

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DIVERSITY, POLITY, AND THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE

HAKAN G. SICAKKAN

Abstract

This article proposes a conceptual and analytical framework for analysing the ongoing structuring of the European public sphere. It views the public sphere as being in a symbiotic, but non-deterministic relationship with polity forms and diversity accommodations. Operationalising the public sphere as a four-dimensional matrix of governance levels, networks, discourses, and collective actors, which takes into account the aforementioned relationship, it identifies the elements of the public sphere that should be focused on research about the European public sphere and locates the individual articles in this issue of *Javnost – The Public* within this matrix.

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Introduction

Post war political change in Europe is characterised by an incessant democratisation process in which the distinction between rulers and ruled is gradually fading away. As the *demos* becomes both the ruler and the ruled through advanced democracy, the notion of rulers' legitimacy loses its common sense meaning, and individuals' legitimacy *vis-à-vis* the liberal democratic state also gains in significance. An inadvertent outcome of advanced democracy is, thus, the notion of individuals' legitimacy in the eyes of the *demos* and of its elected government.

The notion of "legitimacy of individuals" has historical roots, and its content is determined according to different criteria in different socio-political contexts. In social and political theory, examples of such criteria are individuals' *consent* in the rules of the democratic game (Habermas 1994a, 1994b), their *express consent* in and *recognition* of the values, virtues, and conventions of the *demos* in particularised socio-political contexts, which are thought to have universal features (Oldfield 1990), *cultural belonging* to the community (Taylor 1992), *national belonging* to the polity (Miller 2000), and *primordial belonging* to a community (Scruton 1980, 1990).

In this context of reciprocal legitimacy claims by rulers and ruled, which, in an ideal democracy, are merged in one and the same entity (*demos*), criteria determining the states' legitimacy are supplemented with criteria determining individuals' legitimacy – based on persons' belonging, race, ideology, origin, loyalty, participation, gender, sexuality, class, life-style, participation, contribution to community, etc. These criteria are devised and institutionalised by the ruling and ruled *demos* through democratic processes.

Legitimacy of individuals unfolds itself not only as privileging of individuals and groups who qualify as "real" and "worthy" citizens, but also as exclusion and marginalisation of "semi-legitimate" and "illegitimate" citizens, something which also has consequences for citizens' exercise of basic political rights – such as limitations or pressures on the right of free speech, participation, and upward mobility – often resulting in the citizens' absence or limited appearance in the public sphere. Rousseau called such "legitimately" semi-excluded citizens "foreigners amongst citizens" (Rousseau 1989).

To be sure, these are criteria for *internal* inclusion and exclusion of citizens, and they are related to citizens' affairs with the power-holders. However, political systems also have *external* inclusion and exclusion machineries – e.g., immigration, asylum, non-citizens' rights, enlargement issues. What happens at external boundaries also recurs onto internal boundaries of society, and vice versa. The interplay between internal and external boundary making shapes the notion of diversity, which in turn structures the public sphere according to the power relations between different groups. Any attempt at studying the public sphere needs to focus on the interplay between internal and external boundary making, exclusion and inclusion in the public spheres resulting from this interplay, how such inclusion and exclusion patterns structure the public sphere, and the consequences of these for democracy.

Earlier research on the European public sphere (EPS) has made crucial contributions to our understanding of the making of today's Europe. It has shown us that it is difficult to realise a common EPS in the foreseeable future but that there

are traces of a segmented EPS in the making on some policy issues (Eriksen 2005). Most important of all, it has drawn our attention to integrative (de Beus 2010), democratising (Fossum and Schlesinger 2007), legitimising (Lord and Beetham 2001), and meaning-creating (Calhoun 2005) functions of the public sphere. The normatively well-justified view of the EPS as a means of achieving democratic legitimacy at the European level, on the other hand, has not been substantiated empirically, and earlier research teaches us little about how a public sphere can be inclusive in the European context of deep and complex diversities. Existence of a near-to-perfect procedural or deliberative democracy, including a public sphere where citizens freely exercise their rights of free speech, assembly, critique, and deliberation in order to form the public will, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy. If we accept that any notion of state legitimacy produces a corresponding notion of legitimacy of individuals, it is important to inquire into which forms of public sphere include/exclude which groups, in what degree, and on which matters.

In this sense, I take a complementary normative stance with a focus on inclusion/exclusion in and at the boundaries of the public sphere. It is of urgent importance to investigate whether the focus on democratic legitimacy in mainstream EPS studies has inadvertently led to the emergence of new criteria defining who the (il)legitimate participants of the public sphere should be. Indeed, it has been empirically shown in numerous case studies of national public spaces that, in contexts of diversity, such standards can be discriminatory, marginalising, and excluding.[1] As a supplement to the contributions made by the democratic legitimacy debate in EPS studies, I conceptualise the EPS as *a means of inclusion for democracy* with the following overall research question: Is an inclusive EPS possible under conditions of complex diversity, multi-level governance, and shifting boundaries within and of the EU?

The word "inclusive," combined with this special issue's sub-title, "towards a citizens' Europe," is a manifestation of my overall normative orientation toward the public sphere as a site of inclusion and accommodation of diversity. On the other hand, this is also an empirical research orientation positioned against earlier European research's primary focus on the procedures, mechanisms, and legitimising and democratising functions of public spheres, leaving barely answered the substantial question of "what kind of diversity and openness are allowed in public spheres?" – i.e., the main normative question posed by diversity, gender, minority, race, sexuality, disability, and marginalisation researchers.

This research question brings into focus the different approaches to inclusion and diversity, which also impinge upon how one envisions the public sphere, politics, society, and the state. For example, it is possible to view inclusion as assimilation, integration, institutional segregation in a shared polity, or simply as co-existence under a minimal state. It is also possible to view diversity in terms of collective or individual identities and belongings; essentialised collective identities like ethnicity, race, sex, religion, and nation; or in terms of constructed group or individual identities. This all depends on the ontological beliefs of the viewer, and not necessarily the reality. No need to say, each of these priorities includes certain groups as the relevant components of society, on which the public sphere and political institutions are to be based, and, also, which policymaking should

address. Consequently, while determining the relevance of groups and issues, each of these approaches excludes certain groups, individuals, and issues based on their ontological priorities.[2]

Through exclusions and inclusions, ontologies and normative visions have direct consequences for, among other things, notions of politics, society, polity, and citizenship.[3] The different ontological points of departure and their normative exhortations have consequences for the definition of the EPS, European diversity, the European polity, and the design of empirical research on these phenomena. After such a choice is made, the resultant research design will reinforce certain visions of society, polity, and public sphere and justify certain inclusions/exclusions in the public sphere. If research ought to be committed to nourishing our restless wonderments about how society and politics are possible (as opposed to how certain visions of society and politics can be realised), it is of the utmost importance to assess which models of EPS are more inclusive than others in a given context. Indeed, this is one of the main objectives of this special issue, and each of the articles included address different kinds of inclusions and exclusions that are observed in our empirical material about the EPS.

Polity, Diversity, and the Public Sphere

Approaches to the public sphere, especially concerning its purpose and structure, are inspired by discussions between individualists, communalists, multiculturalists, and pluralists. To accommodate individual differences, individualists[4] suggest a single, discursive public sphere (e.g., Habermas 1989). For the European case, this implies "Europeanisation of national public spheres" (e.g., Gerhards 2000; Eriksen 2005). Communalists and multiculturalists propose multiple, segmented public spheres at two levels to accommodate separate historical/cultural communities in one polity (e.g., Taylor 1992; Kymlicka 1995).[5] In the case of Europe, this implies a segmented public sphere divided along the lines of national (and sub-national) cultures (e.g., Kielmannsegg 2003). Criticising both alternatives because of their singular recipes for the good life, pluralists[6] advocate the midway perspective of accommodating both individual and group differences in multiple, multi-level public spheres (e.g., Fraser's (2007) subaltern counter-publics). The implication of this for the European case is "a European sphere of publics" (e.g., Schlesinger 2003).

These four normative approaches unfold differently at various intersections of (1) individualism/collectivism and (2) internal and external openness/closedness of the political system. Figure 1 illustrates a ranking of six models of political society along two dimensions: *vision of political system* and *image of person*. The former dimension represents "political visions" in terms of preferences concerning direct democracy, which empowers all social groups to be influential in the political decision-making process and allow radical changes in the political system through mass participation. The latter dimension conceptualises "image of man" in terms of beliefs about the alterability of human identity and belonging independently of individuals' immediate surroundings. The combination of these two dimensions implies six political society models as illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Six Normative Models of Society



The conceptual frameworks in Figure 1 comprise various relationships between internal and external boundaries, norms, institutions, public sphere, form of political society (the perpendicular axis), and individuals' belongings and identities (the horizontal axis). The models which advocate radical openness for internal systemic changes through direct democracy, and which at the same time assume that individuals' basic features, such as culture, life-style, identity, and political preferences, are unalterable, prescribe the most restrictive models of inclusion in the public sphere (e.g. the community-of-culture perspective). On the other end of this continuum, those models which advocate radical openness for systemic changes and which simultaneously hold that human identity is utterly changeable, prescribe the most inclusive models of public sphere (e.g. the diverse-society perspective). The way of conceptualising diversity and inclusion/exclusion of different types of belongings in each model is different.

Table 1 gives a simplified overview of the theoretical relationships between visions of political society, notions of diversity, and envisioned models of public sphere. The horizontal axis (*types of belongings*) lists the belongings acceptable for inclusion in the public sphere. The perpendicular axis (*visions of society*) represents the envisaged forms of political society. Corresponding public sphere models are placed on the diagonal at different intersections of the two prime dimensions. The first three models (*community of culture, multicultural society, and civic political community*) have particularistic or universalistic presuppositions concerning the relationship between diversity and public sphere. The other three models (*civil political community, civil plural society, and the civic diverse society*) can be distinguished

Table 1: Theoretical Relations between Models of Public Sphere, Polity, and Diversity

Visions of Political Society	***Types of Belongings and Diversity Allowed in the Public Sphere***					
	Singular and Historically Fixed	Singular and Socially Fixed	Singular and Politically Fixed	Singular and Alterable	Multiple and Alterable	Multi-dimensional, Alterable, Mobile
The community of culture	1. Single Protected Sphere					
The multicultural society		2. Multiple Segmented Spheres				
The civic political society			3. Single Shared Sphere			
The civil political society				4. Multi-level Overlapping Nested Spheres		
The civil plural society					5. Multi-level Differential Spheres	
The civic diverse society						6. Multiple Composite Eurospheres

from the former three models by their ambition of context-sensitivity. The common concern in the last three models is to include, give voice to, and empower all the segments of society in the public sphere, though in different ways. Their differences lie primarily in the ontological status they give to individuals' different modes of belonging in their perspectives of diversity.

The first model, "community of culture," largely corresponds to the communitarian vision of society which views the common culture as the essential element of a society that provides a meaning frame for individuals – there is no meaning outside the context of a community culture. Without the community, thus, the individual cannot exist. In this understanding, the public sphere is a social space that accommodates and ensures the continuation of a collective meaning frame that is shared by all members of the community, in a Deweyan or Taylorian sense (Dewey 1985; Taylor 1985). The public sphere is not only an instrument providing democratic legitimacy to power-holders. As a space where the gist of the community is created, preserved, reproduced, and transferred from generation to generation, the community's common public sphere is an end in itself. Hence, the public sphere has to be a *protected space*, since by shielding it we also save the community and its meaning frame. According to this understanding, the only way of protecting the community and its public sphere is to organise the society as a small polity, as Dewey suggested, territorially and institutionally separate from other communities. In the case of the European Union, this model's viability is low. Indeed, the communitarian paradigm would be against creating a single, common EPS shared by all because this would mean the destruction of meaning-bearing communities.

The "multicultural society" model unfolds differently in communalist and individualist perspectives. Communalist multiculturalism does not regard organisation in a small sovereign polity as a necessity. Instead, it demands political autonomy for groups claiming a right to a unique culture (e.g., ethno-religious and ethno-national groups) in territorially divided federal political systems. Apart from suggesting co-existence with other communities in a common federal polity, communalist multiculturalism is similar to the "community-of-culture" perspective in its ontological and normative premises. In communalist multiculturalism, the public sphere model is *segmented along the boundaries of the communities* constituting the federal polity, and there is little horizontal communication and interaction across the boundaries of communities' public spaces, but much communication, deliberation, interaction, and collaboration through community representatives at the federal level.

The third model, "civic political society," corresponds to the liberal-republican society model. Belongings are viewed as alterable independently of individuals' belonging backgrounds – an assumption that fits nicely this model's requirement of citizens' assimilation into a common political culture and abidance by the rules of the democratic game, while allowing for all types of belongings in the private sphere (cf. Habermas 1994a, 1994b). As a space between the state and civil society where power-holders are criticised and held accountable, the public sphere's main function is the formation of common will through public deliberations, following certain rules of communication and deliberation in the public sphere. For this to happen, all citizens and residents are expected to participate in political processes and public deliberation, no matter what belongings they may have. Hence, the civic political society perspective does not tolerate segmentations in the public sphere because, then, the formation of common will would be impossible. What we read between the lines of liberal-republican writings is that the civic political society model requires a *single public sphere*, shared and freely participated in by all citizens and residents of a unitary polity.

The last three models agree that the plurality of belongings should be accommodated in *interconnected multiple public spheres*; however, their designs vary between *nested-overlapping*, *differential*, and *embracive* spaces. The "civil political community model" is the individualist version of multiculturalism. Viewing the right to belong to a community as an individual choice, the individualist version of multiculturalism does not insist on strict communal autonomy but allows it if this is the choice of individuals who freely come together to form a community. The model gives priority to discrete, singular, and alterable forms of belonging in its approach to diversity; structures the public space based on such belongings; and proposes *ad hoc* institutional solutions for inclusion of multiple and mobile forms of belonging. Its nested-overlapping public spaces pre-suppose a degree of homogeneity of belonging in nested, multi-level political units, based on the existing limitations that the Westphalian states system poses, where the communities have a high degree of autonomy to bypass governance levels above themselves. Therefore, it pre-supposes the existence of a complex set of community-specific public spaces which overlap and interact with each other, as components of a larger public sphere. The "civil plural society model," on the other hand, recognises the multiple and alterable nature of individuals and proposes a public space model

that gives differential access to citizens and residents. The degree of inclusion in the public sphere increases with respect to individuals' degree of "insiderness" in the political system, defined by society-determined diversity categories. The "civic diverse society model" recognises all the above forms of belonging as equally valid and moral modes of being, and it problematises the exclusion of belongings that are based on identities that are mobile between different references of identification and thus that cannot be classified under the political-system-defined group/citizen categories.

The Founding Elements of the European Public Sphere

What complicates the task of understanding the EPS is that the aforementioned types of public space all co-exist in it. The EPS should be conceptualised as a sphere that consists of several different types of public spaces that co-exist at different levels, where the transnational European (trans-European) public sphere is only one of the constituent public spaces. Consequently, a trans-European public is only one of the multiple types of public that constitute the European public (see also Sicakkan's article in this issue).

Figure 2: Discourses, Actors, and Networks in the Public Sphere



These public spaces are inhabited by a complex diversity of historical and new publics – e.g., minority publics, national publics, transnational publics, trans-European publics, and new publics. They create their own distinct, internal discursive spaces. More importantly, the institutional and other collective actors emerging from and operating in these spaces, and voicing the publics that inhabit these spaces,

interact increasingly more beyond the existing boundaries and across the levels of governance to create the trans-European spaces.

Some of the trans-boundary communications and interactions – be they collaborations, conflicts, exchanges, or contestations – are explained by common pasts, shared cultural heritage, collective identities, geographical proximity, economic structures and incentives, practical suitability, exit/voice possibilities, and political opportunity structures. This special issue is about the ingredients of this reality that cannot be explained exclusively by such factors, but also with the increasing ability of people to transcend their immediate surroundings and identify with distant political entities, hard-to-imagine collectivities, and less tangible ideas about their own belongings.

The social and political dynamics triggering the emergence of the EPS must be sought in the tensions between, on one hand, the architects and gatekeepers and, on the other, the transcenders and trespassers of borders and boundaries within and around the co-existing publics and public spaces. Each article in this special issue addresses this tension in different ways by focusing on different kinds of actors and public spaces that compete with the trans-European spaces.

Articles in This Issue

Concerning the articulation of the EPS, this special issue focuses on the impact of two specific building blocks of European society, which are seen to be amongst the crucial factors impinging upon the shaping of a public sphere:

• *The roles of different types of social and political* ***actors*** and their ***networks*** *in the articulation of inclusive EPS* – whether or how different types of social and political actors contribute to or impede the formation of a certain model of EPS.

- individual citizens
- think tanks/policy research institutes
- political parties
- social movement/non-governmental organisations
- print and broadcast media

• *The impacts of different social and political* ***spaces*** *on the articulation of inclusive EPS* – whether or how different types of social and political spaces facilitate or impede the emergence of a certain model of EPS.

- essentialising (ethnic/minority) spaces
- nationalising spaces
- transnationalising spaces
- trans-Europeanising
- gendering spaces

These choices are not arbitrary: A focus on the public sphere has to include citizens', institutional civil society actors', and the mass media's framings of issues. Concerning institutions, one has to focus on key civil society actors operating/maneuvering in the public sphere (see Sicakkan's article for criteria for sample selection). Further, both citizens and civil society organisations still relate to the different and sometimes multiple types of public spaces that developed historically as components of the existing national public spheres, which will also have to remain as components of an emerging EPS for a long time.

Table 2: Types of Actors and Public Spaces Covered by the Articles in This Issue

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2" rowspan="2"></td><td colspan="5">Type of Public Space</td></tr>
<tr><td>Gendering</td><td>Essentialising</td><td>Nationalising</td><td>Trans-nationalising</td><td>Trans-Europeanising</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="5">Type of Actor</td><td>Individual Citizens</td><td colspan="5">Klicperova-Baker and Kostal</td></tr>
<tr><td>Political Parties</td><td rowspan="2">Bruell, Mokre and Siim</td><td rowspan="2">Bruell, Mokre and Siim / Sicakkan</td><td colspan="3">Sata/Sicakkan</td></tr>
<tr><td>SMOs / NGOs</td><td colspan="2">Sicakkan</td><td>Kutay/ Sicakkan</td></tr>
<tr><td>Think Tanks</td><td rowspan="2">None</td><td colspan="3">Sicakkan</td></tr>
<tr><td>Media Actors</td><td colspan="3">Sicakkan/Zografova, Bakalova and Mizova</td></tr>
</table>

With a focus on different types of actors and public spaces, as summarised in Table 2, the articles in this issue show how the EPS is structured by a variety of tensions between the architects/gatekeepers and transcenders/trespassers of borders and boundaries in Europe.

Acar Kutay presents a case study of the Platform of European Social NGOs (Social Platform) and discusses the tension between the EU's aim to Europeanise the national civil society organizations' aim of gaining political influence at the European level.

Bruell, Mokre, and Siim discover three contesting discourses about intersectionality between gender and diversity and show how these have become a site of contestation between the diversity-oriented trans-European networks and the gender-equality-oriented national political parties and social movements.

Robert Sata gives an account of how diversity preferences of national political parties affect their willingness to become the transcendrs of national boundaries, finding that this depends on the domestic cleavage structures and competition.

Yolanda Zografova, Diana Bakalova, and Bistra Mizova's study of national media's reporting of the news about two EU-related themes documents that media, even on the core EU issues, are lagging behind the other types of actors when it comes to transcending the national boundaries, which confirms the horizontal segmentation of the media sphere component of the EPS.

Focusing on how the tension between elites and citizens is structuring the EPS, Martina Klicperová-Baker and Jaroslav Košťál map out the matches and mismatches between elite and citizen views on diversity, indicating a vertical segmentation of discourses.

Finally, with a focus on the tension between "trans-Europeanising" and other types of public spaces, this author shows in his article that the EPS is in the process of becoming both horizontally and vertically segmented.

In its entirety, this special issue substantiates the hypothesis that the different types of public spaces, including the trans-European ones, constitute a partially interconnected system of spaces, an EPS, through the mechanisms of gatekeeping and trespassing at different levels of society. Each article also presents findings about the new possible and observed inclusions and exclusions that this EPS legitimises.

Acknowledgment

Around 40 senior researchers and 90 junior researchers from 17 universities in 16 European countries contributed to the project in its different phases and stages. The authors in this special issue are grateful for their invaluable contribution. Special thanks to Professor Slavko Splichal, the editor of *Javnost – The Public* for useful comments. The articles in this issue present part of the results from the EUROSPHERE project (http://eurospheres.org). EUROSPHERE is an integrated project led by Hakan G. Sicakkan at the University of Bergen and funded by the European Commission through the 6th Framework Programme (http://cordis.europa.eu/fp6/dc/index.cfm?fuseaction=UserSite.FP6HomePage). We devote this special issue to the memory of our dear colleague **Professor Michael Bommes** at Osnabrück University, who passed away on 26 December 2010, after finishing his tasks in our common project.

Notes:

1. A huge body of contemporary race, ethnicity, minority, and migrant integration research; gender and gay studies; research on the disabled; and on other marginalised groups strengthen the view that universalistic discourses and rules of participation/communication in public debates result in exclusion of some groups. For examples of theoretical discussions about these, see, among many others, Bader (1995), Fraser (2007), Sandel (1998), Sicakkan (2005, 2006, 2008), Taylor (1992), Walzer (1983), and Young (1989, 1990, 2000).

2. I do not have enough space here to give an overview of the details of relevant approaches, nor to list what each ontology excludes. However, I did this in my earlier work (cf. Sicakkan 2006, 2008).

3. Note that some different normative theories have ended up with similar policy proposals concerning e.g., citizenship, migration and asylum policy, etc. For examples of these, please see the following footnotes. Although this is true at the policy level, the disagreements about models remain strong and still have consequences for which trade-offs are possible.

4. The liberal-republican version of the individualist approach emerges from a rapprochement between liberals and republicans. On the liberal side, Habermas (1994a, 1994b) asserted that individual identities needed to change in order to function in a democratic constitutional state because membership in a democratic constitutional state requires a civic political culture based on public deliberation and communicative action. Effectivity in the public sphere as participating citizens and, for this purpose, assimilation into the deliberative political culture was what Habermas expected from all individuals. In the private sphere, he concurred, individuals did not need to adapt their particular identities to society at large. The limit to change was political culture. This stance is, on the one hand, republican, because it requires individuals' assimilation into a political culture and their identification with a constitution – i.e. constitutional patriotism. On the other, it is also liberal because it allows individual and group identities to exist in the private sphere. From the republican side, Barber argued that it was necessary to create the civic identity that is essential in a "strong democracy," without requiring individuals to abandon their group identities, as long as such identities allow individuals to assume their civic responsibilities and duties (Barber 1984).

5. There are varieties of multiculturalism: Amongst reputed multiculturalists, Kymlicka (1995) advocated "liberal policies of multiculturalism." Based on the ontological priority of individuals and their autonomy, he asserted that individuals can choose to belong to certain communities. As long as a communal identity is an individual choice, he claimed, multiculturalist policies and rights regimes based on groups were defensible. On the communitarian side, Walzer defended a type of communitarianism based on individuals' choice. Walzer made a distinction between two types of liberalism (Walzer 1990). In Walzer's framework, Liberalism-1 can be similar to the Kantian or Lockean liberalisms. Liberalism-2 emerges from Liberalism-1 as a result of individuals' free choices to belong to a particular community. In Walzer's approach, communal identity is defended because it is understood as an individual choice. On the other hand, departing from communitarian premises, Taylor, too, defended multiculturalist policies and rights regimes, but those which were based on

the priority and autonomy of communities (Taylor 1992). Although their ethical and ontological premises were substantially different, liberal and communitarian multiculturalisms have become quite similar in their policy implications: recognition of group rights, affirmative action policies, sovereignty devolutions/autonomy to suppressed historical minorities, etc.

6. Similarly, one finds a multitude of pluralist approaches to diversity. Radical pluralism (e.g., Gray 2000) argues with a point of departure in the incommensurability of value-sets in diverse society. Proposing a context-sensitive *modus vivendi* as a solution for co-existence in diverse societies, the basic assumption in radical pluralism seems to be a momentous fixity of individuals' and groups' cognitive positions in relation to different identification alternatives that are available in society. The diversity perspective of Eurosphere, accepting the incommensurability argument only partially, assumes that individuals have different degrees of mobility of minds between the existing alternatives as well as self-created alternatives.

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Citizens, Communication, and Democracy in the New Digital World

30th EURICOM Colloquium on Communication and Culture in Honour of Professor Hanno Hardt

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EUROPEANISATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY THROUGH THE SPONSORED EUROPEAN PUBLICS

ACAR KUTAY

Abstract

The EU institutions, particularly the European Commission and the European Economic and Social Committee, have encouraged and sponsored the emergence of non-governmental organisations in Brussels. This strategy has been aimed at mobilising the interests of social actors toward the EU and at helping to reduce the EU's perceived communication deficit. This article first suggests that, when put into practice, this strategy has rather reinforced Europeanisation of social actors. Europeanisation within civil society has been rendered as legitimisation of the European political project and of particular modes of governance. Then, the article proposes an alternative NGO networking model, which stresses the civilising impacts of public spheres instead of the proximity of civil society with political power.

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Introduction

From a normative perspective, European NGOs (EU NGOs) role as agents of democratisation has been explained with their potential to function like a transmission belt of European civil society (i.e. establishing a link between grassroots influence and political power) and to generate a critical rationality (Eriksen 2001; De Schutter 2002; Magnette 2003; Steffek et al. 2007).[1] In this view, EU NGOs contribute to democratisation of EU governance by creating publicity about the EU and by carrying the lifeworld experiences of civil society, along with the public interests, to EU policy-making processes. The proponents of this view, though, have ignored the impacts of the top-down processes by assuming that the discursive interactions within NGO networking necessarily flow from the local to the supranational (Curtin 1999; De Schutter 2002; Magnette 2003; Steffek et al. 2007). Accordingly, they have relied on the fact that EU NGOs necessarily possess the means to detect and link public deliberations to European policy-making processes.

The EU's current strategies in regard to civil society can rather be conceived in terms of the legacy of the EU's political project, which suggests creating Europeanised elites whose interests are directed towards the EU. Europeanisation of the EU NGOs and their Europeanising impacts have been addressed in three different ways. First, from a normative perspective, Europeanisation has been conceived as being akin to political socialisation and social constituency building (Warleigh 2001; see also Brüggeman 2005; Fossum and Trenz 2006). Second, it has been argued that EU NGOs have an ambition to implant a European dimension to the NGO community (Sánchez-Salgado 2007). Third, the role of the EU institutions in the making of a European civil society has been addressed with the notion of "participatory engineering" (Zittel and Fuchs 2007; Sauregger 2010). With empirical evidence, this article contributes to these studies which have grasped the top-down processes in the constitution of civil society. Yet, it contradicts the notion of Europeanisation of civil society from above, and in this respect, it conceives Europeanisation of civil society as a detriment to the democratising promises of civil society. In contrast to the argument that defines the main problem of the EU NGOs' work with respect to their disconnection from the grassroots, this article rather points out their Europeanisation as the main problem.

This problem was predicted by Armstrong (2002, 115) who defined Europeanisation of civil society as "processes by which the civil society actors organise in larger, transnational structures not merely to act as a vehicle for national members, but in order to give an authoritatively, representative European voice" (cf. Sánchez-Salgado 2007). Yet, he also addressed another problem related to the work of the EU NGOs, namely that this networking structure would also be hindered by the autonomisation of the Brussels headquarters, resulting in Europeanisation of civil society from above. Armstrong (2002, 115) then argued that in the case of lack of communication and connections between the supranational headquarters and the grassroots, EU NGOs would "develop their strategies independently from the direct control of their members." This article suggests that the activities of the Platform during the 2000s have proved Armstrong's predictions about the processes of Europeanisation and autonomisation, as these concepts were defined by him.

EU institutions have taken on the role of legitimising the presence of these organisations in Brussels, and their contribution to European public policy-making,

by devising norms about their representativeness, accountability, and inclusiveness. Having concentrated on the EU NGOs' work in Brussels, however, this strategy avoids the attention from the impacts of the EU and of these organisations on the organised actors of civil society (CES 851/99, 1999). In turn, to legitimise the engagement of EU NGOs in European governance, the EU has focused on developing formal and procedural rules, including enacting a code of conduct (COM 2002, 704 final) defining criteria for representation and inclusiveness (CES 240/2006, 2006). Nonetheless, due to the process of Europeanisation of civil society, these initiatives would not necessarily help to correct the shortcomings of the EU NGOs' work. In contrast to this formalist and pragmatist perspective, I would rather suggest that the central premises of civil society – in promoting public deliberation, identity-formation and linking public concerns through public spheres – should be sought beyond the proximity of civil society, with the political authorities. In this sense, I will elaborate, at the end, a cognitive model through which particular interests would be transformed into common interests within NGO networking. This model suggests that interactions among NGOs would have civilising impacts when these interactions are not dominated by the political authorities.

The research was conducted within the scope of the EUROSPHERE project,[2] and was based on a methodology of document analysis, reports, leaflets, brochures and newsletters, along with a total of six interviews with the secretariat and members of the Social Platform, one of the prominent EU NGO networks. The documents examined in this article cover the period of the 2000s. The interviews were conducted by the author during 2009.

I will first address the issue of the Commission's active role in the emergence of the Social Platform and discuss the debate over the NGOs' funding by the EU. Then, I will elaborate on how the Social Platform engaged in Europeanisation of civil society during the 2000s, by drawing on empirical evidence about its activities during the 2000s related to the milestone events of the European integration. Finally, I will represent an alternative model for NGO networking, which can function as a public sphere of civil society (cf. Calhoun 1993, 2005; Dryzek 1999).

The Social Platform of European NGOs as a Sponsored European Public

The Social Platform of European NGOs, the network of NGO networks, is a prominent social actor which is officially recognised by the Commission as a partner in social policy. It was established during the 1990s, following the Green Paper on European Social Policy (COM 1993, 551 final), which aimed to initiate structured communication channels between the EU NGOs[3] working in the field of social policy and EU institutions. What makes the Platform significant for this article is that it was established by the Commission in 1995 to help the Commission to play an intermediary role between the Commission and the social NGO networks (Cram 2006; Greenwood 2007a). I will, in the following sections, elaborate upon how, and on which issues, the Platform has fulfilled its task. Cullen (2005, 72) stresses that "the Platform marked the first attempt to gather a group of NGOs characterised by diverse organisational cultures, sectoral interests and ideological orientations within such a collaborative context."[4] I will, however, take issue with the argument that this networking infrastructure has been built by the Platform in order to connect European citizenry with European governance.

The Platform claims that it is set up to articulate the interests of European civil society with the European political structures by gathering transnational networks of European NGOs. In the paper, this networking mechanism is well-interconnected among different sectors and between different levels – including the national and the European. For an initial observer, this structure could be considered a well-functioning network, in which the different levels of civil society communicate with each other, and, in turn, that deliberations begun within this structure *necessarily* link to the political public spheres. Yet, this networking structure is prone to being moulded by the EU institutions.

