57
DOI: 10.17573/cepar.2022.1.03	 1.01	Original	scientific	article
Government Responses to COVID-19: 
A Comparative Analysis of Visegrad 
Countries
Zafer Koca
Köyceğiz Yüksekkum MTAL, Turkey
z_koca@yahoo.com
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2592-1530
Received: 1. 3. 2021
Revised: 2. 1. 2022
Accepted: 12. 4. 2022
Published: 31. 5. 2022
ABSTRACT
Purpose: The purpose of this study is to compare government responses 
and the challenges faced by public authorities in the Visegrad/V4 coun-
tries during the Covid-19 outbreak.
Design/Methodology/Approach: The study is based on a compara-
tive analysis method. In this study, we analysed government responses 
through literature review and data obtained from various databases. The 
data used in the study were collected from ourworldindata.org, OECD, 
WHO, World Bank, Eurostat databases, CoronaNET dataset and Covid-19 
Government Response Tracker.
Findings: The Visegrad countries did well during the initial phase of the 
Covid-19 pandemic. Compared to many other countries in Europe or in 
the world, they had less cases and lower death rates. What made them 
successful was timely and decisive reactions and harsh measures to curb 
Covid-19. They all implemented Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions strict-
ly. Mandatory mask wearing, trust in the government and people’s ten-
dency to obey the rules all helped V4 members in the fight against Cov-
id-19. However, in two countries (Poland and Hungary) of the V4 Group, 
democracy was in decline during the outbreak.
Practical Implications: The study shows that pandemics spread rapidly 
and affect many countries within a short time. They have a significant 
impact on public health, the economy, and social and political structures 
of the countries. In order to reduce or prevent their effects, the govern-
ments must provide a timely response. Timing is a key success factor in 
the fight against the pandemics and helps minimise the consequences 
thereof.
Originality/Value: The study aims to contribute a detailed and compara-
tive analysis of government responses and challenges of V4 countries in 
the fight against Covid-19 in the initial stage of the outbreak.
Keywords: Covid-19, government responses, Visegrad countries, NPIs, policy responses
JEL:
Koca, Z. (2022). Government Responses to COVID-19: A Comparative Analysis of 
Visegrad Countries. 
Central European Public Administration Review, 20(1), pp. 57–84
2591-2259/© 2022 University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Public Administration.
This is an open access article under the CC-BY-NC-ND license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Central European Public Administration Review, Vol. 20, No. 1/202258
Zafer Koca
1 Introduction
Human beings have undoubtedly witnessed various pandemics which affect-
ed different parts of the world. Many people died because of these outbreaks. 
Although the results or effects were different, in general, they emerged as a 
global problem. However, in terms of the country and population it affects, 
the Coronavirus (Covid-19/SARS COV-2/Novel Coronavirus) pandemic is the 
most important of all. The outbreak is still ongoing and there is uncertainty 
about when it will end. COVID-19 (SARS-COV 2), a member of coronavirus fam-
ily such as the SARS (South Asian Respiratory Syndrome) and MERS (Middle 
East Respiratory Syndrome) outbreaks (Şencan and Kuzi, 2020, p. 364) faced 
by the world since early 2000s, first emerged in Wuhan Province of China (Lee 
et al., 2020, p. 364) as clusters of pneumonia cases (Chen et al.., 2020, p. 507) 
in the last quarter of 2019. Although the source or the origin has not been 
fully identified, the virus is thought to be emerged at a fish market in Wuhan, 
China (Zhu et al.., 2020, p. 728; Zu et al., 2020, p. E15; Lu et al., 2020, p. 401).
After the first case identified in China on 12 December 2019, it started to 
spread the other countries within a short time. When they informed World 
Health Organization (WHO) about the virus, it was already late. Like Chinese 
government, WHO was slow in declaring the coronavirus as a pandemic, too. 
WHO first watched the process and declared the Covid-19 outbreak as a 
“Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC)” after more than 
200 people died on January 30, 2020 (Mahase, 2020, p. 1). As it was getting 
worse than expected, about one and half month later WHO officially de-
clared COVID-19/SARS-COV 2 as pandemic (WHO; 2020a). At that time there 
were 126,714 cases and 4,616 deaths across the globe. After WHO declared 
COVID-19 as pandemic, the governments started to take measures in order 
to stop or reduce the cases and deaths in their countries. As pandemics are 
different than the other crises or diseases and it is difficult to form a policy 
response, the governments’ responses varied among the countries. That is 
quite normal because most of them haven’t encountered such a crisis before 
so they have no idea what to do or how to respond to it. After a while, as they 
began learning the dynamics and the characteristics of COVID-19, they start-
ed to implement Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs) that is also known 
as public health interventions.
There are various publications for government or policy responses of Viseg-
rad (V4) countries to Covid-19. Sagan et al. (2021) analysed and compared 
the health policy responses of V4 members during first phase of Covid-19. By 
using the data from Health Policy Response Monitor they focused on the simi-
larities of V4 members. Drinóczi and Bień-kacała (2020) discussed the Cov-
id-19 Acts or pandemic related regulations in Poland and Hungary. They note 
that both countries tried to manage the process in an illiberal way. Especially, 
Hungary was an example of autocracy. Túri and Virág (2021) compared and 
evaluated the public health policies and pandemic management as well as so-
cial and economic outcomes of V4 countries and South Korea during Covid-19 
pandemic. They found that South Korea did quite well in the fight against 
Central European Public Administration Review, Vol. 20, No. 1/2022 59
Government Responses to COVID-19: A Comparative Analysis of Visegrad Countries
Covid-19 owing to the appropriate combination of NPIs and advanced health 
system. Although V4 countries did well, they need to have a well-functioning 
surveillance system, comprehensive testing strategy and transparent govern-
ment communication. In their conference paper, Kovács and Zsigmond (2020) 
analysed the economic effects of Covid-19 on V4 countries for the Spring pe-
riod of 2020 that is the first phase of the outbreak. According to the study 
V4 countries really felt the effects of Covid-19 economically. The decline in 
GDP was significant and many people lost their jobs. In their comprehensive 
literature review, Chubarova et al. (2020) analysed and identified the critical 
factors in success/failure of public policies focusing on fighting the spread 
of COVID-19 pandemic in Czech Republic, Russia, and the Slovakia. They ana-
lysed the policy responses and found that timing of public policy responses 
and success in motivating compliance may be critical factors in containing 
the pandemic. Aidukaite et al. (2021) discussed the social policy responses to 
Covid-19 in Central and Eastern European countries including Poland, Hun-
gary and Slovakia. The mentioned study shows us that governments in V4 
countries reacted to the COVID-19 crisis by providing extensive protection 
for jobs and enterprises. The authors found that “social policy responses to the 
first	wave	largely	depended	on	precious	social	policy	trajectories	as	well	as	the	
political situation of the country during the pandemic”.
This paper aims to discuss the government responses of V4 countries to 
Covid-19 and the challenges they faced during the outbreak in a comparative 
way. After introduction part, the study is structured as flows: In section two 
we give theoretical background. And then we give a brief information about 
Covid-19 in V4 countries. After methodology section, we focus on the govern-
ment responses of V4 countries and challenges that they faced in the fight 
against Covid-19. At the last section, we analyse and discuss the findings. This 
study covers only the initial phase of Covid-19 outbreak.
2 Theoretical Background: Non-pharmaceutical 
interventions (NPIs) as a response to Covid-19
Pandemics have been a problem for humanity throughout history as they af-
fect the whole society in many ways. Microorganisms, which are effective in 
spreading diseases, can spread rapidly via various ways i.e. humans. Especially 
today, modern and advanced transportation facilities have both facilitated 
and accelerated the spread of viruses. Pandemics emerged as a result of the 
rapid progress of outbreaks and the spread of them to a wider area than the 
country where they originated in.
