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Europe from the Great War to the new hope for a better future in Democracy[1]

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Abstract:

Purpose and originality: The purpose of this study is to highlight possible risks for the future of democracy in Europe by focusing on certain important causes of the rise of World War I as well as on some important reasons why the post-war hope for a better future in Democracy could not be fulfilled.
Method: In the study historical descriptive, analytical and comparative method is used. I also tried to combine chronological and thematic approaches.
Results: Based on the political and historical research of important causes which influenced the direction of Europe to World War I. as well as of some important reasons which influenced that the post-war development of democracy, I came to the conclusion that the future of Europe is particularly threatened by the crisis of elites, the underestimation of the solution to social problems, growing tension, poor communication between political representatives of different democratic parties, and the reluctance to assume political responsibility for the development of the country.
Society: The results should raise awareness about risks that not only in the past but still threaten peace and democracy.
Limitations/ further research: Research will continue with a focus on the inter-war period and, in particular, the multi-causality of the causes of the onset of totalitarian regimes, which will require wider teamwork at the international level.

Keywords: Europe, war, democracy, politics, expansion, illusion, sleepwalkers, crisis.

1   Introduction

The time we live since the end of World War II is quite unique from a historical perspective. And when the Communist Party's monopoly ended in the countries of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, new opportunities for representative democracy were opened. Contemporary representative democracy is, in the main, the answer to the request from more than 100 years ago that *"the people"* vote for their representatives, who have the competence to make decisions on important questions. But the 20th century was a period of two world wars, and a frequent failure of democracy. Today, the critics of the representative democracy again declare that the period in which standard political parties compete with one another in

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an effort to gain large numbers of voters to show support of the quality and authority their political decisions is failing. In such an environment a citizen starts to become accustomed to taking a view that constantly puts him in the position of disappointment from the real conducting of politics. In public opinion surveys it is always more frequently emphasized that political elites in fact do not represent the *"voice of the people"* and political decision-making in nearly all European states *"generally takes place outside the influence of citizens and even without their knowledge"* (Verhulst & Nijeboer, 2015, pp. 8-9). In view of the current and anticipated problems recently confronted by the European Union, which originated *"from the ashes of two World Wars"*, the risk still exists that seemingly simple solutions offered by centrifugal political forces will address a dissatisfied public and divert the attention of European political strategists from growing populism to other less serious issues. Surely there is a lot of truth in the fact that those who do not know history's mistakes are doomed to repeat them. Of course, history cannot be repeated as it was before or after World War I. But we can learn from it. The purpose of this study is to highlight possible risks for the future of democracy in Europe by focusing on certain important causes of the rise of World War I as well as on some important reasons why the post-war hope for a better future in Democracy could not be fulfilled.

2   Theoretical framework

This article seeks to contribute, through the knowledge of our recent past, to the development of critical thinking in the coming generation, which is growing in a complicated world of huge possibilities as well as threats. As the sources I rely on my research are predominantly books, studies, articles and journals. Based on the sources I will try to provide a reliable view of important causes, which influenced the direction of Europe to World War I. as well as some important reasons that influenced the post-war development of democracy. In the research of political development in this period, I chose a combination of chronological and problematic approach.

3   Europe before the Great War

After the unification of Italy and Germany it was necessary to find a new balance in Europe. Among the priorities of the government budgets of European states, strengthening the military was on the top of the list and growing more important still. After the Franco- Prussian war, conscription was introduced in nearly all European states, which is related to the increase of finances allocated to the army and to the growing influence generals had in decision-making concerning not only serious matters of international policy, but home-affairs as well (Tkadlečková, 1994: 7 – 8).Trying to find balance in Europe, various problems occurred, because this period was characterized by a multipolar power system, in which "a plurality of forces and interests balance each other in precarious equilibrium. Britain and France were rivals in Africa and South Asia; Britain confronted Russia in Persia and Central Asia. France was determined to reverse the verdict of the German victory of 1870. Conflicting interests in the Balkans gave rise to tensions between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Italy and Austria were rivals in the Adriatic and quarrelled intermittently over the status of Italophone communities

within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, while there were tensions between Italy and France over the latter's policy in northern Africa. All these pressures were held in check by the patchwork of the 1887 system" (Clark, 2013: 121).

The historian Christopher Clark, whose book The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 deals with the period that lead up to the Great War, stressed that the German Chancellor Bismarck "adopted a double-edged policy that aimed on the one hand, to avoid direct confrontations between Germany and other major powers and, on the other to exploit the discord among the other powers wherever possible for Germany's advantage" (Clark, 2013: 125). Despite the demands that Germany – which had rapidly become a major industrial country – pursue expansionist policy, Bismarck tried to counter the immediate threat of war on the European continent; Europe at the time was struck by an economic crisis that was continually disrupting the fragile social balance and increasing the stakes of war.

When there was a danger that the international crisis would result in a war conflict, Bismarck urged an international congress to meet in Berlin in 1878. The Congress of Berlin dealt mainly with the problems arising from the diminishing influence of the Ottoman Empire in Eastern Europe. The Great Powers in essence decided to support the independence of various nations and their governments at the expense of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In spite of the smaller armed conflicts on the Balkans, The Congress of Berlin – a monumental success of Bismarck's policy – managed to eliminate the immediate threat of war for more than three decades. This period of relative peace enabled the development of international cooperation and the exchange of commodities and capital in an extent incomparable to anything that was before. The fact that regions were interconnected made the growth of infrastructure faster and thus helped the industrial and agricultural labour market become more international. Between 1870 and 1913 the world grew faster than in any period before and the result of this process was seen in a whole set of complex social and economic changes. The historian Niall Ferguson writes: "It is inconceivable, however, that such high levels of international economic integration would have come about in the absence of empires. We should bear in mind that, taken together, the possessions of all the European empires – the Austrian, Belgian, British, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Russian – covered more than half of the world's land surface and governed roughly the same proportion of its population" (Ferguson, 2006: 16).

The Great Powers, however, began to negotiate secret agreements of alliance in order to support their expansionist policies or in defence against the expansion of other powers. In Europe two opposing military alliances were created – the Triple Alliance (Germany, the Austria-Hungary, and Italy) and the Triple Entente (Britain, France, and Russia). Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany since May 1882 and later renewed its membership three times. Still, public sentiment on the question of an alliance with Austria was deeply divided. That of course, was related among other things to the fact that

Italy had territorial claims, especially in the North Adriatic with the city of Trieste, the province of Trento, alongside with South Tyrol.

As far as France was concerned, being defeated by Germany and having lost Alsace-Lorraine, they undoubtedly hoped for revenge, but knew it had to wait, considering the military and economic power Germany had in those years. For this reason, the French were looking for powerful allies and grew closer with the Russians and the British; the latter, on their part sought to reduce the threat which could arise from the traditional Anglo-French rivalry. The president of France during the World War I Raymond Poincaré was born in Lorraine and having experienced the German occupation of Lorraine, he was known for his anti-German sentiment. His visit of Russia prior to the outbreak of war was an affirmation of the Franco-Russian alliance which manifested their determination to prevent further German aggression in Europe, but at that point neither France nor Russia were prepared to get into an armed conflict with Germany (Kováč, 2014: 33).

The law of war in general is a product of modern humanistic conceptions, while in an era when legal positivism was a dominant school of thought, the right of the states to engage in war was essentially without limits. On Hague Conferences in 1899 and 1907 certain conventions were ratified, which, however, do not actually deal with the question as to when is a nation entitled to engage in war; the major subject matter were restraints on the use of certain kinds of weapons and warfare. The Hague Convention relative to the Opening of Hostilities stated that opening hostilities was formally forbidden prior to an official declaration of war. In spite of this, however, even a war started by opening hostilities without a previous declaration of war is considered war in terms of international law (Bakerová-Draguňová - Katuninec, 2007: 142 – 143).

The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente presented themselves as defensive, but the military preferred the strategy that attack is the best defence. Alfred von Schlieffen, the Chief of the German General Staff who was particularly involved in preparing and planning for future combat, especially against the French Third Republic, stressed that long wars "are impossible at a time when the existence of a nation is founded upon the uninterrupted progress of commerce and industry" (Schliefen in Beatty, 2012: 249). This attitude led the military strategists to plan "blitzkriegs." I consider it important also to mention the speech of the Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, or, better to say, Moltke the Elder, to the Reichstag on the 14th May 1890; it was a speech in which he voiced his concerns over a possible unforeseen war that would drag on for years: "Should a war break out now, its duration and end cannot be foreseen. The largest powers of Europe armed as never before would take the field. None could be so completely defeated in one or two campaigns that it would declare itself vanquished and that it would have to accept the hard peace conditions imposed upon it. None would promise not to rise up again, even if only after years to renew the struggle. Such a war could easily become a war of seven years` or a thirty years` duration. Woe to him who applies

the torch to Europe, who is the first to throw the match into the powder cask" (see Hughes, 1993: 29; Förster, 1999: 347).

4   The Great Illusion

The economic development of Europe encouraged optimistic beliefs that the future of the developed industrialized countries would be peaceful. Such beliefs were expressed, for example, by Norman Angell, a British writer and politician who was one of the principal founders of the Union of Democratic Control. In his pamphlet Europe's Optical Illusion published at his own expense in 1909 and a year later elaborated and published as a book titled The Great Illusion, Angell tried to address the question why war even exists and why European countries in particular are being involved in military conflicts.

Angell also discusses at length the rivalry between Germany and Great Britain, the latter being concerned about weakening its position as the major colonial power. Britain, at the time, was the greatest colonial empire, which covered around one fifth of the world's surface with about a quarter of the world's population. Colonies were considered a fundamental aspect of a modern great power not only by Great Britain, but by other European countries as well. At the aforementioned Congress of Berlin, Bismarck tried to ease the tension in Europe caused by the colonial expansion of European powers. This was possible to accomplish via international treaties for a certain amount of time, but at the turn of the 20th century, tensions ran high and the issue of colonial rivalry played an essential role in the escalating conflicts.

The tension between Great Britain and Germany began escalating because of the hazardous policy Germany adopted after the young ambitious Kaiser Wilhelm II succeeded to the throne and dismissed Bismarck from the post of the Chancellor the Germany. The Kaiser's liking for the army and the uniform affected nearly all social life in Germany; civilians too, alongside the soldiers, donned uniform. When a decision about building a German fleet was taken in 1898, the threat of an approaching war was looming over Europe. The negotiations between Germany and Great Britain failed and no agreement on counterbalancing naval forces was reached. Still, in spite of this, British foreign policy continued to seek ways to avert the danger of a potential armed conflict, as Britain's chief concern was to retain their own powerful position as a colonial Empire.

One must also realize that Germany's strategic interests lay mainly within Europe; they wished to extend their influence over all of Central Europe. Opinions on the geopolitical significance of this region and on its further development varied among German politicians and political theorists. Bismarck's policy of heading towards centralism met with disapproval on the part of Constantin Frantz, one of the foremost theorists of federalism in the 19th century, whose vision would combine German and European federalism. The liberal politician Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919) should also be mentioned; he, too, addresses these issues in his book *Mittleuropa* shortly after the outbreak of war. His vision of the Central European

region in the years to come was not based on the disruption of the existing political and administrative order, but he rather tried to illustrate means of gradually establishing peaceful coexistence of the smaller Central European nations within a multinational federation lead by Austria and Germany. Naumann's concept of a common Central European identity might have seemed naïve, but at the same time, the book presented a relatively clear vision of the Central European geopolitical unit, which "will have a German nucleus and will voluntarily use the German language which is known throughout the world." Naumann at the same time, however, talked about "toleration and flexibility in regard to all the languages neighbouring that are associated with it. For only so can that fundamental harmony grow up which is essential for a Great State, pressed and threatened from all sides" (Naumann: 1917: 108). Naumann assumed that in spite of the national problems, the war will give birth to solidarity and a Central European spirit ("S*chöpfer einer mitteleuropäischen Seele*"). According to him, "no Central European nationality, not even the German, is in itself big enough to create a world-group economic State. That is the result of the capitalist system of interchange" (Naumann: 1917: 272).

Besides this notion of federalism, more radical, militant and Pan-Germanic notions began to appear in the pre-war papers. These thoughts were mainly supported by the Pan-German League (*Alldeutscher Verband*) who promoted the popular motto "*Drang nach Osten*" (Drive toward the East), but among the voices advocating these thoughts were also entrepreneurs were looking for ways to gain control of Eastern Europe with all the resources the region had to offer. The construction of the Baghdad Railway raised concerns about the German expansion, as the railway was funded by Germany, which spread their influence further East via the railroad; this was worrying mainly to Britain and Russia because the Middle East was traditionally considered their sphere of influence.

Europe was on the brink of the Great War as early as 1905 after the First Moroccan Crisis arose and the situation was worsened still by the Bosnian Crisis of 1908. From 1911, with the Second Moroccan Crisis (the Adagir Crisis) and the outbreak of the Italo-Turkish War, one can clearly speak of an outright pre-war tension in various European countries, in spite of certain claims that a war in Europe was quite unexpected and came like a bolt out of the blue.

Norman Angell's stance to the possibility of a military conflict between the Great Powers was rather negative; he refused the opinion that war would lead to yet greater wealth and he claimed that no nation would derive economic benefit from destroying the assets of another. Angell was convinced that "the economic cost of war was so great that no one could possibly hope to gain by starting the war of what would be so disastrous (Joll, 1992: 202). According to his theory, the counterbalance to war was economic cooperation of all modern economically developed countries and he did not see any ideological background in the struggles between nations, as the nations themselves had often common interests and the modern state was beginning to be open to religious as well as political plurality. "The fight for ideals can no longer take the form of fight between nations, because the lines of division on

moral questions are within the nations themselves and intersect the political frontiers. There is no modern State which is completely Catholic or Protestant, or liberal or autocratic, or aristocratic or democratic, or socialist or individualist; the moral and spiritual struggles of the modern world go on between citizens of the same State in unconscious intellectual cooperation with corresponding groups in other states, not between the public powers of rival States." Men did not any longer feel the urge to kill for religion or ideology and war "has no longer the justification that it makes for the survival of the fittest; it involves the survival of the less fit. The idea that the struggle between nations is a part of the evolutionary law of man's advance involves a profound misreading of the biological analogy." As for the industrial countries, they lost the will to fight on the battlefield (see Angell, 2010: X*; Gilbert, 2005: 129).