In this respect, the sponsorship and financial support of the EU can be conceived as one of the most controversial issues hindering the independence of civil society. The survival of EU NGOs, by and large, is dependent on EU funding and on producing certain outputs as a requirement of their contractual obligations. The central challenge for the EU NGOs, then, is to find a balance between complying with their financiers' demands and defending the interests of their constituencies. Despite the fact that opportunities for funding and consultations are open to all procedurally, in reality access to EU money and entitlement to partner status are necessarily restricted only to some NGOs –considering that funding resources are limited and the consultation mechanism has a confined capacity to handle inputs. The nature of the EU's strategies regarding civil society encourages a competition among the NGOs for funding and entitlement, thus creating an infrastructure for institutional Darwinism within the NGO community. For instance, the Platform has been advocating using a system of accreditation that could confer a status that would enable some of the NGOs to formally interact with the EU institutions. Despite the fact that the Platform has presented this proposal as a means of securing structured relations between the EU institutions and civil society, in fact, with this proposal, the Platform excludes the possibility of involvement of further actors that would threaten the privileged positions of the NGOs settled within the institutional EU framework, including its own position as a interlocutor of the EU.

Yet, in contrast to the critiques of EU funding, some defend EU support by comparing it with the state's financial support for political parties (Fazi and Smith 2006; see also Salgado 2007). In this view, funding EU NGOs is particularly appealing to European governance in a context wherein a European public cannot be built on the basis of a common identity or a common public sphere. For instance, the Social Platform is funded by the EU, under the grant programme of the *Community Action Programme to Promote Active European Citizenship*. Furthermore, in arguing that democracy should not wait for spontaneous emergence of critical publics, the defenders of the EU funding suggest that the EU should mobilise civil society by financially supporting the civic organisations and by formally incorporating them into the decision-making structures (cf. Cohen and Sabel 1997).[5] This strategy, in turn, presumes creating a "critical gaze" around the bureaucratic administration, while reinforcing efficient and effective problem-solving governance (Bohman 2010) by focusing on the Platform's activities. Yet, in the following discussion, I will show how the supporters of EU funding have failed in this regard, and how Armstrong's aforementioned admonition concerning the Europeanisation of the EU NGOs has turned into reality.

Europeanisation of Civil Society

The Turin Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) summit in 1996 diagnosed the legitimacy crisis of EU governance due to a lack of citizens' interest. Since then, the motto of bridging the gap with the citizens has been recognised as the norm by the EU institutions (Kochler-Koch and Finke 2007). Accordingly, the *White Paper on Governance* (WPG) (COM 2001, 428 final) suggested overcoming this gap by relating its proposals about governance reforms to a re-conceptualisation of democracy. This new type of democracy would integrate social groups into decision-making processes and implementation of policies, thus linking citizens' interests to governance. On these grounds, in the early 2000s, the Commission gave a specific emphasis to incorporating EU NGOs into EU governance. The Commission's ex-president, Romano Prodi, articulated the role of the ECS in (new) Europe as follows: "It is time to realise that Europe is not just run by European institutions but by national, regional and local authorities too – and by civil society" (Social Platform 2004). The Platform, on behalf of its members, affirmed Prodi's call, and volunteered for this task of democratising EU governance:

> *NGOs stimulate democratic renewal by providing a channel for citizens to engage in dialogue with policymakers […]. We believe that creating this kind of ongoing dialogue with politicians and policy-makers will help bring about a European Union which is more in touch with its citizens, and is more focused on improving their lives* (Social Platform 2005).

During the early 2000s, in describing its own activity, the Platform claimed that it was "an important way of helping bridge the gap between citizens and the EU institutions and therefore reflecting the views of citizens" (ibid.). The president of the Platform, Conny Reuter, explains the role of the Platform in this process):

> *We must defend the interests of all our member organisations; on the other hand, we must connect to citizens [to advance the interests of the EU]. The most important challenge is to understand that this kind of lobby, what we are doing, is not only for one or two topics. We have connected with the citizens and given them the idea that through us they are involved in EU politics, so that they participate* (personal communication, May 2009).

In turn, the Platform took part in three important incidents concerning European integration during the 2000s: the governance reform, drafting of a Constitution for Europe (2002-2004) and Enlargement (2002-2004). Yet, in these events, the Platform proved to have been acting more like the interlocutor of the EU and the EU NGOs, than as a mechanism linking the voice of the citizenry (cf. Cram 2006).

White Paper on Governance

The *White Paper on Governance* (*WPG*) was a key Commission initiative for administrative reform of EU governance. Despite the Parliament's critical stance toward civil society's engagement in the decision-making process due to their accountability and representation problems, the *WPG* defined civil society as the constituents and stakeholders of governance. The Platform launched the Future of Europe initiative in 2001, which "in a way marked the broadening of the Governance debate" (Social Platform 2001). The Platform "broadened the debate" over governance by circulating its position paper, *Democracy, Governance and European*

NGOs [published in 1999], by participating in the hearings held by the Commission before the launch of the Paper and by organising meetings, speaking at numerous conferences, and writing articles on this issue (Social Platform 2001).

Following the *WPG*, the Platform concentrated on putting into practice the imperatives of the *WPG*, suggesting a new understanding about the relationship between political power and civil society:

> *The Platform will make proposals to the Commission regarding the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission's 2001 White Paper on Governance, which proposes more structured and consistent forms of consultation with society, including the establishment of "partnership agreements" with NGOs in certain sectoral areas* (Social Platform 2003).

The Platform declared its willingness to participate in new power configurations, emphasising that it was capable of fulfilling its roles in that "it plays a leading role in bringing together the various European NGO sectors" (Social Platform 2001). The Platform tried to secure a legal basis for consultations in this regard: "A legal basis for civil dialogue between decision-makers and NGOs is crucial in building a socially just Europe that is able and willing to take the needs of all into account. Promoting this view has been one of the spear points in the Platform's work" (Social Platform 2001). This position has not been altered during the 2000s.

Convention on the Future of Europe, Constitution Turn and the Platform

Against this backdrop, *the Convention on the Future of Europe* was set in 2001 by the European Council, which prepared the *Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe* in 2003. The Convention concerned EU NGOs in the sense that they were included in the discussions; some scholars also considered this as a democratising promise (De Schutter 2002; Magnette 2003). Yet, one of the vice presidents of the Convention, Guliano Amato, emphasised the importance of the "support of civil society in legitimising the final outcome of the Convention's work" (*The Economist* 2004). During the Convention period the Social Platform played an important role in reinforcing a debate about the constitution and the necessity of the constitution within the NGO community. It mobilised the largest NGO networks working in the fields of human rights, environment, and development in order to take part in the debate. With respect to this, during the early 2000s, the Platform initiated several campaigns to promote the debate over the *Future of Europe*. These campaigns, such as the Citizens' Assembly and act4Europe, aimed at mobilising the NGO community for the EU-related issues. Fostering political debate is conceived as a requirement for democratisation (Habermas 1996). Yet, during these campaigns, what was observed was that supranational intermediaries of civil society rather worked for transmitting the political message to the peripheries, instead of carrying the local voices into the constitution-making processes.

For instance, the *Citizens' Assembly* project was introduced within the context of the Future of Europe initiative. It was held in Brussels in December 2001 and continued until 2004. The Platform claimed that the Citizens' Assembly mobilised over 700 NGO delegates, government representatives and members of civil society from all over Europe (Social Platform 2000). It focused on different topics related to the future of Europe, including globalisation, migration, the eradication of poverty, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the European Constitution (ibid.). In

2001, many of the participating NGOs joined in drafting the declaration, "Europe is our Future." This declaration suggested extending EU authority in several areas:

> *We call for the extension of authority of the European Union in the fields of employment, poverty, social exclusion, equality between men and women, sustainable development, services of general interest, food safety, cultural diversity and the fight against discrimination in order to guarantee an upward convergence of policies and national legislation, notably from the point of view of fundamental rights* (Social Platform 2002).

Furthermore, under the leadership of the Social Platform, a group of NGO network coalitions formed the Civil Society Contact Group (CSCG),[6] which initiated the act4europe campaign – that is, the Convention's work – aimed at mobilising the national level NGOs.[7] The Platform declared the objectives of the *act4europe* project as follows: "Citizens have grown dangerously disillusioned with the European project. The Convention on the Future of Europe is thus a vital opportunity to reverse this trend" (Social Platform 2002). With respect to this, act4europe published a toolkit for NGOs in order to inform them about the ongoing debate on the *Future of Europe* and activate them for participating in it.[8] The Campaign's second toolkit about the work of the Convention was distributed at the *Social Policy Forum* in 2002, the forum that brings together the European social NGO networks and the Commission.

The Platform also took an active role in the constitution ratification process. It tried "to facilitate the engagement of social NGOs at national level to engage with the debates around the ratification of the Treaty" (Social Platform 2005, 17). In this respect, it provided legal expertise and analysis about the constitution and prepared a toolkit for NGOs together with the Civil Society Contact Group (CSCG), a coalition of European NGO networks. Furthermore, it organised a conference on the constitution with the Contact Group and a seminar for Platform members on activating NGOs in ratification debates. For the concern of the NGOs, the *Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe* contained an article about "participatory democracy." Despite the fact that the *Draft Constitution* was not ratified, the article on participatory democracy would then be enshrined in the *Reform Treaty* without any change and be constitutionalised with the ratification of the Treaty.[9]

Enlargement and Network Visits

As has been stated, the governance turn promoted by the Commission involves incorporating citizens' associations into public policy-making and administration processes (Jachtenfuchs 2001, Kochler-Koch and Rittberger 2006). This objective required training of those associations that would engage in governance processes – at both EU and local levels – so that they would be capable of managing the complex requirements of public bureaucracy, including that of their own organisations. The Platform took on a trainer task, while conveying the knowledge of EU governance to the NGO community. The trainer task of the Platform can be seen as an attempt to Europeanise the *third sector* from above and with the supranational intermediaries of civil society. To illustrate, it initiated several conferences and seminars to circulate the imperatives of new modes of governance among its members, to inform them about the existence of these policies and to train them for the new era. During the 2000s, the Platform had a special focus on NGOs in Central and Eastern Europe,

organising the following network visits to new member states: Poland (2002), the Czech Republic (2003), Cyprus (2004), Hungary (2004) and Latvia (2004). It organised conferences and seminars to train NGOs in these countries in terms of political advocacy, fundraising, communication techniques and skills, and NGO management. It published toolkits about state-NGO relations, such as "Civil dialogue in the candidate countries: Building bridges across a wider Europe" (Social Platform 2002). In sum, the Platform's training activities can be conceived, on the one hand, as attempts to reinforce the legitimacy of the EU within the new member states; and, on the other, as strategies to foster an ideal collective action model that enables NGOs to talk in a peaceful and constructive manner with power holders. To reiterate, this model was averred by the Platform during the Convention on the European constitution campaigns.

Discontents with Europeanisation of Civil Society

The Platform assessed the Citizen's Assembly as follows:

> *[This] was the first time such a broad coalition of organisations had united to organise an event of this nature, showing that civil society is ready to talk with leaders in a peaceful and constructive manner ... The organisation of the "Citizens' Assembly" in Brussels, December 2001, demonstrated the Platform's ability to mobilise European civil society organisations, and to provide an effective, peaceful and high-profile civil society presence at EU Summits* (Social Platform 2002).

The Platform's own perceptions about the Citizens' Assembly project, combined with its work during the 2000s, can help us draw five conclusions:

First, the Platform revealed that it was, itself, along with the other EU NGOs, the right agent and partner in the process of European political restructuring. NGOs presented their consent and willingness to be agents in this process; thus, they declared that they were ready for formalised deliberations with the political power. In the meantime, they carefully drew a line between themselves and the protesting and deliberating actors of civil society, and thus, in a way, confirmed that they would not challenge the new constellation. The Platform, then, perpetuated the idea of engagement of social actors in deliberative settings, while discarding from collective action the protest as a modus operandi. In other words, the Platform and the EU NGO networks seemed to have had high hopes about the practice of being involved in the deliberative settings. As Young (2001) points out, however, empirical studies on deliberative arrangements showed that those settings are prone to be dominated by the white male power elites and by hegemonic discourse. Given this, Young (ibid.) continues, stating that protest is preferred by social actors as a more effective way of political communication in raising the awareness of the public and the political authorities.

The second conclusion of the Citizen's Assembly is that the Platform and other EU NGOs alike were willing to further the European political project, revealing zeal for the idea of deepening European integration. The interviews conducted within the scope of Eurosphere research also confirmed continuation of these thoughts. In other words, the Platform and the EU NGO community alike have acted like pan-European intellectuals who had shifted their interests to the EU, while striving for

the European cause. The founding fathers of the European project have predicted transformation of the private or instrumental interests of the actors towards the EU. Yet, the Europeanisation of civil society extends beyond this anticipation by gaining the consent of social actors in striving for the European project. Practised in this way, Europeanisation of civil society has resulted in the usage of the sponsored EU NGOs as the interlocutors or brokers of the EU. This practice undermines the presumed role of the EU NGOs in creating alternative projects or in carrying the subaltern projects to European level.

Fourth, the kind of participation that the Platform advocates has an uneasy relationship with normative democracy. This functional interpretation of democracy has been found problematic, as it neglects the institutions of representative democracy and forming collective will processes. This view assumes that citizens are represented by the NGO networks just as the Platform per se. However, as a critique of this, it is argued that having participated in "civil dialogue," the Platform helped in advancing the Commission's institutional power and its consultation regime (e.g. Cram 2006; Smismans 2007), as well as in legitimising the Commission's rule in the respective policy fields (Cram 2006).

Fifth, despite the Platform's aspirations, the Commission has not been willing to formalise its relations with the Platform. These relations have rather been set up in a somewhat nebulous way (i.e. through biannual meetings and Internet consultations, especially during pre-policy formulation processes), so that the Platform's engagement in formal decision-making processes has been kept at a minimum level (Fazi and Smith 2006). In the meantime, multi-stakeholder forums, which were presented in the *WPG* as an indicator of partnership governance, were not commonly implemented. The Platform participated in only one forum in which it formally enjoyed stakeholder status; that was the "Multi-Stakeholder Forum" between 2002 and 2004, which dealt with Corporate Social Responsibility, a policy initiative published by the Commission in 2002. Other stakeholders in this initiative were business representatives, such as Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE), the European Roundtable of Industrialists and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) (Social Platform 2002, 2003 and 2004).

Alternative Model to Europeanisation of NGOs: Civilising Impacts of the Networks

I have, up to now, shown the repercussions of the European of civil society from above by the supranational intermediaries. In this section, I will advance a cognitive model through which particular interests would be transformed into common interests through NGO networking. This model suggests that interactions among the NGOs would have civilising impacts by visualising and de-constructing and re-constructing the norms which are not implanted by the political authorities. For a start, the national NGOs of two different countries, working for the same section of society, for example, immigrants, face different issues due to different public measures in each country. Communication among immigrant NGOs fosters "sharing" and "learning" among them. The NGOs coming from different conditions would deliberate over the differing situations in each national social space. As we have learnt from the literature on deliberative democracy, the communicative interactions would trigger a process of identity transformation (cf. Calhoun 1993;

Habermas 1996; Shifkin 2009). The deliberations would also bring a leap in mentality by transforming the established norms, which have been taken for granted. From a constructivist view inspired by Foucault, the mind is, by and large, contingent on external impetus, and it is inclined to internalise "what exists" as the normal. Unless interacting with "other" norms – for example, in some other society – or initiating a critical attitude that questions the domestic norms (i.e. regarding why they have become the normal, and whether it is possible to imagine different norms) the mind would not problematise the philosophical question of "what can be known" above and beyond the existing. Hence, communication acts like a medium in answering the ontological question of "what can be known." Or, dialogic interaction can be thought of as an epistemological method, thus enlarging the horizon of the mind, as Arendt (1992) would call it. In other words, epistemology finds an answer to the ontological question, and the communicative interactions trigger processes which problematise the "normal." In this process, the normal of the self is detached from the normal of society, due to interactions among the discourses. Hence the self realises that what it used to know, that what belonged to itself as "subjective truth" was, in fact, a reflection of "societal truth." The mind then establishes its "subjective equilibrium" beyond the "societal equilibrium" of the national.

To illustrate, in the example of communication among immigrant NGO networks, the NGOs stationed in places with worse conditions would start to mobilise the public and the national governments to upgrade immigrant policies, since they have learned "what is to be done" and more importantly, that it is already done in their networking. Thereby, whether a discourse on better rights for immigrants can circulate in different national publics depends on the success of NGOs to carry this out in European space. NGOs in this model have an aim to raise the awareness of the public, which in turn is expected to put pressure on the public policies. The media would also continue mobilising the public around the issue; while some political parties would be grasping the concern as per societal demand.

Figure 1: From Communication beyond Nation State to the Publicising at the General Public



This portrayal also entails the argument that EU NGOs could link the public's concerns to the "public authorities" and to the "public itself." For instance, an NGO can contribute to the process of internalising the rights of persons with disabilities as a norm so that public space is modified in their favour. To start with, NGOs would contribute to making the discourse on disability rights visible. As a result, when someone sees, for example, that a lift in the metro or a path in the streets has been constructed for the disabled, that person would not question why it was placed there, but would consider it "normal." Furthermore, rendering the discourse of disability rights visible would foster empathy, so that when one sees an obstacle for the disabled, one would problematise the situation, even if it would not be directly in one's rational interest. Given these illustrations, EU NGO communication creates an infrastructure of communication which enables the circulation norms among different societies. Even though improving disability rights could be thought of as a universal norm, what is evident is that the extent to which persons with disabilities participate in social life is different in each society. The same issue-oriented NGOs can discuss "what more could be done," while developing further "empathy" for other issues. As Arendt (1992) would say, the "enlarged mentality" could emerge from their communication. For instance, the discourse of the excluded is in itself important, as it produces the experience of how one might feel when excluded. In this way, EU NGOs can transform a private interest into a common public interest, first, by informing, and then, by targeting the consciousness of the people.

This process depicts how deliberative participation can illustrate dialogical norm reproduction beyond the nation state. EU NGOs can play a crucial role, as outlined above, if they are not dominated by the sovereign power and the mentality of the market. They could act as the "conscience of the society," mobilising it against unjust decisions. According to the illustrations given here, the impact of NGO communication on norm shifting can also be extended to wider areas and to other issues NGOs are dealing with. The criteria for the success of NGOs, thereby, rely on their capability to present the private issues as universal claims and as the common interest of the public. The "public interest" and common issues have so far been defined within the national space. As more issues are getting global concern, the challenge is to extend the common interest and discuss "the fate of the public" beyond the national territories (Splichal 2011). Illustrated in this way, the visualisation of the issues and norm deconstruction would foster a civilising function, as Linklater (2007) would define it. In Kantian terms, on the other hand, this elucidates discursive construction of morality – as opposed to intuitive reasoning – from within intersubjective communication. The discourse is translated to decision-making processes through the public spheres.

Concluding Remarks

NGOs have been criticised in terms of lacking accountability, representativeness and inclusiveness. This article, however, addresses, as the major problem hindering the democratising promise of collective action, the Europeanisation of civil society, which amounts to a process in which social actors strive for dispersing the objectives devised by the political actors. In this view, the supranational centre dominates the communicative interactions within the network, while engaging in transmitting political messages to its local constituencies. The Social Platform, examined in this

article, has been sponsored to link the voice of European citizenry, while helping to reduce the communication gap between the EU and its citizens. Yet, as with the EU NGOs, it has proved to work in a way to legitimise the EU institutions, particularly the Commission. Further, it has been observed that politically imposed and guided agendas and the asymmetrical power positions within the network undermine the promise of the networking. One of the repercussions of the Platform's work is that it attempts to draw the boundaries of the legitimate European civil society with those actors which prefer to engage in governance settings without contention, thus categorically excluding contentious civil society from the conceptualisation of European civil society. Against this backdrop, the promise of NGO networking can rather be sought beyond the proximity of civil society with the political power and in terms of the relation of this networking to its civilising impacts, as well as to the notions of publicity, and public use of reason. NGO networking builds a potential communicative infrastructure having the premise of fostering social learning and of civic empathy. By following Habermas (1996) then, I rather suggest civil society should avoid involving in corporatist-like settings, in that rationalities of the bureaucracy and the market could dominate over the rationalities of civil society.

Notes:

1. EU NGOs have also been examined from the perspective of social movements (cf. Keck and Skink 1998; Imig and Tarrow 2001; Ruzza 2004; Balme and Chabanet 2008; Della Porta and Caiani 2009). Although in this article I take issue with the normative arguments on the EU NGOs, the climax of the debate carried out here, the repercussions of the top-down processes also challenge the social movements' stress on the self-organising of collective action and contention. For a review of the debate surrounding the European interest intermediation see also Greenwood (2007a).

2. For further information about the Eurosphere project see <http:// www.eurospheres.org/>.

3. It is necessary to make clear to what the phenomenon of EU NGO refers. The following list demonstrates five different channels through which the NGOs are institutionalised at EU level: (1) the national organisations representations' in Brussels, i.e. the Italian environmental organisation Legambiente that has had a branch in Brussels since 1999 (Fazi and Smith 2006); (2) the permanent offices of the international organisations in Brussels (Greenpeace, Amnesty International and Oxfam); (3) the Brussels based European NGO umbrella networks or platforms which appeared during 1990s with the financial support of the EU, such as the European Network Against Racism and the European Women's Lobby; (4) the second-level umbrella organisations of the networks of European NGOs (i.e. the Social Platform, Green 8, Human Rights Development Network, development NGOs' alliance of the CONCORD, consumer groups' platform of the BEUC, and the cultural groups' platform of the EFAH); and (5) the Civil Society Contact Group, established with the participation of the *category four*, with an aim to represent the EU NGO community, specifically in promoting the "participatory democracy" at EU level (ibid.).

4. The members of the Platform claim to represent thousands of organisations, associations and voluntary groups at local, regional and national level, including organisations of women, older people, people with disabilities, the unemployed, people affected by poverty, gays and lesbians, young people, children and families, and those organisations campaigning on issues such as social justice, homelessness, health and reproductive rights and racism.

5. Involving the NGOs in public policy-making processes finds its origins in the associative democracy (Hirst 1994; Cohen and Roger 1995; see also Baccaro 2006).

6. The CSCG started as a loose network, with its organisational work and management initially handled by the Platform. For instance, the Platform hosted and co-funded its coordinator person.

7. See the Social Platform (2003, 22).

8. This toolkit was downloaded 5000 times in ten days after it was published.

9. This article, *article 11* of Lisbon Treaty, involves not only the involvement of "civil society" in EU decision-making processes, but also allow the citizens submitting any legal proposal, with no fewer than one million signatures.

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INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION IN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE: INTERSECTIONS OF GENDER AND RACE

CORNELIA BRUELL
MONIKA MOKRE
BIRTE SIIM

Abstract

Can transnational public spheres be envisaged for Europe, which, in fact, create accountability – that is, spaces of critical articulations, control mechanisms, and political correctives to the governing levels? Can the political, as a critical force and the willingness to struggle and decide, be re-introduced into the public sphere? In which ways are race/ethnicity, class and gender cleavages being (re)presented and articulated in the public sphere and how do they intersect? In attempting to answer these questions, we aim this article at exploring the potential for a European discursive space pertaining to issues of gender and diversity. The empirical focus is on the views of political parties and social movements that are participating in public debates. Addressing the inclusions and exclusions in the European public sphere at the intersections of gender and racial/ethnic minorities, we look at the shifts in rhetoric, discourses and policies. As a result, we find common discursive patterns on the intersections between ethnicity and gender which, however, can at best be interpreted as a sign of the emergence of broader European public spheres. Only if these debates can be generalised, European public spheres fulfilling the functions of creating accountability and control mechanisms can develop.

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Introduction

According to the normative ideal, the democratic public sphere has been envisaged as universal, but critics have pointed out that, in reality, it was, from the outset, based upon different kinds of exclusions. First and foremost, the public sphere was defined as a national sphere of citizens, thereby excluding all non-citizens. Furthermore, the exclusion of the "private sphere" from public discourse led, above all, to the exclusion of women who were relegated to the private, but also to the exclusion of socioeconomic differences seen as part of the private economy. Further, discrimination against ethnic and national minorities has frequently been seen as an issue not to be dealt with in a liberal public sphere as long as legal equality is warranted.

In contemporary Western democracies, these demarcations have shifted – gender equality has become a major legal and political concern – and citizenship and diversity have to be renegotiated due to massive migration movements and supranational political entities. At the level of the EU, there is a growing rhetoric about gender equality and diversity as political goals. At the same time, research has documented that the traditional exclusions of women and ethnic minorities still play a crucial role in political discourses and policies across Europe.

The article addresses inclusions and exclusions in the European public sphere, focusing on intersections of gender and racial/ethnic minorities and looking at the shifts in rhetoric, discourses and policies. The first part of the article will employ theoretical perspectives based upon modern and postmodern/post-structural thought on the (European) public sphere. Key concepts are exclusion/inclusion, "us-them" and intersectionality, focusing on the special role of gender and race. The second part will use empirical data collected and analysed within the Eurosphere project to further develop these theoretical insights. The focus will be on the multiple discriminations against immigrant women as well as on nationalist (mis)use of gender equality as a genuine European value by right-wing political parties and organisations excluding, above all, Muslim minorities from the European public sphere.

The Public Sphere

Theorists of democracy tend to agree in their recognition of the paramount importance of the public sphere for democracy. However, there are wide differences in their concrete assessment of the democratic functions of the public sphere. Very roughly and generally, we can discern two of these functions. A public sphere is (1) the space for presentation/representation of political discourses between parts of the *demos,* that is groups and individuals, (2) the space in which this demos is constructed, that is, in which a common political identity, necessary for democratic decision making, develops. To many scholars, there is an unsolvable tension between these two aims, especially prominent in the case of the European Public Sphere, as identity building is necessarily based on inclusion and exclusion.

In the understanding of Chantal Mouffe (2000), there is a fundamental democratic paradox based on the impossibility of reconciling the values of equality and liberty. Mouffe's analysis makes a theoretical distinction between two conflicting aspects of democracy: democracy as "a form of rule" that is the principle of the

sovereignty of "the people"; and "the symbolic framework" within which this democratic rule is exercised, that is, the liberal discourse with its strong emphasis on the universal value of individual liberty and human rights (cf. Mouffe 2000, 1-16). Modern democracy and its public sphere thus represent a contingent historical articulation between two different traditions with different logic, which may and do conflict. In order to develop a common identity of the demos necessary for popular sovereignty, the borders of the demos have to be defined, which in many cases excludes the rights and liberties of people within the community. However, on the basis of the universal liberal ideal, this exclusion is liiegitimate.

Theorists of deliberative democracy (see, above all, Habermas 1996) find a solution for this dilemma in the concept of rational communication as the base of the public sphere. According to this model, generally accepted procedural rules can warrant equal possibilities to participate in the public sphere and to come to mutually satisfactory results on the basis of rational consideration. Feminist theorists in the deliberative tradition have criticised the universalistic dimension of this concept as, in fact, oppressing concrete differences, with the effect of excluding from the public sphere, women above all, (cf. Benhabib 1992 and Fraser 1990). Due to the liberal private-public distinction, for example, the family as an institution and an important "political" arena for reproducing unequal gender roles, has been ignored (cf. Fraser 1990).

More recently, feminist theorists have tried to re-theorise this critique in a more positive gender-neutral way by including other forms of discrimination. In this vein, Iris M. Young proposes a concept for a more heterogeneous public, open to "bodily and affective particularity" (Young 1998, 443). Public spaces have to recognise, in a positive way, differences of perspective, affiliation and experience. In her influential book *Inclusion and Democracy,* Young (2000) develops an inclusive, communicative theory of democracy based upon difference and diversity, aimed to include marginalised social groups through their mobilisation and organisation in civil society.

The main question behind this vision is the potential tension between political equality and structural group differences. In her concern with marginalised groups, Young criticises the hypocrisies of universalistic models of liberal democracy, not recognising the specific situation of these groups but still claiming to warrant equality of individuals.

The theory of radical democracy (Mouffe and Laclau 1985) criticises universalistic models of liberal democracy and the public sphere from a different perspective: The openness of any structure conditions a constant struggle upon stabilisation of meaning and identity. Difference and equivalence are the categories which contribute to the dynamics of identity building by establishing a discourse. This is only possible by excluding a threatening *other*.

According to Mouffe, the public sphere is necessary for the existence of political subjectivity – only by the public articulation of differences can the political subject locate rifts and take decisions. The claim for "rational discourse" is not more than a claim for hegemony for a certain kind of political understanding. Therefore, we need an alternative "agonistic pluralism," which recognises confrontation between conflicting interpretations of the constitutive liberal-democratic values (cf. Mouffe 2000, 9-16). Here, the similarities between the proposals by Mouffe and Young for

concrete politics become obvious, in spite of their fundamental differences. Drawing on their approaches to democracy, it is possible to conceptualise the public sphere as a locus/space for conflicts and struggles about inclusion and exclusion of marginalised social groups as well as for contesting and negotiating about political discourses and visions about the polity.

The European Public Sphere (EPS)

The idea of an EPS implies a radical break with the theoretical understanding of public spheres as confined to nation states. Most scholars of European integration see an EPS as normatively desirable as it is needed to allow citizens to identify with the political system and to enable responsiveness of the system. To permit representatives and policymakers to react to people's concerns, the latter have to be articulated within the public sphere. Therefore, the lack of an EPS is often understood as part of the democratic deficit and the legitimacy gap in the EU (see e.g. Eriksen and Fossum 2001). Still, it is contested if a public sphere beyond the borders of national democracy is feasible. And, if yes, the question arises how such a public sphere can deal with the many differences to be included in a sphere dubbed "complex diversity" (Kraus 2009).

This situation opens up the space for fundamental questions about the public sphere in democracy: How much homogeneity does a democratic public sphere need? Can heterogeneity be understood as a normative asset of a democratic public sphere? How can diversity and equality be accommodated in a democratic public sphere? Calhoun (2004, 7) plausibly argues that participation in the public sphere shows a form of solidarity even if this participation does not lead to harmony. And Risse (2003, 5) as well as della Porta and Caiani (2010) even maintain that contestation is a crucial pre-condition for the emergence of an EPS, rather than an indication for its absence; that is, Europeanisation by contestation. But does this positive assessment also hold true for fundamental conflicts, for example, of cultural and religious values? In order to deal with these questions, we aim to confront theory and research.

Diversity in the European Public Sphere

The EPS is, per definition, diverse as the EU consists of 27 different nation states. Thus, when the EU tries to democratise (as it has done since the Maastricht Treaty), the question of the possibility of a transnational or supranational democracy arises. A symptom for the emergence of a European democracy can be seen in the EU efforts to do away with certain forms of inequality – between EU citizens of different member states but also, in a rather prominent way, with gender inequality. At the same time, discrimination against citizens of non-EU member states is also a general EU rule, becoming more and more problematic in times of increasing global migration flows.

