciji, kar kaže na pravilnost mojega predvidevanja v hipotezi 5.

Naj kot primer sklepanja s splošnega na posamezno navedem argument iz oddaje o turbofolku, ki ga je navedel Miha: »Če izraziš (perverzijo, op. a.) na takšen način, kot izraža turbofolk s svojo plehkostjo, potem ne vem, na kakšen način so sploh besedila našega gosta (Zorana Predina, op. a.) plehka in hkrati tudi perverzna.« Z drugimi besedami: če se plehkost pojavlja v besedilih turbofolka (širša skupina), se ne more pojavljati v določenem primeru (Zoran Predin). Ni ravno tipičen primer deduktivnega sklepanja, saj je del sklepanja v nikalni obliki. Prav tako je deduktivno sklepanje v osnovi strogi logični ideal, česar pa v tem primeru ne moremo trditi, saj ne vsebuje absolutno resničnih premis, iz katerih bi lahko izpeljali veljaven sklep (nihče ne more dokazati plehkosti v vseh primerih turbofolka). Vseeno pa menim, da je to primer deduktivnega sklepanja, saj gre za sklepanje iz nekega splošnega pojava – plehkosti – na zanikanje obstoja tega pojava v pesmih konkretnega primera – Zorana Predina. In ker ne dosega strogih logičnih idealov formalne logike, ga kaj hitro lahko uvrstimo k primerom neformalne logike.

Tako je bila osnova vseh mojih predvidevanj teza, da v debati prevladujejo elementi neformalne logike. Prvo predvidevanje – Toulminova oblika argumentacije, ki je del neformalne logike, je pogostejša od klasičnega silogizma oz. formalne oblike logike – se je na primeru oddaje Tekma izkazalo za pravilno; prav tako tudi druga hipoteza (najpogosteje uporabljana oblika argumenta je entimem). Čeprav je entimem izpeljan iz formalne oblike argumenta, ga uvrščam k neformalnim oblikam, saj nima vseh elementov strogo formalne strukture.

Pravilnosti *hipoteze 3* nisem mogla potrditi, saj se je manj kot polovica primerov izkazala za utemeljene in z dejstvi podprte trditve. Lahko sicer rečem, da precej dijakov in dijakinj utemeljuje svoje trditve, še vedno pa premalo, da bi lahko potrdila verjetnost, da bodo debaterji utemeljevali svoje trditve. Tudi pri *hipotezi 4* sem napačno predvidevala. Čeprav so vse izmed preverjanih vrst argumentov del neformalne logike, sem večjo verjetnost pogostejšega pojavljanja pripisovala argumentom z zgledom, izkazalo pa se je, da se v analiziranih primerih oddaje Tekma pogosteje uporabljajo argumenti vzroka.

Za konec pa lahko z veliko verjetnostjo potrdim, da debaterji pogosteje uporabljajo induktivne metode sklepanja, kar je bila *hipoteza 5*. Kot večina argumentov, katerim sem ugotavljala obliko in vrsto, je tudi indukcija metoda sklepanja, ki izhaja iz neformalne logike. Prav tako lahko omenjeni primer dedukcije uvrstimo k neformalni logiki, saj ne izpolnjuje strogo logičnih idealov formalne logike. Čeprav sem iz neformalne logike izpeljala vsa moja predvidevanja, sem preverjala tudi elemente formalne logike, da lahko z večjo verjetnostjo potrdim ali zavrnem predvidevanja.

Zaključek

Na vseh področjih javnega ali zasebnega življenja se ljudje trudijo najti rešitve za probleme vsakdanjega življenja s pomočjo razprave (van Rees, 2003: 465). Debatni klubi naj bi pripravljali svoje člane na prepričljivo in argumentirano zastopanje lastnih stališč o problemih vsakdanjega življenja, kar pa je zelo težko preverljivo, saj bi bilo za kaj takega potrebno snemanje določenih situacij. Vsako snemanje pa tudi v realni situaciji največkrat popači in izumetniči obnašanje vsakega posameznika, zato sem se osredotočila na preučevanje argumentacije debaterjev v treh različnih oddajah *Tekma, debatna oddaja za mlade*, ki so posnete in shranjene na spletnih straneh RTV Slovenija.

Vsa moja predvidevanja so bila oblikovana na tezi, da je argumentacija debaterjev del neformalne logike. Ker je Toulminov model argumentacije verjetno najbolj dodelana oblika argumentacije v okviru neformalne logike, klasični silogizem pa je oblika argumenta formalne logike, sem postavila *hipotezo 1*: Debaterji se poslužujejo Toulminovega modela argumentacije pogosteje kot klasičnega silogizma. Ugotovila sem, da v primeru oddaj Tekma to delno drži, saj ni bilo niti enega klasičnega silogizma,

osnovne oblike Toulminovega argumenta (s trditvijo, podporo in utemeljitvijo) pa sem našla skoraj v polovici primerov.

Še pogostejša oblika argumentov v Tekmi je entimem, kar je bila moja *hipoteza 2*. Čas, ki je bil namenjen vsakemu debaterju v oddaji, je bil več kot dvakrat krajši od tistega, ki so ga vajeni z debatnih turnirjev, zaradi česar so argumente skrajšali, kolikor se je dalo. Poleg tega lahko argument, ki ima obliko klasičnega silogizma, izgubi svojo prepričevalno moč zaradi navajanja vsakega (nepotrebnega) vmesnega člena argumenta. Tako je lahko ena izmed rešitev omejenega časa izpuščanje nekaterih premis ali sklepa, ki ga lahko poslušalci sami izpeljejo iz povedanega.

Hipoteza 3 se je nanašala na utemeljevanje trditev debaterjev. Prepričljiv argument je namreč samo tisti, ki je utemeljen in podprt z dejstvi. Pri prepričevanju staršev, da ne greš na fakulteto, ki so ti jo izbrali oni, ampak na fakulteto po lastni izbiri, ni dovolj reči: »Jaz grem na FDV in pika! Ne grem na medicino!« S takšnim pristopom bo dijak povzročil samo veliko hude krvi, namesto da bi razložil in utemeljil, zakaj se mu zdi tako pomembno, da gre ravno na FDV in ne na medicinsko fakulteto. Na primer: »Smeri na FDV-ju me veliko bolj zanimajo kot medicina, zaradi tega bom raje obiskoval predavanja in bom tudi uspešnejši.« Iz analize oddaj sem ugotovila, da debaterji niso preveč uspešni pri takšnem utemeljevanju, saj so trditve utemeljili v manj kot polovici primerov. Razlog za neuspešno utemeljevanje je lahko spet v času, ki jim je bil odmerjen za posamezni govor in se jim določenih trditev ni zdelo potrebno utemeljiti. Argumenti, ki jih debaterji podajajo, se jim pogosto zdijo dovolj utemeljeni, saj sami razumejo povezave med premisami. Vendar pa se argumentov, ki so slabo podani, ne razume dobro, kar trdita tudi Driscoll in Zompetti (2005: 61). Po drugi strani pa je lahko tudi strah pred kamero tisti, ki jih je onemogočil pri uspešnejšem utemeljevanju.

Pri preverjanju *hipoteze 4* – najpogostejša vrsta argumenta debaterjev je argument iz primerov – sem postavila na podlagi trditev strokovnjakov. Torej, argument v podporo tej hipotezi je bil argument avtoritete, ki ni bil dobro dodatno utemeljen, kar se je izkazalo za napako, saj nisem mogla potrditi veljavnosti hipoteze v primeru Tekme. Kot najpogostejša vrsta argumenta se je v analizi pokazal argument iz vzrokov, čeprav sem našla le tri primere več, kot je bilo argumentov iz primerov. Debatne trditve so pogosto postavljene tako, da so bolj smiselni argumenti iz vzrokov, dopolnjujejo pa jih argumenti iz primerov. Tako je tudi v primeru analiziranih oddaj. Poleg tega sem s *hipotezo 4* (nenamerno) dokazala, da za dober

argument ni priporočljivo upoštevati samo mnenj strokovnjakov, temveč je potrebnih precej dodatnih podpor in utemeljitev.

Glede na to, da je ena izmed teorij, ki so osnova debati in debatnim klubom, dialektika, ta pa poudarja sklepanje iz verjetnosti, sem postavila *hipotezo 5* – debaterji pogosteje uporabljajo induktivno sklepanje kot deduktivno. To predvidevanje se je prek analiziranih primerov potrdilo v veliki meri, saj sem identificirala samo dva primera, ki sta bila deduktivna, petintrideset pa jih je bilo induktivnih.

Zaradi resničnosti osnovne teze – da se debaterji pri argumentaciji poslužujejo neformalne logike, sem pri analiziranju naletela na manjšo težavo. Debaterji pogosto niso jasno izpostavili argumentov, prav tako niso navajali vseh premis ali celo sklepov, zato sem jih morala sama prepoznati in njihov govor razdeliti na enote analize – argumente.

Druga težava, sicer povezana s prejšnjo, so bila mašila, ki so jih uporabljali debaterji. Pogosto so namreč uporabljali izraz torej, ne da bi za njim navedli sklep, kar je delno otežilo analizo, saj nisem mogla poiskati besed, ki sem jih opredelila kot indikatorje sklepa, in na njihovi podlagi skleniti, da so debaterji navedli sklep. Po drugi strani pa večkrat sploh niso navedli besed (indikatorjev) za sklepe in premise, zaradi česar sem ponovno morala sama identificirati sklep. Lahko sklenem, da mi indikatorji sklepov in premis niso bili v pomoč.

Na tretji problem pa sem naletela pri številu argumentov. Če sem seštela posamezne vrste argumentov, sem dobila večje število argumentov kot pri njihovem identificiranju s pomočjo elementov argumenta (s trditvijo, dejstvom in utemeljitvijo). Ta problem se je pojavil, ker nisem predvidevala, da lahko argument vsebuje več vrst dejstev (vzroke, primere, primerjave, statistične podatke), zaradi česar je bil v statistikah opredeljen na več mestih – kot argument iz primerov in kot argument iz vzroka.

Raziskovanje v okviru članka je bilo samo kapljica iz morja med možnostmi za raziskovanje, ki jih ponujajo debatni klubi. Žal pa mi čas in prostor nista dopuščala obširnejšega raziskovanja. Tako bi se lahko lotila še drugih sredstev prepričevanja – patosa in etosa, na primer, kako pogosto debaterji poskušajo vzbuditi čustva poslušalcev in/ali sodnikov. Ali pa, koliko znanja pokažejo v svojem argumentiranju. Že res, da sodnik ne sme ocenjevati neznanja debaterja, če nasprotnik ne opozori na to, sta pa dobra informiranost in resnicoljubnost pomembna dela vzpostavljanja debaterjevega etosa.

V najosnovnejšem smislu je sklepanje to, da narediš neko stvar smiselno. Pri tem je pomembno vedeti, kako se lotiti osmišljanja stvari, ne gle-

de na to, za kakšen primer gre – v debati, doma, prepričevanje politikov ... (Broda-Bahm et al., 2004: 217). Na podlagi dobljenih podatkov lahko zaključim, da debaterji iz analiziranih oddaj Tekma, čeprav se redno srečujejo v okviru svojih debatnih klubov, niso zadostili mojih pričakovanj o dobrem sklepanju. Morda ne vejo, kako se lotiti osmišljanja stvari, morda jim čas tega ni dopuščal, morda pa jih je onemogočala trema. Dejstvo pa je, da so v manj kot polovici t. i. argumentov utemeljili svoje trditve, zaradi česar jim ne morem priznati velike uspešnosti v argumentiranju.

Opombe

[1] V nadaljevanju članka bom zaradi večje jasnosti za vse osebe uporabljala samo moško obliko, ki je v slovenskem jeziku obravnavana kot nevtralna. Torej, če pišem o dijakih, vključujem v ta pojem hkrati tudi dijakinje.

[2] Število sodnikov v tekmovalni debati mora biti neparno, da se v primeru izenačene debate vseeno določi zmagovalca.

[3] Stvarne analogije so tiste analogije, ki temeljijo na dejanski podobnosti med dvema primeroma. Simbolične analogije pa se uporabljajo v bolj stilističnem in metaforičnem smislu (Broda-Bahm et al., 2004: 215).

[4] Za primerjavo časov iz oddaje Tekma in z debatnih turnirjev glej Tabelo 7.1.

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DEBATE AS A PRACTICE THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE DISCURSIVE APPROACH

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Introduction

Communication is the thickest social bond, of which existence represents and directs the social reality. There can be no talk about the existence of society when there is no communication since it enables us to transmit and consequentially form the meanings that establish our society/societies in a given historical moment. Although there exists a variety of theoretical approaches to the meaning of communication and its role in the shaping of social reality, some authors share a common framework regarding the definition of communication and that is that '*communication is a symbolic process through which the reality is produced, maintained, repaired and transformed*'[1].

Different approaches to the study of communication have developed through the history and went hand in hand with the social changes. The consensus over the impact of communication on the functioning of the society has been established; however, there still exists a definitional void with respect to the communication/reality divide. Through the history of communication studies there have been three prevalent approaches to this relationship: reflective, intentional and constructivist.

This paper will discuss the common points of two different theoretical approaches to the study of the role of language and representation. The discussion will focus on rhetorical and discourse theory with special emphasis on the application of these two approaches in formal debate. The primary source of this work lies in Maurice Charland's work, *Rehabilitating Rhetoric: Confronting Blindspots in Discourse and Social Theory*. The aim of this paper is not to provide a deeper theoretical reasoning in

the field of the before mentioned theoretical challenge but rather an application of these two approaches and their common points on this form of institutionalised educational discourse. At the end of this analysis I hope to offer possible interpretations of the meaning of formal debate as an educational practice in the sense of not only the training of methods of persuasion but rather as a forum in which critical argumentation can prosper. The evaluation of these two approaches is important in the sense of a perceived need for critical discourse in public discussions. In this sense it becomes important to gain a critical perspective on the object of persuasion which presents a step forward from simply gaining skills of successful persuasion. My notion is that critical argumentation which has its roots in the constructivist paradigm of language/reality relationship can provide for this. The main points of this inquiry will focus on concepts that are common to these two approaches: power, discourse, communication and culture.

Formal debate – where, when, who?

For the purpose of this analysis I would like to introduce the working definition of formal debate. This definition is needed in order to avoid dealing with format distinctions and the confusion of formal debate with its everyday use as a communication event with varying degrees of structure. Since formal debate comes in a variety of formats guiding this communication event, the definition has to come in a more general form. Definition of formal debate reads for the purpose of this paper as *communication event in which two or more teams are involved in the before established rules, that include time limitations and the structure of speech, on a given topic. The position of the teams regarding the position on the given topic is set arbitrarily.*

Formal debate as we know it today has many historical parallels, especially in ancient Greece. Socrates' dialectics bears obvious similarities. It was used to expose errors in the speech of fellow speaker in a given forum, the aim of which was to derive to a higher philosophical recognition. It was used as a method of pro et contra by which a controversial issue was discussed from two opposite standpoints and had questioning time at its core (Škerlep, 2004: 37). Discussion in the form of contrasting standpoints was a common practice of sophistic performances and their methods of education in general (Grimaldi, 1996: 19-43). Formal debate today shares

at least three characteristics with this method; two (or more teams) debate a motion from two opposing sides, they try to identify the mistakes in the speech of the opposing speaker and they use questioning time for the purpose of the direct engagement with the opposing speaker. Although the role of questioning (also known as cross examination) varies in different formats of formal debate it still provides for one of the fundamental building blocks of debate in general. The role of questioning in debate can be summarized as follows: to destroy material parts of the opponent's case, weaken material parts of the opponent's case, narrow the debate for a more direct clash, and advance one's case (Copeland, 1995: 10).

Considering the above mentioned components of formal debate a further insight is offered by Toulmin (Toulmin in Škerlep, 2002: 155), who talks of argumentation as advocacy and argumentation as inquiry. The first is used to describe the advocacy of personal opinions and interests of participants which points to the instrumental – strategic rationality of participants. By applying this notion of argumentation on formal debate we point at the competitive component of an event. Pursuing strategic interests of wining is an important element of formal debate, which we can not neglect let alone dismiss. The value of this element lies in evoking interest through the tension provided by the award system. Toulmins' other notion of argumentation, inquiry, could be applied to the second component of formal debate, which is the educational one. Invention and application of differentiating arguments on a given topic are the ones that create and provide for this component. These two traits of formal debate can not however be analyzed in isolation since they are and have always been deeply intertwined. The structure of formal debate circuit demands from participants to address both components through preparing for a certain motion/debate topic in the environment of their clubs on one hand and through attending debate tournaments on the other. Higher motivation for the preparation process derives from the desire to win the competition. Competitions provide the incentive to work harder and explore more and in this way these two components complement each other.

The third understanding of contemporary theory of argumentation derives stems from audience approach to this social practice. Perelman (Perelman, 1993: 26 – 29) distinguishes between persuasion of a particular audience and argumentation as the persuasion of a universal audience. With that we approach the notion of classical rhetoric which emphasizes the role of audience and sets the source of persuasion in audience. The

role of audience becomes important in analyzing the perception of different argumentation practices in formal debate with regard to judges. Can we really talk about *tabula rasa* notion of judges and what are the 'appropriate' arguments one can use in order to win the 'ballot'?

The ideal of rhetoric?

In the exploration of the meaning of critical rhetoric in the frame of formal debate we will follow and evaluate varying definitions of the ideal of rhetoric. In dealing with this analysis the emphasis will, above all, be on the question whether the usage of rhetorical tools in combination with critical argumentation leads to a wider social goal of rhetoric, namely the uncovering of the truth. In doing so we will rely on guidances as defined by Plato and Foucault. The combination of these two thinkers who stand as prominent representatives of two differentiating theoretical fields will help us to get closer to the praxis of critiquing. On one hand Plato is used as a classical representative of the theory of rhetoric and on the other Foucault as a representative of the constructivist paradigm and with both thinkers we find concepts related to the practice of formal debate.

In Phaedrus Plato sets four basic conditions to rhetoric: a speaker has to know the truth about the subject, the proof has to have a logical structure, a speaker has to pose moral integrity and a speaker has to know the psychological traits of their audience. While this conditions treat a speaker and audience components of a communication event and are still recognised as important today, there is another relevant component, namely that of space. Here we turn to Foucault who deals with the question of placement constrictions and the application of his notion of relevance for critical discourse. His main goal is to prove that the notion of truth seeking has to fulfil another requirement, namely that of a free environment in which the communication event takes place. His notion is that 'The work of profound transformation can only be done in an atmosphere which is free and always agitated by permanent criticism' (Foucault, 1982: 34). The hypothesis which we'll test in this part has two components: content and space. At first we will deal with the question whether critical argumentation presents a tool for achieving Plato's ideal of rhetoric through the practice of formal debate. The second part will deal with the question to what extent (if at all) the forum of formal debate presents the environment in which the power relations in the 'real world'

do not condition the power of the argument in this environment. At the end of this article I'll analyze through the prism of critical argumentation which goal is primary; the quest for truth or the possibility of a free revaluation of ideas.

An analysis will encompass the analysis and synthesis of secondary sources. In this part I'll rely on the work of post-structuralisms, new wave of theory of rhetoric and lectures of debate coaches.

Symbolical production of reality

Carey characterizes the production of reality as a 'miracle we perform daily and hourly' (Carey, 1992: 29). The production of reality presents the first step in the circle of constant changing of meanings that shape our daily reality. The main role in this process is occupied by symbols through which we 'represent reality' and which 'represent for reality', In the first instance we talk about the system of representation[2] of reality through shared symbols (language, signs, images) which form meaning that we consequentially decode in accordance with the prevailing cultural codes. In the second instance we talk about transcriptions of reality that are manifested as symbols through which the reality is pictured so that the symbols stand on the place of reality they represent (Hall, 2004: 37).

The production of reality, however, is not a process that would stand independently. Mere talk about reality is in a way an oxymoron since by talking about reality we at the same time transmit certain meanings and offer our insights about it. We talk about reality which we can neither comprise nor exceed. In spite of constant fluidity of meanings a certain concession to a 'prevailing meaning' is necessary in order to function and cooperate in the society. The same is true with debate. In order to engage in a meaningful practice, the participants need to establish certain rules guiding this communication event and they need to understand the ideas presented. As already indicated above the meanings change, have a certain measure of fluidity which presents the second step in the process of the construction of meanings, namely the renewal of meanings. This step relies on the component of time, the analysis of which shows that the prevailing meanings of social groups change through time as a consequence of constant criticism and attacks. A new practice that developed in formal debate recently is critiquing. While accepted as an established practice of argumentation in US formal debate circuit it still

has not gained momentum in Europe. The establishment of its meaning can only happen through challenging the established ideas and representations and introduction of new forms. Why?

The maintenance of certain representations and its meaning depends heavily on constant 'regeneration and resumption of its authority' (Carey, 1992: 30). But the process does not stop here. Certain representations wane and with this a certain vacuum emerges which has to be filled up with new representations, which consequentially form new meanings. The revaluation of established ideas is present everywhere. With the emergence of new social movements, distrust in the established forms of political representation, rise of apolitical youth and the ever greater fluidity of meanings the need for new forms of argumentation is established, if even only in the sphere of formal debate. With this step we close the circle of representation and the formation of meanings.

Formal debate can be applied to this circle as interpretation of reality through preset rules that are grounded in the theory of rhetoric. With this form of application we move away from looking at debate as a social practice as such and analyze the application of critiquing through this social practice. Further analysis will focus on the understanding of the circle of representation in a given 'debate round'. The forum of formal debate represents a laboratory environment for analyzing this practice of argumentation since it is established through given rules which enable all participants an equal starting ground. And it is precisely this rule security that in a way offers an ideal place for the confrontation and revaluation of ideas. In the continuation of this paper the focus will be on different types of critiques; *critique of language and its meaning, the critique of discourse and its implications and the critique of the presentation itself*[5].

On the representation of reality

The identification of the source of meaning becomes crucial in our understanding of the reality production process. Three main approaches have developed through the years and their main point of differentiation is identification of the source. These three main approaches are *the reflective, the intentional and the constructivist approach*. The reflective approach sets the source of meaning in the material object itself by which the language becomes a mere reflection of the reality, the language merely imitates the truth. The second approach grounds meaning in the

speaker who consciously creates meaning and if we follow this approach 'lays the meaning on the world' (Hall, 2004: 45). Both approaches have suffered great criticism which foremost stems from the fact that language is a social good with socially shared meanings which always have to be thought of in a wider social context (Hall, 2004: 44 – 47). The analysis of these consequences[4] becomes the argumentative battleground in which participants confront their ideas about the meanings engaged in a certain representation.

Constructivists[5] meet debaters

The foundation of this approach lays in the notion that all language is public and social – by that it denies the notion that the meaning could stem from either people or objects themselves. The representatives of this field claim that 'the meaning is not mediated by the world itself but rather in the language codes or any other system that we use for the representation of our concepts' (Hall, 2004: 46). Language and the conceptual map form two interrelated systems of representation that work together in the process of meaning construction (Hall, 2004: 38). The primary characteristic of each culture is a common language that enables the transmission of meanings between members of a certain culture and through shared meanings creates a social reality.

The arguments that stem from this contingency of language have gained ground also in formal debate. They are grounded in the analysis of a certain speech act and its use of language that connotes a certain ideological stance. The most common examples of such a language use include the language of development, the sexist use of language, 'third world language' (Morgan – Parmett, 2001).

McGee writes about ideographs[6] which he sees as ideologically defined terms in a certain 'text' that need to be analysed. As an example he discusses the term 'equality'. There is no pre-defined meaning for this word in today's society; the word is given its meaning through its use in describing a certain phenomena. The word carries meaning as long as this meaning is acceptable for certain audience. In different historical periods the term 'equality' doesn't carry the same meaning since its meaning changes with the situations through which we define 'equality' as a common denominator of a given moment. In spite of changes in the meaning this word retains a common value basis as a foundation of

situations that carries this word as a common denominator (McGee, 1999: 431). Also with the use of the term 'development' in a speech act there can't be talk about the 'harms of the speech itself' but has to be dealt with in a wider social context, where wider social meanings are attached to it and linked with praxis that defines that meaning. That leads to the identification of harmful consequences. Bare prohibition of a certain language use does not offer an answer to the implications that this kind of language causes. But the use of these terms as a foundation of argumentative analysis can be very successful since it offers a comparative review of different meanings in different situations.

The answer, however, still lies in social practices, which are the foundation of the meaning. Historical analysis of the changes in the meaning plays an important part in answering the questions related to the role of these 'ideographs' and can be linked to the presentation of the fluidity of meanings as described by Carrey. This kind of analysis paints the picture and questions the Truth. McGee agrees with the thesis that the meaning of the prevailing ideographs depends upon the prevailing ideology of a given historical moment and stresses the importance of a precise definition and description of that ideology. He also relates to the concept of ideology and defines it as 'a political language composed of slogan – like terms signifying collective commitment' (McGee, 1999: 435). Formal debate through the use of constructivist framework can be seen as a practical analysis of prevailing ideology since it questions collective responsibilities of a certain social group in a given historical moment. If we now return to the before mentioned usage of the term 'development' that is present in the majority of political discourse that deals with state relations then we can observe and criticize the social relations that abound from this. The role of critical rhetoric is therefore to revaluate the social responsibilities of different social groups, in this case, the responsibilities of the majority population that are harmed by this kind of language use and use argumentative structure to point to the linkage between the sole use of language and its consequences in the real world. The end goal is to analyse the way in which a certain use of language harms in each and every situation. It is (ab)used since it reproduces the power relations that produced its meaning today (in the case of 'development' the way it reproduces the system of inequality between states in the system of international relations).

This form of analysis bares close connection to critical discourse analysis that we turn to now.

What is there in discourse that is not right?

The definition of discourse that will be used in this part derives from M. Foucault (Foucault in Hall, 2004: 65), who expands the field of the construction of meaning from language to discourse. Discourse, as defined by Foucault, is 'a group of statements which provide a language for talking about – a way of representing the knowledge about – a particular historical moment... Discourse is about the production of knowledge through language. But... since all social practices entail meaning, and meanings shape and influence what we do – our conduct – all practices have a discursive aspect (Hall in Hall, 2004: 65). The production of knowledge is important from the standpoint of the directions of a certain society that provide commonly acceptable definitions of conduct in each situation. Discourse makes sense out of our everyday practices and guides our conduct in them. The discourse analysis focuses on which and in which way concrete rules influence the realization of ideas, carrying out of practices, the way we define reasonable ways of talking about a given subject. But above this, it also focuses on the way other discourses are excluded from this framework, the way in which certain themes, content and practices are made meaningless. Both sides, exclusion and framing, bare substantial consequences on concrete social consequences because of the influence of discourse on the formation of social functioning of social relations.

The question of knowledge is of crucial importance for Foucault and his discussion of discourse since he understands it as inseparably intertwined with power relations. Knowledge, in his opinion, has always been a consistent part of systems for the supervision of social behaviour in practice (Hall, 2004: 68). Foucault also denies Truth as absolute and provides it with an anti-pole of the regime of truth, a code through which it is shared by a certain social formation about a given social phenomena that guides mechanisms and instances that enable the differentiation between true and false statements. Foucault derives from this conceptualization of power, that is not just negative and suppressive but also productive and all-encompassing and which he gives a name of micro-physics of power that carries with it concrete consequences for the body (Foucault in Hall, 2004: 69–71). But it needs to be emphasized that there can never be talk about just one discourse, that would thread through all conceptualizations of a certain social phenomena. Instead of just one discourse there is a 'variety of discourses', that are mutually intertwined, as is exposed by Burr (Burr, 1998: 50).

The formations of identity through discourse, the sense of belonging to different groups together form the texture of individuals' identity. Out of the formation of prevailing social practices that form the system of the capitalistic economy real consequences for the individual in the society derive. Burr stresses that there can be no talk about a 'coincidental' choice about one's own role in the society, since it is created for us through the prevailing discourses, which with their prevailing practices and prescriptions form and re-affirm that reality (Burr, 1998: 54).

The construction of critical argument in this case is directly linked to the explanation of consequences that are transmitted and defined by the prevailing power relations through the formation of defining social practices. With this practice of argumentation debaters follow the idea of constructivist, who claim, that the models of representation should focus on wider social implications that derive from representations and not just with the sole text as the source of meaning (Hall, 2004: 64). Through the application on formal debate the stress is on *'not just the sole text'* by which the introduction of critical arguments offers a step back from classical methods of argumentative analysis and introduces a new field of argumentation. This group of arguments moves away from the message and attributes it with a new source of meaning. The main question with this form of analysis is what people do with their speech and/or text and what they wish to accomplish with it. This theoretical approach, that stresses the importance of discourse gives meaning foremost to the analysis in the way in which 'accounts are constructed and bring about effects for the speaker or writer' (Potter and Wetherell, Edwards and Potter, Potter and Reicher in Burr, 1998: 47). This is done through accepted forms of argumentation as defined by informal logic.

First we have to expose the 'hidden' assumptions of opponents, which in this case relates to the identified discourse and assumptions that it entails. If we turn away here from classical notion of assumption and turn to Barthes, that defines an assumption as captured in wider ideological frames through which we read off meanings. These assumptions are never explicitly proven (which is also true for the tradition of informal logic) but form a pool of meanings through which we read of the 'real meaning'. Debate is about reading off different meanings, about constructing the ideas around a given subject area and is always open to different interpretations. But not all meanings are accepted as equally valid. Critiquing does not just provide for another

arrangement of ideas, but offers an interpretation of how these interpretations came into being.

Representation works according to Barthes through two different, but in way related concepts; first is the connection between the signifier and the signified, through which the signs are related and form a simple denotative meaning. In this case we would talk about the structural analysis of argument that addresses only the structure of the argument and exposes the logical fallacies. But Barthes does not stop here and connects this denotative level with the second level in which this sign is attached with the second line of signifiers, namely the wider ideological idea. This second level is identified by Barthes as a myth (Barthes in Hall, 2004: 90). The process of critiquing identifies the 'ideographs' and exposes its hidden meaning. Schuster (Schuster 2003) stresses the importance of the identification of assumptions, rather than words. It is the assumption behind the word that is bad, not the word itself. As an example she talks about the discourse of development assistance. Of a crucial importance is the identification of practices and ways of thinking since they rely on 'wrong' perceptions about international relations (myth of the fair distribution), the perception of the ideal of development, not naming certain practices although the discourse implicates them but never explicitly talks about them. This leads to the second point of this form of analysis, namely the connection of the identified assumption with its harmful consequences. This step is primarily based on content analysis. It is important foremost in the sense of confronting two ideas that rarely meet in real life since they diametrically oppose each other and are discussed from different positions of power. In the forum of formal debate the component of power relations looses its strength since the strength of the protagonist of the idea does not lay in their social power. Power is replaced with the force of reason, which is grounded in the argumentative usage of knowledge that is not bound with any other relations.

The third step of the critical argument construction deals with the implications of argument. With this, the strategies of how to construct it can go into different directions. Snider lists three most important ones: the opponents have never properly identified the problem, the opponents will never solve the problem because of their assumptions about it or from working out of these assumptions, and bad consequences will follow (Snider, 2006). With this step the goal of critical rhetoric is addressed, that is according to McKerrow, to give an opportunity to include one's own

insights into the practical interpretation of social consequences (McKerrow, 1999: 442). Schuster and Meany analyze the language of 'Third World' and the hidden assumption of hierarchy of civilizations and the practical consequence of creating relations of inferiority and superiority (Schuster and Meany, 2002: 188). The strength of an argument in this situation can be detached from the strength that the umbrella discourse in real life possesses and can be revaluated on the basis of the confrontation in this given situation. Because of the preset rules in this communication event and because of the argumentative tools that are used to prove a given standpoint, there can also be no talk about the prevalence of *pathos* in the persuasion process. With this notion we approach Foucault's notion of the 'ideal, critical space'.

Through argument structure, that reveals the assumptions entailed in the argument and which are indirectly linked to the power relations, and the introduction of practical implications we also follow McKerrow. He claims that it is not enough to just identify the 'wrong discourses', but also to structure arguments in a way which identifies the integration of power and knowledge in a certain discursive practice. Only through this can the role of the power/knowledge relation as constitutive of social practices be identified (McKerrow, 1999: 451).

In round critical argument structure

We have revised the structure of the critical argument referring to the use of language and discourse. The in-round use of these arguments looses some of the above mentioned complexities and is adapted to avoid some of the theoretical pit falls. Let's revise the structure of these arguments and make them work for the praxis, one which can be used and consequentially achieve all the theoretical assumptions of using these arguments. In order to do so some basic assumptions of critical argument must be proven and here is where the paper turns back to debate theory (Meany and Schuster, 2002: 192).

• The proposition team makes assumption x (involves identification of the proposal of the affirmative team)
• Assumption x is bankrupt (or dangerous, or patently silly, or shamefully weak...) for the following reasons...
• Because we successfully criticize the identified assumption x we win the debate because...

- They fundamentally misunderstand the problem
- The misidentification of the harm undercuts any appeal to solvency
- Their proposal is part of the problem, rather than part of the solution
- Their problem will at least be unable to ameliorate the problem, at worst their proposal will make things worse. (Schuster and Meany, 2003: 192–193)

Some questions at the end: analysis of debate as a social practice

The analytical benefit of the theory of rhetoric derives from the tools it offers for the exposure and analysis of 'the structure of reason' in discourses that shape the reality of our day. The interpretive analysis is also important in the theory of discourse, since it enables the analysis of the structure of organization and the selection of the presented meanings (Charland). While the contribution of this tool for the analysis of presentation 'in a debate round' has been presented above, this section deals with the possibilities these tools offer for the analysis 'from the outside'; for the analysis of debate as an independent presentation, as an individual social practice.

If debate is to have an emancipatory potential, it has to fulfil certain standards, not just in the sense of content, but also in the sense of its own structure. McKerrow in his analysis of critical rhetoric talks about this structure and stresses the danger of the lack of communication power, which consequentially leads to the prevalence of the 'rhetoric of elites'. His thesis is, that the symbolic power of communication as a praxis has to be re-appropriated by the 'marginalized' if they want to gain power. But under the conditions in which the ruling elite control spaces of communication this can not happen. So in order to regain the symbolical power the rhetoric of ruling elite has to be replaced with heterodoxical rhetoric of these groups (McKerrow, 1999: 456). Is debate a place that contributes to this goal?

The achievement of this goal heavily depends upon the ability to freely develop discourses that bear the potential for transformation in an open environment, where the power of discourse does not depend on its real power in the world out there. While the world will not change because of one debate round, this social practice still bears substantial consequences for the people involved. Two questions are important in this regard. Does formal debate empower the already prevailing lines

of discourse and help them to regenerate in the environment of formal debate? And does it equip the already privileged individuals in our society with even more social skills? And if this is all true, where is the place of formal debate in the sense of its role as a social practice?

The aim of this section is not to offer any final answers to the questions posed above, but to look into critical theory in order to find questions that could help answer these questions. The questions can be found in Charland, who revaluates the theory of rhetoric from the standpoint of critical theory and asks questions to the communication event from the outside. He poses questions to the theory of rhetoric in the sense of agent, content, occasion and audience. When analysing debate as a social practice through the prism of critical theory, the questions Charland poses are as follows; *Why a certain speaker?* (Is there a gender bias? Is there a prevalence of any social group? Who is excluded?) *Why this occasion? Why a certain topic?* (Are the topics really set arbitrarily? Are there any topics that are excluded?) *Whose interests are represented? Which audiences are excluded? (In what way? Are there separated competitions?)* and *Is discourse adapted to the/because of audience?* (Charland, 1999: 472). While these questions have already been addressed to a certain extent (notably at the Istanbul Conference), they offer a good starting point for the analysis of debate as a social practice in the light of critical theory.

Although debate has only a limited reach (debate clubs) it is still necessary to evaluate and study the trends that determine it in a given moment. Charland with his synthesis of critical theory and the theory of rhetoric offers an important insight into this field. Instead of evaluating debate solely in the sense of attributing it with certain potentials, these potentials need to be revaluated in the sense of achieving their goals which help to identify it as a social practice, which is not solely the purpose in itself, but also for the society in a wider sense.

