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David Duarte*
Analogija i vaganje: teza o djelomičnoj svodljivosti i njezini problemi
Na temelju analize strukture i slijeda postupka analogije, autor upucuje kritiku tezi o djelomičnoj svodljivo-sti, tj. tezi prema kojoj se analogija, izuzev onoga njezinog koraka koji predstavlja strogu analogiju, može svesti na vaganje. U radu se stoga prvo iznose neki problemi navedene teze, poput nenužnosti svodljivosti ili činjenice da se pod krinkom vaganja provodi prava analogija. Središnja je teza rada tvrdnja da analogiju nije moguce uspješno svesti na oblik vaganja.
Ključne riječi: analogija, prednjak (antecedent), vaganje, čimbenici usporedbe, pravne praznine, teza o djelomičnoj svodljivosti, načela, pravila, sličnost, podvodenje
1 TRI KAO POČETNA TOČKA ANALOGIJE I VAGANJA
Ideja da primjena prava uključuje tri osnovna postupka, podvodenje, vaganje i analogiju, nedavno je postala središnja tema teorije prava, pružajuci nove uvide u analizi njihovih veza: (i) podvodenja i analogije, (ii) podvodenja i vaganja te (iii) analogije i vaganja.1 Medutim, uzimajuci u obzir činjenicu da se pod-vodenje provodi u svakom slučaju primjene prava, a analogija i vaganje koriste samo u odredenim normativnim uvjetima, proizlazi da je treca veza jedina koja povezuje osnovne postupke koji su, prema ovom shvacanju, normativno ne-nužni.2 To obilježje analogije i vaganja predstavlja odredene probleme: (i) koji su njihovi posebni normativni uvjeti? (ii) postoji li ikakvo preklapanje izmedu tih uvjeta? i (iii) u kojoj mjeri seA analogija i vaganje mogu udružiti ili jedno drugo ometati? Upravo ovdje do izražaja dolazi teza o djelomičnoj svodljivosti.3 Uobličena kao objašnjenje analogije u smislu vaganja, ta teza odnosi se upravo
davidduarte@fd.ulisboa.pt | Sveučilište u Lisabonu. Zahvaljujem Hendriku Kapteinu, Luisu Duarteu d'Almeidi, Pedru Muriasu, Pedru Monizu Lopesu i dvama anonimnim recenzentima na njihovim komentarima na raniju inačicu ovoga rada.
O tri osnovna postupka vidi Alexy (2010: 9 i dalje), Brožek (2008: 188 i dalje) i Bustamante (2012: 59 i dalje).
Prva premisa čini se neospornom: nijedan pravni slučaj ne može se riješiti a da nije ispunjen prednjak (antecedent) (norme ili odlučne norme (decision-norm)). Drugu premisu objasnit cu kasnije.
Brožek 2008: 188 i dalje.
1
2
3
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na probleme koji proizlaze iz veze izmedu tih dvaju osnovnih postupaka pri-mjene prava.
2 ANALOGIJA PO KORACIMA: NEKA OSNOVNA RAZMATRANJA GLEDE SLIJEDA
Unatoč tome što analogija predstavlja sam postupak usporedbe, ona je, u strogom smislu, i rezultat: utvrdenje, za neku svrhu, odnosa sličnosti.4 Da bi se dosegla krajnja točka, potrebno je poduzeti neke korake: (i) identificirati uspo-redivane izraze, (ii) sačiniti popis čimbenika usporedbe, (iii) procijeniti sličnost ili ne-sličnost na temelju svakog od čimbenika, (iv) izvršiti odabir odlučujuceg čimbenika i (v) zaključiti da analogija postoji, ako ona postoji na temelju oda-branog čimbenika.5 Dakle, čitav je postupak razmjerno složen.
Složenost postupka očituje se vec u pogledu čimbenika usporedbe. Kao što je poznato, oni su, naravno, beskonačni.6 Neovisno o tome što je predmet usporedbe, uzimajuci u obzir neograničena svojstva izraza i beskonačne izvanjske kriterije analize, sve se može koristiti kao čimbenik usporedbe. Buduci da kontekst usporedbe može suziti skup čimbenika, taj učinak smanjivanja olakšava savladivost čitavog postupka.
-	Kad usporedujemo automobile (a) i bicikle (b), skup čimbenika je beskona-čan: či - cijena, č2 - brzina, č3 - metalna grada, č4 - udobnost, č5 - ljepota, č6 - zadovoljstvo koje pružaju Johnu, itd.
-	Ako se a i b usporeduju s obzirom na kontekst kupnje, skup je sužen: neki čimbenici mogu postati nevažni; primjerice, č3 (metalna grada) ili č6 (zadovoljstvo koje pružaju Johnu).
Složenost postupka dolazi do izražaja i kod procjene sličnosti ili ne-sličnosti koja proizlazi na temelju svakog od čimbenika. S obzirom na svaki od čimbenika treba donijeti sud kako bi se ustvrdila ili odbacila sličnost. Na neki način, taj korak predstavlja srž analogije: upravo se u tom koraku usporedivani izrazi stvarno sučeljavaju na temelju specifične analize sličnosti. Ne smije se previdjeti važnost toga koraka. Zbog nedosljednih sudova stvorenih u ovome stadiju često se javljaju lažne analogije.7
4	Naravno, vrsta analogije o kojoj ovdje govorim ona je koja se odnosi na klasifikaciju a ne analogija kojom se podupire predvidanje (Macagno & Walton 2009: 171).
5	O koracima kod analogije vidi Araszkiewicz (2011: 103).
6	Brewer 1996: 932. Peczenik 1996: 312.
7	O lažnoj analogiji, medu ostalim argumentima protiv analogije, vidi Shelley (2002: 489).
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-	usporedba izmedu a i b na temelju či (cijena) može voditi k zaključku o slič-nosti (=) ili ne-sličnosti (*);8
-	usporedba na temelju č2 (brzina) takoder može voditi k zaključku o = ili i tako dalje za svaki čimbenik.
Čak i kad je sužena kontekstom, moguče je da če usporedbu i dalje biti potrebno napraviti na temelju mnoštva čimbenika. Iz toga proizlazi da su moguče i različite procjene sličnosti i ne-sličnosti. Dakle, za usporedene se izraze javlja tablica s različitim rezultatima: izrazi su na temelju nekih čimbenika slični, a na temelju drugih ne-slični. Kako bi i bilo za očekivati, na temelju zajedničkog popisa čimbenika, što su izrazi bliži, to je manje rezultata ne-sličnosti.9
-	za a i b: č1 č2 * , č3 =, č4 č5 č6 =;
-	za b1 i b2, hipotetički: č1 =, č2 =, č3 = , č4 =, č5 č6 =.
Srž složenosti analogije leži, medutim, u odabiru odlučujučeg čimbenika.10 Ako su odredeni izrazi slični na temelju jednog čimbenika, a ne-slični na temelju drugoga, zaključak o postojanju analogije posve je ovisan o odabranom čimbeniku. Taj je odabir, ipak, izvanjski u odnosu na usporedbu: jednak položaj svakog od čimbenika u pogledu izraza podrazumijeva da postupak sam po sebi ne sadrži nikakve kriterije za odredivanje bilo kakve nadmoči medu čimbenici-ma.11 Tako je ukupan postupak analogije odreden metačimbenikom: onim na temelju kojega je, kad se sve uzme u obzir, moguče odlučiti koji čimbenik treba odabrati.
-	za a i b: č1 č2 č3 =, č4 č5 č6 =;
-	za a i b: (č1 v (č2 v (č3 =) v (č4 v (č5 v (č6 =);
-	za a i b, hipotetički, s metačimbenikom (mča) na temelju kojeg se odabire č3: a = b.
3 ISTI KORACI KOD ANALOGIJE U PRAVNIM SLUČAJEVIMA
Prethodnu je shemu moguče u cijelosti primijeniti kada se postupak analogije koristi kako bi se našlo rješenje za slučaj nepredviden ijednom normom prav-noga poretka. Kada za pravno pitanje nije predviden nijedan odgovor, postupak analogije je potreban kako bi se utvrdilo je li slučaj u pitanju sličan nekom drugom slučaju koji ispunjava uvjete predvidene nekom postoječom normom.
