

Anthropos

*Revija za filozofijo
in psihologijo*
*Journal of Philosophy
& Psychology*

LETO • YEAR 2024
LETNIK • VOLUME 56
ŠTEVILKA • NUMBER 2
ISSN 0587-5161
E-ISSN 2630-4082

56

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Revija za filozofijo in psihologijo
Journal of Philosophy & Psychology

ISSN 0587-5161 | E-ISSN 2630-4082
<https://hippocampus.si/issn/2630-4082>

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Guidelines for Authors and Publishing Ethics
and Malpractice Statement are available at
<https://hippocampus.si/issn/2630-4082>

Uredništvo *Editorial Office*

UP Pedagoška fakulteta, Cankarjeva 5,
SI-6000 Koper

Založba Univerze na Primorskem

University of Primorska Press

Titov trg 4, SI-6000 Koper
<https://hippocampus.si>

Lektoriranje slovenskih besedil

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Tisk · Grafika 3000

Naklada · 150 izvodov

Letna naročnina · 20 EUR

Revijo *Anthropos* izdajata Slovensko
filozofsko društvo in Društvo psihologov
Slovenije, izhaja s podporo Javne agencije
za znanstvenoraziskovalno in inovacijsko
dejavnost Republike Slovenije in Pedagoške
fakultete Univerze na Primorskem.

Anthropos is published by the Slovenian
Philosophical Society and Slovenian
Psychologists' Association with the support
of the Slovene Research and Innovation
Agency and University of Primorska,
Faculty of Education.

Kazalo Contents

On the Necessity of Teaching Philosophy

Tomaž Grušovnik · 251

Mesto filozofije v kurikulumu

The Place of Philosophy in the Curriculum

Philosophy in Education: A Namibian Pursuit of a Liberative Pedagogy

Basilius M. Kasera, Mirjam Sheyapo, and Penehafo Henok · 257

Teaching How to Think: The Philosophical Foundations of the School Subject 'The World and I'

Bruno Ćurko · 273

Integration of the Bharatiya Knowledge System (BKS) for Holistic Development as Envisaged in National Education Policy 2020: A Theoretical Analysis

Alok Gardia, Jagriti Singha, and Deepa Mehta · 293

Logiške in znanstvenoteoretične raziskave

Investigations in Logics and Theory of Science

Epistemologija vrlin in Nezemljani

Danilo Šuster · 317

Kako izključujemo ali vključujemo druge? Logično-filozofska analiza

Borut Cerkovnik · 341

Med antropocentrizmom in antropomorfizmom:

primer Fermijevega paradoksa

Sebastijan Pešec · 359

Živali Animals

Looking into the Face of an Animal As a Mirror: The Case Study of Marina Abramović's Gaze into the Donkey's Eyes/Face

Suzana Marjanić · 391

Psihologija Psychology

Vloga potrebe po stalni dosegljivosti na spletnih socialnih omrežjih pri napovedovanju stresa in psihološkega blagostanja

Ana Milošič, Nejc Plohl in Bojan Musil · 415

Miscellanea

Interview | 'Every Living Thing Has a Soul' – Radical Peace,
Liberation Struggles and Nonviolence: An Interview
with Purushottama Bilimoria

Katja Utroša · 447

Book Review | Shannon Vallor, *The AI Mirror: How to Reclaim
Our Humanity in an Age of Machine Thinking*

Tomislav Furlanis · 461

Recenzija | Andrej Ule, *O naravi duha*

Timotej Prosen · 467

Book Review | Arie Kizel, *Enabling Students' Voices and Identities:
Philosophical Inquiry in a Time of Discord*

Nava Bar · 475

On the Necessity of Teaching Philosophy

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Philosophy is always at the crossroads of thought, and its role is often questioned. In ancient Greece we already read reports of people being sceptical about the business of philosophers: just think of the famous anecdote of Thales' olive presses and of Callicles' appearance in Plato's *Gorgias*. Even in Buddhism, the usefulness of philosophical reflection is often questioned. In modern and postmodern times, however, the role of philosophy in school curricula has become even more controversial, mainly because in the nineteenth century many sciences that were usually considered 'philosophy' (such as physics, biology, psychology, or sociology) branched off from the love of wisdom and became sciences in their own right, mostly based on empirical methodology. The nominal scope of philosophy thus became smaller and smaller, and the increasing pressure on schools from market societies has questioned the existence of purely theoretical forms of knowledge. Indeed, the pressure is sometimes so great that philosophy does not appear as a compulsory subject in many schools in many countries. In fact, UNESCO felt the need to establish a special day – UNESCO World Philosophy Day – to highlight the importance of philosophy for the development of human thought and democracy.

But what are the concrete uses of philosophy in a school curriculum, and why should it not be reserved for elite thinkers? Unfortunately, this is often the view of many people, even intellectuals. Recently I was approached by a full professor of economics who tried to persuade me that philosophy is 'not for the masses' and that it makes sense to study philosophy only in highly specialized environments, such as academies of science and art. I, of course, vehemently disagreed, pointing out that there are at least two ways to think about philosophy today: we can think of it as an academic discipline that develops like any other science, or we can think

of it as a conceptual toolkit that enables us to be better citizens, more responsible in social and political contexts, as well as flourishing individuals in private life. In the first sense, philosophy should definitely be cultivated in specialized institutions, but in the second sense it should be our second nature; thus philosophy is not optional, but obligatory for every human being. Indeed, as I often say, we are all philosophers, since being human means having questions about the meaning of life, the nature of the universe, and so on. But in fact, we are rarely good philosophers unless we dedicate part of our lives to philosophy. So our task is not just to become philosophers, because that is what we are by nature; our task is to become good philosophers, and we can only do that in dialogue with others and with the tradition.

Let us return to the question of the use of philosophy and, consequently, the reasons why it is a compulsory subject in schools. One of these reasons is purely instrumental, and therefore favoured even by market economies. It is called 'critical and creative thinking.' By doing philosophy, we begin to observe ourselves, our beliefs, and thus our world, in a different way. Philosophy teaches us to examine our opinions in a way that makes them stronger and truer. In this sense, philosophical practice is not unlike the general scientific method, which tries to get us closer to the truth and helps us to get better at reading and understanding mathematical concepts.

But this instrumentalist understanding of the role of philosophy is also problematic, for two reasons. The first is that it is not clear why we should impose philosophy on students. After all, do not mathematics and language contribute to mathematical and general literacy just as successfully, if not more so, than philosophy? The second problem has to do with the nature of instrumentalist thinking as such. If philosophy is to be worthy of its name, it must also be critical of instrumentalist approaches, not just try to develop them. To be 'instrumental' is in fact ambiguous, despite today's urge to be 'useful.' For in order to understand the value of the tool, one must first observe and evaluate the value of the goal that the tool seeks to achieve. In fact, something may be very useful for a particular activity, but that activity itself may be problematic. Consider, for example, the use of chemicals in food production.

Thus, what some advocates of philosophy point to is the emancipatory potential that seems to be unique to philosophical thought. Philosophy should not only enable students to survive in the job market, but also to become free subjects. But in order to do this, individuals must be able to

go beyond mere instrumentalist thinking and become critical of social institutions as such. In fact, as Richard Rorty used to say, philosophy is not so much an attempt to solve puzzles as it is an attempt to dissolve them, to understand the concepts and frameworks that give rise to the problems and thus to evaluate their meaning. More specifically, what is often needed for social progress is a Foucauldian (and Rancièresque) transgression of boundaries, which in the first place exposes them. In this sense, the practice of philosophy is crucial for any democratic society, and when we talk about the value and necessity of this subject in the curriculum, we should not overlook this moment.

Because of these complex and pressing issues related to philosophy as a subject in different curricula, the present issue of *Anthropos* is dedicated to reflecting on the role that philosophy can play in schools. More specifically, the issue wants to shed an international, cross-cultural perspective on the subject. Only in this way can the role of teaching philosophy in schools be properly assessed.

Mesto filozofije v kurikulumu
*The Place of Philosophy
in the Curriculum*

Philosophy in Education: A Namibian Pursuit of a Liberative Pedagogy

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Abstract. Education and philosophy are intricately intertwined. Yet philosophy, as a subject, does not feature in education training. Although teachers are expected to embrace the role and task of pedagogues, they often lack the skill to shape thinking, thus perpetuating mindlessness. As such, teacher training institutions are rapidly and ferociously focusing on new techniques and methodologies, but rarely asking whether any of these are needed. These teacher training institutions, driven by a practical end, to supply a workforce for the market, risk producing non-reflective practitioners. This paper argues that incorporating philosophy in the training of teachers is important to produce educators who are not only practice bound but can also ask the second-order questions and reflect on why they are doing it. As an analytical paper it seeks to explore whether there is anything distinctive about the role of philosophy in education, particularly in Namibian teacher training. It engages a liberative pedagogical approach which argues that a post-apartheid society needs to intentionally think about the kind of education it seeks to provide.

Key Words: philosophy, education, teacher training, liberative pedagogy, Namibia

Filozofija v vzgoji in izobraževanju: namibijsko iskanje pedagogike osvoboditve

Povzetek. Izobraževanje je globoko filozofsko prizadevanje, čeprav filozofija kot predmet v njem ni prisotna. Čeprav se od učiteljev pričä-

kuje, da bodo prevzeli vlogo in nalogo pedagogov, jim pogosto primanjkuje spretnosti za negovanje mišljenja, s čemer se ohranja brezbržnost. Tako se šole za učitelje nereflektirano osredotočajo na nove tehnike in metodologije, a si pri tem le redko zastavijo vprašanje, ali so te sploh potrebne. Šole za učitelje, ki jih vodi praktični cilj, tj. zagotoviti delovno silo za trg, tvegajo, da bodo izobraževale nereflektirane strokovnjake. V tem prispevku trdimo, da je vključitev filozofije v usposabljanje učiteljev pomembna, saj lahko le tako izoblikujemo učitelje, ki niso le vezani na prakso, temveč znajo postavljati vprašanja drugega reda in razmišljati o tem, zakaj to počnejo. Pričujoči analitičen članek skuša raziskati, ali je vloga filozofije v izobraževanju, zlasti pri usposabljanju učiteljev, nenadomestljiva. Naslanja se na pristop pedagogike osvoboditve, ki trdi, da mora družba po apartheidu načrtno razmišljati o tipu izobraževanja, ki ga želi zagotoviti.

Ključne besede: filozofija, izobraževanje, usposabljanje učiteljev, pedagogika osvoboditve, Namibija

Introduction

Philosophy is a second-order exercise, implying that it concerns itself with fundamental aspects of things. We are not just involved in the exercise of describing things as they are but also question *what* and *why* they are. For example, in order for education to become an exercise of enquiry, we need to first ask, *what is education?* A question of definition is essential in placing ourselves to understand our task. Education in the context of this paper refers to an institutional exercise of formal schooling. When the sought-after object is clear in the mind of the enquirer, only then can there be a cultivation of practices that will aid in attaining the purpose of education. Philosophy can provide this necessary aid for both educators and students to intelligently evaluate the ends of education. When education can be adequately defined, only then can 'educators think meaningfully about the total educational and life process so that they will be in a better position to develop a consistent and comprehensive program that will assist their students in arriving at the desired goal' (Jarvis 2010, 5).

An unexamined education is not worth pursuing. Education needs to liberate the mind and must expand one's mental horizons. As such it is an exercise of creating and pursuing opportunities and spaces in which truth can be obeyed and practiced (Palmer 1993). However, in a context of disconnect between practice and critical thinking, truth seeking can be sacrificed. The training of teachers is an exercise of preparing generations that will build societies. Society building is a strenuously reflective exer-

cise which requires deep kinship with wisdom. Only then can education be a liberative exercise.

If education ought to be liberative then the role of philosophy is of utmost importance. First, to help educators have a better understanding of the problems of education. Second, to better evaluate the solutions to stated problems. Third, to elucidate the goals of education in the building of society. Lastly, to help develop teachers who have a coherent perspective and can influence a generation of learners who can be reflective makers of society. This paper seeks an answer to these aims or to provoke a discussion that will pursue these ends.

Theoretical Framework

This paper employs a liberative pedagogical approach. As such it argues that creating spaces of inquiry that can expand the mind's horizon is essential to education. To have an educational system that is intentional requires that philosophy (as defined below) be incorporated into the curriculum for teacher education. The focus of this paper is the university, which is the training ground of educators. While the discussion borrows and interacts with ideas from everywhere, its primary context is that of Namibia. As such it must be considered a post-apartheid discussion that calls for a philosophy of education that can contribute to the forming of praxis rooted in intelligent, wise and visionary reflection.

What is Philosophy?

Philosophy refers to the activity of pursuing wisdom. However, the literal translation of *philosophia* as *love of wisdom* does not adequately capture the active pursuit and acquisition of wisdom that defines the practice. Siegel (2018) contends that the notion of *love* implies a passive appreciation for wisdom rather than an active pursuit and acquisition of it. However, the belief that philosophy begins in wonder also implies going beyond and above mere appreciation of wisdom. Philosophy encompasses actively seeking and acquiring wisdom – through inquiry, reflection and critical thinking. Philosophy, then, is that which provides the basic tools for reflection and practice (Pritchard 2013).

Philosophy in this paper refers to the reflective activity of knowing what educational outcomes we desire and why we desire them. It is an activity that seeks to use the institution of the university as a place of practice to form educators who will in return form society makers. Johnson and Siegel (2010) speak of teaching thinking skills; philosophy is the

home for growing such an education. Thus, philosophy is not a mere exercise in abstracts but one that aims to address the larger questions of life and our sociality. In this case, education is meant to address the existential needs of humanity. These needs require a means of intelligently evaluating the various alternatives that can bring about the desired goals.

We are particularly thinking of such a use of philosophy in constructing a post-apartheid society. The same could be said for various post-colonial societies. Colonial and apartheid education had the desired goals to train those in the colonies to secure colonial interests and ensure cultural continuation. However, the post-apartheid notion of education is an essential human right. This understanding has implications. The goal is liberative or a continuation of a liberative telos. Philosophy is the activity whereby we question what kind of education we need and why we need it. It helps generate an understanding of pedagogy that will assist in propelling stunted societies.

The apartheid education provided nothing more than a functionalist role. Now Namibia has an opportunity to construct an education system that would propel it to truly be free. Philosophy as an activity of reflection, when incorporated in the practice of education, can provide for a space for intentional living. Thus, philosophy is that which drives a reflective intellectual dialogue to improve education in a way that will enable citizens to live and create conditions for the good life.

Exploring Philosophy in Education

Some people do not consider philosophy as an area of practical use, a challenge defined by the gradual, if not rapid, move to remove the humanities from university (Reitter and Wellmon 2021). Others think it is so abstract and difficult that it must be reserved as an elective. And in a country riddled with high unemployment one is always confronted with, *what kind of job will I get with a philosophy degree?* While scholars and students of philosophy may think their field is to be the mother of all sciences, those outside it find it to be either cryptic or of no practical use. Unfortunately, most of these misconceptions come from profound ignorance. This ignorance has been further exacerbated by an academic culture that is suspicious of the pursuit of truth and has been at the forefront of ousting humanities from the university's corridors.

Whereas the liberal curriculum used to be central to all who came to the university, including teachers, it has now become limited to training 'cultured elites' (Reitter and Wellmon 2021, 12). With this absence

of humanities in the core curriculum and the university beset by ‘vocalism, managerialism, [and] anti-intellectualism’ (p. 6) – the task of this paper is not made easier, especially when education training reflects some of these effects of ‘institutional rationalization and democratization of knowledge’ (p. 13). Exploring the role of philosophy in teacher training is an approach to address institutional transformation that could pave the way for liberative pedagogies.

The notion of liberative pedagogy employs a socio-political context. How can post-apartheid Namibia engage with education in a way that speaks to its needs? We argue that introducing philosophy to all who would be involved in education, particularly teachers, could be a good starting point. The university needs to be the place for shaping educators to intelligently evaluate alternative ends. Courses in philosophy can assist future educators to wrestle with the nature of social reality in which they would practice and help them reflect meaningfully about education and life processes. If properly introduced to philosophy, teachers would be in a better position to be among those who would be at the forefront of developing and driving consistent and comprehensive programmes that will assist in achieving desired educational outcomes. This role of influencing educational goals is presently left to policymakers who are concerned with bureaucratic procedures with strong leanings to managerialism.

The idea is not to turn the platform of education into that of training professional philosophers. Instead, we want education to be exposed to aspects of academia that will give educators the skills to examine the nature of education and its trajectory for Namibia. Given the assumption that education is a public good, this implies that we need consistent reflections that will establish what values we seek to attain through education. The key to be able to achieve liberative ends should be the cultivation of a life of examining. If philosophy is a reflective activity, then it must drive us to pursue a life of seeking justified true belief. In this case, we need to develop educational practices that will help achieve the good life, previously denied by a racist and racialist philosophy. What exactly is there to examine?

If the telos of philosophy in education is to attain liberative pedagogies, then we need to examine the meaning of education for our context. To achieve this, contexts that inherited systems and practices of education need a new conscientisation. Kamwe Nkrumah (1970) referred to this as *Consciencism* (cf. Freire 2005), a point of awakening to question the origin of things. In a sense, such a project embraces the notion of decolonisa-

tion. However, decolonisation in this sense is only an ally framework, to help frame both the assumption and telos for the role of philosophy in education. This notion of a new conscience hinges on the understanding of reframing, rewording and remaking of education to be contextually relevant.

While the drafting of a curriculum is mainly the work of policymakers, at least in public institutions, it requires philosophical reflection to define what it is that we seek to do and whether it is necessary. The intention is to make education truly meaningful rather than simply putting it through aesthetic refurbishments. Because philosophy is concerned with second-order questions, it can provide educators with the necessary tools needed to give a comprehensive and consistent analysis of the nature of education. When teacher training levels engage such a comprehensive analysis, it produces teachers who in turn become part of the making of society's intellectual culture.

The practical outworking of this role of philosophy in institutions for teacher training must begin in a comprehensive liberal curriculum, in particular, the introduction of philosophy as a subject of study throughout the teacher training process. What has happened, in the name of interdisciplinary learning, is that subjects like philosophy have been shredded to only serve functionalist roles. For example, a student may be introduced to a subject such as 'Critical Thinking.' However, instead of introducing the student to robust aspects of logic, the subject provides little basis upon which a student develops the ability to unify their thoughts. In particular, when there is a low reading culture, critical thinking becomes about what to think and not how to think. In the end it produces students who may pass 'Critical Thinking' as a module, but who have not been taken through robust processes of logic that ought to help them develop the ability to synthesise. Philosophy, when all its various branches (Epistemology, Logic, Ethics, Aesthetics and Metaphysics) are adequately taught, can give future educators the tools needed to synthesise and integrate knowledges in a way that would be helpful towards a meaningful post-apartheid curriculum.

This ability to synthesise knowledge and produce knowledges that are contextually relevant for society is a strong motivation for philosophy-infused liberative pedagogy. Because of the speculative nature of philosophy it can broaden horizons when we are able to realise that there is more to knowledge than what we have at our disposal; more especially, that there is more to doing education beyond the educational templates

we inherited from both the colonial and apartheid system. This practice, which is deeply steeped in philosophy, would even put to the question the notion of internationalisation, which does not take into consideration the socio-historical trajectories and the development stages of post-colonial countries. What some of these practices do is enhance mental paralysis, and do not allow the context's social agency to thrive. Internationalisation initially becomes standardisation, especially when the new methodologies and praxis get state funding to be tested.

We have so far simply tried to make a case that introducing philosophy in teacher training education has benefits for the long-term goal of developing an education system that speaks to Namibian needs. Is this a given? No: it falls within the speculative dimension of philosophy. The basic logical assumption is that thriving contextual curriculums are based on a robust philosophical reflection that informs policy decisions. In the absence of a driving national philosophy of education, sustained by a lack of philosophically trained practitioners, education becomes a patching together of bits and pieces. So, while it is not a given that philosophy would always result in a robust education system, we argue that it allows for a rational longing from disarray to establishing, although to a relative degree, the confidence to find a much more defined and intentional way of doing education. Being able to make judgments between competing needs and visions of what constitutes education is only possible if we embrace the evaluative function that philosophy provides. Even if various educators were to arrive at different understandings of what should constitute education, they can negotiate with open minds using reasonable measures to inform policy and implementation of a fit-for-purpose curriculum.

What the nature of that philosophy would look like must be adequately founded on the principle of universal human rational ascent. While the outworking of philosophy must be contextual, it must be founded on practical rationality. This is to say, that reason must guide the practice of philosophising and context must judge how to best put it to use. A liberative pedagogy separates itself from herd philosophies or common purpose philosophies. It believes that there is no limit to human knowledge and therefore can learn from as wide a spectrum as possible to find answers to contextual challenges. Therefore, universities, which engage in the training of teachers, must create spaces for philosophy to shape thinking minds. This means going beyond just taking a course in philosophy of education. Instead, philosophy must be part and parcel of teacher training.

There are practical modalities to this call. Because philosophy, by nature, is speculative and does not confine itself to pedagogical methods, it must be a truly liberal curriculum. It must be embraced in such ways that allow for liberty to think and not dictate what to think. This introduction of philosophy in teacher education, in search of a liberative pedagogy, provides for a redefinition of power. The education inherited from the apartheid system, that is often driven by internationalisation, tends to sterilise the mind. However, the pursuit to engage in philosophy with the intention of raising a generation of reflective thinking learners and developing contextually driven curriculum is a power-redefining approach. It is liberative in the sense that it takes both the thought and agency of Namibians to rethink what kind of education they would like to have.

As a disclaimer, this is not a liberative pedagogy that seeks a catch-all ideology, as that which is seen in present-day decoloniality and decolonisation conversations. But as in the argument of Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò (2022), we hold the oneness of humanity. As such, philosophy is a universal activity and is fluid enough to allow all people's groups to contextualise systems according to their socio-historical experiences. As people who have come out of a terrible racialised history, we do not imagine returning to a precolonial bliss. Such a life is not possible. The postcolonial and post-apartheid context is a real socio-historical context, therefore, what we need to do in the university is to come up with robust ways to imagine an alternative future.

This alternative future is rooted in the belief that a contextual education can lead to lasting impact. However, it must be founded on principles of open and robust philosophising. If academia is the place that ought to prepare and shape people to become thinkers, then we have an obligation to create university spaces that resist any social control. This is what freedom means. Implying that there needs to be a deeper grasp of the meaning of academia is the home of intellectual formation. When the university becomes more assertive of its role, as the arena where minds interact, it will embark upon intentional integration of philosophy and philosophical activity in its curriculum. This is the unwavering commitment institutions of teacher training must take. Only then can there be replication of reflective practitioners who will participate in raising a society of thinkers.

We have so far tried to convince our readers of the importance of philosophy in education, especially in the teacher training curriculum. Our

hypothesis, which has been reiterated several times, is that philosophy enhances the ability to think critically. Such a skill, as a matter of consequence, can be applied to design a transformative contextual curriculum. However, it requires a common conviction that education is a common good for us to embark upon practices which will embody this conviction.

Shaping Education as a Public Good

Education is generally framed as a human right. This is debatable. However, we agree in principle with this assumption. A right of this nature requires a socio-historical footing. Only then would it find meaning as a public good. The Namibian government has, in principle, accepted education as a public good (Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Article 20). This is despite the inadequate availability of resources to ensure *access and quality*. What is the nature of a public good? We ask this in the context of virtue or arete. As such, that which is a public good ought to have *happiness* as its end goal. Although philosophers have intricately discussed the notion of virtue, we will use James Tooley's (2017) view which borrows from economists. This notion gives a taste of the interdisciplinary nature of education. Education is not an exclusive activity; it is social, political, economic and more. At all times, it is an activity of this and that field. As such, Tooley argues that for education to be a public good it must at least demonstrate: (1) public visibility; (2) nonrivalness; and (3) nonexcludability (p. 125).

A public good requires careful thought processes. It also needs enabling structures for it to meet Tooley's criteria. In order to have an education system that would truly be a public good, then, requires training educators in the science of thinking critically, creatively and constructively. In the Namibian case, the role of education would be the kind that disestablishes regressive hegemonic operations. However, this would require that we name the regressive practices. Although it might be essential to wrestle with the nature of regression, that would be a project too big for this paper to undertake. This does not, however, negate the possibility of exploring it from a speculative perspective. In this case, the lack of philosophy as a subject in the training of teachers creates conditions of socially, politically and economically invisible education.

While there might be good policies around education, what they mean and how they can be realised requires critical thinking. Without the latter, even if there are policies and financial resources to drive education, without the presence of those who ask the human questions, education

would be an activity that perpetuates mindlessness. Public goods must be of such a nature that they empower the public to perpetuate the good, until that kind of perpetuation becomes a habit enshrined in its social fibre. So, when Aristotle urges us to pursue a life of virtue, the admonishment extends beyond ethics and applies to the totality of all the human life. A life of intellectual rigour aimed at addressing the challenges of human society, in our view, must be added to these virtues. Happiness, in this case, takes on an intellectual embodiment and commitment to finding a contextually driven curriculum that would assist in realising education as a public good.

While wisdom can be learned from everyday life's experiences, we need a structured, systematic and intentional curriculum of education in wisdom. The teaching of philosophy in the university has the potential to equip students with the tools needed in exercising practical wisdom when faced with difficult situations. Teaching is often considered merely a communication of information in the curriculum; introducing philosophy in the curriculum attempts to teach students *how to live*.

The gradual demise of the humanities in most of the major universities, attributed to the rapid overtaking of science, undermines the shaping of students who would live well. Education is a particular exercise in the humanities; it is not just a social science. As a public good it may lose a central feature if it is not submerged in philosophy. Philosophy would allow education to find its own trajectory and even life, especially it is to divorce itself from being used as a political or ideological tool. We say the latter, fully aware that for such an independence to happen requires systems and structures that transcend the political and ideological. Such a transcending approach needs to be rooted in rationality, a practical rationality that would result in the kind of consciousness that is in accord with the socio-historical experiences of a post-apartheid society.

Philosophy provides for the space for a tradition-constitutive enquiry. However, this tradition-constitutive enquiry is dynamic. Because philosophy is speculative, formal philosophy has the potential to create space for more traditions of enquiry – in search of truth. It also implies that without it, education becomes static. The repercussion for education, as a system, when it becomes static, is the production of static minds, implying an intellectual poverty that cannot creatively work around problems to find solutions. Without falling into the Cartesian dictum that makes us simply thinking vats, minds must be trained to think. And they must think critically to be able to provide answers.

Practical Implications

Are we then saying that only students and those who operate at the policy level need philosophy? Definitely not. The university must not only expect its students to think critically and creatively; it must expect such second-order skills of all its faculty. For those who teach at university level, philosophy helps with logically structuring the learning and teaching process. If what we teach aims to impact students' thinking and eventually inform their habits, then the classroom must be the place of demonstrating how to think. For this to be true, the syllabus and curriculum of philosophy needs to embrace the true meaning of 'liberal.'

The speculative nature of philosophy also makes it a fluid endeavour. Thus, those that teach philosophy cannot be confined to the curriculum. Neither can the curriculum be replicated. The task is not about uniformity but for students to think in their context. Although they may engage with leading philosophical works, the task is not to create intellectual replicas but independent thinkers. This would have implications for standardised teaching in the context of various campuses that teach similar modules and require students to write standardised examinations. Philosophy cannot be dictated, nor can it be possible in a static syllabus. Because it is speculative by nature, it is also fluid and needs to engage the growing field of ideas, critique and analysis. Thus, to allow for better co-ordination, there needs to be a lead lecturer who would provide for the pedagogical shaping of the learning processes.

To push the notion of a lead lecturer, it would even be best if there is a department of humanities that would be responsible for driving the philosophy curriculum, or students of education need to be integrated into the school or department of humanities where they would be required to take modules in philosophy. Without an intentional drive and creating structures that will enable students to participate in philosophy, it is impossible to have them take philosophy as a subject of study. Moreover, the absence of a structure may just encourage apathy towards philosophy. Intentionally integrating philosophy into the structures of the school of education and curriculum would send the message of its importance and necessity for teachers.

Teachers and Philosophy

We have made an argument for philosophy, but how does it help teachers and learning? Or, what are the practical benefits? There are at least some reasons why education and teacher education must integrate philosophy.

By philosophy, we mean more than just the philosophy of education. It is philosophy in which we can be fully equipped to examine all of life. So, besides philosophy being helpful in understanding and appreciating the practice of education, it expands into enabling effective living. This answers to Socrates' dictum 'an unexamined life is not worth living,' for philosophy provides the material required to examine life. A life of critical reflection and thinking, although it is natural to some, must be cultivated. By doing philosophy, teachers can gain deep insights both into their practice and how it links to all of life. Consequently, a well-integrated thought life can be modelled to students. Thus, philosophy has an inspirational role and can go on to affect students long after they have left the university.

If all other benefits of philosophy were to be forgotten, it would be unforgivable to forget that philosophy provides an opportunity to decipher complex ideas. It is an activity of clearing the mind of clutter and providing clarity for meaningful living. In this case, we should think of philosophy as that which gives the blueprint to think well and live well, without which the academic pursuit and life can be impeded. However, the path to enlightenment must be modelled. The teacher needs to be the first to see the light of reason. Only by seeing the light and knowing the way can the teacher become an effective guide to help students how to think.

We also mentioned that philosophy is linked to the public good, but how? The school or department of education in a university trains teachers who in turn are responsible for training learners who eventually venture into various professions. Thus, the school is one of the primary entry points into the making, and participation of the making, of society. The impact of a teacher on the life of a learner must not be underestimated. A teacher who is well equipped to see life holistically can become a guide in leading learners to make better decisions in the future. Because philosophy seeks to improve how we think and how we live, it can be helpful in shaping the values of the student. Philosophy, in this case, moves from being a field of mere abstracts to that which can be applied to real life.

In our search to cultivate positive values among our learners, philosophy can provide for such a platform. Because philosophy offers an opportunity to examine everything and not simply accept it on authority, students are most likely to be intentional about the kinds of values they adopt for their own lives and how they apply them in society. This approach to education provides a liberative intellectual culture. It counters

the mindlessness that permeates much of education and diminishes the role of second-order thinking.

While most of education has been reduced to generating practical skills, philosophy is concerned with how we ought to live. As such, critical thinking does not limit the student to the current situation; it seeks to teach them to think about the rapidly changing world in a way that can dynamically be adopted. Such critical thinking is enhanced by philosophy, which intentionally seeks to train students to think well (Fung 2017, 24–26). Philosophy has the power to redirect and shape teachers' thinking beyond content knowledge and critical thinking. It fosters teachers' empathetic and interpersonal ability to create educational spaces that aim for a humane educational experience.

Teachers are not just conduits for passing on information; instead, they ought to be at the centre of thinking about how education can improve humanity. What does it mean to educate? How does the curriculum contribute to holistic human formation? Philosophy intervenes to prevent totalising education systems and structures that do not allow critical thinking and participation. Teachers, therefore, are more than just instructors. They need to be trained to be engaged in the intellectual formation of students, who would in return become well-rounded critical participants in the making of their societies.

Teachers, well trained in the field of philosophy, can become critical partners in the shaping of students who would be more than just echo chambers of a curriculum. Philosophy calls for curricula and pedagogies that encourage dialogue between students and authority, allow students' voices in their design, promote critical thinking, and empower students with the ability to critique, reflect and interrogate societal norms. Through reflection they become shapers and creators of knowledge and not just recipients and consumers. This, for a post-apartheid context, would be a pedagogy of hope that operates in the realm of liberatory philosophies. We do not necessarily think of the context of Namibia as one of the oppressed, in a Paulo Freire (2005) sense; instead, Namibia is context of opportunity.

Consider this a tentative discourse, not one that is advocating for a particular practice or model. Instead of providing what would be solutions, we are asking questions. Given our current context, is it possible to reform education as we know it and affect the progress of our society if we become intentional about teacher education that involves philosophy? For a post-conflict society, it is pertinent to seek its own intellectual liberty that

would be integrated in all of society. This intellectual self-propagation provides for space and power to not only adopt but to make an original impact. Philosophy has a powerful potential to connect disciplines and domains of inquiry. It can advance respectful dialogue and promote intellectual openness and curiosity among student-teachers, leading to active citizenship. If we take it further, the ultimate outcome is a society that not only adopts history but makes its own history. Thus, integrating philosophy as part of education has the potential to lead to a new social formation (Brock, Carrigan, and Scambler 2017).

Conclusion

The paper advocates for a tentative discourse for a liberative pedagogy through the integration of philosophy in education training and even management. It argues that philosophy provides for space to think about how we ought to live, which also influences how we think. Therefore, teacher training needs to be the primary place where philosophy is incorporated as part of the curriculum. We argue that this would foster a culture of critical reflection and practice to address post-apartheid challenges. Thus, the university's curriculum needs to have philosophy as a subject to cultivate reflective practitioners who own what, how and why to teach. Teachers who are well trained in philosophy can become highly influential in teaching students to think not only about academics but all of life by applying critical thinking skills. However, this skill is not just intended to improve second order skills; it would also assist in raising scholarship that is critical and seeks to create an education system that speaks to Namibian needs. For an education system borne out of an oppressive history, could it be possible that a liberative approach through philosophy may provide for educational and societal outcomes? This remains the question that needs further exploration and probably action research.

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Teaching How to Think: The Philosophical Foundations of the School Subject ‘The World and I’

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Abstract. The article examines the recently introduced school subject, ‘The World and I’. ‘The World and I’ is introduced in the experimental programme ‘Primary School as a Whole Day School: A Balanced, Fair, Efficient, and Sustainable System of Education’ in Croatian schools. This subject places an emphasis on developing students’ critical thinking skills rather than simply imparting knowledge. It also integrates logic and philosophy, thus positioning it within the philosophical group of subjects. Both formal and informal logic are of significant importance in the development of reasoning abilities. Formal logic enables students to comprehend the structure of arguments and to avoid fallacies. Informal logic, in contrast, provides them with the capacity to apply reasoning in real-world contexts, thus making them more discerning in evaluating arguments encountered in everyday life. The curriculum is informed by the Socratic method that encourages the practice of reflective thinking and the questioning of assumptions. Furthermore, the curriculum emphasizes metacognition, or the ability to think about one’s own cognitive processes, with the aim of enhancing students’ reasoning abilities. By encouraging self-reflection, students become more independent thinkers, capable of evaluating not only external arguments but also their own thought processes. Furthermore, the article highlights how the subject encourages ethical reflection and social responsibility, prompting students to apply their critical thinking skills to real-world ethical dilemmas. The integration of logic and philosophy within the subject ensures that students develop a comprehensive intellectual and moral framework, equipping them with the capacity to make responsible decisions.

Key Words: critical thinking, logic, philosophy, metacognition, school subject ‘World and I’

Učiti misliti: filozofski temelji šolskega predmeta svet in jaz

Povzetek. Članek obravnava nedavno uvedeni šolski predmet svet in jaz. Svet in jaz je uveden v eksperimentalnem programu Osnovna šola kot celodnevna šola, in sicer v sklopu projekta Uravnotežen, pravičen, učinkovit in trajnosten sistem izobraževanja v hrvaških šolah. Predmet poudarja razvijanje sposobnosti kritičnega mišljenja učencev in se ne osredotoča zgolj na posredovanje znanja. Poudarja tudi kritično mišljenje ter povezuje logiko in filozofijo, s čimer se umešča v filozofsko skupino predmetov. Tako formalna kot neformalna logika sta zelo pomembni za razvoj zmožnosti sklepanja. Formalna logika učencem omogoča, da razumejo strukturo argumentov in se izogibajo zmotam. Neformalna logika pa jim omogoča, da so sposobni uporabljati argumentacijo v resničnem svetu, s čimer postanejo bolj razgledani pri ocenjevanju argumentov, s katerimi se srečujejo v vsakdanjem življenju. Učni načrt temelji na sokratski metodi, ki spodbuja razmišljanje in preizpraševanje predpostavk. Poleg tega poudarja metakognicijo ali sposobnost razmišljanja o lastnih kognitivnih procesih, ki pomaga izboljšati sposobnost razmišljanja učencev. S spodbujanjem samorefleksije učenci postanejo samostojnejši misleci, ki so sposobni ovrednotiti ne le zunanje argumente, temveč tudi lastne miselne procese. Poleg tega je v članku poudarjeno, kako predmet spodbuja etično razmišljanje in družbeno odgovornost, saj učence spodbuja, da svoje sposobnosti kritičnega mišljenja uporabijo pri realnih etičnih dilemah. Vključevanje logike in filozofije v predmet zagotavlja, da učenci razvijejo celovit intelektualni in moralni okvir, ki jim omogoča sprejemanje odgovornih odločitev.

Ključne besede: svet in jaz, šolski predmet, logika, filozofija, metakognicija

Introduction

In today's rapidly evolving society, the necessity to provide students with the requisite skills to effectively navigate the challenges of the modern world is becoming increasingly apparent. Technological advancements, and the exponential spread of information, create demands that often exceed the capacities of traditional educational approaches, which are ill-equipped to address these challenges. The subject 'The World and I' addresses a range of complex social and ethical issues, including digital literacy and misinformation, climate change and sustainability, social justice and equality, and privacy in the digital age. These challenges prompt students to engage in critical analysis of the reliability of information, to

recognize their role in environmental responsibility, and to develop empathy for marginalized communities. Furthermore, the subject addresses the ethical implications of personal data security, fostering awareness of privacy in online spaces. Through these themes, students cultivate both critical thinking and a robust ethical foundation for responsible decision-making in contemporary society. Nevertheless, educational systems tend to evolve at a relatively slow pace in response to new developments, which has led to the emergence of non-formal education as a means of maintaining some degree of alignment with these changes.

In some countries, there have been notable shifts in the curriculum, with the inclusion of subjects from the philosophical discipline. For example, in France, philosophy is a compulsory subject for students in their final year of secondary education, with a curriculum encompassing ethical, epistemological and political philosophical themes. Spain also incorporates philosophy in its secondary education curriculum, including critical thinking, logic, and moral philosophy. In Croatia, philosophy is a mandatory subject in the fourth year of high school (gymnasium), with logic included in the third year. Furthermore, ethics is available as an elective in all secondary schools for students who do not attend religious education classes. Ethics is becoming more prevalent in high school educational programmes. These subjects have historically been the preserve of secondary education.

However, with the advent of philosophy for children, as pioneered by Matthew Lipman, and the subsequent expansion of various approaches within this field, philosophy with children has emerged as a distinct area of study. This approach is designed to cultivate critical and creative thinking in children. In the realm of non-formal education, there are numerous iterations of philosophy with children, and recently, subjects aimed at developing critical and creative thinking skills have been increasingly introduced into primary schools. This trend underscores the necessity for the design of educational programmes that will equip children with the ability to effectively navigate the intellectual, social, and moral challenges of the contemporary world.

The School Subject ‘The World and I’

The school subject ‘The World and I’ is designed to foster the development of students’ critical thinking skills, which are considered to be key competencies in the twenty-first century and form an integral part of life-long learning. In an environment characterized by rapid change and tech-

nological advancement, students are confronted with a vast array of information from a multitude of sources, frequently lacking in veracity. The subject provides students with the tools to critically assess and evaluate the information they encounter, as well as to devise creative solutions to the numerous challenges they face (Ministarstvo znanja, obrazovanja i mladih 2023, 1):

The subject 'The World and I' occupies this space by focusing on the individual (student) who critically reflects on both themselves and the world, to act as a bridge between these two realms – the external (the world of facts) and the internal (the world of values).

The subject 'The World and I' is delivered with an annual allocation of 70 hours. It is recommended that the lessons be organized in double periods to allow sufficient time for critical thinking and more effective learning. The subject is taught across all eight grades of primary school. The experimental implementation of this subject began in the 2023/2024 school year as part of the experimental programme 'Primary School as a Whole Day School: A Balanced, Fair, Efficient, and Sustainable System of Education.' 'The World and I' is an elective subject, and students can currently choose between this subject and religious education.¹ The programme, entitled 'The World and I,' is currently part of a whole-day school initiative that has been implemented in just over 60 schools across the Republic of Croatia. Approximately 650 students are currently enrolled in this subject.

The subject 'The World and I' has been designed with the objective of fostering the development of critical thinking, personal responsibility and ethical behaviour in students. The subject is focused on the empowerment of students to engage in critical reflection on the world around them, the analysis of information, and the formulation of informed decisions. These objectives are achieved through teaching that develops the capacity to critically assess, solve problems, and engage in ethical action within the community. One of the principal aims is to encourage students to assume responsibility for their thoughts and actions, while simultaneously fostering social responsibility and an awareness of the importance of the common good. Students are trained to act with confidence and

¹ More information about 'Primary School as a Full-Day School: A Balanced, Fair, Efficient, and Sustainable System of Education' can be found at <https://mzom.gov.hr/UserDocsImages/dokumenti/Obrazovanje/OsnovneSkole/Cjelodnevna-skola/Eksperimentalni-kurikulum-nastavnoga-predmeta-Svijet-i-ja-za-osnovne-skole.pdf>.

autonomy in various life situations, with respect for democratic values, solidarity, and empathy. As the curriculum states (Ministarstvo znanja, obrazovanja i mladih 2023, 2):

The primary educational goal of learning and teaching the subject The World and I is to guide the student towards critically thinking about the world around them by strengthening their critical thinking skills, which will enable them to act confidently, autonomously, and responsibly in various learning contexts and in everyday personal and professional life.

The main goal of this subject is to teach students how to think, rather than what to think, a principle that was first advocated by John Dewey.

Structure: Organizational Areas of the Curriculum ‘The World and I’

The curriculum for the subject ‘The World and I’ is meticulously structured into three principal areas, each designed to cultivate critical thinking, self-reflection, and ethical conduct. These areas are fundamental to enabling students to navigate the modern world, which is characterized by an abundance of information and a multitude of complex social challenges. The curriculum’s fundamental objective is to equip students with the requisite tools to engage with the world around them in a thoughtful and critical manner, to analyse information in a discerning and informed way, and to foster their development into responsible and reflective individuals.

The initial area of focus, ‘Information Management and Application of Critical Thinking Strategies,’ is designed to equip students with the capacity to efficiently process substantial quantities of information. In the contemporary era, where students are frequently confronted with an array of unverified data from disparate sources, the capacity to critically assess information is of paramount importance. Students are instructed in essential competencies, including the ability to discern reliable sources of information, assess the credibility of data, and make well-informed decisions based on their analysis. This area facilitates a progressive learning process, wherein students progress from an initial comprehension of fundamental facts to a more nuanced understanding of intricate concepts and, ultimately, the ability to apply their knowledge in creative problem-solving. As the curriculum states (Ministarstvo znanja, obrazovanja i mladih 2023, 3):

Students must know how to manage information and apply critical

thinking strategies to find, select, and evaluate various sources and information around them.

This foundation guarantees that students are not merely passive recipients of information but active participants in the learning process, capable of making reasoned judgments.

The second area of focus, 'Personal and Social Responsibility, Ethical Action,' is dedicated to fostering the development of students' sense of responsibility, both at the personal and social levels. In this section, the curriculum shifts its focus to assisting students in comprehending their role within society and the consequences of their actions. Students are encouraged to engage in introspective reflection on their personal conduct, the values they espouse, and the extent to which these align with the broader democratic principles of fairness, equality, solidarity, and empathy. This area of the curriculum is of paramount importance for the inculcation of a robust moral compass in students, equipping them with the capacity to engage thoughtfully and ethically in their communities. As stated in the curriculum, 'The development of critical thinking enables students to enhance their personal and social responsibility, ethical conduct, and democratic values' (Ministarstvo znanja, obrazovanja i mladih 2023, 4). This learning area is aligned with the broader educational objectives of preparing students to become conscientious and active citizens who are aware of the importance of their contributions to the well-being of society.

The third area of focus, 'Managing One's Own Thinking,' is centred on metacognition, which entails instructing students on how to reflect on and regulate their own cognitive processes. This area is of great importance in enabling students to develop the skills required to regulate and enhance their cognitive functions. The utilization of metacognitive strategies enables students to monitor their thought processes, evaluate the efficacy of their problem-solving techniques and implement necessary modifications when required. As students become more aware of their cognitive processes, they gain the ability to manage their learning more effectively, which is essential for both academic success and personal growth. The curriculum makes this point explicitly, stating (Ministarstvo znanja, obrazovanja i mladih 2023, 5): 'Metacognition, or thinking about thinking, encompasses the management of one's own thinking processes, including monitoring, assessment, and improvement when necessary.'

The integration of these three domains constitutes a comprehensive framework for the cultivation of well-rounded, critically engaged students. The integration of critical thinking, ethical reflection, and metacognitive awareness provides students not only with academic knowledge but also the essential life skills required to navigate the complexities of contemporary society. The curriculum's concentration on these domains guarantees that students will be adequately prepared to confront the intellectual and moral challenges that lie ahead with assurance, integrity, and a profound sense of accountability.

Structured Learning Outcomes and Competency Development in 'The World and I'

The subject 'The World and I' is designed to be taught at all levels of primary education, with learning objectives that are aligned with the age and developmental stages of students. The learning outcomes are structured within three principal domains: the management of information and the application of critical thinking strategies; personal and social responsibility, with an emphasis on ethical behaviour; and self-management of one's thinking processes. In consideration of the developmental differences among students, the outcomes are designed to evolve and build upon each other in a manner that aligns with the progression through the grades. In the initial two-year period, students develop fundamental abilities for identifying and interpreting concepts from straightforward informational sources. With the guidance of the instructor, they extract new information and apply it in everyday contexts, thereby acquiring an initial capacity for critical thinking. In the domain of personal and social responsibility, students begin to comprehend the significance of community norms, learning about responsibility towards themselves and others. Concurrently, through self-management, students pose simple questions and monitor their progress, with consistent support from the teacher.

By the end of the third and fourth grades, students have developed the capacity to conduct independent research. They become more proficient at integrating new information with existing knowledge, thereby enhancing their comprehension of concepts. With regard to social and ethical conduct, students are able to differentiate between responsible and irresponsible actions and to practice empathy and collaboration within the classroom and in the wider community. With regard to self-management, students are beginning to set their own goals and reflect on their progress, although they still require occasional teacher support. In the fifth and

sixth grades, students develop the capacity to critically assess information and to conduct independent searches for answers. Their comprehension becomes more sophisticated, and the capacity for critical analysis of information is a pivotal element of their learning process. With regard to the domain of personal responsibility, students assume a more prominent role in comprehending the ramifications of their conduct for the community. Additionally, they engage actively in discourses pertaining to ethical matters. As students progress through the educational system, they gradually assume greater control over their own cognitive processes, formulating questions about their learning and directing their own learning trajectory. In the seventh and eighth grades, students demonstrate proficiency in independently analysing and evaluating complex information, applying it in a variety of contexts. At this stage, students demonstrate the greatest capacity for critical thinking as they integrate prior knowledge into new challenges. With regard to social and ethical conduct, students assume an active role within the community, contemplating a range of social concerns and formulating decisions that are grounded in ethical considerations. In the domain of self-management, students exhibit self-regulation, evaluate their own progress, and make decisions based on critical reflection on their learning processes and outcomes.

Teaching How to Think: The Role of Critical Thinking in the Curriculum ‘The World and I’

‘The World and I’ clearly demonstrates its focus on teaching children how to think, rather than what to think, through the development of critical thinking, metacognitive skills and the ability to self-regulate thought processes. At the heart of the subject is the ability to question information, analyse sources and draw independent conclusions. Rather than simply absorbing facts, students develop critical thinking skills, which are recognized as key skills for the twenty-first century and lifelong learning (Ministarstvo znanja, obrazovanja i mladih 2023, 2): ‘The subject The World and I is primarily aimed at developing students’ critical thinking competence – the competence of the future, the competence of the 21st century.’

Critical thinking enables students to become independent thinkers who are able to evaluate the credibility of information and make informed decisions. The key aspect of this process is not just recognizing information, but understanding the wider context in which information exists. In this sense, ‘The World and I’ does not focus on rote learning, but on developing students’ ability to think, analyse and connect facts in order to draw

conclusions. This empowers students to take an active role in their own education and lives, and prepares them for future challenges in a world full of information and complex social issues. The curriculum also promotes strategies for managing thinking by encouraging students not only to analyse information but also to monitor and adjust their thinking processes, making them autonomous thinkers. This process develops gradually, starting with simple monitoring and reflection on personal thoughts and progressing to more advanced monitoring and adjustment of thinking strategies. Students learn to recognize obstacles in their thinking, such as biases or emotional reactions, and how to overcome them in order to reach rational, objective conclusions. As the curriculum states: 'The student develops confidence in his critical thinking process and in the correctness of his conclusions, and is able to manage it: monitor the process, identify influencing factors, direct, regulate and correct it' (Ministarstvo znanja, obrazovanja i mladih 2023, 5). In addition, the metacognitive dimension of the curriculum plays a crucial role in teaching students how to think. Metacognition, which involves reflecting on one's own thinking processes, enables students to become aware of their thinking strategies and to adapt them according to the situation. Students become aware of how they learn, how they manage information and how they can improve their thinking processes. This promotes continuous progress in learning and decision-making, which is essential for the development of independence and responsibility. 'Metacognition includes knowledge and skills for managing one's own thinking: monitoring, controlling and evaluating effectiveness and changing strategies when necessary' (p. 4). In this way, students do not become passive recipients of knowledge, but active creators of their own thought processes, which better prepares them for future educational and life challenges. The curriculum also emphasizes the development of personal and social responsibility. Students not only learn how to think critically, but also how to apply these thinking skills in the context of ethical action. They are trained to take responsibility for their actions and to understand how their behaviour affects the broader community. Students develop awareness of the importance of ethics and empathy in everyday life and are encouraged to reflect on their own values and attitudes, becoming active and responsible members of society. As noted in the curriculum (p. 5): 'The student develops self-confidence, self-criticism, and personal integrity, recognizes and becomes aware of personal and social responsibility, and the ethical nature of actions for the benefit of the community and democracy.'

These elements of the curriculum clearly show that 'The World and I' does not just teach students facts or ready-made answers, but empowers them to think independently, make ethical decisions and act responsibly in the world. Pupils acquire tools for critical thinking, enabling them to become autonomous, responsible and ethically aware individuals who are prepared to face the challenges of contemporary society.

The methods used in 'The World and I' form the backbone of its pedagogical approach and are designed to promote active, experiential and collaborative learning. These methods are crucial to achieving the curriculum's primary objective: developing students' critical thinking skills and their ability to apply knowledge to real-life situations. Rather than focusing on passive learning that emphasizes memorization, the methods encourage students to take an active role in their learning process by exploring, questioning, analysing and reflecting on the content. This is essential for developing students' autonomy and responsibility, which are key outcomes of this curriculum. One of the core methods emphasized in the curriculum is problem solving and critical analysis. These methods guide students from the acquisition of basic knowledge to more advanced intellectual skills, such as researching and synthesizing concepts to solve complex problems. The curriculum explicitly states (Ministarstvo znanja, obrazovanja i mladih 2023, 3): 'Students are guided from basic knowledge and simple conclusions, through further research, concept integration and application, to innovative and creative problem solving.' This progression not only enhances students' understanding of the material, but also equips them with the tools to critically evaluate and manage information and draw well-informed and reasoned conclusions. Furthermore, the curriculum is predicated on the tenets of cooperative learning and discussion. Through group work and collaborative projects, students are afforded the opportunity to engage with a multiplicity of perspectives, thereby acquiring the capacity to communicate effectively while developing empathy and ethical reasoning. Such methods permit students to reflect on their own ideas and to consider the viewpoints of their peers, thereby facilitating the cultivation of social skills and a sense of shared responsibility. As the curriculum makes clear (p. 4): 'Collaborative activities facilitate the exchange of opinions, reflection on others' perspectives, and the development of critical thinking through dialogue.' Furthermore, the teaching methods employed in 'The World and I' incorporate experiential and project-based learning as integral components. By establishing a connection between the classroom and the real world, students are en-

couraged to apply their learning to their local community and everyday life. This approach facilitates the transition from theoretical knowledge to practical application. As the curriculum states (p. 5), ‘Learning through experience and project work encourages students to apply knowledge in practical contexts, reinforcing their understanding and fostering real-world problem-solving skills.’ These hands-on experiences not only reinforce learning but also instil a sense of responsibility and ethical action as students perceive the impact of their learning in a broader societal context. The combination of these methods is essential as they actively engage students, promote critical thinking and enable them to become independent, reflective thinkers. This is especially crucial in the contemporary era, where the capacity to evaluate information critically, engage in collaborative work, and apply knowledge ethically is paramount. The curriculum’s emphasis on active learning strategies ensures that students are not merely absorbing facts, but are learning to think critically, make informed decisions, and assume responsibility for their own learning and actions.

The teaching methods employed in ‘The World and I’ represent a pivotal aspect of the curriculum, as they epitomize its core objective: to instruct students in the art of critical thinking, rather than merely imparting knowledge. By providing students with the intellectual tools necessary to navigate complex information and contribute responsibly to society, these methods facilitate problem-solving, collaboration, experiential learning and critical reflection. By fostering active and engaged learning, these methods facilitate the development of the critical, ethical, and social competencies essential for lifelong learning and responsible citizenship.

Two Engaging Approaches to Teaching

Story Rules: Learning Consequences Through Classic Tales

The objective of this activity is to analyse rules through the lens of well-known stories. This may be achieved by examining a story such as Little Red Riding Hood, or another story of a similar nature, in order to gain an understanding of the importance of following rules and the potential consequences of ignoring them. To illustrate, Little Red Riding Hood did not adhere to her mother’s counsel to remain on the path, which resulted in her encounter with the wolf and subsequent peril. The instructor guides students in a logical examination of her decision and contemplation of the ramifications of her actions. This approach enables students to discern emotions and instinctive responses while also recognizing the role

of rational thinking in making informed choices. The objective is to foster in students the capacity to evaluate circumstances and comprehend the necessity of rules for safety and well-being.

Logic Detective: Spotting Everyday Fallacies

In the pursuit of fostering critical thinking skills in young students, an activity focusing on identifying informal logical fallacies – such as *ad hominem*, false dilemma, and appeal to popularity – has been demonstrated to be an effective pedagogical tool. The Logic Detective exercise introduces students to the subtleties of flawed reasoning in a way that is both accessible and engaging, drawing on everyday scenarios that are relevant to their experiences. The structure of Logic Detective is straightforward yet efficacious. Prior to the activity, the instructor prepares a set of cards, each illustrating a different logical fallacy. To illustrate, an *ad hominem* attack is exemplified in a scenario where Tony's arguments are dismissed on the grounds that he habitually wears a hat indoors. A classic example of a false dilemma is illustrated in the statement, 'If you do not participate in this activity with me, then you are not a genuine friend.' Furthermore, an appeal to popularity is exemplified in a child's entreaty: 'Given that the majority of the class already possesses this item, it would be logical to conclude that I require it as well.' Such examples permit students to encounter, recognize and unpack common fallacies in a controlled and interactive setting. The instructor then divides the students into smaller groups and provides each group with a scenario card, requesting that they analyse the scenarios and identify any logical flaws within them. The exercise requires students to engage in discussion regarding the potential issues with such reasoning and to propose a more equitable and logical alternative. Subsequently, each group presents one scenario to the class, elucidating the fallacy and sharing their insights.

The overarching objective of this exercise is to enhance students' comprehension of logical integrity by enabling them to discern instances where an argument is compromised by personal attacks, the creation of false dichotomies, or social pressures. In learning to identify these fallacies, students are not only better equipped to process the arguments they encounter in their daily lives, but they also develop the confidence to question reasoning that may initially appear persuasive. By engaging in scenario-based activities, students develop the analytical tools necessary for independent critical thinking, a skillset that will benefit them in a multitude of contexts beyond the classroom.