Nancy Fraser (2007) has recently addressed the new challenges to notions of normative legitimacy and political efficacy in a post-Westphalian world and discussed what sort of changes would be required to imagine a genuine critical and democratising role for transnational public spheres under current conditions. According to Fraser, a public sphere theory understood as a critical theory in a post-Westphalian world must rise to the double challenge to create new, transnational

public powers and to make them accountable to new, transnational public spheres (cf. Fraser 2007, 23).

Fraser's approach includes two parts – the critique of the national bias of hitherto held concepts of the public sphere, and the claim for the possibility of transnational public spheres being able to make transnational public powers accountable. While Fraser's critique is shared from different theoretical perspectives, the positive claim raises many questions. From the perspective of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), transnational public spheres are certainly feasible but not in an all-encompassing form. In order to be politically relevant, these public spheres need borders and exclusions.

Furthermore, the efficacy of transnational (as well as of all other kinds of) public spheres depends, inter alia, on the willingness of people to participate in these public spheres. The mere possibility for participation, that is, inclusiveness, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for democratic public spheres. Empirically, we can observe a declining interest of ordinary citizens to participate in public spheres. At the same time, we are facing deep social cleavages and struggles over migration and religious diversity, frustrations due to the decline of the welfare state and a decrease of the middle class, leading to an increasing gap between rich and poor.

Thus, crucial question to be answered is: How can transnational public spheres be envisaged which, in fact, create accountability – that is, spaces of critical articulations, control mechanisms and political corrective to the governing levels?

Categories of importance for theorising and empirically observing these dynamics are race/ethnicity, class, and gender cleavages. These are topics related to great passion and political brisance – but in which ways are they (re)presented and articulated in the public sphere and how do they intersect?

Intersectionality

The overlaps of different identity ascriptions and discriminations (above all, race/ethnicity, gender and class) form the main concern of theories of intersectionality. These issues have been crucial for feminist scholarship. The concept evolved within US debates about women of colour and was first theorised by Kimberlé Crenshaw who stated:

> *Feminist efforts to politicise experiences of women and antiracist efforts to politicise experiences of people of colour have frequently proceeded as though the issues and experiences they each detail occur on mutually exclusive terrains. […] [However,] because of their intersectional identity as both women and people of colour within discourses that are shaped to respond to one or the other, women of colour are marginalised within both* (Crenshaw 1995, 333).

Intersectionality has travelled from the US to Europe and from social movements in the US to EU (mainstream) politics. Intersectional analyses were also developed by European and post-colonial feminists, but the concept did not become central for European feminist research till later (cf. Phoenix and Pattyama 2006). It has also become a central concept for European feminist research (cf. Phoenix & Pattyama 2006). Intersectionality as the claim to recognise multiple types of discrimination and their specific forms of interweaving is to be discerned from intersectionality as an analytical tool, as well as from a governmental concept in policy documents aiming to forestall these acts of discrimination. (see Mokre and Siim forthcoming).

The Eurosphere project offers an opportunity for a context-sensitive empirical analysis of intersectionality. It focuses on inclusion/exclusion of women and minorities in the EPS. This raises questions about intersections of gender with ethno-national diversity, on the one hand, and about gender and national majorities, on the other hand.

On a more fundamental level, we deal here with the tension between diversity, equality and individual liberties. Within the triad of class, gender and race, the general normative assumption consists of a positive view of ethnic and national diversity and negative views of inequalities of men and women as well as a similar view with regard to socioeconomic conditions. However, these normative assumptions are contested, for example, by political positions in favour of traditional family values ascribing a specific role to women. More importantly, the parts of this normative assumption potentially contradict each other, for example, when gender roles are differently defined in different ethnic/national groups.

The intersectionality approach can serve as an analytical tool (1) to discern multiple discriminations due to the overlap of different disadvantages/forms of discrimination; (2) to position different social groups within a complex spectrum of positive and negative discrimination (majority men, majority women, minority men, minority women, majority men with low socioeconomic status etc.); and (3) to understand and evaluate tensions between diversity and equality.

Intersectionality in the Eurosphere Project[1]

Methods. The Eurosphere project has addressed the relations between two key concepts: ethnic/national diversity and the EPS. Conceptually as well as empirically, gender questions and socioeconomic differences were also taken into account, although in a less prominent way than the focal issue of ethnic/national diversity.

The empirical analysis encompassed positions on these questions held by political parties, social movements/citizens initiatives, think tanks and media. These organisations and their representatives are understood, at the same time, as actors in a European public sphere and as communication spaces. Positions and opinions have been analysed on the basis of written documents, elite interviews and a media content analysis.

For the purpose of this chapter, we evaluated the results of interviews and document analyses for all organisations in the Eurosphere project sample, with regard to assessments of the interrelation between gender, ethnicity/nationality, and socioeconomic differences. These positions were identified within the Eurosphere project database; furthermore, Eurosphere project working papers and country reports were included in the analysis.

While our results showed an interesting qualitative picture of perceptions of intersectionality held by important actors in the EPS, they are exploratory and cannot be understood as representative in a general way. This is due to the research design, for which the question of intersections of diversity and gender was a second-order question. Thus, in many of our interviews, gender was not mentioned or only if prompted and sometimes in a rather perfunctory way.

Results. In general, our empirical evidence suggests that intersections between ethnicity/ nation and gender play an important role in most discourses in the EPS.

The overall picture confirms the importance of the interaction of gender with other social categories, especially ethnicity/race, for discourses about diversity and the EPS. Social and political actors formulate different forms of interactions between gender and ethnic minorities, which can be interpreted as a difference between exclusionary and inclusionary intersectionality (cf. Rolandsen Agustin 2009; Christensen and Siim 2010). In our empirical research, we also found statements which cannot be clearly assigned to one or the other form of this intersectionality (ambiguous intersectionality). And also, the explicit rejection of intersections between gender and ethnicity/nation forms a small part of our empirical results (no relation).

Exclusionary Intersectionality. Exclusionary intersectionality sees tensions between diversity and equality as unsolvable and, thus, proposes a radical, one-dimensional solution – either to reduce or abolish diversity, or to abandon claims for equality. In this vein, state-nationalist parties and NGOs emphasise the disadvantages of diversity, above all, with regard to gender equality (cf. Van de Beek and Vermeulen 2010, 14). In our empirical results, such disadvantages were – implicitly or explicitly – nearly exclusively mentioned with regard to Muslim minorities: "The Islamic culture is very different in terms of the understanding of life and of justice, lack of democracy, human rights and gender equality" (Danish Association, quoted in Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010, 12).

As another Danish example showed, some interviewees focused on gender injustice within minorities: "Especially within the Islamic world we see a notion that women are in second place; there is no equality as we see it within Denmark" (quoted after Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010, 12).

In other cases, negative implications for majority women were the main concern:

> *You know, women are engaging with [...] Africans, Turks, Arabs, Egyptians [...] and then they have domestic problems. They are restricted in their individual liberty and their freedom of movement (*Good Bye Mosque, Austria, quoted after Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010, 11).

While most examples of exclusionary intersectionality were found in interviews with nationalist organisations, this attitude could also be found within gender NGOs: Nearly 20 percent of the interviewed representatives of gender NGOs understood ethnic/national diversity as a threat to gender equality. And it seemed interesting, within this context, that the French and Greek members of the European Women's Lobby (EWL) aimed at excluding the Turkish gender group KADER by arguing that the participation of KADER would mean the acceptance of women wearing a headscarf in the EWL[2] (cf. Arribas Lozano and Kutay 2010).

However, these positions were in no way unequivocal, not even within one and the same organisation, as two quotations from members of the Bulgarian Women's Organisation (WAD) showed:

> *I am conservative in regard to different ethnic and religious visions of men and women because I think that the Christian visions of genders are prerequisites for real not only juridical gender equality. To what extent the visions should be imposed in order to be accepted, I can't judge.*
>
> *When we speak about women's rights, we must not speak about national diversity. Women are women everywhere, independently of the role determined*

> *for them by religion, politics or economic situation. A women's community could fight for equal rights independently of ethnic background* (quoted in Pristed Nielsen 2010, 9, 13).

On the other hand, we could find, in our data, at least one example supporting – partly – sacrificing (gender) equality in favour of diversity. Seeing differences in the way different communities deal with women's rights, a member of the Finnish nationalist party started to raise doubts as to whether the Western model of gender equality is really the best model for every society:

> *[W]omen's position is quite different in Western countries than it is in Africa or even in Asia. (…) But is, for example, some Western model of thought or way of life and our model of (gender) equality then for the best somewhere else? I don't know. I haven't been thinking about it in those terms* (quoted in Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010, 22).

Inclusionary Intersectionality. Inclusionary intersectionality sees both equality and diversity as positive values and does not understand them as fundamentally irreconcilable. Within this discourse, we find two sub-discourses:

1. An emphasis on the intersection between different inequality creating mechanisms and the potential negative implications for strengthening inequality (in diversity). (This is the multiple discrimination approach.)

2. The acknowledgement of tensions between equality and diversity, with a focus on the possibility to overcome these tensions by learning (the mutual learning approach).

Multiple Discrimination Approach. This attitude was probably most clearly formulated by a member of a Danish left-wing party:

> *When integration fails, it hits the ethnic women twice as hard because they typically come […] from societies where they are repressed already in relation to the norms which apply in this society. This means that they enter a pocket where they are repressed both in terms of their nationality but also in terms of their gender* (quoted after Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010, 23).

Many of our interviewees, especially from immigrant/anti-racist groups as well as women's organisations and regional national minorities shared this view. Differentiations could mainly be found with regard to the question of whether some forms of discrimination are more problematic/important than other ones.

Frequently, spokespeople of regional national minorities as well as of organisations of the pro-immigrant/anti-racist type define diversity in a very inclusive way and mention all kinds of minorities (such as disabled, gender, sexuality, religion,) (cf. Van de Beek and Vermeulen 2010, 13). Mostly, however, ethnicity/race and gender are mentioned as grounds for discrimination.[3] Thus, respondents from anti-racist NGOs of the European Network for Anti-Racism (ENAR) unequivocally stand for the non-hierarchy of reasons for discrimination. Consequently, policies should aim at abolishing all forms of discrimination regardless of their grounds.

In this vein, at least some of the members of ENAR showed a strong commitment to women's issues. This is most prominently the case for the German organisation Tuerkische Gemeinde Deutschland (TGD), which lists on its homepage a whole range of women related questions with which they take issue, among them hon-

our killings, domestic violence and forced marriages. In a similar vein, the Italian ENAR member, ARCI, has raised a campaign against female mutilation (cf. Pristed Nielsen 2010, 8).

On the other hand, some interviewees from minority NGOs understood the assumption of women's oppression in certain ethnic or, above all, religious groups, as a form of multiple discrimination, in itself: "The Danish debate [about immigrant women] is very un-nuanced and often based on ignorance, clichés and prejudices [...] it is like it is not respectable to be a housewife here [...] there is lack of mutual recognition" (Danish Democratic Muslims, quoted after Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010, 7).

According to opinions from the Danish Social Forum and the Women's Council, this form of discourse can also worsen the situation for majority women: "Projecting problems at other groups clouds the fact that we have not actually achieved gender equality in Denmark" (quoted after Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010, 9).

Overall, the non-hierarchical understanding of discrimination is not shared within gender NGOs. Besides the above mentioned cases of exclusionary intersectionality in gender organisations, representatives of women's organisations tend to use an anti-discrimination discourse, privileging gender; this was shown in an interview with a representative of the Turkish NGO, KAMER, and supported by members of the Bulgarian WAD and the Danish Women's Council.

Still, this attitude cannot be generalised – not even within one organisation. Another representative of the Danish Women's Council stated:

> *As a starting point, there should be no categories which take precedence. Some say gender cuts across, and perhaps this is true, but turning it into the most important – I wouldn´t go so far"* (quoted in Pristed Nielsen 2010, 14).

Summarising, one can state for the NGOs in our sample:

> *[…] It is interesting (and statistically significant) that it is only respondents from women´s groups who prioritise gender equality. Another observation is that particularly respondents from ENAR, but also from its two member organisations TGD and the Anti-Racist Centre, are internally very consistent in their replies. In contrast, respondents from EWL […] are mutually rather far from each other, advocating either the priority of gender concerns, other types of identity affiliation, or the non-hierarchy of grounds. […] Although the evidence is meagre, it seems that questions of policy priorities on group rights are an unresolved issue within the EWL organisations* (Pristed Nielsen 2010, 15).

This problem in dealing with the intersectionality of gender and ethnicity can also be traced to differences between the rhetoric and activities of the EWL: While the EWLs respondents articulated gender as the primary concern of the organisation, their projects show a distinct focus on intersectional gender and race projects. This focus has developed parallel to the shift of official EU policies from gender equality to an increased concern with diversity and multiple inequalities. Thus, in spite of their personal opinions, EWL representatives emphasised that the organisation has developed, during the last 10 years, from a white women's organisation, which privileged gender equality, to an organisation addressing multiple, intersection inequalities and organising immigrant women and their concerns within the organisation.

For the political parties in our project, discrimination due to ethnicity/race or gender and their intersections played, in general, a much less important role than for the NGOs. This did not come as a surprise as we selected NGOs according to their interest in ethnicity/race or gender. However, it was interesting that in the case of political parties also, it was always the category of gender which was seen as the more important one when a hierarchy was mentioned at all. This held true for representatives of parties of different ideologies in Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, and Finland. As a member of the Finnish conservative party explicitly mentioned, this could be partly due to the fear that diversity issues may have become more prominent nowadays than gender issues (cf. Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010, 22).

Mutual Learning Approach. This position could be found in various national and transnational discourses, in pro- and anti-diversity organisations, in political parties of all political orientations, as well as in interviews with representatives of the media:

> *I think that those values [self-determination and independency of women] we have in Europe are so great, we can´t impart those values fast enough to them [immigrant women]. (…) I think it is an advantage [...] women coming from other countries can adapt and they can inform themselves about their rights. They can learn, they can develop* (Austrian movement Good Bye Mosque, quoted after Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010, 8).

> *"(…) (I)mmigrants who study here and see this country [...] spread the Nordic women [sic] democracy to the countries of their origin"* (Finnish Centre Party, quoted in Creutz-Cämppi et al. 2010, 15).

Similar positions could be found in nationalist parties, for example, in Bulgaria and Finland, as well as in the social democratic parties of Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark and Finland (cf. Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010, 22-23). Also, a journalist of the conservative Hungarian newspaper *Magyar Nemzet* shared this position (cf. Selmeczi and Sata 2010, 23).

Sometimes, reference to the possibility of positive change was combined with a critique of certain minority groups, notably Muslims, and, thus, with a form of exclusionary intersectionality:

> *In a society where the Christian cultural model dominates, women and men have equal rights. A cultural community cannot separate itself, differentiate and humiliate women's rights because all are the citizens of the country and should obey some rules. […] in some cultural models, for example in the Muslim religion, women's rights and men's rights are not the same ones. Women are humiliated in their rights* (quoted after Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010, 23).

While this is a quotation by a member of the Bulgarian nationalist ATAKA party, we could find similar opinions among Bulgarian social democrats.

These positions share the common perspective that immigrants should take over concepts of gender justice from majority societies. A similar model has sometimes been applied to the EU Member and Candidate States where, in general, the Nordic model is seen as an ideal for which other states have to strive. As Rolandsen Agustin (2009) showed in relation to Denmark, Northern states tend to define gender justice, at the same time, as a national and a European value.

Especially in Denmark, however, we could also find positions not subscribing to this one-way understanding of learning from European values but rather proposing a mutual approach:

> *I think we could achieve a lot more by trying to understand more and through the dialogue. [...] We have never gone out to say a lot against veils [...]. We prefer to talk with people and figure out where we have something in common as women in Denmark* (Women´s Council in Denmark, quoted in Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010, 8).

In a slightly different way – implying that rules of gender equality might be adapted in order to accommodate minority views, a Finnish social democrat claimed "our society must adapt to the new groups but also vice versa. To meet somewhere mid-way" (quoted after Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010, 22).

Yet, from another perspective, a member of the Finnish conservative party saw it as an advantage of ethnic diversity that it raises awareness of inequalities still existing in the majority population (cf. Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010, 24).

In our data on Austria, Bulgaria, and Finland, we could also find the more general argument that ethno-national diversity leads to more tolerance, which can then lead towards more gender justice:

> *I think to live this cultural and ethnic diversity, is a cultural achievement. And somebody who is able to perform this achievement is maybe also able to accept women´s rights* (Austrian League for Human Rights, quoted after Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010, 11).

Ambiguous Intersectionality. Some of our interviewees held the position that diversity both furthers and hinders equality. This was most clearly formulated by the representative of the Bulgarian NGO OJB Shalom:

> *Ethno-national diversity should contribute to women's rights and gender equality, but it is not realised everywhere. […] Respect between genders and gender equality is realised if the ethnic group is intelligent and cultured.*

While this statement rather implies a devaluation of certain ethnic groups, respondents from a Danish Muslim NGO claimed more mutual respect of ethnic/national groups, also, with regard to their approach to gender issues:

> *The Danish debate [about immigrant women] is very un-nuanced and often based on ignorance, clichés and prejudices [...] it is like it is not respectable to be a housewife here [...] there is lack of mutual recognition* (Democratic Muslims, quoted in Mokre and Pristed Nielsen 2010, 7).

It seems plausible that ambivalence in this regard is, at least, partly due to the blurredness of the term gender equality opening up the possibility for different interpretations.

No Relation. Some representatives of NGOs and political parties in Austria, Bulgaria and Finland held this position. Most prominently, it could be found among interviewees of the Austrian Poverty Conference where three respondents answered in a way exemplified by one quotation: "That [diversity] does not mean at all that […] women are automatically in a worse position." A similar position could be found in an interview with the Bulgarian Women´s Alliance for Development.

Summary

Our results show clearly that for political actors who think at all about ethnic/national diversity and gender, the intersectionality approach is a common perspective. This even holds true for those who explicitly reject this perspective, as this position at least shows that they feel the need to do so. Notably, this prominence only holds true for intersections between ethnicity and gender. The third part of the classical triad, class, gender, and race, that is, class or socio-economic differences, was rarely ever mentioned by our interviewees. This result corresponds with EU and national policies and discourses of discrimination, which frequently exclude questions of social and economic inequality.

The ways in which the relation between diversity and gender is understood and framed are contested and contextual. National contexts are an important factor in this regard. In some European countries, gender equality has become a dominant national value, which is used as a national demarcation to construct a borderline between, "us and them." Here, we can find the status of women as a symbolic border guard of the nation as described by Yuval-Davis (1997). A number of national discourses explicitly exclude the unequal immigrant other, while other national counter discourses aim to include the unequal immigrant other (cf. Rolandsen Agustin 2009). These discourses also express interactions between majorities and minorities. A prominent figure here is the excluded other (woman) symbolising an intersection of gender with ethnicity/race/culture or religion, and used to emphasise the difference between "them and us": The minority oppresses women whereas we, the majority, are gender equal. On the other hand, we can find the – potentially – included other (woman) standing for a more dynamic interaction between gender equality, ethnicity and culture and symbolised, for example, by young immigrant girls as bearers of integration (Rolandsen Agustin and Siim 2010).

The inclusion of immigrant women is an important concern for immigrant and anti-racist organisations. However, the coupling of gender and ethnicity/race was not articulated as a dominant concern in the selected women's organisations (cf. Arribas Lozano and Kutay 2010). Still, diversity and pluralism play an important role for women's organisations. New alliances between majority and minority women and their organisations have also developed, for example, within the EWL, and between the EWL and Black Women's Organisations (cf. Rolandsen Agustin 2011). Thus, our results suggest that ethnic diversity is an important concern for women's organisations but that, up to now, they have not found a common language on this issue, whereas anti-racist movements unequivocally claim the equal importance of ethnicity and gender.

Political families also still play an important role, especially with regard to party discourses, although there are new patterns and conflicts between the Centre/Left and the new Right, as well as cases of surprising congruence among parties of all political orientations. There also tend to be new religious cleavages, that is, between conservative Catholic forces and secular forces.

Finally, the concrete aims of organisations – above all NGOs – and the specific context in which they are operating also play an important role. This is of special impact if we bear in mind that many of the interviewees framed intersections between gender and ethnic diversity, above all, with regard to Muslim communi-

ties. Concrete positions in the EU in regard to Islam, however, do not only always depend on a general pro- or anti-diversity outlook, but also, for example, on the religious convictions of an organisation, as can most clearly be seen in the case of the Jewish organisation OJB Shalom in Bulgaria. Thus, comparisons according to different countries, political families, pro-/anti-diversity positions etc. are only possible to a very limited degree.

Conclusions

Our results allow some conclusions with regard to the EPS, although limited to our concrete question on intersectionality. First of all, we could observe vivid and transnational debates on this issue, debates which are mainly driven by civil society, that is, by different NGOs. Secondly, we could also see that these debates form discourses in the sense of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), that is, that they evolve around a common – contested – theme. Many of the positions we found can be understood as agonistic, in the wording of Mouffe (2000), in that they represent different positions without, however, excluding the opinion of the respective other. However, we also found antagonistic elements. These were most obvious in the framework of exclusionary intersectionality defining some social groups as unable to become an integral part of society. But, obviously, there are also antagonisms between exclusionary and inclusionary understandings of intersectionality. If we see the public sphere as a space of contestation (cf. Risse 2003, Della Porta and Caiani 2010), all these findings point towards the possible emergence of European Public Spheres dealing with issues of importance for the political present and future.

However, this basic positive evaluation leaves us with many open questions. As the European public spheres we found are still relatively small and specific, their impact on the citizenry at large, as well as on the political system, remains limited. For most political parties as well as media representatives, the issues at hand played a much less prominent role than for NGOs. Also, the issue was not dealt with by think tank representatives arguably playing an important role for policy making in many countries. And it was virtually invisible in the media content analysis; thus, it seems probable that the average citizens will only get in touch with different positions in this regard when they are already interested in the issue.

Thus, the question arises as to whether this form of EPS can serve as a linkage between the citizens and the political system or remains confined to a relatively small, though transnational, group of interested people and organisations. If this is the case – as our results suggest – then, we lack here, two paramount features of classical public spheres, namely inclusiveness and accountability.

Inclusiveness means, in the first step, the possibility for everyone concerned to take part in the public sphere. In a representative democracy, this participation can also take place in an indirect way, namely via representative organisations. However, for the main representative organisations of contemporary democracies, namely political parties, ethnicity and gender seem to play a subordinate role. Furthermore, per definition, they do not represent non-citizens. It seems doubtful, how far this role can be taken over by NGOs usually representing a very small constituency of members, while not being linked in any formal way to the general public. Most non-citizens who, as residents, are part of this general public

are, thus, neither represented by political parties for which they are not allowed to vote, nor by NGOs to which they also do not have a formal link. While, therefore, especially Muslim women are discussed within the public sphere, many of them do not have a voice in it.

Furthermore, they are presented in a specific way, also identified by Horsti (2008, 44), with regard to undocumented migrants:

> *[…] undocumented migrants are presented as objects (of charity, criminalisation or control), which means that they are treated as having no social or personal history and life; they are non-persons, as characterised by Dal Lago* (1999).

This form of discursive framing, in combination with few possibilities to actively participate in discourses, enhances discrimination.

When public spheres do not provide links between citizens and the political system, the question of accountability also remains open. This problem is aggravated by the multitude of differentiations between positions on ethnicity and gender due to national and political differences, discursive contexts and the aims of the respective NGOs. The lack of meaningful classifications is not only a problem for comparative research but, probably even more so, for political aggregation.

In sum, we have found promising discourses on the intersections between ethnicity and gender which, however, can, at best, be seen as a sign for the emergence of broader European public spheres. Only if these debates can be generalised can European Public Spheres, fulfilling the classical functions of this concept, develop.

Notes:

1. This section is a further elaboration of results in Mokre and Pristed Nielsen (2010). It builds on reflections and results in Mokre and Siim (forthcoming).

2. However, KADER has become a member of the EWL.

3. While this result might partly be due to a research bias, given the focus of the project on ethnicity and its explicit concern with gender issues, it is also in line with recent EU policies and public discourses in the member states.

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POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE POLITICS OF DIVERSITY IN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE

ROBERT SATA

Abstract

This article compares how diversity views affect political parties' willingness to engage in trans-European deliberation to create trans-European publics. Relying on data collected within the Eurosphere, we investigate the extent to which European diversity frames the issue of integration in the public discourse of political parties in 16 European countries – 14 members of the EU plus Norway and Turkey as non-members. We identify the homogeneity vs. heterogeneity of political party discourses and the consensus or contestation among these discourses. As a result, we find that parties with more inclusive views of diversity are more likely to be active participants in European arenas irrespective of the parties' government role or ideological background (though limited to mainstream parties). More importantly, the nature of the national public spheres and domestic political competition and cleavages determine whether national publics are willing and able to be more open to transnationalisation efforts.

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Introduction

The EU subsidiary principle of devolved power demands the difficult balancing of a multiplicity of identities, while immigration flows bring new diversity to member states that challenge the creation and maintenance of national identities. Political discourse on integration policy seems torn between international commitments to accept immigrants and refugees and public opinion unwilling to grant welfare benefits or rights to them. Frames of reference employed by political actors in their discourse can bolster support for and be the most powerful break in convergence and imitation within the European public sphere, yet trans-European deliberation might be the most appropriate framework for achieving integration because this framework allows for an open-ended process of redefining the principles of inclusion and exclusion (Dryzek 1990). To see the potential for a European public sphere, we compare how diversity views and attitudes on migration might affect political parties' willingness to engage in trans-European deliberation and to create trans-European publics.

Relying on qualitative data collected within Eurosphere, we investigate the extent European diversity frames the issue of integration in public discourse in 16 European countries – 14 members of the EU plus Norway and Turkey as non-members[1] – to identify the homogeneity vs. heterogeneity of European discourses and the consensus or contestation among these. Based on systematic comparative analysis, we analyse the openness or closure of various kinds of public discourses to the idea of societal diversity and immigrant integration on the one hand and European public spheres on the other to answer how diversity and immigration issues affect the potential of democratic deliberation on the European level.

Let us begin with a brief overview of the theoretical assumptions behind the concepts we employ in our analysis. To capture immigration issues, we examine citizenship and free-movement policies. We examine the explanatory power of diversity attitudes and integration policy in creating a European public sphere. We introduce theoretical propositions for the Europeanisation of political parties to formulate alternative hypotheses of how the parties' ideological background, geographic location, or government role might affect how they articulate the public sphere. We also test whether diversity interacts with any of these theoretical propositions for party Europeanisation.

Europeanisation of Public Spheres and Public Discourses

Most commonly cited definitions of Europeanisation conceive it as some process of diffusion/penetration of European rules, norms, policies, etc., into domestic structures, policies, and discourses. In turn, domestic change in response to Europeanisation presupposes that national actors reconstruct their discourse and actively participate in public debate using European references. The overwhelming majority of previous Europeanisation studies focused on the effects of EU rules and regulations on domestic institutions, emphasising a top-down approach, inquiring how member states respond to European pressure (Olsen 2002). Other studies concentrated on how domestic politics shape attitudes toward Europeanisation and how national structures influence the creation of supranational structures (Hooghe 1995).

Notwithstanding the debate in the relevant literature on what Europeanisation consists of, this paper uses the term to describe a process by which the topics and salience of European themes, issues, and actors become dominant in public discourses, identities, and policies. We believe Europeanisation is best conceptualised as an interactive encounter of the domestic with the European. Domestic actors internalise EU norms because of a socialisation process, facilitated by transnational networks. As a result, identity is a critical factor for Europeanisation, and understanding how and when identity is mobilised in relation to Europe is imperative (Hooghe and Marks 2008).

Diversity and especially cultural diversity are important because cultures determine group and individual behaviour, and by portraying values and norms, cultures create identities. We believe cultural identity is neither primordial nor instrumental but contingent and contextual. This means identities are historically constructed, and they are always relational and multiple. Contingency refers to a particular type of group self-identification along multiple axes of identification that are salient in greatly diverse group interactions. The particular expression of collective identity is a function of a conjunction and constellation of factors, meaning collective identity is contextual (Bush and Keyman 1997).

During the past decade, migration research has seen an increased focus on trans-national communities that have strengthened using modern communications technology. The impact of transnational communities on the sending and receiving countries is undoubtedly extensive, but while processes of transnational networking weaken the role and power of national governments, governments continue to dictate the migration, settlement, and integration conditions. Thus, domestic conditions are essential elements influencing transnational politics even within the EU, where free movement of people has become the principle, but national citizenship still serves as a control device for governments (Bauböck 2005).

Habermas conceived the public sphere as an arena not only for the perception but also for the treatment of different problems affecting society as a whole (Habermas 1989). We argue that the public sphere is needed if only to provide information on which citizens can form their opinion and base their choices of policy. Forming transnational public sphere(s) that are inclusive and legitimate will enable citizens "to learn to mutually recognise one another as members of a common political existence beyond national borders" (Habermas 2001, 99). We believe this does not have to translate into a demand for a European identity as Habermas suggests, but mediated processes of communication are indispensible for reaching some commonality on the European level. The European public sphere (EPS) should emerge out of the interconnectedness of and mutual exchanges between various national public spheres. Europeanisation of public communication does not need to increase consensus or convergence across countries (see similarly Ladrech 2002), but if we want to make sense of the future of the EU, we need to examine how one can create new transnational public powers that are accountable to new, transnational publics (Fraser 2007, 23).

Europeanisation magnifies tensions between transnational and national perspectives because the development of the EU polity – recent EU enlargement or international migration – has increased diversity within the EU. This provides new social and political conditions for very diverse social groups to participate and belong

that underscore the need to analyse how different public policy regimes intersect with multiculturalism and diversity. We claim the EPS is a democratic model that can give voice and influence to very diverse social groups, as this sphere is a neutral, shared space for all. Inclusion can be done "from below" along the lines of the "politics of difference" or "from above," fusing the "politics of presence."

Many claim Europe is facing a democratic deficit because European citizens have very little information about the EU and its politics and institutions. Others argue the biggest problem is the lack of a common European culture or identity – often identified as a cultural deficit of the EU (Majone 1998; Benz 2006). Most critics agree political parties should bring Europe closer to citizens as the fundamental flow of Europeanisation is this lack of open competition, of public debate, of clear articulation of debate positions (by political parties) that results in a lack of voter salience on European issues. Creating a new public arena at the European level would provide new opportunities for all types of actors for debate and political mobilisation.

Although in the last few decades society has experienced a shift from government to governance, a move toward a practice of problem-solving involving multiple actors, political parties across Europe continue to play an important role in articulating responses to diversity because parties play important roles in fostering and maintaining multiple political loyalties in multi-level polities (McKay 2004). Citizens form their views about which policy options they prefer through deliberation and party contestation processes that are essential elements of all democracies. Parties can support or oppose the EU because of spillover effects from other ideological positions they might hold, and if a party is opposed to globalisation, immigration, economic competition and openness, cosmopolitanism in general, the party likely will be opposed to the EU. Maintaining multiple contextual identities is crucial for successful Europeanisation of political parties; therefore, an exclusive (national) identity ascribed to parties will make them more likely to be critical of Europeanisation and EU policies, and the more inclusive parties are regarding diversity, the more likely they will participate in trans-European communication and collaboration networks and support the idea of a European public sphere.

