

CENTRAL-EUROPEAN INTRA-SLAVIC DIPLOMACY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH

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Article analyses the Slavic component in the foreign policy of the four Central European Slavic (CES) countries. The central thesis is that the Slavic component is not (an important) part of those countries' foreign policy; however it is relevant within cultural affairs. The author argues that the CES countries instrumentalise their foreign policy to accomplish their interests within the geographically and culturally close nations. This presumption is verified by the comparative-foreign-policy methodology,² being applied to the structure of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Diplomatic Missions of CES countries. The article reaches two main conclusions; the analysis confirms that Slavism is relevant within cultural affairs only, while the foreign policy of all countries is determined by other variables. The derivation of this hypothesis shows that, because CES countries omit their cultural similarities and therefore are not an incentive for better collaboration in their foreign policy, they lose many opportunities and challenges within the EU, as this weakens their negotiating position.

I INTRODUCTION

The enlargement of the European Union in 2004/2007 was a big achievement for the integration. In discussing which changes were procured with the enlargement, the Slavic dimension is often overlooked. Thus, this article would like to discuss the Slavic component in the enlarged European Union diplomacy, which is of importance because of its historical background and unique status.

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² James N. Rosenau, "Comparing Foreign Policies: Why, What, How," in *Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings, and Methods*, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Sage, 1974).

The historical background of the Slavic component is highlighted in the following two facts: Firstly, most Central and South European Slavic nations were – in the past – part of the common Austro-Hungarian Empire, and these roots strongly influenced the behaviour of Slavic entities including its collapse. Secondly, within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, some ideas of ‘Slavic common ground’ had already been established (like austroslavism, panslavism, etc.) but were partially omitted later on because of the changes in the international community.³ On the other hand, the particularity of the Slavic component can be found in the fact that, before the enlargement, the EU was composed of mostly German and Latin countries, while nowadays, the Slavic component is becoming more important; its importance will rise even further in the future, after the enlargement of the EU to the Western Balkans countries.

This article is not prepared as a complete discussion on Slavic relations within the European Union, but is rather more focused on the diplomacy conducted among the Slavic member states of the EU. I would thus like to explore if ‘Slavic consciousness’ really exists or if it is more a residue of the past and is primarily based on national cooperation, dating back to the 19th century. I argue that the ‘Slavic’ group exists more or less when cultural affairs are being discussed, while in other fields (e.g., economics/political affairs/foreign policy interests, etc.) this group is considered more heterogonous than homogenous. I further argue that similar languages partially do influence inter-state relations, but they are not the key determinants when deciding how to conduct national foreign policy.⁴

My analysis builds on two interrelated pillars of the foreign policy structure of Slavic countries in the EU (hereafter CES countries). Firstly, I will analyse the organogrammes and key documents of all four Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA), with the intention of finding out whether there are some special connotations linked to the argument of Slavism or Slavic roots.⁵ Secondly, I will analyse the structure of representative bodies (embassies) within the

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³ These changes occurred after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, when some Slavic entities became independent (Czechs and Slovaks, Poles), while other (Slovenians, Croatians etc.) merged together in a new state. At this stage, the important role of Russia in the process of creating Slavic consciousness should not be omitted. After the revolution in 1917, Russia was no longer capable of leading the process of Slavic integration, since all countries refused to legitimise changes happening in Russia. The result of such developments was the divergence of the ‘Slavic’ element and the convergence towards regional element (for South-Eastern Slavs the ‘jugoslovanisation process’, for Czechs and Slovaks the ‘central-europeanisation process’).

⁴ The president of the Republic of Slovenia prof. dr. Danilo Turk, in his lecture on November 3 2010, envisaged that Slovenia –in conducting its foreign policy – sometimes ‘forget’ its Central-European (and Slavic) part. That is why – according to his opinion – it is relevant to re-evaluate the priorities of the Slovene foreign policy, understanding that Slovenia is a »Central-European Slavic country, belonging also to the Western Balkan and Mediterranean«.

⁵ It will be interesting to look at the structure to find out if maybe some departments or special missions focusing on Slavic countries exist.

group of Slavic countries, focusing on the structure and number of employees in the embassies/institutes/consulates, and so forth. This review will illustrate how 'Slavic' countries are linked through the diplomatic apparatus, and which characteristics of inter-Slavic countries' relations can be traced in the FP structure. The obtained results will enable me to test my hypothesis that Slavism is quite important in cultural as well as language affairs; but in other arenas – especially in FP activities, state policies do not place Slavism as a top priority.

The discussion consists of three parts. The first part follows the introduction and is a short historical overview of Slavism and cooperation among Slavic nations. The second part will present an overview of the basis of the comparative approach, derived from the theory of comparative foreign policy. Finally, the empirical part is based on a comparative approach of MFA and embassies structure of CES countries. In the conclusion, I will summarise the facts and evaluate my presumptions.

2 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SLAVIC COOPERATION

The discussion of Slavism cannot be derived from a discussion of cultural understanding. Etymologically, the word "culture" derives from the Latin word *cultura*, which encompasses activities such as "cultivating, agriculture" (Online Etymology Dictionary). At the time of the Enlightenment (18th century) the word "culture" became associated with *civilisation*, which was understood as a collective process of transition from barbarism.⁶

Compared to the French perception of culture and civilisation (and its political force),⁷ the Germans understood their *Kulturas* behaviour concerning intellectual, religious and art processes.⁸ Such conception of culture was linked to the 'common people,' or the ethnic group. If the French understanding was top-down, where "French was anybody living in France, not concerning its mother tongue," the German perception was derived from the bottom-up process and was generated on the basis of common language or cultural patterns. This type of nation-building process – which was especially developed in the region of Central Europe – was also a generator of instabilities in Europe. The cardinal error of such a concept was exclusivism, deriving from the perception that some nations are more important (because of their history, language, etc.) than others.