Logic as a Core Tool for Critical Thinking in the Curriculum 'The World and I'

The subject 'The World and I' is predicated on the use of logic, which serves as an indispensable instrument for cultivating students' capacity to think lucidly, reason with coherence, and address problems in a methodical manner. Given that this curriculum is fundamentally oriented towards fostering critical thinking, logic becomes an indispensable tool for students in organizing their thoughts, analysing complex issues and drawing reasoned conclusions. The integration of formal and informal logic not only enhances students' intellectual abilities but also provides them with practical tools for navigating the challenges of everyday life. The teaching of formal logic provides students with an understanding of the fundamental principles of sound reasoning. This includes the ability to identify valid argument structures, avoid fallacies and construct coherent and well-supported conclusions. Students engage with deductive reasoning, syllogisms and the basic principles of valid argumentation, which enables them to analyse and evaluate arguments in a systematic manner. For example, children learn logical fallacies such as *ad hominem* attacks, where an argument is dismissed based on a personal trait rather than its merits – like saying, 'I won't listen to Lana because she wears glasses,' which ignores the actual point being made. They also explore false dilemmas, which present only two choices in complex situations, such as, 'Either you're my friend, or we'll never play together again,' overlooking other possible solutions. By analysing these examples, students sharpen their skills in spotting reasoning errors and constructing sound arguments.

As Lipman (2003, 185) notes: 'Formal logic requires the learning of rules for the standardization of everyday language so that the complexities of ordinary discourse can be reduced to the simplicities of logical language.' This formal structure assists students in comprehending the nuances of everyday communication, facilitating the translation of complex ideas into coherent and logical expressions. By practicing these logical rules students develop the capacity to deconstruct complex arguments, identify inconsistencies and arrive at conclusions that are both logical and well-supported. One of the principal advantages of teaching formal logic is its capacity to enhance the clarity of thought. Students are able to discern when an argument is logically sound and, equally importantly, they become adept at identifying flaws in reasoning. This is particularly ben-

eficial when students are exposed to a variety of arguments in subjects such as history, literature, and science, where the capacity to critically analyse sources and claims is essential. For example, in history, students might compare two different stories about a famous event to see how details can change depending on who is telling the story. In literature, they could discuss why a character might act in a certain way and if they can trust everything the character says. In science, they might look at different ideas about what causes weather changes and think about which explanations have more evidence. These activities help students start thinking critically and build their skills in understanding different viewpoints.

As is emphasized in the curriculum (Ministarstvo znanja, obrazovanja i mladih 2023, 4): 'The application of formal logic helps students not only in recognizing patterns of reasoning but in ensuring that their own reasoning is structured, clear, and free from fallacies.' In addition to formal logic, informal logic plays a significant role in the curriculum, enabling students to apply logical reasoning to real-world situations. The focus of informal logic is the construction of arguments in everyday language, with consideration given to contextual factors, the purpose of the argument and the intended audience. It is especially beneficial in fostering students' critical thinking abilities when they are confronted with practical problems or debates. The importance of context in shaping an argument is a key tenet of informal logic, equipping students with the ability to navigate discussions with greater nuance and adaptability. This is crucial for cultivating the capacity for reasoning that students will draw upon not only in academic contexts but also in their everyday interactions. As Lipman (2004, 40) elucidates, 'Informal logic focuses on natural language and the context of the argument, which is crucial for reasoning effectively in everyday situations.'

The study of informal logic provides students with an understanding of the various types of logical fallacies that frequently distort reasoning in everyday conversation. Such errors include ad hominem attacks, straw man arguments and false dilemmas, which collectively serve to undermine the quality of reasoning and are frequently observed in public discourse, the media and even social interactions. By learning to identify and avoid these fallacies, students are better equipped to engage in meaningful discussions and to defend their ideas with logical rigor. In the modern world, this skill set is of the utmost importance, as students are frequently confronted with misleading information and must learn to discern what is credible and what is not. Moreover, the curriculum incorporates logic

not only for the analysis of arguments presented by others, but also for self-reflection and metacognition. Students are encouraged to engage in critical reflection on their own reasoning processes, identify potential biases, and develop strategies for enhancing their thought patterns. This aspect of metacognition, or the consideration of one's own cognitive processes, is central to the broader objectives of 'The World and I'. Dewey himself (1959, 78) makes this point in his writings: 'Logic is both a science and an art; a science as it gives an organized account of how thought operates, and an art as it projects methods for future thinking.'

The curriculum is structured around the dual perspective of logic as both analytical and practical, with an emphasis on the importance of understanding and applying logical principles in real-world contexts.

Furthermore, logic acts as a conduit between the advancement of critical thinking and ethical reasoning. Students are instructed in the processes of critical thinking and ethical reasoning, with an emphasis on the application of logical principles in making responsible decisions. This convergence of logic and ethics is crucial for nurturing individuals who can reason effectively and act responsibly within their communities. The curriculum emphasizes this point by encouraging students to reflect on the ethical dimensions of their decisions, and to weigh their options logically and ethically before taking action (Ministarstvo znanja, obrazovanja i mladih 2023, 6):

By integrating logic into the learning process, students are better prepared to make decisions that are both rational and ethical, thereby ensuring that their actions contribute positively to society.

The incorporation of both formal and informal logic within the 'The World and I' curriculum is vital for achieving the subject's overarching objective: to educate students in critical thinking, rather than simply imparting information. The application of logic provides the cognitive framework necessary for critical inquiry, enabling students to approach complex issues with clarity, precision, and ethical awareness. The study of logic enables students to enhance their intellectual capacities and develop a deeper sense of responsibility in how they think, argue, and act in the world around them. Logic forms the bedrock of the 'The World and I' curriculum, underpinning both critical thinking and ethical reasoning. By equipping students with the skills to construct sound arguments, avoid logical fallacies, and reflect on their own reasoning processes, the curriculum ensures that logic is not only an academic subject but also a

practical tool for lifelong learning. The teaching of logic provides students with the tools necessary for lifelong learning and responsible citizenship. It enables them to construct sound arguments, avoid fallacies and reflect on their own reasoning processes.

A Philosophical Framework for Critical Thinking: Logic, Inquiry, and Reflection in ‘The World and I’

The curriculum for ‘The World and I’ is designed to integrate logic, philosophy, and critical thinking in a coherent framework that is intended to foster students’ capacity for independent thought, reasoning, and problem-solving. These elements are not merely academic concepts; rather, they are practical tools that equip students with the ability to analyse information critically, engage in ethical reflection, and respond thoughtfully to the challenges of the modern world. The curriculum places greater emphasis on the processes of thinking than on the content of thinking, thereby underscoring the significance of logical reasoning, philosophical inquiry, and reflective thinking as fundamental elements of an education. The curriculum’s approach to critical thinking is informed by the tenets of classical philosophical traditions. Also, the curriculum extensively employs the Socratic method, a classical approach to education that fosters deep inquiry through questioning and dialogue. This method teaches students not only to critically evaluate the claims of others but also to reflect on their own assumptions, encouraging a habit of continuous self-reflection. The Socratic method, which entails posing incisive questions to challenge preconceptions and prompt introspective reflection, prompts students to interrogate not only the assertions of others but also their own beliefs. ‘Socrates employed logic to challenge the opinions and views of his interlocutors, frequently utilizing irony to prompt reflection on their own positions’ (Ćurko 2017, 67). The curriculum employs this approach to encourage students to engage in more profound levels of inquiry and reflection, thereby instilling a lifelong disposition of critical questioning.

The influence of philosophy is further reflected in the curriculum’s emphasis on metacognition, defined as the ability to think about one’s own thinking processes. Metacognition is a key element of critical thinking, enabling students to actively reflect on their own thought processes. By becoming aware of how they process information, students can monitor, assess, and improve their cognitive strategies, ultimately leading to better decision-making and problem-solving. This reflective practice is closely aligned with Dewey’s theory of reflective thinking, which empha-

sizes the importance of active, continuous inquiry. According to Dewey, reflective thinking involves not just the absorption of information, but a deliberate process of questioning, evaluating, and revising one's understanding based on new insights. In the classroom, this means students are encouraged to reflect on their learning experiences, ask 'why' and 'how' questions, and apply their knowledge in new contexts. This approach fosters a mindset of ongoing learning and adaptability, key skills for navigating complex real-world situations. As the curriculum states (Ministarstvo znanja, obrazovanja i mladih 2023, 5): 'Metacognition, or thinking about thinking, encompasses the management of one's own cognitive processes, including monitoring, assessment, and improvement when necessary.'

The curriculum's integration of these philosophical principles ensures that students are not only able to critique external arguments, but also to refine their own thinking processes.

As defined in the curriculum, critical thinking entails the capacity to analyse information, question assumptions and apply logical reasoning in order to draw well-founded conclusions. This skill, which is applicable across academic disciplines, is essential for making informed decisions and navigating the complexities of daily life. As Ćurko (2017, 33) notes, 'Critical thinking is not about learning what to think but developing the ability to process, analyze, and critique information in a reasoned way.' This approach empowers students to become independent thinkers capable of handling the demands of a rapidly changing world with confidence and integrity.

The subject not only concentrates on the teaching of critical skills, but also ensures that students develop the ethical and philosophical foundation necessary for the responsible application of those skills in a variety of contexts. In conclusion, the curriculum of 'The World and I' represents a novel addition to the philosophical group of educational offerings, combining the strengths of logic, philosophy, and critical thinking to create a comprehensive framework for developing well-rounded, reflective thinkers. In the absence of these philosophical and logical components, the subject would lack the capacity to educate students in the skills of critical and responsible thinking, thereby undermining its overarching objective of fostering independent and ethical decision-makers.

At the End

The subject 'The World and I' offers a transformative approach to modern education, focusing on the development of key competencies that are essential for students to thrive in a complex and rapidly changing

world. By meticulously integrating logic, philosophy, and critical thinking, this curriculum equips students with the requisite tools to navigate the plethora of information and multifaceted perspectives they will inevitably encounter. This subject is not merely an avenue for the acquisition of knowledge; rather, it is a conduit for the cultivation of the capacity for independent thought, reflective reasoning, and ethical decision-making. One of the key achievements of this curriculum is its success in bridging the gap between abstract reasoning and practical application. The teaching of formal and informal logic provides students with the cognitive structure necessary to analyse arguments and approach problems systematically. Logic, as an intellectual tool, ensures that students develop clarity and rigor in their thought processes, enabling them to avoid fallacies and draw sound conclusions. By making logical reasoning an integral part of the curriculum, 'The World and I' enhances students' ability to engage with the world in a critical and informed manner.

Moreover, the incorporation of philosophical techniques, particularly the Socratic method, cultivates students' capacity to engage in lifelong learning, prompting them to challenge assumptions and pursue a more profound comprehension of the subject matter. This inquiry-based approach is crucial for cultivating an environment where students are not merely passive recipients of information, but active participants in their learning journey. The promotion of metacognition, or the ability to reflect on one's own cognitive processes, provides students with an additional dimension to their educational experience, thereby empowering them to enhance their cognitive abilities on an ongoing basis. Furthermore, the subject's emphasis on ethical reflection and social responsibility ensures that students are not only prepared to engage in critical thinking but also to act in a conscientious manner. By engaging with democratic values and ethical principles, students learn the importance of making decisions that are not only logical but also compassionate and just. This dual emphasis on critical thinking and ethical responsibility equips students with the capacity to become engaged citizens, capable of making thoughtfully informed contributions to their communities.

In conclusion, it can be stated that 'The World and I' is more than just a subject; it is a foundational framework for preparing students to face the intellectual, social, and moral challenges of the future. The curriculum combines the strengths of logic, philosophy, and critical thinking to foster the development of independent, reflective, and ethical thinkers who are equipped to navigate the complexities of the modern world with

confidence and integrity. The subject represents a novel addition to the educational landscape, ensuring that students are prepared not only for academic success but also for meaningful and responsible participation in society.

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Integration of the Bharatiya Knowledge System (BKS) for Holistic Development as Envisaged in National Education Policy 2020: A Theoretical Analysis

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Abstract. Ancient Bharat, i.e. Ancient India, was an epicentre of knowledge, characterised by a profound tradition that integrated spirituality, philosophy, and science. The Bharatiya Knowledge System, commonly known as the Indian Knowledge System (IKS) comprises a compendium of knowledge, customs, practices, and beliefs transmitted down through generations in India. The Upanishads and the Vedic texts – Rigveda, Yajurveda, Samaveda, and Atharvaveda – offered a comprehensive framework for understanding life and the universe in general. The Bhartiya Knowledge System's (BKS), holistic approach to education emphasizes moral, spiritual, and intellectual development. The Gurukul System was a very popular educational system in ancient Bharat. The subjects taught covered a wide range, including Sanskrit, religious literature, logic, and metaphysics. The guru played a very significant role and not only gave instructions but set examples for others to follow. The holistic development of the individual, which went beyond academic knowledge and included emotional, bodily, and spiritual well-being, was one of the main goals of the Bhartiya Knowledge System. A crucial factor that contributed to this all-encompassing development was the practice of yoga, which was documented in ancient literature. Yoga was not just a kind of physical exercise but also

a means of achieving self-discipline, mental clarity, and spiritual enlightenment. The National Education Policy 2020 seeks to bring this age-old knowledge back into the current educational system. It envisions a curriculum that fosters mental resilience, a closer relationship with one's inner self, and overall well-being. The NEP 2020 acknowledges the value of traditional Bharatiya wisdom, particularly in promoting students' emotional stability, mental well-being, and personal development. The paper follows a theoretical analysis approach, focusing on the conceptual foundations and philosophical underpinnings of the ancient Bharatiya Knowledge System. The analysis comprises a thorough examination of primary sources, including the Vedas, Upanishads, and other classical writings and secondary literature, commentaries and contemporary interpretations. The integration of these ancient concepts within contemporary education through NEP 2020, the role of yoga in personality development, and the holistic nature of the ancient education system are among the key themes that are explored. The theoretical framework explores the tenets of Bharatiya Knowledge Practice, emphasizing the connections between traditional knowledge and contemporary educational needs. As a result, the study shows how the ancient Bharatiya Knowledge System provides an integrative, holistic model of education and development that is still very relevant to contemporary teaching methods, especially when it comes to improving students' mental and emotional health.

Key Words: Ancient Bharat, Bharatiya Knowledge System (BKS), holistic development, National Education Policy 2020

Integracija starodavne indijske vednosti v vzgoji in izobraževanju, kot ju predvideva nacionalna vzgojno-izobraževalna politika 2020: teoretska analiza

Povzetek. Starodavni Bharat oz. Indija je bila središče znanja, za katerega je bila značilna bogata tradicija, ki je povezovala duhovnost, filozofijo in znanost. Upaništade in vedska besedila – Rigveda, Jadžurveda, Samaveda in Atharvaveda – so ponujali celovit okvir za razumevanje življenja in vesolja na splošno. Celostni pristop BKS (Bharatiya Knowledge System) k izobraževanju poudarja moralni, duhovni in intelektualni razvoj. Izobraževalni proces v gurukulih, tradicionalnih vzgojnih sistemih, je poudarjal izkustveno učenje, samorefleksijo in raziskovanje, saj je bilo učenje razumljeno kot vseživljenjsko prizadevanje. Guru je imel zelo pomembno vlogo in ni le dajal navodil, temveč je predstavljal zgled, ki so ga drugi posnemali. Vsestranski razvoj posameznika – ki je presegal akademsko znanje in je vključeval čustveno, telesno ter duhovno blaginjo –, je bil eden glavnih ciljev indijskega sis-

tema znanja. Ključni dejavnik, ki je prispeval k temu vsestranskemu razvoju, je bila praksa joge, ki je bila dokumentirana v starodavni literaturi. Joga ni bila le vrsta telesne vadbe, temveč tudi sredstvo za doseganje samodiscipline, duševne jasnosti in duhovnega razsvetljenja. Nacionalna izobraževalna politika (National Education Policy (NEP) 2020) poskuša to starodavno znanje vključiti v sedanji izobraževalni sistem. Predvideva učni načrt, ki spodbuja duševno odpornost, tesnejši odnos z notranjim jazom in splošno dobro počutje. NEP 2020 priznava vrednost tradicionalne indijske modrosti, zlasti pri spodbujanju čustvene stabilnosti, duševnega blagostanja in osebnega razvoja učencev. Članek sledi pristopu teoretične analize in se osredotoča na konceptualne temelje ter filozofske podlage starodavnega indijskega sistema znanja. Z metodo teoretične analize se raziskava osredotoča na filozofske in konceptualne temelje starodavnega indijskega sistema znanja. Analiza obsega temeljito analizo primarnih virov, vključno z vedami, upanišadami in drugimi klasičnimi spisi, ter sekundarne literature, komentarjev in sodobnih interpretacij. Vključevanje teh starodavnih konceptov v sodobno izobraževanje preko NEP 2020 skupaj z vlogo joge pri razvoju osebnosti in celostne narave starodavnega izobraževalnega sistema predstavlja ključne obravnavane teme. Teoretični okvir raziskuje načela indijske prakse znanja in poudarja povezave med tradicionalnim znanjem ter sodobnimi izobraževalnimi potrebami. Študija posledično pokaže, kako starodavni indijski sistem znanja zagotavlja integrativni in celostni model izobraževanja ter razvoja, ki je še vedno zelo pomemben za sodobne metode poučevanja, zlasti ko gre za izboljšanje duševnega in čustvenega zdravja učencev.

Ključne besede: starodavna Indija, indijski sistem vednosti, celovita vzgoja, indijska izobraževalna politika

Introduction

The National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 prioritises the integration of Bharatiya Knowledge System into the modern educational curriculum, intending to amalgamate traditional knowledge from diverse domains such as science, philosophy, medicine (Ayurveda), arts, and culture with modern education, thus promoting a more comprehensive learning experience grounded in India's deep heritage; essentially striving to reconcile ancient Indian wisdom with contemporary knowledge frameworks. The deep heritage of ancient Bharatiya philosophy and wisdom serves as an inspiration for the National Education Policy 2020 (Government of India, Ministry of Human Resource Development n.d.). Bharat has traditionally been an epicentre for learning. Bharat's rich culture, wealth,

beliefs, philosophies, art, architecture, and educational methods enticed travellers from all over the world (Timane and Wandhe 2024; Basham 1954). The educational system of ancient Bharat was well-known for the traditions, customs, and wisdom that served to educate and enlighten people (Radhakrishnan 1953). This lays the foundations for investigating Bharat's historic educational system and realizing its impact on societal norms and values. Our ancient Bharatiya educational system developed over time, starting from the Rigveda, and was centred on the holistic development of the individual by adhering to both the inner and outer self. Intellectual, physical, spiritual, and moral aspects of life were the main objectives of the ancient Bharatiya education system (Kumari 2017). It placed a strong focus on virtues, including discipline, humility, honesty, self-reliance, and respect for all living things. The appreciation of the harmony between humans and the environment was imparted to the students. The *Taittiriya Upanishad* emphasizes the responsibility of students toward society, particularly through the lens of *Dharma*, which refers to righteous duty (Olivelle 1996). It encourages students to uphold moral values, contribute positively to their families and communities, and share knowledge to foster collective growth. Bharat has a long history of educational practices that are realistic, pragmatic, attainable, and compatible with everyday life. Prominent educational establishments such as Nalanda and Takshashila, which offered a comprehensive, multidisciplinary education and lured academia from all over the world, serve as examples of Bharat's rich intellectual legacy. NEP 2020 continues the tradition by emphasizing how important it is for people to develop across all levels – moral, social, physical, emotional, and intellectual. With an emphasis on the highest human aspirations of knowledge, wisdom, and truth, NEP 2020 aims to incorporate indigenous knowledge systems and traditional wisdom into the contemporary educational framework. Recognizing the significance of these components, NEP 2020 seeks to provide a more culturally responsive and comprehensive educational framework that equips students for twenty-first-century problems. Modern educational systems can incorporate the most effective techniques from past centuries. The objective of NEP 2020 is to establish a dynamic and inclusive learning environment that fosters creativity, critical thinking, and cultural appreciation by incorporating parts of the Bharatiya Knowledge System into the educational system. The knowledge and methods of historical scholars and organizations can be used in modern educational systems to improve students' moral, intellectual, and social development.

Sources of Knowledge in Ancient Bharat

The Vedas, Brahmanas, Upanishads, and Dharmasutras were the principal texts used in the ancient Bharatiya educational system. Learning also came via the writings of authors such as Aryabhata, Panini, Katyayana, and Patanjali, as well as from the medical texts written by Sushruta and Charaka. Furthermore, a distinction was made between Kavyas (creative and imaginative literature) and Shastras (learned disciplines). Various disciplines, including Itihas (history), Anviksiki (logic), Mimamsa (interpretation), Shilpashastra (architecture), Arthashastra (polity), Varta (agricultural, trade, commerce, and animal husbandry), and Dhanurvedya (archery), were used as sources of knowledge. A major part of the curriculum included physical education, where students engaged in a variety of activities such as yogasadhana (mind and body training), dhanurvedya (archery for learning martial arts), vyayamaprakara (exercises), and krida (games and leisure activities) (Singh 2017). The gurus and their students together worked tirelessly to hone all areas of knowledge. Peer learning was another method that was in place in ancient times. Learned debates, or shastrartha, were arranged to evaluate students' learning, where less experienced students were supervised by more experienced students (Selvamani 2019).

Both formal and informal educational systems existed in ancient Bharat. Indigenous education was imparted in chatuspadis, gurukuls, pathshalas, tols, temples, and homes. There were adults in houses, villages, and temples who helped young children adapt religious practices. Additionally, temples served as educational hubs and helped in advancing ancient knowledge systems. For further education, students attended universities and viharas. Most of the time, instruction was given orally, and pupils took notes and meditated upon what was taught in the class. Gurukuls, named after sages, and sometimes referred to as ashrams, which served as residential centres for learning, were educational institutions where hundreds of students studied together. Even in the early Vedic era, women had access to education. There are references to several well-known female Vedic intellectuals, including Maitreyi, Viswambhara, Apala, Gargi, and Lopamudra. The Guru-Shishya relationship, lineage, or parampara constituted the foundation of the ancient Bharatiya education system. The Guru, or teacher, served as the preceptor of wisdom, nurturing and caring for his trainees as if they were his sons. The students, referred to as Shishyas resided in the Guru's abode, known as the gurukul, where

they studied the Vedas, and served the Guru as if he were their father (Pal and Chakrabarti 2024). The gurus and their shishyas coexisted, supporting each other in every aspect of life. The primary goals were self-actualization, maintaining discipline, and an extensive education. While pursuing their education in various fields, such as debating arts, history, law, medicine, etc., the focus was placed on developing the inner as well as the external aspects of every person's personality. In their pursuit of knowledge, monks and nuns built several monasteries and viharas where they could meditate, engage in discourse, and meet with scholars. Other higher education institutions grew up around these viharas, drawing students from far-off places like China, Korea, Tibet, Burma, Ceylon, Java, and Nepal (Ghonge, Bag, and Singh 2020).

Bharatiya Knowledge System: A Way of Life

Knowledge was free at the time and was regarded as sacred. Donations for education were regarded as the highest form of giving. Society, parents, and affluent companies provided financial support. In addition to buildings, gifts of land were given to the universities and free education programmes were offered at other ancient universities like Jagaddala, Valabhi, and Vikramshila. Agraharas functioned as educational hubs during the same period throughout southern Bharat. Other cultural institutions known as Ghatika and Brahmapuri were also present in the kingdoms of South Bharat. A Ghatika was a sort of educational institution that taught both religion and other subjects. An agrahara was a larger establishment, a community of erudite Brahmins with its own governing body and resources supported by contributions from the community. The ancient Bharatiya educational system continued as indigenous schools, ashrams, and temples. In the Medieval Period, Madrasas and Maktabas were incorporated into the educational system. During the Islamic period, Madrasas served as institutions of higher education and Maktabas were built for younger students for primary education (Biswas 2016). Indigenous schooling was quite popular in pre-colonial Bharat. This was an extension of the earlier-implemented formal system. The majority of the education in this system was spiritual and religious. Similar schools existed in various parts of Bharat, such as pathshalas in western Bharat, chatuspadis in Bihar, and tols in Bengal. Donations and local resources funded education. According to references found in books and memoirs, locals also sponsored education in southern Bharat. The ancient Bharatiya educational system placed a strong emphasis on develop-

ing every aspect of themselves inside and out. As a result, in the modern educational setting in Bharat, emphasis is being placed on connecting learning to real-world applications. Educationists nowadays acknowledge the value of multilingual and multicultural instruction in bridging the gap between traditional and ancient knowledge and modern education, which as a result, has contributed to the holistic development of the physical, intellectual, and spiritual aspects of life.

The first stage of the Ashrama system, which generally corresponds to the first eight years of a person's existence, is defined as learning to live independently. The following stage is typically a period of knowledge acquisition and preparation for leading a fulfilled life (Rajagopalan 2021). During the Brahmacharya Ashrama (the first stage of life in the Vedic ashrama system), students underwent Gurukulavasam, a period of residency in the guru's abode, dedicated to learning and discipline. Some scholars assert that the Gurukulavasam was more holistic and provided students with knowledge of the world (Aparavidya) in addition to knowledge of religion and spirituality (Paravidya) (Sreekala Devi and Pillai 2012). Teachers during this stage initiate all of the learning, and the pupils are seen as passive recipients of this information. It is common practice to make a negative comparison between this and contemporary educational ideas such as 'activity-based learning' and 'student-initiated learning,' which are praised for their emphasis on the student within the classroom. In contrast to this interpretation, the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad describes education as a three-step process that includes *sravana*, which refers to hearing from the instructor; *manana*, which refers to assimilation by the student through contemplation and reflection; and *Nididhyasana*, which refers to concentrated contemplation of truth to realize it (Sreekala Devi and Pillai 2012). This concept emphasizes student-centred education, with the guru serving as a resource person and facilitator. In addition, for the students to achieve greater levels of learning, they were required to demonstrate *shraddha*, which is a term that means commitment and steadfastness. This placed the students in control of charting their course of learning (Chidbavananda 1964). According to Sreekala Davi and Pillai (2012), the typical age of entry was the eighth year of an individual's life; however, it might stretch up to the twelfth year of the student's life, depending on the readiness of the student.

Through national assemblies and philosophical discussions, knowledge from a variety of disciplines, including philosophy, medicine, and military sciences, was shared at learning centres like Takshashila and

Nalanda, which served as the nucleus of intellectual exchange (Chatopadhyay 2023). Contemporary scholars agree that this method promoted moral and ethical growth in addition to intellectual understanding. Nowadays, to achieve the goal of well-rounded human development, educationists perceive these ideas as a means of integrating older holistic methods with modern educational systems. The goal of the ancient Bharatiya Education System was to develop the human personality in an orderly, systematic, and comprehensive manner. The concept of Purushartha, originating from Purusha (self) and Artha (goal), indicates four principal objectives of existence: Dharma (duty), Artha (wealth), Kama (desire), and Moksha (liberation) (Badjatya 2024). It is based on the Vedas, Upanishads, Smritis, and Mahabharata and promotes a life that is in harmony with the body, mind, intellect, and soul, giving a reasonable approach to fulfilling human urges while acknowledging their validity (Suman and Ashok 2015).

- *Dharma*: Dharma stands for morality, duty, righteousness, and ethical behaviour. It is the desire to live according to one's moral convictions, obligations, and societal expectations. Dharma places a strong emphasis on keeping moral principles, pursuing the path of righteousness, and contributing what is necessary to benefit society, the entire cosmos, and the self.
- *Artha*: Artha represents the desire for material prosperity, wealth, and well-being. To sustain oneself and one's family entails acquiring resources, maintaining one's financial stability, and ensuring one's economic security. Within the frameworks of ethics and social duty, artha includes the satisfaction of material needs and aspirations.
- *Kama*: The pursuit of desires, sensual pleasure, and aesthetic gratification is referred to as kama. It includes the fulfilment of emotional, physical, and sensory needs, such as those found in relationships, love, art, music, and other forms of enjoyment. Kama acknowledges the value of embracing happiness, beauty, and other sense pleasures in life.
- *Moksha*: The ultimate state of liberation, spiritual enlightenment, and freedom from the cycle of birth and death (samsara) can be represented as moksha. Seeking self-realization, transcendence, and unity with the divine or ultimate reality are all part of it. Moksha is the accomplishment of spiritual freedom and enlightenment, as well as the soul's release from material attachments (Panchal 2023).

The Purusharthas provide a complete framework that helps people balance their pursuit of money, pleasure, righteousness, and spiritual emancipation to negotiate the intricacies of human existence. People can work toward holistic development, moral behaviour, financial success, emotional fulfilment, and spiritual enlightenment by incorporating these four objectives throughout their lives. This will eventually result in a happy and meaningful existence (Suman and Ashok 2015).

Ancient Bharatiya education was designed to cultivate dedicated, responsible, and devout individuals who actively engaged in societal contributions (Rangachar 1964, 36). An additional component of the ancient Bharatiya educational system was teaching students about civic and social responsibilities. The pupils were not expected to live as hedonistic individuals. They were frequently reminded of their social responsibilities. The concept of perfection played a central role in the development of the human intellect and spirit in the ancient Bharatiya educational system. Individuals in ancient Bharatiya education were focused on strengthening several major universal attributes that, when combined, create a better kind of person. Any free, developed society is built on the foundation of human values, including trust, respect, honesty, dignity, and courtesy (Markandan 2001). These attributes are not necessarily substantially different from what contemporary educational systems attempt to instil in their pupils. The key purposes of ancient Bharatiya education include:

- *Fit for Society*: The aim was to prepare students to live moral and prosperous lives within society. This required reminding pupils of their responsibilities to the community as well as establishing in them a sense of civic and social duties.
- *Civic and Social Duties*: The emphasis of ancient Bharatiya education was on fostering in pupils a sense of social awareness and civic duty. They were encouraged to live non-selfish lives based on making positive contributions to society.
- *Useful Members of Society*: The primary objective was to create people who could actively work to improve society. Students were encouraged and inspired to contribute to their communities by promoting the value of social responsibility and philanthropy (Sssihl, 2020).
- *Character Development*: Ancient Bharatiya education placed a great focus on character development alongside academic knowledge. The development of virtues, moral principles, and ethical values –

all necessary for living a righteous and moral life – was emphasized for the students.

- *Holistic Development:* Bharatiya education in ancient times was structured around basic ethical principles aiming to support people's progress on all levels, including moral, intellectual, spiritual, and physical. The goal of this all-encompassing strategy is to develop complete and balanced citizens who can make meaningful contributions to society and lead prosperous lives (Radhakrishnan 1992).

By concentrating on these goals, education in ancient Bharat aimed to produce people who were not only knowledgeable but also morally pure, socially conscious, and able to significantly contribute to the well-being of society as a whole.

NEP 2020's Vision Integrating Ancient Bharatiya Pedagogical Practices

Modern educational systems can incorporate the most effective techniques from past centuries. Education in ancient Bharat was focused on the complete realization and emancipation of the self rather than just the acquisition of knowledge for practical purposes. The NEP emphasizes the highest human aspirations of knowledge, wisdom, and truth while attempting to include indigenous knowledge systems and ancient Bharatiya wisdom into the contemporary educational framework. Acknowledging the significance of these elements, the NEP seeks to develop a more comprehensive and culturally embedded educational framework that equips students for the challenges of the twenty-first century (Mukherjee 2015). The study of Sanskrit's linguistic, spiritual, and religious facets is necessary to preserve its peace, humanism, and fraternity. One of the key markers of a society's well-being, wealth, and security is its level of education. The process of education provides people with lifelong abilities that are useful. The creative capacity of Bharat has been substantially damaged by foreign invasion, which has resulted in the loss of traditional knowledge systems and the repression of local innovation (Kumar 1991). Western and Arabic/Persian influences were incorporated into Bharatiya art, literature, and architecture as a result of the legacy of colonialism, Islamic conquest, and the Mughal reign. The consequence of this was the absorption of cultures, the disruption of social and economic systems, and the loss of intellectual capital. The modern Bharatiya educational system

is primarily dominated by Western ideas, literature, culture, and STEM fields. Western education and learning methodologies are being used in Bharat to create graduates without adding any qualitative value that is appropriate. The children born into this system have lost their identity and are turning into fully American or British colonists. The greatest poet in history, Kalidasa, is mostly unknown to the majority of our children despite being an integral part of Bharatiya culture. It is advised that students learn ancient as well as modern philosophy and value systems to revive the Bharatiya tradition. The greatest texts, such as *The Life Divine*, *The Foundation of Bharatiya Culture*, and *Yoga Synthesis*, need to be included in our school curricula (Raina 2021). Hence, through ancient literature, texts, and history students in modern times learn about their rich culture and heritage.

Four Vedas: The Sources of the Philosophy in Ancient Bharat

The Vedas are the oldest and most sacred scriptures of Hinduism, serving as the foundation of spiritual, philosophical, and scientific thought in ancient Bharat. It is a source of Ancient Bharatiya history and provides direction and purpose for followers. The Rigveda, Samaveda, Yajurveda, and Atharvaveda are among the Vedas, which form the basis of Bharatiya culture (Sahoo 2024). Ancient Education in Bharat was founded on these four Vedas. People can acquire an in-depth knowledge of the overarching structure of ancient Bharatiya culture as well as the philosophy of life by studying these Vedas. As a result, the Upanishads, Smritis, Puranas, and all other Bharatiya literature and philosophy acknowledge the supremacy of the Vedas. Through them, we can understand the culture, civilization, life, and philosophy of the ancient Bharatiya people. The Vedas represent the primary objective of human existence. The Bharatiya philosophy of life has never accepted that life is purposeless.

- *Rigveda*: In Hinduism, the Rigveda is regarded as one of the four sacred Vedic texts. The Rigveda is the oldest and most important of the four Vedas, forming the foundation of Hindu philosophy, spirituality, and culture. The Rigveda shaped the spiritual, social, and intellectual landscape of ancient Bharat, influencing later Hindu scriptures like the Upanishads, Puranas, Mahabharata and Ramayana. Certain prayers from the Rigveda, including the well-known Gayatri mantra found in the Samaveda and Yajurveda, have preserved the human soul and reached the pinnacle of wisdom. Rigveda Samhita

is an anthology with more than ten thousand verses organized into ten mandalas, or books, and more than a thousand hymns, known as *suktas*. The praise and worship of the gods is the central theme of the hymns and lyrics, which also have various philosophical and thought-provoking contexts. The issues addressed in the hymns were those that dealt with the then socioeconomic challenges (Radhakrishnan and Moore 1957).

- *Samaveda*: The focus of the Samaveda is on the music of the hymns and traditions. It is comprised of approximately 1,875 verses, the majority of which are translated from the Rigveda, particularly from the eighth and ninth books of the Rigveda. It is divided into two primary pieces: the *Purvarchika*, which is the first part, and the *Uttararchika*, which is the second part. Within each of these sections, numerous sorts of chants are meant for particular rituals, most notably the *Somayaga* ('Samaveda' n.d.).
- *Yajurveda*: The Yajurveda comprises a series of written mantras. The *Hotri* (priest) is in charge of singing hymns during sacrifices, but *Adhvaryus* (the priest's assistants) lead the first class of Vedic priests in singing hymns that are directly associated with the dedication rituals. For this reason, a distinct training institution was founded to instruct these priests. While the Yajurveda contains basic kinds of prose composition, the Upanishads are the pinnacle of Bharatiya literature. In the Yajurveda, an understanding of both the religious and secular facets of Bharatiya culture can be obtained.
- *Atharvaveda*: The fourth Veda was subsequently referred to as the *Atarvaveda*. Hymns, spells, and incantations are all included in the *Atharvaveda*, which is a collection of texts that focuses on rituals, healing, and everyday living (Vashney and Suresh 2015). It differs from the other Vedas in that it contains philosophical discourses and covers practical issues of life.

Education in Ancient Bharat: Processes and Methods

The Gurukul system was a holistic and immersive educational approach that was used in ancient Bharat. In this system, students lived with their Guru (teacher) to acquire information in an atmosphere that was both rigorous and caring. Unlike modern institutional education, the Gurukul system emphasized experiential learning, ethical development, and practical application of knowledge. The subjects ranged from religion to phi-

losophy, medicine, literature, military, astrology, history, and mathematics. Students were encouraged to pursue wisdom throughout their lives by being active participants in their intellectual and spiritual development rather than just passive recipients of knowledge (Radhakrishnan 1953). The ancient Bharatiya education system was based on a three-step learning process. The first step, known as *Sravana* (Listening), required learners to pay close attention to the Guru's teachings, which were communicated verbally. This approach followed to the *Sruti* tradition, which did not involve the writing down of information but rather the vocal transmission of information, hence highlighting the significance of auditory learning and memory. Students were expected to comprehend the fundamental truths that were disclosed by the Guru, and listening was not a passive activity but rather an active involvement (Simjith and Vasudevan, 2017).

During the *Manana* (Reflection and Contemplation) period, students were required to analyse, contemplate, and internalise the knowledge that they had gained through *Sravana*. Critical thinking and reasoning were emphasised throughout this stage, and students were given the opportunity to construct their own interpretations and test their own understanding through discussion and debate. *Shastrartha* (philosophical debates) and group discussions were essential for assessing and improving students' conceptual understanding (Kumar 1991).

Nididhyasana (Application) focused on the practical application of the acquired knowledge. The students were encouraged to integrate what they were learning into their everyday lives, which ensured that they gained experiential wisdom rather than just theoretical understanding. This phase sought to promote intellectual, spiritual, and ethical growth by transforming intellectual knowledge into lived experience and achieving a profound alteration of the self (Simjith and Vasudevan, 2017).

The Vedic education system employed three primary teaching methodologies:

- *Oral Transmission* (*Shruti* and *Smriti* Tradition), where students memorized Vedic hymns and Rigvedic verses. This guaranteed the transmission of knowledge from one generation to the next before the emergence of written texts. Mnemonic techniques, including recitation, repetition, and chanting, were implemented to improve retention (Altekar 2009).
- *The Gurukul method* emphasized reflective thinking (*Chintan* and

Manana Shakti), which went beyond the concept of memorisation. Students were able to build their autonomous thought processes through the use of this method, which acknowledged that reasoning and self-inquiry were essential components of the learning process. The principle of thought (Manana Shakti) was considered superior to the mere accumulation of information, making self-education and intellectual exploration essential components of learning (Kumar 1988).

- *Debate*, also known as Shastrathra, was an quintessential part of Vedic education. During this time, students engaged in intellectual discourse to challenge and increase their level of comprehension. This approach was helpful in developing a culture of critical inquiry, as well as in enhancing reasoning abilities and elucidating concepts. Students were allowed to engage in rigorous debates on philosophical issues, which assisted them in developing their ability to think independently and apply logical thinking while attempting to solve problems (Shireeshkumar, Gore, and Popatwar 2023).

The all-encompassing educational approach of ancient Bharat ensured that students developed not only intellectual acumen but also moral integrity and life skills. Ethical and spiritual disciplines were taught alongside astronomy, mathematics, medicine, and strategy to develop well-rounded people. The Gurukul system was a powerful form of education that went beyond academics to change the ethical and intellectual fabric of society (Altekar 2009). This was made possible by the focus placed on experiential learning, critical reflection, and ethical living.

Role of Yoga in Personality Development

Within the framework of traditional Bharatiya philosophy and the practice of Yoga, the Niyamas are inward constraints or observances that direct people toward self-improvement, self-control, and spiritual advancement. The Yamas, as they are known in the context of ancient Bharatiya philosophy and education, are self-disciplines or ethical disciplines that direct people's behaviour and social relationships. The Yamas are regarded as essential guidelines for moral behaviour and spiritual development. The practice of Yoga Sastra includes five Yamas that serve as guidelines for ethical behaviour and self-control (Agrawal and Pandey 2022). These are:

- *Ahimsa* (Non-violence): This concept places a strong emphasis on

acting with compassion and non-violence toward all living things. It means refraining from harming oneself or others, including physical or mental abuse. Ahimsa encourages compassion, understanding, and harmonious coexistence.

- *Satya* (Truthfulness): Satya is the dedication to speaking, thinking, and responding with truthfulness. It means refraining from dishonesty, deceit, and cheating. Satya practice promotes sincerity, morality, and genuineness in interpersonal interactions.
- *Asteya* (Non-stealing): Asteya places a strong emphasis on abstaining from coveting, stealing, or taking something that is not one's own. It entails being truthful in one's economic dealings, treating others with respect, and learning to be content with what one has.
- *Brahmacharya* (Celibacy or Continence): This has traditionally been considered as one of the Yamas in yoga practice. It entails exercising restraint, self-control, and directing one's energies toward spiritual endeavours. Brahmacharya promotes sensory experiences, relational discipline, and vital energy conservation.
- *Aparigraha* (Non-greed or Possessiveness): Aparigraha stresses contentment, simplicity, and non-attachment in daily life. It entails abstaining from excessive association with material belongings, collecting, and selfishness. Aparigraha encourages generosity, detachment, and an emphasis on inner richness as opposed to material possessions. People develop self-discipline, moral integrity, and ethical behaviour in their daily lives by adhering to the Yamas. The Yamas direct people toward a path of self-awareness, self-improvement, and the moral life by serving as principles for harmony, compassion, and spiritual development.

As part of the practice of Yoga Sastra, there are five Niyamas that centre on developing beneficial attributes and attitudes within oneself. The five Niyamas are:

- *Saucha* (Cleanliness and Purity): Saucha places a strong emphasis on the body, mind, and thoughts being virtuous and clean. It entails upholding mental clarity, emotional purity, and physical hygiene. Saucha promotes punctuality, neatness, and clarity for both one's external surroundings and internal state.
- *Santosha* (Contentment): Santosha denotes inner satisfaction and contentment with one's situation and experiences. It entails embracing and enjoying life as it comes, free from an obsessive need for

more material goods, money, or approval from others. Santosha cultivates calmness, thankfulness, and peace of mind.

- *Tapas* (Self-Control and Hard Work): Tapas is the discipline, austerity, and readiness to work hard for one's own development and spiritual advancement. It includes exercising restraint, tenacity, and devotion in one's undertakings. Tapas develops inner strength, persistence, and determination.
- *Svadhyaya* (Self-Study and Self-Reflection): Svadhyaya emphasizes self-study, introspection, and lifelong learning. It encompasses the study of sacred texts, scriptures, and philosophical teachings, as well as self-reflection on one's thoughts, emotions, and behaviours. Svadhyaya fosters intellectual growth, self-awareness, and self-discovery.
- *Ishvarapranidhana* (Surrender to a Higher Power): This emphasizes giving in to a higher or divine power. It entails admitting and accepting the existence of a higher reality beyond individual control and cultivates humility, faith, and trust in a greater purpose or guiding force (Patal 2019).

The Niyamas are a set of rules for cultivating virtues, good traits, and attitudes that aid people on their path to inner peace and self-realization (Iyengar 1965). Through the Niyamas, people achieve inner purity, contentment, self-discipline, self-reflection, and submission to a higher force (Bhatta 2009). These qualities promote spiritual development and alignment with higher ideals. Teaching used to take into account the qualifications (leadership qualities) of students (*adhikaritva*), but in the modern educational system, this is difficult to do. The teachers of old possessed some innate qualities (*shtrotiriyam*, *brahmanistha*) that enabled them to impart knowledge of both the highest spiritual and worldly nature. Together, the Niyamas and Yamas (self-restraints) provide a comprehensive ethical and moral framework for those who want to reform themselves and live a holistic, well-rounded life (Bhavanani, Ramanathan, and Madanmohan 2013). The setting in which students and teachers interact has drastically changed, with a greater emphasis now being placed on student-centric strategies for helping students develop their greatest abilities. Vocational training was integral to the earlier education system, but reviving it poses challenges. To achieve the best outcomes, it is essential to blend traditional education's wisdom with the modern system's strengths. Since yoga emphasizes the cultivation of the body and mind, the present-day educational system admires it as one such technique that

can be utilized to bridge the gap between ancient and modern value systems (Ranade and Nikam 2023). The practical benefits of yoga are being recognized in various domains of life. Yoga is an emerging field that requires greater emphasis in modern curricula. As a cohesive and rigorous multifaceted discipline, it plays a vital role in fostering holistic personality development. It occupies a unique place in the modern world as a process of refinement of the physical, intellectual, emotional, social, and spiritual arena of an individual. The present education system accentuates only some of the aspects of the personality of a student but is lacking in the holistic development of personality. Students are facing numerous issues and difficulties on a physical, emotional, and intellectual level as a result of this. The preventive, restorative, and nurturing principles of yoga can offer guidance for a holistic personality (Naragatti, Hosakote, and Anburani 2023).

Implementational Strategies

In contemporary Bharat, the curriculum in all disciplines is primarily shaped by current Western intellectual and cultural traditions. While knowledge from diverse intellectual traditions can be enlightening, no single framework offers the absolute or best way to understand nature and reality. The dominance of a monocultural approach in the Bharatiya education system has resulted in an excessive dependence on Eurocentric knowledge frameworks, epistemologies, and ontologies. The lasting impact of colonialism is apparent in Bharat's most prestigious academic institutions. The National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 seeks to amalgamate traditional knowledge systems with contemporary educational practices, acknowledging the profundity of ancient Bharatiya wisdom. This method recognises Bharat's profound intellectual heritage while aiming to render education more culturally grounded, inclusive, and responsive to societal demands. NEP 2020 aims to establish an accessible, holistic, and successful learning framework by incorporating Indigenous educational traditions. This policy is based on the pursuit of knowledge (Jnan), truth (Satya), and wisdom (Pragya), which are historically considered the ultimate human endeavours in Bharatiya philosophy.

An essential implementation strategy of NEP 2020 is the integration of traditional knowledge systems into contemporary curricula. Education is conceived as a mechanism for cultivating moral consciousness and intellectual capacities, promoting a holistic perspective that transcends materialistic pursuits. The policy encourages a multidisciplinary, flexi-

ble approach, providing students with multiple entry and exit points following the completion of Class 10. This approach empowers students to make well-informed decisions, guaranteeing that education remains readily accessible, personalized to their needs, and appropriately related to what they desire. The National Curriculum Frameworks for School Education (NCF-SE) 2023 and Foundational Stage (NCF-FS) 2022 emphasise an in-depth foundation of traditional education. Modern educational systems draw inspiration from the Gurukul system, which is renowned for fostering self-reliance, discipline, and moral principles. These frameworks seek to cultivate well-rounded persons endowed with a profound sense of responsibility and purpose by integrating contemporary instructional strategies with traditional wisdom. Other than that, NEP 2020 emphasises the importance of yoga, meditation, and ancient wellness practices rooted in texts such as the Gita and the Upanishads. These components support mental, emotional, and physical health, highlighting the importance of education in developing resilient and thoughtful individuals. NEP 2020 proposes a dynamic, inclusive, and future-ready education system by blending traditional knowledge with modern techniques. This approach not only equips students with critical thinking and creativity but also ensures that learning remains deeply rooted in Bharatiya values and intellectual traditions.

Conclusion

The incorporation of ancient Bharatiya knowledge and traditions within the framework of the National Education Policy of 2020 (Government of India, Ministry of Human Resource Development n.d.) has the potential to make a substantial contribution to the achievement of the policy's aims of providing an education that is both holistic and inclusive. Additionally, the emphasis placed on experiential learning through practices such as *Savana*, *Manana*, and *Nididhyasana* helps to cultivate critical thinking, self-reflection, and a profound comprehension of information, which is in line with the NEP 2020's emphasis on competency-based education. In addition, traditional educational models, such as the Gurukula model, emphasize individualized instruction and mentoring, both of which have the potential to contribute to increased student engagement and achievement. According to the findings of several studies, modern education can solve contemporary difficulties, such as mental well-being and emotional resilience, by combining these old traditions. The National Education Policy 2020 (NEP 2020) unveils the capacity to propel a more balanced, inclusive, and transformative educational landscape that not only

prepares students for academic achievement but also for personal and social growth. This is accomplished by drawing on the rich heritage of Bharatiya knowledge and its pedagogical practices.

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Logiške in znanstvenoteoretične
raziskave
*Investigations in Logics
and Theory of Science*

Epistemologija vrlin in Nezemljani

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Povzetek. Širokomiselnost je osrednja epistemska vrлина. V članku analiziram izpeljavo: »Nihče ni dokazal, da ne *p*. Mogoče je, da *p*. Zato bi morali biti širokomiselni glede resnice *p*.« Sklep je neupravičen, kadar sklepanje začnemo z *ignoranco* (intelektualna pomanjkljivost), izpeljemo *šibko* epistemsko možnost (golo združljivost z védenjem) in sklenemo z *golo* odprtostjo. A tudi nevednost, ki ni ignoranca, ne vodi vedno do krepke epistemske možnosti. Skeptični argumenti niso prepričevalni (prvi premisi lahko utemeljeno nasprotujemo), vendar niso zmotni (ne temeljijo na ignoranci). *Resnost* dane možnosti je včasih odvisna od pragmatičnih dejavnikov. Sprejemam razliko med agnosticizmom kot nevtralno epistemsko držo in raziskovalno usmerjenim vzdržanjem sodbe. Nekatera vprašanja so nerešljiva, gre za globoko nevednost, zaradi katere širokomiselnost ni upravičena. Spoznavno-teoretske dileme ponazarjam z aktualno temo neprepoznanih anomalnih pojavov (NAP, angl. UAP – *unidentified anomalous phenomena*).

Ključne besede: epistemologija vrlin, širokomiselnost, nevednost, epistemska možnost, skepticizem, vzdržanje sodbe

Virtue Epistemology and Extraterrestrials

Abstract. Open-mindedness is a central epistemic virtue. Sometimes it is inferred as a conclusion in the scheme: 'No one has disproved that *p*. It is possible that *p* is true. Therefore, we should keep an open mind as regards *p*.' The conclusion is unjustified when we commence with *ignorance* (an intellectual failing), infer *weak* epistemic possibility (bare compatibility with the knowledge base) and conclude with *mere* openness. However, radical skeptical arguments are not fallacious, but they are not cogent either, one of the premises can be rationally refuted. Moreover, even a weaker type of possibility, if *serious*, can justify inquiry. The seriousness of an epistemic possibility sometimes depends on pragmatic factors of the epistemic situation (pragmatic encroachment). I accept the distinction between suspension (active, goal oriented, connected with inquiry) and agnosticism (merely being neutral). Some questions remain inherently unanswerable, serving as a

testament to our deep ignorance—a stark contrast to the rationality of open-mindedness. Epistemic dilemmas are illustrated with the controversies surrounding UAP (unrecognized anomalous phenomena).

Key Words: virtue epistemology, open-mindedness, ignorance, epistemic possibility, skepticism, suspension

NLP, NAP in širokomiselnost

Navdušenci nad Nezemljani (ni jih malo) so se razveselili javne obravnave neprepoznanih anomalnih pojavov (NAP, angl. UAP – *unidentified anomalous phenomena*) v ameriškem kongresu (27. julij 2023). Akronim NAP je nadomestil razvpiti NLP (angl. UFO), saj res ni nujno, da bi bila morebitna nezemeljska tehnologija premikanja omejena na letenje.¹ Tudi lebdenje, plavanje ali kakšni še manj predstavljeni načini bi lahko vodili do opažanj čudnih pojavov. Še prej je posebna skupina strokovnjakov pri NASI predstavila analizo NAP – od približno osemsto poročil o opažanjih jih po skrbnem pregledu in iskanju najboljših pojasnil dva do pet odstotkov ostaja *anomalnih*, takšnih, da jih ne moremo takoj pojasniti z opazovalcem ali načinom rabe instrumenta opazovanja (Frank 2023, 74). Rezultati so pričakovani, tudi to, da domnevne priče opozarjajo na teorijo *zarote*: vlada bojda namerno prikriva podatke in skriva artefakte. Politično bolj ozaveščenim je tudi jasen eden od razlogov, zakaj je kljub turbulentni medijski zgodovini pojav deležen resnejše obravnave. »Vložki« so se povečali, gre za nacionalno varnost in zaskrbljenost zaradi morda nepoznane kitajske vohunske tehnologije (razvpiti incident z balonom nad ozemljem ZDA februarja 2023).²

Tema ima zajeten »dosje,« vendar odpira tudi vrsto spoznavno-teoretskih vprašanj. Najbolj me bodo zanimale dileme v epistemologiji *hib* in *vrlin*. Vodja znanstvene ekipe pri NASI je opozoril, da raziskovalci krmarijo med Scilo in Karibdo, mnogim v znanstveni skupnosti se zdi, da je tema od vsega začetka naravnost smešna, na drugi strani pa je množica fanatičnih privrženecv obstoja Nezemljanov. Direktorica NASE brani svoje raziskovalce in pri tem uporabi razvpiti pojem »nadlegovanje« (angl. *harassment*), ki naj bi ga bili deležni, ker se s tem sploh resno ukvarjajo (Fox v Gabbatt 2023): »Nadlegovanje vodi samo v nadaljnjo stigmatizacijo področja NAP, to pa ovira znanstveni napredek in odvrča od preučevanja te pomembne teme. Takšno nadlegovanje prav tako obstruira pravico jav-

¹ V rabi je tudi fraza *unidentified aerial phenomena*, neprepoznani zračni pojavi.

² Prim. recimo Wikipedia (2024).

nosti do védenja.«V jeziku sodobne epistemologije vrlin: šikaniranje raziskovalcev *NAP* je znak dogmatičnosti, torej epistemska *hiba*, ne pa *širokomiselnosti* (odprtosti duha, angl. *open-mindedness*), ki je ena od osrednjih epistemskih *vrlin* pravih znanstvenikov.

Vrnimo se dobrih trideset let nazaj, še v čase »navadnih« *NLP*-jev. Jonathan Adler je bil zagovornik strogega *evidencializma* v epistemologiji: kadar nimaš ustreznih razlogov za neko prepričanje, je nedopustno, da bi sploh *imel* takšno prepričanje. Zato se je zgražal nad razmišljanjem novinarja C. D. B. Bryana, ki je leta 1992 poročal o konferenci, ki so jo na slovitom Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) posvetili domnevnim ugrabitvam ameriških državljanov s strani Nezemljanov. Novinar je zagovarjal stališče, da bi morali biti vsaj »odprti« do te hipoteze, ker gre za nekaj, kar je *mogoče* resnično, saj ni odločilnih dokazov proti. Adler (2002, 105) meni, da nikakor ni razumno (dopustno) biti prepričan v to, da Nezemljani ugrabljajo ljudi (in nad njimi izvajajo zapletene fizične in psihološke postopke), zato Bryanu očita, da v zagovoru širokomiselnosti uporablja zmotno sklepanje. Gre za *ad ignorantiam*, zmoto, ki jo učbeniki pogosto poenostavljeno predstavljajo v precej »butasti« obliki, v kateri nastopa *kategorični* sklep:

Ni dokazov, da duhov ni. Torej duhovi obstajajo.

Kaj pa v primeru *NAP*? Obstajajo dokumentirana opazovanja, ki ostajajo anomalna. Šibkejši sklep je potem morda vsaj smiseln:

Nihče ni dokazal, da ne gre za zunajzemeljsko tehnologijo. Mogoče je, da gre za zunajzemeljsko tehnologijo. Zato moramo biti širokomiselni glede obstoja takšne tehnologije.

Prav takšen vzorec Adler razbere v spornem razmišljanju poročevalca o ugrabitvah. Zanimala me bo samo takšna poenostavljena različica s skromnejšim sklepom, ki jo bom poimenoval *Adlerjev vzorec* (prim. Adler 2002, 105; pri Adlerju sicer nastopa malo zapletenejša shema):

Nevednost Nihče ni dokazal, da ne *p* (tudi: nihče ni ovrgel, da *p*).