The effects of pandemics were devastating and millions of people died. Hun-
dreds of thousands of people have also died in the ongoing COVID-19 pan-
demic. In addition to public health, its impact on the countries’ economies has 
been devastating. In order to prevent this, governments implemented vari-
ous measures. Besides the political structures of the countries and the values 
that the decisions are based on, there are other factors affecting the policy-
making process in implementing those measures. The initial conditions of the 
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Zafer Koca
pandemic and its early development, the global and regional connections of 
countries, in particular, the proximity or connection with the country/s that 
are the epicentre of the pandemic, culture of the countries (local or national) 
are some of these factors (Anttiroiko, 2021, p. 3). Efficient pandemic man-
agement is crucial. During the pandemic management government or the 
public administration must consider everything such as Non-Pharmaceutical 
Interventions, international trade and travel, economic consequences of the 
pandemic. They must find solutions for these problems on time. Pandemic 
management must also involve a vast majority of the population in order to 
be successful (Migone, 2020, p. 260).
During a severe pandemic, several measures are used to prevent or halt the 
spread of an outbreak. One of them is to introduce pharmaceutical (drug) 
interventions such as vaccines and anti-viral drugs and the other one is Non-
Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs) that are applied in cases where there are 
not enough vaccines and drugs or the treatment of the disease/outbreak is 
not yet known. NPIs are the mostly and frequently used ones that both indi-
viduals and households and communities can implement. By implementing 
these measures, the rate of person-to-person transmission of the virus can be 
reduced and thus prevent the burden of an outbreak on health systems and 
public health (paho.org). NPIs may delay the start of a pandemic, or if the pan-
demic has already started, they may prevent or delay its peak enabling health 
authorities to prepare for the outbreak. Due to the implementation of NPIs, 
the transmission of the virus in the community can be reduced, which is use-
ful especially for health systems with limited resources or capacity. They can 
reduce the overall morbidity and mortality rate even if NPIs do not reduce the 
total number of cases in the outbreak (WHO, 2019, p. 8). NPIs include isola-
tion of sick people from human and environmental cleanliness (hand washing, 
hand and surface hygiene, wearing a mask), contact tracking, quarantine of 
infected people, social distance, travel restrictions, closing schools, churches 
and workplaces, and banning people from gathering (Lai et al., 2020; Fergu-
son et al., 2020, p. 20). However, the main condition for the success of such 
interventions is the early and effective implementation at the onset of the 
pandemic. Otherwise the chance of success decreases (Nunan and Brassey, 
2020, p. 1-8). In general, it is best to wait until there is a cluster of cases of 
severe disease in the country or the region. Interventions must be proportion-
ate. If they are implemented too early, especially social distancing policies (in-
terventions) in the community level, they may cause job and income losses. If 
they are implemented too late, then virus may rapidly spread causing deaths. 
So governments must be very careful on implementing NPIs (paho.org).
Today, three different NPI strategies, including containment, mitigation and 
suppression, are adopted and implemented (Hossain et al., 2020). Contain-
ment measures are applied to prevent the infection and spread of the dis-
ease. It is also a method applied when the first cases are detected to save time 
on the health system to make preparations for patients and to wait for the de-
velopment of vaccines and effective interventions (Lai et al., 2020). Mitigation 
measures are used when the number of cases increases and the possibility of 
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Government Responses to COVID-19: A Comparative Analysis of Visegrad Countries
finding a relationship between cases is complex. A mitigation strategy is not 
aimed at cutting off transmission entirely, but rather to slow or reduce the 
health impact of an outbreak on mortality and the collapse of the health sys-
tem (Ferguson et al., 2020, p. 20). The mitigation strategy is likely to be high 
in terms of the risk of the fact that this strategy is applied because of the seri-
ous illness or death. The suppression strategy aims to reducing the number 
of secondary cases produced by each case (Patino-Lugo et al., 2020, p. 3). The 
suppression strategy has significant effects on health and well-being both in 
the short and long term.
3 Confrontation: First wave of Covid-19 in Visegrad 
countries
Compared to other EU members, Visegrad countries felt the effects of Cov-
id-19 later. Covid-19 arrived at V4 members over a month later than the first 
confirmed case in Europe. Covid-19 related cases were seen in the group 
members at almost the same time (the first week of March). Among the 
Visegrad (V4) group, the first country where the Covid-19 outbreak was de-
tected was the Czech Republic. Then the cases were also detected in Poland 
(Guasti, 2020, p. 53; gov.pol; usnews.com) and Hungary on March 04 (Röst et 
al.., 2020, p.15) and finally in Slovakia on March 06 (Nemec and Spacek, 2020, 
p. 839; Nemec, 2020; Donicova, 2020, p. 729). The first confirmed cases were 
detected in those who returned from abroad or had a contact with them. The 
first cases in the Czech Republic were in three people linked to Northern Italy 
(Brom et al.., 2020; Komenda et al.., 2020; Guha et al.., 2020), The first case in 
Poland was identified in a 66-year-old man returned from a visit to Westphalia 
(Germany) to Świecko by bus and from there to Cybinka by private vehicle. 
(Szymczak, 2020). The first cases in Hungary were detected in a 27-year-old 
university student (Röst et al.., 2020, p. 13), who was studying and residing in 
the country and recently returned from Iran and a doctoral student returned 
from Iran. The first confirmed case in Slovakia was a 52-year-old male patient 
who did not travel anywhere but he was estimated to have contracted the 
virus from his son who visited Venice, Italy on February 14-15, 2020 (Slovak 
Spektator, 07 March 2020). Because his son’s test result was positive and he 
was quarantined.
In V4 countries, the pandemic was slower than in many European countries 
and the effects were relatively weaker. After the first case detection in the 
group countries, the increase of cases followed a fluctuating course and 
peaked in April and then declined again except Poland. At the end of March 
totally 6,474 cases were detected, including 3,308 in the Czech Republic, 
2,311 in Poland, 492 in Hungary and 363 in Slovakia. As of May 31, there were 
23,786 cases in Poland, 9,268 in Czech Republic, 3,876 in Hungary and 1,521 
in Slovakia. Mortality rates were at lower levels than in many countries, too. 
Death tolls, which were very low at the end of March, increased in April and 
started to decrease again in May. On May 31, there were totally 1,938 deaths, 
that were 1,064 in Poland, 526 in Hungary, 320 in the Czech Republic and 28 
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in Slovakia (ourworldindata.org). Slovakia, in particular, has the lowest mortal-
ity rates not only among its peers but also within the EU (Gerbery, 2020).
Table 1. Cases, Deaths, Tests and Case-Fatality Rate During First Wave  
(31 May 2020)
Country
Cumulative 
Confirmed 
Cases
Cumulative 
Confirmed 
Deaths
Case-Fatality
Rate
Test Per 
1000
Poland 23.786 1.064 4,5 % 22,10
Czech Republic 9.268 320 3,5 % N/A
Hungary 3.876 526 13,6 % 19,23
Slovakia 1.521 28 1,8 % 31,66
Source: ourworldindata.org
4 Methodology
Our paper based on a comparative analysis. This paper focuses on govern-
ment responses of V4 countries to Covid-19 in a comparative way. As gov-
ernment responses, we discussed Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (public 
health responses). This study also aims at explaining the challenges V4 coun-
tries faced during the pandemic. The period (timeframe) of government re-
sponses in this paper is between January 01 and May 31, 2020 which is also 
known as the first wave (Spring period) of the outbreak. We believe that this 
timeframe is long enough to analyse responses of the V4 Countries.