⁶ Adam Kuper, *Culture: An Anthropologist Account* (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 2001), 28.

⁷ The French understanding of the term civilisation was defined as *we* (civilised, with political renown and rights) vs. *others* (barbarians, not able to be part of the political decision-making system).

⁸ Ana Podgornik, *Kulturna diplomacija slovenskih držav v Evropski uniji* (Ljubljana: Faculty of social sciences, 2010), 49.

The first ideas of the Slavs 'common ground' were derived from German romantic nationalism⁹ at the end of the 18th century. On one hand, the Napoleonic wars interrupted the process of nation formation for a short time, while on the other hand, the Vienna Congress accelerated the formation of nations within the Austrian Empire on a cultural/ethnic basis, by rebuilding the old governing structure.¹⁰ Changes and revolutions in 1830, and the Spring of Nations in 1848, gave an impetuous to the process of nation formation and Slavic cooperation. According to Grdina,¹¹ the cooperation between Slavic nations was understood as emancipatory, and a step towards establishing its own state. Thus, Slavism was not a goal, but more of a tool to enhance the obtaining of national sovereignty.¹²

Within this framework, the highest level of Slavism was achieved in the Austrian Empire in the second half of the 19th century (known as austroslavism), generated mostly by Czech thinkers and activists. The two founding fathers, Adam František Kollár and Pavel Josef Šafařík, argued that the reinforcement of the Slavic nations relied upon their unity. Therefore, it was necessary to enhance their cultural cooperation, especially through "common reading clubs and [Slavic] bookstores; while at the same time a new – common orthography should be issued."¹³ The Congress of Slavs – drawn from inside and outside of the Austrian Empire – took place in 1848 in Prague and was instituted as a manifest against the rising German nationalism, on one side, and as an empowerment of Slavic rights and requirements within the Austrian Empire. The *Ausgleich* of 1867 was a bitter experience in which everyone soon realised that the Slavic element of the Austrian Empire would not be treated equally compared to the other two. At the same time as austroslavism was developing, a new idea of panslavism became relevant. Compared to austroslavism, panslavism was more politically engaged and advocated that "Slavs should live under the same roof."¹⁴ Even though the official Russian decision-makers were not (officially) in favour of such ideas, they supported this movement financially and politically. The Slavic part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire has always been sceptical of the panslavic

⁹ Rudolf Rucker, *Nationalism and culture* (New York: CFP, 1937), 213.

¹⁰ Gerhard Wagner, "Nationalism and Cultural Memory in Poland. The European Union Turns East," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, 17, 2 (2003), 193.

¹¹ Igor Grdina, "Slovenci in slovanski svet" in *Slovenski diplomati v slovanskem svetu*, ed. Ernest Petrič (Mengeš: CEP, 2010), 14.

¹² The Preamble of the Slovenian Constitution illustrates the spirit/idea of the Slavism as a tool in the following words quite well: »[proceeding from .../.../] the fundamental and permanent right of the Slovene nation to self-determination; and from the historical fact that in a centuries-long struggle for national liberation, we Slovenes have established our national identity and asserted our statehood [.../...] (Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, Preamble, adopted 23. 12. 1991; OG 33/91).

¹³ Ana Podgornik, *Kulturna diplomacija slovanskih držav v Evropski uniji* (Ljubljana: Faculty of social sciences, 2010), 40.

¹⁴ Ibid.

approach, particularly concerning the real intentions of Russia. As a counterpart of the panslavism and *Ausgleich*, the Slavic entity in Austro-Hungarian Empire started a movement known as neoslavism, which aimed to achieve political rights and political equality with other two constitutive elements of the empire. Within this process, several actions took place¹⁵ and the Slavic element became even more recognised and tolerated, while still not fully accepted. Germans were not able to cope with the increasing Slavic cooperation within the Austro-Hungarian Empire and tried to lower the intensity of the cooperation among Slavic entities within and outside the monarchy. The beginning of the 20th century can be summarised as a “fight between Germans and Slavs.”¹⁶

The results of World War I were newly established Slavic countries that withered away the need to enhance the process of Slavic integration. Even though the primary preoccupation of new countries was their political emancipation, Czechoslovakia remained the leading state of intra-Slavic cooperation. Czechoslovak efforts were important especially for emigrants from Russia, Belorussia¹⁷ and Slovenia¹⁸, which was institutionally and politically close to Czech politics.¹⁹ That is why it is possible to say that after the political emancipation of Central-European countries, the Slavism – as a linkage – became obsolete. The other reason why Slavism became irrelevant was the October Revolution in Russia, after which Russia was interested in Slavic cooperation only if this meant the export of the revolution and revolutionary values.

The last attempts to ‘call on common roots’ were three Slavic congresses organised in Russia between August 1941 and May 1943. The main discussion of the congresses was the help of Slavic countries working against German occupation. However, the idea that Russia may be a leader of the Slavic countries after WWII was misleading. At the end of the war, it was clear that the future coupling and cooperation would not be based on national/ethnic roots, but on ideology coherence only. Even though most of the Slavic countries were part of

¹⁵ Irena Gantar–Godina, *Neoslavizem in Slovenci* (Ljubljana: Scientific institute of Philosophical Faculty, 1994).