Torej,

Možnost Mogoče je, da *p*.

Torej,

Odprtost Morali bi biti širokomiselni glede *p*.

Adler odločno nasprotuje širokomiselnosti glede domnevnih ugrabitv, a kaj reči o sodobnejši in »blažji« različici, obravnavi *NAP* kot *resne*

možnosti obstoja nezemeljske tehnologije, ki je vredna, da jo preiskujemo? V čem je razlika? Najprej seveda v *radikalnosti* hipoteze (dejanške ugrabitve ali »samo« morebitna tehnologija zunajzemeljskega izvora). Potem v *tehtnosti* sklepa: razumnost (dopustnost) prepričanja, da *p* (ugrabitve) ali samo širokomiselnost glede resnice *p* (nezemeljska tehnologija). Ali pa načelne razlike sploh *ni* in gre v obeh primerih za zmotno razmišljanje, kot bi morda menil Adler? Kritizirani novinar bi verjetno zagovarjal nasprotno stališče: obe sklepanji sta *dobri*, kako je lahko širokomiselnost nekaj slabega? Sklepanja iz odsotnosti dokazil so predmet preučevanja v neformalni logiki (zmota *ad ignorantiam*, prim., recimo, Brengant in Vezjak 2007, 80; Šuster 2019b). V tem članku me zanima izključno spoznavno-teoretska presoja Adlerjevega vzorca, ki temelji na razmisleku o pojmi nevednost, epistemska možnost in širokomiselnost.

Epistemologija vrlin

Čeprav »epistemologija vrlin« zveni malo starinsko in konservativno (azijska država, ki ima »Ministrstvo za promocijo vrlin in preprečevanje grehov«, ne slovi po svoji naprednosti), gre za pomembno vejo sodobne, aplicirane epistemologije. Osnovni predmet presoje so spoznavalci, njihove intelektualne sposobnosti in značajske značilnosti. Epistemske (tudi kognitivne, intelektualne) vrline (kreposti) so navade ali načini razmišljanja, ki prispevajo k temu, da pridemo do resnice, razumevanja, spoznanja ... ali se izognemo zmoti. Epistemske hibe so potem obstrukcije spoznanja – dispozicije, značajske značilnosti ali načini razmišljanja, zaradi katerih je manj verjetno, da pridemo do spoznanja, ga ohranimo, delimo z drugimi ali se izognemo zmoti (prim. Cassam 2019). *Širokomiselnost* je nedvomno občudovanje vredna značajska lastnost, povezana z lastnostmi, ki jih cenimo: radovednostjo, intelektualno poštenostjo in raziskovalnostjo. Širokomiselna oseba ne sklepa prenačljeno, premišljeno presoja o alternativah in je pripravljena spremeniti svoje prepričanje. Natančneje: za širokomiselno osebo je značilno, da je (a) pripravljena in (v mejah) sposobna (b) preseči svoje privzeto spoznavno stališče (c), da bi tako sprejela ali resno obravnavala prednosti (d) drugačnega spoznavnega stališča (Baehr 2011, 202). Kdaj iz nevednosti, ki jo izraža premisa »Nihče ni dokazal, da ne *p*«, upravičeno izpeljemo širokomiselnost glede *p* in kdaj ne?

Predlagam, da najprej ločimo dve vrsti epistemskih vrlin znotraj širšega področja širokomiselnosti. *Raziskovalnost* (angl. *inquisitiveness*) naj bo pripravljenost preiskovati relevantne intelektualne opcije, tudi takrat, ko še *nimamo* prepričanj o neki temi in jih želimo šele oblikovati. Njena

podzvrst je standardna *širokomiselnost*; tipično gre za nek intelektualni konflikt, v katerem oseba sicer *ima* določeno *prepričanje*, a ga je pripravljena spremeniti, zato resno obravnava relevantna drugačna stališča. Številne znanstvenike je Fermijev paradoks – navidez velika verjetnost obstoja takega življenja glede na število zunajsončnih planetov in domnevno popolno pomanjkanje potrjujočih dokazil – prepričal, da *ni* inteligentnega življenja izven Zemlje (kaj šele obiskov Nezemljanov na Zemlji). Še vedno pa so lahko *širokomiselni* glede nasprotnega stališča, morda celo do pojavov zunajzemeljskih tehnologij na Zemlji. Izjavo direktorice NASE bi lahko tolmačili prav kot zagovor *širokomiselnosti* glede NAP – kljub sprejetemu izhodiščnemu prepričanju večine znanstvenikov, da *ne* gre za zunajzemeljske pojave, so tudi nasprotna stališča vredna obravnave. Svoje prepričanje »damo v oklepaj« in se začasno, v namene raziskave, *vzdržimo* sodbe. Kot primer *raziskovalnosti* pa vzemimo kako zgodovinsko uganko, recimo Fajstosov disk s Krete – glinast disk, datiran med letoma 1950 in 1400 pred našim štetjem. Na obeh straneh je pokrit s simboli (45 različnih znakov, skupaj 241 znakov, razporejenih v spiralo) – ali gre za pisavo? In kakšno – zlogovno, abecedno, logografsko? Nekateri menijo, da sploh ni avtentičen, ampak gre za prevaro. Lahko, da je pisava, lahko, da ni. Morda gre za avtentičen zgodovinski artefakt, morda ne, ampak ni odločilnih dokazil, da ne. Ne vemo, saj glede na dokazila ne moremo razločiti med alternativami. Vprašanje je relativno pomembno, na mestu sta vzdržanje sodbe in *raziskovalnost*.

V obeh primerih je širokomiselnost povezana z začetnim vzdržanjem sodbe. Spoznavna teorija standardno pozna tri »doksastične« odnose (mnenjske, »prepričanjaške« drže), med seboj izključujoče se, skupaj pa izčrpne načine, ki jih spoznavalec lahko zavzame do neke propozicije *p*: (1) prepričanje, da je propozicija *p* resnična (angl. *belief*); (2) zavračanje prepričanja, da je *p* resnična (angl. *disbelief*)³; (3) vzdržanje sodbe (angl. *suspension*), zadržanje (angl. *withhold*) presoje glede resnice, da *p* – nismo prepričani, da je resnična in nismo prepričani, da je neresnična. Po vplivnem stališču Jane Friedman (2013, 166) vzdržanje sodbe o neki zadevi ni gola odsotnost prepričanj za ali proti, ampak je epistemsko primerno, če in samo če je primerna *raziskava* te zadeve. Določilo tega odnosa je neko vprašanje (ali propozicija, ki tvori vsebino tega vprašanja), vzdrža-

³ Nevera (nem. *Unglaube*) v slovenščini nakazuje dvom in nezaupanje v *p*, a tu gre za nekaj močnejšega – za zavračanje prepričanja, da *p*. Pogosto se enači zavračanje resnice prepričanja, da *p*, in sprejemanje prepričanja, da ne *p*, a to ni samoumevno (prim. Smart 2020).

nje pa pomeni, da iščemo odgovor in zadevo preiskujemo ali raziskujemo (angl. *inquire*). Vzdržanje sodbe je prav preko takšne aktivne raziskave povezano s širokomiselnostjo: odprtost glede p je smiselna, kadar imamo razloge za radovednost in raziskavo vprašanja, ali p .

Stališče Jane Friedman bom problematiziral, a začnimo s takšnim, aktivnim in ciljno usmerjenim vzdržanjem sodbe. Kdaj je takšen doksaistični odnos *neustrezen*? V dveh primerih: kadar je naš epistemski položaj glede nekega vprašanja tako *dober*, da vzdržanje sodbe ni primerna drža. In pa kadar je naš epistemski položaj glede nekega vprašanja tako *slab*, da raziskovalnost ni smiselna. Alternativi sta odvisni od razumevanja prve premise Adlerjevega vzorca, zato začnimo z razmislekom o nevednosti, ki jo izraža začetna premisa »Nihče ni dokazal, da ...«.

Ignoranca

»Vse srečne družine so si podobne, vsaka nesrečna družina pa je nesrečna po svoje,« se glasi znameniti Tolstojev začetek romana *Ana Karenina* (Tolstoj 2015). Uporaben je na različnih področjih: oznaka uspeha na nekem področju je običajno enostavnejša od oznake neuspeha, spodleti nam lahko na zelo različne načine. V primeru spoznanja: primeri »sreče« in uspeha (védenja) so si podobni (čeprav se epistemologi morda ne strinjajo glede natančne oznake), obstaja pa mnogo zelo različnih vrst nevednosti. Ker je razlikovanj veliko, se bom najprej oprl na ločnico med, grobo rečeno, zavestno, racionalno, dokazilno ... nevednostjo in popolno, globoko, radikalno, brezmejno ... V povezavi s prvo lahko govorimo o zadržanju sodbe in odprtosti za raziskavo, o radovednosti glede odgovora na neko vprašanje. Majhen otrok sploh nima prepričanj o teoriji strun, ker nima pojmovnih sposobnosti, da bi dojel propozicije o teoretski fiziki. Zato se tudi ne more, denimo, vzdržati sodbe glede teze, da so osnovni gradniki vsega strune velikosti Planckove dolžine, ki valovijo z resonančnimi frekvencami. Nobenega *doksastičnega* odnosa do te propozicije nima, zato ne more biti *racionalno* neveden.

Privzemimo takšno, zavestno nevednost v oznaki Adlerjevega vzorca. Oseba S razume propozicijo, da (ne) p , razmišlja (presoja) o njeni (ne)resnici, vendar ni prepričana, da je neresnična. Učbeniški primeri zmote *ad ignorantiam* kažejo, da je izpeljava širokomiselnosti lahko izraz neke *spoznavne pomanjkljivosti*:

Nihče še ni dokazal, da duhov ni. Mogoče je, da obstajajo. Zato moramo biti širokomiselni glede sprejemanja njihovega obstoja.

Tistemu, ki tako argumentira, lahko očitamo neke vrste spoznavno »šlamparijo«: obstoj duhov je v nasprotju z vsem, kar vemo o svetu, ne-skladen je s sodobno znanostjo, premisa izraža neko intelektualno lenobo in malomarnost. Vzemimo malo resnejši primer, ki ga zgodovinarji poznajo pod imenom *ex silentio* (če kak pomemben dogodek ali pojav v zgodovinskih virih ni zabeležen, je to razlog za dvom v njegov nastop). Slavni benečanski popotnik Marco Polo (1254–1324) nikdar ne omenja znamenitega Kitajskega zidu, rabe paličic kot jedilnega pribora, povezovanja nog pri deklicah in kitajske kaligrafije. Gre za velike kitajske »znamenitosti,« njihova odsotnost v spisih pa naj bi dokazovala, da v resnici nikdar ni bil na Kitajskem (prim. Wood, 1995). Torej bi morali biti širokomiselni glede te možnosti? Resni zgodovinarji takšnega razmišljanja ne sprejemajo – Velikega zidu, kot ga danes poznamo, v času Marca Pola sploh še ni bilo. Pitje čaja pa naj bi bilo tako razširjeno, da se nikomur ni zdelo vredno omembe, enako velja za rabo paličic (prim. de Rachewiltz, 1997). Možnost, da Polo ni bil na Kitajskem, se večini zgodovinarjev ne zdi vredna preučevanja, to ni nekaj, glede česar bi morali biti širokomiselni. Frances Wood očita, da ne upošteva vseh relevantnih dejstev in alternativnih pojasnil. Prva premisa našega vzorca – »Nobenega dokaza ni, da je bil Marco Polo na Kitajskem« – temelji na neustreznem raziskovanju virov in defektni obravnavi dokazil.

Mislim, da to značilnost nevednosti najbolje izrazi *normativno* pojmovanje nevednosti, ki nastopa v sodobni epistemologiji vrlin in hib. Oseba je nevedna, kadar se ne zaveda dejstev in dokazil, ki bi se jih *morala* zavedati (prim. Pritchard 2021). Normativno komponento nevednosti približno označi izraz »ignoranca.« Več jezikov loči nevednost in ignoranco (recimo, v nemščini *Unwissenheit* in *Ignoranz*, prim. Meylan 2024, 217). Lahko gre za zavestno ignoriranje, hoteno, načrtno nevednost (prim. Grušovnik 2022, 146–147). A tu me ne zanima nevednost kot hiba sama po sebi, ampak *ignoranca* kot kršitev spoznavnih dolžnosti dobre raziskave. Ignoranca je izraz neke intelektualne pomanjkljivosti, zaradi katere ne oblikujemo resničnega prepričanja, ki bi ga *lahko* in *morali*, če bi izpolnili svojo epistemsko dolžnost.

Kako nam Pritchardova normativna oznaka pomaga v presoji Adlerjevega vzorca? Veliko *zmotnih* sklepanj iz nevednosti lahko pripišemo prav *ignoranci*, ki nastopa v prvi premisi vzorca in tipično manifestirano ali več epistemskih *hib*. Morda gre za intelektualno lenobo, lahkovernost, malomarnost, zanesenost, površnost, brezbržnost, aroganco, opuščenost, pobožne želje, slepo zaupanje ... , zaradi česar vztrajamo pri za-

četni premisi.⁴ Ali je mogoče, da toča, ki je julija 2023 pustošila po delu Evrope, ni naravnega izvora, ampak delo skrivnostnih vladnih služb? Veliko ljudi je menilo, da to ni *povsem* izključeno. Toda sklepanje »Ni dokazil, da ne gre za nenaraven pojav. To je čisto mogoče, zato bi morali biti širokomiselni glede namernih posegov v vremenske pojave.« je slabo. Gre za kršitev pravil dobre raziskave, slabo informiranost in še kakšno epistemsko hibo, tako značilno za številne zagovornike teorij zarote (lahkovernost, intelektualno lenobo, omejenost, slepo zaupanje svoji »skupini« ...).

Ampak ali ni »intervencija v oblakih« nekaj, kar je vsaj *mogoče*, kljub drugačnim zagotovilom strokovnjakov? Za kakšno *možnost* pa tu sploh gre? Prešeren ni v svojem življenju nikdar obiskal Amerike, lahko pa bi jo. Gre za metafizično *možnost* (svet in Prešeren v njem bi lahko bila drugačna) in epistemsko *nujnost* propozicije, da Prešeren ni nikdar obiskal Amerike. Dokazila, ki jih danes posedujemo, in naša najboljša sklepanja na osnovi teh dokazil zadoščajo, da izključimo resnico propozicije: »Prešeren je v teku svojega življenja obiskal Ameriko.« Je Prešeren kdaj v svojem življenju obul eno rumeno in eno črno nogavico? Kolikor vemo, to ni popolnoma izključeno, gre za epistemsko možnost. Propozicija je epistemsko možna za dano osebo, kadar je združljiva z vsemi dokazili in s celotnim znanjem dane osebe. Gre za negativno in relativno oznako (*glede* na nek korpus spoznanj ali dokazil dane osebe *ni* izključeno, da *p*) in *šibko* epistemsko možnost (takšna možnost ne zahteva nobene podpore kakšnih dokazil). Ampak mogoče je tudi, da je Prešeren avtor določenih neuglednih verzov dvomljivega slovesa, ki ne sodijo v visoko kulturo. To ni le združljivo z vsem, kar o njem vemo, obstajajo *pričevanja* o njegovi priložnostni verzifikaciji za vesele družbe – ta *kreпка* epistemska možnost pa je vsaj nekoliko podprta z dokazili in, vsaj za nekatere, vredna nadaljnje raziskave.⁵

Razliko med šibko in krepko epistemsko možnostjo naj ponazorim še z enim primerom. Denimo, da stojim pred zaklenjenimi vrati stanovanja in ne najdem ključev. Ni izključeno, da mi jih je zaradi neke potegavščine izmaknil eden od meni zoprnejših znancev, s katerim sem se precej nerad srečal na kavi. Naj ga pokličem in preverim? Ampak veliko verjetneje je, da sem ključe nekje na poti izgubil (ali nisem nosil vetrovke s ključi kar v rokah?) ali pa jih kje pozabil. Smiselneje je preverjati *te* možnosti,

⁴ Seznam podrobno obravnava Šetar (2024).

⁵ Prim. Hladnik (b.l.).

če pa znanca že kličem, potem je bolj na mestu vprašanje, če je ključne kje videl (ne pa, ali mi jih je izmaknil). Izguba na poti ali pozaba ključev je *krepka* epistemska možnost, takšna, da je vsaj do neke mere podprta z dokazili in vredna nadaljnje *raziskave* (prim. Przyjemski 2017). Razliko včasih ohlapno naznačimo s pojmom verjetnosti: *mogoče* je, da mi je znanec izmaknil ključ, *verjetno* pa to ni.

Kako sta dva pojma možnosti povezna s širokomiselnostjo? Krepka epistemska možnost zahteva vsaj minimalno podporo, ki legitimira smiselnost nadaljnje raziskave. Toda »nismo dolžni preverjati svojih resničnih prepričanj, če smo v njih upravičeno prepričani in pravilno mislimo, da niso rezultat slabih miselnih navad, in/ali če nimamo razloga, da bi mislili, da je njihovo preizpraševanje koristno za doseg resnice« (Kwong 2017, 1620). Kadar je oseba odprta v svojih prepričanjih kar tako, s tem ne izpričuje *vrl*e širokomiselnosti. *Gola* odprtost nima (epistemične) vrednosti. Nekatera prepričanja so tako utemeljena, da resna obravnava alternativ sploh ni smiselna. Ali naj bomo odprti do stališč tistih, ki zagovarjajo ploščatost Zemlje, do zanikovalcev holokavsta ali zagovornikov možnosti, da vlada namerno ustvarja vremenske ujme?

»Hitra« diagnoza zmote je zdaj sorazmerno enostavna. V Adlerjevem vzorcu sklepamo iz nevednosti na možnost in potem izpeljemo širokomiselnost. Ampak nevednost je samo *ignoranca*, možnost je *šibka*, odprtost pa *gola*. Kadar začnemo z ignoranco glede ne-*p*, dobimo kvečjemu šibko epistemsko možnost, ki (vsaj po Adlerju) ne podpira odprtosti za resno preiskavo. *Ignoranca* lahko nakazuje, da prva premisa zmotno postulira nevednost. Rumeni tisk živi od špekulacij tipa »Kaj pa, če je vse to res?«, nad katerimi je najbolje zamahniti z roko. Kako, da ni dokaza, da ne *p*? Čeprav morda ni *odločilnih* dokazil, je racionalno, da se »zapremo« pred šibko, toda nerelevantno možnostjo (da obstajajo duhovi, da Marco Polo ni bil na Kitajskem, da vlade manipulirajo z vremenskimi pojavi ...). Pravi odgovor je v takšnih primerih nasprotovanje (krepki) možnosti, da *p*. Kot opozarjata Marion Vorms in Ulrike Hahn (2019, str. 3610): »[T]eoretiki zarote ali »trgovci z dvomi« se sklicujejo predvsem na »kritično mišljenje« in »širokomiselnost«, ki naj bi bila neškodljiva (v najslabšem primeru, najpogostejše pa koristna).« A tu gre za zlorabo, tudi navidez nedolžno vzdržanje sodbe glede *p* (recimo holokavsta) ne more biti pravi odnos, kadar naša epistemska situacija že vsebuje zadovoljiv odgovor na vprašanje, ali *p*.

Če je gola odprtost lahko epistemska hiba, potem je tudi *dogmatičnost* v nekaterih primerih morda lahko epistemska *vrlina*. Kako je to mogoče?

Po Robertsu in Woodu (2007, 195) je dogmatičnost intelektualna *rigidnost* – dispozicija, da se na iracionalen način odzovemo na nasprotovanje dogmam, ki jih sprejemamo. Heather Battaly (2018) dogmatičnost označi kot *podzvrst* ozkomiselnosti (angl. *closed-mindedness*), ki je zanjo nepripravljenost, da bi resno obravnavali relevantne intelektualne možnosti, ne glede ne to, ali že imamo kako prepričanje o dani temi ali ne. Dogmatičen je potem tisti, ki *ima* določeno prepričanje, vendar ni pripravljen, da bi resno obravnaval *relevantne* alternative temu prepričanju. Zavračanje hipoteze o ploščatosti Zemlje zato še ni dogmatičnost, saj tu ne gre za *relevantno* možnost. In v nekaterih primerih lahko ozkomiselnost, po mnenju Heather Battaly, vodi do tega, da prevladajo *pozitivni* epistemski učinki. V epistemsko *okvarjenem* okolju, kadar smo obkroženi z zmotami, nezanesljivimi viri in zastranitvami (njen primer je Oceanija v Orwellovi distopiji 1984), intelektualna »zaprtost«¹ glede možnosti, ko so v nasprotju s tem, kar vemo, zares *zmanjša* negativne epistemske učinke. Kot si dopoveduje glavni junak O'Brien (Orwell 2017, 62): »Očitne resnice so resnične, vztrajaj pri tem! Stvarni svet obstaja, njegovi zakoni se ne spreminjajo. Kamenje je trdo, voda je mokra, prosti predmeti padajo proti središču zemlje.«

Ampak naše vsakdanje epistemsko okolje je sorazmerno normalno (kljub prepotrebni opozorilu na zastranitve). Zato mi je bližje Cassamovo stališče, da je dogmatičnost v okolju, ki ni spoznavno sovražno, zares epistemska hiba. Kadar je spoznavalec soočen z *relevantnimi* dokazili, ki nasprotujejo njegovemu (sicer čvrstemu) prepričanju, da *p*, pa jih ne more zavrniti in *samo* zato dogmatično vztraja pri svojem prepričanju, takrat nima več upravičenja za *p*, s čimer izgubi tudi védenje (Cassam 2019, 108). V skladu z ideali kritičnega razmišljanja lahko raznim »trgovcem z dvomi«, ki opozarjajo na kakšne šibke epistemske možnosti, dokažemo, da nimajo prav (ali vsaj sebi zadovoljivo utemeljimo svoje nasprotno prepričanje). To je morda lažje pri nekaterih vprašanjih (ploščatost Zemlje) in težje pri drugih (npr. teorije o tem, da izza določenih terorističnih napadov stojijo določene vlade same). Mislim, da za *individualno* upravičenje ni nujno, da gre za znanje in sposobnosti *posameznika*. Kdo pa ima sam dovolj znanj, da zavrne akademsko izobraženega klimatologa, ki s pomočjo zapletenih meteoroloških in geoloških modelov zanika antropogene podnebne spremembe? Opremo se lahko na skupno znanje in konsenz med strokovnjaki, na epistemsko delitev dela v skupnosti, ki ji pripadamo. Na koncu bo sicer vedno ostalo *zaupanje* v določena pričevanja in vire ter nezaupanje v druge. A tudi splošni napotek, da je

pri presoji teorij treba preveriti informacije iz več zanesljivih virov, je še vedno orodje, ki ga kritični posameznik lahko uporabi za spoznavno odločnost (angl. *firmness*) in obrambo svojih *čvrstih* prepričanj. Če na nekem portalu, denimo, ni razvidno, kdo je njegov lastnik in kdo avtor prispevkov, potem verjetno ne gre za zaupanja vreden vir informacij. In tudi podatek, da 97 odstotkov znanstvenikov z različnih področij konvergira glede teze o podnebnih spremembah, ostali trije odstotki pa se strinjajo samo v njenem zanikanju, sicer pa imajo med sabo zelo različna mnenja, bi moral biti ključen za oblikovanje prepričanj o tej temi.

Tegobe skepticizma

Poskusimo zdaj obrniti »hitro« *diagnozo Adlerjevega vzorca kot zmote in razplesti pojmovno mrežo sprejemljivih sklepanj. Morda:*

Nevednost glede ne *p*, ki ni ignoranca (epistemska hiba), vodi do krepke epistemske možnosti (na voljo je vsaj nekaj pozitivnih dokazil za *p*), s katero je povezano *vzdržanje* sodbe, raziskava in *širokomiselnost* glede resnice *p*.

Toda težave so na vsakem koraku. Nevednost, ki bi jo težko označili kot ignoranco, ne vodi vedno do *krepe* epistemske možnosti. In tudi šibkejša možnost, če je le dovolj *resna*, lahko utemeljuje raziskovalnost. Včasih pa *nevednost* glede ne-*p* ni ignoranca, ampak *globoka* nevednost. Nekatera vprašanja so nerešljiva in enostavno nimajo odgovora, zato aktivno preiskovanje in širokomiselnost nista ustrezni drži.

Radikalni filozofski skepticizem nas tipično opozarja, da čutna dokazila ne razločijo med dobro in slabo situacijo (morda živimo v svetu popolne simulacije ipd.), te možnosti ne moremo popolnoma izključiti, torej nič nič ne vemo. V tem razmišljanju razberemo sklepanje:

Nobenega dokaza ni, da nismo v slabi situaciji. Mogoče je, da smo v slabi situaciji. Torej bi morali biti širokomiselni glede skeptičnega scenarija.

Russell (2023, 121) omenja, da ni logično nemogoče, da bi celoten svet nastal pred petimi minutami, iz ničesar, natanko tak, kot je, z vsemi prebivalci, ki se »spominjajo« *popolnoma nerealne preteklosti. Adler je precej odločen: tovrsten radikalni skepticizem je zanj nesprejemljiv na enak način, kot so to domneve, da Nezemljani »ugrabljajo« *ameriške državljanke. Če je šibka možnost, da je hipoteza resnična, zares dovolj, da je ne zavrnamo, potem je tudi gola možnost zmote že dovolj dober razlog za skeptični dvom (Adler 2002, 130). Pravi dvom zahteva neko smiselno**

podporo, meni vrsta filozofskih kritikov radikalnega skepticizma. Če bi nas, tako kot pri Neu v filmu *Matrica* (Wachovski in Wachowski 1999) včasih obšel občutek, da je nekaj narobe z našim svetom, če bi se začela pojavljati sporočila na ekranu mobilnega telefona, če bi se nam zdelo, da imamo usta zlepljena skupaj ... , potem bi imeli razloge (»morda pa je res, da ... «) za dvom, ampak takšnih znamenj ni, skeptik se opira na goli »lahko bi bilo res, da ... « (prim. Šuster 2019a, 130).

Za Adlerja argumenti za skepticizem podpirajo zgolj *šibko* epistemsko možnost, ki ne zadošča za širokomiselnost glede skeptične hipoteze. V filozofskem skepticizmu diagnosticira podobno *zmoto* kot pri hipotezi o ugrabitvah: gre za golo združljivost, kjer resna raziskava ni smiselna. Zdi pa se mi, da problema skepticizma ne bomo rešili tako na hitro, da ga bomo takoj odpisali kot zmoto. V najširšem smislu gre pri zmotah za napake v sklepanju, ki so za mislece in razpravljavce atraktivne, univerzalne in v nekem smislu nepopravljive, saj gre za slabe navade, ki se jih težko rešimo (prim. Woods 2013, 135). Karkoli si že mislimo o argumentih za radikalni skepticizem, težko bi jih kar počez označili kot argumentativne *zmote*, najžlahtnejšim zagovornikom ne moremo očitati intelektualne lenobe in brezbriznosti. To bi prej veljalo, denimo, za G. Moora kot dogmatskega zanikovalca radikalnega skepticizma (»Tu je ena roka in tu je druga«, iz česar domnevno takoj sledi obstoj zunanjega sveta).

Izvirno je filozofski skeptik (gr. *skeptikos*) preiskovalec, tisti, ki premišlja, dvomi, preizkuša; šele takšno aktivno razmišljanje nam omogoča, da se obranimo prevar in skušnjav, ki jih pred nas polaga razum. Antični skeptiki na začetku (*ex ante*) preiskujejo in pretresajo različna stališča in na koncu (*ex post*) zagovarjajo agnosticizem. Skeptikov argument zares ni prepričevalen, mislim pa, da ne gre za *zmoto*. Prva premisa je tipično podprta z razlogi in s pojmovno refleksijo (narava izkustvenih dokazil) in ne temelji na ignoranci. Še vedno jo upravičeno zavračamo, vzdržanje sodbe glede obstoja zunanjega sveta ni nekaj, kar bi morali upoštevati kot krepko epistemsko možnost. Utemeljeno lahko vztrajamo pri prepričanju, da *nismo* v slabi situaciji. Toda to ni dogmatičnost, ampak prej spoznavna drža, ki jo Cassam imenuje spoznavna odločnost (angl. *firmness, tenacity*). Cassam se seveda zaveda, da pri nekaterih prepričanjih upravičeno vztrajamo. Toda spoznavna *odločnost* vseeno dopušča, da priznamo celo temeljne pomanjkljivosti v svojih uveljavljenih orodjih in prepričanjih ter smo jih pripravljeni opustiti (Cassam 2019, 113). Mislim, da radikalnemu skeptiku glede obstoja zunanjega sveta upravičeno nasprotujemo, ampak s sklicevanjem na *razloge* – na koherenco, enostavnost in razlagalno moč zanikanja te teze, ne z dogmatičnim zavračanjem, da bi

sploh obravnavali možnost prevar in iluzij, na katere nas opozarja (prim. tudi Šuster 2019a, 102–133). Skeptikov argument enostavno *ni dober*, toda slabi argumenti še niso argumentativne zmote. Naš epistemski položaj glede teze »Nihče ni dokazal, da nismo v slabi situaciji« je dovolj *čvrst*, da premiso zavrnemo in s tem blokiramo izpeljavo krepke epistemske možnosti ter širokomiselnosti glede skeptičnih scenarijev.

Resna možnost

Filozofski skeptik se z zadnjim sklepom verjetno ne bo strinjal: ali ni že šibka epistemska možnost dovolj *resen* razlog za zaskrbljenost glede možnosti spoznanja? Delitev epistemskih možnosti na šibke in krepke morda sploh ni dovolj natančna za presojo raznovrstne množice sklepanj, ki primerjajo Adlerjev vzorec. Zaradi svoje ignorance so zagovorniki duhov, zanikovalci holokavsta in pristaši teorij zarot odprti za *irrelevantne* možnosti. A morda je relevantca odvisna od *konteksta*: kadar so standardi upravičenja izjemno visoki, takrat je celo radikalni skepticizem resna in upoštevanja vredna možnost. V običajnih kontekstih lahko oddaljene možnosti enostavno zanemarimo kot irelevantne (takšno stališče v epistemologiji zastopajo kontekstualisti, prim. DeRose 2009). Toda relativizirajoči pojem »relevance« (konteksta, okoliščin ...) je precej izmuzljiv. Nekatere predloge že lahko odpišemo kot irelevantne možnosti. Pogosto pa so najtežje razprave prav o tem, kaj sploh je *relevantna* možnost.

Zagovornikom NLP-jev, ESP (angl. *extrasensory perception*, teza o obstoju izvenčutne zaznave) in kakih drugih mejnih hipotez ne moremo kar počez očitati intelektualne lenobe in brezbriznosti. Vzemimo hipotezo o izvenčutni zaznavi, ki zajema pojave, kot so telepatija, jasnovidnost, napovedovanje prihodnosti ... Dokazil *naj* bi bilo obilo: po vsakodnevni izkušnji lahko psi zaznajo, kdaj se bodo njihovi lastniki ali člani družine vrnili že dolgo pred povratkom. Velikokrat se pri telefonskih klicih zgodi, da brez očitnega razloga pomislimo na nekoga, ki nas nato pokliče, ali pa vemo, kdo nas kliče, takoj, ko zaslišimo zvonjenje telefona, še preden sploh pogledamo številko klicatelja. Mnogi poznajo občutek, da jih nekdo gleda. V nadzorovanih poskusih ima ena oseba zavezane oči, druga oseba pa jo včasih opazuje, včasih ne. Oseba s prevezo čez oči mora uganiti, ali jo kdo gleda, pravilen odgovor naj bi nastopil v 55 odstotkih primerov, kar naj bi bil statistično pomemben rezultat, ki govori v prid hipotezi o ESP. Celó ko gre za videonadzor, naj bi se nekatere osebe zavedale, da jih opazujejo (prim. Sheldrake 2013).

Nasprotniki seveda oporekajo in ESP uvrščajo skupaj z magijo, s praz-

noverjem, z astrologijo, s homeopatijo, čudeži ... (prim. Pinker 2022). Opozarjajo na norme bejzijanske epistemologije pri sprejetju »izjemnih« hipotez (v petih besedah Carla Sagana: *izredne* trditve zahtevajo *izredne* dokaze), alternativna pojasnila eksperimentov, metodološke napake, predsodek potrditve ... Včasih morda dobimo vtis, da gre tudi tu za večše zapakirani dogmatizem (prim. Pinker 2022, 49): »Toda ali kdo res lahko misli, da bo do najradikalnejše revolucije v človeškem razumevanju v zadnjih štirih stoletjih vodila trditev lastnikov psov, da njihovi ljubljenci čutijo, kdaj se bodo vrnili domov? Ali pa je verjetneje, da je trditev sumljiva?« Mislim pa, da so v jedru razprave t. i. dokazila *drugega* reda ali dokazila *višjega* reda. Dokazila prvega reda podpirajo resnico določene propozicije (denimo stopinje v snegu in »nekdo je bil zjutraj pred hišnimi vrati;« zvonjenje hišnega zvonca in »nekdo pravkar stoji pred vrati;« sms-sporočilo o napovedanem obisku in »nekdo bo v kratkem pred vrati«). Dokazila *drugega* reda (tudi dokazila višjega reda, angl. *higher-order evidence*) pa zadevajo racionalne sposobnosti spoznavalca in okoliščine oblikovanja prepričanj, metodologijo raziskave, interpretacijo eksperimentov, način izpeljevanja sklepov, zanesljivost uporabljenih virov in metod, upoštevanje alternativnih pojasnil ... Prav zaradi epistemskih pomanjkljivosti dokazil višjega reda racionalist Pinkerjevega kova meni, da gre pri zagovornikih hipoteze o ESP za *ignoranco*, ki ne more legitimirati širokomiselnosti in resne raziskave.

V ozadju spora o tem, ali gre pri spornih fenomenih za *relevantne* možnosti, so nestrinjanja na ravni dokazil višjega reda. Ali *slutnja*, da nekdo stoji pred vrati, šteje kot verodostojno dokazilo? Kako tolmačiti obnašanje psa, ki včasih deset minut pred prihodom lastnika čaka pred vrati? Če je 50-odstotni uspeh napovedi čisto ugibanje, kakšno je teža 55 odstotkov pravih odgovorov, je ta rezultat sploh ponovljiv? Racionalist diagnosticira našo shemo *zmote*: ignoranca – šibka možnost – gola odprtost. Privrženec izvenčutne zaznave pa se s takšno oznako ne strinja, hipotezo po njegovem podpirajo dokazila, torej gre za krepko epistemsko možnost, ki zahteva, da jo resno upoštevamo in preiskujemo. Racionalistu očita ignoriranje znanstvene metode (nadzorovani poskusi!), opiranje na golo vero v svoj prav in dogmatičnost, ki nasprotuje širokomiselnosti, ki naj bi odlikovala *prave* znanstvenike.

V tej bitki o dokazilih drugega reda ni vedno enostavno razsoditi, pomislimo samo na aktualno »krizo ponovljivosti« v znanosti (vse več je »resnih« odkritij, ki jih ni mogoče neodvisno ponoviti – predvsem v medicini in psihologiji). Pogosto je spor prav v tem, kako klasificirati neko

hipotezo – kot šibko ali krepko možnost, kot relevantno ali ne, kaj sploh šteje kot dokazilo. Za Adlerja je samo krepka možnost tudi *resna* možnost in samo resna možnost je povezana s širokomiselnostjo ter z raziskavo. A videli smo, da so zadržki že pri radikalnem filozofskem skepticizmu, ki opozarja na golo združljivost skeptične hipoteze z vsemi dokazili kot relevantno možnost (vsaj v nekaterih kontekstih). Še bolj je »resnost« izmuzljiva, kadar so dokazila za neko hipotezo konfliktna, povezana s spori na ravni dokazil višjega reda in je razprava prav o tem, ali je neka možnost samo šibka ali že (dovolj) krepka, in nestrinjanjih glede tega, kaj sploh pomeni *ignoranca* glede dane propozicije.

Mislim, da *resna* epistemska možnost ni vedno enoznačno podprta z dokazili. Dana možnost je odprta za preiskavo, kadar jo lahko obravnavamo, ne da bi jo takoj izločili kot nerelevantno. Toda v nekaterih primerih so za relevantno odločilni neepistemski dejavniki, praktična situacija spoznavalca, vložki in tveganja, ki so povezana s posledicami (ne)resničnega prepričanja. V sodobni teoriji spoznanja nastopa pojem »pragmatično poseganje« (angl. *pragmatic encroachment*). Včasih ustrezna epistemska drža (sprejemanje, zavračanje, vzdržanje) ni samo stvar dokazil in razlogov, ampak tudi pomembnosti danega vprašanja, posledic, celo stroškov in pričakovanih koristi. Najbolj preučevan pragmatični poseg v spoznavni teoriji je že omenjeni *kontekstualizem* glede pojma upravičenja. Denimo, da na postaji čakate na hitri vlak. Racionalno je verjeti naključnemu potniku, da na peronu zares stoji hitri vlak. Če pa bi vožnja z napačnim vlakom pomenila, da bi zamudili pomemben sestanek, je bolje, da to še enkrat preverite ali vprašate sprevodnika. Standardi *upravičenja*, glede na katere nekaj veste ali ne, so lahko odvisni od pomembnosti *posledic* resnice danega prepričanja. Podobno, mislim, velja za širokomiselnost – kadar je neko prepričanje povezano s posebno odgovornostjo (porotnik v sojenju za umor, vodja države ...), je razumno, da kot relevantne upoštevamo tudi možnosti, ki se zdijo bolj oddaljene, ali pa zaradi zahtev po hitrem ukrepanju določene možnosti zanemarimo (recimo zdravnik).

Resna možnost je relevantna in vredna preiskave. Ni pa res, da je samo *krepka* epistemska možnost tudi resna možnost. Lep zgled so prav premene v obravnavi NAP, s katerimi smo začeli:

Nihče ni dokazal, da pri NAP ne gre za tehnologijo nezemlskega izvora. To je mogoče. Torej bi morali biti širokomiselni glede tega, da gre pri NAP za aktivnosti Nezemljanov.

Odsotnost nasprotnih dokazil še ne pomeni, da gre za *Nezemljane*, bo takoj opozoril znanstvenik. Ali to že pomeni, da ta možnost ni resna? Nekateri »poteze« v tej razpravi so zelo sumljive. Eden od vročih zagovornikov širokomiselnosti glede nezemeljskega izvora *NAP* skuša, denimo, otipiti ostrino Saganovih meril za sprejetje takšne hipoteze tako, da zahtevo *drugega* reda, »izredne trditve zahtevajo izredne dokaze,« razglasi za argument iz neverjetnosti (zmoto zavračanja argumenta, ker se nam zdi preveč neverjeten in je v nasprotju z našimi prepričanji ali pričakovanji (Powell 2024, 2)). »Znanost ne pozna dveh definicij dokazil: navadnih in izrednih. [...] Dokazila so dokazila in dejstvo je dejstvo. In kdo določa, kaj je izredna trditev ali izredno dejstvo? To je zelo subjektivno, cilj znanosti pa je zmanjšati subjektivnost in povečati objektivnost« (Powell 2024, 161). Ampak pri tem seveda (namerno?) prezre, da, denimo, oznaka zanikanja drugega zakona termodinamike kot, blago rečeno, (enormne) ekstravagance še malo ni nekaj *subjektivnega*!

Zgodovina »dokazil,« domnevnih opažanj *NLP*-jev, je sicer fascinantna, kulturološko, medijsko, politološko in znanstveno (prim. Frank 2023, 1–34). V času hladne vojne so bili razvpiti domnevni ostanki letečih krožnikov najdeni leta 1947 pri Roswellu, ki pa so bili dejansko povezani s skrivnim projektom vlade ZDA (opazovanje sovjetskih jedrskih poskusov), razkritim šele leta 1997. Poročila so prepletena z absurdi, področje privlači prevarante in fanatike, težko je razložiti potegavščine od političnih manipulacij in psihološke vojne. V nekem obdobju je bil celoten fenomen razglašen kot znanstveno nezanimiv, za »resno« znanost sta bila značilna zasmehovanje in stigmatizacija, nad katero je bila potem leta 2023 ogorčena direktorica *NASE*. Gre torej za zapleten historiat, v katerem se mešata psihologija množic in nacionalna varnost, v njem nastopa nekaj prevarantstva, precej fantazije in senzacionalizma (»artefakt« v velikosti nogometnega igrišča naj bi se pojavil že leta 1933 v Italiji), a tudi nekaj misterija (skrivnostni posnetki letal mornarice ZDA) in nekaj znanosti.

Premik od *NLP* do *NAP* je lepa ponazoritev dejstva, da je status (ne)resnosti neke možnosti *dinamičen*. Že spremenjeni naziv zveni bolj *resno* (ni več takoj asociacij na skrivnostna bitja, ki bi nas obletaval v neakšnih krožnikih). Na spremembo v statusu možnosti vplivajo tako praktični razlogi (pomembnost vprašanja, kako visoke so »stave,« pomembnost posledic) kot spremembe v *epistemskem* položaju. Glede na uradne izjave se zdi, da je *NASA* zdaj širokomiselna celo glede možnosti tehnologij nezemeljskega izvora. Od leta 2024 dalje financira iskanje življenja na drugih planetih in načrtuje gradnjo vesoljskega teleskopa za iskanje zu-

najsončnih planetov, primernih za življenje (prim. Frank 2023, 43). Razcvet preučevanja *te* (bolj »prizemljene«) možnosti je povezan z novimi orodji, odkritji zunajsončnih planetov in novimi spoznanji o tem, kako sploh iskati znake življenja (astrobiologija – preučevanje znakov življenja v atmosferi planetov) ali celo dokazila o tehnologiji (tehnopodpisi ali tehnološki markerji – merljive lastnosti, ki so markerji za navzočnost preteklih ali sedanjih tehnologij). Podrobnosti tukaj niso tako pomembne, a očitno gre zdaj za *resno* možnost in konkretna raziskovalna vprašanja, dogovorjeni so (nekakšni) standardi dokazil, pravila rokovanje z njimi in izpeljevanja sklepov (prim. Frank 2023, 42). Vzpostavljen je znanstveni konsenz o dokazilih *višjega* reda in s tem tudi to, kaj šteje kot *ignoranca*.

Primer lepo ponazarja, da potrebujemo bolj »fina« razlikovanja znotraj prostora epistemskih možnosti, nekaj drsnik na epistemski skali, ne zadošča binarno stikalo, ki je lahko samo v dveh položajih (Krepka – Odprto in Šibka – Zaprto). Položaj »modalnega« drsnika glede dane epistemske možnosti se lahko spreminja, odvisen je tudi od pragmatičnih dejavnikov, ki lahko včasih neko šibko ali sporno možnost »odprejo« za legitimno raziskavo. A tudi pomembnost posledic sama po sebi ne more odtehtati epistemskih pomanjkljivosti – kar (žal) mnogi izkušajo, ko se oklepajo hipotez alternativne medicine. Največkrat je odločilna sprememba na ravni dokazil drugega reda. Določena opažanja so samo združljiva s sporno hipotezo, ne pa razlog za njeno resno preiskavo, dokler ni sprejetih standardov tega, kaj šteje kot dokazilo in kakšne so procedure za pridobivanje natančnih podatkov, sploh kadar gre za »izredne« hipoteze, ki so nezdružljive s konsenzom v znanosti (verjetno trenutna diagnoza ESP).

Globoka nevednost

Širokomiselnost glede *p* ne more biti pravilen odnos, kadar naš spoznavni položaj že ponuja zadovoljiv odgovor na vprašanje, ali *p*. Takrat je na mestu spoznavna odločnost (za nekatere celo dogmatičnost). A to ni edini primer, ko raziskovalnost in aktivno iskanje odgovora nista racionalno upravičena. Dobro izhodišče so kar primeri, ki jih Pritchard (2021,114) ne označi kot ignoranco (epistemsko pomanjkljivost). Najprej so to *trivialne* resnice, ki nikogar sploh ne zanimajo (recimo število zrn peska na plaži). V takšnih primerih je primerna celo antiizpraševalna drža, odnos, ki nas izolira od tega vprašanja (Lord in Sylvain 2021, 131). Nobenega dokaza ni, da število zrn peska ni *n*. Zakaj bi nas to sploh zanimalo? Kaj je Cezar zajtrkoval na fatalni dan marčevih id? Morda je to za koga zanimivo, morda

ne, v vsakem primeru je spoznavno nedostopno. Po sodobni astrofiziki so deli vesolja, ki so od nas oddaljeni več kot 62 milijard svetlobnih let, preveč oddaljeni, da bi nas lahko – kadar koli – dosegla kakršna koli informacija o njih. Kaj reči o propoziciji »Obstaja zunajzemeljsko življenje, ki je 63 milijard svetlobnih let oddaljeno od Zemlje«? Informacija je že zanimiva, toda spoznanje je v načelu nemogoče, zato, vsaj po Pritchardu, tudi normativne nevednosti (ignorance) glede tovrstnih propozicij ni. V takšnih primerih se odpovemo aktivni raziskavi in se odločimo, da sploh ne bomo oblikovali prepričanj. Lord in Sylvain (2021, 131) menita, da je smiselno celo »neraziskovalni« agnosticizem v religioznih zadevah: odločimo se, da se bomo izognili iskanju odgovora na vprašanje o božjem obstoju, ker smo prepričani, da nikdar ne bo dokazil, ki bi to vprašanje razrešila.

Kognitivna nedostopnost določenih vprašanj kaže, da vzdržanje sodbe ni vedno povezano z neko ciljno usmerjeno raziskovalnostjo, kot meni Jane Friedman (2013). Na to opozarja več epistemologov, tu se bom oprl na razliko med *vzdržanjem* (angl. *suspension*) in *agnosticizmom* (McGrath 2021, 7). Kadar se vzdržimo, zavestno odložimo sodbo (preložimo na kasnejši čas, počakamo na ustrezne pogoje) in vprašanje *aktivno* preiskujemo. Agnosticizem pa je samo stanje nevtralne, vmesne stopnje zaupanja glede p , mera zaupa v p ni dovolj visoka za prepričanje, da p , niti dovolj nizka za zavrnitev prepričanja, da p (podobno velja za stopnjo prepričanja, da $\neg p$, prim. McGrath 2021, 9). Vzdržanje je ciljno usmerjena epistemska drža (iskanje odgovora na neko vprašanje), *agnosticizem* pa zgolj nevtralnost brez aktivne »odprtosti« (raziskovalnosti) glede nekega vprašanja.

Agnosticizem je primeren, kadar preiskava (in razrešitev vprašanja) za nas ni pomembna, a tudi takrat, kadar je obsojena na neuspeh. Nekatera vprašanja enostavno nimajo odgovora, ker je tema za nas spoznavno nedostopna in se tega tudi *zavedamo*. Tu ne gre za ignoranco (kot hibo), saj segamo onstran »svetle,« racionalne, dokazilne nevednosti. Delitev znotraj one druge, »temne« strani je veliko (totalna, radikalna, skrajna ... nevednost), toda omejil se bom na *globoko*, zavestno nevednost. Enostaven primer je kar vprašanje »Ali obstaja zunajzemeljsko življenje, ki je 63 milijard svetlobnih let oddaljeno od Zemlje«? Wilholt (2020, 201) *globoko* nevednost opredeli kot vprašanje, ki ima pravi odgovor, vendar ga oseba ne pozna ali pa si ne more domisliti nobenega odgovora, na katerega ne bi bilo odločilnih ugovorov, in se svojega neznanja tudi *zaveda*.

Globoka nevednost je lahko uvod v napredek spoznanja in odpira nove

poti raziskav, vendar predpostavlja neko razumno možnost uspeha (Wilholt 2020, 209). Mislim pa, da včasih niti resnost možnosti ne odtehta epistemskih in konceptualnih praznin, ki jih zaznamuje globoka nevednost. Lep primer opisuje roman *Gospodov glas* Stanislava Lema (izšel leta 1968). Znanstveniki poskušajo pojasniti in dekodirati urejen snop nevtrinov, ki so ga po naključju zaznali v ozvezdju Malega psa in za katerega se zdi, da je sporočilo Nezemljanov. Seveda gre za superpomembno možnost, vložki so veliki, angažira se vlada (ZDA), vojska, znanstveniki. Po nekaj letih se projekt zaključi, vendar znanstveniki niso na koncu nič bolj prepričani kot na samem začetku, ali je bil signal poskus komunikacije, ki ga človeštvu ni uspelo dešifrirati, ali le slabo razumljen naravni pojav.

Lem spretno prikazuje epistemsko nemoč, do katere vodi nesposobnost konceptualizacije in oblikovanja relevantnih alternativ. Nekateri so domnevali, da signal sploh ni bil namenjen človeštvu in da naša Zemlja čisto po naključju leži na komunikacijski poti med dvema naprednima civilizacijama, ki se pogovarjata. Drugi so ugotovili, da nevtrinski signal poveča verjetnost razvoja življenja, in domnevali, da to ne more biti samo naključje. Po tretji hipotezi je bil signal matematični opis nekega predmeta (morda molekule). Izhajajoč iz te hipoteze so znanstveniki del zajetih podatkov uporabili za sintezo snovi z zelo nenavadnimi lastnostmi. Predmet raziskave je bila tudi sama oblika reprezentacije. Sporočilo bi lahko bilo »napisano« v nekem deklarativno-transakcijskem jeziku, ki operira z enotami pomena. Morda je šlo za sistem »modeliranja« signalov, kot pri klasični televiziji. Ali pa za »recept«, niz navodil za izdelavo določenega predmeta (po mnenju Pentagona naj bi bilo sporočilo nekakšen načrt za super bombo).

Dve leti intenzivnega raziskovanja sta bili večinoma porabljeni za oblikovanje ustreznih raziskovalnih vprašanj in relevantnih alternativ. Končni sklep je *ignoramus et ignoramibus* (»ne vemo in nikdar ne bomo vedeli«), kot resignirano ugotavlja glavni junak, matematik Hogarth (Lem 2016, 144):

Bil sem mnenja, da zvezdni kod ne prikazuje niti »plazmatskih možganov« niti »informacijskega stroja« niti »organizma« niti »zarodka«, ker objekt, ki ga opisuje, sploh ne nastopa v naših pojmovnih kategorijah, da je to načrt cerkve, poslan avstralopitekom, knjižnica, dana na voljo neandertalcu. Menil sem, da kod ni bil namenjen civilizaciji, ki je na tako nizki stopnji razvoja kot naša, in da posledično z njim ne bomo znali početi nič kaj pametnega.

Za Hogartha bi bilo zato naslednje sklepanje verjetno sporno:

Ni dokazil, da ne gre za *sporočilo* Nezemljanov. To je povsem mogoče, zato bi morali biti širokomiselni in to možnost resno preiskovati.

Po Hogarthovem pesimističnem mnenju je končni sklep lahko kvečjemu nevtralni agnosticizem. Kadar ni jasno, kaj sploh so dokazila, kako jih konceptualizirati in kako z njimi ravnati, je tudi raziskovalnost lahko brezplodna.

Gospodov glas v pesimističnem tolmačenju prikazuje nevednost, ki ni samo globoka, ampak že kar *radikalna*. Hoyningen-Huene takšno nevednost pripisuje, recimo, Aristotelu glede vprašanja, kakšno je razmerje vodikovih in kisikovih atomov v molekuli vode. Tega vprašanja Aristotel sploh ne bi bil zmožen razumeti, ker sta mu bila tuja pojma vodik in kisik, voda pa je bila zanj element, ne pa sestav heterogenih komponent (Hoyningen-Huene 2021, 222). A tu sem se omejil na »navadno,« *globoko* nevednost. Lemova zgodba bi zlahka služila kot miselni eksperiment o delovanju inštituta SETI (Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence, Inštitut za iskanje zunajzemeljske inteligence). Astronomi na tem inštitutu preiskujejo elektromagnetna sevanja z oddaljenih zvezd, da bi odkrili znake, ki jih morda oddajajo civilizacije na drugih svetovih. Toda samo entuzijazem navdušencev in prečesavanje neba z najzmogljivejšimi radioteleskopi še nista dovolj, da bi globoko nevednost glede zunajzemeljskega življenja spremenili v aktivno širokomiselnost. Kot pravi znani teoretski fizik, morda se sporazumevajo čisto drugače in ne po radiu. Presemetljivo pa takoj zatem brez posebnih zadržkov zapiše, da bomo v stik s kako zunajzemeljsko civilizacijo po njegovem mnenju stopili še v *tem* stoletju (Kaku 2023, 283). To morda ni popolnoma nekonsistentno. Če verjamemo Franku, potem nove konceptualizacije (biosfera, tehnosfera) in nova tehnologija omogočajo, da znanstveniki iz agnosticizma (da ne omenjam posmehovanja in stigmatizacije) prestopijo v aktivno vzdržanje sodbe in ciljno usmerjeno raziskovanje. Še vedno gre za *globoko* nevednost, a zdaj naj bi bilo vsaj nekaj upanja za *uspeh* v iskanju odgovora, zato je (po Franku in Kakuju) *raziskovalnost* upravičena.

Sklepi?

Sklepanje »Nihče ni dokazal, da ne *p*. Čisto mogoče je, da *p*. Torej bi morali bi biti širokomiselni glede resnice *p*« je v središču aktualnih spoznavnih dilem. Po hitri diagnozi je sklepanje *zmotno*, kadar prva pre-

misa izraža *ignoranco* (kršitev dolžnosti dobre preiskave), vmesni sklep *šibko* epistemsko možnost (samo združljivost s tem, kar vemo), končni sklep pa golo odprtost. Težje pa je razplesti pojmovno mrežo *sprejemljivih* sklepanj. Kako sploh označiti nevednost, ki *ni* ignoranca? Ali takšna nevednost vedno podpira krepko epistemsko možnost? Ali je samo krepka možnost lahko *resna* epistemska možnost? Ali je vzdržanje sodbe vedno povezano s širokomiselnostjo?

V razpravi ponujam nekaj odgovorov. Radikalni skeptik svojo hipotezo gradi na filozofski refleksiji, ne pa na intelektualni lenobi, a gre kljub temu samo za šibko možnost. Skeptični argumenti niso dobri, niso pa niti zmotni. Upravičeno jim nasprotujemo, ampak s sklicevanjem na razloge, ne z dogmatičnostjo. Mislim tudi, da delitev epistemskih možnosti na krepke in šibke ni dovolj izčrpna, sploh, ko jo »križamo« s pojmom resna možnost. V nekaterih primerih so za resnost odločilni ne-epistemski dejavniki. Kadar je neko prepričanje povezano s posebno odgovornostjo, je razumno, da resno upoštevamo tudi šibkejša možnosti. Status (ne)resnosti neke epistemske možnosti se lahko spreminja, pogosto je povezan s spremembami na ravni *dokazil drugega reda* in odvisen od pragmatičnih dejavnikov. Nekatera vprašanja pa so enostavno neresljiva, zato sledim McGrathu (2021) in ločujem med agnosticizmom kot nevtralno epistemsko držo ter aktivnim, raziskovalno usmerjenim vzdržanjem sodbe.