8	O koracima kod analogije vidi Araszkiewicz (2011: 103).
9	I vice-versa. O količinskoj sličnosti vidi Davis & Russell (1987: 265).
10	Ili čimbenici: sva upučivanja na odlučujuči čimbenik uključuju, naravno, skup odlučujučih čimbenika.
11	Alexy 2010: 17. Aarnio 1987: 104.
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Pravni slučajavi tako postaju izrazi koje treba usporediti. Ako je zaključak da analogija postoji, tada prima facie neprimjenljiva norma postaje odlučna norma (decision-norm) za slučaj u pitanju i pravno je pitanje odgovoreno.12
-	Slučaj: »Ulazak u park motociklom«.
-	Nepostojanje norme o ulasku u park motociklom.
-	Pravilo1: »Ulazak u park automobilom nije dopušten«.
-	»Ulazak automobilom« (a) i »Ulazak motociklom« (m) su izrazi koje treba usporediti.
-	Ako su a i m analogni, ni »ulazak motociklom« nije dopušten.13
Kada su usporedivani izrazi slučajevi, kao kod pravnog rasudivanja na temelju analogije, kontekst usporedbe pruža pravno pitanje: ono što je ovdje bitno jest dobiti odgovor glede deontičkog statusa nepredvidene radnje. Upravo tim pitanjem sužava se beskonačan popis čimbenika. Čimbenici koji se ni na koji način ne odnose na to normativno pitanje bit ce nevažni za potrebe usporedbe.14
-	Slučajevi: »Ulazak u park automobilom« (a) i »Ulazak u park motociklom« (m).
-	Pravno pitanje: je li dopušten ulazak u park motociklom?
-	Nevažni čimbenici: č1 - broj kotača, č2 - udobnost za vozača, itd.
-	Važni čimbenici: č3 - zagadivač, č4 - opasnost za pješake, itd.
Čak i ako se popis čimbenika suzi, još uvijek je moguce postojanje mnoštva čimbenika, koji mogu voditi k tablici s različitim rezultatima. Bez obzira na pouzadnost pojedine procjene, bilo koja dva slučaja mogu biti slična na temelju jednog, a ne-slična na temelju drugog čimbenika.
-	za a i m: č3 (zagadivač), č4 (opasnost za pješake), č5 (vozačeva sloboda djelo-vanja), č6 (šteta za vegetaciju u parku), itd;
-	za a i m: č3 č4 č5 =, č6
Rezultirajuce sličnosti i ne-sličnosti iz tablice usporedbe predstavljaju temeljni problem u postupku analogije: odabir odlučujuceg čimbenika. Kao što smo vidjeli, ako se na temelju odlučujuceg čimbenika procjeni da postoji slič-nost, tada slijedi zaključak o postojanju analogije. Ako ne, pravno pitanje ostaje bez pravnog rješenja na temelju postupka analogije.
12	Nino 2011: 293. Weinreb 2005: 97 i dalje. Guastini 1993: 370.
13	Taj primjer, naravno, pretpostavlja pravnu prazninu glede ulaska u park motociklom, a koja ne postoji ako u obzir uzmemo opce načelo o slobodi djelovanja. Medutim, primjer je valjan ako dodamo normu koja blokira dopuštenje koje proizalzi iz tog načela: primjerice, »ulazak u park ovisi o posebnom pravilu glede vrste vozila u pitanju«. Uz tu normu, i uz postojanje pravila glede automobila i nepostojanje pravila glede motocikala, u odnosu na potonju vrstu vozila postoji pravna praznina.
14	Araszkiewicz 2011: 102. Roth 2000: 115.
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-	Za a i m: (č3 ^ ) v (č4 v (č5 =) v (č6
-	Za a i m: ako č5 onda »Ulazak u park motociklom nije dopušten«.
-	Za a i m: ako č4 onda nema analognog odgovora.
Presudna točka u pravnom rasudivanju na temelju analogije takoder redovi-to počiva na odredbi metačimbenika temeljem kojega ce se odabrati prevlada-vajuci čimbenik. Medutim, pravni poredak mora podržavati taj metačimbenik: ako u postupku analogije zaključak podupire nešto što djeluje kao »nova norma«, ne može biti podržana nijedna druga mogucnost. Problem je, naravno, kako.
4 TEZA O DJELOMIČNOJ SVODLJIVOSTI
U kontekstu osnovnih postupaka u primjeni prava, prema tezi o djelomičnoj svodljivosti analogija se djelomično može objasniti pojmom vaganja.15 Prema toj tezi podržava se samo djelomična autonomnost postupka analogije: izuzev onoga njezinog koraka koji predstavlja strogu analogiju, preostali se koraci mogu svesti na vaganje. Dakle, za sporno pravno pitanje rješenje se može izvesti vaganjem sukobljenih načela, kao i kod svakog vaganja.16
Ipak, teza o djelomičnoj svodljivosti ovisi o razlici izmedu dviju razina slič-nosti: sličnosti1 i sličnosti2. Sličnost1 odgovara onome na što se u ovome radu upucivalo kao na kontekst usporedbe i predstavlja bliskost izmedu slučajeva koji proizlaze iz odredenog pravnog pitanja. To pitanje odreduje kao slične1 sve slučajeve čije rješenje je odgovor na isti pravni problem, postavljajuci granice za početni stadij sličnosti.17 Odabrani slučajevi potom su predmet daljnje pro-cjene.
-	Pravno pitanje: je li dopušten ulazak u park motociklom?
-	Pravilo1: »Ulazak u park automobilom (a) nije dopušten«.
-	Pravilo2: »Ulazak u park biciklom (b) je dopušten«.
-	Ne postoji norma o ulasku u park motociklom (m).
-	Pravilo3: »Najveca brzina kretanja bicikala (b) u parku ograničena je na 10 km/h«.
-	Slučajevi a i b su slični1 slučaju m.
-	Slučaj ograničenja brzine b nije sličan slučaju m na ovoj razini sličnosti1.
Sličnost2 presudna je razina sličnosti jer stvara normu za slučaj kojom se uspostavlja pravno rješenje. Na ovoj se razini moraju usporediti slučajevi oda-
15	Brožek 2008: 193.
16	Brožek 2008: 194.
17	Što je, kako je vec rečeno, neproblematična razina sličnosti (Brožek 2008: 191).
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brani na razini sličnostii i donijeti odluka o »relevantnoj sličnosti«. Buduci da su slični1 slučajevi povezani s različitim rješenjima, odgovor na pravno pitanje proizlazi iz onoga slučaja koji je procijenjen kao sličan2. Zbog toga sličnost2 predstavlja konačan i dublji odabir sličnosti.18
-	Ne postoji norma o ulasku u park motociklom (m).
-	Slučaj automobila (a): »Ulazak u park automobilom nije dopušten«.
-	Slučaj bicikla (b): »Ulazak u park biciklom je dopušten«.
-	Ako m = c onda m ~D park;
-	Ako m = b onda m D park.
Srž teze o djelomičnoj svodljivosti leži, medutim, u načinu kako se odreduje i rješava sličnost2. Buduci da su slučajevi odabrani na temelju sličnosti1 povezani s različitim rješenjima, ključno je otkriti načela koja podupiru svako od tih rješenja. Kako ta načela po definiciji upucuju u različitim smjerovima, stvara se uobičajeni scenarij sukoba načela.19
-	Pravilo1 za slučaj automobila (a) (»Ulazak u park automobilom nije dopušten«) poduprto je načelom N1;
-	N1: »Okoliš treba biti pravno zašticen«.
-	Pravilo2 za slučaj bicikla (b) (»Ulazak u park biciklom je dopušten«) podu-prto je načelom N2.
-	N2: »Svatko ima slobodu djelovanja«.20
-	Kod pitanja je li dopušten ulazak u park motociklom načela N1 i N2 dolaze u sukob.
U slučaju sukobljenih načela do rješenja se dolazi vaganjem, tj. uporabom »formule težine«: načela se važu i jedno ce prevladati nad drugim. U skladu s time, načelo koje prevlada pruža rješenje za slučaj u pitanju te se na temelju či-njenica slučaja i posljedica koje proizlaze iz pobjedničkog načela stvara »kolizij-sko pravilo«.21 Takvim se pristupom problem sličnosti2 preobražava u problem vaganja načela, a što, prema tezi o djelomičnoj svodljivosti, ima značajnu prednost: umjesto postavljanja pitanja glede toga koji su izrazi slični2, treba samo izvršiti jednostavno vaganje.22
18	Brožek 2008: 191.
19	Brožek 2008: 194.
20	Ovo načelo početno je bilo predstavljeno u obliku: »ljudi su ovlašteni aktivno se odmarati« (Brožek 2008: 194). Medutim, radi vece pravne preciznosti, u tekstu koristim oblik načela koji, u istom kontekstu, koristi Alexy (2010: 16). Ova izmjena ni na koji način ne utječe na izvedenu shemu.
