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

Looking at Ankara from Strasbourg: An Empirical Assessment of MEPs' Voting on and Framing of Turkey

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THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES the way in which the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) frame Turkey and how this affects their voting stance towards Ankara in the parliamentary debates. Recent studies (Baldwin and Widgrén 2005; Braghiroli 2012; Canan-Sokullu 2011) have demonstrated that the debate on Turkey's European Union (EU) membership produces a very divisive impact on the voting dynamics and voting alignments in the European Parliament (EP) in the light of its national and political significance. The parliamentary positions on the 'Turkey discourse' range from enthusiastic support to open Turkophobia. What is even more striking is the wide variety of individual positions generally identifiable within the same political/ideological area. To what extent are MEPs' different perceptions and representations of Turkey reflected in the way they vote when Turkey is at stake in the EP? And, what is the impact of this state of things on groups' internal cohesion? This study addresses these two fundamental questions using two different sources of data. Elite survey data is used in order to capture MEPs' perceptions of Turkey, while MEPs' voting behavior is assessed in the light of the expressed votes.

Key Words: European Parliament; Turkish membership; perceptions; voting behavior

INTRODUCTION

When the European Council decided unanimously to start the accession negotiations with Turkey in December 2004, the decision was confirmed by the EP, with 407 votes in favor and 262 against.[1]

Despite the unanimous pledge of the EU governments, their commitment lost momentum within a few months and Turkey was in-

creasingly confronted with open or implicit opposition of a number of member states and key stakeholders. According to the Independent Commission on Turkey (2009), 'in several countries such public discourse coincided with elections, giving the impression that domes-
[4] tic political calculations were involved.' At the same time, the functional use of the 'Turkey discourse' also gained ground among the mainstream parties, both at the national and EP level. As witnessed by Nicholas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel's recent negative remarks towards Turkey's accession, ideological and/or functional opposition towards Ankara's EU ambitions has increasingly emerged as a practical short-cut to convey popular concerns about immigration, unemployment, multiculturalism, and Islam (McLaren 2007). Moreover, the functional use of the 'Turkey discourse' seems no longer a monopoly of the radical and populist movements, but it has been increasingly interiorized by the mainstream conservative and moderate political forces.

The growing skepticism is reflected by the new Negotiating Framework formally agreed in the Luxembourg European Council and endorsed by the EP in 2006. While Turkey's accession is defined as 'the shared objective of the negotiations,' the negotiations are presented as 'an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand' (European Commission 2005).

This article examines the way in which the MEPs frame Turkey and how this affects their voting stance towards Ankara in the parliamentary debates. Recent studies (Baldwin and Widgrén 2005; Braghiroli 2012; Canan-Sokullu 2011) have demonstrated that the debate on Turkey's EU membership produces a very divisive impact on the voting dynamics and voting alignments in the EP, in the light of its national and political significance.

The present article proceeds as follows. Following the definition of the EP setting and of the actors involved in the first section, the methodology adopted is discussed in the second section. In the third and fourth section, the analysis of the expressed votes and of the declared opinions is performed; while in the fifth section a comparative exercise is presented. In the concluding sections, some boarder considerations are discussed in the light of the results.

DEFINING THE SETTING AND THE ACTORS

Following the formal redefinition of Ankara's accession prospects, some EU governments openly argued in favor of the cooperation arrangements clearly alternative to the full membership, such as a 'privileged partnership.' They emphasized the exceptionality of the Turkish case when compared to the other waves of enlargement. [5]

So far, only few, non-mainstream, EP party groups are openly against Ankara's EU membership, while the majority of the political forces in the EP formally support it, at least on paper. However, as time passes and the negotiation outcome becomes more unpredictable, the 'Turkey discourse' appears increasingly hostage of partisanship with the European center-left emerging as the herald of a pro-Turkey stance, while a growing number of conservative MEPs appear increasingly tempted to adopt a more populist approach in order to attract protest vote in an electoral perspective (Braghiroli 2012).

Parliamentary support and opposition to Ankara's European ambitions range between functional/interest-based and ideal/ideological stances. The pragmatic stance appears more frequent among the mainstream parties, while the identitarian approach characterizes more extreme and protest parties. A clear example of the functional opposition side is provided by a recent report commissioned by the German Christian-Democrats warning against a 'too big, too poor [Turkey], with too dangerous borders and insufficiently "European" to join the Union.'[2]

In the light of the salience of the issue at stake, the wide range of conflicting positions seems to have a very relevant disruptive potential on the parliament's voting dynamics when the 'Turkey discourse' is at stake. To what extent are the parliamentary voting dynamics on Turkey a function of MEPs' different perceptions and representations of Turkey? So far, no clear answer has been given to this very basic question.

This study represents one of the few empirical attempts to look at the dynamics of the debate on Turkey from a parliamentary perspective involving MEPs' perception-based framing of Turkey. The scholarly attention on the 'Turkey discourse' has mainly been focused on the EU's executive institutions (the Council and the Commission), while the EP

has been generally depicted as a sort of 'irrelevant other.' However, as LaGro and Jørgensen (2007) warn

[6]

> [...] the institutions to decide on the faith of Turkey will not be national parliaments on the recommendation of their respective governments, but the peoples of Europe and, of course, one must not forget, the European Parliament, which is gaining power exponentially within the EU institutions.

In this respect, the EP represents the only EU institution directly legitimized by citizens' vote. It is not only the sole legitimate representative of the people of Europe, but, given its multi-national nature and ideological composition, it is also more likely to reflect their attitude in voting dynamics.

As the analysis is addressing a relatively unexplored ground, this study is conceived as an exploratory analysis towards a more precise understanding of the relationship between MEPs' perceptions and voting behavior in the specific case of the 'Turkey discourse.' For this reason, this study will not propose a formal set of hypotheses to test.

METHODOLOGY

Two different sources of data have been used in the analysis. In order to capture the MEPs' perception of Turkey, a feeling thermometer question included in the 2008–10 waves of the European Elite Survey/Transatlantic Trends Leaders[3] has been used, recoded according to a 0 (lowest level of sympathy) – 1 (highest level of sympathy) scale.

When it comes to the MEP' voting behavior, the available roll-call votes (RCVs) held on Turkey-related issues between 2009 and 2012[4] have been collected. The procedure that has been adopted to score the MEPs' votes according to their connotation towards Turkey implies three successive steps. *First,* for every bill considered, the sections concerning Turkey and Turkish membership are recorded. *Second,* every vote is assigned a score in the light of the connotation it gives to Turkey.[5] *Third,* a final measure is calculated for every MEP on the basis of each legislator's valid votes portraying the MEPs' overall voting position when Turkey and Turkish membership are at stake. Therefore,



FIGURE 1 Distribution of MEPs' individual voting scores

if MEP 'x' supports a piece of legislation favorable to Turkey or opposes one labeled as negative towards Turkey he/she gets score 1, *vice versa* he/she gets score 0. In case of abstention, he/she gets score 0.5. The final measure represents the MEP's average score and ranges from 0 (highest level of Turkey-friendly voting behavior) to 1 (lowest level of Turkey-friendly voting behavior).

The final analysis will be conducted by crossing the MEPs' perception of Turkey and their voting behavior at an individual level[6] and by assessing the level of compliance between the two. This will allow us to understand whether the MEPs tend to vote according to their preferences when it comes to the 'Turkey discourse' or whether they are driven in one way or the other by domestic or parliamentary pressures and behave pragmatically.

THE VOTING SIDE

In the following sections, the two analytical dimensions considered will be discussed. The measures of homogeneity and cohesiveness will be calculated on the basis of the MEPs' partisan affiliation and nationality.

In total, nine votes were included in the analysis respecting the 75:25 ratio; five were coded as positive/favorable towards Turkey and four as negative/unfavorable. The RCVs analyzed are all related to the MEPs' scrutiny of the Commission's annual progress reports.

Figure 1 charts the distribution of the voting scores among the 735 MEPs included in the research. The votes clearly do not appear *normally* distributed. If we look at the two polar voting categories, respectively expressing the highest level of negative votes towards Turkey (0–0.20) and the highest level of positive votes (0,81–1), the chart shows that the latter is by far the most frequent category with 174 MEPs, which constitutes more than 24% of the total. In this respect, those who

expressed the most negative voting stance represent the smallest of the five categories with 98 MEPs (13%).

Looking at the general trend, what emerges is a slight prevalence of positive scores (given an average EP score of 0.53), while the MEPs ex-
[8] pressing a 'moderately negative' voting attitude towards Turkey (0.21–0.40) represent the modal group with 220 MEPs (30%). The general picture seems fairly balanced and the gap between the 'negative' and the 'positive' group seems very narrow, also considering the 143 MEPs that fall in the median category (19%).

Figure 2 represents the average voting scores by country. Also in the light of the great domestic political salience of Turkey's EU accession in many member states, the results presented display a significant level of variance among the national delegations. A 50% gap emerges between the delegation expressing the most negative connotation and the delegation expressing the most positive one.

Against an average EP score of 0.53 (denoting a fair balance of negative and positive votes); the member states representing the lowest rank score are Cyprus with a score of 0.2 and Greece with a score of 0.27 Greece. It is worth noting that if we ignore these two outliers, the gap narrows to 33%. While it is no surprise that Nicosia and, to a lesser extent, Athens' delegations present a cold voting stance towards Turkey, more puzzling are the other low scoring delegations. In total, only seven out of 27 delegations are characterized by a majority of negatively expressed votes. Among them it is worth mentioning the Austrian (0.37), Hungarian (0.42), Dutch and Polish (0.46), and French (0.49) delegations.

While in the case of the Austrian, French, and Dutch MEPs the cold voting stance seems to reflect the long lasting negative bias towards Ankara's membership often fuelled by the presence of relevant migrant communities from Turkey (McLaren 2007), more confusing are the cases of the Hungarian and Polish delegations. In this case, the average negative factors are possibly determined by incidental factors that will be possibly clarified by the analysis of the inter-group variance.

Interestingly, the German delegation (0.55) appears not only characterized by a majority of positively expressed votes, but it also scores



FIGURE 2 Distribution of average voting scores by national delegations (* average)

higher than the EP average. The Scandinavian MEPs and those from the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) express the most favorable voting stance towards Turkey, along with the Mediterranean Spaniards (0.64) and Maltese (0.7).

The political support of the Nordic countries, such as Sweden (0.67), Denmark (0.62), and Finland (0.59) to Ankara's European ambitions has been well documented in a number of studies (Adam and Moutos 2005; Müftüler-Bac and McLaren 2003) and our data seems to confirm the same Turkey-friendly stance in the voting dynamics of the Scandinavian delegations. However, the high scores of most of the CEE delegations – Romanian and Czech (0.61), Slovenian and Estonian (0.6) MEPs – seem due to the well documented phenomenon of



FIGURE 3 Distribution of average voting scores by group

[10]

enlargement solidarity (Falkner and Treib 2008; Rahman 2008; Zielonka 2002).

Figure 3 charts the average voting score distribution by political group. A number of recent studies (Hix and Noury 2009; Rasmussen 2008) have demonstrated that votes in the EP are generally expressed along the political lines, rather than the national ones. Other studies claim that the political groups in the EP also represent the main source of discipline when it comes to the MEPs' individual voting behavior as mirrored by the high level of cohesion in the Parliament (Hix 2002). In this respect, the results presented above appear very relevant.

A point that emerges clearly from the figure 3 is that the MEPs' voting stance towards Turkey seems to reflect a very evident left-right divide, thereby presenting a clear ideological/partisan connotation. Worth noting is that the range between the parliamentary group expressing the most negative stance and the group expressing the most positive one equals 75% and is therefore far larger than in the case of the national delegations discussed above. In this respect, it is useful to divide the political groups in the EP in three clusters. The *right* side of the political spectrum (including extreme right, Euroskeptic right, and moderate-conservative European People's Party[7]) presents the scores far below the EP average, thereby reflecting a majority of negatively expressed votes. The *center* of the spectrum – including liberal-democrats (ALDE) and democratic Euroskeptic affiliated to the group of the European Conservatives and Reformers (ECR) – presents the scores aligned to the EP average, thereby suggesting a combination of different voting options and a less ideological approach for the centrist groups. The *left* side of the political spectrum – including the social-

democrats (S&D) and the Greens – presents the highest scores and the highest level of Turkey-friendly votes.

Looking at the scores of the groups, two relevant exceptions seem to emerge with respect to the ideological characterization of the Turkey-related votes. In particular, the radical left and the democratic Euroskeptics seem to present a relevant mismatch in this respect. The radical leftist group of the European United Left-Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL) presents extremely low voting scores (0.31) comparable to the radical and Euroskeptic right. This seems to be due to two specific factors. On the one hand, it is worth mentioning the long lasting support expressed by many constituent parties for the Kurdish cause, which is reflected by a widespread functional opposition towards Turkey and its alleged assimilation and repression campaigns (Günes-Ayata 2003). On the other hand, another important factor that contributes to the explanation of the exceptionality of the group is represented by the key relevance of the Cypriot communist delegation within the GUE-NGL. In this respect, despite the limited size, the Cypriot communists express the only head of government from the ranks of the GUE-NGL, thereby making the Cyprus-issue a very sensitive one for the group.

In the case of the Euroskeptic ECR, the relatively high scores recorded seem due to their strong support for a faster enlargement strategy of the EU as way to make the Union more plural and to weaken its alleged federal character. In this respect, the conservatives' support for Turkish membership therefore seems functional.

THE ELITE OPINION SIDE

Figure 4 charts the distribution of perception scores among the 176 MEPs included in the EES/TTL surveys. In this case, the MEPs appear more *normally* distributed than in the case of the voting scores presented in the previous section. In terms of the connotation of Turkey, the declared opinions appear positively-oriented. In this case, while the two negative categories (0–0.20 and 0.21–0.40) account for 24% of the total, the percentage grows to 29% if we consider the two positive categories.

Moreover, what emerges as the most relevant difference in compar-



FIGURE 4 Distribution of MEPs' individual scores in the feelings thermometer

ison to the distribution of the voting scores is that the modal group in the elite opinion distribution is represented by the central category (0.41–0.60) capturing neutral or moderate scores in the feelings thermometer and accounting for 47% of the total. In general, we can therefore say that not only do the declared opinions appear on average more *normal* than the expressed votes, but are also more moderate and less polarized.

Figure 5 charts the national delegations' average declared feelings towards Turkey and compares them with their average voting scores presented above. Only the national delegations with at least 10 interviewees were included in the computation in order to grant a fair degree of generalization. Moreover, for the same reason, the distributions presented have been weighted according to the relative size of each party in the respective national delegation.

If we compare the MEPs' image of Turkey with their actual voting scores in the 7 largest delegations included, no major mismatch seems to emerge. Moreover, all scores do not distance themselves too much from the average (0.55) and the gap between the most friendly delegation and the most negative one is much more narrow than in the case of the expressed votes, thereby equaling 14%. Interestingly, in most of the national cohorts, the gap between declared perceptions and expressed votes is of a few decimals. This is the case in the Spanish (+5%), Romanian (–3%), Italian (+2%), and French (+3%) delegations. In these cases, the MEPs' image of Turkey seems to almost perfectly reflect the way they vote.

Partial exceptions to this state of things are represented by the British, German, and Polish delegations. On one hand, in the case of the Polish delegation, the image of Turkey that representatives have in mind is more positive than the one that emerges from the voting scores. The positive mismatch emerged appears consistent and it equals 8%. On the other hand, in the German and British cases, the



FIGURE 5 Distribution of average scores in the feelings thermometer by national delegations (dark – voting scores, light – feelings thermometer)

MEPs' representation of Turkey is much more negative than their actual voting behavior. Moreover, in both cases their voting scores suggest a moderately-positive attitude (respectively 0.55 and 0.56), while their declared opinions highlight the existence of moderately-negative attitudes (respectively 0.47 and 0.45), thereby confirming the existence of a negative mismatch. The existence of relevant mismatches appears – among others – related to the high voting cohesion achieved within the major group, which seems to induce pragmatic, rather than idealistic behavioral styles in the affiliated MEPs.

Figure 6 charts party groups' average feelings towards Turkey and compares them with the voting scores presented in the previous section. Also in this case, the distributions presented have been weighted according to the relative size of each national party in the national delegation. Looking at the overall picture, what emerges is the fact that the inter-group variance is higher than in the case of opinion distribution by national delegations, but smaller than in the case of the vote-based analysis of the party groups.

Looking at the individual groups, the most significant negative mismatches are represented by the group of the European Socialdemocrats (–23%) and by the Greens (–17%). In this respect, the MEPs belonging to the groups that presented extremely high voting

scores appear to have more moderate feelings. Although – on average – they still present a very positive connotation towards Turkey, their positive attitudes appear more tempered than it appears from their voting stance.

[14] Interestingly, the biggest gap is represented by the positive mismatch registered among the MEPs belonging to the radical left, where the difference between declared opinions and expressed votes equals 27%. In the previous section, the study discussed the potential factors behind GUE-NGL's extremely low score, such as the well-known concern for the Kurdish issue and the key role played by the small Cypriot delegation (not included in the EES/TTL sample). In this respect, many of the leftist MEPs appear to have far more moderate ideas than those expressed by the voting stance of their group, denoting a very pragmatic behavior. Other significant positive mismatches are represented by the EPP group (+13%) and by the far-right non-attached MEPs who mark a difference of +17%, despite retaining a very negative stance towards Turkey. In this respect, shifting from expressed votes to declared opinions seems to implement the process of 'normalization of the extremes.'

The ideological diversity in many groups, witnessed by the mismatch between declared opinions and expressed votes, reflects the existence of frequent pragmatic behaviors as hypothesized above. In this respect, it seems that a relevant number of MEPs – if let free to act according to their preferences – would adopt a more positive or a more negative voting stance towards Turkey than the one sponsored by their party group. The emergence of a consistent gap proves the existence of a relevant group of MEPs who only partially follow their belief structure when voting, thereby prioritizing group's interests or other exogenous instances.

However, those with strong negative perception of Turkey appear less likely to behave pragmatically than those characterized by a positive percentage.

CLOSING THE CIRCLE

In this final section, the results of our experiment are discussed, thereby crossing the MEPs' perceptions of Turkey and their voting behaviour



FIGURE 6 Distribution of average scores in the feelings thermometer by party groups (dark – voting scores, light – feelings thermometer)

at an individual level, after having explored them separately in the previous sections.

Figure 7 provides a graphic representation of the 87 MEPs' distribution along the two dimensions. In general, the trend emerged confirms that – as expected – the two dimensions are positively and significantly correlated. In this respect, as the MEPs' perception of Turkey shifts from unfavorable to favorable, their likelihood to support Turkey-friendly legislation and to oppose the unfavorable one is also supposed to increase. However, as proved by the slope of the interpolation line and by the *R*-squared coefficient (0.204), the match appears imperfect and in many instances fairly weak. In particular, around 30% of the analyzed cases do not fall in the expected quadrants if we assume a positive relationship between perceptions and votes. The two unpredicted quadrants are marked in light grey in the figure.