Nekaj dilem ostaja: kako »resno« sploh obravnavati grožnjo radikalnega skepticizma? Smo lahko upravičeni v ignoriranju dokazil, kadar ta nasprotujejo našim čvrstim prepričanjem? Bi res morali študiozno prebirati znanstvene monografije, ki, denimo, zavračajo antropogene podnebne spremembe? Gre za znano Kripkejevo uganko dogmatizma – kadar nekaj vemo, ali bi vseeno morali biti širokomiselni glede domnevnih nasprotnih dokazil (prim. Šuster 2022)? Neresljiva vprašanja sem, sledeč Wilholtu, označil kot *globoko* nevednost, v kateri se zavedamo svojega neznanja. Kdaj je globoka nevednost uvod v širokomiselnost in s tem prvi korak do spoznanja, kdaj pa se moramo sprijazniti z agnosticizmom in vdano sprejeti *ignoramus et ignoramibus*? Adlerjev vzorec odpira tako vroča vprašanja sodobne aplicirane epistemologije kot starodavni filozofski razmislek o mejah spoznanja.

Opomba

Besedilo je nastalo s podporo raziskovalnega program Perspektive sodobne filozofije: med epistemologijo, etiko in politično filozofijo (P6-0144), Oddelek za filozofijo, Filozofska fakulteta, Univerza v Mariboru, ki ga je sofinancirala

Javna agencija za znanstvenoraziskovalno in inovacijsko dejavnost Republike Slovenije.

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Kako izključujemo ali vključujemo druge? Logično-filozofska analiza

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Povzetek. Članek s stališča interpretativne filozofske analize obravnava stavka »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam« in »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami«, ki se oba pojavljata že v *Svetem pismu*. Članek poskuša eksplicirati intuicijo, da je stavek »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam« izključujoč, stavek »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami« pa vključujoč. To intuicijo eksplicira v okviru tetraleme, s pomočjo katere pokaže, da oba stavka temeljita na poprej sprejetem stališču, da je nujno, da vsak od drugih bodisi je z nami bodisi je proti nam (nujno izključujoči logični veznik ali). Preden eksplicira navedeno razliko med »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam« in »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami« v okviru tetraleme, pa članek v uvodnem delu predstavi interpretaciji, ki te razlike ne eksplicirata.

Ključne besede: izključevanje, vključevanje, logično-filozofska analiza, tetralema, Nāgārjuna, Wittgenstein

How Do We Exclude or Include Others? Logical-Philosophical Analysis

Abstract. From the point of view of interpretive philosophical analysis, the article considers the sentences 'Whoever is not with us is against us' and 'Whoever is not against us is with us,' both of which appear in the Bible. The article tries to explain the intuition that the sentence 'Whoever is not with us is against us' is exclusionary, and the sentence 'Whoever is not against us is with us' is inclusive. This intuition is explicated in the framework of the tetralemma, with the help of which it is shown that both sentences are based on the previously accepted point of view that it is necessary that each of the others is either with us or against us (necessary exclusive logical disjunction). Before explaining the stated difference between 'Whoever is not with us is against us' and 'Whoever is not against us is with us' within the framework of the tetralemma, the article, in the introductory part, highlights two possible interpretations that do not explain this difference.

Key Words: exclusion, inclusion, logical-philosophical analysis, tetralemma, Nāgārjuna, Wittgenstein

Uvod

V političnem diskurzu mnogokrat nastopijo izjave tipa »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam« in »Ste z nami ali ste proti nam«, redkeje izjave tipa »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami«. Članek se ukvarja z interpretacijo teh stavkov in poskuša najti takšno interpretacijo, ki bi pokazala, da stavka »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam« in »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami« – kljub skupni predpostavki, da je nujno tako, da ste bodisi proti nam bodisi ste z nami – povesta različno. Da ima prvi stavek (»Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam«) kljub temu oz. celo zaradi tega, ker nekateri drugi niso z nekaterimi izmed nas, vse druge (tudi tiste druge, ki so z nami) za tiste, ki so proti vsem nam. To razumem izključujoče. In da ima drugi stavek (»Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami«) kljub temu oz. celo zaradi tega, ker nekateri drugi niso proti nekaterim od nas, vse druge (tudi tiste druge, ki so proti nam) za tiste, ki so z vsemi nami. To razumem vključujoče. Navedeno bo eksplicirano proti koncu članka, kjer bosta v kota (a) in (b) tetraleme postavljeni trditvi »Vsak drugi je z vsemi nami« in »Vsak drugi je proti vsem nam«.

Preden pa bomo podali svojo interpretacijo, pogledjmo nekaj drugih možnosti. Ena od možnih se naslanja na predpostavko, da je »ne biti z nami« kognitivno sinonimno z »biti proti nam« in »ne biti proti nam« kognitivno sinonimno z »biti z nami«, tako da ni razlike v pomenu/smislu stavkov »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam« in »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami«, če kot pomen/smisel stavka postavimo njegove resničnostne pogoje. Ta stavka sta logično ekvivalentna in celo izražata tautologijo ter zato ne podajata nobene informacije, če, sledeč Quinu (2001), kognitivna sinonimnost med »ne biti z nami« in »biti proti nam« ter »ne biti proti nam« in »biti z nami« pomeni medsebojno izmenljivost *salva veritate* teh izrazov v vseh kontekstih. Tako bi v prvem primeru z zamenjavo dobili »Kdor ni z nami, ni z nami« oz. »Kdo je proti nam, je proti nam«, v drugem primeru pa »Kdor ni proti nam, ni proti nam« oz. »Kdor je z nami, je z nami«. Zato navedena interpretacija ne more pokazati razlike med »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam« in »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami«, kar je namen tega članka.

Druga možnost bi bila, da bi ta stavka razumeli na sledeči način: forma prvega je $(\forall x)(\neg Zx \supset Px)$, forma drugega $(\forall x)(\neg Px \supset Zx)$, »Ste z nami ali pa ste proti nam« pa bi lahko razumeli bodisi v obliki $(\forall x)(Zx \vee Px)$ bodisi v obliki $(\forall x)(Zx \wedge Px)$.¹ Ker vsi ti stavki izražajo univerzalno kvantifikacijo, spremenljivka x pa v maniri russlllovske logike, ki je sprejeta kot

¹ Zx pomeni, da je x z nami, Px pomeni, da je x proti nam.

klasična, vedno sega čez vso domeno (v našem primeru je ta univerzalna), lahko izberemo neko bitnost, imenujmo jo *a*, ki bo zastopala vse bitnosti iz domene *x*.² Tako dobimo resničnostno tabelo:

<i>Za</i>	<i>Pa</i>	$\neg Za \supset Pa$	$\neg Pa \supset Za$	$Za \vee Pa$	$Za \wedge Pa$
R	R	R	R	R	N
N	R	R	R	R	R
R	N	R	R	R	R
N	N	N	N	N	N

Na podlagi te resničnostne tabele se da sklepati, da prvi trije stavki povedo isto – zatrjujejo (vključujočo) disjunkcijo med tem, da ste z nami ali proti nam. A situacijo, za katero gre, opredeljuje izključujoče razumevanje »Ste z nami ali proti nam«. Torej mora biti poleg »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam« in »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami« (»predhodno«) resnično »Bodisi ste proti nam bodisi ste z nami«. Da torej trdimo »Bodisi ste proti nam bodisi ste z nami« in »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam« oz. »Bodisi ste proti nam bodisi ste z nami« in »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami«. Ampak potem vsi stavki pravijo »Bodisi ste proti nam bodisi ste z nami«.³ To je res, če sprejmemo takšno formalizacijo in s tem takšno razumevanje teh stavkov. Kot bom pokazal v nadaljevanju, pa sam menim, da lahko sprejmemo drugačno interpretacijo stavkov »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam« in »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami« ter s tem posledično drugačno formalizacijo, skozi katero se bo pokazala razlika med omenjenima stavkoma.

V nadaljevanju bom najprej predstavil, kako in kdaj so se v zgodovini človeštva pojavile takšne izjave (stavki), zaključni del pa bo posvečen njihovi formi, *skozi katero* se bo izkazala razlika med totalitarnim – izključujočim – stališčem stavka »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam« in libertarnim – vključujočim – stališčem stavka »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami«. Ne nameravam se spuščati v konkretne politične analize takšnih izjav, da bi se opredeljeval *za* ali *proti* njim,⁴ čeprav se jim ne bom mogel popolnoma

² Nekako tako, kot to počno matematiki, ko v svojih dokazih izmed vseh števil izberejo poljudno.

³ Recenzent je opozoril, da sta stavka »Če nisi z nami, potem si proti nam« in »Če nisi proti nam, potem si z nami« ekvivalentna, gre za zakon kontrapozicije. Dopusča pa možnost, da jih dojemamo drugače, o čemer bi lahko več povedali znanstveniki, ki se ukvarjajo s kognitivnimi iluzijami. Drugi recenzent pa je menil, da gre le za retorično razliko.

⁴ Če na tem mestu anticipiram, kar bo eksplicirano šele v nadaljevanju članka, sem izbral kot (d) tetraleme, ker nisem *niti za niti proti*.

izogniti. Zanima me zgolj njihova logična forma in to, kaj *skozi to formo* povedo.

Stavka, ki pravita »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam« in »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami« skupaj s stavkom »Bodisi ste z nami bodisi ste proti nam« prihajata k nam že iz davnine. Oba nastopata v *Svetem pismu*, prvi v obliki »Kdor ni z menoj, je proti meni« v *Evangeliju po Mateju* 12,25–32 (Svetopisemska družba Slovenije 1997, 1496):

Ker je poznal njihove misli, jim je rekel: »Vsako kraljestvo, ki se razdeli zoper sebe, bo opustošeno in nobeno mesto ali hiša, ki sta zoper sebe razdeljena, ne bosta obstala. Če torej satan izganja satana, je proti sebi razdeljen – kako bo potem obstalo njegovo kraljestvo? In če jaz z Bélcebubom izganjam demone, s kom jih izganjajo vaši sinovi? Zato bodo oni vaši sodniki. Če pa jaz z Božjim duhom izganjam demone, potem je prišlo k vam Božje kraljestvo. Ali: kako more kdo vstopiti v hišo močnega in mu zapleniti premoženje, če močnega prej ne zveže? Šele tedaj bo izropal njegovo hišo. Kdor ni z menoj, je proti meni; in kdor z menoj ne zbira, raztresa. Zato vam pravim: Vsak greh in vsaka kletev bosta ljudem odpuščena, kletev zoper Duha pa ne bo odpuščena. Tudi če kdo reče besedo zoper Sina človekovega, mu bo odpuščeno, če pa kdo reče kaj zoper Svetega Duha, mu ne bo odpuščeno ne v tem veku ne v prihodnjem.«

Isti stavek, »Kdor ni z menoj, je proti meni; in kdor z menoj ne zbira, raztresa«, v okviru istega konteksta nastopa tudi v *Evangeliju po Luku* 11,23 (Svetopisemska družba Slovenije 1997, 1578). Drugi stavek, »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami«, pa v *Svetem pismu* nastopa v obliki »Kdor ni proti nam, je za nas« v *Evangeliju po Marku* 9,38–41 (Svetopisemska družba Slovenije 1997, 1542):

Janez mu je rekel: »Učitelj, nekoga smo videli, da je v tvojem imenu izganjal demone, in smo mu branili, ker ni hodil za nami.« Jezus pa je rekel: »Ne branite mu! Nihče namreč ne more storiti mogočnega dela v mojem imenu in takoj grdo govoriti o meni. Kdor ni proti nam, je za nas. Kdor vam da piti kozarec vode zaradi imena, ker ste Kristusovi – resnično, povem vam –, zagotovo ne bo izgubil svojega plačila.«

V nekoliko drugačni različici »Kdor ni proti vam, je za vas« je stavek napisan v *Evangeliju po Luku* 9,49–50 (Svetopisemska družba Slovenije 1997, 1575):

Janez je odgovoril: »Učenik, nekoga smo videli, da je v tvojem imenu

izganjal demone, in smo mu branili, ker ne hodi z nami.« Jezus pa mu je rekel: »Ne branite! Kdor namreč ni proti vam, je za vas.«

V opombi na isti strani te izdaje *Svetega pisma* je napisano, da je nasprotje med »Kdor ni proti vam, je za vas« in »Kdor ni z menoj, je proti meni« navidezno in pri tem navaja Fitzmyerja (Svetopisemska družba Slovenije 1997, 1575):

Drugi izrek je namreč »svarilo posameznemu krščanskemu učencu, naj ne bo »nevtralen«. In je mišljeno kot preizkus, skozi katerega mora vsakdo sam, tu uporabljena oblika pa je norma za odnos učenec do drugih ljudi, ki so zunaj občestva« (J. A. Fitzmyer).

Ta opomba iz slovenske ekumenske izdaje *Svetega pisma* črpa iz opombe 50 Josepha Fitzmyerja (1981, 821) k njegovemu prevodu *Evangelija po Luku*. Fitzmyer na tem mestu opozarja še na poudarek Bultmanna (1968, 25), da je stališče »Kdor ni z menoj, je proti meni« izvirnejše in da je druga uporabljena oblika »produkt zgodnje skupnosti, ker bi izganjanje demonov v Jezusovem imenu težko bilo starejše od njegove uporabe v zgodnji cerkvi« (Fitzmyer 1981, 821). Za Fitzmyerja je izjava »Kdor ni proti vam, je za vas« pregovor, ki usmerja naravnost učencev do drugih, ki so tujci (str. 821). Pri tem opozarja na avtorje, ki pišejo o tem, o čemer piše on, in jih tukaj ne bom obravnaval, hkrati pa tudi na avtorje iz preteklosti, ki so uporabili podobne stavke. Pregovorna oblika teh izrekov naj bi se po njegovem mnenju kazala že pri Ciceru, ki v svojem govoru *Pro Quinto Ligario* pravi (Cicero b.l.):

Čeprav smo vse imeli za svoje nasprotnike, razen tistih, ki so bili na naši strani, si [Cezar] vse štel za svoje privržence, ki niso bili proti tebi.

Fitzmyer (1981, 821) opozori še na Plutarha, ki je v *Vzporednih življenjepisih* za Solona (20.1) zapisal:

Med njegovimi drugimi zakoni je zelo nenavaden in presenetljiv tisti, ki določa, da morajo biti vzete državljanske pravice tistemu [*that he shall be disfranchised*], ki se v času razprtij ne postavi na nobeno stran. Verjetno želi, da človek ne bi bil brezčuten ali brezbržen do javnega blaga, ko bi varno urejal svoje zasebne zadeve in se hvalil, da nima nobenega deleža v nemirih in stiskah svoje države, ampak bi se raje nemudoma zavzel za boljši in bolj pravičen vzrok, delil njegove nevarnosti in mu izkazal svojo pomoč, namesto da čaka na varnem, da vidi, kateri vzrok prevlada.

Solon v tem odlomku iz Plutarha navaja tudi razloge, zakaj se je treba odpovedati nevtralnosti. Podobno kot Solon je takšno »odločitev za odločitev« zahteval tudi Lenin (1974, 366):

Z absolutno odkritostjo govorimo o tem boju proletariata; vsak človek se mora odločiti, ali se bo pridružil naši ali drugi strani. Vsak poskus, da bi se izognili temu vprašanju, se mora končati v fiasku.

Kako je ta stavek »Bodisi ste z nami bodisi ste proti nam«, ki zahteva odločitev in ki nastopa pri Solonu ter pri Leninu, povezan z drugima dvema stavkoma, ki ju v osnovi obravnavamo, bo jasno v nadaljevanju članka. Vseeno pa moramo pri tem spomniti še na znameniti govor predsednika Združenih držav Amerike Georga Busha mlajšega (2001, 69), ki je v svoji borbi proti terorizmu zahteval podobno kot Solon in Lenin:

Vsak narod, v vsaki regiji, se mora zdaj odločiti. Ali si z nami ali pa s teroristi. Od tega dne dalje bodo ZDA vse države, ki bodo še naprej skrivale ali podpirale terorizem, obravnavale kot sovražni režim.

V slovenskem političnem prostoru običajno ena politična stran očita drugi, da zastopa izključujoče stališče, ki ga izraža »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam«. Obe pa se nekako strinjata, da je ta parola vsajena v leninizem, čeprav, kakor smo videli, tega koraka v navedenem govoru Lenin ni naredil. Včasih pa v slovenskem političnem govoru nastopi tudi »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami«. Vezjak (2024) obravnava takšno nekolikanj modificirano izjavo »Kdor ni proti nam, ta je lahko z nami«. Vpeljava modalnega operatorja »lahko« v kontekst izjave »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami« zakomplicira razumevanje. Prvič, ni čisto jasno, ali gre tu za aletično modalnost v smislu možnosti ali za deontično modalnost v smislu dopustnosti na način, kakor, recimo, najstniki kdaj rečejo, da je *nujno* iti na ta koncert priljubljene skupine, čeprav je jasno, da gre za *obveznost*. In, drugič, če ta »lahko« razumemo kot operator dopustnosti, ni jasen doseg te modalnosti: ali ta stavek pove, da je za tiste, ki niso proti nam, dopustno, da so z nami, ali pa morda, da je dopustno, da so vsi, ki niso proti nam, z nami. Vezjak (2024) navaja »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam« brez modalnega operatorja in ne tematizirana posebej nastopa deontične modalnosti. Zato se bom sam omejil samo na stavke, ki ne vsebujejo modalnega operatorja, ker vključeni modalni operator ne spremeni Vezjakove poante. Predpostavljam, da pravzaprav analizira tudi izjavo »Kdor ni proti nam, ta je z nami« na sledeči način (Vezjak 2024):

Zguljena fraza »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam« je gotovo izključevalna v stoo odstotnem smislu. Ponuja le dve možnosti, za in proti, kar je se-

veda črnobelo binarno poenostavljanje, ki izključuje vse možnosti v spektru nevtralnosti, neopredeljenosti ali pozicije, ki bi bila drugačna od dveh vnaprej predpostavljenih. Tokratni zaključek, da kdor ni proti nam, lahko deluje z nami, pa vsebuje ponudbo o sodelovanju, ki je paradoksalno utemeljena na izključevanju.

Fraza »Kdor ni proti nam, ta je z nami« je za Vezjaka (2024) »vključevalna na podlagi geste izključitve«:

Zakaj? Ker na logični ravni stavek postavi dve možnosti in ju poveže na izključujoč način; če nekdo ni »proti nam« (torej tistemu, ki izreka ta stavek), potem je lahko »z nami«. Tovrstna konstrukcija ne samo, da izključuje možnost sodelovanja s skupino, ki je »proti nam«, ampak s tem izključi še vse možne nevtralne pozicije, ki niso »z nami«.

Vključitvena obljuba je torej izključevalna.

Strinjam se z Vezjakom, da je »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam« izključevalna pozicija, saj na podlagi tega, da nekateri od drugih niso z nekaterimi od nas, vzpostavi stališče, da so vsi drugi proti vsem nam. Ne strinjam pa se z njim, da je tudi, paradoksalno ali ne, »vključitvena obljuba«, kakor pravi, torej »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami«, izključevalna. Pokazal bom, da je ta pozicija vključevalna, ker ob predpostavki, da nekateri od drugih niso proti nekaterim od nas, sprejemamo stališče, da so vsi drugi z vsemi nami. Res pa je, da obe poziciji,⁵ kakor bo pokazano, izključujeta tako možnost, da bi bil nekdo hkrati z nami in proti nam ali niti z nami niti proti nam. Pri tem sprejemam, da oba stavka temeljita na sprejetju stališča, da je nujno tako, da so drugi bodisi z nami bodisi proti nam, kar izključuje možnosti, da bi lahko bili hkrati z nami in proti nam ali niti z nami niti proti nam. Morda je imel Vezjak v mislih to, ko je govoril o »spektru nevtralnosti, neopredeljenosti ali pozicije, ki bi bila drugačna od dveh vnaprej predpostavljenih«, oz. se nanašal na »vse možne nevtralne pozicije«. Obe, tako »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam« kot »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami«, namreč temeljita na njima predhodni dikciji »Bodisi ste z nami bodisi ste proti nam«.

Da bi dosegel, kar sem obljubil, se bom naslonil na koščke svojega članka »Nothingness and the Truth-functional Interpretation of Tetralemma«, ki bo objavljen v reviji *Asian Studies*. Bralko in bralca, ki o te-

⁵ Izključevalna »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam« in vključevalna »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami«.

tralemi, ki se v sanskrtu imenuje *catuṣkoṭi*,⁶ ne vesta veliko, bi napotil na izvrsten članek Andreja Uleta v tej reviji »Kako misliti vpričo neizrekljivega? O tetralemi v *māhāyanski* dialektiki« (2022) in na Nāgārjuna (2018), ki je prevod njegove *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* v slovenščino.

Tetralemo bi lahko najenostavneje opredelili kot nekaj, kar postulira (a) eno, (b) drugo, (c) oboje, (d) nič od obojega. Formalno gledano naj bi kot (a) trdil A, kot (b) njegovo negacijo ne-A, kot (c) hkrati A in ne-A ter kot (d) niti A niti ne-A. O težavah, s katerimi se srečujejo formalne interpretacije tetraleme, ki običajno vodijo v nekakšen kolaps, saj sta po njej kota (c) in (d) logično ekvivalentna ter iz njiju sledita kota (a) in (b), se lahko bralec informira v Uletovem prispevku (2022). O nekaterih slepih ulicah, kakor se izrazi, v formalizaciji tetraleme piše Priest (2010, 27–30). Priest ponuja svojo interpretacijo, ki *catuṣkoṭi* razume tako, da ima stavek ne samo dve resničnostni vrednosti, ampak štiri: vsak je lahko resničen, neresničen, tako resničen kot neresničen ali niti resničen niti neresničen. Ta interpretacija po Priestu (2010, 27) nekako razširja Aristotelovo načelo izključitve tretje možnosti:

Zaenkrat je vse, na kar moramo opozoriti, to, da je *catuṣkoṭi* na začetku deloval kot nekaj podobnega principu izključene pete možnosti. Aristotel se je držal načela izključenega tretjega: vsaka izjava mora biti resnična ali neresnična; tretje možnosti ni; poleg tega sta obe ekskluzivni. Na podoben, a bolj velikodušen način nam *catuṣkoṭi* ponuja izčrpen in medsebojno izključujoč nabor štirih možnosti.

Sam v članku predlagam svojo obliko tetraleme, ki je do neke mere navdahnjena z Nāgārjuno. Moja interpretacija se razlikuje od Priestove, čeprav tudi ona, če tukaj ponovim, kar je zapisal, »ponuja izčrpen in medsebojno izključujoč nabor štirih možnosti«. Vendar ostaja pri aristotelovski dvovalentni logiki in ne uvaja štirivrednostne logike, ki jo za svojo interpretacijo predlaga Priest.

Tetraleme torej ne razumem kot sheme, ki postavlja trditev, zanikano trditev, trditev in zanikano trditev ali niti trditev niti zanikano trditev, temveč kot štiri resničnostne funkcije, v katerih nastopata stavek in njegova alternativa, ki *ni nujno* njegova negacija. Alt-A, kakor jo označujem v resničnostnih tabelah, je običajno neka smiselna alternativa A, čeprav bi lahko kot alt-A seveda nastopal kateri koli stavek. V moji eksplikaciji,

⁶ Kar pomeni štirje koti.

kar nakazujejo tudi v nadaljevanju predstavljeni primeri, gre za štiri rešničnostine funkcije nekega stavka (A) in njegove alternative (alt-A).⁷

(a)			(c)		
(A)	(alt-A)	$(A) \wedge \neg(\text{alt-A})$	(A)	(alt-A)	$(A) \wedge (\text{alt-A})$
R	R	N	R	R	R
N	R	N	N	R	N
R	N	R	R	N	N
N	N	N	N	N	N

(b)			(d)		
(A)	(alt-A)	$(\text{alt-A}) \wedge \neg(A)$	(A)	(alt-A)	$\neg(A) \wedge \neg(\text{alt-A})$
R	R	N	R	R	N
N	R	R	N	R	N
R	N	N	R	N	N
N	N	N	N	N	R

Tetralema sicer zelo pogosto uporabljamo v vsakdanjem življenju, ne da bi o tem sploh razmišljali. Npr., ko pijete kavo v restavraciji, je vaša dilema med izbiro rjavega in belega sladkorja, ki sta oba na voljo na mizi, pravzaprav tetralema. Izberete lahko (a) beli sladkor in ne rjavega, (b) rjavega in ne belega, lahko pa tudi (c) oba (morda imate radi njuno kombinacijo v svoji kavi) ali (d) nobenega, ker vam je vseč kava brez sladkorja ali s sladilom. V neki drugi tetralemi pa ste že bili pred odločitvijo o sladkanju, ko ste kavo naročili in izbrali kot (a) kavo, ne čaja. »Kava ali čaj?« je vprašal natakar in lahko bi izbrali (a) kavo, (b) čaj, (c) oboje ali (d) nič od tega dvojega. Naročanje kave in čaja samo zase je nenavadno, a zakaj ne? Seveda bi lahko ne naročili niti kave niti čaja, temveč kozarec vode ali (če bi natakar dovolil) ničesar in samo sedeli v restavraciji. (a) ali (b) ali (c) ali (d) je tautologija. V Wittgensteinovem jeziku iz *Logično-filozofskega traktata* (2022, 4.463)⁸ disjunkcija možnih odločitev v okviru tetraleme »pušča dejanskosti celoten – neskončni – logični prostor«, zato »ne more določati dejanskosti«. Seveda pa svojo dejanskost natančno določa vsak tetralem in kot.

⁷ Običajno se te štiri možnosti, ti štirje koti tetraleme, označujejo s črkami (a), (b), (c) in (d).

⁸ Iz *Logično-filozofskega traktata* navajam, kakor je običaj, tako, da navedem številko teze, v kateri navedek nastopa.

Zgodba, ki sem jo navedel, bi se lahko nadaljevala tako, da bi se, npr., po sprejetju kota (a) iz zgodbe o kavi in čaju, da boste spili kavo, in po sprejetju kota (d) iz zgodbe o sladkanju, da je ne boste sladkali, zgodilo, da se odpravite na volišče, kjer na referendumsko vprašanje obkrožite *za* ali *proti*. Ko (a) obkrožite *za*, poveste hkrati, da niste *proti*; ko (b) obkrožite *proti*, poveste hkrati, da niste *za*. Lahko pa bi na volišču (namenoma ali ne) oddali neveljavno glasovnico. Ali pa sploh ne bi prišli na volišče. S tem bi izrazili (d) – da niste niti *za* niti *proti*. Kaj pa, če bi kdo v celoti bil hkrati *za* in *proti*? Glasovalni listič vsaj formalno ne omogoča, da bi volivec z njim to izrazil, ker tudi če bi obkrožil oboje, (c) *za* in *proti*, bi komisija to štela kot nevtravno pozicijo, glasovalni listič pa bi bil neveljaven.

Situacija, ki nastopa ob našem referendumskem odločanju, je podobna tisti, ki jo Wittgenstein (1997, 91–92) v sestavku »Nekaj pripomb k logični formi« pripiše stavkom o barvah. To, da bi bila oba stavka – »*a* je zelen« in »*a* je rdeč« – hkrati resnična, je nemogoče. (c) je tako protisloven in zato nerelevanten. Vendar je *a* seveda lahko (a) zelen in ne rdeč, (b) rdeč in ne zelen ali (d) niti zelen niti rdeč, kadar je obarvan z barvo, ki ni niti zelena niti rdeča:

<i>a</i> je zelen	<i>a</i> je rdeč	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
N	R	N	R	N	N
R	N	R	N	N	N
N	N	N	N	N	R

Wittgenstein je pred tem v *Logično-filozofskem traktatu* (2022, 6.3751) menil drugače: da sta dva stavka o barvah ne le kontrarna, ampak celo protislovna, kajti:

Da sta npr. dve barvi hkrati na nekem mestu vidnega polja, je nemogoče, in sicer logično nemogoče, ker to izključuje logična struktura barve.

Pomislimo na to, kako je to protislovje prikazano v fiziki: približno tako, da delec ne more imeti dveh hitrosti hkrati; to pomeni, da ne more biti na dveh mestih hkrati; to pomeni, da delca, ki sta istočasno na dveh različnih mestih, ne moreta biti identična.

(Jasno je, da logični produkt dveh elementarnih stavkov ne more biti niti tautologija niti kontradikcija. Izjava, da ima neka točka v vidnem polju hkrati dve različni barvi, je kontradikcija.)

Tako je zato, ker sta nemogoči tako prva kot zadnja vrstica v naslednji resničnostni tabeli:

a je zelen	a je rdeč	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
N	R	N	R	N	N
R	N	R	N	N	N

(c) in (d) sta tu oba kontradiktorna, torej nerelevantna. Ker (c) in (d) odpadeta, so možnosti potem omejene na (a) » a je zelen« in ni res, da » a je rdeč«, ter (b) » a je rdeč« in ni res, da » a je zelen«. Stavka » a je zelen« in » a je rdeč« sta negaciji drug drugega – delujeta kot p in $\neg p$. Tako trdi Wittgenstein v navedeni tezi *Logično-filozofskega traktata*. Z drugimi besedami: to, da a ni zelen, je zadosten pogoj za to, da je a rdeč, in to, da a ni rdeč, je zadosten pogoj za to, da je a zelen.

Zadeve v okviru tetraleme so lahko še zapletenejše kot v primerih iz vsakdanjega življenja, ki sem jih obravnaval. Ko lirski subjekt v pesmi »Should I Stay or Should I Go« punk rock skupine The Clash prosi svojo drago, naj mu pove, »Ali naj ostanem ali naj grem«, to zveni kot dilema, ki jo v logiki običajno izražamo kot nujno izključujočo disjunkcijo, *aut Ceasar aut nihil*. Na ta način običajno motrimo takšne stavke. Ampak stavka »ostanem« in »grem« lahko zlahka razlagamo kot del tetraleme: (a) »ostanem« in ne »grem«, (b) »grem« in ne »ostanem«, (c) »ostanem« in »grem«, (d) niti »ostanem« niti »grem«. Zahodna logika poziciji (c) in (d) obravnava kot nemogoči. S stališča budistične tetraleme pa se lahko vprašamo, ali ni to, da nekdo hkrati ostaja v nekem odnosu in odhaja iz njega ali da niti ne ostaja v njem niti iz njega ne odhaja, vendarle nekako mogoče?⁹

Zdaj lahko v našo razpravo kot osnovna stavka, ki bi ju radi zapeljali v tetralemo, vključimo »Drugi so z nami« in »Drugi so proti nam«. Očitno

⁹ Podobno kot lirski subjekt pesmi Chlashev prosi »Fant južnih krajev«, kakor je tudi naslov skladbe, novomeške rok skupine Drevored, ko pravi: »Daj, povej, ali naj ostanem ali naj vzamem kovček in naj grem.« Zdi se, da bi tukaj, ko je poudarjeno fizično gibanje, težko zagovarjali stališče, da lahko ostanem in grem (kakor se reče: poberem kovčke), morda pa bi se dalo lažje najti situacijo, ko niti ne ostanem niti ne grem (sem s kovčkom npr. na izhodu iz skupnega domovanja in čakam, kaj se bo zgodilo). Ali pa je to podobneje temu, da ostanem *in* grem? The Clash so abstraktnejši. Lirični subjekt njihove pesmi ima težave tudi s sprejemanjem stališč (a) in (b), ko ugotavlja, da »če grem, bo težava, in če ostanem, bo dvojna«; tudi kota (a) in (b) sta zanj nekako nevzdržna.

je, da gre tukaj za stavka, ki univerzum razdelita na dva dela: na nas, kar bom izrazil s tem, da bom kot domeno spremenljivke x določil prav nas, kot domeno spremenljivke y pa bom določil druge. Pri tem je pomembno, da spremenljivke razumemo izključujoče v smislu logike Wittgensteinovega *Logično-filozofskega traktata* (2022), ki je drugačna od russllovske logike, ki v okviru analitične tradicije velja za standardno in ki spremenljivke razume vključujoče, kakor da vse vedno segajo čez isto domeno. Logika, ki jo vzpostavlja *Logično-filozofski traktat*, omogoča tudi, da se z istimi spremenljivkami v različnih stavkih vedno nanašamo na isto, z različnimi pa na različno.¹⁰ Na ta način navedena stavka v eksplicirani obliki razumem v smislu »Za vsakega od nas je vsak drugi z nami«, kar bi lahko formalizirali z $(\forall x)(\forall y)Zyx$,¹¹ in »Za vsakega od nas je vsak drugi proti nam«, kar bi lahko formalizirali z $(\forall x)(\forall y)Pxy$.¹²

Tetralemo, ki jo tvorimo iz teh dveh osnovnih stavkov, bi potem izrazili tako:

(a)		
$(\forall x)(\forall y)Zyx$	$(\forall x)(\forall y)Pxy$	$(\forall x)(\forall y)Zyx \wedge \neg(\forall x)(\forall y)Pxy$
R	R	N
N	R	N
R	N	R
N	N	N

(b)		
$(\forall x)(\forall y)Zyx$	$(\forall x)(\forall y)Pxy$	$(\forall x)(\forall y)Pxy \wedge \neg(\forall x)(\forall y)Zyx$
R	R	N
N	R	R
R	N	N
N	N	N

(c)		
$(\forall x)(\forall y)Zyx$	$(\forall x)(\forall y)Pxy$	$(\forall x)(\forall y)Pxy \wedge (\forall x)(\forall y)Zyx$
R	R	R
N	R	N
R	N	N
N	N	N

¹⁰ Razliko med svojo in Russllovo logiko Wittgenstein (2022) razloži v tezah *Logično-filozofskega traktata* 5.5–5.54.

¹¹ Zxy izraža relacijo x je z y .

¹² Pxy izraža relacijo x je proti y .

(d)

$(\forall x)(\forall y)Zyx$	$(\forall x)(\forall y)Pyx$	$\neg(\forall x)(\forall y)Pyx \wedge \neg(\forall x)(\forall y)Zyx$
R	R	N
N	R	N
R	N	N
N	N	R

(a) $(\forall x)(\forall y)Zyx \wedge (\exists x)(\exists y)\neg Pyx$; (b) $(\forall x)(\forall y)Pyx \wedge (\exists x)(\exists y)\neg Zyx$; (c) $(\forall x)(\forall y)Pyx \wedge (\forall x)(\forall y)Zyx$; (d) $(\exists x)(\exists y)\neg Pyx \wedge (\exists x)(\exists y)\neg Zyx$. Izraženo v neformalni obliki (a) pove »Za vsakega od nas je vsak drugi z nami« in »Obstaja nekaj nas, tako da obstajajo drugi, ki niso proti nam«, ¹³ (b) »Za vsakega od nas je vsak drugi proti nam« in »Obstaja nekaj nas, tako da obstajajo drugi, ki niso z nami«, ¹⁴ (c) »Za vsakega od nas je vsak drugi z nami« in »Za vsakega od nas je vsak drugi proti nam« ter (d) »Obstaja nekaj nas, tako da obstajajo drugi, ki niso proti nam« in »Obstaja nekaj nas, tako da obstajajo drugi, ki niso z nami«. To moramo v nadaljevanju imeti pred očmi, ko bomo obravnavali stavke »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam«, »Bodisi ste z nami bodisi ste proti nam« ter »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami«.

Zdi se, da sta stavka »Drugi so z nami« ¹⁵ in »Drugi so proti nam« ¹⁶ vsaj načeloma logično neodvisna, ¹⁷ to pomeni, da bi se lahko znašli v situacijah, ko (a) so drugi z nami in niso proti nam, (b) so drugi proti nam in niso z nami, (c) so drugi tako proti nam kot z nami ter (d) drugi niso niti proti nam niti z nami.

Očitno pa je, da kdaj pride do situacij, ko kdo zahteva, da kot resnično sprejmemo nujno ekskluzivno disjunkcijo »Bodisi so drugi z nami bodisi so drugi proti nam«. ¹⁸ Lahko bi rekli, da je bila takšna situacija za Lenina v letu 1920, za Busha v letu 2001 pa tudi za Solona v davnih časih. Kaj torej naredi sprejetje tega stavka? Izključi možnost, da bi drugi tako rekoč sedeli na dveh stolčkih, torej bili hkrati z nami in proti nam, in možnost, da bi bili nevtralni, torej ne bi bili niti z nami niti proti nam (oz. z že navede-

¹³ Oziroma: ni res, da »Za vsakega od nas je vsak drugi proti nam«.

¹⁴ Oziroma: ni res, da »Za vsakega od nas je vsak drugi z nami«.

¹⁵ Ki je razumljen v smislu $(\forall x)(\forall y)Zyx$.

¹⁶ Ki je razumljen v smislu $(\forall x)(\forall y)Pyx$.

¹⁷ To pomeni, da iz resnice oz. neresnice enega ni mogoče sklepati na resnico oz. neresnico drugega.

¹⁸ Nagovor teh drugih v »Bodisi ste z nami bodisi ste proti nam« puščam ob strani.

nimi Vezjakovimi besedami: »vse možne nevtralne pozicije«¹⁹). Izraženo z resničnostno tabelo:

$(\forall x)(\forall y)Zyx$	$(\forall x)(\forall y)Pyx$	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
N	R	N	R	N	N
R	N	R	N	N	N

Tako ostaneta samo še dve možnosti tetraleme: (a) in (b), za osnovna stavka pa se zdi, da sta v protislovju. Šele zdaj, po tem koraku, nastopita razvpita stavka »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam« in »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami«. Prvi v tej interpretaciji pravi, da je to, da ni res, da so drugi z nami, zadosten pogoj za to, da so proti nam, oz. da iz neresnice stavka »Drugi so z nami« sledi resnica stavka »Drugi so proti nam«. In ko v tem primeru sprejmemo za resnično, da »Obstaja nekaj nas, tako da obstajajo drugi, ki niso z nami«, je v tem primeru res tudi, da »Za vsakega od nas je vsak drugi proti nam«. To sklepanje na podlagi tega, da nekateri od drugih niso z nekaterimi izmed nas, vse druge jemlje tako rekoč za sovražnike in proizvede kot (b) naše tetraleme. Drugi, »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami«, pravi, da je to, da ni res, da so drugi proti nam, zadosten pogoj za to, da so z nami, oz. da iz neresnice stavka »Drugi so proti nam« sledi resnica stavka »Drugi so z nami«. In ko v tem primeru sprejmemo za resnično, da »Obstaja nekaj nas, tako da obstajajo drugi, ki niso proti nam«, je v tem primeru res tudi, da »Za vsakega od nas je vsak drugi z nami«. To sklepanje na podlagi tega, da nekateri od drugih niso proti nekaterim od nas, vse druge jemlje tako rekoč za prijatelje in proizvede kot (a) naše tetraleme.

Mislim, da sem, deloma v sozvočju z Vezjakom, pokazal, da obe gesti temeljita na izključevanju določenih možnosti,²⁰ vendar je v okviru preostalih dveh možnosti gesta »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam« izključevalna, gesta »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami« pa vključevalna.

Seveda pa je to, katero od teh dveh gest sprejmemo in ali sploh sprej-

¹⁹ Skleпам (morda napačno), da bi lahko imel Vezjak tu v mislih mnogoterost pojavnih oblik tega, da je nekdo nevtralen.

²⁰ Nujno je, da bodisi so drugi proti nam bodisi so drugi z nami, izključni, da (c) drugi so z nami in so drugi proti nam ter da (d) ni res, da so drugi proti nam, in ni res, da so drugi z nami.

memo njima predhodno gesto »Bodisi ste z nami bodisi ste proti nam«, ²¹ odvisno od vsakokratnega konteksta. Kajti pojma »biti z nami« in »biti proti nam« sta izjemno zabrisana. Poglejmo enostavnejši primer. Ljubezen med dvema osebama bi lahko opredelili tako: *a* je z *b* in *b* je z *a*. Vendar obstaja mnoštvo različnih – ki so si v kakšnih ozirih tudi podobne – aplikacij te sheme, ker so ljudje v zvezah na zelo različne načine. Podobno, če nista še bolj zabrisana, velja za pojma »biti z« in »biti proti«, če se sprašujemo, v kakšnih odnosih so različne skupine ljudi, narodi, države, skupnosti držav. Ta pojma sta etična, ne moremo ju definirati, ker nimata ostrih meja in sta odprta. Zanju velja isto kot za pojem »dobro«. Naj tukaj uporabim Wittgensteinovo analogijo iz njegovih *Filozofskih raziskav* (2009, § 77): če bi želeli neoster rdeč pravokotnik zamenjati z ostrim, ²²

bi se dalo potegniti več takšnih ostrih pravokotnikov, ki bi ustrezali neostremu. – Če pa se barve na izvirniku prelivajo brez sledi kakšne meje, – ne bo potem to, da bi narisali ostro sliko, ki ustreza zabrisani, brezupna naloga? Ali ne boš potem moral reči: »Tukaj lahko narišem tako krog kot pravokotnik ali srčasto obliko; saj se vse barve prelivajo. Vse se ujema; in nič.« – In v takšnem položaju je npr. tisti, ki v estetiki ali etiki išče definicije, ki ustrezajo našim pojmom.

Ko naletiš na to težavo, se vedno vprašaj: Kako pa smo se naučili pomena te besede (»dobro« npr.)? Na kakšnih primerih; v katerih jezikovnih igrah? (Potem boš lažje videl, da mora imeti ta beseda družino pomenov.)

Seveda lahko o različnih možnostih razmišljamo, ne da bi se navezovali na tetralema, a nas lahko prav budistična tetralema tako rekoč prisili, da razmišljamo o različnih možnostih. A navsezadnje, etika ni v navajanju ali/in propagiranju določenih načel, temveč v delovanju. ²³ Samo praksa v različnih kontekstih *Lebensform* (nem.) pokaže, kdo in kako *deluje* vključujoče ter kdo in kako izključujoče. Vključujoče delujemo, ²⁴ če v svojem delovanju izhajamo iz kota (a) tetraleme: »Obstaja nekaj nas, tako da obstajajo nekateri drugi, ki niso proti nam« in »Za vsakega od nas je vsak

²¹ Ker zagotovo obstajajo konteksti, v katerih je nekdo drug (morda kakšen dvojni agent?) hkrati z nami in proti nam, in konteksti, v katerih je nekdo drug nevtralen – ni niti z nami niti proti nam.

²² Prevod v slovenščino je moj.

²³ K temu glej Wittgensteinovo »Predavanje o etiki« (2014 in 1994).

²⁴ Kljub izključitvi kotov (c) in (d).

drugi z nami«. Izključujoče delujemo,²⁵ če v svojem delovanju izhajamo iz kota (b) tetraleme: »Obstaja nekaj nas, tako da obstajajo nekateri drugi, ki niso z nami« in »Za vsakega od nas je vsak drugi proti nam«. Kot (a) je ekvivalenten sprejetju stavka »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami«, kot (b) pa sprejetju stavka »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam«.

Stavek »Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam« interpretiramo kot »To, da drugi niso z nami, je zadosten pogoj za to, da so drugi proti nam« in »Kdor ni proti nam, je z nami« kot »To, da drugi niso proti nam, je zadosten pogoj za to, da so drugi z nami«. Ta interpretacija je možna samo v primeru, ko s stavkom »Nujno je, da bodisi so drugi proti nam bodisi so drugi z nami« izključimo *možnost*, da bi bili drugi hkrati proti nam in z nami, ter *možnost*, da ne bi bili niti proti nam niti z nami. Recenzentovemu ugovoru, da to povzroči kolaps kota (a) »Drugi so z nami« in ni res, da »Drugi so proti nam«, v trditev »Drugi so z nami« ter kolaps kota (b) »Drugi so proti nam« in ni res, da »Drugi so z nami«, v trditev »Drugi so proti nam«, bi se lahko izognili tako, da bi – kot Wittgenstein v *Logično-filozofskem traktatu* – razlikovali med resničnostnimi možnostmi, ki »pomenijo možnosti obstoja in neobstoja stanj stvari« (Wittgenstein 2022, 4.3) in »so pogoji resnice in neresnice stavkov« (4.41), ter stavkom, ki »je izraz ujemanja in neujemanja z resničnostnimi možnostmi elementarnih stavkov« (4.4).

Opomba

Članek je rezultat dela na raziskovalnem programu Filozofske raziskave (P6-0252), ki ga financira Javna agencija za znanstvenoraziskovalno in inovacijsko dejavnost Republike Slovenije (ARIS).

Recenzentoma se zahvaljujem za koristne kritike in predloge.

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Med antropocentrizmom in antropomorfizmom: primer Fermijevega paradoksa

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Povzetek. Načelo povprečnosti, ki izhaja iz kopernikanskega načela, trdi, da smo Zemlja in ljudje reprezentativni primerki povprečnega stanja. Dosledno upoštevanje načela povprečnosti vodi v antropomorfizem, saj v razmišljanjih o drugačnosti ne prodremo izven nam poznanih kategorij in smo tako zaprti za možno prepoznavanje drugosti. Treba se je izogniti obema skrajnostma. Fermijev paradoks, čeprav tematsko zadeva druge svetove, je lahko plodna tematika za refleksije o določilih človeka in kontingentnostih, ki sestavljajo njegov razvoj. Članek ponudi dva prispevka k rešitvam Fermijevega paradoksa, ki se skušata izogniti tako slepemu sledenju načelu povprečnosti in s tem antropomorfizmu kot preveliki antropocentričnosti na drugi strani. Prvi prispevek temelji na Sahlinsovi teoriji izvorne družbe izobilja, drugi pa na Ošlajevi diaforični teoriji.

Ključne besede: kopernikansko načelo, antropomorfizem, Fermijev paradoks, izvorna družba izobilja, diaforična teorija

Between Anthropocentrism and Anthropomorphism: The Case of the Fermi Paradox

Abstract. The principle of mediocrity, derived from the Copernican principle, asserts that the Earth and humans are representative examples of the average state. Consistent adherence to the principle of mediocrity leads to anthropomorphism, because in thinking about otherness we do not penetrate beyond the categories known to us and are thus closed to the possible recognition of otherness. It is necessary to avoid both extremes. Fermi's paradox, although it thematically concerns other worlds, can be a fruitful topic for reflections on the human attributes and the contingencies that make up his development. The article offers two contributions to solutions to the Fermi paradox, which try to avoid blind following of the principle of mediocrity and thus anthropomorphism, and excessive anthropocentricity on the other hand.

The first contribution is based on Sahlins' theory of the original affluent society, while the second is based on Ošlaj's diaphorical theory.

Key Words: Copernicanism, anthropomorphism, Fermi paradox, original affluent society, diaphorical theory

Uvod

Človeško mišljenje, tako v znanosti kot v filozofiji in v drugih vedah, vsebuje nekatere nereflektirane predpostavke in tudi predsodke, ena izmed nalog filozofskega mišljenja pa je, da jih odkrije in skuša odpraviti. Situacija postane še kompleksnejša, ko nas trud odmakniti se od nekega predsodka potisne v objem drugega. V članku se bomo namreč skušali izogniti vsaj dvema nereflektiranim predpostavkama oz. predsodkoma: da bi se znebili antropocentričnosti, bomo skušali sprejeti kopernikansko načelo; toda prestrogo sledenje slednjemu nas bo zapeljalo v antropomorfizem in druge oblike popačenega gledanja ter predvidevanja, od česar se bomo prav tako skušali osvoboditi.

Iskanje ravnotežja med antropocentričnostjo in antropomorfizmom se jasno izpostavi v razmišljanjih o možnih rešitvah Fermijevega paradoksa, kjer bomo skušali ta problem najprej izpostaviti, nato pa bomo ponudili dva različna in specifična humanistično-družboslovna prispevka k njegovim rešitvam, enega na področju antropologije, drugega na področju filozofije. Videli bomo, da bodo imela izvajanja večinoma dvojno naravo – četudi se Fermijev paradoks tiče možnih svetov nekje daleč v prostranstvih vesolja, bomo hkrati venomer govorili o nas samih, o človeku in njegovih projekcijah, mankih, (ne)razumevanjih samega sebe, skritih in nereflektiranih predpostavkah. Ker bomo skušali misliti drugost in si jo predstavljati v obliki drugačnih inteligenc ter civilizacij, hkrati pa bomo imeli kot edino primerjalno točko venomer le naše lastne primerke in definicije, bomo vseskozi iskali ravnotežje med prevelikim antropomorfizmom, ki se kaže v iskanju svojih dvojnikov ali svojih projekcij ter v slepoti za drugost in drugačnost, in med prevelikim kršenjem načela povprečnosti oz. zapadanjem v antropocentrizem, kar nas vodi v preveliko poudarjanje naše edinstvenosti in posebnosti. Videli bomo, da je razmišljanje o drugih možnih svetovih in oblikah življenja, inteligence ter civilizacij tako pravzaprav izzivov polna naloga, kjer je treba najprej bolje spoznati in definirati tisto prvo, od katerega naj bi se drugo razlikovalo. Ne bo nam šlo torej zgolj za razmišljanja o potencialnih svetovih, temveč tudi, če ne še bolj, za kritična pretresanja resničnosti verjetja o nekaterih nujnostih v razvoju človeka in njegovih lastnostih.

Kopernikansko načelo, antropocentričnost in antropomorfizem

Kopernikansko načelo je pomembno tako v fizikalni kot v filozofski kozmologiji in trdi, da smo Zemlja, življenje na njej ter ljudje reprezentativni primerki povprečnega stanja in da ljudje nismo privilegirani opazovalci v vesolju. Matematik in fizik George Ellis (1971, 582) implikacije kopernikanskega načela opiše takole: »Prvič, zadevajoč laboratorijske eksperimente lahko interpretiramo, da načelo trdi, da so opaženi lokalni fizikalni zakoni enaki po celem vesolju. Drugič, zadevajoč astronomska opazovanja lahko predvidevamo, da naš pogled na vesolje ni preferirana predstava.«

Načelo povprečnosti, ki izhaja iz kopernikanskega načela in je njegov »filozofski« del, pa v kontekstu kozmologije govori o človekovi – epistemološki, ne pa vrednostni (Uršič 2010, 284) – povprečnosti: ljudje nismo redke izjeme ali celo edinstveni, smo predstavniki povprečnega razvoja in stanja. Čeprav epistemološko, to načelo očitno precej ostro zareže tudi v našo vrednostno samopodobo in s tem v številne predstave o privilegiranosti ter edinstvenosti človeka, ki izvirajo iz različnih religijskih in filozofskih tradicij, in je kot tako prepoznano kot eno izmed protisredstev za antropocentrizem in njegove negativne etične posledice, ki jih je v zgodovini ter v sedanjosti prav gotovo mnogo. Antropocentrizem nam je poznan že v grški filozofiji, še veliko večje je povzdigovanje človeškega statusa v abrahamskih monoteizmi, tudi v indijskih religijah, kjer človek ni tako ostro izločen iz preostanka sveta, ima še vedno duhovno-etično privilegiranost: v budizmu, npr., ki je etično zelo egalitaren do vseh živih bitij, obstaja višje vrednotenje človeka od vseh drugih bitij (tudi bogov), saj je človek privilegiran zaradi svoje »vmesnosti« med nižjimi in višjimi sferami ter ravno pravega razmerja med trpljenjem in užitkom, kar mu daje najplodnejšo priložnost za duhovno kultivacijo (Powers 2007, 36). Zelo podobno o človekovi potencialnosti zaradi njegove svobode in možnosti udejstvovanja tako v dobrem kot zlu govori Pico della Mirandola, ki človeka označi za najsrečnejše bitje (1997, 7). Razsvetljenska filozofska tradicija, čeprav po eni strani izraz upora in odmika od krščanskih predpostavk ter vrednot, ostaja v vrednotenju človeka kot edinstvenega in najvrednejšega – oz. zaradi posesti nekaterih lastnosti, ki jih nobeno drugo živo bitje nima, edinega vrednega – povsem na isti strani kot krščanstvo. Tudi Heidegger ostaja v tem taboru, saj je zanj človek *pastir biti* (1967, 211) (kar ima sicer vseeno zelo drugačne posledice kot pojmovanje človeka kot krone *stvarstva*). Primerov antropocentrizma je seveda veliko,

najdemo pa lahko tudi nekaj izjem, ki človeka dojemajo kot enakovreden del narave oz. sveta (tu predvsem prednjačijo arhaične naravne religije,¹ tudi daoizem, džainizem pa seveda cela plejada sodobnih predvsem iz okoljske etike izvirajočih filozofskih struj itd.).

V tej skoraj črno-beli kategorizaciji pa ima posebno mesto Friedrich Nietzsche, saj je glede vprašanja človekovega vrednotenja v primerjavi z drugimi živimi bitji precej ambivalenten, a kljub temu lahko rečemo, da ravno njegova misel (skupaj s Freudovo) predstavlja »kopernikanski obrat« v pozicioniranju človeka v svetu, in sicer s temeljnim postulatom, da pri človeku center odločanja nista razum ali zavest, temveč je to nezavedno oz. nagoni ali instinkti v njem. Po eni strani lahko rečemo, da pri Nietzscheju čezčlovek (kar mora sicer človek šele postati) kot gospodar Zemlje predstavlja izpolnitev in vrh človeškega samoljubja evropske religijsko-filozofske tradicije, po drugi strani pa moramo biti natančnejši: ena izmed Nietzschejevih kritik človeka je ta, da je vsaka vrsta že ustvarila nekaj čezse, le človek še ne (1999, 12). Pri Nietzscheju je tako za nas najzanimivejše ravno njegovo vztrajno detroniziranje človeka. Sledeča, pogosto citirana misel bo v nadaljevanju našla močan odmev v naših razmišljanjih o pomenu in vrednosti človeške inteligence (Nietzsche 2004a, 65): »V bogve katerem odmaknjenem kotu veselja, lesketajoče razlitega v neštete sončne sisteme, je bila nekoč zvezda, na kateri so modre živali iznašle spoznavanje. Bila je to najbolj napuhla in lažniva minuta »svetovne zgodovine«, pa vendar le minuta.« Nietzsche namreč človeško inteligenco s pripadajočimi lastnostmi, kot sta npr. zavest in spoznavanje, postavlja v kontekst merila, ki vrednoti po tem, koliko je neka lastnost koristna za krepitev življenja.

Za zavest, ki v mnogih definicijah predstavlja tisto ključno, po katerem se človek razlikuje od živali (če smo natančni, seveda govorimo o totalno reflektivni zavesti – več o njej v zadnjem poglavju –, saj imajo zavest že živali), tako Nietzsche pravi, da se bo šele izkazalo, ali se bo zaradi prednosti ali slabosti za preživetje obdržala, izginila ali pa bo zaradi nje propadla človeška vrsta. »Zavedanje je zadnja in najpoznejša stopnja razvoja organskega in potemtako tudi njegov najnepopolnejši in najslabotnejši

¹ Zelo zanimivi so primeri pojmovanja človekovega mesta v svetu, ki ne govorijo o nam poznejšem dvigu človeka iz narave in od ravni živali, temveč, obratno, o padcu živali z mesta, enakovrednega človeku, v stanje manjvrednosti ali podrejenosti. Dober primer tega je majevski mit o recitiranju svete pesmi bogovom, ki so ga vsa bitja morala izvesti enkrat na leto. Živali so nekoč pozabile besedilo pesmi in za kazen so jim bogovi odvzeli sposobnost govora.

del« (Nietzsche 2005, 46). A tudi tu je Nietzschejeva pozicija še vedno specifična, saj ne pade v noben prej naštet tabor. Namreč, Nietzsche ne upošteva načela povprečnosti, a hkrati tudi ne zapade v antropocentrizem – človeški ustroj sicer šteje za nekaj redkega, ne pa tudi vrednega zaradi te redkosti –, ne napravi torej zmote, podobne naturalistični: iz epistemološkega spoznanja o redkosti ne izpelje aksiološke sodbe o vrednosti, kar je množičen pojav pri različnih primerih antropocentrizma. (Samo)spoznavanje, zavest in človeška inteligenca so zanj edinstvene lastnosti, a v nasprotju z večinsko usmeritvijo evropske filozofije niso dobre same po sebi, zato ker še niso izkazale koristi za življenje oz. za krepitev življenja in njegovo samopreseganje. Ravno nasprotno, Nietzscheju se zdi, da te lastnosti velikokrat izkazujejo protiživljenjske tendence, ki življenje krnijo ali ga lahko celo pogubijo in bodo zato izginile po preteku te »kozmične minute«. Nietzsche tako v svojem bistvu ni antropocentrist: v svoji strogi kritiki človeka tega poniža v manjvrednega (ker ne dosega evlucijskih standardov preseganja, morebiti pa celo preživetja zaradi protiživljenjskosti svoje zavestne narave) ali pa ga agnostično vrednoti nevtrarno, kot tistega, ki se bo moral šele izkazati v svoji moči. Prav tako ni antropomorfist, saj vztrajno poudarja posebnost človeškega ustroja, ki ga ne smemo projicirati v druga živa bitja; hkrati s tem pa ne sprejema načela povprečnosti – človek je zanj edinstven, četudi to pomeni, da je po nekaterih merilih vrednostno najnižje v živem svetu.