Europeanisation of Political Parties

Earlier studies have shown that no electoral forum focuses on European issues (Marks, Wilson and Ray 2002). The key debate regarding political parties and Europe is over the relationship of Europeanisation vis-à-vis the traditional political cleavages, and whether, and to what extent, this constitutes a new basis for party competition. Some see party contestation over Europe having few "spillover" effects and absorbed within pre-existing cleavages mainly along the traditional left/right axis (Mair 2000; van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). Hooghe and Marks (2004) claim the two dimensions of more/less integration and the left/right divide are not necessarily independent of each other and parties instead position themselves on the "new politics cleavage" on the green-alternative-libertarian (GAL) versus a traditional-authoritarian-nationalist (TAN) axis. Others claim Europeanisation causes the emergence of a new cleavage in the Rokkanian sense, restructuring political space along the lines of a conflict between losers and winners of the denationalisation of politics, economics, and culture (Kriesi 2005).

Another set of explanations for the Europeanisation of political parties claims that parties' strategic positioning relative to each other is the key determinant of their attitude toward the EU. Thus, Hix (1999) subscribes to the idea of a "politics of opposition" by marginal parties, claiming that mainstream parties will maintain the "status quo" by incorporating European issues into their program, while marginal parties will exploit Euroscepticism since they have to fight the built-in advantage of the mainstream parties over domestic issues (Enyedi 2005). Thus, party positions on Europe cross-cut left/right divisions, and mainstream parties tend to be pro-integrationist, with Euroscepticism confined to the margins of the political spectrum, resulting in the inverted "U" pattern confirmed in empirical studies (Hooghe and Marks 2004; Bielasiak 2005).

As our selected cases include Eastern and Central European (ECE) countries, we must note that some claim in ECE countries Europeanisation shows direct effects unlike in the case of Western Europe (Lewis 2005). Thus, ECE countries are considered by most scholars "downloaders" of European norms and values without any input into them (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Ladrech 2009).We should also warn the reader that this paper uses data from interviews with political party elites, and they tend to be more pro-integrationist than citizens; thus, our findings cannot be easily generalised.

Identifying Party Positions

Since our primary aim is to examine the role of parties in articulating the public sphere, we analyse party positions, not individual respondents. Whenever possible, we concentrate our analysis on multiple dimensions of the same phenomena. These dimensions might often be counterintuitive and occasionally even contradictive, but we believe responses often contain negative and positive attitudes toward different aspects of the same subject of inquiry (Sicakkan 2009). We conduct factor analysis – a non-deterministic procedure that uncovers multiple dimensions with an often unpredictable item combination – with all variables of the questionnaire by running a variance maximisation rotation model to estimate common factors for variables. The factor analysis results are available from the author.

Our analysis reveals several dimensions of attitudes toward diversity, citizenship, free movement, and asylum policy common across Europe. Table 1 shows our findings, identifying relevant factors and the composite indexes we created for further analysis as well as the calculations behind these indexes.

We identify the most salient dimensions of political party attitudes toward diversity across Europe as being the degree of inclusiveness of the definition of diversity parties have, the scope of minority groups the parties identify, how much parties view diversity as a normative goal, and whether they identify advantages and disadvantages associated with diversity. We see that parties prefer adaptation to diversity either through separate institutions for minorities or within existing institutions, while the last important dimension of diversity attitudes is the degree of adaptation parties require from immigrants and minority groups.

When it comes to European party attitudes toward migration, the most important dimensions that explain party views are opinions about citizenship policy, free movement regimes, and asylum regulations. More specifically, parties voice their opinion about the inclusiveness of citizenship policy, as well as their support

Table 1: Attitude Indicators

Dimension	Indicators	Composite index	Explanation	
Attitudes toward diversity	- fluid definitions of diversity - bounded/traditional definitions of diversity - cultural/linguistic definitions	Degree of inclusiveness of the definition of diversity	Made up of the averaged scores	
	-no minority groups mentioned -all groups equal -some groups mentioned	Scope of minority groups	Averaging a scale: no groups mentioned = lowest score, all groups equal = medium, groups mentioned = highest	
	Diversity as a: - fact of life - condition for society - normative goal	Diversity as normative goal	Averaging a scale: diversity as fact of life = lowest score, diversity as condition = medium, diversity as a normative goal = highest	
	- dynamic and globalised identity - freedom, justice, and rule of law - heterogeneous society and individual autonomy	Advantages of diversity	Made up of the averaged scores	
	- broken solidarity and rigid identity - endangered national identity - unequal society with cultural tensions - closed and unjust society	Disadvantages of diversity	Made up of the averaged scores	
	Minority regulation: - special status for groups - parallel systems - minority political institutions	Adaptation to diversity through separate institutions	Made up of the averaged scores	
	Minority regulation: - state neutrality toward groups - multicultural institutions	Adaptation to diversity within existing institutions	Made up of the averaged scores	
	- type of adaptation required	Degree of adaptation required	Made up of the averaged scores	
Attitudes toward citizenship	- the case of children - specific conditions for citizenship	Criteria for citizenship	The degree of inclusiveness of citizenship policy	Made up of the averaged scores
	Preferences in citizenship policy for: - co-ethnics and united family - for culturally similar immigrants - for EU rules on citizenship and immigrants who are accustomed to the host country	Degree of state discretion in citizenship policy (made up of the averaged scores of indicators)		
	- number of criteria for citizenship			
	- support for dual citizenship	Support for dual citizenship	Recoding the two negatively correlated items, made up of the averaged scores	
	- support for supranational EU citizenship	Support for supranational citizenship	Made up of the averaged scores	
Attitudes toward free movement	- specific restrictions - same rules for all residents - discriminating rules	Restrictions on free movement	Recoding the negatively correlated items, made up of the averaged scores	
	- support for rights for non-citizens	Political rights for non-citizens	Made up of the averaged scores	
	- political rights granted to non-citizens			
	Accept migrants: - out of compassion and acceptance of inclusive diversity - out of interest and for human rights	Welcomed groups	Made up of the averaged scores	
	- free movement policies	Preferential policies	Made up of the averaged scores	
	- restriction on asylum	Limits on asylum	Made up of the averaged scores	
Attitudes toward the EPS	- public spaces	European communication sub-spaces	Made up of the averaged scores	
	- types of exclusion	Exclusion from European communication	Made up of the averaged scores	
	- support for more collaboration	Support for more collaboration	Made up of the averaged scores	
	- possible European partners of collaboration - possible non-European partners of collaboration	Addressing European institutions/ addressing civil society	Made up of the averaged scores of the two sets of indicators	

for dual and supranational EU citizenship. Additionally, the restrictions on free movement, political rights for non-citizens, welcomed groups of immigrants, and preferential policies on migration are other important themes shared across Europe, as well as the limits on asylum seekers parties would support.

Last, political parties have clear views on whether they are willing to become participants of trans-European collaboration and communication networks, and they identify different European communication sub-spaces present, as well as the degree of exclusion from these public arenas. Other important common dimensions are the support parties have for more collaboration, and their possible partners for collaboration, with either European institutions or civic actors.

Testing the Traditional Hypotheses on Party Positions

We have mapped out party positions on diversity and migration, as well as the EPS using distinctions between government vs. opposition parties, ideological groups of parties, and East vs. West parties using discriminant analysis elsewhere.[2] Our most important finding is that party ideology and the left/right divide matter most in determining party positions toward Europe. Counter to our expectations, our analysis of party positions has shown that parties assume positions on issues of diversity and migration irrespective of whether they are part of the government or not, while the East/West separation is significant in what parties think about adaptation of immigrants, the normative value of diversity, and group claims.

In fact, the government vs. opposition distinction proves significant only concerning positioning toward the EPS and even here is a relatively weak predictor, meaning government status affects little parties' willingness to participate in European affairs – although one would expect government parties to be more entrenched in these issues since governments interact primarily with European institutions. The East/West distinction between the parties is also weak for most of our analyses, except when it comes to positions about the EPS, where the East/West distinction is a much stronger predictor than the government/opposition divide and the sharper distinction between East and West parties is seemingly due to a much larger interest in the West in interacting with European and civic actors.

The clearest distinction among positions on issues of diversity and immigration as well as the EPS is present among ideological party families, where most often the political space is defined by right parties and left parties as predicted by scholars arguing Europeanisation is absorbed into traditional left-right cleavages. Yet there are a few exceptions; regional minority parties have proved to represent very distinct positions when it comes to an exclusive understanding of diversity (confirming one's expectations for these to be most inclusive). There are issues where Conservatives distinguish their preferences mostly against left parties – and migration policy is such, yet we also observed that Social Democrats and Conservatives have very close positions on most of the other issues, confirming our expectations that mainstream parties assume similar positions close to the political centre. This is especially true for the EPS – where party respondents claim some sub-spaces of European communication exist, they would not think that these are exclusive, yet have no interest in addressing European actors (the most important component) but rather civil society; although they claim they would welcome more trans-European collaboration and communication – where the two mainstream party families take

up stances in the centre that are hardly distinguishable from each other, while the remaining party groups scatter around their position.

Predicting Party Positions

Having established the positions parties assume on the different dimensions of diversity, immigration, and the EPS, we run multiple regression analysis to examine our underlying assumption that parties more inclusive regarding diversity would be more open to trans-European deliberation. We have argued that immigration flows are important challenges for countries all over Europe; therefore, we also test if opinions about immigration as reflected by views on citizenship policy, migration, free movement, and asylum policy might affect parties' attitudes toward further European communication and collaboration. All of the regression tables are provided; meaningful adjusted R square values and significant scores are in bold (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05).

Table 2: The Effect of Diversity Views on the EPS

		European public spheres				
		Extent of European communication space	Degree of exclusion from the EPS	Interest in addressing European institutions	Interest in addressing civil society	More possibilities for collaboration and communication
Diversity issues	Adjusted R Square	**0.495****	**0.147****	-.018	-.067	**0.314****
	Degree of inclusiveness of the definition of diversity	**0.808****	**0.481****	.072	.077	.193
	Advantages of diversity	.078	.015	-.017	.117	.184
	Disadvantages of diversity	**-0.262****	**-0.348****	.004	.035	-.020
	Adaptation to diversity through separate institutions	.026	.034	.180	.141	**0.299***
	Adaptation to diversity within existing institutions	.004	.130	.145	-.078	.150
	Degree of adaptation required	.030	.146	.043	-.083	.033
	Diversity as normative goal	.122	.144	-.088	.100	**0.269****
	The scope of minority claims	-.120	-.137	.094	.091	-.057

Party views on issues of diversity are the most important predictors of support of European communication spaces (Table 2), as the parties' views on diversity explain about half (49.5 percent) of the variation in the extent to which parties believe in the presence of European communication spaces. Looking for individual factors, our data shows the degree of inclusiveness of the definition of diversity has an outstanding effect that is four times larger than the effect of beliefs that object to diversity as having disadvantages, our second most important predictor. Diversity

views have a much weaker predictive power (14.7 percent) on how much exclusion from the European public sphere parties claim is there. What is more important is that the same individual predictors can be observed as in the previous model: the inclusiveness of the definition of diversity and parties' rejection of the disadvantages of diversity. Nevertheless, in the second model the two individual predictors are on an equal footing in their importance, unlike in the previous case.

Notwithstanding the important role views of diversity play in predicting support for European deliberation and how exclusive European public spaces might be, diversity positions do not affect parties' interest in addressing either European actors or civil society actors. However, a relatively large 31.4 percent of the variation of whether parties welcome further European communication and collaboration opportunities is once again explained by the parties' diversity views, confirming our expectation that parties with more inclusive views of diversity would welcome more European debate. What is interesting is that our previous individual predictors of diversity attitudes lose significance in this model, and diversity perceived as a normative goal and the belief in the adaptation of publics through separate institutions for minorities will predict the extent to which parties welcome further opportunities for trans-European communication and collaboration.

Nevertheless, several aspects of diversity seem to have no or little effect on our subjects of inquiry. For example, adaptation to diversity within existing institutions does not score on any dimension, and it seems relatively unimportant the degree of adaptation required from immigrants or the scope of minority claims accepted by the parties – which contradicts expectations of multicultural scholars who focus on the importance of adaptation and minority claim-making. However, in addition to the inclusive definition of diversity as the most prominent predictor, thinking of diversity as a normative goal for society and accepting that adaptation to diversity can happen through separate institutions for minority groups are aspects that turn out to be significant predictors and confirm communitarian scholars' expectations.

Turning to the question of how party opinions about immigration might affect support for the EPS and willingness to participate in European communication and collaboration (Table 3), we show that support for dual citizenship is a single predictor for 20.3 percent of the variation in how political parties judge the extensiveness of European public spaces. Nevertheless, party views on citizenship cannot predict whether the parties judge these deliberative spaces exclusive or not, and explain only 16.2 percent of parties' interest in addressing European-level actors. As the model shows, parties that support granting supranational EU citizenship and at the same time reject inclusive citizenship policy are the ones most likely to address European actors. In contrast, our model is not significant for predicting parties' interest in addressing civil society actors. Our most interesting finding is that citizenship issues predict a relatively high 32.8 percent of the support for more opportunities for trans-European communication and collaboration, and parties that support supranational EU citizenship and dual citizenship will be the ones interested in further trans-European networking, which yet again confirms that inclusive parties are the ones open to more trans-European deliberation.

In a similar manner, attitudes related to the free movement of people also affect parties' willingness to participate in more trans-European communication

Table 3: The Effect of Immigration Views on the Prospects of the EPS

		European public spheres				
		Extent of European communication space	Degree of exclusion from the EPS	Interest in addressing European institutions	Interest in addressing civil society	More possibilities for collaboration and communication
Citizenship	Adjusted R Square	**0.203****	.038	**0.162****	.113	**0.328****
	Inclusiveness of citizenship policy	-.089	-.053	**-0.313****	**-.349**	.140
	Support for dual citizenship	**.497**	.306	.123	.189	**0.508****
	Support for supranational EU citizenship	-.079	.002	0.286**	.121	**0.295****
Migration	Adjusted R Square	**0.182***	**0.205****	**0.283****	**0.365****	**0.188****
	Degree of restrictions on free movement	.021	.244	.083	-.150	**0.342****
	Scope of political rights for non-citizens	**0.364****	**0.391****	.126	.109	**0.495****
	Scope of welcomed groups	**0.224***	**0.226***	**0.469****	**0.495****	.169
	Preferential policies on free movement	.159	.167	.097	**0.219***	-.031
	Asylum restrictions	-.023	-.064	.154	.179	-.180

and collaboration. Support for political rights for non-citizens and the number of groups that parties welcome predict 18.2 percent of the variation in parties' belief in the existence of European spaces of communication. The same two individual predictors with almost identical weights of importance account for 20.5 percent variance in party attitudes on how exclusive these communication spaces are, meaning that party preferences on free movement policy explain simultaneously about a fifth of what parties say about the presence and the exclusive nature of European public spaces.

Thus, what matters most is how many immigrant group parties would be welcomed, as party choice on the scope of welcomed immigrant groups is the single predictor for 28.3 percent party interest in addressing European-level actors. More than a third (36.5 percent) of the interest in addressing civil society actors is explained by the same views, though a second predictor, with half the weight of importance, can also be identified as party support for preferential policies on free movement for specific groups of immigrants. The only aspect of the EPS, which is unaffected by what choices parties have regarding immigrant groups, is whether political parties would welcome more possibilities for trans-European collaboration and communication – a somewhat unexpected finding as we would expect that parties welcoming immigrants would be more cosmopolitan and therefore welcome more trans-European deliberation. Instead, party choices on restrictions on free movement and political rights granted for non-citizens predict 18.8 percent of the variation in answers to this question.

Each measure of party positions on free movement, migration, and asylum policy turns out to be a good predictor of party positions on the EPS, which means

immigration issues are important for determining trans-European collaboration and communication. Support for dual and supranational citizenship predicts a third of the variation in parties' willingness to embrace further opportunities for trans-European cooperation and collaboration, which suggest that more inclusive parties are the ones we can expect to see in European-level debate. Thus, the parties' diversity attitudes and citizenship preferences each determine a third of the variation in party support of the EPS. At the same time, parties' interest in addressing European-level actors is affected (though to various degrees) by the parties' views on citizenship and free movement policy. Furthermore, party positions on free movement are responsible for about a third of the variation in parties' interest in engaging civil society actors, which might suggest that we not only witness a bottom-up version of Europeanisation but also see European issues descending to domestic-level actors as well.

Interactive Models of Party Positions

Having examined our hypotheses that diversity views and attitudes on migration affect what parties think of the EPS, we also inquire how established theoretical propositions on party Europeanisation interact with our predictive models. We control for party ideology, government role, and geographic location to examine how these interact with our independent variables in determining party position regarding the EPS, and whether they weaken or strengthen the explanatory power of our predictive models. Due to space limitations, we control ideology by testing the two main groups of parties in our sample: Social Democrats and Conservatives. We employ multiple regression analysis to test interaction effects; the results are available from the author.

Examining how diversity views interact with our control variables, we find that interactive models have a higher explanatory power as reflected by the relevant R square scores with the exception of controlling for Social Democrat parties. Notwithstanding this, we observe little interaction as some of our original predictors are significant alone even in the interaction models, and some of the control variables themselves turn out to be single predictors emphasising the important role they play in determining party positions. Our most important finding is that being Eastern affects most significantly what parties have to say about the EPS. The interactive model of the diversity views of Eastern parties explains more than half of the identified extent of the EPS, about 40 percent of exclusion from the EPS, and more than four-fifth of party interest in addressing European and 46.4 percent interest in civil society actors. No other model is significant for all dimensions of the EPS, and none provides these high scores. Furthermore, Eastern membership is a significant single predictor for the models explaining exclusion from EPS, interest in EU institutions, and interest in civil society, while government membership and being Conservative single-handedly affect only the extent of the EPS identified, and being a Social Democrat never proves a single predictor of the relationship between diversity views and the EPS.

In turn, government membership interacts with inclusive definitions of diversity and the scope of minority claims in determining the extent of the EPS, and government membership's interaction with definitions of diversity matters for exclusion from the EPS. Being a Social Democrat interacts only with definitions of diversity

and the scope of minority claims in explaining the extent of EPS identified – our weakest interaction effect. On the other hand, being a Conservative interacts with the same dimensions for determining the extent and exclusion from the EPS, and in addition, diversity as a normative goal matters for the extent of EPS, while disadvantages of diversity for the exclusion from EPS. Further interaction shows that Conservatives who do not require adaptation from immigrants and do not think of diversity as a normative goal are likely to support further cooperation and collaboration. Eastern membership interacts with four and five original components in explaining exclusion from the EPS and interest in addressing European institutions, respectively. Further interactions show that Eastern parties that do not require adaptation identify more EPS, those opposed to minority claims are likely to address civil society, and those that do not see diversity as a normative goal will welcome more trans-national networking possibilities.

Turning to the interactions of our control variables with citizenship preferences, we note that the interactive models once again tend to have a better explanatory power with the exception of the model for addressing European actors. What matters most is again Eastern membership, as combined with citizenship preference, not only makes all our models significant but also explains about half of the party interest in addressing European and civil actors – dimensions that were unpredictable in our earlier model. Our control variables being Eastern or Conservative turn out to be single components for explaining interest in European and civil actors, while government membership matters only for explaining addressing civil society, and being a Social Democrat proves to be insignificant as a single component and produces no interaction effects with citizenship preferences.

Being in government and supporting dual citizenship make parties ready for more communication, while Eastern membership interacts significantly with support for inclusive citizenship policy and supranational EU citizenship when predicting exclusion from the EPS and addressing European and civil actors. Eastern parties supporting dual citizenship also address civil society, while those that oppose EU citizenship welcome more communication and collaboration. While being Social Democrat proved insignificant, being Conservative negatively affects interest in European and civil society actors, but Conservatives in favour of inclusive citizenship policy positively affect these interests (see similarly Van Os, Wester and Jankowski 2007).

Last, examining migration-related preferences together with the control variables we cannot observe a straightforward strengthening of the explanatory power of our models. Instead, we see that accounting for government membership in migration preferences significantly raises the explained variance of the extent of and the exclusion from the EPS. Similarly, Eastern party preferences for migration much better explain interest in addressing European and civil actors; while being a Social Democrat or a Conservative does not affect predictive power significantly.

Government parties that oppose immigrant groups and preferential policies of free movement identify a wider EPS, while no other interaction with our control variables can be identified. At the same time, government membership alone and in interaction with no welcomed groups, no preferential policies, and asylum restrictions explain exclusion from the EPS. Eastern membership alone is a significant component – but is also in negative interaction with restrictions on free movement

and the scope of welcomed groups – in predicting the degree of exclusion from the EPS. The Eastern parties opposed to restrictions on free movement and asylum are most likely to address European and civil actors, while those favouring political rights for non-citizens are the most supportive of more collaboration and communication.

When we control for party ideology, Social Democrats turn out to be keen to address European actors irrespective of the missing interaction effect with any aspect of migration. At the same time, Social Democrats opposed to immigrants see exclusion from the EPS, while those opposed to immigrants and favouring asylum restriction welcome more trans-European debate. Similarly, Conservative ideology interacts little with aspects of migration in predicting views about the EPS. Yet, Conservatives who welcome immigrants and political rights for them, and are opposed to preferential policies or asylum restrictions, are likely to identify exclusion from the EPS. Those supporting restrictions in policy and political rights for non-citizens and opposing preferential policies are also the ones open to more collaboration.

To summarise, although one would expect that government status, party ideology, or geographic location would interact with our models of diversity views and immigration attitudes explaining party positioning on the EPS, we find very little evidence that these established theoretical propositions on party Europeanisation matter with the exception of Eastern membership. The diversity views of Eastern parties explain to a much higher degree what parties think of the EPS than any other variable from our analysis. We also see most interactions taking place between Eastern membership and our independent variables not only for diversity views but also citizenship preferences and views on migration, which might suggest that it might make sense to revise the models accordingly.

In contrast, ideological differences for the two main groups of parties, as well as government role, do not produce much interaction; therefore, we do not need to refine our original hypotheses. Findings that contradict theoretical propositions, despite the limited role of ideological differences, might be because both groups of parties are composed by mainstream parties that often position themselves in the centre of the political scene. The few interaction effects that prove significant might help better predict the positioning of given groups of parties, yet these effects do not show a significant pattern for the overall analysis. Furthermore, although Eastern location proved important, it fails to explain the most important aspect of the EPS, namely, how parties see the extent of public spheres. The same is true for controlling for Social Democrats while in a government role and being a Conservative: they interact to various degrees in explaining the extent of the EPS. The other important aspect of the EPS largely unaffected by interaction effects is whether parties would welcome more communication and collaboration possibilities.

Discussion and Conclusions

The systematic comparison of responses from political parties in the 16 countries help us identify the most common understanding of what parties think of diversity, what they dispute regarding immigration, or how they conceptualise the EPS. We should underline that the issues we have identified proved significant for all parties across Europe, and thus, these issues constitute significant common European

themes contested over the entire continent. Our most important finding is that maintaining multiple contextual identities is crucial for political parties in dealing with diversity, migration, or European public spheres as party views on diversity and immigration affect significantly what parties say about trans-European collaboration. This means that national contexts are important determinants for European integration, and if a party is opposed to an inclusive understanding of diversity, the party will most likely oppose European deliberation and vice versa.

Political parties play an important role in articulating the EPS since they aggregate domestic preferences and attitudes on diversity and choice in immigration policy, which then are important predictors of how the European arena is conceived. However, Europeanisation seems to have penetrated domestic political systems since issues such as political rights for non-citizens, adaptation requirements for immigrants, and the inclusiveness of citizenship criteria figure prominently in domestic political discourses across the continent. Diversity views and claims on immigration determine what political parties incorporate in their public discourses not only on the domestic but also on the European level. In turn, common European issues and debates affect what parties think of diversity or migration. In this sense, parties convey the domestic to the European level on the one hand, but on the other, they transmit important European issues and policies back to the domestic civil society actors given the interconnectedness and mutual exchange among various national public spheres.

Traditional cleavages matter in how parties position themselves along the different dimensions of diversity, migration, or the EPS; however, these cleavages are weak in explaining how the views of diversity and migration affect what parties say about trans-European communication and collaboration. The only exception is Eastern location, which seems to substantiate the claim that Europeanisation should be understood differently for Central and Eastern Europe. Ideological differences between mainstream parties or government role play a very limited role in explaining the link between diversity and the EPS.

Thus, we argue that parties with more inclusive views of diversity are more likely to be active participants in European arenas irrespective of their government role or ideological background (though limited to mainstream parties). The nature of the national public spheres and domestic political competition and traditional cleavages determine whether national collective identities and loyalties prevail or whether national publics are willing and able to be more open to transnationalisation efforts. We need to consider the multi-dimensional conditions and processes that affect diversity in contemporary European society as a European-level discussion of common issues could enable national political actors to carry European ideas into their national public sphere, which might prove a new potential for reaching common attitudes and preferences across the different member states.

Notes:

1. For each country, at least three political parties were selected: the two most important parties (government and opposition) plus a maverick party. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with approximately 37 high-ranking party members.

2. Sata, Robert. 2010. *Eurosphere Task Group Report WP 5.2: Does Europe Matter? The Europeanization of Political Parties across Europe and the Fragmentation of European Public Spheres.* <http://eurospheres.org/publications/workpackage-reports/>

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MEDIA REPORTING PATTERNS IN EUROPE:
THE CASES OF CONSTRUCTION OF THE EU AND REFORM TREATY

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Abstract

The mass media are key social actors in the articulation of themes of common concern in the European public space, nowadays. Through mediation of messages, symbols and visions on important issues the media may influence on which themes to dominate the European public sphere. In this article we examine the patterns of media reporting on important EU-related issues, particularly the issues of Construction of the EU and Reform Treaty, in 16 European countries, incl. Turkey. We analyse the EU-related content of 77 print and broadcast media actors by focusing on two dimensions of media reporting: the frequency of reporting and the attitudes manifested by the media actors while reporting on EU-related issues. Our general findings suggest that at the time of data collection (May-October 2008) there was a prevailing country-specific, instead of a unified pattern of media reporting in Europe. Significant interdependencies between the types of state membership (old, new and non-member) and the articulation of both discussed cases, as well as other topics of the EU integration in media are outlined.

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Introduction

Media and media reporting patterns are of key research interest as they are among the public sphere's major aspects and one of citizens' basic means for obtaining information and for shaping representations, attitudes and opinions concerning various issues of EU enlargement, development and perspectives.

National media in Europe usually reflect issues of different scope and concern (national, regional, European, international) with varying frequency and preferences, depending on a number of factors – historical, sociopolitical, economic, etc. In this article, we discuss some results of an empiric research, which is a part of a larger study of media reporting on EU-related issues, carried out within the framework of the Eurosphere Project.[1] The overall objective of this article is to assess whether there is a *unified* or a *country-specific* pattern of media reporting in Europe. We will do this by focusing on two dimensions of media reporting: (1) the frequency of reporting on EU-related issues, particularly on the *Reform Treaty (RT)* and *Construction of Europe and the EU (CEU)*, and (2) the attitudes displayed by the media actors to European integration while reporting EU-related issues.

Despite the diversity of approaches in the field of mass communication, it seems not many studies relevant to the new EU realities and to the dynamic changes caused by the progress in EU integration have been published. Baisnee suggests some reasonable criticism concerning contemporary research in this field. He summarises his critical comments in three directions. First, media research confounds the European Public Sphere (EPS) and the mass media, moreover it is often confined to the press and even then only to the quality press. Second, the EPS is typically reduced to the media with regard to their geographical location, i.e. as national media of EU member countries. Third, the "normative liberal-democratic" viewpoint suggests that all EU citizens are participants in the EPS (Baisnee 2007).

Raising awareness is defined as an explicit function of the mass media with regard to EU-related issues. Still, regardless of their educational and awareness-raising function, which is undoubtedly beneficial to EU citizens (Baisnee 2007; Van Cauwenberge et al. 2009; Statham 2010b), it seems that the media have not obtained the information needed or at least some explicit indications of the content and implications of the Reform Treaty, "as the *lack of information* was one of the main reasons for the preference of a quarter of the 'no' voters" (Van Cauwenberge et al. 2009).

In spite of the continuously increasing number of studies of the EPS, the streamline of "denying" its existence (Kleinstüber 2001; Trenz2004; Wimmer 2005, quoted by VanCauwenberge et al. 2009) is salient both along and within them, as this standpoint is supported by arguments and facts about citizens' national identification and also about the media features regarded as prevailingly national and occupied by national-related issues and actors. All these together with the considerations of not a few authors, who argue that a common EU identity does not exist, limit the possibilities to develop and articulate a common EPS or a transnational media sphere.

At the same time, coverage on the same topic by different countries' media, within the same period, using identical news frames, is considered a basic requirement and indicator for the development of a European public sphere (Brüggeman 2005). In this research, we endeavour to outline topics reflected by the media in

several European states during a selected period, which could be utilised in future investigation in a transnational aspect.

Calhoun mentions that in spite of the latest communication developments, the mass media are still operating mainly on a national territory and scale. According to him, the operation of the mass media on a trans-national level may be arranged on the basis of similarity among spoken languages.

> *It is worth noting, though, that even English media are minimally organised on a European scale; they are national (in the fuzzy sense that includes both Britain and Scotland) or they are global* (Calhoun 2004, 14).

Still, it is promising that

> *… it is not trivial that there is increased reporting in most European countries of the public discussions that take place in others. This provides for links among democracies, and provides a supportive context for transnational social movements. These last play an important role in opinion-formation on a European scale* (Calhoun 2004, 14).

Splichal emphasises some possibilities for a more collective representation of community belonging and for interest in issues of common concern (Splichal 2011):

> *… the involvement of a greater number of civil society actors from different geographic, ethnic, cultural, social, and political environments in the processes of public deliberation and decision making related to media contents and management may contribute to the broadening of the social basis of democratic processes* (Splichal 2011, 104).

In fact, studying and herein presenting some of the main media thematic interest in EU-related issues through their visibility (reporting frequency) and through the expressed media preferences (attitudes), we indirectly reach out to some important issues concerning the role of EU integration for its media coverage and reflection. According to Statham, journalism faces not a few challenges, which hinder the relevant reflection of topical EU-related information. Some of them stem from the features of EU policy communication, but not from the lack of interest and professionalism of journalists (Statham 2010b).