Conclusion

The power of a given theory depends upon its articulation, places of articulation in the power of its presentation. It is my opinion, that post-structuralism presents an important contribution to our understanding of society, social relations and the relations of power that form our understanding. But the power of articulation still heavily depends upon

the material relations of power. While it has gained momentum in academic sphere where it holds a status of recognized theoretical approach, its practical application still remains practically unrecognized. The majority of social practices still depend on the positivistic analysis of social relations, which has concrete social and material consequences. The usage of critical theory for the purpose of contributing to its academic reach seems reasonable in many ways. The practical application of critical argumentation (although in a limited reach) offers alternative answers of the taken for granted truths, that are otherwise used in education and offer alternative world views. On the other side, this kind of argumentation offers for critical theory a practical way of thinking about the application and its usage in the communication events which are still today closed for this way of argumentation.

While debate is primarily dedicated to the exploration of the rhetorical tools of analysis of the wider social themes, I believe that it is necessary to move away from the sole focus on audience. This is important in order to offer public revaluation of norms and to consequentially ascribe debate with emancipator potential. Because of the incorporation of debate into social practices also the meaning, values and ideas of post-structural theory gain importance in analyzing and understanding of social relations. Here I would like to turn once again to Burr, who exposes the importance of the inter-relation of discourse from its real, material events; discourses emerge in things that people say or write, and the meaning of things depends on its usages in the discursive framework in which they appear. This constant dynamics of interpretation that takes place within a given historical moment then becomes a source of changes and negotiation about meanings that are created through these discourses. Only constant negotiation leads to changes, that (though not always) result in social progress. The framework of formal debate offers 'laboratory environment' for the negotiation about meanings that are a part of the reality outside of this communication event. The use of tools of argumentation and the theory of rhetoric offer important foundation for the realization and negotiation about the prevailing opinions since they structure the communication event according to certain rules, that make content more understandable.

In my opinion formal debate should stand for more than just another school of speaking and offer alternative channels of gaining knowledge and the use of critical argumentation in the sense of combining the two

theoretical approaches mentioned above. The reluctance to new forms of argumentation is understandable, but should not hinder the development of debate through these channels as well. The structure of formal debate activity offers the possibilities of idea revaluation that we too many times lack in the real world even if it does so in a limited range for a limited amount of people. Therefore it is even of a greater importance not to close the channels to new ideas and approaches and not to just repeat the prevailing ideas.

Notes

[1] The author in this section refers to: Weber, Durkheim, de Tocqueville, Huizinga, Burke, Duncan, Portman, Kuhn, Berger, Geertz and the Chicago School (Carey, 1992: 23)

[2] 'That is because it consists, not of individual concepts, but of different ways of organizing, clustering, arranging and classifying concepts, and of establishing complex relations between them' (Hall, 2004: 37)

[3] Sometimes the boundaries between the different types of critique are vague. The critiquing of language bears similarities with the critique of discourse, since the discourse is marked with certain words and is intertwined with the critique of thinking and values, since words and discourses rely on a certain value and thought set.

[4] 'Our private, intended meanings, however personal to us, have to enter into the rules, codes and conventions of language to be shared and understood' (Hall, 2004: 45). If we follow the intentional approach then we could never find meaning of the concept of love in its material form, and consequentially never derive to a common understanding which we could all (or at least the majority) agree upon.

[5] Here we follow the thought of Foucault and his discursive approach to language.

[6] An ideograph is an ordinary-language term found in political discourse. It is a high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal' (McGee, 1999: 435). A similar notion is found in Mouffe and Laclaus 'empty signifiers'.

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VALUING VALUE DEBATE

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Introduction

It may be something of a truism that there can be no neutral stance on values. However, this does not necessarily mean that a reasoned debate cannot, or should not, take place. Moreeover, while morality is a fundamental aspect of human relations, and there is a considerable body of literature related to it, it is not morality with which we will be concerned in this paper. Rather, we will be looking at the interaction between morals, ethics, and values. Specifically, what is of greatest interest here is a discussion of those approaches to conflicting values which will sustain an open and deliberative democratic society. We will take a look at competing values domestically and cross culturally, examine some of the basic concepts of value, introduce a case study, review models for value debate, and make suggestions that go beyond those constructs.

Competing Values

It should not be supposed that there is consensus about the kind of society we should have and how it is to be organised. Although it is often assumed, especially since the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, that Western style democracy (by which is usually meant an American free market economy) is the best form of political organisation for the state, this may not necessarily be so. The modern state is a relatively recent phenomenon and the political organisation of the community can take many different forms. The Western liberal begins with the assumption that a market-based democracy is the pinnacle of political organisation. What this perspective seems to be advocating is aspiration to the kind of

comfortable middle class life that some Americans are able to enjoy. Such lives, characterized by the upholding of liberal values, are what many people aspire to and it is liberal values, they claim, which have enabled America to prosper. However, there is simply no Archimedean point from which to evaluate the diversity of values which inform the various conceptions of state and society. There is great dispute as to how to further those values, and often what the end state of those values might even look like.

In the case of social welfare, those who are needy, or even »truly needy«, is a matter of dispute. To what extent the state has a responsibility to its members is a question of values. Even deciding what is in and out of bounds for behaviour within the boundaries of acceptable norms are in conflict. The nature of criminality and illegality can vary from person to person, and even if the offence is agreed upon, the punishment meted out may not be. Despite a framework of laws and rules, there is still significant difference relating to what is good or bad. Thus, a mechanism for evaluating competing views is critical to any proper judgment.

Competing Cross-Cultural Values

As discussed above, even within a society there is a great deal of value difference amongst those that would on the surface seem connected and homogenous. One can imagine the differences that might exist across cultures. The emerging conflict between Western, particularly American, and Islamic values is a case in point. Although American leaders insist that the conflict now raging across much of the Middle East should not be understood as a war against Islam (Rice, 2006), the jarring contrasts throughout the region point quite clearly toward the underlying tensions which pit distinctly Islamic traditions, with roots deeply embedded in ancient Muslim values, against the unmistakable symbols of a modern American lifestyle, and their underlying values.

For many, Islam encompasses an entire complex of not only religious but also social views, whereas America, particularly in its exported form, is seen as godless mass consumerism. For others, America is equated with democratic freedoms and the land of individual opportunity, while Islam represents a throw-back to a less enlightened time of unnecessarily rigid social mores and the anti-democratic rule of a particular religious code. To be sure, this clash of values existed long before the events of Sept. 11,

2001, but was brought sharply into focus by that fateful event and the reaction which followed. The battle is symbolized by an immeasurable chasm that lies between the traditional masses of a rundown slum or pastoral countryside and the smaller but rapidly growing upscale neighborhoods of the business district. Throughout the Middle East you will find countless places where goats graze in empty lots and thoroughly veiled women hurry by with enormous water jugs balanced on their heads (Chahuan, 2005). Such a scene could just as easily be set in a rural peasant village of ancient times as a side street less than a mile from a modern U.S. Embassy in the heart of a congested urban center. In many places, strict limits still govern the lives and behavior of women. Here, relations between the sexes are as they were hundreds of years ago. For instance, it is strictly forbidden for a male to meet a female away from her family or for a woman to uncover her face in public (Chahuan, 2005). Yet, while these traditional Muslim values are still widely practiced, American cultural values are making vast in-roads, especially amongst the affluent that have easy access to American products, media and food.

So thoroughly has the American lifestyle been implanted in some places in the Middle East, that it has begun to displace traditional forms of entertainment, dress, food, and even values. It would be hard to find a place more American in spirit than the sprawling, air conditioned shopping malls popping up in the wealthy districts of Middle Eastern cities, bringing with them American consumerism. McDonald's is present throughout the region, along with KFC, Starbucks, and Coke; video game arcades sit next to shops displaying the latest in Western fashion; and the local theater features American films, often in English (Chahuan, 2005).

For both domestic reasons and growing global interactions, the ability to purposefully participate in public discourse is more meaningful than ever. There is a growing awareness that this discourse should be occurring at the level of values, and that it should be carried out in both an intellectual and respectful manner. The training that academic debate offers can help to achieve that end. What follows is a more focused discussion of how that debate may occur.

Value Basics

To have a debate about values, it is important to make clear exactly what is meant by the term value, and also some of the properties the concept may possess. In common language value is used extensively and in a variety of contexts, none of which could make an exclusive claim for usage. There are also several ideas closely related to value that lead to confusion, and the ability of some of those ideas to conceptually overlap each other in meaningful ways complicates discussion and debate on those matters.

To begin with, it is important to sort out what is meant by value. In acceptable uses it seems to have three purposes: a verb function wherein we could be valuing something, an adjective function which can cast things as valuable, and a noun function that represents something that is valuable (Zimmerman, 2001). It is usually the noun that is of importance in value debate.

There is also the aspect of the relationship between values, beliefs, and attitudes. While a value may be a belief, in general values are considered the core of meaning and understandings. As defined:

> A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state existence. A value system is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end states of existence along a continuum of relative importance (Rokeach, 1973: 5).

Rokeach identifies the nature of values in that they are enduring, they are beliefs, are referent to a mode of conduct or existence, indicate a preference, and can be personally or socially preferable. Values also help to establish standards, can be guidance in conflict resolution or decision making processes, and can be motivational. These are broad but deep orderings of the way things are. Attitudes are an organization of beliefs around a specific object or situation (Rokeach, 1973: 18).

Value is the most important or most base indication of preference that a person has about the way life should be. This can lead to a very difficult situation when there is a disagreement or a debate about values. If values are in conflict, they are the least likely elements of the human ordering of reality to be changed. It turns out that often it is not about which value should be endorsed or rejected, but which is the best to prioritize. There may be a need to rank them if the values are not in direct opposition to

each other (Werkmeister, 1967). Often there is a compromise of values, wherein a person may accept elements in contradiction with their values to achieve others of greater importance (Stocker, 1990).

How that may happen is based on differences in values related to the importance as an end-state, or as an instrument to some other good. Generally persons tend to think that end-state values are of more importance than those that are instrumental, yet, context may alter that preference. Values may also be ordered based on higher or lower needs. Maslow's hierarchy illustrates how individuals frequently make choices between higher and lower level of needs based on context and personal preference.

Complications arise with the assertion of intrinsic values that are considered a priori. Such a situation leaves the only debatable option as how to maximize or achieve the value (Zimmerman, 2001). This has clear implication for debating values as the person that advances that *a priori* value has a huge advantage if in general it is accepted that it is in fact an a priori value to many others as well. It means that counter values are meaningless to introduce, as they can never overcome the hierarchy of value that is already present. It does mean however, that an opponent could accept the value as a priori as well, but insist on the ability to argue a counter method for best achieving the value as the only criteria now becomes maximizing the value.

Other complications for value debate arise from the way it is framed in academic debate as part of a trichotomy of possible inquiries: fact, value, and policy. Most debate texts offer up an orthodoxy of resolution types based on the types of questions that the resolution poses. One of the first concerns that arise from this conceptualization is the acceptance of the fact/value dichotomy. This can be questioned in many ways, the first of which is the implicit acceptance of positivism in that there really can be known facts, and that elements of non-fact based statements are irrelevant to truth and understanding. The fact/value dichotomy also fails to understand that both are just personalized stances about the world (Werkmeister, 1967). Finally, debate is about social truths, or matters of the contingent. As such, humans and their preferences are involved which leaves out the possibility of empiricism being given the higher status over consensus based or other social constructions of truth which are acted on with as much validity as any evidence produced from a lab.

Additional support for the problematic nature of value debate being an independent or unique form of inquiry is the direct association that

philosophers have with value and action. Value always has an inherent action connection. Value can even be a mode of conduct in and of itself (Rokeach, 1973). Often values make no sense unless we know what the person who espouses them will actually do in support of them. The political candidate that runs on »family values« could support legislation that penalizes working women in an attempt to enforce traditional gender roles on women, or support the legality of gays being able to adopt to show support for intentional and non-biologically connected families. A value is an empty promise unless one is willing to say what they would do in behavior to demonstrate their support of that value.

While a focus on values is an educational experience, and one that helps to prepare individuals for interactions in life with others, there is some question in treating it in an isolated form. When one takes action they are inherently demonstrating what they value, as well as what things they believe in the way that they describe the need for the action and how they believe their action will work.

We will now introduce an example to help illustrate some of the dynamics just discussed.

Stem Cell Case Study

Background

The issue of research on embryonic stem cells provides an example of public discourse related to government policy choices. It is an issue wherein the essence of the debate is moral and ethical (Brouillet and Turner, 2005). The value issues relating to stem cell research involve some of the most deeply held beliefs about the nature of life. There is great similarity to another hot-button issue in abortion. Stem cell research is so complex as to involve varying lines of moral expectation and allowable practice. Much of the controversy relates to the clash of faith- based positions with scientific based positions on the issue regarding potential benefits of stem cell research. It is the relative newness of some of the medical technologies and procedures, along with the rapidity of new possibilities that has created a situation where available technologies outstrip essentially a pre-industrial matrix of values and ethics regarding the status of »personhood«, »life«, and other aspects of social construction related to gender and family.

When the first »test tube« baby was born a new era regarding understanding of life and the status of the embryo was begun as well. While the abortion debate had dealt with termination of »life«, in vitro fertilization (IVF), and later stem cell research, it offered positive outcomes for life as their result. Along with each new development of the research, and accompanying public outcry or support, it has become clear that »[s]cience alone cannot answer the types of questions that science sits before us« (Cohen, 2004: 23).

There are distinct constituencies in the debate over stem cells, however, the issue is not one of »interest politics« (Banchoff, 2005: 201). There are two clear poles involved in the debate, and a »spectrum of views« that exists in between with some persons choosing to move away from the poles (Brouillet and Turner, 2005). At one pole exists the Pro-life camp claiming a deontological basis for the protection of life. At the other exists the scientific/utilitarian camp forwarding a vision of benefits to the living. It is this promise of benefit that allows for the issue to even have enough support to be a clash of values. The promise of benefit opens the possibility to accept that if life is important, then quality of that life matters as well. The concreteness of benefit to the living versus an uncertain moral status of an embryo could lead to greater support for research than aversion to it.

Details of the Controversy

Stem cells are a specific type of cell that allows for great plasticity in manipulation. The distinction of where the cells are »harvested« is the root of the controversy (Brouillet and Turner, 2005). The key distinction is whether the stem cells are coming from adults or from embryos. If adult stem cells were as valuable and as promising for research as embryonic stem cells, there would be no controversy. Adults could choose to donate the cells completely eliminating the issue of the status of life. But it is precisely because adult stem cells are not as promising as embryonic stem cells that those in the medical community argue for the ability to utilize the embryonic.

Those benefits are a broad range of treatments for a broad range of ailments. There is potential for regenerative medicine and the ability to understand and treat birth defects (Brouillet and Turner, 2005), as well as individualized cures to diseases (Dolgin, 2004). However, the litany of benefits was sometimes prone to exaggeration when utilized as public

reasoning. Unrealistic time frames also complicate the debate when discussing promising therapeutic benefit. However, it is important to note that such exaggerations also exist about the benefits of adult stem cells when those critical of embryonic research attempt to argue that adult stem cells alone are sufficient (Dresser, 2005).

Issues of Policy

The object of public discourse is often related to getting changes in policy. As is in this case, issues of regulating or controlling science are framed morally, but are made concrete by the way in which the state embraces the value. In the case of stem cells the conflict leads to a condition where policy is made in an adversarial atmosphere (Brouillet and Turner, 2005). Such policy also serves as a means to control the trajectory of the issue. Differing actors, interests and framings of the issue in all areas of government can change the starting point or other key issues of the debate by the actions they take. This adversarial approach and the dynamic of control leads to a limited ability to make sweeping change and results in incrementalism (Banchoff, 2005).

Morality: The Role of the Embryo

The characterization of the opposition of stem cell research as »Pro-life« leads to oversimplifying some complex issues related to what life is and why it is defined that way. A clear analog to the stem cell debate is the abortion debate. In the case of abortion »life« is being directly protected from harm. In the case of stem cells it is »embryos« that are being put at the center of the »life« debate. These embryos are usually collected for utilization in IVF treatments for reproduction. It is possible that some Pro-life supporters also supported the development of IVF treatments to assist in reproduction of »life«.

One interpretation of the Pro-life movement's use of the embryo as centerpiece stems from the concept that arguments over reproduction are contextualized to the era in which they are pursued. Stem cell research is conducted on embryos that were collected for reproduction but are either no longer viable, or are not utilized based on the treatment outcomes of the biological donors/recipients. The role of woman as source of reproduction is less direct in the case of stem cell research. The function of stem cell utilization is for the benefit of persons who are suffering

now. It is not an issue of women being tied to reproduction (and the consequent social roles and norms involved). The embryo is completely separated from the familial or biological context in which it was collected. Individuals not related to the embryo are now interested in the »person« status of the embryo. Pro-life agendas that were once about the sanctity and form of families had to adapt and base their arguments on the value of the embryo itself rather than simply using the embryo as a mechanism to ensure that reproduction was controlled in a certain way and means (Dolgin, 2004). Quite literally, old conservative white men in the government took up the cause of stem cells on the basis of therapeutic promise because of overly compelling moral reasons, yet were still politically committed to Pro-life agendas. By expanding who is implicated in its potential moral impact, stem cell research has created a greater constituency that now includes men that also face having a negative outcome by imposing control versus a situation in abortion where men are not impacted negatively by strict control, only women.

With the appeals to social order, protection of the family, and other reasons taken away as to why the embryo should be protected, the Pro-life movement has to focus on the life of the embryo. Without that claim to the issue, they would have no appeals left at all (Dolgin, 2004).

Status of the Controversy

In the U.S. some might describe the status of the issue as in »impasse« due to the failure of those participating in public discourse to be deliberative or open to argument (Brouillet and Turner, 2005: 49). Others take the position that the complexity of the debate is showing that many more issues are being brought up and in fact could be a sign that »society [is] ready for change but ambivalent about the implications of the process« (Dolgin, 2004: 258).

There is still a great deal of misunderstanding about the issue, as shown in the prevalence of issues that are conflated and misrepresented (Dolgin, 2004). On the political front U.S. policy makers took action that displayed a typically incremental approach.

In July of 2006 President Bush vetoed legislation that would have liberalized federal funding for research on embryonic stem cells. By vetoing Bush kept the policy in place where it is not illegal to work with embryonic stem cells, it just could not receive federal funding. Existing lines of stem cells that were already in use could be maintained. In announcing the

veto, President Bush had children present who were born from »adopted« embryos (those remaining in storage after a procedure that a differing biological recipient utilizes), as well as patients that are recipients of treatments resulting from research on adult stem cells. Bush indicated that these persons show that effective medical science can still be »ethical« (Bush, 2006).

Implications for Debate

The issue of stem cell research will stay an ongoing debate in the future given the incrementalism of policy and polarity of the sides involved. The depth of one's feelings is understood given the clash of strong personal faith versus a form of secular humanism and science. Such strong feelings have led to a level of public discourse that has failed to »meet the model« on how to deal with such issues (Brouillet and Turner, 2005). Clearly there has been a lack of meaningful reflexivity by the interlocutors of both viewpoints. One possibility for reframing the issue is coming to understand the concept of the »fractionalized embryo.« In many ways the reality of embryos for reproduction is accepted by both poles, and it may come down to identifying that there is a difference in embryos that have been artificially constructed, and those sexually produced. But in what other ways can discourse move forward in constructive ways?

If in this case the ongoing evolution of the status of the embryo remains a major roadblock to significant movement, then issue could be moved to focus on different issues that may help guide understanding on what is the right thing to do specific to the medical implications. What is owed those that are suffering? How should we consider issues of distributive justice? Who will have access to the care (issues of cost), and for whom will it be made available (which medical circumstances) (Dresser, 2005)? Answering these issues may make the need to consider the embryo less central. If clarified, those answers may also provide for better reasons to challenge the embryo's status should that part of the debate still need to be settled.

Given the polarity of the issue, as public discourse moves toward the middle, many will feel that their positions have been pushed to the edges (Brouillet and Turner, 2005). For some, the potential to have the embryo scientifically removed from the realm of »life« threatens their entire movement. Others will wonder why their loved ones will die because treatment options have been artificially limited. In these cases,

creating space for discourse that shows respect to others, allows for advancing the conversation, promotes openness, and that seeks common ground will be vital.

Discussion of Case Study

Stem cells perhaps have taken on a greater social meaning than the technology may actually promise. But it does illustrate that when absolutist positions are taken that almost any aspect of an issue becomes a potential incendiary conflict.

The idea of taking the focus off the source of the stem cells and asking better questions about treatment is a means of avoiding the main issue of impasse regarding the »life« of the embryo. If it is determined that such technologies are in fact decades away, or that they will not be affordable to most, then the status of the embryo may be given more consideration by those that don't see immediate benefit. Conversely, if the answers regarding the technology indicate that many could benefit over a range of diseases, and that such treatments would be accessible, then perhaps the status of the embryo may be evaluated with less weight.

In seeking common ground on the issue it would seem both sides would have an interest in the better management of embryos collected for reproductive therapies. The Pro-life side may acknowledge that not all can be adopted, and Pro-research side may accept limits on numbers to help prevent any extras from having to be destroyed.

There may be new conceptual meaning emerging as well with the fractionated embryo. One produced in the lab and one produced through sexual process could be understood as having differences because of the ability to easily distinguish between them. Of course, the bright line for some Pro-life advocates is still crossed with the lab constructed embryos.

The debate over social values, particularly in relation to the many questions revolving around life politics, has, in recent times, been used by politicians as a means of capturing public sentiment and justifying policies which support particular ideological commitments. Numerous politicians have asserted that conservative social values provide a much better standard upon which to base policy than do liberal social values, and vice versa. Each side accuses the other of undermining the well-being of society for political gain. Conservative interests, however, have arguably

been more successful at least with regard to framing the debate in their favor (Rohlinger, 2002). They have appropriated that vocabulary which could be seen as protecting the »weak«, the »defenseless«, and as »promoting life«. They have been rather effective in lambasting those that did not conform to their particular conception of morality, in effect, defining them as immoral. In taking control of the discourse, the conservatives moved the debate about life away from a serious consideration of health, autonomy and the role of medical advancement in society to a debate about how their particular vision of a »good« society could best be implemented.

Current Value Debate Models

In surveying common debate and argumentation texts, the most recurring model for dealing with issues of value debate is to utilize »stock issues«. While there is not universal agreement on what those elements are, the general lists tend to be somewhat similar.

A	B	C	D
• What are the criteria • What is the most important criteria • Does the proposal meet the criteria • Does the evidence support the criteria (Rieke and Sillars, 1993)	• Key Terms • Criteria • Do the facts meet the definitions • Applications made to the value (Rieke and Sillars, 1993)	• Frame of Jurisdiction • Frame of Definition • Frame of Fact • Frame of Quality (Ziegelmueller et al, 1990)	• What does the proposition mean • What value should be used to evaluate • Which standards will tell us if value met • How do standards apply to subject (Verlinden, 2005)

Each of these models tends to promote a style of debate where the answering of questions is the response form for the opposing team. While some texts include the possibility of offering »value objections« as part of the attack, ultimately that strategy is a form of value comparison. Also, these models make definition one of the key components of examination, which may be one of the more difficult types of argument to engage in terms of evidence support being available. There is also some indication that an action or proposal is to be evaluated in determining the basic issues of value. As such, the value/policy split seems to not be

present as a defining characteristic of »value« debate to some theorists. Some even assume that there will be a policy component (Freeley and Steinberg, 2000).

Ultimately, Meany and Shuster's assessment of the potential for vagueness is well heeded. Many debaters are not confident debating values because of the ambiguous nature of the type of debate that tends to emerge, and also the aspect of some values not realistically being debatable, or inviting the intervention of the evaluator. It is possible to suggest that these types of concerns could be applied to almost any style of debate, but it is perhaps the intractable nature of values that causes the most consternation. It is also the limitation of being able to make arguments of definition or mitigation of a case rather than having strong »offensive« rationales for rejecting the proposition. The next section makes some suggestion to address these concerns and add some concreteness to value debate.

Suggested Model

In value debates one must establish criteria for comparing and measuring values. Such criteria consist of standards of evaluation by which to establish a hierarchy of competing values. Together they encompass a decision-making calculus, which serves as a weighing mechanism, or method of judgment, between two or more value sets. The criteria act as a filter through which, it is argued, competing values should be viewed. In so doing, the debaters establish a framework which helps to define both the value(s) in question and to divide the ground between the competing sides of the issue at hand.

The criteria should be contextual to the resolution. Rather than applying a value framework to the resolution, the framework is more appropriately found in the resolution through words and phrases such as: justified, more important than, good, better, etc. These are evaluative terms which call for the comparing and contrasting of conflicting value positions, and they act as the scaffolding upon which to frame the context of the debate.

Once criteria have been established, opposing debaters can choose to either accept the proposed standards for evaluating the debate and advance arguments that fit within that framework, or, if there appear to be flaws in the criteria initially advanced, they can propose their own set of

criteria for consideration as an alternative framework for the debate. Thus, an opposing team is not simply stuck with the proponent's methodology, which may be either flawed or unfairly one-sided, but can advance their evaluative interpretations as well.

While the stock issues are certainly a valid basis of arguments both for and against various issues in a value context, we would suggest that other forms may be helpful as well. In essence, these arguments pre-exist. And, in some cases, the actual form of the argument may be used as a rationale for why a person philosophically may prefer »value« debate to »policy« debate (A critic who may have a bias such as »I don't like counter-plans!«). What is being argued is an understanding that value debate does not automatically reduce the range or types of responses that can be offered. In fact, many value theorists would support a consideration of policy implications in conjunction with, or even required by, looking at values.

A good first example is a proposition team endorsing an a priori value that is a terminal value which most people tend to accept and prefer. For instance, a proponent may frame a debate by arguing that equality is preferable to racism, and the vast majority of debaters, and critics, would agree. In such a circumstance the only possible debate is about how to maximize or achieve that value (Zimmerman, 2001). This choice would seem the only one available given the value chosen to be endorsed. Further, such a framework would appear to necessarily create a requirement for a comparison of how one might best achieve the shared value. As with traditional stock issues debates, the burden would be on the proposition to demonstrate how they would achieve the stated value, and the opposition could offer alternatives as well as indicate a lack of the proposition model to attain the value.

If two values are of relatively equal hierarchy, and not opposites, the need to weigh the differences would require some comparison of costs to favor one value over another. This model of costs versus benefits is often rejected as inappropriate for value debate, but that rejection is typically based on a misunderstanding of the concept of »costs.« It is obvious that costs are not simply monetary calculations, but often of other resources, and even credibility. It would also then be possible to consider the costs of our values if we were clear in our application of the cost benefit model. If the opposition can offer »value objections« that speak of the costs to other values, the wellbeing of persons, and matters of credibility, then they are not limited to a debate of only definition, which the team that initiates the debate would always have the advantage on.

Finally, the ability to compare values is often difficult due to a variety of factors already addressed. It is the function of values to seek the roots of preference and core of the good being promoted. Such a pursuit is clearly critical in nature. As Meany and Shuster discuss in relationship to the critiquing of values, the frameworks for criticism are far more fulfilled in development and ability to guide preference decision making than simple criteria that call for the comparison or ordering of values. The rationales for rejection and implications for endorsement are far more contextualized for most criticisms than exist to consider response to comparison of abstract values.

These suggestions are not intended to undermine value debate, but rather to offer a means of making it a clearly addressable discourse. By looking at values in a vacuum we are limited to simply discussing preferences, and possibly the order of those preferences. By looking at the action implied by the value, we have a much better understanding of what it is and who really benefits by acting to maximize that value. Our social behavior through government policy, or even through non-governmental actors in the public and commercial sectors, is arguably the most authentic way to show our value preference. Being able to test what a value means in terms of the way it structures interaction between persons is critical in being able to determine its real worth.

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METACOGNITION AND CRITICAL THINKING: HOW TEACHERS CAN ENHANCE METACOGNITION AND CRITICAL THINKING IN THEIR STUDENTS

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What is metacognition?

The concept of metacognition is one of the most important achievements in the contemporary studies of thinking. In the broadest sense it refers to thinking about our own thinking and/or knowledge about thinking.

The distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge has its parallel also on the field of metacognition. Metacognitive knowledge can be content in its nature and refers to knowledge about thinking (knowing-what) or it can be a process in its nature and refers to ability to self-control or self-monitor our own thinking (process, strategies, knowing-how-and-when to use knowledge; ability to use knowledge about thinking) (Kuhn, 2000; Roberts and Erdos, 1993).

One of the first researchers of metacognition, Flavell, defines this concept as »one's knowledge concerning one's own cognitive processes and products or anything related to them ... Metacognition refers, among other things, to the active monitoring and consequent regulation and orchestration of these processes ... usually in the service of some concrete goal or objective.« (acc. to Marzano et al., 1988: 9) The metacognitive thinker, thus, reflects his/her own flow of thought, raises awareness about the process and the content of thinking and also about the influential factors, such as emotions, socio-cultural circumstances and others. At the same time he or she systematically plans and monitors his thinking. Flavell distinguishes between metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive experience, metacognitive goals and metacognitive strategies (Brown 1984, also in Juliebo et al., 1998). *Metacognitive knowledge* consists of

knowledge and beliefs about factors influencing problem solving process and cognitive outcome:

a. Knowledge of personal factors or characteristic of a problem solver that affect the result of intellectual activity, for example, knowledge about reading strategies and the insight in one's own preferences in applying reading strategies.

b. Task knowledge involves information available about the task, for example awareness of the type of the problem (whether problems are well structured or not) or how difficult they are.

c. Strategy knowledge refers to awareness about efficient strategies in the situation solving a specific problem.

Metacognitive experiences refer to evaluation and monitoring of cognitive processes in problem solving situation. Metacognitive goals are objectives of a metacognitive exercise, for example consciously monitoring thinking process to estimate its effectiveness. Metacognitive strategies refer to different kinds of self-evaluation and self-monitoring, for example, skimming a text to estimate its difficulty.

Self-control and self-monitoring is the central characteristic of metacognition also through the lenses of many other authorities from this field. Marzano (1988: 9) says: »Metacognition is being aware of our thinking as we perform specific tasks and then using this awareness to control what we are doing,« Baker and Brown (1984, acc. to Maqsud 1997: 387) define metacognition as: »The knowledge and control a child has over his or her own thinking and learning activities, including reading,« Costa (1984: 57) explains metacognition as »ability to know what we know and what we don't know,« and Martinez (2006: 696) explains: »Metacognition is the monitoring and control of thought,« and the latter also: »It can be seen as evaluation turned inward, especially turned toward our ideas« (ibid: 698).

New dimension of the concept of metacognition is seen in work of Nelson, Jost and Kruglanski (1988: 70). These authors define metacognition as: »inferences that are drawn about the mental states of others as well as inferences about one's own mental states.« They broaden focus from self to others, also. All thinking, not just our own, and all knowledge about thinking is involved in the concept of metacognition. Metacognition is also knowledge about knowledge, for example insight and understanding of principles from the field of epistemology, cognitive psychology,

philosophy, linguistics and other scientific disciplines, dealing with thinking. Knowledge one has about his own thinking and about thinking of others is more or less differentiated, systematic and complex. Similar to these authors, also Kuhn and Dean (2004: 270) argue that »broader understanding of thinking and knowledge« is the basic element of the concept of metacognition and it develops in its complexity and differentiation, as the different aspect of self-knowledge.

Other authors, as Flavell, also differentiate the various components of metacognition. Most of them mention two groups of activities, but give them different names: a. knowing about cognitive resources and b. self-regulation of thinking (McLain et al., 1991; acc. to Masqud 1997). Similarly, Paris and Winograd (acc. to Marzano, 1988) claim that metacognition involves two primary aspects: a. knowledge and control of self and b. knowledge and control of processes. The knowledge and control of self involves student's ability to choose commitment to academic task, to choose some healthy attitudes concerning learning and problem solving behavior, such as »be persistent«, »learn from failure« etc. and to monitor and control attention. Knowledge and control of processes refer to student's knowing what facts and concepts are necessary for the task (debate, problem solving etc.), which strategies, heuristics or procedures are appropriate and how to apply the selected strategy, procedure and heuristics. But these three types of knowledge are not enough. A student should maintain executive control in the task and this involves evaluation (assessing our current knowledge state), planning (selecting strategies to fulfill specific goals) and regulation (checking his progress).

If we make a synthesis of all these views, we can say that metacognition is knowledge about thinking that consists of:

a. declarative knowledge about thinking, comprising general knowledge types, processes and laws of thinking (epistemic, knowledge of thinking) and knowing and awareness about his/her own thinking processes and contents (beliefs, assumptions, values, attitudes; self-reflective knowledge) and

b. procedural knowledge about thinking that refers to ability to use general knowledge about thinking of the concrete problem solving situations and the ability to regulate and monitor our own thinking processes in specific situations.

Synthetic definition illustrates the following scheme:

Figure 1: Components of metacognition - synthesis of different views

Metacognition
(thinking about thinking)

Declarative (content-knowledge, »knowing what«)

Knowledge about thinking:

a. General (theoretical knowledge)

. types of thinking, learning and problem solving

. laws of thinking, learning and problem solving,

. strategies of thinking, learning and problem solving

. factors influencing thinking, learning and problem solving

b. Specific, self-directed (self-reflective knowledge, knowledge of self)

· awareness of ones own commitment to the academic enterprise

· awareness of ones own cognitive contents: beliefs, assumptions, values, attitudes etc.

· awareness of one's own cognitive strategies

Procedural (process-knowledge, strategic, »knowing how, when and why«) Use of general knowledge about thinking, learning and problem solving in concrete problem solving situations.

Control and regulation of one's own thinking (be able to choose):

· control of commitment to the academic task

· control of attitudes, beliefs, assumptions, values

· control of strategies

Metacognition – important element of critical thinking

There is no one single definition of critical thinking. The concept of critical thinking has many similar defining features, but at the same time there are also differences in defining this term among theoreticians from this field. Most frequently the concept of critical thinking refers to (Rupnik Vec and Kompare, 2006: 27):

- analysis and evaluation of argument (Ennis, 1985; Halpern 1996; Kuhn and Dean, 2004),

- analysis of different viewpoints (Brookfield, 1995; Paul and Elder, 2001),

- judging of alternatives, solutions, evidence (Halpern, 1996; Sternberg, 2004),

- analysis of assumptions (Ennis, 1985; Brookfield, 1995; Wade, 1995; Paul and Elder, 2001),

- judging on the basis of criteria (Lipman, 1988, 1991; Halpern, 1996; Paul and Elder, 2001; Petress, 2004),

- self-reflection and metacognition (Norris, 1985; Lipman, 1988, 1991; Facione et al., 1990; Halpern, 1996, 1999; Paul and Elder, 2001; Petress, 2004; Kuhn and Dean, 2004; Martinez, 2006).

In this article we focus on self-reflectivity and metacognition as one of the defining features of critical thinking and define the latter with Deanna Kuhn's words as »awareness of one's own thinking and reflection on the thinking of self and others as an object of cognition.« (Kuhn and Dean, 2004: 270).

Theoreticians of critical thinking do not use the concept of metacognition. But they »speak and think« about it with other words. Lipman (1988: 39), for example, defines critical thinking as »skillful, responsible thinking that facilitates good judgement because it (1) relies upon criteria, (2) is self-correcting, and (3) is sensitive to context.« He mentions self-correction, and then, we presuppose self-reflection of one's thought as one of the four basic defining features of critical thinking. Critical thinking is – in the conceptual frame of this author – thinking that is self-developing and self-corrective on the basis of informed judgment and as such has to be self-focused.

In the work of Diane Halpern (1996: 5) metacognition is also mentioned: »Critical thinking involves evaluating the thinking process – the reasoning that went into the conclusion we have arrived at or the kinds of factors considered in making a decision.« In this working definition she conceptualized critical thinking very similar to Martinez's diction where metacognition is defined as self-evaluation of thinking (see in the first chapter of this article).

Brookfield (1995: 7-9) exposed »identifying and challenging assumptions, challenging the importance of context, trying to imagine and explore alternatives and reflective skepticism,« as defining features of critical thinking, so as Myers (2003, acc. to Petress 2004: 461): »Critical thinking examines assumptions, discerns hidden values, evaluates evidence, and assesses conclusions.« Recognizing fallacies in our thinking and listening is also emphasized in Myers' text. (Petress 2004: 461) Both definitions comprise metacognition as they suggest that critical thinking person strives to self-searching and self-questioning: What assumptions are there in the core of my thinking? Are these assumptions true? What

values direct my thinking and decision making? How can I prove that and how reliable is my proof?