This state of things seems to suggest that generally, the MEPs' image of Turkey is not the only and (often) not the strongest criterion according to which the legislators take their voting stance when the 'Turkey discourse' or Ankara's membership are at stake. The presence of a relevant number of MEPs in the unpredicted quadrants confirms



FIGURE 7 Scatter plot crossing expressed votes and declared opinions at an individual level ($R^2 = 0.204$)

that MEPs' pragmatic behavior seems to play a very relevant role in the voting dynamics related to Turkey, as mirrored by the frequent mismatches highlighted in the previous section.

Interestingly, pragmatic behaviors are not equally distributed among the two deviant categories. In this respect, the MEPs who display a positive perception towards Turkey are much more likely to behave pragmatically – that is to support unfriendly legislation towards Ankara (see upper-left quadrant) – than those who display a negative perception towards Turkey. However, the latter appear much more unlikely to ignore their negative feelings and support friendly legislation towards Ankara (see right-lower quadrant). In other words, while *Turkey's supporters* tend to support the votes favorable to Ankara, but can accept voting pragmatically due to group's loyalty or national interest, the *opponents of Turkey* only very rarely vote against their beliefs and therefore appear more ideological and less pragmatic.

Does the mismatch observed have any divisive impact on the groups' voting cohesion? Is there any evident difference among the groups considered? In order to answer these questions it is worth looking at the groups' level of cohesion in the Turkey-related votes and to compare them with the average level of cohesion of the groups in the 7th EP (figure 7).

As expected, in most cases, despite the relevant mismatch between

registered perceptions and expressed votes, the level of cohesion of the groups does not seem to suffer from the gap. Particularly significant seems to be the disciplining potential of the group in the case of the radical left (GUE-NGL) and of the social-democrats (S&D) that presented a mismatch equaling respectively +27% and –23%. In both [17] cases, almost no difference is registered when comparing the voting cohesion in the case of Turkey-related votes with the overall level of cohesion. In general, all major groups do not seem to suffer from ideological mismatch among the affiliated MEPs. However, particularly interesting are the cases of the rightist MEPs affiliated to the Euroskeptic group of Europe of Freedom and Democracy and of the democratic Euroskeptics (ECR) where the impact on groups' discipline is rather remarkable. In the first case, the 'Turkey discourse' seems to play the role of identitarian glue, thereby fuelling the group's cohesion from 50% to 74% in the case of Turkey-related votes. The high ideological coherence of the EFD group in the Turkey-related votes is clearly reflected by the almost perfect match between expressed votes and declared opinions, discussed in the previous section. The opposition to Ankara's membership represents a part of the ideological DNA of the EFD group, as evident by the words of its charter: 'Peoples and Nations of Europe have the right to protect their borders and strengthen their own historical, traditional, religious and cultural values.'[8]

In the second case, despite the modest mismatch between expressed votes and declared opinions, the 'Turkey discourse' seems to play a significant and divisive role within the ranks of the European Conservatives and Reformers, thereby determining the lowest level of cohesion among the eight group (–16%). A more in-depth analysis of the voting defections seems to suggest the presence of a deep-rooted disagreement when it comes to Turkey between the two main components of the group, the British conservatives and the Polish nationalists, with the latter sponsoring a more intransigent stance.

CONCLUSIONS

The present article has the ambition to be a pioneering attempt to explore the nature of the 'Turkey discourse' looking at the MEPs' perception-based representation of Turkey and at the way it reflects

their voting behavior. As this EP perspective is generally ignored by the mainstream literature on EU-Turkey relations, the revealing potential of our results appears even higher. In this respect, the EP seems to represent a perfect laboratory to study the impact of cross-cleavage
[18] issues, such as EU Turkey's bid, on the voting dynamics given its multinational, multilingual, and multicultural nature. A comparative analysis of the EP voting dynamics on the 'Turkey discourse' vis-à-vis the perspective of the EU's executive institutions (the Council and the Commission) seems increasingly necessary also in the light of the EP's growing stake in the enlargement process due to the recent treaty reforms.

Having in mind the EP's exceptional nature and multi-dimensionality, our primary objective was to assess how the MEPs frame Turkey and how this vision affects their voting stance towards Ankara in the parliamentary debates. In the analysis, the results are presented according to the following two criteria: the MEPs' partisan affiliation knowing that the general patterns of competition and coalition in the EP are largely based on the ideological left-right division, and the MEPs nationality knowing the high domestic salience and significance of the 'Turkey discourse.'

Practically, the analysis performed in this study has been twofold. First, it described separately how the MEPs look at Turkey and how they vote when Turkey-related votes are at stake, using respectively EES/TTL survey data and RCV data. Then the analysis crossed these two dimensions at an individual level in order to assess the level of match between the MEPs' declared opinions and expressed votes.

The goal of the analytical efforts was to identify the pragmatic or idealistic/identitarian behavioral styles affecting the MEPs' voting decisions and groups' internal coherence.

In both cases, our analysis proved successful and particularly revealing, thereby demonstrating that the nature of the voting dynamics is much more complex than it might appear at first sight. In general, the study found that the MEPs' declared opinions on average appear not only more *normally* distributed than the expressed votes, but also more moderate and less polarized. However, the score distribution analysis displayed that the inter-group variance is higher than in the case

of opinion distribution by national delegations, but smaller than in the case of the vote-based analysis of the party groups. Therefore, the results seem to confirm the prevalence of politically-driven votes over nationally-driven ones and highlight a significant gap between the MEPs' perceptional representation of Turkey and their expressed votes. [19]

The separate analyses of survey data and voting records revealed that the MEPs' voting stance towards Turkey seems to reflect a left-right divide, thereby presenting a clear ideological/partisan connotation. Three clusters emerged reflecting political groups' different levels of support: the *right* (and moderate) side of the political spectrum representing a majority of negatively expressed votes; The *center* of the spectrum representing a combination of different voting options and a less ideological approach for the centrist groups; and the *left* side representing the highest scores and the highest level of Turkey-friendly votes.

Looking at the level of variance among the national delegations, the analysis revealed the existence of national delegations' clusters characterized by a strong voting support towards Turkey, mainly including the Scandinavian delegations and the MEPs from CEE. The high scores of most of the CEE delegations seem to reflect the phenomenon of *enlargement solidarity.*

When it comes to the second part of the study, crossing the MEPs' perceptional representation and expressed votes, the analysis revealed the existence of frequent pragmatic behaviors witnessed by a mismatch between declared opinions and expressed votes. Our results suggest that a relevant number of MEPs *would* adopt a more positive or more negative voting stance towards Turkey than the one sponsored by their party group, while voting consistently with the latter. The emergence of a consistent gap between *potential* and *actual* behavior proves the existence of a relevant group of MEPs who only partially follow their belief structure when voting, thereby prioritizing group's interests or other exogenous instances.

The results of our final experiment therefore suggest that the MEPs' image of Turkey is not the only and (often) not the strongest criterion according to which they take their voting stance. Moreover, the

presence of a relevant number of MEPs in the unpredicted quadrants confirms that the MEPs' pragmatic behavior seems to play a relevant role when Turkey is at stake. Interestingly, pragmatic behaviors are not equally distributed among the two deviant categories. The MEPs who
[20] display a positive perception towards Turkey are much more likely to behave pragmatically than those who display a negative perception towards Turkey.

A further evidence of legislators' pragmatic behavior is also represented by the fact that, in all the major groups, despite the relevant mismatch between registered perceptions and expressed votes, the level of cohesion of the groups does not seem to suffer from the gap.

In conclusion, our attempt to penetrate the nature MEPs' perception-based representation of Turkey as reflected by the parliamentary dynamics, far from being exhaustive, seems to provide a useful map to identify the key dimensions of conflict and the triggering factors related to the identified voting patterns, while representing a valuable stress test of groups' capacity to achieve high voting coherence despite significant internal ideological variance.

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NOTES

1 The minutes of the parliamentary debate are available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do;jsessionid=C3356102E8CABA5A5A9066FC77A2B3E4.node1?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+PRESS+DN-20041215-1+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN#SECTION1.

2 For further details, see Hughes (2004) and Boehm (2010).

3 The EES/TTL is a panel project (initiated in 2006) whose aim is to examine the attitudes of MEPs and top Commission and Council officials towards foreign policy and transatlantic issues. The project is coordinated by the Centre for the Study of Political Change (CIRCAP)

of the University of Siena in cooperation with other European universities and is supported by the foundation Compagnia di San Paolo.

4 The record of the votes held is available at http://www.votewatch.eu/search.php. Only the votes with the modal voting option lower than or equal to 75% have been considered in the analysis. In total nine votes were included in the computation. [21]

5 Accordingly, the score equals '+' if the overall body of the proposed text is mostly favourable/positive towards Turkey; it equals '–' if the overall body of the proposed ext is mostly unfavourable/negative; it equals '=' if no position or neutral position is reported.

6 While the EES/TTL sample includes 176 MEPs, the final experiment crossing expressed votes and declared includes 87 MEPs for which the comparison was possible, accounting for 18% of the total.

7 Interestingly the moderate EPP, with a score of 0.34 presents a level of voting scepticism very close to the non-attached extreme right MEPs (0.22) and to the Eurosceptic right (0.29).

8 The charter of the EFD group is available at http://www.efdgroup.eu/about-us/who-we-are/charter.html.

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National Culture–Intellectual Capital Inter-Relationship in EU Countries

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THE PAPER AIMS AT IDENTIFYING the type and the intensity of the relationship between the national culture dimension and the intellectual capital dimension. The purpose of the paper is to analyse the correlations of the national culture dimensions, based on the Geert Hofstede approach, with the three dimensions of the intellectual capital within the EU countries. The research procedures were: content analysis of the most representative models and methodologies for evaluating the intellectual capital and the national culture dimensions, and correlation analysis. The main outcome of our research reveals the influence of the national culture on the intellectual capital performance. It also shows that some dimensions of the national culture, such as Individualism versus Collectivism and Indulgence versus Restraint, correlate positively with the intellectual capital, while other dimensions, such as Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance correlate with it negatively.

Key Words: national culture; intellectual capital; conceptual model

INTRODUCTION

Literature in the field presents the analyses of the national culture in relation to leadership (Dorfman and Howell 1988, 127–50; Schein 2004, 280, 413) and managers' values (Ralston et al. 2008, 8–26), to human resources (Gerhart and Fang 2005, 971–86; Schneider 1988, 231–46), as well as their motivation, their value, financial systems (Kwok and

Tadesse 2006, 227–47), etc. However, the national culture-intellectual capital link has been discussed less in the literature (Lynn 1999, 590–603; Sánchez-Canizares, Munoz, and López-Guzmán 2007, 409–30). Still, Lynn (1999, 590–603) evaluates the impact of the national culture
[24] and organisational culture on the ways the companies are managed. The author presents, by means of six case studies of famous companies from Canada, the USA and Sweden, the relation between intellectual capital and national culture. The result shows that both national culture and organisational culture determine successful implementation of the intellectual capital management.

The differences among the national cultural capitals (Yeh-Yun Lin and Edvinsson 2011, 17–30) were the premise of our research. More exactly, we intended to find the connections between the national culture variables and the intellectual capital variables.

NATIONAL CULTURE: EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONFIGURATION AND DIMENSIONS

For management research, the national culture is the system of values corresponding to and being supported by the general behaviour in a country or a large area. It has been brought up for discussion in order to understand how the organisations can cope with individuals coming from other countries (Robu 2011, p. 35).

In an international context, the term 'culture' has at least two determinants (Cornelius 1999, 204; Moldoveanu and Ioan-Franc 1997, 26):

- *organisational culture,* related to traditions, beliefs, behaviour rules, and the managerial style of a company; and
- *national culture* related to language, conduct codes, attitude about human rights, ethic standards, and historical influences characterizing the individuals' behaviour in a region or a country.

In a broad sense, *the notion of culture regards the spiritual, material, intellectual, and emotional assembly of a society or a social group* (Moldoveanu and Ioan-Franc 2011, 76), as defined in The Declaration of Cultural Policies (Mexico 1995); therefore, culture includes 'not only arts and literature, but also ways of living, systems of values, traditions and beliefs.' Each

man is a bearer of the way of thinking, feelings, and potential manifestations acquired throughout life (Hofstede 1996, 20), reflected in the culture of a social group. Therefore, culture is the 'collective programming of thinking, which distinguishes the members of a group from the members of another group' (Hofstede 1996, 21). Identifying [25] its applicability also on the organisation level (Pettigrew 1979), organizational culture is 'a structural assembly of material and spiritual results of an organisation, including a system of values and beliefs, which is cherished and transmitted systematically among its members and outside that organisation' (Puiu 2004). The organisational culture is an efficient factor, which enables the identification of whether an organisation can perform well or not, but which also determines the organisation's response to change (Mărăcine 2009, 149–56).

Since the purpose of our paper is to identify the possible relations between the national culture dimensions and intellectual capital, the six dimensions of the national culture according to the Geert Hofstede theory are presented below:

- *Power Distance* (PDI) expresses the extent to which the most powerful individuals of a society accept that power is not equally distributed. Individuals of the societies showing a *great power distance* accept the hierarchical order where everyone has his/her own place, without requesting or needing justifications or explanations. Power and wealth inequalities are preserved and expanded, and the mounting of the social ladder is difficult. In societies showing a *small power distance,* people try to equalize power distribution and ask for justifications concerning power inequalities. Therefore, power and wealth inequalities are diminished or even removed in the attempt to provide equality and opportunities for all (Hofstede 1980, 65–109). A larger power gap means a strong social conformism, i. e. submission to a higher status. This submission refers to family relationships (child-parent, wife-husband, and younger brother-elder brother), organisational relations (subordinate-manager) or the general social relations (ordinary citizen-celebrity or personality, poor-rich, etc.) (Mihuţ and Lungescu 2006, pp. 5–26).

[26]

- *Individualism versus Collectivism* (IDV). A high level of *individualism* expresses the measure in which a society encourages interpersonal relationships and individual development, as well as individuals' propensity to care only about themselves and their families. The social framework shows no unity; on the contrary, very weak interpersonal relationships exist among the society individuals who are focused on individuality and individual rights. Diametrically opposed, *collectivism* implies a preference for the society's unity, consequently very close relationships exist among individuals. In this case, individuals may expect that relatives or members of certain groups take care of them and every member is responsible for the others. The attitude of a society in relation to this dimension is revealed by the way people perceive their own image, i. e. 'me' or 'us' (Hofstede 1980, 148–75). These relationships among people, in the form of individualism or collectivism, differ from one society to another by three features (Mihuţ and Lungescu 2006, 5–26): intensity, i. e. the measure in which the members of a society depend on each other, *extent,* i. e. the number of persons with whom somebody maintains closer relationships, and *foundation (predetermination)* relating to the criteria on which interpersonal relationships are based. They may be based on social status elements, when they are predetermined, or be fortuitous in accordance with individual preferences. Within individualist societies, the intensity of human relationships is weak, small, and based on individual preferences. As for collectivist cultures, the human relationships are strong, expanded – therefore, multiple – and are predetermined depending on social class, ethnic group, religion or social group to which an individual belongs.
- *Masculinity versus Femininity* (MAS). Societies showing a high level of *masculinity* focus on achievements, fulfilment of purposes, and may be characterized by heroism, assertiveness, self-assertion, and may look for material reward for successes. On the contrary, *feminity* means preference of cooperation, modesty, and concern about the life of the weak ones. In this case, the society as a whole is oriented towards consensus, as defined by Hof-

stede in relation to more arrogant or more modest behaviour of individuals (Hofstede 1996, 99). Initially, a proud behaviour revealing one's own qualities was masculine, while a moderate, modest behaviour was feminine. A masculine society values the dominating behaviour and attempts to excel, while feminine so- [27]
cieties hold them to ridicule. Masculinity does not mean placing woman at a disadvantage, but inequality, irrespective of its meaning (Mihuţ and Lungescu 2006, 5–26). A high degree of masculinity shows that a society is strongly differentiated by gender; man holds a dominant position within social and power structures, while woman is controlled, dominated. A lower degree of masculinity shows less differentiation and gender discrimination; women and men are treated in the same way in all aspects.

- *Uncertainty avoidance* (UAI) expresses the degree in which the members of a society feel uncomfortable in conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity. In this case, a major problem is the way the society deals with the fact that the future cannot be known. Should the future be controlled or should we let things happen by themselves? This is the main question on which this dimension focuses. In the countries where this dimension is strong rigid codes of belief and behaviour are maintained and non-orthodox conduct is forbidden. High values of this dimension show that the society does not tolerate uncertainty and ambiguity and is therefore oriented towards rules, laws, and control measures aimed to reduce uncertainty. Societies showing weak uncertainty avoidance maintain a more relaxed conduct, since practices are more valued than principles. Therefore, there is a high degree of tolerance regarding a variety of opinions, while changes are easily accepted and risk-taking is more frequent (Hofstede 1980, 110–47).
- *Long-term versus Short-term Orientation* (ITOWVS), added by M. Bond in 1991 and extended by M. Minkov to a sample of 93 countries, deals with social virtues. Societies with a *short-term orientation* are more concerned in finding the absolute truth. They have a rule-based thinking, do not value long-term concepts and

traditional orientation, have a low propensity for saving for the future and focus on the quick outcome. They are also characterized by formal observance of traditions, reciprocity in regard to favours and gifts. In societies with a *long-term orientation* people think that truth depends on context and time. They are able to adapt traditions to changes, have a strong propensity for saving and investing, and persevere in obtaining results. Although there is a cult of labour, business is not easy, especially for new-comers, since they promote values related to long-term agreements and expect long-term rewards for present efforts. The people of these cultures are characterized by perseverance, modesty, and feeling of shame.

[28]

- *Indulgence versus Restraint* (IVR). *Indulgence,* a recent dimension based on M. Minkov's empirical analysis, i. e. a 93-contry survey, refers to a society where people have fun and enjoy life. *Restraint* is specific to societies that hinder the satisfaction of people's needs and resort to strict social rules.

INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: KNOWLEDGE STAGE, DETERMINANTS, AND VARIABLES

Since the purpose of our research is the analysis of the national culture-intellectual capital relationship, we have to briefly present the determinants and the variables of intellectual capital, as well as the knowledge stage in this field.