It seems that media reporting features a two-sided pattern. On the one hand, the thematic interest in national issues prevails, which should make it easy to distinguish between media content from different countries. Yet, on the other hand, the journalists themselves are characterised by more differences than countries with regard to media reporting on EU issues. A study of the representations of journalists from four countries revealed that they considered the provision of information as a better option than political communication performance. With regard to commentating decisions, Statham found that journalists are concerned mainly with information aspects and less with political aspects of the EU, i.e. they are rather educationally centred (ibid.).

One of the key dimensions studied with regard to the EU media reality is *visibility*. Adam's study appears to be rather close to and relevant for our study, as it also examines both EU integration and the Reform Treaty. Furthermore, Adam suggests three criteria for assessment of the media "integration potential" and of their contribution to both portrayal and enhancement of citizens' representations of the EU as a community. These three criteria are, as follows: (1) whether the media

make topics and actors in Europe visible, (2) whether they show interdependencies, i.e. interconnectedness between these actors and (3) whether they formulate positive and negative preferences of European integration "without fencing off traditional entities" ("dispute constellation") (Adam 2008). Adam's study examines the quality press in two EU countries. Our study is focused on the first and the third criteria, i.e. *visibility* and *dispute constellation*, with the purpose to analyse media reporting patterns in numerous European countries with regard to their similarities and differences and in the perspective of their integration potential and contribution to development of an EPS.

Analyses carried out by many researchers in the field come to support the most common conclusion that there is a considerable gap between EU elites and citizens. In other words, although involvement of the mass media in EU-related issues is rather high, the media actors still report on decisions, procedures and processes, which are made and implemented at the top, yet remain hardly comprehensible and acceptable by the EU citizens (Mittag and Wessels 2003, quoted by Adam 2008; Statham 2010c).

We are hopeful that our study contributes to casting a stronger light on the aspects, which have remained in the background so far, as, in contrast to most of the latest studies, we encompass a large number and different type of media actors – both print and broadcast and we also examine the patterns of media reporting on EU-related issues in 16 European countries, incl. Turkey.

At the same time, the focus of our attention is shifted to both the *frequency* of media reporting, i.e. visibility of EU-related themes, particularly of CEU and RT and media *attitudes*, i.e. positive and negative connotations of their preferences on the issues, also taking into consideration the country of origin of the media. Analysing these dimensions, we continue the tradition in this area (see Adam, 2008; Statham 2010c). As the Eurosphere provided media content analyses of 4-5 national print and broadcast media actors from 16 different European countries, i.e. the content analyses of a total of 77 media actors around Europe, our data appear to represent almost "half of the EU."

One of the main objects of our research is the analysis of the Lisbon Treaty media coverage. The Lisbon Treaty ratification is a whole process that represents a large-scale indicator of how the EU "project" is perceived by journalists, commentators, scientists and citizens. During the years-lasting process of acceptance of the Treaty in different countries, a number of sceptical assessments, analyses and expectations have accumulated both in the press and in scientific publications – addressing the whole EU and not only the Lisbon Treaty.

If the long process of ratification of the Treaty in the different Member States normally provoked the interest of media and the scepticism of observers, editors and politicians, as well as citizens, its acceptance consecutively by the Irish people and the Polish and Czech presidents, should have evoked a much more serious reverberation in all countries, followed by dozens of publications regarding the new perspectives faced by the EU project (see detailed analysis in Piris 2010).

Research Design and Methods

To achieve our objective, i.e. to assess the media reflection pattern in Europe, we focused on two dimensions of media reporting: the *frequency* of reporting and the *attitudes* manifested by the media actors while reporting EU-related issues. We consider both (frequency and attitude) dimensions measures of the structure of the mediated EPS. Whereas the frequency dimension can be a measure of the *thematic interest structure* of the mediated EPS, the attitude dimension can be interpreted as the *discursive structure* of the EPS. Assessment of the pattern of media reporting on the key EU-related issues through measurement of both dimensions of reporting will help us establish whether and how the national media actors in Europe contribute to articulation of an EPS, and the question of do they mediate a common or fragmented EPS.

The Eurosphere's media content data collection was carried out from 9 May-10 October 2008 in all 16 partner countries involved in the project. The Eurosphere's database contained media content data for this period from 77 pre-selected print and broadcast media actors from all partner countries. The content analysis was focused on news stories/items that had an explicit or implicit "clear European dimension" and referred to different topics: EU institutions, Constructing Europe and the EU, Reform Treaty, Enlargement, Minorities or minority policies, Immigration or migration policy, Free movement or mobility, Gender and gender policy. Two of these topics (represented by a total of 2645 news items) were subjected to qualitative case study analysis and discussed herein – *Constructing Europe and the EU (CEU),* i.e. stories creating a certain European culture/identity, or talking about other European states' national identities or traditions, often resorting to national and cultural stereotypes, and *Reform Treaty (RT)*, incl. European Constitution, Lisbon Treaty, etc. Both broadcast news items from the primetime news programmes and print news items from the news columns of the studied media actors were subjected to analysis.

Along with the analyses of thematic and discursive structure of the mediated EPS "by country," we also carried out analyses by "country type," whereas we grouped the participating countries into three groups: *old, new* and *non-EU members*, regarding the legal criteria as per the year of EU accession (see Table 1). Our objective was to find whether and how the type of countries' EU membership was related to the structure of the mediated EPS and whether it was a stronger or a weaker predictor of the mediated EPS structure in comparison with the country of origin of the media.

To carry out the case studies on the CEU and RT themes we employed both qualitative and quantitative methods (incl. correspondence analysis, descriptive statistics and Chi-square distance measure). We grounded on the argument that qualitative analysis does not reject any form of quantification (Shoemaker and Reese 1996). Furthermore, we added the perspective of classification of the countries participating in Eurosphere according to their EU membership status. Along with the cross-national comparisons of attitudes towards both themes, the latter made feasible the comparisons by membership/country type and revealed whether sub-European spheres of countries' media sharing similar attitudes exist.

Table 1: Type of Country: Old, New and Non-EU Members

Old member countries	New member countries	Non-member countries
United Kingdom Year of EU accession: 1973	Bulgaria Year of EU accession: 2007	Norway
France Founding member	Czech Republic Year of EU accession: 2004	Turkey
Italy Founding member	Hungary Year of EU accession: 2004	
Spain Year of EU accession: 1986	Estonia Year of EU accession: 2004	
Austria Year of EU accession: 1995		
Belgium Founding member		
Germany Founding member		
Finland Year of EU accession: 1995		
Denmark Year of EU accession: 1973		
The Netherlands Founding member		

CEU and RT in the Context of Other EU-related Themes: Cross-national Comparisons

To discover whether the media in the different European countries employed a unified or a country-specific approach to reporting on key EU-related issues, particularly on Construction of Europe and the EU (CEU) and on Reform Treaty (RT), our first step was to measure the "frequency" dimension of the media reporting pattern. By using dimension reduction tools (correspondence analysis and Chi square distance measure), we measured the location of CEU and RT (as the first most important theme "first MIT") and the relative frequency of their media reflection in the context of other EU-related issues discussed in the national media spaces.[2]

Correspondence analysis results revealed that the country of origin of the media and the 1st MIT variables were strongly correlated (See Table 2). Hence, some convincing generalisations could be made about the association of categories.

Table 2: Correspondence Analysis Summary for the Correlation between First MIT and Country (of Origin of the Media)

Summary								
Dimension	Singular Value	Inertia	Chi Square	Sig.	Proportion of Inertia		Confidence Singular Value	
					Accounted for	Cumulative	Standard Deviation	Correlation 2
1	.531	.282			.399	.399	.012	.055
2	.460	.211			.299	.698	.009	
3	.305	.093			.131	.829		
4	.229	.053			.074	.903		
5	.210	.044			.062	.966		
6	.146	.021			.030	.996		
7	.056	.003			.004	1.000		
Total		.708	5957.945	.000[a]	1.000	1.000		

a. 240 degrees of freedom

The biplot correspondence map below reveals the inter-category distances among countries and the first MIT in the space of yielded dimensions (see Figure 1).

Figure1: First Most Important Themes in the National Media Spaces



At the time of media data collection (May-October 2008), "Construction of Europe and the EU" (CEU) as the first MIT was an issue of prior importance, i.e. most frequently discussed by the French, Dutch and UK media and less frequently reflected by the other national media.

"Reform Treaty" (RT) was most frequently found in the spaces of Danish, Czech and Norwegian media and least, in the spaces of Turkish, Bulgarian, Hungarian and Dutch media. Generally, RT was among the most prominent EU-related themes, together with the issues of EU institutions, Minorities and Migration Policy and EU enlargement.

The Italian, Finnish and German media were much more concerned with the issues of Minorities and Migration Policy; Hungary – with Minorities/Minority Policy; the Turkish and Bulgarian media – with EU Enlargement; and the Austrian, Spanish, UK and Estonian media – with the EU institutions theme, rather than with CEU and RT.

Although both CEU and RT as first most important themes were present in all national media spaces, they were discussed with varying frequency in the context of other EU-related issues. Obviously, the current and common sociopolitical circumstances in the process of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty premised more frequent media reflections of the RT issue in most European countries at the time of media data collection. Still, country-specific patterns with regard to the frequency dimension of media reporting on both themes were also prominent. Similar were de Vreese's findings in a study, which suggested the existence of cross-national differences in media reflection of EU issues and also higher frequency of reporting

on current events – EP elections in this case (de Vreese 2008). It is also applicable to our results, as long as the RT issue concerned a set of certain integration events, while CEU was a combination of subthemes as most of them were continual and not so prominent as current events.

CEU and RT in the Context of Other EU-related Themes: Comparisons among Old, New and Non-members

Our next step was to find whether the type of countries' EU membership (old, new and non-members) was related to the "frequency" dimension of media reporting on key EU-related issues and whether the "country type" was a stronger or a weaker predictor of the thematic structure of the mediated EPS in comparison with the country of origin of the media (see above).

Correspondence analysis results showed that the recoded variable, grouping the countries of origin of the media into three types (old, new and non-EU members) was significantly, yet weakly correlated with the first MIT (see Table 3 and Figure 2).

Table 3: Correspondence Analysis Summary for the Correlation between First MIT and Country Type (of Origin of the Media)

Summary								
Dimension	Singular Value	Inertia	Chi Square	Sig.	Proportion of Inertia		Confidence Singular Value	
					Accounted for	Cumulative	Standard Deviation	Correlation 2
1	.422	.178			.837	.837	.014	.051
2	.187	.035			.163	1.000	.011	
Total		.213	1793.823	.000[a]	1.000	1.000		

a. 32 degrees of freedom

Figure 2: Media Reflection of the First MITs in the Old, New and Non-EU members



In the context of other EU-related themes, CEU and RT seemed to be reflected more frequently by the media in the old member countries and less frequently by the media in the new and non-members. While RT as first MIT appeared to be among the most prominent themes mediated in the old member countries, together with EU institutions, CEU as first MIT was not among the most prominent themes for any country type. The non-members' media seemed to be concerned mostly with the Enlargement theme (Turkey) and with Reform Treaty (Norway), the new members' media – with EU institutions, and those in the old members – with Migration and Minority Policies and EU Institutions (together with the Reform Treaty theme).

It is important to note that although both Turkey and Norway were included in the analysis as non-members, the results of cross-national comparisons (see the previous paragraph) reveal important differences between these two countries with regard to the media reflection of RT. While RT proved to be a theme of prior importance for the Norwegian media, it was not among the prominent themes for the Turkish media studied. The latter result was an important insight, revealing the closeness of Norwegian media concerns with RT to those of the old members. Furthermore, although CEU and RT were found mainly in media spaces of the old member countries, still, media actors in some new and non-member countries were also found among those highly concerned with RT (see the paragraph above).

On the one hand, our findings revealed that the media actors' classification by country type (old, new and non-EU members) proved to be a weaker predictor of the thematic interest structure of the mediated EPS in comparison with the country of origin of the media. On the other hand, classification of the national media by country type also proved to play an important role for differentiation within the thematic interest structure of the mediated EPS.

Attitudes towards CEU and RT: Cross-national Comparisons

Although the frequency of reflection of both CEU and RT themes may be regarded as a high concern and good knowledge of the media actors about the EU family's prior issues, their contribution to the EPS and to the process of Europeanisation is much more contingent upon the attitudes/preferences they channel through the reflections of these issues.

Preferences or attitudes of the media while reporting on key EU-related issues constituted the second dimension of their approach to EPS, i.e. the discursive dimension of the mediated EPS that we measured by descriptive statistical tools and Chi-square distance measure. Our next step was to find whether the national media in Europe manifested similar or country-specific attitudes while reporting on key EU-related issues, particularly on the issues of Construction of Europe and the EU (CEU) and Reform Treaty (RT) as the first most important themes (first MIT). These analyses provided the opportunity to assess how the national media contributed to the discursive structure of the mediated EPS.

Results of the descriptive statistical and Chi-square analysis revealed a significant and moderate correlation between the media actors' preferences on both CEU and RT as first MIT and the country of the media (see Table 4).

Table 4: Chi-square Tests for the Preferences on CEU and RT as First MIT by Country (of Origin of the Media)

First most important theme		Value	df	Sig. (2-sided)
Constructing Europe and the EU	Pearson Chi-Square	388.603	60	.000
	Likelihood Ratio	356.240	60	.000
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.001	1	.977
	N of Valid Cases	878		
	Contingency Coefficient	.554		.000
Reform Treaty	Pearson Chi-Square	609.693	60	.000
	Likelihood Ratio	581.511	60	.000
	Linear-by-Linear Association	8.602	1	.003
	N of Valid Cases	1513		
	Contingency Coefficient	.536		.000

The tables below illustrate the media attitudes towards CEU and RT as first MITs in the different countries (see Tables 5 and 6).

Table 5: Attitudes towards CEU as First MIT by Country (of Origin of the Media)

Country	Preferences on Constructing Europe and the EU as 1st MIT (count)					Total
	None/ Not applicable	Only positive	More positive than negative	More negative than positive	Only negative	
Austria	36	9	5	12	19	81
Belgium	12	0	0	0	0	12
Bulgaria	42	26	33	35	6	142
Czech Republic	13	5	3	2	2	25
Denmark	5	3	2	4	4	18
Estonia	9	2	1	5	0	17
Finland	0	13	0	1	0	14
France	65	69	6	10	3	153
Germany	9	6	4	0	0	19
Hungary	17	5	13	0	0	35
Italy	42	8	9	11	4	74
Norway	5	0	3	3	1	12
The Netherlands	47	12	12	15	6	92
Spain	19	0	9	29	2	59
Turkey	13	2	1	0	14	30
United Kingdom	46	6	14	20	9	95
Total	380	166	115	147	70	878

Obviously, in most national media the "none/not applicable" preference, i.e. neutral attitude dominated the reflection of both CEU and RT as first MIT, particularly in Belgian media. It was explicable by the principle of impartiality claimed by most media actors. Finnish, German and Dutch media were found to be more positive than negative (besides neutral) towards both themes, and Danish, Spanish and UK media actors were more negative than positive. Austrian media (besides neutral) were more negative about CEU and neutral-to-positive about RT, while Italian media were more positive about CEU and more negative about RT. Bulgarian, Czech and Hungarian media actors were more positive (besides neutral) about both CEU and RT, while Estonian media manifested more positive attitudes to RT, but also more negative preferences on CEU. The media actors in both Turkey and Norway reported on CEU and RT in a more negative than positive manner. It is

Table 6: Attitudes towards RT as First MIT by Country (of Origin of the Media)

Country	Preferences on Reform Treaty as 1st MIT (count)					Total
	None/ Not applicable	Only positive	More positive than negative	More negative than positive	Only negative	
Austria	114	73	9	17	60	273
Belgium	32	0	0	0	0	32
Bulgaria	27	6	23	14	2	72
Czech Republic	113	11	24	11	8	167
Denmark	110	12	3	16	42	183
Estonia	38	4	13	8	0	63
Finland	42	31	2	6	3	84
France	45	0	5	2	3	55
Germany	108	8	30	12	11	169
Hungary	31	10	4	1	1	47
Italy	42	0	4	5	6	57
Norway	44	1	2	3	4	54
The Netherlands	20	1	5	3	0	29
Spain	30	0	15	30	4	79
Turkey	30	1	0	2	2	35
United Kingdom	30	2	13	24	45	114
Total	856	160	152	154	191	1513

important to note that the approach to media reflection on CEU and RT is quite different in each country's media. These findings first came to support the notion of a country-specific "attitudinal" dimension of media reporting and respectively of a discursive structure of the mediated EPS. The picture of quite varied attitudes – from positive to negative along with the prevailing neutral preferences – suggested that the national media had already been Europeanised or were in a process of Europeanisation. Yet, by October 2008, it was too early to visualise a common European media space in concern to key EU-related issues.

Attitudes towards CEU and RT: Comparison among Old, New and Non-members

Again, to enrich our findings with regard to the discursive dimension of media approach to reporting on key EU-related issues, we decided to check how the country type (old, new and non-members) was related to the media preferences on both CEU and RT and whether the "country type" variable would be a stronger or a weaker predictor of the mediated EPS structure in comparison with country of origin of the media (see above).

Chi-square analysis revealed that the country type was significantly, but weakly related to the media actors' attitudes towards CEU and RT as first MIT (see Tables 7, 8, and 9).

Similarly to the results above, in all country types the "none/not applicable" preference dominated the reflection of both CEU and RT. Besides the neutral attitude, the attention was drawn on the prevailing positive attitude toward CEU of the media in the old and in the new members and also on the "more negative" preferences of the media in the non-members. Generally, the media actors in the old and in the new members appeared to be (besides neutral) much more pro-integration in comparison with the media actors studied in the non-members

– Turkey and Norway, although the media reflections in the old and in the new members were also far from being only neutral and positive about CEU as some ambivalence and negative attitudes were also observed in this regard. It is worth noting that the prevailing positive attitudes towards CEU of the old members' media are mostly due to the Finnish, French and German media's preferences and those of the new members – mostly due to the Bulgarian and less to the Czech and Hungarian media.

Table 7: Chi-square Tests for the Media Preferences on CEU and RT as 1st MIT in the Old, New and Non-EU members

First most important theme		Value	df	Sig. (2-sided)
Constructing Europe and the EU	Pearson Chi-Square	78.187[a]	8	.000
	Likelihood Ratio	60.838	8	.000
	Linear-by-Linear Association	8.847	1	.003
	N of Valid Cases	878		
	Contingency Coefficient	.286		.000
Reform Treaty	Pearson Chi-Square	96.131[c]	8	.000
	Likelihood Ratio	106.385	8	.000
	Linear-by-Linear Association	32.731	1	.000
	N of Valid Cases	1513		
	Contingency Coefficient	.244		.000

Table 8: Attitudes towards CEU as First MIT of the Media Actors in the Old, New and Non-EU member Countries

Country Type	Preferences on Constructing Europe and the EU as 1st MIT (count)					Total
	None/ Not applicable	Only positive	More positive than negative	More negative than positive	Only negative	
Old member	281	126	61	102	47	617
New member	81	38	50	42	8	219
Non-member	18	2	4	3	15	42
Total	380	166	115	147	70	878

Table 9: Attitudes towards RT as First MIT of the Media Actors in the Old, New and Non-EU Member Countries

Country Type	Preferences on Reform Treaty as 1st MIT (count)					Total
	None/ Not applicable	Only positive	More positive than negative	More negative than positive	Only negative	
Old member	573	127	86	115	174	1075
New member	209	31	64	34	11	349
Non-member	74	2	2	5	6	89
Total	856	160	152	154	191	1513

With regard to the Reform Treaty (RT), while the "more positive than negative" attitude dominated the scene in the new EU members, negative preferences dominated the media actors' attitudes toward RT in the old and non-members.

While analysing the data on reported media attitudes one should not miss the fact that the media actors still reflect actual events and governmental policies.

Hence, it is not only about the influence of EPS and not even about current issues of transnational concern, which is of key importance for both print and broadcast media actors, but it is also about the whole configuration of factors at the information-political level (Statham 2010a).

Discussion

The media are not the only "bridge" to articulation of EPS. Still, they are an important channel for enhancement of common European communication space(s). Our findings suggest that at the time of media data collection (May-October 2008), there was a prevailing *country-specific*, instead of a unified pattern of media reporting in Europe with regard to key EU-related issues, studied under the Eurosphere Project, and particularly with regard to the cases of *Reform Treaty (RT)* and *Construction of Europe and the EU (CEU)*. At the same time, the data analysis demonstrates that the type of the EU state – old, new or non-members – also exerts a certain, although weaker influence on the media content on both cases discussed here. In fact, a typology here completes the clarification of national "positions" in the media reporting, for the type of the state furthers the direction of politics, as well as its media reflection.

Hence, our findings are completely consistent with the current state of EPS, which has not been common for all EU members so far, i.e. the more common categories we study as independent variables (such as old/new/non-members), the weaker determinants of EPS's dimensions they turn to be. Anyway, the general impression is that the issues are outlined on a national level and even key questions such as the constitutional, are reflected briefly and superficially (Metykova and Preston 2009).

Some other EU-related themes studied under the Eurosphere Project (EU institutions, EU enlargement, migration and minority policies) were also prominent and relevant to the classification of the media by country type.

Fragmentation of media reporting on EU-related issues along national lines is considered one of the important factors causing deficits in communication. News is presented in the light of the national interpretative schemes and models of thinking, of actuality in a given socio-economical and political context in a certain country and in the EU. To manage this situation, Statham suggests, as follows, that:

> *Following Schlesinger (1999, 276-277; quoted by Statham), the emergence of a 'European sphere of publics' requires the dissemination of a European news agenda, that becomes part of the every-day news-consuming habits of European audiences, to an extent that publics come to understand citizenship and belonging as at least in part transcending the nation-state* (Statham 2010a, 117).

Our findings also suggested interesting and even unexpected further inferences on the *contribution* of each country's media actors in the mediation of the EPS. In the table below we have tried to summarise both dimensions (frequency and attitudes) of the pattern of media reporting on CEU and RT in all the studied European countries (see Table 10).

Table 10 suggests that some media such as the Hungarian and Bulgarian media (which discussed RT as the first MIT with comparatively low frequency), still enhanced mainly positive (besides neutral) attitudes towards both EU-related themes. The Finnish, French, German and Czech media also promoted mainly positive (besides neutral) attitudes towards both themes, combined even with a medium-to-high frequency of reflection. And although some other national media such as Austrian, Turkish, Norwegian, Estonian media and particularly the UK, Spanish and Danish media, reported on both CEU and RT with moderate or even high frequency, they also manifested mainly negative (besides neutral) preferences on these themes. Interestingly, Austrian media displayed mainly positive attitudes towards RT along with negative preferences on CEU. Some other media actors such as the Italian and Dutch ones manifested rather ambivalent attitudes towards both CEU and RT themes contingent upon their importance. While in the case of Belgium media, high indicators of neutrality of preferences were observed for both themes.

Table 10: Typology of the Media Reporting Patterns by Country

Country of the media	Construction of Europe/EU (CEU)		Reform Treaty (RT)	
	Frequency	Attitudes (besides neutral)	Frequency	Attitudes (besides neutral)
	1st MIT	1st MIT	1st MIT	1st MIT
Austria	Medium	Negative	Medium	Positive
Belgium	Medium	Neutral	Medium	Neutral
Bulgaria	Medium	Positive	Low	Positive
Czech Rep.	Medium	Positive	High	Positive
Denmark	Medium	Negative	High	Negative
Estonia	Medium	Negative	Medium	Positive
Finland	Medium	Positive	Medium	Positive
France	High	Positive	Medium	Neutral
Germany	Medium	Positive	Medium	Positive
Hungary	Medium	Positive	Low	Positive
Italy	Medium	Positive	Medium	Negative
Norway	Medium	Negative	High	Negative
Netherlands	High	Positive	Low	Positive
Spain	Medium	Negative	Medium	Negative
Turkey	Medium	Negative	Low	Negative
UK	High	Negative	Medium	Negative

Obviously, although all countries' media actors discussed the key issues of CEU and RT, their reporting pattern was characterised by quite varied frequency and preferences. Hence, we have tried to outline a *typology of the national media by the frequency-attitude combination with regard to both CEU and RT themes:*

1. Media actors combining a *high frequency* of reflection with *neutral-to-positive attitudes* to CEU and RT: *French, Czech, Finnish* and *German* media.

2. Media actors characterised by *medium-to-low frequency* of reporting and *neutral-to-positive attitudes* to CEU and RT: *Bulgarian* media.

3. Media actors combining *medium frequency* of discussion with *neutral attitudes* to CEU and RT: *Belgian* media.

4. Media actors characterised by *low-medium-high frequency* of reporting and prevailing *neutral-to-positive preferences* at least on the first MIT (for both CEU and RT): *Hungarian* and *Dutch* media.

5. Media actors combining *medium frequency* of reporting with prevailing *neutral-to-negative (or ambivalent) attitudes* towards either CEU or RT as first MIT: *Austrian* and *Italian* media.

6. Media actors characterised by *low frequency* of reflection and *neutral-to-negative attitudes* to both themes: *Turkish* media.

7. Media actors combining *high frequency* of discussion with *neutral-to-negative preferences* on both themes: *UK* and *Norwegian* and *Spanish, Estonian and Danish media.*

The classification above suggests some important implications about each country's media contribution to EPS. We have good reasons to argue that the media actors from the countries mentioned in points 1-4 were relatively well-disposed and supportive with regard to European integration, as the level of constructiveness was gradually decreased from point 1 to point 4. Furthermore, the national media indicated in points 5-7 demonstrated much or less ambivalence, non-acceptance and even negativity towards issues related to further European integration, as the level of disapproval was gradually increased from point 5 to 7. Hence, the French, Czech, Finnish, German and Bulgarian media were characterised by the most constructive pattern of reporting on key EU-related issues, while the UK, Norwegian, Spanish, Estonian, Danish and Turkish media – by the least constructive approach to mediation of EPS. The findings for some countries' media such as those of Denmark are surprising to some extent, as far as some other research data suggest advanced Europeanisation of the media in Denmark (Orsen 2008).

Comparison of our research data with some data obtained by other researchers, particularly with regard to ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, outlines a dynamic and irregular process of changing media attitudes in the course of time, as the general trends have been obviously preserved. In Trenz's study of how the ratification process was mediated during the period 2004-2005, some national media were apparently changing their preferences on discussion of the Treaty to a more positive, or at least to neutral ones (French media are an example in this regard). Still, the tendency has remained quite similar to the one described by the researchers for the period some years ago.

> *Although it remains clear that the majority of the journalists in our sample were supportive of the European integration project and by and large also of the Constitutional Treaty, the way the EU and the member states handled the constitutional ratification process was subjected to rather massive criticism* (Trenz et al. 2007, 15).

Similarly to some other cross-country comparisons, the results of our study also suggest salient differences between the national media from various countries. Still, the results emphasise that the large number of different countries' media introduces similar, even common tendencies of the discourse on some crucial events and processes in today's Europe.

Conclusion

Our media typology is, of course, tentative and can serve as an assumption, rather than as a convincing generalisation, since the number of the media studied and news items coded in the different countries/country types was largely different, which inevitably affected the lower or higher frequency/attitude indicators of some countries' media. Still, one should take into consideration some important remarks with regard to our findings and their implications. Definition of the countries' media attitudes to CEU and RT as either positive or negative is quite simplified due to the large number of coded news items. In fact, the media attitudes contained many more lights and shades, particularly with concern to the CEU theme, which encompassed a great diversity of sub-themes, meanings, comments, opinions, ideas, etc. Hence, the CEU content can be subjected to further recoding and analysis that may outline many more differences/similarities among the national media. The fact that contemporary media discourse is focused on similar themes at the same time is at least an indicator for Europeanisation (Bruggemann 2005) of the national media and for "their openness to the idea of a European public sphere" (Sicakkan 2008, 10).

However,

> *The reduction of empirical concept of the public sphere to what one can find in the mass media ... cannot eliminate any "peril" of theoretical uncertainty that would be greater than the reduction itself. For the same reason that "public opinion" should not be confused with polling results, the "public sphere" (and also "public opinion," for that matter) should not be confused with the results of media analysis* (Splichal 2006, 706-707).

On the one hand, according to Splichal, media content is not and should not be considered statistically representative of what and how something is perceived by the general public (ibid.). In fact, the general public has access to various sources of information, incl. the Internet, where official and unofficial information are blended on many occasions and in various ways.

On the other hand, the media are the actors who provide the EU with the opportunity to obtain "a unitary international image, representing it as an actor in a variety of global contexts, making clear its distinctive collective values" (Calhoun 2004, 19).

And since the situation in Europe has been dynamically changing ever since the media data collection, it is quite possible that the pattern of media reporting, the structure of the mediated EPS, as well as the themes of key EU concern have been constantly changing too. This dynamically changing nature of the EU-related issues was well-illustrated by the fact of successful ratification of the Reform Treaty by the 27 EU member countries, in spite of the rather pessimistic expectations of politicians, journalists, academicians, etc. in this regard. Nowadays, after the RT ratification, new EU-related issues come to the fore and the EU project attains new dimensions.

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Notes:

1. The research results presented and discussed in this paper are a part of a larger media study carried out under the project: "Diversity and the European Public Sphere: towards a Citizens' Europe – EUROSPHERE" – Integrated Project under the Sixth Framework Programme of the EC.

2. We analyse both CEU and RT as first and second most important theme (first and second MIT) in the examined media content. Herein, we present and analyse only part of the results obtained for CEU and RT as first MIT.

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ETHNO-NATIONAL, RELIGIOUS, IDEOLOGICAL AND SEXUAL DIVERSITY

EUROPEAN ELITE AND CITIZEN VIEWS COMPARED

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JAROSLAV KOŠŤÁL

Abstract

In contexts of multi-level governance, such as we find in the European Union, where elites are more active in the public sphere, it is particularly crucial to assess whether citizens' views correspond to the views of the elites who claim to represent them. This article compares the views of elites with the views of representative samples of citizens, with a focus on their views on ethno-national, religious and sexual diversity. Findings confirm relationships between elite/citizens views and revealed several rules: Firstly, ethnic and ideological groups which were commonly rejected from neighbourhoods were recognised by elites as relevant for social diversity. Secondly, the most accepted migrant workers by citizens were also viewed as most relevant for social diversity by elites. Finally, sexual diversity manifested a more complex relationship – where gays are most accepted, they are either viewed by elites as highly relevant (Austria, Denmark) or irrelevant for social diversity (Czech Republic, France, Italy, Spain). In countries with high public rejection of gays, LGBT tend to be viewed by elites as very relevant (Turkey, Bulgaria, Estonia). Elite views of relevance push the public to a greater tolerance; public intolerance increases recognition of relevance of marginalised groups.

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Introduction

As societies open up to the world, they face increased diversity. Whether ethnonational, religious, ideological or sexual – diversity is an important factor influencing life in the modern, globalised world. It is particularly significant for the EU, a region aspiring to co-existence through supranational citizenship.

Diversity as a Challenge. In the academic world, as well as in popular discourse, there is an argument about the extent to which diversity provides cultural enrichment, and at what point it becomes challenging or even endangering. Multiculturalism – embracing acceptance and understanding of variety – competes with isolationism. Paradoxically, isolationists argue that their philosophy conserves diversity better than the mixing and blending of cultures: in other words, countries should aggressively protect their uniqueness, and minorities should protect theirs (e.g. Milliken 2010).

