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Introduction

Jana S. ROŠKER*

The present issue of *The Journal of Asian Studies* is dedicated to problems linked to the specific features of Chinese modernization, as viewed through the lens of Modern Confucianism. It contains selected contributions from the international symposium, *Contemporary Confucianism and Chinese Modernization*, Reykjavik, 7–8 September 2013, which was organized by Geir Sigurðsson, in cooperation with the Northern Lights Confucius Institute and the Chinese Studies Department of the University of Iceland.

In international Sinology, this current of thought has been translated with various, sometimes colourful terms, which range from *Neo-Confucianism*, *Contemporary* or *Modern Neo-Confucianism*, to *New*, *Modern* or *Contemporary Confucianism*. The first group, which includes the term “Neo-Confucianism”, is impractical because it is often confused with the term that, in Western sinology, generally denotes the reformed Confucian philosophies of the Song and Ming periods (*li xue* 理學 or *xingli xue* 性理學). A similar confusion can be found in Chinese discourses, which commonly designate this current with one of the following expressions: 新儒學, 現代儒學, 當代儒學, 現代新儒學, 當代新儒學, etc. In our view, the Chinese expression 現代新儒學 is most appropriate, given that in China (as opposed to European sinological discourses), the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties has never been associated with the concept of New Confucianism 新儒學, and thus the character that signifies “new” in this phrase is not problematic. Instead, for the English translation, given that we are dealing with philosophies, social theories and ideologies that belong to Chinese modernity we have decided to use the term *Modern Confucianism* in the title of this special issue.

* Jana S. ROŠKER, Department of Asian and African Studies, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia
jana.rosker@guest.arnes.si

Modern Confucianism arose in China at the edge of the previous century and was later developed further by theorists from Taiwan, and, to a lesser degree, from Hong Kong. Unlike the People's Republic of China, where Confucianism was considered to be the "ideology of outdated feudalism" and therefore silenced (at least formally) until the 1980s, in Hong Kong and Taiwan, both of which were defined by post-colonial social discourses, a number of intellectuals began opposing the growing Westernization of their societies already in the 1950s. Due to the multilayered cultural, national and political situation in Taiwan, intellectuals from that country played an important role in developing this new philosophical current from the very outset.

However, the last two decades have seen intense research and an increasingly open debate regarding the postulates and discourses of the new Confucianism philosophy also in the People's Republic. Academic groups such as *Research into the intellectual current of Contemporary New Confucianism* (*Xiandai Xin rujia sichao yanjiu* 現代新儒家思潮研究), which was founded in November 1986 by the philosophy professors, Fang Keli 方克立 and Li Jinqun 李錦全, have been especially active and influential in this area. Some Modern Confucian scholars in the PRC (e.g. Jiang Qing 蒋庆) have criticized Taiwanese Modern Confucianism for deviating from the original Confucian principles and being overly influenced by Western liberal democracy. These scholars have proposed Constitutional Confucianism (also known as Political Confucianism, or Institutional Confucianism) as an alternative path for China, within the trilateral parliamentary framework.

Despite these controversies, the revival of Confucian philosophy in the PRC, together with increasing interaction among philosophers in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, have the potential of contributing enormously to the reintegration of Chinese philosophical life after the politically conditioned divisions of the latter half of the 20th century. Furthermore, Confucian thought, from its origins to contemporary interpretations, offers both new areas of possible convergence or fusion with Western thought, and a platform from which Western philosophy can be constructively criticized. Indeed, the Modern Confucian current primarily grew out of the search for a synthesis between Western and traditional East Asian thought, in order to elaborate a system of ideas and values capable of resolving the sociopolitical problems of the modern, globalized world. The scholars belonging to this stream sought to reconcile "Western" and "traditional Chinese" values in

order to create a theoretical model of modernization that would not be confused or equated with “Westernization”. Because they viewed modernization primarily as a rationalization of the world, they explored their own tradition for authentic concepts that were comparable to certain Western paradigms deemed essential for modernization.

As one of the most influential and important streams of thought in contemporary East Asian theory, while also representing a crucial part of the new, dominant ideologies in the P.R. China, the so-called Confucian revival is considered by many scholars in Chinese studies to be of utmost importance in terms of research and investigation. However, while many books and articles on this topic are available in Chinese, Western academic studies remain few and far between.

In taking this situation as their point of departure, the authors of the present collection analyze the central values of Confucianism, and interpret them within the very different Chinese and Taiwanese socio-political contexts in order to evaluate their impact on the dominant, contemporary ideologies. The authors also examine the main elements that enable the amalgamation of traditional Chinese values into the framework of capitalistic ideologies and axiological contexts. The present special issue thus not only examines the main Modern Confucian philosophical approaches, ideas and methods, but also explores the political, social and ideological backgrounds of the current revival and its connections with the ideological foundations of East Asian and, most especially, Chinese modernity.

The contributions to this special issue address four different research areas. The volume opens with a foreword in Chinese by Prof. Lee Ming-Huei, member of the Academia Sinica in Taiwan and an internationally recognized authority on Modern Confucianism. The Chinese text is accompanied by a short abstract and a longer summary in English. In focusing on Modern Confucian political theory, the author explains the significance of the theory of the “Development of Democracy from Confucianism”, as elaborated primarily in the works of the Taiwanese Modern Confucians.

The second section, entitled *Modern Confucianism as a New Chinese Ideology*, consists of articles by Geir Sigurðsson (University of Iceland) and Bart Dessein (Ghent University). Sigurðsson’s article analyses the debates surrounding Confucianism as a stimulant for economic activity and the recent attempts to rehabilitate Confucianism in the PRC. Bart Dessein’s contribution instead

addresses the issue of whether Modern Confucianism can be regarded as a “civil religion with Chinese characteristics”, and focuses on how politico-religious narratives that reiterate China’s Confucian tradition serve to create a sense of belonging and sharedness in a community.

The next section is entitled *Philosophical Approaches*, and consists of articles by Jana S. Rošker and Tea Sernelj (both from the University of Ljubljana), who explore a number of concepts crucial to Modern Confucian theory. In her essay, Jana Rošker explains how the third generation of Taiwanese Modern Confucian philosophers changed the framework within which traditional Chinese philosophical inquiry had been carried out, and the importance of the concept of immanent transcendence within this process. Tea Sernelj’s article instead focuses on one of the leading representatives of the second generation, Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 (1903–1982), and elucidates some of the key concepts in his philosophical thought.

In the final section, entitled *Confucian Values and the Contemporary World*, Loreta Poškaitė (Vilnius University) and Monika Gänßbauer (Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg) introduce some of the multifarious connections within this specific area of inquiry. In her article, Loreta Poškaitė discusses the role of *xiao* 孝, one of the central Confucian virtues, in contemporary intercultural dialogue, while Monika Gänßbauer explores Zhang Xianglong’s 張祥龍 idea of a “Special Zone for Confucianism”, and its controversial significance for experimental areas in contemporary Confucian discourses.

Although the authors of the present collection often hold very divergent views regarding many aspects of the Confucian revival, they all share a complex intellectual culture which enables them to explore the Revival and its manifold issues with variety, subtlety, dynamism and an openness to dialogue with Chinese philosophy. We hope that the collection before you will contribute to the realization of our common goal and that Chinese philosophy will finally assume its rightful place in world philosophy. Because Modern Confucian efforts to revitalize and reconstruct traditional Confucian thought can also be seen as an attempt to counter the dominant ideological trends and preserve Chinese cultural identity, the present collection will hopefully also contribute to the development of theoretical dialogues between “China” and “the West”.

Jana S. Rošker, Chief Editor

Chinese Foreword

當代新儒家「儒學開出民主論」的理論意涵與現實意義

李明輝 Ming-huei LEE*

摘要

1950 年代，港臺新儒家曾提出「儒學開出民主論」。在他們與臺灣自由主義者的辯論之中，此說也成為雙方爭論的焦點之一。對筆者而言，此說的意涵並不複雜難解，但奇怪的是：它卻不斷引起誤解與質疑。多年來，筆者曾針對這些誤解撰寫了一系列的論文，故本文不再重述相關的細節，而是從宏觀的角度申論一些未盡之意。

關鍵詞：台灣新儒家, 儒學開出民主論, 自由主義, 政治思想, 良知的自我坎陷

Abstract

In the 1950s, Contemporary Modern Confucians of Hong Kong and Taiwan have exposed the theory of the “Development of Democracy from Confucianism”. In their controversies with the Taiwanese liberals, this theory also became one of the main points of debate. The author of the present article believes that the contents of this theory are not too complicated to understand; however, it nevertheless often became subject of various misunderstandings and questionings. During the past years, the author has written several studies on this topic, aiming to clarify such misunderstandings and to responding to such questionings. Therefore, the present article does not restate the details of this theory, but rather aims to provide further explanations of its essential meaning.

Keywords: Taiwanese Modern Confucianism, the Theory of the “Development of Democracy from Confucianism”, liberalism, political theory, Self-negation of Conscience.

*李明輝，研究員，中央研究院，臺灣。電子郵

Ming-huei LEE, Research Fellow, Academia Sinica, Taiwan
lmhuei@hotmail.com

問題之提出

1950年代，港臺新儒家曾提出「儒學開出民主論」。在他們與臺灣自由主義者的辯論之中，此說也成為雙方爭論的焦點之一。對筆者而言，此說的意涵並不複雜難解，但奇怪的是：它卻不斷引起誤解與質疑¹。多年來，筆者曾針對這些誤解撰寫了一系列的論文²，故本文不再重述相關的細節，而是從宏觀的角度申論一些未盡之意。

港臺新儒家的「儒學開出民主論」出現於中國反傳統主義瀰漫的知識背景之下，特別是針對臺灣自由主義的立場而提出的。1950年代，港臺新儒家與臺灣的自由主義者之間爆發了一場思想論戰³。概括而言，雙方爭論的焦點主要集中在兩個問題上：1)中國傳統文化是否妨礙現代科學之發展與民主制度之建立？或者換個方式說，中國要現代化，是否必須先揚棄傳統文化（尤其是儒家傳統）？2)民主政治是否需要道德基礎？換言之，政治自由是否必須預設道德自由（意志自由）？

關於第一個問題，新儒家特別強調：一切文化上的創新必須建立在傳統文化的基礎之上。他們認為：外來的文化因素是不能直接移植的，而是必須通過自身傳統之內在發展與調適去吸納。自由主義者則認為：中國傳統文化在過去既未發展出科學與民主，其中顯然包含不利於其發展的因素，故欲求中國之現代化，就必須揚棄中國傳統文化（至少揚棄其核心部分，尤其是儒家傳統）。因此，在他們看來，新儒家堅持由儒學「開出」民主與科學，並無現實基礎，只是出於自我防衛之心理需要而已。不但如此，他們甚至認為：由於中國傳統文化產生了君主專制制度，新儒家提倡中國傳統文化，等於是為極權主義張目。

關於第二個問題，新儒家認為：民主政治必須建立在道德理想之基礎上，故政治自由必須預設道德自由。他們固然承認道德界與政治界之分際，但不

¹ 例如，臺灣的《中國論壇》雜誌第165期（1982年10月10日）曾刊出「新儒家與中國現代化」座談會記錄，參與者有李亦園、楊國樞、韋政通、余英時、李鴻禧、劉述先、胡佛、林毓生、張灝、金耀基、張忠棟、蕭新煌、尉天驤，會中便充斥著這類的誤解與質疑。

² 這些論文包括〈儒學如何開出民主與科學？〉、〈當前儒家之實踐問題〉、〈論所謂「儒家的泛道德主義」〉、〈歷史與目的〉，均收入拙著《儒學與現代意識》（臺北：文津出版社，1991年）；此外還有一篇法文論文（Lee 2009, 33–62）。

³ 關於這場論戰的始末，請參閱拙作：〈徐復觀與殷海光〉，收入拙著：《當代儒學之自我轉化》（臺北：中央研究院中國文哲研究所，1994年），頁89–127；簡體字版《當代儒學的自我轉化》（北京：中國社會科學出版社，2001年），頁81–117。

認為這兩界是不相干的。他們也承認政治自由與道德自由之不同，並且理解單是提倡道德自由，對於民主政治之建立是不足的。但是他們反對截斷道德基礎、單從政治層面上主張自由與人權的自由主義。在他們看來，這種自由主義是無根的，根本不足以對抗以理想為號召的共產主義。換言之，他們固然承認柏林（Isaiah Berlin, 1909–1997）所謂的「消極自由」（negative liberty）之重要性，但他們進而強調：「消極自由」必須預設「積極自由」（positive liberty）。

臺灣新儒家的「儒學開出民主論」

「儒學開出民主論」同時涉及這兩個問題。這項主張明白見諸 1958 年元月由唐君毅、牟宗三、張君勱及徐復觀四人聯名發表的〈為中國文化敬告世界人士宣言〉⁴。這篇〈宣言〉包括十二節，相關的論點見於第八、九節。他們在此承認：「中國文化歷史中，缺乏西方之近代民主制度之建立，與西方之近代的科學，及各種實用技術，致使中國未能真正的現代化工業化。」（頁 897）因此，「中國文化中須接受西方或世界之文化。」（頁 896）但是他們又強調：

我們不能承認中國之文化思想，沒有民主思想之種子，其政治發展之內在要求，不傾向於民主制度之建立。亦不能承認中國文化是反科學的，自古即輕視科學實用技術的。（頁 897）

我們說中國文化依其本身之要求，應當伸展之文化理想，是要使中國人不僅由其心性之學，以自覺其自我之為一「道德實踐的主體」，同時當求在政治上，能自覺為一「政治的主體」，在自然界，知識界成為「認識的主體」及「實用技術的活動之主體」。（頁 896）

因此，中國文化依其本身之要求，必須由「道德實踐的主體」自覺地「開出」「政治的主體」。其理由見於〈宣言〉第九節：

⁴ 此《宣言》原刊於香港《民主評論》第 9 卷第 1 期（1958 年 1 月 5 日）及臺灣《再生》第 1 卷第 1 期（1958 年 1 月），後收入張君勱著、程文熙編：《中西印哲學文集》（臺北：臺灣學生書局，1981 年），以及張君勱：《新儒家思想史》（臺北：張君勱先生獎學金基金會，1980 年）（附全文英譯）；亦以〈中國文化與世界〉之名收入唐君毅：《中華人文與當今世界》（臺北：臺灣學生書局，1975 年），以及唐君毅：《說中華民族之花果飄零》（臺北：三民書局，1974 年）。以下引用此《宣言》時，直接標示《中華人文與當今世界》之頁碼。

在過去中國之君主制度下，君主固可以德治天下，而人民亦可沐浴於其德化之下，使天下清平。然人民如只沐浴於君主德化之下，則人民仍只是被動的接受德化，人民之道德主體仍未能樹立，而只可說僅君主自樹立其道德主體。然而如僅君主自樹立其道德主體，而不能使人民樹立其道德的主體，則此君主縱為聖君，而其一人之獨聖，此即私「聖」為我有，即非真能成其為聖，亦非真能樹立其道德主體。所以人君若真能樹立其道德的主體，則彼縱能以德化萬民，亦將以此德化萬民之事本身，公諸天下，成為萬民之互相德化。同時亦必將其所居之政治上之位，先公諸天下，為人人所可居之公位。然而肯定政治上之位，皆為人人所可居之公位，同時即肯定人人有平等之政治權利，肯定人人皆平等的為一政治的主體。既肯定人人平等的為一政治的主體，則依人人之公意而制定憲法，以作為共同行使政治權利之運行軌道，即使政治成為民主憲政之政治，乃自然之事。由是而我們可說，從中國歷史文化之重道德主體之樹立，即必當發展為政治上之民主制度，乃能使人真樹立其道德的主體。（頁 903-904）

他們在不同的場合強調：在君主專制的傳統政治格局中，儒家的「內聖」之學充其量只能建立「聖君賢相」的「德治」格局，這並非其合理的發展。但〈宣言〉中所言，畢竟只是個思想綱領；為它提出完整哲學論證的是牟宗三。這些論證主要見諸其《歷史哲學》與《政道與治道》二書中。在《歷史哲學》中，他提出「綜和的盡理之精神」（synthetically rational spirit）與「分解的盡理之精神」（analytically rational spirit）這組概念。在《政道與治道》中，他又提出「理性之運用表現（functional presentation）與架構表現（constructive presentation）」和「理性之內容的表現（intensional presentation）與外延的表現（extensional presentation）」兩組概念。這三組概念所要表達的是同一個意思，其背後所依據的也是同一套思想間架⁵。牟宗三將這套架構稱為「一心開二門」或「良知（道德主體）之自我坎陷（self-negation）」。

⁵ 牟宗三藉這三組概念來說明中國文化與西方文化所代表的不同觀念形態。在《歷史哲學》中，他提到中國文化中還有一種「綜和的盡氣之精神」，表現為英雄之精神與藝術性之精神，以及政治上「打天下」之精神。在《政道與治道》中，「理性之運用表現與架構表現」和「理性之內容的表現與外延的表現」兩組概念是可以互換的，但第一組概念之使用較為寬泛，第二組概念之使用則偏重於政治領域。

筆者曾詳細討論這套間架的涵義⁶，此處無意重述。筆者在此僅引述牟宗三論「理性之運用表現與架構表現」的一段話，以概其餘：

凡是運用表現都是「攝所歸能」，「攝物歸心」。這二者皆在免去對立：它或者把對象收進自己的主體裡面來，或者把自己投到對象裡面去，成為徹上徹下的絕對。內收則全物在心，外投則全心在物。其實一也。這裡面若強分能所而說一個關係，便是「隸屬關係」（Sub-Ordination）。〔……〕而架構表現則相反。它的底子是對待關係，由對待關係而成一「對列之局」（Co-Ordination）。是以架構表現便以「對列之局」來規定。而架構表現中之「理性」也頓時即失去其人格中德性即具體地說的實踐理性之意義而轉為非道德意義的「觀解理性」或「理論理性」，因而也是屬於知性層上的。⁷

依牟宗三之意，儒家的良知屬於理性之運用表現，表現為實踐理性；而民主與科學須預設理性之架構表現，表現為理論理性。以民主政治來說，良知（道德主體）並不直接要求民主政治，而是要先轉為理論理性，然後才能藉由制度性思考建立民主憲政。這個辯證的過程便是所謂的「良知之自我坎陷」。

牟宗三認為：中國文化偏重於「理性之運用表現/內容的表現」，西方文化則偏重於「理性之架構表現/外延的表現」，而民主政治之建立與現代科學之發展屬於後者。他藉此說明中國在歷史上未發展出民主政治與現代科學的原因。在另一方面，他又指出：從前者未必無法開展出後者，只是這種開展並非直接的過程，而是間接的辯證過程。在政治的領域，「理性之內容的表現」至多只能建立「仁者德治」的觀念，其不足之處在於：一、可遇而不可求；二、人存政舉，人亡政息，不能建立真正的法治；三、治者方面的擔負過重，開不出「政治之自性」。這迫使我們必須進到「理性之外延的表現」⁸。

當代新儒家的「儒學開出民主論」使他們一方面有別於拒絕現代民主制度的儒家保守派與質疑西方民主制度的「亞洲價值」論者，另一方面又有別

⁶ 參閱拙作：〈論所謂「儒家的泛道德主義」〉，收入拙著：《儒學與現代意識》，頁 106–115。

⁷ 牟宗三：《政道與治道》（臺北：學生書局，1987 年），頁 52–53；亦見《牟宗三先生全集》（臺北：聯經出版公司，2003 年），第 10 冊，頁 58。以下引用牟宗三的著作時，以方括號將全集本的冊數及頁碼直接置於原版頁碼之後。

⁸ 牟宗三：《政道與治道》，頁 140（10: 155）。

於將儒家傳統視為與現代民主制度不相容的西化派（包括大部分中國自由主義者與部分華人耶教徒）。對於拒絕西方民主制度的人而言，這套理論自然是不必要的。例如，以「大陸新儒家」為標榜的蔣慶便主張「創立具有中國特色的政治制度」，而指摘唐、牟、徐、張等人要求從儒學開出民主制度，是放棄儒學特有的自性與立場而向西方文化靠攏，實際上是一種變相的「西化論」⁹。對於主張直接從西方移植民主制度的自由主義者（如殷海光、林毓生、李鴻禧¹⁰）而言，這套理論無疑也是多餘的。例如，殷海光便將當代新儒家的這類思想視為一套「自我防衛的機制」¹¹。有些華人基督徒也特別強調西方耶教對現代民主的貢獻，而將中國之所以未能建立民主制度歸咎於中國傳統文化。對於他們而言，「儒學開出民主論」顯然是荒謬的。

「亞洲價值」的倡者（如新加坡的李光耀、馬來西亞的馬哈地）提出一個有爭議性的問題：現代西方建立的民主制度是否體現一種普遍價值？唐、牟、徐、張四人均肯定現代西方民主制度的普遍意義，而這種肯定係基於他們（尤其是徐復觀與張君勱）對中國傳統君主專制制度的反省與批判。在他們看來，傳統儒家與君主專制制度之結合是歷史的機緣所造成的。這種結合固然使儒家思想成為主導中國歷史發展的力量，但也使儒家的理想受到嚴重的歪曲，而付出慘痛的代價。在此他們見到現代西方民主制度的普遍意義，因而主張中國的民主化。但是在另一方面，他們深刻體認到：傳統文化是形塑我們的主體（包括個人與文化的主體）之背景，而非如殷海光所言，是可以任意更換的工具，亦非如若干華人耶教徒所期待的，可以全面更替。這項觀點與當代社群主義（communitarianism）關於「自我」的觀點不謀而合。因此，新儒家強調：中華民族建立民主制度的過程並非如自由主義者所想像的那樣，只是一個自外加添的過程，而應當是中華民族自覺地以精神主體的身分開展其文化理想的過程。換言之，「民主」的理念固然是普遍的，但其證成（justification）卻可以是特殊的。在這個意義下，「儒學開出民主論」可說是民主政治之一種「儒家式的證成」。

⁹ 蔣慶：《政治儒學：當代儒學的轉向、特質與發展》（臺北縣：養正堂文化事業公司，2003年），頁82-83, 174-175。

¹⁰ 中國國民黨在臺灣執政期間，李鴻禧以自由主義為標榜，反對該黨的戒嚴體制。但在2000年民主進步黨取得執政權之後，他卻為該黨的民粹主義（populism）大力辯護，擁護貪腐的陳水扁政府，可說完全背棄了自由主義的精神。

¹¹ 見殷海光為1958年5月1日出刊的《自由中國》（第18卷第9期）所撰寫之社論〈跟著五四的腳步前進〉（頁4）；亦見林正弘主編：《殷海光全集》（臺北：桂冠圖書公司，1990年），第11冊：《政治與社會（上）》，頁577。

「儒學開出民主論」對臺灣民主化的貢獻

最後，筆者要討論當代新儒家的「儒學開出民主論」在臺灣民主化的過程中所發揮的作用。首先要指出：臺灣的自由派與新儒家的論戰基本上是學術界內部的論戰，對臺灣的現實政治並無直接的影響。這猶如我們很難想像羅爾斯（John Rawls）的《正義論》（*A Theory of Justice*）對美國的選舉有直接的影響。因此，新儒家的這套理論對臺灣的民主化至多只能有間接的影響。

1949 年甫從中國大陸敗退到臺灣的中國國民黨（以下簡稱「國民黨」）政府宣布臺灣進入戒嚴體制，頒布種種禁令，其中包括禁止成立新政黨。當時除了國民黨之外，只有中國青年黨與中國民主社會黨隨國民黨遷移到臺灣。但這兩個黨的黨員極少，而且得靠國民黨的資助才能維持下去，故被視為「花瓶政黨」。1960 年《自由中國》雜誌的發行人雷震號召包括外省及本土精英在內的反對派籌組新政黨，而遭到國民黨政府的鎮壓，雷震被捕入獄，《自由中國》也因之停刊。這一波組黨運動的失敗使臺灣長期處於國民黨一黨獨大的局面。直到 1986 年以臺灣本土精英為主的反對派不顧戒嚴令，宣布成立民主進步黨（以下簡稱「民進黨」），這種局面才被打破。但這次國民黨並未鎮壓這個新政黨，反而順應民意，於次年宣布結束戒嚴體制，使臺灣真正開始步上民主政治之途。2000 年民進黨在總統大選中獲勝，完成了第一次的政黨輪替，使臺灣進入了以兩大黨為主導的政治局面，臺灣的民主政治邁進了一大步。2008 年國民黨透過選舉重新取得中央政府的執政權，完成了第二次的政黨輪替，臺灣的民主政治得到進一步的鞏固。在民進黨組黨的過程中，由本土精英主導的本土化運動是主要的動力，自由主義則為輔佐的力量。但諷刺的是，隨著民進黨的茁壯，自由派的陣營卻因民粹主義（populism）的侵蝕而分裂，進而邊緣化。最後，民粹主義取代了自由主義，自由主義只剩下微弱的聲音。

相形之下，新儒家的聲音在臺灣民主化的過程中則相對地沉寂。加以他們對中國傳統文化的肯定態度在表面上似乎呼應了國民黨藉由儒家傳統所進行的黨化教育，所以有人指摘新儒家在臺灣民主化的過程中缺席，甚至阻礙了臺灣的民主化。例如，連認同儒家價值的陳昭瑛在〈徐復觀與自由主義的對話〉一文中都說：「當代儒學在文化、思想方面的建樹已是有目共睹。但在政治上，儒家一直在各種重大政治改革運動中缺席，而所有重大的政治改

革也多援引西方政治思想作為社會實踐的理論基礎。儒家步論在實踐或理論方面都是缺席的。」¹²

這種指摘其實有失公允。因為如上所述，新儒家基於儒家價值肯定民主政治的普遍意義，而且他們所提倡的民主並非威權式的民主（如我們在新加坡所見到的），而是不折不扣的議會民主。張君勱是 1947 年在南京頒布、而迄今仍在臺灣沿用的「中華民國憲法」之起草人。儘管這部憲法之實施因國民黨政府的戒嚴令而大打折扣，但在本質上仍是不折不扣的民主憲法。1949 年以後，儘管張君勱在名義上仍是中國民主社會黨的主席，但他卻因反對蔣介石的戒嚴政策而長年流寓國外，藉講學宣揚儒家哲學。徐復觀則長期在香港的報刊上撰文，除了批評中國共產黨之外，也不時批評國民黨，而支持臺灣的反對派。後來他的言論得罪了國民黨的官僚，而導致《民主評論》於 1966 年停刊，他自己也離開臺灣，到香港任教。此外，錢穆與唐君毅於 1949 年以後在香港創立新亞書院及 1963 年新亞書院加入中文大學的過程中，他們周旋於港英殖民政府、美國勢力與左派勢力之間，努力維持中國文化的主體性¹³，也很難說只是「在文化、思想方面的建樹」。因此，說新儒家在臺灣民主化的過程中缺席，實非公允之論。

自 1911 年的革命結束了中國的帝制之後，儒家傳統喪失了作為國家意識形態的地位，而中國共產黨又進一步以馬克思主義取代儒家傳統的正統地位。但是中國共產黨在 1980 年代初期開始進行開放政策之後，大陸的學界與民間對包括儒家在內的中國傳統文化之興趣迅速恢復，而出現所謂「儒學熱」的現象¹⁴。在臺灣，儘管民進黨於 2000 年取得政權後，致力於推行「去中國化」的政策，但是臺灣社會依然保存了深厚的中國傳統文化。在這種情況下，我們實在很難想像：在臺灣推行民主化，可以不處理民主政治與中國傳統文化（尤其是儒家傳統）的關係。在這個意義下，「儒家傳統與民主制度如何結合」的問題決不只是心理調適或民族自尊的問題，而是具有重大的現實意義。套用德國學者羅哲海（Heiner Roetz）的說法，這屬於一種「重建的調適詮釋學」（reconstructive hermeneutics of accommodation）（Roetz 1999, 257）。

¹² 《思想》第 20 期（臺北：聯經出版公司，2012 年 1 月），頁 175。

¹³ 關於這段艱苦的過程，請參閱周愛靈著、羅美嫻譯：《花果飄零：冷戰時期殖民地的新亞書院》（香港：商務印書館，2010 年）。

¹⁴ 參閱拙作：〈解讀當前中國大陸的儒學熱〉，收入李明輝編：《儒家思想在現代東亞：總論篇》（臺北：中央研究院中國文哲研究所），頁 81–98。亦參閱（Lee 2013, 129–43）。

社會學家金耀基也有類似的看法，因為他主張：經過重構的儒學可以與民主制度結合起來，成為「民主的儒家」（democratically Confucian），但非「儒家民主」（Confucian democracy）——前者是以民主為主導性因素來搭配儒學，後者是以儒學為主導性因素來搭配民主政治（King 1997, 174）。

再就理論效力而言，新儒家反覆強調民主政治與中國傳統文化之間並無本質的矛盾。這對臺灣的政治精英產生了儘管間接的、但卻難以估計的影響。在臺灣民主化的過程中，並未出現以國情不同為理由而從原則上拒絕西方民主制度的聲音（如「亞洲價值論」）。即使實施戒嚴體制的國民黨政府也只是強調當時臺灣的特殊處境（面對中共的嚴重威脅）不宜立即全面採行民主制度，而未根本拒絕民主制度。對比於伊斯蘭基教派（Islamic fundamentalist）對民主制度的抗拒，臺灣在民主化的過程中並未出現革命或大規模的暴力，而兩次的政權輪替也相對地平順。在這一點上，新儒家的穩健政治立場似乎不無貢獻。新儒家的政治觀點或許不會得到臺灣的自由派與本土派政治精英之認同，但是它對國民黨員或親國民黨的政治精英卻有潛移默化的作用，使他們體認到民主化是臺灣必走的道路，而減緩了他們對民主化的抗拒。如上文所提到，「大陸新儒家」蔣慶主張以儒家取代馬克思主義，反對中國採行西方的民主制度，因為他認為這形同向西方文化投降。在筆者看來，這種「儒家基教主義」（Confucian fundamentalism）並未出現於臺灣，正可反顯出新儒家對臺灣民主化的無形貢獻。

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Summary

The 1950s witnessed a debate between the Modern Confucians of Hong Kong and Taiwan on one side and the Taiwanese liberal intellectuals on the other side. The debate focused on the issue as to whether traditional Chinese culture, especially Confucianism, was appropriate for the development of science, technology and democratic political system in the modern sense. In this context, the Modern Confucians of Hong Kong and Taiwan have exposed the theory of the “Development of Democracy from Confucianism”. Since the author of the present article has already tried in several past studies to clarify various misunderstandings connected to these questions, this article does not restate the details regarding the

abovementioned theory. Instead, it rather offers further explanation of its inherent significance.

On the one hand, even though the Modern Confucians admitted that traditional Confucianism did not include science and democracy in modern sense, they did not believe that the Confucian tradition was obstacle to the of modern country with its attributes. On the other hand, the liberals believed in the opposite and insisted that China had to get rid of all of its relicts of Confucianism if it wished to become a modern, technologically developed and democratic state. This debate has shown that the Modern Confucians acknowledged the limits between politics and morality; however on the theoretical level they stressed that political freedom has to presuppose moral freedom. The representatives of the liberal camp denied this assumption, because in their own opinion this scenario (in the best case) would lead to a “totalitarian democracy”.

Through in depth analyses of this controversy, the author comes to the conclusion that democracy and traditional Confucianism do not exclude one another. He exposes the fact that Taiwanese Confucian scholars have never rejected multiple approaches to democracy on the basis of different cultural traditions. In this sense, Taiwanese Modern Confucians have been thoroughly—though indirectly—contributing to the democratization of their country.

Povzetek

V petdesetih letih smo bili priča razpravi med sodobnimi konfucianci iz Hong Konga in Tajvana na eni in liberalno strujo tajvanskih izobražencev na drugi strani. Razprava se je osredotočila predvsem na vprašanje, ali je tradicionalna kitajska kultura in zlasti konfucijanska miselnost primerna za razvoj znanosti, tehnologije in demokratičnega političnega sistema zahodnega tipa. V tem kontekstu so moderni konfucijanci iz Hong Konga in Tajvana izpostavili teorijo o »razvoju demokracije iz konfucianizma«. Ker je avtor tega članka že v več preteklih študijah poskusil razjasniti različne nesporazume povezane s temi vprašanji, ta članek ne prinaša podrobnosti glede zgoraj omenjene teorije. Namesto tega raje nudi dodatno razlago o pomenu teorij.

Čeprav moderni konfucijanci na eni strani priznavajo, da v tradicionalnem konfucijanstvu ti elementi sicer niso bili prisotni, vendar to še ne pomeni, da konfucijanska tradicija razvoj moderne države s temi atributi zavira, so bili liberalci prepričani o nasprotnem in so zato poudarjali, da mora Kitajska, če želi

postati moderna, tehnološko razvita in demokratična država, odstraniti vse prežitke konfucijanske miselnosti. V tej polemiki se je izkazalo, da so moderni konfucijanci sicer priznavali razliko med politiko in moralo, vendar so sistem politične svobode na teoretski ravni pogojevali z moralno svobodo. Predstavniki liberalnega tabora so zanikali njihovo predpostavko, po kateri naj bi bila politična svoboda osnovana na moralni, kajti to bi po njihovem mnenju v najboljšem primeru privedlo do »totalitarne demokracije«.

Skozi poglobljene analize te polemike avtor pride do zaključka, da demokracija in tradicionalni konfucianizem ne izključujeta drug drugega. Avtor izpostavlja dejstvo, da tajvanski konfucijanci niso nikoli zavračali demokratičnega razvoja na osnovi kulturno pogojenih razlik. V tem smislu so tajvanski moderni konfucijanci nemalo – četudi posredno – prispevali k procesu demokratizacije njihove države.

Modern Confucianism as a New Chinese Ideology

Confucianism vs. Modernity: Expired, Incompatible or Remedial?