The Delphi Report (Facione et al., 1990: 4) represents the consensual definition of critical thinking by sixty greatest authorities from the field of critical thinking. Metacognition as characteristic of critical thinking person is implicitly stated in this segment of the definition: »... self-regulation is also central to critical thinking.« Self-regulation consists of self-examination and self-correction, thus critical thinking is self-focused and it is directed at revealing and correction of one's own biases. Norris (1985: 44) argues similarly and says that an important characteristic of critical thinker is a critical spirit that »has three requirements: a. to employ critical thinking skills in reasoning about situations encountered in the world, b. critical thinking is turned upon itself and c. critical thinker has the disposition to act in accordance with the dictates of critical thought.«

Bailin, Case, Combs and Daniels (1999: 281) perceive the knowledge about thinking and quality thinking criteria and also the knowledge about principles and standards of argumentation as important elements of critical thinking: »We have argued that what characterizes thinking which is critical is the quality of the reasoning. Thus, in order to become a (more) critical thinker one must understand what constitutes quality reasoning, and have the commitments relevant to employing and seeking quality reasoning. The knowledge necessary for such understanding includes background knowledge relevant to the context in question, knowledge of principles and standards of argumentation and inquiry, both in general and in specialized areas, knowledge of critical concepts, and knowledge of relevant strategies and heuristics.« These authors put meta-knowledge in the centre of one's ability to think effectively and critically.

In this short review of definitions of critical thinking we can not overlook Paul et al. (1989: 61, 62).[1] These authors in various texts more or less directly expose metacognition as a characteristic feature of critical thinking. They mention (at least) two affective strategies used by critical thinking person that presuppose metacogniton: »Exploring thoughts underlying feelings and feelings underlying thoughts,« and »Developing intellectual humility and suspending judgment.« These authors argue that raising awareness about relationship between thinking and emotion is of great importance to a critical thinker: In the basis of every thought there is some level of emotion and in the basis of every emotion there is some thought. Just with this insight a critical thinker is able to better understand herself/himself and others and is aware of her/his reaction as just

one among possible choices in the situations. It also depends on the interpretation of a situation. A self-understanding is the first step in the process of self-control and self-development. A teacher enables students to learn this skill if he directs them into reflection on core thoughts and emotional reactions of self and others.

The second strategy of a critical thinker that includes metacognition is »intellectual humility and suspending judgment.« A critical thinker knows the limits of his knowledge, he searches for his own biases, stereotypes and prejudices. He strives to get insight in his own beliefs: what is the evidence for his beliefs, how are they built, what further proof would he need etc. A critical thinker knows that he should avoid judgment until he has enough proof. All the time he reflects his reasoning through the lenses of a new knowledge.

On the basis of the review of mentioned authorities from the field of critical thinking we can conclude that there is a consensus about self-directed, self-regulated and self-checking, thus, metacognitive nature of critical thinking.

The metacognition relates explicitly to critical thinking according to three authors. Kuhn and Dean (2004: 270) call attention to diversity of the concepts of critical thinking in their essay on relationship between cognitive psychology and educational practice. But nevertheless »one non-controversial claim we can make about critical thinking, is that it entails awareness of one's own thinking and reflection on the thinking of self and others as an object of cognition.« Metacognition, the concept used by critical thinking theoreticians, is defined in quite similar way.

The third author that argues about the relationship between metacognition and critical thinking is Martinez (2006). He identifies three basic categories of metacognition: a. metamemory and meta-understanding, b. problem solving and c. critical thinking. According to Martinez critical thinking is one of the important areas of metacognition.

As mentioned before, authors from the field of critical thinking neither use the word metacognition, nor argue about some questions about the role of metacognition in critical thinking which we comprehend as crucial: What knowledge (what concepts) from the field of thinking a critical thinker should have to better understand himself and his thinking processes that would enable him to control and monitor his thinking effectively?

Conceptual tools for enhancing meta-cognitive thinking and the development of self-understanding

How to teach critical (effective) thinking effectively is one of the basic questions in education. Ennis (Plath et al. 1999: 208) classifies the various approaches to the teaching of critical thinking skills as either 'general', 'infusion', immersion' or 'mixed':

- The *general approach* is where critical thinking principles are taught in a separate instructional unit.

- The *infusion approach* is where students are encouraged to think critically on the subject and in which principles of critical thinking are made explicit.

- The *immersion approach* is similar to the infusion approach except that the principles of critical thinking are not made explicit.

- The *mixed approach* is one where a combination of the general approach with either the infusion or the immersion approach is applied.

The other three strategies presuppose teaching critical thinking inside scientific disciplines, inside school subjects. They differentiate from each other in degree to which the aim of learning critical thinking is transparent to the pupils. In the cognitive psychology terminology they differentiate in the degree of metacognitive training. The author of this article endeavors that teaching of critical thinking with infusion or for mixed approach (separate plus infusion) should be practised. Both approaches include the development and training of metacognitive thinking within the general aim of critical thinking development. Learning of skills (even metacognitive and critical thinking skills) is more effective if the objectives concerning these skills are stated clearly and if pupils are consciously trying to achieve them.

It is very important that a teacher adapts the transparency of critical thinking principles to children according to their developmental stage. For example immersion approach is enough for secondary school children, when a teacher teaches of qualifiers. But the same children can think about the definition of reasoning, about qualities of good reasoning and can engage in self-evaluation of reasoning (metacognitive thinking) in concrete problem solving situations. The breath, the depth and the

transparency of critical thinking principles is one of the most important decisions of a teacher in planning to teach for critical thinking.

So we argue for systematic *teaching for critical thinking* at the same time as *teaching about critical thinking*, as we interpret Ennis's concept of teaching with infusion. Two groups of relevant questions are set up:

- Questions concerning critical thinking teaching strategies, for example: What are effective strategies of *teaching for critical thinking* inside school subjects? What kind of instructional technic should teacher use to engage students in critical consideration of contents? What are effective strategies for *teaching about critical thinking*? How should a teacher effectively combine teaching for critical thinking with teaching about critical thinking?

- Questions concerning contents of teaching for critical thinking: What issues are the most suitable for critical evaluation?[2] What contents (concepts, models, principles) about critical thinking (in the meta-knowledge sense) should be handled to enable learners more effective self-reflection and more effective metacognition?

In the following section of this article we focus on the last questions from these groups: What knowledge about thinking makes a student more efficient in metacognition? What are effective strategies to enhance metacognitive thinking in students, which in turn makes students think about the quality of their thinking? Let us see what the answers to those questions of some theoreticians are.

Kuhn and Dean (2004) mention two general strategies of metacognitive development:

- Encouraging student's self-reflection and self-evaluation,
- Encouraging interiorization with continuous exposition to critical questions.

The former refers to a teacher's stimulation of students thinking with questions like: Why are we doing that? What have we got to do with this? How effectively are we doing that? The latter strategy implies questions like: How do I know that? What is my evidence for this claim? These suggestions are based on assumption that continuous exposition to such questions leads to interiorization of these structures, which can then be used also in other, not just learning, situations.

Continuous exposure to metacognitive tasks is one of the basic strategies of teaching and learning also for Martinez (2006). Metacognitive development should be, from the perspective of this author, explicit learning goal for both, a teacher and a student. A student will perceive the metacognitive development as important learning goal only if he or she understands the role of metacognition in intellectual enterprise (problem solving, decision making, argumentation, debating etc.)

Another two strategies are mentioned in Martinez's text (2006): modelling and social interaction. A teacher could and should model metacognitive thinking during the problem solving and argumentation. Cognitive processes that are frequently exposed are interiorized. Social interaction during the joint problem solving is a good opportunity for metacognitive training. In dialogs pupils' ideas become clearer, their strategies become more explicit and they are shared among them. That represents an opportunity to model each other their cognitive and metacognitive skills.

Costa (1984) describes the following strategies of metacognitive training that can be used by teachers of all subjects with children of all ages:

- *Planning strategy.* A teacher directs a student to plan his cognitive activity in the context of time constraints or other rules under which a student must operate. Explicit guidelines concerning time, strategies and steps in problem solving process help students keep this all in mind and evaluate their performance afterwards. During the activity a teacher invites students to share their thoughts, progress and perceptions of their own behavior. After the learning activity a teacher can invite students to evaluate how well the rules were obeyed, how successful the strategies were or whether alternative strategies could be used.

- *Generating questions.* It is useful for students to put questions themselves. This self-generation of questions raises motivation and facilitates deep learning.

- *Choosing consciously.* Teachers can promote metacognition by helping students explore the consequences of their choices, thus teaching them to understand the relationships among their choice, their actions and the results they achieved.

- *Evaluating with multiple criteria*. Teachers can enhance metacognitive thinking by inviting students to reflect upon and categorize their actions according to two or more sets of evaluative criteria.

- *Taking credit*. Teachers could invite students to recognize what they have done well by asking a question: »What have you done that you are proud of?« He can stimulate students to seek feedback from their peers and teach them to give constructive feedback information. So students will become more conscious of their own behavior.

- *Outlawing »I can't«.* A teacher shall not allow students to use excuses such as »I can't«, »I don't know how ...«, »I'm not able to ...« and has to tell them this loud and clear. Instead, students should be encouraged to identify what information is required, what skills are needed and how to learn these skills. Students should be encouraged to persist in difficult situations.

- *Paraphrasing or reflecting back student's ideas*. This causes students to listen better to their own ideas, to clarify them or to extend them. It is useful also to invite students to paraphrase, restate, translate and compare with each other ideas because this is an excellent exercise in listening to others and to themselves as well.

- *Labeling students' behaviors*. This enables students to become conscious of their own cognitive processes and/or other behaviors.

- *Clarifying students' terminology.* Students often use hollow, vague and nonspecific terminology. When a teacher asks clarifying questions she or he causes students to explore their thinking in depth: to operationally define their terminology and to examine potentially hidden assumptions on which their thinking is based.

- *Role playing and simulations*. Taking on another role contributes to seeing things from somebody else's perspective and to the reduction of ego-centered perceptions.

- *Journal keeping*. Writing and illustrating a diary is an experience that provides an opportunity to relive such experience, to synthesize thoughts and actions, to revisit initial perceptions, to compare changes in those perceptions with the addition to new data, to identify blind alleys and to recall the successes and the tragedies of experimentation.

- Modeling is probably the most influential technique of all suggested before. A teacher models metacognitive skills when she: shares her planning, admits that to error is human and then shows remedy for it, admits she doesn't know the answer but she designs ways to find it, seeks feedback and evaluation from students etc.

In further text we explore the question: Which knowledge about thinking (concepts, models, principles) would enable students better self-insight and self-understanding and thereby to facilitate and direct metacognition? From our perspective these are some possible strategies:

1. *Invite students into process of exploring the concept of critical thinking and metacognitive thinking (as an important element of critical thinking).*

To judge effectively the quality of one's own thinking and the thinking of others one has to have a clear idea of what critical and metacognitive thinking is, what effective thinking is or what standards of good thinking are, what critical thinking skills are and so on. Different strategies could be used from a teacher to enhance these concepts formation in their students. One can be very simple: ask students to identify characteristics or skills of a critical thinker and then invite your students to compare their (naive) answers (pre-concepts) with one of theoretical models (for example Wade's model, Wade, 1995). So students will form clear idea of what critical thinking, critical thinking skills and metacognition are. These concepts will serve as criteria and will enable them to compare themselves with an ideal and to identify their own strengths and weaknesses concerning critical thinking.

2. *Enable students to make sense of learning critical and metacognitive thinking in the context of concrete science and in life and thus, to enhance their motivation to learn critical thinking.*

What are the benefits of a critical thinking person? In which situations is it especially important to think critically and make informed choice? What can we 'lose' if we don't think critically? What are the consequences of uncritical decisions? Could critical thinking be fun? How can critical thinking enable you to reach important goals? All these are questions that invite students to explore importance and consequences of critical vs. uncritical thinking and decision making. Through this exploration students will make sense of thinking critically.

3. *Enable students to articulate a very clear and simple goal concerning learning of critical and metacognitive thinking.*

Learning is more effective if students try to reach clearly stated learning goals. It's important for a teacher not just to set up the learning goals for students but to invite them to set them up for themselves instead. This is especially important for process learning goals, such as communication skills, self-reflection and metacognitive skills, critical thinking skills. A teacher can at the beginning of school year invite students to clarify the concepts of critical thinking, metacognitive thinking and critical thinking skills and then they articulate clear goals concerning the development of different critical thinking skills jointly. Through the year, it is important that the teacher gives students a lot of opportunities to learn these skills and directs and supports them in their evaluations of their progress (metacognitive thinking).

4. *Teaching students to differentiate facts and interpretations.*

A lot of students mix facts and interpretations of these facts. So the distinguishing between facts and interpretations is one of the most important goals concerning critical thinking. There are different strategies available. Here is an example: a teacher invites students to reply to the question: »Look at this picture. What is going on? What's the behavior of actors?« Students give their ideas and then the teacher causes them to distinguish facts-answers and interpretation-answers. One of the key questions students should learn to continuously ask themselves is: »How do I know this?« or »What is in this situation true?« »What proof do I have for believing this?«

5. *Enable students to understand the role and the influence of beliefs, assumptions, attitudes, values, prejudices and expectations on perception, emotion, thinking and behavior.*

One who understands the role of assumptions and beliefs in one's thinking, feeling and acting is aware of determinism of his own functioning with his cognitive structures. The student who understands also that his perceptions and thinking are framed with cognitive and social and emotional factors, understands that his actual perceptions and cognitions are directed and possibly biased with his assumptions and beliefs also. And he understands that these beliefs are sometimes explicit and even more often they are tacit, hidden, unaware and are taken for

granted. Awareness of this determinism on theoretical as well as on empirical level makes sense of metacognitive enterprise.

Different strategies are available to raise awareness of hidden assumptions which influence thinking. A teacher can introduce some of the models to students which explain influence of assumptions on reasoning and feeling and behaviour in general. Then he/she can invite them to self reflection and metacognition through the lenses of this model. Suitable models that can be used are ORJI cycle (Schein, 1988) or the ladder of inference (Senge, 2000). It is important that these models are presented in an attractive and the simplest possible way.

6. *Enable students to learn key concepts (infusion approach to teaching critical thinking), for example: assumption, perspective, critical questions, high-order questions, clarity in the use of language, intellectual standards, arguments, premises, conclusions, biases in argumentation, facts, interpretations, strategies of problem solving, heuristics etc.*

A systematic formation of the conceptual frame of critical thinking is - from our perspective - one of the most important priorities in teaching for critical thinking. It is important to teach critical thinking together with teaching about thinking. Two general strategies are available: a. a teacher introduces the concept to students and then invites them to use it systematically, and b. students use the (pre)concept without the clear awareness, a teacher names the process and that leads students to become conscious of using it, then a teacher invites them to explore the process or concept in depth and use it systematically in new learning and real life contexts.

These are steps in the first strategy: a. introduction of concept and/or skill, b. exploration of this concept/skill through different exercises, c. articulation of a clear goal concerning this concept use/skill training, d. using/training of the new concept/skill, e. metacognition and self-reflection in every problem situation, f. systematic checking of one's own progress. The other strategy is slightly different from the very beginning (teaching by immersion approach): a. problem solving and spontaneous use of some (pre)concepts and skills, b. raising awareness and naming of those skills. Other steps are exactly the same (teaching by infusion approach).[3]

7. *Enable students to understand in depth the relationship between thinking, emotions and behaviour.*

Paul et al. (1989) suggest teachers should frequently direct their students into analysis of the emotional responses and thoughts, that are in core of these emotions, of self and others. They can provoke this analysis with the questions as: How do I feel in this situation? How do I see (interpret) this situation? Can I see (interpret) this situation in a different way? How would I feel in this situation then? What are my conclusions? What is my evidence? What are my assumptions? How do others see the same situation? What are their conclusions about it? What is their evidence?

Another strategy presupposes the introduction of some theoretical model which explains the relationships between thoughts and feelings. Some possibilities we have mentioned before, another is Milivojevič's circular emotional reaction model (Milivojevič, 1999). When students are familiar with this model they can use it for the sake of better understanding of themselves and of others thinking and feeling in different situations in life.

8. *Enable students to practice metacognitive thinking: to plan, to act according to the plan and monitor the progress, to evaluate, to revise; direct students to reflection of their own thinking through the lenses of key concepts, models and principles from the field of critical thinking.*

Knowledge about thinking (concepts, models, principles) is just a conceptual tool students can use to think more systematically about their own thinking, feelings and behaviors. They direct their attention to different aspects of their internal processes and enable them to raise awareness about potentially hidden (unaware) aspects of their functioning, about thinking structures and processes in the first place (taken for granted assumptions, attitudes, values, preferred strategies of problem solving and decision making etc.), identification of their own strengths and weaknesses in the thinking area, to be proud of their strengths and to work on their weaknesses. So, teaching thinking together with teaching about thinking is from our perspective a powerful approach to enhance students' intellectual development.

Conclusion

In this text we investigate the concept of metacognition and the relationship between metacognitive and critical thinking and finally, we suggest some strategies to enhance both, metacognitive and critical

thinking. From the simplest definition of metacognition as thinking about one's own thinking we make – through the citation of the notions of metacognition of some theoreticians - a step forward to a more complex and deeper understanding of this phenomena. A synthesis of conceptualizations which serves as a frame for further investigations of relationship to critical thinking was made. We find out that metacognition is an important element of critical thinking and an important skill of a critical thinker. Finally we claim that the enhancement of metacognitive thinking is an important educational goal. We searched for principles of supporting and enhanching students' metacognitive development in literature and suggested some of our own ideas also.

Notes

[1] Paul et al. (1989) identify 35 critical thinking strategies and categorize them into three groups: affective strategies, cognitive macro-strategies and cognitive micro-strategies.
[2] Children should evaluate critically all issues they consider. Sometimes there is a lot of content to grasp and a teacher should decide which is the most important and should be investigated in the greatest depth.
[3] Students' portfolio is a useful tool one can apply to systematically develop some skills and to check up one's own progress

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LEARNING OF COMPLEX AND CRITICAL THINKING: A MATTER OF DIDACTICS OR SOMETHING ELSE?

Zora Rutar Ilc

Zavod za šolstvo

Three levels of assuring complex and critical thinking

In the present paper we are discussing about three levels of assuring a learning environment that will contribute to the developing of critical and – in the broadest sense – complex thinking.

The first level refers to the classroom practice: how a teacher can contribute with his practice to stimulating pupils' thinking activity.

The second level refers to the level of individual schools: how much support does a teacher get from his school? Do the schools assure such a climate within the context of their vision and developmental planning which enables the development of complex and critical thinking?

The third level refers to the school policy, to the prevailing pedagogical discourse or paradigm conflict and also to wider social conditions as a broadest frame, which prescribe the limits of possible and the ability to reflect and to exceed them.

None of these levels can be omitted by assuring complex and critical thinking otherwise the whole »enterprise« will fail.

Complex thinking for the »school use«

We should look first, where the contemporary efforts for developing complex thinking or various thinking process arise from.

One of the most influential by lightening the nature of learning and principles of knowledge organising was cognitive psychology. From the early beginning in the 50's its approach to research on learning is

multidisciplinary oriented. It is connected with the developmental psychology, anthropology, linguistics, philosophy, computer sciences, neurology and other branches of psychology.

There are a plenty of more or less exhausted lists and taxonomies of various aspects of thinking: of its processes, components and skills ... One of the most referential classifications of complex thinking arose as a result of collaboration of many experts from the field of cognitive psychology, sociology, philosophy and the so called educational sciences. Based on the analysis of different taxonomies and work of well known authors such as Sternberg, Gardner, Andersen and others (included philosophical references) the group of authors from the USA, gathered around Robert Marzano (1989, 1993, 1997), has prepared the classification of thinking skills and processes especially for the school purposes. This classification will serve as an example to illustrate how to contribute to the development ofcomplex and critical thinking in schools.

Authors stressed that they didn't offer a general model of mind but wanted to expose the areas that are common to different approaches and different subjects and to show how to use them thoughtfully in concrete school situations. They put the attention especially to thinking processes and to thinking skills which contribute to this processes and to critical, creative and metacognitive thinking. These elements are in the mutual and complex interrelations and run together (Marzano et al., 1988).

The above mentioned authors conceptualised thinking processes as forming and creating concepts, understanding, deciding, problem solving ... Thinking processes are treated as complex and goal oriented operations, that originate from combining basic thinking skills such as observing, classification, arranging, finding out characteristics and components, analysing relations, making conclusions, predictions, restructuring, evaluating ... (for example: classification and comparison skills are often a part of decision and problem solving processes, skills of making inferences and abstractions are those which contribute to the process of concepts building and so on).

Creative and critical thinking are not identical with thinking processes such as problem solving or decision making. They are their characteristic, for example: problem solving or decision making are more or less creative and more or less critical (ibid.).

Critical thinking is in the first place evaluative (we evaluate different concepts and ideas), but creative thinking is more generative (we generate concepts). The stress in the critical thinking is therefore on testing and

judgement of findings or statements, and also on creative thinking on validity and usefulness. But for both of them it is characteristic that they contribute something new.

One of the most known classifications of critical thinking (Ennis in Baron in Sternberg, 1987) poses the following thinking skills as skills that take part in critical thinking: elementary clarification of the problem (focusing on questions, analysing arguments, questions for the further clarification), the judgement or credibility of sources by various criteria, making inferences in different ways, problem defining strategies and identification of suppositions ... Also the auto-reflexiveness – reflecting your own ideas and actions – is relevant in this context.

The view of complex and critical thinking and of the relations between them as it was presented above is one of the possible perspectives. We have adopted it for our purpose, because it is systematic, transparent and operative and it helps think which strategies to use for the developing of this field in schools.

How to stimulate complex and critical thinking on the level of classrooms

The most direct initiatives for developing complex and critical thinking arise from learning situations pupils are exposed to every day. The first condition for systematic developing of critical and complex thinking is therefore establishing appropriate circumstances - learning situations that demand the use of thinking processes and skills from pupils. For example the following thinking processes and skills should be elicited: comparison, classification, interfering, finding out the main ideas and characteristics, investigating and researching, making arguments, working with sources, presenting ideas, cooperation and critical judgment (ibid). Students can get a habit of approaching a problem by confronting themselves with open problem situations or the so called unstructured problems and by preparing the conditions in which different aspects of problems have to be treated and empathy and imagination must be used.

For example, critical thinking should be provoked in the following situations:

- by confronting, arguing and exchanging different views and referential frames;

- by searching for clear arguments for one's own statements and for claiming, when we have support;

- through searching for valid and reliable sources;

- at treating situation in its whole complexity;

- through searching for alternatives;

- in the situations that demand openness and exactness;

- in situations that demand sensitivity and appreciating others' arguments ... (Ennis, in Baron and Sternberg, 1987: 9-37).

Very important for the developing of critical thinking is also the stimulation of metacognition and auto-reflexiveness. Students are stimulated to reason about clearness and comprehensibility of their findings and inferences, about the sources they have used, about the logical aspect of their arguments, about various aspects of the problem and different views on their solving. Also the activities that demand the suppositions analysis, presuppositions, stereotypes and other biases and self-evidence should be included.

The convenient methods for stimulating critical thinking are different sorts of discussion groups, round tables, role playing, text analysis, commentary and other materials and especially a debate.

And exactly the debate or widely said – learning of constructing and deconstructing arguments – has a very important role not only for developing critical thinking but also for developing complex thinking at all. Many studies namely show us that the debate effects are not limited only to the skills of arguing and debating but also show the transformative nature of the debate and its potential for preparing students to approach problems (not only in the situation of debate).

This is affirmed also with the Snider's and Scnurer's introduction in the book, dedicated to the debate, which doesn't legitimate the debate as an academic discourse or »added value« but as »a method of learning, which encourages investigating of (new) ideas«. Shuster (2006) shows how to use this method for literacy strengthening of underprivileged: with well organised network of debate circles for hundreds of students from vocational education (who are weak at school work) who were captured and equipped with debate skills which have well influenced not only their cognitive skills, but have also contributed to their personal development and wellbeing.

Theoretical context of developing complex and critical thinking

In spite of the proved effectiveness of separate methods of active learning it would be too short to arise only from concrete forms and methods of work for developing complex and critical thinking. Developing complex and critical thinking should be posed in a wider context dealing with knowledge and learning. And concrete forms and methods can be a helpful tool in this way.

In the broadest sense we could say that for the approach that is focused on developing complex and critical thinking, the learning process is characteristic, that it builds on the students' activity: students construct their comprehension through investigation and experiencing, including various thinking processes and skills.

Many investigations from the last years have affirmed that the durability and usefulness of the knowledge that is acquired in an active mode (by systematic stimulating students' thinking activity) is bigger than the knowledge adopted only form others. For example, it was established (according to Bransford et al., 2000), that students, who have investigated actively the historical sources, were more successful at the analysis of new, not known before, than the students who hadn't got such experience and gave a complaint, that it hadn't been thought at school. Similar findings were obtained for the use of active methods in physics and geometry (ibid.).

It was also shown that it is reasonable to round up the process and the investigative approach with systematic resuming of the wholeness, unless the knowledge obtained from the partial experiences is threatened not to reach the level of generalisation. The biggest durability was therefore shown at approaches where the investigation, research and other various activities were combined with teachers' explanation and work with textbooks.

Cognitive psychologists have established that the active approach, founded in learner's own investigation and knowledge building (with the help of different activities, processes and procedures), relieve the interiorisation of concepts, principles and rules. By all this, also the durability of knowledge and the capacity using it in new circumstances is established. Knowledge, based in learner's own experience, supported by all the phases of the learning process, which they are passing, and which has much more clinging points of retrieving or using it as a knowledge, we only adopt by others (More about this in Rutar, 2003: 28–32).

It is, of course, not meant that nothing can be lectured or that the method of explanation is wrong. On the contrary! For many occasions it is quite an appropriate mode; it is even the most effective way for some of them (especially in connection with the structured discussion).There is also no need to acquire all the knowledge by exploration. But nevertheless, there are many more opportunities where learning by discovery is almost as appropriate as the lectures or even better than we usually think and see.

In our school context we have tried to stimulate the approach that is based on the students' active role in the frame of curriculum reform (and many projects that accompany it). This was namely based on the learning objectives and developmental process approach. The learning objectives approach has brought a shift from content orientation to process or activity orientation.

The stress on learning objectives instead of former contents doesn't mean neglecting or even excluding contents or putting them into the second plan. But it means new emphasis in connection with the contents. Contents are not the exclusive guide for learning process any more, it is also important how these contents are gained and how students treat them – what are they capable of doing with them, in which way do they »process« them: compare and classify, infer, find out characteristics, research, conclude, argue and present ... In the heart of the learning objective approach lies a connection of contents with activities. This puts content in the exclusive connection with concrete mind processes. This contributes to the active acquiring or better said – »building« of knowledge in the process and with the help of the processes. At the same time also the thinking processes and skills – broadly said: complex thinking - are improved.

Anyway, the care for complex and critical thinking is not finished with the use of thinking processes and skills. Both are namely evaluated through the final result, i.e. the capacity of conceptual understanding.

Students are often able to think »about« different concepts and procedures but not »with them« or with their help, which means in such a way that they are used. Also the managing of thinking processes and skills remains only on the level of good art, if it doesn't contribute to »the transforming facts and procedures that they are able to describe and think in the useful conceptual tools« (Cit. Bransford, Sherwood, Sturdevan, 1987: 172). It is very important how to guide pupils to the understanding of how concepts and procedures can function as a tool for problem solving or how they help in conceptualisation of events and phenomena in new

and unrecognised ways (ibid.). Namely, neither the knowing of concepts nor the pure managing of thinking processes assure the development of »conceptual applicability« (ibid.: 174).

Pupils should be helped by organising knowledge in models which are used by experts to solve problems and then train them of similar strategies (ibid). It is not only the question of gaining pure skills and problem solving strategies, but connecting both with the content knowledge in the context of problem solving, and everything together with the aim to develop conceptual understanding or competent knowledge use.

Learning by understanding is constituted of discovering key concepts and connections with other already learned concepts. It is very important to actively elaborate and seek for the connections. Or, as it is established by Resnick, the transfer learning doesn't happen spontaneously – it comes from intentional efforts: to find out connections between elements of knowledge, to develop explanations and arguments and to pose new questions (1989).

The development of complex thinking is therefore guaranteed only by the dialectic connection of contents, gained with the use of thinking processes, stimulated with active methods of work and pushed on to the conceptual level.

The level of schools – what pedagogy of empowerment has in common with the stimulating complex and critical thinking

The experiences we have with our support to teachers in developmental and innovative projects show that the manoeuvring space for their professional growth is large. Many teachers found in consultations with colleagues and materials a lot of inspiration to change their work in developmental challenge. In such a way they become longlife learners and creators of their professional development. And some of them achieve quite persuasive effects in their environments.

However, also the most engaged teachers clash against at least two obstacles: one is the scepticism of their own colleagues or even their open resistance, and the other one refers to systematic level (curriculum materials, norms, working circumstances ...).

In this chapter we will therefore try to think how to transfer the implementation of the projects from the individual level to the school

one. Finally, in the concluding chapter we will try to consider about the broadest frame for the introduction if the change.

As already mentioned, each teacher can do a lot – in his subject. But even very professional teachers who are also didactically skilful are less effective if their acting is not situated in the wider context of development and changes not inclined to school climate. The effects of their efforts are limited if pupils don't experience the changes which are introduced in broader context. That means, if these changes are not the prevailing part of their everyday school experience.

In the case of such isolated trials, students can accept such an engaged teacher benevolently, because he gets out of the mediocrity. Students can take him as an identification model or – on the epistemological level – as a model for their own construction of knowledge and the attitude to it. Anyway, some statements from teachers in the context of evaluation show that pupils can be benevolent to such efforts, but many can experience such teachers and their stimulating to thinking as a »disturbance« that distracts them in their established routines. To research, to do with sources ... - to be engaged still during lessons, caught between overloaded schedules, plenty of tests and fixed hours of five or six subjects a day can be an additional effort for students.

Experience from our projects shows that the effects are the largest, when the project is led on the level of the whole team or with the whole team. Of course it is not the same if the incentive for the project comes from teachers themselves or if the external experts and institutions are the ones who offer the project.

But also in the cases when the external institutions are the initiators, good effects can be expected in certain circumstances. In this case it is especially important that we convince teachers first that it is worth making the efforts for changes. Then we should link our concept to their expectations, which are awarded in the process of analysis of their needs (SWOT). In the continuation teachers should be included in the jointed project planning and self directing development to experience the ownership of the project as much as possible, and to take responsibility for it and engage intensively in it.

In such cases we talk about auto regulative concept or about the concept of introducing changes »from bottom up«. The stress in this concept is on the transfer of power and responsibility for the project to schools and teachers themselves. External partners are only changing

agents but the source of the main power is installed within school as a collegial working environment and learning community.

For the learning community it is characteristic that it establishes more space for the professional development than for everybody caring only for himself. At the same time it stimulates auto reflection and active role of teachers in the community and in the society. In the climate of cooperation, confidence and reciprocal support, teachers come to the awareness of their feelings about themselves, as a human and a professional; they learn to cooperate in different interaction processes to understand group dynamic and to analyse their own acting. They often succeed to pose their fixed concepts and practices under question.

On such basis teachers can jointly plot long-term projects that include personal plans on their own professional development as well as developmental plans of the activity of the whole school. Schools take more incentive for their own development: they identify problems, which they would like to solve more systematically; they establish priorities, make plans and form strategies for evaluation and self-evaluation. The care for your own development is not a signal of weakness that should stigmatise you, but one of the most important quality assurances.

Forming schools into learning and cooperative communities is a part of a wider cooperative culture that is called new teachers' interactive professionalism by Hargreves (1994: 43). It is characterised by culture of cooperation and consultation and by replacing hierarchies and external control with team approach and strategies of self-evaluation. Communities are more and more systematically oriented from accidental intuitive self survival strategies to gaining the feeling of »I can«. In this sense we talk about empowerment.

Introducing any changes has more chances for success if it is supported with strategic action of the whole school. That is especially true for the stimulating complex and critical thinking. It is much harder to stimulate them by training only isolate skills in »laboratory« circumstances at only one subject without context. To be ironic: pupils can learn critical thinking only at history, for example with the help of debate method. But the chances for the developing critical thinking as a general attitude are much fewer, if the only chance pupils have, is at history, as if the whole school decides that it will systematically develop critical thinking and that each teacher will make efforts in this direction in the context of common strategy.

Critical pedagogy: broader context of considering criticism

We have already shown that complex thinking can be conceptualised as a strategic use of different thinking processes and skills. We have stressed that active methods contribute much to their use. To avoid the possibility of pure training of various thinking processes and skills the complex and critical thinking should be posed in the context of knowledge building and conceptual understanding.

We have also made a warning that – in spite of efforts of some teachers – it is much more effective if the stimulative learning environment is guaranteed by the whole school. In such a way schools become learning communities and contribute to their own autoregulation and selfregulation learning of their pupils.

But also in such cases many difficulties and borders are met. Some are transparent – for example oversized norms, segmented schedule, rigid disciplinary frames, external systems of control and similar. It is obvious that these should be challenged together with the efforts for the innovative projects. But some are parts of the hidden curriculum, which is a constitutive part of all schooling and here we shall pay some attention to this aspect.

Until the sixties schooling was treated as doubtless positive – as a tool for enlightening and socialisation and acculturation. But then authors appeared who were the part of the tradition of the so called sociology of education, who started to pay attention to various aspects of »social reproduction« function of schooling and education. Education is seen as consolidating and reproducing the established social and economic relations. The first who had seen the school as one of the key lever for the reproduction of existing social relations was Althusser, who has posed school as an ideological apparatus of state (1980).

Some authors dedicated their attention only to the mechanisms of control that can be read from the policy of schooling. But similarly important or even more so are the sophisticated and less evident mechanisms of their concrete actualising (for instance: the mechanisms of selection and knowledge structuring) and socialisation and subjectivisation effects of schooling.

Usually the curriculum and knowledge seem to be unquestionable. Education is treated as a cultural transmission and as a socialisation in skills and values. Teachers' task is to find the most effective ways of transferring these skills on to as many pupils as possible. Reforms can change

the way of their organisation, but the suppositions are not analysed. Also their selfevidency is not questioned.

The sociologists of education warn that education is a part of wider social process and should be considered in specific socioeconomic frames. On one side they focus on the link between schools and society and on the other on daily practices in classes that produce different meanings, burdens, values and connections. They investigate how specific meanings are constructed in schools and how class practices contribute to this. Each practice contributes different meanings and is determined with specific views we even aren't aware of, until we analyse them.

One of the most important authors of sociology of education is Bourdieu (1971) who links schools with the transmitting cultural capital. Individuals acquire their schooling not only by knowledge and literacy but also by different beliefs, problem approaches, methods ... A thinker is tied to his age with the screen of the prevailed actual problem approach in which he thinks and which was mediated to him by schooling. The frames of problem estimation which we are sunk through our entire schooling are one of the elementary dimensions of intellectual programming of society and the period.

Schooling therefore equips all individuals with »basic, deeply interiorised patterns of mastery« (ibid.: 193), which are the basis for gaining new ones. Gaining the system of patterns which organises the thinking of individuals depends on frequency they are used to and on the stage of consciousness and on how they act in specific circumstances.

»Patterns have got their second nature ..., manage and regulate mental processes without being consciously recognised and controlled. The thinker belongs to the society and to the period with all the cultural unconsciousness that belongs to his intellectual training ... The function of school is conscious and partly unconscious ... producing individuals who are equipped with the system of unconscious (deeply implanted) patterns of managing what constitutes the culture ... Each individual transfers unconsciously the common tendencies and those in which the period styles and thinking patterns are recognised, that organise reality with regulating and organising the thinking about reality ...« (ibid.: 193–194).

The schools equip pupils with the principles of knowledge and reality organisation, states Bourdieu. In the potentially undetermined cultural world - an un-differential chaotic school brings the system and order by the principle of differentiation and use. But schooling doesn't offer only referential points but offers the »methods and programmes of thinking«

(ibid.). With the usual schedule schools carry out and on which chronological order which seems natural and inevitable it is based, schools become alienated from the assurances of logic and teaching.