¹⁶ Ibid. The Centre for the European Perspective (in collaboration with the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) issued a trilingual (Slovene, Czech and Russian) monograph on *Slovene diplomats in the Slavic world* in May 2010. The book can be divided into three parts: the first part is devoted to ‘Slovenians’ operating in tsarist Russia, the second part to Slovene relations with Czechoslovakia, while the third part is just a fragment on Slovene relations with South-Slavic nations. The book is interesting because it describes the ties with Slavic nations and the perception of other Slavic nations from the Slovene perspective, especially from the perspective of selected Slovene diplomats.

¹⁷ Ana Podgornik, *Kulturna diplomacija slovanskih držav v Evropski uniji* (Ljubljana: Faculty of social sciences, 2010), 42–43.

¹⁸ Borut Klabjan, “‘Praški Triglav’, delovanje slovenskih diplomatov v Pragi v času med obema vojnama” in *Slovenski diplomati v slovanskem svetu*, ed. Ernest Petrič (Mengeš: CEP, 2010), 93–117.

¹⁹ E. g. Slovenia (as part of Reign of Serbians, Croats and Slovenians) gave three ambassadors in Prague: Ivan Hribar, Bogumil Vošnjak and Albert Kramer. See Borut Klabjan, “‘Praški Triglav’, delovanje slovenskih diplomatov v Pragi v času med obema vojnama” in *Slovenski diplomati v slovanskem svetu*, ed. Ernest Petrič (Mengeš: CEP, 2010), 97.

the Communist Bloc, cooperation on the Slavic basis was not relevant.

After the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc and changes in the Slavic-state structure, the idea of Slavic roots regained impetus. Consequently, nowadays some projects exist based on the promotion of cultural particularities of Slavic countries. The most well-known among them is the Forum of Slavic Cultures (established in 2004), including all Slavic countries from CE and SEE.²⁰ According to the *Mission*:²¹

The aim of the Forum's action is to preserve and develop cultural values, traditions and contents shared by Slavic-speaking countries. The Forum therefore promotes cooperation among these countries in the cultural, educational and scientific spheres, develops cultural exchanges, organises meetings and provides for designing joint projects.

The confirmation of its focus on Slavic culture can also be found in the next paragraph, where it is written that "responsibilities regarding the organisation and operation of the Forum of Slavic Cultures are held by the Ministry of Culture."²² This partially confirms the hypothesis of this article regarding the relevance of Slavism in cultural affairs, while other fields – like FP, economics, and so on – are not significantly influenced by the Slavic component.

3 COMPARATIVE APPROACH IN FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Foreign policy is certainly one of the most researched concepts in the theory of international relations. This can be attributed to the level FP is defined and its influence on everyday decisions of countries. The classical theory of FP understands it as "an institutionalized process of activities – actions that a particular society organized in a state, carries out into the broader and nearer international environment."²³ These activities are defined by (state) goals and achieved by (available) means/instruments. Depending on these goals, a state envisages a set of foreign policy instruments according to its disposability and suitability; from diplomatic agendas (including propaganda), economics, to military instruments and their combinations,²⁴ as well as culture²⁵ or even

²⁰ It is interesting that Poland and Czech Republic are not full members, but held only an observer status.

²¹ Web page of the Forum of Slavic Cultures; available at <http://www.fsk.si> (January 2011).

²² Ibid. FSK was in years 2004–2006 part of the Ministry of Culture, then between 2006–2009 under the SMFA.

²³ Vladimir Benko, *Znanost o mednarodnih odnosih* (Ljubljana: Faculty of social sciences, 1997), 221, 227.

²⁴ Ibid., 255–283.

²⁵ Christopher Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2003), 152–154.

ideology.²⁶

The theory of FP has passed through three phases, known as Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), which places special emphasis on the decision-making process²⁷ and psychological, situational, political and social context (known as *psychomilieu*),²⁸ while the second generation of FPA uses a comparative tool to understand FP processes.²⁹ The third generation approaches to FP continue with the tradition of decision-making analysis and encompass psychological aspects – for example the so-called game theory. They also add other dimensions such as social and cultural contexts,³⁰ morality³¹ and the role of ethics in the context of the so-called ‘new foreign policy.’

All three generations of FP studies were brought forth along with the concept of comparative analysis of FP (CAFP), which will be used as a primary tool for my research in the next chapter. The first characteristic of CAFPP is that it can be applied simultaneously at several levels of analysis.³² Secondly, it has to be clear which phenomena (taken into account) have to be regarded as dependent and independent variables.³³ The most important methodological aspect of CAFPP is that, besides being *juxtaposed* (only that is not enough), phenomena have to be rendered comparable. A methodology of comparison must be employed if the theoretical questions generated by the adaptive perspective are to be empirically verified.³⁴

Deriving from the logic of Brglez³⁵ and Carlsnaes,³⁶ my research uses the

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²⁶ Robert W. Cox, “Social forces, countries, and world orders: beyond international relations theory,” in *Approaches to World Order*, ed. Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996).

²⁷ Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin (ed.), *Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1962).

²⁸ Harold Hance Sprout and Margaret Tuttle Sprout, *Foundations of International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1962).

²⁹ Valerie M. Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1, 1 (2005), 1–30.

³⁰ Valerie M. Hudson (ed.), *Culture and Foreign Policy* (Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1997).

³¹ Felix E. Oppenheim, *Vloga morale v zunanji politiki* (Ljubljana: Faculty of social sciences, 1998).

³² Valerie M. Hudson and Christopher S. Vore, “Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” *Mershon International Studies Review* 39, 2 (1995), 209ff.

³³ James N. Rosenau, “Comparing Foreign Policies: Why, What, How,” in *Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings, and Methods*, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Sage, 1974), 16.