21	O »kolizijskom pravilu« (zakonu suprotstavljenih načela) vidi, primjerice, Alexy 2002: 54 i Pino 2010: 190 i dalje.
22	Brožek 2008: 195.
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-	Ni (okoliš treba biti pravno zašticen) — m ~D park.
-	N2 (svatko ima slobodu djelovanja) — m D park.
-	Ako na temelju »formule težine« N1 > N2 — m ~D park.
5	pRvi proBLEM: sluČAJNI isHoD vAGANJA
Iz teze o djelomičnoj svodljivosti, unatoč njezinoj neospornoj zanimljivosti, proizlazi nekoliko problema. Prvi i najintuitivniji tiče se izbora načela koja stoje u pozadini pravila koja ureduju slične1 slučajeve. Iako izgradena kao pojedno-stavljen model, teza o djelomičnoj svodljivosti, čini se, zanemaruje činjenicu da je moguce postojanje različitih načela koja podupiru pravila koja ureduju slične1 slučajeve. To je neposredno važno zbog dvaju razloga. Prvo, jer pokazuje da je izbor načela složeniji nego što se čini i, najviše, jer konačan rezultat ovisi o načelima koja su uključena u vaganje.23
-	Slučaj automobila (a): pravilo1 (»Ulazak u park automobilom nije dopu-šten«) poduprto je načelom N1 i ili načelom N3.
-	N1: »Okoliš treba biti pravno zašticen«.
-	N3: »Tjelesna cjelovitost je nepovrediva«.
-	Slučaj bicikla (b): pravilo2 (»Ulazak u park biciklom je dopušten«) poduprto je načelom N2.
-	N2: »Svatko ima slobodu djelovanja«.
-	Pravno pitanje i dalje je isto: je li dopušten ulazak u park motociklom (m)?
-	Ako su upletenja N2 u N1 i u N3 različita (kako motocikli zagaduju i kako mogu nanijeti štetu tjelesnoj cjelovitosti), ishodi vaganja mogu se razlikovati.
-	Hipotetički: N1 > N2 — m ~D park, ali N3 < N2 — m D park.
6	drugi problem: analogija poKRivENA
vaganjem
U vezi s prethodnom točkom, čini se da teza o djelomičnoj svodljivosti zanemaruje i činjenicu da su načela koja su izabrana za provodenje postupka vaganja materijalno povezana s čimbenicima koji se koriste za usporedivanje slučajeva: svako od načela u postupku vaganja opisuje neki čimbenik za slučajeve odabrane tijekom stadija sličnosti1. Dakle, ne samo da izbor načela opisuje
23 Naravno, ništa ne priječi da s obje strane pitanja bude više od jednog načela, što onda zahti-jeva proširenu »formulu težine« (Alexy 2002: 409; Sieckmann 2010: 110). Medutim, bit je u tome da, korištenjem vaganja, analogija postaje ovisna o dvojbenom izboru izmedu načela (ometajuci dosljednost ishoda analogije).
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odabir čimbenika, nego je, štoviše, postupak vaganja izložen samo kao shema za organiziranje odabira odlučujuceg čimbenika. To stoga vodi k tvrdnji da se vaganje ovdje koristi samo kao alat za utvrdivanje metačimbenika: vaganjem se samo odlučuje koji ce od čimbenika odabranih temeljem izabranih načela prevladati. Pod krinkom vaganja provodi se prava analogija.24
-	Za a, b i m: či (zagadivač), č2 (sloboda kretanja), č3 (opasnost za pješake).
-	Načela N1, N2 i N3 predstavljaju č1, č2 i č3.
-	N1: »Okoliš treba biti pravno zašticen«.; u č1: m = a; m * b.
-	N2: »Svatko ima slobodu djelovanja«.; u č2: m = a; m = b.
-	N3: »Tjelesna cjelovitost je nepovrediva«.; u č3: m * a; m = b.
-	Izbor načela N1 i N2 znači da su »glavni čimbenici« č1 i č2.
-	Ako N1 > N2, tada je odlučujuci čimbenik č1: m = a; m * b.
-	N1 — č1 — m = a.
7 TRECI PROBLEM: VAGANJE NEVAžNIH NAČELA
Uzimajuci u obzir da je, na temelju teze o djelomičnoj svodljivosti, zamjena stadija sličnosti2 ostvarena vaganjem načela koja podupiru pravila neprimjen-ljiva na slučaj, javlja se još jedan problem: nevažnost tim pravilima prizvanih načela. Zapravo, unatoč sličnosti1, ne postoji ništa što bi predstavljalo osigura-nje da ta načela nece biti nevažna za neregulirani slučaj, u kojem slučaju ona ne bi mogla opravdati nijedno rješenje. Glavni razlog za takav ishod proizlazi iz neprimjenljivosti jednog od tih načela na slučaj za koji se traži odgovor, što je posljedica činjenice da obilježja koja opisuju taj slučaj ne odgovaraju prednja-ku (antecedentu) načela. U tom scenariju, načela prizvana na temelju sličnosti1 ovdje ne igraju nikakvu ulogu. To vodi k sljedecoj tvrdnji: djelomično svodenje analogije na vaganje moguce je jedino ako je neregulirani slučaj, unatoč slično-sti1, analogan reguliranom slučaju do te mjere da aktivira upravo ona ista načela koja podupiru pravila čija je analogna primjena predmetom razmatranja.
-	Slučaj automobila (a): pravilo1 »ulazak u park automobilom nije dopušten« poduprto je načelom N1.
-	N1: »Okoliš treba biti pravno zašticen«.
-	Slučaj bicikla (b): pravilo2 »ulazak u park biciklom je dopušten« poduprto je načelom N2.
-	N2: »Svatko ima slobodu djelovanja«.
24 Kad se uzme u obzir da se vaganjem, u njegovom pravom smislu, samo odlučuje koju izmedu svih primjenljivih normi treba primijeniti na slučaj, postaje jasno da se vaganjem, kad se ono koristi za izbor jedne od različitih na slučaj neprimjenljivih normi, samo odreduje bliskost i udaljenost izmedu slučaja i svake od neprimjenljivih normi.
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-	Novi slučaj sličnosti2: smije li se u park uči memorijalnim tenkom (mi)?
-	Ne postoji norma o ulasku u park memorijalnim tenkom (mt).
-	Kod sličnostii se ništa nije promijenilo: pitanje se i dalje odnosi na dopušte-nje ulaska.
-	Vaganje načela N1 i N2 za slučaj mt je besmisleno: u najboljem slučaju, načelo N2 je nevažno.
-	Neregulirani slučaj ne ispunjava prednjak (antecedent) načela N2.25
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8 ČETVRTI PROBLEM: MANJAK NAČELA ZA VAGANJE
Prepreka tezi o djelomičnoj svodljivosti koja leži u podlozi prethodnog problema može se proširiti na sve normativne situacije u kojima pravila koja ure-duju sličnei slučajeve nisu utemeljena ni na jednom načelu ili, možda najčešce, u kojima su ta pravila poduprta istim načelom. U takvim situacijama vaganje nije moguce zbog jednostavnog razloga što ne postoji dovoljno načela za vaganje. Poznato je da je vaganje postupak rješavanja normativnih sukoba nerješivih na temelju normi u sukobu: zbog tog razloga, za vaganje su potrebne dvije ili više normi.26 Stoga, kad su načela poduprta istim načelom, ne može doci do vaganja.
-	Pravilo1: »Promet automobilima ograničen je na tri dana u tjednu«.
-	Pravilo2: »Automobili čiji registracijski broj započinje parnim brojem mogu prometovati ponedjeljkom, srijedom i petkom«.
-	Pravilo3: »Automobili čiji registracijski broj započinje neparnim brojem mogu prometovati utorkom, četvrtkom i subotom«.