They establish hierarchies from the mass of works - for example with the selection of textbooks and summaries. Teachers plan teaching in accordance with the system of organisation that is then led by students when they learn and answer the questions.

Each type of teaching produces specific »products«. They can be differentiated by the nature of gained knowledge and by the way they are gained: by the examinations, that must be done, and by the nature of exercises they practice. All the practices of teaching suppose the »right« mode of intellectual activity, the »right« culture and the »correct« attitude to it.

We can talk about some kind of a symbolic violence. This concept interrupts the views and the concepts of the spontaneity of the pedagogical action, and warns against the monopoly of school system that affirms the symbolic violence as the state legitimates physical one (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1994). Symbolic violence is the form of social violence that removes from authoritative way of imposing; it gives up the most violent techniques of coercion, but instead of it forces favoured meanings. Pedagogical action is a symbolic violence whenever it succeeds to impose a kind of cultural arbitrariness. In such a way a pedagogic action reproduces the prevailing culture and contributes to the reproducing actual structures of power.

Pedagogic action demands also pedagogic work which can be seen in this context as a process of coercion that must last long enough to form »right« habits through the training. These habits are a product of interiorised principles of cultural arbitrariness. Pedagogic work assures that a human reacts properly on the symbolic cue in all the circumstances.

Teachers must be well prepared for such a pedagogic work. The spirit of corporative capital shows itself in teachers' deskilling and reskilling. This is in the service of growth of the technical control and efforts for the functional utility – the topic, Apple and Beyer write about. As the only reaction against the expressions of domination the psycho-logistic patterns of life and choice have been developed. But here the problem solving is reduced to the individual level by those and the problematic social relations are not problematised by them.

Teachers are trained in this perspective in such a way that they accept the prevailing teachers' roles, expectations and characteristics. They are equipped by skills, dispositions and competencies, with the already made

solutions of problems, which are needed for the reproduction of the prevailing school practice. Everything that is not directly useful counts as dysfunctional. The efforts for maximising learning achievements, maintaining order and discipline and offering the meaningful learning experiences are prevailing. Intellectual challenges and problems, creating new knowledge and looking for truth are considered to be unpractical and academic.

The applicative approach to curriculum and to teaching is marked by measuring competences which should be as measurable as possible. Instead of questioning, analysing and reflection, technical, measurable, specific training of separated skills prevails. Behind all this is of course the care for educating conformed and well qualified citizens – workers, which will serve the demand for increasing productivity.

Some of sociologists of education don't remain only at school criticism. They also try to offer the emancipatory perspective and they pose it directly in the context of teachers' practice.

For example, Beyer (1988) arises from the supposition that the necessary qualities of the individuals can develop only through the democratisation of the authoritarian structures – through the cooperation at life decisions in institutional and daily practices.

One of the modes to actualise this is the institute of schools as learning communities which we have talked about in the chapter before. At the same time it is very important to stimulate the teacher training for reflection – that they would be able to recognise concepts and suppositions which determine their everyday practices and for that they are usually not awarded.

Similar as Beyer also McLaren (1986) sees the opportunities for opening school space in teachers themselves to find out solutions for their problems and situations.

He argues for resistance against changing routines into repressive and against reducing rituals on routines. Boring archaic rituals should be revitalised and new, more flexible, cooperative and interpersonal class cultures should be stimulated. More rituals that arise from students themselves should be confirmed. Students should be given an opportunity to plan their time and seek their own expressions. But the most important is to attribute them the capacity to reason and imagine and the reflection instead of passive role.

The common idea of all those incentives is similar to the ideas of the new social projects and forms of democracy, articulated recently by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000, 2004). These ideas and concepts

such as representation, freedom, autonomy, empowerment and independent life inside modern global networks of power relations and communication practices, are obviously the most powerful agencies in the process of social and political regulation of modern life. Contemporary shift from industrial toward postindustrial societies has been accompanied by the so called nonmaterial production of social relations, communication practices, feelings, emotions, ideas etc. We can name this production as a biopolitical production. This biopolitical production profoundly influences many aspects of our lives – and the effects are not always good or pleasant, because they serve to powerful international corporations with their systems of propaganda and are driven by the logic of profit (Rutar, 2006)

The alternative is offered by the concept of multitude. Multitude is an open network of singularities, which are mutually connected on the basis of their own produced goods and not on the basis of the logic of profit, power relations, hierarchy and exploitation. The multitude is an ultimate space where people can really develop solidarity, mutual cooperation and logic of shared production which would be not dependent on propaganda and popcultural mass media. There are many different and open movements and creative groups around the world that are able to revolutionize the ways how everyday people understand the world, work and live inside it and think about it. And teachers are the ones who could contribute to the production of the new culture of conversation, cooperation and mutual problem solving.

Of course it remains an open question of how is it structurally possible for schools to become such special free places where people can seriously talk to each other, freely choosing themes and issues or topics and learning the culture of conversation which includes many different skills (how to listen, offer arguments, discuss, interpret, argue, protest, express your own opinion, demonstrate etc.). Is it really possible for any institutionalised place to offer really new opportunities which will enable different people to express their opinions, talk about themselves, social relations, society, politics, art, science, teach themselves how to think and operate?

We should namely be aware of the fact, that although school space is being opened, many things depend not only on democratic awareness and efforts of all involved. They also depend on conflict between hidden hegemonistic incentives and efforts for domination and control, built in the system and everyday practice on one side and emancipatory incentives on the other.

Therefore continuous and strict reflexive attitude and theoretical enlightening of concepts and suppositions on work are indispensable in schools. This holds also for the school practices, which seem undoubtedly advanced. In the first place this is true exactly for the stimulation of complex and critical thinking. Namely both of them refer to the most demanding thinking activities still in their names. The stimulation of criticism and complexity of thinking shall remain on the half of its way if it is not posed in the context of questioning of your own conceptual frames and suppositions and analysing effects both, on the side of teachers as well as on the side of pupils. Unless it happens that we remain in the frames of proficient training of thinking processes and skills – but critical and complex thinking is nevertheless not developed by this! Even worse: student training for definite skills (although for such fine activities as for example a debate is) can remain without the analysis of suppositions and efforts of one's own activity and without posing a question on the wholeness of social relations in the last phase on only one brilliant mechanism for conforming young people to the concurrency in the profit battle for the survival. And nothing more!

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DE BONOVE LEKCIJE ZA IZBOLJŠANJE MISELNE UČINKOVITOSTI V KONTEKSTU SLOVENSKIH OSNOVNIH ŠOL

Tamara Malešević

Osnovna šola Šmarje pri Jelšah

V slovenskih osnovnih šolah je že nekaj časa aktualno vprašanje, katere programe razvijati za spodbujanje razvoja identificiranih nadarjenih učencev. Vse relevantne usmeritve za spodbujanje nadarjenosti dajejo prednost razvijanju višjih kognitivnih procesov pred bogatenjem osnovne baze znanja. Zato je lahko sistematično razvijanje kritičnega mišljenja nadarjenih otrok pomemben prispevek k njihovemu razvoju.

Še vedno je odprta debata med zagovorniki programov direktnega poučevanja učinkovitega razmišljanja na eni strani ter zagovorniki, da je učiti misliti mogoče le posredno, skozi kurikulum.

Woolfolkova navaja nekatere izmed številnih programov, ki neposredno poučujejo spretnosti mišljenja: De Bonov sistem CoRT, program Odyssey: Kurikulum za razmišljanje, Winocurjev projekt vplivanja, Lipmanovo filozofijo za otroke, Meekerjev SOI (Woolfolk, 2002).

Teoretične predpostavke programa CoRT (Cognitive Reaserch Trust)

Inteligenca je potencial. Razmišljanje je veščina, s katero ta potencial izkoriščamo (De Bono, 1998: 17). Izurjenost misleca določa, kako bo ta potencial izkoriščen (ibid.: 20). Analogija: močan motor je mogoče voziti slabo, manj močen avto pa je mogoče voziti dobro. Razmišljanje je aktivna veščina, s katero inteligenca vpliva na izkušnje (ibid.: 21).

De Bono veščino razmišljanja primerja z modrostjo (ibid.: 21). Bistrost je zelo izostrena slika v kameri. Modrost je širokokotni objektiv. Ena glavnih nalog je učiti modrost (ibid.: 21).

Nič ne more visokointeligentnim ljudem preprečiti, da ne bi bili tudi odlični misleci. Vendar se to ne zgodi avtomatično. Veščino razmišljanja je vsekakor treba razviti (De Bono, 1998: 21).

Če si oseba dobro ogleda situacijo in jo oceni, medtem pa izpusti fazo raziskovanja, je to slabo razmišljanje (ibid.: 21). Mnogi viskointeligentni ljudje zavzamejo stališče do neke zadeve in potem uporabijo svojo inteligenco, da to stališče ubranijo (ibid.: 21). Past visokointeligentnih ljudi je, da dokazujejo, preden so raziskali, da so prepričljivi zaradi svoje verbalne spretnosti, da ohranjajo svoj imidž »vedno imeti prav« (De Bono, 1992: 15).

Teoretično bi moral biti vsakdo vesel, če v prepiru izgubi, saj ima tako na koncu več, kot je imel na začetku (De Bono, 1998: 27). Zaradi problemov »ega« De Bono pri učenju razmišljanja razvija tehnike, s katerimi ločimo razmišljanje od ega.

Razmišljanje ni nadomestilo za informacije, medtem ko so informacije lahko nadomestilo za razmišljanje. Kadar je znanje popolno in dovršeno, ni potrebe po razmišljanju – gre za rutinske zadeve, ki jih lahko postopno prepuščamo tehnologiji (De Bono, 1998: 19). Slaba je, da je inteligentnost v večji meri dedna. Dobra novica je, da za življenje potrebujemo učinkovito mišljenje, ki je manj odvisno od podedovane inteligentnosti. Mišljenje je po De Bonu veščina, katero se da razvijati. Eden izmed ciljev njegovih vaj CoRT je, da učence »spremeni » v mislece.

Misliti smo prisiljeni le zato, ker nimamo celovitih informacij. In ker ne moremo imeti vseh informacij, je bolj smiselno, da se usmerimo v izboljšanje učinkovitosti mišljenja.

Dobra vaja za razmišljanje ne sme biti težka. Zmerna težavnost zagotavlja rezultat, do katerega pridemo z urjenjem veščin. Ob tem utrjujemo svojo samozavest in smo motivirani za naslednje izzive.

Večino napak v razmišljanju predstavljajo napake v percepciji (De Bono, 1998). V vsakdanjem življenju si moramo percepcije izoblikovati sami. Boljšo percepcijo zagotavlja usmerjanje pozornosti. Večina tehnik (orodij) programa CoRT ima namen ravno usmerjati pozornost.

»Modrost je zasnovana direktno na percepciji. Modrost je sposobnost, da opazimo več stvari hkrati: stvari, ki so prisotne v tem trenutku, in stvari, ki se bodo zgodile v prihodnosti. Modrost nam omogoča, da na stvari gledamo različno« (De Bono, 1998).

Percepcija ima 2 aspekta: širino (zajeti čim več stvari) in spremembo (gledati na eno stvar različno).

Razmišljanje naj bi bilo *konstruktivno, kreativno in produktivno*.

De Bono visoko ceni operativno znanje – uporaba v Bloomovi taksonomiji. »Vedeti« je premalo. Temu je treba dodati KNOW HOW. Operativnost ali spretnost delovanja zahteva veliko različnih vidikov razmišljanja: poglede drugih ljudi, prioritete, cilje, alternative, posledice, ugibanja, odločitve, reševanje konfliktov, ustvarjalnost …

Domiselno ali lateralno mišljenje ima v osnovi provokacijo, špekulacijo. To je skok v neupravičeno, ki je nujno za spremembe, za ustvarjanje novih idej. Provokacijo sprožimo načrtno.

Lateralno mišljenje je miselna drža in sklop definiranih metod. Miselna drža vključuje pripravljenost gledati na stvari različno. Vključuje spoznanje, da je katerikoli način samo eden od mnogih. Vključuje razumevanje, kako razume, uporablja vzorce, pa tudi zavest o tem, da je treba pobegniti uveljavljenim vzorcem in preiti na boljše (De Bono, 1992: 61). Razmišljanje potrebujemo za: izume, ustvarjanje novih rešitev, ustvarjalnost, za načrtovanje ter ukvarjanje s prihodnostjo.

De Bono razlikuje reakcijsko in proaktivno razmišljanje. Reakcijsko razmišljanje nastopi, ko je problem popolnoma definiran, vse potrebne informacije pa so na razpolago. Proaktivno razmišljanje pomeni, da se mora učenec angažirati pri definiranju problema, z iskanjem informacij, z uporabno rešitvijo, da mora povzročiti določeno situacijo … Slednje je bolj tipično za življenje. Šola naj bi simulirala življenjske probleme in s tem bi učenci pridobivali uporabno, kakovostno znanje.

Na razmišljanje vplivajo še: logika, čustva, občutki, intuicija. De Bono zagovarja zavestno usmerjanje pozornosti na čustva in intuicijo v izbranem trenutku. Časovno bi moral ta prostor nastopiti po fazi raziskovanja, nikakor pred njim.

De Bono vztraja na omejeni uporabnosti kritičnega mišljenja. Trdi, da je kritično mišljenje reakcijsko mišljenje. Mora obstajati nekaj, kaj se bo kritiziralo. Vsekakor je lažje kritizirati kot ustvarjati. Ono je lahko le del razmišljanja in ne sme postati »drža«, ker se lahko izrodi v nevarno aroganco, ki lahko zavira kreativnost.

Kritično razmišljanje je dialog nasprotij. Kaj se zgodi, če ena stran naleti na podporo druge strani? Ali jo bo razkrila ali prikrila z retoriko ali ignorirala? To je pozicija »Jaz imam a priori prav, ti pa a priori nimaš prav«. Tako navidezno zagovarjanje trditev ima namen razvijati retoriko, pred tem pa poteka selektivno zbiranje argumentov. Izključuje objektivnost in iskreno raziskovanje resnice. Dokazuje subjektivnost subjektivnosti. Izkrivlja, prikriva zaradi zmage, prevlade. Takšni so včasih tudi sodni procesi.

De Bono je razvil sistem, ki opredeljuje pristope, principe, navade, osnovne operacije, orodja in strukture.

Principi razmišljanja so:

1. Vedno bodite konstruktivni.
2. Razmišljajte počasi in skušajte stvari poenostavljati, kolikor je to mogoče.
3. Ločite svoj ego od razmišljanja in bodite sposobni pogledati na svoje razmišljanje z distance.
4. Kaj skušam narediti v tem trenutku? Kaj je bistvo in namen mojega razmišljanja?
5. Bodite sposobni »menjati prestave« v vašem razmišljanju. Zavedajte se, kdaj je treba uporabiti logiko, kdaj ustvarjalnost in kdaj je treba poiskati informacijo.
6. Kaj je izid mojega razmišljanja – zakaj verjamem, da bo uspešno?
7. Občutki in čustva so zelo pomemben del razmišljanja, vendar pridejo na vrsto po raziskovanju in ne pred njim.
8. Vedno skušajte poiskati alternative, nove percepcije in nove ideje.
9. Bodite sposobni premikanja med ravnjo širokega razmišljanja in ravnjo podrobnega razmišljanja.
10. Ali gre tukaj za »mogoče« ali gre za »mora biti tako«? Logika je dobra samo toliko, kolikor so dobre percepcije in informacije, na katerih je zasnovana.
11. Nasprotujoči si pogledi so lahko vsi pravilno zasnovani na nasprotujočih si percepcijah.
12. Vsa dejanja imajo posledice in vplivajo na vrednote, ljudi in svet okoli nas.

Navade so nekakšni vedno prisotni načini razmišljanja, ki zagotavljajo učinkovitost:

1. Vsak trenutek moramo vedeti, kaj je *bistvo in namen* razmišljanja.
2. Mislimo *naprej* in *vzporedno* hkrati.
3. Zavedajmo se pomena *percepcije* in *logike*.
4. Vrednote – treba je ugotoviti, katere vrednote se skrivajo za določenim stališčem.
5. Definirajmo izide in zaključke.

Med orodja programa CoRT spadajo:

1. PNC (Prizadevanja, nameni, cilji) – usmerja pozornost k specifičnemu bistvu in namenu razmišljanja. Kaj hočemo doseči? Koristno za načrtovanje akcije.

2. UVF (Upoštevaj vse faktorje) – ima namen v fazi raziskovanja preučiti vse relevantne faktorje in gledati z različnih zornih kotov. Razširja percepcijo. Koristno za odločanje.

3. SDL (Stališča drugih ljudi) – če gre za situacije, ko so pomembni ljudje. Najprej se imenujejo vsi ljudje, ki jih stvar zadeva, zatem pa njihova stališča. Razširja percepcijo.

4. AMI (Alternative, možnosti, izbire) – usmerja pozornost predvsem po vzporednih možnostih.

5. PNZ (Pozitivno, negativno zanimivo) – sili misleca, da situacijo raziskuje, preden sprejme sodbo.To je orodje za usmerjanje pozornosti: najprej v pozitivno, potem v negativno ter v smer zanimivega. Koristno za reakcijo na sugestijo.

6. P & N (Posledica in nadaljevanje) – naravnano v prihodnost. Predvidevanje pri načrtovanju, izbirah, odločitvah, iniciativah. Koristno za reakcijo na sugestijo.

7. PPP (Prve pomembne prioritete) – pred odločitvijo je treba obnoviti prioritete. Uporabna je umetna meja – upoštevati prvih 3 do 5 prioritet. Koristno je za odločanje.

Program razmišljanja CoRT je izobraževalni program, ki je sestavljen iz 6 delov, od katerih vsak vsebuje po 10 lekcij – prevzeto z De Bonove internetne strani (viri):

Program CoRT	L e s s o n s
CoRT 1 BREADTH ŠIRINA DUHA	PMI (Plus, Minus, Interesting), CAF (Factors Involved), Rules, Consequences, Objectives, Planning, FIP (Priorities), APC (Alternatives), Decisions.
CoRT 2 ORGANISATION ORGANIZACIJA	Recognize, Analyze, Compare, Select, Find Other Ways, Start, Organize, Focus, Consolidate, Conclude.
CoRT 3 INTERACTION INTERAKCIJA	EBS (Examine Both Sides), Evidence: Type, Evidence: Value, Evidence: Structure, ADI (Agreement, Disagreement, Irrelevance), Beeing Right 1, Beeing Right 2, Beeing Wrong 1, Beeing Wrong 2, Outcome.
CoRT 4 CREATIVITY KREATIVNOST	YES, NO & PO, Stepping Stone, Random Input, Concept Chalenge, Dominant Idea, Define the Problem, Remove Faults, Combination, Requiremennts, Evalvation
CoRT 5 INFORMATION & FEELING INFORMACIJA in OBČUTJE	Information – FI & FQ,Questions – FQ & SQ, Clues – CS & CC, Contradiction Co & FCo, Guessing – SG & BG, Belief – BP & BO, Ready-mades – RM-H & RM-S, Emotions – EM & EG, Values – VH & VL, Simlification & Clarification – SF & CF
CoRT 6 ACTION AKCIJA	Target, Expand, Contract, TEC (Target, Expand, Contract), Purpose, Input, Solutions, Choice, Operation, TEC-PISCO

(Nazive lekcij sem ohranila v angleščini zaradi morebitnih napak pri prevajanju specifičnih pomenov znotraj sistema CoRT.)

Program CoRT so prvič uvedli leta 1982. Znotraj šolskega sistema je prisoten na celotnem področju Kanade, v nekaterih državah ZDA (Minnesota), v Rusiji: Šolski projekt 1 – poskusne šole in njihovi učitelji, na Kitajskem – na višji stopnji izbranih srednjih šol, 45 šol v Singapurju, v Maleziji na višji stopnji srednjih šol, v Bolgariji: po preizkusu se uvaja v vse šole, v Venezueli, Združenem kraljestvu, Avstraliji, Novi Zelandiji, Izraelu, Švedski, Kuvajtu, Pakistanu. Poleg izobraževanja je program CoRT prisoten v poslovnem svetu in javnih zadevah v različnih državah sveta.

Raziskave niso potrdile pomembnih sprememb po desetletni izvedbi programa v šolah Woolfolk, 2002.

Programi za nadarjene učence v osnovni šoli naj bi predvsem sledili višjim taksonomskim ciljem in zajemali vsa področja otrokovega razvoja: kognitivno (konvergetno in divergentno), moralno, duhovno, motivacijsko-čustveno, telesno.

Programi so kreativna priložnost za učitelje. Izstopili naj bi s predmetnih področij. Opremili naj bi učence z medpredmetnimi znanji in veščinami ter razvijali kritičen pogled na svet.

Razvijanje kritičnega, učinkovitega in ustvarjalnega mišljenja gotovo spada med cilje spodbujanja razvoja nadarjenosti.

PNZ (Pozitivno, negativno, zanimivo) tehnika E. de Bona za raziskovanje možnosti uvajanja lekcij CoRT za direktno učenje razmišljanja v programe za nadarjene učence slovenskih osnovnih šol

Pozitivni vidiki uvajanja lekcij CoRT v programe za nadarjene učence slovenskih osnovnih šol:

- Razvijanje spretnosti razmišljanja spodbuja transfer znanja in medpredmetna znanja. Veča se miselna angažiranost, miselna prožnost.

- Operativnost oz. spretnost delovanja in uporabe teoretičnih znanj vpliva pozitivno na konkretne rezultate in s tem na motivacijo.

- Lekcije so ekonomične, kratke, kar pomeni, da jih lahko večkrat uporabimo in s tem bolj utrjujemo. Verjetno se bo dolgoročno obrestovalo, če se bo uporaba orodij relativno avtomatizirala in se s tem njihova uporaba širila.

- Proaktivnost, iniciativa, raziskovanje posameznika je v duhu civilnodružbenega aktivizma – ukvarjanje z generativnimi temami, ekologijo ... Na drugi strani je pasivno, reaktivno razmišljanje.

- Program ni zasnovan na znanju iz enega določenega predmeta. Lahko uporabimo življenjske situacije, ki bodo zahtevale priklic ali učenje vsebin iz različnih šolskih predmetov. V ospredju so miselne spretnosti.

- Uspešni so lahko tudi učenci, ki imajo z učenjem težave, kar ugodno vpliva na njihovo doživljanje lastne kompetentnosti (Woolfolk, 2002).

- Spodbujanje ustvarjalnosti v programu CoRT se mi zdi še posebej pomembno z vidika nadarjenih, ki kažejo talent na področju ustvarjalnega mišljenja.

- Učinkovita poraba teh orodij gotovo utrjuje asertivnost osebe, saj je treba izražati svoja mnenja, izboljševati, dvomiti o predlogih, treba se je boriti za doseganje ciljev…

- Mentalno zdravje je definirano kot odsotnost krivde in skrbi, kar je povezano z učinkovitim reševanjem problemov, s kreativnostjo, fleksibilnostjo in z odprtostjo (Rutar, 2002). Program CoRT naj bi vplival na ustvarjalnost, racionalni pristop k reševanju problemov, k upoštevanju vseh zornih kotov, k razumevanju in upoštevanju mnenj drugih ljudi. Sklepamo lahko, da ugodno vpliva na mentalno zdravje bodočih odraslih ljudi.

To naj bi spodbujalo njegovo intelektualno avtonomijo. Predlagala bi uvedbo predmeta »Kritični in ustvarjalni bralec in mislec« na dodiplomskem študiju učiteljev. Podobno predlaga Rutar, ko navaja McLarna (Rutar, 2003): «Kritična pismenost pomeni zmožnost razpravljanja o temah, ki so za vse ljudi življenjskega pomena, če nočejo biti zgolj pasivni, ubogljivi, enoumni potrošniki.« To novo potrebo v pedagogiki imenuje kritična, revolucionarna ali progresivna edukacija. Konkretneje pomeni, da bi se učenci naučili razumevati, kaj pomenijo civilnodružbena gibanja, da bodo imeli pozitiven odnos do občestvenega aktivizma, da razvijamo pri njih kritično medijsko pismenost (ibid.).

Negativni vidiki uvajanja lekcij CoRT v programe za nadarjene učence slovenskih osnovnih šol:

- Uporaba teh veščin ni avtomatična, če jih učitelji drugih predmetov ne spodbujajo. Treba bi torej bilo usposobiti vse učitelje, da te spretnosti uporabljajo vsakodnevno pri svojem predmetu.

- Če je učinkovito razmišljanje primarni cilj programa, potem je pridobivanje znanj avtomatično v ozadju.

- Raziskave niso potrdile pomembne dejanske spremembe po 10 letih izvedb (Woolfolk, 2002).

- Dolgoročno se bodo pri učencih obrestovale le, če bodo relativno avtomatizirane.

- Prenatrpan predmetnik, ki težko dopušča dodajanje novih vsebin.

- Razdrobljenost lekcij avtomatično ne zagotavlja dejanske fleksibilnosti pri uporabi ter uvida v korist, ki jo le-te prinašajo.

Zanimivi vidiki uvajanja lekcij CoRT v programe za nadarjene učence slovenskih osnovnih šol:

- Med učenci je lahko prisotna tekmovalnost – kdo bo upošteval več dejavnikov, kdo bo gledal na stvar z več vidikov, ali pa »Zmaga tisti, ki izgubi«.

- Učitelji bi morali biti sami »uporabniki« tega programa, da bi jih avtomatično in spontano prenašali v ostale učne vsebine. Šele potem lahko usmerjajo dejavnosti učencev. Učitelj je kritični mislec.

- Mogoče je ugotoviti povezanosti med različnimi programi, ki razvijajo voditeljske sposobnosti, medpredmetne spretnosti (Marentič Požarnik), problemski pouk, (Strmčnik), ali programi, kot so: debatna tehnika, filozofija za otroke, RWCT, vzgoja za medije, retorika, metakognicija, emocionalna inteligentnost, transfer ...

Na splošno se zdi zanimivo začeti zadevo z nadarjenimi učenci – dobre izkušnje se bodo hitro »prijele« in začele uporabljati pri rednem pouku. Je pa to gotovo stvar kulture šole. Šola, ki premore sodelovanje, neposredno komunikacijo, vodenje razprav, pogajanja, reševanja problemov (po J. Bečaju), bo lažje uvajala razvojno-procesno kulturo in s tem gojila uporabna znanja, naravna, vseživljenjska znanja. Takšna šola bo mislila in govorila boljši svet.

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CRITICAL THINKING FOR A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSITY

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The Swedish Higher Education Act emphasises the developing of critical thinking skills as a major goal in all academic education (§8, Högskole-lagen, law 1992:1434). However, recent reports from Swedish Board of Education show that in the eyes of many teachers and students, university education does relatively little to develop the critical thinking skills of students. This problem is hardly unique for Sweden. For instance, Deanna Kuhn in an extensive empirical survey finds similar problems in American higher education. (Kuhn, 1999.)

The conditions for higher education have changed drastically in the last decades. Widening student recruitment, increasing social and cultural pluralism and more complex demands on the teachers, such as interdisciplinary teamwork and cooperation with the surrounding society, have coincided with drainage of time and resources for university teachers. Many teachers therefore state lack of resources as the major impediment to working with students' critical thinking skills.

But the problem is pedagogical as well as financial. There are certainly well thought-out pedagogical initiatives regarding critical thinking in many areas of the Swedish academic society, both within specialised courses and courses in other subjects. Nevertheless we find indications that training in critical thinking is often neglected, in Sweden as well as internationally.

We suspect that this is in part due to a wide-spread belief, that critical thinking skills cannot be trained separately, but are formed so to speak automatically as by-products in the development of knowledge in other fields. Some even seem to think that critical thinking skills should be left for the students to attain after they have completed their formal educations, so that university courses should comprise only the lower levels of

Benjamin Bloom's knowledge taxonomy: remembering, understanding, applying, analysing, synthesising, and evaluating.

Another problematic but seemingly wide-spread view is that critical thinking is equivalent to logical analysis, the identifying of logical fallacies in argumentation, and the correct use of scientific method. A preliminary survey of the Swedish national database on university courses shows that formal and informal logic, argumentation analysis, basic semantics and methodology and philosophy of science are the most common contents of both specialized courses in critical thinking and courses where critical thinking is one objective among others.

In a joint research project, which we are currently planning, we want to challenge both these views. We believe that critical thinking is more than logical reasoning, and we believe that critical thinking skills can and ought to be systematically trained. Pedagogic theories from cognitivism, through constructivism to socio-cultural theories, indicate that critical thinking skills cannot simply be left to evolve by themselves. Logic is doubtless an important ingredient in critical thinking, but it seems to us that the capacity to change viewpoints and study an issue from different perspectives is crucial for critical thinking in an increasingly pluralistic and multi-cultural society, and that therefore it should be considered an essential object for higher education to promote that capacity.

We find theoretical and practical inspiration for a pedagogy of multi-perspectival critical thinking in both the rhetorical tradition and in contemporary philosophy: in ancient and renaissance views of rhetoric as means for critical and creative reflection; in the sophistic movement, with its emphasis on the perspective-dependence of knowledge; in so-called ethical particularism, according to which ethical evaluation is radically context-dependent; in the didactic theories that evolved from Max Horkheimer's and Theodor Adorno's critical theory; and in theories of interpretation of others as based on empathy, or the imagining of oneself being in the other's position.

The sophistic tradition from Protagoras, Isokrates and Gorgias has recently re-emerged as a potential epistemology (a more correct notion might be »doxology«) (Cassin, 1986; McComiskey, 2002; Mendelson, 2002; Schiappa, 2003; Rosengren, 2003). One of the fundamental sophistic ideas is that we as humans and as individuals are inextricably tied to the idiosyncrasies of our senses, shaped by our culture and constrained by our language in ways which make all knowledge situated and context-dependent. While Plato interpreted Protagoras' thesis »Of all things the

measure is Man« as subjectivistic, the sophists themselves most likely drew a different conclusion. The perspective-dependence of all knowledge, they thought, does not prevent the evaluating and validating of views and arguments. However, such evaluations should take many different viewpoints into account. We extend our knowledge through dialogue, by letting our thoughts collide in argumentation with others and with ourselves, thereby widening our repertoire of perspectives for critical examination. Philological studies and close readings of sophistic sources have shown that sophists strived to develop a pedagogy for these ends (Clark, 1957; Jarret, 1969; Mendelson, 2002; Schiappa, 2003). A particularly interesting notion in this regard is the so called »anti-logic« elaborated in Dissoi logoi, »opposite opinions«, from approximately 400 B.C. This text by an unknown author elaborates a range of pedagogical tools for fostering the capacity to change and try out different perspectives. The underlying idea is that there are contradictory standpoints for all issues, and that the wisest way to deal with an issue is to examine it with curiosity and thoroughness from as many sides as possible, preferably in argumentation. For every view, the arguments for the opposite view (anti-logos) should be examined, and understanding evolves through a dialogue between different views. These ideas on knowledge and language were incorporated into Cicero's and Quintilian's pedagogy, in which controversia and argumentation in utramque partem, pro-et contra, played a vital role, and a critical and creative dialogue where opinions and views could meet was considered necessary, both for developing knowledge and for fostering good human beings and citizens.

Another source of inspiration for a pedagogy of multi-perspectival critical thinking is the rhetorical pedagogy of renaissance humanism. In opposition to the formalized and mechanical logic of the scholastic tradition, the humanists pointed to the classical rhetorical idea of topoi as a pragmatic method for heuristic interpretation and critical reflection on ethical and political issues (Jardine, 1974; Mack, 1993). They emphasized the fundamental role of language in creating the human life-sphere, not just as an inert tool, but as a dynamic power (Waswo, 1987), and stressed its situational character. Rudolphus Agricola's and Desiderius Erasmus' teachings offered pedagogical devices for a critical thinking as intellectual abundance, copia, and multi-perspectivism (Jardine, 1993; Moss, 1998). Humanists re-vitalized the idea of argumentation in utramque partem as a method for analysis and evaluation, and gave a central position in their

pedagogy to the rhetorical and ethical concepts of prudentia, »practical wisdom«, and decorum, »the appropriate« (Ekedahl, 2003).

Inspired by the sophistic and rhetorical tradition, Giambattista Vico, Emanuel Tesauro, Matteo Peregrini and other 16th century Italian philosophers attempted to deconstruct or transcend the gap between res and verba, thereby challenging Cartesian and Port Royal teachings. According to Vico, the Cartesian focus on logical analysis threatened to sterilize the students' faculty of creative elucidation and assessment if not accompanied by a pedagogy for perspective shift. Like Tesauro and Peregrini, Vico held that learning arises through analogical thinking, and that what is often thought of as mere figures of style and aesthetic ornamentation in language are in fact essential cognitive devices which structure impressions and concepts in internal and external dialogues.

A third source of inspiration is ethical particularism, a theory of moral epistemology first developed by Jonatan Dancy in Moral Reasons (1993). According to ethical relativists, moral reasoning can be well conducted without the applying of ethical principles, and this does not imply relativism (Kihlbom, 2002; Dancy, 2004). Dancy stresses that moral decisions must not assume that morally relevant features have equal relevance in all situations; the latter assumption is the »generalist mistake«. On the contrary, the particularist insists, a feature may count as a »pro« in one case and a »con« in another, and lack moral relevance in a third case, depending on other features of the cases. The clue to rational deliberation is to master use of the moral concepts, i.e. being able to argue that a feature is morally relevant in a case, based on arguments of similarity or contrast, but without appealing to general principles. Ethical particularism, we suggest, may be widened into a more general particularism about critical thinking, which contributes to both the rhetorical epistemology of perspectives and the pedagogy of critical thinking, and which also has consequences for the way we conceive objectivity.

A fourth tradition of ideas, which contributes to our project is so-called simulation or empathy theory in the philosophy of mind and in the philosophical theory of interpretation. (See for instance the contributions in Davies & Stone, 1995a and 1995b and Kögler & Stueber 2000.) Understanding an other human by means of empathy means imagining being in the other's situation – »in his shoes« – and seeing it from his or her perspective. This idea has been important in the hermeneutic tradition, in R. G. Collingwood's theory of historical understanding, and in recent analytical-philosophical debates on the nature of »folk psychology« and

the methodology of interpretation. One of the aims of our project is to deepen the understanding of the ways in which empathetic understanding is perspective-dependent. Drawing on recent truth -theoretical work on the notion of a perspective (Kölbel 2002, and others) and on so-called contrastive explanation theory in the philosophy of science (Bas van Fraassen, 1984, and others) it will be argued that the relation between the perspectives of the interpreter and other determines booth what constitutes an adequate explanation or interpretation, and what constitutes an expplanatory problem in the first place. Briefly stated, an action or utterance of the other is problematic for an interpreter if, from the perspective of the interpreter, it appears unreasonable, or less than motivated by the circumstances, and explaining it is to show that, everything considered, it was reasonable after all. Some aspects of perspectives are incapable of being true and false, or correct and incorrect, such as objects of comparisons or physical points of view, while others are capable of being true and false, or correct and incorrect, such as background factual and value assumptions. Where background assumptions differ, interpretation becomes in part a matter of integrating, or negotiating the perspectives of the interpreter and the other, and this is in part a matter of self-critical reflection concerning the interpreter's own background assumptions. Thus, interpretation by means of empathy leads to confrontation of incompatible perspectives, which in turn leads to criticism and self-criticism of underlying background assumptions, or presuppositions. As Charles Taylor once put it: »Understanding is inseparable from criticism, but this in turn is inseparable from self-criticism.« (Taylor, 1985: 131.)

In our group, we hope to develop these ideas further in our planned research project. We invite anyone interested to contact us for comments and suggestions.

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RHETORIC IN LESSONS OF ENGLISH IN VOCATIONAL PROGRAMMES OF UPPER SECONDARY EDUCATION

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Introduction

How English is taught in Slovene secondary schools is determined by three major factors: on one side there are educational legislation, regulations and directives, knowledge standards, attainment targets, educational goals, which are determined on the national level, on the other side there is usually a very heterogeneous group of students of a particular class, each student contributing to the classroom climate his/her unique abilities, knowledge, experiences and preferences. On the third side, as a kind of a mediator between the requirements of both, stands a teacher with his/her professional education, experiences, personal traits and values. Lesson planning and teaching are undoubtedly very demanding processes for everyone involved. They require constant adjustment and do not allow unchangeable, final answers to the questions that arise in the process.