Geir SIGURÐSSON*

Abstract

This paper is an exploration of the reappraisal that has been taking place since the 1980s of Confucianism's suitability for a modernized society. The first section focuses in particular on the discussion that took place in Singapore on Confucianism as a stimulant for economic activity, arguing that it was first and foremost a politically motivated attempt to establish Confucianism as a convenient ideology. I then move to a discussion of recent attempts to rehabilitate Confucianism in the PRC. In the final section, I suggest how Confucianism can be a healthy antidote to some of the ills produced by contemporary capitalist practice.

Keywords: Confucianism, modernization, capitalism, consumerism

Izvleček

Ta članek raziskuje prevrednotenje primernosti konfucionizma za modernizacijo družbe, ki se odvija od 1980. Prvi del se osredotoča predvsem na razpravo, ki je potekala v Singapurju o konfucianizmu kot poživilu za gospodarske dejavnosti, z utemeljitvijo, da je bil najprej in predvsem politično motiviran poskus vzpostavitve konfucionizma kot priročne ideologije. Nato preidem na razpravo o nedavnih poskusih vnovične rehabilitacije konfucionizma v Ljudski republiki Kitajski. V zadnjem poglavju pa predlagam, kako je lahko konfucionizem zdrav protistrup za nekatere tegobe, ki jih proizvajajo sodobne kapitalistične prakse.

Ključne besede: konfucianizem, modernizacija, kapitalizem, potrošništvo

* Geir SIGURÐSSON, Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor), Chinese Studies, Vice-head, Department of Foreign Languages, Literature and Linguistics, University of Iceland
geirs@hi.is

Introduction: The Changing Meanings of Confucianism

The term “Confucianism”, whether in its Western version or its Chinese equivalent *rujia* 儒家, is gradually receiving a new, while still inchoate, signification. Its meaning will probably never be entirely clear, nor, I argue, has it ever been. As with any complex philosophy or ideology with a long history, it is not—and most likely should not be—easily definable. While a number of specific Confucian values, approaches and notions can be identified, Confucianism’s lack of indispensable foundations or dogmas eschews rigorous definitions. What is at least clear, however, is that its point of reference in academic and even public discussion has recently been undergoing considerable changes. Today, “Confucianism” is beginning to literally *mean* something rather different from what it did only three decades ago when it was predominantly understood as the major stream of thought in ancient China, and, somewhat more narrowly, as the ruling ideology of the Chinese dynasties. Back then, however, and during most of the 20th century, Confucianism was only rarely presented as a viable or desirable way of thinking. On the contrary, in fact, it was largely rejected, and sometimes even persecuted, as a relic of the past and the primary culprit of China’s alleged stagnation during the last few centuries of dynastic rule (Chen 2011, 205).

The fact, however, that not everyone rejected Confucianism in this manner should not be understated. A number of philosophers in Taiwan and Hong Kong, for instance, significantly upheld the reverence for the Confucian enterprise during the 20th century. Thinkers who held comparable views were certainly also present in the People’s Republic of China, while state repression provided little if any possibilities for them to expound their views without running the risk of suffering serious personal consequences. Some prominent Western sinologists, moreover, engaged themselves critically but in many cases also constructively with Confucianism as a philosophical tradition worthy of consideration.

But the link with modernization was rarely, if at all, made until in the 1980s. Indeed, until very recently, few Western sinologists or other academics would even dare mention Confucianism and modernity in the same sentence. It would simply not occur to the majority of them that Confucianism might have anything to offer to a “modern” or “modernizing” society. While certainly of indisputable historic importance, Confucianism tended to be regarded as comparable perhaps to

medieval Christianity, a previously powerful ideology that had all but outlived its days.¹

The decisive first steps taken towards a reevaluation of Confucianism were taken in the 1980s. While dialogues took place in China and Taiwan about Confucianism's suitability for a modernized society, it was in Singapore that Confucianism was first suggested as a potential catalyst for modernization after Lee Kuan Yew's government introduced Confucian ethics in the secondary curriculum in 1982. What ensued was a major philosophical, sociological and economic discussion hosted by the Institute of East Asian Philosophies (IEAP), which was established at the National University of Singapore in 1983, about Asian and notably Confucian values as an appropriate platform for social and economic modernization. The aim seemed to be taken towards a Confucian revival, or perhaps rather inception, as it is questionable whether Confucianism had ever been a strong cultural force in the city state. The government-sponsored Confucian programme in Singapore sought to find values and motivations inherent in Confucianism that could establish it as being parallel to the Protestant ethic in its Weber-inspired image, i.e. as a cultural force informing ways of living that forge ahead capitalism, industrialization and modernization. Apparently, hopes were high that an Asian cultural stimulant for a social and economic progress comparable to earlier breakthroughs in Euro-America would be discovered and affirmed. Confucianism was perceived as an important strand in and aspect of what came to be called "Asian values", a broader cultural base on which modernization could be constructed while westernization could be avoided.

But not everyone was in such a hurry to come to the desired conclusion. Tu Weiming, the well-known scholar of Confucianism, then based at Harvard University, was brought into the dialogue as a leading authority in the field. As Tu is generally considered a champion of Confucianism, one would have expected him to be eager to identify and affirm its positive and modernizing effects. But Tu is also a careful and thorough scholar. One may surmise that he failed to fulfil the high expectations of his hosts as he was unwilling, as published in a later paper, to

¹ Besides the many May Fourth and Maoist denouncements of Confucianism in 20th century China, a prominent view of Confucianism as a relic of the past is found in Joseph R. Levenson's monumental *Confucian China and its Modern Fate*, in which he concludes that "Confucian civilization" is merely historically significant in much the same way as ancient Greek and Egypt civilizations (Levenson 1958–1965, 3: 123f.).

subscribe to the thesis that Confucianism “provides a necessary background and powerful motivating force for the rise of industrial East Asia”, arguing that

the method of finding the functional equivalent of the Protestant ethic in the “modernized” or “vulgarized” Confucian ethic is too facile, simple-minded, and mechanistic to merit serious attention. (Tu 1993, 8)

He further wrote:

The question, In what sense has the Confucian ethic contributed to the economic dynamics of industrial East Asia? seems less interesting than a much more profound subject of investigation: How does the Confucian tradition, in belief, attitude, and practice, continue to impede, facilitate, and guide the modern transformation in East Asia and, in the process, how is it being rejected, revitalized, and fundamentally restructured? (Tu 1993, 13)

It appears that Singapore’s endorsement of Confucianism as a modernizing power was largely intended as a self-fulfilling prophecy. An ideology convenient for an authoritarian regime was to be established on the grounds that it was the cultural basis of Singapore’s economic success story. Thus, the discussion was first and foremost ideologically driven rather than searching for real understanding, while a number of good scholars participating in the dialogue certainly aimed at and contributed to the latter. By concocting a Confucian cultural foundation, the People’s Action Party under Lee Kuan Yew’s leadership had found a vindication for continuing its authoritarian rulership in a period of world history characterized by growing demands for stronger democratic principles. The state was attempting to “naturalise, validate, and ironically reunite (Chinese) Singaporeans with a presumed moral and philosophical code.” (Yew 2011, 277) Ong Pang Boon 王邦文, a first generation People’s Action Party politician, and an outspoken critic of the Confucian programme, warned that

successive generations of monarchs had always made use of and promoted those parts of Confucianism that were advantageous to feudal rule. (Hong and Huang 2008, 105)

In this respect, it is illuminating that in the 1970s and into the mid-1980s, the Singapore leadership praised and encouraged “rugged individualism” until it suddenly began endorsing a Confucian kind of collectivism, duty and self-sacrifice. (Englehart 2000, 555)

The Confucian programme in Singapore turned out largely to be a failure, most decisively due to fear by other ethnic groups that the country was being Sinicized, but also because of scarce interest and even opposition by the Chinese population (Yew 2011, 277). The Institute of East Asian Philosophies was changed in 1990 to the Institute of East Asian Political Economy (IEAPE) and given different tasks in line with its new name.²

Around the same time in the People's Republic of China, or in the wake of the Four Modernizations campaign launched at the end of the 1970s, a radical reexamination of Confucianism began taking place. This was a time calling for a thorough reconsideration of the present and future status of the various ideological, philosophical and religious forces in the PRC. Much of the discussion during the first years revolved around Confucianism's adaptability to the official Marxist state-ideology. This particular issue was of broader political nature and applied to major religions such as Buddhism and Christianity as well. But Confucianism's historical and cultural status is only partly comparable to that of other religions and therefore required a more differentiated treatment. Not only is Confucianism not represented by some kind of ideological establishment, such as a church, but it was and still is considered by many as some kind of locus or core of Chinese culture that transcends any ideological categories, or, as Li Zehou 李泽厚 has put it, a "psycho-cultural construct" beyond the manipulation of human will. (Song 2003, 88) Thus, an acceptance of Confucian deep-seated social and cultural influences would call for an investigation into its compatibility with a modernizing society.

While the discussions in China and Singapore were set against different backdrops, the former was somewhat influenced by the latter. For instance, some of the participants, such as Tu Weiming, were active both in China and in Singapore. The cultural implications of Singapore's notion of "Confucian capitalism" (*rujia zibenzhuyi* 儒家资本主义) may to some extent be meaningfully compared with China's notion of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" (*Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi* 中国特色社会主义), although Confucianism's impetus for economic modernization was only fleetingly addressed in China, perhaps, one may surmise, because China was officially still socialist and not

² In 1997, the Institute of East Asian Political Economy was then changed again into the still operating East Asian Institute. On the opposition to and eventual failure of the Confucian programme, see Kuo (1996, 303ff.).

heading towards becoming a capitalist country. Fang Keli, an influential Marxist-Confucian thinker, “was adamant that mainland scholars did not advocate the road of ‘Confucian capitalism’, and that what they were exploring was the socialist road to modernization with Chinese characteristics.” (Song 2003, 95) Thus, whether or not in line with the views of those participating in the debate, it seems that such considerations were more or less brushed aside and the main attention turned toward Confucianism as a cultural, ethical and even “religious” foundation in China. The 1980s debate was, after all, termed “culture craze” or “culture fever” (*wenhua re* 文化热), indicating that it revolved mostly around the search for a national culture suitable for China’s intention to find its place among other modernized nations of the world.

Confucianism’s Present Status in the People’s Republic of China

The “culture craze” came to a halt with the repressive political situation in China after the student revolts were crushed in 1989. But the question of Confucianism’s place in China’s future was by no means forgotten. Already in the mid-1990s it was becoming obvious that a reconsideration of Confucian values was inescapable. This has become even more obvious in the new millennium, when Confucianism has been enjoying positive reappraisal in China as a kernel of a new and still ongoing “craze” of “national learning” (*guoxue* 国学). A grassroots embrace of Confucianism is taking place, and a clear, while also clearly debated, top-down endorsement of Confucian culture has been occurring, manifesting itself in both private and public schools that teach Confucian values and virtues, university institutes for the furtherance of Confucian studies,³ not to mention the now more than 300 Confucius Institutes operating all over the world. While the Confucius Institutes are not, as many people seem to believe, specifically designed to further the Confucian philosophy as such, they are certainly symbolic for the radically changed attitude to Confucius and Confucianism in the PRC.

A growing number of intellectuals in China are now considering Confucianism in a favourable manner. Some of these even explicitly endorse it as a viable

³ The first institute of such a kind, the Chinese Confucius Research Institute (中华孔子研究所), was established already in 1985 in the birthplace of Confucius, Qufu. In the new century, however, they have proliferated and been established at various universities in China, for instance, at Renmin University of China in Beijing in 2003 (孔子研究院), Qufu Normal University in 2007 (孔子文化学院), Sichuan University in 2009 (国际儒学研究院), Shandong University in 2010 (儒学高等研究院) and Peking University in 2010 (儒学研究院).

ideology for China's future. Others suggest it more as a practical guide for everyday life. Among those belonging to the first group, Jiang Qing 蒋庆 and Kang Xiaoguang 康晓光 are probably the best known thinkers. They differ, however, considerably in their approaches and motivations. Jiang, a self-proclaimed Confucian, believes in the correctness of Confucian institutions, way of life and values.⁴ Kang, on the other hand, is rather a pragmatic thinker who, while not considering himself a Confucian, believes that the foundation of a unifying institute such as a “Confucian church” would have beneficial effects on the anomical state of Chinese society.⁵ In the second case, I am of course primarily referring to Yu Dan's 于丹 somewhat controversial but overall popular interpretation of the *Analects*.⁶

Within the continuous educational reforms in China, Confucian values and insights have received and are receiving more and more attention as potential sources for moral education and existential meaning, not least during the previous leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, who “moved closer to an official embrace of Confucianism” and repeatedly came up with Confucian-based slogans and encouragements such as “harmonious society”, “filial piety” and “eight glories and eight shames”. (Bell 2010, 91f) It is still too early to detect the attitude of the present leadership to Confucianism, but on the surface it seems certainly less openly supportive of a Confucian-inspired policy. One may surmise that the bizarre case of Confucius's statue on Tiananmen Square in 2011, erected in January, removed overnight in April, may be associated with a more skeptical attitude to Confucianism with the then incumbents-to-be. (Gardner 2011)

Be that as it may, the growing number of positive allusions to Confucian ways of thinking, both in media and on the political arena in China, makes it increasingly urgent to come to a better understanding of their meaning. While it would be easy to dismiss these allusions as empty and meaningless, as much of Western media often does, I believe that such cynicism is unhelpful, and that we should rather be taking them reasonably seriously.⁷

⁴ Jiang's ideas of Confucianism's future political role in China are well presented in Fan (2011).

⁵ The best English introduction to Kang's suggestions and approaches is found in Gaenssbauer (2011).

⁶ On its controversial nature, cf. Zhao (2007).

⁷ Cf. Shobert (2011) who implies that in Chinese politics “Confucianism is a tool to be employed, a means to an end” of silencing any opposition in the country, and Roberts (2012) similarly concludes his article by citing a Hong Kong-based scholar who says that the “Party uses Confucianism as a tool,

Hence an important question is what Confucianism means, or should mean, in a contemporary context. This question obviously also begs the question what sort of form it might take in its future development in China. The second and probably more important question is what, if anything, Confucianism can offer modernity: whether it is still, or perhaps once again, relevant to modern societies. This is of course a topic for many dissertations and books and here I can only briefly touch upon a few pressing issues.

With regard to the contemporary meaning of Confucianism, there is no simple and fixed definition or formulation that could fill in the blanks for us—not even from a historical point of view. Confucianism has a long and a highly syncretic history, it has, explicitly or not, been generally rather inclusive of other streams of thought in China, and was so pervasive in Chinese society that there were few if any aspects of human living that had no association with it at all. As the Confucian reformer Liang Qichao 梁启超 remarked in his *Confucian Philosophy* 儒家哲学 from 1927, “Confucian philosophy does not equate with the whole of Chinese culture, but if you take Confucianism away, I am afraid that not much else will remain.”⁸ (cited in Zhou 2011, 27) To conflate Confucianism with Chinese culture would certainly be an over-generalization that left the label largely meaningless. But one can hardly deny that Confucianism has been pervasive in the entire cultural history of China.

Confucianism has been many things and it has had many paradoxical manifestations—some of which were present at the same time. In its ancient form as philosophy, it was anti-dogmatic in nature, flexible and adaptive. During the Han-dynasty, it was a powerful but also a largely creative state ideology. In its Neo-Confucian guise, it was highly syncretic, lofty and idealistic, while also practical and realpolitical. In the Ming and Qing, it became inward-looking, somewhat dogmatic, nostalgic and thus reactionary. It was always a motivation for learning, although the learning it encouraged may not always have been, as it was meant to be, appropriate for the times. Confucianism also always justified hierarchy, both within family and society at large—but the hierarchy it justified

as a way to legitimize their rule, and as a way of criticizing Western democracy”. An editorial in *Der Spiegel* also concludes that Confucianism may be a convenient ideology for the CCP by assuming a misleading interpretation of a passage from the *Analects* (12.19): “the virtue of the *junzi* is like the wind, while that of the *xiaoren* like the grass. As the wind blows, the grass is sure to bend.” (Brüder im Geiste 2007)

⁸ “儒家哲学，不算中国文化全体；但是若把儒家抽去，中国文化，恐怕没有多少东西了。”

was often realistic and not necessarily rigid. Which of all these Confucianisms do people want? And is the Confucianism people want really still Confucianism? And, perhaps more importantly, who are these people?

In any case, it probably goes without saying that the institutionalized, or indeed, politicized Confucianism of fixed moral codes and hierarchies is unlikely, to say the least, to gain much ground with the Chinese population at large. Considering its heightened exposure to persuasive “global” (i.e. predominantly Anglo-American) values, such as individualism, negative freedom and increased consumer choice, as well as other progressive social changes in China, such as improved women’s rights, this development will exclude, or has already excluded, the possibility of anything close to the formerly institutionalised Confucianism to be reconstructed.

Hence, should Confucianism continue to be interpreted in a historicist manner by specialists on Confucianism, who tend to identify it with the reactionary Qing Dynasty establishment, then it would appear unlikely that the population will embrace the Confucian ideology. On the other hand, it is intriguing that Yu Dan’s highly popular interpretation of Confucianism has precisely been criticized for being too accommodating to the status quo; critics say “that her thinking and her lecturing resemble a scholar-official from the feudal society”, aiming at the reduction of critical social input in order to “maintain harmony”, virtually as if the May Fourth Movement had never existed. (Zhao 2007) And yet, however curiously, the public readership seems to embrace it.

Perhaps such criticism of Yu Dan is too subtle, perhaps even pedantic. A guide through everyday life rooted in local culture may simply find easier access to people’s way of thinking and valuing than foreign self-help manuals. Even so, a return to a dynastic kind of Confucianism would seem entirely out of place. The New Confucian movement that has sought to find some commensurability between the Confucian philosophy and modern (or Western) institutions and values such as democracy, human rights, gender justice and individualism would seem to be the most promising for a kind of Confucianism suitable to the modern times. On the other hand, it must also be taken into account that Confucianism cannot simply be a vehicle to implement “modern” values in their Western format. If such values are to be adopted, as Daniel Bell has correctly observed, they must also be adapted (Bell 2010, 93).

Confucianism's Contribution to the Modern World: A Suggestion

Whether Confucianism is capable of adapting to modernity, however, does not answer the question whether it has something specific to contribute to modernity. In this regard, I would like to propose a suggestion. Which issues are the most pressing ones in modernity? Currently, economic considerations are without doubt the most conspicuous ones. Has Confucianism anything to contribute to these issues? I believe so, but in a way rather different from what people might expect. Let me explain.

As touched upon in the first part of this paper, the last few decades have witnessed much discussion about what sort of influence Confucianism would have (and has had) on capitalist enterprise. Although the Chinese Communist Party was prone to regard Confucians as “capitalist-roaders”, Confucianism had, in history, probably somewhat restraining effects on commerce and market forces, as it assigned merchant activity a very low social status, which, admittedly, was rather a reflection mainly of Legalist views. (Hansen 2000, 99) This tendency has been criticized by some historians as having inhibited the development of Chinese society, eventually causing it to lapse behind the Western powers (e.g. Fairbanks and Goldman 2006, 179ff). There is probably some truth in this, but today we may need to reevaluate this entire historical development as it has arguably triggered a number of grave problems in the world at large, social, moral, environmental and even existential. Indeed, considering the long-term interests of humanity and other living beings on the planet, the narrative of the West's success may in fact turn out to be simply a brief preface to the horror story of humanity at large.

There are other and more recent arguments for considering Confucianism in fact a catalyst for capitalist activity. I will not go into detailed discussion of these arguments here, but briefly explain my conviction that most of these are actually misguided, partially resting upon a mistaken interpretation of Max Weber's Protestant Ethics thesis as an explanation of, let alone a blueprint for, desirable progress. Weber was concerned about the process of increased rationalization (*Rationalisierung*) in the Western way of living, thinking and valuing, certainly triggering a more systematic approach to organized co-existence, but also leading to depersonalization, loneliness and isolation. The fateful factor in this process was the quest for money-making, stimulated unintentionally by certain Protestant theological interpretations, and leading to the unique Western capitalist system, which Weber envisaged as becoming dominant in Western culture with all its

inhumane and deplorable consequences.⁹ In this process, money-making becomes not only a rationalized activity but one that takes precedence over all other human activities: it becomes an end in itself. According to Weber, the unique feature of Occidental capitalism derives from its reliance upon an inner motivation to strictly organize our mundane life in such a way that virtually all of our actions contribute to the accumulation of capital. But not only is this an absurd and meaningless way of living, it also has profoundly negative consequences for human civilization and the “quality” of the human creatures being moulded by such a framework of values when gaining ascendancy in our societies.¹⁰ Weber would certainly have agreed that the process of rationalization has brought many improvements to Western societies, but considering his ironic remarks towards the end of his *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, it seems evident that he did not regard the “capitalist revolution” as a civilizational progress, and in fact rather the opposite:

For of the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: “Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved.” (Weber 1930, 182)

Thus, to base one’s quest for cultural factors giving rise to social progress on Weber’s thesis seems seriously misguided unless it is utilized as a powerful critique of modernity’s ills.

There is in any case a pressing need to reform the global capitalist system and radically reconsider the underlying values that help to maintain it. Marxism or socialism, at least of the conventional kind, is probably not that effective, not only because of its painful repressive history that has made it unattractive, but also because it is based on the fundamental idea that the system needs to be overturned before the way people think can be changed. We should have ample examples from history to realize to what sort of results such efforts tend to lead. Confucianism starts at the other end, with pedagogy, and seeks to instil certain

⁹ Tu Weiming (1984, 86) observes in this respect that “the Protestant ethic that has contributed to the rise of capitalism in the West has led to all kinds of problems such as excessive individualism and excessive rights-consciousness. (...) Excessive self-interest has led to the fragmentation of the individual, the generation gap and other problems of similar gravity.”

¹⁰ It is illuminating for Weber’s overall project that when hard-pressed by his critics to explain the focal point of his extensive comparative social and cultural investigations of which the *Protestant Ethic* was a part, he himself said that it was “not the advancement of capitalism in its expansion that was of *central* interest” to him, “but the evolution of the *humankind* [Menschentum] shaped through the confluence of religiously and economically dependent factors.” (Weber 1978, 303)

values and ways of thinking that contribute to a flourishing human co-existence and may even be necessary for the future of human societies and life on earth as a whole. Should it be unclear whether Confucian traits are likely to have a stimulating effect on industrial producer capitalism, it seems far less compelling when considering our modern consumer capitalist system. For Confucians would in most circumstances be reluctant consumers and generally rather frugal. Interestingly, however, they would not see anything wrong as such with material wealth to the extent that it simply provides conditions for good living. At first glance, this may seem contradictory, but, as will be clear, a closer look at the Confucian teachings reveals that it is not. Ruiping Fan has made the following observation about the Confucian attitude to material wealth:

Material rewards are accepted as generally good, so that there is a pragmatist affirmation and openness to various means (such as central planning, the market, or both) as the source of monetary wealth, which is in turn a source of family and individual well-being. Confucians are this-worldly in pursuing a good life and human flourishing. They work for their families within a non-Puritanical acceptance of material success in this world in which material wealth is taken as, *ceteris paribus*, good and not grounds for moral suspicion. Wealth is desirable and should be pursued, as long as one does not pursue it by violating morality. (Fan 2010, 233)

Wealth, however, is not an acceptable goal in its own right, as Confucius himself states rather clearly in *Analects* 7.12:

If wealth were an acceptable goal, even though I would have to serve as a groom holding a whip in the marketplace, I would gladly do it. But if it is not an acceptable goal, I will follow my own devices. (*Analects* 1998)

On another occasion, where Confucius is engaged in conversation with one of his disciples, he expresses his approval of the dictum “Poor but enjoying the way; rich but loving ritual propriety” (1.15). This view comes through more clearly in the following statement:

Wealth and honor are what people want, but if they are the consequence of deviating from the way, I would have no part in them. Poverty and disgrace are what people deplore, but if they are the consequence of staying on the way, I would not avoid them (4.5).

Wealth is thus first and foremost an expedient tool for improving one’s moral development. Other things being equal, it is to be preferred to poverty, but only

insofar as it will not corrupt the individual in question. After all, Confucius has nothing against making a nice profit:

Zigong said, “We have an exquisite piece of jade here—should we box it up and put away for safekeeping, or should we try to get a good price and sell it off?” The Master replied, “Sell it! By all means, sell it! I am just waiting for the right price!” (9.3)

Greed, egotism and extravagance, however, are all deplored. When fishing, Confucius himself avoided excess by using a line, not a net (7.27). Frugality is presented as a commendable virtue, while miserliness is not. Nevertheless, frugality leading to miserliness is better than extravagance leading to immodesty (7.36). An exemplary person (*junzi* 君子) is often contrasted with the petty person (*xiao ren* 小人) whose actions are motivated by narrow egotistic interests of personal gain instead of a sense of fairness or the desire to advance public welfare (4.11; 4.16). Exemplary persons, on the other hand, come to the assistance of those in need, but do not increase the wealth of those who are already wealthy (6.4; 11.17).

“I have heard,” Confucius says, “that the ruler of the state or the head of a household: Does not worry that his people are poor, But that wealth is inequitably distributed ... For if the wealth is equitably distributed, there is no poverty” (16.1).

The assumption is that there are sufficient resources for everyone to live decently, and that scarcity is caused by individual greed of those in power. When the despot King Xuan of Qi confides in Mencius that he is fond of both money and sex, Mencius (1970, 1B.5) reassures him that such fondness is perfectly acceptable as long as it is shared with the people. Already in antiquity, Confucian thinkers identified the harmful social effects of economic inequality: “The accumulation of wealth” as it says in the “Great Learning” chapter of the ancient *Book of Rites* (*Liji* 礼记), “is the way to scatter the people, and the distribution of wealth is the way to collect the people” (*Li Chi* 1967 (Daxue §26)). Wealth is a means to the end of a good life, not an end in itself. “Virtue is the root; wealth is the branches,” as the *Book of Rites* states quite clearly (*Li Chi* 1967 (Daxue §26)). The point, in other

words, is not material goods and their acquisition and consumption, but decent human living.¹¹

The values nurtured in our capitalist economic system, values that capitalism needs in order to thrive, are, on the contrary, most certainly destructive with regard to social solidarity, the environment and natural resources. I would even go so far as to state that current capitalist practice is comparable with cancer: its demand for continuously increased consumption is undermining virtually all the conditions for life, human or non-human, to flourish on earth. There is no lack of arguments for this, despite the continuous efforts of powerful interest groups to diffuse them. Underlining the serious state of the current environmental situation in the world, a number of European scientists have recently called for new approaches to environmental issues in light of the emerging and formidable impact of human activity on planet earth:

It has created a completely novel situation that poses fundamentally new research questions and requires new ways of thinking and acting. (Palsson 2013, 2)

This emerging epoch, in which human activity must “be considered a ‘driver’ of global environmental change”, has been referred to as the “Anthropocene” (Palsson 2013, 2).¹² Asking for a healthy integration of both natural and human sciences in environmental studies, these scientists argue that the human being cannot any more be considered apart from nature, and “the environment must be understood as a social category”. (Palsson 2013, 4) This would seem to require quite novel perspectives on the nature-human relationship and may even challenge us to think about the categories of nature and human in new terms:

Nature has often been presented as one half of a pair—nature/culture, natural/social, and so on. This is still echoed in some earth-system notions that are fundamentally dualistic, “linking”, “connecting”, and “coupling” the two systems of the earth and humans as if they were different realities. But

¹¹ I provide a more detailed discussion of the Confucian (as well as Daoist and Mohist) views of consumption in Sigurðsson, 2014.

¹² Cf. Ellis and Haff (2009, 473): “We live in the Anthropocene: For better or for worse, the Earth system now functions in ways unpredictable without understanding how human systems function and how they interact with and control Earth system processes. Regardless of whether this transition from the Holocene (generally thought of as the past 12,000 years) to the new epoch of the Anthropocene will ultimately be for the better or for the worse, the Earth system will not be returning to a preanthropogenic state for the foreseeable future.”

recently, environmental discourse has increasingly emphasized the need to move beyond the stark dualism of the natural and the social. (Palsson 2013, 7)

Some of the main reasons for such an emphasis are the outcomes of empirical research, suggesting that the human impact on natural occurrences and even genetic conditions of both humans and animals is considerably more than believed up to now. Thus, a strict demarcation of the human vs. the natural is increasingly being seen by scientists as an unrealistic reflection of the real state of affairs.

Importantly, this awareness of the new “human condition”, to use Hannah Arendt’s well-known term, has profound ethical implications. A classic modernist approach to the environment purely as a resource for human consumption is no longer viable. As the aforementioned scientists point out:

We are only part of a complex network of elements and relations that make up planet earth, but we are the only part that can be held responsible. (Palsson 2013, 9)

They go on to refer to Feminist theory and ethics of care as potential alleviators of this rigid modernist approach, which, despite an awareness of the need for change, retains us in an economic model whose aims are directly antagonistic to the environmental situation.

Some of us are desperately seeking resources in our culture to deal with this pressing problem. This is because the only real and lasting solution can be cultural. Patch-up jobs on the current framework of values, way of living and views on the relationship between individual and mankind as a whole will not do. It is well worth investigating whether the Asian cultural and philosophical sensibilities, perhaps Confucian, Neo-Confucian or even Daoist and Buddhist ones, having operated for a long time in a much more “responsive” conceptual relationship with nature, may have something to teach us. Indeed, Confucianism with all its syncretic and open-ended tendencies may have had its best moments when incorporating elements from all these systems of thought. The yin-yang kind of dualism seems for instance much more realistic than our sharp-ended Platonic-Christian-Cartesian dualism, stimulating a “softer” and certainly more moral relationship between man and world, and thus being more likely to contribute to the formation of a culture of sustainability.

To conclude, humanity is in need of a new *culture*, not simply a new system. We need a culture, a grassroots culture that promotes certain values, according to

which uninhibited profit-making is simply considered an unaesthetic, a deplorable or a shameful activity. In this sense, something quite radical is needed, and I believe that there is much in the Confucian teachings, its outlook on human co-existence, the symbiosis between human and nature and an elegant kind of human living, from which contemporary human beings—Chinese or non-Chinese—can learn.

Confucianism is certainly not expired; it may be incompatible with modernity as it is, but that is because there is precisely something very wrong with modernity as it is, something that is in desperate need of being remedied.

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Faith and Politics: (New) Confucianism as Civil Religion

Bart DESSEIN*

Abstract

This paper discusses how, in contemporary China, politico-religious narratives that reiterate the country's Confucian tradition serve to create a sense of belonging and sharedness in a community, and provide a way to interpret this community and the contemporary Chinese nation as having a divine mission. As these Chinese foundational myths combine elements of Confucianism with patriotism and nationalism, they can be interpreted as a constitutive element of a "civil religion with Chinese characteristics", and as providing arguments for a "religious" legitimization of the CCP as organization that has to lead the nation on this mission.

Keywords: Confucianism, New Confucianism, civil religion, political rhetoric

Izvleček

Članek razpravlja o tem, kako sodobne kitajskopolitično-religiozne pripovedi, ki vedno znova govorijo o državni konfucijski tradiciji, služijo za ustvarjanje občutka pripadnosti in sodelovanja v skupnosti in tako zagotavljajo način interpretacije te skupnosti in sodobnega kitajskega naroda, kot bi imeli božje poslanstvo. Ker ti kitajski fundamentalni miti združujejo elemente konfucianizma s patriotizmom in nacionalizmom, jih je mogoče razlagati kot sestavne elemente "ljudske religije s kitajskimi značilnostmi", in tako zagotavljajo argumente za "versko" legitimacijo CCP kot organizacije, ki mora voditi narod na tem poslanstvu.

Ključne besede: konfucianizem, novi konfucianizem, ljudske religije, politična retorika

* Bart DESSEIN, Professor of Chinese Language and Culture, Ghent University, Belgium.
bart.dessein@UGent.be

*Historiography is a form of symbolical representation of the world,
helping us to understand it by (re-)constructing it.*
(Mittag and Mutschler 2009, 434)

The Power of Historical Narratives

In his speech delivered on 28 August 2013 on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the March on Washington, President Barack Obama stated:

[...] We hold these truths to be self-evident, that *all men are equal*, that they are *endowed by their creator* with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness [...] And then, on a hot summer day, they assembled here, in *our nation's capital*, under the shadow of the great emancipator, to offer testimony of injustice, to petition their government for redress and *to awaken America's long-slumbering consciousness*. [...] In the face of hatred, they prayed for their tormentors. In the face of violence, they stood up and sat in with the moral force of nonviolence. Willingly, they went to jail to protest unjust laws, their cells swelling with the sound of freedom songs. A lifetime of indignities had taught them that *no man can take away the dignity and grace that God grants us*. [...] And because they kept marching, America changed. [...] Because they marched, America became more free and more fair, not just for African-Americans but for women and Latinos, Asians and Native Americans, for Catholics, Jews and Muslims, for gays, for Americans with disabilities. America changed for you and for me. *And the entire world drew strength from that example*, whether it be young people who watched from the other side of an Iron Curtain and would eventually tear down that wall or the young people inside South Africa who would eventually end the scourge of apartheid. [...] as people of all colors and creeds live together and learn together and walk together, and fight alongside one another and love one another, and judge one another *by content of our character in this greatest nation on Earth*. [...] The March on Washington teaches us that we are not trapped by the mistake of history, that we are masters of our fate. But it also teaches us that *the promise of this nation will only be kept when we work together*. [...] That's where courage comes from, when we turn not from each other or on each other but towards each one another, and we find that we do not walk alone. That's where courage comes from. [...] And *that's the lesson of our past, that's the promise of tomorrow*, that in the face of impossible odds, *people who love their country can change it*. And when millions of Americans of every race and every region, every faith and every station can join together in a *spirit of brotherhood*, then those mountains will be made low, and those rough places will be made plain, and those crooked places, they straighten out towards grace, and we will vindicate the faith of those who sacrificed so much and *live up to the true meaning of*

our creed as one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.¹ (*italics mine*)

President Barack Obama's call thus is a renewal of Martin Luther King's appeal to the nation, an appeal that, in a context of prevailing segregation, indeed was a milestone in the realization of the "American dream" for all who, regardless of race or faith, live in the United States. The speech contains the elements that incarnate America's promise: America is the greatest nation on earth; those living in America are created by God and have equal and unalienable rights granted to them by this God—a claim that entails a connection between the secular realm and the realm of the divine—; and the Americans have the natural and moral duty to, in a spirit of brotherhood and building on the past, change their country for the better, and to be the model for the entire world to shape their future.