Scholarly studies devoted to effects of diversity, heterogeneity and fractionalisation of societies agree that diversity creates tensions and challenges; the dispute is focused on how these strains fit into a larger picture of human coexistence. Under some conditions, diversity leads to the betterment of societies, but in other cases, the tensions caused have an adverse effect. An expert on democracy, Robert Putnam, pointed out that "immigration and ethnic diversity challenge social solidarity and reduce social capital" (2007, 138). Putnam also noted that these adverse effects (e.g., a loss of trust) not only affect trust in other groups, but, contrary to typical assumptions, also erode trust among the in-group members. Putnam backed up his statements using extensive American data, which documented that both inter-racial trust and trust of neighbours increased with the racial homogeneity of neighbourhoods. Gerritsen and Lubbers (2010), among others, confirmed that this conviction also had relevance to the conditions in the EU, claiming that cultural diversity within the EU decreases levels of trust.

Scholars often attempt to soften this generally pessimistic perspective on diversity: e.g., Hooghe et al. (2009, 198) summed up the debate by stating that "diversity does not exert the consistent and strong negative effects often attributed to it" and that "fullblown negative relationship between ethnic diversity and generalised trust does not hold across Europe." The real challenge to the generalised negative relationship between social diversity and social capital often comes either from research focused on well-defined, particular aspects, or from studies which attempt a longer perspective. Specifically:

a) Studies describing thriving examples of ethnically diverse societies tend to focus on *well defined smaller areas*; areas with frequent inter-ethnic contacts and hence better mutual knowledge, subjects with a university education, those who have a positive image of other countries, etc. Additionally, successful co-existence is more likely in areas where diversity is limited in scope: such as when languages are similar, religions are close, and there is little variation in socioeconomic status.

b) The second type of study that is optimistic about diverse coexistence is the study that considers a *long time span*. Here we should quote Robert Putnam again (2007, 138-139):

> *In the medium to long run, on the other hand, successful immigrant societies create new forms of social solidarity and dampen the negative effects of*

diversity by constructing new, more encompassing identities. Thus, the central challenge for modern, diversifying societies is to create a new, broader sense of "we."

This "broader sense of 'we'" includes not only ethnic but also ideational and sexual diversity, and this new sense of "we" is as inspiring for the USA (to which Putnam mostly refers) as it is for the European Union. In its broadest definition, the sense of "we" could expand to include all humanity (McFarland 2011).

The international Eurosphere consortium has focused on the expanding topic of diversity from various angles. The Eurosphere working papers alone cover a wide array of topics: from universal perspectives (Sicakkan 2008), methodological issues in diversity research (Perez 2009), liberal responses to diversity (Bauböck 2008) and concerns about diversity framing (Huszka 2009), to studies focused particularly on diversity and immigrants (Sicakkan 2009), diversity and gender (Siim 2009, Nielsen 2010), diversity within the EU, and the process of European integration (Mokre and Nielsen 2010, Sata 2010).

The Role of Elites in the Public Sphere. There is no doubt that elites play a crucial role in the public sphere – whether they are "policy elites," "opinion elites" (Almond 1960), "power elites" (Mills 1965, Splichal 2002, 165) or, most importantly, the "communications elite" (Almond 1960) and "consensually unified elite" (Diamond 1999, 218). Risse (2010, 234) pointed out that "the European Community of communication is almost exclusively populated by elites rather than by civil society." Margolis and Mauser (1989, 87) observed that public opinion "is dependent on elite initiatives that are linked to the public via the mass media and other means" – hence the course of events in this arena is controlled by the elite, while the citizens are limited merely to attempts to limit that control, and may struggle not to feel alienated (Knobloch 2011). Risse, among others, noted a cultural cleavage, a democratic deficit due to the fear of the elites to start a public debate, rock the boat and wake a sleeping giant (Risse 2010, 240-242). Statham (2010, 292) stresses that it is the "overdomination by elite actors of the Europeanised debates" which constitutes the substance of the EU public sphere deficit.

The Public Sphere as an Arena of Citizens and Elites. The natural differences between the views of elites and citizens have been widely acknowledged and documented. Among others, Papadopoulos (1995) demonstrated the clash of views on political referenda between ruling elites (who consider them disruptive) and citizens (for whom they symbolise empowerment). Nissen (2003) and Diez-Medrano (2003) proved different levels of support for EU integration among "ordinary" citizens and among intellectual, political and local elites in various European countries.

Diversity and minorities can be classed as sensitive issues, and potential disparities between citizen and elite views are worthy of exploration. The notion that cultural conflicts are largely the creations of intellectual elites, as opposed to representing real problems bothering average citizens, has been largely dismissed (e.g., Yates 2001, criticising the lighthearted approach to diversity taken by Smelser and Alexander 1999). It has also been argued that average citizens suffer from the burdens of diversity more than "elites who tend to be both morally and materially insulated from the common people" (Devine 1996). This view can also be illustrated in an abundance of real-life vignettes: for example, during the controversy over a

difficult coexistence at the boundary between a Roma project and family houses (the case of Matiční street in Ústí nad Labem in the Northern Czech Republic), some citizens accused president Havel, who defended the Roma, of elitist pseudo humanism. They suggested that he should purchase or rent one of the family houses and try to live there himself.

After all, if the general citizenry is underrepresented in the public sphere, we should know what views are underrepresented. How can we compensate for this imbalance in order to foster democracy in the EU? This study aims to shed light the issue, on the path towards answering some of these questions.

Method

The core of this study is a comparison of citizen and elite attitudes to diversity across various European countries, searching for relationships and imbalances between their views.

Design and Survey Items. Two initial data sets were employed: the first was comprised of elite views. It was created at our international Eurosphere consortium (the respondents and the procedure are described below). The Eurosphere projects focused on multiple facets of diversity in current European society. Its extensive survey was introduced by a question "*In your own notion of diversity, which groups do you believe are relevant today for defining a diverse society?"*(Question Qv1, variables Qv1_1 to Qv1_17, answered by 725 respondents). Responses were categorised into a list of 18 diversity categories, including ethnic, migrant, ideological, class, disability, gender, sexual, linguistic, social economic and age groups. Data were collected in 2008/2009.

At the same time, though approaching the question from a different angle, tolerance to diversity was the subject of an international survey by the European Values Study (EVS). In question Q6 (variables v46-v60) EVS presented respondents with a list of 14 groups/minorities (ethnic, religious, sexual, etc.) and asked the question *"Could you sort out any (of this list) whom you would not like as neighbours?"* Responses from countries which also participated in Eurosphere constituted the source for our second data set. When we wrote this study in 2011, this set included the available data from 22,128 respondents participating in the fourth wave of EVS.[1] As soon as we had the opportunity to broaden the sample using the updated data edition of the fourth EVS wave, we did so. During the revision phase of this issue, we expanded the data set to N=25,196 and included Norway in the data wherever feasible.

These represented two different approaches, target groups and different wording of questions, yet both were based on a similar underlying issue: the diversity of citizens in Europe at the present time. The subject matter overlapped but was not quite identical; for comparison we had to drop from each data file those items which had no adequate counterparts. For example, Eurosphere asked about generational diversity, cultural and language groups, shifting and territorial belonging, but EVS did not; on the other hand, EVS questioned people with a criminal record, drug addicts and heavy drinkers, emotionally imbalanced and AIDS patients, as well as large families, but Eurosphere did not. Despite above mentioned differences, we compiled comparable data from 16 countries in total. They are presented in a condensed form, as country percentages, in Table 1. These figures, as well as their standardised z-transformations, were the subject of our analysis.

Table 1: Eurosphere and EVS Responses. Eurosphere Elite Responses (percentage by country; positive answers to the question "Which groups are relevant today for defining a diverse society?") vs. European Values Study (citizen responses, percentages by country; affirmative answers to the question "Could you sort out any (of this list) whom you would not like as neighbours?"; significantly higher percent values are highlighted in the columns)

	Eurosphere: Elite responses						European Value Study: Citizen responses								
	Ethnic groups (people identifying with a specific ethnic group) V1_7	Ideological groups (people identifying with a specific ideology) V1_8	Migrant groups (people coming from non-European countries) V1_10	Religious groups (people identifying with a specific religion) V1_13	Sexuality groups (e.g., gays, lesbians, transsexuals, homosexuals, etc) V1_14	N	Left wing extremists v48 Q6C	Right wing extremists v50 Q6E	Muslims v53 Q6H	Jews v58 Q6M	Immigrants/foreign workers v54 Q6	People of different race v47 Q6B	Roma v59 Q6N	Gays v57 Q6L	N
1 Austria	73.08	46.15	42.31	55.77	53.85	52	47.28	61.52	30.07	16.89	22.52	17.15	30.20	23.31	1510
2 Belgium	50.00	16.67	50.00	37.50	37.50	24	25.31	37.64	14.45	3.84	6.16	5.37	26.11	6.69	1509
3 Bulgaria	84.21	31.58	24.56	63.16	36.84	57	43.20	44.40	18.80	14.07	16.80	20.00	47.47	51.47	1500
4 Czech Republic	76.32	7.89	7.89	15.79	7.89	38	33.22	36.02	29.16	11.42	28.83	21.58	54.81	22.35	1821
5 Denmark	66.04	18.87	28.30	52.83	54.72	53	5.37	16.85	10.95	1.73	5.71	3.92	32.18	4.78	1507
6 Estonia	47.22	30.56	19.44	44.44	38.89	36	31.16	28.99	32.61	21.67	31.09	23.85	44.40	47.69	1518
7 Finland	59.62	13.46	21.15	46.15	34.62	52	17.90	23.81	22.49	4.67	15.34	8.73	48.68	11.38	1134
8 France	34.29	5.71	8.57	17.14	8.57	35	13.32	28.65	7.53	2.33	4.26	3.40	25.18	5.66	1501
9 Germany	58.33	35.42	33.33	52.08	37.50	48	37.06	65.88	23.71	5.49	10.51	4.14	26.89	15.47	2075
10 Hungary	80.00	18.18	9.09	34.55	47.27	55	11.43	12.62	10.97	6.35	15.14	8.92	38.47	29.28	1513
11 Italy	66.07	.00	92.86	16.07	.00	56	26.93	30.41	21.33	11.39	15.08	14.75	59.78	20.34	1275
12 Netherlands	66.67	14.29	33.33	42.86	40.48	42	58.17	67.57	18.40	7.85	15.06	10.88	29.34	10.62	1554
13 Norway	17.07	4.88	12.20	9.76	9.76	41	14.50	31.83	13.21	2.84	5.96	5.05	24.50	5.60	1090
14 Spain	16.67	10.42	45.83	16.67	10.42	48	15.53	19.27	12.60	2.47	4.07	3.93	25.47	5.27	1500
15 Turkey	90.20	13.73	.00	76.47	27.45	51	62.37	61.79	5.91	67.41	47.69	42.03	66.07	89.14	1206
16 United Kingdom	54.05	16.22	27.03	32.43	32.43	37	25.30	29.92	12.75	3.20	14.61	5.77	33.31	10.70	1000
Total	60.69	18.21	29.10	39.72	30.48	725	31.10	39.13	17.68	13.51	17.49	13.59	39.28	25.05	25196
Per-country mean	58.85	17.78	28.53	38.43	29.92	16	29.36	37.43	17.80	11.60	16.25	12.53	38.36	22.63	16
Standard deviation	21.9	12.00	21.76	18.85	16.77		16.29	17.29	7.88	15.51	11.34	10.15	13.11	22.15	
Eta/Cramer's V	.432	.316	.506	.394	.385		.366	.367	.213	.535	.330	.332	.284	.571	

Participants. Eurosphere, with 130 researchers in 16 countries, carried out an interview survey focused on diversity, European Union, and the European public sphere. The focus of interview data collection was on elites – significant members of major political parties, actors within social movements, NGOs, think tanks and the media (for a detailed description of the methodology, please see Sicakkan 2008). To minimise a selection bias, institutions were selected according to a general key (e.g., the parties selected included two major parties and a maverick party; social movements included national as well as transnational institutions; think tanks

had to include advocacy think tanks, universities without students, and contract research organisations; broadcast media were to include public service as well as commercial broadcasters; print media comprised a major daily as well as minor periodicals etc.).

The interviewees selection key instructed the Eurosphere researchers to choose three to seven members from each institution (e.g., from political parties it was an organisational leader, an opinion leader, two internal opposition leaders, and three internal "group" leaders; from think tanks, an organisational leader, a research leader and a prominent researcher; from the media, a representative from the Chief Editor's office, a news-section editor and up to two news-section journalists).

Although not all the teams fulfilled the originally planned quota of respondents (because the saturation point for information about some organisations was reached before the quota was filled, and in a few cases, the elites that the Eurosphere team contacted were not accessible), a satisfactory number of 725 elite respondents from diverse backgrounds were interviewed (N column in Table 1), and answers were coded and entered into a central database administered by Norwegian Social Science Data Services and the University of Bergen.

Data Treatment. Initial analyses of Eurosphere and EVS data were conducted separately. Means and variances were analysed by ANOVA and t-test to determine a level of international variance within the data. In parallel, frequency counts were subjected to contingency analyses (CHI^2 and adjusted residuals at sig. level <.01, Cramer's V for measuring the intensity of the relationship and a sign test for measuring higher than expected frequency on adjusted residuals). The second step focused on analyses of Eurosphere and EVS data *together* to determine the degree of agreement between them. This stage included:

- Testing the independence of both samples pairwise, using Student t-tests of independent samples for percentages;
- Searching for patterns and testing closeness of relationships between the two samples using ANOVA and correlation analysis (Pearson's r and scatterplots, Spearman's rho and Eta, as well as ALSCAL distance models);
- Finally, due to the risk of bias in a small sample, verification of previous results by non-parametric rank-order tests for two independent samples: the Mann-Whitney test was used to check for parallel design of data (null hypothesis signaled that both samples came from the same underlying distribution).

We also calculated transposed standardised z-percentages (z_p) to control for an individual bias within both samples:

$$Z=(x_i\text{-Xbar})/SD_x$$
$$Z_p=(Z+\text{Min}(Z)/(\text{Max-Min}(Z))*100$$

where x_i=score, SD_x=standard deviation; Xbar=mean over the whole range of multiple dichotomies (i.e., 18 variables in Eurosphere and 14 variables in EVS); Min=minimum and Max=Maximum. The following data matrix was computed for multidimensional scaling (ALSCAL):

$$D_{ij}=((a_{ij}-b_{ij})-(c_{ij}-d_{ij}))^2$$

where D_{ij}=Euclidean distance and a,b,c,d are the four variables required for calculation of the distance between A and B (e.g., a=Eurosphere view of ethnicity in

country A, b=EVS intolerance of foreign workers in country A, c=Eurosphere view of ethnicity in country B, d=EVS intolerance of foreign workers in country B).

Both samples were tested for independence of percentages and standardised z-percentages. The percentages from Table 1 were used for testing as country scores and country standardised z-scores, i.e., as elements of one merged sample of 16 countries or 2 x 16 countries. Analyses were carried out using SPSS version 18.

Relationships between Eurosphere and EVS data

Having verified that both Eurosphere and EVS data manifest statistically significant international variance, we progressed to analysis of both data files together.

Table 2: Ethnic, Migrant, Ideological and Sexuality Diversity: Relevance and Intolerance (percent scores by country). Superimposition of the elite view on the relevance of various groups to defining social diversity (Eurosphere N=725, variables starting with V1_) and citizens' rejections of having neighbours from the relevant groups (EVS N=22,128, variables v47–v59)

	Ethnic groups (V1_7)	Migrant groups (V1_10)	Religious groups (V1_13)	Roma (v59)	Jews (v58)	Muslims (v53)	Different race (v47)	Foreign workers (v54)	Ideological groups (V1_8)	Left-wing extremists (v48)	Right-wing extremists (v50)	Sexuality groups (V1_14)	Gays (v57)
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1 Austria	73.08	42.31	55.77	30.20	16.89	30.07	17.15	22.52	46.15	47.28	61.52	53.85	23.31
2 Belgium	50.00	50.00	37.50	26.11	3.84	14.45	5.37	6.16	16.67	25.31	37.64	37.50	6.69
3 Bulgaria	84.21	24.56	63.16	47.47	14.07	18.80	20.00	16.80	31.58	43.20	44.40	36.84	51.47
4 Czech Republic	76.32	7.89	15.79	54.81	11.42	29.16	21.58	28.83	7.89	33.22	36.02	7.89	22.35
5 Denmark	66.04	28.30	52.83	32.18	1.73	10.95	3.92	5.71	18.87	5.37	16.85	54.72	4.78
6 Estonia	47.22	19.44	44.44	44.40	21.67	32.61	23.85	31.09	30.56	31.16	28.99	38.89	47.69
7 Finland	59.62	21.15	46.15	48.68	4.67	22.49	8.73	15.34	13.46	17.90	23.81	34.62	11.38
8 France	34.29	8.57	17.14	25.18	2.33	7.53	3.40	4.26	5.71	13.32	28.65	8.57	5.66
9 Germany	58.33	33.33	52.08	26.89	5.49	23.71	4.14	10.51	35.42	37.06	65.88	37.50	15.47
10 Hungary	80.00	9.09	34.55	38.47	6.35	10.97	8.92	15.14	18.18	11.43	12.62	47.27	29.28
11 Italy	66.07	92.86	16.07	55.55	12.90	17.20	14.75	15.55	.00	25.60	27.40	.00	28.50
12 Netherlands	66.67	33.33	42.86	29.34	7.85	18.40	10.88	15.06	14.29	58.17	67.57	40.48	10.62
14 Spain	16.67	45.83	16.67	25.47	2.47	12.60	3.93	4.07	10.42	15.53	19.27	10.42	5.27
15 Turkey	90.20	.00	76.47	71.97	61.86	.00	33.91	45.40	13.73	67.16	67.50	27.45	90.05
16 United Kingdom	54.05	27.03	32.43	37.90	6.20	14.10	9.20	15.10	16.22	27.90	29.50	32.43	24.10

Views on Ethnic Diversity. How prominently is ethnic diversity perceived by the elites and to what degree are citizens willing to live in ethnically diversified neighbourhoods? Table 2 presents a combination of both views. The first column for each country represents the Eurosphere results, indicating that the representatives of national elites viewed ethnic groups (ethnicity) as a prominent factor,

similar to general diversity. The relevance of this factor was reported by a majority of elite respondents in most countries – most notably by Turkish elites – but was less prominent in Central Europe and was only marginal in more cosmopolitan Spain/Catalonia and France.

How do these elite views compare to what public opinion (in the EVS results) tells us about acceptance of various ethnicities? Columns 4 through 8 in Table 2 illustrate great variation in the willingness to live with ethnically diverse neighbours between each country. Roma were particularly ostracised: rejected by majority of citizens in Turkey, Italy, and the Czech Republic.

Relationships between elite views on the relevance of ethnic groups and citizen xenophobia were analysed by examination of scatter plots and by statistical scrutiny.

All five scatter plots (one for each relevant EVS category) followed a similar pattern, i.e., a positive correlation of the "elite opinion on ethnic group relevance" with citizen intolerance toward people of different race, toward immigrant and foreign workers, and to Roma, Jews and Muslims respectively. Hence, *ethnic relevance was tied to intolerance. A modest increase in citizen intolerance was related to a steep increase in the relevance of ethnic groups judged by national elites*.

Pearson's R correlation coefficient expressed the relationship between relevance and unwillingness to share the neighbourhood with Roma (r=.752), with people of different race (r=.602), with immigrants/foreign workers (r=.592), and with a combined index of five diverse groups (r =.543). However, we have to take into account the low number of countries compared, and the fact that these coefficients tend to be falsely enhanced due to the existence of separate clusters and outliers – these serve to corrupt Pearson's correlation. Therefore, an additional statistical measure – conversion of raw scores – was employed.

A statistically significant correlation was confirmed only for the relationship between "relevance of ethnic groups" (by elites) and "intolerance toward immigrants/foreign workers" (by citizens), depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Relevance of Ethnic Diversity and Intolerance of Immigrant and Foreign Workers. Scatter Plot (percent)



The outliers stand out in the graph: Turkey on the top right (least tolerant citizens and most relevance), Spain on the lower left (most tolerant citizens, least relevance), whilst the third outlying country is Estonia in the middle, high above the regression line (almost half of elites recognising relevance of ethnicity, and a third of citizens rejecting neighbouring immigrant workers).

Table 3: Correlations and Significance of Non-parametric Tests between Eurosphere and EVS Countries: Final Relevant Results (significant correlations supported by non-parametric tests are highlighted; Eurosphere N=725, variables starting with V1_; EVS N=22,128 variables v47-v59)

EVS and Eurosphere combined	Left-wing extremists+ ideological diversity v48 and v1_8	Right-wing extremists+ ideological diversity v50 and v1_8	Foreign workers/immigrants+ non-European migrant diversity v54 and v1_10	Roma+non-European migrant diversity v59 and v1_10	Gays+ sexuality diversity v57 and v1_14	Immigrants/foreign workers+ ethnic diversity v54 and v1_7	Different race+ ethnic diversity v47 and v1_7	Jews+ religious diversity v58 and v1_13	Muslims+ religious diversity v53 and v1_13	
Country scores Pearson's r	x	x		x	x	.592 (x)	.602 (x)	.768 (x)	x	
Country scores Eta	.391	x	.384	x	x	x	x	x (1)	x (2)	p of F<.01
Standardised zp-scores Eta	x	x (7)	x	.808 (4)	.885	.312	x	x (1)	x (2)	p of F<.01
Country scores Rho	x	x	-.546	x (4)	x	x	x	x	x	p <.01
Standardised zp-scores Rho	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	p <.01
Sig. of country scores Mann-Whitney	.056(a)	.004(a)	.050(a)	.000(a)	.305(a)	.000(a)	.000(a)	.019(a)	.000(a)	H0 (same sample) refuted if p≤.05
Sig. of standardised zp-scores Mann-Whitney	1.000(a)	.106(a)(7)	.000(a)	.116(a)	.000 (a)(5)	.126(a)	.126(a)	.000(a)	.001(a)	H0 (same sample) refuted if p≤.05

a) no ties x = not significant or false (i.e. not supported by n-par tests) correlation

(1) for religious diversity (Jews) Eta without outlier (Tk) is .727 (.726 for standardised zp-scores); however n-par tests refuted dependence of both samples (sig. Mann-Whitney=.000)

(2) for religious diversity (Muslims) Eta without Tk is .533 (.857 for standardised zp-scores); however dependence of both samples was refuted (Mann-Whitney sig.=.019)

(3) for migrant groups (people of different race) Eta without outliers (Tk and It) is .554 (and for standardised zp-scores Eta=.924 without Tk and It); however both samples were independent (for country scores Mann-Whitney sig.=.013 and for standardised zp-scores sig.=.055)

(4) for migrant groups (Roma) rho without outliers (Tk and It) is -.615 (and for standardised zp-scores Eta=.808 including Tk and It); and both samples were coming from the same underlying dimension (for country zp-scores Mann-Whitney sig.=.101 and including It and Tk sig=.116)

(5) for sexuality diversity (gays) without outlier (Tk) intensity of relationship is very high (Eta=.938 for standardised zp-scores) and also similarity in pattern of zp-responses is very high (Mann-Whitney sig.=.178)

(6) for ideological diversity (left-wing extremists) Eta without outlier (Tk and Nl) is .234 (Spearman's rho not significant); samples were not independent (sig. Mann-Whitney=.27)

(7) for ideological diversity (right-wing extremists) Eta without outlier (Tk and Nl) is .444 (not significant Eta=.340 for standardised zp-scores) (Spearman's rho not significant for both scores without outliers); the same sample provenience confirmed for standardised zp-scores (sig. Mann-Whitney for scores=.034, for standardised zp-scores=.101)

To refine the analysis, instead of raw scores (derived from original percentages), we worked with converted and z-transposed zp-scores (based on zp-percentages which control for individual bias, improve comparability and enable further statistical operations. Zp-calculations confirmed that the correlation between variables is statistically significant although rather low (Eta .312). See Table 3.

Views on (Non-European) Migrant Diversity. How relevant do elites perceive migrant diversity to be, and to what degree are citizens willing to live in neighbourhoods with migrants? (Values depicted in Table 2, Columns 2, 4, 7, and 8). Table 2 demonstrates that representatives of national elites generally did not view migrant groups as a particularly relevant factor in social diversity (on average by country only 28 percent did so). One country was an exception, seeing migrant groups as extremely relevant: this was Italy, which was experiencing particularly strong waves of immigrants at the time. The opinions of citizens on coexistence with migrants were rather mixed. In the previous section we noted citizens' deep reluctance to share neighbourhoods with Roma. On average, almost 40 percent of respondents voiced their aversion to having a Roma neighbour.

However, here the context was migrant groups, and Roma are now only partially migrant. In countries where coexistence with Roma is most problematic, i.e., in the post-communist countries, Roma were forced to settle down by the previous Communist regimes. Still, some Roma are ready to move from the former Communist countries and emigrate in search of better living conditions. Within Europe, once again, the favourite target for emigration is Italy. At the time of our

Figure 2: Migrant Diversity and Intolerance toward Roma: Multidimensional Distance Model between Standardised and Transposed Zp-scores by ALSCAL. (Dimension 1: Decreasing relevance of migrant diversity from left to right, along with a decreasing positive difference from left to centre and an increasing negative difference from centre to right between elite and citizen opinions)



study, a wave of Roma immigrants settling in Italy stirred political debates about the right of free movement within the current boundaries of the European Union. The most recent data proved that negative attitudes towards Roma neighbours in Italy had increased, from 52 percent in 1999 to 60 percent in 2010. Whether due to the exodus of Roma, or to immigrants from Africa, Italy turned out to be an outlier in the context of Eurosphere data on migrant groups.

Foreign workers and people of different race tend to be more readily accepted than Roma in all studied countries. Increased rejection rates toward Roma are obvious in Eastern Europe – in Turkey, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. Somewhat surprisingly, rejection rates of foreign workers and people of different race in Italy are not high despite the overwhelming recognition of the relevance of migrants by Italian elites.

Is there a similar tendency of positive correlation between the opinions of elites and citizens apparent in the previous section on ethnic diversity? Curiously, the scatter plots suggested the opposite, a *negative relation* between (elite perceived) relevance of migrant groups and (citizen) intolerance of foreign workers, as well as of Roma or different races. To state in brief, *migrant relevance correlated with tolerance towards these groups, intolerance correlated with irrelevance.*

Yet, there was an exception: the Italian data did not here match the general pattern of other countries. For the Italians, even in the context of migrant groups, undesirability (not desirability) correlated with relevance.

Statistics including non-parametric tests partially confirmed this model (see Table 3, significant results for Roma (Eta for zp-scores=.808).

Figure 2 presents a multidimensional distance model based on zp-scores (ALSCAL). Elite views on the relevance of migrant diversity range from the lowest intensity in Hungary (only 9.1 percent elite relevance alongside 38.5 percent citizen intolerance) to the *highest* in Italy (92.9 percent of elite relevance alongside 52.9 percent citizen intolerance). Several meaningful clusters of countries can be identified based on the intensity of opinion scores, as well as on the probability of congruence of elite and citizen views. The upper right corner hosts Bulgaria, Finland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. The odds of citizen views to elite views are between 1.9 and 6.9, and the consequent probability of congruence is 14-52 percent; the intensity of elite opinions is distinctly below that of citizen views, by 23-47 p.p. difference. The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Norway in the upper left segment attain equal to high probabilities of congruence 50-88 percent, and the intensity of elite opinion is slightly below that of citizens (by 4-12 p.p.). Another cluster is formed by France, Denmark, and Estonia (on the bottom right) where the opinions of both the elites and the citizens have a low intensity and variable difference (4-25 p.p.) Austria and Germany (bottom centre) also have a very low difference (6-12 p.p.) and probability of congruence (71-81 percent).

Views on Religious Diversity. Elites expressed considerable variation in their assessment of the extent to which *religious groups* are relevant to national diversity. More traditional Turkey took the lead with as many as three quarters of elite respondents recognising the relevance of religious groups, while at the other end of the spectrum are secular Czechs, as well as the French, and the Catholic countries Italy and Spain. There is probably not a great deal of religious diversity in these societies – see Table 2, Columns 3, 5 and 6.

Citizens also varied in their acceptance/rejection of various religions in their neighbourhoods. Perhaps most striking is the intensity with which Turks distance themselves from the Jews while, obviously, embracing fellow Muslims – only the French could compete with their level of pro Muslim embrace. On the other hand, Muslims were accepted with a lot of caution in Central Europe (Estonia, the Czech Republic and Austria). Note that Turks were not asked about Muslims in EVS wave 3, hence we do not have data in that category.

The data pattern tends to be inconsistent, implying that there is no clear relationship between the opinion of the elite and public opinion. The Pearson coefficients suggest there might be a positive relationship between religious relevance and intolerance of Muslims (.200, sig.=.492), and of Jews (.768 and even higher without outlying Turkey), however, these correlations are falsely enhanced and not corroborated by statistical scrutiny. Neither ANOVA, Spearman´s rho, nor correlations with transformed country scores (and especially non-parametric rank-order analyses), could confirm the statistical significance of the correlations cited above.

Ideological Diversity. The representatives of national elites generally did not see ideological groups as significantly contributing to national diversity (see Table 2, columns 9, 10, and 11). In Italy, France and the Czech Republic, the relevance of ideological groups was reported as being negligible, while understandably rather different views were expressed by elites in Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Estonia where sensitivity to ideology was high, as was citizen vigilance against right-wing extremism (except in Estonia). This vigilance was also shared by most citizens of Turkey and the Netherlands. In general, there was more apprehension about right-wing rather than left-wing extremism, except in East European post-communist countries (and in Turkey), which signalled that the spectre of communism still exists.

A relationship was found between the elite perceived ideological relevance and public intolerance of left-wing extremism. Furthermore, a comparable intensity of relevance and intolerance was observed in Austria, Estonia and Germany (Figure 3) and prevalence of elite views of relevance over citizen intolerance in Hungary and Denmark. The rest display a more common prevalence of citizen intolerance (including uncorrelated outliers Turkey, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands).

Figure 3: Relevance of Ideological Diversity and Intolerance toward Left-wing Extremists (country scores and percent)



Sexual Diversity. On average, less than a third of the national elites of the respective EU countries indicated that sexually diverse groups play an important role. There were few "average" voices since the elites had a tendency to report either a considerable or negligible relevance to sexual groups. On the other hand, citizens' voices were much more varied: from an embracing attitude toward gay people (single digit rejections in Denmark, Spain, France and Belgium) to an almost total rejection, with hardly any gay-friendly neighbourhoods, in Turkey (see Table 2, Columns 12 and 13).