This paper focuses on the value of rhetorical knowledge for the students and presents some of the more effective methods developed to present the students the rhetorical concepts and to develop their speaking skills as well as their social competences. It comments on the presented approach and offers some suggestions for effective teaching in such classes.

English in upper secondary vocational education

The project focused on the students of secondary vocational programmes of Salesman and Custodian. These programmes offer three years of

full-time education to students aged 15 to 17/18 years. The curriculum for the first programme includes 350 (two years and a half of four periods per week) and the second 208 (three years of two periods per week) hours of a foreign language. The project focused on this particular group of students to test the hypothesis that the teaching and implementation of rhetoric in a foreign language teaching and learning offers mechanisms which can alleviate some of the problems that arise in these classes.

In Velenje, the students who choose these two programmes are quite heterogeneous. Many a student is two years older than the majority of his/her peers because s/he has chosen this programme after s/he had not been successful in a four-year technical programme. The students also come from a wide range of social backgrounds. Many students in these two programmes are the first generation born in Slovenia to the labour immigrants who arrived in Slovenia in the 1970's and 1980's. Some of them came with their parents as war refugees in the 1990's. These students bring different cultural background and experiences to the classroom, which is then reflected in the classroom climate.

The foreign language proficiency of the majority of students attending these programmes is average or less than average (according to the primary school knowledge standards). They come with more or less negative past learning experiences and with a rather poor self-image and self-esteem. Often they want to assert themselves in front of their peers in ways which are not connected with knowledge or values they are being taught in school. Teaching in such classes can be very difficult and stressful for the teacher because s/he has to deal daily with discipline violations, work with often unmotivated students and, of course, stand his/her ground against the natural rebelling of the teenagers. The existing disciplinary measures are in most cases ineffective to maintain discipline and order daily and to keep interpersonal interactions at an adequate level.

In this situation a teacher is obliged to act according to the national educational legislation, regulations and recommendations. The Law on the Vocational and Technical Education states that such education should among other things:

- provide the students with the internationally comparable level of knowledge, skills and professional competences necessary to practice a profession and for lifelong learning,
- develop independent, critical judgement and responsible acting,
- support awareness of an individual's integrity,

- educate for responsible maintenance of peace and tolerant, peaceful and respectful co-existence with the others,
- develop and preserve one's own cultural traditions and inform about other cultures and civilisations,
- develop awareness of the rights and responsibilities of an individual and a citizen. (Uradni list 12/1996)

For the curricular subject of English there are two national Catalogues for secondary vocational schools, specifying the educational goals and didactic recommendations. One is from 1998 and the most recent one from 2003. This one is still in its development phase and anticipates the future programme reform.

The most recent catalogue presents more concrete and useful goals. Education should stimulate and develop those competences which prepare the students to be successful in their personal as well as professional life. An integral approach to language is emphasised and a communication model is recommended. This model is based on the following principles:

- foreign language proficiency enables and encourages interpersonal communication,
- communication is efficient if the speaker is linguistically and strategically independent, and
- a precondition for effective learning is the motivation to learn and use the language.

In the communication model teaching is focused on a student. A student and a teacher should equally contribute to a relaxed interaction; a teacher should present his/her knowledge to students and encourage them to achieve a higher level of independence, and students should actively participate in this process according to their abilities. The social integration of students is recommended by implementing activities such as team or project work. The catalogue recommends teachers to encourage students to take the initiatives, be innovative and to solve the problems of their environment. By developing these competences, students increase their awareness of the professional responsibility. Lesson plans and selected learning contents are recommended to be cross-curricular.

After finishing the vocational programme, students should acquire the following key competences:

- understanding the general message in simple and clearly formed oral or written texts and understanding the vocabulary from the most basic areas of personal and professional life,
- communicate about simple, everyday activities,
- speaking about him/herself, the others, various objects, living conditions and current activities,
- writing simple, short texts which are used in different circumstances (e.g. a warning, SMS, fax, a short personal letter, etc.)

The goals presented above are quite clear and directed not only towards increasing the integral linguistic proficiency and strategic competences in communication. They also develop those personal traits which will enable them to become productive members of society. It is difficult to disagree with that. However, when a teacher wants to implement this in his/her teaching practice, problems arise.

The catalogues presuppose an ideal situation in the classroom where students do not behave disturbingly and are highly motivated. A teacher works with a manageable group of students so s/he can monitor the achievements and progress of each one of them. In reality the students in vocational programmes are very difficult to motivate for work and large classes do not allow high-quality work due to the constant and numerous disruptions.

For bridging this discrepancy between the ideal and realistic situation, a teacher can rely only on his/her professional knowledge and autonomy to find (more or less successfully) the ways to lead students towards the presented teaching goals. In the following sections the teaching approach which was designed for the students of vocational programmes for the subject of English will be outlined. At the core of the approach was rhetoric.

Rhetoric in the classroom

The concept of rhetoric has shifted widely during its 2500 history. It this paper it is understood in the framework of its classical tradition as the art, technique or practice of persuasion through the use of language (cf. Encyclopedia Britannica, 1994-2002).

»Rhetoric in the sense of the means and techniques of persuasion appears in all societies. Every communication involves rhetoric. The speaker or the writer has an objective (-s) and rhetoric defines the ways of achieving those objectives within the framework of a given culture«.

(Kennedy, 2001: 19)

Following the classical tradition, rhetoric in this paper is approached through the five canons of classical rhetoric (*inventio*, *dispositio*, *elocutio*, *memoria*, and *pronuntiatio*) and the three modes of persuasion (ethos, pathos and logos).

Teaching rhetoric prepares an individual for his/her civil role. In a democratic society the conflicts between different ideas should be resolved verbally. The efficient use of arguments is in today's society the only possible, or rather the only sensible alternative to violence.(Perelman 1984: 199) Rhetorical knowledge should empower an individual to make a stand for his/her ideas, rights and interests. It should also enable him/her to recognise and defend himself/herself from manipulations and illogical argumentation.

Rhetorical knowledge is also very valuable in one's professional life. Conflicts of ideas and interests are also part of the very competitive global market. Concise use of language for expressing ideas and supporting them by arguments, practising the art of persuasion, advising to do or not to do something, explaining, being experienced in delivering speeches in public, all these are factors which decide if an individual will be professionally successful or not.

Nowadays, when the value of rhetorical knowledge is being increasingly recognised, rhetoric is re-entering general education in the form of selective subjects, debate clubs and the use of debate techniques in primary and secondary schools. Rhetoric can be very easily and organically incorporated into many of the existing curricular subjects. Since rhetoric does not limit the speakers by any particular content, it transcends the framework of a single discipline, and can be equally effectively incorporated into the lessons of a single discipline as well as the interdisciplinary lessons.

Rhetoric is not usually associated with the population of 15 to 17/18 year-olds attending vocational programmes. However, these students, being at a critical period of their personal development and in many cases at the last phase of their regular education, need to be offered some of the rhetorical knowledge within their upper secondary education too. Rhetoric does not only have positive effects on their personal

development, but also, as I will try to show in the following sections, on their learning of a foreign language.

The developed approach

It may seem at first glance that effective learning of rhetorical topics requires a good language proficiency of students and that they need to show interest for theoretical contents. The majority of students in vocational programmes lack both of these aspects. However, experience from teaching practice suggests that just the basic knowledge of a foreign language and the understanding of the rudimentary rhetorical concepts are enough to create a firm foundation for effective further study of rhetorical topics in the following years of the programme.

It is very important to start implementing the approach as soon as possible. In the first year, when the students' language proficiency is at the lowest point, the most emphasis is put on the acquisition of the basic vocabulary and grammar. At this phase, a lot is achieved already if the students adopt the new methods of work and establish tolerant and safe working environment. Later, when their speaking skills improve, the emphasis can shift gradually from very guided activities in which they mostly learn from given oral or written texts, to increasingly independent activities in which they learn by using the acquired vocabulary and structures creatively.

When selecting the areas of rhetoric for the classroom presentation, the primary criterion was their usefulness for the students in concrete life situations. The programmes Salesman and Custodian prepare the students to work in the service industry. Because the speaking and listening skills are here of primary importance (Catalogue, 1998), we focused mostly on these two skills.

The theoretical part of rhetoric was mostly taught in the form of a group work by means of illustrative examples. The groups were given specific tasks and their results were then commented on in the classroom. In these (guided) discussions the students were able to learn the basic principles of effective use of language and at the same time practise the art of persuasion and using arguments for evaluation of their products.

In this way they learned, for example about the importance and influence of the order of the text parts, the amount of and quality of information in the text, the type of addressee, the emotional elements

in the text, the importance of memorising, etc. They collected and shared the examples of good style from the songs, internet chats, movies, etc. Some of the rhetorical concepts were merely touched upon, some were devoted to several lessons. The amount of time and depth of the presentation depended on the student's interest and motivation for work and their active participation. In lower grades the learning content was mostly limited to the basics, in upper grades the students could already be given more complex tasks.

However, learning about the basic rhetorical concepts was not the primary goal – more time was spent and more emphasis was put on the practical use of language. This was carried out in the form of discussions and oral presentations. Since the students needed a clear goal, the purpose to their activities, two main goals were set already at the beginning of the school year:

1. to learn how to communicate with others; e.g. to have a conversation, make arrangements, explain, persuade, advise in pairs or groups, mostly in the form of discussions, and

2. to prepare a two-minute oral presentation on the topic of their choice.

Their participation in the discussions was assessed only with the student's agreement, the two-minute oral presentation was assessed for all the students.

Discussions were mostly conducted in three or four groups of students. Groups of students were solving problems or trying to reach an agreement on various issues. All discussions had a clear goal (e.g. to reach an agreement, find a solution, make a decision) and a time limit. Reaching a goal was less important than the process of discussing. When the students were still learning about this form of work, it was better if only one group was active at a time and the rest of the class would listen and later give their comments. Later, especially in higher grades in more disciplined classes, it was possible for groups to work simultaneously.

During the group work the students had to adapt to each other and respect everyone's freedom of speech. Personally offensive language was not allowed and was considered to be a sign of the speaker's argumentative weakness or a lack of relevant arguments. The groups who very successfully finished the task were rewarded, and those who were unsuccessful due to inactivity or a lack of discipline were punished. Reward and punishment were in most cases symbolical and were defined and agreed upon

beforehand by the students. This carrot-and-stick approach proved to be a strong motivational factor for the students and it often brought humorous effect to the lessons.

The topics were mostly chosen a few lessons before they were discussed. In this way it was possible for the students who wished to be assessed in the discussions to prepare for them. Among other topics, we discussed the relationship between money and happiness, (un-) attractiveness of stardom, the ethics of spending money on luxurious items, the influence of pornography on the teenagers. We searched solutions to the problem of inactivity of the students during the lessons, the problem of eating healthy food in our hectic world (an excellent opportunity to sort out personal priorities and practise modal verbs, adjectives and sentence connectives). We tried to reach a decision about the most efficient management of waste paper, an effective management of the personal free time and the time for school work. In the form of role-play the students had to persuade the customer about the quality of their products or argue for and against eating (un-)healthy food.

The student's two-minute oral presentation took place in the latter part of the school year. More complex topics could be presented by more than one student. The students were given an opportunity to enrich their vocabulary from the field which they found particularly interesting and to use and show the knowledge acquired during the school year(-s). As a preparation for those presentations, some students had test presentations during the first part of the school year. Those presentations were commented on in the classroom and if necessary, the students were offered individual consultations for their projects.

They learned how to search for and select information, and organise it effectively in their presentations. The grade depended on the effort put into the project and the quality of their oral presentation. The students were informed about the assessment criteria beforehand.

Evaluation of the presented approach

The presented approach can be assessed as promising for at least three reasons: firstly: the feedback from the students in connection with this approach has been mostly positive; secondly: it is in accordance with the current pedagogical and didactic recommendations, and thirdly: the assessed teaching results (according to the same knowledge standards)

have improved in classes where the presented approach was implemented. However, no definite conclusions can be offered yet because the number of students that have been included in the project is too small (65 students) and the approach is still being developed.

Among the used methods of work and selected topics, some proved to be more efficient than others. The more efficient ones followed the following three principles: usefulness (what will the students need later in their lives), concreteness (inductive approach) and shortness (less is more). Those three principles proved to be essential for the increase of the students' motivation in the secondary vocational programmes. These students often have an aversion to the teaching contents which will not be useful in their lives or the practical application of which is not immediately evident. They also dislike the contents which remain (only or for too long) on theoretical level and finally, the contents which require a long period of intense concentration to be understood or remembered.

The majority of the students looked forward to the rhetorical lessons of English because they were more active. The student's active participation is encouraged also in the current pedagogical and didactic publications:

> »Active learning is every activity in which the students work at a certain level of independence and organisational control, guidance and direction. ... It is intellectually stimulating and more effective for sustaining the students' motivation and interest. [It is also] more effective for acquiring many important skills (work organisation, mutual co-operation, exchanging opinions). The students like such activities because they are less intimidating than the activities where the teacher speaks and stimulate a more positive attitude to the student's individual role as well as to the subject«.
>
> (Kiriacou, 1997:.54)

Powell and Solity emphasise that students should be educated to take responsibility for their actions, acquire a critical and independent way of thinking in order to become active participants in the selection of the learning contents (Powell and Solity 1993: 16).

In the presented approach it was the students who mostly chose the topics and thereby their interest increased as well. This observation can be supported also by the recent didactic publications. Adamič (2005: 27-28) argues that the choice of the learning contents and their form always receives problematic extensions when the educational subjects become tied with the disciplines. Then the syllabus is too subjected to the narrow interests of a particular discipline and too little consideration is devoted to the students' interests, which need to be developed, and the requirements of society. Human interests have an incredible motivational

potential for learning and a substantial influence on the quality of the learned contents.

As the work in the classroom was carried out mostly in groups and pairs, co-operation and empathy increased among the students, they developed tolerance towards the different and trust towards the teacher and the peers. Friendships among some of the students became closer. This pattern of relationships among the students enabled different individuals not to feel alienated if they wanted to preserve their identity. The discipline consequently improved, because, as Strike (2005: 23) points out, the main enemy of discipline is alienation. Integration is its cure.

It may seem at the first sight that the presented approach is trying to sell already seen things under a new name. After all, pair-work and group-work have been around in the foreign language teaching for a long time. However, there is a substantial difference here. Traditional pair-work seldom transcended the framework of the more or less mechanical use of the taught conversational pattern. The same pattern was used several times with minor modifications. In a more traditional implementation of group-work the emphasis was put on the result and not so much on the process. Because communication did not arise from an authentic need, and because it was easier to arrive at the result by using the mother tongue, it was difficult to motivate the students to work in groups in a foreign language.

The essential difference in the presented approach is in the fact that the communication is approached in a comprehensive way, it is thematically open and theoretically systemised. It sets up a more authentic and complex communicative situation where one needs to consider:

- what it is that you want to say,
- how you succeed in saying what you mean,
- what the addressee expects you to say,
- what the addressee thinks you will say and
- what the addressee thinks was your purpose.

These are the challenges our students will need to respond to when they communicate in a foreign language as well as in their mother tongue. It is as unrealistic to expect that the students in vocational programmes can completely master these complex tasks as it is unrealistic to expect that they cannot do it at all.

The presented approach to the teaching of English brings also problems and opens up new questions that require more research. One

of the problematic areas is the right balance between the focus on the communication and the focus on the language in the narrow sense (vocabulary, grammar, pronunciation, etc.). This aspect of a foreign language still needs to be taught and practised because it enables effective communication. More traditional teaching methods seem more effective in this respect. Experience gained in the project suggests that the right balance depends primarily on the particular structure of the students in a class and their level of English. In general, it seemed most effective to dedicate approximately one third of the lessons to the rhetorical workshops.

Another problem is related to the individual character traits of the students and their level of English. The presented approach is very stimulating for extroverted and linguistically proficient students. For the introverted students and/or those who are linguistically extremely weak (according to my experience a very small proportion of students), the communicative approach can be quite intimidating, especially in the beginning. They often do not want or do not know how to participate in those activities and therefore start feeling excluded, which brings more problems with discipline. With these students it is necessary to work on the emotionally safe working environment, the development of trust and positive self-esteem. With the students involved in the project it sometimes proved to be effective to appoint a peer translator for the ones who wanted to participate in discussions but were not able to due to their weak English.

Conclusion

Kroflič (2005: 10) emphasises that the goal of education is not only the acquisition of new theoretical knowledge. It is equally important for the teacher to help the young to develop mechanisms to create an appropriate culture of inter-relationships in the classroom and in school, so that they can deepen their trust, create new friendship ties with the peers, develop a personal capacity to empathise with those who are different, develop appropriate forms of co-operation and healthy competitiveness. The presented approach effectively addresses these issues as well. It is in concordance with the Slovene educational legislation, the national standards of knowledge for the subject of English and the findings of many contemporary didactic and pedagogical experts. The main advantages of the presented approach can be summarised in the following points:

- since it is based on the active participation of the student, it increases their motivation and thereby their learning results,
- it integrally develops the student's speaking skills in quite realistic situations which they will encounter later in their lives,
- it develops strategies of co-operation and tolerance to the different,
- it develops the student's sense of responsibility for themselves and the others,
- it improves the discipline in the classroom.

The presented experiences and findings are not intended to represent the final answers or the universal recipe for the teachers of English in three-year vocational programmes of secondary education. The aim of this paper is to highlight for the general and scholarly public the substantial educational potential of rhetoric for the subject of English in the upper secondary vocational education as well as for school education in general. In spite of this potential, rhetoric is still not generally included into the system of undergraduate education of teachers.

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UPORABA DEBATNIH TEHNIK PRI POUKU ZGODOVINE V 2. IN 3. LETNIKU GIMNAZIJE

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Uvod

Vsak učitelj se na svoji poklicni poti sreča s številnimi prenovami učnih programov. Ti naj bi izboljšali kakovost pouka in dijake oziroma učence opremili s kakovostnejšim, uporabnejšim in trajnejšim znanjem. Prej ali slej se vsak sooči tudi z izkušnjo, da je nove ideje težko uveljaviti, saj je za to treba ogromno časa in energije, uspeh pa nikakor ni zagotovljen. Karavana namreč velikokrat gre dalje, ne glede na vse predloge in prenove.

Kljub temu se veliko učiteljev odloči za težjo pot in poskuša uveljaviti različne načine poučevanja, nagrada pa je ponavadi zadovoljstvo, da so dijaki dobili več, kot se sicer pričakuje od običajnega učitelja. Večina dijakov in njihovih staršev na srečo to zna ceniti.

Sam sem bil dokaj natančno seznanjen s predlogi o didaktični prenovi gimnazij, prav tako je bilo teoretično znanje, ki sem ga pridobil med študijem, vključno z Marzanovo in Bloomovo taksonomijo ter procesnim uresničevanjem ciljev, še dokaj sveže. Moj pouk zgodovine pa je kljub temu vseboval zelo malo principov, ki jih omenjene teorije podpirajo. Nenehno se mi je zastavljalo vprašanje, kako naj v razredu uveljavim aktivno vlogo učenca kot enega izmed bistvenih didaktičnih principov poučevanja in obenem dosežem vse vsebinske cilje učnega načrta. Pogled na količino podatkov v učbenikih me je navdajal s strahom. Prepričan sem bil, da lahko takšno količino podatkov v razredu usvojimo le s frontalnim poukom, v katerem prevladuje razlaga z redkimi priložnostmi za pogovor. Tudi uporaba avdiovizualnih sredstev (video, predstavitev v Power Pointu) se mi ni zdela dovolj učinkovita. Dijakom z njimi lahko zares plastično prikažemo dogajanje, vendar so ob njih še vedno popolnoma pasivni. Poskušal sem tudi z uvajanjem seminarskih nalog, vendar so dijaki večinoma kopirali že izdelane naloge, ki so na voljo na različnih straneh na medmrežju, borne

predstavitve nalog pa so bile povod, da sem se končno odločil za uporabo debatnih tehnik.

Debato sem zelo dobro poznal, saj sem kot somentor debatnega kluba že tri leta uspešno pomagal dijakom pri pripravah na regijske, državne in mednarodne turnirje. Razlog, da debate nisem uveljavil prej, pa ni bil v nepoznavanju le-te, ampak predvsem v mojem dojemanju pouka zgodovine. Danes sem prepričan, da bi moral debato uvesti v pouk takoj, ko sem postal mentor debatnega kluba.

S člankom želim predvsem predstaviti svoje izkušnje in obenem spodbuditi vse, ki bi radi, da bi bili dijaki pri pouku zgodovine dejavnejši, da izberete debato kot eno izmed kakovostnih in uporabnih metod poučevanja.

Cilji pouka zgodovine

Splošne cilje učnega načrta za predmet zgodovina lahko glede na vrsto znanja po Marzanovi klasifikaciji razdelimo v tri skupine (Rutar Ilc, 2005: 8).

V prvo skupino spada vsebinsko znanje. Dijak mora poznati slovensko, evropsko in svetovno zgodovino. Med splošnimi cilji učnega načrta sta zelo pomembna dva učna cilja: »dijaki naj pridobijo znanje o pomembnih dogajanjih, pojavih in procesih iz svetovne, evropske in slovenske zgodovine« in »dijaki naj pridobijo znanje o življenju, delu, miselnosti in znanstvenih dosežkih, gospodarskih procesih in socialnih odnosih v različnih zgodovinskih obdobjih« (Zgodovina, predmetni katalog – učni načrt, str. 3).

V drugo skupino spada proceduralno znanje. Sem spada sposobnost uporabe temeljne zgodovinske terminologije, uporaba vseh vrst zgodovinskih virov, iskanje različnih zgodovinskih virov, sistematičen prikaz določenega dogajanja ali procesa. Dijak s tem znanjem obvlada določene spretnosti. Med splošnimi cilji učnega načrta spada v to skupino med drugim učni cilj: »dijaki se usposabljajo za uporabo zgodovinske karte, virov in besedil ter za samostojno delo in razvijajo zanimanje za družboslovno proučevanje in raziskovanje« (Zgodovina, predmetni katalog – učni načrt, str. 3).

V tretjo skupino spada problemsko, procesno ali tudi vseživljenjsko znanje. To nastaja s prepletanjem uporabe in usvajanja prvih dveh skupin znanj. Med vseživljenjska znanja tako spada zmožnost razlage soodvisnosti različnih pojavov, ovrednotenje pomena določenega zgodovinskega dogajanja, kritično presojanje in primerjava zgodovinskih virov, samostoj-

no in strokovno predstavljanje podatkov, dogodkov, argumentov in proti-argumentov, izražanje osebnih stališč. Dijak je s pridobljenim procesnim znanjem sposoben samostojno uporabljati in nadgrajevati svoje zgodovinsko znanje. V splošnih ciljih učnega načrta sta med drugim navedena tudi naslednja procesna cilja »dijaki razvijajo sposobnost za komuniciranje in izražanje misli o zgodovinskih dogajanjih« in »dijaki se naučijo ločevati vzroke, povode in posledice ter ugotavljati soodvisnost različnih pojavov, kontinuitete in sprememb v razvoju ter si tako razvijajo zgodovinski način mišljenja« (Zgodovina, predmetni katalog – učni načrt, str. 3).

Razlogi za uporabo debatnih tehnik

Splošni cilji učnega načrta so usmerjeni v usvajanje vseh skupin ciljev Marzanove taksonomije. Za dosego vseh ciljev, na primer iskanje različnih zgodovinskih virov ali njihove vrednotenje, vsekakor ne morejo zadoščati le razlaga, pogovor ter preverjanje in ocenjevanje znanja, ki so ga ob tem pridobili. Kljub temu večina profesorjev zgodovine pri pouku uporablja predvsem metodo razlage in pogovora.

Znanje in razumevanje dijakov programa gimnazije je tako na sorazmerno visoki ravni, kar je v veliki meri zasluga učbenikov in dela učiteljev, močno pa je zapostavljeno procesno in problemsko znanje, saj so dijaki sposobni predvsem reproducirati podane informacije pri pouku ali v učbenikih.

Uporaba debatnih tehnik pri pouku zgodovine pa učitelja in dijake bolj usmerja v usvajanje procesnih in problemskih/vseživljenjskih ciljev. Prek debate se dijaki tako v večji meri usposobijo za samostojno raziskovanje, razumevanje, vrednotenje in interpretiranje zgodovinskih obdobij, idej, dogodkov in oseb.

Izobraževalna debata v Sloveniji

Izobraževalna (tudi formalna) debata kot oblika strukturirane diskusije ima v Veliki Britaniji in ZDA dolgo tradicijo. V Sloveniji pa sta debato leta 1996 začela sistematično spodbujati Soroseva fondacija in Zavod za odprto družbo, kasneje pa neprofitna organizacija Za in proti, Zavod za kulturo dialoga. Formalna debata je za pouk primerna zato, ker natančno določena pravila o poteku debate in o vlogi udeležencev omogočajo

izvedbo debate v šolski uri, ohranjajo pogovor v okviru izbrane teme in preprečujejo nastajanje osebnih napadov in konfliktov.

Cilj formalne debate je spodbujati kritično mišljenje, razvijati logično argumentacijo in usposobiti dijake za sproščeno in učinkovito predstavljanje idej v govorni komunikaciji. Obstaja več formatov (modelov) formalne debate. V Sloveniji se na debatnih prvenstvih uporabljata svetovni debatni format ter model Karl Popper debate. Formalna debata je v slovenskem jeziku najbolje predstavljena v delih Odkrijmo svet s pomočjo debate (Driscoll in Zompetti, 2005) in Priročnik za Karl Popper debatni program (Johnson, 1997), na kratko pa jo predstavlja v okviru zbornika prispevkov z naslovom Spodbujanje aktivne vloge učenca v razredu tudi Jasna Vesel pod naslovom Uporaba debatnih tehnik pri pouku (Vesel, 2005: 62).

Vsebina debate vedno izhaja iz določene izjave ali trditve, ki je običajno vnaprej določena. Izbrano trditev zagovarja ena skupina (zagovorniška stran), druga skupina pa trditvi nasprotuje (nasprotniška skupina). Obstaja natančno določen vrstni red govorcev, pri čemer je bistveno, da izmenično govorijo predstavniki zagovorniške in nasprotniške skupine. V okvir debate ponavadi spada tudi navzkrižno zasliševanje. Vsaka ekipa ima na voljo tudi vnaprej določen pripravljalni čas. Število govorcev, njihove naloge ter časovna omejitev govorov, zasliševanja in pripravljalnega časa so odvisni od izbire debatnega formata.

Debata je pri pouku uporabna tudi zato, ker lahko debatne formate prilagajamo našim časovnim in vsebinskim omejitvam. Držati se moramo le načela, da je mogoče trditev enakovredno zagovarjati in ji nasprotovati ter da imata tako zagovorniška kot nasprotniška skupina na voljo enake pogoje (predvsem čas).

Uvajanje debate v pouk zgodovine

Debata se uspešno uveljavlja v debatnih klubih in v televizijski oddaji Tekma, kljub temu pa je pomembno, da dijakom jasno in natančno predstavimo pravila debatiranja, saj večina dijakov debatiranja ne pozna. Za uvajanje debate v pouk zgodovine potrebujemo vsaj dve šolski uri, odvisno od sposobnosti in motiviranosti razreda. Najboljši princip uvajanja je

kombinacija razlage in pogovora s praktičnimi preizkusi, ki naj na začetku temeljijo tudi na principu igre.

Osnovne pojme o debati in debatnih tehnikah dijakom tudi strokovno razložimo s pomočjo jasne tabelske slike, najlažje pa s pomočjo predstavitve Power Point, pri kateri lahko tudi s fotografijami in kratkimi video posnetki. prikažemo vlogo posamezne skupine in govorcev. Zelo koristno je, da vsak dijak dobi list (delovno gradivo) z najpomembnejšimi informacijami (format, vloga govorcev, resolucija, argument, podpore, negiranje nasprotnika).

Najpomembnejši del priprave na debatiranje so različne vaje, ob katerih se dijaki aktivno srečajo z debato in spoznavajo vse njene elemente po korakih (Driscoll in Zompetti, 2005: 89–109).

Če učitelj namerava debato tudi ocenjevati, mora dijakom pred začetkom natančno razložiti način ocenjevanja govorcev. Koristno je, če dijakom razdeli tudi liste s kriteriji za ocenjevanje. Z odločitvijo o načinu ocenjevanja je sicer dobro počakati do konca izvedbe poskusne/-ih debat, s čimer preprečimo odpor do debate zaradi strahu pred neznanim.

Primeri vaj:

1. Dijaki oblikujejo trditev, ki se nanaša na določeno zgodovinsko obdobje.

2. Dijaki navedejo argument in/ali protiargument na določeno trditev.

3. Možganska nevihta, pri kateri dijaki na določeno trditev zapišejo vse ideje brez miselnih korektur.

4. T – tabela, pri kateri dijaki narišejo v zvezek črko T in na levo napišejo seznam pozitivnih, na desno pa seznam negativnih asociacij.

5. Dijaki s pomočjo učbenika poiščejo podpore, dokaze, s katerimi podkrepijo določen argument.

6, Dijaki, razdeljeni v dve skupini, sestavijo na določeno trditev en argument. Nato skupini druga drugi zastavljata vprašanja.

7. Dijaki negirajo že oblikovane argumente na določeno trditev.

8. Dijaki se usedejo ali stojijo v krogu, učitelj enemu izmed njih vrže žogo. Ta mora oblikovati argument na izbrano trditev (mogoče je tudi, da trditev ni izbrana). Nato ta vrže žogo sošolcu, ki mora argument spodbijati in oblikovati protiargument. Igra se tako nadaljuje, dokler dijaki uspejo odgovarjati oziroma dokler se argumenti ne začnejo ponavljati. Potem izberemo novo debatno trditev.

9. V igri vlog, t. i. balonu, si mora vsak dijak izbrati zgodovinsko oseb-nost (lahko iz določenega zgodovinskega obdobja). Vsak ima nalogo s pomočjo igre vlog prepričati publiko (razred), da si ta oseba edina zasluži, da ostane na balonu, ki zaradi okvare lahko nosi težo le enega človeka. Ostali dijaki odločijo zmagovalca in ocenjujejo kakovost na-stopa in argumentacije.

Izbira debatnega formata

Debatni formati, ki se uporabljajo na debatnih prvenstvih, pri pouku pra-viloma niso uporabni, ker za njihovo izvedbo potrebujemo več kot 45 mi-nut. Debatne formate je zato treba prirediti. Najbolje je, da se na začetku uporabijo krajši in enostavnejši debatni formati. Formate je dobro prila-goditi tudi glede na sposobnosti in motivacijo dijakov.

Dijaki 2. in 3. letnika gimnazije pri pouku zgodovine debatirajo v de-batnih formatih 2 + 2 z vprašanji publike ali navzkrižnim zasliševanjem nasprotne ekipe ter v debatnem formatu 3 + 3 z navzkrižnim zasliševa-njem. Debatni format Karl Popper, na katerem temeljijo navedeni formati, je predstavljen v priročniku Odkrijmo svet s pomočjo debate (Driscoll, Zompetti 2005, 8–11).

Debatni format 2 + 2 z navzkrižnim zasliševanjem in dvema minuta-ma pripravljalnega časa:

	Del debate	Čas
1.	Zagovorniški govor (1. govorec afirmacije)	2 minuti
2.	Negacijsko navzkrižno zasliševanje	1 minuta
3.	Negacijski govor (1. govorec negacije)	2 minuti
4.	Zagovorniško navzkrižno zasliševanje	1 minuta
5.	Drugi zagovorniški govor (2. govorec afirmacije)	2 minuti
6.	Drugi negacijski govor (2. govorec negacije)	2 minuti

Poskusna debata

Poskusna debata je pomembna tako za učitelja kot za dijake, še posebej, če se z debato srečujejo prvič. Učitelj in dijaki se bodo namreč namesto na vsebino morali bolj osredotočiti na obliko debate. Pri uvodni debati

je nujno, da se vanjo vključi celoten razred in da ima vsak dijak določeno zadolžitev, kar je pri večkratni uporabi debat težje izvedljivo.

Dijaki, razdeljeni v skupine, merijo čas, ocenjujejo neverbalno in verbalno komunikacijo, organizacijo govorov, si zapisujejo argumente in podpore, zastavljajo vprašanja (pri formatu, kjer zaslišuje publika) in odločajo o zmagovalcu.

Na koncu debate skupine predstavijo svoje ugotovitve, učitelj pa natančno analizira govore vseh govorcev ter dopolni ugotovitve dijakov. Pri tem mora dijake predvsem spodbujati k napredku in se osrediniti na dobre plati govorov. Obenem mora opozoriti na vsebinske napake v govorih, zaradi katerih bi si lahko dijaki začeli napačno razlagati določene zgodovinske osebe ali dogodke. Najboljši način za natančno analizo debate je snemanje z videokamero in ogled debate v eni izmed naslednjih ur.

Dijaki 2. letnika Gimnazije Celje-Center so pri pouku zgodovine debatirali na dve debatni trditvi: »Cerkev je v srednjem veku družbi povzročila več škode kot koristi« in »Življenje v mestih je bilo v srednjem veku lepše kot na podeželju«.

Mnenje dijakov

Naklonjenost dijakov določeni učni obliki ali metodi je pomembna s stališča motivacije dijakov in s stališča učitelja, ki tudi na podlagi odziva dijakov lahko spreminja svoj način poučevanja. Ob koncu šolskega leta je zato smiselno s pomočjo anonimnega anketnega vprašalnika ugotoviti odnos dijakov do debate in pouka zgodovine.

V šolskem letu 2005/2006 je 85 dijakinj in dijakov 2. letnikov na Gimnaziji Celje-Center izpolnilo vprašalnik Likertovega tipa, ki se je nanašal na uporabo debate pri pouku zgodovine. Vprašalnik je vseboval trditve, ob katerih so dijaki obkrožili številke od 1 do 5. Višja je bila obkrožena številka, večja je bila stopnja strinjanja dijakov s trditvijo. Pouk zgodovine je bil dijakom dokaj všeč (ocena 3,4). V manjši meri so bili prostovoljno pripravljeni debatirati pri pouku zgodovine (2,8). V veliki meri (3,7) so se strinjali, da jim bo spretnost debatiranja koristila v poklicnem in zasebnem življenju. Večinoma si dijaki niso želeli ocenjevanja debat (2,0). Raje kot debato imajo pouk, pri katerem učitelj razloži vse, kar se morajo naučiti (3,4).

Anketa je pokazala, da se dijaki zavedajo uporabnosti znanja, ki ga bodo pridobili ob debatiranju. Uporaba debate pri pouku zgodovine dija-

kom ni všeč predvsem zato, ker se morajo na debato pripravljati in ker jih je strah javnega nastopanja pred razredom ter pred učiteljem. Še posebej odklonilno mnenje so dijaki imeli glede ocenjevanja debat, kar pa je bilo razumljivo, saj do takrat niso bile ocenjevane in zato niso poznali kriterijev ocenjevanja. Posebej problematična je želja dijakov, da bi profesorji dijakom predvsem servirali informacije, ki se jih morajo naučiti, kar je ravno v nasprotju s cilji in principi, ki jih v pouk zgodovine uvaja uporaba debatnih tehnik. Pomembno je, da se učitelj zaveda, kakšno je mnenje dijakov, vendar to ne pomeni, da se mora prilagoditi (vsem) njihovim željam. Lahko pa spremeni določene elemente pouka in tako poveča naklonjenost dijakov določeni učni metodi.

Ocenjevanje debat je najzahtevnejša in najobčutljivejša faza debate pri pouku, zato je nujno treba z ocenjevanjem debat počakati toliko časa, dokler dijaki debate ne sprejmejo kot sestavni del pouka. Če so dijaki nezadovoljni, je mogoča rešitev dogovor, da se v redovalnico vpišejo ocene le tistim, ki to želijo. V tem primeru se neresnost pri debatiranju prepreči tako, da se sodelovanje pri debatah v vsakem primeru upošteva pri zaključevanju ob koncu šolskega leta.