³⁴ Ibid., 14. Even though Rosenau (“Foreword”) argued that it is important to include all levels of analysis below the nation state when CAFPP is done, in this discussion I – for methodological purposes – remain on the level of a nation state, because I argue that the concept of Slavism can have different (official and unofficial) sources, but for the analysis of the FP behaviour of CEE countries, only official/state actions are relevant.

³⁵ Milan Brglez, *Filozofija družbenih ved v znanosti o mednarodnih odnosih: od kritike političnega realizma h kritičnemu ontološkemu realizmu* (Ljubljana: Faculty of social sciences, 2008), 66.

³⁶ Walter Carlsnaes, “Foreign Policy,” in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2002), 336–341.

structure-agency view on FP and diplomacy. Within the established framework,³⁷ the paper analyses the structural view³⁸ of FP analysis, understanding Slavism, on one hand, as a regulatory institution, while on the other as an instrument for extrapolating international environment limitations' in achieving its own FP goals. Such an approach emphasizes the internal, process-based perspectives, while also maintaining psychological and organizational perspectives of foreign policy decision-making from a view-point of actors included in this process.³⁹

Even though the structural approach will be the main theoretical concept used to study intra-Slavic relations of Central-European Slavic countries (hereafter CES), the analysis of Slavic momentum would be incomplete if the actor-based approach was omitted. This is of extreme importance when a comparative approach is applied to the study of the structures and actions of diplomatic representatives. The diplomatic structure performs a nation's FP goals, though some goals are created by diplomatic mission actions or potentials. In this respect, diplomatic representation is not only a tool, but also a constitutive institution of national interests. Therefore, a comparative aspect of diplomacy of CES countries will be of extreme interest because, if the CAFD is sufficiently elaborated, a comparative approach to diplomacy is not theoretically elaborated. This gap can be attributed to the fact that diplomacy was (and still is) most often understood as a "state of art" and thus not a scientific field. Within this framework, the diplomatic theory was quite often linked to the "practitioners' perspective" instead of being treated equivalently with other social sciences. As exposed by Simoniti,⁴⁰ diplomacy interweaves various scientific fields (within the group of international relations and studies), and that is why its research and *scientification* is deficient.

Therefore, a comparative study of diplomatic structure and activities of intra-Slavic relations will also constitute a methodological apparatus, which will bridge the rationalistic (institutional) perspective⁴¹ and will be closer to the work of Jönsson and Hall,⁴² who elaborate the constitutive character of diplomacy as an institution of international society from three angles, namely communication, representation and re-production of the international community (where the

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³⁷ Milan Brglez, *Filozofija družbenih ved v znanosti o mednarodnih odnosih: od kritike političnega realizma h kritičnemu ontološkemu realizmu* (Ljubljana: Faculty of social sciences, 2008), 68.

³⁸ Walter Carlsnaes, "Foreign Policy" in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2002), 336–337.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Iztok Simoniti, "Diplomacy: methodological perceptions," lecture held at the Faculty of social sciences, 25 October 2010.

⁴¹ Eileen Denza, *Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998). Luke T. Lee, *Consular Law and Practice* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991). B. S. Murty, *The International Law of Diplomacy: The Diplomatic Instrument and World Public Order* (New Haven, CT: New Haven Press, 1989).

⁴² Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2005).

practice of recognition is particularly important).

4 THE 'SLAVIC COMPONENT' IN CENTRAL-EUROPEAN SLAVIC COUNTRIES' FOREIGN POLICY AND DIPLOMACY

The following analysis is derived from the comparative approach when studying different phenomena. This methodological framework will be the basis for analysing two structures: the MFA as a whole and the intra-Slavic embassies and cultural centre structures (e.g., the Slovene embassies in the other three CES countries, etc.). Within this framework, I would like to compare whether there are some similarities in the MFA structure, based on the Slavic element on one hand, while on the other I assume that strong ties among some Slavic nations are also reflected in the structure and size of the diplomatic missions.

The structure of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs

Slovenia

The organogramme of the Slovene Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*hereafter* SMFA) shows a three-level pyramid structure. The Head of the SMFA is the Minister,⁴³ followed by one State secretary. The level below is represented by four Directorates, each headed by a Director General, covering (i) EU Affairs and political bilateral relations, (ii) Global Issues and Multilateral Relations, (iii) Economic Diplomacy and Development Cooperation, (iv) International Law and Consular Affairs; and (v) Secretariat headed by Secretary General. As seen above, none of the elements in the founding structure is oriented towards the Slavic countries. The analysis of the lower level in the diplomatic structure demonstrates that the Slavic element cannot be found. Slavic countries are covered by three sectors – CES countries by the *European Department*, SEE Slavic countries by the *Western Balkans Department*, while Eastern European countries are analysed by the *Department for Eastern Europe and Central Asia*.⁴⁴ Within the *Directorate for Bilateral and EU Relations*, a *Department for International Cultural Relations* exists, but there is no mentioning of the Slavic component within this department. Deriving from this analysis, it is clear that Slovenia does not have a separate strategy towards CES countries, which leads us to the conclusion that the Slavic component within Slovene FP is politically relevant only within the framework of the EU. On the other hand, the tendency towards cultural cooperation

⁴³ In-between the Minister and the State secretary we can find four offices that are responsible directly to the Minister: the Public Relations Office, The Service for Cooperation with the Government and National Assembly, the Internal Audit Service and The Office for Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU).

⁴⁴ I have to mention that Croatia is (as a Slavic country) is part of the Department for the Enlargement Process. See *The organogramme of the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SMFA)*. Available at <http://www.mzz.gov.si> (January 2011).

is very intense.⁴⁵ According to the SMFA's Annual Report,⁴⁶ there was a lot of cultural cooperation in the fields of art, theatre exchange, literary evenings, and various exhibitions. The largest share of cultural exchange occurred between Slovenia and the Czech Republic, followed by Slovakia. One of the most important aspects of cultural cooperation is the lectureship of the Slovene language in CES universities (and vice versa).