Angell's effort to prove that war is economically destructive even for the winning side, met with various reactions shortly after his novel was published. Several well known personages questioned his attitude, asking whether a state does not have the right to protect its borders or the people protect their freedom, just because after war they would be poorer. Angell's opinion was backed by the attitude of the European powers to the Balkan Wars; the great powers seemed appalled at the sight of formerly allied nations slaughtering one another. The British historian Martin Gilbert claims that many people had hoped that the Balkan Wars could serve as an example not to be repeated. (Gilbert, 2005: 190). To learn from the situation on the Balkans, would, however, require a more diplomatic attitude and tolerance which would transcend the borders of national prejudice. Some of the European monarchs were kinsmen, which gave Europe a spark of hope for peace, but in the end they did not learn from the recent events and between 1914 and 1918 Europe was in the midst of the Great War that started the process of Europe's decline from its prominent position in the world.

5 The Sleepwalkers

After the Austro-Prussian War, Austria-Hungary turned its attention to the Balkans. In 1908, the Austro-Hungarian Empire resolved to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, to which Great Britain and France reacted only by formal protests. Serbia, however, which had won independence from the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, and which was closely geographically and ethnically related to Bosnia and Herzegovina, reacted sharply to this annexation. Apart from Serbia, several other countries reacted adversely, among which was Italy; at the beginning of the 20th century "the Italians made it increasingly clear that they viewed Austro-Hungarian policy in the Balkans as impinging on their interests in the area" (Clark, 2013: 92-93). The Italian government and King Victor Emmanuel III broke ranks with the Triple Alliance to sign secret agreements with France and Tsar Nicholas II. The Balkan Wars deprived the Ottoman empire of most of its European possessions and destroyed Austria's security position on the Balkan Peninsula and created a bigger and stronger Serbia. The First Balkan War resulted in a momentous victory of the Balkan allies over the Ottoman forces. After the Second Balkan War, the tension between Austria-Hungary and Serbia grew

and their increased mutual distrust further poisoned relations between Vienna and Belgrade. (Clark, 2013:93-99).

The Australian historian Christopher Clark who is quoted above, no doubt, chose the title for his book (*The Sleepwalkers*) in order to raise challenging questions. However, the Slovak historian Dušan Kováč stresses that Clark's oversimplifications which attribute the responsibility for the war to all the countries involved display an attitude which is, "morally questionable, as it places the aggressor and the victim on the same level. Therefore, assaulted Serbia and the aggressor Austria-Hungary would both be 'sleepwalkers'" (Kováč, 2014: 31). Clark explains the use of this word towards the conclusion of his book. He speaks of Antoine Depage, the president of the Belgian Red Cross who was in charge of a Belgian field hospital in the Balkan Wars (1912-13). Having experienced modern warfare in this war, Depage proposed an international embargo on the use of modern weapons. The journalist writing of it in the French newspaper *Le Figaro* acknowledged that they "understand the generosity of his motivation," yet at the same time added: "but if we must expect to be outnumbered one day on the field of battle, than it is as well that our enemies know that we have such weapons to defend ourselves with, weapons that are to be feared..." (Horace Blanchon (pseud.) in Clark 2013: 562) In relation to this comment, Christopher Clark points out that "we can find such glib reflections wherever we look in pre-war Europe. In this sense, the protagonists of 1914 were sleepwalkers, watchful but unseeing, haunted by dreams, yet blind to the reality of the horror they were about to bring into the world" (Clark, 2013: 562).

It would be absurd of course to seduce the reader into believing that all of Europe had a share of blame for causing the war; still, when seeking to answer the question of war guilt, it is not enough to point solely at the German Empire as being the only initiator of the war and to present the Allied Powers as mere victims who had no other choice but to react to the situation. A boarder view of this issue is discussed in various scholarly publications, for example the book *The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914*, written by the Canadian historian Margaret MacMillan. World War I and the post-war peace negotiations have been among her scholarly interests for years. Professor MacMillan does not lay the blame exclusively on Berlin or Vienna, but distributes the responsibility and also criticizes the representatives of other powers who dragged their countries into this devastating military disaster (see MacMillan, 2013). However, in regard to the July Crisis she points out that the German politicians consciously chose to risk war. During this crisis, European monarchs and political leaders were surrounded by people who preferred confrontation; war hawks in particular tried to exploit the situation and sought to influence public opinion, which was becoming increasingly militant. Swayed by their influence, the European powers chose to solve Europe's problems by military action, which was the least human way to do so (Tóth, 2014).

After the suicide of the Emperor's son Rudolph, his nephew Archduke Franz Ferdinand became heir apparent to the Habsburg throne. Franz Ferdinand tried to consolidate the empire,

but he was not a war hawk and he favoured policy of diplomacy. At his residence in Vienna, the archduke held meetings with various non-Magyar members of the elite. This group which formed around him – the so called "Beldevere circle" – discussed, among other things, the issue of the possible federalization of the Empire. However, Günther Kronenbitter, emphasizes that "it is wrong to think of Franz Ferdinand as a protector of the Slavs and an ardent federalist who would have rescued Austro-Hungary by implementing a wide-ranging constitutional reform" (Kronenbitter, 2006: 82).

It is not the historian's task to deliberate upon the question whether World War I could have been prevented, if Archduke Franz Ferdinand had survived the assassin's bullet, but nevertheless, I favour the view that the Archduke would have been the strongest spokesman for peace. He believed that a war with Russia would lead to the downfall of some monarchies, and thus to the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire. The assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo resulted in Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against the Kingdom of Serbia, which was Russia's ally.

People in Europe as well as many European politicians were occupied with their local problems. They did not take the impact of previous conflicts, series of limited wars, and crises particularly seriously and badly underestimated the possible emergence of a major armed conflict. The days preceding the war bear testimony to the power – and danger in this case – of the influence of individual persons on political decision-making. According of some historians, Helmuth von Moltke, or better to say Moltke the Younger, the Chief of the German General Staff, prone to believe in the short-war illusion, looked for an opportunity to carry out the strategic plans of the general staff and forced the German government 'to press the button', figuratively speaking. The German leadership made the decision to support its ally and at the beginning of the war, in his speech to the Reichstag Deputies, Kaiser Wilhelm II declared: "Gentlemen ... I no longer know any parties. I know only Germans. And in order to testify that you are firmly resolved without distinction of party to stand by my side through danger and death, I call upon the leaders of the different parties in this House to come forward and lay their hands in mine as a pledge" (Wilhelm II: August 6, 1914).

Countries which engaged in war had leaders who claimed that their position was determined by God's will. This book has followed the relationship of ethics and politics through various life stories of monarchs, many of whom were men with moral values, skilled and honourable rulers. Sometimes, of course, we witnessed drastic stories describing dynasties and rulers whose road to the throne room was paved the way with false allegiances, betrayals, brutality, and murders. The stories of the European monarchs in the pre-war era, however, do not abound in chaos, opacity, or tyranny. The power of these rulers, compared to the Middle Ages, was considerably restricted. Still, they yet possessed an authority which could influence a broad spectrum of the population. They did not, however, use this authority to try to maintain peace, but driven perhaps by the belief of their own grandeur or the desire to secure

their position, they encouraged a conflict that, in many countries, shattered the myth of a ruler destined by God's will.

Pope Pius X warned the leaders of Europe in his apostolic exhortation *Dum Europa*, which was presented shortly before his death (he died 18 days later) only a few days after the outbreak of the war. Being one of the most distinguished testaments to peace, the apostolic exhortation claims that "Europe being dragged into the storm of an extremely gruesome war, of which no one can foresee the dangers, the massacres, and the consequences without feeling oppressed by the sorrow and by the horror" (Pius X: August 2, 1914). These words, however, were left unheeded, as they were outbellowed by the nationalistic calls and appeals fuelled by the expectations of military success.

The inhabitants of the Central Powers on one side and the Allied Powers on the other generally welcomed the outbreak of war with fervour. The new Pope Benedict XV, however, urged on December 7, 1914 the leaders of all warring governments to negotiate and he begged them to agree to an official cease-fire so that "the guns may fall silent at least upon the night the angels sang". Although his request for a twenty-four hour ceasefire on Christmas Day was ignored, many soldiers in the trenches alongside the Western Front declared their own unofficial truce, taking things into their own hands on Christmas Eve. Their letters home contain a moving description of the one-day truce; one of the letters reads: "Christmas day was very misty and out came these Germans to wish us 'a happy day'; we went out told them we were at war with them and that really they must play the game and pretend to fight; they went back but again attempted to come towards us so we fired over their heads; they fired a shot back to show they understood and the rest of the day passed quietly in this part of the line, but in others a deal of fraternising went on. So there you are; all this talk of hate, all this firing at each other that has raged since the beginning of the war quelled and stayed by the magic of Christmas. Indeed one German said 'But you are of the same religion as us and today is the day of peace! It is really a great triumph for the church. It is a great hope for future peace when two great nations hating each other as foes have seldom hated, one side vowing eternal hate and vengeance and setting their venom to music, should on Christmas day and for all that the word implies, lay down their arms, exchange smokes and wish each other happiness'" (The Carlisle Journal January 8, 1915).

The truce, however, did not last long. After it came to an end, officers of both parties threatened to employ disciplinary measures in case the soldiers quit fighting and thus Christmas meetings of the like when soldiers of opposing armies would fraternize did not occur again during World War I. By that time, the war which broke out on the European continent became a truly world war, as the participating parties dragged in their colonies and eventually even originally neutral states decided to join in. It became a total war and peace was to be insured only by the capitulation of the enemy. A man drawn into the tumult of war loses the understanding of a person's value, trust in institutions, faith in inherited religion, and

finally, when morals are confronted with crude force, he loses even his moral values (Zálešák, 2014: 119-120).

When the Great War finished, Europe and the rest of the world finally established peace, but Europe's dominant position in world politics was considerably weakened. Later the term Great War was changed to World War I, as it was not the greatest war in history; but still, it shattered the ideal of rationalistic Eurocentrism, which used to give the "Europeans" assurance that their culture most certainly was a natural model for all the other "primitive" cultures. Having this in mind, it is not an overstatement to say that Europe suffered wounds from which she never recovered.

Unlike after Napoleon's defeat, when the Congress of Vienna convened by the victors of the war decided to renew the legitimacy of the pre-revolutionary era, after 1918 this idea had no chance of being put to practise. The Great War led to extensive changes on the European map at the expense of Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman empires. The old regime in Europe became a matter of past never to return. On the shambles of great monarchies in decay, new nation states were emerging. Their founders were all pointing out a nation's right to self-determination, but their understanding of these concepts differed.

National diversity made establishing new borders particularly difficult in Central and Eastern Europe; various young states got involved in armed conflicts, which did not make determining the borders any easier. Peace treaties contained clauses valid for the following five years, which enabled the successor states to maintain a common economic space, but the practical implementation of this temporary economic and customs union failed and the new states asserted bilateral cooperation, striving to develop their own markets.

6 Democracies without democrats?

The peace conference after World War I aspired to bring about permanent peace and make international relationships more democratic. In the early 1930s, during the first wave of democratization, over thirty countries established at least some democratic institutions, which fostered hope for a new approach to politics. To ensure that war would never break out again, the League of Nations was founded. It was through this idealistic and morally motivated organization that the leaders of governments were to be inspired to promote international cooperation. The League of Nations "sought to reinstate the fundamental principle that underpins just-war strategies," which is, according to Stephen Neff, "the notion that the normal state of international relations is one of peace, with war permitted only as an exceptional act requiring affirmative justification" (Neff, 2005: 279). A system in which the rights of ethnic, racial, religious, and linguistic minorities would be protected under international law was meant to be an adequate guarantee of stability. The League of Nations had the authority to oversee whether the principles of protection were followed in individual countries.

The man who is considered to have stood behind the creation of the League of Nations is the American President Woodrow Wilson. According to various scholars, this devoted Presbyterian considered honesty to be a principle of utmost importance and he strove to incorporate a deep sense of morality into international. Nowadays Wilson may be seen as a naive politician, but he was one of the few post-war politicians who raised hopes for a better future. He openly warned against potential horrors, should there be a next war: "I do not hesitate to say that the war we have just been through, though it was shot through with terror of every kind, is not to be compared with the war we would have to face next time. There were destructive gases, there were methods of explosive destruction unheard of even during this war, which were just ready for use when the war ended great projectiles that guided themselves and shot into the heavens went for a hundred miles and more and then burst tons of explosives upon helpless cities, something to which the guns with which the Germans bombarded Paris from a distance were not comparable. What the Germans used were toys as compared with what would be used in the next war. Ask any soldier if he wants to go through a hell like that again. The soldiers know what the next war would be. They know what the inventions were that were just about to be used for the absolute destruction of mankind. I am for any kind of insurance against a barbaric reversal of civilization." Wilson tried to make American politicians endorse his vision, persuading them to see his *truth*: "...we are going to be led by it, and it is going to lead us, and through us the world, out into pastures of quietness and peace such as the world never dreamed of before" (Wilson, September 25, 1919; Naveh, 1990: 134).

Wilson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1919 for his merits in the creation of the League of Nations. However, in the same year he had a series of debilitating strokes, which incapacitated him to the extent he was no longer fit to lead his country as a president. Despite the fact that the League of Nations was Wilson's most important objective, in the USA he did not gain support for it and one can easily agree that the absence of the United States in the League was "fatal blow to the League of Nations".

On the peace conference in Paris in 1919 the International Labour Organization was founded, being an agency of the League of Nations whose aim was to support social justice and help maintain lasting general peace. The experiences Europe had with democracy so far brought about many positive changes. After a short post-war economic crisis which hit various European countries, middle class began continuously growing. This provided hopes of boosting social cohesion and reinforcing democratic society. In 1918 Woodrow Wilson declared with optimism: "Democracy seems about universally to prevail ... The spread of democratic institutions ... promise[s] to reduce politics to a single form ... by reducing all forms of government to Democracy" (see Ferguson, 2006: 227) After the end of the Great War, liberal democracy seemed to be developing dynamically, but only two decades later most European countries spoke of democracy as of a form of government whose place is the ash heap of history.

Many discussions are lead about the crisis of democracy in the interwar period. What usually is not mentioned though is that various influential politicians leading democratic parties acted with certain arrogance even when the situation became critical, as if nothing could have gone wrong. The state and its citizens often became only tools in the power struggles, and means of encouraging particracy and the political career of individual politicians. Most of the parliamentary systems in Europe seemed to be 'democracies without democrats' and politicians upholding democracy alongside with lawyers, diplomats, and government officials held on to the naive belief that "good constitutions could overcome bad political and social conditions." Devoid of honest democratic politicians, even the best and most democratic of constitutions upholding a wide range of fundamental rights were prone to be misused in the constant polarization of everyday life, leading to a gradual rise of anti-democratic powers. This fact was as if ignored, which, according to the political theorist John Keane, could have been one of the many causes "of the death of representative democracy" (Keane, 2010: 568).