Data on Covid-19 cumulative confirmed cases, cumulative confirmed deaths, 
case-fatality rate and tests per 1,000 people were collected from the our-
worldindata.org that is sourced by the Coronavirus Resource Centre of Johns 
Hopkins University and operated by Oxford University. For the responses of 
V4 countries to Covid-19 outbreak, we used the secondary sources such as 
articles from ScienceDirect, Google Scholar, PubMed, Web of Science (WoS); 
newspapers or institutional reports and Covid-19 and health related data 
from WHO, IMF and OECD databases. For the policy responses in V4 countries 
and other EU countries in order to make a comparison, we used ourworldin-
data.org, CoronaNET and Covid-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT) 
databeses. While we were selecting sources for this article, we decided some 
inclusion criteria which are as follows: the publications should contain Cov-
id-19 management of our selected countries, the countries’ health systems, 
the functions and responsibilities of the organizations of outbreak manage-
ment, policy responses of the countries to the pandemic. We excluded the 
publications that are not related to pandemic management and that don’t 
include good strategies for the fight to Covid-19.
There are several reasons for choosing V4 countries. First of all, these coun-
tries have a common history. Because of their geographical location, they are 
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Government Responses to COVID-19: A Comparative Analysis of Visegrad Countries
often known as Central and Eastern European nations. Because of these char-
acteristics, they have relations with EU countries such as Germany, Austria 
and non-EU countries such as Ukraine. All of these countries are high-income 
countries with a very high Human Development Index. V4 countries are at the 
forefront both in Europe (5th) and in the world (8th) in terms of exports and 
imports. In addition, V4 countries rank high not only in the EU but also in the 
world in terms of national income per capita. They are similar to Central and 
Eastern European countries in many respects, so the results here may be use-
ful for other countries in the region.
Although V4 countries are governed by populist leaders, they differ from each 
other in the style of leadership. Hungary and Poland, in particular, have fur-
ther accelerated the transition to illiberal democracy (also called as autocracy) 
that they started before the pandemic, along with the Covid-19 pandemic. 
For Hungary in particular, this presented a great chance to gather power and 
rule the country with the decrees. Although the situation in the Czech Repub-
lic and Slovakia is not that bad, there is still a risk. Therefore, comparing the 
measures taken by populist leaders who adopt such different management 
styles to prevent the pandemic and evaluating their effectiveness has also 
become important and worth discussing.
V4 countries, like many other countries-especially Europe and EU countries - 
have not previously encountered a situation similar to Covid-19. However, a 
study on OECD countries by Sebathu et al. (2020) found that countries that 
have adopted the democratic style of governance (this is controversial for 
Poland and Hungary) followed each other’s positive decisions. Therefore, it 
would be useful to examine the reactions of these countries in such a situ-
ation. Most importantly, they gathered these countries under one roof. The 
policies implemented by these countries can also provide us with informa-
tion in terms of the functioning and compliance of the union (group). As we 
focus on discussing the similarities, differences and challenges of the policy 
responses of V4 countries, we try to find answer to the following research 
questions (RQ).
RQ1: How do the government responses differ in V4 countries?
RQ2: Why are the government responses similar or different in the group 
countries?
RQ3: What challenged the V4 countries during the fight against to Covid-19?
5 Results
5.1 Government responses to the pandemic in V4 Countries
After the declaration of Covid-19 as a “pandemic” by WHO on March 11, 2020, 
the governments started to take “Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs)” 
to slow down the pace of the pandemic and minimize its effects (Lewnard 
and Lo, 2020) as mentioned above. To do that governments rapidly started 
to implement various measures such as travel restrictions, border closures, 
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Zafer Koca
closure of workplaces, bans on public or religious gatherings, mandatory 
mask-wearing, curfew or lockdown (Desvars-Larrive et al., 2020, p. 2; Correia 
et.al., 2020). While implementing NPIs, some governments (as China) used 
Restrictive/Suppression Strategy which includes more rigid and central to lo-
cal measures, some such as the UK and the USA used Permissive Strategy that 
is softer and doesn’t contain harsh interventions. The others such as Hong 
Kong, Japan, Singapore preferred Hybrid Strategy that is the mixture of two 
above (Travica, 2020).
In our sample countries, in order to reduce the spread of the virus and to 
minimize deaths, as in many other countries, “hybrid strategy” and its various 
methods were applied, except for some minor differences. The rationale to 
choose this strategy and especially the NPIs was that the outbreak had a fea-
ture that can be easily transmitted through respiratory droplets, and the only 
way to prevent it was to implement NPIs at that time. This method, especially 
human mobility restriction, isolation and quarantine practices, gave success-
ful results (albeit with a delay) in China where the outbreak was first emerged 
(Kraemer et al., 2020; Voko and Pitter, 2020; Vinceti et al., 2020; Alfano and 
Ercolano, 2020) have prompted V4 countries, like many others, to implement 
the same method to stop transmission and reduce the burden on the health 
system. V4 countries, like other EU members, unlike Asian countries (they 
have experienced SARS, MERS beforehand), have not experienced a large-
scale pandemic like Covid-19 since the Spanish Flu. Because of this lack of 
experience, the governments have begun implementing similar practices or 
measures implemented around the world in the Covid-19 outbreak. In addi-
tion, European countries’ trust in each other in their policy practices (Sebatu 
et al., 2020) has been influential in implementing similar policies and there-
fore NPIs. Moreover, as there was no vaccine or vaccine development studies 
in the group countries, NPIs were the best as they were accessible, affordable 
and effective. We can group the NPIs in V4 members into three categories as 
in WHO paper (2019). These are as follows;
1. Travel related measures (travel advice, entry and exit screening, internal 
travel restrictions and border closure).
2. Social distance measures (school and workplace closures, quarantine of 
exposed persons, contact tracing, isolation of sick people; bans of gathe-
ring, meetings etc.),
3. Personal protective measures (hand hygiene, face mask and other personal 
protective equipments),
The governments first introduced travel related measures because mobility 
may cause the rise of the cases. So as to reduce human mobility and miti-
gate the Covid-19 outbreak, many European countries including V4 members 
followed the guidelines of European Commission (Linka et al., 2020, p. 711). 
They introduced travel restrictions within and outside the country by closing 
the borders to certain countries such as China, Iran, Italy. The V4 countries 
were among the first countries that closed their borders in Europe (Sagan et 
al., 2021, p. 5). The V4 members also started to test the people at the airports 
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Government Responses to COVID-19: A Comparative Analysis of Visegrad Countries
coming from abroad and they were kept in quarantine for a certain period of 
time. A 14-day mandatory quarantine for people returning from certain re-
gions of Italy on March 06 in the Czech Republic (Radio Prague International, 
03 June 2020), for everyone returning from abroad in Slovakia (uvzsr.sk) and 
all citizens coming from abroad for 14 days in Poland (Filonchyk et al., 2020, p. 
2). Polish government also advised her citizens not to do unnecessary flights 
and travels within the country and to nine countries, including Northern It-
aly, China, Iran and South Korea, unless necessary (Pinkas et al.., 2020, p. 2). 
The Czech Republic closed its borders on March 16 (GOV, 2020; Brom, et al.., 
2020, p. 2), Slovakia on March 12 (uvzsr.sk), Poland on March 13 (Pancevski 
and Hinshaw, 2020) and Hungary on March 16 (Guasti, 2020). Bans on all per-
sonal international flights, train and bus travel, and unnecessary international 
travel as of 12th of March 2020 was the strictest measures implemented by 
the Slovak Government in Europe.