Zgodovina človeškega samovrednotenja je polna kršenja načela povprečnosti in na tem mestu ne bomo naštevali vseh primerov in tudi negativnih etičnih posledic, ki lahko iz tega izhajajo. Prav tako ne bomo naštevali negativnih etičnih posledic in epistemoloških popačenj ter neuspehov, ki izhajajo iz antropomorfizma. Pomembno je, da se iz Nietzschejevega primera naučimo upoštevati sredinsko pozicijo, ki ni ne antropocentrična ne antropomorfna, vrednostno pa lahko vodi v prav vse smeri in dopušča tako negativna, pozitivna kot nevtralna vrednotenja. K možnim epistemološkim odgovorom na kršenje načela povprečnosti pa se bomo še vrnili v naših dveh prispevkih k rešitvam Fermijevega paradoksa.

Vrnimo se sedaj k načelu povprečnosti v astrofizikalnem smislu. Tu poznamo sorodno načelo, imenovano kozmološko, ki trdi, da so opaženi lokalni fizikalni zakoni enaki po celem vesolju in da je vesolje homogeno ter izotropno. Tudi tej poziciji lahko zoperstavimo filozofsko kritiko (nekatero fizikalne ugotovitve, ki so nasprotne temu načelu, bomo našteli v nadaljevanju). Sinologa David Hall in Roger Ames v svoji analizi (1998)

razlik v temeljnih predpostavkah evropske in kitajske religijsko-filozofske tradicije govorita o teološki zapuščini v predpostavkah znanosti, kot se je razvila v Evropi. Ena izmed njih je verjetje v *svet enega reda*, ki predpostavlja, da je celoten univerzum enovita celota z enakimi fizikalnimi zakoni, ki izhajajo iz istega vira. To verjetje pa ima korenine v predpostavki o enem načrtovalcu opaženega reda in v verjetju v zmago reda nad kaosom.² Četudi črno-bela razdelitev na vseprisotnost verjetja v svet enega reda v evropski tradiciji in njena popolna odsotnost v kitajski tradiciji ne moreta držati, je refleksija o tej predpostavki vseeno zelo koristna.

Zastavljeni cilj znanosti je, da vsa različna dognanja in naravne zakone poveže v koherentno ter neprotislovno celoto. Končni cilj fizike je *teorija vsega*, ki bo združila kvantno fiziko in splošno relativnost ter bo zmožna razložiti vsak pojav v vesolju. Znanost skuša vsak nov, nerazložen element, ki ga odkrije (dober primer sodobnega izziva tega je npr. temna snov), ukalupiti v en vesoljni red in v en sistem razlage. A kaj če to ni mogoče na takšen način, kot si predstavlja trenutna znanost? Ellis (1971, 656) opozarja, da imamo kot opazovalci lahko dostop edinole do podatkov znotraj našega preteklega svetlobnega stožca (predel prostora-časa, iz katerega je imela svetloba od Velikega poka do sedaj čas, da nas doseže):

Čeprav bi načeloma lahko pridobili *nekaj* podatkov o prostoru-času zunaj našega svetlobnega stožca z meritvijo gravitacijskega »Coulumbovega« polja zaradi materije zunaj, je zaenkrat še nejasno, kaj točno bi bili zmožni ugotoviti na ta način. Zato so trditve o daljnih dogodkih izven našega svetlobnega stožca na temeljen način nepreverljive trditve in so lahko zelo zavajajoče. [...] Zatorej če postuliramo »kozмолоško načelo« [vsak opazovalec ima enako sliko vesolja, ki je homogeno in izotropno] na filozofski podlagi, ga je nemogoče ovreči; v tem primeru je njegov znanstveni status obskuren.

Sodobna opazovanja namreč najdevajo izjeme in konflikte s kozmološkim načelom, kar se tiče homogenosti in izotropije vesolja,³ četudi za-

² Hall in Ames trdita, da se evropska znanost v svojih nereflktiranih temeljih naslanja na tri dokaze za obstoj Boga. Iz kozmološkega dokaza prevzema verjetje v nujnost obstoja transcendentalnega prvega vzroka, ki je nepovzročen. Namesto Boga razmišlja o Velikem poku. Iz obeh, kozmološkega in ontološkega argumenta, znanost podeduje idejo nujnosti. Iz argumenta o načrtovalcu prevzema dva sklepa: red, ki ga opazimo, potrjuje agensa, ki je red ustvaril; red, ki ga opazimo v enem delu stvarstva, dokazuje, da obstaja enak red povsod (Hall in Ames 1998, 214–215).

³ Npr. Secrest idr. (2021) ter Horvath, Hakkila in Bagoly (2013).

enkrat še velja, da kozmološko načelo v grobem v velikem merilu drži. A vendar je kritika kozmološkega načela mogoča, tako na filozofski kot na empirični ravni. Še bolj pa je to mogoče za načelo povprečnosti, ki zaobsega več ravni, ne le fizikalne. To bomo v članku tudi storili, predvsem na ravneh, ki zadevajo ne toliko fizikalne kot biološke in psihološke procese. Tu nas bodo najbolj zanimala vprašanja nujnosti ali kontingentnosti razvoja inteligence in refleksivne zavesti ter uporabe in razvoja visoke tehnike in znanosti. Tega se bomo najprej lotili s pomočjo razmišljanj o možnih rešitvah Fermijevega paradoksa, ki ima to prednost, da nas dvigne daleč stran od utečenih filozofskih razmišljanj o človeku – gre namreč za razmišljanja o drugih možnih oblikah življenja, inteligenc in civilizacij⁴ izven meja našega planeta. V sklopu teh razmišljanj pa lahko zavzamemo tudi odmaknjeno perspektivo do nas samih in do določil, ki definirajo našo inteligenco in civilizacijo ter oblike življenja na Zemlji. To pa vsekakor pomeni dodano vrednost za poskus objektivnejšega razmišljanja o nas samih.

Fermijev paradoks

Fermijev paradoks, ki je ime dobil po fiziku Enricu Fermiju,⁵ predpostavlja, da je glede na velikost Rimske ceste (ali pa celotnega vesolja) in število planetov v njej nujno, da obstajajo številne tehnološko napredne civilizacije, ki so imele glede na starost vesolja dovolj časa, da bi stopile v kakršen koli stik z nami oz. da bi njih ali njihove sledove ljudje že zaznali – a očitno se nič od tega do sedaj ni zgodilo, iz česar izhaja paradoks (Čirković 2018, 10). Reševanje paradoksa v večini primerov poteka v domeni znanosti, natančneje, z empiričnim raziskovanjem vesolja, nato pa z uporabo statističnih modelov, ki napovedujejo verjetnost. Ironično pa je, da pravzaprav veliko število sodobnih znanstvenih odkritij le še povečuje, ne pa zmanjšuje paradoks, npr., odkritih je čedalje več naseljivih planetov ali

⁴ V članku, kjer bomo obravnavali avtorje tako z ozadjem fizike kot antropologije in filozofije, bomo naleteli na mnoge različne definicije termina *civilizacija* (ter tudi na drugačne ali sovpadajoče definicije terminov *kultura* in *družba*), kar bo za enoten diskurz predstavljalo precejšen izziv. Ob vsakem avtorju bomo tako skušali slediti njegovemu eksplicitnemu ali implicitnemu pomenu teh terminov.

⁵ Fermi ni bil čisto prvi, ki bi zastavil vsebino tega paradoksa (paradoks se je razvil iz pogovora, ki ga je imel s kolegi fiziki leta 1950). Prvo instanco zasnutka paradoksa lahko najdemo že pri francoskem razsvetljencu Bernardu le Bovier de Fontenellu v njegovem romanu *Entretiens sur la Pluralité des Mondes* (Pogovori o pluralnosti svetov) iz leta 1686 (Prantz 2013, 249), leta 1933 pa je podobno kot Fermi razmišljal tudi sovjetski raketni inženir Konstantin Eduardovič Ciolkovski (Čirković 2018, 3).

lun, več ekstremofilov (organizmov, ki preživijo v ekstremnih okoljih) in več načinov premagovanja medzvezdnih razdalj ter drugih tehnoloških rešitev (Ćirković 2009, 3–4). Zakaj nismo zaznali nobene sledi druge inteligentne civilizacije, torej postaja čedalje zanimivejše vprašanje, h čemur pa nujno spadajo razmisleki o redkosti ali pogostosti inteligentnih civilizacij ter seveda vprašanje same definicije tega pojma.

Ker je tako izziv paradoksa še večji in ker ga znanost sama zaenkrat še ni uspela zadovoljivo rešiti, je smiselno, da je v razmisleku o Fermijevem paradoksu, katerega predlagane rešitve vsebujejo številne skrite predpostavke, vključena tudi kritična filozofska oz. humanistična misel. S sledečo izjavo astronoma Milana Ćirkovića (2009, 9) se tako ne bomo najbolj strinjali: »Celo najobjektivnejše, matematične študije, kot je, recimo, ta Newmana in Sagana, so bile nekako prisiljene resignirano zaključiti, da je »nenavadno, da je rešitev za problem »Kje so?« močno odvisna od politike in etike naprednih družb« (Newman in Sagan 1981, str. 320). Pri tej vrsti odgovora je nekaj zelo nezadovoljivega. Bolj kot nezadovoljstvo nam lahko takšni zaključki prinesejo dobrodošlo gradivo in izziv za nadaljnje raziskovanje.

Predlaganih in obravnavanih rešitev paradoksa, ki so ali logično veljavne ali empirično možne, je nekaj sto (Ćirković 2018, 265),⁶ a nobena paradoksa ne reši zadovoljivo in popolno, zato v članku ne bomo iskali nove rešitve, temveč bomo le odprli novo polje razmisleka in ponudili prispevka, ki lahko dodatno pojasnita ali utrdita nekatere že obstoječe rešitve. Poglejmo si torej Fermijev paradoks, kot ga v preprosti shemi navaja Ćirković (2018, 19): »časovnoprostorska razmerja Galaksije + očitna odsotnost zaznanih izvenzemeljskih civilizacij + dodatne predpostavke → paradoksen zaključek.« Pri čemer dodatne predpostavke zajemajo naivni ali znanstveni realizem, naturalizem, kopernikanizem, gradualizem, neekskluzivnost in ekonomske predpostavke (Ćirković 2018, 20 in Ćirković 2009, 2). Medtem ko bi nas kritika znanstvenega realizma, naturalizma

⁶ Nekatere obravnavajo ovire samega fizikalnega ustroja vesolja, ki otežuje razvoj življenja ali razvoj tehnologije, potrebne za premagovanje medzvezdnih razdalj ali pošiljanja in sprejemanja signalov, precej rešitev govori o katastrofičnih dogodkih, ki lahko uničijo civilizacijo oz. življenje, najsibodo to različne kozmične ali planetarne naravne nesreče ali pa samouničenje civilizacije z visoko tehnologijo (kar seveda že vsebuje mnogo humanistično-družboslovnih predpostavk o naravi takšnih civilizacij), nekaj jih spada v t. i. solipsistično skupino rešitev, kjer najdemo številne precej obskurne, neznanstvene in nedokazljive predloge, nekaj pa jih ostaja izven te kategorizacije. Za več o tem glej Ćirković (2018).

in neeksluzivnosti, ki so pravzaprav metode znanstvenega in s tem tudi filozofskega raziskovanja, pahnila v neznanstvenost, pa je kritika drugih treh predpostavk pravzaprav del kritičnega znanstvenega dela. Fermijev paradoks vsebuje premiso, da je naša civilizacija povsem povprečna (upoštevna načelo povprečnosti oz. kopernikanizem⁷) in zaradi tega ne more biti edina niti ne redka – to je pravzaprav ključni steber paradoksa. A načelo povprečnosti v tem oziru je filozof Ernan McMullan označil kot »uniformitaristično zmoto« – če se je življenje razvilo na enem kraju, še ne pomeni, da se bo tudi na drugih krajih s podobnimi pogoji (Lamb 2004, 41).

Filozof David Lamb nas pravilno opozarja, da nas nobena od teh dveh skrajnosti, ne načelo povprečnosti ne predpostavka edinstvenosti, sama po sebi ne more pripeljati do resnice (2004, 47). Obe sta koristni za obrzdanje skrajnega mišljenja v njunem nasprotnem polu in s tem za omilitev antropocentričnih ali antropomorfni predpostavk. Eden izmed primerov močnega antropomorfizma v Fermijevem paradoksu je predstava, da naj bi druge civilizacije posedovale željo po raziskovanju, kolonizaciji in vzpostavljanju stika z drugimi civilizacijami. Mnogi astrofiziki sicer priznajo možnost, da si nekatere civilizacije ne želijo kolonizirati ali vznemirjati drugih, toda trdijo, da, statistično gledano, to ne more veljati za večje število civilizacij (Prantzos 2013, 252),⁸ kar pa nas zopet vrne nazaj na uklonitev načelu povprečnosti. Antropomorfizem je na tak način povsem zavestno sprejet: v mnogih razumevanjih in verjetnostnih izračunih modeliranja možnih »galaktičnih kolonizacij« astrofiziki namerno uporabljajo dejanske koeficiente kolonizacije iz evropske ali polinezijske zgodovine (Webb 2015, 106)⁹ in te koeficiente uporabljajo kot znanstveno relevantne iztočnice.

Čeprav je takšna predstava kolonizacije res izjemno antropomorfna, bi

⁷ Čirković opozarja, da so kopernikansko načelo porušila sodobna odkritja, ki kažejo, da je povprečna starost Zemlji podobnih planetov okoli 6,4 milijarde let, kar je precej več kot Zemljina (4,5 mrd) (2009, 3). Starost planetov je sicer le en delček kopernikanskega načela oz. načela povprečnosti, tako da težko rečemo, da zaradi tega načela povsem padeta.

⁸ Tu gre za upoštevanje zahteve po neeksluzivnosti, ki jo omenja Čirković – gre za to, da bi morali za prepričljivejšo rešitve Fermijevega paradoksa imeti neeksluzivne rešitve, ki slonijo na majhnem številu neodvisnih vzrokov. Npr., globalna sestava vesolja z velikimi, težko premagljivimi razdaljami je primer takšne dobre rešitve, medtem ko samouničenje civilizacije z jedrskim orožjem ni, saj lahko velja le za statistično manjše število planetov.

⁹ Eric Jones v svojem modelu galaktične kolonizacije uporabi koeficient 0,0003 na leto, kar je bil koeficient emigracije iz Evrope v Severno Ameriko v 18. stoletju (Webb 2015, 91).

jo lahko mogoče vseeno vsaj malce omilili s hipotezo, da je ena izmed bistvenih lastnosti življenja njegova težnja k razširitvi (ljudje in naša tehnologija smo skozi ta pogled le sredstvi za to, da življenje poneseemo na druge planete). A tudi tu se še vedno gibljemo v območju določene vrste centrizma, ki se opira na do zdaj edino nam znano instanco življenja (Čirković 2009, 15):

[P]ogosto citiran kliše, da življenje zapolni vse razpoložljive niše, je očitno *non sequitur* v ustreznem kontekstu; medzvezdno kolonialno razširjanje tako ne bi smelo biti privzeta hipoteza, kar pa na žalost je v večini dosedanjih diskurzov, povezanih s SETI [angl. *Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence*, iskanje zunajzemeljske inteligence] [...].

Vemo, da astronomi, ki iščejo planete izven Osončja, kjer bi lahko obstajalo življenje, iščejo *Zemlji* podobne planete, kjer bi lahko obstajalo življenje, podobno *zemeljskemu*: iščejo planete, ki ležijo v območju naseljivosti, ki je vzvratno definirano glede na pogoje nastanka zemeljskega življenja. Poleg življenja, podobnega zemeljskemu, pa znanstveniki iščejo tudi tehnologijo, ki je trenutno poznana nam, kot pravi Lamb (2004, 20): »Tehnologija, uporabljena za iskanje ETI [angl. *Extraterrestrial Intelligence*, zunajzemeljske inteligence], je vsilila lastno definicijo inteligence. [...] Glede na potencial za veliko raznolikost inteligentnih kultur se to morda zdi precej ozek in omejujoč cilj. Toda to je vse, kar lahko zazna obstoječa tehnologija [...].« Temu sledi antropomorfno definiranje inteligence (str. 20): »Glede na to, da je radovednost sorodna značilnost inteligence in da enaki fizikalni zakoni delujejo po vsem vesolju, je verjetno, da bodo radovedni ETI odkrili to, kar smo odkrili mi.« Z vidika praktičnih ciljev zaznavanja/prepoznavanja takšnega nam bolj znanega življenja je ta zamejitev na podobnost seveda popolnoma smotrna (Marino 2015, 184), z vidika širših vprašanj redkosti ali pogostosti življenja, razumevanja vzrokov za nastanek življenja in različnih mehanizmov razvoja življenjskih oblik itd. pa smo s temi pristranskostmi izbire omejili naše iskanje drugih oblik življenja in naše razumevanje pojava življenja kot takega. Antropomorfizem (natančneje mogoče »geobiomorfizem«) je, kot vidimo v teh razmišljanjih, izredno močan in izjava astrofizika Nikolaja Kardaševa, ki kritizira obstoječe programe SETI, je tako zelo na mestu (Čirković 2018, 80): »Zunajzemeljske civilizacije še niso bile najdene, ker jih dejansko še nismo iskali.«

Ravno ta druga plat, četudi spekulativnejše narave, pa je vseeno zelo pomembna v kontekstu razumevanja možne edinstvenosti našega la-

stnega planeta in življenja. Naslednji reprezentativen primer antropomorfizma je verjetje v občo veljavnost zakonov zemeljske evolucije in s tem predvidevanje, da bodo tudi na drugih planetih z življenjem veljali podobni zakoni evolucije kot na Zemlji (Ashkenazi 2017, 53): »Sklenemo lahko, čeprav samo pod močno hipotezo, da je evolucija posledica zelo osnovnih pravil v našem vesolju. Zato bi morali pričakovati, da jo bomo našli v drugih bioloških sistemih [...].« Predpostavka gradualizma, našeta med dodatnimi predpostavkami Fermijevega paradoksa, predpostavlja počasne spremembe brez prelomnih dogodkov, ki so plod enih in istih zakonov – zakoni, ki oblikujejo sedanost, so oblikovali preteklost in bodo oblikovali tudi prihodnost. To verjetje so sicer različna znanstvena odkritja že precej spodkopala (Ćirković 2018, 81–82) in glede definiranja življenja vseeno najdemo tudi nekatere alternativne pozicije, ki upoštevajo drugačne možnosti, npr. da življenje ne temelji le na ogljiku (Lamb 2004, 89), tako kot zemeljsko, ali da lahko življenje obstaja tudi v drugačnih pogojih od tistih, ki jih potrebuje naše, ogljično. A slednja možnost je že bolj ali manj navdihnjena zaradi odkritij zemeljskega (ogljirnega) ekstremofilnega življenja, ki obstaja v doslej nepredstavljenih pogojih (bakterije, ki preživijo visoko vročino, mraz, pomanjkanje svetlobe, sevanje itd.) (str. 93).

V razmišljanjih o možnih rešitvah Fermijevega paradoksa in o možnih drugih inteligentnih civilizacijah pogosto naletimo še na dve nereflektirani predpostavki, ki sta pravzaprav izjemno ključni za sam argument paradoksa. Obe zadevata (antropomorfno) definiranje pojma inteligenca. Definicijo pojma »inteligenca« so podajali že mnogi misleci različnih ozadij,¹⁰ in ker bi bila diskusija o možnih definicijah inteligence ter o možnih različnih inteligencah vsekakor preobširna za okvir tega članka, se bomo podrobneje posvetili zgolj dvema lastnostma inteligence, ki sta poudarjeni in hkrati visoko vrednoteni v določenih človeških civilizacijah (npr. iz Evrope izhajajoči »zahodni« civilizaciji) in kot takšni velikokrat

¹⁰ Definicija inteligence biologa in filozofa Toma Stonierja je precej blizu Nietzschejevi opredelitvi (Ashkenazi 2017, 77): »Definiramo jo lahko kot »lastnost naprednih informacijskih sistemov, ki takšnim sistemom omogočajo, da analizirajo svoje okolje, nato pa izvajajo procese, ki povečujejo sposobnost preživetja in/ali reprodukcijo sistema«. Toda tu moramo paziti na verjetje, da večja inteligenca pomeni vedno večje možnosti preživetja in reprodukcije, za kar ni nobenega dokaza. Evolucija namreč ne teži vedno k večji kompleksnosti ali k večji inteligenci in nekatere vrste, ki jim priznavamo manjšo inteligenco, so lahko veliko uspešnejše pri preživetju in reprodukciji kot inteligentnejše (str. 70, 96).

postavljeni kot obči in kot nujna pogoja inteligence – govorimo o povezavama med inteligenco in totalno reflektivnostjo zavesti ter med inteligenco in izgradnjo tehnično ter znanstveno venomer razvijajoče se in napredujoče civilizacije. Zelo pogosto pa ob teh dveh lastnostih najdemo pridruženo verjetje, da civilizacija s takšno tehnično zmožnostjo nujno poseduje tudi nekatere psihološke (oz. psihofizične) komponente, ki so potrebne za namero komuniciranja ali kolonizacije, npr. radovednost, željo/potrebo po komuniciranju oz. iskanju drugih bitij (Lamb 2004, 19), stremljenje po presežku, spremembi, razvoju, širjenju itd. Naša prispevka bosta tako variaciji ene izmed že poznanih rešitev paradoksa, sloneče na hipotezi redke Zemlje oz. njeni različici, ki jo Ćirković imenuje hipoteza redkega uma.¹¹

Nadaljujmo s kritiko antropomorfnih predpostavk. Hipoteza o kontinuiteti govori o kontinuiteti med anorganskim in organskim svetom ter tem, da med njima ni vrzeli, ki bi jo bilo težko preskočiti, torej da je razvoj življenja v primernih fizikalno-kemičnih pogojih visoko verjeten. Intelligence v različnih svetovih naj bi si bile tako zelo podobne, civilizacije pa naj bi imele podobne vzorce obnašanja. Polihistor John Haldane je celo govoril o kontinuiteti, ki seže tudi do evolucije kulture (Ćirković 2018, 91–92).¹² Tu sicer ne gre za idejo nujnosti, temveč zgolj za visoko verjetnost. V taboru, ki zagovarja močno kontinuiteto, pa niso samo naravoslovci, mednje spada tudi antropolog Michael Ashkenazi (2017, 399):

[T]ako kot obstajajo fizikalne in kemične zakonitosti, ki, kolikor jih poznamo ljudje, držijo po vsem vesolju, tako obstajajo tudi družbene in kulturne zakonitosti, ki se bodo izražale v vedenju in proizvodih ETI. To ne pomeni, da se te zakonitosti izražajo na enak način. Daleč od tega. Zakonitosti [...] so le okviri, ki omogočajo neskončno raznolikost.

Temu je seveda mogoče ugovarjati. Biologi opozarjajo, da iz zakonov zemeljske evolucije ne moremo sklepati na evolucijo na drugih plane-

¹¹ Rešitve, ki slonijo na hipotezi »redke Zemlje«, so ene izmed najširše sprejetih v mnogih astrobioloških krogih, njihov izziv kopernikanizmu pa je bil večinoma sprejet – četudi samo unikatnost Zemlje nekatere nove empirične ugotovitve spodkopajo, saj ugotavljajo, da pogoji za nastanek Zemlje le niso tako redki (Ćirković 2009, 10).

¹² Poleg tega, trdi kognitivni znanstvenik Marvin Minsky, bodo zunajzemeljske inteligence razmišljale podobno kot ljudje, saj bodo soočene z enakimi ovirami ekonomičnosti in učinkovitosti pri reševanju problemov (Ashkenazi 2017, 79). A kdo lahko trdi, da bodo imele enake probleme kot ljudje?

tih, tudi kar se tiče inteligence (Lamb 2004, 42): »[I]nteligenca lahko daje selektivno prednost, vendar njene pojavitve ni mogoče zagotoviti, saj se lahko izkaže, da imajo druge lastnosti večjo prednost.«

Za vznik inteligence pri živih bitjih tako ne obstaja nujnost; da bi inteligenca morala vsebovati totalno refleksivno zavest, tudi ne; da so posledice vznika totalno refleksivne zavesti uniformne in podobne tem, ki jih poznamo pri človeku, tudi ne. Slednje bomo obravnavali v drugem prispevku. S prvim prispevkom pa bomo skušali pokazati, da ne obstaja nujnost in tudi morebiti visoka verjetnost ne, da bi morala inteligentna civilizacija prispeti do stopnje visoke tehnike in znanosti. Tu seveda predpostavljamo, da – kljub vsem naštetim in nenaštetim pomislekom – lahko pride do razvoja inteligentne civilizacije, ki ima nekatere podobnosti s človeško. Poleg razmisleka o različnih možnostih drugje bo šlo tu hkrati za enako pomembno refleksijo o nujnostih in kontingentnostih zgodovinskega razvoja človeka samega.

Antropološki prispevek: Sahlinsova teorija o prvotni družbi izobilja

To [verjetje] predpostavlja, da bodo druge razvijajoče se vrste verjetno šle skozi podobne stopnje od kamene do jedrske dobe. Če pa upoštevamo kontingentnosti v razvoju človeške naravne in družbene zgodovine, se zdi takšna ponovitev zelo malo verjetna. [Lamb 2004, 54]

Tudi če bi Lambovo sodbo omilili in *zelo majhno verjetnost* spremenili zgolj v to, da za kaj takega *ni nobene nujnosti*, bi bili na boljšem kot pri večini razmislekov o zgodovinskem razvoju drugih možnih intelligentnih civilizacij. Znotraj njih zasledimo nereflektirano sprejemanje (evro)antropomorfnega pojmovanja ene možne premice zgodovinskega razvoja in njegovih stopenj, skozi katere naj bi šla vsaka »inteligentna« civilizacija. To verjetje je zgodovinsko najprej služilo primerjavam in sodbam o neevropskih civilizacijah, najbolj se je izostrilo v času pospešenega stika evropske civilizacije z drugimi civilizacijami od konca 15. stoletja naprej, idejno podkrepitev je pridobilo v dobi razsvetljenstva (Dunér 2015, 257), konkretno-praktično podlago in pospešek pa v dobi imperializmov 19. in 20. stoletja. Tudi danes to verjetje, ki mu teoretiki zgodovine pripenjajo različna imena,¹³ vztraja še marsikje, tudi v razmišljanjih o mogočih nezemeljskih civilizacijah.

¹³ Progresivizem, vigovska zgodovina itd. Že Montesquieu je kristaliziral idejo o zgodovini kot poti k večji popolnosti človeške civilizacije, Vico je razdelal stopnje razvoja, ki ve-

Pri tem verjetju pride do izenačevanja zgodovinska procesa z idejo napredka – potek zgodovinskih sprememb naj bi vodil do vedno večjega napredka neke civilizacije. Verjetje enega možnega poteka civilizacijskega razvoja tako nosi predpostavko, da je bilo človeštvo (kot celota ali kot posamezne civilizacije) v vsaki prejšnji eri nujno manj razvito¹⁴ na malodane vseh področjih, ne le tehničnem (npr. tudi na etičnem, socialno-političnem, ekonomskem, idejnem itd.), ter da je bilo preživetje težje, trpljenje večje, kakovost življenja pa v celoti slabša. Nekateri pogosti »hobbesovski« pred sodki o najzgodnejših družbah (v paleolitiku) so sledeči: ljudje so bili v stalni nevarnosti, podvrženi nenehni grožnji stradanja; naravni viri so bili pičli, tehnična nezadostnost je ljudi silila, da so ves čas porabili le za golo preživetje; niso imeli »prostega« časa, ki bi ga lahko porabili za druge dejavnosti oz. za izgradnjo »kulture«;¹⁵ značilna sta bila odsotnost ekonomskega presežka in pa maksimalni vložek energije maksimalnega števila ljudi (Sahlins 1999, 15, 17).

Toda antropološke ugotovitve glede življenja prvotnih človeških družb kažejo povsem drugačno, skorajda nasprotno sliko. Sahlinsova teorija o prvotni družbi izobilja¹⁶ je zamajala predsodek o pomanjkanju kot »naravnem stanju narave«, ¹⁷ saj so raziskave antropologov, ki jih navaja, po-

ljajo za vse civilizacije, Kant, Rousseau, Hobbes in Hegel so te ideje o napredku vpeljali v (politično) filozofijo, Smith pa v ekonomsko teorijo (Little 2020, razdelek »Does History Possess Directionality?«).

¹⁴ Dopolnitev in vsekakor ne nasprotje takšnemu verjetju so bile tudi degeneracijske teorije 18. in 19. stoletja. Skozi njihovo perspektivo so bile tehnično nenapredne družbe, na katere so naleteli takratni Evropejci, posledica padca iz že doseženega višjega civilizacijskega stanja (Kaplan 2000, 317).

¹⁵ Arheološko najdišče Göbekli Tepe v Turčiji, ki so ga začeli preučevati leta 1995, je morebiten konkreten protidokaz temu. Gre za najstarejše odkrite religijske objekte (med 9600 in 8200 pr. n. št.), ki so jih zgradili pripadniki lovsko-nabiralniške/-ih družbe/družb. Po prvotni interpretaciji naj bi šlo za tipično nomadsko lovsko-nabiralniško prebivalstvo, ki naj bi se srečevalo na tem ritualnem kraju, a odkritja ostankov stalnih bivališč so to hipotezo omajala. Še vedno pa niso bili odkriti sledovi poljedelstva, kar nakazuje, da so objekte res zgradili lovci in nabiralci.

¹⁶ Sahlins v uvodu knjige *Ekonomika kamene dobe*, katere prvi esej je »Prvotna družba izobilja«, razloči med formalistično in substantivistično pozicijo v ekonomski teoriji. Formalistična nekako ustreza zgoraj navedenemu verjetju v eno premico zgodovinskega razvoja, saj »formalistična metoda nujno obravnava primitivne ekonomije kot nerazvite različice naše lastne ekonomije [...]« (Sahlins 1999, 10). Substantivistična, ki ji pripada tudi Sahlins, pa skuša različne družbe razumeti iz njih samih.

¹⁷ Sahlinsova teorija sicer ni bila popolnoma nova iznajdba, saj so nekateri antropologi že v 19. stoletju vedeli, da sta lov in nabiranje vzela manj časa kot poljedelstvo in živinoreja

kazale na obstoj prvotne družbe izobilja: »Po splošnem mnenju družba izobilja zlahka zadovoljuje vse človeške materialne potrebe. [...] Do izobilja namreč lahko pridemo na dva načina. Želje »zlahka zadovoljimo«, bodisi tako, da veliko proizvajamo, ali tako, da si malo želimo« (1999, 15–16). Sahlins zoperstavlja pojmovanje tržne ekonomije, ki verjame, da so človekove želje velike ali celo neskončne, in pa »zenovsko« pot, kot jo imenuje, ki verjame, da so želje končne in maloštevilne, tehnična sredstva za njihovo doseg pa zadostna. »Ljudje, ki sprejmejo zenovsko strategijo, lahko uživajo materialno obilje brez primere – a imajo nizek življenjski standard. Ta pot, menim, velja za lovce« (str. 16).

Sahlins trdi, da je pomanjkanje bolj kot nekaj objektivnega razmerje med sredstvi in cilji. Medtem ko razvojno usmerjena iz Evrope izhajajoča civilizacija temelji na stalnem povečevanju sredstev in na nikoli dosegljivih ciljih, pa nam lovsko-nabiralniške družbe kažejo, da lahko sredstva ostajajo enaka, cilji pa se lahko prilagajajo sredstvom oz., natančneje, so lahko v različnih družbah različno zahtevni. Namreč, ne gre za to, da bi pripadniki prvotnih družb namerno znižali ambicije za svojimi cilji, da bi le-te lahko dosegali z enakimi sredstvi in se tako izognili pomanjkanju. Seveda si tudi pripadniki teh družb včasih želijo imeti več od tistega, kar imajo, a antropologi so opazili, da ne delajo dlje, da bi to pridobili (Solway 2006, 70–71). Zakaj? Ker tej želji ni dodeljena dovolj velika vrednost oz. ker zadovoljitev takšne želje ni institucionalizirana in spodbujana, kot razlaga tudi Sahlins (1999, 31): njihove želje niso bile zatrte in njihovi materialistični vzgibi ne obrzdani, »iz njih kratko malo niso naredili institucije«. Tako si lahko predstavljamo drugačno družbo, ki z (materialnimi) željami (ki so razločene od osnovnih bioloških potreb) ne ravna enako kot nam poznana iz Evrope izhajajoča civilizacija,¹⁸ iz česar seveda ne bi mogla iziti k tehničnemu napredku in znanosti stremeča civilizacija.

Ker je prvotnim družbam okolje (ki so ga redno menjavale, saj so se

(Barnard 2007, 67), a kljub temu so nasprotne in napačne predpostavke o tej temi prevladovali do te mere, da je Sahlins vseeno povzročil precejšno revolucijo v svoji vedi. A vendar lahko rečemo, da te predpostavke tudi še danes ostajajo precej trdno zasidrane, celo v znanstveni srenji.

¹⁸ Drugačna interpretacija postavitve nizkih proizvodnih ciljev pravi, da je lahko razlog tudi v vednosti, da bi moral član s presežkom lastnine le-to deliti zaradi institucije deljenja (Solway 2006, 74). A tudi ta, manj »romantična« različica možne civilizacije je več kot dobrodošla, saj nam zopet pokaže drugačno možnost – iz povsem drugih vzrokov bi tu spet imeli družbo, ki ne bi kopičila in ne bi imela presežka materialnih sredstev, ki bi lahko vodil v visok tehnični razvoj.

selile) zadovoljevalo vse potrebe, niso razvile vzgibov za razvijanje novih tehničnih sredstev, kopičenje in shranjevanje dobrin ter razvijanje občutka za lastnino. Ravno zato, ker so bili pripadniki teh družb mobilni, jih je lastnina pri premikanju močno ovirala (Sahlins 1999, 28), tako niso čutili potrebe po shranjevanju dobrin. Še zanimiveje je, da tudi zalog hrane večinoma niso shranjevali, saj so imeli globoko *zaupanje v obilje v naravi* (str. 53). Slednje je zelo pomemben pojem za naš kontekst. Zaupanje v obilje narave je pomenilo temeljno usmeritev življenja in tudi »svetovnega nazora« ljudi v teh družbah. Toda to zaupanje v naravo ni zgolj verovanje v prizanesljivost ali celo dobroto zunanje, od človeka ločene narave, gre tudi za zaupanje v lastne sposobnosti človeka samega (ki je del narave), da bo ujel in nabral zadostno količino hrane, hkrati pa gre tudi za holističen pogled na »kozmično ekonomijo deljenja« (Bird-David idr. 1992, 30), kjer zaupanje, da bo narava delila svoje obilje, poleg tega korenini v verjetju, da bodo tudi drugi ljudje – člani skupnosti – delili svoje imetje in tako ne bodo nobenega člana skupnosti pustili v pomanjkanju (Solway 2006, 71–72).

Antropologinja Nurit Bird-David idr. (1992, 34) kritizirajo Sahlinsa, da je zagrešil napako, ker ni razločeval med ekološko in kulturološko perspektivo, a to je pravzaprav »voda na naš mlin«. Lahko se strinjamo, da sta v lovsko-nabiralniških družbah vzroka za zaupanje v obilje, ki izhajata enden iz dejanskega obilja v naravi in drugi iz zaupanja v ekonomijo deljenja znotraj skupnosti, zelo različna in da ju ne gre zamenjevati. A ravno kulturološka perspektiva – institucionaliziranje deljenja dobrin in zakonitve vrednot, ki podpirajo takšno ekonomijo in način življenja je ta, ki je relevantna v kontekstu rešitev Fermijevega paradoksa. Ta primer nam nakazuje možno obliko civilizacije, ki bi izšla iz podobnega biološkega substrata kot naša, a zaradi različnih razlogov ne bi razvila ekonomije vedno večjih sredstev in ciljev ter napredka, kaj šele visoke tehnologije, potrebne za komuniciranje na dolge razdalje ali kolonizacijo drugih planetov!

Tudi glede prostega časa v lovsko-nabiralniških družbah je slika prenetljivo drugačna od že navedene predpostavke, da te družbe niso mogle vzpostaviti »kulture« zaradi pomanjkanja časa in virov zanjo. Sahlins navaja izsledke, ki kažejo, da so pripadniki lovsko-nabiralniških družb na dan porabili najmanj dve in največ pet ur za pridobivanje in pripravo hrane (1999, 35, 48),¹⁹ kar je bistveno manj kot v kasnejših poljedelskih,

¹⁹ Najsodobnejše antropološke raziskave potrjujejo, da se je količina dela, ki ga je moral

še bolj pa industrijskih ekonomijah. Prostega časa so tako imeli dovolj, prav tako pa v tem kontekstu ne smemo pozabiti, da so vseeno imeli pomembna elementa kulture – religijo in umetnost. Trditev, da niso ustvarjali kulture, je tako zelo nenavadna in odvisna predvsem od samovoljnosti definicije samega termina. Torej mogoče bolje formulirano: kljub obilju prostega časa se te lovsko-nabiralniške družbe niso odpravile na pot izgradnje civilizacije, kot jo predpostavlja verjetje v eno možno premico zgodovinskega razvoja, ki nujno vključuje tudi tehnični, organizacijski in politično-ekonomski napredek.

Ne glede na kritike in ugovore Sahlinsovi teoriji²⁰ se njena resnična vrednost nahaja ne v empiričnem preverjanju veljavnosti njene hipoteze, ampak, kot trdi tudi antropologinja Jacqueline Solway, v zastavitvi teoretskega vprašanja glede razmerja med sredstvi in cilji (in s tem v kritiki »osnovne predpostavke formalistične antropološke ekonomike« (2006, 65), ki temelji na verjetju v eno možno premico zgodovinskega razvoja) (str. 68).²¹ V pričujočem članku se tako nanašamo na temeljno uporabnost Sahlinsovih izvajanj, ki je v razprtju polja možnosti oz. možnih razumevanj različnih premic razvoja (ali mirovanja) civilizacij in v odmiku od pojmovanja zgodovine kot poti nujnega ter stalnega (tehničnega) razvoja, vedno večjih sredstev in ciljev. Skupaj s Sahlinsom lahko dvomimo v veljavnost predpostavke o neskončnosti ciljev in se sprašujemo o družbeni pogojenosti njihovega oblikovanja, vrednotenja, načinov zadovoljevanja ter osmišljanja pomembnosti njihovega doseganja. V osnovi nam gre torej za postavljanje in zamišljanje protihobbessovskih alternativ razumevanja človeške preteklosti.

Zdaj si lahko lažje zamislimo možnosti drugačnih »zgodovin«, npr. da bi bile na nekem Zemlji podobnem planetu vse družbe z lovsko-

za preživetje dnevno opraviti človek, skozi zgodovino povečevala, ne pa nujno tudi njegovo blagostanje in možnosti za preživetje ter možnosti za doseg zastavljenih ciljev in potešitev želja.

²⁰ Predvsem glede prevelikega idealiziranja lovsko-nabiralniških družb, ki naj bi posedovale »nepokvarjenost«, samozadostnost, srečnost in odsotnost pohlepa, vse, kar manjka sodobni (post)industrijski družbi. Omeniti velja tudi, da nekateri drugi antropološki izsledki, ki Sahlinsove teorije ne podpirajo v popolnosti, kažejo na malce drugačno podobo pomanjkanja, dela in razmerja med sredstvi ter cilji v lovsko-nabiralniških družbah (nekateri primeri malce znižujejo količino prostega časa, drugi raven izobilja). Glej Kaplan (2000) in Solway (2006, 68). Kljub temu se številni antropologi strinjajo s trditvijo Nurit Bird-David idr. (1992, 36), da »Sahlinsov argument, ustrezno posodobljen in rekonceptualiziran, res drži«.

²¹ Glej tudi Barnard (2007, 80).

nabiralniško ekonomijo samozadostne, pri čemer ne bi nikoli prišlo do iznajdbe naprednejše tehnike in znanosti. Lahko seveda ugovarjamo, da aktualna možnost, ki se je pokazala na Zemlji in kjer so nekatere družbe lovsko-nabiralniške, druge pa industrijske, ni enaka kot potencialna možnost, kjer se nobena družba ne bi tehnično intenzivneje razvijala. Dovolj je namreč, da se na planetu razvije ena sama družba, nagnjena k tehničnemu razvoju, ki postane prevladujoča, kot se je to zgodilo na Zemlji. Izredno pogosta nereflektirana predpostavka o razmišljanjih o drugih inteligencah v sklopu rešitev Fermijevega paradoksa je, da vsako inteligentno življenje nujno razvija čedalje naprednejšo tehniko in znanost. V naslednji drži, ki jo izpostavi Ćirković (2018, 155), ko govori o možnih ovirah na poti, da civilizacija prispe do stopnje visoke tehnike, vidimo, kako močno je zakoreninjena: »Čeprav je verjetno, da takšne in drugačne razmere zmanjšujejo možnosti za nastanek naprednih tehnoloških civilizacij, ne moremo biti zares prepričani, da evolucija – tako biološka kot kulturna – ne bo našla poti, da bi jih obšla.« Tu vidimo, da je tendenca, ki civilizacijo vztrajno potiska proti tehničnemu napredku, razumljena kot normalno stanje, kot esenca inteligentnega življenja, ki bo *našla pot okoli katerih koli ovir*, ki jih bo proizvedlo okolje! To spominja na Bergsonov *élan vital*, ki od znotraj poganja evolucijo življenja v odzivanju na zunanje okolje (Bergson 1983), kar so biologi že zdavnaj zavrnil. Vsekakor je pravilneje iznajdbo orodja razumeti kot odziv na okolje (a seveda je za samo iznajdbo potrebnih več nujnih pogojev, poleg primerne inteligence tudi npr. ustrezno razvite okončine za natančno delo). Kljub veljavnosti zgornjega protiargumenta o eni razvojno usmerjeni družbi, ki postane prevladujoča, lahko na to odvrnemo, da gre tu za neutemeljeno predpostavlanje osnovnega stanja oz. esence inteligentnega življenja, težečega k tehničnemu razvoju, ki mu naproti stojijo ovire, ki jih mora premagati, da se bo uspešno izrazilo.²²

Eden izmed ključnih naukov tega prvega prispevka je, da porušimo

²² Tu moramo omeniti še eno antropomorfno predpostavko. V skoraj vseh razmišljanjih o drugih civilizacijah se namreč predpostavlja, da imajo inteligentna bitja na drugih planetih enako veliko ali pa večjo zmožnost oblikovanja družbenih skupin, kot jo ima človek: niso namreč samotarska bitja in se združujejo v posamezne skupine ali pa so združena v celoti (to, kar upamo, da bo človeštvu uspelo v prihodnosti – v skladu z gradualističnim optimizmom). A človek ima pri tem številne ovire, sprva zagotovo kognitivno omejitve, s kolikimi posamezniki je zmožen imeti socialne odnose (Dunbarjevo število), ki je diktirala velikost prvotnih družb, kasneje pa se tu vpletejo še številni kompleksnejši sociološki, ekonomski in politični vzroki.

nedotakljivost skrite predpostavke o nujni povezanosti inteligence z večanjem ciljev in želja ter posledično izgradnjo tehnološke in znanstvene civilizacije ter zanemarjanjem alternativ, npr. optimizacije sredstev in metod zadovoljevanja obstoječih ciljev ter želja. Vemo, da imajo posamezniki v (preteklih ali sedanjih) lovsko-nabiralniških družbah biološko približno enake predispozicije za inteligenco kot pripadniki visoko tehnološko razvite družbe. Poleg definicije inteligence, ki preferira tehnološki razvoj, ali takšne, ki se osredotoča na večanje sredstev in ciljev, si s pomočjo takšnih razmišljanj lažje zamišljamo še druge možnosti, ki so manj (evro)antropomorfne. Kot pravi Lamb (2004, 97):

Ni nujno, da je inteligenca povezana s tehnologijo ali celo z razvojem orodij in sredstev za manipulacijo okolja. Inteligenca lahko obstaja brez tehnologije. Na primer, delfini in številni primati kažejo sposobnosti abstraktnega sklepanja. Tehnologija lahko obstaja tudi brez inteligence. Žuželke izvajajo inženirske podvige, vendar pravimo, da nimajo inteligence in sposobnosti abstraktnega mišljenja.

Glavne poante tega prispevka so, da inteligenca ni nujno povezana z razvojem visoke tehnike in da zmožnost izdelave orodja ne vodi nujno v stalen ter neomejen tehnični razvoj ali v uporabo znanstvene metode in da inteligenca ne vodi zgolj v večanje sredstev ter ciljev in ustvarjanje novih želja.

Pri drugem prispevku pa se bomo dotaknili tudi nastanka želja, ki presegajo osnovne biološke potrebe. Videli bomo, da si lahko predstavljamo možno civilizacijo, ki takšnih želja preprosto nima, s čimer tudi ne bi imela enega izmed vzrokov za tendenco k visoki tehniki. Drugo pot podkrepitve hipoteze, da ne velja (evro)antropomorfna nujnost, po kateri bo vsaka civilizacija, ki je zmožna izdelave orodja, nenehno razvijala svoje tehnične zmogljivosti, bomo ubrali v naslednjem poglavju, kjer bomo še podrobneje razčlenili lastnosti, ki so potrebne, da se civilizacija sploh odpravi na »spolzko strmino« vedno večjih sredstev in ciljev – tega zagonetnega momenta pa ne Sahlinsova teorija ne katere druge antropološke ne uspejo razložiti oz. se ga niti dotikajo ne.

Diaforična teorija in načini preseganja občutja diafore

Adaptacijska verzija hipoteze redke Zemlje, imenovana hipoteza redkega uma, ki smo jo že omenili, govori o evolucijski prilagoditvi organizmov in o tem, kako lahko določena lastnost izgine, ko za vrsto ni več uporabna. Podobno, a pravzaprav veliko kritičneje je glede (ne)uporabnosti zavesti

že govoril Nietzsche. V rešitvah Fermijevega paradoksa (kot tudi marsikje drugje) so žal inteligenca, zavest in samozavedanje mnogokrat medsebojno zamenljivi, nenatančno definirani in nujno medsebojno povezani, zato sledečo Ćirkovićevo (2009, 10) izjavo preberimo s potrpežljivostjo glede definicijske natančnosti:

[Z]avestno izdelovanje orodij in gradnja civilizacije sta prehodni prilagoditveni lastnosti, kot vse druge v živem svetu. Prilagoditvene lastnosti bodo zagotovo izginile, ko se okolje dovolj spremeni, da izgine kakršna koli prej obstoječa selektivna prednost. Inteligenca bo na dolgi rok zagotovo izginila, saj je njena selektivna prednost časovno omejena z nenehno spreminjajočimi se fizičnimi in ekološkimi pogoji. Rezultat kulturne evolucije v zelo dolgih časovnih okvirih je vrnitev k neposredni, netehnološki prilagoditvi.

V tem prispevku pa ne bomo govorili o možnosti izginotja totalno reflektivne zavesti, temveč o njenem nastanku, a ne o vzrokih za biološki vidik nastanka, temveč o možnostih človeškega vedênja in soočanja s prednostmi ter slabostmi takšne zavesti. Tudi pri tem prispevku bomo lovili težko ulovljivo ravnovesje med prevelikim antropomorfizmom in prevelikim kršenjem načela povprečnosti. Na primeru totalne reflektivnosti zavesti bomo videli, da je to lastnost, ki je v tako izostreni obliki od poznanih živih bitij lastna zgolj človeku in je vzrok za njegovo kvalitativno različnost od vseh drugih življenjskih oblik na Zemlji, po drugi strani pa ne moremo reči, da prav nobena druga vrsta ne poseduje neke stopnje ali oblike reflektivne zavesti. Znanost je v zadnjih desetletjih edinstvenost človeka pogosto skušala razložiti z nekaterimi kognitivnimi sposobnostmi, npr. s samozavedanjem, z izdelavo in uporabo orodja, s kulturo in simbolnim jezikom (Marino 2015, 197), a prav nobena izmed teh sposobnosti, sama zase, v vsaj eni izmed oblik, ni lastna zgolj vrsti *Homo sapiens sapiens*.

Če povzamemo, nevrobiološke študije v desetletjih niso uspele odkriti niti ene lastnosti človeških možganov, ki bi bila kvalitativno drugačna od lastnosti drugih vrst, tj. ki je ni mogoče razložiti v skupnem okviru primerjalne evolucije z ostalimi oblikami življenja na tem planetu. [O]bstaja veliko in vedno več dokazov o *kontinuiteti uma* pri vseh vrstah na tem planetu. [Marino 2015, 194]

Če se osredotočimo zgolj na samozavedanje in reflektivno zavest, ki to omogoča, vemo, da imajo to zmožnost vsi primati, nekateri delfini in sloni ter tudi srake (Marino 2015, 197). Kaj pa je tisto, kar je edinstveno

samo človeku? Četudi gre mogoče za kvantitativno zelo majhno razliko, pa ravno ta razlika naredi velik kvalitativni preskok (zopet mišljeno epistemološko in ne vrednostno!). Eden izmed možnih odgovorov bi bil: vznik ekscentrične zavesti z zmožnostjo totalne refleksivnosti, s katero lahko človek z (relativno) ločenega gledišča opazuje svet okoli sebe, naravo, druga bitja in celo samega sebe ter svojo dejavnost samoopazovanja in samozavedanja ter se posledično od/iz vseh naštetih entitet in od/iz celote sveta počuti (iz)ločenega. Totalna refleksivnost zavesti je pravzaprav kvantitativno povečanje zmožnosti refleksivne zavesti, ki jo imajo nekatere živali. Tudi filozof Borut Ošljaj, na katerega razumevanje ekscentrične zavesti s totalno refleksivnostjo se bomo naslonili, svojo diaforično teorijo gradi na temeljih Plessnerjeve filozofije, ki izpostavi enotnost oz. zgoraj omenjeno kontinuiteto živega sveta v pojmu pozicionalnosti: že rastline imajo pozicionalnost, to je stik z zunanjim svetom, s tistim, kar niso one same in kar potrebujejo za preživetje; živali imajo centrično pozicionalnost, saj so bolj kot rastline zamejene od svojega okolja in so si znotraj svojega lastnega bitja še enkrat dane kot relativno samostojna entiteta z lastnim telesom, razločenim od okolja, s katerim so v posredovanem stiku; človek pa se od vsega tega, tudi od sebe in od svoje lastne centričnosti, lahko umakne in vse to motri z relativno ločenega gledišča (Ošljaj 2004, 229–232).²³

Odmik od sebe, svojega telesa in tudi uma, drugih ljudi in živih bitij ter sveta kot celote po Ošljaju povzroči občutenje *diafore* (izraz izhaja iz grščine, pomeni pa razliko). Človek se počuti izvrženega iz celovitosti sveta, iz enotnosti narave, kozmosa ali božanskega, čuti se tudi ločenega od preostanka svojega telesa-duha (ter zaradi tega postulira različne dualizme), povratek v enost, ki ji je nekoč že pripadal, oz. ponovna izgradnja izgubljene celote pa je cilj vseh njegovih stremljenj, ki jih druga bitja ne poznajo – vsekakor ne v tako izraziti meri. Ta stremljenja se izražajo skozi njegovo celotno kulturo in njene raznovrstne simbolne forme (jezik, mit, religija, metafizika, umetnost, znanost, tehnika ...), ki jih je ustvaril ravno zato – večinoma sicer bolj nezavedno kot teleološko –, da bi zopet dosegel enost, celovitost, (po)polnost. Simbolne forme so načini človekovega soočanja z diaforičnostjo, so objektivacije resničnosti, skozi katere si človek prisvaja svet (Ošljaj 2005, 26). Vse, kar torej na tej ravni počne, je namenjeno temu, da bi presegel diaforo, ta razcep z enovitostjo, najsi bo to

²³ Za podrobnejšo argumentacijo teorije, ki jo tu predstavljam zelo posplošeno in jedrnato, poleg navedenega dela glej še Ošljaj (2015).

večinoma nezavedno ali nemalokrat tudi zavestno. To vrsto zavesti lahko imenujemo tudi simbolna zavest, saj ustvarja svoj simbolni svet, s katerim želi preseči občutenje diafore, s katerim pa se naravnemu svetu in enotnosti z njim le še bolj odmika. Znotraj okvira simbolnih form tako najdemo vse raznolike dejavnosti, ki zadevajo želje, aspiracije, stremljenja ali kakor koli jih poimenujemo, ki ne spadajo več pod osnovne biološke potrebe.

Ekscentričnost zavesti in njena totalna refleksivnost, ki je živali načeloma nimajo, je sicer psiho-biološka danost. O vzrokih in pogojih za njen nastanek žal nimamo prostora razpravljati, a glede na refleksije o inteligenci znotraj Fermijevega paradoksa, ki velikokrat obsegajo skrito predpostavko o občosti in nekontingentnosti totalne refleksivnosti ekscentrične zavesti, je pomembno predvsem to, da slednjo človeško lastnost pripoznamo kot nekaj, za kar ne vemo, ali je kontingentno ali ne in ali je pogosto ali redko pri »inteligentnih« živih bitjih. Zaenkrat vemo, da se je ta kapaciteta razvila zgolj pri ljudeh,²⁴ ker pa je ekscentrična zavest izredno pomemben faktor za nastanek številnih elementov civilizacije oz. simbolnih form (jezik, tehnika, znanost ipd.), je razmislek o njeni pogostosti zagotovo nujen. Tudi ko v kontekstu Fermijevega paradoksa razmišljamo o civilizacijah, ki posedujejo radovednost in željo po ekspanziji ter kontaktu z drugimi civilizacijami, je velika verjetnost, da pravzaprav razmišljamo o bitjih s totalno refleksivno zavestjo. Ashkenazi (2017, 63) npr. kar *a priori* zavrne možnost inteligentne vrste bitij, ki ne bi imela refleksivne zavesti: »Vendar se zdi vprašljivo, ali bi lahko vrsto, katere vedenje je povsem genetsko in instinktivno – ne glede na to, ali je sposobna zgraditi radijske teleskope ali celo vesoljske ladje –, imenovali inteligentna.«

Kot rečeno, totalna refleksivnost je psiho-biološka danost, a načini postopanja z njo in poskusi preseganja občutja diafore nikakor niso enoznačno utemeljeni v biološki ali psihološki zasnovi človeka. Izkazujejo možnost izbire, ki jo ima človek, različni načini preseganja občutja diafore, ki so se jih in se jih še poslužujejo različne človeške družbe, pa so

²⁴ Ali zgolj pri *Homo sapiens sapiens* ali tudi pri neandertalcih in denisovancih, je glede na našo empirično raven vednosti trenutno pretežno vprašanje. A pripomniti moramo, da so neandertalci imeli oblike religije in umetnosti ter tudi jezika, se pravi vsaj tri simbolne forme, ki jih naša podvrsta uporablja kot načine premoščanja občutja diafore. Poglavitno vprašanje tu je seveda, ali se je možen vzniki ali vsaj zametek ekscentrične zavesti oblikoval pri skupnem predniku treh podvrst *Homo sapiens*, torej pri *Homo heidelbergensis*, ali zgolj pri naši podvrsti ali pa se je to zgodilo večkrat, v ločenem razvoju pri vsaki posamezni vrsti.

dokaz pestrosti te izbire.²⁵ Izpostavimo lahko dva skrajna (in nikakor ne edina) načina, ki ju človek skozi zgodovino vseskozi izpričuje: aktivnega, ki ustvarja vedno nove poskuse, da se zaceli diafora, ki pa le-to pravzaprav le še bolj povečujejo, in meditativno-mističnega, ki stori ravno obratno in poskuša do zaceljenja diafore priti po nasprotni poti – s poskusom njene ukinitve na izvoru. Vidimo, da načina spominjata na Sahlinsova dva načina zadovoljitve želja oz. doseganja proizvodnih ciljev. Primerjava je na mestu, a ne smemo zabrisati razlike, saj se občutje diafore ter razmerje med sredstvi in cilji nikakor ne nahajata na isti ravni – občutje diafore je predhodno in temeljnejše.