7 Conclusion

After World War I, most of the new constitutions were emphasizing their democratic, national, and republican character. Various politicians and thinkers, however, warned the world to beware of unreasonable expectations and were well aware of the dangers that the young and fragile democracy had to face. To mention but one of them, the first President of Czechoslovakia Thomas Garrigue Masaryk stated that Europe was "a laboratory built over the graveyard of the World War, a laboratory that needs the work of all" (Masaryk - Čapek, 1935: 299). Masaryk warned the democracy of about its lack in political experience and cautioned against vague political slogans and manifestos which easily gain public support. He was aware of the fact that freedom of mind was hard to acquire after war by people who had been downtrodden and oppressed.

Several countries distanced themselves from liberal democracy not long after the war, moving towards authoritarianism. Communism, Fascism, and National Socialism all rivalled democracy. The struggle of democracy and totalitarian regimes was often influenced by the paralysis caused by economic and social problems. The events of the interwar period demonstrate that social and economic stability is a major precondition to the existence of a true democracy. The ideological rivals of democracy strove to tackle the problems of mass politics, industrialization, and social order. After 1918 there were few countries whose governments outlived a year and "such governments naturally found it difficult to push through the socio-economic reforms which were promised in their constitutions and party programmes" (Mazower, 1999: 18).

What young democracies failed at in particular, was their attitude to solving social issues. In the eyes of most of the voters, democracy was discredited by mass unemployment and failed expectations in the economic and social sphere. Growing tension, poor communication between political representatives of different democratic parties, and the reluctance to assume

political responsibility for the development of the country, all of this played in favour of totalitarian systems. Many European countries were going through an elite crisis; this can be seen once realized that basic values of a society are defined by the ruling elite, that is, those members of the society who, through their positions, take on responsibility. This is true of democracies as well as of other systems. Democracies today are again exposed to many risks, which are associated with the growth of political illiteracy and uncritical work with information; therefore, no wonder that in the battle with extremism in which prevention is underestimated, open discussions about the failures of society and political power. Therefore, especially in times of crisis, democracy needs genuine democrats to be in charge. A peaceful and democratic Europe is dependent on citizens who are not subject to the naive illusion of the triumphant path of liberal democracy, citizens who are not indifferent to the growing dissatisfaction of the public with the political practice of democratic countries and the strengthening ambitions of extremism, citizens who do not remain passive observers of social change, citizens, who are willing to protect and develop peaceful and democratic ideas, who do not underestimate the importance of democratic institutions, who freely engage in public affairs and social interests.

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Povzetek:

Evropa od velike vojne do novega upanja za boljšo prihodnjost v demokraciji

Namen in izvirnost: Namen študije je osvetliti potencialne nevarnosti za demokracijo v Evropi v prihodnosti skozi perspektivo pomembnih vzrokov, ki so pripeljali do prve svetovne vojne kot tudi razlogov zakaj povojno upanje ni prineslo želenih rezultatov.

Metoda: Uporabljene metode so bile zgodovinska deskripcija, analitična in primerjalna metoda, avtor pa je uporabil tudi kombinacijo časovnega in tematskega pristopa.

Rezultati: Na osnovi politološke in zgodovinske analize pomembnih vzrokov prve svetovne vojne v Evropi kot tudi drugih pomembnih vzrokov, ki so vplivali na povojni razvoj demokracije, prihajamo do zaključka, da je Evropa prihodnosti ogrožena s strani krize elit, podcenjevanja pomena reševanja družbenih problemov, naraščajočih trenj, slabe komunikacije med političnimi predstavniki različnih političnih strank ter nepripravljnosti sprejemanja politične odgovornosti za razvoj države.

Družba: Rezultati naj bi prispevali k zavedanju tveganj, ki niso zgolj del preteklosti temveč še vedno ogrožajo mir in demokracijo.

Omejitve / nadaljne raziskovanje: Raziskava se bo v prihodnje osredotočala na medvojno obdobje ter več-vzročnost pojava totalitarnih režimov, kar bo zahtevalo širše sodelovanje na mednarodnem nivoju.

Ključne besede: Evropa, vojna, demokracija, politika, ekspanzija, iluzija.

Presumptions for E-leadership in Local Self-Government in Lithuania[1]

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Abstract:

Purpose and Originality: ICT usage in management processes became inseparable part of both private and public organizations' practice. E-leadership concept is quite new in public administration area. The purpose of this research was to explain main theoretical and practical presumptions for the e-leadership in the local self-government organizations in Lithuania. The value and the originality of the research are achieved by revealing theoretical elements of this concept in the local self-government (based on the Good Governance approach) and giving some evidences of e-leadership practical implications in Lithuanian municipalities.
Method: The research is based on the theoretical approach of Good Governance, which explains the need of better management in public administration organizations. Scientific methods such as the content analysis of scientific literature, presenting theoretical presumptions for e-leadership in local self-government in Lithuanian researches, as well as PEST analysis (the document analysis) of Lithuanian municipalities' practice are used.
Results: Theoretical insights about e-leadership in local self-government organizations in Lithuania are still missing the deeper understanding of this phenomenon; however, the practical presumptions (the legal basis, social readiness and technological instruments) were founded to be created strong and having the potential to grow. Therefore it can be stated that Lithuanian municipalities already using ICT for their daily activity are ready for the implementation of e-leadership tools, but they still need more clear vision (and guidelines) for strengthening e-leadership as an organizational practice.
Society: Results of this research are important for researchers of Lithuanian public administration, especially interested in local self-government looking for new directions for future researches. Moreover, they can be used by practitioners in municipalities understanding the value of ICT usage for management and leadership processes.
Limitations / further research: The research is the first phase of wider ongoing international research.

Keywords: E-leadership, local self-government, municipality, ICT usage.

1   Introduction

Lithuania got back the independence from Soviet Union just in 1990 (Hiden, Salmon, 2014). Now it is considered as young small (northern or central) European developed country (Nekrašas, 1998; International Monetary Fund, 2015), which has to follow well-developed European countries and to adapt organizations (including local self-government) to new standards of quality and efficiency.

The usage of information communication technologies (hereinafter referred to as ICT) in all activities and digitalization ideas are changing the perception of organization management, processes of control, accountability for results and the evaluation of the efficiency of activity. Leadership has the huge influence in organizations (on the behaviour and decisions of employees, the culture and the policy of the organization) and can implement norms, standards, expectations, and desirable outcomes during transformative (including ICT usage) projects, therefore, leaders are expected to have the ability to know when and how to adopt technologies and to implement them successfully (Sow & Aborbie, 2018; Schepers et al., 2005; Van Wart et al., 2017). And this is becoming one of the biggest challenges for modern leadership at organizational level. Therefore, it is important to investigate how digitalisation frames leadership processes and what kind of challenges emerge from it in local government organizations.

The aim of this research was to identify main theoretical and practical presumptions for the e-leadership in the local self-government organizations in Lithuania. *The objectives* of this research were: (1) to give the theoretical background for the e-leadership in local self-government organizations; (2) to explain how deep the e-leadership concept was already investigated by Lithuanian researchers; (3) to identify main political, economical, social and technological presumptions for the implementation of e-leadership practice in Lithuanian municipalities. *Scientific methods* were used for this research: the content analysis of the scientific literature helped to present theoretical presumptions for e-leadership in local self-government in Lithuanian researches, the PEST analysis (the document analysis) - to identify practical presumptions for e-leadership in Lithuanian municipalities.

2   Theoretical framework

2.1 E-leadership concept in the context of Good Governance

The digitalization is becoming a daily management practice of public sector organizations: human resources management, finance management and accountancy, control and monitoring, public relations and communication, etc. ICT-based tasks have become an integral part of the working life in local government organizations. Therefore, e-leadership (as the theoretical concept and the practice) has become important not only for private, but for public sector too (including local government organizations).

There are few definitions of e-leadership phenomenon, but in most cases it is explained as the social influence process embedded in both proximal and distal contexts mediated by information technology (Avolio et al., 2000; Avolio et al., 2014; Kahai et al., 2017; Van Wart et al., 2017; Van Wart et al., 2019). As e-leadership is considered as a complex phenomenon, Liu et al. (2018) recommended dividing the field of e-leadership researches into four quadrants to facilitate the research focus according to: e-leadership phases (the adoption of technology phase vs. the quality of use of technology phase), as well as the purposes (e-leadership as virtual communication vs. e-leadership as management of organizational structures). As differences of the meaning of the term "leadership" exist in local government systems in different countries (management vs. political leadership, supervisors vs. leaders), authors give the definition (appropriate for the context of the research): e-leadership is considered as a process by which a supervisor guides and motivates employees in a municipality through information technologies. This definition is closely connected with three dimensions: ICT usage for management processes in an organization, leadership using ICT phenomenon and the local level of the government. In this case, according to Van Wart et al. (2019) main elements of e-leadership would include such challenges: communication (miscommunication, communication overload, loss of informal interactions, loneliness and weakened sense of belonging); motivation (monitoring employees and milestone accomplishment, recognition, rewards, development of employees); and change management (positive attitudes toward changes more difficult in virtualized environments). All those challenges need to be dealt with to seek for the good governance in municipalities.

Good Governance is one of the most popular theories of Public Administration (hereinafter referred to as PA). As a theory it is based on the position of international organizations (in particular, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) that developing countries facing economic and social problems have to look for instruments and ways to seek for the good governance. Good governance is considered as "the new public management empowerment, which ensures the political, social and economic priorities justification under the inclusive public consensus, and the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable are respected in decision-making processes, with the regard to the allocation of development resources" (Juknevičienė, 2015). Accordingly some principles of Good Governance are highlighted: legal authority (rule of law), citizens' participation, responsiveness, consensus principle, justice and fairness, transparency, equity and inclusiveness, efficiency and effectiveness, accountability, the strategic vision (Drechsler, 2004; Šaparnienė & Valukonytė, 2012; Ekundayo, 2017). E-leadership would be closely connected to principles of efficiency and effectiveness (saves time and resources of tasks' accomplishment for both citizen and civil servants), equity and inclusiveness (makes services and information more reachable and accessible), transparency (gives more tools for the control and monitoring both for leaders (supervisors, managers) and citizens).

Good Governance concept emphasizes three main challenges for PA organizations (United Nations, 2006), which are closely connected with ICT usage:

1. Adequate and timely respond to citizens' needs together seeking for the greater cooperation. Citizens have to become the part of the problem-solving process. It may be encouraged by ICT tools provided to the communication between citizens and local self-government organizations (i.e. e-democracy, e-governance processes).

2. Operation and provision of high quality services with receding resources and limited operational capacities. It requires PA organizations to use resources and develop skills not only more creative and efficient. For example, using ICT for providing municipal public services or communication with citizens (i.e. e-government tools, e-services).

3. Increased accountability, responsibility, efficiency and orientations towards the needs of citizens in PA organizations. Publicity requirements are fulfilled by using ICT (anticorruption tools, watchdog's tools, websites, social media channels, etc.).

Local government organizations as PA organizations need to deal with all mentioned challenges, therefore, it can be stated that this concept gives the stable theoretical background for the e-leadership in local government phenomenon and its practical integration to the management processes in municipalities.

2.2 Features of local self-government in Lithuania

According to Junevičius & Ereminaitė (2012), the existing one-tier local government system has a great influence on the Lithuanian public administration system; however it has the executive role and has no enough freedom to act (i. e. the increasing functional responsibility of municipalities was not accompanied by correspondingly increasing discretion, which left the powers of Lithuanian municipalities limited despite the increased number of functions) (Burbulytė-Tsiskarishvili et al, 2018). Local governance is based on the territorial system where municipalities and neighbourhoods are acting. The profile of Lithuanian local self-government can be described by some features:

- Lithuania has 60 municipalities (7 of them are cities' municipalities);
- Municipality's functions are divided to two groups: a group of independent (autonomous) functions and a group of state (delegated by the State to municipalities) functions;
- The dual model of the organizational structure of the local self-government is applied;
- Mayors of municipalities are elected directly (from 2015);
- Municipal servants are divided into office managers, career servants and political (personal) trust servants (Astrauskas, 2015).

The dual model of the organizational structure of the local self-government means that municipal institutions are responsible for the implementation of the right to self-government in the interests of the municipal community and are divided to two groups:

- *a representative institution of the municipality* - the municipal council that possesses the rights and duties of local government and public administration, which is governed

by a member of the municipal council (directly elected in a single-member constituency according to the procedure established by the Law on Elections to Municipal Councils) - the mayor. The mayor is the head of the municipality, exercising the powers provided by laws;

- *an executive institution of the municipality (executive institutions)* - the director of the municipal administration, deputy director(s) of the municipal administration (if this/these position(s) is/are set up and if the powers of an executive institution are delegated to this/these position(s)), who possess the rights and duties of public administration (LR Vietos savivaldos įstatymas, 2019).

Therefore, the municipal administration is the bureaucratic apparatus executing decisions and tasks formulated by the political municipal structure (municipal council) and implementing programs of municipal territory development and public administration (Astrauskas, 2011). This research is oriented to local government organizations (municipalities) and even more focused on the municipal administration as a body responsible for internal management processes (needed e-leadership tools), provision of public services and communication (ensuring the engagement of citizens to problem solving and decision making processes).

Researchers (Šaparnienė & Lazauskienė, 2012; Gaulė & Žilinskas, 2013; Astrauskas, 2015, Bučaitė-Vilkė & Žilys, 2016; Lazauskienė, 2016) has founded that various measures have been implemented to promote the engagement of local community (citizens) to local affairs in Lithuania: introduced direct elections of municipal mayor and other forms of direct participation (excluding local referendums, decision-making meetings, but including e-government tools), simplified procedures for conducting surveys, legitimated representatives of local communities living in the area (known as "elders"), encouraged creation and operation of local (territorial) community organizations, etc. Seeking to ensure the appropriate citizen participation and the institutional efficiency of e-government tools and the usage of information and communication technologies (hereinafter referred to as the ICT) for daily work become the inseparable part of Lithuanian PA practice both at national level and local self-government.

3 Method

Scientific methods used for this research were selected according to objectives of the research.

The content analysis of the scientific literature was chosen to present theoretical presumptions for e-leadership in local self-government in Lithuanian researches. It was chosen because the research needed a method which would focus on the characteristics of language as communication with attention to the content or contextual meaning of the text (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). It needed to reveal what kind of researches have been conducted in Lithuania to present the status qua of e-leadership in local self-government. Main keywords as "e-supervision" ("*e-vadovavimas*"), "e-leadership" ("*e-lyderystė*"), "leadership" ("*lyderystė*"),

"ICT usage" ("*IKT naudojimas*"), "ICT development" ("IKT vystymas"), "ICT skills" ("*IKT įgūdžiai*") were combined with another keywords as "government" ("*valdžia*"), "local self-government" ("*vietos savivalda*"), "municipality" ("*savivaldybė*") for the search of scientific literature in the Google Scholar. Both languages (English and Lithuanian) were used to find needed resources. 20 scientific publications (presenting results of researches) closely connected to the topic of the research were founded. All of them were analyzed using a matrix based on three main pillars (ICT usage, leadership, government), which was prepared after the theoretical analysis of the research object.