In addition to travel related measures, V4 members also introduced social dis-
tance measures. Educational institutions and workplaces were closed; social 
or religious activities or meetings that could bring many people together were 
banned to reduce human mobility and spread of the virus. One step further 
than those measures was a curfew or full lockdown. In the Czech Republic 
public meetings and activities with 100 people or more were prohibited (GOV, 
2020; Nemec and Spacek, 2020, p. 839) on March 10. The next day, as of March 
11, all educational institutions (universities were closed on March 16), along 
with 22 countries such as Italy, China, France, the USA, Japan, Singapore, were 
closed and online (distant) education started (Brom et al.., 2020, p. 1). By this 
decision, the Czech Republic was one of the first countries in the world to 
close educational institutions face to face (UNESCO, 2020). The Czech gov-
ernment declared the state of emergency on March 12 (Löblova, 2020, p. 75; 
Trnka and Lorencova, 2020, p. 546) and decided to close the workplaces, non-
essential shops, bars etc. on March 14. Curfews were imposed except for basic 
shopping, commuting to work and walking in parks (16 March 2020). Since 
March 23, more than two people except family members and employees have 
not been allowed to come together (GOV, 2020; Trnka and Lorencova, 2020, 
p. 546). Hungary introduced similar measures as her peers. On March 7, the an-
niversary of the Hungarian Revolution, which would be celebrated on March 
15, was cancelled. The Orban government first closed the universities (11 
March) and then all educational institutions (13 March) to in-person education 
and distant education started. On March 11, the government banned indoor 
meetings of more than 100 people and outdoor meetings of more than 500 
participants (nnk.gov.hu). On the same day, the state of emergency was de-
clared. As of March 17, the opening hours of the shops were shortened and 
the mobility of citizens were restricted on 27th of March (www.koronavirus.
gov.hu; Merkely et al.., 2020, pp. 1064-1065). On March 28, public events were 
cancelled and a lockdown was announced. Only grocery stores and pharma-
cies were allowed to remain open (Merkely et al., 2020, p. 1065).
In Poland, all mass events were banned on March 10 (Matczak, 2020, p. 350), 
and all educational institutions, including universities, were closed two days 
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later (Jarynowski et al.., 2020, p. 10; Wielechowski et al.., 2020, p. 6) and res-
taurants and shopping centres were closed on March 1 (Paul, 2020, p. 242). 
Starting from March 14, all gastronomic activities, sports and entertainment 
services were limited (Filonchyk et al.., 2020, p. 2; Jarynowski et al.., 2020, 
p. 10). A pandemic was declared in the country on March 20, and more so-
cial distance measures were promulgated of March 25 (Pinkas et al.., 2020; 
Matczak, 2020, p. 351). The measures against the pandemic in Slovakia took 
place just on the eve of the government change. Despite this, we can say that 
the current government did not neglect the fight against the pandemic and 
did well before handing over its task. The Slovak government mobilized the 
crisis team long before the outbreak started. Earlier than many European 
countries, Slovakia declared the state of emergency on March 16 (Sagan et al., 
2021). The Slovakian government banned social, sporting and cultural events 
starting from March 9. Kindergardens and all educational institutions were 
closed on March 12. All sports facilities were cancelled (13 March), all public 
prayer halls, including churches, were prohibited. As of March 16, all retail 
stores have been closed, except the stores that are allowed to remain open 
under certain conditions. Grocery stores and pharmacies were excluded from 
closure (Nemec, 2020).
The last group of NPIs implemented in the Visegrad Countries was personal 
protective measures such as hand washing, social distance and mask wear-
ing (face covering). Hand hygiene was one of the important measures of 
Covid-19 all over the world. The cleanliness-hygiene-distance rule has been 
recommended to everyone since the beginning of the pandemic. Hands must 
be frequently washed with water and soap. If there is no water or soap, then 
alcohol-based hand sanitizers are recommended, too. People were also ad-
vised to maintain at least 1-2 metres distance from the others. It was also rec-
ommended to clean surfaces such as frequently used door handles, lighting 
buttons and frequent ventilation of closed areas such as home and workplace 
(CDC, 2019; WHO, 2020b). All these measures were advised to the people in 
the V4 countries as they were advised by WHO. In the Czech Republic, as of 
March 19, it has been obliged to wear masks, including children over two years 
old. The Czech Republic is the first European and V4 country that imposes the 
obligation to wear masks (19 March 2020) in indoor and outdoor areas. When 
Czech Government imposed to wear mask in the public spaces, there were 
no countries imposing mandatory mask wearing (only France recommended 
mask wearing) in Europe. Like Czech Republic Slovakia was also one of the 
first countries who imposed to wear mask (in public transport and shops on 
March15 and in all public spaces on March 25) in European and V4 countries 
(Tait, 2020). Other than these countries Poland (required in all public spaces) 
and Hungary (required in some public places such as public transport) also 
imposed mandatory mask wearing (ourworldindata.org).
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Government Responses to COVID-19: A Comparative Analysis of Visegrad Countries
Table 2. Measures/Responses to Covid-19 in Visegrad Countries
Country
Measures
First 
Measures
Quarantine 
at Country 
Entrance
Border 
Closure
School 
Closure
State of 
Emergency
Mandatory 
Mask 
wearing
Full 
Lockdown
Poland 10.3.2020 15.3.2020 11.3.2020 12.3.2020
20.3.2020
(* state of 
pandemic, not 
emergency)
16.3.2020 24.3.2020
Czech 
Republic
06.3.2020 06.3.2020 16.3.2020 10.3.2020 12.3.2020 18.3.2020 15.3.2020
Hungary 07.3.2020 26.3.2020 16.3.2020 16.3.2020 11.3.2020 No 16.3.2020
Slovakia 28.2.2020 13.3.2020 13.3.2020 08.3.2020 16.3.2020 25.3.2020 08.4.2020
Source: ourworldindata.org; Guasti (2020, p.50); Covid19healthsystem.org;  
Sagan et al. (2021)
The measures taken against the Covid-19 outbreak naturally have to have 
some legal basis as restrictions on many rights and freedoms were imposed. 
The restrictions or practices lacking no legal basis can’t remain in force for a 
long time and they don’t have sufficient support from the people. Although 
they have been criticized in some aspects, Covid-19 measures of V4 countries 
have legal basis. In Poland, the details of the state of emergency and what 
measures can be applied are stated in Article 228(1) of the Constitution of 
Poland 1997. According to this article, one of the “martial law, state of emer-
gency or natural disaster measures” may be applied in cases of special danger 
where constitutional measures are insufficient. But instead of these meas-
ures, which are enshrined in the Constitution (Urbanovics et al., 2020), the 
Polish government declared a state of pandemic emergency under the law 
on the prevention and control of human infections and Infectious Diseases (5 
December 2008) - also known as the Polish Infectious Diseases Act or Conta-
gious Diseases Act (Binder et al., 2020). Articles 46-48 of the Act in question 
detailed regulation of the pandemic emergency. it is mentioned in its articles. 
Accordingly, the pandemic emergency came into force on March 14, and the 
restrictions were gradually lifted from the end of May. All measures during 
the outbreak were based on Contagious Diseases Act.
In Hungary, the general rules of certain types of “Special Order of Law” are 
mentioned in articles 48-54 of the Constitution (Fundamental Law). The so-
called “state of danger” of the Hungarian government was declared with Gov-
ernment Decree 40/2020 (Binder et al., 2020) in accordance with the article 
53 to the Fundamental Law. Until the adoption of the Hungarian Coronavirus 
Law, the government chose to manage the pandemic only by decrees based 
on Article 53 of the Constitution. The Hungarian Coronavirus Act came into 
force on 31 March 2020 and remained in effect until it was abolished on 18 
June (Urbanovics et al., 2020). But despite this act, the government still chose 
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Zafer Koca
to manage the process through decrees. Borders, shops, schools and universi-
ties in Hungary were closed by decrees issued on the basis of the article 53 of 
Fundamental Law (Drinóczi and Bień-kacała, 2020, p. 183). Drinóczi and Bień-
kacała (2020, p. 180) claims that Coronavirus Act itself is unconstitutional be-
cause of three reasons. First, the measures do not correspond to the 15-day 
rule of Fundamental Law. Second, the published decrees are aimed at legiti-
mising the old post facto because they are not placed on a constitutionally 
appropriate basis. Finally, it has allowed future decrees to be excluded from 
parliamentary oversight. Due to these characteristics, the Coronavirus Law is 
named as the “Law of Authoritarianism”.