The extant versions of ancient Chinese philosophical and historical works in a similar way testify of the conviction that the inhabitants of the 'Middle Kingdom' (*Zhongguo*) are of divine origin and have a divine mission. Such elements can be traced as far back in history as the *Shijing* (*Book of Odes*).² In the translation by Arthur Waley (1954, 241–43), the ode "*Sheng min*" (The Birth of [our] People) of this classic work (Part III, Book II, 1) that describes the birth of the Zhou people goes as follows:

She who in the beginning gave birth to the people,
This was Chiang Yüan (Jiangyuan).
How did she give birth to the people?
Well, she sacrificed and prayed
That she might no longer be childless.
She trod on the big toe of God's footprint,
Was accepted and got what she desired.
Then in reverence, then in awe
She gave birth, she nurtured;
And this was Hou Chi (Houji; Lord Millet).

Indeed, she had fulfilled her months,
And her first-born came like a lamb
With no bursting or rending,
With no hurt or harm.
To make manifest His magic power

¹ Transcript courtesy of Federal News Service.

² On the nature of the extant *Mao shi* version of the *Odes* and its importance for Confucianism as civil religion: see further in this article.

God on high gave her ease.
So blessed were her sacrifice and prayer
That easily she bore her child.

Indeed, they put it in a narrow lane;
But oxen and sheep tenderly cherished it.
Indeed, they³ put it in a far-off wood;
But it chanced that woodcutters came to this wood.
Indeed, they put it on the cold ice;
But the birds covered it with their wings.
The birds at last went away,
And Hou Chi (Houji) began to wail.

Truly far and wide
His voice was very loud.
Then sure enough he began to crawl;
Well he straddled, well he reared,
To reach food for his mouth.
He planted large beans;
His beans grew fat and tall.
His paddy-lines were close set,
His hemp and wheat grew thick,
His young gourds teemed.

Truly Hou Chi's (Houji) husbandry
Followed the way that had been shown.
He cleared away the thick grass,
He planted the yellow crop.
It failed nowhere, it grew thick,
It was heavy, it was tall,
It sprouted, it eared,
It was firm and good,
It nodded, it hung—
He made house and home in T'ai (Tai).⁴

Indeed, the lucky grains were sent down to us,
The black millet, the double-kernelled,
Millet pink-sprouted and white.
Far and wide the black and the double-kernelled
He reaped and aced;
Far and wide the millet pink and white

³ Waley (1954, 241, note # 2) remarks that "The ballad does not tell us who exposed the child. According to one version it was the mother herself; according to another, her husband."

⁴ Waley (1954, 242, note # 2) specifies T'ai as "South-west of Wu-kung Hsien, west of Sianfu. Said to be where his mother came from."

He carried in his arms, he bore on his back,
Brought them home, and created the sacrifice.

Indeed, what are they, our sacrifices?
We pound the grain, we bale it out,
We sift, we tread,
We wash it—soak, soak;
We boil it all steamy.
Then with due care, due thought
We gather southernwood, make offering of fat,
Take lambs for the rite of expiation,
We roast, we broil,
To give a start to the coming year.

High we load the stands,
The stands of wood and of earthenware.
As soon as the smell rises
God on high is very pleased:
‘What smell is this, so strong and good?’
Hou Chi (Houji) founded the sacrifices,
And without blemish or flaw
They have gone on till now.

This narrative arguably is the first Chinese historical narrative, and to the extent that it connects the origin of the “Chinese” people to the realm of the divine, may also be regarded as the first “religious” narrative. Apart from the connection between the secular realm and the realm of the divine, it shares some more of the concepts that were also present in the above quoted passage of President Barack Obama’s speech: once born through divine intervention,⁵ the Chinese people keep enjoying divine intervention; agriculture—the economic backbone of the “Middle Kingdom”—flourishes through divine intervention;⁶ and the people are grateful for this divinity and bring sacrificial offers to ensure further divine help. By the time of the Zhou dynasty (1046–771/770–256) and Confucius (551?–479 BCE), further, a hierarchical feudal government headed by the “Son of Heaven” (*tianzi*) had become recognized, and this socio-political model had become reflected in religion, as “the spirits of the dead, nature divinities, and political deities like the

5 Schwartz (1985, 30) remarks that the God (*di*) to which the first stanza of this ode refers, is not a deified ancestor, “but the nonhuman high god who engendered the dynasty.”

6 Waley (1954, 242, note # 1) remarks that the sentence “Followed the way that had been shown” is reminiscent of the following line of the ode *Si wen* of Part IV, Book I, 10 of the *Shijing*: “You gave us wheat and barley in obedience to God’s command” (translated by Waley 1954, 160). It may also be reiterated here that some of the sage rulers of antiquity (the *san huang* and the *wu di*), are directly or indirectly related to agriculture.

god of the Land and Grain, were arranged under a supreme god, who [...] was called Heaven (*tian*) or the Emperor on High (*shangdi*). (Shryock 1966, 4–5) This “Emperor on High” (Waley’s “God on high”) thus became regarded as the divine double of the “Son of Heaven”, the secular ruler (*wang*) whose reign was, through its connection with the realm of the divine, conceived as a divine enterprise. This connection between the realm of the divine and the realm of the secular made it possible that the ruler was perceived as the representative of heaven on earth. The concept of “divine rulership” that comes with this perception, was sanctioned with the promotion of Confucianism to the status of official ideology in the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), as this development was shaped within the religious-cultural heritage of the Zhou.⁷ According to the philosophers of the New Text School of Han Confucianism, most important exponent of whom is Dong Zhongshu (179?–104? BCE), a major figure in the promotion of Confucianism to the status of official ideology, any change in one of the constituents of the holistic world—consisting of heaven, man, and earth—naturally has its effect on the other constituents.⁸ This explains why Joseph Needham (1958, 281–82) called this type of Confucianism “cosmological Confucianism”.⁹ The politico-religious character of Confucian rule implies that it is the task of the ruler to safeguard the harmony between all constituent parts of the holistic world, and also explains the popular etymology of the character for “*wang*”, ruler (king), that is mentioned in Xu Shen’s (ca.58–ca.147 CE) *Shuo wen jie zi*, the oldest extant etymological dictionary of the Chinese language. Here we read that, according to Dong Zhongshu, it is so that “when depictions (*wen*) were created in olden [times], three strokes that were connected through the middle were called “*wang*”. The three are heaven, earth and men, and the one who connects them is the “ruler” (*wang*)”. (*Shuo wen jie zi* 1988, 7b) The belief that ancestors (belonging to the realm of the divine) are able to intervene in this life

⁷ Dull (1994, 3) remarks that the reign of Emperor Wu (140–87 BCE) of the Han dynasty is the period in which Confucianism for the first time was recognized as the “ism”, “to the exclusion of all others, that was to be acceptable to the state and was to become the object of study for those who hoped for official careers”. Yu (2005, 34) remarks that the politico-religious narrative of Confucianism, in fact, builds on the system that was developed already in the Shang dynasty (trad. 1766–1122 BCE), when ancestors were transformed from kin to symbols of divine power.

⁸ The intricate connection between the realm of secular governance and the realm of the divine is also reflected in the references to the *Shijing* in the Confucian *Lunyu* (*Analects*). References to the *Shijing* are: Book I, chap. xv, 3; Book II, chap. ii; Book III, chap. viii, 3; Book VII, chap. xvii; Book VIII, chap. viii, 1; Book XIII, chap. v; Book XVI, chap. xiii, 2, 5; Book XVII, chap. ix, 1, 2. For the significance of the fact that the *Lunyu* refers to the *Shijing* see Shryock (1966, 4).

⁹ Schwartz (1985, 364) defined this type of cosmology as “essentially a belief that political and social irregularities can invoke important disturbances in nature.” See also Dessein (2008).

makes heaven (the collective of forefathers) not only the last example of the ruler, but also his last judge: it is from heaven that the ruler, the “Son of Heaven”, obtains his mandate to rule (*tianming*), and it therefore also is heaven that can, ultimately, withdraw this mandate.¹⁰ Phrased differently, it is through divine approval of his moral virtue—philosophically articulated in the Confucian concept *ren*, “humaneness”—that the “Son of Heaven” maintains his legitimacy to rule.¹¹ This naturally also explains why ruling has to be based on the wise words of the ancestors,¹² and why ancestral worship—an institution that establishes the organization of authority and thus of political alignments and the territorial division that comes along with it—developed to be an essential part of Confucian state cult.¹³ The Confucian installment of an elaborate system of rules of behavior and ritual prescripts that conform to the hierarchical social structure that was inherited from the Zhou was instrumental in perpetuating the Confucian system.¹⁴ The significance of these rituals was further such that they impacted to commoners “a sense of belonging to an ‘imagined community’ of supremely civilized subjects of the realm”. (Nylan 2009, 61) The merging of the indigenous Confucian political ideology and the age-old acceptance of a divine origin of the “Chinese” people, thus created the possibility that the inhabitants of the central plains (*zhongyuan*)—elite and commoners alike—imagined themselves and the territory they inhabited (*Zhongguo*) as fundamentally different from the people, creeds and customs of the regions surrounding the central plains.

Discussing the concept “All-under-Heaven” (*tianxia*), Michael Nylan (2009, 42–43) remarks that the term “initially referred to the lands and activities under the beneficent supervision of the ancestors of the ruling house,” but that “by a fairly easy extension, the term later suggested the imagined community that depended upon the moral ruler’s exemplary consciousness that he held his lands in trust for the ancestors above and the people below”. The unification of China in the 3rd century BCE and the elevation of Confucianism to state doctrine thus have been of crucial importance in the shaping of the Chinese world view and the Chinese interpretation of politics. This new vision of the world is evident from the

¹⁰ See on this Schwartz 1985, 23.

¹¹ For a discussion of *ren* see Schwartz 1985, 75–85.

¹² See Wechsler 1985, 123; Bauer 2006, 37.

¹³ See Lloyd and Sivin 2002, 193.

¹⁴ Yu (2005, 51) states that: “Just as the state’s recognition of Confucius and its continual process of canonizing his descendants were indicative of its own moral discernment and enlightenment, so the designated descendants’s fulfilment of their ritual duties on behalf of the state betokened their acknowledgement of the regime’s legitimacy.” See also Nylan 2009, 47.

“Prefaces” to the *Mao shi* version of the *Odes* which were, when not authored in the transitional period from Western to Eastern Han (i.e. ca.50 BCE–50 CE), than at least expanded and revised in that period, present the *Shijing* as one single history of the Zhou from its beginning in the 11th century BCE up to 599 BCE, a history of *Zhongguo*, inhabited by the people of Zhou, and surrounded by barbarian peoples. In its historical approach, the *Mao shi* version of the *Odes* not only constitutes a major break with earlier historical works such as the *Chunqiu* (*Spring-and-Autumn Annals*) or the *Shujing* (*Book of Documents*), (see Mittag 2009, 151–53), but has developed a full-fledged politico-religious narrative. Achim Mittag and Fritz-Heiner Mutschler (2009, 439) characterize the impact of the unification of the Chinese territory and the installation of Confucian rulership as follows:

In the Chinese view, the beginning of human civilization coincides with the emergence of the body politic, i.e. *tianxia*, “All-under-Heaven”. Thus already the Yellow Emperor is said to have received and “possessed” (*you*) *tianxia*, followed by the sage emperor Yao, who chose his successor Shun to “confer” (*shou*) *tianxia* upon him. From Shun, *tianxia* was transmitted to the Great Yu, the founder of the semi-legendary Xia dynasty, and thence down to the Shang and Zhou dynasties. To be sure, the political and cultural elites of early imperial China were well aware that *tianxia* did not yet cover all the known “world”. But the key point is their overriding conception that from the very beginning there was a “universal” order which had been established by the Five Emperors (*wudi*) and handed down the ages.¹⁵

In fact, this perpetual character of Confucian rule could already be discerned in the following two passages from the ode “*Sheng min*” quoted above: “Truly Hou Chi’s husbandry/Followed the way that had been shown (*You xiang zhi dao*),” and “They have gone on till now (*Yi qi yu jin*)”. These sentences imply that the model

¹⁵ This is significantly different from the Roman case. For the Romans of the period of expansion, history was a progressive phenomenon, moving towards their domination of the world through expansion. (See Mittag and Mutschler 2009, 439) According to Pirazzoli-t’Serstevens (2009, 302), although the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven (*tianming*) had not been taken into account before Emperor Chengdi (r. 33–7 BCE) or as full-fledged theory before Wang Mang (r. 5–23 CE), the concept had been operative even before the 1st century BCE. Pines (2009, 78) remarks that “One aspect of Mozi’s (and Confucius’) legacy [...] was adopted by almost all Zhanguo thinkers and their successors: namely, the assertion that a line of sage monarchs presided over the unified realm from time immemorial”.

set by Houji is also the model to pursue in the future. This, of course, also explains why Houji has been bestowed offerings throughout Chinese history.¹⁶

We can thus sum up that in the Chinese view, the beginnings of human civilization came to be equated with the emergence of “*tianxia*”—an event that already applies to the Yellow Emperor—and that while in the Western Zhou period, the term “*tianxia*” exclusively referred to the royal domain, in the Han dynasty it was expanded to include the imagined territory, the inhabitants of which modeled themselves on the culture of *Zhongguo*.¹⁷ As a consequence, in China, politics were always in some sense internal politics. (see Mittag and Mutschler 2009, 440) This explains why, e.g. the *Gongyang zhuan* (*Gongyang’s Commentary on the Chunqiu*) presents unification of All-under-Heaven—including “Chinese” and “barbarian” parts—as the ultimate goal of the true ruler. (see Pines 2009, 81)

That the Confucian state is characterized by an intimate and reciprocal relationship between the ruling house, state power, the concept of ‘empire,’ and the realm of the divine is well illustrated in the following declaration Emperor Yuan of the Han (r. 48–22 BCE) made at the beginning of his reign:

We make it a point to establish personally our *ancestral temple*, because this is the ultimate power to build up our *authority*, eliminate the sprouts of rebellion, and *make the people one*. (Ban 1973, *Hanshu* 10: 3116) (*italics mine*)

This brings us to the broader political mission of the Chinese Confucian state. Commenting on the “*Daxue*”, (*The Great Learning*), the 39th chapter of the *Liji* (*Records of Ritual*), a work compiled in the Han dynasty in the 3rd–2nd century BCE, Wing-tsit Chan (1963, 84) says the following:

The importance of this little Classic is far greater than its small size would suggest. It gives the Confucian educational, moral, and political programs in a nutshell, neatly summed up in the so-called “three items”: manifesting the clear character of man, loving the people and abiding in the highest good; and in the “eight steps”: the investigation of things, extension of knowledge, sincerity of the will, rectification of the mind, cultivation of the personal life, regulation of the family, *national order*, and *world peace*. (*italics mine*)

¹⁶ On the importance of the divine origin of Houji and comparisons with other religions see Waley (1954, 239–40).

¹⁷ See Pines (2009, 72), who, in this respect, elaborates on the importance of a Han re-interpretation of the Ode “*Bei shan*” (ode 205) of the *Mao shi*.

For the present discussion, especially the latter two—national order and world peace—are important. On this issue, the original text has the following to say:

The ancients who *wished to manifest their clear character to the world* would first bring order to their states. Those who wished to bring order to their states would first regulate their families. Those who wished to regulate their families would first cultivate their personal lives. Those who wished to cultivate their personal lives would first rectify their minds. Those who wished to rectify their minds would first make their wills sincere. Those who wished to make their wills sincere would first extend their knowledge. The extension of knowledge consists in the investigation of things. When things are investigated, knowledge is extended; when knowledge is extended, the will becomes sincere; when the will is sincere, the mind is rectified; when the mind is rectified, the personal life is cultivated; when the personal life is cultivated, the family will be regulated; when the family is regulated, the state will be in order; and when the state is in order, there will be peace throughout the world. (translation by Wing-tsit Chan 1963, 86–87; italics mine)

The importance of this passage for Chinese political philosophy is hard to be overrated. As Confucianism kept its function of state doctrine throughout China's imperial history—viz. to the beginning of the 20th century—generations of political thinkers have commented on the precise meaning of the text. In his appreciation of the “*Daxue*”, the famous Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi (1130–1200) states:

What is meant by saying *that in order to govern the state it is necessary to regulate the family* is this: There is no one who cannot teach his own family and yet teach others. Therefore the superior man (ruler) without going beyond his family, can bring education into completion in the whole state. *Filial piety is that with which one serves his ruler*. Brotherly respect is that with which one serves his elders, and deep love is that with which one treats the multitude. [...] *When the individual families have become humane, then the whole country will be aroused toward humanity. When the individual families have become compliant, then the whole country will be aroused toward compliance*. [...] Therefore the superior man must have the good qualities in himself before he may require them in other people. [...] Therefore the order of the state depends on the regulation of the family. [...] Only when one has rightly ordered his household can he teach the people of the country. [...] Because he served as a worthy example as a father, son, elder brother, and younger brother, therefore the people imitated him. This is what is meant by saying that the order of the state depends on the regulation of the family.¹⁸

¹⁸ Translated by Wing-tsit Chan 1963, 91–92; italics mine.

A ruler is thus presented as having the task to cultivate himself according to the Confucian (divine) moral principles, in order to influence his state and the world at large (*tianxia*). In this lies a politico-religious mission of the “Son of Heaven” and of *Zhongguo*. Fei Xiaotong (1992, 62–63) illustrated the political view that is expressed in the “*Daxue*” with the metaphor of the concentric circles that appear when throwing a rock into the water. For an individual, the concentric circles of his individual moral and social behavior are the product of his potential moral autonomy. When an individual develops his moral potentiality, he can increase his impact on other individuals and, hence, his value in society. Society thus both is the inspiration and the aim of an individual’s existence (Shun 2004, 190–93),¹⁹ and the value of an individual is measured by his value for society (Fei 1992, 67). In the same way as each individual is at the center of the circles produced by his or her own social influence, also each state is at the center of the concentric circles of its moral and political influence. The morality of a state expands to the world at large, to “All-under-Heaven”. Applied to international relations, this viewpoint was traditionally interpreted as that when the ruler, the “Son of Heaven”, successfully safeguards the harmonious (cosmological) relations in his state through his superb Confucian behavior, this influence would extend to the neighboring territories, the so-called “tribute states”, with China, the “Middle Kingdom” at the center.²⁰ The relation between *Zhongguo* and the bordering regions was interpreted as the relation between an older brother and a younger brother, in which China is the older brother and the non-Chinese territories are the younger brothers. As in a family, the older brother sets the moral example for the younger, and the younger brother follows this example. As with individual relations, “All-under-Heaven” is both the inspiration and the aim of China’s existence, and economic and political relations with the so-called “tribute states” were philosophized in similar terms (Fairbank 1942, 137–39). While China interpreted the existence of these tribute relations as a proof that the Chinese emperor excelled in Confucian virtue—which added to the cultural prestige of the empire and thus also served an internal political agenda, for the so-called “tribute states”, these “tribute relations” were primarily of economic importance. For them, engaging in a “tribute relation” with China, the regionally most important political

¹⁹ See also Schwartz 1985, 113.

²⁰ Schmidt-Glintzer (2009, 179) remarks that already in the “*Yu gong*” chapter of the *Shanhai jing* (*Classic of Mountains and Seas*), the world is represented as consisting of five concentric zones: the royal domain, the domains of the princes, the pacification zone, the zone of allied barbarians, and the zone of savagery.

and economic power, was a necessary condition to be able to establish commercial relations. In periods in which the cultural luster of the Chinese Confucian elite in the capital was waning, the “cultural model” based on moral virtue no longer worked. As a result, the Chinese political elite could no longer maintain its cultural authority over the bordering territories and also the “tribute states” no longer had a political, economic or cultural profit in maintaining their relations with China. The more recent and the less thorough the connection with China had been, the easier Chinese culture disappeared again. (Fairbank and Teng 1941, 129–30) It can therefore be argued that Chinese history is a continuous movement of slowly surging and retreating concentric circles of cultural Han influence.

Reconsidering Confucianism—Phase One

Although the intellectual climate of the end of the 19th and the early 20th century is characterized by a profound self-doubt and culture criticism (Jansen 2009, 402), the perception that there is a connection between Confucianism as moral guideline and national power continued to linger on, even after the fall of the Qing Empire in 1911. As remarked by Julia Schneider (2012, 54):

At the same time Han Chinese scholars began to think about the validity of their own historical models based on Confucian philosophy like historical atrophy (*lishi tuihua*), a belief in the great achievements of the so-called Golden Age and the general notion that the past could provide a model for present-day politic²¹ continued.

The ambivalence between the notion of China as model state and the conviction that the traditional Confucian state had to be overturned in order to create a modern nation-state, is also evident from Liang Qichao’s (1873–1929) claim that the new nation-state that had to be built from the rumble of the multi-ethnic Qing dynasty should not mean that “several equally powerful peoples live next to and with each other in One State”, but that “One People (*Eine Nation*)” should take a superior position among them. (Schneider 2012, 61) It is very likely that Liang Qichao was herein heavily influenced by the theories of Johann Kaspar Bluntschli who, in his *Lehre vom modernen Staat* of 1886, had claimed that such a nationalization can only be successful where “die herrschende Nation den übrigen an Bildung, Geist und Macht entschieden überlegen ist” (Bluntschli 1965, 1:

²¹ See also Moloughney and Zarrow 2012, 4.

109).²² Similarly, Liang Qichao ascribed to the Han the same role Bluntschli had ascribed to the “Aryans”, i.e., that they were destined to be the guides for all people around them and lead them to the nation-state. The distinction Liang Qichao makes between “small nationalism” (*xiao minzhu zhuyi*) and “great nationalism” (*da minzu zhuyi*), and his claim that it is “large nationalism” that is to be supported, reveals that he also adhered to the “international” dimension of the Han concept of “All-under-Heaven”. With “small nationalism”, he refers to the sentiment of the Han people towards other ethnicities inside the borders of the former Qing empire (*guonei*), while “great nationalism” refers to the sentiments of all people towards all people outside the borders of the former Qing empire (*guowai*). (Liang 1983b, 75)²³ Reminiscent of the Confucian idea that “China” is the “model” for others to emulate, he here introduces the concept of China’s “assimilative power” (*Zhongguo tonghuali*). This “power” is the power of superior ethnicities (i.e. the Han) to “swallow inferior weak ethnicities and wipe their frontiers” (Liang 1983a, 11).²⁴ He therefore meaningfully appeals to his readers with the following words:

[...] unite Han, unite Manchus, unite Mongols, unite Turkish Muslims, unite Miao, unite Tibetans and form one large nation (*yi da minzu*). Then we will form one third of the world’s population. And we will extend widely about the five continents.²⁵ (Liang 1983b, 76)

And he specifies

If this [unification] is really achieved, then this large nation (*da minzu*) has to take the Han people as their centre (*zhong xindian*). Moreover, their organization has to be formed by the hands of the Han people. About this fact, one cannot argue. (Liang 1983b, 76)²⁶

²² See also Bluntschli 1965, vol.1: 108: “Die Tendenz des Staates, gestützt auf die hervorragende Kultur einer Nationalität, allmählich die anderen nationalen Elemente zu assimilieren und dadurch das ganze Volk zu einer Nation umzuwandeln [...]”. See also Schneider 2012, 61–63.

²³ See also Schneider 2012, 66–67.

²⁴ Bluntschli (1874, 41) gives the simile of casting iron: “The civilizations of the world were all completed through mutual teaching and mutual guidance of all kinds of ethnicities (*zhu zhong minzu*). Regarding the affairs of a single state they are also often achieved and improved through the help and assistance of other ethnicities. [This is] like the casting of coins: one does not only use pure gold and silver, but also mixes and adds one or two cheap metals. Only then the coins are quite complete, and the lines and colours are prettier” (translated by Schneider 2012, 61).

²⁵ Translated by Schneider 2012, 69.

²⁶ Translated by Schneider 2012, 69.

This political ideal is in line with the concept of an “ancestral state” as defined by Anthony C. Yu (2005, 146): a state which “in its demand for total and unconditional submission exists to make the people one (*yi min*) by erasing all differences—whether ethnic, cultural, political, or linguistic” (italics mine). The awareness that Han civilization can serve as a model, and the conviction that ethnicity (*minzu*) is fundamental in the creation of a Chinese nation-state is also apparent in Sun Zhongshan’s (1866–1925) claim that “China has been a state comprised of one people since the Qin and Han Dynasties”; (Sun 1974, 186) and in his understanding that ethnicity (*minzu*) is synonymous with *guozu*, “statism”. When Sun Zhongshan, in his inaugural speech on the first congress of the Nationalist Party in 1912, declared that he no longer wanted to “govern” the state through the Party (*yi dang zhi guo*), but to “establish” it through the Party (*yi dang jian guo*), he gave expression to his conviction that the Nationalist Party had developed from an ideological movement to an instrument of power politics, i.e. in the same way that the Qin and the Han had united the then “*tianxia*”, also now the “Chinese” world had to be “re-united” before it could be governed. (Fitzgerald 1996, 185) As a consequence, nationalist feelings for the state were identified with the Nationalist Party as the incarnation of this new state, a situation that is reflected in the term *dangguo*, “party state”.²⁷ As a result, the only way for the citizens to respond to the nationalist appeal and to contribute to the “establishment of the state” was to become member of the Nationalist Party, viz. the instrument to establish the state and to make the people one.²⁸

Reconsidering Confucianism—Phase Two

Although the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter CCP) had appealed itself to Sun Zhongshan’s Han nationalist ideology in its resistance against Japan, once having come to power in 1949, it turned to Marxism-Leninism to build up a “New China”, now called “*Zhonghua renmin gongheguo*” (People’s Republic of China). In contradistinction to the concept “*Zhongguo*” that essentially refers to the “central plains” (*zhongyuan*), the term “*zhonghua*” in “*Zhonghua renmin gongheguo*” denotes the assembly of the fifty-six ethnic groups that live in the territory of the

²⁷Notice the combination of “*guo*” “(nation-)state” with “*min*,” “people”—the “*min*” of “*minzu zhuyi*”, “nationalism”, in the term “*Guomindang*”.

²⁸ Notice that also Kang Youwei’s (1858–1927) appeal to the Chinese *huaqiao* in Southeast Asia to contribute to the build-up of the national industry reveals his conviction that the primary loyalty of the *huaqiao* was to their native homeland. On the importance of redefining the notion of *huaqiao* in terms of loyalty to the Chinese nation-state, see Harrison 2001, 110.

former Qing empire.²⁹ In a broader sense, building on the concept “*huaqiao*” as it was defined in the Republican period, this new name also comprises the overseas Chinese, and the people of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.³⁰ The choice for Marxism-Leninism was not self-evident: Marx and Engels had anticipated that a workers’ revolution would occur in a highly developed capitalist society, after which a socialist state would be installed whose primary function would be the equalization of wealth rather than dealing with the problem of production. (Chang 2001, 142–43) In 1949, China was far from being a capitalist industrialized nation. Marxism did provide an answer, though, for the apparent insolvable difficulty of “making the people one”, viz., of bringing the Han and the different non-Han peoples of the former Qing empire into one nation-state: the Marxist emphasis on class struggle enabled the equation of all the different ethnic groups of the former empire as, in the class struggle, not the opposition between the various ethnic groups and the Han is highlighted as the most fundamental opposition, but the class differences within each of these individual ethnic groups. In its appeal to the Marxist class struggle, the CCP pictured itself as the representative of the modernistic vanguard that assists the Han and non-Han alike to realize their own liberation within a reunited classless nation state.³¹ In its appeal to the nation, the CCP “party state” (*dangguo*) replaced the Han ethnic party state of the Nationalists.³² The fact that the CCP was (and still is) an above all Han dominated organization gives its vocation to be the vanguard of modernization a flavor of

²⁹ Chang (2001, 45), explains: “‘*Huaxia*’ was the earliest name for the Chinese people until it was supplanted by ‘*Hanren*’ (People of Han). Today, ‘*Huaxia*’ denotes a cultural identity; whereas Han is an ethnic term, differentiating the Han from the other ethnic groups in the People’s Republic of China. As scholars of the People’s Republic of China insist, ‘The Chinese culture, with *Huaxia* as its core [...] includes the cultures of all the members of the big family of the Chinese nation’, but the ‘Han race (*Hanzu*)’ is China’s ‘mainstream or host (*zhuti*) nation’. Contemporary Chinese call themselves *Huaren* (Hua people), and the overseas diaspora Chinese call themselves *Huayi* (Hua posterity). The combination of ‘*Zhongyuan*’ (Central Plains), the word from which the concept ‘*Zhongguo*’ [...] is derived, and ‘*Huaxia*’ produces ‘*Zhonghua*’ (China or Chinese), a word that is also part of the name ‘*Zhonghua Minguo*’ (Republic of China).”

³⁰ Therefore, Fitzgerald 1996, 57, claims that the People’s Republic of China is a state without nation, since, with the unity as state, there is no corresponding uniform nation.

³¹ Chen Duxiu (1880–1942), a founder of the CCP, wrote in *Xin Qingnian* Vol.VIII/1 (September 1920): “I recognize the existence of only two nations, that of the capitalists, and that of the workers;” and “At present, the ‘nation’ of the workers exists only in the Soviet Union. Everywhere else we have the ‘nation’ of the capitalists.” Quoted from Schwartz 1968, 28. See also Fitzgerald 1996, 321, 348.

³² Fitzgerald (1996, 348) remarks: “The question at issue was how to essentialize the national self, which was to be represented by the state and awakened as a mass community”. It has, in this respect, been proven that building one single political party is more efficient for political institutionalization than immediately to proceed to a multiparty system is. See Huntington 1971, 478.

patronism and, in some sense, re-introduces the old culturalist idea that the Han are the older brothers to whom the different ethnic groups stand in an older brother-younger brother relation. Put differently, the degree to which the People's Republic of China becomes a modern state depends on the CCP's success to bring all its citizens to the level of development of the Han. (Nimni 1995, 57–61)

When Mao Zedong died on 9 September 1976, China was not more a fully industrialized nation than it had been when he had come to power. In order to lift the country out of the dire economic state in which it had fallen, Deng Xiaoping (1904–1993) emphasized the concept of “productive forces” as, according to him, it was industrial development that had to make China into a modern nation-state. This new emphasis enabled him to bring economic reforms into a Marxist framework, as “productive forces” encompasses more than only the working class, and gives room for the introduction of capitalist instruments. In order to attract “foreign” knowledge and capital, just as Kang Youwei had done earlier, also Deng Xiaoping appealed to the *huaqiao*. In his claim that: “No matter what clothes they wear or what political stand they take, all Chinese have a sense of pride and identification with the Chinese nation and would want the People's Republic of China to become strong and prosperous” (Deng 1987, 51)³³, he not only focused on their Han ethnicity, but also on their connection to the “Chinese nation”.

Reconsidering Confucianism—Phase Three

Dengist economic reforms that started at the end of the 1970s have led to an unprecedented economic growth of one single country in such a short time span. Capitalist economic development has, however, also increased the wealth gap between different social groups in Chinese society. It is not without importance that those people who have suffered the most from economic reforms and social inequality in the new era, are not seldom precisely those people who were the greatest advocates of CCP rule in the Maoist era. This, combined with the fact that, in China, it is the CCP that is engineering a capitalist economic model, have questioned the communist identity of the Party among some groups of Chinese society. The greater degree of autonomy in the economic domain has also fed ethnic nationalism among some ethnic groups that feel themselves supported in their “uniqueness”. This is especially true for those regions that had enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy also under Qing rule: Xinjiang, Mongolia and Tibet,

³³ See also note # 27.

i.e. regions at the far end of the concentric circles of China's "*tianxia*". This growing ethnic unrest, the fact that the Party increasingly co-operates with the West to achieve its economic goals, and the growing involvement of China in bodies of global governance, have called into question the historical "nationalist" claim of the CCP.

Against the background of growing social disparity and ethnic tension, and a diminished "national(ist)" appeal of the Party, a revaluation of traditional Chinese culture in the People's Republic of China that started with the condemnation of the Gang of Four and of their iconoclastic policies, has become increasingly apparent. (Bresciani 2001, 420) This revaluation is sustained by the fact that while in the Republican period and in the first decades of the People's Republic traditional Confucian culture was portrayed as an obstacle for development, in much of Southeast Asia (the so-called Asian tigers) the presence of elements of traditional Chinese culture, often labeled "Confucianism", is commonly seen as the reason of the success of business and commerce within the Chinese communities in these regions. (Harrison 2001, 262) The fact that, as argued above, Confucian memory has, in fact, never disappeared, helps to explain the success of this revaluation.³⁴ This reappraisal of Confucian values goes hand in hand with the Party's patriotic stance. Patriotism affects the nation-state as a whole, not a single national/ethnic group. In this respect, the Marxist emphasis on class struggle is seen as contrary to Confucianism that is an ideology of harmony. Re-installing a "Confucian" harmonious society (*hexie shehui*) thus entails a renewal of the traditional Chinese values.³⁵ Moreover, as the CCP is, through the concept of "*dangguo*", identified with the People's Republic, patriotism also affirms its position as ruling party and can serve as an instrument to counter the centrifugal powers of ethnic nationalism. Historical memory is an important element in this: it is the CCP that, after the period of Western domination, reunified China. A weakened position of the Party is therefore portrayed as a virtual threat to territorial unity as in these circumstances, China might, once again, fall prey to Western dominance.³⁶ In its

³⁴ It may, here, also be reminded that also during the Maoist years, Confucius was studied assiduously, be it in order to criticize him (Bresciani 2001, 419).

³⁵ Although there is no direct reference to the concept "*hexie shehui*" in the Confucian literature, the concept is generally accepted to be related to the concept "brotherhood" (*datong*) of chapter VII, *Li jun*, of the *Liji*.