The PEST analysis (*the document analysis*) helped to identify practical presumptions for e-leadership in Lithuanian municipalities. The PEST analysis is considered as the precondition (presumption) analysis which allows the identification of the environment within the organization operates and provides information that will enable the organization to predict situations and circumstances that it might encounter in future (Yüksel, 2012). It reveals political and legal, economic, social and technological preconditions for e-leadership in local self-government organizations. The PEST analysis is based on the *document analysis*. It is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents, it requires that data be examined and interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Bowen, 2009). It included the analysis of legal acts and strategic documents of Lithuania, analysis of data of several indexes, the analysis of other resources, presenting Lithuanian context.

4   Results

4.1   Theoretical presumptions for e-leadership in local self-government in previous Lithuanian researches

As authors could not find previous studies with the exact topic of the research they decided to make an analysis and to show what kind of theoretical presumptions for e-leadership in local self-government organizations are revealed already by previous Lithuanian researches. Using the specific matrix, based on three main pillars (ICT usage, leadership, government) they have made a content analysis and showed how different researches touched the topic of e-leadership in local self-government organizations (see Table 1). As the research was following the definition of e-leadership as a process by which a supervisor guides and motivates employees in a municipality through information technologies, main important aspects for the research were ICT usage for management processes in an organization, e-leadership mentioning and the level of local government (municipalities).

It was found that e-leadership is quite new concept and almost unused by Lithuanian researchers. Majority of Lithuanian scientists analysed such objects as the ICT usage in public administration, e-government, e-services, and the common leadership aspects on the national level (not focusing on local specifics). Authors found just few researches which could significally contribute to the e-leadership conception in Lithuania.

Firstly, the analysis of e-leadership concept and its implementation in the practice in European Union (in Lithuania too) was provided by INSEAD (INSEAD eLab, 2012). This report emphasized that every e-leader should have the T-shape skill' set: vertical set of skills, showing the expertise or in-depth knowledge in a certain area (e.g., science, engineering, ICT, social sciences); horizontal set of skills, which refers to universal skills (e.g., negotiation, critical thinking, design and systematic thinking, entrepreneurship, etc.), allows different areas to be aligned. It provided recommendations for the development of e-leadership: to develop and apply e-leadership program guidelines and quality labels (brands); to create new forms and partnerships for the training and acquisition of e-leadership skills; to align actions of promoting the entrepreneurship for e-leadership development across the EU; to build awareness of the relevance of e-leadership skills for innovation, competitiveness, and employability (INSEAD eLab, 2012). However, this research did not revealed features of local self-government.

Table1. Matrix of previous Lithuanian researches in the field of e-leadership in local self-government

Dimensions / *Resources*	ICT usage					Leadership			Government		
	ICT in PA	Social media in PA	E-government	E-services	Organizational management	Common leadership	E-leadership	ICT skills of leaders	National level institutions	National and local level institutions	Local level institutions (municipalities)
Šarkiūnaitė (2004)					✓	✓		✓			
Šarkiūnaitė & Krikščiūnienė (2005)					✓	✓		✓			
Domarkas & Lukoševičienė (2006)	✓		✓								✓
Kažemikaitiene & Bilevičiene (2008)	✓		✓						✓		
Butkevičienė & Rutkauskienė (2008)	✓			✓						✓	
Guogis et al. (2008)			✓	✓							✓
Ožalienė & Šaparnienė (2009)	✓		✓								✓
Gatautis et al. (2009)	✓		✓						✓		
Jurkėnaitė & Paliulis (2010)			✓	✓							
Domarkas et al. (2012)			✓								✓
INSEAD eLab (2012)					✓		✓	✓			
Petrauskas (2012)	✓		✓								✓
Gaulė & Žilinskas (2013)	✓		✓								✓
Milė & Junevičius (2013)				✓						✓	✓
Jokūbauskienė (2013)					✓			✓			✓
Paražinskaitė (2014)	✓				✓			✓	✓		
Rybnikova et al. (2015)	✓		✓			✓		✓			✓
Pivoras et al. (2017)	✓				✓					✓	
Aurylaitė (2017)		✓									✓
Vengrienė (2017)	✓					✓			✓		

Conducted by authors, according to mentioned resources.

Secondly, Paražinskaitė (2014) studied ways how with the help of the Government to Employee framework to investigate what organizational and environmental issues influence application of information technologies in the process of human resources management. She founded that a positive leader's approach to IT and a well-presented benefit of the innovation may promote a positive employee's attitude; presented benefit of the technology before application, the opportunity to consult together with learning is very important. However, the

field of the empirical research was the national (ministry) level of Lithuania (not municipalities).

Finally, the international scientific research "Leadership in Public Administration: Case Study of Lithuania and Germany" (Rybnikova et al, 2015) (funded by the Baltic-German Office, the Baltic States and German High Schools Office through the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany) was very important for the development of the leadership concept in local self-government in Lithuania. It gave very important insights connected to the e-leadership in municipalities. The research has revealed that the document and process management system "Beehive" ("AVILYS") which was implemented in local governance institutions enabled the control of task performance of employees by the heads of the departments (i.e. checking if a deadline for completing the task is approaching, if the task is completed on time and if the answer is prepared properly). Leaders, who participated in this research, were quite optimistic regarding "Beehive" since they considered it as a great relief enabling digital communication with their subordinates to assign tasks and to give feedback, notes and comments without explaining the issues personally. Leaders believed that formal communication with the staff only through the system "Beehive" leaves a lower risk and creates a higher ability to control and punish the employee for irresponsibly or untimely prepared task. Research showed that the technology system reduces the role of the leader and becomes a substitute for leadership. Professional expertise and results of this research suggested that "Beehive" cannot run without managerial interventions. An additional concern expressed by the informants regarding "Beehive" referred to the reduced face-to-face communication in the department as an effect of the system. The second critically perceived aspect of less face-to-face communication regarded the issue of less control over employees by reduced direct communication. The heads of departments have seen the risk in the fact that employees can change their minds and accuse them for unclear described or untimely assigned tasks. However, this research was focused on a broader aim of the research, so the aspect of e-leadership was more contextual rather than essential.

The content analysis of previous researches in Lithuania, directly connected with main dimensions of e-leadership concept, revealed that scientists are interested in the problematic of leadership and ICT usage in PA. However, despite of quite good insights from previous researches, the development of e-leadership concept in local government organizations still requires deeper understanding and empirical researches of the practice in the Lithuanian context.

4.2 Practical presumptions for e-leadership in Lithuanian municipalities

4.2.1 Political and legal presumptions

Organizational processes (in a municipality) are heavily influenced by information systems as they involve complex software processes and information flow (Vengrienė, 2017). Therefore,

it is very important to find out what is the status quo of using ICT-systems in Lithuanian local self-government.

The Programme of the 17th Government of the Republic of Lithuania (LR Seimo nutarimas dėl…, 2016) supports ICT usage in public administration (e-democracy, e-services) to ensure the sustainable state governance and he provision of qualitative and accessible public services.

There are several legal acts providing guidelines for ICT development in PA institutions (including municipalities) in Lithuania:
- The most important document is *the Information Society Development Programme for 2014-2020 'Digital Agenda for the Republic of Lithuania'* (2015), which has the purpose is to define the goals and objectives of the information society development with a view to maximising the economic advantages provided by ICT as a very important tool for economic, social and cultural activities, enabling the circulation of advanced electronic services, work, access to entertainment, social interaction and free expression of opinion.
- Second legal act important for ICT usage in public administration is *the General Requirements of state and municipal institutions and agencies websites and APPS* (LR Vyriausybės nutarimas dėl Bendrųjų reikalavimų..., 2019), which regulates the right to receive information from state and municipal institutions and bodies, ensures greater publicity of activities of state and municipal institutions, obliges state and municipal institutions (providing public services) to publish documents of activity planning, activity reports, information related to open data protection and personal data protection on their websites.

Those two main legal acts are supported by some strategic documents and their provisions:
- *National Progress Programme for Lithuania for the period 2014-2020* (2012). The 5th priority in this programme is "Meeting needs of society and advanced public governance". Objectives of this priority are closely connected with ICT usage in public administration: to strengthen strategic competences in public administration institutions and to improve performance management there, the openness of management processes and active civic participation; to improve the quality of services and their accessibility to the society.
- *Public Governance Improvement Programme for 2012-2020* (LR Vyriausybės nutarimas dėl Viešojo valdymo…, 2015). The 2nd aim of this programme is to ensure the delivery of services meeting needs of society, thus, it is followed by the objective: to improve the quality of services for individuals in public administration institutions and to increase the accessibility of services to the society. One of measures is the growth of the delivery of e-services and the development of its accessibility.
- *Lithuania's progress strategy "Lithuania 2030"* (2015). One of three main dimensions of this strategy is Smart Governance. It is planned to seek for strategically

powerful government (one of objectives is to develop leadership and management competencies in central and local authorities and communities) and for governance meeting public needs (the objective is to ensure effective provision of services and to use the latest technologies, including electronic service delivery).

These main documents are followed by other legal acts and documents at national, local and organizational levels. Authors would like to emphasize that there are enough legal preconditions for the development of e-leadership in local self-government organizations (municipalities) in Lithuania.

4.2.2 Economic-social presumptions

Every year *Lithuania invests in projects*, oriented to the development of information society and public governance. In the period of 2014-2020 10 big projects of information society will be implemented by using EU funds (around 236 billion Euros). 12 projects of development of public governance in the same period will require around 146.5 billion Euros from EU funds (majority of them are directly connected to the digitalization of public administration via the transfer of services and channels to the electronic platform or starting using some ICT systems or tools) (Patvirtintos priemonės, 2014). It is planned to spend 174 billion Euros (majority of them – 129 billion Euros will be covered by EU funds) for the development of information society in Lithuania in 2019-2021 (Informacinės visuomenės plėtrai..., 2018).

According to international indexes *Lithuanians are informed about possibilities to use e-services and e-democracy tools and tend to use them more often*.

In 2018 according to the Electronic Government Development Index (EGDI) Lithuania was ranked in 40th position among 193 countries in the world (even Lithuania's position in the global ranking has fallen 17 positions down since the last evaluation in 2016) - the Lithuanian EDGI was 0.7534, and Lithuania was classified as having "very high e-government development index" in the group of countries with an index above 0.75 (United Nations, 2018). In 2018 according to European Commission Lithuania was among 11 best European countries according to the efficiency of e-government and the accessibility of e-services for citizens (Tinholt et al., 2018). According to the data of the Information Society Development Committee (Informacinės visuomenės plėtros komitetas, 2018), the share of Lithuanian population using electronic public and administrative services continues to grow and in 2018 50.8 percent of Lithuanian population used these services (respectively, 44.9 percent in 2016 and 48.4 percent in 2017), E-Government Gateway was visited 16.9 billion times (respectively, 8.2 billion in 2016 and 10.9 billion in 2017), E-Government Gateway was visited and e-services were used by 773 thousand inhabitants (respectively, 517 thousand in 2016 and 630 thousand in 2017). However, just 19 percent of Lithuanian population has participated in e-democracy processes: 19 percent of them were looking for the information about decisions made or planned to make by public administration institutions, 4 percent have expressed their opinion about such decisions, 1 percent has submitted projects for such

decisions and 2 percent have submitted suggestions for the improvement of such decisions. Most active part of the population in e-democracy processes are young and medium age citizens, living in cities and more wealthy.

In 2019 according to the Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) (which evaluates Connectivity, Human Capital/Digital Skills, Use of the Internet by citizens, Integration of Digital Technology by businesses, Digital Public Services, and Research and Development ICT in the scale of 0-100 points), Lithuania is the 14th of 28 European Union states (52 points, the average of EU - 52.5 points). In the field of digital public services, Lithuania is ranked as 8th among all EU countries (73.3 points). E-government services were used (various fulfilled e-forms were submitted to institutions) by 81 percent of Internet users in Lithuania - according to this indicator Lithuania is ranked as 9th in the EU. According to the supply indicator, access to pre-filled e-forms from institutions is highly evaluated (88 points, 3rd place in the EU), but there is still challenging areas such as open data (46 points, 24th place in the EU). In terms of completeness of e-services Lithuania is ranked in the 5th place in the EU (96 points), while in terms of digital public services for business Lithuania is taking the 4th place in the EU (97 points) (European Commission, 2019a).

Therefore, it can be stated that Lithuanian population (social environment) is ready (favorable) for the development of ICT usage in public administration as well as local government institutions, including e-leadership processes.

4.2.3   *Technological presumptions*

The accessibility of PA in Lithuania is mainly increased by implementing various initiatives for the delivery of *electronic services and using the principle of one-stop shop*.

Under the request of the Information Society Development Committee the information system - *E-Government Gateway* (*Elektroniniai valdžios vartai*, in Lithuanian) was created in 2008 and it was possible to get 421 public service online (Butkevičienė & Rutkauskienė, 2008; Barcevičius, 2008). From 2015 all municipalities may deliver public e-services for citizens and business using the E-Government Gateway (Per Elektroninius valdžios vartus..., 2015). Moreover, Lithuanian municipalities are using ICT for citizens' engagement processes, i.e. e-democracy tools are provided by municipalities' websites: e-notifications, e-complaints, e-initiatives, e-petitions, e-requests, e-content dissemination, e-services monitoring, e-consultation, e-surveys, e-forums, e-meetings (broadcasting of councils' meetings), etc.

Moreover, some other national ICT systems are enabling municipal organizations to work more efficient (European Commission, 2019b):

- The System for Interoperability Among Public Administration Institutions' Information System' (*PASIS*) enables state and municipal institutions, establishments and companies to provide electronic public services under the one-stop-shop principle. It furthermore allows centralised authentication of a person and subsequent payment for the delivered service using a secure inter-institutional data exchange.

- The State Information Resources Interoperability Platform (*SIRIP*) was created and managed by the Information Society Development Committee. It is a system that delivers centralised access to public services. System users can connect using a mobile or electronic signature, EU identity card or electronic banking systems. Solutions enable the heads of legal entities to authorise their employees to perform certain actions in the electronic space. SIRIP created the structure and transferred into electronic space the 65 most important services provided by the country's municipalities and 29 services and 111 electronic applications for provision of services to 14 state institutions.
- The Register of Legal Acts (*TAR*) is used for registering and publishing legal acts, their consolidated versions, depersonalised rulings, and international treaties. The users of systems are State and municipal institutions, and other legal bodies involved in legislation. Once a legal act is registered and published on the TAR, it is considered officially promulgated. A legal act reaches the TAR in the form of eDocument with an eSignature.