Czech Republic

The Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs (CMFA) has a similar structure to the SMFA. The Head of the Ministry is the Minister, followed by one *First Deputy Minister* and two more *Deputy Ministers*.⁴⁷ The *First Deputy Minister* is responsible for FP as a whole, while one of the *Deputy Ministers* covers only European Union and Bilateral Relations with European Countries. The level below the Deputy Ministers is composed of five major (substantive) Directorates led by Director Generals,⁴⁸ while the *Directorate for Security and Multilateral Issues* is headed by the Political Director.⁴⁹ Relations with Slavic countries are divided into three departments within the CMFA: a) the Central Europe Department (e.g., Slovakia, Poland, Slovenia, etc.), b) the North and East Europe Department (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus), and the c) South Eastern Europe Department (Western Balkans' Countries + Cyprus, Greece and Turkey). Important parts of the promotion of the Czech Republic are the Czech Centres, which are stationed under the section titled, Directorate for Economic Cooperation and Promotion Abroad. According to the Czech Centre's web page, the "main responsibility [of the Czech Centres] is the promotion of the Czech Republic in the areas of culture, tourism and trade, as well as the provision of information about the Czech Republic."⁵⁰ Even though Czech Centres are not only oriented specifically towards Slavic countries, it is illustrative to find out that Czech R. has 25 centres, one-third of which are in Slavic countries, and seven in neighbouring countries.

The Annual Report of the CMFA⁵¹ declares that "the relations with central European countries continued to be one of the priorities of Czech foreign policy in 2009." Further on, the report enumerates all achievements of Czech R. FP, with a special emphasis on "Czech-Polish cooperation in strategic areas and issues of Eastern Europe (*Eastern Partnership*)," "Slovak partnership and alliance"

⁴⁵ *The Annual Report of the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SMFA)*. Available at <http://www.mzz.gov.si> (January 2011).

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 54–56; 85; 89–90.

⁴⁷ *Annual Report of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs (CMFA)*. Available at <http://www.mzv.cz> (January 2011).

⁴⁸ The two operative Directorates are: The Information Section and the Logistic Section.

⁴⁹ The interesting thing is that the CFSP in CMFA is stationed within this Directorate, while in Slovenia, it is part of the Minister's Cabinet. In Slovakia, the CFSP is part of the Political Directorate.

⁵⁰ *Czech Centres*. Available at <http://www.czechcentres.cz/prague/stranka.asp?ID=3740&menu=9627>.

⁵¹ *The Annual Report of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs (CMFA)*. Available at <http://www.mzv.cz> (January 2011), 233–234.

and Slovene-Czech relations “remaining at the traditional very high level.”⁵² The deeper analysis of CES relations shows that the highest level of political cooperation with Czechs was operated by Slovakia, followed by Poland and Slovenia;⁵³ however, relative to its size, Slovenia was the most engaged in cultural affairs with the Czech Republic, followed by Poland and Slovakia.

Slovakia

The structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia (SkMFA) is less complex than the CMFA and similar to the SMFA.⁵⁴ On top is the Minister, supported by two Secretaries of state, with completely separated fields of work.⁵⁵ The operative body of the SkMFA is composed of nine Directorates and 38 departments. Slavic countries are covered by three departments:

1. the Central and Northern Europe Department (CES countries), which is within the Directorate for European Affairs;
2. the Eastern Europe /.../ Department (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine);
3. the Southeast Europe Department.

The Eastern and Southeast Europe departments belong to the Political Directorate (next to CFSP and Security Policy Department).

Based on the structure of the SkMFA, it seems that the CES countries receive no special attention. However, deeper research into the SkMFA web page shows that the Slavic component is partially encompassed within the Visegrad Group (V4), which is composed of three Slavic countries (Slovakia, Czech R. and Poland) and Hungary. The V4 closely cooperates with other countries and regional bodies (e. g. Benelux), among which are Slovenia and Austria, as a part of the ‘regional partnership.’ The role of Slovakia within the V4 Group is as a concordant with basic Slovak FP priorities, focusing mostly on regional and transatlantic cooperation.⁵⁶ According to the *Report on Foreign Policy Activities*,⁵⁷ Slovakia tends to “reinforce neighbourly relations and enhance cooperation with countries in the region.” Thus, Slovak FP is, similar to the Czech R., oriented mostly towards regional initiatives and based mostly on strengthening regional potential and cooperation. Therefore, the Slavic component is linked to geo-

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⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ 2009 was a time resolving the case of maritime border dispute under the Czech Presidency (to the Council of the EU).

⁵⁴ This structure was valid before the last elections were held on June 12th 2010. According to the SkMFA web page, there is now only one Secretary of State. Unfortunately, the new organogramme of the SkMFA is still not available.

⁵⁵ One state secretary is entitled to head European Affairs, Economic Relations, Migration, Public Diplomacy and Consular Services, while the other State Secretary coordinates the Bilateral relations (of non-EU countries), Security Policy, Human Rights, CFSP and the UN.

⁵⁶ *Annual Report of the Slovakian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009 (SkMFA)*. Available at <http://www.mzv.sk> (January 2011). *Orientation of the Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic (SkMFA)*. Available at <http://www.mzv.sk> (January 2011).