³⁶ Already Deng Xiaoping cautioned that if China were to descend into "turmoil", the situation would be far worse than during the Cultural Revolution because the country no longer had "prestigious leaders" like Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to hold it together. Chang (2001, 163) suggests that this is also the reason why Deng Xiaoping did not completely denounce Mao Zedong,

continued emphasis of its role as binding factor in the Chinese nation-state, patriotism is thus further complemented with nationalism. (Rainey 2010, 181–83) The state's renewed interest for Confucianism is, e.g. also evident in the term “*xiaokang shehui*” that refers to the economic policy of the Hu Jintao era. While the concept “*xiaokang shehui*” builds on the 7th chapter of the Han dynasty Confucian classic *Liji* (Dessein 2011) the term “*xiaokang*” itself already appears in the ode “*Min lao*” (The People Are Hard Pressed) of the part *Daya* of the *Shijing* (Part III, Book II, 9). In the translation by James Legge (1970, 495), the first stanza of the ode goes as follows:

The people indeed are heavily burdened,
But perhaps a little ease (*xiaokang*) may be got for them.
Let us cherish this *centre of the kingdom*,
To secure the repose of the four quarters of it.
Let us give no indulgence to the wily and obsequious,
In order to make the unconscientious careful,
And to repress robbers and oppressors,
Who Have no fear of the clear will [of Heaven].
Then let us show kindness to those who are distant,
And help those who are near;—
Thus establishing [the throne of] our king. (italics mine)

The message the contemporary concept “*Xiaokang shehui*” thus conveys contains ample elements we also discerned in the Ode “*Min sheng*” discussed in the beginning of this article. In the context of contemporary economic and social developments, these are that (1) the masses of the people resort to a moral leadership (“cherish this centre of the kingdom”) that will (2) guide them to a peaceful era through economic development and social redistribution (“a little ease may be got for them”); that this is (3) modeled on ancient models (“have no fear of the clear will of Heaven”), and that (4) will be the model for the homeland and internationally (“show kindness to those who are distant, and help those who are near”), and, as such (5) be a model for the world at large (“establishing the throne of our king”).

The politico-religious mission of this contemporary emphasis on patriotism and nationalism goes along with a reappraisal of the past—China's 5,000 years

and why, although he did not seem to object to Western democracy in principle, he rejected it in practice.

long history. This can be seen in the following statement by Liu Qi, then member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party and president of the organizational committee of the Beijing Olympic Games, done at the occasion of the launching of the Olympic Slogan “One People, One Dream” on 21 April 2006. Liu Qi commented on the Olympic slogan as follows:

It is a slogan that conveys the lofty ideal of people in Beijing as well as in China to share the global community and civilization and to create a bright future hand in hand with people from the rest of the world. It expresses the firm belief of a great nation, with a long history of 5,000 years and on its way towards modernization, that is committed to peaceful development, a harmonious society and people’s happiness.

This comment contains three important claims with respect to the present discussion: (1) the concept of a Chinese nation that has a history of 5,000 years; (2) China’s desire to become part of a peaceful globalized world; and (3) the claim that it is modernization that will lead to a national and international harmonious society. This ideal has, in 2013, been rephrased as the “Chinese Dream” by the present leadership.

New Confucianism as Civil Religion

The three claims contained in Liu Qi’s statement are exponent of two types of “nationalism”: cultural nationalism that is rooted in China’s history, and political nationalism that originated along with the modernization concept in the early 20th century. While, e.g., Tu Weiming (1989) interprets the Confucian revival as a search for cultural roots and thus as a spontaneous event, the reappraisal of Confucianism by the ruling CCP undeniably also is to be explained as a symptom of the necessity for an instrument to boost feelings of nationalism and patriotism.³⁷ Indeed, as claimed by Harvey Nelson (2000, 227), apart from some traditional family values, Confucianism has lost its ability to really rally the contemporary Chinese citizens. Against the background of a faltering Marxism-Leninism, the contemporary revival of Confucianism in China has therefore above all to be interpreted as a deliberate movement by the government to fuse superficial popular sentiments and a longing for “golden pre-Marxist-Leninist times” (Chen 2005, 51) with its official rhetoric. In an increasingly globalized world and its concomitant search for national identity, Han culture is, by the ruling CCP, defined as an

³⁷ On the issue of the difference between bottom-up and top-down political nationalism (Kruithof 2000, 233–34).

essential part of Chinese identity, and, although in the not too far past, Confucius was condemned as a reactionary enemy, he is now increasingly embraced. In this process, further, the CCP's nationalist and patriotic stance and popular nationalism may enhance one another. The recuperation of popular Confucian sentiment by the ruling CCP makes PRC New Confucianism different from its counterpart on Taiwan: despite the fact that also the Nationalist Party had grown out of the May Fourth Movement, Nationalist rule on Taiwan did not comprise the same intense repression of traditional values as they had to witness during the decades of Marxist-Leninist "iconoclastic nationalism".

A highly remarkable cultural site in this respect is the "*Huangdi guli*" (Old site of the Yellow Emperor) in Xinzheng, Henan Province. On the site, the visitor is guided along a series of square pillars on each side of which a short introduction is given to one of the fifty-six officially recognized ethnic groups that live on the Chinese territory, and along a sacrificial vessel in the style of a Zhou dynasty tripod. The route eventually leads to a statue of the Yellow Emperor. This site is, as it were, an incarnation of the traditional Confucian political ideology: all ethnicities in "*tianxia*" merge into the Yellow Emperor. The description of the site on its website reads as follows:

In order to exhalt the *magnificent traditional culture of the Chinese people (Zhonghua minzu)*, to show the magnificence of the culture that has its basis in Henan, and to create *a holy place where the Hua-people of the whole world can search for their roots* and are able to *show respect to their ancestors*, the town of Xinzheng, supported by the highest authorities and the descendants of Yanhuang³⁸ within China and abroad, has created a cultural site in order to vehemently exploit the culture of the Yellow Emperor. After the 90s of the 20th century, enlargement and embellishment projects have continuously been set up in the scenic site of *Huangdi guli*, whereby the present area of the domain is more than 70,000 square meter. [...] The present scenic site *Huangdi guli* [...] is *a holy place where the descendents of Yanhuang from within the country and abroad can show respect to their ancestors and can search for their roots*. It has an enormous appeal on the descendents of Yanhuang, and brings [them] together. It incorporates the spirit of Zhonghua and the roots of the ethnicities. The scenic site *Huangdi guli* is an important national protected cultural unity, a scenic site of the national AAAA-

³⁸ "*Huang*" in the term "*yangyan*" refers to Huangdi, the Yellow Emperor; "*yan*" refers to Yandi: Emperor Yan. According to legend, Yandi and Huangdi ruled over conquering territories. In a battle between them, Yandi was beaten by Huangdi, whereafter the people of both territories amalgamated to the "Huaxia". In this sense, both Huangdi and Yandi are seen as the ancestors of the Huaxia. (See also note # 27)

categorie,³⁹ *a base for patriotic education of the Chinese huaqiao*, a base for patriotic education of the province of Henan, one of the ten outstanding touristic scenic sites of the city of Zhengzhou, a base for the patriotic education of the youth of the city of Zhengzhou, etc. [...] The ceremony of showing respect in *Huangdi guli* is categorized in the second section of the catalogue of immaterial cultural inheritance of China. *Huangdi guli gradually has become the spiritual cradle of the descendants of Yanhuang within this country and abroad*, a holy place where the ethnic groups search for their roots, and show respect to their ancestors, the *spiritual homeland of the Chinese people*. (Own translation; italics mine) (Huangdi guli)

The text on this site thus connects the mythical origin of the Chinese people—the Yellow Emperor—to the contemporary Chinese nation-state. We can also reiterate here, as discussed above, that the Chinese view is that human civilization started with the emergence of the concept of “*tianxia*”, and that the Yellow Emperor is said to have received and possessed “All-under-Heaven” as, from the very beginning, there was a “universal” order “which had been established by the Five Emperors (*di*) and handed down the ages” (Mittag and Mutschler 2009, 439). Or how, as remarked by Martin Kern (2009, 226): “Through remembrance, history turns into myth,” whereby “it does not become unreal but, on the contrary, and only then, reality in the sense of a continual normative and formative force”.⁴⁰

In the same way as Han dynasty Confucianism was shaped within the framework of the religious-cultural heritage of the Zhou dynasty and created the idea of a “national” unity and continuity that started with the Yellow Emperor, contemporary political historiography connects the mission of the unified Chinese nation-state to inherited politico-religious narratives. Where, as argued by Michelle A. Gonzalez (2012, 571), politicians in liberal democracies are acknowledging the political functioning of religious believers and have become increasingly aware of it that religion can be manipulated in order to attract voters because voters with religious values vote for politicians of whom they think they share the same religious values, in authoritarian states—the People’s Republic of China being an example in case—political theology is an instrument used by the ruling authorities to ensure the stability of the state through appealing to the

³⁹ The highest category is AAAAA.

⁴⁰ With respect to pre-imperial bronze inscriptions, Kern (2009, 226) remarks that these inscriptions “commemorated and preserved but the sacralized distillate of history, creating a representation of the past that was as radically abbreviated as it was profoundly ideological. [...] the rhetoric of the inscriptions [...] annihilated the multi-perspective records of all the former states and replaced them with the single and central perspective of the universal ruler. They silenced the many voices of history and monopolized memory”.

population's patriotic sentiments for a divine nation. Seen from the other side of the electoral process, where liberal democracies are characterized by the fact that interest groups may elect individuals based on theology with the perception that this will lead to their theological worldview being represented in government, in authoritarian states, the support of the people for the government is a product of the degree to which the people perceive the government to bring its historic mission to a good end. (Bellah 2006, 228) In China, therefore, the contemporary politico-religious narrative appeals on the Chinese citizens as heirs of a divine tradition, and as responsible to bring the divine mission of the nation to a good end. Expressions, symbols, and rituals that are part of a collective "Confucian" memory are used as part of a Confucian "civil religion" that has to affirm, among other things, the CCP's "religious legitimization" as the highest political authority, and, in line with the concept of "cosmological Confucianism", this authority is presented as only being able to fulfill its mission of realizing the "Chinese Dream" with the support of the people, that is, loyalty to the Party. Confucianism thus is an instrument that presents the modern Chinese nation-state and its policies as sacred institutions under the divine rulership of the CCP.

Also on an international level, Confucianism as civil religion can bring the country close to the idea that it serves a divine will—in the same way that civil religion in the American context combines an emphasis on the blessedness of the nation with its role as an agent of good in the world, and, as a result, gives government divine authority and makes the president appear as "the high-priest of the US as blessed nation". (Gonzalez 2012, 572) This perception explains why the revaluation of Confucianism—at least in the minds of some New Confucians—has given rise to the idea that the rest of the world should be convinced of the values of Confucianism, and that a symbiosis between western values and Confucian values is the way out of an alleged 21st century moral and political degeneration. The "Confucianized" CCP nation-state is thus also presented as the legitimate successor to the empire—a model to be emulated (see also Kahn 2011, 2).⁴¹

Through the contemporary politico-religious and historical narratives, New Confucianism can thus be interpreted as a constitutive element of a 'civil religion with Chinese characteristics'. Just as in the American case, civil religion can be used as an instrument to manipulate and change perceptions about how the United

⁴¹ Tamney and Chiang (2002, 74) called this kind of Confucianism a "stripped-down version of Confucianism".

States act as a Christian nation and can come dangerously close to presenting the United States as embodying God's will, for the Chinese case, Confucianism takes this role. The diverse religious makeup of the different people in the Chinese nation-state are erased in this narrative, leaving only the false notion that China *is* a Confucian nation, the same way as the United States would be a Christian nation. As remarked by Paul W. Kahn's (2011: 23), "In a crisis, it remains true today that the secular state does not hesitate to speak of sacrifice, patriotism, nationalism, and homeland in the language of the sacred."

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Philosophical Approaches

The Philosophical Sinification of Modernity and the Modern Confucian Paradigm of Immanent Transcendence (内在超越性)

Jana S. ROŠKER*

Abstract

As a major source of social values, Modern Confucian theory assumes essential significance amidst the proliferation of instrumental rationality in contemporary China. This current is distinguished by a multifaceted attempt to revitalize traditional thought by means of new influences borrowed or derived from Western systems. It defines itself with a search for a synthesis between “Western” and traditional Chinese thought, aiming to elaborate a new system of ideas and values, suitable for the modern, globalized society. The present contribution examines the ways in which 3rd generation of Modern Confucian philosophers changed the framework within which traditional Chinese philosophical inquiry has been carried out, exposing the importance of immanent transcendence.

Keywords: Modern Confucianism, modernization theories, immanent transcendence

Izvleček

Teorija modernega konfucijanstva predstavlja osnovni vir družbenih vrednot sodobne Kitajske. Njen pomen se kaže predvsem v širitvi inštrumentalne racionalnosti preko uporabe različnih metod revitalizacije tradicionalne miselnosti s pomočjo novih idej, prevzetih iz zahodnih miselnih sistemov. Ta struja je opredeljena z iskanjem sintez med »zahodno« in tradicionalno kitajsko miselnostjo, s pomočjo katerih naj bi postalo možno izdelati nov sistem idej in vrednot, primernih za moderno, globalizirano družbo. Pričujoči članek raziskuje metode, s pomočjo katerih je 3. generacija Modernih konfucijancev spremenila referenčno ogrodje, znotraj katerega so se dotlej izvajale raziskave tradicionalne kitajske filozofije, pri čemer so izpostavili pomen imanentne transcendence.

Ključne besede: moderno konfucijanstvo, teorije modernizacije, imanentna transcendenca

* Jana S. ROŠKER, Department of Asian and African Studies, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia
jana.rosker@guest.arnes.si

Introduction

After representing the central state doctrine and ideological foundation of traditional Chinese society for two thousand years, beginning in the 19th century it became clear that Confucianism, at least in its orthodox traditional form, could no longer serve as a philosophical basis for the further development of modern society. However, this period also planted the seeds of so-called Modern Confucianism (*xin ruxue* 新儒學)¹, which arose as a critical attempt to revitalize and modernize this fundamental ancient tradition of thought.

The revitalization of the complex traditions of Chinese philosophical thought during the 20th century has assumed increasing relevance and significance in recent decades. In the first half of the 20th century, this tendency could be observed in the works of many of the leading modern Chinese philosophers who were searching for ways to renew the methodological and theoretical aspects of the Chinese tradition, and especially of the pre-modern philosophy which followed the Neo-Confucian revival.

These attempts manifested themselves most clearly in the abovementioned new intellectual current of Modern Confucianism (*xin ruxue* 新儒學). In addition to Xiong Shili 熊十力 and Feng Youlan 馮友蘭, who are certainly among the most visible representatives of this current, we should also mention Liang Shuming 梁漱溟, Zhang Junmai 張君勱 and He Lin 何鄰. Modern Confucianism is distinguished by a multifaceted attempt to revitalize traditional thought by means of new influences borrowed or derived from Western systems.

Because of ideological reasons, Modern Confucianism was reduced to silence for the most of the 20th century in mainland China. Its main concerns continued to be developed by Taiwanese theorists and, to a certain extent, also by those from Hong Kong. The renewed interest in Confucian renovation could also be observed among modern theoreticians in Japan and Korea.

In contrast to the People's Republic, where until recent times, Confucianism was regarded as the "ideology of a superseded feudalism", a number of

¹ The term *Xin ruxue* 新儒學 has sometimes been translated literally as *The New Confucianism* or as *Contemporary Confucianism* by some Western authors. To avoid confusing it with the traditional School of Principles (*li xue* 理學), generally denoted as *Neo-Confucianism* or *New Confucianism* in Western sources, we shall omit the literal translation and apply the most frequently used term, *Modern Confucianism*.

intellectuals living in these societies (which were determined by post-colonial discourses) began to oppose the increasingly dominant Westernization of their countries, and started looking mainly to the framework of Confucian thought for alternatives to these developments.

Modern Confucian investigations have been based mostly on the supposition that Confucian thought could be completely amalgamated with the system of capitalistic development. Many of its proponents also believed that a renewed form of this traditional Chinese system of social, political and moral thought could serve as a basis for endowing modern life with new ethical meaning and as a spiritual salve for the alienation which appeared as an undesirable side-effect of capitalist competition and profit-seeking.

Their efforts to revitalize and reconstruct traditional Confucian thought can therefore be seen as an attempt to counter the dominant ideological trends and preserve traditional cultural identity, while also contributing to the development of philosophical and theoretical dialogue between East Asia and the West.

Despite its importance, this stream of thought is still little known in Western academic circles. It defines itself with a search for a synthesis between “Western” and traditional Chinese thought, aiming to elaborate a new system of ideas and values, suitable for the modern, globalized Chinese society. The contemporary intellectual history mainly orders the main proponents of Modern Confucianism into 3 generations.

In the present paper which aims to introduce their contribution regarding these issues, I will mainly focus upon the work of the 4 most important members of the so-called second generation of Modern Confucianism, represented by Fang Dongmei 方東美 (1899–1977), Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–1978), Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 (1903–1982) and Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995). In the second half of the 20th century, these philosophers have been living and working in Taiwan and Hong Kong respectively. Due to space limitations, I will try to summarize the essence of their respective individual findings and to delineate their ontological foundations by which they aimed to provide a philosophical basis for a new mode of specifically Chinese or Confucian modernization.

New Views on Chinese Modernization

While Maoist historiography relegated Confucianism to the past, most Western modernization theories also implied that Confucianism would have to be abandoned if Asia wanted to develop a dynamic modern society (Weber 1989, 132). Marx and other classical theorists of modernity assumed that traditional Chinese culture was impervious or even inimical to modernization. Max Weber's famous thesis that the Protestant ethic was an essential factor in the rise and spread of modernization contrasts with a notion that has gradually emerged in the last two decades in East Asia, which argues that societies based upon the Confucian ethic may, in many ways, be superior to the West in achieving industrialization, affluence and modernization. Weber also wrote extensively on Asia, especially China and India, concluding that Asian cultural and philosophical or religious traditions were ill-suited to modernization:

Confucianism, we have seen, was (in intent) a rational ethic which reduced tension with the world to an absolute minimum. Completely absent in Confucian ethic [*sic*] was any tension between nature and deity, between ethical demand and human shortcoming, consciousness of sin and need for salvation, conduct on earth and compensation in the beyond, religious duty and sociopolitical reality. Hence, there was no leverage for influencing conduct through inner forces freed of tradition and convention. (Weber 1989, 227)

Modern Confucian philosophies have shown that such a Western-centered perspective on modernity is no longer valid, because these discourses reopened the question about the relation of modern capitalism and culture in a new way and on a new level of intercultural philosophical methodology. Thus, it is important to examine these competing theses in order to clarify the question whether modernization is an universal process or a complex scope of social transitions which includes both universal and culturally conditioned elements.

The philosophers of the new Modern Confucianism were namely engaged in efforts to find some reconciliation between "Western" and "East Asian" values, out of which would emerge a theoretical model of modernization that cannot be equated with "Westernization". Since Modern Confucians viewed modernization mainly as a rationalization of the world, their works reflect the special relationship that has been mainly elaborated in the specific circumstances of modern Asian societies, namely the relation between the new Confucian cultures and the rapid emergence of a super-industrial world economy.

In this respect, Modern Confucian theoreticians have mainly followed the presumption, according to which China's modernization did not represent a »natural« process that could be defined solely by the inherent dynamics of an autochthonous social development. Although Modern Confucians believed that the European colonial past has to a great extent influenced these processes, they were against the supposition, according to which Chinese modernization could be equated with Westernization. Thus, for them, modernization was not necessary a universal process, but rather one that is partly also culturally conditioned. Thus, they have striven to develop a renovation of traditional Chinese, especially Confucian, thought in order to become able to preserve Chinese cultural identity in the modern world.

In order to elaborate a theoretical condition for a specifically Chinese mode of modernization, their basic approach was defined by the analysis of traditional Chinese philosophical ideas, comparable to the three crucial concepts of modernization, namely the concept of subject, the concept of rationality and the concept of humanism. According to Modern Confucians, classical Confucianism (especially the Neo-Confucian philosophy) has elaborated these notions in the categories of the spiritual Self (*xingtì* 性體) in the sense of the self-reflexive will, humanness (*ren* 仁) in the sense of both, the source and the end of the development of the individual and the community, as well as the (specifically Chinese) structural principle of reasonableness (*lǐ* 理), avoiding the Western dualism of rationality and feeling.

Modern Confucian Ontology

In their effort to modernize these traditional concepts, they had first to establish a synthesis in the more fundamental field—namely that of ontology. In order to achieve the aims of synthesizing Chinese and Western theory, Modern Confucian philosophers mostly focused upon ontological problems which had been introduced by Western systems of thought, in the belief that questions related to the ultimate reality of the cosmos, the substance of being and the Absolute determined the meaning of life and were crucial to the establishment of a new values system compatible with current social conditions and the preservation of an integral cultural and personal identity. They looked to ontology as the philosophical discipline that would provide clear solutions to the problems they faced, beginning with that of Western modernization, and with the conviction that

only through a genuine and clear comprehension of the cosmic essence would modern man become able to find his spiritual home again. Since ontology as a specific philosophic discipline has been introduced by Western systems of thought, a synthesis of Chinese and Western ideas in the field of questions, linked to the realm of existence and of being was crucial to the establishment of a new values system compatible with current social conditions and the preservation of an integral cultural and personal identity. The crucial task, therefore, was to find the “proper” orientation, i.e. new, clearly marked signposts which pointed the way towards modern culture, while also providing basic criteria for solving practical problems in the sphere of politics and the economy. Without such a framework of orientations, society would slip into a generalized spiritual malaise, in which the actions of individuals would be determined by the purely mechanistic laws of technocratic utility. In this case, the comprehension of Western thought for the purposes of finding spiritual guidelines for the modernization in course would necessarily remain fragmentary, incoherent and superficial, and would therefore not only be incapable of enriching the Chinese spiritual world, but would actually accelerate the processes of spiritual disorder and alienation.

However, the focus upon ontological questions can also be seen as a specific reaction of traditional Chinese philosophy to modernization. It represents a specific attempt of constructive reactions to developmental trends of theoretical (and practical as well) problems of modernization with the help of certain elementary aspects of traditional Chinese philosophy².

Thus, ontological issues were unavoidable for the 2nd generation of Modern Confucian theorists. Addressing these issues meant reacting constructively to the developmental trends of the theoretical (but also practical) problems of modernization with the aid of certain elementary aspects of traditional Chinese philosophy. In Modern Confucian interpretations, classical Confucianism saw Heaven or Nature (*tian* 天) as the ultimate noumenon. Mou Zongsan, for instance, described this view in the following way: “Which concept can lead us to break through existence? It is the concept of ‘Nature’³.” (Mou 1983, 29: 75)

² In traditional Chinese philosophy, the realm of ontology has been thoroughly linked to epistemology, for in this worldview, the possibility of any existence has been pre-conditioned (and endowed with meaning) by its human perception and comprehension.

³ 通過哪個概念可以透射到存在呢？就是‘天’這個概念。

This concept was transcendental and represented the elementary entity, creating and changing all that exists. Due to its ontological duality, one of the characteristic features of the classical Chinese intellectual tradition, the Modern Confucian Heaven was also immanent⁴ and endowed human beings with innate qualities (nature, *xing* 性) that were essentially determined by the elementary Confucian virtue of humanity (*ren* 仁). This was a development of the Mencian understanding of the Self, which was typical of the Neo-Confucian discourses in which Mengzi 孟子 was canonized as a “proper” follower of Confucius. However, in their interpretations of traditional systems, the Modern Confucians went a step further and in their discourses human innate qualities (nature, *xing* 性) became that potential which not only formed the moral or spiritual Self, but also transcended the individual’s empirical and physiological characteristics. By acting in accordance with humanity (*ren* 仁), the individual could be united with Heaven/Nature (*tian ren heyi* 天人合一) and thus comprehend the genuine meaning and value of existence.

The elementary features of the concept of Heaven or Nature (*tian* 天) can help clarify the difference between external (*waizai chaoyuexing* 外在超越性) and internal (or immanent) transcendence (*neizai chaoyuexing* 內在超越性) with the latter being one of the typical features of Chinese philosophy.

The “Pure” and the “Immanent” Transcendence

In interpreting traditional Confucian thought (especially the idea of Heavenly Dao or the Dao of Nature, *tian dao* 天道), the Modern Confucians often made use of the concepts of “transcendence” or “immanence”.

They pointed out that the Confucian Dao of Nature, which is “transcendent and immanent”, is diametrically opposed to the basic model of Western religions, which are “transcendent and external”⁵ (Lee 2001, 118).

Immanent notions, which are essential to defining Chinese philosophy, are necessary outcomes of the holistic worldview. If there is no separation between two worlds (material/ideal, subjective/objective), it is difficult to define which of

⁴ The Modern Confucian formulation of immanent transcendence is discussed below.

⁵ 當代新儒家常借用「超越性」和「在性內」這兩個概念來詮釋傳統儒家思想（特別是其天道思想），強調儒家的天道或基本精神是「在內超越而」，以與西方宗教中「超越而外在」的基本模式相對比。

the two is more important or absolute. This also explains why transcendent notions, which are generally perceived as transcending one and proceeding into another (usually higher) sphere, are also immanent in most traditional Chinese philosophical discourses. The Modern Confucians often defined the differences between “pure” and “immanent” transcendence on the basis of discursive differences between Christianity and Modern Confucianism:

The theological worldview of Christianity could be defined as “pure transcendence”. This means that God has created the world, but is not part of it. Thus, God possesses a transcendental nature which is beyond or outside of the world. This is the actual traditional belief in the Christian tradition... The Chinese tradition instead believes that Dao circulates between heaven and earth. The *Xi Ci* 繫辭 chapter of the *Book of Changes* 易經 states “that which is above the form exists as Dao (the Way, the Great principle), and that which is below them exists as a definite thing”. But it also affirms that “Dao is the definite thing and vice versa”. On the one hand, Dao is above the forms (i.e. it is metaphysical), and thus not a definite, visible or perceivable thing. Therefore, it is transcendent. On the other, it can only be put into practice through definite things (i.e. through physical forms); thus, it is immanent. This is the form of ‘immanent transcendence’⁶ (Liu 2005, 14–15).

The notion of Dao, which is one of the core concepts of traditional Chinese philosophy and manifests itself in multiple ways in the category of the Way, is thus a notion of “immanent transcendence” (*neizai chaoyue* 內在超越). In its oneness and indivisibility it reflects the original cosmic principle, but at the same time it also reflects the smallest atoms of existence, constantly creating through their infinite combinations all existing worlds. Dao is both the elementary, abstract driving force of the universe, and the concrete, intimate path of every human being. Dao is the fundamental source of all existence, and the incorporation of each particular appearance.

In Chinese philosophy, “Dao” represents the essence of the universe, society and every individual, but also the moral substance implying humanity, justice, rituality, loyalty and similar axiological contents⁷. (Liao 1994, 46)

⁶ 我把基督宗教的神觀定為“純粹超越”(pure transcendence),意思是上帝創造世界,並不是世界的一部分。上帝有這種超越在世界意外的性格,的確是基督宗教傳統的信仰...而中國傳統相信,道流行在天壤間,一方面“形而上者謂之道,形而下者謂之器”(易·繫辭上,第十二章),另一方面,“器亦道,道亦器”。道既是形而上,非一物可見,故超越;但道又必須通過器表現出來,故內在,這樣便是一種“內在超越”(immanent transcendence)的型態。

⁷ 在中國哲學中,‘道’,即是宇宙,人事和人性的本體,又是以仁義禮智信等為內容的道德實體。

However, Dao does not constitute an absolute principle, as in the theological idea of Divinity or the ancient Greek idea of substance. Immanent notions are never incorporations of absoluteness, for their nature is conditioned by everything they surpass. The concepts resulting from the immanent worldview are based upon the relativization of all that exists. Therefore, they seldom appear independently or individually. In traditional Chinese philosophy, this essential relativity was expressed through binary categories, composed of binary oppositions. The complementary, mutual interaction of both antipodes was able to express every, even the most complex, area of time and space. For a better understanding of binary concepts and the principle of complementarity, we must first examine their theoretical foundation, which is reflected in the traditional, structurally ordered and, at the same time, comprehensive Chinese worldview.

As is well known, the traditional Chinese worldview was a holistic one⁸. Traditional Chinese thinkers did not strictly or categorically distinguish between the spheres of matter and idea, nor between any other dualistic connotations resulting from this basic dichotomy⁹. What is much less known or recognized is that this holism was by no means indiscriminate. The traditional Chinese holistic world was not some sort of homogenous unity in which everything was connected to everything else, without boundaries or distinctions. On the contrary, the traditional Chinese worldview was logically ordered based on relatively strict, binary oppositional patterns. On a mental-reflective level, these patterns formed a series of specific Chinese analogies¹⁰ which provided the basis for the prevailing method of logical thought. (Cui and Wen 2001, 14–24)

Specifically Chinese Mode of Binary Patterns as Basic Inherent Structures of Immanent Transcendence

Binary categories (*duili fanchou* 對力範疇) are thus one of the fundamental characteristics of traditional Chinese philosophy. They are a kind of duality that seeks to attain the most real (possible) state of actuality through relativity,

⁸ The Chinese holistic worldview is traditionally expressed by the phrase “unity of men and nature” (*tian ren heyi* 天人合一).

⁹ For example, distinctions between subject and object, substance and phenomena, creator and creation, etc.

¹⁰ The analogical model used in the context of traditional Chinese logic differs from the classical European model in terms of both its methods and functions (Cui and Wen 2001, 25–41).

expressed in terms of the relation between two oppositional notions¹¹. As Graham (1989, 286) points out, distinctions were seen in binary terms, and primarily between pairs of opposites (with even figure and color reduced to square/round and white/black). Having drawn them, and recognized some recurring or persisting pattern (e.g. white, large, square, hard or heavy), we can then detach, for instance, a stone from other things in the same way we cut out a piece of cloth or chop off a piece of meat. Things were not seen as isolated, each with its own essential and accidental features; instead, distinguishing characteristics were mostly seen as relative.

Of course, binarity as such is not a specific feature of Chinese philosophy, for in its function of differentiation it is basic to human thought. What distinguishes Chinese binary categories from traditional Western dualisms is the principle of complementarity, which forms a basic method for their functioning. (Rošker 2012, 12–13)

In effect, what we have is a structural pattern of binary oppositions which, however, differs fundamentally from the model of Cartesian dualism. The Cartesian model involves dialectic between the mutually exclusive, polar opposites of thesis and antithesis that have been determined by an opposition which is also a contradiction (Hegel 1969, 112). This contradiction creates a tension, in which the mutual negation of thesis and antithesis forms a synthesis. Instead, the complementary model which was dominant in the Chinese tradition of thought, is based on a non-contradictory opposition between two poles which do not exclude but complement each other, and which are interdependent (Hegel 1969, 14). Contemporary Chinese scholars generally define this difference as that between two types of dialectical reasoning, in which the Western, Hegelian model tends to look for divisions and contradictions, while the traditional Chinese form of dialectical thought seeks to achieve a unity between these binary oppositions.

In the traditional Chinese complementary model, binary patterns did not produce any separate syntheses that could preserve “positive” elements from their previous state, while eliminating the “negative” ones. Zhuangzi described the relation between the two binary poles of a complementary model as follows:

¹¹Some well-known binary categories are: *yinyang* 陰陽 (sunny/shady), *tiyong* 體用 (essence/function), *mingshi* 名實 (concept/actuality), *liqi* 理氣 (structure/ phenomena), *benmo* 本末 (roots/crown).

Therefore: why do we not preserve truth and abolish falseness? Why do we not preserve order and abolish chaos? If we think in this way, we do not understand the structure of nature, nor the state of being in which everything exists. This would mean preserving earth and abolishing heaven, preserving yin and abolishing yang. It is quite clear that this would not work¹². (Zhuangzi 2012, *Qiu shui*, 5)

But in the Judeo-Christian tradition the dominant pattern was one of “logocentric” binarity which aimed at preserving one anti-pole, while eliminating the other. The post-structural theorist Jacques Derrida, the founder of ‘Deconstruction’, pointed out that we live in an intellectual tradition that tends to preserve the significant at the expense of the signifier, speech at the expense of writing, noumena at the expense of phenomena, Nature at the expense of culture, life at the expense of death and good at the expense of evil (Derrida 1994, 95–6; 1998, 35). As Graham affirms (1989, 65), in reflecting on the more profound implications of this tendency, we can note a certain affinity among a number of apparent oppositions in “Western” culture, given that the majority of Western discourses are based on the idea of a universal causality that tends to eliminate one oppositional pole in order to preserve the other. (Rošker 2012, 142) Such an affinity can be found, for example, between Christian beliefs regarding the immortality of the soul, and the tenets of traditional science (before the discovery of quantum mechanics).

In their article, “Chinese philosophy” for the *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, David Hall and Roger Ames (1998, 1–2) list and compare some of the typical chains of binary patterns. They conclude that the dominant Western tradition of thought usually treats one of the poles as being “transcendental”, i.e. in a way that allows it to exist independently of its oppositional pair, which instead does not have this possibility (Hall and Ames 1998, 1–2). Graham argues (1989, 65) that reasoning in accordance with such patterns means being incapable of imagining the possibility of creation without a creator, reality without appearances or good without evil¹³.

¹² 故曰，蓋師是而无非，師治而无亂乎？是未明天地之理，萬物之情者也。是猶師天而无地，師陰而无陽，其不可行明矣。

¹³ Several interpreters (e.g. Ng 1996, I), especially those seeking a connection between Christian and Confucian ethics, see transcendence (in the sense of *a possibility of transcending*) as proof that Confucian ethics is not secular, but contains religious elements.