Currently *municipalities apply the following information systems* for internal organizational management processes as well as for the implementation of functions (Eurointegracijos projektai, 2015; Urbšaitytė & Veikutis, 2010):
- Financial Management System (FVS) is important for finance and accounting, involving all economic activities of the municipality (accounting, budget allocation, reporting, financial flows, human resources and other management);
- Document Management System (DVS) is used for preparation, registration, management and storage of documents (one of the most used systems is AVILYS);
- Strategic Planning and Monitoring of the Implementation of the Strategic Plan System allows the coordination of different municipal planning documents (strategic development plan, general plan, strategic activity plan, etc.) and ensuring the timely monitoring;
- Geographic Information Management System (GIS) is used by municipalities for mapping, collecting and disseminating geographic data. GIS is a very important tool for municipal spatial planning, agriculture and property management, especially giving important data for environmental departments or companies exploiting engineering networks. It allows making decisions related to municipal property management, territory management, and development analysis, etc.

These all systems are connected, at least in part, to the Website Content Management System (TVS) because the municipal website is a key tool for providing electronic public administration services.

According to opportunities provided by various information systems, municipalities have the capacity to encourage digitalization and e-leadership processes.

5   Conclusion

The concept of e-leadership in local self-government organizations is influenced by ideas of digitalization and e-government, transformation of leadership and management processes, and specifics of local level of government in a particular country. Lithuania as young democratic country still has many challenges to deal with to implement the e-leadership idea in municipalities.

The content analysis of previous researches in Lithuania revealed that the focus on ICT usage in the public sector and e-government in local level were main theoretical presumptions to appear and to develop concept of e-leadership in local self-government organizations in Lithuania. However, researches still did not explain the phenomenon in a systematic approach, therefore, the deeper understanding of it is still missing. As the lack of the understanding of this concept exists, guidelines for its implementation are missing too. This situation opens the area for future researches.

This research revealed practical presumptions for e-leadership in local self-government organizations in Lithuania. The legal basis (laws, strategic documents and even government programme) support ideas of e-leadership. The readiness of Lithuanians for using ICT for getting public services is quite high. Lithuania invests every year to the development of ICT in the public sector organizations, including municipalities. Technological instruments (tools and systems) already used in the practice of municipalities are founded as creating strong potential to strengthen e-government processes as well as to implement e-democracy.

It can be summarized that Lithuanian municipalities even using ICT for their daily activity and being ready for the implementation of e-leadership tools, still lacks the understanding (the systematic approach, organizational policy guidelines) for strengthening e-leadership as the practice helping to achieve better results.

This research is based on the content analysis of scientific literature and document analysis (PEST analysis), therefore, it should be continued with the empirical research, giving some more evidences from municipalities' practice. The comparative analysis of different local government systems (countries) would be recommended as well.

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Povzetek:
Predpostavke E-voditeljstva v lokalni samoupravi Litve

Namen in izvirnost: Uporaba IKT v upravljalskih procesih je postala neločljivo povezn del upravljalskih praks v javnih in zasebnih organizacijah. Koncept E.-voditeljstva pa je precej nov na področju javne uprave. Namen te raziskave je predstaviti ključne teoretične in praktične prepdostavke e-voditeljstva v lokalni samoupravi Litve. Glavni doprinos je v prepoznavanju ključnih elementov e-voditeljstva (osnovano na podlagi koncepta kakovostnega upravljanja) ter zaznavanju le-teh v praksi litovskih občin.
Metoda: Raziskava temelji na teoretičnem pristopu "kakovostnega upravljanja", ki pojasnjuje potrebo po boljšem upravljanja v javni upravi. Članek temelji na metodah kot so analiza vsebine, predstavitev predpostavk e-voditeljstva v lokalni samoupravi Litve kot tudi PEST analizo dokumenov Litovskih občin.
Rezultati: Teoretični vpogled v e-voditeljstvo v organizacijah lokalne samouprave v Litvi še vedno ne zagotavlja podrobnejšega razumevanja tega pojava. Vsekakor pa praktične predpostavke (pravne osnove, družbena pripravljenost in dostopnost tehnologije) nakazujejo svojo močno prisotnost ter potencial za nadaljno rast. Na podlagi tega lahko trdimo, da Litovske občine že sedaj uporabljajo IKT na dnevni osnovi in so pripravljene za vpeljavo orofij e-voditeljstva. Še vedno pa potrebujejo jasno vizijo (in usmeritve) z namenom okrepitve e-voditeljstva kot organizacijske prakse.
Družba: Rezultati raziskave so pomembni predvsem za raziskovalce Litvanske javne uprave, s poudarkom na lokalni samoupravi, ki iščejo usmeritve za nadaljnje raziskovanje. Rezultati pa so zanimivi tudi za strokovnjake v lokalni samoupravi z namenom razumevanja pomena IKT v upravljalskih in voditeljskih procesih.
Omejitve/nadaljnje raziskovanje: Članek se omejuje na prvo fazo širšega mednarodnega projekta, ki je šele v teku.

Ključne besede: E-voditeljstvo, lokalna samouprava, uporaba IKT.

Vpliv oddaljenosti bivanja na zaupanje v jedrsko elektrarno

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Povzetek:

Raziskovalno vprašanje (RV): Proučujemo, kako oddaljenost zunanjih deležnikov jedrske elektrarne vpliva na zaupanje v jedrski objekt.
Namen: Dokazati želimo, da različni deležniki jedrskega objekta ne sprejemajo na enak način in da ima oddaljenost mesta bivanja pri tem pomemben vpliv. Posebno pozornost namenjamo tudi sprejemljivosti morebitne nove jedrske elektrarne v slovenskem prostoru.
Metoda: Proučujemo funkcijo zunanjih deležnikov jedrske elektrarne pri vzpostavitvi zaupanja, tudi izkušnje iz drugih držav z jedrskimi elektrarnami. Uporabljamo spletno anketiranje, v raziskavo vključujemo pomembne slovenske zunanje deležnike Nuklearne elektrarne Krško. Pri analizi zbranih podatkov uporabljamo opisno in frekvenčno statistiko, Mann-Whinteyev in Kruskal-Wallisov test.
Rezultati: Rezultati raziskave pokažejo, da je zaupanje v jedrski objekt, merjen s petimi spremenljivkami, v korelaciji z oddaljenostjo. Oddaljenost izražamo na dva načina: prvič soočamo lokalno skupnost Posavja (ki sobiva z jedrsko elektrarno) z drugimi lokalnimi skupnostmi v Sloveniji in drugič, pri šestih različnih skupinah zunanjih deležnikov upoštevamo dejansko oddaljenost bivališča od jedrskega objekta. Zaupanje v jedrski objekt je večje pri prebivalcih, ki živijo bližje jedrski elektrarni. V primeru umeščanja nove jedrske elektrarne bodo deležniki v Posavju takšni odločitvi bolj naklonjeni, nezanemarljiv delež sodelujočih pa o tem nima izoblikovanega mnenja.
Organizacija: Dokazana dejstva bo lahko jedrska elektrarna upoštevala pri optimizaciji strategije vključevanja različnih skupin zunanjih deležnikov.
Družba: Različne interesne skupine, ki (so)odločajo o perspektivi jedrske energije v Sloveniji in vplivajo na javno mnenje bodo rezultate raziskave lahko uporabile kot izhodišče pri uveljavljanju svojih interesov.
Originalnost: Sodeč po javno dostopnih informacijah, gre za prvo takšno raziskavo v Sloveniji. Še posebej je pomembna zaradi dolgoročnih zavez omejevanja toplogrednih izpustov, zagotavljanjem stabilne in konkurenčne oskrbe z električno energijo, kjer lahko jedrske elektrarne znatno prispevajo k rešitvi.
Omejitve/nadaljnje raziskovanje: Zavedamo se določene stopnje negotovosti, na katero bi lahko vplival obseg izbranega vzorca. Raziskave je smiselno usmeriti še na druge dejavnike, ki vplivajo na zaupanje zunanjih deležnikov v jedrsko elektrarno.

Ključne besede: jedrska elektrarna, družbena odgovornost, zunanji deležniki, sobivanje, zaupanje.

1 Uvod

Jedrske elektrarne (JE) so pomemben vir oskrbe z električno energijo. Umeščene so v prostor nekaterih držav, tudi Slovenije, tako bo ostalo vsaj še nekaj časa. Bahun, Jančič, Habjan in Jakopin (2017) navajajo, da glavna naloga prihodnjega razvoja energetike v Sloveniji še naprej ostaja zagotavljanje ravnotežja med tremi osnovnimi stebri energetske politike, ki so

neločljivo prepleteni – podnebno trajnostjo, ustrezno zanesljivostjo oskrbe in izboljšanjem konkurenčnosti oskrbe z energijo. Sedanji energetski sistem v Sloveniji in ustaljeni načini proizvodnje, pretvorbe in rabe energije za prihodnost niso trajnostni, predvsem zaradi previsokih emisij toplogrednih plinov, prevelike porabe energije na enoto ustvarjene vrednosti in preobsežnega izkoriščanja neobnovljivih virov energije. Slovenija je zato pred ključnimi izzivi: prestrukturiranjem rabe energije v prometu, opuščanju fosilnih goriv za proizvodnjo električne energije, o odločitvi glede stopnje uvozne odvisnosti, ta je povezana tudi z odločitvijo o dolgoročni rabi jedrske energije, ter izzivi sledenja tehnološkemu razvoju in izkoriščanja priložnosti na trgu. (str. 32)

Poslanstvo Nuklearne elektrarne Krško (NEK), kot edine JE v Sloveniji, temelji tudi na odgovornosti zagotavljanja družbene sprejemljivosti (Nuklearna elektrarna Krško, 2019). Napotki za družbeno odgovornost, ISO 26000 (2010, str. 12), kot pomembno načelo družbene odgovornosti opredeljujejo spoštovanje interesov deležnikov organizacije. Deležnike dojemamo kot različne interesne skupine, ki želijo biti vključene in tako ali drugače vplivajo na organizacijo, so z njo povezane s konkretnimi vezmi, in sicer poslovnimi, strokovnimi in interesnimi (Serajnik Sraka, 2009, str. 99). Razumevanje pomembnosti in interesov, ki jih izražajo zunanji deležniki JE, prispeva k obvladovanju vplivov na okolje in družbo. Vzpostavlja pogoje za kakovostno sobivanje z JE. Mednarodna agencija za atomsko energijo (IAEA, International Atomic EnergyAgency, 2007) navaja, da je v načela varnostne kulture JE vključena tudi zaveza spoštovanja interesov deležnikov. Pri tem so, s ciljem doseganja najvišjih varnostnih meril, vodilo najvišji etični standardi. (str. 11)

Sprejemljivost jedrske energije se vzpostavlja tudi z vključevanjem vseh zainteresiranih deležnikov, upoštevajoč njihovo različnost. Pomemben del procesa spoštovanja njihovih interesov je prepoznavanje stopnje zaupanja v JE, pričakovanj zunanjih deležnikov in vrednotenju medsebojnih vplivov.

Optimalen model vključevanja zunanjih deležnikov v delovanje jedrskih elektrarn je tisti, ki vzpostavlja kakovostno sobivanje jedrskega objekta in njegovih zunanjih deležnikov. Vzpostavljene ima mehanizme samoocenjevanja in kontinuiranega uvajanja izboljšav. Vpliva na sprejemljivost JE v okolju in krepi kakovost sobivanja JE in njenih deležnikov. Vključevanje zunanjih deležnikov temelji na partnerskem odnosu. Pomembno vlogo pri tem imajo učinkovit komunikacijski proces, postavljena vizija, cilji in usmeritve JE, učinkovite strategije, ki izhajajo iz družbeno odgovornih dejanj, uvajanje stalnih izboljšav in uporaba orodij za doseganje trajnostne odličnosti JE kot nikoli zaključenega procesa. (Simončič, 2018, str. 194–195)

Z raziskavo ugotavljamo, ali za Slovenijo obstaja korelacija med zaupanjem v JE in med oddaljenostjo zunanjih deležnikov od jedrskega objekta. V raziskavo vključujemo več skupin pomembnih slovenskih zunanjih deležnikov JE. Rezultati raziskave predstavljajo pomembno izhodišče pri načrtovanju in utemeljitvi učinkovite strategije spoštovanja interesov deležnikov.

2   Teoretična izhodišča

2.1   Perspektiva in družbena odgovornost jedrskih elektrarn

Evropska komisija povzema, da je evropska unija (EU) trenutno eno od treh velikih gospodarstev, ki več kot polovico svoje električne energije proizvedejo brez emisij toplogrednih plinov.EU 27 % električne energije proizvede v jedrskih reaktorjih, 27 % pa iz obnovljivih virov. Izdan usmeritveni jedrski program predstavlja izhodišče za razpravo o tem, kako lahko jedrska energija pripomore k doseganju energetskih ciljev EU. Po mnenju komisije jedrska varnost ostaja absolutna prednostna naloga, v jedrski program pa še posebej vključuje naložbe v zvezi z varnostnimi nadgradnjami po nesreči v japonski JE Fukušima. Jedrska energija, kot nizko oglični vir, bo pomembno prispevala k zanesljivosti oskrbe in diverzifikaciji. Pričakuje se, da bodo JE v mnogih državah ostale pomemben sestavni del raznoterosti energijskih virov EU vsaj do leta 2050. EU želi ohraniti vodilni tehnološki položaj v jedrskem sektorju. S tem EU ohranja energetsko in tehnološko neodvisnost, ob hkratnem zagotavljanju poslovnih priložnosti za evropske družbe. To bo podpiralo rast, nova delovna mesta in konkurenčnost EU. (European Commision, 2016,str. 2−10)

Culley in Angelique (2010, str. 231) povzemata, da dojemanje jedrske energije kot »mogoče zelene rešitve« pri reševanju podnebnih vplivov predstavlja tudi glavni vir razdvajanja zagovornikov in nasprotnikov. To je razvidno tudi na primeru EU. Nekatere evropske države so izrazito naklonjene jedrski energiji (primer Francije), nekatere pa so napovedale, da bodo v celoti opustile svoj jedrski program (primer Nemčije).