In a knowledge-based society, organisations change continuously, and the key-factor of change is intellectual capital, which is also a strategic value of an organisation (Parpandel 2013, 53–8). The changes in the power balance of nations are caused by technological innovations and new technologies (Boghean et al. 2009, 151–6), which are important elements of the structural capital. Reporting and measuring intellectual capital is controversial and no points of view are unanimously accepted in scientific theory and practice, probably due to the fact that reporting is rather voluntary than mandatory. Following the analysis of various methods and models of evaluation, reporting and measurement of the intellectual capital, we believe that the most important ones are the following: *The Intangibles Asset Monitor,* which evalu-

ates the internal and external structure of a company and employees' skills (Sveby 1997); *The Balanced Scorecard,* which evaluates the financial prospects, relationships with customers, business processes, learning and development (Kaplan and Norton 1996), the approach to intellectual capital by Edvinsson and Malone (1997); *The Scandia Business Navigator,* which includes financial aspects, renewal and development, customers, processes and human resources; *The* IC *Index* (Roos et al. 1997); *Performance Prism* (Neely, Adams, and Kennerley 2003). [29]

Although measurement and evaluation is difficult, the knowledge stage in this field enabled us to identify the main component variables of intellectual capital. Following the analysis of the most important concepts regarding intellectual capital and its variables, Martin-de-Castro et al. (2011, 649–62) identified the below presented dimensions and variables. *Human capital* has three dimensions: *Knowledge* (formal education, training, staff development and staff experience), *Skills* (individual learning, collaboration for teamwork, dissemination of individual knowledge and know-how, and leadership) and *Behaviour* (models, paradigms, beliefs, feeling of belonging to a group, self-motivation, labour satisfaction, flexibility, and creativity). *Structural Capital* has the following dimensions and variables: *Technological Capital* (R&D efforts, technological infrastructure, intellectual and industrial property), *Organisational Capital* (organisational culture, values and attitudes, capabilities related to ICT, organisational design). *Relational Capital* includes the following: portfolio of customers, customers' loyalty, market proximity, sales efficiency, suppliers, and relationships with other actors.

In our opinion, the organisational culture should transform into a knowledge culture. Moreover, the link between entrepreneurial dynamics and R&D policy is demonstrated through complex systems of indicators (Năstase 2013, 561–99; Yin-Kuan at al 2012). Drucker (1992, 95–105) considers that organisations should direct their efforts towards achieving the '3 I:' Innovation (creation of knowledge), Information (knowledge acquiring), and Interactivity with partners for knowledge. Stimulating the formation of partnerships between university and business environment is decisive for meeting the requirements of a knowledge-based society (Şerbănică 2011, 431). Therefore, it is necessary to make profound changes in the whole structure of

a company, its processes, as well as human resources, which ensure the company's transformation into a knowledge-based company. Human resources are special as regards their potential to grow and develop (Pănoiu, Belu and Marinescu 2008, 103–6). Nevertheless, given
[30] the current economic crisis, the training level diminished resulting in a negative impact on the human resources (Bălănescu 2010, 527–32) and the human capital. The impact of intellectual capital on the economy of any European Union member state is even greater as the problem of population ageing is topical in almost all developed states (Ioneci and Mîndreci 2011, 997).

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The objective of this paper is to analyse the correlations between the national culture dimensions, in accordance with Geert Hofstede's approach, and the three dimensions of the intellectual capital, i. e. structural, relational, and human capital, for EU member countries.

Our intention is to identify the type of links established among the variables. Therefore, we tested for the existence of a positive association between previously identified variables. The correlation shows the strength of the link between the variables; therefore identifying the variables with the strongest link, as well as those with weaker correlations. In order to test this hypothesis we used the Pearson correlation coefficient r, where S_x and S_y are standard deviations for series X and Y.

$$r = \frac{\operatorname{cov}(X, Y)}{S_x S_y}. \tag{1}$$

To conceptualize the model we formulated the following hypotheses:

H1 *There is a negative association between the Power Distance* (PDI) *and the three dimensions of intellectual capital, i. e. structural, relational, and human capital. Therefore, bigger power distance will cause a diminution in intellectual capital.*

H2 *There is a positive correlation between Individualism versus Collectivism* (IDV) *dimension and the three dimensions of intellectual capital – structural,*

relational, and human capital. Therefore, increasing individualism causes an increase in intellectual capital.

H3 *Masculinity versus Feminity* (MAS) *dimension does not significantly influence intellectual capital in its three dimensions.*

H4 *There is a negative correlation between the Uncertainty Avoidance* (UAI) *dimension and the structural, relational, and human capital; while uncertainty and ambiguity increase, the performance of intellectual capital diminishes.* [31]

H5 *Long-Term versus Short-Term Orientation* (ITOWVS) *dimension influences intellectual capital. Thus, long-term orientation, which implies a strong propensity for saving and investing, is positively correlated with intellectual capital performance.*

H6 *There is a positive link between the Indulgence versus restraint* (IVR) *dimension and intellectual capital, i. e. indulgence, seen as a relaxation of rules and constraints, favours an increase in performance of the three dimensions of intellectual capital.*

Operationalization of Variables and data Collection

For the purpose of this analysis, we used a model of intellectual capital evaluation for companies from the EU countries, which was proposed and tested by us for previous research work (Dindire 2012, 33–9). We considered the results of the performance evaluation of the companies from the EU countries in relation to the elements that determine organisational behaviour oriented toward knowledge-intensive development and identification of critical items, which was smaller than the performance index average for each dimension of intellectual capital: structural, relational, and human.

The performance index was calculated by means of the following formula:

$$I_{pi} = \frac{V_i - V_{i\,\min}}{V_{i\,\max} - V_{i\,\min}}, \qquad (2)$$

where V_i is the value of criterion *pi* (in our case, score value per item), $V_{i\,\min}$ is the minimum value of criterion *i* (in our case, minimum scorecard value per item), and $V_{i\,\max}$ is the maximum value of criterion *i* (in our case, maximum scorecard value per item).

After the analysis of the most representative models and method-

ologies for intellectual capital evaluation and content analysis of reports concerning the intensive knowledge development of top ranked companies by Forbes in 2011 (*The World Most Valuable Companies*), as well as relevant reports of international organisations (World Bank, World
[32] Economic Forum), Eurostat and UNCTAD statistics and publications, Eurobarometers and EU reports on intellectual capital, we proposed the following dimensions and variables (showing positive correlations, as demonstrated by our research):

- *Structural Capital:* V1 – ethical conduct of the company; V2 – the company's investment in R&D; V3 – knowledge-intensive production process; V4 – confidence in the professional capability of the leaders; V5 – degree of absorption of new technologies; V6 – determinants of competitive advantage; V7 – competence delegation; and V8 – innovation capacity of the company.
- *Relational Capital:* V9 – customer proximity; V10 – sophistication of marketing instruments; V11 – R&D cooperation between the academic environment and the entrepreneurial environment; V12 – the level of protection of investors.
- *Human Capital* – V13 – employee-employer cooperation; V14 – brain drain; V15 – personnel training level; V16 – the effectiveness of boards of directors.

We calculated the average score per item for each dimension; furthermore, we calculated – using the above-mentioned formula – the performance index of structural capital, relational capital, and human capital. For our research we used data on companies from the EU countries provided by the World Economic Forum (2012) and the World Bank (2012). It is worth mentioning that we identified qualitative data on companies from the EU countries only from these international organisations. We obtained the following data to be further used for evaluating the intellectual capital of companies from the EU countries (table 1)

For this research we collected data from the six dimension data matrix, *Dimensions Data Matrix* (Hofstede and Hofstede 2012). The matrix contains the scores of the national culture dimensions for 110 coun-

TABLE 1 Performance indices of the three dimensions of intellectual capital

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Austria	5.31	0.70	5.15	0.57	5.08	0.76
Belgium	5.33	0.71	5.88	0.86	4.85	0.67
Bulgaria	3.29	0.00	4.25	0.22	3.30	0.01
Cyprus	4.01	0.25	4.45	0.30	4.13	0.36
Czech Republic	4.19	0.31	4.78	0.43	4.18	0.38
Denmark	5.86	0.89	5.68	0.78	5.30	0.86
Estonia	4.39	0.38	4.88	0.47	4.30	0.43
Finland	5.93	0.91	5.50	0.71	5.28	0.85
France	5.15	0.65	5.05	0.53	4.23	0.40
Germany	5.74	0.85	5.30	0.63	4.90	0.69
Greece	3.39	0.03	3.70	0.00	3.28	0.00
Hungary	3.66	0.13	4.40	0.28	3.65	0.16
Ireland	5.06	0.61	6.00	0.91	4.58	0.55
Italy	4.18	0.31	4.60	0.36	3.48	0.08
Latvia	3.74	0.16	4.50	0.32	3.95	0.29
Lithuania	3.89	0.21	4.78	0.43	3.90	0.26

Continued on the next page

tries. From this matrix, we selected data on EU countries (table 2). Since in case of Cyprus, data was provided only on the Indulgence versus Restraint (IVR) dimension, we eliminated this country from the correlation matrix.

The model, i. e. the national culture-intellectual capital relation, is presented in the form of a diagram to facilitate the presentation of the relations between variables (figure 1).

DATA ANALYSIS, RESEARCH RESULTS, AND INTERPRETATION

Statistical data were processed by means of EXCEL, Data Analysis. Hypotheses were tested by the correlation method. The correlation displays the strength of the link between variables. Therefore, we calculated the Pearson correlation coefficient. The interpretation was based on the results of the Pearson coefficient $r = \mathrm{cov}(X, Y)/S_x S_y$, where S_x and S_y are standard deviations for series X and Y. The correlation

TABLE 1 *Continued from the previous page*

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Luxembourg	5.25	0.68	4.98	0.51	5.25	0.84
Malta	4.15	0.30	3.93	0.09	4.33	0.44
[34] Netherlands	5.66	0.82	5.30	0.63	5.30	0.86
Poland	3.78	0.17	4.65	0.38	3.88	0.25
Portugal	4.10	0.28	5.00	0.51	3.78	0.21
Romania	3.34	0.02	4.23	0.21	3.40	0.05
Slovak R.	3.65	0.13	4.23	0.21	3.73	0.19
Slovenia	4.01	0.25	4.93	0.49	3.75	0.20
Spain	4.23	0.32	4.60	0.36	3.85	0.24
Sweden	6.18	1.00	5.98	0.90	5.63	1.00
United Kingdom	5.43	0.74	6.23	1.00	5.20	0.82
	$V_{i\ \min}$	3.29	$V_{i\ \min}$	3.70	$V_{i\ \min}$	3.28
	$V_{i\ \max}$	6.18	$V_{i\ \max}$	6.23	$V_{i\ \max}$	5.63
	$\overline{I_{pi}}$	0.44	$\overline{I_{pi}}$	0.48	$\overline{I_{pi}}$	0.44

NOTES Column headings are as follows: (1) EU member countries, (2) average score per items of structural capital, (3) I_{pi} of structural capital, (4) average score per items of relational capital, (5) I_{pi} of relational capital, (6) average score per items of human capital, (7) I_{pi} of human capital. Adapted from Dindire (2012).

matrix allowed us to test the relation between the six dimensions of the national culture and the performance of the three dimensions of intellectual capital as follows:

H1 *There is a negative association between the Power Distance* (PDI) *dimension and the three dimensions of the intellectual capital (structural, relational, and human).*

Therefore, a bigger power distance causes a diminution in the intellectual capital dimensions. We used the correlation method to test Hypothesis 1 (H1). The correlation displays the strength of the link between variables. The negative correlation coefficients point to the fact that an increase in the Power Distance (PDI) dimension causes decreases in the performance of the structural, relational, and human capital. The three correlation coefficients take on values below –0.5, which means a good to very good negative correlation. The highest

TABLE 2 Matrix of national culture dimensions

Country	PDI	IDV	MAS	UAI	ITOWVS	IVR
Austria	11	55	79	70	60	63
Belgium	65	75	54	94	82	57
Bulgaria	70	30	40	85	69	16
Czech R.	57	58	57	74	70	29
Denmark	18	74	16	23	35	70
Estonia	40	60	30	60	82	16
Finland	33	63	26	59	38	57
France	68	71	43	86	63	48
Germany	35	67	66	65	83	40
Greece	60	35	57	112	45	50
Hungary	46	80	88	82	58	31
Ireland	28	70	68	35	24	65
Italy	50	76	70	75	61	30
Latvia	44	70	9	63	69	13
Lithuania	42	60	19	65	82	16
Luxembourg	40	60	50	70	64	56
Malta	56	59	47	96	47	66
Netherlands	38	80	14	53	67	68
Poland	68	60	64	93	38	29
Portugal	63	27	31	104	28	33
Romania	90	30	42	90	52	20
Slovak R.	104	52	110	51	77	28
Slovenia	71	27	19	88	49	48
Spain	57	51	42	86	48	44
Sweden	31	71	5	29	53	78
United Kingdom	35	89	66	35	51	69

NOTES Adapted from Hofstede and Hofstede (2012).

negative correlation is found between PDI and the human capital performance index ($r = -0.69$), followed by the correlation structural capital performance index ($r = -0.66$) and between PDI and the relational capital performance ($r = -0.56$). Therefore, *all the three components of intellectual capital are negatively associated with the Power Distance* (PDI) *dimension.* This result allows us to validate Hypothesis 1 (H1).

TABLE 3 The Pearson coefficients of correlation between Power Distance (PDI) and performance of the three dimensions of intellectual capital

Dimensions	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(1) PDI	1			
(2) I_p Structural Capital	−0.668	1		
(3) I_p Relational Capital	−0.569	0.837	1	
(4) I_p Human Capital	−0.690	0.946	0.790	1

TABLE 4 The matrix of correlation between the Individualism versus Collectivism (IDV) dimension and the three dimensions of the intellectual capital

Dimensions	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(1) IDV	1			
(2) I_p Structural Capital	0.585	1		
(3) I_p Relational Capital	0.546	0.837	1	
(4) I_p Human Capital	0.584	0.946	0.790	1

H2 *There is a positive correlation between the Individualism versus Collectivism (IDV) dimension and the three dimensions of intellectual capital: structural, relational, and human. Therefore, an increase in individualism causes increases in the intellectual capital dimensions.*

The correlation matrix allowed us to test for positive association related to Hypothesis 2 (H2). The values obtained are presented in table 4. We obtained correlation coefficients that are positive and > 0.5, which allows us to validate the association implied in the hypothesis. However, the correlation coefficients are nor very close to +1, which means a moderate association between dimensions. Therefore, an increase in individualism causes moderate increases in the intellectual capital performance.

H3 *The Masculinity versus Feminity (MAS) dimension does not significantly influence the intellectual capital.*

This hypothesis was based on several scientific studies supporting gender equality and equal opportunities for women and men. For testing Hypothesis 3 (H3) we used the correlation matrix. The correlation coefficient ranges between −1 and +1. The closer the coefficient is to

TABLE 5 The matrix of inter-item correlation between the Masculinity versus Feminity (MAS) dimension and the intellectual capital performance indices

Dimensions	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(1) MAS	1			
(2) I_p Structural Capital	–0.225	1		
(3) I_p Relational Capital	–0.200	0.837	1	
(4) I_p Human Capital	–0.237	0.946	0.790	1

+1, the higher the positive linear relation intensity. The closer the coefficient is to –1, the higher the negative linear relation intensity. In our case, the values are closer to 0, which justifies the hypothesis validation, i. e. *the Masculinity versus Feminity* (MAS) *dimension does not significantly influence the intellectual capital.*

H4 *There is a negative correlation between the Uncertainty Avoidance* (UAI) *dimension and the structural, relational, and human capital, i. e. while uncertainty and ambiguity increase, the performance of intellectual capital decreases.*

Hypothesis 4 (H4) was also tested by means of the Pearson correlation coefficient. The values obtained are presented in table 6. We obtained values below –0.5, which shows a good negative correlation between the analysed dimensions. Considering that the closer r is to –1, the stronger the link intensity is, we may conclude that the highest negative association is between UAI and the relational capital performance index ($r = -0.66$), followed by the negative correlation between UAI and the human capital performance index ($r = -0.65$), and the link between UAI and the structural capital performance index ($r = -0.61$). The results allow us to validate the hypothesis that *while uncertainty and ambiguity increase, the intellectual capital performance decreases.*

H5 *The Long-term versus Short-term Orientation* (ITOWVS) *dimension influences intellectual capital. Thus, long-term orientation, when people have a stronger propensity for saving and investing, is positively correlated with intellectual capital performance.*

The correlation matrix allowed us to test hypothesis 5 (H5). The values obtained are presented in table 7. The Pearson coefficients ob-

TABLE 6 The Pearson coefficients of correlation between the Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) dimension and the performance of the structural, relational, and human capital

Dimensions	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(1) UAI	1			
(2) I_p Structural Capital	−0.612	1		
(3) I_p Relational Capital	−0.660	0.837	1	
(4) I_p Human Capital	−0.655	0.946	0.790	1

TABLE 7 The matrix of correlation between the Long-term versus Short-term Orientation (ITOWVS) dimension and the three dimensions of intellectual capital

Dimensions	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(1) ITOWVS	1			
(2) I_p Structural Capital	−0.053	1		
(3) I_p Relational Capital	−0.132	0.837	1	
(4) I_p Human Capital	−0.023	0.946	0.790	1

tained are close to 0, which means *that there is no correlation between the Long-term versus Short-term Orientation* (ITOWVS) *dimension and the three dimensions of intellectual capital.* Therefore, there is no association – either positive or negative – between the analysed variables.

H6 *There is a positive link between the Indulgence versus Restraint* (IVR) *dimension and intellectual capital, i. e. indulgence, seen as a relaxation of rules and constraints, favours an increase in performance of the three dimension of intellectual capital.*

Hypothesis 6 (H6) was tested by means of the correlation coefficients. Data analysis allows us to identify a good to very good correlation between the Indulgence versus Restraint (IVR) dimension and intellectual capital. Therefore, we conclude that *indulgence, seen as a relaxation of rules and constraints, favours increases in performance of the three dimensions of intellectual capital* and validates the hypothesis. We may notice that all coefficients take on values > 0.5. Moreover, between IVR and the structural capital performance index there is a very good positive association ($r = 0.76$). Also there is a very good positive correlation between IVR and the human capital performance index ($r = 0.75$).

TABLE 8 Coefficients of correlation between the Indulgence versus Restraint (IVR) dimension and intellectual capital

Dimensions	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(1) IVR	1			
(2) I_p Structural Capital	0.761	1		
(3) I_p Relational Capital	0.598	0.837	1	
(4) I_p Human Capital	0.756	0.946	0.790	1



FIGURE 1 National culture–intellectual capital inter-relationship (PDI – Power Distance, IDV – Individualism versus Collectivism, UAI – Uncertainty Avoidance, IVR – Indulgence versus Restraint)

The smallest value – although implying good positive correlation – was found between IVR and the relational capital performance index ($r = 0.59$). The proposed model is presented in figure 1.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

This paper analyses National Culture – Intellectual Capital inter-relationship. An important result was the demonstration of the national culture influence on intellectual capital.

The research conclusions, which reveal the development of the relations between variables, are the following:

- All the three components of intellectual capital are negatively associated with the *Power Distance* (PDI) dimension of the national culture. Therefore, a rise in the Power Distance dimension will cause a diminution in the performance of structural, relational, and human capital.

- A rise in the *Individualism* level will cause a moderate growth in intellectual capital performance.
- The *Masculinity versus Feminity* (MAS) dimension does not significantly influence intellectual capital.
- When uncertainty and ambiguity increase, intellectual capital performance decreases.
- There is no association, either positive or negative, between the *Long-term versus Short-term orientation* (ITOWVS) dimension and the three dimensions of intellectual capital.
- Indulgence, considered as a relaxation of rules and constraints, favours higher performance of the three dimensions of human capital.