The Transformation of Religion into Morality

According to the Modern Confucians, this paradigm (or worldview) of immanent transcendence has been developed in China during the axial age (800–200 BCE, Jaspers 2003) in which religion was transformed into morality. The representatives of the second generation have namely followed the supposition according to which in the abovementioned historical process of social transformations in China, the idea of Heaven or Nature (*tian* 天) has been transformed from an anthropomorphic higher force in to something which determined the inner reality of every human being. Fang Dongmei 方東美, for instance, explained:

At first, this culture was formed on a basis of a religious spirit, but it has been transformed into a culture of a highly developed ethics. This ethics was assumed and properly ordered by Confucius¹⁴ (Fang 2004b, 99).

Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 has followed the hypothesis that the original Confucianism has attempted to establish a basis for moral decisions in the idea of a subjective righteousness which was supposed to serve as a fundamental criteria and thus replace the previous fear of spirits. Xu has exposed that this transformation represented a higher level of spiritual development which cannot be found in monotheistic religions, based upon the idea of an (external) God. According to him, in China, this transformation has led to humanism based upon a high level of “self-awareness” (*zijuexing* 自覺性):

The main contribution of the Zhou period lies in the fact that a spirit of self-awareness was incorporated into traditional religious life. In this sense, a culture that has previously been rooted in material achievements, was raised to the sphere of ideas. This contributed to the establishment of the humanistic spirit of Chinese morality.¹⁵ (Xu 2005, 15–16)

Thus, regarding the human beings, since they exist in such a realm of immanent transcendence, they also have to be limited and infinite at the same time. On this basis, Mou Zongsan has developed a double ontology, namely an ontology of the noumenal and the ontology of the phenomenal world.

¹⁴這個文化傳統的形成, 主要的是從宗教精神體現出來, 而成為高度的倫理文化. 孔子承受之而予以適當的整理.

¹⁵ 周人的貢獻, 便是在傳統的宗教生活中, 注入了自覺的精神; 把文化在器物方面的成就, 提升而為觀念方面的展開, 以啟發中國道德地人文精神的建立.

If we start from the assumption, that “man is finite as well as infinite”, we need to use ontology on two levels. The first is the ontology of the noumenal sphere and can also be called the “ontology of the intangible”. The second is the ontology of the sphere of appearances and can also be called the “ontology of the tangible”.¹⁶ (Mou 1975, 30)

It is the very awareness of this double nature that defines human nature. The moral Self which links the immanent and the transcendental sphere is simultaneously the link connecting the individual with the society in which he/she lives. Tang Junyi's idea of such individual self-awareness is rooted in the individual feeling of the inborn responsibility that could (similar to the neo-Confucian concept of “inborn knowledge” /*liang zhi* 良知/ lead humans through the opaque jungle of all ethical dilemmas and doubts with which they are confronted in their concrete lives. As can be seen from this quotation, the individual can offer his/her contribution to the higher goal of social harmony only on a basis of following this inner signpost of responsibility:

A human being is not a thing; a human being is a goal in and of itself. This means that individuals are not tools of society, nor tools of the state. And the people of today are not tools for the people of tomorrow... But if we say that people are not tools of society, this does not mean that we are outside of it, and individuals should not look upon society and the state as the means for achieving their own interests... I believe that the conflict between individuals and society can only be solved by educating people to develop to the utmost their innate moral nature¹⁷. (Tang 2000, 61–62)

This is clearly not about obedience to external authorities. As his choice of language indicates, Tang remains loyal to the fundamental principles of Chinese ethics, which consciously strives to transcend the boundaries between the Self and Others through harmonious action in the sphere of interpersonal relations. (Sin 2002, 320)

¹⁶我們以“人雖有限而可無線,”需要兩層存有論,本體界的存有論,此亦曰“無執的存有論,”以及現象界的存有論,此亦曰“執的存有論”。

¹⁷人不是物,人本身為一目的。人本身為一目的涵義,亦包括個人不是社會之一工具,國家之一工具,此時代之人不是下不是下一時代人之工具...我們說每一人不是社會之一工具,不是說每一人可以自外與社會,個人亦不須視社會國家為達其個人目的之工具...我們人為只有以教化充兩發展人之此種道德的天性,可以協調所為個人與社會的衝突。

Conclusion

As we could see, the Modern Confucian philosophers see the world as a metaphysical reality which is immanent to everything that exists in the universe and also possesses moral qualities. Therefore their ontology is tightly connected with their epistemology and with axiology. In this way, the central Confucian virtue of humanness or mutuality (*ren* 仁) as such is already part of the cosmic structure; its perception of reality which is incorporation and internalization at the same time, is namely manifesting itself in the moral performance of individuals, necessarily existing in a mutually complementary relation with society.

Hence, it is not coincidental that Modern Confucians have always emphasized the significance of “immanent transcendence”. According to Lee Ming-Huei (2001, 118), this emphasis is explained by the fact that they wished to overcome the widespread prejudice against Chinese philosophy (including among sinologists) prevalent in the Western academic world since Hegel. In his *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* (1969, 142–43), Hegel described Confucius as an ancient “master” who had disseminated a collection of thoughts on morality without creating any real philosophy. This naturally implies that his work did not contain any transcendental dimensions. This superficial (mis)understanding of ancient Chinese texts continues to hold sway in Western theory not only with respect to Confucius, but in terms of Confucianism in general, and the whole of traditional Chinese thought. The present article represents a humble, but nevertheless important, attempt to abolish, or at least reduce these kind of ingrown prejudices in order to establish a less biased basis for intercultural philosophical dialogues between the Chinese and the Euro-American theories.

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The Unity of Body and Mind in Xu Fuguan's Theory

Tea SERNELJ*

Abstract

The present article deals with the philosophical theory and epistemological methodology of the Modern Confucian Xu Fuguan (1903–1982), a significant Taiwanese philosopher of the 20th century whose theoretical contributions are in the center of academic interests in China and Taiwan, though almost completely unexplored in the West. The article's main focus is on Xu's interpretation of the concepts of bodily recognition and the creative potential *qi* that are forming the basis of the unification of body and mind as a fundamental method of traditional Chinese perception of reality. For Xu Fuguan, this unification represented the proper way to achieve the awareness of the Moral Self and to thoroughly act in accordance with humanness (*ren*).

Keywords: bodily recognition, *qi*, Xu Fuguan, Chinese philosophy, Chinese epistemology

Izveček

Pričujoči članek obravnava filozofsko teorijo in epistemološko metodologijo Modernega konfucijanca Xu Fuguana (1903–1982), pomembnega tajvanskega filozofa 20. stoletja, katerega teoretski doprinosi so v središču akademskega interesa v kitajsko govorečih regijah, medtem ko so na Zahodu še tako rekoč popolnoma neraziskani. Članek se v glavnem osredotoča na Xujevo interpretacijo konceptov telesnega spoznanja in tvornega potenciala *qi*, katera predstavljata osnovo za združitev telesa in zavesti kot ene temeljnih metod tradicionalne kitajske estetske percepcije resničnosti. Ta enotnost je za Xu predstavljala pot do ozaveščanja moralnega sebstva in do doslednega udejanja sočlovečnosti (*ren*).

Ključne besede: telesno spoznavanje, *qi*, Xu Fuguan, kitajska filozofija, kitajska epistemologija

* Tea SERNELJ, PhD Candidate and Assistant Reasercher, Department of Asian and African Studies, Faculty of Arts, Ljubljana
tea.sernelj@ff.uni-lj.si

*Just as it is true that everything
symbolizes the body, so it is equally
true (and all the more so for that
reason) that the body symbolizes
everything else.
(Mary Douglas)*

Xu Fuguan and the 2nd Generation of Modern Confucianism

Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 (1903–1982) was a Chinese intellectual and historian who made important contributions to Modern Confucian studies. Hence, it is not coincidental that he belonged to the philosophical of Modern Confucianism (新儒學). This stream of thought mainly developed during the 20th century in Taiwan and Hong Kong. It still forms the most influential and important stream of thought in contemporary Chinese theory. It is distinguished by a comprehensive attempt to revitalize traditional (particularly Confucian and Neo-Confucian) thought by means of new influences borrowed or derived from Western systems (see Rošker 2013, 18). It is defined as a search for synthesis between Western and Chinese traditional thought, aiming to elaborate a system of ideas and values, suitable to resolve social and political problems of the modern, globalized world.

Since Modern Confucians viewed modernization mainly as a rationalization of the world, I follow in my research the presumption, according to which Modern Confucianism (as a discourse in which “signposts” for rehabilitation of traditionalism were most clearly expressed), can be considered as originating with the famous *Declaration for a renewed valuation of Chinese culture as a world heritage* (為中國文化敬告 世界人士宣言), which was published by a group of philosophers from Taiwan and Hong Kong, on January 1, 1958 (Rošker 2013, 20). Besides Xu, who's aesthetic and epistemological work will be introduced below, the key undersigners of the declaration were Carsun Chang (Zhang Junmai 張君勱, 1887–1969), Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995) and Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–1978). These theoreticians are still widely regarded as the founders of Modern Confucianism, understood as a system which provided a more systematic reinterpretation of traditional Chinese philosophy based on a profounder and more integral command of the foundations of Western, especially Platonic, Kantian and Hegelian, thought. Most of them are regarded as representatives of the so-called

second generation of Modern Confucians which includes—according to the most prevailing categorization—the following theoreticians:

1. Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995)
2. Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–1978)
3. **Xu Fuguan** 徐復觀 (1903–1982) and
4. Fang Dongmei 方東美 (1925–1948)

They dealt extensively with problems, linked to the Chinese modernization. This process was regarded by the majority of them as a rationalization of the world. In search of their philosophical basis they mostly focused upon the question of ontology which they usually formed in the frame of the newly investigated Western systems of thought. Generally, they derived from the premise that the questions of innermost reality of the Universe, of the substance of being and of the Absolute are the questions that determine the meaning of life. As such, these questions were essential for the establishment of new value systems, adjusted to the requirements and conditions of modern societies and, on the other hand, for the preservation of the integrated, unalienated cultural and personal identity of the individuals in China.

The intellectual stream of Modern Confucianism emerged from the attempt to synthesize Western and traditional thought. However, these attempts were defined with the crisis of both types of discourses. The ideals of Modern Confucians were not limited to the attempt for revitalization and rehabilitation of ideological traditions from which they derived; it was obvious that they could entice the modernization of Confucianism only on the basis of its fusion with ideas “imported” from abroad, i.e. from the very areas in which the modernization processes were emerging.

Their efforts were not merely to save their own tradition, but also to find a solution for the foreign ideological tradition, which had been irrevocably entangled into its own philosophical traps.

In general, the members of the second generation have attempted to find new methods for a revitalization of their own cultural identity in the sense of “transplanting old roots” of their own tradition, because in their view, such a revival was the only possible way for the survival of the cultural tradition, from which they were a part, and which suffered under pressures and challenges of Western cultures. This renovation of the “root” should not merely serve for the

survival of their own cultural identity, but should—if carried out conscientiously and accurately enough—also offer the stream of Modern Confucianism an active and innovative role of becoming the leading current of modernized Chinese thought and as the leading force in intercultural dialogues between contemporary societies.

The Complementary Relation of Body and Mind

For Xu Fuguan, the traditional Chinese interconnection of body and mind was closely linked to the concept of anxiety (*youhuan yishi* 憂患意識) which also belonged to the central problems investigated in his theoretical work (Sernelj 2013, 650). This connection can already be seen in several quotations from Zhuangzi 莊子, one of Xu Fuguan's favorite ancient philosophers:

三患莫至，身常無殃。

If one manages to escape from the three forms of concern, his body will always remain free from misfortune (Zhuangzi 2013, *Waipian*, *Tiandi*, 6).

In another important ancient Daoist work, namely in Laozi's 老子 *Daodejing* 道德經 for instance, we also come across the following statement, implying the same connection:

吾所以有大患者，為吾有身，及吾無身，吾有何患？

What makes me concerned is the fact that I own a body. Without having a body, what concerns could I have? (Laozi 2013, 13)

In his main work *The Spirit of Chinese Art* (*Zhongguo yishu jingshen* 中國藝術精神), Xu Fuguan also repeatedly pointed out that the body is in the center of Confucian interest; most of the Confucian philosophers found their theoretical models upon the direct presence of the body and physical discipline, although they always end with their central attention directed towards men's social duties (Liu 2008, 578). Mengzi 孟子, for instance, laid stress on the fact, that the body is the beginning of all human existence, including their social worlds:

天下之本在國，國之本在家，家之本在身。

Man always links the world, the country, and the family together when he talks; the world is based on the country and the country on families, while family is based on the body (Mengzi 2013, *Li lou shang*, 5)

A similarly fundamental role has been prescribed to the body in the *Book of Rites* 禮記 (*Li ji*), one of the most important Confucian classics. In this work, we also often come across its relation to the mind (in the sense of *xin*, i.e. 心 heart-mind or consciousness):

心正而後身修，身修而後家齊，家齊而後國治，國治而後天下平。

Only after the heart-mind has been properly settled, the body can be cultivated. The cultivation of the body makes then the regulation of the family possible, which preconditions a good government. A good government, again, is a precondition for the world peace (*Li ji* 2013, *Da xue*, 2).

This quotation shows very clearly that the mind is seen as having priority (or being more fundamental) to the existence over the body. Similar statements can be found throughout the entire Chinese intellectual history, although in denoting the body, the concept *shen* 身 has mostly been replaced by the concept of *qi* 氣 which was very precisely and in great details investigated by Xu Fuguan in his above-mentioned work (2001).

Because of the differences in the linguistic and philosophical development, the traditional Chinese concept of body differs from the one that was established in the Western historical development. It can be expressed in various ways, implying numerous different semantic connotations which cannot always exactly match to the Western ones. The above-mentioned notion *shen* 身, for instance, can denote a (human or animal) body. In addition, however, it can also denote the individual or a personality. In its verbal form, it can even mean personal experience of some individual human being, his or her life, or even his or her own moral character and ability (see *CTP Dictionary*). The body in the Western sense, however, could be even better translated with the notion *xueqi* 血氣, as it can be seen in the following quotation from the *Book of Rites*:

夫民有血氣心知之性。

Now, in the nature of men there are both the physical powers and the intelligence of the mind. (*Li ji* 2013, *Yie ji*, 27)

Here, the binary anti-pole of the concept *xueqi* (literary: blood and vital energy) is represented by the notion *xinzhi* 心知 (literary: heart and knowledge).

That which is in the center of Xu Fuguan's interest, however, is the relation between the concept *qi* 氣 in the sense of an organism (i.e. an organic body) and

the concept *xin* 心 in the sense of consciousness or human heart-mind. Although the earliest missionaries, who were in China translating the philosophical works of the Chinese tradition, have mostly translated it as a form of matter, i.e. a pure physical entity (Rošker 2012, 275), it is evident that the concept *qi* can hardly be understood as a matter in the “Western” sense. In fact, the Neo-Confucian philosophers defined it as something which is not necessarily substantial, as air or even a vacuum (the Great void 太虛) is composed of it. Thus, it represents a concept which could be more appropriately defined as creativity, or a potential that functions in a creative way and which can appear in some material sphere, but also in the abstract realm of ideas:

氣之聚散於太虛由冰釋於水。

In the Great void, *qi* condenses and dissolves again. This can be compared to ice dissolving in water. (Zhang 1989, 389)

As noted, the majority of traditional European and American sinologists have translated this concept as “matter” (Graham 1992, 59). To illustrate this aspect, we can quote the translation of this passage by the well-known French sinologist from the beginning of the 19th century, Le Gall, in which the notion *qi* is clearly understood as atom(s): “

Le condensation et les dispersions des atomes dans la T'ai-hiu peuvent se comparer a la fonte de la glace dans l'eau. (Le Gall in Graham 1992, 60)

Such translation of the concept *qi* is questionable, because it derives from profoundly incorporated criteria, of the model of Cartesian dualism. Although Zhang Zai's comparison with water explicitly states that *qi* is a continuous state, and not an aggregate of atoms, the analogy with “matter” was so deeply rooted in Le Gall's perception, that he automatically saw the notion *qi* as an entity which contains or is composed of atoms (Rošker 2012, 276). Hence, for centuries, Le Gall and other sinologists who followed his interpretations have misled scholars regarding the question whether traditional Chinese philosophy applied the concept of atomicity (Graham 1992, 61).

This creative potential, which can, as already mentioned, appear in both the material as well as in the ideal sphere, and which has been most often denoted in the contemporary esoteric New Age literature simply as “energy”, or at the most, as a “vital energy”. This could possibly be understood as a kind of dynamic organic potential or—depending on the context—an organic body, i.e., an

organism. Given the fact that all Modern Confucians, including Xu Fuguan, were proceeding from the onto-epistemological notion of the immanent transcendence, the concept *qi* could, in this understanding, be viewed as possessing a double ontology. Thus, when appearing in the concrete sphere of life it is incorporated in the sense of a living body, and at a transcendental level it manifests itself as a creative potential, enabling and preserving physical life.

Since in Chinese philosophy, central concepts seldom appear alone or independently, but rather in the framework of the so-called binary categories (*duili fanchou* 對立範疇) (Rošker 2012, 280), the concept *qi* has also mostly appeared linked to an anti-pole, as for instance within the binary category *qi-zhi* 氣志 (vital or creative potential and human will, as applied by Mengzi 孟子 and Xunzi 荀子), or *li-qi* 理氣 (structure and creativeness, as applied by Zhu Xi 朱熹). In the present context which regards the relation between body and mind, it has naturally been applied in a binary *qi-xin* 氣心, whereas the former could be (rather freely, of course) associated with the body, and the latter with the mind.

Although binary categories always function in a mutually complementary way which means that they are interdependent and mutually completing one another, the primary role among them has in Chinese tradition most often been prescribed to the concept of mind or heart-mind (*xin* 心). This has been exemplified in the above cited quotation from the chapter “Daxue” 大學 of the *Book of the Rites* which clearly showed that the cultivation of the body was preconditioned by a “proper state” of the (heart-) mind. Similarly, Mengzi also exposed the primary role of the will in connection to the body, pointing simultaneously to the relation between the two aspects of the body, namely of *qi* 氣 in the sense of a vital creativity which revives the physical body *ti* 體¹.

夫志，氣之帥也；氣，體之充也。

The will is the leader of the vital organism, which pervades and animates the (physical) body. (Mengzi 2013, *Gonsong Chou* I)

When introducing the concept *qi* 氣 (in the sense of an organism) into this binary relation with the heart-mind, the latter concept mostly still remains placed on a prior position throughout the entire Chinese intellectual history.

¹ In classical Chinese worldview, *qi* 氣 as the principle of organic creativity was seen as the very vital potential which animated the physical body *ti* 體 and which actually brought it to life.

In his famous *Chun qiu fanlu* 春秋繁露, for instance, Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 clearly states:

凡氣從心。心，氣之君也。

Qi is always following the heart-mind. The heart-mind is the ruler of the Qi.
(Zhongshu, *Xun tian zhi dao*)

This priority, however, by no means remained limited to Confucian sources. Even the egalitarian Daoist philosophers have often pointed out that

心之所之，則氣從之；氣之所之，則形應之。

Wherever the heart-mind is pointing, the Qi has to follow it; and wherever the Qi is pointing, the form has to adjust to it (Wen shi zhenjing 2013, *Wu yan*, 15)

On the other hand, however, the heart-mind has thoroughly been seen as a part of the body. Its ability to “think” comes from the body’s changing of its function from that of a physical organ to that of a mental organ (Liu 2008, 579). See, for example, Mengzi’s view on this relation:

耳目之官不思...心之官則思

The organs such as the ears and eyes cannot think [...] the function of the heart is to think. (Mengzi 2013, *Gaozi shang*, 15)

It is quite obvious that the heart-mind (i.e. the consciousness and the central cognitive tool) was understood as one of the (although highly developed) bodily organs.

In this regard, the relation between body and mind (or *qi* and *xin*) can still be considered as a complementary structured unity.

Bodily Recognition and Embodiment of Moral Subjectivity

Xu Fuguan was practically the only representative of the second generation of Modern Confucians who considered that metaphysics and ontology were not appropriate instruments for understanding ancient Chinese thought, and much less for the development of its interpretation, because, according to him, its pragmatic nucleus never led to any composition or any structured and coherent conception of a metaphysical system, as had been established, for instance, by the ancient Greek philosophers (see Xu 2001, 43ff). Instead, ancient Chinese philosophers developed an idea of ethics, based on the “divine or heavenly” essence of human beings,

directly from the “primitive” state of religious and mythological society. (Sernelj 2013b, 73)

Xu argued that we can’t find anything similar to the Western metaphysic tradition in Chinese philosophy. On the contrary, one of the basic characteristics of Chinese philosophy is immanent transcendence which means that everything that appears in the abstract sphere can exist—at least possibly—also at the physical level. He places the binary category of the heart-mind on the one, and the body at the other, and at the center of both, human reasoning and the cosmos. He states:

Although the “heart” mentioned in Chinese culture refers to a part of the five physiological organs, China regards the heart’s functions as where life’s values originate, as we regard our ears as where our sound—hearing and color—distinction originate. Mencius takes ears and eyes as “small bodies” because their functions are of small significance, and heart as a “great body” because its functions are great. Great or small, however, they are at one in that they are all parts of human physiological functions. Can we then talk of this physiological part as a mind of Western idealism? Does the West’s idealistic mind refer to our physiological part? There may be traces left of our heart if we relate “heart” in China to Western materialism, for physiology is something materialistic and the heart’s functions are works of physiology, yet there would be no trace left at all of the heart if we relate it to idealism. (Xu 1975, 243 in Huang 2010)

He suggests that Chinese philosophy and the heart—mind culture should be considered as a mesophysics rather than metaphysics not only because of the above mentioned characteristics of Chinese philosophy, but also because of the physiological basis and implications of the heart’s functions for value (and moral) judgments. (Huang 2010)

Xu followed Mencius’ distinction between great man (*junzi* 君子) and small man (*xiaoren* 小人) which includes understanding of the body and its functions as a great (*dati* 大體) and small parts (*xiaoti* 小體) of the body in the following way:

公都子問曰：「鈞是人也，或為大人，或為小人，何也？」

孟子曰：「從其大體為大人，從其小體為小人。」

曰：「鈞是人也，或從其大體，或從其小體，何也？」

耳目之官不思，而蔽於物，物交物，則引之而已矣。心之官則思，思則得之，不思則不得也。此天之所與我者，先立乎其大者，則其小者弗能奪也。此為大人而已矣 (Mengzi 2013, *Gaozi* I)

The disciple Gong Du asked, "Though equally human, why are some men greater than others?"

Mengzi answered: "He who is guided by the interest of the parts of his person that are of greater importance is a great man; he who is guided by the interests of the part of his person that are of smaller importance is a small man."

The disciple asked: "Though equally human, why are some men guided one way and others guided another way?"

Mengzi replied: "The senses of hearing and seeing do not think, and are obscured by external things. When one thing comes into contact with another, as a matter of course it leads it away. To the mind belongs the office of thinking. By thinking, it gets the right view of things; by neglecting to think, it fails to do this. These—the senses and the mind—are what Heaven has given to us. Let a man first stand fast in the supremacy of the nobler part of his constitution, and the inferior part will not be able to take it from him. It is simply this which makes the great man."

What Mencius called the great body is the reasoning performed by our bodily heart-mind which consists of the enduring quest for self-improvement and self-cultivation. This self-cultivation is regarded as a cultivation of the body. Ito Togai exposed:

When people have this heart, there will be this affair. When there is this affair, it can be out of this heart. Is there a shooting? It is this heart shooting. Riding? It is this heart riding. Writing letters? It is this heart writing. However, if we merely concentrate on this one heart, pondering on how to train it, without the body exercising such affairs, we would end up being unable to shoot, ride or write letters, while the heart remains their lord and leader. So, the sage's teachings often talk about the body without talking about the heart, because within the talk of the body there naturally are the heart's operations. Thus, what they say about humanity, rightness, ritual—decency and music, is all about affairs of cultivation of the body. (Ito in Huang 2010, 32–33)

In Mengzi's words, if we want to become a great man, we should think with our bodily heart-mind and avoid perceiving the world only by senses. In such a way, the body becomes the manifestation of spiritual cultivation:

君子所性，仁義禮智根於心。其生色也，睟然見於面，盎於背，施於四體，四體不言而喻。」 (Mengzi 2013, *Jin xin shang*, 21)

That which a gentleman follows as his nature, that is to say, benevolence, rightness, the rites and wisdom, is rooted in his heart, and manifests itself in his face, giving it a sleek appearance. It also shows in his back and extends to his limbs, rendering their message intelligible without words.

Since according to Mengzi, our body and its complexion are given to us by Heaven, only a sage can give his body complete fulfillment (Huang 2010, 33). Xu Fuguan also argues that Confucius obtained the Decree of Heaven or moral decree through bodily recognition (*tiren* 體認). According to him, *tiren* is a retrospective and active process in which “the subject uncovers moral subjectivity from the pseudo-subjectivity of human desires and affirms it, develops it”. One reveals one’s own moral nature through “overcoming the self” and “reducing sensual desires.” By freeing oneself from these constraints, the subject lets the original mind emerge. The way to determine what desires and inclinations need to be overcome is the same as the way to reveal moral subjectivity: bringing whatever feelings and ideas that one experience before the light of moral subjectivity in one’s own heart-mind, and seeing whether one can still take the feelings and ideas at ease. (Ni 2002, 289)

Xu agrees with the Cheng brothers and with Wang Yangming that there exists the identity of the Heaven and the human heart-mind which can be directly experienced through bodily recognition. If so, the Heaven and its moral implications are not something abstract to human beings, but rather something implemented in our physiological and psychological structure. Therefore, we are able to reduce the sensations and feelings that are not following the way of the heart-mind to achieve the unity of the Heaven as the moral instance and the human nature (Ni 2002, 289). The method of achieving such unity is the learning for the self (*weiji zhi xue* 為己者學) which is not the learning merely to understand others but rather serves for discovering, opening, transforming and completing oneself through which one turns the biological self into moral, rational and artistic self.

Conclusion

For Xu Fuguan, who has thoroughly laid stress upon the role and the function of the ethical nucleus of ancient Chinese worldview, the reduction of pure sensory perception was a central factor which enabled humans to achieve higher levels of self-completion. According to him, humans become able to reduce such purely instinctive perception, because their bodies are inherently connected with their heart-minds. This unity enabled them to follow the “significant”, i.e. benevolent, justified, ritualized and wise paths of social practice, instead of following the “insignificant”, i.e. instinctive, egoistic and egocentric ways of individual benefits. Because for him, *tiren* (bodily recognition) is a method of achieving the complex

manifestation of the moral character and the realization of *ren* 仁 (humanness), this kind of perception is one of the central features dividing humans from other living creatures.

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Confucian Values and the Contemporary World

Filial Piety (*xiao* 孝) in the Contemporary and Global World: A View from the Western and Chinese Perspectives

Loreta POŠKAITĖ*

Abstract

The relationships between children and parents seem to be one of the most urgent issues in the contemporary world, spanning from the United States and European countries to East Asian societies, as a consequence of the transformation of traditional family ethics, values and institutions brought about by the processes of modernization and globalization. The present paper aims to reveal the ways and problems of the application of *xiao* 孝 (filial piety) ethics in the contemporary Western and Chinese societies, as reflected in the works by a number of famous Western Protestant missionaries, religious philosophers, sinologists and present-day Lithuanian Sinology students, and counterbalance their views with the insights of contemporary Chinese sociologists. The place of *xiao* in the contemporary inter-cultural dialogue will be discussed from the point of view of dialogue between religions, theory and practice, Western and Chinese culture, traditional and modern societies and values.

Keywords: filial piety (*xiao*), Confucianism, care, duty, rights

Izvleček

Zdi se, da so odnosi med otrokom in starši eden izmed najbolj perečih vprašanj v sodobnem svetu, ki sega od ZDA in evropskih držav, do vzhodnoazijskih družb, kot posledice preoblikovanja tradicionalne družinske etike, vrednot in institucij, ki jih prinašajo procesi modernizacije in globalizacije. Namen tega prispevka je razkriti načine in probleme uporabe etike *xiao* 孝 (spoštovanja staršev) v sodobnih zahodnih in kitajski družbah, kar se odraža v delih številnih znanih zahodnih protestantskih misijonarjev, verskih filozofov, sinologov in današnjih litvanskih študentov sinologije, in jih primerja s spoznanji sodobnih kitajskih sociologov. O vlogi etike *xiao* v sodobnem medkulturnem dialogu se razpravlja z vidika dialoga med religijami, med teorijo in prakso, med zahodno in kitajsko kulturo, med tradicionalnimi in sodobnimi družbami in vrednotami.

Ključne besede: spoštovanje staršev (*xiao*), konfucianizem, skrb, dolžnost, pravice

* Loreta POŠKAITĖ, Associate Professor, Centre of Oriental Studies, Vilnius University, Lithuania. lposkaite@yahoo.com

Introduction

There exists an almost unanimous agreement among sinologists that *xiao* 孝 (filial piety), which consists of reverent, sincere, self-sacrificing, and unconditional care for one's parents while they are alive and after their death, is one of the basic values of Chinese traditional culture in general and the basis for the development of the moral person in Confucian ethics in particular. At the same time however, it seems to be one of the most complicated and contradictory virtues in its practical application not only for the Chinese themselves, but also for the Westerners, who have treated the notion with both, criticism and approval. This could be one of the reasons why such a core virtue of traditional Chinese (Confucian and, more generally, East Asian) ethics and the whole context of the "morality of duty" implied by it is almost excluded from any public discussion centered around the contemporary crisis of the family (parents vs. children) relations and their legal regulations in contemporary Western countries. Such discussions have recently become a very hot topic in the Lithuanian public media, as a reaction to the intentions of a few members of the Parliament to introduce some corrective measures in the Law for protecting the rights of children against the violence of their parents¹. The initiators of such correctives refer to the Scandinavian countries as an illustrative example of such practice, while their critics express an apprehension that these correctives will prompt children to exercise their rights in a improper manner. According to them, children will be free to treat their parents as the potential violators of their rights when the latter refuse to tolerate, approve and fulfill every wish of their child, or force to fulfill their family duties².

Such a prioritization of children's rights over their duties seems to have little in common with Chinese traditional ethics of *xiao*, which emphasizes children's obligations towards their parents and the reverence to their authority until their death. However, there are some sinologists and comparative philosophers, who come out in favour of the relevance of *xiao* ethics for the contemporary Western and global world. Their supportive ideas are in accordance with the recent rebirth of studies of Confucianism and its reinterpretation as a teaching with a universal appeal. Moreover, such approaches may find further support in the facts pointed

¹ In sum, its corrections should give more freedom to the police and social institutions in taking the child from the family (parents) after registering any act of psychological or physical violence, committed by a parent towards his or her child.

² See, for example: Vidmantė Jasukaitytė (2013).

out by H. Rosemont and R. T. Ames in the introduction to their translation of *Xiaojing* 孝经:

the great majority of the rest of the world's peoples in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East—certainly more than two-thirds of the human race—do not seem to define themselves fundamentally as free, autonomous (and rights-bearing) individuals. [...] Except of the Westernized urban elites in these areas, most of the peoples who live in these places would define themselves much more in a relational, “Confucian” language than in Enlightenment and modern liberal terms. (Rosemont and Ames 2009, 34)

The two authors thus question the possibility of resolving the many issues concerning the contemporary society and family by discussing the latter exclusively in terms of rights-bearing individuals. They suggest that one should consider such alternative ideas and practices as Confucian ethics of *xiao*, even if classical ideals of the latter were grounded in the society far “remote from contemporary Western technology-driven capitalist democracies”, or even if classical Confucian texts and language do not have any close analogues to all key terms like “freedom”, “liberty”, “rights”, “individual” etc., which are employed in the contemporary Western moral discourse (Rosemont and Ames 2009, 32, 34)³.

However, I am inclined to argue that, in order to avoid “ahistoricity” in one’s approach, it would be more reasonable to discuss the relevance of *xiao* for the contemporary Western or global world, by relying on present-day examples and practices from modern China. And here we are confronted with the problem, which will be discussed in greater detail below, that the understanding and practice of *xiao* in post-Maoist China is far more complicated and contradictory than it could be imagined from classical texts or their Western interpretations. For any recognition, approval or disapproval of this virtue, practice or ideal, as a phenomenon of a different culture, it is “filtered” through the prism of one’s religious, cultural, social, historical or even ideological and national identity, or rather a sum of all those identities as well as existential conditions. Thus, any attempt to put *xiao* into the context of contemporary ethical ideas and social practices should involve a number of approaches, such as a dialogue between

³ I need to point out here, that H. Rosemont and R. Ames choose to translate Chinese term of *xiao* into English as “family reverence”, thus resisting the most common English translation “filial piety”. By this they seek to emphasize the centrality of family ethics in Chinese culture in general, and the particularity of Confucian ethics, which they call “role ethics”, since it “takes as its starting point and as its inspiration the perceived necessity of family feeling as ground in the development of the moral life” (Rosemont and Ames 2009, xii).

Confucian and Christian religions, the relationships between contemporary Chinese and Western social institutions and their cultural backgrounds, as well as the possibility of interpenetration of or conflict between Chinese traditional and modern (primarily Western) values in modern (post-Maoist) China. The paper aims to put together all these perspectives in order to reveal the complexity of the notion from the inter-cultural and global perspectives. In the pages that follow I will also examine the reflection on *xiao* and their relevance to Western culture as seen by some famous Western Protestant missionaries, religious philosophers, sinologists as well as present-day Lithuanian Sinology students. The final part of the article will be concerned with the results of a sociological researches conducted by a few Chinese Sinologists and their insights on the condition and problems of *xiao* practice in post-Maoist China.