-	Nije doneseno pravilo za nekolicinu automobila čiji registracijski broj zapo-činje slovom.
-	Slučaj parnog broja (p): pravilo2 poduprto je načelom N1.
-	Slučaj neparnog broja (n): pravilo3 poduprto je načelom N1.
-	N1: »Okoliš treba biti pravno zašticen«.
-	Pravno pitanje: kada mogu prometovati automobili čiji registracijski broj za-očinje slovom?
-	Vaganje je neupotrebljivo: načelo N1 podupire oba pravila; ne postoji normativni sukob.
25	To je još vidljivije ako se ono koristi u svojoj prvotnoj inačici: »ljudi su ovlašteni aktivno se odmarati« (Brožek 2008: 194). Čini se neospornim da ulazak u park memorijalnim tenkom ni u kojim okolnostima ne predstavlja primjer aktivnog odmaranja.
26	Primjerice, Pino 2010: 185 i dalje, i Duarte 2010: 56 i dalje.
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9 POZADINSKI PROBLEM: ANALOGIJA I VAGANJE SE NE PREKLAPAJU
Svi do sada identificirani problemi s tezom o djelomičnoj svodljivosti, na neki način, ne predstavljaju ništa više nego posljedicu jednog šireg problema: analogija i vaganje se ne preklapaju. To postaje jasnije kada uzmemo u obzir činjenicu da svaki od tih osnovnih postupaka zahtijeva suprotne normativne okolnosti: dok analogija ovisi o nepostojanju ijedne primjenljive norme, vaganje se oslanja na primjenljivosti dviju ili više normi. Činjenica da tim postup-cima prethode suprotne normativne okolnosti upucuje na njihovo medusobno isključivanje. Slučaj u kojem je potrebno izvršiti analogiju nije slučaj u kojem bi trebalo izvršiti vaganje i vice-versa.
-	Slučaj: »Ulazak u park motociklom (m)«.
-	Normativne okolnosti analogije: ne postoji norma o m.
-	Normativne okolnosti vaganja: u pogledu m, načelo Ni i načelo N2 su u su-kobu.
Moguce objašnjenje preklapanja postupaka analogije i vaganja, unatoč nji-hovom medusobnom isključivanju, leži, čini se, u reduktivnom shvacanju uloge načela kao stvarno usmjeravajucih normi. Prihvacanje činjenice da su načela norme poput svih ostalih normi, što je neizbježna posljedica njihove deontičke naravi, mora podrazumijevati to da načela reguliraju slučajeve na isti način kao i pravila. Osobita obilježja načela, počevši od njihove primjenljivosti u različi-tim stupnjevima, ne utječu na činjenicu da ona i pružaju pravna rješenja: ako slučaj ispunjava prednjak (antecedent) načela, onda za taj slučaj postoji pravna posljedica. Očito je da, ako jedno načelo dode s drugim u sukob, rješenje ovisi o njihovu vaganju. Medutim, jednom kad je ishod vaganja poznat, poznata je i konačna posljedica i nema više mjesta za uključivanje analogije.
-	Pravno pitanje: je li dopušten ulazak u park motociklom?
-	N1: »Okoliš treba biti pravno zašticen«.
-	N2: »Svatko ima slobodu djelovanja«.
-	Ulazak motociklom slučaj je na koji su primjenljiva načela N1 i N2.
-	Ne postoji norma o »ulasku u park automobilom«.
-	Ne postoji norma o »ulasku u park biciklom«.
-	Do pravnog rješenja dolazi se vaganjem načela N1 i N2.
Dakle, ispada da reduktivno shvacanje uloge načela kao stvarno usmjeravajucih normi utječe na ispravno razumijevanje pravne praznine. Ako pravna praznina i dalje predstavlja izočnost regulacije, kod razumijevanja dosega pravne praznine mora se uzeti u obzir da i načela i pravila na jednak način predvidaju pravne posljedice, iako su načela, sa svojim širokim prednjacima (antecedenti-
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ma) koji pokrivaju veliki dio stvarnosti, znatno suzila prostor za neregulirane slučajeve. Stoga, za primjenu prava ne postoji pravna praznina ako je sporni slučaj manifestacija prednjaka (antecedenta) načela: ako slučaj aktivira pravilo, pravilo je primjenljivo, ali ako aktivira »samo« načelo, slučaj je takoder predviden pravom i, uz prethodno vaganje ili bez njega, treba primijeniti načelo.27
-	Pravno pitanje: je li dopušten ulazak u park motociklom?
-	Ni: »Okoliš treba biti pravno zašticen«.
-	N2: »Svatko ima slobodu djelovanja«.
-	Ulazak motociklom slučaj je na koji su primjenljiva načela N1 i N2.
-	Pravilo1: »Ulazak u park automobilom nije dopušten«.
-	Pravilo2: »Ulazak u park biciklom je dopušten«,
-	Do pravnog rješenja ne dolazi se na temelju analogije.
-	Do pravnog rješenja i dalje se dolazi na temelju vaganja načela N1 i N2.
-	Pravno pitanje: je li dopušten ulazak u park automobilom?
-	Pravno rješenje pruža pravilo1.
Čini se da se ono što se razumijeva pod »pravnom prazninom« znatno pro-mijenilo uzimajuci u obzir razliku izmedu načela i pravila i, posljedično, ono što proizlazi iz naravi načela kao »optimizacijskih zahtjeva«.28 Ako se prihvati da se i načelima i pravilima propisuju pravne posljedice i da se, dakle, i primjenom načela i primjenom pravila na isti način mogu rješavati slučajevi, doseg »pravne praznine« sada, čini se, pokriva samo dvije normativne situacije: (i) malo vje-rojatnu situaciju u kojoj nijedna norma, ni pravilo ni načelo, nije primjenljiva na slučaj i (ii) situaciju u kojoj pravilo, blokirajuci primjenljivost načela, pred-vida posljedicu koja nije posebno odredena za kategoriju koja, izmedu ostalih, spada i u njegovo područje primjene.29 Ako te normativne situacije odreduju
27	Ali sigurno bez primjene analogije, s obzirom na to da nisu nazočne njezine normativne okol-nosti. Time se opravdava tvrdnja da neki oblici navodne analogije ne mogu biti smatrani ana-logijom (vidi, primjerice, Verheij & Hage 1994: 65; takoder, u okviru reduktivnog pristupa, Kaptein 2005: 502). Naravno, s obzirom na pojam pravne praznine, ovdje se uzimaju u obzir samo normativne praznine (o razlici izmedu normativnih i aksioloških praznina vidi Nino 2003: 281 i Rodriguez 2000: 152).
28	Primjerice, Alexy 2002: 47 i dalje, i Brožek 2012: 223.
29	Ono što se ovdje želi reci jest da normativne praznine postoje samo na razini pravila ako je praznina stvorena na temelju pravila, odnosno na razini načela ako je ijedno načelo primjenljivo (Ruiz Manero 2005: 123). Primjerom koji slijedi u glavnom tekstu, u slučaju pravne praznine2, dobro se može pokazati na što se ovdje misli. S druge strane, važno je istaknuti da uobičajeno razlikovanje izričitih i prešutnih načela (primjerice, Burazin 2014: 171) ni na koji način ne utječe na ovo pitanje. Ako je načelo nepisano, moguce su samo dvije situacije: ili ono jest ili nije norma skupa (pravnog poretka). U potonjem slučaju, načelo ne postoji i iz njega ne proizlazi ništa. Medutim, ako je ono stvarna norma skupa, što je naravno slučaj kad je riječ o običajnom izvoru, onda se ono ponaša kao i sva ostala načela i ni po čemu nije različito od
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što može uci u doseg »pravne praznine«, iz toga slijedi da je osnovni postupak
analogije ograničen upravo na njih.30
-	Slučaji: promet automobilima čiji registracijski broj započinje slovom.
-	Prazninom ispunjena situacija1: ako slučaj nije pokriven nijednim pravilom ili nijednim načelom (pravna praznina1).
-	Prazninom ispunjena situacija2: ako postojece norme sadrže neodredene posljedice za slučaji, primjerice:
-	Pravilo1: »Promet automobilima ograničen je na tri dana u tjednu«.
-	Pravilo2: »Automobili čiji registracijski broj započinje parnim brojem mogu prometovati ponedjeljkom, srijedom i petkom«.