[40]

For future research we intend to extend the sample to see if it is applicable to non-EU countries. Furthermore, we intend to draw a cause-effect map to be used as a diagnosis and control tool for intellectual capital performance.

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The Importance of Work Goals and Life Domains among Jews, Christians, and Muslims in Israel

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WORK VALUES among the Jews in Israel have been studied for several decades, while there has been no attempt to study work values among the ethno-religious minorities in Israel. This study is based on the Meaning-of-Working (MOW) questionnaire that was conducted on a sample of employees in the Israeli labor force that included Jews, Muslims, and Christians. It examines and compares the centrality of life domains and the preferred work goals among the three religious groups in Israel. The findings reveal significant differences regarding the importance of all life domains and several of the preferred work goals among Jews, Muslims, and Christians. The findings show that the Arab Christians' values are located mainly between those of Jews and Muslims and their means and rankings are closer to those of Jews than to those of Muslims. Regression analysis shows that demographic variables hardly explain the value differences among the members of the three religions. The findings can be explained by cultural, social, and economic factors and primarily by the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict.

Key Words: work values; Jews; Christians; Muslims; ethnic conflict; Israel

INTRODUCTION

Work values and ethics at the level of groups within a particular society, and in society at large, can affect the degree of a society's economic success (Child 1981; Sharabi and Harpaz 2007). Perhaps the most prominent articulation of the relationship between religion and work was presented by Max Weber in his seminal work *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1958). Weber examined Calvinism and showed that this theology, such as Protestantism as a whole, viewed

work as a virtue, consequently even menial jobs should be performed well. Reformers, such as Luther and Wesley, preached that work was the individual's mission to God and paved the road to redemption. By excelling at their work, believers could prove to themselves and to others that they were among the elected. An individuals' idea of success depended not only on social conditions, but also on religious ideals and values. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam also concerned themselves with the value of work (Harpaz 1998).

Several comparative studies have found significant differences of work value between societies (Hofstede 1980; 2001; MOW International Research Team 1987; Sharabi and Harpaz 2007; Super, Svirko, and Super 1995); however, none of them compared the work values of different ethnicities in the same country. There are hardly any studies on the values of ethnic or ethno-religious groups that have been living together in the same country for more than several decades, similar to the situation in Israel. In the USA, Gaines et al. (1997) found almost no cultural-value differences between the Anglo-American and the African-American men and women, whereas the differences between the Anglo-American, the Latin-American, and the Asian-American men and women (who are newer ethnic immigrants) were wider. Another research comparing cultural values among ethnic groups was that of Rodrigue and Richardson's (2005), which compared Chinese, Malays, and Indians in Malaysia and found that there were few differences in cultural-values between these ethnic groups.

In these two cases, the ethnic groups that have been living peacefully in the same country for a long time (Anglo-American and African-American in the USA, and Chinese, Malays, and Indians in Malaysia) share similar values although they are segregated and have socio-economic gaps between them. This strengthens the claim that the level of trust between groups in general, and specifically ethnic groups, can affect the individuals' attachment to cultural values (Berry, Segall, and Kagitcibasi 1997). In addition, the level of friendship, trust, and collaboration between individuals of different ethnic groups can affect the understanding between ethnic groups and their willingness to except each other's values (Hewstone 2003). Higher levels of trust can lead to higher levels of cultural similarity between societies and

ethnic groups, whereas mistrust and conflict between societies and ethnic groups may lead to rejection of the other's culture and values (Ward, Bochner, and Furnham 2001).

This exploratory study attempts to reveal the intra-state work values of Jews, Muslims, and Christians in a deeply divided society, which [45] experiences an ethnic conflict for over a hundred years. Understanding the similarity and differences of work values among the three religious groups in the Israeli context can shade a light on the perceptions of each ethno-religious group and its relations to the political, social, and economic situation in Israel.

THE ISRAELI SOCIETY

The state of Israel was founded by Jews in 1948 and the dominant culture is Jewish and secular, with a western orientation. One fifth of the Israeli society is comprised of the Arab ethnic group (or Palestinians that have Israeli citizenship), out of which 82% are Muslims, 9% Christians, and 9% Druze (*Statistical Abstract of Israel* 2009).

The Jews in Israel have undergone a gradual change in values, similar to that of the Western world, moving from a collectivist and altruist society in its early years to an individualist society. These global processes have left their mark on Israel and can be seen in the rapid change that has occurred since the late 1970's. Today, the Jewish society places great emphasis on different dimensions of individualism, cultivating personal independence and autonomy, while granting a high degree of social permissiveness (Sharabi 2009; 2012). As part of the Americanization process, the Jewish-Israeli culture has become increasingly individualistic and materialistic at the expense of collectivistic and altruistic values (Harpaz 2008; Sharabi 2011; Sharabi and Harpaz 2011a). Unlike the Jewish society, the Arab Christian, and especially the Arab Muslim subcultures, in Israel are more conservative, emphasizing tradition, welfare and safety of the group, rigid hierarchy and little autonomy – all fundamentally collectivist characteristics (Al-Haj 1995; Khattab 2005; Sharabi 2011; 2012). In the past, the Arab work force was mainly agricultural, but over time the number of farmers decreased, while the numbers of those employed as hired workers in the Israeli labor market increased (Al-Haj 1995; Khattab 2005). The Arab eth-

nic group, especially the Christian Arabs, is also experiencing a partial process of modernization and internalization of the western values (Khattab 2005; Kaufman, Abu Baker and Saar 2012).

[46]

The Israeli Economy and Labor Market

Since its establishment, the Israeli society has undergone significant economic, political, and social changes. Until the worldwide economic recession of the 1970's, the economy grew at a rate of approximately 10 percent per year (Sharabi 2008). Since then, the average economic growth has been higher than in most Western countries (Senor and Singer 2009; Sharabi 2008). Since the 1970's, the Israeli economy has shifted from a centralized socialistic economy, with employment virtually guaranteed for almost all, to a capitalist market economy characterized by an uncertainty of employment (Sharabi and Harpaz 2007; 2010).

Since the 1980s, globalization has had more and more influence on the Israeli society. The positive aspects may include enhancement of Israel's world trade, the Israeli high technology industry, foreign investment in Israel, and the development of an information society. Increasing global competition and the influence of the global economy is forcing organizations to improve their efficiency, which includes downsizing and transferring activities to low cost labor countries. These negative processes have led to mass layoffs and job insecurity (Sharabi and Harpaz 2013). The privatization processes (duplicated from the western countries) were strengthened in the 1990s and in the new millennium. The national airline (El-Al), the national telephone company, banks and other state-controlled organizations were privatized. A new generation of employees entered the labor market with new and less favorable working conditions that exclude 'work tenure' and other social benefits granted to the previous generation of workers (Harpaz 2008; Sharabi and Harpaz 2013).

The most notable change in the labor relations has been the reduction in the Histadrut's (the labor union federation) influence as a professional trade union, especially in wage determination. The participation rate in the Histadrut union dropped from approximately 80 percent in the 1980s to an estimated current level of 20 percent of the

labor force. This is in addition to a shift of approximately 40 percent of the Israeli labor force to personal contracts (Sharabi and Harpaz 2010; 2013).

The second Intifada (Palestinian uprising) that began in 2000, together with the global high-tech industry financial crisis in 2001 ('the burst of the bubble') led to an economic recession in Israel between the years 2002–4 and to substantial layoffs and economic uncertainty, especially in the high-tech and tourism sectors (Senor and Singer 2009). The above negative aspects have been upsetting to both Israeli society and the economy; the employment rate, the state of labor unions, and employee working conditions were especially affected (Harpaz 2008). [47]

A number of factors, which Hofstede (1980; 2001) suggests as characterizing high individualism, apply to the Jewish society in Israel, including: rapid economic growth, high degree of social mobility, strong middle class development, private enterprise support, less traditional agriculture, modern industry, and progressive urbanization. Triandis (1995) claims that an important factor influencing the degree of individualism is the relative level of wealth in any given society. Indeed, the Israeli society has been enjoying a relatively high level of economic success in the last few decades. Another factor that Triandis (1995) mentions is the exposure to international communication networks and mass media, the influence of which is certainly felt in Israel.

Muslim and Christian Arabs in the Israeli Labor Market

The Israeli-Arab economic market is dependent on the Israeli-Jewish economic market and the work options that it provides. This situation stems mainly from the fact that the modernization process in the Israeli Arab society (Muslims and Christians) was not accompanied by an internal economic development of the Israeli Arab market, which is partially due to the lack of government investment and private funding (Al-Haj 1995; Kraus and Yonay 2000; Khattab 2005). Most Israeli Arabs remain dependent upon the Israeli Jewish economy to earn a living and are concentrated in the fields and professions that are characterized by tough competition and no collective wage agreements. Their integration into the Jewish-Israeli economy was limited from the beginning, enabling them mainly inferior occupations that

only enhanced their dependency. For the sake of comparison, 1.5% of Arabs hold managerial positions, while 5.8% of Jews hold such positions (Jerby and Levi 2000). In addition, some areas of employment, such as the military industry and other security related fields, are closed
[48] to the Arab Muslims as they usually do not have adequate security classification. At the same time, most of the industries in the Arab sector consist of manual labor and consequently pay low wages (Jerby and Levi 2000; Kraus and Yonay 2000; Khattab 2005). The Christians in Israel achieve the level of higher education, hold a higher status of occupations, and experience less occupational discrimination than the Muslims (Al-Haj 1995; Kaufman, Abu Baker, and Saar 2012).

Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in Israel

Since 1882, masses of Jews immigrated to Palestine as an implementation of the Zionist movement's goal, establishing a homeland for the Jewish people. This settling led to conflicts with the native Palestinians and in 1948 to a war between the Jews and the Palestinians with the support of the Arab countries, a war that led to the establishment of the Israeli state. During this war, many Palestinians left or were transferred to the Arab countries and became refugees, while the Palestinians that remained in Israel in 1948 became Israeli citizens (Dowty 2004). The tension between the Jews and the Arab Palestinians (in and out of Israel) increased after the 1967 war between Israel and the Arab countries when Israel occupied Gaza and the West Bank. Since then there are Palestinian uprisings in the occupied territories, the conflict is escalating and involves the Palestinians in other Arab countries (mainly Lebanon). This long and tough conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in the occupied territories, as well as with other Arab countries, has led to a high level of mistrust, social tension, and a dual identity problem among the Israeli Arabs (who are also Palestinians) who are bisected between their loyalty to Israel and to their Palestinian kin (Al-Haj 1995; Dowty 2004). The Israeli Arabs are increasingly more involved in the anti-Israeli demonstrations and even in terrorist actions. According to Arian et al. (2008), their survey displayed that 87% of the Israeli claim that the relationship between the Jews and the Arabs in Israel is the main problem facing the Israeli

society, followed by the relationship between the rich and the poor, and in the third place the relationship between the seculars and the religious.

Smith (2006) defines ethnicity as 'named and self-defined human population sharing the myth of common ancestry, history, historical memories elements of culture (often linked with territory) and measure of solidarity' (p. 172). Judaism is a religion; however, the Jews, according to this definition, are also an ethnic group and although there are people from several religions (mainly Muslims, Christians, and Druze) among the Arabs), their main identity is Arab (Arian et al. 2008; Dowty 2004; Soen 2008). According to a recent survey carried out among the Israeli Arabs, 45% consider themselves as Arabs, 24% as Palestinians, 19% according to their religion (Muslims, Christians, Druze, etc.), and only 12% as Israelis (Arian et al. 2008). Since the main characteristics of the Jews and the Arabs in Israel are ethnic, this conflict can be described as an ethnic conflict.

Although the Arab Muslims and Christians are part of the Israeli society representing a meaningful part of the labor market, a survey of the literature did not disclose any systematic empirical attempts to study the work values of the Israeli Arab Muslims and Christians, nor is there any comparison of the work value structures among the Jews, the Muslims and the Christians in Israel. This paper attempts to fill this gap and hence contributes to the existing literature.

WORK CENTRALITY AND PREFERENCES RELATED TO WORK-GOALS

Centrality of Work as a Life Role refers to the degree of general importance that working has in the life of an individual at any time (MOW International Research Team 1987). Work centrality, as a major life domain, can be compared to the relative centrality of other life domains or roles, such as family, leisure, community, and religion. The evaluative frame of reference for this procedure is complex but structured, involving self and work versus self and other major life domains (MOW International Research Team 1987; Sharabi and Harpaz 2007). In general, work has been found to be the most important component (after family) compared with other life domains in most of the

countries surveyed over the course of time (Sharabi and Harpaz 2007; 2009). Work was ranked before family only in Japan in the early 1980s (MOW International Research Team 1987) and in China at the end of 2000 (Westwood and Lok 2003).

[50] *The importance of Work Goals.* This means the relative importance of various work goals and values for individuals. The preferred work goals were, based on the literature, in the areas of job satisfaction, work values, and work needs (MOW International Research Team 1987). An investigation of the sort of goals individuals seek from work may shed a light on the fundamental question of why people work. A useful way of understanding what is important to people in their work life is to focus on a uniform set of work goals, or facets of work, and to ascertain how important each of them is to individuals (MOW International Research Team 1987; Sharabi and Harpaz 2013). The literature is replete with references to the concepts of work values/goals/norms/outcomes/expectations, as all of these deal with the importance that the individuals attach to different aspects of their work life (Sharabi and Harpaz 2009). Among these the following are interesting: work, security, variety, pay, and interpersonal relations. Much research has been carried out on these aspects and they have been defined and characterized differently by many scholars of various approaches (Sharabi and Harpaz 2009).

PROCEDURE

Sample

Data for the present study were collected in 2006/7 via the Meaning-of-Working (MOW) questionnaire developed by the MOW International Research Team (1987). The respondents were selected randomly and the interviews were conducted at the respondents' homes by trained interviewers with an average interview lasting 30 minutes. The sample included 909 Jews, 219 Muslims, and 103 Christians. Among the Jews, 50.6% were men and 49.4% women. 7% had primary school education, 35.5% had secondary school education, 30.7% had some college or vocational-technical education, and 26.7% had university degrees. 63.6% were secular, 28.1% traditionalists, and 8.4% religious. 64.8% lived in cities, 7.3% in little towns, and 27.7% in rural areas. Regarding

income, 57.4% had a net income higher than 5000 NIS (about 1000€in 2007). Among the Muslims, 55.3% were men and 44.7% women. 8.4% had primary school education, 31.1% had secondary school education, 33.3% had some college or vocational-technical education, and 26.9% had university degrees. 24.7% were secular, 60.3% traditionalists, and [51] 15.1% religious. 33.2% lived in cities, 10.1% in little towns, and 56.7% in rural areas. Regarding income, 39.7% had a net income higher than 5000 NIS. Among the Christians, 51.5% were men and 48.5% women. 4.9% had primary school education, 29.1% had secondary school education, 33% had some college or vocational-technical education, and 33% had university degrees. 60.2% were secular, 31.1% traditionalists, and 8.7% religious. 55.3% lived in cities, 14.6% in little towns, and 30.1% in rural areas. Regarding income, 51.5% had net income higher than 5000 NIS.

Measures

The measurement of work values utilized in the present study was based on the Meaning-of-Work questionnaire (MOW International Research Team 1987) translated into Hebrew with the use of the 'translation/back-translation' method.

The importance of work centrality and other areas of life were measured by the item: 'Distribute a total of 100 points to signify the relative importance of the following areas in your life: leisure time, community, work, religion, and family.' The more points awarded to a certain area, the greater its centrality compared to other areas of life.

The importance of work goals was measured by the question: 'Regarding the nature of your work life, how important is it to you that your work life,' contains the following:

1 A lot of opportunities to *learn* new things
2 Good *interpersonal relations* (supervisors, co-workers)
3 Good opportunity for upgrading or *promotion*
4 *Convenient* work hours
5 A lot of *variety*
6 *Interesting* work (work that you really like)
7 Good *job security*

8 Good *match* between your job requirements and your abilities and experience
9 Good *wage*
10 Good physical working *conditions* (such as light, temperature, cleanliness, noise level)
11 A lot of *autonomy* (you decide how to do your work)

[52]

Respondents were requested to rank-order all eleven items from the most important to the least important.

RESULTS

Table 1 presents the comparison of each of the major life domains among the Jews, the Muslims and the Christians. The findings reveal significant differences in all life domains between the three religious groups.

Work and religion centrality are significantly higher among the Muslims than among the Christians and the Jews (work centrality means: 35.66, 30.00 and 16.50 respectively, $p < .01$; religion centrality means: 9.79, 6.59 and 4.16 respectively, $p < .01$). Leisure centrality is significantly lower among the Muslims than among the Christians and the Jews (14.21, 20.00 and 19.20 respectively, $p < .01$). Among the Jews, family centrality is significantly higher (43.10, 34.55 and 32.32 respectively, $p < .01$) and community centrality is significantly lower (5.22, 8.41 and 8.74 respectively, $p < .01$) than among the Christians and the Muslims. The Jews and the Christians rank family in the first place,

TABLE 1 The relative centrality of major life domains among Jews, Christians and Muslims

Life domains	Jews		Christians		Muslims		*F*
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	
Leisure	19.52	13.53	20.00	16.95	14.21	10.86	13.71**
Community	5.09	7.66	8.41	12.05	8.74	10.99	17.24**
Work	28.16	16.39	30.00	16.71	35.66	17.50	18.17**
Religion	4.46	8.46	6.59	9.75	9.79	10.19	40.42**
Family	42.89	18.15	34.55	18.55	32.32	16.01	37.91**

NOTES Column headings are as follows: (1) mean, (2) standard deviation. ** $p < .001$.

TABLE 2 Means and rankings differences of work goals among Jews, Christians and Muslims

Work goals	Jews			Christians			Muslims			*F*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	
Learning new things	(7)	5.66	3.13	(7)	5.48	2.77	(6)	5.80	3.12	.21
Interper. relations	(3)	6.50	2.82	(5)	6.27	3.11	(10)	5.49	2.96	11.16**
Promotion	(10)	4.88	2.98	(9)	5.25	3.13	(8)	5.64	3.15	5.87*
Conv. work hours	(6)	5.87	3.19	(8)	5.43	3.18	(7)	5.72	3.03	.22
Variety	(9)	5.14	2.67	(11)	4.77	3.05	(11)	4.20	2.94	11.11**
Interesting work	(2)	7.30	2.90	(2)	7.02	3.06	(3)	6.50	2.97	8.01**
Job security	(4)	6.37	3.03	(4)	6.41	3.00	(2)	6.81	2.94	2.34
Job–abilities match	(8)	5.34	2.86	(6)	6.16	2.86	(4)	6.37	2.83	13.78**
Good pay	(1)	8.12	2.93	(1)	7.75	3.20	(1)	7.79	3.05	1.18
Working conditions	(11)	4.78	3.17	(10)	4.98	3.12	(9)	5.59	3.41	6.89**
Autonomy	(5)	6.12	3.34	(3)	6.64	3.17	(5)	6.24	3.29	.29

NOTES Column headings are as follows: (1) rank, (2) mean, (3) standard deviation. * $p < .01$; ** $p < .001$.

followed by work and leisure, whereas among the Muslims, work is ranked first, followed by family and leisure. Among both the Jews and the Christians, community and religion are ranked fourth and fifth respectively, while among the Muslims religion is ranked fourth and community fifth.