Schneider, Froggatt in Thomas (2011) navajajo, da je največ JE pričelo obratovati v sredini 80. let prejšnjega stoletja. Od začetka 90. let svetovna proizvodnja iz JE znaša okvirno 13 % vse proizvedene električne energije. 31 držav oz. 16 % članic Organizacije združenih narodov, upravlja z jedrskimi elektrarnami, polovica od teh je lociranih na področju EU. (str. 12–13)

V začetku leta 2019 v svetu obratuje 454 jedrskih reaktorjev (IAEA, 2019).S slike 1 je razviden trend števila trajno zaustavljenih JE od leta 2008, novogradnej, števila elektrarn, ki so bile v navedenih letih prvič sinhronizirane z električnim omrežjem in skupna proizvodnja električne energije iz delujočih JE. Po dogodkih v Fukušimi, marca 2011, se je povečalo število trajno zaustavljenih enot, zaustavljen je bil tudi večletni trend porasta začetka gradnje novih reaktorjev. Po letu 2012 je na globalni ravni zaznan ponovni porast proizvodnje električne energije iz JE, vendar proizvodnja ne dosega vrednosti pred dogodki v Fukušimi.

Slika 1. Status JE v svetu in proizvodnja (2008–2017). Vir: International Atomic Energy Agency. (2019, 9. januar). IAEA. Pridobljeno na IAEA: http://www.iaea.org/PRIS/

Program *Harmony*, ki ga vodi Svetovna jedrska zveza (angl. *World Nuclear Association*, WNA), predstavlja vizijo jedrske industrije in poudarja prispevek, ki ga JE predstavljajo pri uresničevanju podnebnih ciljev. WNA navaja, da bo potrebno na globalni ravni znatno povečati jedrske zmogljivosti, da bi lahko vsaj s 50 % verjetnostjo preprečili rast globalne temperature za več kot 2 °C. (World Nuclear Association, 2019) Horvath in Rachlew (2016) pravita, da je državam skupen interes, da bi pri proizvodnji električne energije zagotavljali trajnost, da bi jo proizvajali z nizkimi stroški in z minimalnim vplivom na okolje. V izpolnjevanju tega cilja je jedrska energija ob drugih razpoložljivih virih v mnogih državah del rešitve. Povpraševanje po električni energiji se bo v prihodnosti verjetno znatno povečalo. Vzrok za to bo tudi proizvodnja električnih in hibridnih vozil. Še posebej v Evropi so potekale zelo kritične razprave o nadaljnji uporabi jedrske energije. Nemčija je postavila cilj, da do leta 2022 zapre vse svoje JE. Proizvodnja električne energije iz JE se v državah v Evropi močno razlikuje, ponekod predstavlja ničelni prispevek (primer Italije in Litve), spet drugod pa večji delež (na primer Francija, Madžarska, Belgija, Slovaška, Švedska). (str. 38)

Današnje razumevanje družbene odgovornosti JE vključuje trajnostno delovanje, temelji na varnostni kulturi in vedenjskem vzorcu operaterjev in lastnikov JE. Širša družba od lastnikov in operaterjev JE ob tem pričakuje spoštovanje najvišjih etičnih in moralnih vrednot. (Simončič & Žurga, 2016, str. 658) Družbeno odgovorne organizacije imajo nezanemarljivo vlogo pri oblikovanju podobe podjetja, izkazujejo integriteto, iskrenost odnosov do svojih deležnikov in zadovoljujejo njihova pričakovanja. Sodelujoči z organizacijo prepoznavajo verodostojnost in zaznano kakovost, zadovoljstvo potrošnikov pa krepi zaupanje ljudi v organizacijo. (Swaen&Chumpitaz, 2008, str. 21)

Mnogi avtorji (Carroll, 1991; Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001; Schwartzin Carroll, 2003; Snider, Hill in Martin, 2003 idr.) dokazujejo pozitivno korelacijo med zaupanjem v organizacijo, konkurenčno prednostjo, perspektivo ter družbeno odgovornostjo. Tudi Bertoncelj, Meško, Naraločnik in Nastav (2011, str. 131), Brown in Dacin (1997, str. 79), Yoon, Gürhan-Canli in Schwarz (2006, str. 385), Boulouta in Pitelis (2014, str. 249), Fadun (2014, str. 16), Matuleviciene in Stravinskiene (2015), Park in Kim (2011, str. 321) in Sheehy (2014) navajajo, da je družbena odgovornost pogoj za ugled organizacij.

Avetisyan in Ferrary (2012) proučujeta vlogo različnih deležnikov in analizirata proces uvajanja družbene odgovornosti. Utemeljujeta predpostavko, da je razvoj družbene odgovornosti v različnih okoljih odvisen od narave sodelujočih lokalnih in globalnih deležnikov ter medsebojnih vplivov. Ugotavljata razlike v dojemanju deležnikov, njihove motive in realizacijo družbene odgovornosti v različnih okoljih, kot posledico neenakega vključevanja. Povzemata, da spoštovanje interesov deležnikov krepi družbeno odgovornost organizacij. (str. 125–130)

2.2 Vključevanje deležnikov v funkciji sprejemljivosti jedrske elektrarne

Pravilna identifikacija vplivnih deležnikov in implementacija ustrezne strategije zanje, predstavlja pot do učinkovite komunikacije in zaupanja.

Na sprejemljivost JE vpliva več dejavnikov. Venables, Pidgeon, Parkhill, Henwood in Simmons (2012) ugotavljajo, da je lokalno prebivalstvo v Veliki Britaniji, ki živi blizu JE, jedrski energiji bolj naklonjeno kot drugi. Raziskava je bila narejena v letih od 2003 do 2008, na primeru dveh JE. (str. 374–375) Časovni okvir te raziskave sega v čas pred dogodki v Fukušimi. Zaupanje strokovne in laične javnosti v jedrsko energijo seje takrat zaradi merljivih in občutnih vplivov na naravno okolje in širšo družbo (vsaj kratkoročno) zmanjšalo. Dogodek v Fukušimi je imel za posledico uvedbo stresnih testov, strožjih kriterijev in dodatnih varnostnih ukrepov v delujočih in načrtovanih JE. Kljub zmanjšanemu zaupanju v JE, pa so podobne korelacije ugotavljali tudi po letu 2011, navajajo Kim et al. (2013). Raziskava v 42 državah v Aziji, Evropi in ZDA kaže, da se naklonjenost jedrskim elektrarnam po dogodku v Fukušimi veča (oz. vrača) pri prebivalcih, ki živijo bliže JE. (str. 6) Slovenija v to raziskavo ni bila vključena. Sugiman (2014) večjo naklonjenost jedrski energiji bližnjih prebivalcev po dogodkih v Fukušimi potrjuje tudi za Japonsko. Navaja, da zato ker imajo prebivalci v bližini japonskih JE več znanja o jedrski energiji, poznajo načine zaščite, mnogi osebno poznajo zaposlene. Poleg tega je veliko njihovih družinskih članov in drugih sorodnikov zaposlenih v elektrarnah ali imajo koristi od kakšnega drugega poslovnega odnosa. Uživajo tudi finančne koristi, ki jih vlada namenja kot nadomestilo za sprejemanje potencialnih tveganj. (str. 264) Kato, Takahara, Nishikawa in Homma (2013) na primeru japonske JE navajajo, da lokalna skupnost, ki ji je namenjen višji proračun za program socialnega varstva – kot obliko nadomestila, prisotnost JE dojema bolj pozitivno. (str. 816)

Chung in Yeung (2013) za Hongkong dokazujeta, da je stopnja zaupanja v JE pomembno povezana z dejanji vlad in lastnikov JE. V raziskavi nista dokazala statistično značilne

korelacije med zaupanjem in oddaljenostjo od jedrskega objekta, vendar sodelujoči v raziskavi ne živijo neposredno ob JE, Hongkong električno energijo dobavlja s Kitajske. Z večanjem ocene sposobnosti vlade in lastnikov se povečuje tudi zaupanje v jedrski objekt. (str. 1172, 1187)

Raziskava (Huang, Bi, Zhang, Li, & Qu, 2010), narejena v Tajvanu kaže, da osebe z večjim zanimanjem in znanjem o jedrski energiji bolj sprejemajo in bolj prepoznavajo njene prednosti. Ugotovljeno je, da je dojemanje tveganja deležnikov povezano z zaupanjem v politično in gospodarsko strukturo. Pomen te ugotovitve kaže, da imata država in gospodarstvo pomembno vlogo pri zaznavanju tveganj za večino ljudi. Dobro zasnovana komunikacija zato povečuje zanimanje in znanje ljudi s področja jedrske energije. To pa lahko izboljšuje stopnjo sprejemljivosti jedrskega objekta. Še vedno pa v zvezi z dojemanjem tveganja obstajajo nekateri pomembni dejavniki, ki niso zadostno raziskani, npr. čustva, vplivi rente in pripravljenost na sodelovanje med JE in njenimi zunanjimi deležniki. (str. 74, 79)

Perkova, van Gorp, Turcanu, Thijssen in Carle (2013) ugotavljajo, da imajo znanja, ki jih imajo deležniki, pomemben vpliv na razumevanje in sprejemljivost JE. Pri tem imajo lahko odgovorni v JE, ki posredujejo informacije, pomembno vlogo. Na študiji primera v belgijski JE dokazujejo, da imajo v krizni komunikaciji (primer izrednih dogodkov) glavno vlogo specifična znanja. Ljudje z veliko znanja so prepoznani kot posebno pozorni, motivirani in sposobni sprejemanja informacij v zvezi s krizno komunikacijo, povezano z JE. Izobrazba, izkušnje o nevarnosti, zaupanje, zaznavanje tveganja in strah pri tem nimajo tako pomembne vloge. (str. 1996)

Matuleviciene in Stravinskiene (2015) navajata dva osnovna dejavnika, ki vplivata na zaupanje deležnikov, in sicer ugled organizacije in verodostojnost (organizacijska zanesljivost). Organizacija lahko nadzira dejavnike, ki so z njo povezani (ugled in verodostojnost), medtem ko psihološki, osebnostni in situacijski dejavniki ne morejo biti pod njenim nadzorom. Glede na to, sta vplivne dejavnike razdelila v dve skupini. Obvladljivi dejavniki imajo neposreden vpliv na zaupanje vsakega deležnika, neobvladljivi pa imajo na zaupanje le posreden vpliv. (str. 599–602)

Mednarodna agencija za atomsko energijo (IAEA, 2006) povzema, da javno sodelovanje deležnikov pri odločanju omogoča večjo stopnjo medsebojnega razumevanja. V zvezi z delovanjem JE to lahko zagotovi bolj razumno dojemanje tveganj in koristi. To je izjemnega pomena za zagotavljanje možnosti vključevanja zainteresiranih strani in iskanje novih načinov za pridobitev mnenj zunanjih deležnikov. Dejavno vključevanje zainteresiranih strani v zvezi z jedrskimi vprašanji lahko zagotovi znatno izboljšanje na področju jedrske varnosti in povečuje splošno sprejemljivost jedrskih objektov. (str. 13)

Banerjee in Bonnefous (2011) utemeljujeta, da imajo zunanji deležniki na JE pomemben vpliv. Razdelita sta jih v tri skupine, ki se razlikujejo po vplivih, aktivnosti in interesih. JE,

poleg podpornikov in nasprotnikov, zaradi tveganja za zavzetje aktivnejše vloge, pri svojih aktivnostih upoštevajo tudi pasivne deležnike. (str. 137)

Spoštovanje interesov deležnikov je pogoj za sprejemljivost JE v družbi in okolju. V raziskavi, potekala je v Sloveniji v letu 2017, je bilo 63 % vplivov kakovosti sobivanja pojasnjeno z vplivi na sprejemljivost JE v okolju. 41 % vplivov na spoštovanje interesov deležnikov je bilo pojasnjenih s sprejemljivostjo JE in 30 % s kakovostjo sobivanja. Očiten je torej vpliv spoštovanja interesov deležnikov JE na kakovost sobivanja, še bolj pa na sprejemljivost JE v družbi. Za JE to predstavlja dodaten izziv v iskanju optimalnih možnosti za zagotavljanje njihove dolgoročne perspektive, obstoja v družbi in okolju ter vpliva na kakovost življenja lokalnih skupnosti in drugih zunanjih deležnikov JE. (Simončič, 2018, str. 193)

2.3 Postavljena hipoteza

Dobre strategije v JE vključujejo zaupanje javnosti v jedrski objekt, interese zunanjih deležnikov, razumevanje jedrske energije in druge specifike. Za lastnike in operaterje JE je pomembno, da z izbranim načrtovanjem in primernim ravnanjem pristopijo do posameznih interesnih skupin in z njimi poskušajo vzpostaviti partnerski odnos, ki krepi zaupanje. Vzpostavitev zaupanja med JE in njenimi deležniki bo pomembno izhodišče tudi za morebitno umeščanje nove JE v slovenski prostor. Preveriti želimo, kako je naklonjenost jedrski energiji v Sloveniji povezana z oddaljenostjo od jedrskega objekta. Postavili smo sledečo hipotezo: *»Stopnja zaupanja zunanjih deležnikov v Nuklearno elektrarno Krško je odvisna od oddaljenosti od objekta«*. Pričakujemo torej, da korelacija, ki so jo dokazali v nekaterih drugih okoljih z jedrskimi objekti, velja tudi za Slovenijo.

3 Metoda

Za potrebe raziskave smo pripravili vprašalnik za izbrane zunanje deležnike JE. Zaupanje deležnikov v JE smo merili s petimi trditvami iz vprašalnika, vključili smo tudi nekatera demografska vprašanja. Pri opredelitvi kakovosti življenja so bili sodelujoči naprošeni, da upoštevajo zadovoljstvo z življenjem na splošno in z življenjskim standardom, zdravje (pričakovana življenjska doba, prehrana, splošno zdravstveno stanje…), delovni čas, oz. zadovoljstvo z zaposlitvijo, možnosti izobraževanja, možnosti za izkoriščanje prostega časa, družabno življenje, turizem (počitek, rekreacija, druženje, spoznavanje česa novega), varnost (v cestnem prometu, osebna varnost, varnost pri uporabi interneta), stopnjo kriminalitete in čistočo okolja (zrak, voda).Končna oblika vprašalnika je bila po pilotni raziskavi(kjer nismo našli razlogov za korekcijo) oblikovana s pomočjo odprtokodne aplikacije 1KA, ki omogoča storitev spletnega anketiranja. Ciljne skupine zunanjih deležnikov smo k sodelovanju povabili z elektronsko pošto. V raziskavi so sodelovali polnoletni predstavniki zunanjih deležnikov JE, in sicer:

- lokalna skupnost Posavja (njihove javno objavljene elektronske naslove smo po lastni izbiri pridobili preko različnih spletnih strani podjetij, društev, zavodov in javnih ustanov);

- lokalna skupnost drugih slovenskih regij (elektronske naslove smo izbrali podobno kot v prvem primeru, v vzorec smo vključili štiri naključno izbrane statistične enote, in sicer Jugovzhodno Slovenijo, Obalno-kraško regijo, Savinjsko regijo in Zasavsko regijo);
- dobavitelji storitev in blaga za NEK (seznam dobaviteljev, s sedežem podjetja v Sloveniji, smo izključno za potrebe raziskave pridobili v NEK, vzorčni okvir so predstavljala podjetja, ki so v letih od 2012 do 2017 za NEK dobavljala blago ali izvajala storitve v vrednosti vsaj 10.000 EUR letno, naključno smo izbrali okvirno tretjino vseh, kontaktne naslove smo poiskali na njihovih spletnih straneh);
- novinarji (povabilo smo posredovali preko dostopnih spletnih strani različnih slovenskih medijev, čim bolj smo jih poskušali nagovarjati tudi neposredno oz. preko njihovih osebnih elektronskih naslovov, ki so bili javno dostopni);
- nevladne organizacije in društva s področja varovanja okolja in narave (po navedbah Ministrstva za okolje in prostor je bilo v času raziskave v Sloveniji registriranih 30 nevladnih organizacij s statusom delovanja v javnem interesu na področju varstva okolja in 36 društev, ki delujejo v javnem interesu na področju ohranjanja narave, v raziskavo smo vključili vse, povabili smo jih preko elektronskih naslovov, navedenih na njihovih spletnih straneh);
- politična javnost (kot slovensko politično javnost smo opredelili predsednika Republike Slovenije, predsednika Vlade Republike Slovenije, ministrice in ministre, članice in člane Državnega sveta, članice in člane Državnega zbora, ustavne sodnice in sodnike ter županje in župane vseh slovenskih občin, izvoljenih v mandatu 2014–2018,povabila za sodelovanje v raziskavi smo posredovali na elektronske naslove vseh uradnih predstavnikov in kabinetov, ti so navedeni na službenih spletnih straneh, razen občin, kjer smo s pomočjo generatorja naključnih števil izbrali 22 županov, oz. približno 10 % vseh).