Pearson's coefficient approximates to zero because of outliers (especially Turkey), and because countries appear to form several clusters. The relationship could correspond more to a curvilinear rather than a linear function. Low rejections of gay people (i.e., high acceptance) seem to be related to *both* high and low relevance of sexuality groups, while at the same time, high rejection seems to be associated with medium levels of relevance.

Four distinct country categories can be identified (see Table 4). The highest positions on the rejection scale are held by three Eastern European countries (Turkey, Bulgaria and Estonia) where gay people are rejected by approx. 50 percent citizens or more. Even so, gay people in these countries have relatively high relevance. Five countries can be characterised by their similar level of relevance but high acceptance of gay people (Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, Germany and UK). The remaining two groups embrace gay people but differ dramatically in the gay-groups relevance rating. The data suggest that in Denmark, Austria and possibly Hungary gay groups are very intensely relevant (possibly very active within the public sphere as LGBT representatives). In contrast, we have France, Spain, the Czech Republic, Norway and Italy, where gays are embraced with low relevance; one can assume that they are accepted and integrated, having attained most of their rights. Being gay, then, is as normal as having a different colour of eyes; it is not a political issue in these countries.

Table 4: Sexual Diversity – Relevance and Intolerance: Main Categories

	RELEVANCE OF SEXUALITY GROUPS			
	VERY LOW RELEVANCE	LOW RELEVANCE	HIGH RELEVANCE	VERY HIGH RELEVANCE
GAYS ACCEPTED	France, Spain, Italy Czech Republic	--	Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, UK	Denmark, Austria (Hungary)
GAYS UNDESIRABLE	--	--	Turkey, Bulgaria, Estonia	--

Statistical scrutiny included conversion to standardised zp-scores. Subsequent correlations of variables became significant (Eta=.885 and even higher without outlying Turkey and rho=.554) and this was also supported by a non-parametric test. As illustrated by Figure 4, the pattern of relationship between zp-scores appears as a complex combination of ordinal (linear line) and nominal (undulating value) variables. While citizens' intolerance decreases, elite views of diversity fluctuate close to the citizens' views. The shape of the relationship may be a combination of linear and polynomial curves.

Figure 4: Sexual Diversity – Relevance and Intolerance: Scatter plot of Zp-scores



Discussion

Our study drew upon two surveys distinct in their approach and methodologies. Combining disparate resources is inspiring, but the treatment of the data is challenging. Our solution to complexity was to analyse the data both from a qualitative point of view (utilising graphic layouts of histograms and scatter plots, most of which could not be included here for lack of space), as well as in taking a meticulous approach to statistical data treatment (z-standardisation, using both parametric and non-parametric methods). Non-standardised and standardised data served as sources of complementary insights into the patterns of survey results, each highlighting different aspects of a complex picture. The theme has certainly not been exhausted, but to keep this article concise we did not extend the analyses – to socio-demographic details, for example. Rather, we presented the initial direction and approach taken in our procedures. However, we also plan to extract "elites" from the citizen samples, and to compare the views of elites and non-elites.

We did not devote any special attention to the possible effects of social desirability and political correctness. We can assume that they skewed elite and citizen responses in opposite directions: sophisticated elites, living mostly in state capitals, might have projected more relevance to minorities than they objectively should have done, while at the same time, representative samples of citizens might have been hesitant to reveal all their prejudices, and they might have downplayed the diversity factor. This could have influenced some of the observed discrepancies or concord between the views of elites and citizens.

The original survey questions for elites and citizens differed from one another in addition to their contexts, preventing us from drawing shortcut conclusions about the level of concord. Still, our results confirm the assumption of cross-national differences, and the division of public sphere, where elites and citizens stress different aspects of diversity, and have different worries and aspirations.[2]

This comparative study has a limitation; namely, the imperfect fit of the categories which were compared. For example, ideological diversity is not exhausted merely by left and right-wing extremism, and religious diversity is certainly not exhausted by questions relating only to Jews and Muslims.

We also did not explore all possible relationships between these views. Some meaningful relationships that we detected were not incorporated into our analy-

ses: for example, religious relevance (assessed by elites) correlated not just with citizen intolerance of diverse religions, but also with acceptance or rejection of gay people.

The Eurosphere questions for elites were complex, and we assumed that elites are used to dealing with complex terminology. Something could have been lost in the transfer from the elites to our interviewers, but they can also be categorised as elites by their rank, so hopefully corruption was minimised.

The key concept of "relevance to social diversity" is complex, having at the very least a dual meaning: it contains *both an aspect of diversification (which groups make society diverse and fragmented?) as well as an aspect of inclusion (which groups managed to have their voices heard?).* Further analyses should recognise this twofold aspect.

Still, overall, the Eurosphere and EVS data appear to provide a good knowledge base, and our analyses proved that their data differentiate significantly along the important variables which we were to study. Both resources – the elites as well as the citizen samples – expressed a variety of opinions to allow us to study diversity across a very wide range: from diversity as a challenge (the prevalent view of the elites) to an ordinary citizen's view, which includes irrational phobias alongside legitimate fears.

Conclusions

Our study presents two perspectives on diversity: a concrete one, expressed by citizens who were asked to consider having a diverse neighbour, and a more abstract viewpoint expressed by national elites. We gathered, arranged and analysed *empirical data* with a particular attention to the relationship between views expressed by elites and citizens, and to their agreements and incongruities. One example of this is the fact that in both the Netherlands and Turkey, elites do not see ideological diversity groups as particularly relevant, but the citizens of both these countries tend to intensely ostracise left- and right wing extremists. We also identified *patterns or typologies* of diversity according to the distribution of data. In some cases we could also detect *gradient* of relationships: for example, in case of ethnic diversity, where a modest increase in citizens' intolerance was related to a steep increase in the relevance of ethnic groups, as judged by national elites. Standardisation of scores enabled us to study the level of agreement of elites and citizens in individual countries, as well as projection of clusters of dis/agreeing countries.

Hypothetical Patterns of Diversity. Four main patterns of diversity between social relevance and rejection/acceptance were observed:

A. *Positive correlation of rejection with relevance and acceptance with irrelevance*. This applied especially in the contexts of ethnic, ideological and possibly religious diversity. For example, ethnic diversity could be recognised most clearly in countries where minorities were most rejected. Conversely, minorities that were most accepted appeared to be the least relevant in the ethnic diversity context. A typical example of this is the case of immigrants/foreign workers in Europe. Well-integrated minorities do not form political pressure groups; conversely, a high level of fear in citizens may be associated with high publicity of ethnic crime.

B. *Reverse relationship: Correlation of acceptance with relevance and rejection with irrelevance*. This pattern was typically observed in migrant diversity: diverse soci-

eties where migrant workers are most accepted also accord the highest relevance to migrant groups. This model may have its limit if the number of migrants rises above a certain threshold, and the embracing attitude may be replaced by increasing fear.

C. *Model of converging/diverging perspectives.* Disparities between public and elite views seem to mutually influence each other in a converging process. For example, public intolerance of minorities seems to "push" elites toward recognition of the higher relevance of the problem. On the other hand, the recognition of relevance by the elites appears to push the public towards greater tolerance.

A combination of converging and diverging perspectives may be witnessed, for example in the case of gay people: in liberal societies they tend to be accepted by the public, but the elites tend to differ in their views on relevance. Gay people are either recognised as a highly significant minority (and LGBT activists participate in the society) or sexual orientation is not viewed as an issue at all (being socially irrelevant), since gay people have equal social rights and do not need to be accorded any special status.

Congruence and Clashes between Citizen and Elite Voices. Our analysis of congruence between the voices of the elites and citizens was particularly focused on the intensity and constellations of citizen/elite opinions. To ensure maximum comparability, significance was tested with standardised zp-scores. We found different communication models:

a) Balanced, with relative equilibrium between the views of elites and citizens (e.g., elite views of the significance of ideological diversity and citizens' intolerance of left-wing extremists).

b) Imbalanced, with prevalence of citizen voices (public opinion) or prevalence of elite voices (e.g., the citizens had a more intense opinion than elites when they voiced their attitudes to Roma; at other times, the elites were more vocal than the public opinion, e.g., about the relevance of sexuality groupings). The imbalanced model was more common.

From a wider perspective, it may appear as if public opinion puts pressure on the elites, leading them to attempt to push through their view of *differentiation* (e.g., coexistence with Roma). Conversely, the elites' views were more pronounced than those of citizens,' as if the elites were educating their fellows toward an *inclusive* tolerance and the embracing of minorities (e.g., about the significance of the equal voice of gay people).

These relationships and models may be helpful in the further study of diversity, diversification and integration within the EU, and for enlightening the path towards European democratic citizenship.

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Notes:

1. The United Kingdom, Italy, Turkey and Norway have not made their data available at that time, in their case we used data from wave three (except Norway which did not take part in the 3rd wave).

2. This can be illustrated by many examples, e.g., interesting discrepancies in religious sphere. The Danish elites refer to religious groups as very relevant for social diversity, yet a mere 11 percent of Danes express intolerance towards Muslims. Conversely, the Czech elites are relatively disregarding of the relevance of religion; yet as many as a third of Czech citizens would prefer not to have a Muslim neighbour.

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TRANS-EUROPEANISING PUBLIC SPACES IN EUROPE

HAKAN G. SICAKKAN

Abstract

Are there any trans-border interactions and networking patterns, any common systems of competing political discourses, and/or any common channels, platforms, or arenas of communication or action that can be regarded as the beginnings of a European public sphere? If so, how is this embryonic European public sphere being structured? Based on a comparative analysis of discursive configurations and networking patterns of more than 240 civil society organisations in sixteen European countries and eight European civil society networks, this article finds discursive gaps between the views of member state-level and European-level civil society organisations on diversity, the future of the EU polity, and who they see as their legitimate addressees. Networking patterns indicate this gap is not only in discourses but also in interactions. Considering the current segmentation along national lines, this may imply the beginnings of a development toward the emergence of a horizontally and vertically segmented European public sphere.

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Introduction

The aim of this paper is to assess the extent to which the participants of public debates in Europe are interconnected through transnational networks, collaboration, and discourses. A focus on transnational interconnectedness is important for the European public sphere (EPS) research for several reasons.

Normatively, from a democracy point of view, a transnational public sphere with a transnational public, which is conscious of its role of overseeing the actions of the supranational policymakers, is desirable in Europe due to the increasing powers of the European Union (EU). Theorists of democracy on the neo-functionalist and cosmopolitan flanks call for a transnational European public which can assume the task of holding the supranational power-holders accountable (cf. Eriksen 2005). On the other hand, the intergovernmentalist and communitarian wings do not entirely recognise the need for a transnational public sphere in Europe as their proponents view supranational policymaking to be primarily a result of collective decision-making by democratically elected, legitimate representatives of the citizens of the EU-member state.

Theoretically, identity (Risse 2010), universal values like democracy and human rights, economic interdependency and common market, common interests in international politics, and common law and political institutions, among other things, have been highlighted as factors that can energise the growth of a transnational public and a European public sphere in Europe. In this debate, the intergovernmentalist and neo-functionalist camps have focused on, respectively, what divides and what brings Europeans together.

Empirically, in the current decade, research has gone beyond the question of whether a European public sphere exists. Empirical focus has been on Europeanisation of national media due to the assumption that, with its public outreach, accessibility, and openness, the media sphere is the best empirical equivalent of the concept of public sphere (Habermas 1974). Media research that offers a structural approach has used (1) media's attention to "European themes" (e.g. Gerhards 2000; Trenz 2003), (2) the degree of reporting the same events at the same time (e.g. Eder and Kantner 2000), (3) whether news are reported with a "European framing" or "similar framing" (Peters et al. 2005), (4) visibility and resonance[1] beyond national borders (Eder and Kantner 2000; Eder and Trenz 2003; Koopmans 2004; Olesen 2005), (5) legitimacy of foreign speakers in national public spheres (Risse and Van de Steeg 2003). This line of research has documented that media's attention to Europe-related themes is gradually increasing. Media research that deploys "common/similar discourses" or "common/similar meaning frames" as an indicator of the European public sphere reports at best contradictory findings because the degree of transnational similarity in discourses and meaning frames varies with respect to the "policy fields one studies" (Koopmans and Erbe 2004, 114) or a "halting" process of Europeanisation (Peters et al. 2005).

Every step forward in the conceptualisation of the EPS increased our knowledge of the commonalities and differences among the national media in Europe. However, considering the media is not a channel that only mirrors reality, but also forms it in different ways, there is no guarantee that the commonalities found in media research is the artwork of a European public. Except few outstanding examples (e.g.

Koopmans 2004, 2007; Splichal 2011), the media research on the EPS has not given us a solid idea about whether a European public exists and how it is structured and interconnected. This is because we have hitherto tried to understand the public sphere by looking at it "directly" through its appearance mirrored by the media and, at the same time ignored its preordained component: the public.

Conceptually, the EPS and the European public are imagined in various ways by scholars. On the one hand, those who sought in Europe the classical Habermasian model of a public sphere as a single space shared by a unified, critical European public, were quick to recognise that they were looking in vain. On the other hand, those who view the EPS and the European public as overlapping public spheres and multiple publics (cf. Schlesinger 1999) are still working to map out the areas of overlap.

A European public is difficult to imagine in isolation from national publics just as national public spheres cannot be imagined without the subaltern and sub-national public spaces (Sicakkan 2006) that constitute them. Nor can the EPS be imagined in isolation from the territorially and level-wise polycentric and hierarchical European power structures – recently, some researchers have discovered that the EPS might be following the multi-level governance (MLG) system of the EU (cf. Koopmans and Erbe 2004). Indeed, the EPS should be conceptualised as a sphere that consists of several different types of public spaces at different levels, where the transnational European (trans-European) public sphere is only one of the constituent public spaces that co-exist. The same holds true also for the conceptualisation of a European public: a trans-European public is only one of the multiple types of publics that constitute the European public. Note that I am not deploying "European," "transnational," and "trans-European" interchangeably.

In order of their appearance in European history, the major types of public spaces that currently co-exit are (1) essentialising ethnic, religious, or national spaces, (2) nationalising public spaces of the modern nation states, (3) trans-Europeanising public spaces, and (4) globalising/transnationalising public spaces, which correspond, respectively to, ethnic and religious publics, national publics, trans-European publics, and transnational/global publics. Through European integration, each of these public space types has found its expression and representation at different levels.

The EPS has come into being with the emergence of a trans-Europeanising public space and a trans-European public that stretches over different levels of the EU political and social systems and co-exists and interacts with the other current public space types. The important empirical question at this juncture is "how do the different types of public space types and public form the EPS in interaction with each other?" In the following, I primarily focus on the impacts of the collective actors operating in trans-European and national arenas with an empirical focus on the patterns of their discourses and networks.

Trans-Europeanising Public Spaces in Europe

The reason for labelling the new public space a "trans-Europeanising public space" is two-fold: First, by using this term, I emphasise that trans-Europeanisation is an ongoing process. Second, the term can also be understood as a function of certain common arenas, networks, and interaction patterns although the objectives

associated with them may not be Europeanisation. An example is the nationalist, intergovernmentalist, and anti-EU organisations' cooperation throughout Europe. Although these organisations are against any change that would reduce the sovereignty of the member states, the organisations' trans-border interactions contribute to forming a trans-Europeanising political space.

In operational terms, a trans-Europeanising political space is defined as a system of multiple competing discourses advocated and voiced by different types of collective actors at national and European levels and/or a set of trans-border networks/structured interactions between collective actors located in different countries. That is, when either the criterion of transnationally shared discourses, or the criterion of transnational interactions, or both, is satisfied, one can start talking about trans-Europeanising political spaces.

Table 1: A Conceptual Framework for Trans-Europeanising Political Spaces

		Is the Discourse Europeanising?	
		YES	NO
Does the Organisation Have Trans-European Ties/Networks?	YES	I Trans-European organisations (e.g., Social Platform)	II Non-Europeanising organisations in trans-European arenas (e.g., UEN)
	NO	III Europeanising organisations in non-trans-European arenas	IV Non-trans-European organisations

Table 1 gives a schematic overview of the categories that constitute trans-Europeanising political spaces. In this framework, a nationalising discourse, for instance, can be observed in trans-European and national arenas, and similarly a Europeanising discourse can be observed in national and trans-European arenas. An organisation may be disseminating Europeanising discourses and simultaneously getting involved in trans-European networks (*model I*). An organisation may also be engaging in trans-European networks while disseminating primarily nationalising discourses (*model II*). Further, an organisation may be disseminating Europeanising discourses in its own member-state context without participating in trans-European networks at all (*model III*). Finally, an organisation may be deploying nationalising discourses only in a member state without engaging in trans-European networks (*model IV*). The organisations (actors) that fall under models I, II, and III, their trans-European affiliations (networks), and their views (discourses) on selected policy issues altogether constitute the trans-Europeanising public spaces.

Model IV in Table 1, however, refers to the public spaces that are not trans-European as these organisations operate with typically non-Europeanising discourses only in national or local arenas. The different elements of this conceptual framework are further elaborated in the following sections and used as a heuristic tool to depict the current structuring of trans-European political spaces.

Discourses. For this research, I measure and assess the discourses focusing on organisations' statements about (1) which groups to include in the organisations' vision of a diverse society and whether an ethno-nationally diverse society

is acceptable/desirable/inescapable in their mindset, (2) the role they envision for the EU central political institutions and member states in the EU, and (3) which institutions/organisations/networks the groups want to receive their political messages. These three themes lie at the core of the tension between the gatekeepers and trespassers of borders and boundaries of many kinds in Europe as well as different levels of government within the EU political system. I simply distinguish between Europeanising and non-Europeanising discourses.

Europeanising discourses tend to contain inclusive attitudes favouring (1) diversity of all kinds and (2) central EU institutions' participation in policymaking at different levels along with the existing national and local political authorities, and (3) defining different European intergovernmental and supranational institutions as receivers of the political messages – along with the existing national authorities.

Non-Europeanising discourses, on the other hand, are characterised by disfavouring and excluding attitudes toward (1) diversity caused by non-native groups of people and (2) intergovernmental and supranational authorities' involvement in policy matters, as well as (3) regarding non-national (intergovernmental and supranational) political institutions as irrelevant addressees for the political messages.

Networks. Analytically, the network dimension of trans-Europeanising public spaces can be approached in two ways. The first approach focuses on "horizontal" (Koopmans and Erbe 2004) networks where social and political actors seek and get involved in transnational collaboration and communication without attempting to build a higher hierarchical level that structures their interactions. The second approach emphasises "vertical" (Koopmans and Erbe 2004) networks that seek to articulate more structured, and often institutionalised, channels of collaboration and communication, at the European level. The second approach can be further elaborated in terms of bottom-up and top-down networks. Bottom-up networks emerge through social and political actors' own initiatives to build trans-European networks seeking to structure and/or institutionalise their collaboration at the European level. Top-down networks emerge through elite-led European-level initiatives that attempt to bring different social and political actors together under their umbrella.

Each process and mechanism for forming a trans-European network implies a specific preference for a particular model of a EPS. Different preferences concerning involvement in horizontal and vertical trans-European structures, on the one hand, and in bottom-up and top-down structures, on the other hand, imply different approaches to diversity, as well as different attributions of ontological priority to the individual, the collectivity (of different types), the sub-national, the national, and the European. In other words, I expect some actors to deliberately rule out participating in vertical structures because the actors do not want to contribute to a hierarchical EPS structure. Therefore, in trans-European constellations of national-level organisations, I expect to find not only pro-European orientations but also diverging ideas and strategies concerning how the EPS should be structured (or not be structured at all) – e.g., a strictly segmented EPS along the lines of a Europe of nations, or an EPS as an arena that facilitates only limited trans-national collaboration on certain issues that cannot be dealt with only at the national level, or an EPS of overlapping European publics that follows the multi-level governance structure of the EU, or an ideally integrated single EPS, etc.

In this article, the network dimension of trans-European political spaces is measured through the following indicators: (1) the operative level of the networks (regional, national, trans-European interactions), (2) the scope of collaborative interaction (collaborative projects/actions, joint projects/actions, attempts to formulate common objectives, efforts to formulate common actions to address common concerns, synchronising existing projects/action plans, mutual information sharing), and (3) membership status in networks (active membership, passive membership, observer status).

Research Design, Sample and Data

The data about the collective actors is measured at two levels: institutional level data about organisations, gathered from organisations' printed and online official documents, and individual level data, obtained from in-depth interviews with persons that are in leading positions in the organisations (elite interviews).

Organisations and the Institutional Data Sample. The research design focuses specifically on those organisations and elites that have high visibility in public debates – representing the most visible mainstream and alternative discourses and networks. In each of the 16 European countries, I focus on three political parties (the party leading the government, the main opposition party, and the most visible Maverick party in each context), three non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or social movement organisations (SMOs) – civil society organisations that are the most visible in their contexts and represent the mainstream or alternative discourses, three think tanks (a policy research organisation, an academic think tank, and an advocacy think tank in each context), three print media actors (two main-player newspapers and one smaller newspaper that exhibits anti-establishment views in each context), and two broadcast media actors (one public and one commercial TV-channel that are main players in each context).

The research design includes collective actors operating at different levels of governance. Therefore, I also planned to include three European political party federations (*The Party of European Socialists* "PES," *European People's Party* "EPP," and *Union for Europe of Nations* "UEN"), three trans-European networks of NGOs/SMOs (*Social Platform of European NGOs* "Social Platform," *European Network against Racism* "ENAR," and *European Women's Lobby* "EWL"), and two trans-European networks of think tanks (*European Policy Institutes Network* "EPIN" and *Trans European Policy Studies Association* "TEPSA"). However, there are no Europe-wide media actors that are followed by a large European population: Euronews, which comes closest to what may be called a trans-European media channel, is not amongst the significant news sources utilised by European citizens although it broadcasts in several languages. Facing this fact, the research design had to omit the "trans-European media."

Due to concern for representing the actors that are the most visible in the public debates, the final sample includes a larger number of organisations: 242 organisations at member-state level (56 political parties, 67 social movement organisations, 46 think tanks, 44 newspapers, and 29 TV-channels, which are spread throughout sixteen European countries) and 8 European umbrella organisations that are the trans-European counterparts of these. In terms of both discourse and networking, these exhibit varying degrees of affiliation with or dissociation from trans-Euro-

peanising political spaces. Some are contained in national arenas in terms of both discourse and networks; some operate with Europeanising discourses in trans-European arenas.[2]

Elites and the Interview Data Sample. From each organisation, a number of persons in leading positions have been interviewed. Understanding the internal diversity within the organisations that are active in public debates is very important with respect to the theoretical points of departure of Eurosphere. One of the project's aims is to identify the organisations and the persons in organisations that are pushing for more trans-Europeanisation or nationalisation. Thus, in each organisation, either the leader, or the vice leader, or someone in the steering board known to be endorsing the leader's views, was selected. In addition, for each organisation, a person known to be the opinion leader but not holding an official leadership position was selected. In cases where the official leader and the opinion leader were identified as the same person, an interview with an additional opinion leader was not conducted. Further, at least one leading person who had official responsibility for, or was known to be interested in the policy areas that Eurosphere is researching on, was included in the sample. Further, for those organisations with internal groups like women's groups, minority groups, youth groups etc., we included those persons who led the group that was the most visible in public debates.

Thus, the size of the qualitative sample in each country is determined by four factors: (1) the number of the organisation types (which is four – political party, NGO/SMO, think tank, print media), (2) the number of the organisations' positions in the public debates (which is three – mainstream, main opposition, Maverick/alternative/anti-anti-establishment), (3) the number of the elite types (which is four - formal leader, opinion leader, internal opposition leader, sub-group leader), and (4) the saturation point for representing internal diversity in each organisation.

The research design stipulates that including 48 elites from each country (representing 4 organisation types, 4 elite types, and 3 positions: 4x4x3=48) will provide the optimum coverage of important collective actors that participate in public debates. This makes a total of 768 interviews required to conduct the project in 16 countries. However, 54 interviews were planned for each country in order to avoid ending up with too few interviews, making a total of 864 interviews with organisations at the member state level: seven persons from each political party, four from each NGO/SMO, three from each think tank, and three from each print media. The number of interviewees from political parties is larger because they accommodate almost all types of elites and internal groups.

In addition, 24 interviews were planned with the leaders of eight trans-European networks. These are the central operative units of eight European networks, the majority of which are located in Brussels. By operative units, I refer to leaders, boards, and secretariats of European umbrella organisations that bring together national level organisations under their transnational networks.

The final interview data set contains 764 interviews because, in some organisations, the saturation point was reached below the maximum number of planned interviews – indicating a low level of internal diversity in the respective organisations. That is, interviewing more persons would not result in new information about the respective organisation. The second factor is inaccessibility of print media elites in the UK.

Methods of Analysis. I use organisations, networks of organisations, and people who are in leading positions in these organisations (elites) as units of observations in different analysis stages. Discourses about diversity, the European polity, and the European public sphere are mapped through interviews with elites. The information about networking and collaboration patterns comes from institutional-level data collected from the organisations' official printed documents and other online publications as well as secondary literature on these organisations.

Each of the three dimensions – views on diversity, European polity, and the European public sphere – and the networking and collaboration patterns are mapped by using multiple variables. In order to create concise indicators, the number of the variables is reduced with principal components analysis (PCA). To create the new scores, I use regression factor scores since they consider the importance (loadings) of the variables constituting the respective dimensions. All the PCA-results tables in this paper report rotated component matrixes based on varimax rotation with Keiser normalisation.

For the question of whether a system of competing Europe-wide discourses and trans-European interaction patterns exists, I adopt an exploratory approach. By using a series of discriminant analyses (DA), I identify the member state-level organisations that display discourse and networking patterns similar to those of trans-European networks, and vice versa. The grouping variable in each DA is simply a dummy variable indicating whether an organisation is a national-level organisation of a trans-European network. The final classifications of the cases are cross-validated.

Elite Discourse Patterns in the European Public Sphere

Interviews with leaders of national and trans-European-level organisations show there are clear differences in the organisations' approaches to diversity, EU polity, and the public sphere. Although the whole spectrum of views is represented at both levels, the set of views that dominate at each level differs.

Differences between National and Trans-European Elites' Views on Diversity. The interviewees were asked to mention persons and groups that they see as relevant to their own idea of a diverse society. After the interviewees talked about their own preferences, they were asked to consider whether they would like to include other categories. The answers were then registered in a common database. Table 2 presents results from a PCA of the categories mentioned by the respondents.

The first dimension indicates global and transnational understanding in the sample. All the variables loading on this dimension concern categories that are unrelated to the notion of a homogenous nation state – but other phenomena, other groups, and belongings that contest it. I labelled this dimension "Global and Transnational Orientation to Diversity." It measures the respondents' tendency to include all types of diversity, not only group-based diversity but also individual diversity. This includes diversity generated by internal mobility within the EU.

The second dimension measures the extent to which a respondent is willing to include gender, disability and sexuality groups, different generations, and social classes in his or her definition of a diverse society. I labelled this dimension "Bodily and Individualist Orientation to Diversity." These variables are associated with social class as the majority of the respondents were concerned that such belonging might affect people's social class/status.

Table 2: Principal Components Analysis of Groups Seen as Relevant for Definition of the Diverse Society

V1.1: Which groups are relevant today for defining a diverse society? (Valid N= 741)	Component		
	1	2	3
Transnational belonging (groups that are identifying with more than one country)	.874	.292	.137
Shifting belongings (people whose belongings are under a process of change)	.848	.273	.136
European belonging (groups identifying with the EU)	.842	.281	.173
Global belonging groups (identification with humanity)	.835	.308	.181
Multiple/mixed belongings (people identifying with more than one group)	.826	.255	.149
Life-style groups (people identifying with different sorts of life-styles)	.695	.262	.214
Territorial belonging (groups identifying with a specific region in a country)	.690	.255	.111
Ideological groups (people identifying with a specific ideology)	.601	.239	.390
Migrant groups (people coming from non-European countries)	.531	.172	.078
Gender groups (men/women)	.191	.782	.227
Disability groups (people with physical and mental disadvantages)	.390	.709	.062
Sexuality groups (e.g., gays, lesbians, transsexuals, homosexuals, etc)	.200	.649	.390
Generation (e.g., youth/elderly)	.393	.643	.143
Social Class (e.g. workers, employers, farmers, rich, poor, etc)	.370	.519	.179
Ethnic groups (people identifying with a specific ethnic group)	.023	.261	.734
Religious groups (people identifying with a specific religion)	.189	.268	.704
National belonging (people identifying with a specific nation)	.459	-.019	.580
Contribution to explained variance (%)	49.90	8.65	5.50

The third dimension clusters the indicators measuring whether the respondents include national, religious, and ethnic groups in their definitions of a diverse society. I labelled this dimension "Traditional Orientation to Diversity." In this dimension, we measure how inclusive respondents are to group-based diversity created by the nation-state itself.

DA of the three scales with the grouping variable "national vs. trans-European organisation" gave the results shown in Table 3, 21.8 percent of the interviewees from national organisations and 52.9 percent from trans-European organisations agree on a globally/transnationally-oriented definition of a diverse society. Inversely, 78.2 percent of national and 47 percent of trans-European elites agree on a national orientation to a diverse society. These results show nationalising and Europeanising discourses are disseminated at national-level and trans-European-level organisations, but the national orientation is stronger at the national level whereas the transnational/global orientation is stronger at the trans-European level.

Table 3: Classification Results from Discriminant Analysis of Groups Relevant for the Definition of Diversity

		V6 National or Transnational Organisation?	Predicted Group Membership		Total
			National	Trans-European	
Cross-validated	Count	National	566	158	724
		Trans-European	8	9	17
	%	National	78.2	21.8	100.0
		Trans-European	47.1	52.9	100.0

My second indicator concerning diversity views relates to the normative, ontological, or instrumental status each interviewee gives to ethno-national diversity. The respondents were asked what they thought about ethno-nationally diverse societies. The responses were classified according to whether the respondents regard ethno-national diversity as a normatively desirable goal in itself, or an inescapable fact, or a matter that defines the meaningful existence of persons, or a means to achieve other goals. Respondents' answers were coded into multiple categories when the answers fit more than one category.

Table 4: Principal Components Analysis of the Status Given to Ethno-national Diversity

V2.1 What do you think about ethno-nationally diverse societies? (Valid N=720)	Component		
	1	2	3
The respondent sees an ethno-nationally diverse society as a desirable goal to achieve	.869	-.301	-.214
The respondent does not attribute any normative or ontological status but sees ethno-national diversity as an inescapable fact of a social life	-.835	-.376	-.214
The respondent sees an ethno-nationally diverse society as an ontological matter without which society's and/or an individual's existence would not be possible	-.001	.969	-.054
The respondent sees an ethno-national diversity as means for achieving some other goals and not as a goal in itself	-.014	-.044	.986
Contribution to explained variance (%)	36.54	29.65	26.11

Results from a PCA of these four categories are presented in Table 4. The first dimension is labelled "Normative vs. Realist Approach," and it measures respondents' tendency to view an ethno-nationally diverse society as a goal in itself or as an inescapable fact. Large positive values indicate perception of ethno-national diversity as a goal in itself. Negative scores with larger absolute values indicate perceptions of ethno-national diversity as an inescapable fact whether or not one sees it as desirable or not.