V vsakem razredu je nekaj dijakov, ki imajo strah ali celo odpor do javnega nastopanja. Tem dijakom je dobro ponuditi sodelovanje v lahkih in kratkih debatnih formatih (na primer balon) ali pa jih celo kako drugače zaposliti (na primer iskanje virov za eno izmed ekip, merjenje časa). S tem preprečimo, da bi se njihov odpor do nastopanja še povečal, a so kljub temu vključeni v potek debat.

Izvajanje debat

Dve uri pouka tedensko in obsežen učni načrt težko omogočata, da bi v vsakem šolskem letu lahko debatirali vsi dijaki. Pomembnejše je, da se debata kot učna metoda uveljavi pri pouku in da se z njo neposredno ali posredno med šolanjem vsi dijaki vsaj seznanijo. V šolskem letu je smiselno izpeljati štiri ali pet debat. Število debat in njihova oblika sta v največji meri odvisna od razreda. Najbolje je, da predvidene debate vključimo v časovno razporeditev učne snovi.

V šolskem letu 2006/2007 bodo dijaki 3. letnika Gimnazije Celje-Center tako debatirali na naslednje debatne trditve:

1. Turški vpadi so slovenskemu narodu koristili.

2. Reformacija je katoliški cerkvi koristila.
3. Uvedba absolutizma je bila upravičena.
4. Francoska revolucija je povzročila več škode kot koristi.
5. Program Zedinjene Slovenije je pomembnejši od zemljiške odveze.

Najbolje je, da se za sodelovanje v debati dijaki javijo sami. Če nihče ne želi sodelovati prostovoljno, skupine določi učitelj. Na vsako debato se dijaki pripravljajo 14 dni. Pred začetkom priprav učitelj ob upoštevanju mnenj dijakov in njihovih sposobnosti določi debatni format. V času priprav dijaki oblikujejo argumente, pregledujejo dostopno knjižno gradivo v knjižnicah in na medmrežju, s katerim argumente podkrepijo z dokazi ter se po lastni želji posvetujejo z učiteljem.

Zaradi čim večje učinkovitosti je dobro, da so v razredu že vnaprej določeni dijaki, ki poskrbijo za primerno ureditev učilnice in merjenje časa. Učitelj mora med debato poskrbeti za pozornost in zbranost ostalih dijakov ter preprečiti kakršnekoli oblike sovražnega govora, še posebej ob občutljivih temah, na primer pobojih domobrancev. S tem se dijaki učijo imeti spoštljiv odnos do sogovornika in splošnih vljudnostnih pravil.

Zelo pomembno je, da na koncu debate namenimo vsaj 10 minut časa za pogovor o izbrani temi, navedenih argumentih ter dokazih. Za debato 2 + 2 z vprašanji publike in analizo tako potrebujemo 26 minut. Ne glede na to, ali se debata ocenjuje ali ne, je nujno, da si učitelj zapiše razlago argumentov in najpomembnejša dejstva, saj le tako lahko na koncu debate poda izčrpno analizo in objektivno oceni govore posameznih dijakov. Če so v delo vključeni tudi ostali dijaki, mora učitelj oceniti in ustrezno pohvaliti tudi njihovo delo. Učitelj mora povzeti bistvene točke debate, jo povezati z obravnavano učno snovjo ter opozoriti na morebitne napake ali pomanjkljivosti v navajanju, razlagi ali interpretaciji.

Pri ocenjevanju učitelj upošteva nastop, organizacijo in predvsem argumentacijo. Pri argumentaciji mora govorec/-ka navesti argument, ga razložiti in podpreti z dokazi. K argumentaciji spada tudi negiranje nasprotnih argumentov. Ocenjevanje debat poveča njihov pomen. Z ocenjevanjem naj bi predvsem nagradili dijake za njihovo prizadevnost in kreativnost.

Evalvacija izvedenih debat

Po intenzivnih pripravah na debato in poskusni debati dijaki dokaj dobro razumejo naloge posameznih govorcev in ekip ter poznajo osnovne principe nastopanja. Še vedno pa je težko napovedati, kako dobri bodo dijaki pri izvedbi same debate. Ti se med seboj izredno razlikujejo v načinu nastopanja, najbolj pa se razlikujejo v sposobnostih razumevanja, argumentiranja, predstavljanja idej in kritičnega zavračanja. Večina dijakov ima velike težave pri argumentaciji, še posebej pri sposobnosti povezave določenih dejstev, ki jih navedejo z določeno vrednoto in trditvijo, katero zagovarjajo. Težavo dijakom predstavlja tudi negiranje nasprotnih argumentov, ker ne znajo poslušati nasprotnika, saj so prepričani, da je »za zmago dovolj, če navedeš svoje podatke«. Kljub težavam pri argumentaciji dijaki v debatah pokažejo visoko mero inovativnosti in zavzetosti, napreduje pa tudi kakovost njihovih debat. Tako je običajno, da bodo dijaki hitro predlagali, da se dolžina govorov podaljša. Največji napredek ob izvajanju debat je viden pri nastopih dijakov, medtem ko je napredek v argumentaciji močno povezan s kakovostjo priprave na debato. Dijaki, ki se posvetujejo s profesorjem, se ponavadi bolje izkažejo kot tisti, ki se zanašajo le na lastno znanje.

V nadaljevanju je predstavljena analiza in primerjava govorov med poskusno in eno izmed rednih debat, ki naj bi prikazala kakovost argumentacije dijakov v 3. letniku gimnazije in njihov napredek. Podobna analiza je lahko tudi osnova za ocenjevanje.

Nastop:
Nekateri dijaki so ob prvem nastopu (balon, poskusna debata) imeli težave z nastopom. Tako je na primer dijakinja po enem stavku doživela blokado in končala s svojim govorom. Nekateri so le prebrali tri ali štiri stavke, ki so jih napisali na list. V podobnih primerih je treba dijake predvsem spodbujati, da ne obupajo, in zahtevati, da se naslednjič bolj potrudijo.

V rednih debatah so dijaki že suvereno nastopali. Večina je dobro uporabljala glas (višino, ritem), s katerim so pritegnili publiko in poskušali poudariti svoje trditve. Več jih je imelo težave z gibanjem rok in telesno držo (gibanje telesa naprej in nazaj, zaprta drža), vendar so bili njihovi nastopi boljši od nastopov marsikaterega predavatelja z univerzitetno izobrazbo.

Organizacija:

Dijaki pri poskusni debati niso izkoristili vsega časa, prav tako pa v govorih niso bili sistematični, ampak so navajali le dejstva, ki so si jih napisali. Pozabili so tudi na razlago besed v resoluciji (definicije).

Pri rednih debatah dijaki niso imeli nikakršnih težav z organizacijo. Pojavila se je le težava, da nekaterim že zmanjkuje časa za vse, kar želijo povedati.

Argumentacija:

Najpomembnejši del debate je argumentacija. Dobra argumentacija zahteva intenzivno raziskovanje in delo z viri, sodelovanje pri skupnem delu skupine ter sposobnost analiziranja, sintetiziranja in vrednotenja informacij, idej in vrednot. Obstaja več možnih načinov argumentacije in zavračanja nasprotnikov. Pri pouku zgodovine se od dijakov pričakuje, da argumente navedejo (poimenujejo), jih razložijo in podprejo z dokazi. Tudi pri negiranju se dijaki osredotočijo na reinterpretacijo razlage in spodbijanje dokazov (lahko tudi z novimi dokazi).

Pomembno vlogo v debati ima tudi navzkrižno zasliševanje, s katerim ekipa poskuša nasprotnika z vprašanji prisiliti v priznanje dejstva ali vrednote, ki bi jim pomagala pri argumentaciji. Zasliševanje lahko izrabijo tudi za to, da od nasprotnikov zahtevajo dodatna pojasnila. Govorci morajo informacije, pridobljene v navzkrižnem zasliševanju, uporabiti v govorih, na kar je treba dijake opozoriti med pripravami na debato. Pri navzkrižnem zasliševanju se dijaki ponavadi najbolj razživijo, saj pri njem prihaja do neposredne komunikacije med dvema nasprotujočima si stranema, kar je za dijake velik izziv. V praksi pa kasneje večina dijakov ne zna uporabiti pridobljenih informacij v govorih.

Primerjava argumentov v preizkusni in redni debati kaže, da dijaki napredujejo. Pri trditvi (poskusna debata) »Cerkev je v srednjem veku družbi povzročila več škode kot koristi« so dijaki navajali med drugim naslednje argumente: krepitev izkoriščevalske oblasti oziroma fevdalizma, zažiganje čarovnic, cerkve so bile prostor za druženje, Cerkev je edina pospeševala izobraževanje. Argumenti so bili brez izjeme slabo razloženi, predvsem pa niso bili podprti z dokazi. Vsekakor je razlog za slabšo argumentacijo tudi dejstvo, da dijaki niso imeli pripravljalnega časa, ki se je izkazal kot nujen za izvedbo kakovostnih debat na kakršnokoli zgodovinsko temo.

Pri rednih debatah se je zmanjšalo število navedenih argumentov, ti pa so bili precej bolje razloženi. Nekatere ekipe kljub temu še vedno niso uspele navesti jasnih dokazov. Razlog je predvsem v neučinkovitem ra-

ziskovanju, ker se nekateri zanašajo le na podatke v učbeniku ali pa tudi teh ne znajo uporabiti in ovrednotiti. Večini dijakov zaenkrat še ne uspe povsem jasno povezati argumentov s trditvijo. Nekateri dijaki so v svojih govorih pozabili negirati nasprotnike, ker jih niso poslušali, ampak so se med govori nasprotnikov pripravljali le na to, kar so želeli sami povedati. Na trditev »Turški vpadi so slovenskemu narodu koristili« so dijaki med drugim navajali sledeče argumente: Slovence so povezali, kar je omogočilo začetek nastajanja naroda, brez njih se reformacija ne bi razvila, kar bi onemogočilo nastanek knjižnega jezika in književnosti, omogočili so razvoj gospodarstva za potrebe Vojne krajine, ogromna materialna škoda, več tisoč pobitih in ugrabljenih je narodu škodilo, dodatna obremenitev kmetov z davki.

Večina dijakov je hitro dosegla raven povprečnih debaterjev na debatnih tekmovanjih, kar je za njih velik uspeh. Tudi zato je bila do sedaj večina ocenjena z odličnimi ocenami, trije dijaki so bili ocenjeni s prav dobro oceno, eden izmed dijakov pa je bil ocenjen z oceno dobro.

Kakovost debat se bo povečala z učinkovitejšim in intenzivnejšim raziskovanjem, skupno pripravo celotne ekipe, pogovorom z učiteljem ter natančnim poslušanjem govorcev nasprotne ekipe. Veliko vlogo pri napredovanju dijakov ima učitelj, ki jim mora stalno usmerjati in spodbujati.

Zaključek

Ključna vprašanja, ki se zastavljajo pri uvajanju debate v pouk zgodovine, so:
1. Ali je izobraževalno/formalno debato mogoče učinkovito vključiti v pouk zgodovine?
2. Kako dijaki sprejemajo debato in v njej sodelujejo?
3. Kakšni so rezultati in napredek dijakov?

Glede na dosedanje izkušnje dobra priprava in organizacija omogočata, da debate potekajo brez zapletov in ne zahtevajo več kot 30 minut, razen v primerih, ko uporabljamo daljše debatne formate. Tako lahko brez večjih težav vsako šolsko leto izvedemo tudi pet debat. Kakršnekoli konflikte med dijaki zaradi različnih stališč do občutljivih zgodovinskih dogodkov preprečuje dosledno upoštevanje pravil debate.

Debata popestri pouk in poveča zanimanje dijakov za raziskovanje zgodovine. Kljub izraženim pomislekom (predvsem glede ocenjevanja) so dijaki z dosedanjim potekom debat zadovoljni. Sami ugotavljajo, da bi

za kakovostnejšo debato morali podaljšati govore tudi na več kot 3 minute, pri čemer pa mora imeti odločilno besedo učitelj. Tudi ocenjevanje je potekalo brez težav. Te se sicer lahko pojavijo, ko se v debato vključijo manj motivirani dijaki.

Ob vsaki debati je bil opazen napredek govorcev in celotnega razreda. Dijaki so se intenzivno ukvarjali s pripravo na debato in argumente dokaj kakovostno predstavili publiki. Takšna raven debatiranja zagotavlja, da dijaki usvajajo tudi najvišje ravni znanja. Znanje razširjajo in poglabljajo z uporabo miselnih procesov primerjanja različnih definicij, pojmov, procesov in učinkov, izvajajo indukcijo in dedukcijo, privajajo se na analiziranje perspektiv različnih stališč, usvajajo veščine dela z viri (zbiranje, analiziranje, interpretiranje, vrednotenje), razvijajo predstavljanje idej, se učijo učinkovito komunicirati v skupini, z nasprotno skupino in s poslušalci, pridobivajo veščine aktivnega poslušanja sogovornika, se učijo sodelovanja pri skupnem delu in razvijajo kritično mišljenje ter kreativno mišljenje (Vesel, 2005: 68).

Uporaba debate tako spodbuja usvajanje proceduralnega in vseživljenjskega znanja (Marzanova klasifikacija) oziroma najvišjih ravni znanja – analize, sinteze in vrednotenja (Bloomova taksonomija). Debata je vsekakor učinkovita in uporabna metoda, ki močno poveča kakovost pouka zgodovine. Večina učiteljev zgodovine v Sloveniji zaenkrat nima znanja, s katerim bi učinkovito vključila debato v pouk zgodovine. Zato je smiselno, da bi v prihodnosti načrtno spodbujali izobraževanje učiteljev zgodovine na področju debate s pomočjo seminarjev in strokovnega praktičnega gradiva, ki bi vsebovalo glavna teoretična izhodišča, osnovne napotke, različne debatne teorije in predvsem primerne zgodovinske debatne trditve.

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REVISING VOCABULARY AND TEACHING ESSAY WRITING THROUGH DEBATE: WHY USE DEBATE TECHNIQUES FOR TEACHING A FOREIGN LANGUAGE?

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What is debate?

Debate is not simply a form of expression; it is, rather, a form of persuasion. Debaters hope to change minds. They hope that their listeners will come to see things their way.

Debate is not about the conflict of good and evil; neither it is about the conflict between the truth and falsehood or between facts and opinions. Debate is, rather, about the conflict of values and principles. Taken independently, each value has worth and validity, and deserves support. But when two valid principles conflict, a decision must be made as to which one is more important. Reasonable people will disagree about which one is more important. There is something to be said for each side. This is the nature of debatable proposition.

The virtue of debating both sides of a good resolution is that debaters come to understand that there are different ways of thinking about the same issue. By understanding and appreciating both sides, debaters come to a better understanding of their own ideas. When faced with conflicts beyond the classroom, they make decisions that are informed and principled, rather than prejudiced and capricious.

In short, arguing both sides has considerable educational value. It forces students to recognise that, in everyday life, there is no monopoly on truth (Driscoll, Zompetti, 2003: 13)

Students love to argue with their teachers. Debate is a perfect opportunity to teach students how to express their thoughts and opinions in a civilised, respectful way. They are not afraid of new ideas as long as they find them challenging. Students also learn that if they want to change someone else's

mind, the best way is to examine the opposing points of view and refute their premises. When students argue both sides of the resolution, they learn that both sides are worthy of serious consideration.

The most successful classrooms are those that encourage students to think for themselves and engage in critical thinking. Critical thinking allows us to think about our own thoughts and the reasons behind our points of view. It means that we reflect on our ways of making decisions and solving problems. Thinking like this means that our thoughts are consciously directed to some goal. Our thoughts and ideas are based not on our biases or prejudices but on logic and information we might gather and filter from many sources. As we think critically, we are always mindful of what and how we are thinking. When we detect an error or a different way to think about a problem, we explore it eagerly. Students who think critically are typically excited about their learning. They see challenges and opportunities for learning even in the most difficult intellectual tasks (ibid.: 4).

Can students benefit from debate in language classes?

Debate in class should:

1. Improve students' fluency,
2. Enrich their vocabulary,
3. Give them an opportunity to practise the language in real situations,
4. Teach them the importance of their choice of words, intonation, body language and facial expressions,
5. Teach them to be tolerant, patient and respectful of people who might think differently, and
6. Last but not least, boost their self-confidence.

Students are under enormous pressure to learn huge amounts of vocabulary but they are rarely given guidance as to how to go about it. They have a tendency to try and learn long lists by heart, but this is hardly the most efficient approach to the problem. The golden rule is to do lots of revision at regular intervals.

Secondly, students should concentrate on words with the highest frequency, particularly everyday words which also improve the students' spoken fluency. They should also take every opportunity to use the words in communication – there is considerable psychological evidence that students who like using the foreign language improve their oral performance and their overall acquisition of the language much more

rapidly than students who are reluctant to practise the language in real situations. (Grammar and Vocabulary for First Certificate 2002: 223)

The most efficient way of practising a language is to create a real situation in your classroom. Debate is a real situation. The first step in introducing debate is to teach students to consider an issue, a problem or resolution from opposing points of view. To begin with, a teacher chooses a statement students strongly agree with. It should not be too complicated or too emotional. For a resolution to be good, it has to involve a conflict of values or policies. It takes work to construct a good resolution, but it is not impossible. Often, a debate resolution can be constructed by looking at a daily newspaper or a text from their students' books.

A teacher writes arguments for on the blackboard and invites students to think of a few arguments against.

Example (1)
HOMEWORK IS USELESS
Arguments for:

(1) It takes me ages to do my homework.

(2) It is boring and usually quite difficult.

(3) If I make a lot of mistakes, my teacher gets angry.

Arguments against:

(1) It helps me learn new words / structures.

(2) If I do it carefully, I can get a good mark.

(3) If I get a good mark, I am happy.
Students are divided into two groups, one for and one against. A teacher encourages students to support their points with justification (i.e. reasons or examples).

Example (2)
WATCHING TV IS A WASTE OF TIME
Arguments for:

It is entertaining, relaxing and educational.

(1) TV enables people to unwind after a stressful, tiring day at work. Most young people find reality shows entertaining and surprisingly

educational. They learn a lot about our world by watching educational programmes, such as Discovery Channel or BBC. There is usually a whole range of interesting documentaries to watch which bring insights and sounds into your home that you would not otherwise have the opportunity to experience.

(2) *It is a cheap form of entertainment.*
It is very relaxing to sit in the comfort of your own home and be entertained without having to worry about getting dressed up and spending a lot of money to have a good time.

(3) *It is also convenient.*
It's always there, ready to be switched on.

Arguments against:

(1) *There is too much violence / horror, etc.*
There is often not much censorship of television. Programmes containing violence, horror and other unsuitable viewing material can be broadcast and watched by children without their parents' knowledge. Even cartoons are full of violent scenes and characters frequently use abusive language.

(2) *It is bad for your eyesight.*
The more people watch TV, the worse their eyesight gets.

(3) *People don't talk to each other so much.*
Watching television encourages people to be lazy and not to communicate with each other.

(4) *There are more interesting things that could be done instead.*
Spending quality time with your family and friends is much better than being glued to your television. Doing sport is another great idea of spending your free time usefully, not to mention reading an interesting book.

(5) *It is easy to get addicted to it.*
Television is a drug of the modern world. It is very addictive. Once you have become addicted to it, it is extremely difficult to find the right balance and to decide what is worth watching and what is not.

(6) *It is unhealthy – people don't get enough exercise when they watch TV.*
Lying on your couch, watching TV for several hours a day, not selectively, eating junk food and drinking excessively is a perfect way of

becoming a couch potato. The more inactive you are, the greater the risk of becoming ill is.

Debate works best as a collaborative activity. There are many different techniques that can be used to generate and organise ideas (brainstorming, T-charts, M-charts, Venn Diagrams). Students report their ideas/findings as a pair/group while inviting the responses of others. The teacher running the discussion should encourage students to clarify their ideas, to add nuances, or to raise objections. They might use expressions some students do not know/understand. The teacher writes new word/s on the blackboard and elicits the meaning from the students. Through debate students revise and/or enrich vocabulary, improve their fluency, learn to express their ideas in a polite, logically organised way, gradually get rid of the fear of speaking publicly and consequently boost their self-confidence.

The teacher may also introduce new ideas that have not occurred to debaters themselves.

In the end, the teacher should lead the students towards some kind of rough consensus. What do they think are the best arguments in favour of the resolution? What do they think are the best arguments against it?

Students are divided into groups of four. The teacher encourages them to support the points with justification (i.e. reasons or examples) and to use the words they have learnt in their student's book, The Third Edition of New Headway, Intermediate, unit 6. The unit focuses on food and eating habits.

In the course of preparation and discussion, it often becomes clear that words in the resolution have more than one meaning. Sometimes, the range of possible meanings is fairly limited. Sometimes, it is broad, and possible definitions can be radically different. So, it is advisable to ask students to define the key words in the statement, preferably using a monolingual dictionary.

Example (3)
FAST FOOD SHOULD NOT BE SERVED IN STATE SCHOOLS
Definitions:
fast food (n) food such as hamburgers that is prepared quickly in a restaurant;
junk food (n) informal food that is not healthy because it contains a lot of fat, sugar, or carbohydrate;

state school (n) a school that receives money from the government and provides free education;
Arguments for:

(1) It is unhealthy because it contains a lot of saturated fat, salt and sugar.

(2) It is fattening and can lead to obesity.

(3) It is not very varied.

(4) Young people should be served a variety of dishes.

Arguments against:

(1) It is easy to make, easy to serve.

(2) It can be eaten with both hands without using cutlery.

(3) It tastes good.

(4) It is not too expensive.

A teacher asks one student to define the key words in the statement. Then groups' spokespersons are invited to present their points, along with their justification. Again, if any new words are used, a teacher writes them on the blackboard.

Students are divided into groups of four. A teacher encourages them to support the points with justification (i.e. reasons or examples) and to use the words they learn in their student's book, The Third Edition of New Headway, Intermediate, unit 8. The unit focuses on money and happiness.

They define the key words in the statement, not necessarily using a dictionary. Happiness can mean a lot of different things to different people. So, they need to choose a definition that covers most people's idea of happiness. Also, they are encouraged to express their personal opinion at the end. They must not use colloquial or strong language.

Example (4)
MONEY BRINGS HAPPINESS
Definitions:

money (n) what you earn by working and what you spend in order to buy things;

happiness (n) the state of being happy;

happy about/with (adj) (1) having feelings of pleasure, for example because something good has happened to you; (2) satisfied and not worried; (3) suitable;
Arguments for:

(1) *Wealthy people have no money worries.*

(2) *They can afford a big house and an expensive car.*

(3) *They can have a lot of hobbies and leisure activities.*

(4) *They can go on holidays regularly.*

(5) *They can be generous and do good deeds and help other people less fortunate than them.*

Arguments against:

(1) *They usually have very few true friends.*

(2) *They have no privacy.*

(3) *They have no reason to get up in the morning.*

(4) *Most people are envious of their fortune.*

(5) *Another problem might be ceaseless hounding from the press.*

(6) *Also, endless charity requests and begging letters from individuals as well as organisations.*

A teacher asks one student to define the key words in the statement. Then groups' spokespersons are invited to present their points, along with their justification. Again, if any new words are used, a teacher writes them on the blackboard. In the end, a few students present their personal opinion on money and happiness. They try to answer the question if money brings happiness to them or not. Finally, a teacher asks students if they know anybody who has a lot of money and is unhappy and anyone who has very little money but is happy. They should think of the reasons for that person's un/happiness.

'For and against' essays

One type of argumentative essay is that which gives advantages and disadvantages (For and Against). It is a formal piece of writing in which a topic is considered from opposing points of view. A good essay of this type should consist of:

a) *an introductory paragraph* in which you state the topic. This means that you talk generally about the topic without giving your opinion;

b) *the main body* in which the points for and the points against, along with your justification, appear in two separate paragraphs; and

c) *a closing paragraph* in which you give either your opinion or a balanced consideration of the topic.

Points to consider

Make a list of the points for and against before you start writing.

Write well-developed paragraphs in which the points you present are supported with justification (i.e. reasons and examples).

Do not use informal style (short forms, colloquial language, etc.) or strong language (e.g. I firmly believe, etc.).

Try to include a quotation relevant to the topic you are writing about. For example, if you are writing an essay on space exploration, a quotation you may include is: 'One small step for a man, one giant leap for mankind.' (Neil Armstrong)

Begin each paragraph with a topic sentence which summarises what the paragraph is about.

> *However, there are disadvantages to owning a house. (topic sentence)*
>
> Firstly, it can be rather expensive and tiring to maintain. For example, repairs to the outside of the house can be costly, not to mention the time-consuming task of caring for a backyard or garden. (point & justification)
>
> (Evans, 1998: 64)

Students put the jumbled sentences in the correct order. Then they write them out in two separate paragraphs, one including all the advantages (arguments for), the other all the disadvantages (arguments against). Finally, they find a suitable beginning and ending.

Example (5)

DISCUSS THE ADVANTAGES & DISADVANTAGES OF LIVING IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

a)   *Finally, living in a country with a different climate can prove beneficial to both one's health and state of mind.*

b)   *In addition, many people become more independent and self-reliant by having to cope with difficult situations on their own.*

c)   *Every morning some people strap on their skies, climb into their canoes or ride a horse to get to their jobs. They are not eccentrics, though; they have simply chosen to live in a place where ways of getting to work differ from those in their own country.*

d)   *On the other hand, even if you try your hardest to adapt to your new surroundings it is likely that you will often experience moments of isolation, frustration and loneliness. This can be caused by communication problems, especially if you cannot speak the language yet.*

e)   *In conclusion, living abroad is a good way to learn to co-exist with others. Perhaps if everyone experienced life in a foreign country, relations between countries might improve and the world would become a more peaceful place.*

f)   *What is more, finding a job can often be a stressful experience as in some countries foreigners are not easily accepted.*

g)   *Moreover, one is given the chance to learn and become fluent in another language through everyday use.*

f)   *One of the main advantages of living in a foreign country is that it gives you the opportunity to experience an entirely different way of life, which can be a valuable form of education.*

(adapted from Evans, 1998: 66)

Key: c, h, g, b, a, d, f, e

MORE EXAMPLES OF ARGUMENTATIVE ESSAY TITLES

(1) Cinema will soon be a thing of the past.

(2) The plane is the most convenient means of travel.

(3) Cars are the greatest danger to human life today.

(4) Science has created more problems than it has solved.

(5) Being different means being unpopular.

(6) People spend too much time and money on fashion.

Children should leave home at the age of 16.

Climate change is the biggest threat to humanity in the 21st century.

Literary essays

Students are asked to read a book The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-time by Mark Haddon. They discuss the relationship between Christopher John Francis Boone, a fifteen-year-old boy with Asperger's Syndrome, and his parents.

A teacher writes two sentences on the blackboard.

Who could have said ...

I care, therefore I left.

I love, therefore I stayed.

Students tell who they think could have said that and support their answers with examples from the book.

Then students read a passage from the book. (Hadden, 2004: 121/122)

Dear Christopher,

I'm sorry it's been such a very long time since I wrote my last letter to you. I've been very busy. I've got a new job working as a secretary for a factory that makes things out of steel. You'd like it a lot. The factory is full of huge machines that make the steel and cut it and bend it into whatever shapes they need. This week they are making a roof for a cafe in a shopping centre in Birmingham. It's shaped like a huge flower and they're going to stretch canvas over it to make it look like an enormous tent.

Also we've moved into a new flat at last as you can see from the address. It's not as nice as the old one and I don't like Willesden very much, but it's easier for Roger to get to work and he's bought it (he only rented the other one), so we can get our own furniture and paint the walls the colours we want to.

And that's why it's been such a long time since I wrote my last letter to you because it's been hard work packing up all our things and then unpacking them and then getting used to this new job.

I'm very tired now and I must go to sleep and I want to put this into the letterbox tomorrow morning, so I'll sign off now and write you another letter soon.

You haven't written to me yet, so I know that you are probably still angry with me. I'm sorry Christopher. But I still love you. I hope you don't stay angry with me forever. And I'd love it if you were able to write me a letter (but remember to send it to the new address!).

I think about you all the time.

Lots of love.

Your Mum.

x x x x x x

A teacher writes on the board 'Discuss what kind of parent Mrs Boone is.' A teacher elicits ideas from students and writes them on the board, then students write their essays as homework.

Final thoughts

Debate is a very efficient and challenging method of teaching a foreign language. It enables you to revise new vocabulary and teach students how to organise their thoughts and ideas sensibly. Students acquire a lot of general and specific knowledge.

They become more aware of what is happening locally as well as globally. Debate raises their political, cultural, social and environmental awareness. They become genuinely interested in different topics and also learn to think logically and critically. They generally ask a lot more questions, sometimes even unpleasant ones, and are rarely satisfied with simple answers, not to mention the fact that they learn to listen to each other even when they disagree.

Perhaps if everyone was taught to listen to and respect people who think differently, there might be fewer misunderstandings among people and relations between countries might improve and our world would hopefully become a more peaceful place.

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FROM A STORY TO A CONVERSATION AND FROM PHILOSOPHY WITH CHILDREN TO COMMENCEMENT OF CRITICAL THINKING

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> Through wondering at the world and wish for knowledge one inevitably decides for love of knowledge; thus – through all the »whys« leading us from a child's cradle to the man's grave, he thus manages to master the eternal path of philosophy.
>
> (Anita Lukanc, 2001)

Wondering . . . , Disapearing with age

The nature of a small child is directed towards research. A child often gazes at something and wonders. He/She feels enthusiastic about the world. By means of research he/she discovers and gets acquainted with him/herself and others. A philosopher Bloch (Kotnik, 1996) starts from wondering and asking questions, stating that all small children are philosophers. He explains that original wondering of a five- or six-year-old and his questions can be formulated and incorporated into philosophical questions. But he notices that the philosophical nature disappears with age. We know ourselves that soon after starting school children stop wondering and asking questions. So where do we as teachers go wrong? What do we do in a wrong way?

Marjan Šimenc sees the reason in adults who are unable to cope with a heap of unusual children's questions. First he explains that no extraordinary intelligence is needed to think them over, only the readiness to use one's own common sense and openness for the questions that have been asked.

Matthews (Naji, 2003) suggests that we should listen to the child and thus get acquainted with his experience of the world that he is talking about. Having our attention, he/she will feel safe and at the same time

encouraged in the sense that he/she is doing the right thing, so he/she will continue the research.

In the school practice there is usually little time for this kind of approach; however, this is an important field for a child's emotional, intelectual and also spiritual development.

So, how should we intentionally awaken a child's philosophical curiosity and preserve it? How should we encourage critical thinking?

In the eastern philosophical tradition there exists the anglo-saxon course focusing attention on teaching philosophy with the aim of independent thinking. Practically it is implemented in the philosophy for children and philosophy with children (Kotnik, 1996).

The programmes derive from a child's wondering, his/her experiencing the world and his/her imagination. They respond to a child's need of knowledge and research. They listen to a child and offer him/her an opportunity to search, discover, realize, explain, confirm his/her interpretations, or they encourage him to choose new more constructive arguments.

The approaches belong to the programme for early implementation of philosophy with children and at the same time they are the answer to the above questions.

The origin of the philosophy with children

The programme Philosophy for Children (shortened to P4C) appeared in the 1960's in the USA. Its author Matthews Lipman – together with his colleagues at the Institute for the promotion of philosophy for children - enriched the programme on the theoretical and practical levels in order to encourage children for independent and critical thinking and to develop higher cognitive levels. So nowadays we can speak about a systematic programme, addressed to children of six to eighteen years of age, including seven textbooks and teacher's manuals.

The programme Philosophy with children was developed from the structured Lipman's programme. Matthews, the author of this approach, started to implement the above mentioned topics on the basis of his daughter's questions, asked in a philosophic way. Matthews knew Lipman's principle well since its very beginning, but he did not wholly agree with his schematic approach to philosophy, so he formed the programme Philosophy with Children (shortened to PwC). The author as opposed to

Lipman does not require specially written philosophical stories, but he considers his discussion of philosophical ideas.

Matthews sees in children a treasury of imagination and phantasy, representing their reality; however, for their independence the reality is needed, possessed to a much vaster extent by adults. He suggests that adults and children should enrich each other by their experience and thus help each other (Naji, 2003).

Matthews speaks about »making« philosophy with children. He also wrote a number of philosophically enriched stories for children.

The aim of the concept of philosophy with children is to develop children and turn them into young philosophers (Lipman, in Naji, 2003). Marjana Ivanjko (2005) states that abroad philosophy with children also represents a kind of a formal movement of adults, who are interested in children's ideas about the world, themselves and the like.

Both programmes derive from a child's needs and characteristics. They lead them from here to the community of research, passing gradually from the conversation to the dialogue and discussion.

> If we teach children to observe their thinking, it will be easier for them to plan their future thinking. (Katarina Zahrastnik, 2001)

Methodology

I will present a practical example of a lesson of philosophy with children which I carried out with the pupils of the fourth form in the Primary School Šmarje pri Jelšah, aged nine or ten, in the schoolyear 2005/2006.

The process followed a steady procedure: first we shared important events which happened to us. This was followed by listening to an ancient story from the collection of Hana Doskočil: Diogenes in a barrrel (mostly translations of Greek myths). We retold the story together. The pupils wrote their questions and findings on a sheet of paper. They chose the most interesting ones to continue the conversation. The conversation followed. When we began with our lessons, they still needed additional questions, later they took over the initiative and the leading to the conversation themselves. Towards the end of the lesson they wrote their findings and their possible implementation in everyday life on the back of the sheet of paper.

An example of a philosophy lesson with children

Monday, 9 January, 2006, at 7.00

DIOGENES IN A BARREL
The summary of the story
In the town of Corinthus there lived Diogenes, who was a learned and wise man. The majority of people believed he was a queer person, because he only had four things: a coat, a stick, a haversack and an earthen jug. When he saw a child drinking well water from his hands, he threw away his jug as well. Even Alexander the Great himself visited him and wondered at his wisdom. Once Diogenes was kidnapped by the robbers and sold as a slave. A wealthy merchant paid a good price for him and the queer man from Corinthus became a good teacher to all his sons who never turned into envious weeklings.

After listening to the story the pupils wrote the following questions on their sheets of paper:
Why did Diogenes throw away his jug?
Did Diogenes like children?
What did Diogenes become?
Why did Diogenes live in a barrel?
Did Diogenes need a house?
Did Diogenes become happy as a teacher?
Was Diogenes happy?

The starting point for further thinking was the question that most of the pupils chose:

Was Diogenes happy?
He was happy, because he only had a few things.
He knew what he needed, he lived with the nature.

Did Diogenes become happy as a teacher?
He was a good teacher.
Everybody wondered at him, he was different, because he could teach children according to his common sense.
He did not spoil children.

Teacher: What does it mean to be spoiled? Who is spoiled (additional question)?
A person who has everything is spoiled.
The one who wants to have everything.
Parents are also spoiled, because they want everything at once.
It is very difficult to get rid of bad habits.
Children need proper upbringing in order not to be spoiled.

Teacher: How should they be brought up (additional question)?
By being strict.
By not buying them everything.

The first human should have been well-bread.
Good breeding is transferred from one generation to another.

Only a part of the conversation has been noted. The pupils went on answering and looking for better answers to the questions. Matthews believes (Naji, 2003) that all questions have answers, but it is not inevitable to find the best ones today; we may find them tomorrow or some other time.
The pupils ended the lesson with the thought, that one can be happy without being rich. A few questions were left to be answered next time.

The teacher's reflexion to the statements

The question which served as a starting point for the conversation, was related to Diogenes' happiness from the point of view of a human being or a teacher. The reason for his happiness was ascribed to his modesty, behaviour and life with the nature. They believed that he was happy teaching, because he was a good, reasonable and wise teacher who did not spoil the pupils. Then I asked questions about the meaning of the word spoiled and elicited thinking about spoiled people. Who is like that? In their answers being spoiled is interpreted as the need to satisfy many wishes instantly, implying the possibility of addiction. They see the prevention in good breeding. Giving an additional answer, they stated that good breeding is strict and transferred from one generation to the next one. The final thought is a kind of a summary of the story and the consideration of the lesson.

The findings

Philosophy lessons with children are an opportunity for pupils' wondering and research of stories, their thoughts and words. The story is also an impulse to think; namely, the children did not know where the thoughts would lead them and where they would stop. They kept thinking and searching for better solutions without insecurity or fear of having said something wrong. When the problems were demanding and exceeded their cognitive capabilities, they used imagination.