Ključna je torej razlika med posledicami teh dveh načinov preseganja občutja diafore. Aktivni način se zateka k vedno novim ustvarjanjem simbolnih form, s katerimi bi zapolnil manko in zakrpal razcep. Njegova najbolj potencirana oblika se zanaša predvsem na tehniko in znanost, preko katerih človek upa, da se bo dokopal do odgovorov (na vprašanja, ki si jih brez ekscentričnosti zavesti ne bi postavljaj) in si skoraj dobesedno izgradil manjkajočo polovico oz. zapolnil svoj manko. A vsi ti poskusi človeka, vse te stvaritve, ki se na koncu vedno izkažejo le za njegov lastni podaljšek in za nov tujek v svetu, ki le-tega le še bolj odmika od človeka, občutje diafore samo še večajo. Začaran krog se tako ponovno zavrti z novimi poskusi udomačevanja z vnašanjem tujega.

Pri meditativno-mističnem načinu pa gre za poskus odpraviti občutenje diafore na samem izvoru. Mnogotere tehnike, izpričane v mnogih religijskih tradicijah, skušajo zmanjšati razcep med ekscentrično zavestjo in lastnim telesom-umom, drugimi bitji in svetom, najpogosteje z metodami, ki izničujejo moč lastnega jaza – točke identifikacije in izolacije v sferi totalne refleksivnosti, in z brzdanjem nastanka sredobežnih hotenj, ki stremijo k posedovanju delov »izgubljene celote«, najsi bodo to naravne dobrine, človeške stvaritve ali zgolj idejne entitete. Treba je opozoriti, da so se te tehnike večinoma razvile kasneje v toku zgodovine, ko se je človekova dejavnost skozi aktivni način preseganja le-tega še močnejše oddaljila od celote in je človek diaforo občutil še globlje ter še problematičnejše. Kot odziv na to so se razvile tehnike, ki ubirajo ravno nasprotno smer in skušajo ustaviti večanje občutja diafore.

²⁵ S tako zmožnostjo izbire ne trdim, da ima človek metafizično obliko svobode. Kakšno vrsto oz. kako močno obliko svobode ima človek, je problemsko polje, ki znatno presega okvir članka. V omenjeni obliki svobode gre zgolj za vsakodnevno, površinsko uporabo tega pojma.

Kljub temu zgodovinskemu dejstvu pa je ključen premislek o družbi, ki bi v celoti delovala zgolj po meditativno-mističnem načinu (po svoje so preproste lovsko-nabiralniške družbe lahko *približek* temu). Takšna družba, ker ne bi občutila tako velikega manka, ne bi ustvarjala tehničnega in znanstvenega napredka ter ne bi posedovala radovednosti in želje po raziskovanju. Če bi bili njeni načini preseganja občutja diafore res uspešni, verjetno tudi ne bi imela želje po iskanju drugih bitij in komuniciranju z njimi (tu se že naslanjamo na psihologizem, da je iskanje drugih inteligentnih bitij le kompenzacija za pomanjkanje stika s pripadniki lastne vrste ali pa s celoto sveta oz. z absolutom, virom vsevednosti in drugih presežkov). Treba je tudi osvetliti naše predstave o različnih možnih psiholoških ustrojih drugih inteligentnih bitij, ki so velikokrat bolj ali manj projekcije naših lastnih posameznih psihičnih lastnosti. Lahko si sicer predstavljamo, da imajo tuje inteligence drugačne preference, interese, dispozicije, prioritete itd., a vse to si po navadi predstavljamo na podlagi nam poznane duševnosti z ekscentrično zavestjo, ki izkazuje totalno reflektivnost – torej na ozadju diafore, manka in ne celovitosti, ki pogujejo ali potencirajo nastanek teh psiholoških elementov. Prava drugost nam ostaja skrita, venomer predpostavljamo diaforično inteligenco, ki jo določujejo temeljen občutek manka in posledične aktivnosti ta manko zapolniti.

Da bi torej na nekem Zemlji podobnem planetu našli sebi podobna bitja, bi morali za to obstajati številni pogoji, o katerih so znanstveniki in filozofi napisali že ogromno. K tem pogojem zdaj dodajamo ali vsaj poudarjamo ključnost še štirih. Prvi je nastanek ekscentrične zavesti s totalno reflektivnostjo, ki povzroči nastanek občutja diafore, drugi pa je pogojen s prvim, in sicer gre za način preseganja diafore. Da bi inteligentna bitja začela ustvarjati simbolne forme oz. elemente civilizacije, ki jih iščemo, bi morala uporabljati aktivni način preseganja diafore, ki bi jih pognal na pot razvoja tehnike ter znanosti. A tudi tu moramo biti natančni in opozoriti na možnost, da aktivni način preseganja občutja diafore ne pomeni nujno zanašanja zgolj na tehniko in znanost – takšna je naša, industrijska civilizacija. Aktivni način preseganja se lahko odvija tudi preko metafizike in umetnosti ali tudi mita in religije kot primarnih simbolnih form. Torej imamo tu še tretji pogoj: izbira simbolnih form v samem aktivnem načinu preseganja občutja diafore.

S tem že stopamo na Sahlinsovo področje izvornih družb izobilja, ki niso posegale po vedno novejših tehničnih rešitvah in znanosti ter tudi ne po velikih spremembah v socialno-ekonomsko-politični orga-

nizaciji. A določiti, da je glavni modus lovsko-nabiralniških družb aktivni ali meditativno-mistični način preseganja občutenja diafore, bi bila prevelika posplošitev za te med seboj različne družbe. Seveda se zaradi izpričanega mirovanja napredka bolj nagibamo k oznaki meditativno-mističnega načina, a spremembe na mitsko-religijskem področju in pa sama uporaba umetnosti kažejo na sledove aktivnega načina.

Ne glede na to, tudi če razvoj neke inteligentne civilizacije prestane vse te tri »kriterije« (totalna refleksivnost z občutjem diafore, aktivni, perpetualni način preseganja in primat simbolnih form tehnike ter znanosti), ostane še četrti pogoj/kriterij: večanje ciljev in želja namesto optimizacije sredstev in metod. Ta sicer ni sukcesiven kot ostali trije, ne sledi časovno za tretjim – težje si predstavljamo družbo, ki se naslanja na primat tehnike in znanosti ali pa nasploh bazira na aktivnem načinu preseganja diafore, ki po notranji nujnosti vodi k spremembam in razvoju, da bi si tako modro optimizirala sredstva za dosego svojih ciljev, ne da bi se ji cilji in želje z novimi spoznanji večali. Tudi to je sicer možnost, ki je ne smemo kar tako odpraviti, a realneje in relevantneje je razmišljati, da se naš četrti pogoj nahaja na isti ravni kot drugi pogoj – na območju načinov preseganja občutja diafore. Večje kot je to občutje in bolj kot načini preseganja sami le še povečujejo razcep med človekom ter celoto, težje je ohranjati ravnotežje razmerja med sredstvi in cilji, težje je brzdati suprabioološke, družbene želje in poskuse njihovega zadovoljevanja.

Da bi neka civilizacija torej razvila visoko tehnologijo, potrebno za medzvezdno komunikacijo ali potovanje, bi morala biti njena temeljna bivanjsko-ekonomska usmerjenost zelo podobna naši, »tržni«, ki podpira stalno večanje sredstev, ciljev in s tem ustvarjanje vedno novih želja. Samozadostna družba z ekonomijo, ki služi obstoječim ciljem in željam ter energijo vplaga le v izboljšanje sredstev in metod za dosego teh ciljev ter želja, bi imela manjše možnosti za razvoj takšne tehnologije (manjše, a seveda še vedno obstoječe, ti cilji in želje bi lahko izhajali iz drugih vzrokov). Vidimo torej, da je bilo treba za nastanek naše, tehnično-znanstvene, cilje in sredstva povečujoče civilizacije *izbrati* kar nekaj (našteli smo tri ključne momente – prvi moment, vznik totalno refleksivne zavesti, je biološko dejstvo) »arbitrarno« določenih usmeritev, njihove alternative pa bolj ali manj opustiti.

Zaključek

Pokazali smo na specifičnost štirih ključnih lastnosti, ki jih ima človeška civilizacija oz. ki bi jih morala imeti zunajzemeljska civilizacija, »iz-

klesana po naši podobi«. Brez ekscentrične zavesti in občutja diafore ter baziranja na aktivnem preseganju občutja diafore verjetno ne pride do tako močne radovednosti in vedoželjnosti ter želje po spoznavanju; brez zanašanja na primat tehnike in znanosti ter stalnega postavljanja višjih ciljev in večanja želja pa verjetno ne pride do iznajdbe visoke tehnike in znanosti, potrebnih za »galaktična« udejstvovanja. Fermijev paradoks se s takšno osmiselitvijo zdaj mogoče zdi malo manj močan. Ti štirje koraki, začeni z in izhajajoči iz totalno refleksivne ekscentrične zavesti, so zgolj prispevki in ne samostojne rešitve paradoksa. So le pokazatelji nekaterih nujnih razmislekov pri tej temi. Članek namreč ne vsebuje skrite agende, ki bi težila k dokazovanju, da smo »v vesolju res sami«, za filozofijo je zagotovo mnogo zanimivejša ravno nasprotna možnost.²⁶

Očitno smo v članku prekršili načelo povprečnosti – z opombo, da tudi ne zapadamo v drugo skrajnost in ne zagovarjamo, da smo ljudje zagotovo edinstveni –, a za razliko od tiste vrste kršenja tega načela, kjer je posledica (ali celo vzrok samega kršenja) antropocentrizem, torej vrednotenje človeka kot večvrednega od drugih živih bitij na Zemlji, gre tu za drugačno, večdimenzijsko vrednotenje, ki upošteva slabosti in prednosti našega specifičnega ustroja, konkretno naše diaforičnosti. Tu se lahko zopet vrnemo k Nietzschejevemu vrednotenju, ki nam sprva (če pozabimo na njegov oster jezik) pokaže nevtrarno vrednotenje človeka, ki pa se temeljno razlikuje od drugih živali. Ta razlika sicer lahko pomeni manjvrednost – po Nietzscheju v smislu protiživljenskosti, skozi prizmo diaforične teorije pa gre za nezadovoljenost zaradi necelovitosti in manka, kar lahko posledično vodi v protiživljensko, (avto)destruktivno dejavnost. A to seveda ni edina možnost. Po Ošlaju namreč ni nujno, da ekscentrična zavest, ki povzroči vznik diafore in s tem nastanek simbolnih form, ustvari nekaj življenju sovražnega, simbolne forme lahko nadaljujejo življenjsko voljo do oblikovanja (2005, 42), saj iz življenja tudi črpajo vso energijo, ki jo imajo, problem nastopi šele ob sekundarni odtegnitvi, ko se ekscentričnost povzdigne v absolutno (str. 135) in se simbolne forme obrnejo stran ali celo proti življenju – tu nastopi vsa Nietzschejeva kritika protiživljenskosti (enako tudi Nietzsche ve, da »simbolne forme« same

²⁶ Zato se tudi ne strinjam z vrednotenjem Robina Hansona in Nicka Bostroma, da bi odkritje zunajzemeljske inteligence pomenilo slabo napoved za človeštvo – zgolj zaradi statistične verjetnosti, ki bi v enačbi močno znižala vrednost spremenljivke, ki govori o deležu inteligentnega življenja, ki dospe do stopnje visokotehnološke razvitosti, kar bi pomenilo, da imamo tudi mi malo verjetnosti, da prispemo do tja (Verendel in Häggström 2017, 3).

na sebi niso nujno sovražne življenju, temveč bi ga morale krepiti in mu služiti) (Nietzsche 2004b, 178). Simbolne forme lahko življenju zelo dobro služijo in ga delajo močnejšega. Lahko bi klišejsko rekli, da se ravno v izvoru človekovih trpljenj nahaja tudi rešilno. Zaradi diaforične zavesti, zaradi poskusov preseči manko in ne celovitost lahko človek skozi številne simbolne forme ustvari vse svoje največje civilizacijske dosežke ter s tem še okrepi in izboljša življenje, konec koncev pa ga tudi ponese naprej in razširi na druge svetove, če se zopet vrnemo k tej že omenjeni misli.

Napačna alternativa je razmišljati zgolj o skrajnostih antropocentričnega samoljubja ali podobe o manjvrednem, »pokvarjenem« živem bitju, ki bo verjetno pogubilo samo sebe (o čemer govorijo tudi pogoste in precej široko sprejete rešitve Fermijevega paradoksa, spadajoče pod katastrofično kategorijo). Človek je bitje s posebnostjo, ki ga dela hkrati slabšega in boljšega kot druga nam poznana živa bitja – čeprav se trenutno v odnosu do njih izkazuje kot slabši. S tega vidika je antropocentrizem seveda treba ostro napadati, a bojazen pred njim ne sme zamegliti naše kritike antropomorfizma, ki zamegljuje ne zgolj naša razmišljanja o drugih svetovih, temveč tudi razumevanje nas samih in naših kontingentnosti ter s tem tudi drugih, alternativnih možnosti razumevanja, ki jih imamo na razpolago. Eden izmed namigov pričujočega članka je tudi v tem, da skušamo odpreti oči in ume za drugačnost ter razmišljati o možnostih drugačnosti in drugosti – ne le tam daleč, ampak tudi tu, blizu, na našem planetu, v naših načinih preseganja diafore in razumevanja odnosa med sredstvi in cilji. Zato pa je morebiti še nujneje bolje spoznati določila človeka – če ne poznamo sebe, tudi drugačnosti in drugosti, lastne in tuje, ne moremo ne videti ne misliti. Kaj bi bil torej lahko nov odgovor na Fermijev paradoks? Nič drugega kot zavedanje, da je ključna večja jasnost, zakaj smo ljudje to, kar smo, in zakaj so druga »inteligentna« bitja, če obstajajo, verjetno precej drugačna, mogoče zaenkrat za nas nespoznavna. Če bomo uspeli ozek prehod med Scilo antropocentričnosti in Karibdo antropomorfizma varno prejadrati, bomo za odtenek napredovali v naših spoznavnih zmožnostih in odprtosti v mišljenju drugosti. Naših dvojnikov ali boljših različic sebe tako v prostranstvih vesolja morebiti ne bomo našli, a sprijaznili se bomo, da nas delo čaka drugje, v lastnem samospoznavanju in v ustvarjanju boljših različic iz samih sebe.

Opomba

Članek je rezultat dela na raziskovalnem programu Filozofske raziskave (P6-0252), ki ga financira Javna agencija za znanstvenoraziskovalno in inovacijsko dejavnost Republike Slovenije.

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Živali
Animals

Looking into the Face of an Animal As a Mirror: The Case Study of Marina Abramović's Gaze into the Donkey's Eyes/Face

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Abstract. In the context of Una Chaudhuri's interpretation on animal faces, the article focuses on the performance *Confession* (2010), in which Marina Abramović uses a donkey's face as a mirror of her own past/trauma. Specifically, this example provides us with an opportunity to explore Derrida's (2002, 376) question: 'How can an animal look you in the face?' As Derrida (p. 376) points out, according to Martin Buber's book *I and Thou* (1923), an animal's eyes have the power to speak a great language ... 'Sometimes I look into a cat's eyes' (Buber 1958, 96–97). Additionally, the article interprets three more performances (by Croatian artists – Saša Živković, Šikuti Machine and Hrvoje Cokarić) involving *confrontations*-mirroring with animals. The meeting between a man and an animal is, therefore, always 'the meeting of two subjectivities, two wills, which by definition are mutually exclusive' (Grušovnik 2023, 13).

Key Words: face of an animal, performance art, Marina Abramović and donkey

Pogled v obraz živali kot v ogledalo: študija primera Gaze into the Donkey's Eyes/Face Marine Abramović

Povzetek. V kontekstu interpretacije Une Chaudhuri o živalskih obrazih se članek osredotoča na performans *Confession* (2010), v katerem Marina Abramović uporabi oslovski obraz kot ogledalo lastne preteklosti/travme. Natančneje, ta primer nam ponuja priložnost, da raziščemo Derridajevo (2002, 376) vprašanje: »Kako ti lahko žival pogleda v obraz?«. Kot poudarja Derrida (str. 376), imajo v skladu s knjigo Martina Bubra *Jaz in ti* (1923) živalske oči sposobnost spregovoriti v veličastnem jeziku ... »Včasih gledam v mačje oči« (Buber 1958, 96–97). Poleg tega članek interpretira še tri performanse (hrvaških umetnikov

– Saše Živkovića, Šikuti Machine in Hrvoja Cokarića), ki vključujejo soočenje/odražanje z živalmi. Srečanje med človekom in živaljo je torej vedno »srečanje dveh subjektivitet, dveh volja, ki se po definiciji izključujeta« (Grušovnik 2023, 13).

Ključne besede: obraz živali, performativna umetnost, Marina Abramović in osel

An animal looks at us and we are naked before it (her/him).
Thinking, perhaps, begins there.

Jacques Derrida

Marcus Bullock (2002, 99) opens up his article 'Watching Eyes, Seeing Dreams, Knowing Lives' with the question 'What do we see when we look at an animal?' Following this question, this article documents several performances (art) that explore the concept of using an animal's face as a mirror. There have been various performances and artistic explorations where the faces of animals are used metaphorically as mirrors, reflecting human emotions, perceptions, or societal issues. One notable example is the work of French artist Pierre Huyghe. In his film and installation *Untitled/Human Mask* (2014), Huyghe created a sculpture of a monkey wearing a realistic human mask. This installation challenges viewers to consider the erasing of boundaries between human and animal (non-human), raising questions about identity, consciousness, and the human tendency to anthropomorphize animals,¹ and 'evokes many such themes: the monotony of work and the repetition of ritualistic behaviours, the possibility of a catastrophic future, and the power that living creatures hold over us as ciphers of ourselves' (Huyghe 2014).

It is no coincidence that Una Chaudhuri begins her essay '(De)Facing the Animals: Zooësis and Performance' (2007) with countering Derrida's philosophical question 'How can an animal look you in the face?' with the question 'Did your food have a face?' posed on the activist posters

¹ Anthropomorphism, which is often labelled as a blind spot in animal ethics, was exceptionally clarified by ethologist Frans de Waal when he stated that some other scientists always objected to him, asking if the term 'reconciliation,' in the context of his study of chimpanzees, was overly anthropomorphized. On the other hand, de Waal points out, expressions related to aggression, violence and competition have never been problematic in scientific anthropomorphism; therefore, as soon as it was about a friendly outcome of the fight, it was demanded that one switch to a dehumanized language (cf. Grušovnik 2023, 67; cf. Mota-Royas et al. 2021; cf. Moussaieff Masson and McCarthy 2004, 15).

(the skinned head/face of a slaughtered animal) of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals/PETA (2001).

The image is not of a face at all: it is of the head of a carcass, skinned and bloody. It is an image of a *missing face*, aptly representing the disappeared animal of the modern meat industry, which invests hugely in suppressing such images, and which systematically and literally keeps its operations, its vast animal factories, hidden – and keeps us, the consumers, in the dark. [Chaudhuri 2007, 13]

John Berger focuses primarily on the gaze of one animal, specifically the gaze of a captive animal, as emphasized by Kari Weil in her article ‘Killing Them Softly: Animal Death, Linguistic Disability, and the Struggle for Ethics’ (2006). The gaze that Berger argues we lost in the nineteenth century can equally be the gaze of the animal we kill, whether in the context of slaughter for food or slaughter in the name of art (cf. Berger 2007). This gaze of the animal at the moment of its slaughter also appears in the academic novels on animal rights – *Lives of Animals* and *Elizabeth Costello* by J. M. Coetzee (cf. Marjanić 2022).

The Donkey’s Gaze and the Gaze in the Donkey’s Eyes/Face

As mentioned in the introduction, we will focus on the view of the animal, specifically on the face of the animal included in the performance arts, with the duo performance *Confession* (2010) by Marina Abramović as our starting point. In this performance, the artist uses the donkey’s face as a mirror, an escape from the faces of people and culture, as a form of rest, and as an opportunity to confess her own trauma, as a mirror of her own past/trauma. We can use this example to explore the question: ‘How can an animal look you in the face?’, raised by Jacques Derrida (2002, 377), which is one of his central concerns. Derrida pointed out that, according to Martin Buber’s book *I and Thou* (1923) (English translation by Ronald Gregor Smith in 1958), an animal’s eyes have the power to speak a great language (Buber 1958, 96–97). Marina Abramović, in her performance/video piece titled *Confession* (2010, 60 min), confronts a donkey while kneeling before him. She explains:²

I took one donkey into the backyard of Nicholas’s [Nicholas Logsdail] house and made a video piece called ‘Confession.’ I confessed

² <https://www.facebook.com/300806525911/posts/i-took-one-donkey-into-the-backyard-of-nicholass-house-and-made-a-video-piece-ca/10156176855450912/>.

to the donkey all the flaws and mistakes of my whole life, starting from my childhood and extending to that day.

Only by the slight swaying of the donkey's tail can one conclude that the recording (video) is not frozen. Abramović states that she chose this animal because of the donkey's exceptional power of immobility, persistence, and endurance. She does not mention the speciesist attribution of that animal as supposedly stubborn.³ First, she tried, by her words, to *bewitch* the animal, *hypnotize* him,⁴ and then silently narrated her life's misfortunes to him as a way of freeing her memory – a confession like a strip of text scrolling across a screen. After the donkey left the interaction an hour later, the artist said she felt a little better (Racanović 2019, 201).

Trisha McCagh points out that animals will mirror us for different reasons. 'They are our constant companions and "roommates" in our home' (McCagh n.d.). In the context of the mirroring process, McCagh also notes that 'our animals' mirror our conditions and issues and this is the point where animal communication is the key to uncovering our *animal's problems*.

The performance with the donkey was conducted by the artist in preparation for her performance piece *The Artist Is Present*, which involved her sitting for eight hours a day over a period of three months in 2010. She trained for months to build the physical stamina to perform the piece, and in her memoir *Walk through Walls* (2019), Marina Abramović comments on how the performance demonstrated the profound need for people to connect. In *The Artist Is Present*, the artist perceptively faced individuals *face-to-face* to get as deep as possible into their psyche and encourage them to think about the meaning of life. After a month of performance-

³ The donkey is primarily symbolically associated with the 'qualities of stubbornness, ignorance, foolishness. It is characterized by its unpleasant voice and long ears, as well as its use for heavy labor. However, in its native habitat of Central Asia and North Africa, the wild donkey does not exhibit the negative traits of its European-transplanted relative. In Phrygia, he was worshipped (Midas I), and he figured as a highly esteemed animal among the Romans. Today, he is featured in the emblem of the American Democratic Party' (Hansen-Kokoruš 2016, 43–52). The donkey/ass was first domesticated in ancient Egypt around 3000 BC, well over a millennium before the horse (Sax 2001, 14; Bough 2012). Unfortunately, in anthropocentric history textbooks, the fact that a small Egyptian white donkey was exploited in the construction of the pyramids is often omitted as well as the fact that 'the ancient Egyptians are using donkeys as their only beast of burden' (Bough 2012, 184).

⁴ I do not use the pronoun 'it' for animals in accordance with the concept of rejecting linguistic speciesism, as advocated by Joan Dunayer (2004).

confrontation, she removed the small wooden table in front of her so she could be as close as possible to the person with whom she had a psycho-emotional duel, conversation, confrontation and/or mirroring. At the same time, the artist also tried to contribute to the associative effect of the spectacle with her clothes; she had a blue dress in March, red in April and white in May. Abramović states that blue signifies peace and tranquillity, red stands for energy, and white, as the last colour, purification (Marković 2011, 196).⁵

Just as the mirror serves as a reflection of the world (Bandić 1997, 190), so too do the eyes of the donkey in this performance function as a passage for the artist between two worlds, two realities – between trauma (the past, the autobiographical story written on the screen) and the present (the encounter with the eyes of the donkey). The eyes of the donkey almost serve as doors of perception (in Aldous Huxley's sense) for confronting one's own past. This is, in fact, the bottomless gaze discussed by Derrida (2002, 381), in reference to Lévinas:

In looking at the gaze of the other, Lévinas says, one must forget the color of his eyes, in other words see the gaze, the face that gazes before seeing the visible eyes of the other. But when he reminds us that the 'best way of meeting the Other is not even to notice the color of his eyes,' he is speaking of man, of one's fellow as man, kindred, brother; he thinks of the other man and this, for us, will later be revealed as a matter for serious concern.

While Derrida poses the question physically naked before the gaze of his cat, Marina Abramović autobiographically exposes all the flaws and mistakes of her entire life before a donkey. However, the effect in meeting the gaze of the animal seems to be the same, regardless of whether he/she involves the body or the psyche. In communication with the gaze of the animal, the Cartesian dichotomy between body and *psyche*, spirit, disappears. Or, as Derrida (2002, 381) would say about his cat's gaze upon his naked body when he rose from the bathtub:

As with every bottomless gaze, as with the eyes of the other, the gaze called animal offers to my sight the abyssal limit of the human: the inhuman or the ahuman, the ends of man, that is to say the border crossing from which vantage man dares to announce himself to

⁵ Cf. 'Mirror Your Audience: Four Life Lessons From Performance Artist Marina Abramović' (n.d.).

himself, thereby calling himself by the name that he believes he gives himself.

In the aftermath of the cathartic experience of *The Artist Is Present*, the artist performed the series *Back to Simplicity* in 2010, stemming from her need to re-establish a simple and immediate connection with nature. As the artist stated ('Marina Abramovic: Luciana Brito Galeria' n.d.):

[...] after I had been looking at one thousand six hundred and seventy five pairs of eyes, after that incredible human connection, I needed to be connected with nature. [...] Being under a tree, holding a lamb for two days, in complete joy, that's what *Back to Simplicity* is all about.⁶

The aforementioned emphasis on the dichotomy between *nature* (a lamb resting under a tree) and *culture/sophistication* (in the Museum of Modern Art – MOMA) is evident, as the artist not only engaged in direct eye contact with the audience but was also observed and *gazed* upon by both the audience and monitored by the media. What the artist refers to as a return to nature is, of course, not natural for the lamb she was holding in her arms.

In relation to *Confession*, I note Emmanuel Lévinas's thinking about the face of animals. Specifically, in Lévinas's ethics, the Other appears as a face, interlocutor and transcendence, or, in his words in *Totality and Infinity*: 'Because the face (of the Other) does not belong to my world, despite appearing in my world, I cannot eradicate it. In a very profound sense, then, the Other remains' (Lévinas 1979, 189–199). But we should add that Jan-Harm de Villiers (2020) noted that Lévinas's writings on animals are 'problematic in denying (albeit inconsistently) that the animal is capable of eliciting an ethical response or, put simply, that all animals have a face.' Lévinas pointed out the following in *The Paradox of Morality*: 'One cannot entirely refuse the face of an animal. It is via the face that one understands, for example, a dog' (Lévinas 1988, 169 in Burgat 2015, 186). The *face-to-face* relation (French: *rapport de face à face*)⁷ is a concept in Levinas's thought on human sociality. It means that, ethically, people are responsible to one another in the *face-to-face* encounter. Specifically, Lévinas says that the human face 'orders and ordains' us. It calls

⁶ Cf. 'Marina Abramović: Holding the Lamb, 2010' (n.d.), Breese (2010); 'Marina Abramović' (2022).

⁷ Unlike Lévinas, Erving Goffman in his book *Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior* (1967) did not study interspecies relations.

the subject into 'giving and serving' the Other.⁸ Marcus Bullock (2002, 99), whom I mentioned at the beginning of this article, states that the muteness that shrouds animals' senses accompanies us in the realm of our language.

In the case of Bobby, a dog who greeted Jewish prisoners in a concentration camp as humans, Lévinas concluded in his essay 'The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights' that animals can be far more humane than humans (cf. Crowe 2008, 315–316). He wrote that Bobby 'was the last Kantian in Nazi Germany, without the brain needed to universalize maxims and drives' (Lévinas 1990, 153). Svendsen (2019, 137) adds that this statement is ironic because it is known that Adolf Eichmann declared himself a Kantian. Svendsen critiques Lévinas's claims that animals are supposedly incapable of showing interest in or caring for others for their own sake, contrasting this with Lévinas's view that humans are defined by their openness to others. However, Svendsen emphasizes that Lévinas and other interned, detained persons, the Jews in the concentration camp who experienced Bobby's gaze, recognized him as a gaze, perceived it as one of friendship and loyalty (p. 139). On another occasion, Lévinas emphasized that 'one cannot entirely refuse the face of the animal. [...] Yet the priority here is not found in the animal, but in the human face' (Lévinas 1988, 169 in Crowe 2008, 315).

Marina Abramović's profound interaction with a donkey (through gaze and eyes),⁹ as expressed in her personal narrative of childhood trauma, exemplifies a shift towards psychological communication with animals. By gazing into the donkey's eyes, Abramović uses the animal's visage as a mirror of her own trauma, thereby emphasizing the potential for emotional connection and understanding between humans and animals. Of course, this can be seen as one-way communication, where the artist releases her own trauma through the eyes, or gaze, of a donkey, as a radical animal studies interpretation of the work might emphasize. This possible and realistic interpretation of the duo-performance *Confession* can be connected to Steve Baker's critique of Beuys's weeklong gallery action

⁸ Cf. Burgat (2015).

⁹ Similarly, photographer Tim Flach achieves sensory identification most strikingly and obviously by highlighting the animal's eyes (Kramer 2005, 145): 'Flach applies meticulous care to the problem of illuminating the eyes. [...] Before shooting can commence, Flach spends hours "bending the light" so that the eyes of the animal model are illuminated with requisite precision (a procedure which usually tires the subject long before shooting has even begun).'

Coyote: I Like America and America Likes Me, performed in 1974 at the René Block Gallery in New York. The performance juxtaposes living animals with a rather *clumsy* and/or shamanic human symbolism (cf. Antliff 2014, 107–110; Baker 2000, 151). Although Beuys emphasized that it was a shamanic encounter with an animal symbolizing the indigenous peoples conquered by Western colonialism (which is why the coyote urinates on the *Wall Street Journal*), Steve Baker (2003, 150–151) focuses on Beuys's symbolic use of the gloves that the artist repeatedly threw to the coyote, Little John:

The spectacle presented to viewers through the chainlink fencing separating them from the main space of the gallery, took the form of the artist's and the animals continuing interaction with each other as the week progressed [...]. [A] confrontation of human and animal, through which, Beuys suggested, 'the roles were exchanged immediately.'

Although initially structured by a cycle of ritualized actions, Beuys was acting out the limits of his own control of the situation, with the coyote figuring for him as 'an important co-operator in the production of freedom' (Baker 2003, 151). The animal enabled the artist to edge closer to that which 'the human being cannot understand' (p. 151).

Unlike Abramović, who focuses on the gaze, Beuys focuses on the hands, and in this symbolic interaction he threw his gloves to the coyote, about which he said the following (Baker 2003, 151):

The brown gloves represent my hands, and the freedom of movement that human beings possess with their hands. They have the freedom to do the widest range of things, to utilise any number of tools and instruments. They can wield a hammer or cut with a knife. They can write or mould forms. Hands are universal, and this is the significance of the human hand [...]. They are not restricted to one specific use like the talons of an eagle or the mole's diggers. So the throwing of the gloves to Little John meant giving him my hands to play with.

Baker (2003, 151) links Beuys's statement about gloves/hands to Heidegger's (1947) *Letter to Humanism*:

His initial theses, framed as a means of assessing how it was possible to know or to have access to the experience of the world, ran as follows:

1. The stone is wordless.

2. The animal is poor in world.
3. Man is world-forming.

After the Museum of Contemporary Art of Vojvodina bought Marina Abramović's video performance *Confession* for \$80,000, reactions arose concerning the poor economic situation in Serbia.¹⁰ Additionally, cartoonist Corax (real name Predrag Korakšić), a renowned Serbian cartoonist for the newspaper *Danas*, created a cartoon featuring a *šajkača* (traditional Serbian men's cap) atop a donkey's head, inviting the artist to examine Serbia's historical trauma instead of Marina Abramović's own. 'The cartoon raises the question that is on everyone's minds: Will the exhibition *Cleaner* (the title of one of the artist's exhibition in Belgrade in 2019) provide an opportunity for Serbia, as well as for Marina Abramović, to move past the sins of the past and pave the way for a long-awaited reconciliation?' (Novi Magazin, 2019). Questions were also raised as to whether the donkey was drugged, given that he stood motionless in front of Marina Abramović and watched for an hour.¹¹

Finally, in relation to the mirroring effect seen in the faces of animals in Marina Abramović's performances, it is worth noting that she also utilized the human skeleton to achieve similar mirroring purposes.¹² The video piece *Cleaning the Mirror II* (1995) involves the act of steady, deep, conscious breathing by the artist, which sets in motion the skeleton placed on her naked body. This produces a living, supine sculpture with a breathing skeleton which is revived through the artist and her naked body (Racanović 2019, 167). The act affirms the reconciliation of the living with their own mortality; the skeleton is a mirror, just as the donkey serves as a mirror into/through the same kind of mortality in the performance *Confession*. Nancy Spector, the curator of the Guggenheim Museum, emphasizes that this work, along with *Cleaning the Mirror II*, evokes 'Tibetan death rites that prepare disciples to become one with their own mortality'

¹⁰ The unpaid nature of animal labour can be explored in performance works, as Nicolas Ridout (2006) demonstrates. Thus, with the return of the animal to the stage, its strangeness does not stem from the idea that he/she has no place there or nothing to seek, but rather from the realization that there is suddenly nothing strange about it. We sense that the animal does indeed have something to seek on the stage and that he/she can be used much like any human performer.

¹¹ Cf. Stojanov (2018).

¹² The artist does not treat the donkey's eyes as a mirror in terms of objectification. Rather, they represent subjectivization, allowing the artist to achieve a 'view of confession' that she could not attain with human beings.



Figure 1 Marina Abramović, *Confession* (2010). 'For the majority of the film however, the donkey remains posed – virtually frozen and with a deceptively sympathetic look in his eye – opposite the artist' (Amicus Asini 2016; photo Marko Ercegović/MSUV, by courtesy of Film, Video and Photography Collection of the Museum of Contemporary Art Vojvodina, Novi Sad)

(Spector n.d.; cf. Pešić 2017, 121). The same scene of lying with the skeleton, filmed from a different angle, became the foundation for her video performance *Nude with Skeleton* in 2005 (Pešić 2017, 121).¹³

Reading as Mirroring to Animals

In contrast to the silent mirror confrontation with an animal and the psycho-emotional confession, I present two examples of confrontations with animals in which artists read selected works to animals.¹⁴

¹³ The dark, mysterious world of Tibetan monks is the basis for her three video performances dealing with death that M. Abramović entitled *Cleaning the Mirror* (1995). She conceived the performances after an invitation from art critic Chrissie Iles to exhibit at the Museum of Modern Art in Oxford (Pešić, 2017, 121).

¹⁴ The classic way to study self-awareness in animals, as encyclopedia notes highlight, is with the mirror test developed by Gordon Gallup, Jr. in 1970. To conduct the test, an animal's body is secretly marked, for example by placing odorless red dye on the face, and then the animal is given access to a mirror. Gallup refers to the mirror test as the real metaphor of the ancient Greek aphorism 'Gnothi seauton,' the looking glass as self-awareness. As stated by veterinarian Marty Becker, among animals, only higher primates, dolphins, orcas, elephants, and European magpies are currently known to recognize that what they see in a mirror is a reflection of themselves. While pigs show no sign of recognizing their own reflections, they can use other information seen in the mirror, such as identifying the location of food placed behind them (Becker 2012). In his chapter titled 'Through the



Figure 2 Saša Živković: *Reading Zerzan* (2022) to the Donkeys (photo by Kruno Jošt)

Reading Zerzan is a performance by Croatian artist Saša Živković performed in 2022 in the village Rasoja (Lovinac, Lika, Croatia, the Lovinac Performance Nights). Živković reads John Zerzan's text *The Case Against Art* (2009) to donkeys who listen to him, and at the end of the reading they leave. Živković's performances, which at first glance appear as a simple or ironic joke, have deeper *philosophical* foundations ('MMK22 predstavlja: LVP performans "Čitanje Zerzana" 2022). In this performance, he opted for John Zerzan's anarcho-primitivism, which is not just a mere assessment of values, and the performance refers to a 'non-human' audience in the open space (in nature, the natural habitat for these donkeys – the audience).

In the aforementioned essay, among other points, Zerzan expresses criticism towards avant-gardes that have lost their original essence by succumbing to sensationalism. He also voices criticism over the symbolic value of art, arguing that it should return to reality (Zerzan n.d.):

Mirror, in the Puzzle,' Svendsen (2019, 67–70) highlights various points, including the fact that dogs and cats do not pass the mirror test. Svendsen explains that dogs primarily rely on their sense of smell for orientation, as emphasized by Stanley Coren's observation on the mental abilities and intellectual potential of dogs: 'I smell, therefore, I exist.' Hearing is the second most important sense for dogs, while sight ranks third. Considering the problematic aspects of the mirror test, it becomes evident that it lacks significance in terms of detecting self-awareness. Or as Lesley J. Rogers and Gisela Kaplan point out, the mirror test tells us little, if anything at all, of the mental aspect of the self. Another notable drawback of the test 'is the fact that it can be used only on captive animals, which may not be representative of their species' (Rogers and Kaplan 2004, 177).



Figure 3 Šikuti Machine: Darko Pekica, *Vogrda* (2011), or Reading the poem 'Miracles' by Walt Whitman to the Cows (photo by Andi Bačić)

Reacting against the increasing mechanization of life, avant-garde movements have not, however, resisted the spectacular nature of art any more than orthodox tendencies have. In fact, one could argue that Aestheticism, or 'art for art's sake,' is more radical than an attempt to engage alienation with its own devices. The late 19th century art pour l'art development was a self-reflective rejection of the world, as opposed to the avant-garde effort to somehow organize life around art.

The artist points out that as far as contact is concerned, the animals were calm and sometimes timid when he read the text a little more expressively; it is *interesting*¹⁵ that as he was throwing pages, one of the *she-donkeys* ate a few pages. Patience was closely related to feeding, as they were given hay.

The next example of a performance involving reading to animals is the video performance *Vogrda* by Šikuti Machine (2011), named after a meadow where Darko Pekica (the author of the video performance) reads Walt Whitman's poem 'Miracles' while tending to his cows. The connection to anarcho-primitivism, as outlined by John Zerzan, can also be seen in the activities of the Šikuti Machine collective from Savičenta. Their

¹⁵ Here I emphasize that I personally found it *interesting* as a visual sight.



Figure 4 Hrvoje Cokarić and Vanja Pagar: *Export*, 14th Days of Performance Art in Varaždin 2015

work affirms village life by demystifying artistic processes and promoting rural *culture*¹⁶ toward a place of greater cultural recognition.

The very name of the Šikuti Machine group symbolically refers to the link between rural, or, as the collective itself says, peasant life in Šikuti near Savičenta (in Istria) and modern technology.

While Živković chose to read Zerzan's critique of avant-gardes that have lost their original essence by succumbing to sensationalism, Darko Pekica chose Whitman (n.d.) who addresses (our) existence in the 'marvellously marvellous' poem 'Miracles' (published in the 1855 edition of his book of poetry, *Leaves of Grass*), starting from everyday observations, the physical and material world, enumerating a series of poetic images, possible scenes, situations and experiences to their bridging, transcendence and merging with the spiritual, from a walk through the streets of Manhattan, a bee in an apiary, other insects in the air, the wonders of the sunset

¹⁶ Under the term 'rural,' Šikuti Machines also refer to nature in a simplified sense, as part of the binary opposition between village and city. However, we can also use the compound term 'natureculture,' first introduced by Bruno Latour in *We Have Never Been Modern* (1993; originally published in French in 1991), to denote the ontological inseparability of nature and society. As Jane Bennett (2010, 108) puts it, we live in an era 'when the interactions between human, viral, animal, and technological bodies are becoming more and more intense.'

or the thin arc of the new moon, all the way to the movement of the sea. Finally, in this reflection on life and everything visible – here, there, next to us, and even what we sometimes fail to notice – he concludes the poem with the question ‘What strange miracles can there be?’ At the same time, the poem about miracles seems to ask the question ‘Is there such a thing as a miracle?’ Specifically, while some would look for miraculous healing or resurrection from the dead or some other such dramatic miracle as evidence, Walt Whitman reveals, through the strange phenomenon of life in simple, free-form verses, that he believes in miracles – not because he has experienced biblical or other extraordinary miracles, but because he has experienced the same things most people encounter daily, though many fail to recognize them as miracles.¹⁷

The main goal of the multimedia project *Toward/d*¹⁸ *Europe*, conceived as a community art initiative by the Split multimedia artist Hrvoje Cokarić, is to integrate true artists with the coastal-Dinaric donkeys, who are threatened with extinction in its natural habitat in Croatia. In his monograph *Toward Europe*, he also highlights their view/eyes (Magdić and Cokarić 2016, 40):

You can't put a donkey into a cage. He won't sing. He can't be a slave. Although he is a democratic child, he too is proud, he is dignified and he is able to put himself in order. You think that he thinks you're better than him? You beat him and he doesn't even turn his head. And if he turns his head and *looks at you, you can see in his eyes that he thinks very little of you*. A donkey is full of dignity, he doesn't give you much importance and maybe he even despises you, or feels sorry for you ... Not all donkeys are on the same height, but not all people are the same, you can find all kinds of them. Usually people don't understand him, so they beat him. And that is all that they know.

The performance *Export*, as part of the project *Toward/d Europe*, fea-

¹⁷ Here I would like to mention the performance *Requiem for Boškarin* (2005, Svetvinčenat, Istria) by multimedia artist Darwin Butković, dedicated to the Boškarin *who* was slaughtered the next day. (The term *B/boškarin* refers to a breed of cattle native to the Istrian peninsula, which spans parts of Croatia, Slovenia, and Italy. The Boškarin is also a symbol of Istrian heritage and is celebrated for its cultural significance in the area.) Along the lines of the activity of St. Francis, who preached to the birds, the artist thus decided to play *Requiem for Boškarin* (cf. Marjanić 2014, 1662).

¹⁸ ‘Toward,’ not ‘towards’ in this specific case because of the play on words. The Croatian word *tovar* refers specifically to a donkey used for carrying loads or cargo. In English, it can be translated as a ‘pack donkey’ or simply a ‘donkey used for carrying goods.’

tured two donkeys from Varaždin – Jura and Ferdo – alongside the artists Hrvoje Cokarić and Vanja Pagar. In this project, the donkey-artists and their human artist colleagues, as Hrvoje Cokarić (2016, 24) points out, become the ultimate suprematists, ‘those who will resist the world that we ourselves have created and which wants to destroy us.’ Just as Traveler’s donkey from 1922 became Croatia’s first Dadaist donkey (cf. Marjanić 2014), and for some a Zenithist or futurist, maybe even a constructivist, what is important is that he is an avant-garde figure.¹⁹ The leader of the Uzgon association, multimedia artist Hrvoje Cokarić connects with the Dalmatian donkeys, who are disappearing, drawing a parallel to the donkey Benjamin from Orwell’s allegorical novella *Animal Farm* (1945). Benjamin represents *kynicism*, a philosophical teaching focused on virtue, a return to nature, and the rejection of social conventions – principles championed by figures like Antisthenes and Diogenes. Cokarić adds that *kynicism* is synonymous with anarchism, and he identifies his Dalmatian donkey as both an anarchist with artistic determination and a suprematist.

In Conclusion as *Reflection*

All of the animals used by the artists in these case studies are mammals or those with faces that humans would likely recognize, such as donkeys and cows. These artists are not focused on animal rights, nor is their aim to *disrupt* “normalized” human-animal interactions. Only Hrvoje Cokarić’s self-sacrifice serves a dual purpose: both for the preservation of donkeys, *who* are unfortunately disappearing in Dalmatia (Croatia), and for the artistic project called *Toward Europe*. However, they do not anthropomorphize these specific animals; rather, they *use* animals in their *natural state*.²⁰ Marina Abramović stated that she ‘took a donkey into the backyard of Nicholas’s (Logsdail) house,’ while Saša Živković performed *Reading Zerzan* to the donkeys in their *natural habitat*. Additionally, Darko

¹⁹ Hrvoje Cokarić and Vanja Pagar also came up with a gilded ‘donkey dung’ as a souvenir that tourists can take home from Croatia. The multimedia project *Toward Project* explores the protection of the coastal Dinaric donkey and includes an ironic cryptocurrency based on donkey dung. The ‘cryptocurrency donkey,’ gilded donkey dung, becomes an exceptional Croatian souvenir, with the project aiming to lay the foundation for a future park for indigenous Dalmatian animals with educational and cultural content.

²⁰ By the term ‘natural state,’ I mean that the animals remained in their living space; they were not placed on a theatre stage or in a gallery. Of course, the term ‘natural state’ does not imply their potential freedom in this context.

Pekica, from the artistic collective Šikuti Machine, uses cows as a scenography for Whitman's poem 'Miracles' about nature and its wonders. It is not known how Marina Abramović managed to calm the donkey for one hour; she wrote that after about an hour, the donkey decided to leave, 'and that was it. I felt a little better' (Abramović 2019, 283). She recorded the performance on the island of Lamu in the Indian Ocean, where she had come at the invitation of Nicholas Logsdail. She described how she was fascinated by the donkeys on the island: 'They are the most static animals I have ever seen – they would stand for hours in the strongest sun, almost motionless' (Abramović 2019, 283). Saša Živković told me that he kept the donkeys calm with hay, and Darko Pekica had no need to calm down the cows because they were in their territory, on the meadow Vogrda, where they graze on the grass.

Like Derrida, these artists also use animals to explore ontological questions. Zerzan's anarcho-primitivism is reflected in Živković's performance with donkeys while Whitman's poem, celebrating the wonders of nature, resonates in Šikuti Machine's performance. Both can only be fully appreciated by animals untouched by civilization. Or, as the Šikuti Machine states (Marjanić 2014, 1162):

At the moment when the objective and social reality disappear in imposed 'reconstructions,' re-branding and re-design, led by market economy and cruel interest when a strip of land represents a property and the social interest in ecology gets marginalized, Vogrda take us back into nature and encourages us to believe that there is a spot under the sun where the pastoral idyll is true.

Jacques Derrida, in his article 'The Animal That Therefore I Am,' addressed his readers on the subject of standing naked in the presence of his cat, 'or *this* cat, *this* specific cat with which he shared aspects of his life, and this cat with him' (Reich, 2022).

I often ask myself, just to see, *who I am* – and who I am (following) at the moment when, caught naked, in silence, by the gaze of an animal, for example, the eyes of a cat, I have trouble, yes, a bad time overcoming my embarrassment. Whence this malaise? [Derrida 2002, 372]

However, there are similarities between Derrida's view of the cat and Abramović's view of the donkey's face, both of which involve searching for pathos in the eyes of animals. 'What Derrida experiences, and is searching for an expression of, is *pathos* – the pathos in the artificial human-animal relationship. He finds pathos in the suffering of animals' (Reich, 2022). Or

as Derrida states in his article 'The Animal that Therefore I Am (More to Follow)' (2002, 372–380), the animal can be looked at, but he also warns that philosophy may forget that the animal can look at us and that he/she can have his/her own point of view towards us.

It has its point of view regarding me. The point of view of the absolute other, and nothing will have ever done more to make me think through this absolute alterity of the neighbor than these moments when I see myself seen naked under the gaze of a cat. [Derrida 2002, 380]²¹

As I pointed out, the duo-performance *Confession* by Marina Abramović can be contextually linked with Beuys's action involving a coyote, particularly regarding the zoo-ethic use of the animal. Additionally, in terms of the symbolic meaning of the two performances (Saša Živković, Darko Pekica) involving reading to donkeys/cattle, we can also draw a symbolic connection to Joseph Beuys's action *How to Explain Pictures to a Dead Hare* (1965). By contrasting the hare (*intuition*) with the human (*rationality*), Beuys covered his head with honey and gold leaf, then spent three hours walking through an exhibition of his work, explaining the art to a dead hare (Berghaus 2005, 161). Beuys points out that 'even a dead animal preserves more powers of intuition than some human beings with their stubborn rationality.' Human thinking was capable of achieving so much, but it could also 'be intellectualised to a deadly degree, and remain dead, and express its deadliness in the political and pedagogical fields' (Antliff 2014, 62).²²

²¹ Žarko Paić solves the aforementioned meeting of the cat's gaze and the naked philosopher with the inverted question: why is Derrida's cat (not) ashamed of the reciprocal shame of the philosopher as a non-cat? Derrida states that he is not looking at the 'naked' cat, but that the little cat is looking at him, the 'naked' Derrida, not the man-philosopher. He describes how the cat's gaze disrupts his sense of identity and challenges his perception of being the master of language and reason. Derrida emphasizes the cat's gaze as something that sees him without any cultural or linguistic mediation, exposing the vulnerability and animal (non-human) aspects of his existence. 'In this gaze, the Other, i.e. man, sees something sublime and monstrous in general, because the gaze comes from an animal. Shame is Derrida's response to the event of meeting "his" cat while he is bathing naked in the bathtub. It is not just any kind of shame, not even the apocalyptic one of Josef K. at the end of Kafka's novel *The Process*: "Shame will outlive him!" It is the pure vitality of individual contingency, the irreducibly "human-all too-human". It is only through this encounter that man perceives himself as 'naked' in the presence of the Other Being (species/genus of animal). Who is truly "naked" and who is actually "looking" at whom – is Derrida as a man looking at a cat/an animal or vice versa?' (Paić, 2022, 613).

²² The performance based on interpreting his own work was staged at the opening of the ex-

Aldo Leopold, in the essay 'Thinking Like a Mountain' (first published in 1949), wrote about how, in his youth, he witnessed a dying wolf and how that experience changed his attitude towards nature (Leopold 1987, 130):

We reached the old wolf in time to watch a fierce green fire dying in her eyes. I realized then, and have known ever since, that there was something new to me in those eyes – something known only to her and to the mountain. [...] But after seeing the green fire die, I sensed that neither the wolf nor the mountain agreed with such a view.

The green fire in the gaze of a dying wolf taught Leopold a lesson for life (Sanders Pollock and Rainwater 2005, 7).

In any case, this donkey's gaze (cf. Yong 2017; Saporito, n.d.), this *zoo-centric* essay²³ will only be read by those with a sense of *Solastalgia*,²⁴ as Glenn Albrecht would say.

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hibition *Joseph Beuys ... irgendein Strang ... (Some Rope or Other)* at the Schmela Gallery in Düsseldorf on 26 November 1965, which was also his first exhibition.

²³ The article is a part of the project *Bestiary of Croatian Ethno-Culture: Interdisciplinary starting points (BESTIA)*.

²⁴ A form of emotional or existential distress caused by environmental change.

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Psihologija
Psychology

Vloga potrebe po stalni dosegljivosti na spletnih socialnih omrežjih pri napovedovanju stresa in psihološkega blagostanja

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Povzetek. V zadnjih letih je uporaba spletnih socialnih omrežij v porastu, ta pa so spremenila način interakcije med posamezniki. Ti so velikokrat neprestano v stiku z drugimi preko spletnih socialnih omrežij, pri tem pa se lahko pojavi potreba po stalni dosegljivosti, ki potencialno vodi v negativne posledice. Namen pričujoče raziskave je bil podrobneje raziskati dejavnike, ki prispevajo k doživljanju potrebe po stalni dosegljivosti na spletnih socialnih omrežjih ter nekatere njene potencialne posledice. Želeli smo preučiti predvsem mediatorско vlogo stalne dosegljivosti na spletnih socialnih omrežjih v odnosu med preučevanimi napovedniki in izidi. V raziskavo je bilo vključenih 157 udeležencev, ki so izpolnili vprašalnike o strahu pred zamujenim, nevroticizmu, osamljenosti, samokontroli, zaznanem stresu, psihološkem blagostanju ter potrebi po stalni dosegljivosti na spletnih socialnih omrežjih. Rezultati so pokazali, da potreba po stalni dosegljivosti na spletnih socialnih omrežjih delno mediira odnos med osamljenostjo in stresom, osamljenostjo in psihološkim blagostanjem ter samokontrolo in psihološkim blagostanjem. Dobljeni rezultati so bili le delno skladni s predpostavkami. Izpostavljene so prav tako pomanjkljivosti raziskave ter možnosti izboljšav v prihodnosti.

Ključne besede: spletna socialna omrežja, stalna dosegljivost, stres, psihološko blagostanje

The Role of the Need for Constant Availability on Social Networking Sites in Predicting Stress and Psychological Well-Being

Abstract. In recent years, the use of social networking sites has been on the rise and has changed the way individuals interact with each other. They are often in constant contact with others through social networking sites, and the need for constant availability can arise, potentially leading to negative consequences. The aim of the present research was to explore in more detail the factors that contribute to the experience of the need for constant availability on social networking sites and some of its potential consequences. We wanted to examine the mediating role of constant availability on social networking sites in the relationship between the predictors and outcomes. The study included 157 participants who completed questionnaires on fear of missing out, neuroticism, loneliness, self-control, perceived stress, psychological well-being, and the need for constant availability on social networking sites. The results showed that the need for constant availability on social networking sites partially mediated the relationship between loneliness and stress, loneliness and psychological well-being, and self-control and psychological well-being. The results obtained were only partially consistent with the hypotheses. The shortcomings of the study, as well as possibilities for future improvements, are also highlighted.