The second dimension is labelled "Ontological-Existential Approach." The higher scores with positive values on this scale indicate the respective respondents do not necessarily favour or not favour ethno-national diversity, but they accept it since they regard ethnicity and nationality as the foundation of people's social existence. Higher scores with negative values mean that the respective respondents do not perceive ethno-national diversity as an existential matter, but acceptable for other reasons.

The third dimension is labelled "Instrumental Approach." Specific statements – e.g. ethno-national diversity "is enriching our culture," "stimulates economic development and innovation," "is a god way of fighting an aging society," "should be tolerated if we want to share our wealth with poor people," "is acceptable since it leads to a more just society/world," "is a necessary tool for protecting human rights," "needed if we want to have a more colourful society etc – are coded into this category. Higher positive values on this scale thus indicate instrumentalist approaches to ethno-national diversity.

Table 5: Classification Results from Discriminant Analysis of Views on Ethno-national Diversity

		V6 National or Transnational Organisation?	Predicted Group Membership		Total
			National	Trans-European	
Cross-validated	Count	National	452	294	746
		Trans-European	6	12	18
	%	National	60.6	39.4	100.0
		Trans-European	33.3	66.7	100.0

The distribution of these views between levels is given in Table 5, 39.4 percent of the interviewees from national-level organisations and 66.7 percent from trans-European organisations share a normative view of diversity as a goal to achieve. However, 60.6 percent of the national and 33.3 percent of the trans-European interviewees share an instrumentalist and realist approach to diversity. That is, among the national-level elites, ethno-national diversity is acceptable because it is unavoidable, a necessity for meaningful social existence, and needed to achieve other goals. Views that do not see ethno-national diversity as a goal in itself dominate among the national-level elites. Inversely, views that regard ethno-national diversity as a goal in itself dominate among elites who work in trans-European organisations.

Differences between National and Trans-European Elites' views on EU Polity. Application of PCA on the five items listed in Table 6 resulted in three dimensions. The first dimension measures the extent to which the respondents want a development where policymaking/decision competences between the member-state and EU levels are differentiated and divided between levels according to different policy areas. Based on an inspection of the answers about different policy areas in qualitative interviews, I have interpreted this dimension as measuring the preference for a system of multi-level governance (MLG). In addition, an inspection of the respondents' preferences concerning decision levels in different policy areas in the quantitative data set supports this interpretation. Large positive values mean a preference for multi-level governance whereas large negative views mean the absence of this preference.

Table 6: Principle Components Analysis of the Views on EU Polity Development

V3.1 In which direction should EU polity develop in the future? (Valid N=663)	Component		
	1	2	3
More centralisation, but in certain policy fields	.804	.003	-.158
More autonomy for member states, but in certain policy fields	.782	-.037	.007
More federalisation at large	-.293	.802	-.270
More autonomy for member states	-.339	-.722	-.380
More centralisation	-.156	-.024	.919
Contribution to explained variance (%)	29.83	23.53	21.36

The second dimension can be interpreted as measuring the preference for a multi-level federal polity (MLP) versus more autonomy for member states in all areas. "Autonomy for member states" and "federalisation at large" load on the same dimension with opposite signs, making this dimension meaningfully bipolar. Large positive values imply a pro-federalisation attitude, and large negative values imply pro-member state autonomy attitudes.

The third dimension measures the extent to which a respondent is for more EU centralisation regardless of policy areas – that is, a preference for building a centralised EU polity (EUP). Large positive values indicate pro-centralisation attitudes, and large negative preferences mean the absence of this preference in a respondent. Cases with very low values on all three dimensions display a general anti-EU preference, and even a preference for dissolving the EU.

Table 7: Classification Results from Discriminant Analysis of the Views on EU Polity Development

		V6 National or Transnational Organisation?	Predicted Group Membership		Total
			National	Trans-European	
Cross-validated	Count	National	545	160	705
		Trans-European	9	8	17
	%	National	77.3	22.7	100.0
		Trans-European	52.9	47.1	100.0

As indicated in Table 7, 22.7 percent of the interviewees from national organisations and 47.1 percent of the interviewees from trans-European organisations agree on establishing a MLG or (to less extent) a MLP. However, 77.3 percent of national-level interviewees and 52.9 percent of trans-European interviewees agree on more decentralisation and more autonomy for member states.

Differences in Elites' Preferred Addressees in the European Public Sphere. This section is based on a set of variables measuring the extent to which, and whom, actors want to target as the addressees of their messages or claims in their communications and interactions.

The first column in Table 8 lists the different authorities and organisations the respondents mentioned as their addressees. A PCA resulted in two dimensions.

The first dimension encompasses the different European and EU political and judicial authorities – that is, the addressee is an institution at the European level, and the communication is upward. The second dimension measures the extent to which an actor's targeted addressees are other organisations, networks, groups, etc., including the European Commission, the European Parliament, and European parties/party families. Unlike the first dimension, communication and collaboration here do not necessarily imply a vertical or hierarchical but rather a horizontal structure of communication.

Table 9 shows 2.3 percent of the interviewees from national-level actors and 31.3 percent of the interviewees from trans-national actors want to be involved in vertical communication structures. However, 97.7 percent of the national actor interviewees and 68.8 percent of the transnational actor interviewees want to be primarily involved in horizontal communication structures.

Table 8: Principal Components Analysis of the Actors' Addressees in the Public Sphere

V5.10 Which actors on all levels (international, supranational, national, sub-national, i.e., regional and/or local) do you want to address with your activities? (Valid N=544)	Component	
	1	2
European Court of Auditors	.844	.079
European Ombudsman	.841	-.021
European Economic and Social Committee	.774	.310
Presidency of the Council	.757	.321
European Committee of the Regions. Agencies	.745	.232
Council of the European Union	.724	.269
Council of Europe	.713	.234
European Council	.677	.325
European Court of Human Rights	.652	.224
European Court of Justice	.643	.193
European Commission	.441	.375
Gender organisations/networks	.174	.709
Ethnic minority organisations/networks	.189	.672
Religious organisations/networks	.181	.665
Political parties and/or party families	.058	.634
Lobbies	.229	.622
Citizens in general	.128	.454
European Parliament	.374	.443
Contribution to explained variance (%)	41.53	10.08

Elites at the national and trans-European levels clearly prefer horizontal trans-European interactions. This trend is much more pronounced within the national-level organisations. A closer examination of the in-depth interviews also shows many of those who favour involvement in horizontal networks and who simultaneously want to involve EU political institutions as little as possible in their trans-European affairs do so because they are sceptical about the EU's democratic qualities, and they do not want to be part of the legitimisation mechanisms the EU has devised. Some political elites stated they already had good communication and collaboration channels with their sister parties in other countries, through party federations and one-to-one contacts between the party elites. Further, the national-level SMO/NGO leaders who prefer horizontal Europeanisation say this process started before the European Union existed and should continue especially now in the new political

Table 9: Classification Results from Discriminant Analysis of the Actors' Addressees

		V6 National or Transnational Organisation?	Predicted Group Membership		Total
			National	Trans-European	
Cross-validated	Count	National	516	12	528
		Trans-European	11	5	16
	%	National	97.7	2.3	100.0
		Trans-European	68.8	31.3	100.0

context of Europe, which is characterised by pooling of sovereignties so that the new concentrated power can be effectively criticised and controlled by citizens. The interviewees also think for issues on which some national governments are not responsive enough (e.g. women's rights, minority rights, environmental protection), European-level institutions can be a good tool for making national governments change their courses of action. Since the interviewees' own aim is to make sure that the interests they voice be protected, horizontal Europeanisation uninfluenced by EU premises is, for them, a better alternative. If necessary, European political institutions can be addressed for this purpose, but the European level should not, in their eyes, be taken for granted as a legitimate authority in all matters. This trend is clear concerning organisations operating at the national level.

In addition to those who favour horizontal trans-Europeanisation, we find national-level elites who seek to address only national governments and authorities in their activities. Here, the concern is the survival of the nation state rather than the democratic legitimacy of EU political institutions.

Trans-European elites, on the other hand, perceive their role as mediators between European Union institutions and the national-level organisations. Trans-European elites are aware they cannot claim to be representing anybody, but what they do is important and needed, because the new power structures in Europe require trans-European organisations that can articulate the common interests of European civil societies. However, trans-European organisations strive on both fronts. Access to EU decision-making mechanisms is difficult although some of the organisations have been defined by the European Commission as official consultation partners in the matters they specialise in. They think it is also difficult to gain the full trust of national-level member organisations because they are sometimes regarded as too close to the EU.

This view was confirmed by interviews with national-level political party and SMO/NGO elites. In addition to the perception that trans-European elites may be ideologically closer to the EU than to the grassroots, national-level elites are also concerned about the EU terminology adopted by trans-European elites. In the eyes of national-level elites, the difficulty of this terminology makes communication between national and trans-European-level elites at times ineffective, and this challenge also makes it difficult for national-level elites to actively participate in trans-European-level activities. However, trans-European elites tend to see EU terminology as a practical necessity that makes it possible to communicate with and disseminate contention toward EU policymakers. The majority of the trans-European elites state that it is important that the national-level civil society and political organisations understand the necessity of acting together on issues that require European-level solutions, but it is not always easy to persuade their member organisations to be more active.

Further, the elite interviews and our institutional data document that trans-European organisations usually operate with a very small number of full-time staff members, which makes it difficult to prioritise integration activities for national-level organisations. The most ambitious trans-European organisation in creating a high level of integration, by creating a common understanding of common problems, is the EWL. This organisation uses considerable staff resources and voluntary resources to integrate women's organisations from Central and Eastern European

countries. In addition, ENAR appears to be concerned about linking with member state-level anti-racist organisations.

On the other side of the coin, 2.3 percent of the national-level and 33.3 percent of the trans-European-level elites say they want to address the intergovernmental and supranational bodies in Europe with their activities. The trend within the trans-European organisations is not negligible. Among the trans-European organisations, the Social Platform appears to be the most oriented toward using the European Union institutions, and specifically the European Commission, as one of the primary addressees of their activities.

Discursive Misalignments between National and Trans-European-level Elites? These findings point to misalignments between the values of national and trans-European elites. If trans-European organisations are supposed to represent/aggregate the interests of European civil society regarding the EU, this can be perceived as a legitimacy problem on the part of the trans-European organisations. Even when we assume a somewhat less ambitious mission for them, such as articulating interests, it is not possible to ignore this mismatch. Certainly, diversity of views and political polarisation in the public sphere are necessary and desirable from a democracy point of view. However, what we observe here is not only a horizontal polarisation but also a vertical, hierarchical polarisation between the member-state and trans-European-level organisational elites.

Some of the trans-European elites interviewed work in organisations officially involved in EU-level policy processes as regular consultation partners – this is especially true for the Social Platform, ENAR, and the EWL. Although an overwhelming majority of the interviewed trans-European NGO/SMO elites are aware they cannot claim to represent the European civil society, they claim to represent social and political norms for the good of all – thus investing in output legitimacy rather than input legitimacy.

The three party federations we interviewed are supposed to represent their member parties, and they have representatives in the European Parliament. Low electoral turnout, combined with mismatches between national-level and trans-European-level elite views, also points to a hierarchical structuring of the trans-European political spaces.

Although the think tank networks – EPIN and TEPSA – and their member organisations we interviewed are not expected to represent anybody other than themselves and their expertise, they provide policy assessments, evaluations, and advice to the European Union.

The European Commission and other EU political institutions take these trans-European organisations as the most relevant conversation partners in certain policy issues, and have privileged them and institutionalised their participation in consultation processes in different ways. However, the views these institutions disseminate about diversity, ethno-national diversity, and legitimate addressees in the European public sphere are fundamentally different from the views expressed by elites working in national-level organisations.

In addition, the European Union's consultation system provides opportunities for other organisations and individual citizens to express their views on policy issues.

Organisations' Networking Patterns in the European Public Sphere

In the following set of PCAs and DAs, the unit of observation and analysis is organisation. Data about the organisations networking and interactive patterns were gathered from their printed and online documents (annual reports, activity reports, leaflets, brochures, descriptions of ongoing projects and project partners, and secondary literature where available). The following principal components and discriminant analyses of organisations' networking patterns include sub-national, national, and trans-European interactions.

Organisations' Collaboration Patterns. Table 10 shows the results from a PCA of the operative levels of networks the interviewed organisations are actually involved in. The 46 media actors in the data set are excluded from this analysis as the networking they do is not comparable with the networking of the three other types of organisations.

Table 10: Principal Components Analysis of the Organisations' Networks

Organisations/networks the organisation collaborates with N=158	Component	
	1	2
Regional organisations/networks	.921	-.063
National organisations/networks	.631	.543
Trans-European organisations/networks	-.012	.938
Contribution to explained variance (%)	49.64	31.22

The first component measures the extent to which an organisation is involved in sub-European (regional and national) networks, and the second measures an organisation's involvement in trans-European networks and national networks. The variable "national organisations/networks" loads on both dimensions. This indicates the majority of the organisations in our data material have national networks. However, those with large positive scores in the first dimension are also involved in sub-national networks, and those with large positive scores in the second dimension, in addition to their national networks, are involved in trans-European networks. This implies the presence of and a distinction between national multi-level and European multi-level networking structures in Europe, strengthening my expectation that national boundaries and European multi-level governance structures would lead to this type of networking structure.

Table 11: Classification Results from Discriminant Analysis of the Organisations' Networks

		National or transnational?	Predicted Group Membership		Total
			National	Transnational	
Cross-validated	Count	National	142	3	145
		Transnational	5	2	7
	%	National	97.9	2.1	100.0
		Transnational	71.4	28.6	100.0

Table 11 presents the distribution of these two networking patterns between trans-European and national-level organisations. We observe that 98 percent of member state-level organisations collaborate primarily with organisations' national and sub-national networks. However, 71.4 percent of the trans-European organisations also primarily collaborate with national and sub-national-level organisations, whereas 28.6 percent of trans-European organisations cooperate with national organisations and other trans-European networks.

As the percentage of national-level organisations collaborating with other national organisations and simultaneously with trans-European networks is low (2.1 percent), and the percentage of transnational organisations that collaborate with national-level organisations is high (71.4 percent), trans-European organisations collaborate with only a small selection of national-level organisations. This is certainly true in the case of the trans-European think tank networks, which prefer to include only one think tank from each EU member country. The same argument goes for party federations, which collaborate with a limited number (preferably only one) political party in each member country. As to the SMOs and NGOs, ENAR and the EWL also have limited the number of organisations from each country, often to only one, in their membership lists. However, the Social Platform is a network of networks, and individual organisations cannot be members in the Social Platform.

Even without considering the results presented in Table 11, the membership structure of trans-European organisations demonstrates the number of national-level organisations involved in trans-European networks is quite low. The results I obtained from the analysis of the interviews (Table 9) are almost identical with the results from this analysis of the institutional data. Combining these results, I conclude organisational elites are quite consistent in their intensions and actions: To a large degree, they do not want to have intergovernmental and supranational authorities as addressees of their activities; in practice, they do not collaborate with trans-European organisations that have these authorities as the main addressees of their activities.

Scope of Organisations' Collaboration with Networks and Other Organisations. A PCA of six variables indicating how organisations collaborate in their national, sub-national, and trans-European networks resulted in one component (Table 12). The variables in the first column measure different types of collaboration forms. The variables "attempts at mutual information sharing," "efforts to synchronise separate projects/action plans," "collaborative projects/actions," "joint/projects/actions," "attempts to formulate common objectives to address common concerns," and "attempts to formulate common objectives" represent ordinal-ranked categories of the variable collaboration scope. However, the PCA did not distinguish between variables measuring project-/action-based collaboration and more strategic collaboration to achieve long-term objectives; I will stick to interpreting this scale as an indicator of the organisations' collaboration scope.

Thus, the extracted single component can be interpreted as a measure of the size of the collaboration repertoire of organisations. The higher an organisation's score, the more collaborative activity types in which the organisation participates. Smaller scores indicate less collaboration activity with networks and other organisations. However, the largest scores with a positive sign are also forms of collaboration

Table 12: Principal Components Analysis of the Organisations' Actions in Trans-European Networks

N=158	Component
	1
Efforts to synchronise separate projects/action-plans	.786
Attempts at mutual information-sharing	.763
Attempts to formulate common objectives	.721
Joint projects/actions	.719
Collaborative projects/actions	.702
Efforts to formulate common objectives to address common concerns	.622
Contribution to the explained variance (%)	51.93

aiming to achieve longer-term common objectives. Whereas the indicators I constructed in the previous section measure the extent to which organisations network with organisations operating at different levels, this indicator tells us what they do when they collaborate.

Table 13 shows 60 percent of trans-European-level organisations have a larger collaboration scope or repertoire, and 76.5 percent of the national-level organisations have smaller collaboration repertoires. This is certainly not surprising since the survival of trans-European networks largely relies on collaboration with member organisations and other networks.

Table 13: Classification Results from Discriminant Analysis of the Organisations' Actions in Networks

		National or transnational?	Predicted Group Membership		Total
			National	Transnational	
Cross-validated	Count	National	117	36	153
		Transnational	2	3	5
	%	National	76.5	23.5	100.0
		Transnational	40.0	60.0	100.0

What do these numbers tell us about national and trans-European-level organisations? First, a much smaller percentage of national-level organisations than trans-European organisations get involved in collaboration that requires agreement on common objectives. Second, a considerable portion (40 percent) of the trans-European organisations has this collaboration repertoire. Still, 23.5 percent of national-level organisations and 60 percent of trans-European-level organisations do get involved in collaboration that either may lead to or has led to formulation of common objectives. Indeed, this is a lot and implies individual organisations are coming together to stand on the different poles of whatever kind of political spaces they are operating in. The results cover collaboration at all levels (local, national, or European).

Organisations' Membership Status in Networks. Our institutional data also covers information about the organisations' membership status in trans-European networks. The PCA presented in Table 14 is based on three variables indicating whether organisations have active or passive membership status or observer status

in their networks. The analysis gave two components that distinguish between organisations that are members and organisations that have only observer status in their networks.

Table 14: Principal Components Analysis of the Organisations' Membership Status in Networks

Status of the organisation in selected networks N=160	Component	
	1	2
Passive membership status (only voting rights)	.820	-.147
Active membership status (with voting and representation rights)	.688	.267
Observer status	.039	.961
Contribution to explained variance (%)	40.03	32.1

The first component measures whether an organisation has active membership status in the network with voting and representation rights (large positive values). The higher scores indicate membership with voting and representation rights, and the smaller values indicate only passive membership status without representation rights. The second component measures whether a non-member organisation has observer status in an organisational network. Larger values indicate observer status, and smaller values indicate the absence of observer status. Organisations that score low on both dimensions are those that do not have membership or observer status in any organisational networks; however, this does not mean the organisations do not collaborate with networks.

Table 15: Classification Results from Discriminant Analysis of Membership Status in Networks

		National or transnational?	Predicted Group Membership		Total
			National	Transnational	
Cross-validated	Count	National	145	10	155
		Transnational	4	1	5
	%	National	93.5	6.5	100.0
		Transnational	80.0	20.0	100.0

Table 15 shows 6.5 percent of national-level organisations and 20 percent of trans-European organisations have strong membership statuses in organisational networks. The one trans-national organisation with strong membership status in a network is ENAR – which is a member of the Social Platform.

The Structuring of Trans-Europeanising Public Spaces

The conceptual framework of this paper defines "the articulation of trans-Europeanising public spaces" in terms of two features: (1) generating trans-European discourses and (2) creating trans-European networks. Fulfilling either of these criteria means contributing to creating trans-Europeanising public spaces.

Although Europeanising and non-Europeanising discourses exist in national and trans-European-level organisations, non-Europeanising discourses domi-

nate in national-level organisations, and Europeanising discourses dominate in trans-European organisations. Concerning discourses on diversity and the future development of an EU polity, the gaps between the views of national- and trans-European-level elites are more or less similar across the different topics analysed here. The largest gap between trans-European-level and national-level elites' views is between their acceptance of the EU political institutions as legitimate addressees in the public sphere.

Organisations' networking patterns at the institutional level also indicates that, while the majority of member state-level organisations and all of the trans-European-level organisations are involved in horizontal trans-European relations with organisations in other European countries, very few national-level organisations are involved both horizontally and vertically in trans-European relations. This finding is consistent with the findings in the analysis of their discourses concerning legitimate addresses in the European public sphere.

These findings show the most active and influential social and political actors at the member-state level prefer and are working to achieve a horizontal trans-Europeanisation in Europe – by leaving out from their communication paths and collaborative work EU political institutions and trans-European networks that draw on EU institutions as their addressees.

These results point to the existence of trans-Europeanising political spaces, with Europeanising discourses and/or trans-European ties between organisations at the national and European levels. Earlier research – on especially the media public sphere – convincingly shows the current European public sphere is horizontally segmented along national lines in Europe. While this study shows the same tendency exists in the discourses and networking patterns of the central organisations participating in public debates, it also finds that there is a notable discursive rapprochement between member-state and trans-European-level elites.

More importantly, trans-Europeanising political spaces, i.e. the component of the European public sphere, which is expected to contribute to the weakening of the national boundaries, may also potentially divide the European public sphere vertically. There are some discursive gaps between the views of national and European-level elites. Further, networking patterns also show this gap is not only in discourses but also in interactions. This implies a significant lack of interconnectedness between national and trans-European publics. In the future, this currently weak vertical division may contribute to the emergence of a horizontally and vertically segmented European public sphere. However, if Stein Rokkan's conclusions (Rokkan 1975, Rokkan et al. 1987) pertaining to European national state-building processes hold true for the building of the European Polity, such vertical segmentation may also create common transnational reactions from the grassroots, resulting in integration of the European peripheries against the multiple political centres of the EU.

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Notes:

1. According to Olesen (2005), "Visibility refers to the degree to which frames are heard and seen in the public sphere," and "Resonance refers to the degree to which frames elicit a response from interested parties; for example likeminded activists and social movements, media, politicians and the targets of claims (for example states and institutions)."

2. For detailed information about rules and procedures for selecting organisations and interviewees, see Eurosphere Research Notes no. 9 and 13 at http://eurospheres.org/publications/research-notes/.

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HAKAN G. SICAKKAN

RAZNOLIKOST, POLITIČNA DRŽAVA IN EVROPSKA JAVNA SFERA

Članek postavlja pojmovni in analitični okvir za analizo procesov strukturiranja evropske javne sfere. Javna sfera je obravnavana v simbiotičnem, vendar nedeterminističnemu razmerju do oblik politične države in urejanja raznolikosti. Z operacionalizacijo javne sfere kot štirirazsežne matrike glede na ravni vladovanja, omrežja, diskurze in kolektivne akterje, ki upošteva prej omenjeno razmerje, članek identificira elemente javne sfere, ki bi morali biti v ospredju raziskovanja evropske javne sfere ter na osnovi omenjene matrike razvrsti posamezne članke tokratne številke *Javnosti – The Public*.

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ACAR KUTAY

EVROPEIZACIJA CIVILNE DRUŽBE SKOZI POKROVITELJSKO EVROPSKO JAVNOST

Institucije EU, še posebej Evropska komisija in Evropski ekonomski in socialni svet, so spodbujale in pokroviteljsko omogočale nastanek nevladnih organizacij v Bruslju. Tovrstna strategija je bila namenjena mobilizaciji interesov družbenih akterjev za EU in pomoči pri zmanjševanju zaznanega komunikacijskega deficita EU. Članek najprej nakaže, da je takšna strategija v praksi predvsem utrdila evropeizacijo družbenih akterjev. Evropeizacija znotraj civilne družbe je bila zasnovana kot legitimizacija evropskega političnega projekta in specifičnih načinov vladovanja. V nadaljevanju članek ponuja alternativni model mreženja nevladnih organizacij, ki poudarja civilizacijske vplive javnih sfer namesto zbliževanja civilne družbe s politično oblastjo.

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CORNELIA BRUELL
MONIKA MOKRE
BIRTE SIIM

VKLJUČEVANJE IN IZKLJUČEVANJE V EVROPSKI JAVNI SFERI NA PRESEKU SPOLOV IN RAS

Ali si v Evropi lahko predstavljamo transnacionalne javne sfere, ki dejansko zagotavljajo odgovornost – tj. prostore kritične artikulacije, mehanizme nadzora in politične korektive vladajočim ravnem? Ali je lahko politično, kot kritična sila in pripravljenost za boj in odločanje, ponovno uvedeno v javno sfero? Na kakšne načine se rasne/narodnostne, razredne in spolne razlike (re)prezentirajo in artikulirajo v javni sferi in kako se med seboj prepletajo? Da bi našli odgovore na ta vprašanja, članek raziskuje možnosti za oblikovanje evropskega diskurzivnega prostora z vidika tematik spola in ras. Empirično se članek osredinja na stališča političnih strank in družbenih gibanj, izraženih v javnih razpravah. V obravnavi vključenosti in izključenosti manjšin iz evropske javne sfere na podlagi spola in rase/narodnosti članek išče spremembe v retoriki, diskurzih in politikah. Članek ugotavlja skupne diskurzivne vzorce na stičiščih narodnosti in spola, ki se jih lahko v najboljšem primeru razume kot znak pojavljanja širše evropske javne sfere. Le če so te razprave generalizirane, lahko nastanejo evropske javne sfere, ki služijo ustvarjanju mehanizmov odgovornosti in nadzora.

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ROBERT SATA

POLITIČNE STRANKE IN POLITIKE RAZNOLIKOSTI V EVROPSKI JAVNI SFERI

Članek proučuje, kako stališča o raznolikosti vplivajo na pripravljenost političnih strank na vključevanje v transevropsko posvetovanje za oblikovanje transevropske javnosti. Na osnovi podatkov, zbranih v okviru projekta Eurosphere, članek raziskuje, do katere mere evropska raznolikost uokvirja temo intergacije v javnem diskurzu političnih strank v 16 evropskih državah – 14 članicah EU ter v Norveški in Turčiji kot nečlanicah, s tem da ugotavlja homogenost oz. heterogenost diskurzov političnih strank ter konsenz oz. spor v diskurzih. Rezultati kažejo, da se stranke z bolj vključujočimi stališči do raznolikosti bolj verjetno aktivneje udeležujejo v evropskih arenah ne glede na njihov položaj v vladi ali ideološko ozadje (čeprav je to omejeno zgolj na vodilne stranke). Še bolj pomembno kot to pa je, da narava nacionalnih javnih sfer in domače politično tekmovanje ter nasprotja določajo, ali so nacionalne javnosti pripravljene in sposobne postati bolj odprte do transnacionalnih pobud.

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YOLANDA ZOGRAFOVA
DIANA BAKALOVA
BISTRA MIZOVA

VZORCI MEDIJSKEGA POROČANJA V EVROPI: PRIMERA KONSTRUKCIJE EU IN REFORMNE POGODBE

Množični mediji so ključni družbeni akterji v artikulaciji tem javnih zadev v evropski javni sferi. S posredovanjem sporočil, simbolov in pogledov o ključnih vprašanjih lahko mediji vplivajo na pomembnost tem v evropski javni sferi. Članek raziskuje vzorce medijskega poročanja o pomembnih temah, ki zadevajo EU, še posebej izgrajevanje EU in reformno pogodbo, v 16 evrospkih državah, vključno s Turčijo. Članek analizira vsebino 77 tiskanih in elektronskih medijev, pri čemer se osredinja na dve dimenziji medijskega poročanja: pogostost poročanja ter stališča, ki so jih izrazili akterji med poročanjem o temah, ki zadevajo EU. Rezultati kažejo, da je v času zbiranja podatkov (maj-oktober 2008) prevladovalo specifično državno poročanje in da ni bilo skupnega vzorca medijskega poročanja. Članek poudarja močno medsebojno povezanost med tipom članstva držav (stare in nove članice ter nečlanice) in artikulacijo obeh analiziranih tem in tudi drugih vprašanj glede evropskega povezovanja v medijih.

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MARTINA KLICPEROVÁ-BAKER
JAROSLAV KOŠŤÁL

ETNO-NACIONALNA, VERSKA, IDEOLOŠKA IN SPOLNA RAZNOLIKOST: PRIMERJAVA STALIŠČ EVROPSKIH ELIT IN DRŽAVLJANOV

V kontekstu večnivojskega vladovanja, kot ga najdemo v Evropski Uniji, kjer so elite v javni sferi bolj dejavne, je še posebej pomembno ugotoviti, ali se stališča državljanov skladajo s stališči elit, ki trdijo, da jih predstavljajo. Članek primerja stališča elit s stališči reprezentativnega vzorca državljanov, pri čemer se osredinja na njihova stališča do etno-nacionalne, verske in spolne raznolikosti. Rezultati potrjujejo povezanost med stališči elit in državljanov in razkrivajo nekatere zakonitosti. (1) Etnične in ideološke skupine, ki jih soseske zavračajo, so bile s strani elit prepoznane kot relevantne za družbeno raznolikost. (2) S strani državljanov najbolje sprejeti imigrantski delavci so bili tudi v očeh elit videni kot najbolj pomembni za družbeno raznolikost. (3) Spolna raznolikost predstavlja bolj kompleksen odnos – kjer so geji najbolj sprejeti, jih elite dojemajo kot bodisi zelo relevantne (Avstrija, Danska) bodisi irelevantne za družbeno raznolikost (Češka, Francija, Italija, Španija). V državah z visokim javnim zavračanjem gejev, gledajo elite na LGBT kot na zelo relevantne (Turčija, Bolgarija, Estonija). Elitna stališča o relevantnosti spodbujajo večjo toleranco v javnosti; javna netoleranca povečuje prepoznavanje relevance marginaliziranih skupin.

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HAKAN G. SICAKKAN

TRANS-EVROPEIZACIJSKI JAVNI PROSTORI V EVROPI

Ali obstajajo kakršnekoli čezmejne interakcije in vzorci mreženj, kakršnikoli skupni sistemi tekmujočih političnih diskurzov in/ali kakršnikoli skupni kanali, platforme ali arene komuniciranja ali akcije, za katere bi lahko trdili, da so zametki evropske javne sfere? Če le-ta obstaja, kako je potem strukturirana? Na podlagi primerjalne študije diskurzivne konfiguracije in vzorcev mreženj več kot 240 civilnodružbenih organizacij v šestnajstih evropskih državah in osmih evropskih civilnodružbenih omrežij članek ugotavlja diskurzivne vrzeli med stališči civilnodružbenih organizacij na evropski ravni in ravni držav članic. Le-te se nanašajo na raznolikost, prihodnost državnih politik EU in identifikacijo legitimnega naslovnika. Vzorci mreženj nakazujejo, da do vrzeli ne prihaja samo v diskurzih, ampak tudi v interakcijah. Upoštevajoč trenutno segmentiranost po nacionalnih mejah lahko govorimo o začetkih razvoja horizontalno in vertikalno segmentirane evropske javne sfere.

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