At the beginning of our meetings we were faced with talkativeness and naughtiness of some pupils. During the lessons these pupils were spontaneously integrated into the process itself, becoming extraordinarily active in the debate about a certain question or topic. Therefore, this was also an occasion to teach tolerance.

Having performed lessons of philosophy with children for a year, I found out the following on the basis of observation and analysis:

- they improved their rhetorical capabilities which presents itself in their self-confident expressing of thoughts;
- they are more precise at asking questions, more critical and realistic, which can also be noticed in the more constructive search for solutions;
- they possess a richer vocabulary as they use different words in conversation;
- they are more persistent;
- the development of imagination is noticeable.

At the end of the schoolyear the pupils used dialogue with ancient stories, demanding arguments for and against and new solutions. They also used discussion.

During my observation of the pupil's activity I perceived a certain graduality in the development of thinking processes, which could be shown by concentric circles – they will be presented later on.

In this schoolyear all »last year's« pupils are attending the club – with the exception of a girl whose absence is justified; another girl joined us and she is already taking an active part. They still read and listen to stories, the conversation grows into a dialogue and discussion. At the beginning of the lesson they determine the leader who is in charge of good conversation: he/she grants permission to speak, asks questions and provokes with his/her assertions. The role of the leader is a demanding one, but it gives the pupil more freedom. I remain the reader of the story and more and more only the observer.

Every second month the pupils discuss a philosophical story »live« in a children's programme Magic chest on the local radio station Štajerski val (Styrian wave). The participants of the discussion are not acquainted with the story in advance, therefore the procedure of »making philosophy« is similar to the one in the class, only the role of the leader belongs to me. The pupils relax in the debate, they ask interesting questions, find incredible answers and conclude with their own thought. I find that the radio discussion is more demanding in comparison to the situation in class, being that it is public and subject to criticism, the discussion is more concise and constructive due to the time limit and the need to conclude sensibly. The pupils are much more concentrated as compared to the discussion in class.

On the basis of a year-long planned observation during the lesson, the pupils' written sources and some theoretical findings according to Bettelheim (1999), Lipman (1980) and Matthews (in Naji, 2003) I want to present the process of thinking, experiencing and feelings, which was aroused during the lessons of philosophy with children with the majority of the pupils, by using a picture of concentric circles.

Picture 1: Presentation of the process of thinking, experiencing and feelings in stages in the form of concentric circles

1. The stage of wondering and imagination

While listening to the story, a pupil experiences the feelings of comfort. He/she feels comfortable and free. The story heard arouses his/her imagination and encourages wondering.

2. The stage of research

Due to the feeling of freedom the need to research and ask questions arises. Given the proper encouragement, a pupil him/herself searches for the answers to the questions that have been asked. He/She explains the ones that do not supercede his/her understanding of the world and the people; for more demanding questions imagination is used. Unusual questions encourage the pupil to think.

3. The stage of introspection

A pupil pays attention to his/her thoughts and thinking which shows in sensible questions and good answers.

4. The stage of listening

A pupil is self-confident and infatuated with his/her thoughts. He/she focuses his attention on other pupils, their statements and questions. He/she looks for arguments for his/her own assertions and arguments to express disagreement with another pupil's assertion. A sort of a dialogue is being formed.

5. The stage of evaluation

A pupil focuses attention on the whole group, judges, supports assertions with arguments and searches for new solutions. The communication broadens. An initial discussion can be noticed.

A pupil developed - from a mostly emotional response in the 1st *stage of wondering and imagination* to a more and more recognizeable response in the 5th *stage of evaluation*, where he/she recognizes an encouragement to research and construct new solutions in a good evaluation.

At this stage a pupil in certain cases already shows criticalness, but I cannot speak about critical thinking – I presume that within the concentric circles a field with the beginnings of critical thinking has been created.

A pupil is now ready to take the role of a discussion leader.

The emotional and cognitive response have been presented with two triangles in picture 1, pointed to two opposite directions. The arrow shows the development which always spreads from grade 1 outwards.

6. The stage of Lipman's philosophy for children

It is also the first step or the beginning, offered by Lipman by means of his approach to philosophy for children. It does not only open the questions and encouragement to thinking, it also has a lot of didactical and methodical material which can be used as aid, so that the skills of critial thinking can be tackled in a systematic and also a very pleasant way. But as Šimenc says (the same source), the teaching of thinking within the philosophy with children is a side product of thinking. The point is still the thinking about the questions that pupils are interested in.

As Lipman's programme Philosophy for children is offered as one of the optional subjects at our primary schools, I see an opportunity to develop the beginnings of critical thinking with pupils on the basis of Lipman's stories, tasks attached, games and of course the constructive dialogue.

Of course, I do not insist that philosophy with children is a prep school for the big school of philosophy for children and good critical thinking. But I feel that the graduality of the procedure itself gives good and provable results.

The procedure presented by concentric circles is thus a transfer from the story to conversation, from the philosophy with children to the beginnings of critical thinking and the philosophy for children.

The process of transfer between circles is individual for each pupil. It is based on the interest for stories and the motivation for research, whereas the group can be an encouragement for transfer.

Conclusion

It would be shameful not to expose a child to philosophy, as philosophy completes the internal nature of a human being. This is not like teaching him to play the violin. It means teaching him to use his own internal voices.

Anne Margaret Sharp (Lukanc, 2000)

The programmes for early work with philosophy offer the pupils to use their own internal voice. At the same time the transfer of methods of work implemented in philosophy for children and philosophy with children can be noticed, as pupils also ask questions in other subjects, they are creative and use dialogue. So they use their own thinking to practice philosophy as an activity, thus affecting the process of education in a long run.

With teachers who have met with early implementation of philosophy, the transfer of methods and ways of work to other subjects can be noticed;

they practice teaching according to the method of discussion, they encourage pupils to search for solutions themselves, they allow different paths towards the goal and the like, wanting to encourage pupils to think independently.

Thus, by using the programmes for early implementation of philosophy we are gradually changing the existing practical methodology of the teaching process.

But it all begins with a simple story and with listening to young philosophers, who still know what is good, useful and correct.

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TRANSKRIBIRANJE OTROŠKE ARGUMENTACIJE

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Izhodišče, ozadje in tehnika

Ideja, kasneje pa tudi spodbuda za preučevanje argumentacije pri otrocih je nastala v okviru raziskave, poimenovane *Edukacija in konstrukcije kritične pismenosti: percepcija, argumentacija, interpretacija*, ki poteka pod vodstvom dr. Igorja Ž. Žagarja s Pedagoškega inštituta v Ljubljani. Raziskava nadaljuje preučevanje problematike, ki sta jo Igor Ž. Žagar in Barbara Domanjko predstavila v knjigi Argumentiranost kot model (uspešne) komunikacije. Bistvo raziskovalnega dela obeh projektov in avtorjev predstavlja iskanje oziroma določitev vloge argumentacije na pedagoškem polju. Premisa je, da je argumentiranost v pedagoškem delu (lahko) ključen proces, ki vodi k uspešni komunikaciji, k razumevanju. Hipoteza pristopa je, da so določene argumentativne jezikovne strukture vpisane v sam jezikovni sistem, da so torej nujne za (uspešno) argumentiranje, da nosijo določen pomen.

Za preverjanje, potrditev ali opustitev tako krepke hipoteze so potrebni dobri argumenti. Eden izmed načinov, kako jih dobiti, se nahaja na področju otroškega usvajanja jezika. V procesu, ki iz otrok rojeva govorce, se ti postopoma zavedajo svojih govornih zmožnosti in tehnik, ki so jim na voljo pri komunikaciji z drugimi. Ena izmed njih je tudi argumentacija. Če so določene argumentativne strukture resnično notranjepomenske sistemu jezika, potem bodo morda opazne in prepoznavne tudi pri samem izvoru argumentiranja – otroškem govoru.

Transkripcijski material, ki ga opisujem in analiziram v članku, je nastal na podlagi avdiovizualnih posnetkov dveh vrtčevskih skupin. Raziskovalci so uporabili dve kameri, ki sta pokrivali celotno igralnico. Da bi pro-

stor kar najbolje pokrili, so kamere namestili v diagonalna kota. Snemanje vsake skupine je potekalo deset zaporednih delovnih dni, in sicer po dve uri posnetkov na dan. Enega dopoldne in enega popoldne. Prvo skupino, ki so jo posneli januarja in februarja 2005, je sestavljalo sedemnajst otrok, starih med tremi in štirimi leti, ter dve odrasli osebi: vzgojiteljica in njena pomočnica. Drugo skupino, ki so jo posneli marca in aprila 2005, je sestavljalo osemnajst otrok med petim in šestim letom ter, podobno kot pri prvi skupini, vzgojiteljica in pomočnica.

Skupaj je bilo narejenih štirideset ur posnetkov. Oba video posnetka posamezne ure so kasneje, s posebej za to prirejenim računalniškim programom, združili v en uporabniški vmesnik. Rezultat je bil vmesnik z dvema sinhroniziranima video posnetkoma in enim avdio posnetkom (preklopljiv bodisi z ene, bodisi z druge kamere). Namen snemanja je bil posneti čim bolj naravno vrtčevsko okolje in pridobiti kakovostno bazo otroške argumentacije.

Ko so bili posnetki enkrat obdelani in v prej omenjenem programu, se je začelo prepisovanje. Transkribiranje je potekalo s pomočjo okrnjenega in nekoliko spremenjenega transkripcijskega sistema CHAT. Glavne spremembe so bile narejene zaradi posebnosti slovenskega jezika in specifičnih ciljev raziskave. Ker je CHAT namenjen celotnemu usvajanju jezika, je zelo kompleksen. Tu je bila v ospredju le otroška argumentacija, zato ni bilo potrebe, da uporabimo vse možnosti ter distinkcije, ki jih nudi CHAT. Pa vendar, potrebno je bilo imeti koherenten in za nadaljnjo analizo odprt transkripcijski format.

Proces

Prepisovanje otroške argumentacije je bilo zame precej stresno početje. Če bi se moral odločiti, ali bi se še enkrat spustil v kaj takega, ne vem, ali bi bil odgovor pritrdilen. Zakaj?

Naloga, ki sem jo dobil, se je zdela dokaj enostavna: iz avdiovizualnih posnetkov skupine otrok naredi transkripcije. Prvotna ideja je bila, da se transkribira bolj ali manj ves govor. Zelo hitro se je pokazalo, da to ne bo mogoče. Na koncu nekajurnega poslušanja posnetkov je bilo jasno, da je materiala, ki bi bil sploh razumljiv, zelo malo. Na večjem delu posnetkov je bilo slišati le trušč. Gre za petnajst triletnikov, ki govorijo drug čez drugega, kolikor govoriti sploh znajo. Poleg njih sta v sobi še vzgojiteljica in pomočnica, ki ju je sicer lahko razumeti, a ponavadi preglasita vse otroke. Nekateri otroci govorijo precej več kot drugi, tudi razumljivi so bolj. Ven-

dar se tudi oni pogosto umaknejo v kak del sobe, ki je mikrofonu težko dostopen, na primer v kot ali v grad, ter se sami ali pa še s kakim drugim otrokom tiho oziroma mrmljajoče igrajo različne igre. Zato smo se, v soglasju z vodjo raziskave, dogovorili, da se transkribira razumljive dele posnetkov, po možnosti take, ki imajo opraviti z argumentacijo. Potem ko sem temeljito obnovil in dopolnil svoje znanje o tem, kaj argumentacija sploh je in kaj so njeni sestavni deli, sem se lotil dela. Kronološko, najprej s skupino, v kateri so bili mlajši otroci.

Delo še zdaleč ni potekalo hitro. Pogosto mi je zmanjkovalo energije, ko sem se trudil slišati smisel. Običajno namreč, ko hrup v našem okolju preseže določen prag, naredimo situacijo znosno s tem, da hrup prepoznamo kot šum. Večno nihanje, bučanje, skorajda plimovanje zvoka.

Ko sem bil dovolj zbran, sem opažal stvari. Najprej sem spoznal skupino, imena ter izgled posamičnih članov. S tem, ko je moje poznavanje skupine in obenem tudi njene dinamike postajalo ostrejše, bolj poglobljeno, sem začel opažati stvari, na katere prej nisem bil pozoren. Če nekoga opazuješ štirinajst dni, vsak dan po dve uri, o njen marsikaj izveš. Ne nazadnje tudi to, kako shaja z drugimi, kako uspešna je njegova ali njena komunikacija.

Delo je potekalo takole: najprej sem naredil legendo za vsako skupino. V njej so bili našteti, opisani ter oštevilčeni vsi pripadniki skupine. Poleg tega sem v legendo zapisal tudi vsa pravila, ki sem jih uporabljal za prepisovanje. Kot že povedano, gre za okrnjena in prirejena pravila sistema prepisovanja CHAT, ki se nanašajo na označevanje govorne dinamike, neke vrste didaskalije. Tovrstno označevanje prepisov omogoča lažje razumevanje vsebine (vemo, kaj kdo naredi; kaj dela, medtem ko govori; kako govori ljudem...). Obenem so takšni zapisi nadvse pomembni tudi za korpusne potrebe. Ločimo lahko, kaj govorijo otroci in kaj odrasli, katere besedne zveze se (največkrat) pojavljajo, kolikšna je pogostost napačnega izgovarjanja določene besede, katere kretnje/dejanja spremljajo specifične izjave itn.

Skratka, izdelava legende predstavlja ključen element v procesu transkribiranja. Najpomembnejše je, da je konsistentna in da se tako tudi uporablja. Za lažjo predstavo prilagam konkretno legendo skupine. Manjkajo le imena ljudi.

Osebe
V → vzgojiteljica, XXXX
P1→ pomočnik, XXXX
P2 → pomočnica, XXXX
1 → deček, temni lasje, ostriženi malo na gobico, XXXX
4 → deček, svetlo rjavi lasje, spredaj štrlijo, XXXX
6 → deček, temni lasje, bolj okrogel obraz, očala?, XXXX
9 → deček, temno rjavi lasje, XXXX
11 → deček, svetli lasje, rahlo ostriženi na gobico, XXXX
13 → deček, svetli lasje, podoben 11, XXXX
17 → deček, kratki rjavi lasje, XXXX
2 → deklica, zelo svetli lasje, kratek paž, preča na sredini, XXXX
3 → deklica, temno rjavi lasje, daljši paž, močen frufru, precej živahna, XXXX
5 → deklica, dolgi svetli lasje, okroglolična, XXXX
7 → deklica, bolj kratki svetlo rjavi lasje, rahlo skodrani (podobno kot v šestdesetih letih), XXXX
8 → deklica, temno rjavi lasje, kratek paž, močen frufru, XXXX
10 → deklica, kratki svetlo rjavi lasje, frufru, za spoznanje močnejša, XXXX
12 → deklica, kostanjevo rjavi lasje, dolg paž do sredine ramen, XXXX
14 → deklica, zelo skodrani svetli lasje do ramen, XXXX
15 → deklica, temno rjavi daljši lasje, speti, frufru, malo nižja, XXXX
16 → deklica, kostanjevo rjavi daljši lasje, brez frufruja, čopki, XXXX

Pravila prepisovanja
%com: xxx → komentar v razlagalni vrstici
[% *]** → komentar v glavni vrstici
%act: xxx → akcija v razlagalni vrstici
[=! xxx] → akcija v glavni vrstici
[=? xxx] → če nisi prepričan, kaj si slišal, tu notri vpišeš še drugo opcijo
[* xxx][: xxx] → če sklepaš, da je nekdo nekaj rekel narobe, vpišeš popravljeno verzijo
[:=hr xxx] → označba za tuji jezik
xxx@o → oponašanje
xxx@i → intonirano
‹ xxx › → prekrivanje govora
xxx + → če se sam prekine
+ xxx → če sam nadaljuje
xxx +/ → če ga nekdo drugi prekine
++ xxx → če nadaljuje nekdo drugi
# → premor do 8 sek.
→ daljši premor

Proces izdelave in dopolnjevanja legende je do neke mere sovpadel s samim prepisovanjem posnetkov. Prvih nekaj ur posnetkov sem moral pregledati še enkrat, saj na začetku še nisem poznal vseh potrebnih informacij (predvsem identitete govorcev). Kmalu sem se odločil, da na koncu vsakega prepisa dodam še poimenski seznam zanimivih delov oziroma fragmentov (z navedbo časa), ki pa niso primerni za transkribiranje. Morda pridejo prav, če se bo kdo odločil za ponoven ogled in poslušanje posnetkov.

Pri prepisih posnetkov mlajše skupine otrok, ki sem jih najprej opravil, sem poleg že omenjenih težav pri razumevanju govora opažal, da veliko uporabnega materiala prihaja iz pogovorov otrok z vzgojiteljico ali pomočnico. Ob takih priložnostih so otroci govorili glasneje in razločneje, in če so bili pravilno spodbujeni (odrasla oseba pusti, da sami dokončajo, kar želijo povedati, jih vpraša zakaj, kako...), je bilo tudi zametkov argumentacije kar nekaj, na primer:

1. skupina, 26. 1. 2005, 13:08 min.
%com: Ob malici se otroci in P2 pogovarjajo. Prebudi se 1. P2 mu pravi, da je še ves pomečkan.
3:    ja, čisto zmečkan.
P2:   [=!govori 15] Tezej, a boš še pomarančo?+/
3:    ++jst sm <pod tušem#>čisto zmečkana.
P2:   <Tezej, a boš še pomarančo?>+
3: +čisto zmečkana.
P2:   kdaj si zmečkana?
3:    ko grem pod tuš.
P2: a ko greš pod tuš@i#a Maja [%očitno P2 pozna mamo od 3] reče, da si zmečkana?
3:    jaa@i.
P2:   res?+
7:    jst sm tud mal zmečkana.
13:   jst sem tudi.
%com: Približno dvajset sekund govora je nerazumljivega, saj govorijo drug čez drugega.
13:   ko greš pod vodiko, pa laske tkole vušš@o
7:    [=!z roko si gre skozi lase] jst mam pa take zmečkane laske+/
P2:   ++kakšne maš?# skodrane, skraužlane#a se ti skodrajo, k maš mokre?
7:    <ja>+/
3:    ja tkole, tk tk@o[=!z roko si gre skozi lase] #ko sm takrt jst dojenček, si nism kr jst lask umila.
P2:   ne, ti jih je mami.
3:    ja.

P2:	kdo ti pa zdej laske umije?
3:	mami pa oči.
P2:	oba#al enkrat eden, enkrat pa en?
3:	#ja kogar hočem.
P2:	a ti si zmišljuješ tkole?
3:	neee@i+/
P2:	++al pa reče Andrej jst pa ne bom dones umil Trini laske?«al ne reče#nč ne reče#ti kr umije laske anede?
3:	ja#včer sm pa sama šampon na glavo dala, pa sm si sama glavo umila, pa me je u učke pekl+/
P2:	++pa si se jokala?
3:	ja.
P2:	aneda
3:	ja, pa nism mogla brisače uzet.
6:	kaj?+/
P2:	++kaj je pa Maja rekla?
3:	to ne smeš jutr. jutr ne boš več+/
P2:	++[=!se zasmeji]
3:	+mi je rekla.
%com: Pogovor se nato preusmeri na to, kako so otroci kot mali veliko jokali.	

Še opaznejše kot argumentiranje otrok je bilo argumentiranje odraslih, sicer za potrebe konkretne raziskave manj zanimivo, vendar vseeno poučno ter uporabno. Iz prepisov je moč videti, kateri dejavniki in okoliščine vplivajo na to, da odrasli v pogovoru z otroki uporabljajo argumentacijo, in kako se otroci na argumentacijo odzivajo. Zgleden primer argumentacije odrasle osebe pri posnetkih mlajše skupine je bil na primer tale:

1. skupina, 28. 1. 2005 dopoldne
%com: Otroci skupaj z vzgojiteljico in pomočnico (do 11 min.) izdelujejo okraske iz slanega testa ter papirnate krone. Vmes se spremeni zamik kamer. S prvotnega 218 zamika kamere 1 se ta poveča na 471. Nato se lotijo prepevanja pesmic in prižiganja svečk na torti, saj deklica Azim (14) praznuje rojstni dan.
24:45 min.
V: U redu, zdej bomo pa Azim prešteli, kolk je ona stara [!=gre po vžigalnik].
1:   Ona je pa tko stara, tko pa tko.
?:   kok pa jst+/
%com: Nekaj sekund otroci govorijo vsevprek. Nato se vrne V z vžigalnikom.
V: najprej je bila Azim stara samo eno leto [!=prižge svečko].

V:	ko je bila stara eno leto, je imela eno svečko#potem je bila stara lansko leto#[!=prižiga svečko]zrasla je. znala+
V:	+naučila se je govorit, pa hodit in prišla je k nam v vrtec.
V:	takrat je bila stara dve leti.
14:	o, o@i
V:	hopsala#[%svečka se noče takoj prižgati, 14 se nagne naprej nad torto] dve leti#račka pazi+
14:	zakaj dve leti?[=!še bolj se nagne nad svečke]+
V:	pazi račka.
V:	danes pa je Azim stara#[!=pokaže z roko]tri leta.
11:	tok, a ne? [!=pokaže]
V:	takole [!=prižge svečko]#zato ji danes na torti gorijo tri svečke.
P2:	[!=vstane] grem slikat.
14:	v to se pa ne sme vtikat prstke.
V:	zakaj pa ne? povej ti nam+/
14:	++pol se bomo <spekeli[*]>
12:	<pol se spečemo>
V:	zato ker so svečke vroče#zdej pa, ko ji gorijo svečke, ji pa res lahko zapojemo vse najboljše#prav?
%com:	Vsi skupaj začnejo prepevati, najprej vse najboljše, potem pa še nekaj drugih pesmic.

Argumentiranja v pogovorih med otroki je v mlajši skupini bolj malo. Morda tudi zaradi tega, ker je bilo pogovore med otroki težje detektirati, razumeti ter prepisati, vendar je pogostost argumentiranja v pogovorih med otroki tudi precej povezana z njihovo starostjo in razvojem.

Iz povedanega bi bilo moč sklepati, da je argumentacija govorna veščina, ki se jo je treba naučiti, in da jo otroci okoli tretjega leta še ne obvladajo najbolje, izjeme so precej redke. Še najbližji argumentaciji je na primer naslednji pogovor:

1. skupina, 31. 1. 2005 dopoldne
%com: Vzdušje v skupini je precej razpuščeno. Sprva se sicer lotijo branja Minke, vendar se nekaj otrok ne pridruži in se samostojno igrajo. Tudi kasneje je dogajanje bolj ali manj razdeljeno na več manjših skupin, kar nekoliko otežuje razumevanje sicer precej pestre komunikacije med otroki.
18:30 min
%com: 1 in 11 sta se do sedaj igrala v lesenem gradu, ki ga imajo otroci v igralnici. Večina ostalih otrok skupaj z V in P2 barva kartonaste škatle.
1:      a boš ti kupu gusarja?
11:     ??# ne drugega bom kupu.

1:	a gusarja?
11:	kupu bom čelado.
1:	vem to@i
11:	čelado si bom kupu.
1:	noo@i
%com: Za nekaj sekund ju preglasijo ostali otroci. Medtem dečka zapustita grad in se napotita v kot ob oknu.	
11:	to je moja čelada#si jo dam gor [%vzame namišljeno čelado s police in si jo natakne na glavo]
11:	to je tvoja čelada#jo dam tebi gor [=!1 natakne drugo namišljeno čelado]
1:	ne, ne, jst ne rabm čelade bom jo dal na polico [=! Odide nazaj v grad]
1:	[=! Srečata se na vratih gradu] čelado sm dal na polico.
%com: Skupaj odideta v grad. Nekaj sekund se ne sliši natančno, kaj govorita.	
1:	Tud jst sm si zaželu met zmaja.#??najprej bo prijazen#tuki [=!pokaže na polico v gradu]#??#ga bom peljo čez cesto, pa bo, pa bo, pa bo zmaj bil#pa ne bo bil hudoben, pa ga bomo mi hmal lulat pelal+
11:	a un zmaj bo bil hudoben?
1:	ne, prijazen.
11:	a un, [=!pokaže na drugo stran gradu] tist bo pa bil hudoben?
1:	ja un bo bil hudobn#un bo pa+/
11:	++a un vitez#je ukradu#??
%com: Njun pogovor ponovno postane nerazumljiv. Čez približno deset sekund prideta iz gradu.	
1:	to je krona [=!vzame s police navidezno krono]
11:	ja.
1:	nimava dveh.
11:	to je ogrinjalo [=!vzame frizersko ogrinjalo in odide v grad[%očitno sta se dečka namenila opremiti viteza]]
1:	ja. tudi jst bom nekaj ?? krono ??
%com: Tudi 1 odide v grad. Tam se z 11 igrata naprej, vendar se njuna igra zgubi v trušču ostalih otrok. Čez čas se jima pridruži 13.	
11:	[%govori 1] a bi mi ti dal ogrinjalo? [%v rokah drži ogrinjalo]
1:	kaj?
11:	bi mi dal ogrinjalo?
1:	ja.
%com: 13, ki je nekaj sekund spremljal pogovor med 1 in 11, zdaj plane, pograbi ogrinjalo in z njim zbeži iz gradu. 11 mu sledi. Malo se prerivata, nato stečeta v kot sobe, od koder se nato sliši kričanje.	
P2:	[%z drugega konca igralnice] Filip kaj je#a?
P2:	Tezej, Filip, kaj je blo?
13:	to ni ogrinjalo#to ni ogrinjalo@i [=!z ogrinjalom v roki priteče proti P2 in V]

11:	\<dej mi.\>
P2:	\<to je ??\> za pri frizerju, Filip veš?#ko si laske strižeš, ti da tole frizerka okrog, a ne, da te lohk ostriže, da laski dol padajo, da nimaš na oblekici, da+/
V:	++[=!govori eni izmed deklic, ki barvajo škatle] Tjaša takole rokavi niso dobre.
%com: P2 in V se vrneta k svojim opravilom. 11 in 1 stojita v kotu sobe.	
1:	[=!govori 11] to tega pa ne vejo#Ne vejo tega.
%com: Približa se jima 13 z ogrinjalom v roki.	
13:	zastava [=!maha z ogrinjalom] to je zastava.
11:	[=!s prstom pokaže na ogrinjalo]to ni zastava, to je za frizerja.
13:	ne, zastava je+/
11:	++ne ni zastava.
13:	[% še vedno maha z ogrinjalom. Slednjič ga da 11] gusarji so meli rutke@i.#niso meli ??# to je gusarska ruta, uhhhh@o [%nekaj sekund je nerazumljivih]
%com: 11 in 1 gresta v grad, 13 gre z njima.	
11:	[=!govori 13]ti ne greš. Ti nisi vitez.
%com: Nekaj časa se 11 in 13 še malo dajeta, nato pride V in 13 odpelje.	

Prepisovanje posnetkov starejše skupine otrok je potekalo dokaj podobno. Res je, da je bilo razumljivega govora otrok več, kar je glede na višjo starost otrok precej logično. Vendar pa je bil močnejši tudi trušč. Otroci so se hitreje premikali po igralnici, večkrat odhajali iz nje, tako da je bilo sledenje pogovorom težje kot pri mlajši skupini.

Razlike med količino argumentacije glede na okoliščine pogovora (otrok-odrasel, otrok-otrok), so manjše. Sklepali bi lahko, da so se te veščine pač že bolje priučili.

Argumentacija odraslih oseb je še vedno zanimiv dejavnik, saj kaže, v navezavi z argumentacijo odraslih pri mlajši skupini, na to, koliko je, predvsem njena pogostost ter uspešnost, odvisna od posameznikov. Kot bi se tudi odrasli na nek način delili na tiste, ki argumentacijo obvladajo, ter tiste, ki morda poznajo njene osnove, vendar jo v praksi precej manj uporabljajo.

Navajam tri primere iz starejše skupine: argumentacijo odrasle osebe med otroki ter argumentacijo med otroki in odraslo osebo.

2. skupina, 25. 3. 2005 dopoldne, 8:05 min.	
%com: 2,3 in 9 se v kotu sobe pripravljajo na ples z rutami. Izbirajo in natikajo si različne rute.	
2:	[=!govori 9]a mi nobene rute ne daš?
9:	ne
2:	a mi nobene ne daš? [=!9 ji da ruto]#ti morš skos met več#mi mormo#mi mormo pa skos met mn

%com: 2,3 in 9 se pogovarjajo naprej, vendar jih je zaradi hrupa ostalih otrok nekaj časa nemogoče razumeti. Pomerjajo si rute in poplesujejo.

3:	[=!govori 9]ti povem?#kako ti bo ime [%očitno k igri sodi tudi umetniško ime]
2:	kako ti bo ime?
3:	ime ti bo alin, ne azijka, ne+

%com: Priteče 1 in začne 9 puliti ruto, ki si jo očitno želi imeti sama.

1:	jst sm si tole izbrala
9:	ne [=!vsaka vleče ruto k sebi]
2:	[=!govori 9]ti maš pa skos več#[=!govori 1] ti maš pa samo eno

%com: Dekletom se približa V.

V:	ste že vsi narisal za rojstni dan?
2:	Dragi@i# Kaja ma pa skos več, mi pa skos mn
V:	za vsacga eno#razdeli Kaja#eno dej Manci, eno pa še meni
9:	sam pet jih mam
V:	a lahko daš še eno Nataliji#dones ma rojstni dan, dones jo morš prov posebi rada met#pa sploh vedve, k sta prjatle, ajde, kr dej ji eno ruto, pa eno Manci, eno Kaji# pa ti še zmeri dve ostaneta# lej, ena je še tmle na tleh [=!pokaže kje leži še ena ruta]
1:	jst bi mela pa modro
2:	noče mi jo dat
V:	sej ti jo bo dala#vidš, da že deli, no,#mejhn potrp

%com: Pogovor za nekaj časa zamre, V pokliče neki drugi otrok in odide od deklet. Te so povečini tiho, le 1 nekaj reče 9, potem ta pripomni, da je za vsakega le ena ruta.

2. skupina, 17. 3. 2005 popoldne, 43 min.

%com: P je pravkar odšla iz sobe. Medtem ko se otroci igrajo, v sobo priteče 1.

1:	ej#a veste kaj#anka je uzuni rekla, da snemamo#hitr se vsi skrite, ker je turšicam rekla, da snemamo#skrite se vsi
?	zakaj?
1:	ja, ker se snema# da nas ne bo snel...posnelo

%com: Otroci se začnejo skrivati pod mize. Občasno pogledujejo proti kameri.

1:	hitr se skrimo

%com: Skupina otrok ob mizi se igra človek ne jezi se.

?:	??brezveze??
13:	mi se ne bomo#eh, eh#zato k ns ni strah#[%malo pomisli in se popravi]ne, zato k mi mamo še človek ne jezi se

%com: Ostali otroci se skrijejo, tisti, ki se igrajo človek ne jezi se, pa ostanejo pri igri. Nekoliko glasni so.

?:	pridni bodte, da ne bojo ns posnel.

%com: Otroci se umirijo. V sobo se vrne P.

1:	Anka, zakaj snemaš?

P:	sej ne, js sm šla ??[=?tebi] rito obrisat
1:	snemala si
P:	jst?
1:	snemaš, k sm te slišala#k si povedala turšicam
P:	snema se že dolg časa
%com: 1 preneha ugovarjati oziroma spraševati, otroci in P se spet vrnejo k igri.	

2. skupina, 24. 3. 2005 dopoldne, kamera A⁸, 1:01:10 min. ???	
%com: 8 in 1 sta pridno pospravili ves kotiček. O tem najprej poroča P, kasneje pa še V. Ostali otroci so že odšli iz sobe.	
1:	[=!govori 1]lej kok so pustil razmetan#dragi glej še to#[=!kliče V]Dragi#prit pogledat
8:	[=!V pride v sobo in gre z 8 proti kotičku, kjer ju čaka 1]tut ta kotiček likovni sva pospravli cel#oboje
V:	kaj pa tista koala tmle dela?#??#mal mn,mal mn [%očitno 1 in 8 nekaj počneta, vendar so vse tri izven vidnega polja kamere. Nekaj deset sekund je nerazumljivih]
8:	k sva tukile pospravljali so pa pršli#pršov Milan pa Žan pa+/
V:	++pa so razmetali@i
8:	[=!prihajajo iz kotička]ne, pa Adriano#pa so se afnali [=!oponaša] ja, vi ste pa res kotiček lepo pospravli, <??>
1:	<??>
8:	prov tko so se začel važt
%com: 1 še nekaj reče, potem pa si vsaka vzame svoj piškot. Njun pogovor prekine konec posnetka.	

Zanimiv je predvsem drugi primer (17. 3. 2005). Poleg argumentiranja v njem najdemo tudi potrditev, da se šestletniki nekako zavedajo, kaj pomeni, da jih nekdo snema, ter da ta vednost vpliva na njihovo obnašanje.

Ureditev

Ko sem končal s prepisovanjem posnetkov, sem se lotil urejanja. Čeprav se mi je med delom zdelo, da ni uporabnega prav veliko, sem ugotovil, da je uporabnega materiala kar precej. Zato sem izdelal tabelo, v katero sem vključil zanimivejše posnetke iz obeh skupin ter pri vsakem zapisal, katere teme oziroma deli konkretnih prepisov so tisti, na katere velja biti pozoren. Tako je orientacija po korpusu dosti lažja, dostop do relevantnih informacij pa hitrejši.

Mlajša skupina (1):
24. 1. dop. – zgodba s čarovnico, predmeti v vrečki
24. 1. pop. – dojenčkov tepež
26. 1. dop. – igranje rojstnega dneva, dojenček
26. 1. pop. – zmečkana pod tušem
28. 1. dop – rojstni dan
28. 1. pop. – čakanje na plesne vaje, preveč čaja
31. 1. dop. – viteška oprava
31. 1. pop. – bosi ribič
1. 2. pop. – čakanje na sneg, luknjica v plastični posodi
2. 2. pop. – boj z morskim psom
3. 2. dop. – možnost slikanja in telefoniranja s telefonom
3. 2. pop. – razdrta sestavljanka
Starejša skupina (2):
17. 3. pop. – iskanje lastnika slike, strah pred snemanjem
18. 3. dop. – smučarski poleti in prekinitev
18. 3. pop. – Titova smrt, bolnišnica
21. 3. pop. – divje brisanje mize
22. 3. pop. – tožarjenje, podajanje skokice
23. 3. dop. – lisica ob cesti
24. 3. dop. A – sestavljanje avionov, pospravljen kotiček
25. 3. dop. – rojstnodnevne rute, opeklina pri torti
25. 3. pop. – barvanje jajčk, salta, pomoč pri dojenčku
29. 3. pop. – ribanje, lovec in živali, ustvarjanje s plastelinom
31. 3. dop. – iskanje predmeta

Sklep

S sestavo gornje tabele se je moje delo bolj ali manj končalo. Preden zaključim, naj navedem še nekaj opažanj, ki bi komu utegnila koristiti pri morebitnem nadaljnjem oziroma primerljivem delu.

Razumevanje govora je bilo bistveno lažje, ne glede na starost otrok, kadar je bilo prisotnih manj oseb, kadar so bili pogovori relativno umirje-

ni ter blizu mikrofonov. Video posnetki so v pomoč predvsem pri razvozlavanju tega, kdo govori in kaj ob tem počne, za samo vsebino govora pa nimajo vrednosti.

Na razumevanje sta poleg kakovosti posnetka vplivali tudi elokventnost ter artikulacija govorcev. Otroci z boljšimi govorniškimi sposobnostmi so povedali veliko več uporabnega kot ostali. Nasploh bi lahko dejal, vsaj na podlagi te prepisovalske izkušnje, da je argumentiranje v skupini stvar nekaterih posameznikov, ki tudi sicer dobro obvladajo veščino govorjenja in se je poleg tega poslužujejo kot neke vrste načina za mirno reševanje (morebitnih) sporov. Saj je logično, govorec se posluži argumentacije, ko skuša drugega z besedami prepričati o tem, da ima prav.

Na koncu naj namenim nekaj besed vlogi samega prepisovalca. Ugotovil sem, da je bila količina razumevanja in izluščevanja govora ter argumentacije močno odvisna od, kot sem že omenil, moje koncentracije ter pripravljenosti na delo, pa tudi od tega, kako dobro sem znal opazovati in poslušati ljudi. Na koncu procesa prepisovanja je bilo moje razumevanje tako govora otrok kot karakteristik njihovega načina argumentiranja mnogo večje kot na začetku.