Table 2 presents significant differences between the Jews, the Christians and the Muslims in six of the eleven work goals. The most important work goal among the three religious groups is a good wage, but the Jews and the Christians attribute higher importance to interesting work and rank it higher than the Muslims do.

The goal of interesting work is more important to the Jews than to the Christians and especially more important than to the Muslims (7.36, 7.02 and 6.50 respectively), the goal of variety gains a similar ranking of importance (5.14, 4.77 and 4.20 respectively). The goal of opportunity for a promotion is most important for the Muslim, followed by the Christians and the Jews (5.64, 5.25, and 4.88 respectively). This ranking of importance is similar regarding the goal of match between job requirements and abilities/experience gains (6.37, 6.16, and 5.31 re-

spectively) and the goal of working conditions (5.59, 4.98, and 4.73 respectively). Based on all these findings, we can see that the Christians' values are mainly located between the values of the Jews and the Muslims, while their means and rankings are closer to those of the
[54] Jews than to those of the Muslims.

Since there are demographic differences between the Jews, the Muslims and the Christians in the area of residence, degree of religiosity, income, and occupational status (see the literature review and the sample characteristics), linear regression analysis was conducted (see table 3) to examine the influence of the main demographic variables on life domain centrality and preferred work goals among the Jews, the Muslims and the Christians.

Overall, the demographic variables hardly explain the value differences among members of the three religious groups. Among the Jews, the Muslims and the Christians, the degree of religiosity has a negative impact on leisure centrality ($\beta = -.22$, $p < .001$; $\beta = -.20$, $p < .01$ and $\beta = -.22$, $p < .05$ respectively) and as expected positive impact on the centrality of religion ($\beta = .48$, $p < .001$; $\beta = .32$, $p < .001$ and $\beta = .48$, $p < .001$ respectively). Furthermore, income has a positive impact on the work goal of autonomy ($\beta = .11$, $p < .01$; $\beta = .16$, $p < .05$ and $\beta = .45$, $p < .001$ respectively). Those were the only similarities among the three ethno-religious groups and, as we can see, there is more similarity between the Jews and the Christians than between the Jews and the Muslims or between the Muslims and the Christians. Only among the Jews and the Christians is the goal of convenient hours negatively influenced by the area of residence ($\beta = -.09$, $p < .01$ and $\beta = -.24$, $p < .05$ respectively) and income ($\beta = -.13$, $p < .001$ and $\beta = -.37$, $p < .01$ respectively) and the goal of good wage is negatively influenced by the degree of religiosity ($\beta = -.11$, $p < .01$ and $\beta = -.23$, $p < .05$ respectively).

DISCUSSION

Although the Jews, the Christians and the Muslims in our research live in the same country, the findings reveal meaningful differences between the three ethno-religious cultures. Not only are there significant differences in the centrality of life domains, but the differences are also

TABLE 3 Regression analysis (standardized beta) of life domains centrality and work goals preferences according to demographic variables among Jews, Muslims and Christians

Demographic variables	LC	CC	WC	RC	FC	LT	IR	PO	CH	VR	IW	JS	JAM	GP	WC	AU
Jews																
Residence area	.01	.06	−.02	−.08**	.02	.05	−.01	−.02	−.09**	.05	.04	−.05	.06	−.09**	−.02	.09**
Religiosity degree	−.22***	.09**	−.14***	.48***	.02	−.01	.05	.06	.06	−.11**	−.07*	.06	.00	−.11**	.05	−.04
Income	−.05	−.05	.03	−.01	.04	−.02	−.06	.08*	−.13***	−.00	.02	.04	−.02	.06	−.08*	.11**
Occupational status	−.05	.05	.11**	−.04	−.05	.08*	−.05	−.12**	−.13***	.14***	.08*	−.08*	.05	−.06	−.01	.13***
R^2 (adjusted)	.05	.01	.03	.24	.00	.01	.01	.01	.06	.03	.01	.01	.00	.02	.01	.05
F	13.06***	3.06*	8.48***	72.56***	.82	1.87	2.52*	4.12**	15.74***	8.74***	3.70**	3.17*	1.27	4.88**	2.31	12.91***
Muslims																
Residence area	.03	−.11	−.15*	.12	.17**	.06	.12	.08	.00	−.12	−.07	−.05	.03	−.02	.07	−.07
Religiosity degree	−.20**	−.20**	.04	.32***	−.00	−.010	.00	−.12	−.03	.04	−.08	−.03	.13	.10	.03	.07
Income	−.06	−.03	.08	.05	−.08	−.03	.05	−.15*	−.12	.03	.02	.07	.01	−.05	.08	.16*
Occupational status	−.12	.00	−.08	−.07	.24***	−.08	−.04	−.01	.01	.14	.00	−.15*	.03	.01	.06	.01
R^2 (adjusted)	04	.05	.02	.12	.08	.00	.00	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.00	.00	.00	.01
F	3.09*	3.05*	1.95	8.46	5.37***	.87	.91	2.05	.73	1.72	.67	1.52	.98	.72	.90	1.65
Christians																
Residence area	.17	−.16	−.17	.07	.14	.21*	.01	.02	−.24*	−.27*	−.13	−.10	.06	.25*	.13	.05
Religiosity degree	−.22*	−.09	−.10	.48***	.05	−.20	.04	.04	.04	.12	−.20	−.15	.35**	−.23*	−.03	.20
Income	−.14	−.19	−.04	.07	.22*	.02	−.30*	−.05	−.37**	.21*	.19	−.11	.07	−.11	.06	.45***
Occupational status	.02	.19	.10	−.08	−.17	.10	.26*	.10	.15	.04	.07	−.17	−.16	−.37**	−.03	.05
R^2 (adjusted)	.01	.03	.06	.15	.04	.01	.04	.09	.06	.07	.03	.02	.04	.22	.08	.14
F	2.12	1.64	.41	3.85*	1.61	1.86	1.92	.44	2.72	2.83	1.95	.84	1.48	5.01**	.77	3.79*

NOTES Column headings are as follows: LC – Leisure centrality; CC – Community centrality; WC – Work centrality; RC – Religion centrality; FC – Family centrality; LT – learning things; IR – Interpersonal relations; PO – Promotion Opportunities; CH – Convenient hours; VR – Variety; IW – Interesting work; JS – Job security; JAM – Job–ability match; GP – Good pay; WC – Working conditions; AU – Autonomy. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

evident in the rankings, which demonstrate a different perception of life spheres. The Jews and the Christians rank family first, followed by work and leisure, which is similar to the ranking in other Western countries (Sharabi and Harpaz 2007; 2011b), whereas Muslims rank
[56] work first, followed by family and leisure. This ranking is unique, since it is similar to the ranking observed in Japan in the early 1980's (Sharabi and Harpaz 2007), in China at the end of 2000 (Westwood and Lok 2003) and among high-tech workers in Israel (Snir, Harpaz, and Ben-Baruch 2009).

Higher work centrality of the Muslims compared to the Christians was found also in Arslan (2001) and Aygun, Arslan, and Guney (2008) studies; however, the lower work centrality of the Jews when compared to the Christians contradicts former studies (Harpaz 1998; MOW International Research Team 1987; Sharabi and Harpaz 2007). We have to take into consideration that those comparisons were with the Christians in other countries were they are the dominant religion, while in Israel the Christians are a small minority and constitute a part of the Arab society. The high work centrality among the Christian and especially among the Muslim Arab minority stems presumably from the perception that work is a main means of social mobility; furthermore, working in the labor market (instead of working in the wider family affairs), together with the status and the income related to it, are also a means for fulfillment of other needs (such as influencing family decisions, working outside of the community, achieving independence, and shaping one's own destiny) in a collectivist, traditional, and patriarchal society (El-Ghannam 2002; Sharabi 2009; 2012). Al-Haj (1995) notes that among the Israeli Arabs, education and occupation have taken the place of land as a source of pride and represent a reliable way to earn a living and guarantee socio-economic mobility. Moreover, among minorities there is a tendency to view work (and education) as a means for prestige and social mobility (Haveman and Smeeding 2006; Sharabi 2009; 2011). It seems that the Israeli Arabs, as an ethnic minority, value work much more than the Israeli Jews due to all the reasons mentioned above.

Another explanation for the Jews' low work centrality can be the religiosity trend occurring in the last decade. Sharabi and Harpaz (2011b)

found that the importance of religion, which declined between the 1980s and the 1990s, increased in 2006, correspondingly, work centrality that increased between the 1980s and the 1990s declined in 2006. All the studies in Israel found that, among the religious Jews, work centrality is lower than among the secular Jews (Harpaz 1998; Snir and Harpaz 2005; Sharabi 2012). This phenomenon is unique to Israel and can be explained by the fact that religious Jews may view work as less important than their practice of religion and even perceive it as interfering with it. Accordingly, it is possible that the latest religiosity trend reduced the Jews' work centrality.

All previous studies examining the importance of family among the Jews in Israel found that it is higher than the importance of family among other societies, such as the US, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, UK, and others (Sharabi and Harpaz 2007; Westwood and Lok 2003). Consequently, one could expect to reach a similar finding when comparing family importance to the Muslims and the Christians in Israel. The greater importance of religion and the lower importance attributed to leisure among the Israeli Muslims may reflect the fact that they are more traditional than the Christians and much more than the Jews as other studies pointed out (Al-Haj 1995; Khattab 2005; Kaufman, Abu Baker, and Saar 2012). The demographical data (see the sample section) demonstrates the traditional aspects of the Muslims compared to the Christians and the Jews. A higher percentage of the Muslims than the Christians and the Jews live in rural areas (56.7 % vs. 30.1% and 27.7 % respectively), and are less secular (24.7% vs. 60.2% and 63.6 % respectively).

Some of the differences in work goals' importance can be explained by the 'scarcity hypothesis,' which assumes that individual preferences reflect the socio-economic surroundings, where individuals bestow a more subjective value to the issues that have relatively little to offer and do not satisfy their needs (Inglehart 1990; Sharabi and Harpaz 2007). The 'scarcity hypothesis' may explain the greater importance the Muslims attribute to compatibility of job requirements and personal abilities and experience, and to promotion opportunities. The high preference to these work goals illustrates the dissatisfaction many Israeli Muslims experience as a result of working in positions that

do not match their education, experience, and expertise (Al-Haj 1995; Sharabi 2009). They may also reflect the difficulties this population has due to the employment discrimination, as well as their difficulty in climbing the hierarchy ladder in private and public Israeli organizations (Al-Haj 1995; Jerby and Levi 2000; Yaish 2001).
[58]

The fact that the Jews in our study attribute higher importance to interpersonal relationships than the Christians, and especially than the Muslims, can be explained by the 'scarcity hypothesis.' The transition of a society or a sub-culture from a cultural to industrial economy, and as a result from collectivism to individualism, weakens the social support and the extended family ties and leads to the increase of the importance of interpersonal relations. Hofstede (1980) also indicates the need for friendships in individualistic societies. While the Israeli Jewish society is closer to the individualistic pole of the spectrum, the Israeli Muslims are closer to the collectivistic pole, and the Christians are in between. These differences are reflected by the urbanization level of the three religious groups, namely the highest percentage of respondents living is the cities is reached by the Jews (64.8), followed by the Christians (55.3), and lastly by the Muslims (32.2) (see the sample section). Additionally, the intrinsic orientation is characterized as one of the Individualism dimensions (Hofstede 1980; 2001) and the Jews' intrinsic orientation (interesting work and variety) is higher than that of the Christians and much more than that of the Muslims. This individualism is also reflected by the lower centrality of community among the Jews than among the Muslims and the Christians.

Throughout this study, we generally observed that the centrality of life domains and the preferred work goals among the Jews, the Muslims and the Christians were very different, especially between the Jews and the Muslims. This was also reflected by the impact of the demographic variables on the values (see the regression analysis). It is interesting to find that the three ethno-religious groups, who have been living together for many decades (before and after the establishment of the Israeli state), have a different perception and internalization of life domains and work values.

It seems that the value differences between the Jews and the Arabs (Muslims and Christians) in Israel stem primarily from four sources.

First, there are the cultural differences between the Jews and the Muslim and Christian Arabs (and also between the Muslim and Christian Arabs). Second, there is a high degree of residential and occupational segregation. Third, there is occupational discrimination of the Arabs in the labor market, especially against the Muslims; and fourth, the long and tough conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in the occupied territories, as well as with other Arab countries, which has led to a high level of mistrust and social tension between the Jews and the Israeli Arabs (who are Palestinians as well), and to the dual identity problem especially for the Muslims (Al-Haj 1995; Khattab 2005; Sharabi 2009). [59]

Rodrigue and Richardson (2005) found that, although there was an economic and occupational discrimination of the Chinese (who are Buddhist) when compared to the other ethno-religious groups in Malaysia (Malays who are Muslims and Indians who are Hindu) and segregation between the ethnic groups, there were few differences in the cultural-values of these groups. They explain the value similarity by the good relationships between the ethnic groups in Malaysia. The effect of good relationships can also explain the value similarity between the Anglo-Americans and the African-Americans in the USA (Gaines et al. 1997) who also have residential and educational segregation coupled with economic and occupational discrimination against the African-Americans; hence it seems that the profound differences in the work values between the Arabs and the Jews in Israel primarily stem from the ethnic conflict. This is demonstrated with the survey, which finds that Israelis view the relationship between the Israeli Jews and the Israeli Arabs as the widest cleft and the main source of tension in the Israeli society (Arian et al. 2008).

The Jewish-Arab conflict has existed for more than a hundred years (before the establishment of the Israeli state) and has escalated over the years, especially with the Palestinians in the occupied territories. The Israeli Arabs, who are also Palestinians, are experiencing a strengthened dual identity problem and are perceived by many Jews as a 'fifth column' (Arian et al. 2008). Gaines et al. (1997) found in their study that the individuals' racial/ethnic identity mediated the impact of race/ethnicity on all cultural value orientations. In Israel less and less

Arabs describe themselves as Israelis (12% in 2008) and more and more as Arabs and Palestinians (43% in 2008) (Arian et al. 2008). The alienation, mistrust and social tension between the ethnic groups seems to be the main cause that prevents the Israeli Arabs (especially Muslims) from identifying with the Jewish culture, values, and norms. This will probably hold true as long as the Palestinian/Arab-Israeli conflict is on-going and escalating. The findings strengthen the assumption that mistrust and conflict between the ethnic groups lead to individuals' alienation from the opponent group and to the rejection of their culture and values (Hewstone 2003; Ward, Bochner, and Furnham 2001). These factors minimize the possibility for work values diffusion and formation of similarity between the dominant Jewish culture and the Arab subculture, now and in the near future, especially concerning the Muslims in Israel.

Various findings show that people with higher work centrality reach a higher level of performance, job involvement and commitment to the organization, and work longer hours (Harpaz 1998; Mannheim, Baruch and Tal 1997; Sharabi and Harpaz 2010). The extra-high work centrality of the Arab Christians and even more so the Muslims reflects high non-actualized potential for organizations and for the Israeli economy e. g the high work centrality and economic success in Japan in the early 1980's and in China at the end of 2000 (Sharabi and Harpaz 2007; Westwood and Lok 2003). Although the Israeli government has recently decided to implement affirmative action for the Arabs, especially for the Arab academic graduates, it seems that it will take some time until the changes are reflected in the labor market.

The limitation of this study is related to the measures. The preferred work goals measure is based on the rankings of eleven one-item goals, while the measures of the centrality of life domains were based on responses to a single question. Using the single-items measure and ranking measures may not be optimal. Those measures were built and used by the MOW research team in eight countries (MOW International Research Team 1987). Later they were used in different studies in the USA, Germany, Japan (Sharabi and Harpaz 2007), China (Westwood and Lok 2003), and several other countries. Over time, the

findings show that this measurement can reflect work values in different societies.

Future studies in this field will benefit from the combination of qualitative and quantitative data regarding the effect of this ethnic conflict on work values. This mixture will help us understand better to what extent each of the factors (ethnic conflict, cultural and socio-economic differences, segregation, and employment discrimination) explain the gaps in work values between the three ethnic groups.

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Connecting Research, Higher Education and Business: Implications for Innovation

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DEVELOPING INNOVATION NETWORKS might positively influence research and development performance, boost creation of new knowledge, and increase technology transfer and export of high technology products in a country. In our study, we analysed some of the networking mechanisms in Slovenia, which have been introduced to create innovation synergies between research, higher education, and business sector: Competence Centres, Centres of Excellence, and Development Centres. Through the analysis we confirmed the basic assumptions stemming from the theory of networking. We found that: innovative clusters (or groups) usually consist of members who come from similar disciplines or industries, the history of cooperation represents an important element of innovative cooperation, and groups are usually geographically concentrated. Besides, we confirmed and revealed some problems related to Slovenian technological development and consequently economic performance.

Key Words: networking; innovation; social network analysis

INTRODUCTION

Research Opportunities

In 2009, Slovenia has been ranked as a European innovation follower (Ministrstvo za visoko šolstvo, znanost in tehnologijo 2010), which means that the volume of innovation activity of Slovenian companies

has grown; however, the level of such activities in the country is still relatively low. In addition to some relative advantages, such as the quality of human resources and the existence of entrepreneurship support services, the key weaknesses of the Slovenian innovation environment
[66] relate particularly to technological achievements in terms of patenting, commercialisation of new knowledge, exporting of high-tech products, and the transfer of high technology.

In Slovenia, the number of European patent applications per million inhabitants reaches only 44% of the EU27 average. The situation regarding Slovenian patent applications in the North American market is even worse, because they reach only 13% of the EU27 average. Slightly better is the situation regarding the European high-tech patents applications – Slovenia has achieved 61% of the EU27 average. Slovenia is also quite weak in the field of high-tech exports. The export share of high-tech products in total exports reaches only a 28% share of exports of the EU27 average (see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu). Besides, Slovenia's spending for R&D reaches 1.9% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is 0.1 percentage points less than the EU27 average (see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu). Total R&D expenditure per capita in Slovenia is rather modest, since it reaches only 68% of the EU27 average. Furthermore, in higher education (HEI) sector the average reaches only 48%. The situation is slightly better in the business sector, but its R&D expenditure is still only at 71% of the EU27 average. Nevertheless, in recent years, the Slovenian R&D expenditure has been rising. For example, the volume of total expenditure rose from about 300 million EUR to about 600 million EUR since 2001. Most of these funds were invested by the Slovenian business sector (387 million), while a slightly smaller proportion was invested in R&D activities by the Slovenian government (187 million). We believe that to encourage the volume and the quality of innovation and ensure the protection and commercial use of new knowledge, it is important to increase the scope of research and development (R&D) activities, especially by encouraging the establishment of innovation networks including key actors of R&D – higher education institutions (HEI), public research organizations (RO), and companies (Vidulin and Gams 2006).