In the Czech Republic, the declaration of a state of emergency is not in the 
Constitution, but in the Czech Security Law (CAS). Article 2 of CAS listed the 
declarable types of extraordinary permits, including the state of emergency 
specified in the articles. In addition to this law, the Czech Crisis Management 
Act (CMA) and the Czech Health Protection Act (APPH) have established the 
legal basis for decisions taken in the management of the pandemic. Article 
5(1) states in which case the state pf emergency will be declared, and Article 6 
(2) states the process of the state of emergency and how it will be extended. 
Bans (freedom of movement, the right to free assembly and the right to do 
business) during the outbreak were introduced in accordance with the article 
5 of the Czech Crisis Management Act (Urbanovics et al., 2020).
The structure of Slovakia’s state of emergency is very similar to that of the 
Czech Republic. The way to declare war, declare a state of war, declare a state 
of crisis, declare a state of emergency and use public authority in a time of war, 
the state of war, the conditions of a crisis situation will be set out by a consti-
tutional law [Article. 102 (3)]. The constitutional law 227/2002, which forms 
the basis of the Slovak government’s declaration of state of emergency, is the 
Slovak Security Law (CASS) on state security. However, there are two other 
low legislative acts that have a role in emergency situations of COVID-19, and 
these are the Civil Security Act No. 42/1994 and the Slovak Emergency Law 
Covid-19. On 12 March, the so-called state of emergency” was declared under 
the Slovak Civil Security Law (Urbanovics et al., 2020). A state of emergency 
under the Slovak Security Law was declared from 16 March and introduced a 
much stricter package of restrictions and precautionary measures (Binder et 
al., 2020).
5.2 Challenges in V4 countries
When taking steps to prevent the pandemic, governments have to deal with 
or consider numerous problems which also have important effects on the ef-
ficiency and success of policy-making. We can list the difficulties faced by the 
administration in the Covid-19 process as economic structure, government 
and health system capacity, public support, the country’s elderly population 
and vulnerable groups, the efficiency of the decision-making process. But 
apart from these, there are also some more challenges such as air pollution, 
ethnicity issues that governments face during covid-19 policy-making process.
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Government Responses to COVID-19: A Comparative Analysis of Visegrad Countries
In general, although the government and health system capacities of the 
group countries are at a good level, it is useful to mention some factors that 
governments may have difficulties in policy-making process while the out-
break is ongoing. V4 countries do not allocate a sufficient share to health ex-
penditures. In other words, the money spent on health is below EU average, 
which is a significant challenge. Hungary’s share in public health expenditures 
is two-thirds, that is below the EU average (79%) (OECD, 2019a, p. 3). Almost 
half of out-of-pocket health expenditures in Hungary (one of the highest rates 
in the EU) go to pharmaceutical and medical device expenditures and this cre-
ates a serious problem for the low-income and vulnerable population (OECD, 
2019a, p. 22). Similarly, in Poland and Slovakia, the share of the government 
in health expenditures is also below the EU average. Poland’s health budget 
(1507 Euros per capita and 6.5% of GDP) is one of Europe’s lowest (OECD, 
2019b, p. 22). As its peers the Slovakian government spends significantly less 
on health than the EU average, both in absolute terms (EUR 1,600 per capita 
in 2017, adjusted for differences in purchasing power) and as a share of GDP 
(6.7%) (OECD, 2019c). Low financing of health expenditures may lead to inad-
equacies in meeting the healthcare needs of the increasing elderly population 
and providing quality healthcare services (OECD, 2019b, p. 18). Especially in 
these days when the Covid-19 pandemic continues, this risk is higher.
In addition to health expenditures, the low or high number of healthcare 
workers, one of the indicators of health system capacity, is also an important 
factor in health service delivery. A country with sufficient and qualified health 
workers is more likely to cope with pandemics, crises or other unexpected 
situations. The shortage of healthcare personnel is a problem for many coun-
tries or regions. Although the number of medical graduates has increased in 
recent years in Poland, the number of physicians and nurses is still insufficient. 
In particular, the scarcity of general practitioners causes disruptions in the 
provision of primary health care services and it is estimated that this problem 
will continue (OECD, 2019b, p. 19). In Hungary the inadequacy of the number 
of healthcare workers and the uneven distribution of the existing healthcare 
personnel make it difficult to access healthcare services and to provide ef-
fective healthcare services. In order to overcome this problem, the Orban 
government has made significant improvements in the income of healthcare 
workers in recent years but there is still a shortage of healthcare staff due to 
inadequate working conditions and career planning (OECD, 2019a, p. 8). The 
problem for the Czech Republic is the growing share of the elderly population 
among healthcare workers. Especially the rising elderly population of doctors 
and the approaching of retirement times as a result, if necessary measures 
are not taken, are likely to create a problem in the future (EC-EPC, 2018). The 
number of healthcare workers in the country is equal to the EU average, but 
it poses a risk to the public administration as interregional disparities persist 
(OECD, 2019c). Another country facing a shortage of healthcare workers is 
Slovakia. In particular, the number of nurses is below the EU average and this 
rate is increasing every year (OECD/EU, 2020). In sum, V4 countries have a rate 
relatively below the EU average but above the OECD average in terms of the 
number of physicians. In terms of the number of nurses and midwives, group 
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countries are below both the EU and OECD averages. The number of hospital 
beds the countries have is above the EU and OECD average. V4 countries gave 
a better test than many European and world countries in the first wave in the 
fight against Covid-19 and did not encounter a bed occupancy issue such as 
Italy, the USA, Spain. However, as mentioned above, the ratio of health expen-
ditures of countries to GDP is far below the EU and OECD average.
Table 3. Health Indicators of Visegrad Group Members
Country
Number of 
Physicians 
per 1,000
Number of 
Nurses and 
mid-wives 
per 1,000
Number 
of H. Beds 
per 1,000
Number 
of ICU 
Beds per 
100,000
Curent Health 
Expenditures 
(% of GDP)
Czech 
Republic
4,1 8,4* 6,6 11,6 7,6
Slovakia 3,4* 6,1** 5,8 9,2 6,7
Poland 2,4* 6,9 6,6 10,1 6,3
Hungary 3,4 6,9 7 11,2 6,7
EU 3,7 9,3 4,6 9,1
OECD 2,9 9,6 5,1 12 12,5
Source: who.int; ourworldindata.org; databank.worldbank.org.; 
* According to 2017 data; ** According to 2016 data
6 Discussion
The Covid-19 pandemic is still ongoing. it seems as if it is going to continue 
for a longer period, at least until the vaccination reaches a certain level. Unlike 
previous pandemics, it affected a vast region, and as it is a virus that has not 
been experienced before, it initially left the governments desperate. While 
some Asian countries such as South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan were more pre-
pared for the pandemic due to their previous MERS and SARS experiences, the 
vast majority of the world was unprepared for this outbreak. Confusion about 
what measures to take at first and the inability of the World Health Organi-
zation to manage the process caused the virus to spread rapidly. However, 
governments have immediately adapted to the process and started to take 
essential measures. These methods, also called Non-Pharmaceutical Interven-
tions, have been applied worldwide with minor differences. They are used as 
one of the most effective ways of preventing pandemics/diseases that have 
not yet been treated. When the epidemiology literature is examined, it has 
been found that NPIs (Markel et al., 2007; Hatchett et al., 2007) provide an ap-
proximately 45% reduction in high mortality and flatten the infection curve. 
There was a 20% decrease in the cumulative excessive death rates of cities 
that intervened in the pandemic with early and drastic measures. In sum, we 
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Government Responses to COVID-19: A Comparative Analysis of Visegrad Countries
can say that NPIs has been proven by studies that slow down the spread and 
meeting rate of the disease (Bootsma and Ferguson, 2007).