Je pač tako, da otroci govorijo ter argumentirajo drugače kot odrasli, in če jih želimo slišati in razumeti, jim moramo resnično prisluhniti, jim pustiti, da povedo, kar imajo povedati. In tu nimam v mislih le tujih otrok, ki sem jih poslušal na posnetkih, ne, temeljna pripravljenost in posluh za otroški pogled na stvari je najočitnejši/najpomembnejši pri lastnih otrocih. Pri njih lažje razumemo in do neke mere celo spodbujamo argumentiranje. Nekoliko v šali rečeno, kakovost »posnetkov« in količina »materiala« sta najboljši oziroma največji, kadar ne samo opazujemo z udeležbo, temveč smo deloma tudi sami predmet preučevanja, prav dobesedno, saj smo bili nekoč vsi otroci. Boljše ko so tovrstne prepisovalčeve izkušnje, lažje in uspešneje jih lahko aplicira v drugačnih (izjavljalnih) okoliščinah. Bolj celostno je razumevanje otroške argumentacije.

Opombe

[1] Amandi Saksida se zahvaljujem za veliko pomoč pri iskanju primernega načina (metode) zapisovanja prepisov in sistematizaciji dela. Naredila je ogrodje modifikacij in dopolnitev sistema transkribiranja CHAT ter postavila temelje klasifikacije in označevanja oseb, govora in dejanj.

[2] Igor Ž. Žagar, Barbara Domanjko: *Argumentiranost kot model (uspešne) komunikacije*; založba Izolit, Domžale 2006.

[3] CHAT je orodje za analizo govora, del projekta Childes, ki se ukvarja z usvajanjem jezika. Glavna prednost sistema CHAT je možnost standardizacije in instrumentalizacije prepisov, kar omogoča poznejšo analizo ter obdelavo z računalniškimi programi. Poleg tega so tako transkribirani posnetki, zahvaljujoč temeljiti transkripcijski metodi, običajno berljivi tudi brez izvornih avdiovizualnih posnetkov. Več o orodju lahko izveste na: http://childes.psy.cmu.edu/

[4] Ker že več let delam na radiu, kjer se občasno srečujem tudi s transkribiranjem, zlasti intervjujev, sem menil, da ne bom imel večjih težav. Zavedal sem se, da je transkribiranje skupinskega govora drugačno, celovitejše kot transkribiranje govora posameznika. Prav tako sem vedel, imam namreč dva otroka, da je otroke (na videz) težje razumeti kot odrasle. Dobro, stvar bo pač malo večji izziv, sem si rekel.

[5] Pri tem sem se opiral na že prej omenjeno razpravo *Argumentiranost kot model (uspešne) komunikacije (2006)*, delo Stephena Toulmina, pa tudi na nekaj drugih (filozofskih) razmišljanj o argumentih in pripovedi nasploh, na primer psihoanalitičnih, logiških, hermenevtičnih ter naratoloških (Stanzel, Kos, Foucault, Ricoeur).

[6] Ta del legende je bil v pomoč predvsem meni, saj sem imel vedno na razpolago orodje, s katerim sem lažje ugotavljal, kdo govori.

[7] Ta del legende je bistven za razumevanje prepisov.

[8] Posnetka kamere A in B nista sinhrona. Posnetek A je kronološko v celoti posnet šele po zaključku posnetka B. Zato je tudi prepis razdeljen v dva dela. Za vsako kamero (uro) en.

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RECENZIJA KNJIGE »*ARGUMENTIRANOST KOT MODEL (USPEŠNE) KOMUNIKACIJE*«

Silvestra Klemenčič

Igor Ž. Žagar in Barbara Domajnko: *Argumentiranost kot model (uspešne) komunikacije*. Založba Izolit - Zbirka Zrenja, Domžale, 2006, str. 92, [ISBN 961-6279-99-8]

Iz naslova sicer ni moč razbrati, da gre za podrobno obravnavo pedagoškega diskurza, ki vsebuje svoje specifične elemente in posebno obliko jezikovne rabe znotraj pedagoškega procesa oziroma odkritega in prikritega kurikula v šoli in zunaj nje.

Argumentiranost kot model (uspešne) komunikacije je znanstvena monografija, ki celostno obravnava pogled na specifični, to je na pedagoški diskurz, njena prava vrednost pa je v aplikativnosti. V izhodiščno razlago teoretičnih postavk komunikacije v šoli (govorne in pisne) so namreč nazorno vpleteni praktično uporabni primeri in priporočila. S tega vidika je delo pomembno ne le za učitelje, temveč tudi za širok strokovni krog oblikovalcev, uporabnikov, izvajalcev in raziskovalcev šolskega polja ter za vse, ki jih komunikacija v vsakdanjem življenju kakorkoli zanima.

Osvetlitev pedagoškega diskurza temelji na predpostavki, da jezikovna raba ni »nevtralen prenos dejstev«, »odsev stvarnosti«, temveč družbena dejavnost, ki sooblikuje interpretacije družbene stvarnosti. Zato je v delu posebna pozornost posvečena poti oziroma potem, po katerih diskurz v šoli deluje, in to v vseh klasičnih elementih pedagoške prakse. Šolski diskurz je z vidika retorike in argumentacije nazorno predstavljen, tehnike in strategije argumentacije pa uporabne v vsakodnevni praksi in na kateremkoli področju, ne le v šoli.

Avtorjema je uspelo dokazati tezo, da je komunikacija v šoli za pedagoški proces temeljnega pomena, da jo lahko pojmujemo kot mesto in hkrati kot sredstvo izvajanja pedagoških dejavnosti (aktivnega skupnega oblikovanja učne situacije in znanja), in da je poznavanje in obvladovanje komunikacije v šoli eden temeljnih vidikov kakovosti izobraževanja.

Prilagajanje osnovnih elementov retorike, logike in argumentacije je v pričujočem delu spretno prevedeno v načine komunikacije v šoli. Retorika in argumentacija že skozi dvatisočpetstoletno zgodovino postavljata temelje pravilnega in učinkovitega oblikovanja argumentov in prepričevanja. Z obvladovanjem teh spretnosti lahko tako učitelji kot učenci bistveno izboljšajo kakovost pedagoškega procesa. Poudarjeno je, da je argumentiranje spretnost, ki se je lahko vsakdo nauči, a je v veliki meri odvisna od vsakokratnega posameznega konteksta, kjer sta ključni predvsem praktična izkušnja in veliko vaje. Tudi ni naključje, da smo v Sloveniji z reformo šolstva vključili v edukacijski sistem retoriko kot samostojni predmet. Oblikovalci teh politik so prisluhnili stroki in ugotovili, da bi bilo dobro, da bi učitelji učili to/tako, kar/kot najbolje znajo. Še prej pa se morajo vsekakor kontinuirano izpopolnjevati in usposabljati tudi za obvladovanje spretnosti argumentiranja in pedagoškega diskurza.

Monografija je smiselno razdeljena v dva sklopa. Najprej je opredeljeno, v čem in kako se znanstveni diskurz razlikuje od pedagoškega, kateri so retorični elementi pedagoškega diskurza in kako ga z mehanizmi retorike nadgrajujemo.

V retorični analizi pedagoškega diskurza so izpostavljene zlasti vljudnostne jezikovne strategije kot dejavnik pospeševanja sodelovalnosti v razredu in povečevanja učinkovitosti pedagoškega procesa. Konceptualiziranje pedagoškega diskurza je podprto z nekaterimi teoretičnimi elementi tradicionalnega pojmovanja retorike in s primerom retorične analize v treh delih: v okviru tematike vljudnosti (kako se z uporabo vljudnostnih strategij ohranjajo/oblikujejo vloge ter odnosi med učitelji in učenci), s ponazoritvijo vpliva načina ubesedovanja na tip pedagoške dejavnosti (kako izbira jezikovnih strategij vpliva na tip in uspešnost pedagoške dejavnosti) in z dokazovanji, zakaj znanje pojmujemo kot skupno oblikovanje vednosti (kako se šele skozi komunikacijo oblikuje vednost, ki ji je pripisan status znanja).

Posebno poglavje je namenjeno etiki komuniciranja v šoli, kjer sta posebej izpostavljeni in obravnavani dve temi, to je vljudnost in etična podoba učiteljev, kot enako pomembno racionalni argumentaciji za uspešno in učinkovito izvajanje pedagoškega procesa.

Prvi del je zaokrožen s prikazom vloge argumentacije v vsakdanjem življenju, s pojasnitvijo argumentiranosti kot konstitutivnega elementa pedagoškega diskurza ter navajanjem pomembnih razlik med logiko, retoriko in argumentacijo. Podani so načini oblikovanja in strukture (konstrukcije)

argumenta, standardizacije ter kriteriji veljavnosti argumentiranja oziroma dobre argumentacije – sprejemljivost, relevantnost in zadostnost.

V drugem delu je predstavljen retorični model pedagoškega diskurza. Njegova osnovna enota je učna ura, model pa je oblikovan širše, in sicer kot opomnik točk, ki naj/lahko bi jim sledili učitelji (učenci). Pri oblikovanju modela so poudarjeni predvsem elementi racionalne argumentacije. Kako ga oblikujemo, kateri so tekstualni korelati prilagodljivosti (njihova odvisnost od fizičnega, družbenega, kognitivnega in jezikovnega konteksta) ter kateri so kriteriji (oporne točke) za kvalitativno analizo pedagoškega diskurza.

Pravila in elementi procesa veljavne racionalne argumentacije pri oblikovanju in utemeljevanju stališč so opredeljeni »funkcionalno«. Iz njih je po korakih oblikovan argumentativni vzorec, v smislu napotkov in kritične presoje. In sicer prek strukturiranja učne ure in oblikovanja govora/besedila ter izbire in ureditve argumentov.

V zaključku je predstavljena Ducrotova teorija argumentacije v jeziku, s katero raziskuje argumentativni potencial jezika kot sistema in pokaže na dejstvo, da jezik ni nevtralen »medij«, ampak naši argumentaciji postavlja določene omejitve.

Na kratko se avtorja dotakneta tudi Bahtinove polifonije, navedeta, kako jo je Ducrot posplošil na jezik kot sistem oziroma kako jo je opredelil, hkrati pa nas napotita na dela s podrobnejšo informacijo o razmerju med polifonijo in toposi.

Delo nam namesto zaključka ponuja sklepne misli o strokovni in komunikacijski usposobljenosti učiteljev, o široki rabi in pojmovanju pedagoškega diskurza in navaja še nekaj napotkov enega najstarejših raziskovalcev pedagoškega govora, Kvintilijana, na čigar stališčih temelji obstoječe delo.

Poudariti velja, da je monografija zamišljena kot učni pripomoček za izobraževanje govorcev in da je v njej ravno zato izbrana Kvintilijanova opredelitev retorike. Ta namreč izpostavi predvsem »dobro govorjenje«, ki zajema ne le kakovosti govora, temveč tudi govorca (pri čemer »dobro« vključuje tudi visoke standarde izobraženosti in moralno-etično razsežnost).

|POVZETKI / ABSTRACTS

KRITIČNO MIŠLJENJE ZA PLURALISTIČNO UNIVERZO
Henrik Bohlin, Maria Wolrath Söderberg, Anders Ullholm in *Anders Burman*

Spodbujanje kritičnega mišljenja ponavadi razumemo kot eno najpomembnejših odgovornosti univerzitetnega izobraževanja. Ankete švedskega odbora za izobraževanje ugotavljajo, da gre za zapleteno nalogo. Tudi naše raziskave kažejo na to, da je prevladujoč pogled na kritično mišljenje logično-deduktiven. Prepričani smo, da je tako ozko razumevanje kritičnega mišljenja pomanjkljivo za našo sodobno pluralistično univerzo, ki potrebuje interdisciplinarno sodelovanje ter postopno vključevanje bolj heterogenih, morda multikulturnih študentskih skupin. V okviru projekta »Kritično mišljenje za pluralistično univerzo« želimo razviti alternativno pojmovanje kritičnega mišljenja. Še posebej si kritično mišljenje predstavljamo kot način soočanja z mnogimi sorodnimi perspektivami. V tem prispevku želimo razpravljati o tem, ali in kako lahko tradicije, kot so klasična sofistika, retorična renesančna pedagogika, moderne hermenevtične teorije in kritiška teorija prispevajo k bolj vsestranski pedagogiki kritičnega mišljenja, ki je prilagojena zahtevam današnjega časa.

Ključne besede: kritično mišljenje, vzgoja in izobraževanje, univerza

CRITICAL THINKING FOR A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSITY
Henrik Bohlin, Maria Wolrath Söderberg, Anders Ullholm and *Anders Burman*

Fostering critical thinking is usually seen as one of the most important responsibilities of university education. Surveys of the Swedish Board of Education show this to be a complicated task. Our own investigations indicate that the dominant view of critical thinking is logical-deductive. We are convinced that this narrow understanding of critical thinking is insufficient for our contemporary pluralistic university, requiring interdisciplinary co-operations and gradually including more heterogeneous, perhaps multicultural student groups. Within the framework of the project "Critical Thinking for a Pluralistic University" we want to develop alternative conceptions of critical thinking. Particularly we conceive of critical thinking as a way of handling many concurring perspectives. In this paper we would like to discuss if and how traditions like classical sophistry, rhetorical renaissance pedagogy, modern hermeneutical theories and critical theory can contribute to a more comprehensive pedagogy of critical thinking adapted to modern requirements.

Keywords: critical thinking, education, university

DEBATNA ARGUMENTACIJA
Jerneja Domanjko

Članek obravnava debato, kot se poučuje v debatnih klubih, z vidikov retorike in dialektike ter z vidika modernejšega teoretskega pristopa, ki je kombinacija omenjenih starodavnih ved. Gre za pragma-dialektiko, ki sta jo zasnovala Frans H. van Eemeren in Rob Grootendorst. Avtorica prav tako obravnava debato v okviru prepričevalnega diskurza, pri čemer je nje-

na glavna teza, da debatni klubi in debatni turnirji vplivajo na posameznikovo sposobnost prepričevanja, predvsem na *logos*, ki je razumski del prepričevanja. Vrste argumentacije, oblike argumentov in metode sklepanja so še posebej izpostavljene, saj želi pokazati na povezanost teh teoretskih konstruktov z argumenti, ki jih uporabljajo slovenski debaterji in debaterke, preko analize argumentov v mladinskih oddajah *Tekma, debatna oddaja za mlade*, ki so zasnovane kot skrajšane oblike debatnega formata Karl Popper.

Ključne besede: debata, argumentacija, prepričevanje, pragma-dialektika, retorika

DEBATE ARGUMENTATION
Jerneja Domanjko

The paper presents debate taught in debate clubs from the perspectives of rhetoric and dialectics and from the perspective of the modern theoretical approach which is a combination of the two formerly mentioned ancient disciplines. This is pragma-dialectics founded by Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst. The paper also sees debate in terms of persuasion discourse where we argue that debate clubs and tournaments influence a person's ability of persuasion, foremost *logos*, which is a rational part of persuasion. Types of argumentation, schemes of argument and methods of reasoning are emphasized since we would like to point out the connection between these theoretical constructs and arguments used by Slovenian debaters. We do this by analyzing arguments in broadcasts for young people called *Tekma, debatna oddaja za mlade* which were a shortened version of the Karl Popper debate format.

Keywords: debate, persuasion, pragma-dialectics

UPORABA DEBATNIH TEHNIK PRI POUKU ZGODOVINE V 2. IN 3. LETNIKU GIMNAZIJE
Miha Gartner

Izobraževalna debata v Sloveniji v zadnjih letih pridobiva na pomenu, njena vloga pri doseganju višjih nivojev znanj pri dijakih pa je neizpodbitna. Tudi pri pouku zgodovine je izobraževalna debata zelo uporabna metoda, saj ga popestri in dijake motivira za doseganje višjih ciljev, kot je le reprodukcija navedenih dejstev. V članku so predstavljene nekatere značilnosti izobraževalne debate, način priprave na debato, debatni formati, pomen in oblika argumentacije, vloga učitelja pri vodenju in ovrednotenju debate ter ugotovitve o uspešnosti dijakov v času enoletne praktične uporabe debate pri pouku zgodovine. Avtor članka je svoje izkušnje pridobil v času mentorstva debatnega kluba in ob izvajanju debate pri pouku zgodovine v 2. in 3. letniku gimnazije na Gimnaziji Celje-Center.

Ključne besede: izobraževalna debata, pouk zgodovine

USE OF DEBATE TECHIQUES IN HISTORY LESSONS IN 2ND AND 3RD YEAR OF GRAMMAR SCHOOL
Miha Gartner

Education debate in Slovenia is gaining importance in recent years and its role in achieving higher levels of knowledge with pupils is indisputable. It is a very useful method in history

lessons since it stimulates lessons and motivates pupils to achieve higher goals than merely reproducing stated facts. Some of the characteristics of the education debate, ways of preparation for the debate, debate formats, meaning and form of argumentation, role of the teacher in leading and evaluating debate and the findings of the pupils' success in the time of one year practical use of debate in history lessons will be presented in the paper. The author gained his experience in the time of his mentorship over the debate club and with practising debate in history lessons in 2nd and 3rd year of Gimnazija Celje-Center grammar school.

Keywords: education debate, history lessons

TRANSKIBIRANJE OTROŠKE ARGUMENTACIJE
Pavel Koltaj, Igor Ž. Žagar

Prispevek se ukvarja s praktičnimi in teoretičnimi platmi transkribiranja otroške argumentacije v okviru raziskave poimenovane *Edukacija in konstrukcije kritične pismenosti: percepcija, argumentacija, interpretacija*, ki poteka pod vodstvom dr. Igorja Ž. Žagarja s Pedagoškega inštituta v Ljubljani, Slovenija. Članek je razdeljen v tri sklope. Prvi predstavlja tehniko zbiranja podatkov; transkripcijski material je nastal na podlagi avdio-vizualnih posnetkov dveh vrtčevskih skupin (3-4 in 5-6 let starosti). Drugi del članka opisuje obdelovanje podatkov; transkripcijo odlomkov pomembnih za argumentacijo s pomočjo skrajšanega in prirejenega CHAT sistema za transkribiranje (http://childes.psy.cmu.edu/). Zaključni sklop predstavlja preliminarno analizo prepisov, predloge za reševanje problemov glede kvalitete posnetkov in količine zbranih podatkov ter nekaj splošnih opažanj glede pristopa k raziskovanju, njegovih metod in rezultatov.

Ključne besede: otroška argumentacija, zbiranje podatkov, sistem transkribiranja

TRANSCRIBING CHILDREN'S ARGUMENTATION
Pavel Koltaj, Igor Ž. Žagar

The paper deals with practical and theoretical aspects of transcribing children's argumentation in the context of *Education and critical literacy constructions: perception, argumentation and interpretation*, a current research under the direction of Dr. Igor Ž. Žagar from the Educational Research Institute in Ljubljana, Slovenia. The paper is divided into three sections. The first section presents a data gathering technique; transcription material was gathered by audio-visual recordings of two kindergarten groups (3-4 and 5-6 years of age). The second part of the paper describes data processing and transcribing argumentation relevant fragments using abbreviated and modified CHAT Transcription System (http://childes.psy.cmu.edu/). The final section presents a preliminary analysis of the transcriptions along with the suggestions for solving problems as to the quality of recordings and the quantity of the gathered data as well as some general observations concerning the research approach, its methods and results.

Keywords: children's argumentation, data gathering, transcription system

PONAVLJANJE BESEDIŠČA IN POUČEVANJE PISANJA ESEJEV SKOZI DEBATO
Mateja Lenarčič Glušič

Debata ni le oblika izražanja, temveč bolj oblika prepričevanja. Debaterji si želijo spreminjati mnenja. Upajo, da bodo poslušalci stvari videli na njihov način. Pri debati ne gre za konflikt med dobrim in zlim niti za konflikt med resnico in neresnico ali med dejstvi in mnenji. Debata je predvsem konflikt med vrednotami in načeli. Če jih obravnavamo posamezno, ima vsaka vrednota svojo vrednost in veljavo ter si zasluži podporo. Ko pa se soočita dve veljavni načeli, je treba sprejeti odločitev o tem, katera je pomembnejša.

Ključne besede: debata, prepričevanje, vrednote

REVISING VOCABULARY AND TEACHING ESSAY WRITING THROUGH DEBATE
Mateja Lenarčič Glušič

Debate is not simply a form of expression; it is, rather, a form of persuasion. Debaters hope to change minds. They hope that their listeners will come to see things their way. Debate is not about the conflict of good and evil; neither it is about the conflict between the truth and falsehood or between facts and opinions. Debate is, rather, about the conflict of values and principles. Taken independently, each value has worth and validity, and deserves support. But when two valid principles conflict, a decision must be made as to which one is more important.

Keywords: debate, persuasion, values

RETORIKA PRI POUKU ANGLEŠKEGA JEZIKA V TRILETNEM POKLICNEM PROGRAMU: IZKUŠNJE IZ PRAKSE
Nataša Makovečki

Prispevek predstavlja izkušnje pri vključevanju elementov retorike v pouk angleškega jezika v dveh triletnih poklicnih programih v Šolskem centru Velenje skozi obdobje petih let. Pri poučevanju angleškega jezika v tovrstnih programih se soočimo s specifičnimi težavami, ki jih je potrebno upoštevati pri načrtovanju učnih priprav. Najbolj kritične so: pomanjkanje motivacije in samozaupanja, nizka samopodoba, težave z disciplino, zelo omejene jezikovne kompetence in spretnosti izražanja v tujem (in maternem) jeziku. Metodološki pristop temelji na treh načelih: uporabnost, konkretnost (induktivni pristop) in kratkost (manj je več). Članek predstavlja nekatere od metod, ki smo jih uporabili: predstavitev teorije z nazornimi primeri, izvedba govornih vaj v obliki diskusijskih skupin in priprava dvominutnega govornega nastopa na poljubno temo. Tovrsten pristop je dvignil motivacijo učencev in jih postavil v aktivnejšo vlogo v učnem procesu. Naučili so se uporabljati argumente, da bi v jezik lahko prenesli kritičnost in čustva. Pristop je dvignil zavedanje učencev o pomembnosti prevzemanja odgovornosti zase in za druge.

Ključne besede: retorika, poklicno izobraževanje, angleški jezik

RHETORIC IN ENGLISH LESSONS IN A THREE-YEAR VOCATIONAL PROGRAMME IN SECONDARY EDUCATION: EXPERIENCES FROM TEACHING PRACTISE
Nataša Makovečki

The paper presents experiences of including rhetorical topics in English lessons in two three-year vocational programmes at the School Centre in Velenje over the period of five years. Teaching English in these programmes faces specific problems which need to be considered in lesson plans. The most critical ones are: lack of motivation and self-reliance, poor self-image, problems with discipline and a very limited linguistic competence and poor speaking skills in a foreign language (and the mother tongue). The methodological approach was based upon tree principles: usefulness (applicability), concreteness (inductive approach) and shortness (less is more). The paper presents some of the used methods: presenting theory with illustrative examples, execution of oral exercises in the form of discussion groups and preparation of a two-minute oral presentation on a chosen topic by the students. This approach increased the students' motivation and put them into a more active role in the learning process. They learned how to use arguments to channel criticism and emotions into language. It encouraged the students' awareness of taking the responsibility for themselves and others.

Keywords: rhetoric, vocational education, English

DE BONOVE LEKCIJE ZA IZBOLJŠANJE MISELNE UČINKOVITOSTI V KONTEKSTU SLOVENSKIH OSNOVNIH ŠOL
Tamara Maleševič

Avtor pravi, da sta v zvezi nadarjenostjo dve novici: ena slaba in ena dobra. Slaba je, da je nadarjenost v večji meri dedna. Dobra novica je, da za življenje potrebujemo učinkovito mišljenje, ki je manj odvisno od (v glavnem podedovane) nadarjenosti. Miselne spretnosti so po de Bonu veščina, ki se jih da razvijati. Eden izmed ciljev njegovih CoRT vaj je, da učencem pomaga, da postanejo MISLECI. Misliti smo prisiljeni le zato, ker nimamo celovitih informacij. Da bi nadomestili pomanjkanje informacij, je smiselno izboljšati miselne spretnosti. Uporabili bomo eno izmed de Bonovih tehnik za usmerjanje pozornosti – PMZ (plus, minus, zanimivo) in tako predstavili učinke prenosa de Bonovih miselnih lekcij v naš izobraževalni sistem.

Ključne besede: de Bono, miselne spretnosti, usmerjanje pozornosti

DE BONO'S LESSONS FOR IMPROVING THINKING EFFECTIVENESS IN THE CONTEXT OF SLOVENIA'S SCHOOLS
Tamara Maleševič

Edward de Bono says there are two facts about intelligence: one good and one bad. The bad one is that intelligence is mostly inherited and this is the reason it cannot be substantially increased. The good one is that thinking effectiveness is more important for living than (mostly) inherited intelligence. De Bono claims that thinking skills can be developed. Helping students to become THINKERS is one of the aims of De Bono's CoRT program. People think only because they do not have complete information. It is therefore sensible to improve thinking skills in order to compensate for the lack of information. We are going to use one of

de Bono's techniques for focusing attention – PMI (plus, minus, interesting) – to introduce the effects of implementing De Bono's CoRT thinking lessons into our education system.

Keywords: de Bono, thinking skills, focusing attention

TRI RAVNI ZAGOTAVLJANJA KOMPLEKSNEGA IN KRITIČNEGA MIŠLJENJA
Zora Rutar

Vsi napredni šolski sistemi in didaktični pristopi poudarjajo pomembnost aktivnega učenja, problemski pristop, razvoj komunikacijskih veščin ter veščin sodelovanja, partnerstvo in dialog, raziskovanje, organizacijo ter kritično in kreativno mišljenje. V članku bomo razmišljali o treh ravneh zagotavljanja takšnega učnega okolja, ki bo pripomoglo k razvoju kompleksnega in kritičnega mišljenja. Prva raven se nanaša na prakso v razredu: kako lahko učitelj prispeva k razvoju kompleksnega in kritičnega mišljenja z različnimi pristopi pri načrtovanju in izvajanju pouka. Druga raven se nanaša na raven posameznih šol: kako lahko šole v kontekstu svoje vizije in razvojnega načrtovanja zagotovijo klimo, ki bo omogočala razvoj kompleksnega in kritičnega mišljenja. Tretja raven se nanaša na šolsko politiko, na prevladujoč pedagoški diskurz ali konflikt paradigem, kakor tudi na najširši okvir socialnih pogojev, ki odreja meje mogočega in možnost, da le-te odraža in preseže.

Ključne besede: kritično mišljenje, šolska politika, praksa v razredu

THREE LEVELS OF ASSURING COMPLEX AND CRITICAL THINKING
Zora Rutar

All advanced school systems and didactic approaches stress the importance of active learning, problem approach, communication and collaboration skills development, partnership and dialogue, research, organizing, critical and creative thinking. In the present paper we will think about three levels of assuring such a learning environment that will help to develop complex and critical thinking. The first level refers to the classroom practise: how a teacher can add to complex and critical thinking development with different approaches to planning and doing. The second level refers to the level of individual schools: how can schools in the context of their vision and developmental planning assure such a climate which will enable development of complex and critical thinking. The third level refers to school policy, the prevailing pedagogical discourse or paradigm conflict and also wider social conditions as a broadest frame which prescribes the limits of possibility and the ability to reflect and exceed them. None of these levels can be omitted to ensure complex and critical thinking otherwise the whole "enterprise" will fail.

Keywords: critical thinking, school policy, classroom practise

VZAJEMNOST RETORIČNE IN DISKURZIVNE TEORIJE
Anja Šerc

Osnovna ideja prispevka izhaja iz teoretskega navdiha ob Charlandovem članku z naslovom »Rehabilitating Rhetoric; Confronting Blindspots in Discourse and Social Theory« in pristne-

ga osebnega zanimanja za emancipacijski potencial formalne debate v družbi. Teoretski izziv prispevka je v povzemanju literature in glavnih idej, ki predlagajo izpraševanje o retorični in diskurzivni teoriji. Obe teoretski smeri vidita izziv v povezavi med besedilom in močjo, vendar uporabljata različne metode in se razlikujeta v temeljnih vprašanjih o viru moči, ki izhaja iz njene povezanosti z besedilom. Retorična teorija išče odgovore v argumentih, katerih moč ne izhaja le iz razuma (logos) ampak deloma temelji na avtoriteti (etos) in čustvih (patos). Teorija se v prvi vrsti zanima za prakso, ki onemogoča interpretativne možnosti v raziskovanju socialne moči skozi različne prizme. Besedilo ostaja edina interpretativna možnost. Na drugi strani kritiška teorija odpira nov pogled na raziskovanje ne le možnosti dekonstrukcije ampak tudi na oblikovanje in legitimizacijo novih pristopov k argumentativnim možnostim v formalni debati. Sledili bodo primeri iz izkušenj v dolgoletni debaterski praksi, ki bodo prikazali prenos 'teoretskega izziva' v prakso.

Ključne besede: retorika, diskurz, debata

INTERPLAY OF RHETORICAL THEORY AND DISCOURSE THEORY
Anja Šerc

The core idea of the paper originates from the theoretical inspiration of Charland's article "Rehabilitating Rhetoric; Confronting Blindspots in Discourse and Social Theory" and a genuine personal interest in the emancipatory potential of formal debate in social life. Theoretical challenge of this paper is in summation of literature and the main ideas which propose interrogation of rhetorical theory and discourse theory. Both theoretical communities challenge the connection of text and power but through different methods and differing fundamental questions regarding the source of the power deriving from its connection with the text. Rhetorical theory seeks answers in arguments whose power does not derive strictly from reason (logos) but is also partially based in authority (ethos) and emotion (pathos). The interest of the theory is primarily in the praxis which closes interpretative options for the examination of social power through more than this lens. The text remains the sole barer of interpretative options. On the other hand critical theory opens up a new avenue for exploring potential possibilities not only of deconstruction but also of forming and legitimizing new approaches to argumentative options in formal debating. Examples will follow from experience acquired in years of debating and will provide for application of the 'theoretical challenge'.

Keywords: rhetoric, discourse, debate

OD ZGODBE DO KONVERZACIJE TER OD FILOZOFIJE Z OTROKI DO NASTAVKOV KRITIČNEGA MIŠLJENJA
Lidija Šket

Otrok je osupel, kadar stoji pred nečim in se čudi: »Zakaj dežuje? Zakaj obstaja nekaj in nič?« Bloch (1995) meni, da so vsi majhni otroci filozofi, ker o svetu sprašujejo in se mu čudijo. Žal to filozofsko mišljenje z leti vse bolj izginja. Ko se otrok sveta navadi, se mu neha čuditi in se o njem spraševati. Kako ohraniti to filozofsko radovednost? Kako spodbuditi kritično mnenje? Rada bi izpostavila pomen zgodnjega srečevanja s filozofijo. Predstavila bom primer otroške filozofije v četrtem razredu (9), ki je temeljil na poslušanju zgodb iz zbirke H. Doskočilove: Diogen v sodu. Na koncu šolskega leta so otroci s pomočjo zgodb spontano vedeli, kako ust-

variti dialog, ki zahteva argumente za in proti, ter izjave, ki zahtevajo nove razprave. M. Lipman meni, da lahko rezultati kasneje postanejo kreativno področje za ukvarjanje z otroško filozofijo, ki na posreden a sistematičen način obravnava kritično mišljenje in logično sklepanje.

Ključne besede: filozofija, kritično mišljenje, argumentacija

FROM THE STORY TO THE CONVERSATION AND FROM PHILOSOPHY WITH CHILDREN TO CRITICAL THINKING
Lidija Šket

A child is amazed when standing in front of something and wondering: "Why is it raining? Why is there something and nothing?" Bloch (1995) thinks that all small children are philosophers because they ask questions about the world and are amazed by it. Unfortunately this philosophic mind is disappearing year after year. When children get used to the world they stop wondering and asking themselves. How to keep this philosophic curiosity? How to stimulate critical opinion? I want to expose the meaning of early encounters with philosophy. I will introduce an example of children's philosophy in the 4th grade (9), based on listening to stories from the collection of H. Doskočilova: Diogen in a cask. At the end of the school year, with the help of these stories, the children spontaneously knew how to create a dialogue that claimed arguments for and against and new statements that demanded new discussions. According to M. Lipman the results can later on become a creative field for dealing with children's philosophy that in an indirect but systematic manner deals with critical thinking and logical inference.

Keywords: philosophy, critical thinking, argumentation

METAKOGNICIJA IN KRITIČNO MIŠLJENJE
Tanja Rupnik Vec

Namen članka je poiskati odgovore na naslednja vprašanja: a) Kaj je metakognicija?, b) Kako sta metakognicija in kritično mišljenje povezana?, c) Kako lahko učitelji pospešijo, usmerjajo in podpirajo razvoj metakognitivnega ter, posredno, kritičnega mišljenja pri svojih učencih? Prvo vprašanje je glavna tema številnih sodobnih študij o kognitivni in razvojni psihologiji. Pri iskanju odgovora na zastavljeno vprašanje se ne moremo zadovoljiti s splošno definicijo koncepta, kot je »metakognicija je razmišljanje o razmišljanju« in raje podrobno raziščemo, kako pojem konceptualizirajo različni avtorji. V drugem delu članka raziskujemo odnos med metakognicijo in kritičnim mišljenjem, kot ga pojmujejo nekateri avtorji s področja izobraževanja. Na tej osnovi zaključimo, da je metakognicija pomemben element kritičnega mišljenja. V tretjem delu smo pragmatični in predlagamo konkretne strategije za pospeševanje metakognicije, ki jih lahko učitelji uporabijo pri podajanju različnih vsebin in uporabi različnih metod (debata, igra vlog, reševanje problemov, študije primerov itd.).

Ključne besede: metakognicija, kritično mišljenje, izobraževanje

METACOGNITION AND CRITICAL THINKING
Tanja Rupnik Vec

The purpose of this article is to answer the following questions: (a) What is metacognition?, (b) How are metacognition and critical thinking related?, (c) How can teachers stimulate, direct and support the development of metacognitive and – indirectly – critical thinking in their students? The first question is in the heart of many contemporary studies of cognitive and developmental psychology. In the search for an answer to this question we are not satisfied with the general definition of the concept, such as 'metacognition is the thinking about thinking'; rather we investigate in detail how some authors conceptualize it. In the second part of the article we investigate the relationship between metacognition and critical thinking, as conceptualized from the perspective of some authors from the field of education. On this basis, we make the conclusion about metacognition as an important element of critical thought. In the third section we are pragmatic and suggest concrete strategies for enhancing metacognition that teachers could use as they teach various contents and apply different methods (debate, role play, problem solving, case studies etc.).

Keywords: metacognition, critical thinking, education

VREDNOTENJE DEBATE O VREDNOTAH
Steven Woods in *Korry Harvey*

Glede na povečano polarizacijo družb velja zmožnost razpravljanja o njihovih vrednotah za prednostno potrebo. Da bi lahko akademska debata služila kot priprava za razpravo v javni sferi, je potrebno ustvariti možnosti za udejstvovanje v diskurzu in razpravi o vrednotah na koherenten in učinkovit način. Prispevek prinaša temeljna izhodišča za učinkovito debato o vrednotah, ki pozornost posveča identifikaciji vrednot, konstrukciji kriterijev in obravnavi trkov med konkurenčnimi vrednotami. Raziskali bomo primere tem, predstavili pa bomo tudi diskusijo, kako doseči premik v debati o vrednotah od akademske debate do tovrstne debate v javni sferi.

Ključne besede: debata, vrednote, javna sfera

VALUING VALUE DEBATE
Steven Woods and *Korry Harvey*

Given the increased polarization of societies, the need to be able to discuss the core values of those societies is a priority. In order for academic debate to serve as a training ground for discussion in the public sphere the ability to engage in discourse and discussion of values coherently and effectively is called for. The paper will provide a primer for effective value debate, focusing on identifying values, criteria construction, and dealing with the clash of competing values. Examples of topics will be explored, and a discussion of how the transition beyond academic debate to debating values in the public sphere can be achieved will also be presented.

Keywords: debate, values, public sphere

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
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