Innovation Networking

In the studies of entrepreneurial networking some authors focus primarily on the horizontal links and cooperation between small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Tavčar and Dermol 2012). Marshall (1961) named such kind of networking 'the industrial districts.' [67] Other authors highlight the links between big companies and their suppliers, usually smaller firms (Marceau 1999; Vukasovič 2012). In such cases, the hierarchical relationships or clusters in vertical supply chain appear. Links can also be developed among companies, which base their businesses on the same kind of resources. Furthermore, relations also emerge among companies involved in joint innovation or in joint production (Marceau 1999). In such cases innovation clusters appear.

Businesses rarely innovate in isolation. Innovation can actually be defined as a learning process, which requires the exchange of knowledge and a high level of interaction between different actors in the network or value chain (Roelandt and Hertog 1999). Hidalgo and Albors (2008) summarize the core features of an innovation process in a knowledge-driven economy: (i) a problem-solving, (ii) interactive process involving relationships between firms with different actors, that (iii) arises from different learning situations, such as: learning-by-using, learning-by-doing or learning-by-sharing, and as such (iv) involves the exchange of codified and tacit knowledge, and where (v) interdependence between actors generates an innovative system or an innovation cluster. Innovation activities require the involvement of several parties combining their specialized yet complementary knowledge (Roelandt and Hertog 1999). Active participants in innovation clusters are often companies (large and small), academic research institutions, as well as HEI and public or private providers of education and training (Roelandt and Hertog 1999; Košir and Bezenšek 2009; Natek and Lesjak 2013).

Researchers focused on innovation networks emphasise the importance of geographical proximity between the members of the network. Proximity encourages interaction and is an important part of network dynamics. As noted by Marceau (1999), operating in the geographic vicinity is easier if there are various HEI or research organizations in-

volved as well. However, geographical proximity is not the only criterion for successful networking. Knowledge sharing and cooperation between organizations in networks are based on trust and shared experience, which is often exercised informally and through direct contacts
[68] between individuals. Research shows that the bulk of the knowledge transfer is self-organized and implemented directly among the employees, professionals, and managers (Spielkamp and Vopel 1999; Starček and Trunk 2013). Antončič, Ruzzier, and Bratkovič (2007), in addition to geographic concentration, emphasise the importance of the existence of support institutions in terms of infrastructure (e. g. information centres, computer networks), the involvement of HEI and research organisations, and also underline the importance of prior cooperation between network members and the reputation of key members of the network. Spielkamp and Vopel (1999) further note that companies often join the network on the basis of belonging to the same industry (e. g. information technology, food industry, financial industry etc). They emphasize that innovation clusters tend to include bigger companies.

R&D *Integration Mechanisms in Slovenia*

According to the data on innovation activities in Slovenia in 2006, approximately half of the innovation active companies were involved in R&D cooperation with some other organisation. Less than 25% of such companies cooperate with HEI and approximately 15% of them cooperate with public RO (Ministrstvo za visoko šolstvo, znanost in tehnologijo 2010). Relative modesty of networking activities is also acknowledged by the research on networking for lifelong learning (Natek et al. 2010).

The Slovenian government encourages innovation networking with some financial incentives. For the years from 2009 to 2015, the government plans to encourage R&D activities through three key mechanisms of R&D integration (Competence Centres – CC, Centres of Excellence – CE, and Development Centres – DC) in the amount of about 314 millions of EUR. This amount of money displays a relatively high importance of these three mechanisms; namely, this amount exceeds the volume of almost two years of governmental investment

in R&D in Slovenia. The Ministry responsible for higher education and science, together with the European Regional Development Fund, supports research and networking through CC in the amount of 45 million EUR in the years 2010–3 and through CE in the amount of 84 million EUR in the years from 2009 to 2013. The Ministry of Economy, in cooperation with the European Regional Development Fund, encourages research and networking in the range of 185 million in the period of 2010–5 investing in the construction and operation of DC. [69]

With our study, we identify the centres of the Slovenian R&D and innovation. Additionally, we attempt to identify the research areas within which the Slovenian companies, public RO and HEI most often cooperate.

RESEARCH METHODS

The data about companies, HEI, RO, and other organisations cooperating in CC, CO, and RC were obtained from the internet. Additional information related to research activities and performance of organisations' researchers and research groups was collected from the web pages of IZUM (Institute of Information Science). We were especially interested in the number of registered researchers in the organisation, their SICRIS points, measurement of their research performance, number of citations (in journals indexed by SCI-Expanded, SSCI, and A&HCI), and in the number of registered patents in an organisation. Eventually, organisations were clustered into twelve Slovenian statistical regions.

Special emphasis in our analysis was on cooperation among analysed organisations. Therefore, we used the network analytic techniques. These statistical methods are focused on the characteristics of relations, rather than on the characteristics of individual entities. Nevertheless, the examination of the structure of any given network is a formidable task that includes significant hurdles associated with the issue of how to define and measure links or relationships (Jackson 2008). The relation in our network was defined in the following way: two organisations are in the relationship if they are involved in the same CC, CE or RC. Thus, the defined relation is symmetrical and the network is undirected. Furthermore, the pair of organisations could be involved in various CCs, CEs or DC's, thus the network is considered

as weighted. The weight on each edge (undirected tie between entities in the network) is determined by the number of CCs, CEs or DCs in which the organisations are included.

The R package (http://www.r-project.org) software was used for
[70] descriptive analysis and algorithms for the preparation of network. Network analysis was carried out by Pajek (Slovenian word for Spider) (Batagelj and Mrvar 2002; http://vlado.fmf.uni-lj.si/pub/networks/pajek/). Pajek is a program for the analysis and visualisation of large networks (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Both programs are open source programs and thus freely available for non-commercial use.

RESULTS OF THE STUDY

The Networks in Slovenian R&D

The basic network consists of 336 organisations, grouped in 34 CC, CE, and DC with 3697 edges among them. The vast majority of edges (3527 or 95.4%) has the value of 1, the remaining 170 edges have higher values. The Institute Jozef Stefan (IJS) has the most valued edges, since it cooperates with the Faculty of Electrical Engineering in Ljubljana (UL FE) in seven different CC, CE, and DC, and with the Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science in Maribor (UM FERI) and Lek (Slovenian pharmaceutical company) in five different CC, CE, and DC. Furthermore, UL FE and UM FERI are together in six aggregations. All other values of edges in the network are lower.

Due to the specific definition of relation, we decided to remove all the edges with values less than 2 from the network. Indeed, organizations that participate in only one CC, CE or DC are not difficult to trace, but we were more interested in more densely connected innovation network. When we defined our network in such way, only one weak component (group of related organizations) remained with 58 vertices (members). According to the definition of (sub) network, each organization in the (sub) network is a member of at least two CC, CE or DC together with another organization from this (sub) network. The network is graphically presented in figure 1. The vertices representing the organizations are painted according to the region to which the organisations belong. Throughout the paper, the region from which a company is originating is displayed in the square bracket.

It appears that organizations from Central Slovenia region dominate among the participating organizations (black circle shaped vertices; [10]), a surprisingly large number of organisations involved in the original network come from the small Gorizia Region (gray circle shaped vertices; [11]). However, there are very few members of this network from Podravska Region with the second largest university in Slovenia (black square shaped vertices; [3]). [71]

R&D *Cooperation Between Statistical Regions in Slovenia*

In the following steps of our study, we compressed the organizations by the region they belong to, which resulted in a network with 12 vertices – statistical regions in Slovenia (see figure 2). We wanted to examine to what extent the different regions in Slovenia cooperate in the area of R&D. After we removed all the loops (links within regions), we normalised the rest of the edges by dividing the edges' value with the square root of the multiplied numbers of organizations in both regions. The size of the vertices (circle or square shaped) indicating the regions is proportional to the number of inhabitants in each region. As shown in figure 1, the Slovenian R&D is rather centralised and located mainly in the Central Slovenian Region. This is of course expected, since the largest Slovenian university and most of the major high-tech companies and public RO are located in this region.

The Gorizia Region has surprisingly the strongest links (relative to the number of organizations) with the Central Slovenian Region. The links between the Podravska Region and in particular the Coastal-Karst Region on one side and the Central Slovenian Region on the other are quite weak, although the second and the third largest university are both in these two regions.

Evaluation of R&D *Performance by Regions*

In table 2 we present the data related to the indicators of the average R&D performance of companies, RO, and HEI in 12 Slovenian statistical regions. We took into account only the organisations included in our basic network. The table also contains data regarding the number of residents in the regions and the number of organisations in the basic network. R&D performance could be measured by three indicators

FIGURE 1 Network with edges with values of 2 or above



FIGURE 2 R&D network of statistical regions in Slovenia

– SICRIS points measuring publishing achievements, the number of citations measuring the relevance of research work, and the number of patents measuring commercialisation of new knowledge. We can see that the best ranking region in the sense of publishing performance is, surprisingly, the Gorizia Region, which outperforms even the Central Slovenian Region. The situation regarding the number of citations is somewhat different. The differences between the Slovenian Regions are quite big in this area, and the numbers of citations are consistent with the size of public universities in these regions (University in Ljubljana, University in Maribor, and Primorska University in the Coastal-Karst Region). The situation regarding the number of patents pinpoints the major problem of Slovenian innovation performance. The numbers are very low showing either weak commercialisation of new knowledge or its low quality. The highest numbers of patents are achieved in the Central Slovenian Region with plenty of technical and natural-science HEI and, surprisingly, in the South-East Slovenian Region with practically no HEI and RO, but with important foreign car producing company and a major Slovenian pharmaceutical company.

TABLE 1 R&D performance data in Slovenian statistical regions

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gorenjska Region	203,427	30	16.10	23.17	0.03
Gorizia Region	119,146	16	28.25	13.62	0.00
Koroška Region	72,494	15	8.53	53.53	0.00
Inner-Karst Region	52,287	8	2.00	0.00	0.00
Coastal-Karst Region	110,760	7	21.00	493.71	0.00
Central Slovenian Region	533,213	135	27.50	1877.01	0.76
Podravska Region	323,119	26	17.69	922.35	0.23
Pomurska Region	119,145	8	7.12	36.25	0.00
Savinjska Region	259,726	43	18.16	11.70	0.05
South-East Slovenia Region	142,483	21	16.57	131.14	0.48
Spodnjeposavska Region	70,167	9	2.00	0.78	0.00
Zasavska Region	44,222	13	13.00	0.29	0.07

NOTES Column headings are as follows: (1) region, (2) number of residents, (3) organisations in basic network, (4) SICRIS points per organisation, (5) citations per organisation, (6) patents per organisation.

Evaluation of R&D *Performance by Internal Cohesion*

In figure 1, we can identify the organisations with most frequent co-operation. For this purpose, we used the generalized cores method. Based on the data, we found that 14 is the highest possible order in the basic network. We decided to analyse the generalized core of order 10, which means that all of the 31 organizations in the obtained core (sub) network participate in at least 10 common CC, CE, and DC, together with other organizations from this (sub) network. This is also the only (sub) group of organizations in our primary network with such a feature.

The companies in the generalized 10-core were divided into four groups using Ward's method of hierarchical clustering and generalized Euclidean distance (Ferligoj 1984; Doreian, Batagelj, and Ferligoj 2005). Dendrogram of this method of clustering is shown in figure 3. Furthermore, the core is presented with a matrix in figure 4. The organisations in the matrix are denoted by regions (with numbers in square brackets) and divided into four groups according to the outlined classification method. The matrix is symmetrical, since the net-

FIGURE 3

Dendrogram of hierarchical clustering with Ward's method



work is non-directional. The inference is that these groups might actually represent cases or rudiments of innovative networks.

As seen in figures 3 and 4, IJS occupies the central position of the Slovenian R&D cooperating with almost all organizations in the core. As we consider only the edges with weight 2 or more, 27 organizations in the generalised core cooperating with IJS participate in at least two common CC, CE or DC. There are only three exceptions: Rotomatika, BSH, and Domel.

The first, most strongly associated, group in the generalised core consists of IJS and two higher education institutions – UL FE and UM FERI, operating in the fields related to computer science, informatics, electrical engineering, and related fields. The second group consists of organizations, which are almost all involved in cooperation with the first group and some of them also among themselves. This group consists of companies whose primary activity is associated with process automation, computer engineering, and computerization, as well as development and use of electronic communications, and speech technology. Additionally, two HEI are involved in this group – the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering (UL FS) and the Faculty of

FIGURE 4
The matrix of 10-core



Computer Science and Information Science (UL FRI), which are both members of the University in Ljubljana. The third group of cooperating organizations is closely related to the development and use of electronic circuits and components, technologies, and materials for electronics with optoelectronics components and measuring instruments. The fourth group is focused on a different discipline – chemistry and pharmacy. It involves some chemical companies (Cinkarna, Salonit, Lek), two public RO (National Chemical Institute and National Institute of Biology) and relevant HEI – the University of Nova Gorica and also the Faculty of Chemistry and Chemical Technology (UL FKKT), Biotechnical Faculty (UL BF) and Medical Faculty (UL MF), which are all members of the University in Ljubljana. Some of these groups cooperate with each other poorly – typical example are groups where one focuses on research and production in the field of chemistry and pharmacy, while the other focuses on research and production in the field of automation and computerization.

In the next step, the performance of R&D for 4 recognised groups was analysed. The results are presented in table 2. The most successful

TABLE 2 R&D performance data in 4 recognised groups and IJS

Groups	SICRIS points per individual per group	Citations per individual per group	Patents per individual per group
Group 1	205.86	47.95	0.0274
Group 2	36.82	3.80	0.0015
Group 3	59.79	8.67	0.0000
Group 4	138.28	55.44	0.0330
IJS	342.86	113.55	0.0344

group regarding publishing performance is the group consisting of 2 HEI (UM FERI and UL FF) and IJS. This finding is quite logical, since IJS, when analysing its performance, is really the leading R&D organisation in Slovenia. On the other hand, the group with the best result in the area of citations is the last one – chemistry based group of companies, RO, and HEI. This group is also the best when considering the number of patents. Their achievement in this area is almost the same as the achievement of IJS. On the other hand, R&D performance of group 3 and also group 2 is rather poor (despite the fact that IJS is also involved in these two groups). In group 3, for example, there has been no evidence of registered patents, which is quite worrying since there are some leading Slovenian companies (e. g. Gorenje) in this group.

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

With the study we attempted to identify innovative clusters in Slovenia. As a base for the research, we analysed three governmental mechanisms for the encouragement of R&D activities through cooperation between business sector (companies), public RO, and HEI, which represent quite a big share of public spending for R&D in Slovenia. These three mechanisms are: competence centres, centres for excellence, and development centres.

Through the analysis, we confirmed the basic assumptions stemming from the theory of networking. We found that innovative clusters (or groups as we defined them) usually consist of members, which come from similar disciplines or industries (in our case process automation, computer engineering, computerization, development and

use of electronic components, chemistry etc.), that there should be some history of cooperation present in the group (there are obvious relationships between HEI, which educate engineers and RO or companies where these engineers mostly operate), and that groups
[78] are usually geographically concentrated (we even recognised relatively weak cooperation between different Slovenian statistical regions). Additionally, we confirmed and revealed some of the problems related to Slovenian technological development and consequent economic performance. We also identified weak links between research performance (SICRIS points), relevance of research (number of citations) and transfer of knowledge (number of registered patents). The main weakness of the Slovenian R&D space seems to be relatively weak cooperation between business, HE, and research combined with the dominance of a single public research organisation. It seems that synergies, which are probably expected due to the introduction of three networking mechanisms, are actually not implemented.

This study represents one of the first attempts to analyse the cooperation and clustering issues in R&D in Slovenia. Our findings and approaches to the study could be a starting point for further research. We are sure that such research could bring benefits to both – theory and practice. Although Slovenia is a Mediterranean country, it is, by its cultural values and practices, a part of the Eastern European cultural cluster (Bakacsi et al. 2002). Societal culture has strong association with national rates of innovation. Shane (1993) found that national rates of innovation are most closely associated with the cultural value of uncertainty acceptance, and that the lack of power distance and individualism are also related to high rates of innovation. Cultural values of citizens and their assimilated behavioural patterns are important determinants of the acceptable rate of cooperation and interaction between the members of society, the attitudes toward hierarchy, and the tolerance of unclear future (Babnik 2010). These are important elements of the innovation process (Hidalgo and Albors 2008) and the process of inter- and intra-organisational cooperation, and are present in the Slovenian culture (Babnik 2010). Further research in this field should therefore take into account the cultural features of the society and the network in which the innovation process is performed.

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Towards New Scenarios for the Integration of Europe and the Mediterranean: Prospects and Strategies for Trieste and the Upper Adriatic Region

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GLOBAL ECONOMIC DYNAMICS crucially affect territorial transformations and the relations between towns, leading them to better define their functions and to internationalize their image to enhance international competitiveness. Coastal areas equipped with berths for ocean-going vessels have gained a strategic importance thanks to the progressive reduction of maritime transport costs, compared to those of land transport. Since the early '90s, the role of the Mediterranean has been increasingly strengthening within the context of the main routes and today, after a critical period, signs of recovery, above all in relation to the growth of the emerging economies of North African and Far Eastern Countries, may be foreseen. In this scenario, the Upper Adriatic region and its port cities, among which Trieste stands out for its historical vocation to internationalization and for its modern infrastructures, have the opportunity to create a system to reassert their strategic role within the Euro-Mediterranean area.

Key Words: maritime transport; Trieste; Upper Adriatic

INTRODUCTION

Global economic dynamics crucially affect territorial transformations and the relations between towns, leading them to better define their functions and to internationalize their image to enhance international competitiveness. Coastal areas equipped with berths for ocean-going vessels have gained a strategic importance thanks to the progressive reduction of maritime transport costs, compared to those of land transport. Since the early '90s, the role of the Mediterranean has been in-

creasingly strengthening within the context of the main routes; new large transhipment hubs have been developing and many existing docks have been modernized/extended. This phenomenon is due to the following factors: extension of the ship size, which has led to transporters
[82] prefer the Trans-Mediterranean route for the traffics with the Far East because the Suez Canal, unlike the Panama Canal, has the suitable structural characteristics for the transit of large container ships; the economic performance of the Far East and of the North African emerging countries, which has significantly increased the sea transport interchange on the commercial routes from/to Europe and between the two Mediterranean shores. In this regard, certain field studies, like those carried out by Drewry Shipping Consultants and by Fearnleys, highlight that the recovery of the world's economy and the performance of Asian economies will continue to be the main drivers of a demand for sea transport services that will be further strengthened by the economic growth of North African Countries.