Model izvedene raziskave je prikazan na sliki 2.

Slika 2. Model raziskave.

Za čim bolj reprezentativno izbiro vzorca smo uporabili sistematične tehnike vzorčenja. Pri oblikovanju vprašalnika smo upoštevali napotke za kakovostno pridobivanje podatkov in uspešen zaključek raziskave, povzela sta jih Ambrož in Colarič Jakše (2015, str. 131). Zbiranje podatkov smo v Sloveniji izvedli v oktobru 2017.Pri analizi zbranih podatkov smo uporabili opisno in frekvenčno statistiko, Mann-Whinteyev in Kruskal-Wallisov test. Raziskava je ponovljiva, s čimer je mogoče preveriti njeno konsistentnost. Udeleženci raziskave so odgovarjali na splošna in demografska vprašanja ter izražali svoje strinjanje s postavljenimi trditvami. Tako so lahko jasno izrazili svoja stališča.

4 Rezultati

4.1 Nekatere značilnosti vzorca

Iz tabele 1 je razvidno, da se je za sodelovanje v raziskavi skupaj odzvalo 292 zunanjih deležnikov JE.V raziskavi je sodelovalo nekaj več kot 100 respondentov, ki imajo bivališče oddaljeno manj kot 30 km od JE, od teh je bilo pričakovano največ predstavnikov lokalne skupnosti Posavja. Ostali so bili v večini bolj oddaljeni (slika 3).

Tabela 1. *Odzivnost in število vseh sodelujočih deležnikov NEK.*

št. poslanih vabil	pripadnost skupini	število sodelujočih(N)	delež odziva (%)
432	lokalna skupnost – Posavje	95	22,0
488	lokalna skupnost – druge slovenske regije	91	18,6
110	dobavitelji blaga in storitev za NEK	21	19,1
66	društvo/organizacija v javnem interesu na področju okolja in ohranjanja narave	17	25,8
124	slovenska politična javnost	21	16,9
177	novinarji	23	13,0
	drugo ali neopredeljeno	24	
1397		292	20,9

Slika 3. Oddaljenost bivališča od NEK, po skupinah deležnikov.

4.2 Opisna statistika, frekvence in preizkus hipoteze

Zaupanje deležnikov v JE smo merili s petimi spremenljivkami iz vprašalnika, navedli smo jih v tabeli 2. Te so sodelujoči ocenjevali s 5-stopenjsko lestvico strinjanja (lestvica ocen 1–5, kjer 1 pomeni »brez vpliva«, 5 pa pomeni »zelo velik vpliv«).

Oddaljenost od JE smo merili z vprašanjem »Kakšna je oddaljenost vašega stalnega bivališča od NEK?«. Sodelujočim smo ponudili 4 odgovore: »do 10 km«, »od 10 do 30 km«, »od 30 do 100 km« in »več kot 100 km«. Oddaljenost od JE smo izrazili tudi na podlagi pripadnosti v lokalno skupnost (v Posavje, kjer je umeščena JE, ali lokalna skupnost drugih regij).

V prvem primeru so bile vključene vse skupine zunanjih deležnikov. Spremenljivka »Kakšna je oddaljenost vašega stalnega bivališča od Nuklearne elektrarne Krško?« je bila iz štirih prekodirana v dve novi spremenljivki: »<30 km« in »> 30 km«. Frekvenčna in opisna statistika za uporabljene trditve je razvidna iz tabele 2.

Tabela 2. *Opisna statistika in frekvence*

Zaupanje deležnikov NEK	Razdalja	N	M	SD	Mdn	Mo
Slovenija potrebuje poleg drugih virov električne energije tudi Nuklearno elektrarno Krško.	<30 km	105	3,99	1,079	4,00	4
	>30 km	182	3,53	1,206	4,00	4
Vodstvo Nuklearne elektrarne Krško je družbeno odgovorno.	<30 km	105	4,17	0,826	4,00	4
	>30 km	181	3,83	0,885	4,00	4
Nuklearna elektrarna Krško obratuje varno.	<30 km	105	3,89	0,934	4,00	4
	>30 km	181	3,52	1,073	4,00	4
Nuklearna elektrarna Krško naj obratuje do konca življenjske dobe.	<30 km	105	4,14	0,975	4,00	4
	>30 km	182	3,79	1,088	4,00	4
Po izteku življenjske dobe Nuklearne elektrarne Krško naj Slovenija zgradi novo jedrsko elektrarno.	<30 km	105	3,35	1,225	4,00	4
	>30 km	182	2,71	1,370	3,00	3

Opomba.N: število; *M*: srednja vrednost; *SD*: standardni odklon; *Mdn*: mediana, *Mo*: modus.

Za ugotavljanje statistično značilnih razlik med zaupanjem v NEK in oddaljenostjo od NEK smo uporabili Mann-Whitneyev test, rezultate smo podali v tabeli 3. Vsi narejeni testi so statistično značilni ($p < 0,05$).

Tabela 3. Mann-Whitneyev *test*

Zaupanje deležnikov NEK	Razdalja	N	Povprečje ranga	U	p
Slovenija potrebuje poleg drugih virov električne energije tudi Nuklearno elektrarno Krško.	<30 km	105	165,23		
	>30 km	182	131,75	7326,000	0,001
	Skupaj	287			
Vodstvo Nuklearne elektrarne Krško je družbeno odgovorno.	<30 km	105	163,97		
	>30 km	181	131,62	7353,000	0,001
	Skupaj	286			
Nuklearna elektrarna Krško obratuje varno.	<30 km	105	161,04		
	>30 km	181	133,32	7660,500	0,004
	Skupaj	286			
Nuklearna elektrarna Krško naj obratuje do konca življenjske dobe.	<30 km	105	162,09		
	>30 km	182	133,57	7656,000	0,003
	Skupaj	287			
Po izteku življenjske dobe Nuklearne elektrarne Krško naj Slovenija zgradi novo jedrsko elektrarno.	<30 km	105	169,20		
	>30 km	182	129,46	6909,000	<0,001
	Skupaj	287			

Opomba. N: število; *U*: Mann-Whitneyeva testna statistika; *p*: statistična značilnost ($p < 0,05$ pomeni, da obstaja statistično značilna razlika).

Na enak način smo preverjali še razlike, upoštevajoč pripadnost skupini zunanjih deležnikov. Pri tem smo primerjali »Lokalno skupnost Posavje« in »Lokalno skupnost drugih slovenskih regij«, ostali deležniki v ta preizkus zato niso bili vključeni. Frekvenčna in opisna statistika je razvidna iz tabele 4. Tudi v tem primeru so bili vsi narejeni testi (navedeni v tabeli 5) statistično značilni ($p < 0,05$).

Tabela 4. *Opisna statistika in frekvence*

Zaupanje deležnikov NEK	Pripadnost	N	M	SD	Mdn	Mo
Slovenija potrebuje poleg drugih virov električne energije tudi Nuklearno elektrarno Krško.	Posavje	95	3,92	1,136	4,00	4
	Ostalo	91	3,30	1,225	4,00	4
Vodstvo Nuklearne elektrarne Krško je družbeno odgovorno.	Posavje	95	4,16	0,842	4,00	4
	Ostalo	91	3,74	0,905	4,00	4
Nuklearna elektrarna Krško obratuje varno.	Posavje	95	3,81	1,003	4,00	4
	Ostalo	91	3,33	1,106	4,00	4
Nuklearna elektrarna Krško naj obratuje do konca življenjske dobe.	Posavje	95	4,07	1,024	4,00	4
	Ostalo	91	3,58	1,146	4,00	4
Po izteku življenjske dobe Nuklearne elektrarne Krško naj Slovenija zgradi novo jedrsko elektrarno.	Posavje	95	3,23	1,250	4,00	4
	Ostalo	91	2,45	1,416	2,00	1

*Opomba.N*: število; *M*: srednja vrednost; *SD*: standardni odklon; *Mdn*: mediana, *Mo*: modus.

Tabela 5. *Mann-Whinteyev test*

Zaupanje deležnikov NEK	Pripadnost	N	Povprečje ranga	U	p
Slovenija potrebuje poleg drugih virov električne energije tudi Nuklearno elektrarno Krško.	Posavje	95	107,42		
	Ostalo	91	78,97	3000,500	<0,001
	Skupaj	186			
Vodstvo Nuklearne elektrarne Krško je družbeno odgovorno.	Posavje	95	106,25		
	Ostalo	91	80,19	3111,000	<0,001
	Skupaj	186			
Nuklearna elektrarna Krško obratuje varno.	Posavje	95	104,82		
	Ostalo	91	81,69	3247,500	0,002
	Skupaj	186			
Nuklearna elektrarna Krško naj obratuje do konca življenjske dobe.	Posavje	95	105,62		
	Ostalo	91	80,85	3171,000	0,001
	Skupaj	186			
Po izteku življenjske dobe Nuklearne elektrarne Krško naj Slovenija zgradi novo jedrsko elektrarno.	Posavje	95	107,97		
	Ostalo	91	78,40	2948,000	<0,001
	Skupaj	186			

Opomba. N: število; *U*: Mann-Whitneyeva testna statistika; *p*: statistična značilnost (*p*< 0,05 pomeni, da obstaja statistično značilna razlika).

Rezultati testov izpričujejo, da je stopnja zaupanja v NEK v korelaciji z oddaljenostjo bivanja zunanjih deležnikov.

Delež strinjanja in popolnega strinjanja s trditvami, vključenimi v dokaz hipoteze, smo prikazali na sliki 4. Tudi iz histogramov je razvidno, da so pripadniki lokalne skupnosti Posavja, torej tistih, ki živijo bližje JE, jedrski energiji bolj naklonjeni.

Slika 4. Delež strinjanja sli popolnega strinjanja za pripadnike lokalnih skupnosti.

4.3   Javno mnenje o novi jedrski elektrarni v Sloveniji

Naklonjenost do morebitnega umeščanja nove JE smo ugotavljali s trditvijo *»Po izteku življenjske dobe Nuklearne elektrarne Krško naj Slovenija zgradi novo jedrsko elektrarno«*. V tabeli 6 smo prikazali osnovne podatke opisne statistike za uporabljeno spremenljivko. Na sliki 5 so razvidne frekvence strinjanja s trditvijo, po skupinah zunanjih deležnikov.

Tabela 6. *Opisna statistika*

Trditev	N	Mdn	Min	Max	SD
Po izteku življenjske dobe Nuklearne elektrarne Krško naj Slovenija zgradi novo jedrsko elektrarno.	290	3	1	5	1,355

Opomba.N: število; *Mdn*: mediana;*Min*: najmanjša vrednost; *Max*: največja vrednost; *SD*: standardni odklon.

Slika 5. Strinjanje s trditvijo »»Po izteku življenjske dobe NEK naj Slovenija zgradi novo JE.«.

S Kruskal-Wallisovim testom smo ugotavljali, ali po posameznih skupinah respondentov v strinjanju s trditvijo, da naj Slovenija zgradi novo JE, obstajajo statistično značilne razlike. Rezultati v tabeli 7 kažejo, da se stopnja strinjanja s trditvijo statistično značilno razlikuje upoštevajoč pripadnost skupini deležnikov. Podobno velja tudi, če upoštevamo kakovost življenja in oddaljenost od NEK. Statistično značilnih razlik v strinjanju s trditvijo nismo izmerili upoštevajoč starost respondentov, njihov zaposlitveni status in najvišjo doseženo izobrazbo.

Tabela 7. *Ugotavljanje statistično značilnih razlik (Kruskal-Wallisov test)*

Skupina	*df*	*H*	*p*
pripadnost skupini	6	34,465	0,000
starost	4	5,152	0,272
zaposlitveni status	4	4,117	0,390
izobrazba	3	4,200	0,241
kakovost življenja	2	16,278	0,000
oddaljenost od NEK	3	23,181	0,000

Opomba.p< 0,05 pomeni, da obstaja statistično značilna razlika.

Na sliki 6 smo prikazali strinjanje s trditvijo, upoštevajoč kakovost življenja, ki so jo navedli sodelujoči.

Slika 6. Odločitev o novi jedrski elektrarni v Sloveniji, po kriteriju kakovosti življenja.

5 Razprava

Javno mnenje deležnikov o jedrski energiji in vzpostavitev zaupanja med JE in različnimi interesnimi skupinami, je za JE in odgovorne dejavnike energetskih politik zelo pomembno. Na javno mnenje pomembno vplivajo široka družbena razprava o odprtih vprašanjih,

obratovalni rezultati JE, v javnostih prepoznana družbena odgovornost JE in jedrska varnost. Različne interesne skupine in posamezniki do JE izražajo različno stopnjo zaupanja.