In this paper, the pandemic management of V4 countries and the challenges 
that affect or may affect governments’ policies were discussed. The coun-
tries in the region started to take rapid measures that are similar in almost all 
group members after the spread of pandemic to Europe. Interventions such 
as mask wearing, hygiene and distance rules, school and workplace closures 
and curfews were implemented in all V4 countries. Apart from health meas-
ures, the countries also implemented socio-economic policies for the people 
and firms, too. The performance of V4 countries during the first wave of the 
pandemic was better than many European countries and worldwide. It is obvi-
ous when the cumulative number of cases, deaths and tests as of 31 May 2020 
is checked. There are some key factors that can explain this success story.
Timing is one of the key factors, for us the most important, for the success 
of V4 countries in the fight against Covid-19. It is important as it increases 
the efficacy of the decisions. For instance, the Czech Republic had a full lock-
down before the deaths from Covid-19 were detected in the country. Similar 
to the Czech Republic, Slovakia also greatly reduced human mobility before 
deaths, meaning it had achieved a partial closure. Two other group countries, 
Poland and Hungary, were also fast for the measures. On March 10, the last 
of the first measures taken against Covid-19 in V4 countries, no deaths from 
Covid-19 were recorded in any group members. While, on March 10, the total 
number of cases in V4 countries was 79 (41 in Czechia, 22 in Poland, 9 in Hun-
gary and 7 in Slovakia), it was 1,457 in Germany, 10,149 in Italy, 182 in Austria 
and 889 in the UK. Similarly, the total number of deaths in V4 countries was 
318 (159 in Poland, 99 in Czechia, 58 in Hungary and 2 in Slovakia) on April 
08, the date of the last decision for full lockdown. At the same date, the total 
number of deaths was recorded as 2,349 in Germany, 8,589 in the UK, 10,874 
in France and 273 in Austria (ourworldindata.org). These figures clearly show 
that one of the core success factors of V4 countries in the first wave of the 
pandemic is that they acted on time and quickly. This also coincides with the 
survey of Lai et al. (2020) in China.
According to that survey, if the interventions in China had been implemented 
one week before their actual time, there could have been a 66% reduction in 
the number of cases, and if they had been implemented three weeks earlier 
than the actual time, the number of cases could have been reduced by 95%. If 
there had been a reverse application, that is, if the NPIs had been implement-
ed one week or three weeks later than real-time, a 3-fold and 18-fold increase 
could have occurred respectively. Based on these data, Lai et al. (2020) sug-
gest that timing (early detection and isolation) may be more effective than 
travel restrictions or social contact bans in fighting against the pandemic. This 
is also consistent with the work of Jablonska et al. (2020, p. 141). Brudzinska 
(2020) notes that there are mainly three reasons why V4 members acted as-
sertively and fast. The first one is that the region is near the ski-resorts in Italy 
or Austria. Citizens of V4 countries usually go those resorts for the winter 
holiday and they may bring the virus from there. The second reason is that 
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Zafer Koca
Visegrad members have one of the highest number of cross-border commut-
ers as a share of employed population. About 5% of Slovak, 2,3% Hungarians 
and less than these two country workers cross the border to work every day. 
Those people can move among the countries with no stringent ID or passport 
checks at the border which also means no control of virus. The last reason 
for the rapid movement is the healthcare capacity of the countries and elder 
population in some countries (Czechia, Hungary and Poland).
Society’s tendency to accept and obey rules, in other words trust and sup-
port of the people to the governments may be another success factor of V4 
members. Trust, especially political trust, in a state is very important for the 
success of government policies or interventions in times of crisis. As shown 
in various studies (Scholz, 1998; Chanley et al., 2000; Tyler, 2006), trust in the 
government encourages citizens to comply with the policies implemented by 
the government. During the SARS pandemic, although the people of Singa-
pore did not know much about the disease, they followed the rules to the 
maximum extent as a sign of trust in their government, and thanks to this, 
the Singapore government was able to control the pandemic (Deurenberg-
Yap et al., 2005). The governments of V4 countries have received sufficient 
support from the public. Especially during the first wave of the outbreak peo-
ple in V4 countries supported and trusted their governments. They obeyed 
the social distance rules and curfews. This high willingness to comply with 
social distance measures such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong 
Kong played an important role in the fight against Covid-19 in V4 members. 
According to a survey conducted by Kantar (2020) in the name of European 
Parliament in the second half of June, support given to governments dur-
ing the Covid-19 outbreak was 63.6% in Slovakia, 52% in the Czech Republic, 
48.2% in Hungary and 29% in Poland. In the same research, the satisfaction 
level of the participants with the measures was 72.5% in Slovakia, 64.6% in 
the Czech Republic, 48.2% in Hungary and 40% in Poland (EU POM, 2020). 
There is a background of cooperation in complying with the measures taken 
in V4 countries. The first one is the higher civic awareness in Central Europe 
compared to Western Europe. The other one is the high level of resistance 
and collective thinking that existed in the society due to the difficulties expe-
rienced in communism times (Bault, 2020). Only Poland and Hungary received 
less support when compared to their peers. This is because of the fact that 
Hungary implemented harsh restriction. The restrictive limitations, lack of 
transparency and the increase in the powers of the Prime Minister by decrees 
and the elimination of Parliament for an indefinite period are factors which 
have an impact on the decline in trust in the government in Hungary (Woj-
tas and Walecka, 2020, p. 196). The Czech Republic has also received a high 
level of support but it has been criticized by the public for not managing the 
process transparently enough and not providing sufficient scientific evidence 
and basis (Löblova, 2020). These results show us that compliance of people 
with measures are important but it doesn’t mean that this will last forever. If 
there is an uncertainty about when the restrictions will end, this support can 
turn into protests within no time. As Newton et al. (2018, p. 40) noted “if the 
people	are	in	a	serious	difficulties	i.e	pandemic,	the	trust	to	the	government	or	its	
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Government Responses to COVID-19: A Comparative Analysis of Visegrad Countries
policies may weaken or disappear.” For that reason, the duration and content 
of the measures should be clearly defined and they should not be extended 
arbitrarily, except under extraordinary circumstances.
Another key factor for the low number of cases especially in Poland and Slova-
kia is that a significant part of the population (46% in Czechia, 40% in Poland) 
lives in rural areas. Although this rate was low in the other two group mem-
bers, the case and death rates were also low in them. V4 members do not 
have very crowded cities. Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland have only one 
city with population of one million or more. Slovakia does not have city with 
the population over 500,000. Furthermore, the vast majority of the popula-
tion in V4 countries (Slovakia 88%, Czech Republic 89%, Hungary 82% and 
Poland 88%) live in cities with a population of 500 thousand or less. This low 
population density in the cities reduced the rate of spread of the pandemic. 
As aforementioned, Covid-19 is a disease that can be transmitted through 
human contact (Chan et al., 2020). Therefore, there is a common belief that 
the virus can be transmitted more easily and spread rapidly in crowded ar-
eas, while in low-population dense regions, people are less likely to become 
infected (Bhadra et al., 2021, p. 623). Although some argue that population 
density does not increase the spread of the virus and the number of deaths 
(Carozzi et al., 2020), It has turned out to be effective in the later stages, if 
not at the beginning of the pandemic, in densely populated areas (Wong and 
Li, 2020). A study by Bhadra et al. (2020) in India found that the virus spreads 
faster in densely populated areas. In the policy brief of United Nations (2020) 
it is stated that %90 percent of the Covid-19 cases (according to July 2020 
data) were in urban areas.