-	Pravilo3: »Automobili čiji registracijski broj započinje neparnim brojem mogu prometovati utorkom, četvrtkom i subotom«.
-	Nije doneseno pravilo za nekolicinu automobila čiji registracijski broj započinje slovom (pravna praznina2).
10 ZAKLJUČNA PRIMJEDBA
Analogija je usmjerena k cilju: izmedu čimbenika usporedbe, osobito na ra-zini sličnosti2, odabir se može izvršiti samo s obzirom na neku svrhu. Bez neke takve svrhe neodrediv je metačimbenik na temelju kojega se odlučuje o tome koji ce od čimbenika prevladati i, zbog tog razloga, nedostaje opravdanje za odabir izmedu čimbenika pa odabir postaje posve arbitraran. Buduci da načela šire i očitije propisuju ciljeve koje je usvojio pravni poredak i buduci da se ti ciljevi uvode u postupak analogije kako bi se riješio problem metačimbenika, ciljno usmjerena narav analogije u toj je vrsti normi pronašla svoj glavni izvor sposobnosti djelovanja. Ovdje se, medutim, načela javljaju u dvojakoj ulozi: kao »propisivači ciljeva« i, s obzirom na to da pružaju neposredna rješenja za sluča-jeve, kao »smanjivači pravnih praznina«. S tom dvojakošcu treba biti oprezan: kad god je slučaj reguliran načelom, načelo odmah zaustavlja korištenje analogije i tako uklanja mogucnost da tvori kriterij glede toga što je čemu slično.
S engleskog jezika preveo Luka Burazin.
pisanih načela. Bilo ono pisano ili ne nevažno je za odredivanje pravne posljedice, pod uvje-tom da je (prihvaceno kao) norma koja pripada skupu.
30 Sve to pretpostavlja da analogija, kao postupak koji se može koristiti kako bi se stvorilo odluč-nu normu (norm-decision) koju nije donijela normativna vlast, ovisi o normi koja dopušta nje-zinu uporabu pod odredenim uvjetima i činjenici da je taj uvjet postojanje pravne praznine.
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Bibliografija
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Robert ALEXY, 2010: Two or Three? On the Nature of Legal Principles. Ur. Martin Borowski. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. 9-18.
--, 2002: Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Michal ARASZKIEWICZ, 2011: Analogy, Similarity and Factors. Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law. New York: ACM. 101-105.
Scott BREWER, 1996: Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Arguments by Analogy. Harvard Law Review 109 (1996) 5. 923-1029.
Bartosz BROZEK, 2008: Analogy in Legal Discourse. Archiv für Rechts - und Sozialphilosophie 94 (2008) 2. 188-201.
--, 2012: Legal Rules and Principles: a Theory
Revisited. i-Lex, Rivista di Scienze Giuridiche, Scienze Cognitive ed Intelligenza Artificiale (2012) 17. 205-226.
Luka BURAZIN, 2014: Antinomies Between Implicit Legal Principles: a Solution to the Total-Partial Antinomy. Courts, Interpretation, The Rule of Law. Ur. Miodrag Jovanovic and Kenneth E. Himma. The Hague: Eleven International Publishing. 167-180.
Thomas BUSTAMANTE, 2012: Finding Analogies Between Cases. On Robert Alexy's Third Basic Operation in the Application of Law. On the Philosophy of Precedent. Ed. Carlos Bernal Pulido. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. 59-71.
Todd DAVIES & Stuart RUSSELL, 1987: A Logical Approach to Reasoning by Analogy. Proceedings of the Tenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Ur. John P. McDermott. Burlington: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers. 264-270.
David DUARTE, 2010: Normative Conditions of Balancing: Drawing Up The Boundaries of Normative Conflicts That Lead to Balances. Legal Reasoning: the Methods of Balancing. Ur. Jan Sieckmann. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. 51-62.
Riccardo GUASTINI, 1993: Le Fonti del Diritto e L'Interpretazione. Milano: Giuffre.
Hendrik KAPTEIN, 2005: Legal Progress Through Pragma-Dialectics? Prospects Beyond Analogy and E Contrario Argument. Argumentation 19 (2005) 4. 497-507.
Fabrizio MACAGNO & Douglas WALTON, 2009: Argument from Analogy in Law, the Classical Tradition, and Recent Theories. Philosophy & Rhetoric 42 (2009) 2. 154-182.
Juan Ruiz MANERO, 2005: Algunas Concepciones del Derecho y sus Lagunas. Lagunas en el Derecho. Madrid: Marcial Pons. 103-126.
Carlos Santiago NINO, 2003: Introducción al Análisis del Derecho. 11. izd. Barcelona: Ariel.
Aleksander PECZENIK, 1996: Jumps and Logic in the Law. Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (1996) 3-4. 297-329.
Giorgio PINO, 2010. Diritti e Intepretazione. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Jorge Luis RODRÍGUEZ, 2000: Axiological Gaps and Normative Relevance. Archiv für Rechts -und Sozialphilosophie 86 (2000). 151-167.
Bram ROTH, 2000: New Reasoning Patterns in Analogical Legal Case-Based Reasoning: An Informal Investigation. Legal Knowledge and Information Systems. Ur. Joost Breuker. Amsterdam: IOS Press. 113-122.
Cameron SHELLEY, 2002: Analogy Counterarguments and the Acceptability of Analogical Hypotheses. British Journal of Philosophy of Science 53 (2002) 4. 477-496.
Jan SIECKMANN, 2010: Balancing, Optimisation, and Alexy's »Weight Formula«. Legal Reasoning: the Methods of Balancing. Ur. Jan Sieckmann. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. 101-118.
Bart VERHEIJ & Jaap HAGE, 1994: Reasoning by Analogy: A Formal Reconstruction. Legal Knowledge Based Systems. The Relations with Legal Theory. Ur. Henry Prakken. Lelystad: Koninklijke Vermande. 65-78.
Lloyd WEINREB, 2005: Legal Reason. The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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revus (2015) 25, 141-154 141
David Duarte*
Analogy and Balancing: The Partial Reducibility Thesis and Its Problems
With an analysis of the structure and the sequence of analogy, the paper is mainly a critique to the partial reducibility thesis: a thesis sustaining that analogy, besides a strictly analogical step, is in the remaining part reducible to balancing. Thus, the paper points out some problems raised by the partial reducibility thesis, such as the contingency of reducibility or the fact that a proper analogy is done under the cover of a balancing. The main point is, however, the claim that analogy and balancing have opposite normative conditions, being this premise the reason to a structural explanation for the unaccept-ability of the reducibility enterprise.
Key words: analogy, antecedent, balancing, factors of comparison, gaps, partial reducibility thesis, principles, rules, similarity, subsumption
1 THREE AS THE STARTING POINT FOR ANALOGY AND BALANCING
The idea that the application of law includes three basic operations, sub-sumption, balancing and analogy, has recently become a central matter in legal theory, yielding new insights into the analysis of their connections: (i) subsumption and analogy, (ii) subsumption and balancing, and (iii) analogy and balancing.1 However, taking into account the fact that subsumption is performed in every case of the application of law, and analogy and balancing are used only under specific normative conditions, it follows that the third connection is the only one linking the basic operations that are, under this point of view, norma-tively contingent.2 This feature of analogy and balancing poses certain problems: (i) what are their respective specific normative conditions, (ii) is there any intersection between those conditions, and (iii) to what extent can analogy
davidduarte@fd.ulisboa.pt | University of Lisbon. I thank Hendrik Kaptein, Luis Duarte d'Almeida, Pedro Murias, Pedro Moniz Lopes and the two anonymous referees for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.
On the three basic operations, Alexy (2010: 9 and ff.), Brozek (2008: 188 and ff.), and Busta-mante (2012: 59 and ff.).
The first premise seems undeniable: no legal case can be solved without the fulfilment of an antecedent (of a norm or a decision-norm). The second one will be explained later.
*
1
2
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and balancing be combined or interfere with each other. It is precisely here that the partial reducibility thesis comes into play.3 Formulated as an explanation of analogy in terms of balancing, this thesis deals exactly with the problems raised by the connection between these two basic operations of the application of law.