Key Words: social networking sites, constant availability, stress, psychological wellbeing

Uvod

Uporaba spletnih socialnih omrežij (v nadaljevanju sso) je v porastu že vrsto let; trenutno jih uporablja kar 4,76 milijarde ljudi po vsem svetu (Auxier in Anderson 2021; Kemp 2023; Vally in D'Souza 2019), po ocenah Statiste (b.l.) pa jih uporablja tudi približno 72 % Slovencev. Med najpogostejše uporabljene sso v splošni populaciji spadajo predvsem YouTube, Facebook in Instagram, med mlajšimi pa sta pogosti tudi uporaba TikTok in Snapchat (Auxier in Anderson 2021; Vogels, Gelles-Watnick in Massarat 2022). Omenjene aplikacije, ki so med drugim dostopne preko pametnih telefonov in drugih prenosnih naprav, omogočajo stalen dostop do informacij, zabave in družabnih stikov (Hofmann, Reinecke in Meier 2017). V skladu s tem se lahko uporabljajo za ohranjanje že vzpostavljenih družbenih mrež, spoznavanje novih ljudi na podlagi skupnih interesov, pridobivanje, izmenjavo ter uporabo informacij, izražanje mnenja pa tudi krajšanje časa, zabavo in sprostitve (Kuss in Griffiths 2011; Reich in

Vorderer 2013; Satici in Uysal 2015; Vorderer, Krömer in Schneider 2016; Whiting in Williams 2013).

V zadnjih letih so sso spremenila način interakcije med posamezniki. Po eni strani so zagotovila nova sredstva za razvijanje odnosov in ohranjanje družbene povezanosti ter omogočila vzajemnejše in bolj neprekinjene interakcije med posamezniki ne glede na čas ter lokacijo. Po drugi strani pa je takšen nov način družbenega komuniciranja sprožil tudi niz negativnih posledic (Alutaybi idr. 2020). Pogosto se namreč dogaja, da posamezniki v družbenih situacijah ignorirajo ljudi okoli sebe ter namesto interakcije z njimi uporabljajo pametne telefone (in sso na njih), kar pa lahko negativno vpliva na odnose z drugimi. Ta pojav imenujemo »te-leignoriranje« (angl. *phubbing* oz. *phone snubbing*) in zdi se, da je do neke mere postal normativ v vsakdanjem komuniciranju (Chotpitayasunondh in Douglas 2016; 2018). Že Le Roux in Parry (2022) sta izpostavila, da je zaradi hitrosti, s katero je stalna spletna povezanost postala (na nek način) norma, naše razumevanje širokega spektra možnih učinkov in posledic teh sprememb izrazito pomanjkljivo. To področje tako zahteva dodatno raziskovanje dejavnikov, ki delujejo v ozadju (da dobimo vpogled v to, kaj takšno vedenje spodbudi), pa tudi posledic (da dobimo vpogled v to, do česa lahko takšno vedenje vodi).

V skladu s tem v pričujoči raziskavi preučujemo do sedaj še ne dovolj raziskano področje, s čimer želimo prispevati k boljšemu razumevanju značilnosti, ki usmerjajo potrebo po stalni dosegljivosti na sso in njene posledice. S tem zapolnjujemo vrzel na področju, saj so se pretekle raziskave osredotočale predvsem na problematično uporabo sso in zasvojenost z internetom ter sso; osrednjemu konstrukt, ki ga preučujemo v pričujoči raziskavi, pa se še ni posvečalo veliko pozornosti.

Opredelitev potrebe po stalni dosegljivosti na spletnih socialnih omrežjih

Naraščajoča uporaba sso v vseh starostnih skupinah prispeva k različnim pojavom. Do nedavnega so se raziskovalci posvečali predvsem preučevanju zasvojenosti s spletom ter specifičnejše tudi zasvojenosti s sso ali problematične, kompulzivne uporabe le-teh (npr. Alimoradi idr. 2019; Baltacı 2019; Chia idr. 2020; Hou idr. 2019; Servidio idr. 2022). V zadnjih letih pa je vse več raziskav uporabe sso usmerjene k preučevanju t. i. potrebe po stalni dosegljivosti. Živimo namreč v svetu, v katerem smo nenehno obkroženi z vplivi sso (Barone, Cogliandro in Persichetti 2022); med drugim se od nas, denimo, pogosto pričakuje, da bomo nenehno

(vsaj delno) prisotni na sso in posledično tudi neprestano na voljo za pogovor (Birnholtz idr. 2012). Zdi se, da danes skorajda ni več družbenega konteksta, tako v javnem kot zasebnem okolju, v katerem bi bil posameznik prostovoljno »odklopljen« od dogajanj na sso. Namesto tega je v stiku z drugimi, kolikor je le mogoče, kadar koli in kjer koli. Tako uporaba sso predstavlja tudi velik del zasebnih družabnih interakcij – posamezniki jih vedno več uporabljajo doma, ob družbi prijateljev, celo z otrokom ali romantičnim partnerjem ter med gledanjem televizije (Quinn in Oldmeadow 2013; Vorderer in Kohring 2013; Vorderer, Krömer in Schneider 2016). Tovrstna vedenja opisujejo pojav, za katerega so bili uporabljeni različni izrazi, prav tako pa se med seboj nekoliko razlikujejo definicije.


Peter Vorderer, Nicola Krömer in Frank M. Schneider (2016) npr. izpostavljajo pojav stalne prisotnosti (uporaba spletnih vsebin hkrati z drugimi aktivnostmi) ter povezanosti (vključevanje v družbeno interakcijo na spletu, hkrati z drugimi aktivnostmi) na spletu. Opredeljujejo ga skozi dve dimenziji, in sicer kot odkrito vedenje v obliki dolgotrajne uporabe elektronskih medijev (uporaba spletnih storitev in informacijske tehnologije, ki zagotavljajo tehnološko podlago za stalno dosegljivost spletnih vsebin in komunikacije preko spleta) in kot psihološko stanje stalne (komunikacijske) budnosti (ta dimenzija se razlikuje od tradicionalnih oblik uporabe spleta ter se nanaša na subjektivni občutek stalne razpoložljivosti in povezanosti z drugimi). Čeprav pojem kot celota ustreza osrednjemu konstrukt, ki smo ga v tej raziskavi poimenovali »stalna dosegljivost«, so Peter Vorderer, Nicola Krömer in Frank M. Schneider (2016) izpostavili, da konstrukt ne obstaja nujno le kot celota, ampak se lahko vidik stalne prisotnosti na spletu in vidik stalne povezanosti z drugimi na spletu preučujeta bodisi kot celota bodisi ločeno (v pričujoči raziskavi konstrukt preučujemo kot celoto). V skladu s tem lahko znotraj konstrukta stalne dosegljivosti opazimo tako vidike pasivne kot aktivne uporabe sso. Pri tem aktivna uporaba vključuje pošiljanje sporočil, deljenje fotografij ali informacij z določenim občinstvom ter objavljanje osebnih vsebin, ki jih lahko drugi komentirajo ali »všečkajo« (vidik stalne povezanosti z drugimi na spletu). Pasivna uporaba pa se nanaša na brskanje, pomikanje (angl. *scrolling*), deljenje povezav ali objav ter gledanje vsebine oz. objav drugih (vidik stalne prisotnosti na spletu). Uporaba sso torej ne vključuje le aktivnega družbenega udejstvovanja, ampak tudi pasivno interakcijo; ljudje namreč lahko uporabljajo sso, ne da bi ustvarjali vsebine ali odgovarjali na objave prijateljev s komentarji (Servidio 2021).

Pri opredeljevanju potrebe po stalni dosegljivosti na sso se nanašamo tudi na konstrukt, ki so ga Reinecke idr. (2018) poimenovali spletna budnost (angl. *online vigilance*) ter ga definirali kot stalno kognitivno usmerjenost k spletnim vsebinam in h komunikaciji ter nagnjenost k nenehni uporabi le-teh. Od zasvojenosti z internetom se ta razlikuje predvsem z vidika nadzora vedenja, pri čemer je pri zasvojenosti največji poudarek na izgubi nadzora vedenja, prav tako pri zasvojenosti govorimo o patološkem vedenju, kar pa ni značilno za ostale oblike stalne uporabe sso (Brand, Laier in Young 2014; Kardefelt-Winther idr. 2017; Reinecke idr. 2018). Spletna budnost se nanaša predvsem na lastnosti uporabnikov sso, kot so njihova kognitivna usmerjenost v stalno, vseprisotno spletno povezanost z drugimi; kronična pozornost in stalno vključevanje znakov ter dražljajev, ki so povezani s spletom, v njihovo razmišljanje in občutenje; ter motivacijska naravnost, da dajejo prednost možnostim spletnega komuniciranja pred vedenjem, ki ni vezano na uporabo sso (Reinecke idr. 2018). Pri tem se lahko zadnji vidik poveže s predhodno omenjenim teleignoriranjem, ki je prav tako zajeto v preučevan konstrukt stalne dosegljivosti.

Torej, ko govorimo o (potrebi po) stalni dosegljivosti na sso, ne govorimo le o neposredni komunikaciji in interakciji z drugimi na sso, ampak ima ta tudi posreden oz. pasiven element. Izraža se neprestano, tudi med preživljanjem časa z drugimi in ob manj primernih trenutkih (npr. na delovnem mestu, v šoli ipd.), zanjo pa sta značilna predvsem dolgotrajna uporaba elektronskih medijev in psihološko stanje stalne komunikacijske budnosti na sso.

Napovedniki in izidi potrebe po stalni dosegljivosti na sso

Potreba po stalni dosegljivosti lahko vodi v neprestano (vsaj delno) prisotnost na sso in posledično tudi nenehno razpoložljivost za pogovor, kar pa ima lahko negativne posledice. V pričujoči raziskavi se bomo osredotočili tako na vzrode, ki spodbujajo potrebo po stalni dosegljivosti na sso (njene napovednike), kot tudi na njene potencialne izide. Za namen preučevanja teh odnosov smo razvili teoretični model (slika 1), ki kot napovednike izpostavlja strah pred zamujenim (angl. *fear of missing out* – FOMO), samokontrolo, nevroticizem in osamljenost, kot izida pa stres in psihološko blagostanje. Pretekle raziskave še niso preučile specifičnih napovednikov, ki določajo potrebo po stalni dosegljivosti na sso, temveč so se posvečale predvsem dejavnikom (problematične) uporabe sso. Prav zaradi tega se nam zdi pomembno, še posebej ob vedno pogostejši upo-



Slika 1 Teoretični model

rabi sso, preučiti tudi napovednike, ki usmerjajo potrebo po stalni dosegljivosti, ter posledice, ki jih lahko ta prinaša.

Napovedniki

Prvi napovednik, ki smo ga vključili v model, je FOMO. Ta se nanaša na občutek tesnobe, ki se pojavi zaradi posameznikovega zavedanja, da morda zamuja pomembne izkušnje, ki jih doživljajo drugi. Zajema strah pred zamujanjem dogodkov, informacij in drugega, kar je za posameznika pomembno (Franchina idr. 2018; Vorderer, Krömer in Schneider 2016). Za FOMO je značilna tudi želja, da bi bili nenehno v stiku s tem, kar počnejo drugi (Przybylski idr. 2013), kar pa spodbuja uporabo sso za namene ohranjanja stikov (Roberts in David 2020). V splošnem naj bi bil FOMO povezan z negativnimi posledicami, ki lahko izhajajo iz uporabe mobilnih telefonov (Oberst idr. 2017). Raziskave ga povezujejo s povečano uporabo sso (Blackwell idr. 2017; Beyens, Frison in Eggermont 2016; Bloemen in De Coninck 2020; Opsenica Kostić, Pedović in Stošić 2022; Przybylski idr. 2013), problematično uporabo pametnih telefonov (Elhai idr. 2016; Servidio 2021; 2023; Tugtekin idr. 2020; Yang, Liu in Fang 2021) ter problematično uporabo sso (Çetinkaya, Kirik in Gündüz 2021; Fu, Li, in Liang 2023) kot tudi teleignoriranjem (Franchina idr. 2018). Obenem se FOMO pozitivno povezuje s kompulzivno uporabo sso (Lin in Jian 2022).

Kot drugi napovednik smo vključili samokontrolo, ki se nanaša na sposobnost posameznika, da prepreči, spremeni ali se izogne nezaželenim vedenjskim težnjam, predvsem z namenom usklajevanja vedenjskih odzivov z lastnimi vrednotami ter uresničevanja dolgoročnih ciljev (Baumeister, Vohs in Tice 2007; Hofmann idr. 2014). Današnja stalna dostopnost

in prisotnost medijskih vsebin in sso lahko predstavlja izziv za samokontrolo, še posebej, če je izpostavljenost medijem v navzkrižju z drugimi obveznostmi (Panek 2014; Reinecke in Hofmann 2016). Predvsem takrat, ko je odvrčanje pozornosti od pomembnih, a neprijetnih nalog »le en klik stran«, lahko uporaba medijev zlahka odvrne pozornost od doseganja dolgoročnih ciljev in opravljanja obveznosti (Reinecke in Hofmann 2016). Visoka samokontrola naj bi znižala uporabo sso, njeno pomanjkanje pa je povezano s povečano ali celo pretirano uporabo sso (Błachnio in Przepiorka 2016; Panek 2014). Prav tako se samokontrola negativno povezuje s problematično uporabo interneta (Yilmaz in Karaoglan Yilmaz 2023).

Tretji napovednik, ki je bil vključen v model, je nevroticizem. Ta zajema vidike anksioznosti, depresije in čustvene vzkipljivosti (Ormel, Rosmalen in Farmer 2004; Soto in John 2017), Costa in McCrae (1992) pa sta ga opredelila kot dimenzijo neprilagojenosti ali negativne čustvenosti. Za posameznike, ki imajo visoko izraženo osebnostno potezo nevroticizem, so značilne anksioznost, ranljivost, čustvenost, impulzivnost, nestrpnost in razdražljivost (Costa in McCrae 2008). Mnoge raziskave so izpostavile, da je višje izražen nevroticizem povezan s povečano uporabo sso (Blackwell idr. 2017; Kuss in Griffiths 2011; Tang idr. 2016) kot tudi s problematično uporabo sso (Dalvi-Esfahani idr. 2019; Gugushvili idr. 2022).

Četrty in zadnji napovednik, ki smo ga vključili v model, pa je osamljenost. Ta je opredeljena kot stanje, ki ga oseba zaznava, ko je mreža njenih socialnih odnosov manjša ali manj zadovoljujoča, kot bi si želela (Peplau in Perlman 1979). Posamezniki z visoko stopnjo osamljenosti uporabljajo sso z namenom, da bi nadomestili pomanjkanje odnosov izven spletnega okolja (Clayton idr. 2013; Skues, Williams in Wise 2012). Osamljenost je tako povezana s časom, ki ga posameznik preživi na sso, kot tudi s pomembnostjo uporabe sso – osamljenejši kot je posameznik, pomembnejša bo zanj uporaba sso. Osamljenost je tako pozitiven napovednik uporabe sso (Jackson in Wang 2013), pri čemer naj bi stopnja osamljenosti napovedovala dajanje prednosti spletnim družbenim interakcijam (Wood, Bukowski in Lis 2016). Osamljenost je povezana tudi s pretirano uporabo pametnih telefonov (Enez Darcin idr. 2016), sama psihološka izkušnja osamljenosti pa z večjo uporabo sso (Reissmann idr. 2018).

Izidi

V neprestano povezanem komunikacijskem okolju morajo uporabniki sso nenehno posvečati pozornost velikemu številu družabnih zahtev sso.

Te povečane energetske potrebe lahko povzročijo utrujenost zaradi sso, kar pa lahko vodi do fizičnih in psiholoških obremenitev (Lee, Son in Kim 2016).

sso so pogosto vir stresa zaradi nenehno naraščajočega toka informacij, ki ga ustvarjajo, in družbenega pritiska, ki ga posredujejo do uporabnikov (Cheikh-Ammar 2020; Maier idr. 2012). Stres se pri tem nanaša na posameznikovo zaznavanje neskladja med zahtevami iz okolja in njegovimi sposobnostmi za učinkovito obvladovanje teh zahtev (Looker in Gregson 1993). Raziskovalci v splošnem poročajo o pozitivni povezavi med uporabo sso in simptomi stresa, pri čemer naj bi (problematična) uporaba sso vodila v višjo raven zaznanega stresa (Brailovskaia idr. 2021; Beyens, Frison in Eggermont 2016; Fu, Li, in Liang 2023; Lim in Choi 2017; Maier idr. 2012; Vally in D'Souza 2019; Wartberg, Thomasius in Paschke 2021; Wolfers in Utz 2022). Tudi kompulzivna uporaba sso na mobilnem telefonu naj bi prispevala k doživljanju stresa (Apaolaza idr. 2019).

Uporaba medijev sicer omogoča dostop do številnih ugodnosti in je lahko osrednji vir zadovoljitve potreb ter blagostanja, vendar je pozitiven potencial uporabe medijev mogoče v celoti izkoristiti le, če se izpostavljenost medijem ne izvaja na račun drugih dolgoročnih ciljev (Hofmann, Reinecke in Meier 2017). Carol D. Ryff (1989) je psihološko blagostanje opredelila kot proces samouresničevanja, za katerega so značilni avtonomija, obvladovanje okolja, osebnostna rast, pozitivni odnosi z drugimi, življenjski namen in samosprejemanje. Uporaba sso pa lahko negativno prispeva k blagostanju (Wilcox in Stephen 2013). (Prekomerna) uporaba sso je povezana z nizkimi stopnjami psihološkega blagostanja, pri čemer več časa, preživetega na sso, vodi v nižje stopnje psihološkega blagostanja (Hudimova 2021; Thorisdottir idr. 2019; Zahrai idr. 2022).

Namen

Namen naše raziskave je podrobneje raziskati osnovne dejavnike, ki prispevajo k doživljanju potrebe po stalni dosegljivosti na sso, kot tudi nekatere njene posledice oz. izide, pri čemer želimo preveriti tudi, koliko potreba po stalni dosegljivosti na sso prispeva k pojasnjevanju teh izidov. Še zlasti pa želimo preučiti mediatorsko vlogo stalne dosegljivosti na sso v odnosu med preučevanimi napovedniki in izidi.

Podrobneje povedano, predpostavljamo, da bo potreba po stalni dosegljivosti na sso mediirala odnos med FOMO in stresom (H1) ter FOMO in psihološkim blagostanjem (H2), samokontrolo in stresom (H3) ter samokontrolo in psihološkim blagostanjem (H4), nevroticizmom in stresom

(H5) ter nevroticizmom in psihološkim blagostanjem (H6), osamljenostjo in stresom (H7) ter osamljenostjo in psihološkim blagostanjem (H8). Pri tem predpostavljamo, da bodo večji FOMO, nižja samokontrola, visoko izražen nevroticizem ter večja osamljenost povezani s povečano potrebo po stalni dosegljivosti na sso, kar se bo kazalo v višji ravni zaznanega stresa ter nižjem psihološkem blagostanju.

Predhodne raziskave slovenskih in tujih avtorjev se do sedaj niso osredotočale na vidik potrebe po stalni dosegljivosti na sso, zato se nam zdi pomembno podrobneje raziskati tudi ta vidik uporabe sso. Menimo, da lahko naša raziskava predstavlja pomemben korak naprej na področju, ki se šele razvija, ter lahko služi kot odskočna deska za prihodnje raziskave, ki bi preučevano polje še razširile in nadgradile.

Metoda

Udeleženci

V raziskavi je sodelovalo 157 posameznikov, od tega 124 žensk (79,0 %) in 29 moških (18,5 %), štiri osebe pa svojega spola niso želele opredeliti (2,5 %). Njihova starost je bila med 13 in 58 let ($M = 25$; $SD = 8,85$), pri čemer je bilo pri udeležencih, mlajših od 15 let, pridobljeno soglasje staršev (to je bilo potrebno le pri enem udeležencu, pri katerem so bili starši tisti, ki so otroku posredovali vprašalnik). Udeležence smo povprašali tudi o času, ki ga dnevno preživijo na sso izven službenega/študijskega časa (torej v prostem času), pri čemer je 68 posameznikov (43,3 %) poročalo, da na sso preživijo 0–2 uri dnevno, 71 (45,2 %) 2–4 ure dnevno, 18 (11,5 %) 4–6 ur, nihče pa ni poročal o dnevni uporabi sso, ki bi presegala šest ur.

Pripomočki

Za namen zbiranja podatkov smo v anketo vključili demografska vprašanja (o spolu, starosti in času, ki ga udeleženci preživijo na sso na povprečen dan) ter vprašalnike, ki vključujejo vprašanja, povezana s FOMO, samokontrolo, z osamljenostjo, nevroticizmom, s psihološkim blagostanjem, stresom ter potrebo po stalni dosegljivosti na sso.

FOMO smo izmerili z Lestvico strahu pred zamujenimi priložnostmi (The 10-Item Fear of Missing Out Scale (Przybylski idr. 2013)), ki jo sestavlja deset postavk (npr. »Strah me je, da drugi doživljajo več dragocenih izkušenj kot jaz«; $\alpha = 0,85$). Udeleženci so postavke vrednotili na petstopenjski lestvici (od 1 – »Sploh ne drži zame« do 5 – »Popolnoma drži zame«). Uporabili smo slovenski prevod vprašalnika, ki je nastal v

okviru projekta o teleignoriranju, v katerem sta sodelovala Musil in Čuš Babič (Blačnio idr. 2019).

Samokontrolo smo izmerili s Kratko lestvico samokontrole (The Brief Self-Control Scale (Tangney, Baumeister in Boone 2004)), pri čemer so udeleženci na petstopenjski ocenjevalni lestvici (od 1 – »Sploh se ne strinjam« do 5 – »Popolnoma se strinjam«) ovrednotili 13 postavk (npr. »Včasih zaradi užitka in zabave ne opravi dela«; $\alpha = 0,86$). Uporabili smo slovenski prevod vprašalnika, ki so ga pripravili Agata Blačnio idr. (2019) v okviru projekta o teleignoriranju.

Osamljenost smo izmerili z Lestvico osamljenosti UCLA (UCLA Loneliness Scale (Russell 1996)), ki vsebuje 20 postavk (npr. »Kako pogosto se počutite kot del skupine prijateljev?«; $\alpha = 0,95$). Udeleženci so postavke ovrednotili na štiristopenjski lestvici (od 1 – »Nikoli« do 4 – »Vedno«). Uporabili smo slovenski prevod vprašalnika, ki sta ga pripravila Andreja Avsec in Boštjan Bajec in ki je bil uporabljen tudi v drugih raziskavah na slovenskem vzorcu (Lep, Kikelj in Gorjan 2016).

Nevroticizem smo izmerili s šestimi postavkami iz vprašalnika BFI-2-s (The Big Five Inventory–2 Short Form (Soto in John 2017)), ki merijo poteze nevroticizma. Udeleženci so na petstopenjski ocenjevalni lestvici (od 1 – »Sploh se ne strinjam« do 5 – »Se povsem strinjam«) ovrednotili trditve (npr. »Sem nekdo, ki je nagnjen k depresivnemu razpoloženju in potrnosti«; $\alpha = 0,83$). Uporabili smo slovenski prevod vprašalnika, ki sta ga pripravila Andreja Avsec in Gregor Sočan (2007).

Psihološko blagostanje smo izmerili s krajšo različico Lestvice psihološkega blagostanja (Psychological Wellbeing scale (Ryff in Keyes 1995)). Udeleženci so na sedemstopenjski lestvici (od 1 – »Popolnoma se strinjam« do 7 – »Sploh se ne strinjam«) ovrednotili 18 postavk (npr. »V mnogih ozirih sem nad svojimi dosežki v življenju razočaran/-a«; $\alpha = 0,85$). V pričujoči raziskavi smo uporabili slovensko različico lestvice, ki smo jo prevedli sami po metodi prevoda in vzratnega prevoda. Lestvica ima šest dimenzij (avtonomnost, obvladovanje okolja, osebna rast, pozitivni odnosi z drugimi, smisel življenja in sprejemanje samega sebe), vendar smo v pričujoči raziskavi konstrukt preučevali kot celoto. Garcia in Siddiqui (2009) sta v svoji raziskavi namreč prišla do ugotovitve, da je skupni rezultat boljša in zanesljivejša mera psihološkega blagostanja, ko uporabljamo 18-postavčno obliko vprašalnika.

Stres smo izmerili s sedmimi postavkami vprašalnika DASS-21 (Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (Lovibond in Lovibond 1995)), ki merijo dimenzijo stres. Pri tem so udeleženci na štiristopenjski lestvici (od 0 –

»Nikakor/nikoli ne velja zame« do 3 – »Zelo velja zame ali večino časa velja zame«) ocenili, v kolikšni meri je opisana trditev zanje veljala v preteklem tednu (npr. »Težko se mi je bilo sprostiti«; $\alpha = 0,90$). Uporabili smo slovenski prevod, ki je že bil uporabljen v preteklih raziskavah (npr. Plohl idr. 2023).

Za namene raziskave smo na podlagi predhodnih raziskav (npr. Hetz, Dawson in Cullen 2015; Przybylski idr. 2013) sestavili lestvico, ki je merila potrebo po stalni dosegljivosti na sso (glej prilogo 1). Sestavljalo jo je sedem postavk, ki so spraševale po intenzivnosti potrebe po preverjanju sso v različnih okoliščinah in različnih časih tekom dneva (npr.: »Potreba po preverjanju spletnih socialnih omrežij, ko ste s prijatelji«; $\alpha = 0,75$). Udeleženci so podajali odgovore na petstopenjski ocenjevalni lestvici (od 1 – »Zelo šibka potreba« do 5 – »Zelo močna potreba«).

Postopek

Podatke za raziskavo smo zbirali v spletni obliki. Vse vprašalnike smo pretvorili v spletno obliko preko portala 1KA. Udeležence smo pridobivali preko sso, predvsem Facebooka in Instagrama, ter po elektronski pošti. Pri tem je šlo predvsem za študente programov Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Mariboru ter znance avtorjev članka. Sodelovanje v raziskavi je bilo prostovoljno, zagotovljena je bila anonimnost udeležencev, pred začetkom sodelovanja so udeleženci izpolnili tudi obveščeno soglasje. Povprečen čas izpolnjevanja je bil približno 11,5 minute.

Statistične analize

Vse analize so bile opravljene s programom IBM SPSS Statistics 28.0. Za namen preverjanja normalnosti porazdelitve vključenih spremenljivk smo izvedli Shapiro-Wilkov test in preverili koeficiente asimetričnosti ter sploščenosti. Rezultati testa so nakazovali normalnost porazdelitve dveh spremenljivk (samokontrola in nevroticizem), vendar smo na podlagi koeficientov asimetričnosti in sploščenosti, katerih vrednosti so bile med -2 in $+2$, zaključili, da gre za normalno porazdelitev vseh spremenljivk (George in Mallery 2010). Nato smo izračunali še deskriptivno statistiko vseh analiziranih spremenljivk (numeruse, povprečne vrednosti, standardne odklone ter korelacijske koeficiente med vsemi vključenimi spremenljivkami). Za preverjanje korelacij med spremenljivkami smo uporabili Pearsonov korelacijski koeficient (izjema je ena spremenljivka, kjer smo uporabili Spearmanov koeficient). Za preverjanje teoretičnega modela smo izvedli multiple regresijske analize z metodo sočasne vklju-

čitve (angl. *enter*). Predpostavkam multiple regresije je bilo zadoščeno; opazili smo sicer osem multivariatnih osamelcev, vendar so rezultati v primeru izbrisa teh udeležencev ostali enaki, zato jih iz nadaljnjih analiz nismo izključili. Nato smo za namen testiranja zastavljenih hipotez izvedli mediacijske analize z uporabo dodatka PROCESS MACRO (model 4) (Hayes 2022).

Rezultati

V tem poglavju predstavljamo opisno statistiko relevantnih spremenljivk (FOMO; samokontrola; nevroticizem; osamljenost; čas, preživet na sso; stalna dosegljivost; stres in psihološko blagostanje) ter korelacije med njimi (preglednica 1). Sledijo rezultati hierarhičnih multiplih regresij (povzeto v preglednicah 2 in 3) ter mediatorskih analiz (slike 2 do 4).

Deskriptivna statistika in korelacije med analiziranimi spremenljivkami

Iz preglednice 1 je razvidno, da so vse spremenljivke med seboj zmerno do močno povezane, pri čemer najvišjo korelacijo opazimo med psihološkim blagostanjem ter osamljenostjo, najnižjo pa med stalno dosegljivostjo in osamljenostjo. Stalna dosegljivost je statistično značilno in pozitivno povezana s FOMO, z nevroticizmom, osamljenostjo, s stresom ter časom, preživetim na sso. Statistično značilno in negativno pa je povezana s samokontrolo ter psihološkim blagostanjem.

Preglednica 1 Deskriptivna statistika in korelacije med analiziranimi spremenljivkami

	M	SD	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(1)	2,46	0,74	–							
(2)	3,13	0,65	–0,47**	–						
(3)	3,22	0,81	0,39**	–0,50**	–					
(4)	2,16	0,60	0,39**	–0,44**	0,58**	–				
(5)	1,68	0,67	0,33**	–0,17*	0,10	0,14	–			
(6)	2,63	0,65	0,51**	–0,41**	0,33**	0,27**	0,43**	–		
(7)	2,19	0,70	0,41**	–0,45**	0,67**	0,55**	0,15	0,31**	–	
(8)	5,22	0,82	–0,36**	0,48**	–0,55**	–0,69**	–0,16*	–0,32**	–0,54**	–

OPOMBE Spremenljivke: (1) FOMO (strah pred zamujenim), (2) samokontrola, (3) nevroticizem, (4) osamljenost, (5) čas, preživet na sso (poročan Spearmanov korelacijski koeficient), (6) stalna dosegljivost, (7) stres, (8) psihološko blagostanje. * $p < 0,05$, ** $p < 0,01$.

Napovedniki stresa in psihološkega blagostanja

V prvem koraku hierarhične multiple regresije pri preverjanju napovednikov stresa sta bila vnesena dva napovednika, in sicer spol ter starost – model je bil statistično značilen ($F(2, 154) = 12,95$; $p < 0,001$) in je pojasnil 14,4 % variance stresa. Po vnosu FOMO, samokontrole, nevroticizma in osamljenosti v drugem koraku je bila skupna varianca, ki jo je pojasnil model kot celota, 50,7 % ($F(6, 150) = 25,75$; $p < 0,001$), kar je statistično značilno več, kot smo lahko pojasnili le s spolom in starostjo. V tretjem koraku smo dodali še čas, preživet na sso, in stalno dosegljivost, pri čemer je bil tudi ta model statistično značilen ($F(8, 148) = 19,12$; $p < 0,001$), pojasnil pa je 50,8 % variance. Izkazalo se je, da ti dve spremenljivki sicer bistveno ne povečata deleža pojasnjene variance. V končnem modelu sta bili statistično značilni dve napovedni spremenljivki – osamljenost in nevroticizem. Regresijski koeficienti so prikazani v preglednici 2.

V prvem koraku hierarhične multiple regresije pri preverjanju napovednikov psihološkega blagostanja sta bila prav tako vnesena dva napove-

Preglednica 2 Hierarhični regresijski model pri napovedovanju stresa

Korak/spremenljivka	<i>B</i>	SE <i>B</i>	β	<i>t</i>	R^2	ΔR^2
Prvi korak					0,14***	
Spol	2,90	0,85	0,25**	3,41		
Starost	-0,16	0,04	-0,28***	-3,70		
Drugi korak					0,51***	0,36***
Spol	-0,14	0,72	-0,01	-0,19		
Starost	-0,03	0,04	-0,05	-0,77		
FOMO	0,07	0,05	0,10	1,39		
Samokontrola	-0,04	0,04	-0,07	-0,97		
Nevroticizem	0,47	0,08	0,46***	5,90		
Osamljenost	0,09	0,03	0,21**	2,85		
Tretji korak					0,51***	<0,01
Spol	-0,15	0,73	-0,01	-0,20		
Starost	-0,03	0,04	-0,06	-0,77		
FOMO	0,06	0,05	0,10	1,28		
Samokontrola	-0,04	0,04	-0,07	-0,99		
Nevroticizem	0,47	0,08	0,46***	5,87		
Osamljenost	0,09	0,03	0,21**	2,86		
Čas, preživet na sso	0,22	0,48	0,03	0,47		
Stalna dosegljivost	-0,03	0,09	-0,02	-0,30		

OPOMBE ** $p < 0,01$, *** $p < 0,001$; FOMO – strah pred zamujenim.

Preglednica 3 Hierarhični regresijski model pri napovedovanju psihološkega blagostanja


Korak/spremenljivka	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>R</i> ²	ΔR^2
Prvi korak					0,12***	
Spol	-9,97	2,59	-0,29***	-3,85		
Starost	0,29	0,13	0,17*	2,22		
Drugi korak					0,53***	0,42***
Spol	-2,10	2,11	-0,06	-1,00		
Starost	-0,06	0,11	-0,04	-0,57		
FOMO	-0,07	0,14	-0,03	-0,48		
Samokontrola	0,31	0,12	0,18*	2,49		
Nevroticizem	-0,42	0,23	-0,14	-1,79		
Osamljenost	-0,63	0,09	-0,51***	-7,13		
Tretji korak					0,54	0,01
Spol	-1,90	2,10	-0,06	-0,90		
Starost	-0,14	0,12	-0,08	-1,19		
FOMO	0,01	0,15	0,00	0,05		
Samokontrola	0,28	0,12	0,16*	2,28		
Nevroticizem	-0,40	0,23	-0,13	-1,71		
Osamljenost	-0,64	0,09	-0,51***	-7,20		
Čas, preživet na sso	-0,95	1,39	-0,04	-0,68		
Stalna dosegljivost	-0,33	0,26	-0,10	-1,30		

OPOMBE ** $p < 0,05$, *** $p < 0,001$; FOMO – strah pred zamujenim.

dnika, spol in starost, pri čemer je bil model statistično značilen ($F(2, 154) = 10,06$; $p < 0,001$) in je pojasnil 11,6 % variance psihološkega blagostanja. V drugem koraku smo ponovno dodali FOMO, samokontrolo, nevroticizem in osamljenost, pri čemer je bil model statistično značilen ($F(6, 150) = 28,55$; $p < 0,001$), pojasnil pa je 53,3 % variance. Delež pojasnjene variance je v drugem koraku statistično značilno večji kot v prvem koraku. Po vnosu časa, preživetega na sso, in stalne dosegljivosti v tretjem koraku je model pojasnil 54,3 % variance ($F(8, 148) = 21,95$; $p < 0,001$). Razlika v deležu pojasnjene variance med drugim in tretjim korakom ni statistično značilna. V končnem modelu sta bili statistično značilni dve napovedni spremenljivki, in sicer samokontrola ter osamljenost (preglednica 3).

Stalna dosegljivost kot mediator pri napovedovanju stresa in psihološkega blagostanja

V nadaljevanju smo preverili vlogo stalne dosegljivosti kot mediatorja med nevroticizmom in stresom ter osamljenostjo in stresom (slika 2) kot




Slika 2 Stalna dosegljivost kot mediator med osamljenostjo in stresom (** $p < 0,05$)

tudi osamljenostjo in psihološkim blagostanjem (slika 3) ter samokontrolo in psihološkim blagostanjem (slika 4). Vloge stalne dosegljivosti na sso kot mediatorja med FOMO in stresom ter psihološkim blagostanjem, nevroticizmom in psihološkim blagostanjem ter samokontrolo in stresom nismo preverili, saj napovedniki, ki smo jih predpostavili v modelu, niso statistično značilno napovedovali predpostavljenih izidov. S tem ni bil izpolnjen eden od pogojev za mediacijo, ki sta jih izpostavila Baron in Kenny (1986).


Ugotovili smo, da stalna dosegljivost ne mediira odnosa med nevroticizmom in stresom (posredni učinek = 0,03; SE = 0,02; 95 % CI = [-0,006; 0,080]), vendar (delno) mediira vse tri preostale odnose. Ti so podrobneje predstavljeni v nadaljevanju.

Kot je vidno na sliki 2, je osamljenost statistično značilen napovednik stalne dosegljivosti, osamljenost in stalna dosegljivost pa sta statistično značilna napovednika stresa. Neposredni učinek osamljenosti na stres je statistično značilen, prav tako je statistično značilen tudi posredni učinek (posredni učinek = 0,02; SE = 0,01; 95 % CI = [0,004; 0,038]). Posledično je prišlo do delne mediacije; odnos med osamljenostjo in stresom lahko torej delno pojasnimo s pomočjo stalne dosegljivosti kot mehanizma, ki povezuje osamljenost s stresom.

V primeru stalne dosegljivosti kot mediatorja med osamljenostjo in psihološkim blagostanjem prihaja do podobnih rezultatov (slika 3); osa-



Slika 3 Stalna dosegljivost kot mediator med osamljenostjo in psihološkim blagostanjem (** $p < 0,05$)



Slika 4 Stalna dosegljivost kot mediator med samokontrolo in psihološkim blagostanjem (** $p < 0,05$)

mljenost je statistično značilen napovednik stalne dosegljivosti, osamljenost in stalna dosegljivost pa sta statistično značilna napovednika psihološkega blagostanja. Tudi tukaj sta statistično značilna tako neposredni kot posredni učinek osamljenosti na psihološko blagostanje (posredni učinek = $-0,05$; $SE = 0,02$; 95 % $CI = [-0,102; -0,009]$). Torej lahko odnos med osamljenostjo in psihološkim blagostanjem delno pojasnimo s pomočjo stalne dosegljivosti kot mehanizma, ki povezuje osamljenost s psihološkim blagostanjem.

Iz slike 4 je razvidno, da je samokontrola statistično značilen napovednik stalne dosegljivosti, samokontrola in stalna dosegljivost pa sta statistično značilna napovednika psihološkega blagostanja. Tudi v tem primeru je statistično značilen tako neposredni kot posredni učinek samokontrole na psihološko blagostanje (posredni učinek = $0,11$; $SE = 0,06$; 95 % $CI = [0,001; 0,223]$). Odnos med samokontrolo in psihološkim blagostanjem lahko delno pojasnimo s pomočjo stalne dosegljivosti kot mehanizma, ki povezuje samokontrolo s psihološkim blagostanjem.

Razprava

V pričujoči raziskavi smo želeli preveriti, ali potreba po stalni dosegljivosti na sso mediira odnos med identificiranimi napovedniki (FOMO, nevroticizmom, osamljenostjo in samokontrolo) ter izidi (stresom in psihološkim blagostanjem). Potrdili smo tri predpostavke, in sicer so rezultati analiz pokazali, da potreba po stalni dosegljivosti na sso delno mediira odnos med samokontrolo in psihološkim blagostanjem (H4), osamljenostjo in stresom (H7) ter osamljenostjo in psihološkim blagostanjem (H8). Potreba po stalni dosegljivosti na sso ni mediirala odnosa med nevroticizmom in stresom. Vloge stalne dosegljivosti na sso kot mediatorja med FOMO in stresom, med FOMO in psihološkim blagostanjem, med nevroticizmom in psihološkim blagostanjem ter med samokontrolo in stresom nismo mogli preveriti, saj napovedniki, ki smo jih predpostavili v

modelu, niso statistično značilno napovedovali predpostavljenih izidov.

V splošnem smo ugotovili, da je višja potreba po stalni dosegljivosti na sso povezana z večjim FOMO, nižjo samokontrolo, višje izraženim nevroticizmom, večjo osamljenostjo, višjim stresom ter nižjim psihološkim blagostanjem. Na podlagi rezultatov regresijskih analiz pa lahko zaključimo, da stalna dosegljivost sama po sebi neposredno sicer ne prispeva k pojasnjevanju preučevanih izidov, je pa mehanizem, ki povezuje samokontrolo in osamljenost s psihološkim blagostanjem in stresom.

Ugotovili smo, da nižja samokontrola vodi v povečano potrebo po stalni dosegljivosti na sso, kar se kaže v nižjem psihološkem blagostanju. Slednje ugotovitve se skladajo z ugotovitvami Reineckeja in Hofmanna (2016), ki sta izpostavila, da lahko današnja stalna dostopnost medijskih vsebin predstavlja izziv za samokontrolo, v kolikor je izpostavljenost medijem v navzkrižju z drugimi cilji in obveznostmi. Prav tako naj bi bili neuspehi pri samokontroli na sso povezani s škodljivimi posledicami za osebno blagostanje (Zahrai idr. 2022). Uporaba sso lahko pri tem predstavlja osrednji vir zadovoljitve potreb in blagostanja, ta pozitivni potencial uporabe sso pa je mogoče v celoti izkoristiti le, če se uporaba ne izvaja na račun drugih dolgoročnih ciljev. Če samokontrola, ki je povezana s sso, ni uspešna, se blagostanje lahko poslabša (Hofmann, Reinecke in Meier 2017).

Ugotovili smo tudi, da večja osamljenost vodi v povečano potrebo po stalni dosegljivosti na sso, kar lahko posledično vodi v nižje psihološko blagostanje. Slednje se sklada s predhodnimi raziskavami, saj naj bi bila sama osamljenost povezana z uporabo sso nasploh kot tudi s povečano uporabo sso, prav tako pa naj bi predstavljala dejavnik tveganja za problematično uporabo sso (O'Day in Heimberg 2021; Reissmann idr. 2018). Pri tem naj bi osamljeni posamezniki problematičneje sodelovali oz. se vključevali v aktivnosti na spletu ter iskali družbeno podporo na sso z namenom, da bi morda nadomestili pomanjkanje osebne podpore »v živo« (O'Day in Heimberg 2021). (Prekomerna) uporaba sso, ki naj bi bila značilna za osamljene posameznike, pa naj bi bila po poročanjih Ingibjörg Eve Thorisdottir idr. (2019) ter Ksenie Zahrai idr. (2022) povezana z nizkimi stopnjami psihološkega blagostanja, pri čemer več časa, preživetega na sso, vodi v nižje stopnje psihološkega blagostanja.

Prav tako lahko na podlagi rezultatov zaključimo, da večja osamljenost vodi v povečano potrebo po stalni dosegljivosti na sso, kar vodi v višjo raven zaznanega stresa. Jason L. Skues, Ben Williams in Lisa Wise (2012) so izpostavili, da študenti z visoko stopnjo osamljenosti (preko Facebo-

oka) poskušajo dostopati do drugih na spletu in biti z njimi v interakciji z namenom nadomestitve pomanjkanja odnosov izven sso. V splošnem pa uporabniki sso poročajo, da so pod stresom zaradi pogostega preverjanja najnovejših novic z namenom, da bi bili dobro obveščeni o vseh dejavnostih prijateljev (Maier idr. 2012), kar se prav tako sklada z ugotovitvami v naši raziskavi.

Nevroticizem je v pričujoči raziskavi sicer bil statistično značilen napovednik stresa, ta odnos pa ni bil mediiran s strani potrebe po stalni dosegljivosti na sso. Kljub temu da so predhodne raziskave potrjevale povezavo med povečano uporabo sso (Blackwell idr. 2017; Tang idr. 2016) ter problematično uporabo sso (Dalvi-Esfahani idr. 2019; Gugushvili idr. 2022) in višje izraženim nevroticizmom, pa te povezave niso bile vedno močne. Huang (2019) je, denimo, ugotovil pozitivno povezavo med uporabo sso in nevroticizmom, vendar je bila ta precej šibka, Kathryn Wilson, Stephanie Fornasier in Katherine M. White (2010) pa v svoji raziskavi niso našle povezave med povišanimi ravnmi uporabe sso ter nevroticizmom. V raziskavi Tracy L. Tuten in Michaela Bosnjaka (2001) je bil nevroticizem negativno povezan z uporabo spleta za namene iskanja informacij o izdelkih ter za učenje in izobraževanje, torej je nevroticizem predstavljal napovedni dejavnik uporabe interneta le za poseben namen iskanja informacij in ne za druženje. S slednjim lahko obrazložimo tudi naše rezultate, saj je konstrukt, ki smo ga preučevali v raziskavi, zajemal oba vidika uporabe sso – tako družbeno in interaktivno komponento kot pasivnejšo komponento uporabe sso, ki ni primarno vezana na vzdrževanje odnosov.

Samokontrola in FOMO se v naši raziskavi nista izkazala kot statistično značilna napovednika stresa. Ta ugotovitev je nekoliko presenetljiva, vendar se delno sklada s predhodnimi raziskavami. V nekaterih raziskavah je bil namreč FOMO mediator odnosa med zaznavanjem stresa in problematično uporabo sso (Fu, Li, in Liang 2023) kot tudi odnosa med stresom in resnostjo problematične uporabe pametnih telefonov (Yang, Liu in Fang 2021). Kar se tiče odnosa med stresom in samokontrolo, pa so Angela L. Duckworth, Betty Kim in Eli Tsukayama (2013) izpostavile ravno obraten odnos, in sicer da negativni življenjski dogodki napovedujejo zaznavanje stresa, ta pa naj bi zmanjševal samokontrolo. Hea-Young Cho, Dai Jin Kim in Jae Woo Park (2017) so samokontrolo izpostavili kot mediatorja v odnosu med stresom ter zasvojenostjo s pametnimi telefoni, pri čemer naj bi se s povečevanjem stresa zmanjševala samokontrola, kar posledično vodi v povečanje zasvojenosti s pametnimi telefoni.

FOMO in nevroticizem se nista izkazala kot statistično značilna napovednika psihološkega blagostanja. Tudi ta ugotovitev ni popolnoma skladna s predpostavljanim. Razloge za to lahko iščemo v ugotovitvah raziskave, ki so jo na mladostnikih izvedli Ine Beyens, Eline Frison in Steven Eggermont (2016), pri čemer so izpostavili, da lahko (pri mladostnikih) FOMO usmeri ljudi k uporabi sso, ta pa lahko še poveča FOMO. Stalen dostop do sso in možnost stalne povezanosti z drugimi lahko torej še dodatno spodbujata FOMO pri mladostnikih. V raziskavi Przybylskega idr. (2013) je FOMO služil kot mediator, ki je pojasnjeval odnose, ki so povezovali individualne razlike v zadovoljitvi potreb in blagostanju, z uporabo sso. Prav tako naj bi FOMO lahko pozitivno vplival na blagostanje, če vodi k uporabi sso, ki spodbuja družbeno povezanost (Roberts in David 2020). Tudi Hudimova (2021) je izpostavila, da naj bi aktivni vzorec preživljanja časa na sso višal raven psihološkega blagostanja. Shelia R. Cotten, Amy M. Schuster in Alexander Seifert (2022) so prav tako izpostavili, da naj bi blagostanje napovedovalo uporabo sso, slednja pa naj bi napovedovala blagostanje. Posledično lahko zaključimo, da je odnos med FOMO, psihološkim blagostanjem in potrebo po stalni dosegljivosti na sso precej zapleten ter odvisen od več dejavnikov, predvsem pa je tudi premalo raziskan. Če pogledamo še odnos med nevroticizmom in psihološkim blagostanjem, pa so Catharine R. Gale idr. (2013) ocenjevali nevroticizem pri 16 in 26 letih, pri čemer je bil vpliv nevroticizma na blagostanje večinoma posreden, in sicer preko dovzetnosti za psihične stiske in težave s telesnim zdravjem. Tudi Daniela Ionescu (2017) je izpostavila posredni vpliv nevroticizma na psihološko blagostanje. V predhodnih raziskavah je bilo izpostavljeno, da so lahko učinki nevroticizma na zasvojenost z družbenimi mediji medirani preko negotovih stilov navezanosti (Blackwell idr. 2017; Gugushvili idr. 2022). Na podlagi tega zaključujemo, da je že sam odnos med nevroticizmom in psihološkim blagostanjem pogojen s strani mnogih drugih dejavnikov, zato se v naši raziskavi ni izkazal za statistično značilen.

Peter Vorderer, Nicola Krömer in Frank M. Schneider (2016) so v splošnem izpostavili, da je potrebno razlikovanje med uporabo spletnih vsebin in spletno interakcijo z drugimi uporabniki, saj se spletna interakcija z drugimi uporabniki nanaša na družbeno interakcijo, medtem ko se uporaba spletnih vsebin bolj nanaša na iskanje informacij ali uporabo medijskih vsebin, zaradi česar se koncepta močno razlikujeta v teoretičnem ozadju, ki bi lahko pojasnilo razloge ali posledice uporabe. Za razlago rezultatov naše raziskave se zato obračamo na izpostavljeno dejstvo,

da morda predpostavk nismo potrdili tudi zaradi tega, ker konstrukt potrebe po stalni dosegljivosti na sso zajema tako uporabo spletnih vsebin kot interakcijo z drugimi uporabniki ter se zato preučevani konstrukti povezujejo le z enim od teh vidikov uporabe sso, ne pa s celotnim konstruktom kot takim.

Pomanjkljivosti raziskave, ideje za prihodnje raziskave in uporabna vrednost

Pomanjkljivost naše raziskave osvetli prej izpostavljen komentar Petra Vordererja, Nicole Krömer in Franka M. Schneiderja (2016), ki so navedli potrebo po ločenem preučevanju uporabe sso za namene iskanja informacij (ter pasivnejše uporabe) in namene družbene interakcije z drugimi. Tudi druge raziskave so npr. nakazale razliko med pasivno in aktivno uporabo sso, pri čemer naj bi bila pasivna uporaba povezana z večjim, aktivna pa z manjšim številom depresivnih simptomov (Frison in Eggermont 2016; Escobar-Viera idr. 2018; Nisar 2019). V prihodnje bi bilo treba konstrukta preučevati ločeno, da bi lahko dobili podrobnejši vpogled v razloge in posledice potrebe po stalni dosegljivosti na sso, saj v ozadju očitno ne delujejo vedno enaki mehanizmi, ko gledamo različne vidike uporabe sso. Predvsem je v prihodnje treba podrobneje opredeliti potrebo po stalni dosegljivosti na sso ter razviti in validirati vprašalnik, ki bi ta dejavnik meril. V pričujoči raziskavi smo namreč vprašalnik za merjenje omenjenega konstrukta oblikovali sami na podlagi mer, ki so jih raziskovalci v preteklosti uporabili za merjenje podobnih konstruktov, s čimer je morda prišlo tudi do tega, da smo z vprašalnikom merili druge vidike, ki pa niso nujno del konstrukta potrebe po stalni dosegljivosti na sso. Tako bi bilo v prihodnje morda smiselno preučiti tudi, kateri podobni konstrukti niso del potrebe po stalni dosegljivosti, vendar so tej le podobni, ter jih od nje ločiti. Emily B. O'Day in Richard G. Heimberg (2021) sta prav tako izpostavila, da je potrebnih več eksperimentalnih in longitudinalnih modelov, tako da bi bilo v prihodnje smiselno preučevano tematiko raziskati tudi z omenjenimi pristopi kot tudi s kvalitativnimi pristopi, kot je npr. uporaba intervjujev, ki bi omogočila podrobnejši vpogled v razloge za uporabo sso kot tudi mehanizmov, ki to poganjajo. Prav tako bi bilo v prihodnjih raziskavah treba poskrbeti za reprezentativnejši vzorec, ki bi omogočil posplošitev rezultatov. V pričujoči raziskavi je bilo namreč v vzorec vključenih veliko mladostnikov ter posameznikov pod 30. letom starosti, kar je lahko vplivalo na rezultate.

Ugotovitve naše raziskave so še dodatno poudarile pomen podrobne

konceptualizacije potrebe po stalni dosegljivosti na sso ter preučevanja vseh dejavnikov, ki jo tvorijo. Predvsem je treba poudariti, da raziskava nudi vpogled v kompleksnost pojava, ki je v današnji družbi zelo prisoten, ter zagotavlja okvir za prihodnje raziskave enakega konstrukta. Gre namreč za precej slabo raziskano področje, zaradi česar lahko naše ugotovitve služijo kot prvi koraki pri raziskovanju potrebe po stalni dosegljivosti na sso ter mehanizmov, ki so z njo povezani.

Priloga 1: Vprašalnik potrebe po stalni dosegljivosti na sso

S pomočjo petstopenjske ocenjevalne lestvice označite, v kolikšni meri je pri vas prisotna potreba po preverjanju spletnih socialnih omrežij v različnih situacijah.

Potreba po preverjanju spletnih socialnih omrežij ...	Zelo šibka	Šibka	Zmerna	Močna	Zelo močna
... ko ste s prijatelji.	1	2	3	4	5
... ko jih iz kakršnegakoli razloga ne morete uporabljati.	1	2	3	4	5
... ko ste v šoli/slужbi.	1	2	3	4	5
... ko ste sami.	1	2	3	4	5
... takoj po tem, ko se zbudite.	1	2	3	4	5
... tik preden greste spat.	1	2	3	4	5
... med prehranjevanjem.	1	2	3	4	5

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Miscellanea

Interview

‘Every Living Thing Has a Soul’ – Radical Peace, Liberation Struggles and Nonviolence: An Interview with Purushottama Bilimoria

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An increasingly militarised world, where even resistance strategies across the political spectrum are sharpened and turning to violent means, reaffirms the need for normative ethics and modes of social and political resistance based on non-cooperation and nonviolence. As just agents for achieving political and social change, they have deep roots in tradition, advocated among others by Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Leo Tolstoy, Henry David Thoreau, Quakers, other Christian and Indian religious and philosophical schools. These ideas are still relevant in contemporary posthumanist liberation struggles, especially regarding animal and environmental ethics.

The interview with Purushottama Bilimoria, a philosopher and professor of law and international affairs, was recorded on June 24th, 2023, on the eve of Statehood Day of the Republic of Slovenia. We met at the cafe of the Museum of Modern Art in Ljubljana, not far from the Congress Square where the state celebration was to take place. Bilimoria had tea. He brought his own plant-based milk to go with it – an important detail. I stuck to my usual diet of coffee with regular milk and sugar and plenty of tobacco. The interview was planned to shed more light on classic Indian philosophy in the local academic discourse. However, it took a slightly different route.

While researching his work, I realised he teaches a course on Gandhi, nonviolence and civil rights with an emphasis on King Jr. and William E. B. Du Bois, two important social reformists and leaders from the US, who contributed significantly to the equal rights struggle of Blacks. I anticipated gaining some further insight into the Black emancipation move-

ment, as I studied the militant abolitionist John Brown (1800–1859), who was (partly) connected to the American transcendentalists Ralph Waldo Emerson and Thoreau. The conversation took off from there across a picturesque cast of people, institutions, and ideas that crossed paths, building a movement that successfully stood up to oppression and exploitation in different parts of the world.

Gandhi's efforts, based on three key ideas from the Indian philosophical traditions – *satya* (truth), *ahimsā* (nonviolence) and *tapasya* (asceticism), definitively contributed to the end of British colonial rule in India. His ideas and practices influenced Black leaders in the US during the Civil Rights Movement, resulting in what Bilimoria calls the 'Black Satyagraha.' The exchange between civil rights leaders in the US and Gandhi's work is the focal point of the interview. It weaves a transnational network of activists determined to change the *status quo*: Du Bois' newspaper reported Gandhi's activities; Marcus Garvey shipped Gandhi's forbidden papers to the West; Rosa Parks and James Lawson trained in nonviolent strategies; and King had an extensive collection of Gandhi's books and was taught by teachers who were familiar with Gandhi's work. Many Indian scholars and activists visited, lectured and worked in the US and in Europe, among them Indian Christian theologian Manilal Parekh, socialist Ram Manohar Lohia, and academic and Garvey's associate Haridas Muzumdar, who wrote on Gandhi and nonviolence.

The key idea of nonviolence or non-injury, which permeates Gandhi's work, is a cornerstone of several Indian philosophical traditions. It is present in Buddhism, Hinduism, especially in the epics, and in Jainism, an ancient Indian philosophical system and way of life, adhering to a teaching started around 500 BCE by Mahavira. The Jains prohibit any form of injury towards living and sentient creatures, prescribing strict vegetarianism. Jain monks and nuns carry soft brooms and wear mouth cloths so as to not (accidentally) step on, inhale, or harm any living creature, reinforcing nonviolence as an ascetic practice. In conclusion, the interview relates the idea of nonviolence to animal liberation and ecological movements that prescribe political and legal rights to animals, plants, and ecosystems, to the contemporary subaltern.