Although V4 countries are ruled by populist leaders (Guasti, 2020; Buštíková 
and Baboš, 2020), and especially in two of them – Hungary and Poland – have 
adopted an autocratic management style, they have adopted a different ap-
proach against Covid-19 than many populist leaders. Of course, during the 
pandemic they, especially Victor Orban, tried to gather power in their hands 
(Drinóczi and Bień-kacała, 2020, p.179; Kovács, 2020; Thompson and Ip, 
2020)1, but none of these leaders have underestimated the outbreak. On the 
1 There are very practices that Victor Orban has taken power by turning the pandemic into an 
opportunity and has acted in a manner that undermines the separation of powers. Decrees on 
Covid-19 are the sample practices. Normally, decrees have an automatic sunset after 15 days 
without parliamentary authorisation. So as to ensure that Decree remains in force, the Orban 
government submitted the Act on Protecting Against the Coronavirus to parliament on March 
23rd, but it was passed on March 30. This act has been publicly called the ‘Enabling Act’ as it 
gives the government extraordinary powers to the government. These powers also do not 
require the approval of parliament. Parliament is in session but it is the prime minister who 
makes the decisions and decides when they end. Control over the executive with the Authori-
zation Act is also getting more difficult (Thomson and Ip, 2020; Kovacs, 2020). By Enabling Act, 
elections and referendums are cancelled until the pandemic is over (Kovacs, 2020). As Orban 
has the majority of parliament i.e. two-thirds of it, he can easily have the decisions he wants 
accepted. Another important indicator is that Covid-19 measures are excluded from judicial 
review. The ordinary courts were closed and they do not have the opportunity to supervise 
the actions of the government. That power is only in the Supreme Court. However, the court 
seems far from doing this as most of its members are Orban allies (Kovacs, 2021). The gov-
ernment has also implemented military measures (Drinóczi and Bień-kacała, 2020). The army 
began to control strategic institutions and state-owned hospitals and even became involved in 
decision-making processes. Management of public hospitals and implementation of health re-
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Zafer Koca
contrary, they have taken various measures by acting faster than many coun-
tries, which was a core success factor for the low cases and deaths. Schwartz 
(2012) states that authoritarian regimes can produce effective results in an 
undemocratic environment due to centralized decision-making, effective mo-
bilization of public support, and power over mass media. We think this is what 
happened in Hungary and Poland. Unlike Hungarian and Polish leaders, popu-
list leaders in the USA, in Brazil, and in Venezuela have underestimated the 
Covid-19 virus at the onset, even denied it is a pandemic. For example, Bol-
sanaro, president of Brazil, described the pandemic which has caused to the 
death of nearly 20,000 people worldwide as a media trick. Trump and Maduro 
suggested that the virus can be treated using hydroxychloroquine, although 
they cannot withstand any scientific data (Mckee et al., 2020, p. 2-3). Trump 
called the virus just a simple flu and claimed the outbreak would end in April 
2020. Similarly, Bolsanaro described the virus as a simple flu and strongly criti-
cized the closure of schools and workplaces. Furthermore, he did not hesitate 
to hug and kiss his supporters frequently (Gezgüç and Duman, 2020).
There were differences such as timing, the way they implemented the meas-
ures, testing, leadership etc. among the group members. While places such 
as restaurants, cinemas and theatres were closed, businesses and shops 
where food and beverage sales are allowed varied from country to country. 
For example, restaurants in Hungary were open until 15.00, while they were 
just allowed for takeaway services in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. 
There were also differences on timing of school closures. Towards the mid-
March, there was no decision for closing schools in Poland, while all grade lev-
el schools were closed in Czech Republic and certain grade levels in Hungary 
and Slovakia. With the rapid spread of the pandemic, from the second half of 
March to the second half of May, schools in all V4 countries were all closed and 
distance education started. They also differed in restrictions on gatherings. 
While Czechia first banned the gatherings of 101-1000 people on March 10, 
2020, it changed its policy on March 12 and banned 11-100 people from com-
ing together. As of March 24, 10 or fewer people are banned from gatherings. 
Hungary banned 1,000 or more people after March 11; Slovakia has banned 
between 11 and 100 people from gathering. Poland, compared to its peers, 
introduced the restrictions on gatherings later and banned 10 or fewer people 
after the end of March until the bans were lifted (Pozo-Martin et al., 2021).
Although populist leaders have ruled the Visegrad Countries, their reactions to 
Covid-19 were different. Unlike Slovakia and Czech Republic, leaders of Hun-
gary and Poland preferred to use autocratic methods in pandemic manage-
ment (Kovács, 2020; Drinóczi and Bień-kacała, 2020). In Hungary, the Orban 
government decided to manage the outbreak with decrees for an indefinite 
forms are coordinated by the Ministry of Interior (Kovacs, 2020a). Another practice that Orban 
is trying to gather power in his hand is the inclusion of provisions in the Criminal Code that al-
low violations of pandemic confinement and imprisonment of those who give and spread false 
information during the pandemic process for up to five years. It has been criticized by various 
international organizations such as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Secretary-
General of the Council of Europe and Director of the OSCE- Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights (Thomson and Ip, 2020) and the domestic opposition as the crime of mis-
information was very complex and not clear enough (Drinóczi and Bień-kacała, 2020, p. 185).
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Government Responses to COVID-19: A Comparative Analysis of Visegrad Countries
period of time and rendered the parliament ineffective. This caused distrust 
in the public (Wojtas and Walecka, 2020, p. 196). In countries with authoritar-
ian leaders, the effectiveness of government or its policy production capacity 
is problematic. Greer et al. (2020, p. 619) claims that authoritarianism itself 
does not naturally produce a decisive or effective government, and some 
forms of authoritarianism will reduce both decisiveness and effectiveness. 
Unlike other countries, Hungary has also engaged soldiers and police in the 
fight against the pandemic. This based on Fundamental Law which has provi-
sions on police, national security service and military mobilization (Drinóczi 
and Bień-kacała, 2020, p. 174). The government in Poland which tries to rule 
the country with autocratic tools, has not yet achieved its goals, but tries to 
undermine liberal democracy. In Czech Republic and Slovakia democracy was 
resilient. They managed to rule pandemic in a peaceful manner (Guasti, 2020, 
p. 57) because of functioning system of check and balance.
Epidemiologically, all V4 members did quite well. However, Czech Republic 
and Slovakia were not successful in managing the pandemic economically. 
Although both countries have taken various measures to reduce or mitigate 
the socio-economic effects of the pandemic, they have remained inadequate. 
State subsidies, especially for Slovakia, were not at the desired level. Anoth-
er criticism directed at these countries is that pandemic measures have not 
been carried out in coordination with neighbouring countries and EU mem-
ber states (Nemec, 2020, p.13). Allocations provided were not used in proper 
areas in some of the group members, either. For example, allocations pro-
vided by the Hungarian government have gone to football clubs and stadium 
constructions rather than employees or companies affected by the pandemic. 
Another difference between countries occurs in the number of tests. Accord-
ing to the data on 31 May 2020, the number of cumulative tests per 1000 
people was 31.66 in Slovakia, 22.10 in Poland, 19.23 in Hungary and 0,61 in 
Czech Republic (ourworldindata.org, 2020). These test numbers are not at 
the desired level. With these rates, V4 countries were below Germany (51,26), 
Austria (49,80), the United Kingdom (51,77) and Slovenia (38,68). Poland and 
Hungary were not good at testing (Aristodemou et al., 2020). In Poland coor-
dination between the central and the voivodes on testing at the beginning 
of the pandemic was very weak. One of the important indicators of this was 
that test samples could not be directed to laboratories with less work inten-
sity (Matczak, 2020, p. 351) and therefore the results were not obtained in a 
timely manner. This naturally increased infection and the number of cases. 