⁵⁷ Ibid., 28ff.

graphical proximity. If Slavic countries are not part of the (narrowly understood) region (e. g. Slovenia), they present the third circle⁵⁸ in the Slovakian FP. This is also confirmed by the *Orientation of the Foreign Policy* of Slovak Republic,⁵⁹ where it is written that,

/.../ Besides strengthening its integration links, Slovakia will develop bilateral cooperation with its key partners – NATO and EU allies, neighbouring countries, Russia, other countries of eastern Europe, countries of the Western Balkans, Japan, the People's Republic of China, South Korea, India, and other countries of the world. /.../ Slovakia will place emphasis on intensifying its economic relations with the aim of fostering domestic employment and export, strengthening the existing basis for long-term economic, investment, security, cultural, scientific and educational cooperation (underlined – B. U.).

Another confirmation of the absence of the Slavic component within the Slovak FP can be found in the Manifesto of the Slovak Government 2010–2014, where it is written that, [the Government] will maintain traditional, historically-formed privileged relations with the Czech Republic, expand relations with Poland, transcend the regional dimension, and relations with Austria, and improve relations with the Republic of Hungary. In the latest document, Slovenia (as a CES country) is not even mentioned. Both quoted fragments confirm my thesis regarding the circles in Slovak FP, within which Slavism is not an important issue.

Poland

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland (PMFA) was structured somewhat differently compared to the above mentioned ministries. The Head of the PMFA is the Minister, while the lower level lacks the composition described in the previously mentioned countries – such positions as Secretaries of state (or Deputy Ministers in the Czech R.). Rather, the PMFA is divided into six Directorates, followed by seven Secretaries of state, and one General Director. The latter primarily covers operational and logistic tasks.⁶⁰ However, the new structure – from September 2010⁶¹ – includes two Secretaries of state, five under-secretaries and one Director-General.⁶² These coordinate 24 departments and 11 bureaus and some other offices. The two secretaries cover different fields within PMFA: one is entitled to cover EU and economic affairs, while the other covers cultural,

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⁵⁸ The first circle is the regional cooperation, while the second circle denotes European and Transatlantic relations.

⁵⁹ *Orientation of the Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic (SkMFA)*. Available at <http://www.mzv.sk> (January 2011), 4.

⁶⁰ *Web page of the Polish MFA*, available at <http://www.msz.gov.pl> (January 2011).

⁶¹ The new structure is not reflected in the organogramme available at the webpage. However, I have found a different information on the PMFA structure under the category *Scopes*, of responsibilities of secretaries of state and under-secretaries of state at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and I will – in the following elaboration – use this document.

⁶² *Scopes of responsibilities of secretaries of state and under-secretaries of state at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Web page of the Polish MFA*, available at <http://www.msz.gov.pl> (January 2011).

educational, financial and social affairs with the FP; one of his key responsibilities are issues relative to the Polish Diaspora.⁶³

Within the PMFA, all CES countries are included in the European Policy Department, which became a single actor after the merger of two departments: the *Department of Central and Southern Europe and the Department of Western and Northern Europe*. This department “coordinates bilateral cooperation of the Republic of Poland with the European countries /.../ and deals with the issues of EU expansion and neighbourhood policy.”⁶⁴ However, when discussing the Slavic component of Poland, the activities of the *Department of Public and Cultural Diplomacy* and the *Department of Cooperation with Polish Diaspora* should not be overlooked. According to the description, both departments are entitled to “promote Polish culture, science and tourism.” Although Poland has formidable support of internal (PMFA) and external (Polish Centres) institutions, its cultural diplomacy is not strictly linked to the common ground of Slavism. Poland also promotes its culture through Polish institutes, which are located in various countries. On December 1, 2010 Poland had 20 Polish Institutes, 6 in Slavic countries – one in the Czech R. and one in Slovakia.⁶⁵

The analysis of the available documents and statements reveals that the Slavic component is important when Poland presents its culture abroad, but is not used as a linkage to enhance cooperation (within the cultural, political or economic fields) with other CES countries. Poland, as a middle-power state⁶⁶ – which could be a leader of intra-Slavic cooperation – builds its FP goals, as do other Slavic countries, outside the sphere of Slavism. Similarly to other CES countries, Poland tends to position itself within its regional interests, basing its FP on *high-policy* determinants.

*The size and structure of the national representation in CES countries*⁶⁷

In this part of the discussion, I would like to discuss the size and structure of the diplomatic and ‘other representative bodies’ abroad. Being aware that this division is sometimes superficial, I argue that, for the purpose of this article, it is necessary to divide the ‘official’ – classical representation, dealing mostly with *high politics*, from ‘official’ – neo-structures, dealing mostly with the activities of *low politics*. That is why I divide the analysis of CES countries’ activities into

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⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Poland has stationed its institutes in all neighbouring countries, in some EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom), Colombia, Israel and the United Countries of America.

⁶⁶ Sabina Kajnc, *Srednje velike države v Evropi: iskanje paradigme na primerih Poljske in Španije* (Ljubljana: Faculty of social sciences, 2001).

⁶⁷ All data was collected on the December 1st 2010 from the official web pages.

(a) activities/structure of embassies and (b) structure and activities of cultural centres/institutions.

The size and the structure of diplomatic missions

It is arguable whether the size of diplomatic missions reflects the extensiveness of relations among nations.⁶⁸ In classical diplomacy, the size of the mission also shows the importance of establishing good diplomatic relations with a country. Nowadays, the situation seems to be changed, especially as countries – parallel with classical (residential) diplomatic missions – coordinate their diplomacy through different activities (within modern conference and summit diplomacy; personal diplomacy, etc.) and means (e.g., *ad hoc* envoys, etc.). However, the complexity of modern diplomacy calls for strong (and permanent) diplomatic missions, which should be able to analyse the applied phenomena in the international community and conduct their functions, according to Article 3 of the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations (VCDR).