2 ANALOGY BY STEPS: SOME BASIC CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE SEQUENCE
Despite being used to represent the operation of comparison itself, analogy is, rigorously, a result: the establishment, for any purpose, of a relation of similarity.4 In order to reach the final point, some steps must be taken: (i) identification of the terms compared, (ii) list of comparison factors, (iii) evaluation of similarity or non-similarity under each factor, (iv) choice of the decisive factor, and (v) conclusion of analogy, if this is the case under the factor chosen.5 The overall operation is therefore relatively complex.
The operation is complex, immediately, with regard to factors of comparison. As it is known, they are naturally endless.6 Independently of what is compared, everything can be used as a factor, considering the illimitable properties of the terms and the infinite external criteria of analysis. Since the context of comparison is able to narrow the set of factors, this decreasing effect gives some manageability to the process.
-	When comparing cars (c) and bicycles (b), the set of factors is endless: fi - price, f2 - speed, f3 - metal texture, f4 - comfort, f5 - beauty, f6 - how it pleases John, and so on.
-	If c and b are compared for buying purposes, the set is narrowed: some factors may become irrelevant; for instance, f3 (metal texture) or f6 (how it pleases John).
Complexity also arises from the evaluation of similarity or non-similarity that each factor confers. Beneath each one of them, a judgment has to be made in order to state or refute similarity. In a certain way, this step is the core of analogy: it is here that the terms compared are effectively confronted under the specific analysis of resemblance. Its importance cannot be overlooked. Often false analogies appear from the inconsistent judgments made at this level.7
3	Brozek 2008: 188 and ff.
4	Naturally, the kind of analogy considered here is that regarding a classification and not the analogy supporting a prediction (Macagno & Walton 2009: 171).
5	On analogy steps, Araszkiewicz (2011: 103).
6	Brewer 1996: 932. Peczenik 1996: 312.
7	On false analogy, among other analogy counterarguments, see Shelley (2002: 489).
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-	Comparison between b and c under fi (price) can lead to similarity (=) or non-similarity (^).8
-	Under f2 (speed) it can also lead to ^ or =; and so on for all the factors.
Even if narrowed by context, a comparison may still have to be done under a plurality of factors. From this it follows that different evaluations of similarity and non-similarity may be carried out. Therefore, for the terms compared, a table with different results appears: terms are similar under some factors and non-similar under others. As would be expected, under a common list of factors, the more proximate the terms, the fewer the results of non-similarity.9
-	For b and c: f1 f2 f3 =, f4 f5 f6 =.
-	For b1 and b2, hypothetically: f1 =, f2 =, f3 =, f4 =, f5 f6 =.
The complexity of the analogy lies, however, in the choice of the decisive factor.10 If certain terms are similar under a factor and non-similar under another, the conclusion of analogy is wholly dependent on the factor selected. This choice is, nonetheless, external to the comparison: the equal position of each factor with respect to the terms implies that the operation, in itself, holds no criteria for defining any kind of prevalence.11 Thus, the overall analogy operation is decided through a meta-factor: the one that decides which factor, all things considered, is to be chosen.
-	For b and c: f1 f2 f3 =, f4 f5 f6 =.
-	For b and c: (ft *) V f *) V f =) V f *) V f *) V f =).
-	For b and c, hypothetically, with a meta-factor (mfa) that chooses f3: b = c.
3 THE SAME STEPS IN A LEGAL CASES ANALOGY
The previous scheme is entirely applicable when the operation is used to provide a solution for a case unforeseen under any norm of the legal order. Here, where no answer to the legal question is provided, an operation of analogy is required to define whether the case at hand is similar to another which fulfils the conditions foreseen in an enacted norm. Legal cases, then, become the terms to be compared. If the conclusion is an analogy, then the prima facie inapplicable norm becomes the decision-norm of the case and the legal question is answered.12
8	The symbols = and # are used here for simplification purposes, just to represent similarity and non-similarity.
9	And vice-versa. On quantitative similarity, Davis & Russell (1987: 265).
10	Or factors: all references to a decisive factor include, naturally, a set of decisive factors.
11	Alexy 2010: 17. Aarnio 1987: 104.
12	Nino 2011: 293. Weinreb 2005: 97 and ff. Guastini 1993: 370.
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-	Case: Motorcycle entrance into the park.
-	No norm on motorcycle entrance into the park.
-	Rulei: "Cars are not allowed to enter the park."
-	"Car entrance" (c) and "motorcycle entrance" (m) are terms of comparison.
-	If c and m are analogous, "entrance on a motorcycle" is not allowed.13
When terms of comparison are cases, as in legal reasoning by analogy, the context of comparison is given by the legal question: what matters here is to obtain an answer to the deontic status of an unforeseen action. The endless list of factors is narrowed precisely by that question. Factors with no bearing on that normative issue will be irrelevant for the comparison.14
-	Cases: "Car entrance into the park" (c) and "Motorcycle entrance into the park" (m).
-	Legal question: Is a motorcycle allowed to enter the park?
-	Irrelevant factors: f1 - number of wheels, f2 - comfort for the driver, and so on.
-	Relevant factors: f3 - pollutant, f4 - danger to pedestrians, and so on.
Even if narrowed, there may still be a plurality of factors which may lead to a table with different results. No matter what the reliability of each evaluation is, any two cases may be similar under some factor and non-similar under another.
-	For cases c and m, the factors of comparison are: f3 (pollutant), f4 (danger to pedestrians), f5 (drivers' freedom of action), f6 (damage to the park vegetation), and so on.
-	For c and m: f3 f4 f5 =, f6
Now the results of similarity and non-similarity offered by the table of comparison present the main problem in the analogy operation: the selection of the decisive factor (step iv). As we have seen, if the decisive factor implies an evaluation of similarity, then a conclusion of analogy follows. If not, the legal question remains without a legal solution with regard to the analogy operation.
-	For c and m: (f3 V (f4 V (f5 =) V (f6 *).
-	For c and m: if f5 then "Motorcycles are not allowed to enter the park".
-	For c and m: if f4 then no analogical answer.
13	This example presupposes, obviously, a gap concerning the entrance of motorcycles into the park, inexistent if a general principle regarding freedom of action is taken into account. However, the example is valid if a norm blocking the permission given by that principle is added: for instance, "entrance into the park depends on a specific rule regarding the kind of vehicle in question". With this norm, and with a rule for cars and no rule for motorcycles, there is a gap regarding the latter kind of vehicle.
14	Araszkiewicz 2011: 102. Roth 2000: 115.
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As is generally the case, the decisive point in legal reasoning by analogy also rests upon the definition of the meta-factor according to which the prevailing factor will be selected. However, this meta-factor must be sustained by the legal order: if in an analogy operation the conclusion supports something that works as a "new norm", no other option can be upheld. The problem is, of course, how.
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4 THE PARTIAL REDUCIBILITY THESIS
In the context of the basic operations in the application of law, the partial reducibility thesis says that analogy can be partially explained through balancing.15 The thesis sustains only the partial autonomy of the analogy operation: besides a strictly analogical step, the remaining part is reducible to balancing. Thus, for the legal question at hand, the solution is drawn by weighing up the principles in conflict, as in any balancing.16
The partial reducibility thesis depends, however, on a distinction between two levels of similarity: similarity1 and similarity2. Similarity1 is equivalent to what was referred to here as the context of comparison and stands for the proximity between the cases brought by the legal question at hand. This question defines as similar1 all cases whose solution is an answer to the same legal problem, setting the boundaries for an initial stage of similarity.17 The cases selected here are then subject to further evaluation.
-	Legal question: Are motorcycles allowed into the park?
-	Rule1: "Cars (c) are not allowed into the park."
-	Rule2: "Bicycles (b) are allowed into the park."
-	No norm on motorcycle (m) entrance into the park.
-	Rule3: "Speed limit for bicycles (b) in the park is 10 km/h."
-	Cases with cars (c) and bicycles (b) are similar1 to the cases with motorcycles (m).
-	Speed limit case b is dissimilar to the case m at this level of similarity1.
Similarity2 is the decisive level of similarity since it creates the norm for the case establishing the legal solution. Here, the cases that were selected at the level of similarity1 have to be compared and the decision on the "relevant similarity" must be taken. As similar1 cases are linked to different solutions, the answer to the legal question is given by the case that is evaluated as similar2. For this reason, similarity2 stands for the conclusive and deeper choice of similarity.18
15	Brozek 2008: 193.
16	Brozek 2008: 194.
17	Which is, as stated, an unproblematic level of similarity (Brozek 2008: 191).
18	Brozek 2008: 191.
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-	No norm on motorcycle (m) entrance into the park.