Although their numbers increased later, there were only two certified labora-
tories in the country during the pandemic period (Szymczak, 2020) that was 
not enough. According to the news on the media, the reason why the gov-
ernment kept the number of tests low was to make the number of positive 
cases look low. Fewer tests mean fewer positive cases. Thus, the government 
aimed at holding elections on time by persuading the public that the process 
was well managed and nothing to be worried about the cases (Matczak, 2020, 
p. 351). Poland also had a different testing policy than its peers at the onset 
of the pandemic. While her peers adopted testing for some key groups and 
symptoms since the first week of March, Poland began testing in late March 
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(ourworldindata.org). Similarly, the number of tests in Hungary remained low 
compared to its peers. This could be because of inadequate government re-
sources (ourworldindata.org). Merkely et al. (2020) notes that another reason 
why the number of tests remained low in Hungary is as the fact that health 
authorities did not consider it necessary to conduct more tests due to the low 
positivity rate of the tests performed. They also add that the testing policy of 
the government was only to test essential workers, people who have contact 
with Covid-19 patients and those coming from abroad.
Covid-19 related regulations were seriously criticised especially in two coun-
tries, Poland and Hungary. In Poland, according to academics, the government 
chose a pandemic state of emergency rather than a state of natural disaster 
under the Constitution because the elections have not yet been held and the 
ruling party didn’t want to postpone the election as they hoped to win by an 
overwhelming majority (Drinóczi and Bień-kacała, 2020, p. 181). If they had 
chosen the first one, the election would have been postponed. Jaraczewski 
(2020) criticizes the emergency measures of Polish government from several 
perspectives. Firstly, he stated that the Infectious Diseases Act was unconsti-
tutional because it did not clearly specify the scope of it while limiting human 
rights and freedoms. In addition, he underlines that the act gives government 
the power to unconstitutionally limit freedom of movement. Jaraczewski also 
argues that the act loses its legitimacy because penalties for violating Covid-19 
prohibitions are imposed by administrative authorities rather than judicial au-
thorities, and they cannot be appealed (Urbanovics et al., 2020). As mentioned 
above Orban, Hungarian leader, rules the country with governmental decrees. 
It is the most significant distinction between Hungary and the rest of the group 
and the EU. Because, rather than managing the pandemic through legislation, 
Orban chose to rule through decrees, which both expedite the process and 
allow it to pass laws without the approval of Parliament. They were prepared 
within a short time (1-2 days) and none of them went through any consultation 
process (Drinóczi and Bień-kacała, 2020, p. 185). Since decrees are issued for 
a certain period of time (15 days), the coronavirus law adopted to create the 
legal infrastructure for this also contains some provisions that are contrary to 
the Constitution. The first one is that the Constitution does not comply with 
the 15-day rule, the second one is that this law does not fall under the disaster 
Law, and the last one is that it forms the basis for decrees that will be issued 
later and by-passes the parliament (Drinóczi and Bień-kacała, 2020, p. 180).
As a result, key success factors of V4 countries in the fight against Covid-19 
are as follows;
– V4 countries acted quickly and decisively (Sagan el at., 2021). They were rapid 
to respond the outbreak. After the first cases recorded within their borders, 
they soon declared the state of emergency (ECDC, 2021; ourworldindata.
org) which gave the governments extraordinary powers to fight Covid-19.
– They all implemented harsh measures. They closed their borders, banned 
meetings, concerts etc.; they closed the restaurants, shops, cafes; they all 
closed their schools and universities; there were very strict social distance ru-
Central European Public Administration Review, Vol. 20, No. 1/2022 77
Government Responses to COVID-19: A Comparative Analysis of Visegrad Countries
les; by banning travel within the country and/or to abroad, they reduced the 
human mobility. Lockdown was also one of the key factors of V4 countries.
– Mandatory mask wearing, especially in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, he-
lped to succeed mitigating the cases. The two other members of the group 
followed their peers but a few weeks later.
– Trust to governments at the initial stage and people’s tendency to obey the 
rules helped V4 members in fight to Covid-19.
In the fight against coronavirus, there are some points that governments 
should pay attention. The state has to protect the health of its citizens that 
is a constitutional requirement and also a feature of a social state. However, 
it is necessary to pay attention to the policies implemented for this purpose. 
For example, they should not forget the negative effects of curfews on the 
health of people. Long curfews and ambiguity about when they will end have 
significant effects on the mental health of the elderly population whose only 
social contact is outside the home (Armitage and Nellums, 2020). Therefore, 
it would be more appropriate to have a certain duration of the measures and 
to treat the elderly population, which is easier to fall into a mental depression, 
a little more flexible. Otherwise, we are likely to push these people whom we 
are trying to protect their health to other diseases or ailments. This may be a 
significant public health issue that influences policymakers’ decision-making 
processes. In V4 countries, the governments did not give enough attention to 
the primary health care services (preventive health services). Health service de-
livery in Hungary is mostly secondary rather than primary level (OECD, 2019a, 
p. 3). In other words, hospital-centred health service delivery is more prevalent 
than preventive health care services. Preventive health expenditures are also 
underestimated in Slovakia. Only 1% of health expenditures (this ratio is 3% in 
the EU) is allocated to preventive healthcare services (OECD, 2019d). Preven-
tive healthcare service is crucial. It helps to reduce medical expenses. Hospital 
services are expensive in almost every country. Diseases that are not detected 
on time or treatments that are not performed on time cause people to be 
hospitalized which means more spending for individuals and governments.
Governments should strengthen their health infrastructures to combat the 
pandemics. Especially, they should increase the number of hospital beds, the 
number of intensive care beds, protective materials and other equipment. 
Increasing domestic production such as masks, ventilators, hand disinfect-
ants and vaccine production will further strengthen the hand of healthcare 
professionals in cases such as the covid-19 outbreak. The preparation of pan-
demic preparedness plans and the inclusion of possible situations in the fu-
ture and the regular strengthening of the plans will play an important role in 
combating the pandemic. Transparency and participation are also important 
in dealing with emergencies. Managing the process in a way that includes all 
stakeholders of the society will increase the trust of the people to the govern-
ment and it will be easy for them to accept and support the measures and the 
policies. Policymakers should pay more attention to digitalization of health 
and public services. In particular, they should make the most of artificial intel-
ligence technologies and mobile applications. One of the success factors of 
Central European Public Administration Review, Vol. 20, No. 1/202278
Zafer Koca
countries that did quite well in the Covid-19 pandemic was the usage of the 
internet/digital technologies (Ting et.al, 2020).
This study has some limitations. First of all, the study covers the first wave 
(Spring period) of the pandemic (01 January 2020-31 May 2020) and the data 
here is not valid for the second wave or the other phases. V4 countries, which 
had successful pandemic management in the first phase, had to face the vi-
rus again and more seriously from the beginning of autumn because of the 
relaxation in the summer months. Second, we made an analysis based on data 
from various databases. The data here can sometimes be deliberately distort-
ed by governments. Data may be incomplete, especially for countries such as 
Hungary, which try to manage the process without transparency through au-
thoritarian methods. Failure to test adequately or to test a limited part of the 
population may prevent the correct number of cases from emerging. It may 
be useful for further studies to evaluate the measures and decision-making 
processes in the second wave of the outbreak. Researchers may also search 
whether the support of the public continues in the second wave or what kind 
of socio-economic or psychological problems it created especially on vulner-
able groups so far.
7 Conclusion
Covid-19 is still ongoing. It is a pandemic that caused most human loss after 
1918-1919 Spanish Flu. It has had a very serious impact not only on the health 
system but also economically. In this process, it is not possible to characterize 
countries as successful or unsuccessful as the process is still ongoing and vac-
cination is just at the beginning of the road. In the first wave, some countries 
gave a successful test, while others failed. V4 countries gave a successful test 
in the first wave of the pandemic, not economically but epidemiologically. 
By acting in a timely and fast manner, they prevented the spread of the pan-
demic and the increase in the death toll. In addition to timely intervention, the 
public’s compliance and cooperation in implementing the measures taken has 
been important in this success. But they couldn’t continue this in the second 
wave of the outbreak. So this caused very high case rates and death tolls com-
pared to the first phase of the Covid-19.
Central European Public Administration Review, Vol. 20, No. 1/2022 79
Government Responses to COVID-19: A Comparative Analysis of Visegrad Countries
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