Next to its size, the structure of permanent diplomatic representations (hereafter embassies) illustrates the FP concept of a state conducting diplomatic relations with other countries. Thus, a big economic department in an embassy would suggest that one country is interested in economic cooperation with another country, while conversely an absence of an economic department within an embassy would be a signal that a state has other (non-economic) interests and preferences. However, the structure of the permanent diplomatic representation should not be understood in absolute terms, but rather in relative terms, comparable to other diplomatic representations of the same state.⁶⁹ The relative comparative approach allows for the possibility to compare (coherently) different facts. Within this methodological approach, I have prepared Table 1,⁷⁰ which presents data based on: (i) the acting head in a permanent diplomatic

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⁶⁸ I argue that there is a difference between the absolute size, which encompasses all characteristics of the diplomatic mission; and the relative size of the mission, which is defined in a comparative way with other diplomatic representations.

⁶⁹ The comparison of permanent diplomatic representations in an absolute term would compare »pears with apples«, because it is impossible to compare an embassy of a large state (like USA) with an embassy of a small state (like Iceland). Firstly, small state – because of its size – encounters inward limitation in its cadre policy (the pool for best cadre selection is much smaller comparing to the large country's one). Secondly, the financial funding for diplomatic activities of a small state is more constrained than the funding for diplomatic activities from the large state. Thirdly, the small state, because of its inner limitations, establishes its embassies only in a limited number of countries, while a large state has much more possibilities and capabilities to have their representations worldwide. The comparison on relative terms means that it is necessary to compare similar activities and structures, therefore comparable facts should be presented as similar (e. g. the comparison on absolute terms of employees in embassies shows us nothing, while the share of (total) employees in an embassy is a comparable variable).

⁷⁰ For the theoretical background and importance of the size of a diplomatic mission see Milan Jazbec, *The diplomacies of new small states: the case of Slovenia with some comparison from the Baltic* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 166ff.

mission;⁷¹ (ii) how many members of the diplomatic staff are employed within the embassy and (iii) which departments constitute an embassy.

TABLE 1: BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PERMANENT DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS OF CES COUNTRIES

		Czech R.	Poland	Slovenia	Slovakia
Czech R.	Acting head	*	ambassador	ambassador	ambassador
	Members	*	10+1	6+1	19+1
	Departments	*	5	2	6
Poland	Acting head	ambassador	*	chargé d'affaires a. i. (f)	ambassador
	Members	n. a.	*	9+1	10+1
	Departments	3	*	2	4
Slovenia	Acting head	chargé d'affaires a. i.	ambassador	*	ambassador
	Members	4+1	5+1	*	3
	Departments	4	3	*	2 ⁷²
Slovakia	Acting head	ambassador	chargé d'affaires a.i.	ambassador (f)	*
	Members	11+1	5+1	4+1	*
	Departments	4	5	2	*

Source: Own elaboration on the data available at the CMFA, PMFA, SMFA and SkMFA (2010).

According to the available data, the acting heads of three embassies (out of 12) are now chargé d'affaires *ad interim*; only two acting heads are women, both in Slovenia – the Polish chargé d'affaires *ad interim* and the Slovak ambassador. The size of embassies is quite equal, ranging from 6 to 10 diplomatic staff. However, the largest embassy is the Czech embassy in Slovakia, followed by the Slovak embassy in Czech R., both having employed more than 10 members of the diplomatic staff. The comparison of the established departments blurs the real picture, because in some cases there are 4 departments with 10 employees (like the Polish embassy in Bratislava), while on the other hand, 19 employees are spread through 6 departments (e. g. Czech R. in Slovakia).

Further research is needed to explore the inner structure of an embassy. Here I would like to find out if there are some similarities/differences between embassies in regard to their inner structure. I presume that all embassies divide their work into three departments: political (including military and police

⁷¹ The definition of the *terminus technicus* is from the Article 1, paragraph (d) from the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations.

⁷² The economic department is covered non-residentially from Prague.

attaches), economic and consular. Although all countries are EU members, it will be interesting to find out whether other departments exist. For the purpose of this analysis I mark the political, economic and consular departments as 'classical,' other departments (cultural, etc.) as 'modern' (Table 2).

TABLE 2: THE STRUCTURE OF THE EMBASSIES

		Czech R.	Poland	Slovenia	Slovakia
Czech R.	Classical	*	Y	Y	Y
	Modern	*	N	N	N
Poland	Classical	Y	*	Y	Y
	Modern	N	*	N	N
Slovenia	Classical	Y	Y	*	Y
	Modern	N	N	*	N
Slovakia	Classical	Y	Y	Y	*
	Modern	N	N	N	*

Source: Own elaboration on the data available at the CMFA, PMFA, SMFA and SkMFA (2010).
Legend: Y= Yes, N=No

An overview of Table 2 illustrates that the inward structure of embassies still focuses on a classical approach to diplomacy. The embassies are entitled to perform classical diplomatic activities, while 'modern' diplomatic means (like cultural diplomacy etc.), are carried out outside the formal diplomatic apparatus, particularly within the so-called centres or institutes.⁷³

(National) Centres/Institutes

As previously explained, the cultural dimension of CES countries is not covered by the classical diplomacy establishment, but rather by the modern approach in promoting inter-cultural relations, known as cultural centres/institutes. However, these centres should not be understood as a place where cultures meet, but rather as a public (and cultural) diplomacy tool for promoting the national culture. I will test my presumption on these centres by analysing the tasks and aims of cultural centres of CES countries (Table 3).