-	Car case (c): "Cars are not allowed into the park."
-	Bicycles case (b): "Bicycles are allowed into the park."
-	If m = c then m ~P park.
-	If m = b then m P park.
The core of the partial reducibility thesis lies, however, in the way similar-ity2 is defined and solved. As the cases selected under similarityi are linked to a different solution, the main point is to discover the principles backing each one of those solutions. Since these principles by definition point in different directions, a common scenario of principles in conflict is created.19
-	Car case (c) Rule1 ("Cars are not allowed into the park.") is backed by principle P1.
-	Principle P1: "The environment should be protected by law."
-	Bicycles case (b) Rule2 ("Bicycles are allowed into the park.") is backed by principle P2.
-	Principle P2: "Everyone has freedom of action."20
-	With the question if motorcycles are allowed into the park, principles P1 and P2 conflict.
In the case of conflicting principles, the solution is obtained through balancing, namely the use of the "weight formula": here, principles are weighed and one of them will prevail over the other. Accordingly, the prevailing principle yields the solution of the case and a "collision rule" is created with the case facts and the consequence withdrawn from the winning principle.21 With this approach, the problem of similarity2 is transformed into the problem of the weighing of principles, which encompasses, as the partial reducibility thesis sustains, a significant advantage: instead of asking which terms are similar2, only simple balancing must be carried out.22
-	Principle P1 ("The environment should be protected by law.") — m ~P park.
-	Principle P2 ("Everyone has freedom of action.") — m P park.
-	If with the "weight formula" P1 > P2 — m ~P park.
19	Brozek 2008: 194.
20	In its original presentation, the principle mentioned here is "people are entitled to rest actively" (Brozek 2008: 194). However, as is legally more accurate, the principle used in the text is that adopted, in the same context, by Alexy (2010: 16). The change does not affect the scheme in any way.
21	On the "collision rule" (law of competing principles), for instance, Alexy 2002: 54, and Pino 2010: 190 and ff.
22	Brozek 2008: 195.
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5 FIRsT PRoBLEM: RANDoM WEIGHING ouTcoME
Despite it being of undeniable interest, the partial reducibility thesis poses several problems. The first and most intuitive concerns the choice of the principles that stand behind the rules governing similar cases. Albeit constructed as a simplified model, the thesis seems to disregard the fact that different principles may be available to back the rules that sustain similar cases. This is immediately relevant for two reasons. First, because it shows that the principle choice is more complex than it seems and, mainly, because the final result depends on the principles brought to weighing.23
-	Car case (c): Rulei ("Cars are not allowed into the park") is backed by principle Pi and/or principle P3.
-	Principle P1: "The environment should be protected by law."
-	Principle P3: "Physical integrity is inviolable."
-	Bicycles case (b): Rule2 ("Bicycles are allowed into the park") is backed by principle P2.
-	Principle P2: "Everyone has freedom of action."
-	Legal question is still the same: Are motorcycles (m) allowed into the park?
-	If interferences of P2 in P1 and in P3 are different (how motorcycles pollute and how they can damage physical integrity), the weighing result can differ.
-	Hypothetically: P1 > P2 — m ~P park, but P3 < P2 — m P park.
6 second problem: analogy covered BY balancing
Related to the previous point, the partial reducibility thesis also seems to disregard the fact that the principles chosen to carry out the weighing process are materially connected with the factors used to compare cases: each principle within balancing describes a factor for the cases selected during the similarityi phase. Therefore, not only does the choice of a principle describe the selection of a factor, but, furthermore, the balancing process is merely set out as a scheme for organising the choice of the decisive factor. Hence, this leads to the claim that balancing is used here only as a tool for determining the meta-factor: among the factors selected by the principles chosen, balancing just decides which one of them prevails. Under the cover of balancing, proper analogy is performed.24
23	Of course, nothing prevents there being more than one principle on each side of the question, requesting an extended "weight formula" (Alexy 2002: 409; Sieckmann 2010: 110). However, the point is that, through the use of balancing, analogy becomes dependent on a dubious choice among principles (disturbing the consistency of the analogy outcome).
24	When one considers that balancing, in its proper sense, just decides which norm among all those applicable is to be applied to a case, it becomes clear that, when used for selecting one
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-	For c, b and m: fi (pollutant), f2 (freedom of movement), f3 (danger to pedestrians).
-	Principles P1, P2 and P3 represent f1, f2, and f3.
-	Principle P1: "The environment should be protected by law."; in f1: m = c;
m ^ b.
-	Principle P2: "Everyone has freedom of action."; in f2: m = c; m = b.
-	Principle P3: "Physical integrity is inviolable"; in f3: m ^ c; m = b.
-	Selection of principles P1 and P2 means that the "main factors" are f1 and f2.
-	If P1 > P2, then the decisive factor is f1: m = c; m ^ b.
-	P1 f1 m = c.
7 THIRD PROBLEM: BALANCING IRRELEVANT PRINCIPLES
Taking into account that, under the partial reducibility thesis, the replacement of the similarity2 phase is achieved by balancing principles that support rules inapplicable to a case, another problem arises: the irrelevance of the principles called on by those rules. In fact, in spite of similarity^ there is nothing to ensure that those principles are not irrelevant for the unregulated case, in which case they would be unable to justify any solution. The main reason for this result comes from the inapplicability of one of those principles to the case requiring an answer, which follows from the fact that the features describing that case do not match the principle's antecedent. Under this scenario, the principles called on under similarity1 play no role here. This leads to the following claim: the partial reducibility of analogy to balancing only works if the unregulated case, in spite of similarity^ is analogous to the regulated case to the point that it triggers exactly the same principles as those backing the rules whose application by analogy is being considered.
-	Car case (c): Rule1 ("Cars are not allowed into the park") is backed by principle P1.
Principle P1: "The environment should be protected by law."
-	Bicycles case (b): Rule2 ("Bicycles are allowed into the park") is backed by principle P2.
-	Principle P2: "Everyone has freedom of action."
-	New similarity2 case: May a memorial tank (mt) enter the park?
-	No norm on memorial tank (mt) entrance into the park.
of the distinct inapplicable norms for a case, balancing merely defines the proximity and distance between the case and each one of the inapplicable norms.
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-	Under similarity!, nothing has changed: the question is still the permission to enter.
-	Balancing of principles P! and P2 for mt is meaningless: at least, principle P2 is irrelevant.
-	The unregulated case does not fulfil the antecedent of principle P2.25
8 FouRTH PRoBLEM: Not ENouGH PRINciPLEs
for balancing
The obstacle to the partial reducibility thesis that underlies the previous problem can be extended to all normative situations in which the rules governing similari cases are not based on any principle or, probably most often, in which those rules are supported by the same principle. In such situations no balancing is possible for the simple reason that there are not enough principles in play. It is known that balancing is an operation used to solve the normative conflicts unsolvable by norms of conflicts: for that reason, balancing requires two or more norms.26 Therefore, when cases are backed by the same principle, no balancing can take place.
-	Rule1: "Car circulation is restricted to three days per week."
-	Rule2: "Plates with an even first digit: Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays."
-	Rule3: "Plates with an odd first digit: Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays."
-	No rule was enacted for the few cars whose plate starts with a letter.
-	Even first digit case (e): Rule2 is backed by principle P1.
-	Odd first digit case (o): Rule3 is baked by principle P1.
-	Principle P1: "The environment should be protected by law."
-	Legal question: When can cars whose plates start with a letter circulate?
-	Balancing is unusable: principle P1 backs both rules; no normative conflict exists.
9 THE BAcKGRouND PRoBLEM: ANALoGY AND
balancing do not match
All of the problems with the partial reducibility thesis identified so far are, in a sense, no more than a consequence of a larger one: analogy and balancing do
25	This is even more visible if it is used as the original principle P2: "people are entitled to rest actively" (Brozek 2008: 194). It seems undeniable that in any circumstance the entrance of the memorial tank can be an instance of resting actively.