The Treatment of *xiao* Ethics in Western Sinology

One of the earliest extensive approaches to *xiao*, formulated from the perspective of a different (Western) culture, was presented in the book *Chinese Characteristics* by the famous expert in Chinese culture, Protestant missionary Arthur H. Smith (2002). Although the book was published more than a century ago and became arguably the most widely read book about China in the West at the turn of the 20th century, it also gained great popularity in post-Maoist China at the turn of the 21st century⁴. His observations seem important mainly because they were based not only on the readings of Classical Confucian texts, but also on his long-term “fieldwork”. Smith starts a separate chapter entitled “Filial piety” with the paradoxical observation of the contradictory place and manifestations of filial piety in Chinese culture and behavior. On the one hand, he confirms the fact attested by him and other Christian missionaries in China regarding the evident lack of proper discipline, filiality and even any idea of prompt obedience in Chinese children, although upon achieving adulthood, they become filial, as if it was natural to their behavior. On the other hand, he repeats a popular Chinese view that “a defect of any virtue, when traced to its root, is a lack of filial piety”, thus recognizing the all-embracing nature and place of *xiao* in the moral and social life of Chinese, which is hardly describable and understandable in Western terms and reasoning (Smith 2002, 173).

⁴ This could be proved by the fact that, as Lydia H. Liu informs us in her introduction to the recent English re-edition of the book, there were as many as three new Chinese translations of the book which have emerged in different cities, namely, in Beijing (1998), Šanghai (1999) and Hong Kong (2000), “and all three editions have enjoyed wide distribution and readership” (Smith 2002, i).

Smith concludes the chapter listing the features which could be attractive and beneficial to Christians and Western people, such as the respect for age or maintaining the connections with one's parents even when the child (the son) becomes of age and has his separate life. However, far more extensive is his list of the “fatal defects” of *xiao*, which make it hardly attractive to a good Christian. He criticizes *xiao* for such “radical faults” as concentration on the duty of children towards their parents, while ignoring the duty of parents to their children; for speaking mainly on behalf of sons, but not on behalf of daughters; for putting the wife on an inferior plane, which is contrary to Christian practice⁵, thus encouraging the cultivation of love towards one's parents to an extreme degree, while suppressing natural instincts of the heart; for developing “the almost entire subordination of the younger during the whole life of those who are older”; for encouraging some improper social practices, such as adoption of children, early marriages, polygamy and concubinage; for encouraging such fallacious religious practices as the worship of ancestors, which “is one of the heaviest yokes which ever a people was compelled to bear”; and finally—and maybe most importantly—for ignoring and failing to recognize the existence of a Supreme being as well as the lack of the conception of Heavenly Father (Smith 2002, 182–85). The last “fault” of *xiao* reminds us about the author's true missionary intentions, his religious background and identity, which all prevent him from looking at Chinese practice of filial piety from a wider or universal perspective.

But here, one paradox should be mentioned or a very opposite fact in the history of Western receptions of *xiao*, which was observed by Keith Nathan Knapp in his insightful book on *xiao*, based on the histories from *Twenty-four Filial examples* (*Er shi si xiao* 二十四孝). As Knapp remarks, most English translations of this book were made by 19th- and 20th- century Western missionaries, for whom its tales seemed so appealing, that they started to disseminate them in the United States. Through tales they sought “to instill a sense of filial obligation in the hearts of unruly American youth”—even if at the same time the tales were dismayed by those same missionaries, and largely ignored or belittled by Western sociologists and historians at the turn of the century as rather absurd, grotesque or cruel (Knapp 2005, 5, 2).

⁵ According to him, “Christianity requires a man to leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife” (Smith 2002, 183).

Another Western scholar who wrote extensively on the possibilities of the transplantation of Confucianism into the urban Western cultures and modern Western social context is Robert Cummings Neville. In his book on Boston Confucianism he discusses four aspects of Confucianism which complicate such transplantation, filial piety being one of them⁶. In a separate chapter entitled “Filial Piety as Holy Duty” (Neville 2000, 194–201), he names four traits of *xiao*, which could allow or prevent the engagement of Confucianism with Christianity: 1) *xiao* concentrates on honoring one’s biological source of life, that is, one’s parents, grandparents and so forth, thus deferring to the family processes of nature and equating honouring of parents and family with honouring life itself; 2) its institutions contribute to the social services that care for the elderly, but the latter could even replace children’s care of elderly parents, if extensively developed and modernized, as in the case in most modern Western countries; 3) *xiao* is the background for all human relationships, mutual care and manifestation of love and humanity (*ren* 仁, benevolence), thus making one’s parents love the model of all kinds of love, and one’s parents the only real and authoritative parents and source of family connections. Neville contrasts such understanding of *xiao* with Christian ideas about the God as the Father of all humankind, and his love as the only model for any other love, which helps to transform personal identity and family relationships from the kinship family to a universal community with the church as the main institution for social relationships and the way of learning love; 4) *xiao* is concerned with the succession of the virtues of the ancestors, learning them from one’s parents, whose main duty is to make their children into good people or persons “of full humanity”, and after this to have a “freedom from the obligation to make you more virtuous” (Neville 2000, 199). This trait of filial piety, according to Neville, is analogous to the Christian doctrine of taking over the mind of Christ in one’s path to sagehood and universal love, although there are some minor differences and nuances. Neville concludes his exploration of the four traits of filial piety by bringing to light some extraordinary parallels between Confucianism and Christianity “so long as filial piety does not necessarily means one’s particular parents, and so long as the model of heavenly established virtues is not necessarily Jesus” (Neville 2000, 201). However, filial piety ceases to be a Confucian (Chinese) *xiao*, if it is not necessarily based on the reverent care of

⁶ Here he describes them as “four difficult cases”, namely, “filial piety as a holy duty”, “ritual propriety” in its relation to Christian morality, “the kinds of objections a Confucian might have to a community constituted around elaborating the ministry and character of Jesus” and the intention to acquire a mixed (Confucian Christian or Christian Confucian) identity (Neville 2000, 194).

one's parents. Thus, the filter of religious identity and the perspective of dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity for the transplantation of *xiao* into the sphere of global or Western culture seem far more complicated than are implied by the similarity between commandments to honour one's parents, as presented in the Christian Bible and Confucian Classics.

This may be one of the reasons why the reflections upon and discussions about the relevance of filial piety for the solutions of the contemporary social and family problems since the second half of the 20th century were shifted predominantly to the sphere of philosophical, ideological or political ideas and their possible dialogues. Some of the “faults” of *xiao*, as mentioned above, are still mentioned in the contemporary criticisms of filial piety, although they are reformulated in more precise, modern Western terms, such as sexism, liberalism, individual autonomy, human (children) rights, equality, authoritarianism, etc⁷. On the other hand, a number of sinologists and comparative philosophers, especially those working within the framework of family studies, tend to reread filial piety in the light of more universal values. For example, professor A. T. Nuyen from the National University of Singapore argues that filial piety has a relevance in the contemporary discourse on global ethics and culture if it is understood as respect for tradition. According to him, in this sense it can even be used “to correct the ‘traditional’ Chinese family structure that has been the subject of social critics” (Nueyn 2004, 213), to help harmonize all the seemingly conflicting statements found in Confucian classics, and even to eliminate the charges of the idea of filial piety with conservatism, too common in the Western literature (Nuyen 2004, 210)⁸.

The most far-reaching philosophical arguments about the relevance of *xiao* ethics for the contemporary global world and ethics were presented by H. Rosemont and R. T. Ames in their translation of *Xiaojing*. In their “Introduction” to the translation, the authors give an extensive answer to the question they formulate themselves: What can this book teach a person from the contemporary Western world if it is located too far from him/her in terms of time, worldview, social conditions and philosophical terminology? According to them, reading this text can help appreciate anew the importance of intergenerational relations

⁷ Some voices of such criticism are discussed in Nuyen 2004, 204.

⁸ In his interpretation, Nuyen uses Gadamerian hermeneutics: “to interpret something, in turn, is to stand within a tradition and to bring to bear what one has already understood in it to the new situation”. Thus, according to Nuyen, “to question this family structure and to correct its defects is not to do away with filial piety”. (Nuyen 2004, 208, 213)

between people, to envisage a different way of defining one's personality and self, to broaden the concept of social justice, to approach differently the issues of death and dying, and to "provide insight into the question of what makes human beings human" (Rosemont and Ames 2002, xv). But perhaps most importantly, it would be helpful in learning to do big things, starting from doing little or trivial things on a day-in day-out basis, and to "face the world on the basis of our family" (Rosemont and Ames 2002, 51)⁹. Interestingly, through their examination of the filial role ethics, the authors find the answer to the question as to what would prevent or combat the physical or psychological abuse of children by their parents in other families—though this answer does not seem to be conforming to the contemporary values of liberal societies, such as individual rights or privacy¹⁰. Moreover, the present translators of *Xiaojing* hope that this classical text can even help Westerners to realize the cost of prioritization of values of modern Western ethics such as individual freedom and independence, equality, privacy, rights and entitlements, and personal integrity¹¹.

However attractive and persuasive they look, such views and arguments by authoritative scholars, motivated by their scholarly interests and the need to substantiate the topicality of their object of research, are not enough elucidate a more nuanced and broad opinion about *xiao* by the contemporary representatives of the Western culture (-s). Moreover, as the famous expert in Chinese psychology Michael Harris Bond pointed out in one of his books, the most cross-cultural comparisons of Chinese and Western cultures (or their particular aspects) in the past have involved only one uneven group of the representatives of each culture, namely, the Americans representing the Westerners on one hand, and other, the

⁹ To substantiate their view, the authors provide several insights regarding the logic of Confucian role ethics and relational understanding of oneself, which can make one's life more meaningful even in its trivial things. See: Rosemont and Ames 2002, 51–52, 54.

¹⁰ According to them, the Confucian, or the person with the developed sense of relationality, should feel responsible not only for the good relationships in his family, but also for the neighbours' families, thus being responsible to prevent any violent or unrightful behaviour of the parents toward their children and not turning his eyes „away from the bruises we see on our neighbour's children—or spouse“ (Rosemont and Ames 2002, 54). It may be this sense of communal solidarity, that obliges us to rethink the supposed sanctity of our neighbor's home, and could help to settle the matter better than the application of laws or interruption of social and legal institutions, which, as I wrote earlier in this article, become increasingly active in some European countries today.

¹¹ In other words, it can help to avoid or realize the extremes of individualism, such as feelings of alienation, depression and selfishness since "too much freedom becomes license; too much independence becomes loneliness; too much autonomy becomes moral autism; and too much sacrilization of human beings comes at the cost of massive species extinction" (Rosemont and Ames 2002, 63).

abstract denomination “Chinese” on the other, whether or not those Chinese are born in mainland China, Singapore or Chinatown of San Francisco (Bond 1991, 4). His question “Are the Chinese in various political, social, and economic settings similar?” could be readdressed and reformulated with respect to Westerners, and this research, by asking “whether all Western people from United States and various European countries will approach *xiao* in the similar way”. Will the family feeling and honoring parent’s authority, implied by filial piety, be appreciated in the same way by the people from the North and South European countries with their different emphasis and traditions of the family and intergenerational relations or emphasis on individual freedoms and rights? What about judgments about *xiao* in Russia and Post-Soviet countries with their particular histories of honoring authorities and autocracy?

Bearing these questions and tentative answers in mind, I have decided to include in this research the reflections on *xiao* by my present Sinology students—that is, young people who are still more dependent on their parents and family relations, but are interested in Chinese culture. Thus making it possible of some cross-cultural comparisons with those who have already learned something about Chinese ethics of filial piety and “filial mentality” from Classical Chinese texts (such as *Lunyu*, *Xiaojing*, *Ershisi xiao*, *Nüxiao jing*).

The View on *xiao* by Lithuanian Sinology Students

The students were asked to answer three questions concerning filial piety:

- 1) How do you conceive *xiao* in relation to other aspects of Chinese culture and from the comparative perspective?
- 2) Which aspects of *xiao* seem to you the most unattractive or unacceptable, as viewed from the perspective of your culture?
- 3) Does (and in which ways) *xiao* seem relevant and needful for modern Western (or global) culture?

As to the first question, the students responded almost unanimously that ethics of filial piety seems to them neither exotic, nor strange, nor too unique a feature of Chinese culture, if comprehended from the comparative perspective. Even if not discussing it in the sense of respect and honouring one’s obligations towards the ruler and the state, it is something that could be easily understood by most people around the world, since its concept in its basic sense, reverence for parents, is present in all cultures, albeit in different extent and forms of expression. On the

other hand, some of the students consider it as one of the best means to explain a specific behaviour of Chinese people, for example, avoid to oppose or confront an older person. Students view such behaviour as standing in sharp contrast with the Western cult of “individualism”.

However, most students have admitted that one of the most difficult things in understanding the Chinese virtue and practice of filial piety is the exaggerated, overwhelming obsession with the demonstration and extreme forms of expression of filial feelings, such as the tradition of 3-year-long mourning rites, as well as some extreme forms of unconditional obedience and self-sacrifice, which are illustrated in the tales from *Twenty-four Filial Examples* (such as “Burying his son to save his mother”). According to one student, though the child in this story was not harmed, from the standpoint of someone from the Western society, in which protecting children has become a kind of *idée fixe*, the notion of killing one’s own offspring for the sake of the wellbeing of your parents is quite possibly one of the most monstrous and bizarre acts that could be committed, and is certainly incomprehensible to most Westerners. Among other non-acceptable aspects of *xiao*, the students also named less extreme forms of self-sacrifice, such as compliance with the wishes of parents, obeying all their orders and unspoken wishes, furnishing them with what they need and want, having the pressure to bear an offspring; refusing high office in order to take personal care of one’s parents if they are old or sick. For them, such behaviour deprives children of all personal freedom and possibility to arrange his/her life by himself.

Most of such acts of filiality are viewed by the students as contradictory and rather confusing in their demands. Too often the obligation of filial piety places one into the filial dilemma of having to choose between two simultaneous ways of filial piety. For example, what should be more filial in the same situation—giving up one’s job and career in order to take care of a sick old mother, or aspiring to a higher post in order to gain more money for the same care of the mother, especially having in mind that making one’s career is considered as acting in compliance with the parents’ wishes and making them proud for one’s success? What should be more filial—to steal the fruits from the neighbors’ house in order to give them to hungry parents, or not to steal and thus avoid their disgrace for their child’s bad behaviour? What students found particularly problematic was the treatment of a suicide committed by a child, as the way to save the face of her parents, or to remonstrate against their bad behavior. In this case, students see a conflict between two ways of filial piety, namely, the child’s duty not to comply

with the father's bad behaviour, and the preservation of one's life and body as they are co-owned by one's parents. Such contradictions, as some students point out, seriously complicate the understanding and logical reasoning of all rules of filial behaviour, since the same act could be treated very differently by the society and even by one's parents. This makes it difficult to understand which act is approved and glorified as filial, and which are considered as punishable, thus making the practical application of filial piety too problematic. In other words, students see a contradiction between filial actions, intentions and feelings of filiality, which form its complexity and over-comprehensiveness, and make it stand out from the ethics of filiality cherished in other cultures and traditions.

Some students have also questioned the application of the principle of reciprocity (*bao* 報) in promoting a special sense of children's gratitude towards their parents simply because they brought them into life. Students found it evidently disproportional or unjust especially in the case of feeling obliged to ensure reverent care for one's parents, if they did not take care of or treated the child badly in his young years. For them, such demand does not seem to be conforming to the general Confucian principle of exemplary behaviour, namely, teaching by one's example, or the Golden rule of putting oneself in the place of the other; treating others in such a way as you would like to be treated. The students raise a question: How can I be reverent to my parents, if they do not respect me? They evidently fail to understand the intergenerational "transitivity" of filial behaviour, which means that bad treatment of one's parents in response to their previous bad behaviour will show an example of such behaviour to one's children or the next generation.

In response to the third question, one student, like a true Confucian, admitted, that the principles of *xiao* are grounded on the most fundamental value, which, if realized, can bring all other values into harmony. The very idea of respecting one's parents as the source of one's life forms the "essence" of the harmonious society, since if one shows reverence to his/her parents, then he/she will do the same with regard to other people and himself/herself. He/she will naturally develop the habit to consider the consequences and impact of his/her deeds and words on other people, first of all, family members. Another student expressed the belief that ethics of family reverence could be helpful in overcoming such vices as over-indulging in alcohol and laziness, which are very urgent problems in present Lithuanian society. As he says, this could be achieved only by realizing not only one's rights, but also duties, first of all the duties to one's family and parents,

simply by understanding that one's bad behaviour primarily harms the reputation and feelings of one's family members. Also, almost all students admitted that, since parents are the first form of authority we come to know, the lack of respect and obedience towards them could ultimately result in the negation of authority figures in general.

All of my students repeat the remark by Smith mentioned above, namely, that the very Confucian idea of filial reverence for one's parents and taking care of them in their old age is very relevant for contemporary Western societies, since in most of them this virtue has almost disappeared because of the crisis of the responsibility and duty, as well as of the traditional family institution. Most people prefer to live by themselves, fulfilling only their own individual needs, isolating themselves from the society and from the family, abandoning or ignoring their parents, and even resisting normal communication with them. Thus, what Lithuanians (as Westerners) can learn from *xiao* ethics is how to respect not only one's parents, but old people and old age in general. According to one student, discussing filial piety through the examples of model behaviour may work as a mirror, which can improve the relations between children and parents in Lithuania.

However, this remark leads me to the final question of this research, namely, which examples of filial piety are relevant for us today? My students, like many Western Sinology students, usually discover this Chinese virtue mainly from classical sources, as did the Chinese themselves in Imperial China. Those sources were helpful not only in forming ethical ideals of filial behaviour, but also in putting the background for a number of its supportive institutions, such as the legal system, public opinion, patrilineal kinship organizations, the religious system, and family ownership of property. All those institutions were transformed in the 20th century China, and this fact helps to validate the statement, so common in post-Maoist China, about the disappearance of *xiao*. Accordingly, the authority of the classical books has been questioned since then. Some Chinese professors suggest that their Western colleagues whom they met at international conferences should not take "Twenty-four filial examples" seriously, since, according to them, none in China today take those stories as real, nor do they seem an inspiring for Chinese children. Therefore, in the third part of the article, I would like to briefly discuss the studies and insights on the changes of Chinese society and family ethics in post-Maoist China, as presented by Chinese scholars, since their opinion can not be ignored in this kind of research.

The Transformation of Family Ethics in Post-Maoist China

One of the most “productive” Chinese scholars in this field is Yunxiang Yan, who presented the results of his fieldwork in a few books and many articles published in English. In one of those books he declares that “unconditional filial piety, which was based on the sacredness of parenthood, no longer exists. For younger villagers, intergenerational reciprocity [...] has to be balanced and maintained through consistent exchange. If the parents do not treat their children well or are otherwise not good parents, then the children have reason to reduce the scope and amount of generosity to their parents.” (Yan 2003, 177–78) In other words, the traditional Confucian obligation to unconditionally fulfill one’s role of a filial son, despite the parents failing to fulfill their roles and obligations, seems unreasonable today not only for Western students, but for young Chinese as well. The author illustrates the current state of family relations, and the son-father relations in particular, referring to a story he was told in one village as a common example of the current state of family relations: “When a father could not silence his son during a family discord, he yelled: “Don’t forget I’m still your father”. Without thinking, the son yelled back: “Nowadays it’s hard to tell who’s whose father”. And the dispute ended quickly”. (Yan 2009, 113) Such a tendency in questioning the validity of parental authority, so common in the behaviour of the young Chinese, helps to explain, why the main complaint from the elders is the unfiliality, or rather, the disappearance of filiality. Yunxiang Yan goes even further by concluding that “without the traditional forms of support, the notion of filial piety lost cultural legitimacy and social power”, especially due to the individualization of society, growth of market economy, intergenerational reciprocity and the rise of conjugality, as well as the tendency of grounding the intergenerational relationships on rationality, self-interestedness, autonomy and free-will (Yan 2003, 189).

But the problem lies not only in the loss of the authority of classical books and parental authority, and not even in the disappearance of *xiao* in post-Maoist China, but rather in the confusion or disagreement over the understanding of the duty of filial piety between older and younger generations. This problem was also pointed out clearly by Yunxiang Yan. After studying some village communities, he found that elderly parents very often blamed their children and daughters-in-law for the “lack of respect and concern” (*buxiaoshun* 不孝顺), the disregard of their wishes. Some of them could not stand to see their married son display affection or

intimacy towards his wife outside the bedroom (Yan 2003, 171). However, the married children felt unfairly accused, and saw the real problem not in the disappearance of *xiao*, but rather in the feudal thoughts of the older generation and their obsolete understanding of what it should be. Some young Chinese not only reject the traditional ideas that giving life to a child is the parents' great and totally non-repayable favour. They not only deny the sacredness of parenthood, but even tend to interpret filial piety in terms of individualism and one's own happiness. For example, they ask their parents to pay for their comfortable life (such as new cell phones, travels, drinks in Starbuck's coffeedhop every day), and still consider themselves as filial. The children tend to think that their parents' best hopes and happiness come from their child's happiness, thus "their pursuit of pleasure and comfort in life should be viewed as their way of fulfilling the duty of filial piety" (Yan 2011, 37).

The same opinion regarding the existence of the disagreement over the meaning of filial piety among two generations is held by another Chinese sociologist, Wu Fei, who concentrates his research on the issue of suicide in contemporary China. Through the analysis of the specific cases and suicide stories he shows how often such disagreement or misunderstanding leads to the suicide of the parents, revealing the change of power in family relationships. As he remarks, many children today think that filial piety only requires economic support, while what their parents expect from them is proper respect and something more than material assistance, that is, emotional and moral care. If they do not receive it, the most extreme way of their resistance is committing suicide. In his survey and conclusions he almost repeats the words of Yan, mentioned above: "most elders agree that filial piety is a big problem in contemporary China. However, young people do not agree. They still consider filial piety important and don't think of themselves as unfilial, however, their conception of filial piety is different from that of their elders" (Wu 2011, 221). Young Chinese feel confused too often, failing to know how to treat their old parents in order to make them feel comfortable and satisfied. On the other hand, another part of suicides in post-Maoist China is the suicide committed by the children because of failing to fulfill their duty of filial piety. Such kind of suicides is traditional, but the fact that they still exist in modern society prevents one from any one-sided conclusions about the disappearance of the ethics of filial piety in contemporary China. Perhaps the best term to describe the current state and treatment of filial piety in contemporary China would be "confusion".

Conclusions

The understanding of *xiao* and its relevance in the contemporary Western or global world, as well as its application in social and family practices and ideals, is complicated due to a number of factors, such as irreconcilable differences between Confucian and Christian religious ideas, the adjustment of authoritative texts to the changing historical circumstances. The most important factor is the confusion of its treatment in contemporary China itself, which stems from the diffusion and confrontation between traditional Chinese and modern (mostly Western) social values and ideas. However, in no ways does such complexity of the viewpoints on *xiao* hinder the possibility to emulate or practice this virtue in one's relations with parents in whichever culture. For this, one has simply remember that for Chinese, filial conduct must be judged by the intentions, not by acts; for "judged by acts, there would not be a filial son in the world." (Smith 2002, 173)

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‘A Special Zone for Confucianism’? Theses of the Academician Zhang Xianglong on Traditional Chinese Culture

Monika GÄNßBAUER*

Abstract

This article introduces the work of the academician Zhang Xianglong (b. 1949), focussing on his idea of establishing a “special zone for Confucianism” in China. Zhang argues that special protection is needed for Confucian traditions which he perceives as the leading culture of China. Confucian culture should find its way out of the museum, says Zhang. He also refers to the political concept of “one country, two systems” that was implemented when Hongkong was restored to Chinese rule. Zhang applies this to his idea of a “special zone for Confucianism”, suggesting that this political concept could be extended to “one country, three systems”. In my view Zhang is developing new, creative ideas for possible experimental fields dealing with Confucianism in the context of the People’s Republic of China. In the end it is my argument that it would be helpful to conduct in-depth research on the possible role of Confucianism in today’s China.

Keywords: Confucianism, Zhang Xianglong, special zone

Izvleček

Ta članek predstavlja delo akademika Zhang Xianglong (r. 1949) in se osredotoča na njegovo idejo o ustanovitvi »posebne cone za konfucianizma« na Kitajskem. Zhang trdi, da je potrebna posebna zaščita za konfucijansko tradicijo, za katero meni, da je vodilna kultura Kitajske. Konfucijska kultura bi po njegovem morala najti svojo pot iz muzeja. Sklicuje se tudi na politični koncept »ena država, dva sistema«, ki se je izvajal, ko je bila obnovljena kitajska nadvlada Hongkongu. Zhang to povezuje s svojo idejo o »posebni coni za konfucianizem« in predlaga, da bi se ta politični koncept razširil na »ena država, trije sistemi«. Po mojem mnenju Zhang razvija nove, ustvarjalne ideje za morebitna poskusna področja, ki se ukvarjajo s konfucianizmom v okviru Ljudske republike Kitajske. Tako je moj argument, da bi bilo koristno, da se naredi poglobljena raziskava o morebitni vlogi konfucianizma v današnji Kitajski.

Ključne besede: konfucianizem, Zhang Xianglong, posebna cona

* Monika GÄNßBAUER, Professor of Chinese Studies, University of Erlangen, Germany.
m.gaenssbauer@gmx.net

Introductory Remarks

Zhang Xianglong 張祥龍 was born in 1949 in Hongkong. Later he moved to Beijing together with his parents. He studied philosophy at Beijing University and obtained his M.A. and PhD degrees at the Universities of Toledo and Buffalo in America. He taught for some years at Beijing University. Currently, he is a professor at the University of Shandong. His main areas of research are comparative philosophy of East and West and the philosophy of Heidegger.

Zhang Xianglong belongs to a group of contemporary Chinese academics who concern themselves as scholars with the topic of Confucianism and Confucianism's possible role in today's China. He and his work have not been mentioned yet in the reviews of contemporary Chinese scholarship in these areas, e.g. published some years ago by John Makeham (Makeham 2008) and Daniel Bell (Bell 2008). In my view, though, he is an interesting figure developing new, creative ideas for possible experimental fields in dealing with Confucianism under the circumstances of today's China.

Zhang Xianglong and the Contemporary Confucian Discourse

Unlike his contemporary Jiang Qing 蔣庆 (b. 1953), the founder of a Confucian academy in Guizhou province who taught at the Southwest University of Political Science and Law and the Shenzhen College of Administration, Zhang Xianglong is not proposing Confucianism as the only possible solution for all of mankind's problems. In his book *A Confucian Constitutional Order* Jiang Qing claims:

The [Confucian] Way of humane Authority [...] has brought together the values of monarchy and of theocratic forms of rulership from ancient times, the democracy of the modern era, and contemporary ecology. It can also help Western countries to draw on historical-cultural legitimacy for their political development. (Jiang 2013, 39)

Zhang Xianglong's works do not display a missionary impetus. His reflections are centered on the situation of Chinese society and the state of traditional philosophy in China today. The political Confucianism doesn't have the character of universalism for him (Zhang 2011, 232). This is also a point that Zhang criticizes in Jiang's theory. Zhang Xianglong is not of the opinion that Confucianism could or should be universalized as a model of "global politics". Furthermore,

Confucianism should resist being reduced to a university discipline or implemented as an institutionalized religion (Billioud and Thoraval 2008, 99).

Confucianism should be non-utilitarian, argues Zhang. People should not worship high technology as a source of economic power and should not blindly believe in science and technology. Instead, technological power should be critically examined from a cultural standpoint. Otherwise people in China would be “converted to universalism and lose the cultural legitimacy that Jiang Qing speaks of”. (Zhang 2011, 236) Here Zhang is openly critical of a position taken by China’s mainstream society. The sinologist Thomas Fröhlich has identified an unbroken, optimistic belief in technical feasibility in today’s China. Modernity is not perceived by most Chinese as a contingent process. In contrast to Europe, where the idea of progress has been the object of several almost fatally telling critiques, many people in China are still convinced that scientific-technological progress is operable and controllable (Fröhlich 2011).

In Zhang Xianglong’s view, true Confucians, or “Ru scholars” (*ru zhe* 儒者), do see the Ru teachings as the ultimate truth and they hope that these teachings find more and more followers. But they do not long for material gain and profit. Their aspiration extends no further than that the Ru teachings become more and more widely known. And they see it as their responsibility to criticize inhumane and unnatural tendencies in modern life.

A Special Zone for Confucianism?

In my paper I focus only on a small slice of Zhang’s oeuvre, namely, his idea of a special zone for Confucianism in China. My approach is a sinological one, and I will try to contextualize the theses of Zhang Xianglong in the current Chinese society and the field of studies on Confucianism.

As Rošker and Von Senger have remarked Chinese approaches to the exploration of their own tradition are often quite different from research interests, methods and interpretations of academics coming from a European or American background (Rošker 2005, 191; Von Senger 2008). I agree with them that it is challenging but necessary to establish creative dialogues and to deal with those Chinese explorations in a respectful manner which also means to take them seriously. This is where I see the purported significance of this article.

Zhang Xianglong’s idea of a special zone for Confucianism in China was

formed after he graduated from Beijing University. In an interview conducted by students of Beijing University, Zhang told them that immediately after his graduation he wanted to live the secluded life of a Daoist in the mountains. But the forestry authorities did not allow him to do so. Later he obtained a post in a nature reserve but was assigned mainly to paperwork there (Chen and Zhou n.y.)

In an article entitled "Provide a Shelter for China's Ancient and Endangered Culture—A Proposal to Established a Special Zone for Confucianism" Zhang argues that, just as this nowadays special protection is needed for endangered species of plants and animals, so too does this apply to Confucian traditions, which Zhang refers to as the most valuable among Chinese traditions and the leading culture of China (Zhang 2006). Statements like this could easily be seen as part of the widespread trend towards Han nationalism in the People's Republic of China, a trend which perceives Han Chinese traditions as more advanced and civilized than that of the minorities in China (Gladney 2009).

As Zhang sees it, the Confucian traditions have failed, and continue to fail, in countering waves of Westernization with alternative measures. Unlike Buddhist and Daoist traditions in China, which succeeded in building their own Noah's Ark and in finding refuge in temples and religious communities, Confucianism in China has to be saved by special rescue measures. "Confucius Temples" should be revived and Confucian culture should find its way out of the museum. Besides using the concept of a "nature reserve for Confucian culture", Zhang also refers to existing communities such as the Amish people in the United States who are closely following their own community rules, rules often deviating from those of the mainstream society surrounding them (Zhang 2006). Zhang Xianglong also compares Confucianism with the aboriginal culture of the Indians. In 2009 he taught in Latin America and got into contact with Indian communities there. In his view, Indian and Chinese communities are facing the same task: to recover the centerpiece of their culture (Zhang 2010). Zhang's arguments are part of a discourse of self-assertion within modern Confucianism. This discourse took shape, Michael Lackner argues, as a response to a challenge, i.e. it is an emotive reaction to a perceived threat to Chinese identity (Lackner 2003, 275). This kind of discourse gives rise to its own challenge by defending a purported identity against purported alien forces.

As regards the Chinese context, Zhang Xianglong refers to the political concept of "one country, two systems" that was implemented when Hongkong was

restored to Chinese rule. Zhang applies this to his idea of a “reserve for Confucian culture”, suggesting that this political concept could be extended to “one country, three systems”. To me, this idea, through its extension of existing political and societal concepts, seems to be a very meaningful step towards pluralization. One is not only reminded of strategies for the handover of Hongkong but also of the process of establishing Special Economic Zones since the 1980s, which functioned as experimental areas and pilot projects documenting the growing capacity for innovation in China (Heilmann 2009).

In Zhang’s view it is the responsibility of the government and of academics in China to revitalize Confucianism (Zhang 2010). Confucianism should resist being reduced to a university discipline or an institutionalized religion. The Western powers that invaded China during the 19th century are obliged to acknowledge their guilt and to shoulder responsibility for their misdeeds. Similarly the author Lao She (1899–1966) whose family suffered deeply during the violent repression of the Boxer uprising carried out by the Joint Army of Western forces once wrote: “This question of guilt can never be completely settled.” (Lao 1993, 296) Christianity which is a truly ecumenical and universal religion was not successful in China, says Zhang, because it did not respect the vital structure of Confucianism. Seligman and Weller also see Christianity as “the most obvious example of a set of ideas meant to be equally true for all times, places, and peoples.” Still their conclusion is that

while never as successful in China as in some other parts of the world, it [Christianity] has had a significant impact both through direct conversions [...] and by leading other groups to emulate some of its techniques. (Seligman and Weller 2012, 143)

Even today, China is still, according to Zhang, confronted with cultural invasions by universalist theories and ideas. Education and the academic world in China seem to be quite westernized (Zhang 2007, 7) and Zhang’s hope is that Confucianism can help change these ossified ways of thinking. With this opinion Zhang does not stand alone. Quite a few Chinese academics have been criticizing, over the last few years, the dominance of scientific concepts derived from a discourse among scholars with European and American backgrounds. This has been the case, for example, in the area of religious studies (Fudan 2009; Wang 2008). As an alternative to this, Chinese scholars are striving to further develop indigenous Chinese concepts.

Returning now to Zhang's idea of establishing a Confucian "special zone", Billoud and Thoraval restate this matter in the following terms:

If the genius of Confucianism can only flourish within daily life, within an organic space that includes the ensembles of its arts and rituals inherited from the past, is it not tempting to imagine the possibility of re-establishing such a space within the modern world? (Billoud and Thoraval 2008, 99)

A few of Zhang's texts contain a somewhat closer description of his own conception of such a "special zone". It could be an area of about 100 square kilometers, says Zhang. Modern technology would not be needed within such a reserve. Traditional ways of living would be revitalized. The community would take joint decisions on matters of common interest. The mode of government would neither be individualistic nor autocratic. Farmers should form a considerable part of the inhabitants, green agriculture and technology should be applied. Officials would be selected through competitive exams and there should be a strict selection of the future inhabitants of a Confucian special zone (Zhang 2007). People would live peacefully together and apply traditional Chinese techniques, such as Chinese medicine. In another text, Zhang proposes the revival of Confucian rituals, such as wedding ceremonies (Zhang n.y.).