Therefore, adequate infrastructures are necessary to integrate hub ports effectively in the logistic chain of transport and to intercept the growing traffic flows. In line with the prospects of recovery of the international macroeconomic context, the world's sea transport is soon expected to revive; in particular, container traffic is expected to grow by 4.2% on the Asia–North America route (–14.9% in 2009) and by 2.2% on the Asia–Europe route (–14.8% in 2009). Undoubtedly, the last mentioned data will significantly affect the internal dynamics of the Mediterranean region. In the next few years, the ports, which are located on the intersections between sea and land routes, will be destined to become increasingly important for the implementation of an effective European multimodal transport system, especially in view of the estimated upturn in traffic development. In this scenario, the ports with the best geographical location are Valencia, Barcelona and Genoa, for the southwestern axis, and Trieste, Brindisi and Patras, for the south-eastern axis.

The eastern Mediterranean appears to be one of the areas with the highest potential for development, with an increase in the supply by stakeholders (shipping companies and national and international multimodal transport operators), which aim at exploiting the potentials

of growth of the Adriatic-Mediterranean system following the EU enlargement to the East. Particularly, the Adriatic-Ionian corridor is a strategic route for international trade, since it is a privileged link with the emerging markets of Central-Eastern Europe.

One of the problems, which are set to become increasingly important, is certainly related to the links between the European Union and the neighbouring countries overlooking the Mediterranean and the Adriatic Sea, which is considered as a 'multimodal corridor' for the combined transport within the trans-European connections envisaged by the Treaty of Maastricht. Its upper coasts, with the ports of Trieste, Venice, Koper and Rijeka, are the channel of the south of the Community, which is most projected towards the centre, north and east of Europe. Nevertheless, it must always be taken into account that the competitiveness of the port nodes for the transportation of passengers or goods is strongly influenced by both the functionality of the connections with the port hinterland and the levels of spatial integration between the port and the surrounding town. Recent researches aim at verifying that the projects of development and rationalization of port facilities, which must consider the functional and economic aspects of the planned investments, can trigger actual widespread processes of urban and land regeneration. As a matter of fact, the infrastructural flows resulting from linear infrastructures, combined with different speeds and functions, and from their intersections, materialize into new urban and territorial poles, such as dock stations, public squares, well-equipped urban pathways and waterfronts related to tourist, cultural and leisure activities (Di Venosa 2006). These are themes which must be tackled at the different territorial and institutional levels, in a perspective of governance implying an increasing participation of different local public and private actors to prefigure shared scenarios, as well as the search for a delicate equilibrium between local and global dimensions.

Port cities must face the continuous evolutions in the field of vessel traffic, the demand for larger and larger areas and the loss of a strong port identity in favour of intermodal port facilities. All these factors increase interdependences and the needs of innovation. Therefore, it is extremely advisable to define strategies for the port system of the Up-

per Adriatic region, which are consistent with tradition yet projected into the future. Moreover, they should be aimed at integrating the area, both inside the single administrative regions and inside the macroregion including Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Slovenia, Croatia, Lower
[84] Austria and Lower Germany, in a system based on the values of fair collaboration and efficiency, supported by services of general interest and regulated by common rules of behaviour (Honsell, Malinconico and Maresca 2006).

In short, since the development of transportation directly depends on the quality of port facilities, on the use of new technologies, on the strengthening of multimodality and on the capacity of innovation, only a wide and multidisciplinary approach to the problem of traffic and transportation can lead to a prospect of growth for the Adriatic region and its most northern ports.

In the light of what has been mentioned above, this paper examines the following aspects: connecting infrastructures within the EU cohesion and integration policies; the Upper Adriatic region in the framework of the south–north routes between Europe and the Mediterranean; the role of Trieste between its historic vocation for internationalization and future scenarios, as well as the complex issue of the relations between city and port, which is a topical subject for those who deal with territorial themes (geographers, town planners, economists, historians, etc.); finally, prospects and strategies in a common scenario of integration and cooperation between port cities, which keep track of the questions related to sustainable development.

PROSPECTS FOR THE UPPER ADRIATIC REGION IN THE EU INFRASTRUCTURAL POLICIES

The transport sector is international by its nature. Therefore, on the one hand, its external dimension must be well integrated in the general EU transport policy and, on the other hand, the transport policy must be part of wider relations with third countries and external organizations (Commission of the European Communities 2006).

It is common knowledge that the EU transport policy aims at the creation of a multimodal transport system that effectively integrates land and sea transport networks. In particular, the White Paper on

Transport (Commission of the European Communities 2001) highlights how the double objective of enlargement and sustainable development demands actions to improve the transport system in order to make it economically, socially and environmentally sustainable. The risks deriving from traffic congestion problems might undermine the competitiveness of the European economy if they are not adequately managed. [85]

In 2007, the European Commission launched a series of initiatives, concerning ports and logistics, through the following communications: 'Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union;' 'The EU's Freight Transport Agenda;' 'An EU Port Policy' and 'Freight Transport Action Plan.' Furthermore, a Communication of 21 January 2009 fixed the 'Strategic Goals and Recommendations for the EU Maritime Transport Policy until 2018' to support the EU maritime transport in the globalized markets through the development of human resources, skills and maritime know-how so that Europe could become a world leader in maritime research and innovation (Commission of the European Communities 2009).

The rebalancing of transport modes is one of the main goals of a transport policy pursuing a sustainable development. To that end, one of the suggested measures is the promotion of maritime traffic, particularly short sea shipping, able to make up for the congestion of certain road infrastructures and for the lack of rail infrastructures. Over the last ten years, the EU planning has been related to the 'Trans European Network' (TEN), which includes the fundamental corridors and hubs of the whole EU and non-EU transport system that must be considered as invariants for the strategic planning choices. Hence the need to create real 'sea highways' in the framework of TEN guidelines, envisaging better connections between ports and railway and waterway networks as well as the improvement of the quality of port services. The strategy of European corridors pursues the goal to identify transnational routes and infrastructures, which can boost the material circulation of people and goods, besides the mobility of capitals, services and ideas, and to help overcome the traditional national physical and organizational barriers. Thus, the question does not imply only transport and infrastructural aspects but also prefigures the medium-

and long-term evolution of the economic and spatial relations of the continent and the consequent development of eastern and southern peripheral areas (Migliorini 2004). Therefore, it is indispensable to build and strengthen a network of corridors (among which the Adri-
[86] atic and Danubian Corridors and, transversally, Corridors 5 and 8) conceived as the fundamentals of a strategy for the development of the territories they run through and as permeable pathways able to establish relations with the space surrounding them.

The main specific measures of the EU transport policy refer to the two essential European principles of 'subsidiarity' and 'non discrimination:' the former assumes that the European Union can act only if interests, which are higher than those of the single countries, prevail; the latter presupposes that national policies do not damage or favour specific businesses on the basis of their nationality.

Considering the expected development of the Mediterranean traffic and the completion of the great European transport networks, the Adriatic side might become a strategic hub in the international maritime trade. In particular, the port system of the Upper Adriatic region might provide a privileged access to the Central and Eastern European markets for the goods coming from the Far East and take market shares away from the Northern Range area (with the ports of Rotterdam, Hamburg, Antwerp, Bremen and Le Havre), since it would allow for cut navigation times to e cut by 5 days. At present, the Northern Range absorbs over 67% of the European container traffic (44 mln/TEU compared to 22 mln/TEU of the European ports in the Mediterranean) and, in 2008, the ports of Rotterdam and Hamburg alone managed 31% of the European container traffic (10.7 mln/TEU and 9.7 mln/TEU respectively). Even Italian businesses are turning to the big Northern European ports, and over 40% of the goods from/to the Italian market are projected to transit through foreign ports.

Since the Upper Adriatic region, which has always been strongly integrated in the service of a richer market area (Bavaria and Central Europe), has not yet shown its capacity to be a crucial connection between that area and the Far East through the Suez Canal, there is a great need for conditions of competitiveness, port and railway services and infrastructures that can lead primary shipping companies to trans-

fer their traffic from the ports in Northern Europe to the Mediterranean, bearing in mind that any form of inefficiency penalizes even the areas with an excellent geographical location. At the same time, it is indispensable to make precise and high-profile choices of transport policy and to adopt all the organizational measures that can promote the efficiency of rail freight transport within a solid framework of integrated logistics. [87]

The EU transport policy is generally aimed at facilitating trade in the internal market and between the internal market and the neighbouring countries of the European Union. Therefore, it is a support policy for two key EU competences: internal market and external trade. The idea underlying the creation of the Trans-European Networks of Transport TEN-T is that the planning and investments of the Member States in this field should be made in a framework which should be shared and agreed upon and eventually give rise to a real common European network envisaging two levels of planning: the global network and priority projects. The infrastructural projects for the construction of specific road and rail corridors, which directly concern the Adriatic region, are: Corridor 5 (railway axis Lyons–Milan–Trieste–Divača–Ljubljana–Kiev), which connects the European western quadrant to Kiev; the Adriatic–Baltic Axis, which connects the Adriatic Sea with the Baltic Sea through Italy, Austria, Czech Republic and Poland. These intermodal axes are supported to the south by the Mediterranean ports and by the Adriatic port systems.

Worth-mentioning is a study (Honsell, Malinconico, and Maresca 2006) which aims at defining a reference conceptual diagram that can be used to adopt specific and consistent measures and to revert to a system that directs traffic from the south towards Europe and favours the Adriatic port facilities, for their railway network and integrated logistics, and port/railway systems strictly coordinated with the main corridors. Therefore, a maritime policy supporting the routes, which extend from the north-east and the north-west to the north, is necessary to focus attention on certain ports-corridors (meant as strategic port systems at the root of the corridors), such as Trieste, Monfalcone, Koper and Venice, in order to take up the challenge of Pontebbana (axis of Tarvisio) and of Corridor 5 (axis of Ljubljana). The latter

is an important dare since it implies the transfer of the goods transit from its traditional pathway north of the Alps to a new one to the south; it is a strategic intergenerational infrastructure aimed at achieving goals of cohesion and integration. The great railway and highway
[88] infrastructural axis plays a crucial role both for the countries it crosses (Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Slovakia, Bosnia, Ukraine, Hungary) and for the surrounding areas, which will indirectly benefit from the improvement of the transit routes, in particular of the connection with the other corridors going to the south (corridors 4, 7 and 10), through the Balkan peninsula, and assuring the access to the East.

Nevertheless, this prospect may become much more significant if, instead of being meant only as a transversal work – within the horizontal traffic to the south of the Alps, in a Lyons-Kiev market dimension –, it will be also considered within the vertical traffic from the Mediterranean to Europe. Certain parts of Corridor 5 are not important only in the long term for the traffic to the south of the Alps, but they are also urgent in order to link the Mediterranean to Europe through the Loetschberg, Gotthard, Brenner and Pontebbana passes. Such a corridor is of crucial importance for Trieste-Koper-Monfalcone area, for Friuli, Veneto and Slovenia. Its flow includes the infrastructural actions aimed at supporting the ports of Trieste and Koper, such as the 6-kilometre link that will unify them, as well as the actions to connect the port system of the Upper Adriatic region with Pontebbana (Tarvisio pass) and the industrial districts of Friuli with the Brenner Pass and Slovenia. In any case, these port systems must direct traffic towards southern Europe and implement effective forms of intermodality.

As regards the 'Baltic-Adriatic corridor' (EU Priority Project no. 23), which is considered as one of the priority corridors and will link the Baltic Sea with Vienna, an ongoing study (for which 3.7 million Euros have been allocated, 2.9 of them coming from EU funds), called the Baltic-Adriatic Transport Cooperation (Batco), is dealing with the extension of its route from Vienna to Graz, Klagenfurt and Udine, with branches leading to Trieste, on one side, and to Venice-Bologna-Ravenna, on the other. 19 regions of the 5 countries concerned by the 'corridor' are participating in the project: not only Austria and Italy,

but also Poland, Slovakia and Czech Republic. The basic idea is to create a corridor which links the two seas of new Europe, thus laying the foundations for a socio-economic development of the territories crossed by this railway axis; favouring the rail transport solution for heavy bulk traffic; developing new trade routes through the Friuli Venezia Giulia port system (a fundamental element of the Baltic-Adriatic route); and connecting with new markets in Poland, Russia and Finland. From an infrastructural point of view, its implementation would focus European and national investments on the double-tracking of the Ronchi-Cervignano-Udine railway line, which would allow for exploitation of the potentials of the ports of Trieste, Monfalcone and Porto Nogaro.

Always regarding the north-south route, the EU transport policy is perfectly in line with the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), established at the Paris Summit of the Euro-Mediterranean Heads of State and Government on 13 July 2008, as a logical development and consolidation of the Barcelona Process (1995). It encompasses the 27 EU Member States and Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Occupied Territories, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Albania, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Monaco and Mauritania, while the Arab League and Libya are observer members. 'Maritime and land highways' are among the six UfM priority projects: they should integrate the Euro-Mediterranean transport system with the Trans-European network and improve the relations between states and regional trade by developing waterways, port and land infrastructures and by increasing marine safety (De Andreis 2010).

Therefore, the competitiveness of the port system of the Upper Adriatic region necessarily depends on a choice of transport policy which involves connecting infrastructures (the European corridors), port terminals and Central European reference markets.

TRIESTE AND ITS PORT BETWEEN HISTORY AND FUTURE

Within the framework of an enlarged EU, which envisages the development and construction of maritime and land infrastructural networks, as well as a new central role of the Adriatic ports as vital points of

trade between Europe and the Mediterranean, Trieste enjoys a crucial position: its name appears on all the studies and documents concerning the EU enlargement to the east; on the infrastructural network plans, particularly those concerning Corridor 5 and the development

of maritime and port infrastructures. The ongoing changes, which are related to both the European political and institutional evolution and the global economic and territorial processes, are showing, once again, the important strategic location of the city as the 'gateway-bridge' of Western Europe towards the eastern and Balkan area and the Mediterranean. In this context, it is evident that Trieste has the opportunity to play a geopolitical role of 'linking area,' not only in the territorial and economic field, but also in the cultural and social sphere, by creating a system with the neighbouring ports and reasserting the crucial role of the Adriatic region in the Euro-Mediterranean area.

Outlining the salient points of the history of Trieste in the Euro-Mediterranean context can be a useful starting point to reflect upon the future. Since the 18th century, the already existing nature of the Adriatic region as a link between Europe and the Mediterranean has found its highest expression in the city-emporium of Trieste. In fact, its free port was established in 1719 after the will of Emperor Charles VI, with the purpose of creating a free area to the benefit of businesses. The following creation of adequate infrastructural connections, which had been lacking until then, enabled the nascent port city to slowly replace Venice in the Mediterranean traffic network. In this regard, particularly worth mentioning is the construction of the road to Ljubljana, which allowed traffic to reach Crainburg and Neumarkt and, from here, Vilalco and Klagenfurt; while the road to Cilli continued towards Graz, Bruck and Vienna and allowed traffic to reach the eastern markets and Hungary as far as Temesvàr. The trade with the Empire was then followed by the opening to Hungary and Croatia, the strengthening of trade with the Turkish Bosnia and the Ottoman gateway and the new agreements with Spain.

The idea of the city-emporium was originally inspired to develop the conception of the port as a place of storage and exposition: the destiny of port facilities was much influenced by the possibility of the goods remaining in the warehouses to be exposed and sold. It was a

great market with absolute free access and able to enhance the birth of a lively heterogeneous urban merchant community, made up of different religious and social communities, which could live together respectful of their respective traditions (Pultrone 2007). It is particularly noteworthy, also considering modern society, that international trade was exactly the unifying element of different religious and social communities.

There existed other aspects making of the Trieste port system the real factor of diversity and characterization of the whole region and almost the prerequisite for the construction of an intermodal system and for the promotion of an international traffic flow. Such aspects were: its strategic position in relation to Central Europe; a special legal status, which dated back to the 17th century and obliged nation-states to guarantee access according to the principle of non-discrimination. As long ago as in the late 19th century, the function of city-emporium failed and the idea of a transit/industrial port emerged, owing to a greater interest of the Habsburg administration in the promotion of international trade and logistics. In particular, railway systems were modernized and the relations with the Far East were strengthened; new regulations allowed any carrier to reach the port of Trieste both from the sea and from land infrastructures, without any discrimination and any cost, unless they were justified by services actually rendered to goods. The construction of the New Port (today's Old Port) was the most modern logistic achievement of the time. It was served by an internal railway infrastructure, which is still the most important in Italy (with a 70-km total internal network of service reaching all terminals and a connection with the dry port areas of Carso, from Ferretti to Opicina), connected with Vienna by the Southern Railway (Südbhan), which linked Trieste with the Empire through Slovenia. The effectiveness of a transit port is evaluated not so much by its capacity to stock goods for long periods as by the low costs, by the yields and by its capacity to forward an increasingly large quantity of goods. Thus, in the late 19th century, the conditions for modern international logistics, which would develop between the '60s and the '70s with the advent of containerization, had already been created (Honsell, Malinconico, and Maresca 2006).

The foregoing shows that, as it has happened in other Mediterranean cities, the port is the main factor of development of Trieste and gives origin to deep changes, both in the spatial organization and in the management of the different activities (Pultrone 2004). As regards the
[92] general physical and functional aspects of the complex city-port relation, Rinio Bruttomesso (2002) has carefully analysed current trends in order to identify scenarios for a sustainable development compatible with the different needs. The changes in the transport sector inevitably imply a new layout of the urban structure that may lead to a new configuration of port cities, which would become interesting workshops, due to their high number of infrastructures for the transportation of goods and people. Since the introduction of containers demands increasingly larger spaces, it is necessary to evaluate the aspects that concern the urban dimension of the port and lead to the inevitable confrontation between port and city resulting from the search for adequate solutions to the problems of development. Those aspects are: the search for new spaces to extend the activity; the tendency to locate the new facilities in fringe areas; the effort to improve the accessibility to port areas; the choice of intermodality for goods handling and the redevelopment of derelict port areas. An action concerted between the port authority and the local authority is necessary to clearly define the criteria and rules for a harmonious coexistence in the same urban and territorial framework.

In this city, which is of great interest from a town planning point of view, the areas of contact between port and city show special morphological characteristics and different composition and geometries in comparison with other urban areas. Two types of physical planning converge on these spaces: the town planning of local authorities and the port planning of the managers of infrastructures. Over the last decades, the port has undergone important processes of transformation, and the coexistence of the two types of planning has not been easy. The Port Master Plan, provided for by the national law 84/94, should be the occasion of a positive exchange of ideas. It should not limit itself to listing the works to be carried out, following an exclusively port-oriented logic, but it should seek the possible connections with the global development of the city and of the territory as a whole,

particularly taking into account the following aspects: the accessibility to port areas; the organization of the infrastructural transport network; environmental issues affecting both the specific port area and the stretch of sea in front of it. That is also the purpose of the Port Master Plan of Trieste, which has been recently approved (2010). In any case, it is important to be aware that the quality of port areas and buildings is a primary objective and that the port can be an opportunity for urban regeneration. All the more so because, when the redefinition of the city-port relation becomes a topical subject, it is necessary to pursue the double objective to favour the development of the economic system and to safeguard the identity of the urban system.