26	For instance, Pino 2010: 185 and ff., and Duarte 2010: 56 and ff.
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not match. This becomes rather clearer when we take into account the fact that each one of these basic operations demands the opposite normative circumstances: while analogy depends on the absence of an applicable norm, balancing relies on the applicability of two or more norms. Based on their reverse opportunity, this opposition points towards a mutual exclusion. A case requiring an analogy does not call for balancing and vice-versa.
-	Case (m): "Motorcycle entrance into the park."
-	Normative circumstances of analogy: No norm on m.
-	Normative circumstances of balancing: About m, principle Pi conflicts with principle P2.
The probable explanation for the overlap between analogy and balancing, notwithstanding their mutual exclusion, seems to be in a reductive understanding of the role played by principles as effective regulating norms. Acceptance of principles as norms like all others, which is an inevitable consequence of their deontic character, has to imply that they govern cases in the same way that rules do. All the particular features of principles, starting with their ability to be applied in various degrees, do not interfere with the fact that they provide for legal solutions as well: if a case fulfils the antecedent of a principle, then there is a legal consequence for that case. It is obvious that, if this principle conflicts with another, the solution becomes dependent on their balancing. However, once there is a weighing outcome, a final consequence is obtained and there is no place for intromitting an analogy.
-	Legal question: Are motorcycles allowed in the park?
-	Principle P1: "The environment should be protected by law."
-	Principle P2: "Everyone has freedom of action."
-	Motorcycle entrance is an instance of principles P1 and P2.
-	No norm on "car entrance into the park".
-	No norm on "bicycle entrance into the park".
-	Legal solution is obtained through balancing of principles P1 and P2.
The reductive understanding of the role played by principles as effective regulating norms turns out to affect, then, the proper comprehension of what a gap is. If it still represents an absence of regulation, its extension must consider that both principles and rules are in the same way providing legal consequences, even though principles, bearing expansive antecedents which cover larger amounts of reality, have considerably narrowed the space for unregulated cases. Thus, for the application of law no gap exists if the case at hand is an instance of a principle's antecedent: if it triggers a rule, the rule is applicable, but if it trig-
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gers 'only' a principle, the case is legally foreseen as well and, with or without balancing, the principle has to be applied.27
-	Legal question: Are motorcycles allowed in the park?
-	Principle Pi: "The environment should be protected by law."
-	Principle P2: "Everyone has freedom of action."
-	Motorcycle entrance is an instance of principles P1 and P2.
-	Rule1: "Cars are not allowed into the park."
-	Rule2: "Bicycles are allowed into the park."
-	Legal solution is not achieved by analogy.
-	Legal solution is still obtained through balancing of principles P1 and P2.
-	Legal question: Are cars allowed in the park?
-	Legal solution is given by Rule1.
It seems that what is meant by "gap" has significantly changed pursuant to the distinction between principles and rules and, consequently, to what follows from the "optimisation requirement" character of principles.28 If one accepts that both principles and rules stipulate legal consequences, and thus that both are capable of solving cases in the very same way, the extension of "gap" now has a range that seems to cover only two normative situations: (i) the unlikely situation in which no norm is applicable to a case, neither a rule nor a principle, and (ii) the situation in which a rule, blocking the applicability of principles, has a consequence that has not been specified for a category that, among others, also belongs to its sphere.29 If these normative situations define what can enter into the extension of "gap", it follows therefrom that the basic operation of analogy is confined to them.30
27	But surely without analogy, as its normative circumstances are not present. This justifies why some forms of alleged analogy cannot be considered as such (for instance, Verheij & Hage 1994: 65; also in the case of a reductionist approach, Kaptein 2005: 502). Naturally, with regard to the concept of the gap, only normative gaps are relevant here (on the distinction between normative and axiological gaps, Nino 2003: 281, and Rodríguez 2000: 152).
28	For instance, Alexy 2002: 47 and ff., and Brozek 2012: 223.
29	The point here is that normative gaps exist only at the level of rules if rules created the gap or at the level of principles if any is applicable (Ruiz Manero 2005: 123). The following example, in the case of gap2, shows what is meant by this. On the other hand, it is important to note that the common distinction between explicit and implicit principles (for instance, Burazin 2014: 171) is of no consequence for this matter. If a principle is unwritten, one of two scenarios has to be real: it is or is not a norm of a set (legal order). If the second alternative is the case, there is no principle at all and nothing follows from it. But, if it is an effective norm of a set, which is naturally the case with a customary source, then it behaves as all principles do and is no different from written principles. Being written or not is irrelevant to defining a legal consequence, provided that it is (accepted as) a norm belonging to a set.
30	All this presupposes that analogy, as an operation adoptable in order to create a decision-norm not enacted by the normative authority, depends on a norm allowing its use under a specific condition and the fact that this condition is the existence of a gap.
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-	Casei: Circulation of cars whose plates start with a letter.
-	Gap situation^ If case1 is not covered by any rule or any principle (gap1).
-	Gap situations If existing norms have unspecified consequences for casei5 for instance:
-	Rule1: "Car circulation is restricted to three days per week."
-	Rule2: "Plates with an even first digit: Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays."
-	Rule3: "Plates with an odd first digit: Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays."
-	No rule was enacted for the few cars whose plates start with a letter (gap2).
10 FINAL REMARK
Analogy is goal-oriented: no choice among comparison factors, particularly at the level of similarity2, can be carried out except in view of some purpose. Without some such purpose, the meta-factor deciding which factor prevails is indefinable and, for this reason, the choice among factors lacks justification and becomes a strictly arbitrary option. Since principles provide the ends adopted by a legal order both on a larger scale and more perceptibly, and since these ends are usually introduced in analogy in order to solve the meta-factor problem, the goal-oriented character of analogy has found its main source of oper-ability in these kind of norms. Here, however, principles play a double role: as "end-providers" and, while giving direct solutions for cases, as "gap-decreasers". This duplicity has to be treated carefully: whenever principles govern a case, they immediately put analogy aside and thus remove the possibility of them constituting the criteria with regard to what is similar to what.
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synopses, keywords, and biographical notes 191
Synopsis
David Duarte
Analogy and Balancing: The Partial Reducibility Thesis and Its Problems
SLO. | Analogno sklepanje in tehtanje: teza o delni zvedljivosti in njeni problemi. Avtor z analizo zgradbe in poteka analognega sklepanja poda kritiko teze o delni zvedljivosti, tj. teze, po kateri je analogno sklepanje - z izjemo tistega koraka, ki ustreza strogi analogiji -mogoče razložiti kot obliko tehtanja. Avtor najprej izpostavi nekatere probleme omenjene teze; na primer nenujnost zvedljivosti in dejstvo, da se pod krinko tehtanja opravlja prava analogija. Osrednje sporočilo razprave pa je trditev, da analognega sklepanja ni mogoče uspešno zvesti na obliko tehtanja.
Ključne besede: analogija, antecedent, tehtanje, dejavniki primerjave, praznine, teza o delni zvedljivosti, načela, pravila, podobnost, subsumpcija
ENG. | With an analysis of the structure and the sequence of analogy, the paper is mainly a critique to the partial reducibility thesis: a thesis sustaining that analogy, besides a strictly analogical step, is in the remaining part reducible to balancing. Thus, the paper points out some problems raised by the partial reducibility thesis, such as the contingency of reducibility or the fact that a proper analogy is done under the cover of a balancing. The main point is, however, the claim that analogy and balancing have opposite normative conditions, being this premise the reason to a structural explanation for the unacceptability of the reducibility enterprise.
Key words: analogy, antecedent, balancing, factors of comparison, gaps, partial reducibility thesis, principles, rules, similarity, subsumption
Summary: 1. Three as the Starting Point for Analogy and Balancing. — 2. Analogy by Steps: Some Basic Considerations Concerning the Sequence. — 3. The Same Steps in a Legal Cases Analogy. — 4. The Partial Reducibility Thesis. — 5. First Problem: Random Weighing Outcome. — 6. Second Problem: Analogy Covered by Balancing. — 7. Third Problem: Balancing Irrelevant Principles. — 8. Fourth Problem: Not Enough Principles for Balancing. — 9. The Background Problem: Analogy and Balancing Do Not Match. — 10. Final Remark.
David Duarte is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Lisbon, Portugal. | Address: Faculdade de Direito, Universidade de Lisboa, Alameda da Universidade, Cidade Universitaria, 1649-014 Lisboa, Portugal. E-mail: davidduarte@fd.ulisboa.pt.
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