In reading these texts one cannot help to be reminded of traditional ideas of ideal communities developed for example in the works of the Confucian philosopher Mencius 孟子 (370–290 BCE). In one of the chapters Mencius gets involved in a conversation with King Hui of Liang. Mencius gives advice that if a state does not interfere with the people during the growing season, there will be more grain than the people can eat. And if the King would allow axes to be used in the woods only in proper season, there would be more lumber than the people can use. According to Wolfgang Bauer, Mencius has developed the first social utopia in China (Bauer 1971, 42). Another Chinese philosopher, Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893–1988), was of the opinion that the mechanized cities are the characteristic form of existence in Western civilizations whereas life in the countryside is much more in accordance with the essence of Chinese culture. He himself laid down his position as a teacher and founded a rural cooperative in Shandong which became an example for self-governing and social reform (Bauer 1971, 497).

But still one gains the impression that Zhang's descriptions of a Confucian Reserve remain quite peripheral. For me, this problem also arises with regard to

the idea propounded by Kang Xiaoguang (b. 1963) from Renmin University in Beijing, who pleads for the establishment of Confucian religion (*rujiao* 儒教) in today's China but neglects to provide any concrete blueprint for the implementation of this idea (Gaenssbauer 2009).

Zhang Xianglong has also organized a petition to erect a statue of Confucius on the Campus of Beijing University. The culture of Beijing University is characterized by tolerance, says Zhang (Zhang 2008). The University, however, should not only show tolerance for Western culture but for Chinese culture as well. One of Zhang's texts is even entitled: "Wu Kongzi zhi Beida wu linghun – Beida Xiaoyuan li Kongzi xiang de jianyi 无孔子之北大无灵魂——北大校园立孔子像的建议" (Without Confucius Beijing University is Without a Soul). The title of this article recalls a book written by the sinologist Richard Wilhelm in the year 1926: *The Soul of China* (Wilhelm 2007). This intervention of Zhang's contains a clear critical allusion to the iconoclastic May Fourth Movement which had its inception at Beijing University and wanted to do away with such Chinese traditions as Confucianism (Chow et al. 2008).

In an article on the "crisis of Chinese traditional culture" Zhang Xianglong restates still more emphatically his view that a culture has a soul (Zhang 2003). His crisis analysis is grounded in the following questions:

Are there still transmitters of traditional Chinese culture?

Do the societal structures that have hitherto borne this traditional culture still exist?

Are people nowadays still influenced in their decision-making process by the values of this traditional culture?

Does the language of this culture still find expression in the thoughts and feelings of people today?

Confucius' birthday is not an official holiday in China. This means, so Zhang argues, that Confucianism is marginalized and that the government does not sufficiently value traditional culture. The acute crisis-awareness of Zhang Xianglong even leads him to make the following statement: "The waters of the Huanghe are the blood that flows through the veins of the Chinese nation." Zhang Xianglong's understanding of the state seems to display similarities here to that of

the Chinese philosopher Zhang Junmai 张君勱 (1886–1969) who, according to Thomas Fröhlich, perceived the state as an organism with its own will and self-awareness and, as it were, a mind of its own (Fröhlich 2000, 171).

Critique and Conclusion

Of course Zhang Xianglong's theses have also met with criticism in China and Taiwan. Shang Xinjian 尚新建 (b. 1953) from Beijing University has commented that the cultural elements in such a "special zone for Confucianism" would not be real and alive (Hong 2001). In his view, the vitality of a culture can only show forth and prove itself in day-to-day life. Another argument of Shang's is that Confucian culture in China was historically closely connected with a "feudal dictatorial system". Shang poses the question: "Should such a system also be implemented in the special zone for Confucianism?" Shang's remarks mirror a trend in the People's Republic of China where, as Jana Rošker remarks, "classical Confucian philosophers have [...], mildly speaking, 'fallen into disgrace' as representatives of suppressing [...] 'feudal ideologies.'" (Rošker 2005, 199)

Wang Huaiyu 王懷聿 from Georgia State University asks himself, in a book review on Zhang's work *Refuge of Thinking*:

How can "the preservation of a set of ancient customs and morals [...] be in accord with the Confucian spirit of 'proceeding with time' [...] Must a holding on to the archaic forms of rituals and institutions not constitute rather a direct contravention of the genuine Confucian spirit, which is supposed to constantly explore and expand its meanings in the ever-changing world?" (Wang 2008)

Dang Guoying 党国英 (b. 1957), researcher at the Department for Rural Development in China, Academy for Social Sciences in Beijing, is even sharper in his critique of Zhang's idea (Dang 2010). He emphatically rejects Zhang's proposal for the state-supported establishment of a "special zone for Confucianism" in China. As long as the problem of poverty exists in China, says Dang, he feels bound to strongly resist the idea of government subsidy for such an idea as Zhang's. He also opposes Zhang's perception of a wide gap between the cultures of "East" and "West". In his view, the assumption of the existence of an "Eastern, Confucian culture" is contrived and highly overestimated.

Gong Pengcheng 龔鵬程 from Taipei, (b. 1956), author and president of

Foguang University, has dealt with the topic of revitalizing Confucianism from a still broader perspective (Gong 2010).

It is not possible to revive Confucianism without adding some new elements to it, argues Gong. He recommends a sober and calm discussion. Confucianism's revitalization is only a recent phenomenon but there is already a heated debate going on about what should be accomplished through this revitalization. Gong points to the dangers which this debate brings with it: sloganeering, dogmatism and reducing Confucianism to "fast food". He compares the current situation to consuming chocolate or ice cream: If it is sweet and tasty you eat it. But this is not the real taste. Or, to abandon the metaphor, he proposes that more profound research should be conducted on the actual value of such a revitalization of Confucianism and on its possible effects upon society. Currently, many institutions in mainland China invite academics to give talks on Confucianism. But these institutions take a very utilitarian approach to this activity, Gong Pengcheng argues. They require of the invited academics that they talk about the usefulness of Confucianism for management measures, or for gaining profits.

Furthermore, it is not easy to apply Confucianism to today's society because of the tremendous changes that Chinese society has undergone. Pre-modern China was an agrarian society. Now, China has transformed itself into an industrialized, commercial society. This change also brought with it a change in the realm of ethics. Family structures in pre-modern and modern China differ enormously from one another. And Confucianism would have to cope with these changes.

It is nowhere near sufficient merely to discuss Confucianism, or to read some classical books, says Gong. At the moment, taking part in the discourse on the revitalization of Confucianism seems to be very much in vogue. But, as we all know, fashions are short-lived. Gong's conclusion, with which I can only agree, is: it would be helpful to conduct in-depth research on the possible role of Confucianism in today's China.

The government of the People's Republic of China, in an effort to lend legitimacy to its rule, has been propagating for some years a movement of cultural renaissance, which aims to instil national pride in "5000 years", as it is claimed, "of Chinese culture" among the general populace. There is, however, a continued refusal on the part of those in power to allow the reestablishment of institutions with Confucian character. I regard Zhang Xianglong's proposals as creative and

probably promising with regard to their potential of actually being realised since they skillfully blend in with the successfully tried strategies by the Chinese government: the establishment of special zones and the concept of one country, two systems. In view of the existing political and social conditions Zhangs proposal may represent a possible course of action in order to revive Confucianism in the People's Republic of China.

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Asian Studies in Slovenia

Šanghajski geto in zgodovinsko ter politično ozadje judovskih beguncev iz Tretjega rajha v letih 1933–1945

Matjaž VIDMAR*

Izvleček

Pričujoči članek predstavi usodo skoraj 20.000 judovskih beguncev v Šanghaju v času Tretjega rajha. Šanghajski eksil je edinstven zaradi dejstva, da so judovski begunci v mednarodne enklave lahko vstopili brez vizuma do jeseni leta 1939. V najbolj kritičnem letu 1938 je bil zaradi nevtralne države mednarodnih enklav Šanghaj edini kraj na svetu, kamor so Judje lahko vstopili brez vizuma, zato je bilo priseljevanje v tem letu največje. Članek obravnava tudi življenjske razmere beguncev v okupiranem Šanghaju, politiko Japonske do Judov in ob koncu osvetljuje ozadje razglasitve šanghajskega geta v japonski četrti Hongkou.

Ključne besede: šanghajski eksil, judovska emigracija, šanghajski geto, kolonialni Šanghaj, Tretji rajh

Abstract

The article presents the fate of nearly 20.000 Jewish refugees in Shanghai during the Third Reich. Shanghai exile was unique because Jewish refugees were able to enter international enclaves without visa until the autumn of 1939. Due to the International Settlement's policy of neutrality, Shanghai was in the most critical year of 1938 the only area in the world, where Jews were allowed to enter without visa, which caused mass immigration in this crucial time. The article also deals with living conditions in the occupied Shanghai, the Japanese policy towards Jews and illuminates the proclamation of Shanghai ghetto in the Japanese concession Hongkou.

Keywords: Shanghai exile, Jewish emigration, Shanghai ghetto, colonial Shanghai, the Third Reich

* Matjaž Vidmar, univ. dipl. sinolog in profesor nemščine, mladi raziskovalec na Oddelku za azijske in afriške študije, Filozofska fakulteta, Univerza v Ljubljani.
matjaz.vidmar@ff.uni-lj.si

Uvod

Šanghajski eksil vsekakor spada med manj znana poglavja emigracije iz Tretjega rajha. V nasprotju z emigracijo v ZDA, Palestino, Veliko Britanijo, Francijo in druge države zahodne poloble pa temu delu zgodovine judovske emigracije še ni bilo namenjene velike pozornosti. K temu je vsekakor pripomoglo dejstvo, da se šanghajski emigranti niso ustalili na Kitajskem in so skoraj v celoti kmalu po ustanovitvi Ljudske republike Kitajske ponovno emigrirali. Z leti je njihova izkušnja utonila v pozabo. Drugi razlog je izobrazbena struktura teh izseljencev. V ZDA, Francijo, Turčijo, Veliko Britanijo in Mehiko so emigrirala prominentna imena iz različnih področij znanosti in umetnosti, kot so npr. Albert Einstein, Anna Seghers, Henry Kissinger, Sigmund Freud in drugi. Med šanghajskimi emigranti, ki so bili pretežno judovskega rodu, pa ni bilo tako slavnih oseb. Večinoma so pripadali srednjemu meščanskemu razredu. Znani umetniki, znanstveniki in kulturniki so brez težav emigrirali v bolj zaželene države, večinoma v ZDA, zato se nihče izmed njih ni odločil za manj zaželjeno emigracijo v Šanghaj. Kljub temu si ta del zgodovine zasluži več pozornosti s strani raziskovalcev. Pionirsko delo raziskav o šanghajskem eksilu Davida Kranzlerja *Japanese, Nazis & Jews: the Jewish Refugee Community of Šanghaj, 1938–1945* kljub letnici 1976 še vedno velja za osrednje delo šanghajske emigracije. V zadnjih desetletjih je bilo izvedenih več raziskav v Nemčiji in Avstriji, med katerimi izstopata magistrsko delo Astrid Freyeisen o prisotnosti nacistične stranke v Šanghaju in monografija Elisabeth Buxbaum o kulturnem udejstvovanju beguncev. Pričujoči članek bo slovenski javnosti predstavil zgodovinsko in politično ozadje emigracije, ki pri nas doslej še ni bila podrobneje raziskana.

Priseljevanje Judov v Šanghaj

Sprejemanje judovskih beguncev je omogočila posebna administrativna ureditev Šanghaja, ki je bil razdeljen na tri administrativne enote. Tuje oblasti so se odločile za načelno nevtralnost v številnih mednarodnih konfliktih. Podoben potencialni konflikt med velesilami, ki bi lahko izbruhnil ob morebitni popolni kolonizaciji Kitajske, bi se lahko na manjšem območju zgodil tudi v Šanghaju. Zato so se mednarodne enklave vedno skušale izogniti konfliktom in so praviloma vojaško posredovale le v obrambnih situacijah. Politične odločitve so bile predvsem v mednarodni naselbini dokaj neodvisne od matičnih držav, zato se politike omejevanja priseljevanja niso razširile v Šanghaj. Za prihod v Šanghaj ni bilo treba predložiti vizuma. Posledica nevtralnosti Šanghaja v raznih konfliktih je

bila, da so mednarodne enklave sprejemale veliko število beguncev iz Kitajske in iz tujine. Največji val beguncev iz tujine je Šanghaj sprejel proti koncu tridesetih let, ko so v kitajski metropoli zatočišče našli judovski emigranti iz Tretjega rajha. V času po novembrskih pogromih leta 1938 so bile mednarodne koncesije v Šanghaju edini kraj na svetu, kamor so Judje lahko pribežali brez vizuma.

Administrativna ureditev Šanghaja

Francoska koncesija (*fa zujie* 法租界) je bila ustanovljena leta 1849, mednarodna koncesija (*gonggong zujie* 公共租界) pa leta 1863. Pred tem sta že obstajali Britanska in Ameriška koncesija, ki pa sta se zaradi skupnih interesov združili (Freyeisen 2000, 18). Prvotno so tuje koncesije obsegale majhen pas ob reki Huangpu, ki je segal od sotočja reke Huangpu in potoka Suzhou do starega mestnega jedra, ki se je nahajal okoli današnjih vrtov Yuyuan (豫园). Najdlje v notranjost je tuja administracija segla na ulici Nanjing (南京路). Tuji koncesiji je obdajal kitajski Šanghaj, ki je v začetku obsegal le staro mestno jedro. Vzporedno z gospodarskim vzponom Šanghaja in zaradi številnih vojn je kitajski del Šanghaja po prebivalstvu hitro prekašal tuje enklave. Po ponovni združitvi Kitajske pod nacionalistično vlado v Nanjingu (南京) se je kitajski del mesta preimenoval v Veliki Šanghaj. Župan tega dela Šanghaja je bil neposredno odgovoren kitajski vladi. V začetku so lahko tujci le najemali zemljo, ki je sicer pripadala cesarju, že po Drugi opijski vojni pa so lahko kupovali zemljo in gradili lastne hiše. (Hawks Pott 2008, 13). Francoska koncesija je leta 1862 ustanovila mestni svet, toda pravo moč je imel francoski konzul, ki je imel pravico veta na odločitve mestnega sveta. V mednarodni naselbini se je mestni svet imenoval *Shanghai Municipal Council* (SMC). Imel je odločilno politično moč v mednarodni enklavi (Hawks Pott 2008, 18). Člani sveta niso bili izvoljeni demokratično, le trije odstotki tujcev so smeli prisostvovati volitvam v SMC. Kitajci do dvajsetih let niso imeli svojih predstavnikov. SMC je bil izvoljen v Skupščini tujih davkoplačevalcev (*Meeting of Ratepayers*), ki je bila sestavljena iz lastnikov največjih podjetij ter veleposestnikov. To je praktično zagotavljalo diktat kapitala v SMC-ju. V Skupščini tujih davkoplačevalcev so od leta 1926 od štirinajstih članov sedeli tudi trije Kitajci, leta 1937 pa pet. SMC tudi ni bil popolnoma neodvisen in tuji konzuli so imeli pravico revizije odločitev (Hawks Pott 2008, 138–42).

Po Vstaji Taiping¹ je bilo zaradi množičnega priseljevanja Kitajcev v tuje naselebne ustanovljeno mešano sodišče, ki je bilo pristojno za v mednarodnih enklavah živeče Kitajce. Sodne procese so nadzorovali tuji sodniki (Hawks Pott 2008, 67). Posebne pravice, ki so jih uživali tujci v Šanghaju, so bile eksteritorialne pravice, podrejenost mednarodnemu pravu in ne kitajski jurisdikciji ter prepoved vstopa kitajske vojske na območje tujih koncesij. Trgovinske pravice, ki so si jih izborili tujci, so omogočale hitro bogatenje. Tujci so bili poleg carine in najemnin oproščeni davkov, zato so bili šanghajski tujci praviloma bogatejši kot rojaki v matičnih državah. Pristojnosti SMC-ja so obsegale davčno izterjavo, javna dela, policijo, zdravstvo, šolstvo, gasilce ter prostovoljno obrambno četo, ki je bila sestavljena iz vseh narodnosti v Šanghaju. Po Boksarski vstaji so upravljali tudi s tujo garnizijo. V mednarodnih enklavah ni bilo zagotovljenega socialnega varstva, zato so v kriznih časih ljudje pogosto umirali kar na ulicah. Slabo organizirana prostovoljna karitativna dejavnost ni zmogla skrbeti za množice beguncev, ki so v kriznih časih preplavili mednarodne enklave. Zaradi nemogočih nastanitvenih in sanitarnih razmer je mestna policija mednarodne naselebne leta 1935 naštel kar 20.000 smrtnih žrtev na šanghajskih ulicah, med njimi tudi mnogo otrok, ki so večinoma umrli zaradi mraza in podhranjenosti (Freyeisen 2000, 27).

Prva večja razširitev mednarodnih enklav se je izvedla po letu 1899, ko se je zaradi posledic Sporazuma v Shimonosekiju² število tovarn drastično povečalo. Tudi število prebivalcev je skokovito naraslo. Tuje enklave so se povečale za trikratnik. Francoska koncesija se je razširila na zahod do današnjega Xujiiahuija (徐家匯), mednarodna koncesija pa na sever in severovzhod v četrti Zhabei (閘北) in Hongkou (虹口). Nova razširitev mednarodne uprave se je zgodila leta 1910. V takšnem obsegu so mednarodne enklave obstajale vse do konca mednarodnih privilegijev leta 1943 (Freyeisen 2000, 18–21).

Emigracija Judov v Šanghaj

Za Jude v Tretjem rajhu, ki so razmišljali o emigraciji, Šanghaj nikakor ni bil prvi kraj, na katerega so pomislili. Toda po novembrskih pogromih leta 1938, ko je

¹ Uporniško gibanje sredi 19. stoletja, ki je dodobra zamajalo centralno oblast. Z veliko vojsko so osvojili ozemlja v srednjem toku Modre reke in za kratek čas celo proglasili državo Tianguo 天国. Po napadih uporniške vojske na Šanghaj se je močno povečalo število beguncev v mestu.

² S tem sporazumom je Kitajska sprejela ponižujoče zahteve: Neodvisnost Koreje, vojno odškodnino, odprtje štirih novih pristanišč ter pravico Japoncev, da na Kitajskem odpirajo tovarne. Sporazum v Shimonosekiju je zaradi klavzule o največjih ugodnostih prinesel privilegije vsem preostalim tujim velesilam, kar je tuja podjetja postavilo v superioren položaj napram kitajskemu gospodarstvu.

pravno diskriminacijo nadomestilo nasilje, je še največjim optimistom postalo jasno, da je treba zapustiti Hitlerjevo Nemčijo. Že sredi leta 1938 mednarodna skupnost ni uspela zaščititi beguncev na Konferenci v Évianu³, v najtežjih trenutkih so skoraj vse države dobesedno pred nosom zaprle vrata judovskim beguncem. Hitro se je med Judi v Tretjem rajhu razširila vest, da za prihod v Šanghaj ni treba urediti nikakršnih dokumentov. Celo osebe brez državljanstva⁴ so lahko prišle v Šanghaj. Točno število emigrantov v Šanghaju variira glede na različne vire. Pionir raziskav o šanghajskem eksilu, David Kranzler, navaja število med 17.000 in 18.000 (Kranzler 1976, 21), drugi viri ne presežejo števila 25.000. Med njimi je bilo tudi nekaj »arijskih« Nemcev, ki so bili v zakonski zvezi z Judi, ter kakih 1000 poljskih Judov. Že pred prihodom Judov iz Tretjega rajha sta v Šanghaju živeli dve judovski skupnosti.

Kulturne kategorije šanghajskih Judov pred begunci iz Tretjega rajha

Skupina Sefardov se je v Šanghaju naselila med prvimi tujimi priseljenci in je bila izjemno vplivna ter se je z leti povzpela v sam vrh šanghajske družbe. Med letom 1820 in prvo svetovno vojno so se bagdadske Sefardi, imenovani tudi Bagdadi, množično selili na Daljni vzhod. Med ciljnim državami so bile Indija, Kitajska, države na Malajskem polotoku ter Japonska. Zaradi tesne povezanosti znotraj družine so sefardski Judje v Vzhodni Aziji ustanovili prave dinastije. Tak primer je bila družina Sasoon v Šanghaju, ki je bila najvplivnejša družina na Daljnem vzhodu do leta 1949. David Sasoon je bil potomec bagdadskega trgovca. Leta 1832 se je ustalil v indijskem Bombaju. Pod britansko krono se je ukvarjal z bančništvom in trgovino. Svoje sinove je poslal na Kitajsko, ker je zaznal izjemno priložnost, ki jo je omogočilo odprtje kitajskih mest po sporazumu v Nanjingu. Tako se je njegov sin Elias David Sasoon leta 1850 ustalil v Šanghaju. Njegovo podjetje David Sasoon and Sons je imelo podružnice v vseh za trgovino odprtih kitajskih mestih ter na Japonskem in v Indiji. Zaposlovali so le ozek krog družinskih članov ter drugih bagdadskega Judov. V začetku so se kot večina drugih trgovcev ukvarjali s trgovino z opijem, kasneje pa je družina Sasoon razširila svoje

³ Konferenca v Évianu je bila sklicana kot odgovor na Hitlerjevo priključitev Avstrije. Sosednje države so preplavili judovski begunci. Konferenca ni prinesla nobenih praktičnih rešitev za problem judovskih beguncev. Ko so začele nekatere vzhodnoevropske države na čelu s Poljsko iskati države gostiteljice za lastno judovsko prebivalstvo, se je število potencialnih beguncev povzpelo s pol milijona na nekaj milijonov. Humanitarni naboj konference, kjer naj bi reševali vprašanje judovskih beguncev, se je sprevrgel v »judovsko vprašanje«, kar paradoksalno spominja na retoriko Tretjega rajha.

⁴ Poljski Judje, ki sta jim obe državi odrekli državljanstvo.

dejavnosti tudi na hotelirstvo in na nepremičninski trg. Sasoonovi so imeli v lasti nekaj najbolj prestižnih stavb na promenadi Bund (外滩). Zaradi gospodarskega vzpona Šanghaja se je v naslednjih desetletjih v Šanghaj priselilo okoli 700 Sefardov. Sasoonovi so bili pionirji, toda tudi druge sefardske družine, ki so se priselile kasneje, so dosegle zavidljivo blaginjo. Kljub temu pa ostali Sefardi razen nekaterih družin niso bili tako bogati, večinoma so bili zaposleni v večjih podjetjih bogatejših kolegov. Večina sefardskih Judov je imela britansko državljanstvo. Član družine Sasoon je vedno sedel v šanghajskem mestnem svetu (*Shanghai municipal council* ali SMC). Nekaj se jih je leta 1924 odločilo tudi za prevzem španskega državljanstva, ki ga je Španija ponudila leta 1492 iz Španije izgnanim sefardskim Judom (Kranzler 1976, 45–48).

Najvplivnejše judovske družine v Šanghaju so dosegle izjemno blagostanje in njihov prispevek k zdravstvu, šolstvu in kulturnemu življenju v Šanghaju je bil nepogrešljiv. Zgradili so več šol, leta 1934 tudi kliniko, ki je bila v času emigracije iz Tretjega rajha nepogrešljiva, ter knjižnico. Tudi za človekoljubne namene so Sefardi namenili velik del dohodkov. Zgovorni primer je sefardska družina Hardoon, ki je ustanovila več šol, med drugim tudi univerzo, kjer so poučevali tako kitajske klasike kot tudi zahodno znanost. Oktobra 1920 je Silas Hardoon prejel odlikovanje kitajske vlade, saj je zgradil internate za 500 kitajskih otrok. Poleg tega je s svojo kitajsko ženo, ki je bila budistka, posvojil 11 kitajskih sirot ter finančno podpiral še 100 drugih otrok. Milijone je družina Hardoon darovala v dobrodelne namene v času lakot v različne dele Kitajske. Druga judovska skupnost, ki je po številnosti prekašala Sefarde, pa je v Šanghaj emigrirala iz Rusije (Freyeisen 2000, 401–3).

Če so Sefardi prišli v Šanghaj zaradi gospodarskih priložnosti, pa so ruski Aškenazi bežali pred pregonom. Prvi ruski Aškenazi so v Šanghaj prispeli na prelomu stoletja. Po odprtju mandžurske železnice leta 1895 je mnogo ruskih Judov v Mandžuriji našlo bolj prijazno okolje kot v Rusiji. Večina jih je ostala v Mandžuriji, nekaj se jih je podalo tudi na jug v Tianjin (天津) in Šanghaj. Prvi ruski judovski priseljenci v Šanghaju so prihajali iz vrst vojakov, ubežnikov iz sibirskih zaporov ter političnih beguncev, zato so naleteli na neprijazen sprejem uglednih sefardskih veljakov. Ukvarjali so se s sumljivimi posli, npr. z razpečevanjem drog, trgovino z belim blagom ter odpiranjem barov v sumljivih mestnih četrtih. To je še poglobilo kulturni in socialni prepad med Bagdadi in ruskimi Aškenazi. Največji val ruskih Aškenazov pa je sledil Oktobrski revoluciji

v Rusiji. Poražena bela garda je masovno emigrirala iz Rusije. Med begunci je bilo tudi mnogo Judov. Na Kitajskem so zatočišče našli večinoma v Mandžuriji, Harbin (哈尔滨) se je s prihodom ruskih emigrantov hitro razvijal. Nekateri begunci so zatočišče iskali tudi v priobalnih kitajskih mestih, vključno s Šanghajem. Po japonski okupaciji Mandžurije v začetku tridesetih let je sledila množična selitev Rusov na jug, predvsem v mesti Shenyang 沈阳 in Dalian (大连). V tem času je tretji večji val ruskih imigrantov, vključno z Aškenazi, dosegel Šanghaj. Število ruskih Judov je v tridesetih letih doseglo 4000 ter močno preseгло Sefarde. Približno četrtna vseh Rusov v Šanghaju je bilo Judov. Do tridesetih let dvajsetega stoletja je bil Harbin središče vzhodnoazijskega judovskega življenja, po prihodu nemških emigrantov pa mu je primat prevzel Šanghaj. Ruski Aškenazi niso dosegli blagostanja sefardskih magnatov, kljub temu pa so se sčasoma uvrstili v srednji in nižji srednji razred ter večinoma delali v malih podjetjih. Toda Japonsko-kitajska vojna je tudi na šanghajske Ruse slabo vplivala, mnogi so se morali spopadati z revščino. Z naraščanjem števila ruskih Aškenazov je tudi ta skupina organizirala svoje šole in sinagoge.

Potek emigracije Judov iz Tretjega rajha do leta 1938

Po Novembrskih pogromih so šanghajske medije preplavile novice o grozodejstvih v Tretjem rajhu. Z zaskrbljenostjo so se spraševali, kakšne posledice bo prineslo zaostrovanje razmer v Nemčiji položaju v Šanghaju. Naraščajoče število Judov v Šanghaju, prisotnost stranke NSDAP ter politično zavezništvo Berlin-Tokio so prebivalce navdajali s strahom. Prve emigrante so prebivalci pristrčno pozdravili in jim pripravili topel sprejem. Ko pa se je njihov pritok nenadzorovano širil, so tudi mednarodne koncesije omejile priseljevanje. (Freyeisen 2000, 390).

Emigracija judovskih Nemcev v Šanghaj je potekala po dveh poteh. V prvi fazi do 10. junija 1940 pretežno po morskih poteh, v drugi fazi od 11. junija 1940 do 7. decembra 1941 pa prek transsibirske železnice. Begunci so večinoma potovali z italijanskimi čezoceanskimi. Pred začetkom vojne je bila možna tudi pot z nemškimi čezoceanskimi linijami. V prvem polletju leta 1939 so bile vse vozovnice za Šanghaj razprodane 6 mesecev vnaprej. Nekatere ladijske družbe so beguncem zaračunavale tudi do desetkrat višje cene za vozovnico kot običajno, saj so vedele, v kakšni stiski so. Ker so bile za judovske emigrante na voljo le vozovnice v prvem razredu, je nemška judovska organizacija *Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden* pogosto doplačala razliko do cene za prvi razred. Morska pot je običajno vodila iz italijanskih pristanišč v Trstu, Genovi, Benetkah ali v Neaplju

prek Egipta, Bombaja ter Hong Konga v Šanghaj. V Egiptu je emigrante na krovu pozdravila judovska organizacija, ki jim je razdelila poletna oblačila ter druge potrebščine. Potniki na nemških ladjah so namesto plovbe skozi Sueški prekop potovali okrog Rta dobrega upanja. Begunci so večtedensko pot opisali kot pozitivno izkušnjo, saj so si lahko končno oddahnili in pozabili na vsakodnevni teror v domovini (Kranzler 1976, 86–88).

Junij 1940 je prinesel za nekaj tisoč Judov bridko razočaranje, saj so bile njihove vozovnice in tranzitni italijanski vizumi razveljavljeni. Italija je z vstopom v vojno na strani sil osi zaprla Sredozemsko morje, zato je bila edina možna pot na Daljni vzhod po kopnem. Zaradi obstoječega pakta o nenapadanju med Hitlerjem in Stalinom je bila zadnja rešilna bilka beg prek Sovjetske zveze. S transsibirsko železnico so nekateri prek Vladivostoka dospeli v japonski Kobe, tisti brez vizuma so pot nadaljevali prek Harbina do Daliana, od koder so se vkrcali na ladjo za Šanghaj. Junija 1941 se je z napadom Nemčije na Sovjetsko zvezo zaprla tudi ta pot. Kljub temu pa je zadnjim beguncem uspelo doseči Šanghaj do decembra leta 1941 (Kranzler 1976, 89).

Iz znanih razlogov se je le nekaj sto Judov leta 1933 odločilo za emigracijo v Šanghaj. Prvih 300 beguncev je bilo v veliki prednosti pred kasnejšimi emigranti, saj takrat še ni potekal proces arizacije⁵. Tudi državljske pravice so jim bile zagotovljene. Prišleki so si v Šanghaju hitro našli zaposlitev in brez večjih pretresov preživeli vojno. Prvi begunci so bili večinoma dobro izobraženi akademiki, zdravniki, odvetniki ter inženirji. Judovski zdravniki so po številu prekašali svoje »arijske« predhodnike, zato so ti rohnili, češ da ne bodo dovolili »pojudenja« kitajskega zdravstva. Le dve družini nemških Judov sta do leta 1936 potrebovali socialno pomoč. Po letu 1935, ko so v veljavo stopili Nürnberški zakoni, je sledil novi val beguncev v Šanghaj. Drugi val beguncev je bil nekoliko večji kot prvi, saj je dosegel število 1000. V tem času tudi mediji in različne judovske organizacije Šanghaja še niso promovirale kot možnega kraja za emigracijo. Za emigracijo v Šanghaj so se odločali predvsem tisti, ki se niso želeli ukvarjati z neskončno birokracijo, ki je bila potrebna za večino drugih ciljnih držav. Pogosto so v Šanghaj prispeli tudi odpuščeni izobraženci, ki niso imeli sorodnikov v tujini. Leta 1936 so se judovske publikacije v Tretjem rajhu začele zanimati za Šanghaj kot možni cilj emigracije. Največji judovski časopis v Nemčiji pa je šele leta 1938 informiral judovsko prebivalstvo o tej možnosti.

⁵ Proces razlastitve in prenosa premoženja Judov na nemške lastnike.

Zaradi posledic slabe informiranosti kot tudi zaradi osebnih preferenc je do Novembrskih pogromov v Šanghaj prispelo le okrog 1500 beguncev iz Tretjega rajha (Freyeisen 2000, 391–95).

Položaj po letu 1938

Velika večina judovskih emigrantov je v Šanghaj prispela po Novembrskih pogromih. V primerjavi s preostalimi ciljnim državam je šanghajska emigracija potekala pozno in ni enakomerno razporejena po letih. Za šanghajsko emigracijo je zato značilna izkušnja terorja v Tretjem rajhu. Velik del emigrantov je po novembrskih pogromih doživel internacijo v koncentracijskih taboriščih ali v uradih gestapa. Interniranci v taboriščih Dachau in Buchenwald so bili praviloma izpuščeni že jeseni istega leta, če so jim bližnji kupili vozovnico ali če jim je uspelo dobiti vizum za emigracijo. Druga značilnost šanghajskega eksila je bila, da emigranti Šanghaja niso dojemali kot kraj stalne naselitve. Okrog 90 % emigrantov je izjavilo, da ne nameravajo ostati v Šanghaju. Največ emigrantov je v Šanghaj prispelo konec leta 1938 in v letu 1939. Samo do junija 1939 se jih je izkrcalo okrog 15.000. Poleg tega so bili ti emigranti popolnoma obubožani. Prisilna arizacija judovskega premoženja je bila v tem času v polnem teku. Za nakup vozovnice za aretiranega družinskega člana so bližnji pogosto porabili zadnje prihranke. Revnejši sloji si niti vozovnice v tujino niso mogli privoščiti. Tisti, ki so imeli sorodnike v tujini, so lahko po postanku v Italiji prejeli nakazilo in si tako olajšali življenje v eksilu. Po zakonu so lahko emigranti na pot vzeli le borih 10 oz. 20 mark, zato so nekateri v kovčkih skrivali denar ali vrednejše predmete. Hitlerjeva politika prisilne emigracije je v upanju, da bo s tem antisemitizem izvozila v tujino, namenoma oropala Jude vsega premoženja (Freyeisen 2000, 390–401).