Pomembna skupina zunanjih deležnikov JE so lokalne skupnosti, najprej tista, ki z njo neposredno sobiva. Bližnji prebivalci najbolj dojemajo in občutijo pozitivne ali negativne vplive zaradi JE. V Sloveniji je to lokalna skupnost v šestih posavskih občinah, še posebno v občinah Krško in Brežice. Glede na različne interese, strokovno znanje in pričakovanja je skupina lokalne skupnosti pričakovano heterogena. Pripadnikom znatnega števila lokalne skupnosti Posavja so omogočeni neposredni ali posredni stiki z zaposlenimi v JE. Predstavniki bližnjih lokalnih skupnosti in posavske občine so upravičeni do jedrske rente. Vplive JE zunanji deležniki Posavja dojemajo z različno stopnjo tolerance, od skrajno negativne do izrazito naklonjene, precejšen je delež tistih, ki do posameznih vprašanj niso jasno opredeljeni. Podobno velja tudi za pripadnike drugih lokalnih skupnosti v Sloveniji, ki so sodelovali v raziskavi. Lokalna skupnost Posavje je, bolj kot ostale, vključena v shemo načrtovanih ukrepov za primer nepričakovanega dogodka v JE. Izraža precejšnje zaupanje v vodstvo NEK.V manjšem obsegu, vendar še vedno precej, vodstvu NEK zaupajo tudi bolj oddaljeni prebivalci. Za lokalne skupnosti drugih slovenskih regij na splošno velja, da so z obratovanjem JE, vplivi in posledicami manj seznanjeni kot bližnji prebivalci, polovica jih kljub temu meni, da NEK obratuje varno.

Glede na dobro organiziranost predstavljajo nevladne organizacije pomemben vpliv na obratovanje in perspektivo JE. V večini izražajo kritičen odnos do obratovanja in umestitve jedrskih objektov v bivalna okolja. Spodbujajo širšo razpravo, kot protiutež morebitnih pristranskih politik, jedrskemu in drugim vplivnim lobijem.

Dobavitelji storitev in blaga so neposredno vključeni v nabavni proces JE. Nekateri so za JE zelo pomembni strateški partnerji, ki omogočajo nemoteno obratovanje in izvajanje poslanstva varne in učinkovite proizvodnje električne energije. Partnerski odnos, medsebojna odvisnost in sodelovanje krepijo zaupanje med dobavitelji in JE. Naklonjenost do JE, ki jo izražajo dobavitelji storitev in blaga, je pričakovano precejšnja.

Politična javnosti izvaja upravno, nadzorno in zakonodajno funkcijo na področju sevalne in jedrske varnosti. Njihovi pripadniki lahko pomembno vplivajo na odpravo morebitnih navzkrižij med lokalnimi skupnostmi in JE, na javno mnenje, na vzpostavitev in vzdrževanje klime, ki JE omogoča delovanje in perspektivo. Znaten delež predstavnikov slovenske politične javnosti glede umeščanja nove JE v Sloveniji (še) ni jasno opredeljen, ali tega ne želi izraziti.

Tudi novinarji imajo pomembno vlogo pri oblikovanju javne podobe JE. Napačno posredovanje informacij, lahkomiselno vpletanje čustev, nepreverjenih dejstev in podleganje vplivom različnih lobijev, lahko JE povzroči veliko škodo, omaja ji lahko pridobljeni ugled in zaupanje. Več kot petina sodelujočih novinarjev je glede perspektive jedrske energije v Sloveniji neodločena, slaba polovica pa meni, da Slovenija potrebuje novo JE.

V času izvajanja raziskave podpora zunanjih deležnikov, ki so izrazili nesporno naklonjenost morebitni novi JE, ko bo NEK prenehala obratovati, ni bila prepričljiva. Hkrati pa se je znaten del iste populacije precej bolj strinjal s trditvijo, da naj NEK obratuje do konca življenjske dobe, da obratuje varno in s trditvijo, da JE zagotavljajo stabilno, konkurenčno in zanesljivo oskrbo z električno energijo. Strinjanje s trditvijo, da bodo imele JE v prihodnosti pomembno vlogo pri uresničevanju globalnih ciljev podnebnih sprememb, je bilo višje kot podpora v prid umestitve nove JE v Sloveniji. Upoštevajoč celoten nabor sodelujočih v raziskavi ugotavljamo, da se je z umeščanjem nove enote JE v Sloveniji strinjalo, oz. popolnoma strinjalo, okvirno 38 % sodelujočih. Več kot četrtina vseh (27 %) je bilo neopredeljenih. Razloge za takšen delež neopredeljenih vidimo tudi v pomanjkanju kakovostne in argumentirane strokovne razprave o različnih vidikih jedrske in energetske politike v Sloveniji in v zavedanju odgovornosti, ki jo prinaša takšna odločitev (politična javnost). Tako podporniki jedrske energije, kot njeni nasprotniki, v razpravi o dolgoročnem nacionalnem energetskem programu poskušajo prepričati neopredeljene pripadnike različnih interesnih skupin, pri tem izbirajo različne pristope.

Bližnji prebivalci na splošno izražajo večjo naklonjenost do NEK. Hipotezo, da je stopnja zaupanja zunanjih deležnikov v JE odvisna od oddaljenosti od objekta, smo zato potrdili. Nesporno smo jo dokazali z Mann-Whitneyevim testom. Tudi za nekatera druga okolja v Evropi, Aziji in ZDA, v katera so umeščene JE, je več avtorjev potrdilo takšno korelacijo. V nadaljevanju povzemamo najverjetnejše razloge za to:

- Večja osveščenost bližnjih prebivalcev o jedrski energiji. Lokalna skupnost Posavja, dobavitelji storitev in blaga, pripadniki posavskih lokalnih oblasti, bližnje organizacije in ustanove so pogosteje kot ostali v stiku z vodstvom JE in drugimi zaposlenimi. Bližnji prebivalci imajo na razpolago več virov informacij in imajo več podatkov o delovanju, varnosti in učinkih JE.
- Bližnjim prebivalcem je omogočena večja možnost vključevanja in pomembnejši vpliv na sprejemanje nekaterih odločitev. Politična javnost in lokalna skupnost v določenih primerih izdaja določena soglasja, dovoljenja, posreduje strokovna mnenja ipd. Dobavitelji imajo zaradi bližine jedrskega objekta večje možnosti poslovnega sodelovanja.
- Konkretno dojemanje pozitivnih vplivov JE na kakovost življenja (vpliv na zaposlovanje, širitev gospodarske dejavnosti, donacije društvom in podpora nekaterim projektom v širši skupnosti, vpliv na gospodarske kazalce lokalnega okolja).Dojemanje pozitivnih vplivov na kakovost življenja zaradi izplačil jedrske rente (npr. izraženo kot višji proračun za program socialnega varstva, kot obliko nadomestila, tako navajajo tudi Kato, Takahara, Nishikawa in Homma, 2013).
- Bližnji prebivalci imajo več strokovnega znanja o jedrski energiji, bolje poznajo ukrepe in so vključeni v načrt za primer izrednega dogodka (Sugiman, 2014).
- Možni so večji učinki komunikacijske strategije na zunanje deležnike, ki živijo bliže JE (strategija utrjevanja podpornih deležnikov, strategija stabilizacije pasivnih

deležnikov, strategija zadrževanja za nasprotnike, tako ugotavljata Banerjee in Bonnefous, 2011).

- Določen delež bližnje populacije je zaposlen v JE, vključeni so v njene procese, zagotavljanje varnostne funkcije in razpolagajo z neposrednimi informacijami, ki so povezane z obratovanjem, rezultati, varnostjo in vplivi JE. Svoje izkušnje posredno in neposredno – zavestno in nezavestno, prenašajo na okolje, v katerem živijo.

Poleg oddaljenosti in opredeljenosti skupini deležnikov, na podporo novi JE vpliva tudi kakovost življenja, ki so jo navedli sodelujoči. Tisti, ki živijo bolj kakovostno življenje, so izrazili višje zaupanje do JE.

Z vidika zanesljivosti oskrbe z električno energijo v Sloveniji si v skupini GEN prizadevajo za učinkovito nadaljevanje projekta izgradnje drugega bloka JE v Krškem. Zanj imajo pripravljene potrebne študije za širšo družbeno in politično razpravo o energetski prihodnosti Slovenije in prihodnji vlogi jedrske energije kot trajnostnega vira energije. Projekt ustrezno odgovarja na vse tri temeljne usmeritve evropske in domače energetske politike: na zanesljivost, podnebno trajnost in konkurenčnost oskrbe z energijo. (Bahun, Jančič, Habjan, & Jakopin, 2017, str. 37)

Odgovornim za sprejem energetskega koncepta, navedena dejstva potrjujejo potrebo po skrbni opredelitvi strateških ciljev in metod za implementacijo vključevanja zunanjih deležnikov JE. Pri tem ne morajo računati na univerzalne, splošno veljavne pristope. Identifikacija deležnikov sloni na ugotavljanju pripadnosti posameznim interesnim skupinam, zaupanja, vrednotenju njihovih željenih in dejanskih vplivov (moči), pričakovanj, ugotavljanju interesnih področij, prepoznavanju vplivnih posameznikov (vodij) in načinov komunikacijskih poti. V tem procesu imajo zunanji deležniki JE priložnost družbeno odgovornega soodločanja pri nadaljevanju ali opustitvi jedrskega programa v Sloveniji in uveljavljanju svojih interesov.

6 Zaključek

Energetski koncept EU in Slovenije, kot njene članice, temelji na gospodarskem, okoljskem in družbenem razvoju. Izhaja tudi iz sprejetih mednarodnih obvez za omejevanje toplogrednih izpustov, kjer jedrska energija po mnenju mnogih predstavlja del rešitve. V naslednjih desetletjih bo tudi Slovenija povsem prešla na nizkoogljične vire pridobivanja električne energije. Upoštevajoč še dejstvo, da se bo življenjska doba NEK čez dobri dve desetletji iztekla, se zdi gradnja nove JE v Sloveniji razumna in verjetna. Več skupin deležnikov je izrazilo različne poglede na perspektivo jedrske energije v Sloveniji.

Raziskava je pokazala, da je stopnja zaupanja v JE tudi v Sloveniji povezana z oddaljenostjo, to smo preverjali s postavljeno hipotezo. Primerljivo korelacijo zaupanja v jedrski objekt in oddaljenosti so v raziskavah potrdili tudi za Veliko Britanijo (Venables, Pidgeon, Parkhill, Henwood, &Simmons, 2012), nekatere azijske in evropske države ter ZDA – skupaj 42 (Kim, Kim, &Kim, 2013) ter za Japonsko (Sugiman, 2014).

Medsebojno razumevanje, spoštovanje, sprejemanje argumentov in preseganje nasprotij interesov so glavni cilji družbeno odgovornih partnerjev. Vključuje obvladovanje tveganj v spremenljivem okolju in omejuje socialne, ekonomske in politične vplive na elektroenergetskem trgu.

Rezultate raziskave bodo lahko JE upoštevale pri optimizaciji strategije vključevanja različnih skupin zunanjih deležnikov. Pomembna informacija za JE in širšo družbo je tudi, da je delež neopredeljenih glede morebitnega umeščanja nove JE (še posebej med predstavniki politične javnosti, ki imajo na to pomemben vpliv) precejšen. Različne interesne skupine, ki (so)odločajo o perspektivi jedrske energije v Sloveniji in vplivajo na javno mnenje (med njimi, nevladne organizacije, politična javnost in novinarji) bodo rezultate raziskave lahko uporabile kot izhodišče pri uveljavljanju svojih interesov in vplivov. Sodeč po javno dostopnih informacijah, gre za prvo takšno raziskavo v Sloveniji. Še posebej je pomembna zaradi dolgoročnih zavez omejevanja toplogrednih izpustov, zagotavljanjem stabilne in konkurenčne oskrbe z električno energijo.

Za uporabljen metodološki pristop smo želeli zagotoviti čim boljšo reprezentativnost raziskave. Kljub vsemu se zavedamo določene stopnje negotovosti, na katero bi lahko vplival izbor in obseg sodelujočih zunanjih deležnikov. Nadaljnje raziskave je smiselno usmeriti še na proučevanje drugih dejavnikov, ki vplivajo na sprejemljivost jedrske elektrarne in kakovostno sobivanje.

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Milan Simončič je diplomiral na Fakulteti za kemijo in kemijsko tehnologijo v Mariboru. Z disertacijo »Model vključevanja zunanjih deležnikov v izvajanje družbeno odgovornih načel jedrskih elektrarn«, ki jo je v letu 2018 zagovarjal na Fakulteti za organizacijske študije v Novem mestu, je pridobil naziv doktorja znanosti s področja menedžmenta kakovosti. Kot vodilni inženir analitične kemije in radiokemije je zaposlen v Nuklearni elektrarni Krško. Objavil je več strokovnih člankov. Aktivno deluje v strokovnih forumih, v domačih in mednarodnih organizacijah - predvsem na področju omejevanja degradacijskih mehanizmov v jedrskih elektrarnah, upravljanja sistemov kakovosti – predvsem implementacije standarda SIST ISO/IEC 17025, odličnosti ter koncepta družbene odgovornosti.

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Abstract:
The influence of the distance of residence to the trust in nuclear power plant

Purpose and Originality: We are studying trust of external stakeholders in the nuclear facility. We want to prove that the different stakeholders the nuclear facility do not accept in the same way and that the distance of the place of residence has an important influence. According to public information, this is the first such research in Slovenia. It is particularly important because of long-

term commitments to limit greenhouse emissions, ensuring a stable and competitive supply of electricity, where nuclear power plants can make a significant contribution to the solution.

Method: We are studying the function of external stakeholders of nuclear power plant in correlation with confidence, including experience from other countries with nuclear power plants. The web survey includes important Slovene external stakeholders of the Krško nuclear power plant. In the analysis of the collected data we use descriptive and frequency statistics, Mann-Whinteyev and Kruskal-Wallis test.

Results: The results of the research show that confidence in the nuclear object, measured by five variables, is in correlation with the distance from the nuclear power plant. The distance is expressed in two ways: firstly, we are confronting the local community of Posavje (living with the nuclear power plant) with other local communities in Slovenia, and secondly, for six different groups of external stakeholders we take into account the actual distance of the residence from the nuclear facility. Trust in a nuclear facility is greater for residents living closer to the nuclear power plant. In the case of placement of a new nuclear power plant, the stakeholders in Posavje will be more inclined to make such a decision, while the non-negligible share of the participants has no opinion on this.

Society: Proven facts will nuclear power plant take into account in optimization of strategy of involving various groups of external stakeholders. Various stakeholders who influence on the perspective of nuclear energy in Slovenia and influence public opinion will be use the results of the research as the starting point for the realization of their interests.

Limitations / further research: We are aware of certain degree of uncertainty that could be influenced by the extent of the selected sample. Research also makes sense to focus on other factors that influence the confidence of external stakeholders in the nuclear power plant.

Keywords: nuclear power plant, social responsibility, external stakeholders, coexistence, trust.