Over the last fifteen years, in Trieste, general and sectoral programmes, plans and projects have alternated with feasibility studies and design contests with the common will of local authorities to reassert the central role of the city as a territorial and economic, but also cultural and social 'linking area' between Europe and the Mediterranean. The following are the most significant themes: maritime and land transport infrastructures; the regeneration of the waterfront and of derelict areas; the redevelopment of the whole urban area and of its surroundings (e. g. karst villages); the extension of the port areas, due to the expected increase in traffic following the completion of Corridor 5, the extension of Pier 7, the construction of the Logistic Centre in the area between the Timber terminal and the former Italsider steelworks and of the consequent road and rail connections (Pultrone 2004). The need to include the single projects of transformation in a shared strategic vision, the capacity to elaborate innovative forms of management of plans, projects and partnerships with a strong local character and the decisive importance of time as a crucial variable in a rapidly evolving context must lead to an immediate action to start the engine of development, so that Trieste can be projected into the future with a new Euro-Mediterranean role.

ONGOING EXPERIENCES OF INTEGRATION IN THE UPPER ADRIATIC REGION

The strategic role of the Adriatic region, as a transboundary area whose port cities are the nodes of a complex set of relations focussed

on its northern coasts, is best highlighted in the transport and communication sector. Frequent references have been made to the function/vocation of port cities as intermodal poles linking sea and land transport, as hinges between the Mediterranean and continental Eu-
[94] rope. The guidelines of the EU transport policy relaunch the idea of the Adriatic area as a transboundary region, as a basin of culture and trade meant as a channel of communication between the parties of a wide geopolitical system. In the past, the advantage gained from the position of its ports, cutting navigation times by four to five days compared to North European ports, was lost due to a number of difficulties, such as the lack of an adequate railway and road infrastructural network, which could optimize the integration and multimodality of the transport systems, as well as political, economic and legal impediments. Then, it is indispensable to implement the most suitable strategies to overcome the problems, e. g. activities of cooperation between ports, avoiding local competitions and defining a single port system, with specific specializations in the different ports, able to compete with north European ports.

When ports demand large areas to stock incoming and outgoing goods, when intermodal railway terminals must be constructed and when the railway plays a crucial role, then the elements of interdependence increase. The debate about port facilities concerns also dry port areas and railway services and, in particular, the integration between ports and dry ports situated on the corridors. In order to promote the traffic on the corridor and to be competitive with north European ports, it is necessary to create a single port system, with one or more dry port terminals, able to support the traffic from the south and to direct it to central Europe. The presence of growing traffic flows, above all from the Far East, to be redirected to the strategic south-north routes, leads to the indispensable extension of the port areas of Venice, Trieste, Monfalcone and Koper to one or more dry port terminals, between Fernetti and Sežana, on the one hand, and Cervignano, on the other. The proposal envisages a system that provides container terminals supported by two large dry port terminals, as well as the establishment of an international Port Authority of the Upper Adriatic region whose competence encompasses also dry

port areas and connecting infrastructures (Honsell, Malinconico and Maresca 2006).

Considering that the homogeneity of the Adriatic region was historically based precisely on a network of port cities, for which actual favourable conditions of growth and development are expected today, only the integration of transport systems and intermodality can lead to positive results and to the closure of the gap with north European port facilities – which are highly competitive, have high traffic volumes and have been able so far to attract a considerable part of the hinterland of Mediterranean ports, thanks to the presence of adequate organizational systems, logistic facilities and proper infrastructures (Pultrone 2004).

Recent initiatives inspire great hopes of integration and Adriatic cooperation. Among them, in May 2010, the start-up of a project of the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AII) for the creation of a macroregion within 2014. The AII includes three EU Member States (Italy, Slovenia and Greece) and five accession and pre-accession countries (Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania). The strategy aims at involving more the western Balkans by strengthening the *governance* and the economic capacity of these countries. At the same time, it will be intended to consolidate the strategy of cooperation with the Balkan area favouring the interaction with the strongest shores of the Middle and Upper Adriatic region.

The establishment of the North Adriatic Port Association (NAPA) with the ports of Trieste, Venice, Ravenna and Koper, in March 2010, is of particular importance for the ports of the Northern Adriatic region. In fact, it is an alternative to the north European ports for the goods directed to Central and Eastern Europe. The overall estimated investments (about 3.4 billion Euros) will be earmarked to improve the competitiveness of the port system of the Upper Adriatic region. The planning guidelines and the already strengthened services are arousing the strong interest of the administrations of the neighbouring European regions, among which Carinthia and Bavaria, and of the different operators of international markets. The strategy is based on the development of existing competences and infrastructures, which should be introduced in the logic of a system, by channelling international trade

flows from and to Europe, developing intermodality through connections with the hinterland, through the switch from road transport to rail transport and through the extension of terminals. Thus, the main purpose is to harmonize regulations, times and procedures of port operations.

Therefore, the most important port cities of the Upper Adriatic region (Trieste, Venice, Ravenna, Koper in Slovenia and Rijeka in Croatia) are thinking together of the possibility of creating a system, of the great opportunities of trade, of which they can become the protagonists, within an area, rich in innumerable historical, cultural, environmental and economic resources, that can assert its central role in the Euro-Mediterranean context.

In this scenario, ports become not only intermodal elements, but also engines of a possible geopolitical transformation, beyond the administrative borders of the single states and regions, aimed at creating an Adriatic Euro-region that, starting from the principle of an economic development obtained through virtuous transport, enables a sustainable environmental, economic and social development.

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

Résumés

Regard sur Ankara depuis Strasbourg : étude empirique du comportement des députés européens au sujet de la Turquie

STEFANO BRAGHIROLI

L'article analyse comment les députés européens créént leur perception de la Turquie et de quelle façon cette perception influence leur vote sur la question de la Turquie dans les débats parlementaires. Les études récentes (Baldwin 2005 ; Braghiroli 2012 ; Canan-Sokullu 2011) montrent que les débats sur l'adhésion de la Turquie à l'Union Européenne (UE) ont une influence décisive sur la dynamique de vote et sur le positionnement au sein du Parlement Européen. Etant donné son importance nationale et politique, la question de la Turquie divise et peut sensiblement influencer le vote des députés européens. Les positions des députés au sujet de la Turquie vont d'un soutien enthousiaste à une véritable turcophobie. Encore plus impressionante est la diversité de positions individuelles qui émergent à l'intérieur d'un même champs politique/idéologique. Dans quelle mesure les perceptions de la Turquie influencent le vote des députés européens quand la Turquie est en jeu au Parlement Européen ? Quel est l'impact de cet état de fait sur la cohésion interne d'un groupe du PE ? Notre étude a pour objectif de répondre à ces deux questions fondamentales utilisant deux bases de données différentes. Un sondage d'élite nous a permis de saisir les perceptions des députés européens au sujet de la Turquie. Quant à leur comportement de vote, celui-ci a été analysé à la lumière des voix exprimées.

Mots clés : Parlement Européen ; adhésion de la Turquie ; perceptions ; comportement de vote

IJEMS 6 (1): 3–22

Corrélation entre la culture nationale et le capital intellectuel dans les pays membres de l'UE

VALERIU IOAN-FRANC, KLEMEN ŠIROK et LAURA-MARIA DINDIRE

Notre article étudie la nature et l'intensité de la liason entre la culture nationale et le capital intellectuel. Il se propose d'analyser les relations entre les différents paramètres de culture nationale (tels que définis par Geert Hofstede) et les trois dimensions du capital intellectuel dans les pays de l'UE. Procédures de recherche utilisées : l'analyse du contenu des modèles les plus

représentatifs ; méthodologies appliquées à l'étude du capital intellectuel et des paramètres de culture nationale ; analyse de corrélation. Notre recherche permet de conclure que la culture nationale a une influence sur le capital intellectuel. Elle démontre également que certaines dimensions de la culture nationale, telles que l'Individualisme par rapport au Collectivisme et l'Indulgence par rapport aux Restrictions, ont une corrélation positive au capital culturel, tendis que d'autres, comme le Pouvoir de Distance et le Contrôle de l'Incertitude, ont une corrélation négative au capital intellectuel.

Mots clés : culture nationale ; capital intellectuel ; matrice de corrélation de la culture nationale au capital intellectuel ; modèle conceptuel
IJEMS 6 (1): 23–42

L'importance des objectifs de travail et des domaines de la vie au sein des communautés juive, chrétienne et musulmane en Israël

MOSHE SHARABI

Les valeurs de travail chez les Juifs en Israël ont été largement étudiées, tandis qu'on ne dispose pas d'étude consacrée aux valeurs de travail au sein des minorités ethno-religieuses d'Israël. La présente étude repose sur le questionnaire Meaning-of-Working (MOW) qui a été soumis à un échantillon d'employés de la population israélienne active comprenant les trois communautés (juive, musulmane et chrétienne. Nous avons analysé et comparé entre elles la place qu'occupent les différents domaines de la vie et celle des principaux objectifs de travail au sein de chacune des trois communautés religieuses d'Israël. Les conclusions révèlent des différences significatives quant à l'importance des différents domaines de la vie et des principaux objectifs de travail au sein de chacune des trois communautés. Les conclusions sembler indiquer que les valeurs des Arabes-chrétiens se trouvent quelque part entre celles de la communauté juive et musulmane et que leurs moyens sont plus proches de ceux des Juifs que de ceux des Musulmans. L'analyse de régression montre que les variables démographiques ne jouent pas de rôle majeur dans l'explication des différences de valeur entre les membres des trois communautés religieuses. Ce sont les facteurs culturels, sociaux et économiques, notamment le conflit israélo-palestinien, qui permettent en partie d'expliquer ces différences.

Mots clés : valeurs de travail ; Juifs ; Chrétiens ; Musulmans ; Conflits ethniques ; Israël
IJEMS 6 (1): 43–64

Collaboration entre recherches, education superieur et entreprises : implications pour l'innovation

VALERIJ DERMOL, NADA TRUNK ŠIRCA, KATARINA BABNIK et KRISTIJAN BREZNIK

Développer des interconnexions de réseaux intonatives peut influencer positivement sur la performance de recherche et du développement, augmente la création des nouveaux connaissances, le transfert de technologie et exporte des produits de haute technologie dans un pays. Dans notre étude, nous faisons l'analyse de quelque mécanisme des interconnexions de réseaux en Slovénie qui ont été introduits pour créer des synergies intonatives entre recherches, éducation supérieure et secteur d'entreprises : Centres de Compétence, Centres des Excellence et Centres du Développement. Par cette analyse nous confirmons des suppositions basics qui viennent de théorie d'interconnexion de réseaux. Nous avons trouvé que : communautés intonatives (ou groups des personnes) normalement consistent des membres qui viennent des disciplines similaires ou industries dont l'histoire de coopération représente un élément important de coopération intonative, et que ces groups sont généralement géographiquement concentrés. En plus, nous avons confirmé et révélé quelques problèmes liés au développent technologique slovène et par conséquent la réalisation économique. Les résultats de cette analyse sont discutes aussi en relation des caractéristiques culturelles slovènes.

Mots clés : interconnexion de réseaux, innovation, analyse sociale des interconnexions de réseaux

IJEMS 6 (1): 65–80

Vers de nouveaux scénarios pour l'intégration de l'Europe et de la Méditerranée : perspectives et stratégies pour Trieste et la haute mer Adriatique

GABRIELLA PULTRONE

Les dynamiques économiques globales jouent un rôle déterminant dans la transformation du territoir. Elles agissent sur les relations entre les villes en obligeant ces dernières à mieux définir leurs fonctions respectives afin de renforcer leur visibilité/compétitivité internationale. Les régions littorales possédant des quais pour les navires de haute mer ont gagné en importance stratégique grâce à la réduction progressive du coût du transport maritime par rapport au coût du transport terrestre. Dès le début des années Quatre-vingt-dix, le rôle de la Méditerranéenne a été renforcé par le

développement des axes de communication principaux. Aujourd'hui, après une période d'incertitudes, des signes de reprise, notamment la croissance des économies émergentes de l'Afrique du Nord et des pays de l'Extrême-Orient commencent à apparaître. La Haute Mer Adriatique et ses villes portuaires dont Trieste, qui se détachent par leur vocation historique d'internationalisation et par une infrastructure moderne, ont ainsi l'opportunité de s'ériger en réseau et d'affirmer leur rôle stratégique au sein de l'espace euro-méditerranéen.

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Mots clés : transport maritime ; Trieste ; Haute Adriatique
IJEMS 6 (1): 81–97

Povzetki

Pogled na Ankaro iz Strasbourga: empirična ocena glasovanja evropskih poslancev o Turčiji

STEFANO BRAGHIROLI

Članek preučuje način, kako poslanci Evropskega parlamenta (poslanci) obravnavajo Turčijo in kako to vpliva na njihovo glasovalno stališče do Ankare v parlamentarnih razpravah. Nedavne študije (Baldwin 2005, Braghiroli 2012, Canan-Sokullu 2011) so pokazale, da ima razprava o članstvu Turčije v Evropski uniji (EU) zelo razdiralni učinek na dinamiko glasovanja in razdelitev volilnih glasov v Evropskem parlamentu (EP), v nacionalnem in političnem smislu. Parlamentarna stališča glede »turškega diskurza« segajo od navdušene podpore do odprte Turkofobije. Še bolj presenetljiva je široka paleta individualnih stališč, ki se jih splošno gledano lahko uvrsti v isto politično/ideološko območje. V kolikšni meri se različni pogledi in predstavitve Turčije s strani poslancev Evropskega parlamenta odražajo v načinu glasovanja glede Turčije v Evropskem parlamentu? In kaj je vpliv tega stanja na notranjo kohezijo skupin? Ta študija obravnava ti dve temeljni vprašanji s pomočjo uporabe dveh različnih virov podatkov. Da bi zajeli poslansko dojemanje Turčije, se uporabljajo anketni podatki, medtem ko se ravnanje poslancev presoja na podlagi izraženih glasov.

Ključne besede: evropski parlament; članstvo Turčije; zaznave; volilno vedenje
IJEMS 6 (1): 3–22

Raziskave o nacionalni kulturi: medsebojna povezanost intelektualnega kapitala v državah EU

VALERIU IOAN-FRANC, KLEMEN ŠIROK in LAURA-MARIA DINDIRE

Namen članka je opredeliti vrsto in intenzivnost razmerja med nacionalno kulturno dimenzijo in dimenzijo intelektualnega kapitala. Namen prispevka je analizirati korelacije nacionalnih razsežnosti kulture, ki temeljijo na pristopu Geerta Hofstedeja, s pomočjo treh dimenzij intelektualnega kapitala znotraj držav članic EU. Raziskovalne metode so bile: analiza vsebine najbolj reprezentativnih modelov, metodologija za vrednotenje intelektualnega kapitala in nacionalne razsežnosti kulture ter primerjalna analiza. Glavni rezultat naših raziskav razkriva vpliv nacionalne kulture na uspešnost intelektualnega kapitala. Prav tako kaže, da se pri nekaterih dimenzijah nacionalne kulture,

kot je individualizem v primerjavi s kolektivizmom in užitkarstvo v primerjavi s samoobvladovanjem, intelektualni kapital izraža pozitivno, medtem ko se pri drugih dimenzijah, kot sta odsotnost moči in izogibanje negotovosti, izraža negativno.

Ključne besede: nacionalna kultura; intelektualni kapital; konceptualni model
IJEMS 6 (1): 23–42

Pomen delovnih ciljev in življenjskih domen med judi, kristjani in muslimani v Izraelu

MOSHE SHARABI

Delovne vrednote med judi v Izraelu se proučujejo že več desetletij, za razliko od tega pa poskusov preučevanja delovnih vrednot med etnično-verskimi manjšinami v Izraelu ni bilo. Študija temelji na anketi o pomenu dela, opravljeni na vzorcu zaposlenih izraelske delovne sile, ki je vključevala jude, muslimane in kristjane. Proučuje in primerja osrednjost življenjskih domen in prednostne delovne cilje med tremi verskimi skupinami v Izraelu. Ugotovitve kažejo pomembne razlike glede pomembnosti vseh življenjskih domen in več prednostnih ciljev dela med judi, muslimani in kristjani. Ugotovitve kažejo, da se vrednote arabskih kristjanov nahajajo pretežno med vrednotami judov in muslimanov, njihove ocenjene vrednote pa so bližje vrednotam judov kot muslimanov. Regresijska analiza je pokazala, da demografske spremenljivke komaj lahko razložijo razlike med vrednotami pripadnikov treh religij. Ugotovitve je mogoče razložiti s kulturnimi, družbenimi in gospodarskimi dejavniki in predvsem z izraelsko-arabskim/palestinskim konfliktom.

Ključne besede: delovne vrednote; judje; kristijani; muslimani; medetnični spori; Izrael
IJEMS 6 (1): 43–64

Povezave med raziskavami, visokim šolstvom in gospodarstvom: vpliv na inovativnost

VALERIJ DERMOL, NADA TRUNK ŠIRCA, KATARINA BABNIK in KRISTIJAN BREZNIK

Razvoj inovacijskih mrež lahko v državi pozitivno vpliva na uspešnost raziskav in razvoja, vzpodbudi ustvarjanje novega znanja ter poveča prenos tehnologij in izvoz visokih tehnologij. V naši raziskavi smo preučili nekatere mehanizme mreženja v Sloveniji, ki so bili vpeljani, da bi ustvarili sinergije

med raziskavami, visokim šolstvom in gospodarstvom: centre kompetenčnosti, centre odličnosti in razvojne centre. V raziskavi smo potrdili temeljne predpostavke, ki izhajajo iz teorije mreženja. Ugotovili smo, da člani inovativnih grozdov (ali skupin) praviloma prihajajo iz podobnih disciplin ali panog, da je zgodovina sodelovanja pomembna za inovativno sodelovanje, in da so skupine praviloma zgoščene na posameznih zemljepisnih področjih.

Ključne besede: mreženje; inovativnost; analiza socialnih omrežij
IJEMS 6 (1): 65–80

Približevanje novim scenarijem za integracijo Evrope in Sredozemlja: načrti in strategije za Trst in zgornjo jadransko regijo

GABRIELLA PULTRONE

Globalna gospodarska dinamika bistveno vpliva na ozemeljske spremembe in odnose med mesti, ki bolje opredeljujejo svoje naloge ter izboljšujejo svojo podobo za povečanje mednarodne konkurenčnosti. Obalna območja so s privezi za morska plovila okrepila strateški pomen zahvaljujoč postopnemu zmanjševanju stroškov pomorskega prometa v primerjavi s stroški kopenskega prometa. Od zgodnjih 90. let se vloga Sredozemlja krepi v smislu glavnih poti in po kritičnem obdobju danes kaže znake okrevanja, predvsem v odnosu do rasti razvijajočih se gospodarstev Severne Afrike in držav Daljnega vzhoda. Po tem scenariju ima zgornja jadranska regija s svojimi pristaniškimi mesti, med katerimi Trst izstopa po svoji zgodovinski nagnjenosti k internacionalizaciji in s sodobno infrastrukturo, možnost ustvariti sistem, da uveljavi svojo strateško vlogo v evro-sredozemskem prostoru.

Ključne besede: pomorski transport; Trst; zgornja jadranska regija
IJEMS 6 (1): 81–97



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