TABLE 3: PRESENCE/ABSENCE OF CULTURAL CENTRES/INSTITUTES

	Czech R.	Poland	Slovenia	Slovakia
Czech R.	*	Y	N	Y (Bratislava, Košice)
Poland	Y	*	N	Y

⁷³ In order not to be misleading, I have to point out that there are some employees within the embassies entitled to carry out 'modern' diplomatic activities, but there is not a section devoted to this field.

Slovenia	N	N	*	N
Slovakia	Y	Y	N	*

Source: Own elaboration on the data available at the CMFA, PMFA, SMFA and SkMFA (2010).
Legend: Y= Yes, N=No.

As seen in Table 3, only Slovenia has no cultural centre abroad for the promotion of its own culture. It can be said that this absence is partially covered by the lectureships of the Slovene language in all CES capitals,⁷⁴ but such explanation seems more as an excuse than a real fact, especially if we take into consideration that other CES nations also have their lectureships in Slovenia.⁷⁵

The aims of national cultural centres/institutes can be summarised in the following two points:

- A national cultural institute has to promote the national culture of the sender state in the receiving state.
- The national cultural institute ought to – through bilateral cooperation – promote, strengthen and facilitate bilateral cultural, political and economic relations.

Nevertheless, whichever point is taken into account, it is clear that national centres are not established to find common ground among Slavic countries. Their functions can be summarised as promoting national interest on a unilateral or bilateral basis, as opposed to a multilateral basis. The concept of national interests is narrower than the idea of the 'common ground' – and how I argued that Slavism should be understood – which leads to the conclusion that the current politics and relations among CES countries derive from different grounds, and that Slavism is not an important issue in constituting national FP. Thus, I argue that the idea of 'common interests' within Slavic countries does not exist and that coalitions or co-operations are not based on historical roots, but more on practical – everyday interests, which determine the behaviour of the analysed countries.

All above mentioned facts confirm my reluctance concerning the existence of the common "Slavic component" as a driving-force for close cooperation among CES countries. The acknowledgement that Slavism is *passé* and that its relevance in the today's world is obsolete creates a strong framework for preparing a national thesis and positions within the European Union.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Chairs of Slovene language exist on Prague Charles University and Masaryk's University in Brno; there are lectureships in Poland in Krakow, Warsaw, Katowice, Lodz etc., and in Bratislava (Slovakia).

⁷⁵ This question is of great risk and should be addressed by the decision-makers on the status of Slovene cultural diplomacy as a whole.

⁷⁶ Bernardette Andreosso-O'Callaghan, *The Economics of European Agriculture* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 177–190.

5 CONCLUSION

The article was designed as an analysis of the intra-Slavic relations of CES countries in the enlarged EU. The purpose of the article was to prove how Slavism – as a cultural component – is present in the strategies and activities of CES countries. My presumption was that, after the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the following political emancipation of all four CES nations, the Slavic component, which was tying Slavic peoples together during times of the emergence of national identities, vanished because there was no need for its reproduction. Even though the newly-established countries were not all nations (e.g., Czech and Slovaks established Czechoslovakia; Slovenes became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later Yugoslavia) the influence of a historical moment alleviated the cultural ties from the past. Such spirit elapsed in terms of enhancing inter-Slavic cooperation, and the common cultural ground of Slavic countries was replaced by other (especially political) interests within the region.

In the time of the bipolar system, established after WWII, the idea of cultural common ground of Slavic countries was replaced by the communist ideology. Thus, Slavism and cultural similarities were not an important factor in developing inter-state relations.

After the dissolution of the communist system, the idea of EU membership replaced the ideological factor. Within this concept, Slavic countries had the possibility to strengthen their position in negotiating with the EU, but this did not happen. The European institutions conducted the negotiation process with each state separately, and the newcomers accepted such treatment; a similar approach was introduced within the CAP, in which countries were given asymmetrical relieves.⁷⁷ This structural gap of giving priority to national interests, instead of common interests, demonstrates that all new member countries were in a worse position than its predecessors.

The analysis in this discussion proves that CES countries ground their FP goals on regional concepts and on the basis that 'speaking a common language and tracing some cultural similarities' do not play a larger part in the formulation of their FP goals.⁷⁸ Thus, the 'Slavic consciousness' exists only within national culture patterns, but even this is strongly influenced by regional components (*cf. supra*). The 'leftover' of such FP constitution is that the component of Slavism becomes obsolete and relevant only when Slavic countries want to differentiate themselves from other national groups (like Germanic, Latin etc.). Within this

⁷⁷ Jerzy Wilkin, *Agriculture in new Member States – expectations and lessons learned* (Budapest: Corvinus University), 6–8 September 2007.

⁷⁸ Therefore, the realisation of these countries FP goals can be summarised in the three-circle method, where the first circle presents the bordering countries, having a large impact on nation own FP, which is followed by strategic partners (circle 2) and then by other countries (circle 3).

notion, it seems that the 'Slavic' common identity is a spent concept, non-attractive and irrelevant in modern times. As explained by Wilkin and Andreosso-O'Callaghan,⁷⁹ the CES countries lost quite a few possibilities in the EU accession process because they acted as free riders and have not harmonised their strategy. The enlarged EU offers lots of possibilities to the newcomers, which should be caught and used. Maybe the revival of the 'Slavic' common ground can be an effective means of accelerating cooperation among CES countries, especially as the next big enlargement will likely be in the Western Balkans region. If history is *Magistra vitae*, then it is necessary to learn from the past. One hundred years ago, Slavism was the first step to the political emancipation of CES countries within the Austro-Hungarian Empire; nowadays, maybe this should be applied to achieve common interests in the enlarged EU.

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⁷⁹ Ibid.

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