Martin Luther King Jr. is known worldwide as the leading figure of the Civil Rights Movement in the US. However, what is your view of the earlier, influential but perhaps a little less known leader, Du Bois?

Du Bois is a sociologist. I think he was the first Black man with a Har-

vard PhD. He started a paper called *The Crisis*. He was critical of the American policy and treatment of freed slaves.

He was active in the first half of the twentieth century and was actually a contemporary of Gandhi.

In 1910, Du Bois founded the paper *The Crisis*. He called it 'a record of the darker races.' He was a prolific writer. He wrote a very good and powerful book, *The Souls of Black Folk*, in which he criticised the way the rights were not being given to the Blacks because they were not included in the Constitution as citizens of the New World. During the period of the Reconstruction the freed slaves were supposed to reconstitute their lives and rejuvenate their community in enterprising ways, but it was not in their favour. What the White masters used to do was to capture freed slaves, re-enslave them, and make them servants, as the British did with indentured labourers in the colonies. He wanted the Black people to come up. It was too early for him to be thinking in terms of equal rights but at least some recognition and dignity could be accorded. He was very aware of the concept of colonisation. In 1905, quite early on, he and some other Black leaders formed what was called the Niagara Movement and wrote Niagara's Declaration of Principles in which it is very clearly stated that people of dark races, Africans, Asians, and so forth are being colonised.

He also attended a congress in London, where he came across Gandhians, the Gandhian nationalists. That is how he got interested in Gandhi. He wondered who this man was. But it was not just from that conference. He was reading papers Gandhi was publishing in South Africa. He and some other American journalists wrote about the *satyāgraha* Gandhi staged in South Africa in 1906. Those papers, called *Young India*, came to America by boat and were distributed widely among African Americans. They were very aware of what Gandhi was doing. They were aware there was a movement to oppose the empire. The empire in the Indian case being the British Empire, but also America was highly involved with different imperial activities. He compared the state of the Blacks in America to the untouchables in India. How the British treated the colonised subjects and within that not doing anything about the caste system, and the so-named untouchables, was not dissimilar to how the United States had rendered their former slaves and their descendants to second-class, barely citizen, segregated status. He started to take very seriously the kinds of strategies Gandhi was using to question and protest against what we now call white supremacy and white domination. He wasn't committed to any

kind of revolution. He thought the process of reform should happen from the inside. The Blacks should empower themselves as much as possible and as part of reconstruction take on projects like industrialisation. It wasn't really industrialisation but any kind of industry that they could begin themselves. They could produce things and not be dependent on the dominant society.

There was another man called Booker T. Washington at about the same time. He started what was called the Tuskegee Institute. Tuskegee was separate. He didn't want any kind of integration into the White community. There was a bit of a debate and difference between Du Bois and Washington in a similar way you had arguments later on between Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X. A little bit of that. It was about what kind of approach you take to education. Du Bois was educated at Harvard University. He thought there was no reason why Blacks couldn't go to White colleges even if segregation was still there.

How did Du Bois get into Harvard University?

That is a question I have not been able to find the answers to. He must have had a very strong recommendation. Later on in the 1930s, a young Black woman, Pauli Murray, tried to get into Harvard Law School and they would not take her because she was Black and a woman. But Du Bois somehow managed to get into Harvard.

If I remember correctly, Du Bois spent the closing part of his life in Africa, in Ghana.

Yes, the very last part of his life. He was so disillusioned that he left and spent his time there. He worked until very late. He was an academic. It wasn't until the 1960s that he left the US permanently, but until then he was very well-connected and worked very hard for the Blacks. He wrote some amazing things about how children should be brought up. He was in education. He also wrote storybooks for Black children.

In *The Crisis* he covered Gandhi's activities, especially after Gandhi returned to India in 1915. For a few years, Gandhi travelled, but in 1917, he started his activities in India, staging protests based on non-cooperation, i.e. not cooperating with the British rulers on the industries, demanding better pay and enhanced rights. Of course, he was also questioning the power base. He was tried and charged with sedition in 1922. He said to the British in that famous quote that if you are here illegally I am being tried by a system that is not legitimate, but if you want to, you can give me the maximum penalty, or, he said to the judge, you should resign from

your position in the Government. Du Bois reported all that in *The Crisis*, which was circulating among the Blacks and some White church leaders.

Some Whites were leading trade unions and wanted Blacks to be involved. There were church and social leaders, a man called John Haynes Holmes, who worked closely with the Blacks. A Dutch immigrant Abraham Muste, who was a pacifist, led a huge strike called the Lawrence Textile Strike in 1912 in Massachusetts. The White pacifists mostly came from the Quaker tradition, and some were Jewish.

At that time, what was the role of the Unitarian church, which is connected to progressive social movements? We find Unitarians among the abolitionists in the nineteenth century.

Actually, Haynes Holmes was a Unitarian.

In *The Crisis*, Du Bois has pictures of Gandhi and he even has several swastikas identifying with the Indian tradition – before the Nazis appropriated the swastika; then he removed it. He would say: There is only one man in the world when he sneezes, the whole British Empire shakes, and when he fasts all of India fasts with him and would back him for the things he is doing. He almost compares him to a mystic, a mystic leader, a social Jesus, which is a term that Martin Luther King Jr. later used. Du Bois was instrumental, as was Washington, who was in correspondence with Gandhi. He was asking him: How are you running your ashrams? These were cooperative movements Gandhi had started. He started the spinning of *khadi*, producing your own clothing, and so forth. Tuskegee wanted to do something very similar. They invented many things at that time. The Blacks were very industrious. They likewise had schools, industries, and farms.

Several Gandhians visited the US, including Reverend C. F. Andrews, who was an English priest and a friend of Gandhi and Tagore. Gandhi sent him to spread the message of nonviolence and non-cooperation to people who were oppressed. Andrews was very instrumental. About that time two or three people from Gandhi's circle visited – an English woman Madeline Slade, known as Mirabeau, came, Manilal Parekh, and Ram Manohar Lohia. They spoke at Black colleges, like Oberlin College and Morehouse College. They would talk about Gandhi. There were others, academics, about half a dozen Indians who had migrated and had jobs in Berkeley and other places. They were involved in setting up mutiny groups training Indians to stage a possible mutiny in India. In earlier stages, they were still kind of violent, they didn't understand Gandhi's idea

of nonviolence, and it was not until later that some of them converted to Gandhi's way because they saw the message that violence may not be the productive way to go in the long run. Their efforts to take the mutiny to India failed; so they started to form nonviolent activist circles with the Blacks and the Jews. The Jews were also second-class citizens in the US at that time and they needed to fight for their rights. Some of the support that came commercially was from a number of Jewish philanthropists.

From my account, Du Bois was instrumental in getting Gandhi recognised as a very important leader of the Coloured people, indeed as an exemplar that the Black folks could follow. He didn't say straightforwardly much about nonviolence but he did talk about Gandhi's strategy of protest and non-cooperation.

I studied some other things related to the American Civil Rights Movement and the earlier emancipation struggle, and that is how I came across Du Bois. I was not aware he had a significant connection to Gandhi.

In his papers, he covered both Gandhi and also Rabindranath Tagore. Tagore, who had won the Nobel Prize in Literature, also toured the US. He too visited Tuskegee. I don't know if he met with Du Bois, but Du Bois wrote to him and asked: Do you have a message for my people?

There was another guy. He was a bit of a maverick, Marcus Garvey. He was a Caribbean and owned a shipping company. He would bring over some of Gandhi's papers because the British would not allow them to come. He had some issues with Gandhi, but he did correspond with him. He thought anything that would work to bring down the empire was worthwhile looking at. He was aware Gandhi was being successful in India. Whether that strategy would work in the US or not, he had some doubts about that, but he had a very close connection with a Gandhian who was an academic, by the name of Haridas Muzumdar. They were both deported from the US. Garvey was not deported because of his political campaign but on some other trumped-up commercial charge, like not declaring his income and taxes. Muzumdar returned to India to join Gandhi's Salt March in 1930, and later took up an academic post as a sociology professor in a small liberal college in the Midwest.

I have the names of all these people who came around, gave lectures, and wrote books on Gandhi. A Jewish woman, who had married an Indian, called Gertrude Stein, wrote articles for the *New York Times* on Gandhi. Gandhi's books and some local books were being reviewed. At that time, papers like the *New York Times* were quite pro-Gandhi because they had nothing to do with Britain basically. Yes, they fought together in

the First World War, and by now the Second World War had started, but after the war, it wasn't really important.

Garvey is known for his Pan-Africanism.

Garvey founded the UNIA, Universal Negro Improvement Association, supported African nationalism, and declared himself to be the provisional president of all African people.

But he is Jamaican.

Yes. He was flamboyant. He was very important. People tend to dismiss him, but he had a lot of influence on setting up trade union movements for the Blacks. He helped them quite a lot. He participated in one of the Pan-African Congresses, where he criticised Du Bois. There were a series of them being held in Paris, Brussels, Manchester, and London. There were always representatives from the African American community in the leadership, and a good number of Gandhians, too.

From about the 1930's African American leaders started to travel to India. But even before they went, there was a man called Richard Gregg. He was White, very educated, and a psychologist. He spent some months in Gandhi's ashram studying nonviolence, its psychological ramifications, what it means to be a nonviolent fighter, and also how powerful that method can be. He wrote a book, *The Power of Nonviolence*, which in a later edition has a foreword written by Martin Luther King Jr. The book was published and circulated in the US.

In the 1930s African American students were able to go to India, go on missions, and be exposed to all that was going on. Then a man called James Lawson – he is still alive¹ – goes to India in the 1950's. He spends time in the ashram of Gandhi's associate Vinoba Bhave, who was still alive and one of the most powerful people in Gandhi's time. Gandhi had his ashram not far from there, near Patna. Lawson had gone to do missionary work in a Christian school in the same town, but he gets so interested in the idea of nonviolence that he trains himself as a nonviolent activist.

I was not aware there was so much back and forth between Indian activists and the ones from the US. But it is an expected exchange in the context of their shared struggles against systemic oppression.

They were inspired. From Du Bois, there was another man called Alain Locke, who was also an academic. He wrote extensively about nonviolence and issues of civil rights.

¹ James Lawson passed on June 9th, 2024.

In about the mid-1930s, some other important people go to India. They are Howard Thurman and Sue Bailey Thurman. They made 8mm movies. They were on their way to visit Tagore, but they wrote to Gandhi, who invites them to his itinerant location, they come and interview him, and that interview was published in a book. It had one of the last photos of Gandhi before he stopped posing for cameras. The last beautiful photo of Gandhi and Sue Bailey Thurman, the original of which is in Emory University in Atlanta. After the Thurmans, a couple of other people go, Mordecai Johnson and others. Right up to the time when India had its independence in 1948. There is a delegation of African Americans who are there for it. I don't know whether the U.S. government sent a delegation or not but the African Americans are there. A delegation of Blacks also come for Gandhi's funeral upon his assassination.

Thurman, Johnson, and others were teaching at Spelman College, Morehouse College, and Howard University, which are Black colleges. Howard University is the place where Kamala Harris and Angela Davis studied. It becomes the very stronghold of the civil rights movement at one time. So, the teachers of Martin Luther King Jr. were people who had visited India. He attended their lectures, heard about Gandhi, bought his books, and had one of the largest collections of Gandhi's books in the US. They are all in his archives at Stanford University. He writes notes on them. He is looking at how Jesus was doing something very similar. He was looking for social justice because it was important for him. But he is still training to be a pastor. He goes to Boston University, where he wrote his PhD on Christian aspects of social justice. I don't think there is any Gandhi in it. I haven't read the thesis. I should one day.

Then he goes to Birmingham, Alabama, to be a pastor. That is about the time Rosa Parks refuses to get off the bus. There is a bus strike now – the Montgomery Bus Boycott. It was a very big strike. For two months, the Blacks are not getting on buses. They are walking. Big protests are being mounted called the Selma to Montgomery marches, crossing the bridge in Selma, Alabama.

There was a movie called Selma, directed by Ava DuVernay, about these marches a decade ago.

They are looking for a leader. They go down, including a very young man at that time, John Lewis, who becomes a very important and powerful congressman later on. A whole group of people called the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee persuaded King to lead the march.

He is reluctant because he just wants to be a pastor. But when he gave a speech down at the church, people were convinced he was the one who stood out to lead them. So, he becomes their leader.

At the first protest he led, violence was very likely from the Whites, from the state. He calls that off. It goes all over the country. He says we are committed to nonviolence. We cannot have violence perpetuated on us. They reorganised – because they also didn't have a permit or something like that. The next protest is organised much more effectively. There are people from all over the country. There were two young eight-year-old girls who marched with King. I met later one of them. Sheyann Webb became a soprano singer and Bettie Mae a gospel singer. That was the first time a mass hand-to-hand protest of the kind Gandhi had been doing in India happened in the US. By that time, television was around. The Kennedys try to dissuade him. From that point on the Kennedys and the FBI started to track King because he was going to become a very important leader. From Selma, he moves to Atlanta, and many things happen from there. He has some very close people who he works with – Philip Randolph, Ralph Abernathy, Andrew Young, John Lewis, Bernard Lafayette, and Bayard Rustin. They are all training. Even Rosa Parks attended a school where African American women trained people on non-violent strategies. The bus boycotts were happening earlier. They were being staged by students but they didn't make headlines until the Rosa Parks one that led to the boycott and mass protests.

Then Jim Lawson comes back. He and a young student Diane Nash lead what is called the Freedom Rides. They get on the bus and go on protest. They get off in towns where there are stores that also have a cafeteria and where Blacks are not allowed. Even if the Blacks were serving, they wouldn't serve the Blacks. The students go in and sit, and they do not move. The police come, beat them, and they all surrender. The jails were full. Busloads of African Americans came. One of the buses was burned by the Whites, by the Ku Klux Klan.

Were there casualties during the Freedom Rides and the burning of the bus? Were there people on that bus?

They escaped, but they were injured. John Lewis was burned and injured quite badly. Great man, I met him. Robert Kennedy intervened. He sent the National Guard to protect them, get them out of there, put them on a flight, and get them safely away. The Whites were waiting in towns as the buses arrived. They would attack and not let them through. The atti-

tude of the Whites was very nasty. But it made international news that the Blacks were mounting something with nonviolence, and the nonviolence was winning. They would be beaten, hosed down with water hoses, and dogs were being put after them, but they just stood and took it. It changed the violent attackers; not so much the local people, but they disarmed the police. The people were not reacting. When somebody is seen to react or resist, that is when they get angrier, and more violence happens.

The influence of nonviolence on the civil rights movement is intriguing. I am more familiar with the events of the nineteenth century that led to the American Civil War – for example, with the militant abolitionist John Brown. The philosopher Henry David Thoreau wrote in defence of Brown. Are you familiar with this story?

Yes, Brown worked with Mary Ellen Pleasant, the woman who funded him. They were trying to raise a mutiny.

Yes, an armed mutiny. They wanted to arm the slaves so they could defend and emancipate themselves. There was a raid at Harpers Ferry, where there was a federal armoury. The army stopped it. Robert E. Lee was involved, the later leading Confederate general. Brown was in jail or already hanged when Thoreau wrote two letters of support for him. Not only Thoreau but Victor Hugo wrote to the editor of the London News and the Polish poet Cyprian Kamil Norwid wrote poems in his name.

I have to look that up. I didn't know Thoreau wrote in defence of that. He influenced Gandhi because of his nonviolence, actually, civil disobedience more than nonviolence. It was a passive act: don't pay poll taxes and don't cooperate. Gandhi got non-cooperation from Thoreau and the nonviolence and pacifism from Tolstoy. Tolstoy had a lot of influence on Gandhi. The pacifism: turn the other cheek. But Gandhi wasn't so much a pacifist. He said: you must have a sense of protest. You don't just turn the other cheek; you give both cheeks or you take the beating, but you try and bring out justice in that situation. That was the difference with Tolstoy. What Gandhi started was something very new. No one had quite done that. It might even provoke, in the sense it might provoke violence from the other side. But let them see the pointlessness of their violence. We are standing for justice and when we stand for justice in our nonviolent boots we are not moving. We are not going to budge. We are not going to go away. We will keep moving with that until justice is meted out. That was a very powerful way of doing it.

There were a couple of women during the Emancipation period to be mentioned: Sojourner Truth and Ida Wells. They had some ideas about

not committing any kind of violence. They were influenced by the Quakers. There was a pacifist way of using the legal system, going to Lincoln and so on. Am I not a woman? I deserve to be respected. This kind of thing. They worked with the suffragettes, the women who were fighting for women's rights, even if they knew that Black men did not have votes. What chance do then Black women have? But they were supportive of the idea: if White women get votes, they will support us to get votes sometime, too. There were a lot of bits and pieces that happened at that time that were very important.

Are you familiar with the abolitionist editor William Lloyd Garrison and his newspaper The Liberator? I believe it was first primarily focused on the emancipation of slaves, but it supported women's suffrage, too.

Yes. That is right. Garrison was very influential, liberal, and progressive for his time.

But coming back to civil rights, there was segregation. Kennedy had written the legislation but wasn't pushing it through. He was holding back. They were very frightened of King because he had too much power. Malcolm X was coming up. The Whites were confused: What were these people doing? There was the Black Panther movement. The militant Blacks. Black Panthers might have been a little bit later. There were converted Black Muslims, Elijah Mohammed and the Black Muslim league. Malcolm X fell out with them. He didn't want all-out violence. He wanted votes. He said: the ballot or the bullet. That was his famous speech. But he wasn't like some others who were being influenced by other Muslim revolutions outside and were prepared to be more violent. Probably, he was assassinated by Elijah Mohamed or the FBI. Nobody knows.

Some speculate Malcolm X was assassinated by Elijah Mohammed and the FBI in collusion.

A recent book that has come out in America says that they both worked together because Malcolm X was more of a threat to the American nation than King was. Because any kind of violent revolution – they would be scared of that.

They would. The American Civil War that led to the emancipation was very bloody. It was part of the industrial age with more advanced weapons coming into the dynamic.

Whites had the weapons.

To continue, after Gandhi was assassinated, King went to India together with Coretta Scott King in 1959. He wants to feel the spirit of Gandhi. He gave some wonderful lectures on Gandhi. He said, my faith in Indian

philosophy has grown stronger after I've come to India, my faith in non-violence. He uses the word Indian philosophy. Although I don't think he read any classical Indian philosophy that is how he put it in his speech in India that is publicly available. It is called 'King's speech to the All India Radio'. He gave two speeches, actually, very powerful. We have wonderful liberal radio stations in America. They archive them and make them available. It is among one of his famous speeches. He really thinks that being completely nonviolent is the only way. Then the March on Washington happens. He, John Lewis, and other people organise it. There he gives that speech: I Have a Dream. Again, he stresses nonviolence and says: One day, I can see my children and White children walking hand in hand.

Desegregation came from the Supreme Court. But whenever Blacks would walk into a college the Whites were in huge protests. Kennedy had to send in guards to help the Blacks go to the rooms in colleges and start studying. Desegregation and civil rights were big achievements. There was a Civil Rights Act in the nineteenth century, but it was overturned by a court ruling. Civil rights didn't really happen, but there was a civil rights act.

Would the mentioned Civil Rights Act of 1875 have given equal rights to African Americans?

It would have given them some recognition of the rights of citizens. The 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments tried to bring in rights for Blacks, but there was a lot of opposition to them. There was Plessy v. Ferguson, a Supreme Court ruling, which said that the Constitution does not confer equal rights to every person. It dampened it. That is why there had to be amendments. It was a very slow process. Even after the amendments, segregation was still on. You could have equal rights but also have segregation. Whites have to go on the bus where the White schools are, and the Blacks should not be on the same bus – those kinds of Jim Crow regulations.

To update the conversation: how do you view colonial and post-colonial studies today? Your bibliography covers several topics, for example NGOs and feminism, gender justice and ecology, etc.

I can talk about gender justice and ecology, the work which was done by my late wife Dr Renuka Sharma. She passed through cancer. She was a doctor, psychiatrist, philosopher, and feminist. I've continued her work. She was very concerned about women's rights and justice. I'm just putting

out Volume II of Indian Ethics. It's called *Companion to Indian Ethics: Women, Justice, Bioethics, and Ecology* (Routledge 2024). It is dedicated to my wife. We have two volumes. *Companion to Indian Ethics: Women, Justice, Bioethics, and Ecology* (Routledge 2017), which you have seen, is also my work that is theoretical. It includes theories of *dharma* and practical ethical thinking of Sri Aurobindo and Vinoba Bhave, whom I mentioned earlier. I also have a chapter on animal ethics and ecology in India.

Animal ethics is another subject I wanted to speak to you about.

I have a much longer chapter on animal ethics in Volume II. It also includes issues of bioethics and how it impacts on women, surrogacy, infanticide, the impact it has on female children, amniocentesis when they abort female fetuses because they are not desirable, and the role of the state and its complicity, including questions of abortion. I have a chapter on euthanasia. The volume covers a lot of things. There is a chapter on ecology, environmental ethics, animal ethics, and biotechnology.

You are also an expert on the Jain tradition. They have a very radical and focused position towards animals, nonviolence, and animal ethics. Audiences in the West are maybe not so familiar with it. It is a school of religion, so their standpoint on nonviolence is influenced by that.

Their commitment to nonviolence is a philosophical position, but it possibly has a religious origin, too, because any kind of violence to any animal hurts the soul. It creates karma. It retards, blocks your chance of being enlightened and becoming omniscient at some point. To avoid karma one must avoid hurting. That is where it starts. But now the Jains have taken after animal liberation, the issues of animals and factory farming, and the huge amount of violence. They have become morally concerned about these issues. They are turning into vegans as well. Some of them wouldn't use milk because there is violence involved in the production of milk with the cow. The calf is deprived of its milk.

But are they looking at the issue only from the perspective of the idea of nonviolence or are they considering the animal as a subject?

Yes, they have souls. That is why. Every living thing has a soul, including the two-cell amoeba, any sentient being. In more recent work in marine biology, and philosophers are looking at this as well, it is not sentience as defined in the 1970s and 1980s, which was a response to pain. It comes from the Jains in India. People are now thinking that the amount of intelligence animals like octopuses or even shells and corals have is extraordinary. They are looking at consciousness as more than just a response to

pain. Looking at how these bio-systems are purposeful in their own right, they have intentionality, they have a purpose, and they want to achieve that. Some critters and creatures they find might only live for one day, but they have such an amazing sense of their purpose, and of what they need to achieve. They also often cooperate with other creatures. They are not all eating each other. An Australian philosopher Peter Godfrey-Smith goes deep down in the sea with marine biologists, and he has been studying with them and looking at these tiny creatures. He was on a philosophy programme and was asked: Has your moral attitude changed as a result of your study? He said: Yes, to quite a degree. I can't just dismiss these creatures, who we don't know or even see, that are amazing. Shells maybe we could eat, but some other 3 cents creatures are living things, they have life, and they have intelligence.

Trees and other plants also have some intelligence. Studies show they cooperate.

They all have it, too. People have talked about the communication that trees have underground. They can distribute water among themselves and warn if a predator is coming. They can warn other trees and produce some kind of fluid to kill the threat.

What is your view of contemporary ecological movements that focus on global warming? Young people are organising worldwide and demanding things like climate justice.

They are coming at it from a different angle, of course. I call my chapter 'Animal Justice and Moral Mendacity'. I was there when animal liberation started with Peter Singer. I am not just coming from Indian philosophy. My chapter has a fair bit of discussion about the threat to the species that we are losing and just the sheer number of animals killed every year. It is exploitation by human beings. It is a post-colonial perspective on the subaltern. It is not just human beings that are subaltern. That is what subaltern meant: under the lowest of lowest beings. That was the original use of subaltern. Now, of course, it is used politically for people – subaltern people. One of my papers is: 'What is the Subaltern of the Philosophy of Religion?' I used the term playfully. Subaltern is a term used in post-colonial studies for the marginalised and disadvantaged. They get it from Antonio Gramsci, he was using it, but he took it from biology – subaltern, underneath, underground, or in the water.

Book Review

Shannon Vallor, *The AI Mirror: How to Reclaim Our Humanity in an Age of Machine Thinking*

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In the famous scene of the movie *Matrix* (Wachowski and Wachowski 1999), Agent Smith climactically holds captive the severely beaten-up protagonist Neo against the tracks in a powerful clinch as the train approaches. With confidence, he proclaims: ‘Do you hear that, Mr. Anderson? That is the sound of inevitability. It is the sound of your death. Good-bye, Mr. Anderson.’ The protagonist, Neo, looking at the approaching train, responds with a quiet but resolute ‘My name ... is Neo,’ to suddenly and forcefully release himself and jump out from the oncoming train and his demise. This scene poignantly embodies the motif of the movie, which is humanity’s struggle to break free, to wake up, from the forceful surrender of their collective free will, imposed upon them by deterministic machines, made possible through an elaborately woven illusion of the matrix.

The most recent book by Shannon Vallor (2024), the famed philosopher of technology and virtue ethics, *The AI Mirror: How to Reclaim Our Humanity in an Age of Machine Thinking*, reflects a similar existential orientation. She wants global humanity to wake up from what Langdon Winner called ‘technological somnambulism,’ where we ‘willingly sleepwalk through the process of reconstituting the conditions of human existence’ (Vallor 2024, 216, quoting Winner 1977). She wants us to understand the existential dangers of following the dominant techno-deterministic narratives, predominantly propagated by big tech companies, that inadvertently diminish the essence of humanity by constraining our collective self-authorship capabilities.

There are two fundamental aspects with which Vallor engages in her book. First, she wants to show that the real existential risk of utilizing, deploying, and developing contemporary, generative AI systems is not one

of mass extinction (as in the death of the human species). Instead, the existential threat lies in the gradual loss of what makes us human. Namely, it is in the diminishing of self-determination, the gradual surrender of the will to live and to shape our civilization in creative, beneficial ways, the entrenchment of social bias, the erosion of social and moral confidence, and the denigration of the mutual care we manifest towards each other as fellow human beings. Second, she wants to highlight that the dominant AI narratives, fuelling the rapid development and investment of generative AI systems, promote these systems as inevitable steps towards the achievement of the fabled artificial general intelligence (AGI) but in all actuality only serve to reinforce the social, political, and economic power of the companies designing, deploying and selling these products to the global market. Thus, the second significant concern is the potential for social and political influence by tech giants like OpenAI and Google. These companies, with their powerful AI products and the narratives surrounding them, possess the capacity to exert considerable influence over global society.

For Vallor, when combined, these points constitute an existentially dangerous illusion, a spectre, that utterly misdirects the proper existential efforts humanity should invest in its relation to AI technologies. Here then, instead of taking human destiny into our own hands, and working it out, in trying to produce the best possible future we can envision – through the use and development of our moral and political skills – we are releasing our collective freedom and will to a technological spectre that is not only suppressing human agency into a position of existential surrender but is, in all actuality, only a proxy for the manifestation of the economic and political power of big tech companies. In Vallor's (2024, 200) words, these systems are:

designed to ensnare our attention, stoke our anger, fear, and division, and prevent us from trusting ourselves and one another to be anything more than their handmaidens. Which just means being handmaidens to the humans who build and profit from them.

Or even more clearly (Vallor 2024, 63):

Today's data-hungry tools are being built by powerful corporations to feast like insatiable parasites on our own words, images, and thoughts, strip away their humane roots in lived experience, and feed them back to us as hollow replacements for our minds.

Crucially, Vallor doesn't merely use strong language in a general sense.

She explicitly identifies those she believes are driving this harmful trend: Elon Musk, Sam Altman, Geoffrey Hinton, and the Future of Humanity Institute. These individuals and organizations are actively promoting techno-deterministic narratives while simultaneously profiting directly from the very technologies these narratives endorse and market. Similarly, she connects her arguments with the work, and social presence, of other (in)famous generative AI critics such as Gary Marcus (2024) or Timnit Gebru (Bender et al. 2021), thus positioning her message directly in the ongoing and dynamic human-AI real-life context, which, by the day, is becoming increasingly politicized in front of our eyes. Thus, the overall style of the book leans more towards a performative, not an argumentative approach. As such, the book serves better as an alarm bell than a magnifying glass.

Accordingly, interested readers, especially those equipped with the technical know-how, may be enticed by Vallor's descriptions, comparisons, and explications – but may not be impressed, as the argumentation, more often than not, rests at a perfunctory level. To exemplify, and more philosophically, the author uses the perspective of embodiment and phenomenology to point out how 'minds almost certainly come into existence through the body and its physical operations.' But the argument is left at that, without explicating why that is so. Similarly, when mentioning how, 'contrary to the suggestions of philosophers like David Chalmers, human wellbeing is inseparable from the flesh of the world' (Vallor 2024, 207), the statement does not continue to say 'why' that is so, nor are we provided with Chalmers' argument beyond this short mention. Similarly, when pointing out how the current state of AI development can be improved with the advancement of the 'responsible AI' approach, not much is added besides an introductory mention of this field of research. Or when, in portraying what specific, real-life, problems the current generative AI could be used to improve, or even solve, not much is added beyond the point that these systems could be used to narrow 'the gaps between what we need and what others have the resources or skills to give us' (p. 213).

To move the reader towards relevant action, Vallor places her ideas in seven distinct thematic chapters. The first two chapters aim to dismantle the idea of contemporary AIs as 'minds,' or 'intelligence' and thus defeat the narrative that machines can substitute humans. For, these systems are – in Vallor's description – nothing more than a "mirror", and a really bad one at that. These tools do not think or understand or reason in any mean-

ingful sense of the word, rather, they reflect the patterns found in our human thinking, understanding, and reasoning. Consequently, due to their lack of a commonsense world model, these machines are very brittle and unreliable. As a result, they generate harmful fictional accounts of real people and events, outright confabulate nonsense, and often reflect existing societal or historical prejudices.

However, while this is their reality, the systems are at the same time being promoted as efficient human performance optimizers, as systems deterministically leading us to the holy grail of a ‘superhuman AI,’ of an AGI, where ‘super’ connotes being ‘better than humans at calculation, prediction, modeling, production, and problem-solving’ (Vallor 2024, 86). For Vallor, these narratives are missing the mark, since they are promoting what Langdon Winner in 1977 called ‘reverse adaptation’ (Vallor 2024, 88, quoting Winner 1977). Here, instead of making machines adapt to humanity by becoming more humanized, humans are forced to adapt to machines by becoming more mechanized – similar to the fate of humans in the Matrix fictional universe. For Vallor, this is a great error in thinking, because it conflates human existence to mathematically describable and economically traceable performance, and it presents an obstacle to the achievement of optimal human performance. Moreover, by quoting Brynjolfsson’s concept of the ‘Turing Trap,’ Vallor argues that – even if we wanted to produce the highest performance-producing machines – we should know that machines become capable of achieving the highest performance not when they substitute human agency but instead when they augment or enhance it.

Here, however, besides the remarks, the discussion does not steer much into the foray of human augmentation or human-AI cooperation. Personally, and highlighting my own research bias (one of symbiotic cooperation), I found this lack dissatisfying as the AI field in its broadest terms has witnessed a palpable shift from ‘automation’ towards ‘augmentation’ in the past decade of both research, use, and marketing of AI systems (Jarrahi 2018; Hassani et al. 2020; Rajpurkar et al. 2022; Tankelevitch et al. 2024). As such, the point of human-LLM cooperation should have been covered more, especially when we have in mind that there are authors who are already extensively investigating the theme of human-AI cooperation (Mollick 2024).

To exemplify, Vallor points out that the moral victories humanity has achieved in the domain of civic life have been accomplished through arduous and constant engagement in the public sphere. But AI generators

are capable of diminishing ‘the value of human participation in moral and political thought [by taking] the hard work of thinking off our shaky human hands’ (Vallor 2024, 130). For it is precisely in the face of imperfection that the humans can engage the importance of the ‘meaningful moral reflection, moral appeals, moral responsibility, and imagination. What are we without these?’ (p. 129).

To combat these negative trends, we require institutions that are willing to ‘deploy planetary-scale interventions and systemic reforms of unsustainable practices, where technical and moral excellence need to come together, to synergistically engage the ongoing concerns’ (Vallor 2024, 167). AI developers cannot be omitted from the obligation of responsibility. As she concludes in the closing chapter: ‘The most plausible existential danger is not a genocidal machine oppressor but the annihilation of human moral confidence’ (p. 196). For ringing a clear alarm bell to this danger, then, this work deserves high praise and recommendation.

Acknowledgment

This publication is a part of the research programme The Intersection of Virtue, Experience, and Digital Culture: Ethical and Theological Insights, financed by the University of Ljubljana, and research project Epistemic Identity and Epistemic Virtue: Human Mind and Artificial Intelligence, supported by the John Templeton Foundation and the Ian Ramsey Centre for Science and Religion (University of Oxford).

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Recenzija

Andrej Ule, *O naravi duha*

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Prva opazka, ki bi jo naredil o zadnji knjigi Andreja Uleta, *O naravi duha* (2023), je, da gre za izjemno obsežno delo. S tem ne mislim zgolj tega, da je razprava razmeroma dolga, temveč merim predvsem na to, da se na poglobljen način spopada s številnimi temeljnimi filozofskimi problemi, pri čemer črpa ne le iz raznovrstnih filozofskih perspektiv, temveč tudi iz širokega nabora naravoslovnih in humanističnih ved (ki obsega vse od kvantne mehanike do (sistemske) biologije, kibernetike, semiotike, hermenevtike, informacijske teorije, psihologije, sociologije in še bi lahko našteval), poleg tega pa še iz mnogih religioznih tradicij in duhovnih praks ter nenazadnje tudi iz pronicljive analize lastne (recimo temu) osebno-eksistencialne umeščenosti v svet.

Tematiko knjige je zato tudi nemogoče izčrpno povzeti v okvirih te recenzije. Vendarle pa menim, da iz Uletove knjige ni težko izluščiti njene osnovne poante, oz. bolje rečeno, njenega osnovnega problema, torej tistega, okoli česar se razprava vije in kar kot Ariadnina nit vodi avtorjevo kompleksno manevriranje skozi raznovrstne miselne okvire. Kot vsaka dobra transdisciplinarno zasnovana razprava tudi ta uspe doseči to, da z različnih zornih kotov na večplasten, a sistematičen način osvetli predmet raziskave in nam tako tudi ponudi nekaj več od uvidov katere koli posamezne perspektive.

Središčni predmet obravnavane razprave je razviden že iz njenega naslova. Ule preizprašuje pojem duh, pojem, ki se v – sicer razmeroma heterogenih različicah – pojavlja tako rekoč skozi celotno zgodovino filozofije pa tudi v številnih religioznih oz., rečeno splošneje, duhovnih praksah. V naslovu najdemo tudi namig glede avtorjevega pristopa k predmetu razprave. Ta je usmerjen k raziskovanju *narave* duha, torej k opredelitvi načina obstoja oz. ontološkega statusa duha. Hkrati pa lahko naravo, o kateri je govora, razumemo tudi v nekoliko specifičnejšem smislu, namreč kot tisto, o čemer nam govori znanost o naravnem svetu. Specifiko Uletovega pristopa k vprašanju duha odlikuje ravno posebna pozornost,

ki jo namenja dognanjem sodobne znanosti. Eno izmed ključnih vodil razprave je vprašanje, kako združiti koncepcijo naravnega sveta sodobne znanost z uvidi o duševnosti, ki nam jih posredujejo duhovne prakse in filozofska refleksija. Pri tem bi izpostavil, da se Ule spretno izogne enostranskostim, tako v obliki znanstvenega reduktivizma kot tudi v obliki idealistične nedovzetnosti za empirična vprašanja. Ne gre mu torej zgolj za to, da bi uvide filozofije ali duhovnih praks zgolj »prevedel« v jezik trenutno uveljavljenih naravoslovnih teorij oz. reduciriral na dejstva o naravnem svetu, kot so nam trenutno znana. Niti mu ne gre za to, da bi s filozofskega ali z religioznega vidika kritiziral morebitne omejitve dometa znanstvenega razumevanja duha. Gre mu prej za prikaz določenih konvergenč med obema perspektivama, za iskanje stičnih točk, kjer bi si lahko znanstveni, filozofski in duhovni pristop medsebojno pomagali pri jasnejši opredelitvi narave duha ter s tem tudi pomagali presežati morebitne parcialnosti in omejitve.

Da bi lahko povedal kaj več o Uletovem večplastnem razumevanju narave duha, moram najprej na kratko opredeliti njegova izhodišča, v prvi vrsti, kaj točno pravzaprav razume pod pojmom duh. Kot rečeno, nosi pojem duh v različnih miselnih disciplinah in usmeritvah raznolike in do neke mere tudi nezdružljive konotacije. Zato je pomembno upoštevati, da se Ule pri izhodiščni opredelitvi tega pojma nasloni na specifično miselno tradicijo, ki izhaja iz Heglove filozofije. Objekt njegove razprave je v osnovi tisto, kar Hegel naznačuje s pojmom *objektivni duh*. Avtor ta pojem znatno dogradi in modificira, vendar pa določene specifikke Heglovega razumevanja duha ostajajo pomembno vodilo celotne razprave.

Z izrazom *objektivni duh* Ule meri predvsem na to, da duha ne gre razumeti zgolj kot določilo zavesti oz. individualnih umnih bitij, temveč kot specifično nad- oz. transindividualno realnost. Objektivni duh naznačuje podlago našega skupnega razumevanja sveta in medsebojnih interakcij. Kot tak ni zvedljiv na zavestne vsebine katerega koli posameznika, temveč gre prej za nekakšen obči medij, v katerem se kot zavestna umna bitja gibljemo, pri čemer duh deluje kot pogoj možnosti našega specifičnega odnosa do sveta in naših razumnih medsebojnih interakcij (Ule 2023, 100). To je pomembno upoštevati, saj se v filozofiji duha in kognitivni znanosti pogosto izenačuje pojme zavest, um in duh, posledica tega pa je v prvi vrsti, da v tem kontekstu še vedno prevladuje razmeroma individualističen pogled na človeka in njegove kognitivne zmožnosti. S tem ko Ule za svoje izhodišče izbere pojem objektivni duh, se tudi odločno zoperstavlja tej individualistični tradiciji, ki človeško kognicijo razume izključno

kot dejavnost posameznikov. Če želimo razumeti naravo duha, le-te po njegovem torej ne smemo iskati zgolj »v naših glavah«.

Ule sicer dopušča, da so ljudje kot posamezniki nosilci lastnega zavestnega izkustva in tudi določene oblike umnosti, tj. zmožnosti inteligentne interakcije z okolico (str. 99). Isto po njegovem drži tudi za mnoga druga živa bitja. Vendar pa vsaj človeku – za razliko od (vsaj domnevoma) večine drugih živih bitij – pritiče tudi določena oblika kognicije, ki ni zvedljiva na nobenega posameznika. Ta je utelešena v raznovrstnih človeških interakcijah, artefaktih in institucijah, npr. v religioznih ali umetniških praksah pa vse od znanstvenih kolektivov do aparatov države.

Če objektivni duh ni zvedljiv na posameznike, pa preostane vprašanje, kakšen način obstoja mu lahko pripišemo. V tem pogledu Ule deloma skrene od Heglove pozicije (Ule 2023, str. 68), prav tako pa tudi od kasnejših odmevnejših razumevanj objektivnega duha (str. 309). Heglu očita, da objektivnega duha neupravičeno *substancializira*, torej da ga pojmuje kot samo po sebi obstoječo realnost, oz. natančneje, da ga obravnava kot entiteto, ki je – vsaj v določenem smislu – neodvisna od posameznikov, ki v njej participirajo (str. 308). Ključni problem v Heglovemu stališču vidi v tem, da so posamezniki razumljeni kot normativno podrejeni zahtevam objektivnega duha, torej da je ta nadosebna realnost v zadnji instanci tista, ki naj bi diktirala cilje in vrednote, ki usmerjajo dejavnosti posameznikov (str. 308). Po avtorju pa moramo upoštevati, da duh ne deluje zgolj na posameznike, tako rekoč od zgoraj navzdol, temveč da imajo tudi ti določeno avtonomijo pri ustvarjalni konstrukciji tega duha.

Najshematičneje rečeno, duh po Uletu *supervenira* na posameznikih in njihovi medsebojni interakciji (Ule 2023, str. 309). Je torej povsem odvisen od posameznikov, saj ni nič drugega od celote vzorcev takšnih ali drugačnih razumskih interakcij med posamezniki v danem kontekstu. Z njegovimi besedami (str. 100): »[P]ojem duha zajema individualne in nadindividualne potenciale za kompetentno delovanje ljudi v življenjskem svetu pa tudi udejanjenje teh potencialov v zavestih in umih posameznikov ter duhovnih stvaritvah ljudi skozi človeško zgodovino.« Če je v obravnavanem delu posamezniku pripisana odločilnejša vloga kot v Heglovi filozofiji, pa je pomembno upoštevati, da duh po drugi strani ni obravnavan kot goli skupek posameznikov. Duha kot celote torej tudi po avtorjevem stališču ne gre obravnavati zgolj kot »seštevka svojih gradnikov«. To pa v prvi vrsti zato, ker prakse, kolektivi in institucije, ki tvorijo objektivnega duha, lahko na korenit način povratno vplivajo na posameznike. Da bi dospeli do celovitejšega razumevanja duha, je zato po Uletu

ključno upoštevati specifično *dvosmerno razmerje določevanja* med posameznikom in širšimi družbenimi dejavniki, v katere je vključen.

Takšno razumevanje duha je v razpravi podrobneje razvito skozi prizmo že omenjenega širokega nabora miselnih okvirov. Ta nabor seveda vključuje številne discipline, ki se tako ali drugače osredotočajo na vidike bodisi človeka bodisi družbe ali njunega medsebojnega razmerja. Kar pa je pri Uletovem pristopu morda še posebej zanimivo, je, da to tematiko na daljnosežen način osvetli tudi z vidikov, ki bi se lahko bralcu na prvi pogled zdeli v tem kontekstu presenetljivi. Dobršen del knjige je, denimo, posvečen kvantni mehaniki. Uleta pri tem zanima predvsem koncept *potencialnosti*, ki v okvirih kvantne mehanike ne naznačuje nečesa možnega, a (še) ne obstoječega, temveč posebno obliko *obstoja*, ki kot takšna sicer nima značilnosti predmetov s točno določenimi značilnostmi in prostorsko-časovno lokacijo, a vendarle na svojstven način vpliva na potek dogodkov v svetu.

Avtor najde določene vzporednice s takšnim razumevanjem potencialnosti tudi na biološki in človeški ravni, namreč v kolikor imamo tudi tu opravka s potencialnostmi – kakršna je, denimo, potencialnost človeka za privzemanje različnih družbenih identitet –, ki kot takšne niso »upredmetene« v specifičnih posameznikih ali njihovih gradnikih, a imajo vendarle določen obstoj in učinke. Seveda pa to ne pomeni, da lahko v povsem istem smislu govorimo o potencialnosti na ravneh človeka, preostanka živih bitij in nežive materije. Izhajajoč iz sistemske biologije in biosemiotike Ule trdi, da organizmom pritiče še nekoliko kompleksnejša oblika potencialnosti od tiste, o kateri govori fundamentalna fizika. Živa bitja so namreč sposobna predvideti dogodke v prihodnosti in se odzivati na okolje v skladu s svojimi predikcijami. Procesi življenja zato niso zgolj aktualizacije določene potencialnosti, temveč vključujejo tudi *zaznavo in odzivanje na potencialnost kot takšno*. V tej specifikaciji življenja lahko po Uletu prepoznamo zametke duha oz., bolje rečeno, bistven predpogoj za njegov vznik.

Da pa bi lahko govorili o duhu v strogem smislu, moramo upoštevati še dodatno raven kompleksnosti, ki pritiče specifikam človeka. Ključne značilnosti, ki človeka v tem pogledu razlikujejo od drugih življenjskih oblik, so po Uletu predvsem sposobnost lingvističnega izražanja, samozavedanje in intersubjektivnost. Ne da bi spuščal v podrobnosti avtorjeve pronicljive razdelave teh tematik, naj nakažem zgolj razlog, zakaj so omenjene značilnosti po njegovem mnenju ključni pogoji za vznik duha. Specifiko človeka, o kateri je govora, bi lahko izrazili tudi na splošnejši način: med-

tem ko druga živa bitja lahko potencialnosti okolja zaznajo zgolj izhajajoč iz lastne individualne perspektive, pa so človeku dostopne tudi perspektive drugih. Človek se zato tudi zaveda lastne individualne perspektive *kot ene izmed možnih perspektiv*, ki jih kot živo bitje lahko zavzame v razmerju do svojega okolja. To pa mu omogoča, da svojo perspektivo usklajuje s perspektivami drugimi, da o njih reflektira in da spremeni način lastnega vedenja. V tem oziru lahko človeku pripišemo posebno obliko potencialnosti; ni namreč le zmožen zaznavati potencialnosti okolja, temveč tudi razumeti in do neke mere preoblikovati lastne načine odzivanja na te potencialnosti.

Pravkar izpostavljeni uvidi o tipu potencialnosti, značilnem za človeka, še posebno vrednost nosijo v kontekstu Uletove razprave, saj lahko s tega vidika natančneje opredeli svojo tezo, da duh bistveno vključuje dvosmerno razmerje določevanja med posameznikom in širšimi družbenimi dejavniki. Po eni strani lahko s tega vidika bolje razumemo, kako lahko posamezniki tvorijo koherentne vzorce družbene interakcije, torej kako duh vznikne iz delovanja posameznikov. Po drugi strani pa na ta način osvetlimo tudi morda zahtevnejše vprašanje, namreč na kakšen način koncipirati vpliv duha na posameznika, ne da bi s tem slednjemu pripisali povsem sekundarno ontološko in normativno pozicijo. Odgovor na to vprašanje se po avtorju skriva v specifični *odprtosti in nedovršenosti* identitete človeka kot posameznika. Človeški način obstoja, kot rečeno, bistveno vključuje dojemanje perspektiv drugih in zmožnost, da slednje preoblikujejo njegove lastne poglede in načine delovanja ter s tem tudi temelje njegove *identitete kot posameznika*. Z izrazom Gilberta Simondona (2020) – ki ga Ule sicer ne omenja, a bi lahko po mojem mnenju zelo produktivno vstopil v »dialog« z njegovo razpravo –, bi lahko rekel, da človek sam po sebi pravzaprav nikoli ni zares *posameznik*, saj je *individuiran* šele v družbenih interakcijah. Če to ubesedim še nekoliko drugače: vsak človeški posameznik se kot tak lahko izoblikuje zgolj v skupnem »mediju« duha. Kar pa ne pomeni, da so posamezniki zato ontološko sekundarni, saj ta skupni medij ne bi obstajal brez njihove dejavnosti. Niti ne vodi do zaključka, da je posameznik normativno podrejen zahtevam drugih oz. duha v splošnem. Ravno »prepustnost« naše individualne identitete nam namreč omogoča specifično človeški odnos do soljudi, odnos, kjer medsebojni konflikti ne terjajo nujno predajo avtonomije ene osebe na račun druge, saj obstaja tudi možnost za skupno sooblikovanje načina bivanja vseh udeleženih. Temu slednjemu tipu človeškega soobstoja in interakcije bi lahko rekli *duhovno življenje* v najglobljem pomenu in tudi

v tistem pomenu, ki si ga Ule z različnih zornih kotov prizadeva osvetliti skozi celotno razpravo.

Tovrstni razmisleki so v avtorjevi razpravi večinoma razviti v ontološkem in znanstvenem registru, nosijo pa tudi omembe vredne etično-politične in (recimo temu) osebno-eksistencialne implikacije. Ule (2023, 425) apelira, da moramo v svojih interakcijah z drugimi skrbeti za čim večjo enakopravnost vseh ljudi pri dostopu do možnosti participacije v duhovnem življenju. Ta etična oz. politična drža pa svojo veljavo in težo pridobi ravno s ključnim uvidom njegove razprave, namreč da je naš lastni obstoj kot duhovnih bitij povsem odvisen od drugih ljudi oz. od njihove vključenosti v skupno duhovno življenje. Omenil bi še, da je Uletova pozicija v tem pogledu bližja Marxu kot pa Heglu, saj moramo po njegovem upoštevati, da so za enakopravnost – in tudi za vznik same iskrene želje po enakopravnosti – potrebne specifične »materialne«, torej ekonomske in kulturne okoliščine (str. 243). Teh okoliščin avtor sicer žal ne opredeli natančno, a menim, da si vsaj v grobem ni težko predstavljati, kaj vse bi to lahko vključevalo; v prvi vrsti npr. dostop do osnovnih življenjskih potrebščin, izobrazbe in nenazadnje do načina bivanja, ki ne terja konstantnega boja za lastno preživetje in ki dopušča čas za duhovno udejstvovanje. Te okoliščine, kot opozarja Ule, so še vedno dostopne zgolj peščici ljudi, prizadevanje za njihovo zagotovitev za vse pa je po njegovem pomemben, a tudi vse preveč zapostavljan notranji moment duhovnega življenja (str. 243).

Z ozirom na povedano bi zaključil, da avtor formulira zelo kompleksno in večplastno, a hkrati sistematično in prepričljivo koncepcijo duha. Kot vsaka tako ambiciozno zastavljena razprava tudi ta odpira številna nova vprašanja. Odprto ostaja – kot avtor sam izpostavi –, ali lahko kvantna mehanika ponudi ne le analogijo, temveč nove temeljne koncepte za razmišljanje o makroskopskih pojavih, kakršna so živa bitja. Zanimivo bi bilo tudi podrobneje raziskati biološke razlike med človekom in drugimi živimi bitji ter nasloviti vprašanje, na kakšen način in do katere mere se domnevna kvalitativna razlika med njimi odraža že na tej ravni ter do katere mere so za obravnavane specifične človeka odgovorni povsem drugi, npr. zgodovinski dejavniki. Zadnje odprto vprašanje, ki bi ga posebej izpostavil, pa se navezuje na določene vidike duhovnega življenja, ki jih Ule sicer omenja, a so nekoliko manj jasno konceptualno razdelani od nekaterih drugih. V mislih imam predvsem *afektivno* dimenzijo duha, torej dejstvo, da je duhovno življenje globoko »prežeto« z našim čustvenim odnosom do sveta in soljudi ter da so duhovne preobrazbe lahko

povezane s korenitimi preobrazbami naših afektivnih dispozicij. Ule ima sicer ta vidik duha za pomembnega – sočutje in ljubezen do drugih npr. izpostavlja kot ključni vidik duhovnega življenja (2023, 439), pri čemer naj bi naše sebstvo v takšni afektivni dispoziciji na nek način »zajemalo tudi potrebe, bolečine in radosti drugih ljudi, s katerimi delimo sorodne duhovne kvalitete skupnega življenja« (str. 440). Implikacij tega pa avtor ne raziše tako natančno, kot se loti, denimo, vidika jezikovne komunikacije in drugih kognitivnih procesov v ožjem smislu tega izraza. Afektivnost morda v razpravi ostaja obrobne pomena predvsem zato, ker se jo dandanes večinoma pojmuje na individualistični način, torej kot duševni proces, ki se v celoti odvija na ravni posameznika, kar bi jo v Uletovi dikciji postavilo v domeno *uma* in ne *duha*. Avtor se sicer očitno želi izogniti takšnemu individualističnemu razumevanju afektivnosti, vendar pa je obrobnost te tematike v njegovi razpravi po mojem mnenju simptomatična za širše pomanjkljivo razumevanje afektivnosti v sodobnem času. Mojih tukajšnjih opazk zato tudi ne gre razumeti kot kritiko avtorjeve pozicije. Prej želim izpostaviti, da lahko njegov pristop razumemo kot plodno izhodišče za natančnejši razmislek o afektivni naravi duha in specifično človeški obliki afektivnega življenja v splošnem. Gre torej za še eno izmed mnogih točk, kjer njegova razprava nakaže aktualne in obetavne iztočnice za poglobljeno razumevanje duha.

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Book Review

Arie Kizel, *Enabling Students' Voices and Identities: Philosophical Inquiry in a Time of Discord*

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Prof. Arie Kizel's latest book, *Enabling Students' Voices and Identities: Philosophical Inquiry in a Time of Discord* (2024) offers a timely and insightful exploration of how philosophical inquiry can empower students to develop their voices and identities in an era of increasing social and political polarization. Drawing on his extensive experience in the philosophy of education and philosophy for/with children, Kizel, an ex-president of the International Council of Philosophical Inquiry with Children (ICPIC), presents a compelling case for cultivating critical thinking and dialogue skills as essential tools for navigating our complex educational world.

The book is structured around three key themes: the importance of student voices, identity formation ('Enabling Identities,' in Kizel's words) in education, and the power of philosophical inquiry as a pedagogical approach. Kizel weaves these threads together masterfully, demonstrating how philosophical questioning and discussion can create spaces for students to express themselves while also authentically engaging with diverse perspectives.

Kizel lays out his theoretical framework in the opening chapters, drawing on thinkers like John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and Matthew Lipman. He argues that traditional education models often stifle student voice and agency, whereas a more dialogic approach centred on philosophical inquiry can nurture students' critical reflection and self-expression capacity. This sets the stage for a deeper examination of enabling identity within educational contexts, providing readers with enlightening insights into this crucial aspect of education and dialogue.

The book's middle section delves into the challenges of identity development in our current 'time of discord.' Kizel astutely observes how social

media, political tribalism, and rapid cultural change have made it increasingly difficult for young people to forge coherent identities. He posits that philosophical inquiry offers a valuable toolkit for helping students navigate these turbulent waters by encouraging them to question assumptions, consider multiple viewpoints, and articulate their beliefs and values.

The book's greatest strength lies in its practical focus. Kizel does not simply theorize; he provides concrete strategies for implementing philosophical inquiry in diverse educational settings. Through vivid case studies and sample lesson plans, he illustrates how educators can create 'communities of inquiry' where students feel safe to voice their thoughts and grapple with challenging ideas. These examples span a range of age groups and subject areas, demonstrating the versatility of Kizel's original approach.

One particularly compelling chapter explores how philosophical inquiry can foster intercultural understanding and bridge ideological divides. At a time when many societies are grappling with intense polarization, Kizel's insights on cultivating empathy and intellectual humility through structured dialogue feel especially relevant.

While the book's arguments are generally persuasive, some readers may find Kizel's optimism about the transformative power of philosophical inquiry a bit idealistic. He acknowledges some practical challenges educators face in implementing these methods but could have engaged more deeply with systemic obstacles in educational institutions.

Additionally, the book's focus is primarily on formal educational settings. It broadened its impact by exploring how these principles might apply to informal learning environments or adult education.

These minor critiques aside, *Enabling Students' Voices and Identities* is essential to educational philosophy. Kizel's important work offers a hopeful vision for how education can evolve to meet the needs of students in our rapidly changing world. He charts a path toward a more engaged and reflective citizenry by emphasizing the development of critical thinking skills alongside emotional intelligence and self-awareness.

Educators, policymakers, and anyone concerned with the future of education will find valuable insights in this thoughtful and timely book. Kizel's passionate advocacy for student voice and identity development, grounded in rigorous philosophical inquiry, provides a compelling blueprint for nurturing the thoughtful, articulate, and empathetic individuals our societies desperately need.

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pri napovedovanju stresa in psihološkega blagostanja

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Recenzija | Andrej Ule, *O naravi duha*

Book Review | Arie Kizel, *Enabling Students' Voices and Identities:
Philosophical Inquiry in a Time of Discord*

Anthropos 56 (2)