7000 šanghajskih emigrantov je prihajalo iz Nemčije in 4000 Avstrije. Nekaj sto jih je bilo iz Italije in Češkoslovaške. Kakih 1500 pa jih je imelo druga državljanstva ali pa so bili brez državljanstva. Okrog 1200 poljskih Judov, ki so pribežali v Šanghaj, se ima za preživetje zahvaliti japonskemu in nizozemskemu konzulu v litovskem mestu Kovno (današnji Kaunas). V prvi polovici leta 1941 je nizozemski konzul Jan Zwartendijk Judom, ki so iz Poljske množično pribežali v Litvo, izdajal vizume za nizozemski karibski otok Curaçao. To je storil na lastno pest, saj je vedel, da je sprejem Judov odvisen od odločitve guvernerja otoka, ki je načeloma zavračal možnost sprejema beguncev. Zwartendijk je izdal okoli 1500 vizumov za otok Curaçao, japonski veleposlanik Chiuné Sugihara pa je za te

vizume izdal tranzitno japonsko vizo. Tudi posameznikom brez nizozemskega vizuma je izdajal tranzitne vize za Japonsko. S temi vizumi so lahko begunci potovali skozi Sovjetsko zvezo. Sugihara in Zwartendijk sta, kot kaže, delovala iz humanitarnih vzgibov. Sugiharo so zaradi nemškega protesta kmalu odpustili, po nekaterih navedbah naj bi tudi na dan odhoda z veleposlaništva izdajal tranzitne vize. V Kobeju na Japonskem so več kot 2000 beguncev v začetku lepo sprejeli, toda po zaostrovanju odnosov z ZDA in zaradi protesta nacistične Nemčije pri japonskih zaveznikih Judom jeseni 1941 niso več podaljšali veljavnosti vizuma. Kakih 1500 Judov je uspelo emigrirati v druge države, preostale Jude pa so Japonci deportirali v Šanghaj (Freyeisen 2000, 399).

Razmere v šanghajskem eksilu

V Šanghaju so bile zaradi številnih razlogov razmere za begunce veliko težje kot v ostalih večjih begunskih središčih v Evropi in v ZDA. Imigrante so pestile številne bolezni, poleg tega je razmere zaostrovala dolgotrajna Kitajsko-japonska vojna. Večina beguncev po letu 1938 je bila skoraj brez sredstev in zato so bili popolnoma odvisni od humanitarnih organizacij. Več kot polovica jih je bila nastanjena v begunskih centrih⁶, ki pa so bili prenatrpani in v katerih so vladale katastrofalne higienske razmere. Kljub tem težkim življenjskim razmeram pa se je v šanghajskem eksilu razvilo živahno kulturno življenje, ki je vnašalo optimizem ne le v življenje beguncev, temveč tudi vseh drugih prebivalcev Šanghaja.

Omejitve priseljevanja

Pri omejevanju priseljevanja v Šanghaj so imele prste vmes tako svetovne velesile kot tudi mednarodne judovske organizacije. Hud pritisk na begunce so izvajali tudi šanghajski tujci. Predvsem nižji sloji ruskih emigrantov so se počutili ogrožene, saj jim je množičnost beguncev pomenila hudo konkurenco. Tleči antisemitizem med tujimi prebivalci Šanghaja je tudi pripomogel k omejevanju priseljevanja. Tudi šanghajski nacisti so skušali prek antisemitske propagande med kitajskim in japonskim prebivalstvom razširiti antisemitizem. Toda to ni bistveno vplivalo na odnose med Kitajci in begunci. Drugi pomembni razlog za slab odnos tujcev do beguncev je bila izguba družbenega prestiža belcev. Belci so bili navajeni vladati, zato bi morebitno fizično delo beguncev pomenilo izgubo te družbene vloge (Kranzler 1976, 151–53).

⁶ Teh begunskih centrov se je prijelo nemško ime *Heim*.

Japonska je bila nesporno najbolj vplivna velesila v Šanghaju. Brez njene privolitve ni bil izveden noben ukrep. Zato tudi omejitve priseljevanja niso stopile v veljavo, dokler jih ni blagoslovila Japonska. Pritok beguncev se je zaradi nevtralne države Japonske do Judov nadaljeval kljub pritisku mednarodne skupnosti. Povod za uvedbo restrikcij avgusta 1939 ni prišel od zunaj, temveč se je porodil znotraj japonske skupnosti v Šanghaju. Višanje cen najemnin v japonski četrti Hongkou, povečanje konkurence ter pomanjkanje stanovanj je vznemirilo japonske prebivalce četrti Hongkou. V letu 1939 se je zgodil preobrat japonskega obravnavanja Judov, saj je več japonskih časopisov objavilo protijudovske članke. Japonci so dolgo odlašali z uvedbo restrikcij zaradi bojazni pred kritiko v ZDA in Veliki Britaniji. Ko jim je sam Sir Victor Sassoon zagotovil, da podpira omejitve priseljevanja in da to ne bo vplivalo na javno podobo Japoncev v ZDA, so le izvedli prve restrikcije. 9. avgusta 1939 so v veljavo stopile prve omejitve. S tem se je končala doba brezvizumskega režima Šanghaja, ki je kot zadnji priprl vrata judovskim beguncem. Tisti begunci, ki so že bili na poti, so lahko prišli v Šanghaj brez omejitev, kasnejši begunci pa so morali izpolniti enega izmed naslednjih štirih pogojev: posedovanje 400 ameriških dolarjev kot garancijo, ozka sorodstvena vez s prebivalcem Šanghaja, pogodba o zaposlitvi v Šanghaju ali poroka s prebivalcem Šanghaja. V japonski četrti so se tega dogovora držali bolj striktno kot v Mednarodni naselbini. Ker večina imigrantov ni imela dovolj denarja, so nakazila običajno opravili sorodniki v ZDA ali pa humanitarne organizacije, ki pa so od imigrantov zahtevale, da po prihodu vrnejo 300 dolarjev za kasnejše begunce. Na pritisk Japoncev je SMC 1. julija 1940 zaostрил pogoje. Poleg že obstoječih pogojev so morali imigranti izpolniti posebno prijavnico in šele s potrditvijo izpolnjevanja pogojev s strani mestne policije ter z nakazilom 400 dolarjev eni izmed šanghajskih bank so se lahko vkrcali na ladjo za Šanghaj. Po teh restrikcijah je le redkim uspelo po morju priti v Šanghaj, saj je Italija dober teden kasneje vstopila v vojno. S tem so bile dovolilnice za vstop v Šanghaj 2000 nemških Judov neveljavne. Le še nekaj sto beguncem je pod zaostrenimi pogoji uspelo iz Nemčije prek Sibirije priti v Šanghaj. Zadnji imigranti so bili poljski Judje leta 1941, ki jim je japonski konzul Sugihara rešil življenje (Kranzler 1976, 267–76).

Zaostritev razmer po japonski okupaciji mednarodnih enklav

8. decembra 1941 je Japonska le nekaj ur po napadu na Pearl Harbor napadla britansko vojaško ladjo blizu Šanghaja. Zatem je sledila bliskovita zasedba

celotnega Šanghaja. Tujci se niso upirali očitno premočnemu nasprotniku. Kljub zagotovilom, da se življenje v Šanghaju ne bo spremenilo, pa je okupacija Šanghaja močno prizadela vse Šanghajčane. Vsi tujci, ki so bili državljani Japonski sovražnih držav, so si morali nadeti trakove z napisom »Enemy National«. Nadzor nad vsemi tujimi podjetji so prevzeli Japonci. Bančni računi tujcev so bili zamrznjeni, dovoljeni so bili le minimalni dvigi za preživetje. Uvedena je bila stroga cenzura medijev. Čez nekaj dni so se morali vsi britanski in ameriški državljani registrirati pri japonskih oblasteh. Paradoksalno so imeli begunci brez državljanstva boljši status kot državni sovražniki. Toda to je veljalo le na papirju, revščina se je med njimi drastično povečala, saj so mnogi begunci izgubili službe v tujih podjetjih. Tuji poslovneži so bili prezaaposleni z reševanjem svojih podjetij, da bi skrbeli za begunce, poleg tega pa jim z zamrznjenimi računi niso mogli pomagati (Kranzler 1976, 453–55). Najpomembnejši razlog za humanitarno katastrofo pa je pomenila prekinitve stikov z ZDA. Začetek pacifiške vojne je presekala humanitarno pomoč ameriških organizacij, izvozno naravnana Šanghajska podjetja pa so izgubila pomembne trge in v naslednjih letih morala trgovati le znotraj ozemlja pod japonsko okupacijo. Že v prvi fazi japonske okupacije leta 1937 je Šanghaj izgubil pomemben stik s kitajskim zaledjem, po letu 1941 pa so se razmere močno poslabšale. Inflacija je skokovito naraščala, potem ko se je zaupanje v valuto marionetne vlade v Nanjingu zmanjševalo. Razmerje med ameriškim in kitajskim dolarjem se je med letoma 1939 in 1942 desetkrat povečalo v prid ameriškega dolarja. Do konca vojne je inflacija dosegla vrtooglave vrednosti. Tudi tisti, ki so imeli službe, s plačo niso mogli preživeti niti sebe (Kranzler 1976, 455–58).

Za judovske begunce je vojna med Japonsko in zavezniki poleg prekinitve dotoka pomoči šanghajskih Sefardov in ameriških humanitarnih organizacij pomenila tudi spremenjen odnos Japoncev do nemških beguncev. Judovski imigranti so bili za Japonsko koristni le pri ohranjanju dobrega odnosa z ZDA. Ker pa po vstopu ZDA v vojno ni bilo več razloga za previdno ravnanje z judovskimi begunci, je Japonska spremenila politiko do emigrantov v Šanghaju. Odslej je vsakršno humanitarno pomoč morala odobriti pisarna za judovske zadeve, ki je bila v japonskih rokah. Kljub velikemu izpadu finančne pomoči so se številni begunci naučili sami poskrbeti zase. Nekaj hrane so sami pridelali na vrtovih okoli *heimov*. Socialni delavci so na vseh koncih poskušali pridobiti sredstva. Ker je ameriški politični vrh zavračal komunikacijo s sovražnikom, socialni delavci ameriških humanitarnih organizacij niso mogli prejemati denarja od matične

organizacije. Kljub temu jim je uspelo ilegalno dobiti posojilo v švicarskih frankih. Med donatorji so bili tudi premožnejši šanghajski Kitajci in ruski Aškenazi. Organizacija HICEM⁷ s sedežem v Londonu je skrbela za komunikacijo s svojci v Evropi ter nakazovala majhne donacije najbolj potrebnim (Kranzler 1976, 464–68).

Kultura v šanghajskem eksilu

Prihod beguncev je ponovno oživil kulturno dogajanje v Šanghaju, ki je po japonski okupaciji začelo pešati. Revno in v letih 1932 in 1937 deloma porušeno četrto Hongkou so begunci preoblikovali v »mali Dunaj«, saj so odpirali številne kavarne, restavracije in slaščičarne. Med begunci je bilo veliko kulturnikov, ki so s pevskimi in igralskimi večeri skrbeli za svetle trenutke v sivem vsakdanu vojne. Izhajale so številne publikacije beguncev, med katerimi je izstopal kulturni list *Gelbe Post*, ki se je trudil zgraditi most med evropsko in kitajsko kulturo. Najbolj živahno kulturno dogajanje pa se je odvijalo na šanghajskih odrih. Prednjačili so kabareti, operete in komedije, dve resnejši drami *Fremde Erde* in *Die Masken fallen* pa lahko uvrstimo med vrhunce šanghajskega eksila. Tematizirali sta realne izkušnje terorja v Tretjem rajhu in težke razmere v mednarodno obarvanem Šanghaju. Ker pa sta bili vezani na specifično zgodovinsko situacijo v Šanghaju, sta močan vtis pustili le v času šanghajskega eksila. Podobno lahko trdimo tudi za celotno prepoznavnost šanghajskega eksila znotraj širšega zgodovinskega konteksta. Šanghaj je v vojnih razmerah skoraj 20.000 judovskim beguncem ponudil zatočišče, kar ga uvršča med večje emigracijske centre med Drugo svetovno vojno.

Šanghajski geto

Mnogi judovski begunci so imeli dokaj dobro mnenje o Japoncih. Predvsem poljski Judje so imeli dobre izkušnje z Japonsko zaradi Sugihare in toplega sprejema v Kobeju. Zdelo se je, da so Hitlerjevi azijski zavezniki odporni na njegov uničevalni antisemitizem. Toda begunci po vstopu ZDA v vojno niso bili več vzvod za pozitivno podobo Japonske v ZDA in nacistična Nemčija je vedno bolj pritiskala na Japonsko glede »judovskega vprašanja«. Po decembru 1941 se je sicer povečal nadzor Japoncev nad begunci in ulice so bile polne japonskih vojakov. Toda isto je veljalo za vse ostale tujce razen japonskih zaveznikov. Prvi

⁷ Judovska človekoljubna organizacija, ki se je osredotočala na pomoč pri emigraciji evropskih Judov. Nastala je po združitvi treh organizacij leta 1927, in sicer je akronim treh organizacij: ICA, HIAS ter Emigdirect.

očitni kazalnik spremenjene japonske politike je bila serija antisemitskih člankov poleti 1942. Če so bili nemški poskusi, da bi vplivali na japonsko politiko do Judov, do Pearl Harborja neuspešni, pa so po vstopu ZDA v vojno padli na plodna tla. Nemško veleposlaništvo v Tokiu je izdajalo antisemitske publikacije v japonščini, razširila so se antisemitska predavanja. Šanghaj so preplavili antisemitski članki, celo predsednik japonske marionetne vlade v Nanjingu Wang Jingwei (汪精卫) se je podpisal pod antisemitski članek o judovskem izčrpanju Kitajske in Japonske. V japonskih šolah se je začela antisemitska indoktrinacija, judovske publikacije v Harbinu so bile ukinjene. Po vojni je leta 1951 nemški konzul v Tianjinu (天津) Fritz Wiedemann pričal (Diekmann 2012)⁸, da Japonci niso gojili antisemitskih čustev in da je zaostritev japonske politike do Judov povzročil pritisk nacistične zaveznice. Šlo naj bi za stalno Hitlerjevo prakso izvajanja rednega pritiska na zaveznice ter svetovanje pri političnih odločitvah (Kranzler 1976, 477–88). V tem kontekstu je mogoče razumeti tudi pritisk nemškega veleposlanika Josefa Meisingerja iz Tokia, ki je 1942 obiskal Šanghaj ter zahteval »dokončno rešitev judovskega vprašanja«. Toda Japonci iz različnih razlogov niso v celoti upoštevali njegovega nasveta, saj kljub vojni z ZDA niso želeli dodatno vznemirjati Američanov (Zhang in Wang 2011, 27). Josef Meisinger, ki je bil pred tem vodja varšavskega gestapa, kjer se ga je prijelo ime Varšavski klavec, je kmalu po nastopu funkcije veleposlanika na Japonskem pozornost usmeril na Šanghaj. Neslavnemu imenu, ki se ga je prijelo na Poljskem, se tudi na Daljnem vzhodu ni izneveril. Njegova žena je po vojni pričala, da je julija 1942 s podmornico prispel v Šanghaj. Tam se je srečal z japonskimi diplomati, s policijo ter z vodjo pisarne za judovske zadeve. Po navedbah japonskega vicekonzula naj bi predlagal naslednje:

Zavoljo našega zavezništva menimo, da bi se morali znebiti celotne judovske nadloge v Šanghaju. Ni se vam treba ukvarjati z izvedbo, mi bomo uredili vse podrobnosti. Vi boste le poželi uspehe našega dela. Seveda boste podedovali vso judovsko lastnino in od njih prevzeli nadzor. (Freyeisen 2000, 470).

Zatem je Meisinger Japoncem razkril svoje načrte. Čez dva meseca, ko Judje praznujejo praznik roš hašana, bi obkolili sinagoge. Na tej točki je Meisinger predlagal več možnosti. Jude bi lahko vkrcali na ladje in jih poslali na odprto morje, lahko bi jih zaprli v zapuščene rudnike soli, kjer bi umrli od lakote. Najbolj

⁸ Kot so pokazale najnovejše raziskave, je Wiedemann pred prihodom na Kitajsko sodeloval z Angleži in ga lahko štejemo kot enega zgodnejših pripadnikov vojaškega odpora proti nacizmu.

zloglasen načrt pa je bila gradnja koncentracijskega taborišča po nemškem zgledu na otoku Chongming (崇明島) v estuariju Dolge reke severno od Šanghaja. Japoncem je predlagal izvajanje medicinskih poskusov in predložil natančne načrte koncentracijskega taborišča. Prisotni japonski slušatelji so predlog sprejeli različno. Japonski vicekonzul je kmalu zatem sklical krizni sestanek vodilnih judovskih organizacij in jih obvestil o morilskih načrtih nacistov, ker se je bal, da bi preostali prisotni resnično začeli izvajati ta načrt. Judovske organizacije pa so izrabile zgledne odnose z nekaterimi vodilnimi predstavniki japonskih oblasti ter preprečile najhujše. Ni jasno, ali je Meisinger za te načrte prejel neposreden ukaz iz Berlina. Po mnenju Astrid Freyeisen je bila njegova naloga nadzor nad judovskimi begunci v Šanghaju, vsi morilski načrti pa naj bi služili njegovim ambicijam. Bil je namreč vpleten v številne afere, zato je bil pripravljen za izboljšanje svoje podobe v Berlinu storiti marsikaj. Ustanovitev šanghajskega geta je bila zanj velik uspeh, zato je bil nekaj dni pred razglasom povišan v polkovnika policije. Očitno so v Berlinu za ta japonski ukrep zasluge pripisali Meisingerju (Freyeisen 2000, 470–75).

Razglasitev šanghajskega geta

Čeprav nacisti verjetno niso sodelovali pri razglasitvi šanghajskega geta in pri konkretnih operativnih vprašanjih, pa je njihov vpliv na spremembo japonske politike več kot očitno. 18. februarja 1943 so bile govorice o getu, ki so krožile med begunci, dokončno potrjene. Prek radia in prvih strani časopisov so Japonci razglasili šanghajski geto. V t. i. »označeno območje« so se morali vsi begunci brez državljanstva preseliti do 18. maja 1943. Za prodajo, najem ali nakup stanovanj, podjetij ali drugih ustanov zunaj označenega območja so begunci morali zaprositi za dovoljenje japonskih oblasti. Ostalim ljudem se ni bilo dovoljeno preseliti v označeno območje brez dovoljenja japonskih oblasti. Za kršitelje so bile zagrožene stroge kazni. Japonci so se v razglasu namenoma izognili besedama »geto« in »Judje« ter ti dve besedi nadomestili z »označeno območje« in »begunci brez državljanstva«. Ta evfemizma je bilo treba uporabljati tudi v zasebnih pogovorih, saj je bila omemba geta kazniva. Japonci so podrobneje pojasnili, koga mislijo z evfemizmom »begunci brez državljanstva«. To so bili begunci po letu 1937 iz Nemčije, Avstrije, Češkoslovaške, Madžarske, (nekdanje) Poljske, Latvije, Litve ter Estonije, ki so v tem času izgubili državljanstvo. Jeseni leta 1941 je dopolnilo k zakonu o državljanstvu v Tretjem rajhu vsem Judom na begu odvzelo državljanstvo. Zaradi časovne definicije emigracije je več kot očitno,

da gre za begunce iz Tretjega rajha. Ruskih Aškenazov ta razglas ni prizadel, saj so v Šanghaj emigrirali bistveno prej. Zdi se, da so se Japonci tudi po vstopu ZDA v vojno bali vznemiriti ameriško vlado, zato so se izogibali izrazom Judje in geto. Verjetno so se bali povračilnih ukrepov nad interniranimi Japonci v ZDA, zato so krmarili po srednji poti med voljo nemških zaveznikov in ZDA. Nekateri begunci, ki so imeli najeta stanovanja zunaj geta, so se morali preseliti v japonsko četrt Hongkou, kjer so bile razmere veliko slabše. Zaradi kompleksnega postopka pridobivanja dovolilnic za izhod iz geta so nekateri izgubili službe. Japonska vojaška vlada je želela, da bi okrog 100.000 kitajskih prebivalcev geta zapustilo to območje. Toda Kitajci so japonskim oblastem prekrizali načrte, saj se niso hoteli preseliti. Ko so Japonci poskušali uporabiti silo, so se Kitajci pognali na ulice in dosegli svoje. Judje so se z množico Kitajcev v getu počutili varneje. Sami bi bili preveč izpostavljeni in so se zato pridružili kitajskim protestom proti japonskim načrtom izselitve Kitajcev (Kranzler 1976, 489–92).

Območje, ki so ga Japonci določili za »označeno območje«, je bilo že pred tem gosto naseljeno. Na površini, manjši od ene kvadratne milje, je živelo okrog 120.000 ljudi. Geto se je nahajal v osrčju japonske četrti Hongkou, na severu se je končal z mejo Mednarodne naselbine, na jugu pa ni dosegel reke Huangpu. V dolžino je meril le dobre tri kilometre. Že po japonski zasedbi celotnega Šanghaja je bil vstop v mednarodno naselbino za nemške Jude oteženi in potrebovali so t. i. dovolilnice za most.⁹ Med begunci je bilo veliko mešanih judovsko-nemških parov, nekateri med njimi so zvito pretentali nacistično spodbujanje ločitev »arijcev« od Judov. »Arijci« so namreč dobili finančno pomoč nemške ambasade, če so se ločili od svojih judovskih partnerjev. Okrog 150 parov se je ločilo le z namenom, da črpajo denar za svoje družine v getu (Kranzler 1976, 492–96).

Upori v getu

Če so določeni begunci do leta 1943 gojili občutke hvaležnosti do Japoncev, saj so jim ti dovolili imigracijo, pa se je po ustanovitvi geta med begunci razvil odpor do japonskih okupatorjev. Nekaj beguncev je sodelovalo v tajni podzemni združbi *Gemeinschaft der Demokratischen Deutschen in Shanghai*, ki je bila ustanovljena po začetku Vojne na Tihem oceanu. Vodstvo so prevzeli zgodnji begunci pred letom 1935, ki so obdržali državljske pravice. Dr. Paulik je bil nejudovski

⁹ Meja med četrtjo Hongkou in Mednarodno naselbino je bila na potoku Suzhou, mostove pa so stražili japonski vojaki, prečkanje mostu je bila edina možna pot v Mednarodno naselbino, od tod ime dovolilnice za most.

politični begunec, ki je imel stike znotraj nemških diplomatskih¹⁰ ter celo vojaških krogov. Begunski člani te organizacije so se na dogovorjenih mestih srečevali z nejudovskimi sočlani. Ti so jih med drugim obvestili, da Japonci nameravajo zaseči vse radijske sprejemnike v getu, zato so jih mnogi begunci lahko pravočasno skrili. Radijski sprejemniki so bili glavni vir informacij za begunce. Zelo pomembna informacija, do katere se je dokopal antinacistični oficir nemške pomorske obveščevalne službe je bila obstoj vohunov znotraj geta, ki jih je gestapo poslal v Šanghaj že v času množičnega priseljevanja. Begunci so tudi sodelovali pri reševanju ameriških pilotov iz japonskega zapora, ki so jih pomagali spraviti do kitajskega zaledja. Nekateri begunci so sodelovali s kitajskim odporniškim gibanjem, ki se je predvsem osredotočalo na sabotžo japonskih tovarn in drugih objektov. Ruski Judje so sodelovali z Američani pri uničevanju japonskih zalog goriva ter pri usmerjanju ameriških letal na japonske tarče (Kranzler 1976, 530–35).

Poslabšanje življenjskih razmer v getu

Heterogena skupnost beguncev se je z getoizacijo poenotila v boju proti silam osi. Ko so po radiu slišali za poraz nemške vojske v Stalingradu, jih je to navdalo z upanjem, saj je bil čas na njihovi strani. Toda začetek leta 1944 je pomenil najtežje obdobje eksila. Lakota se je zaostila, saj je ameriški organizacija za pomoč judovskim beguncem vedno težje zbirala denar. V tem času so begunci prodali celo svoje edine srajce za pest riža. Begunski otroci so skupaj z revnimi kitajskimi vrstniki tekmovali za ostanke gnilega sadja na tržnici. Revščina je dosegla celo tako skrajnost, da je 20 mater svoje novorojence prodalo za preživetje družine. Predvsem pozimi so bile razmere neznosne, saj so mnogi begunci prodali svoje obleke. 102 prebivalca *heimov* sta zaradi podhranjenosti umrla decembra leta 1943. V začetku leta 1944 je organizacija *Kitchen Fund*, od katere je bilo odvisnih od 5000 do 6000 beguncev, zmanjšala dobavo hrane na en obrok na dan, kar je begunce pahnilo na rob podhranjenosti. Otroci ter bolni in ostareli so zvečer prejeli še en obrok. Kasneje so se razmere nekoliko izboljšale zaradi reorganizacije humanitarnih organizacij in zaradi prvih osvoboditev koncentracijskih taborišč, ki so povečale donacije humanitarnim organizacijam. Hud udarec za begunce pa se je zgodil 17. julija 1945, ko so ameriške zračne sile bombardirale Šanghaj. Že od januarja 1945 so ameriški bombniki preletavali in občasno bombardirali kitajsko

¹⁰ Najvidnejši diplomat, ki je bil član te organizacije je bil že omenjeni konzul v Tianjinu Fritz Wiedemann, ki je imel stike v najvišjih krogih nacistične oblasti.

obalo. Na območju med Šanghajem in Nanjingom so bile njihove tarče razni vojaški objekti, skladišča, zaloge goriva, vojaške tovarne ter objekti za vojaško komunikacijo. Čeprav so imeli ameriški piloti ukaze, da ne smejo bombardirati civilnih območij, pa so občasno bombe zadele tudi civilne stavbe. Japonci so še vedno verjeli v teorijo, da za Judi stojijo ZDA in so zato strelivo shranili v getu Hongkou, saj so bili prepričani, da Američani ne bodo tvegali napada na geto. 17. julija pa so Američani izvedli najobsežnejše bombardiranje Šanghaja. Cilj ZDA je bila japonska radijska postaja, ki je koordinirala vojaško ladjevje. Radijska postaja se je nahajala v japonski četrti Hongkou. Dotrajane in slabo utrjene stavbe najrevnejše šanghajske četrti so se hitro vdale ameriškim bombam. Umrlo je 250 prebivalcev geta, med njimi 31 judovskih beguncev. Več kot polovica od 500 ranjenih je bilo beguncev, okrog 700 jih je ostalo brez strehe nad glavo (Kranzler 1976, 543–64). Časopis Shenbao, ki je bil v tem času že v japonskih rokah, je poročal, da je dvakrat v enem dnevu več kot 60 letal napadlo Šanghaj (*Shenbao* 1945).

Konec vojne in ponovna emigracija

Govorice o koncu vojne so se poleti 1945 okrepile, saj je ameriško letalstvo pogosteje preletavalo Šanghaj. Prek radijev, ki so jih begunci skrivali v getu, so izvedeli za odvrženi atomski bombi ter za vojno napoved Sovjetske zveze Japonski. Zatem so do konca avgusta vladale paradoksalne razmere. Nekajkrat so se begunci že veselili konca vojne, pa so jim japonske oblasti prekrizale načrte in niso dovolile prostega gibanja. Četudi je Japonska že prekinila z boji, pa je bil šanghajski geto osvobojen šele konec avgusta in 3. septembra so bile odstranjene zadnje postojanke, kar označuje tudi uradni konec geta. Po poročilu ameriških vojakov šanghajskega eksila ni preživelo 1726 beguncev, se je pa v tem času rodilo skoraj 300 otrok (Kranzler 1976, 566).

Poročilo komiteja za Daljni vzhod je maja 1946 naštel še 16.000 beguncev v Šanghaju, 7380 nemških in 4298 avstrijskih. V začetku so bile možnosti emigracije v druge države majhne. ZDA so se striktno držale sistema kvot. Nekaj 1000 beguncev se je vrnilo v domovino, predvsem Avstrijcev. Nekaj 100 beguncev se je vrnilo v Berlin. Do oktobra leta 1946 je med 5000 in 6000 beguncev zaprosilo za ameriški vizum, od teh jih je le 600 prejelo odobritev. ZDA so bile na vrhu želja emigrantov zaradi prisotnosti svoje vojske v Šanghaju, ki je za begunce lepo skrbela. Nekaj jih je emigriralo v Avstralijo in v Latinsko Ameriko. Največ emigrantov pa je sprejela novoustanovljena država Izrael. Maja

1948 ustanovljena judovska država je bila cilj predvsem religioznih beguncev. Konec leta 1948 in v začetku leta 1949 se je začela emigracija v Izrael. Sprva so se tja priselili predvsem ruski Aškenazi ter Bagdadi, pridružilo se jim je tudi nekaj beguncev iz Nemčije in Avstrije. Po ustanovitvi Ljudske Republike Kitajske je v Šanghaju živelo še okrog 10.000 Judov. Po dogovoru med Izraelom in kitajsko vlado se jih je večina kmalu preselila v Izrael, leta 1957 jih je v Šanghaju ostalo le še kakih 100 (Buxbaum 2008, 179–82).

Zaključek

Pričujoči članek je poskušal osvetliti manj znani del judovske emigracije iz Tretjega rajha. Kalvarija judovskih beguncev pred nacizmom se je začela leta 1933, ko je Hitler izigral demokracijo in brezobzirno prevzel oblast. Postopno je nacistične sovražnike številka ena izločeval iz družbe. Z zlorabo zakonodaje je Jude oropal vseh pravic. Vajeni diskriminacije in antisemitizma niso slutili, kam vodi Hitlerjeva politika in iz različnih razlogov odlašali z emigracijo. Šele leta 1938 so uvideli, da jim nacistični režim zavezuje vrv okoli vratu. Po kristalni noči¹¹ so bile mednarodne koncesije v Šanghaju edini košček zemlje, ki jih je bil pripravljen sprejeti. Konglomerat različnih narodov v Šanghaju je lahko v miru sobival le z načelno nevtralnostjo, zaradi tega je bil Šanghaj do beguncev gostoljuben. Toda begunci, oropani vsega premoženja, so bili popolnoma odvisni od tuje pomoči. Tudi Šanghaj je tako kot celotna Kitajska preživel hude čase. Povrh vsega je Jude v Šanghaju ogrožal tudi režim v Berlinu, katerega lovke so segale do Šanghaja. Pritisk stranke NSDAP na japonske zaveznike je povzročil izgradnjo šanghajskega geta, le strahospoštovanje Japoncev do ZDA je morda preprečilo pomor judovskih beguncev v Šanghaju. Življenje emigrantov v getu je bilo najtežje obdobje šanghajskega eksila, bili so potisnjeni na rob preživetja, mnogim ni uspelo preživeti tega obdobja. Toda kljub trpljenju, strahu, pomanjkanju in drugim nadlogam so si begunci osmislili življenje s kulturo. Živahno kulturno dogajanje v šanghajskem eksilu sicer ni doseglo svetovne slave, je pa mnogim vsekakor pomagalo prebroditi najtežje obdobje svojega življenja. Gledano iz širšega zgodovinskega konteksta lahko opazimo globoko zakoreninjen antisemitizem in rasizem, ki je takrat preveval ves svet. Le Šanghaj je ponudil

¹¹ Pogrom nad Judi v Nemčiji in v delih Avstrije, ki se je zgodil 9. in 10. novembra 1938. Nasilje, aretacije, požige sinagog, trgovin ter drugih poslopij v lasti Judov je izvajala paravojaška enota SA (Sturmabteilung). Kristalna noč označuje pomembno prelomnico v zgodovini holokavsta, saj se s tem dogodkom začne sistematično iztrebljanje judovskega prebivalstva.

roko beguncem in predstavlja zadnjo rešilno bilko za skoraj 20.000 življenj. Ta del zgodovine si vsekakor zasluži vidnejše mesto v evropski zavesti.

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Discussions

What's Wrong with the Study of China/Countries

Hans KUIJPER*

Abstract

In this paper¹ the thesis is submitted that there is something fundamentally amiss in Western Sinology (*Zhōngguóxué*, as distinct from *Hànxiué*, which is a kind of old-fashioned philology): 'China experts' either pretend to be knowledgeable about everything related to China, in which case they cannot be taken seriously, or—eventually—admit not to be scientific all-rounders with respect to the country, in which case they cannot be called 'China experts'. The author expects no tenured professor of Chinese Studies/History to share this view. Having exposed the weakness, indeed the scandal of old-style Sinology, he also points out the way junior Sinologists should go. The fork in that road is two-pronged: translating or collaborating.

Keywords: Sinology, area/country studies, complexity, scientific collaboration, e-research

Izveček

V tem članku avtor predstavi tezo, da je nekaj bistveno narobe v zahodni sinologiji (*Zhōngguóxué*, za razliko od *Hànxiué*, ki je nekakšna staromodna filologija): »Kitajski strokovnjaki« se bodisi pretvarjajo, da so dobro obveščeni o vsem v zvezi s Kitajsko, in v tem primeru jih ni mogoče jemati resno, ali pa na koncu priznajo, da niso vsestransko znanstveni o državi, in jih v tem primeru ne moremo imenovati »Kitajske strokovnjake«. Avtor pričakuje, da nihče od univerzitetnih profesorjev kitajskih študij ali kitajske zgodovine ne deli tega stališča z njim. Z izpostavljenostjo šibkosti, kar je škandal za sinologijo starega sloga, opozarja tudi na pot, po kateri naj bi šli mladi sinologi. Na tej poti sta dve smeri, in sicer prevajanje ali sodelovanje.

Ključne besede: sinologija, področne študije/študije držav, kompleksnost, znanstveno sodelovanje, e-raziskovanje

* Hans KUIJPER. The author, who graduated in Sinology from Leiden University and in economics from Erasmus University Rotterdam, is a retired civil servant and independent researcher, currently working on a book about the necessity and possibility of scientific collaboration with regard to the study of countries. Email address: j_kuijper@online.nl.

¹ The substantially longer, heavily annotated version, entitled 'Uplifting the Study of China', can be downloaded for free at the website of Academia.edu. With the article 'Is Sinology a Science?' (Kuijper 2000) we attempted the ball to start rolling. After the falling of our advice on deaf ears, however, we found solace in Seneca's saying: *Silentium videtur confessio*.

All things are one. (Heraclitus)
There is nothing isolated. (Zhu Xi)
Tout tient à tout. (French proverb)

Introduction

To mark its 50th anniversary, in April 2003, the Institute of International Relations, a think tank affiliated with the National Chengchi University, in Taipei, published a double issue of its flagship journal *Issues & Studies* on “The State of the China Studies Field”. The reasons given for this laudable initiative were: *a)* “the major jump in both data output within China and access to this data by scholars from outside the PRC”, and *b)* “the dramatic increase in the number and types of individuals analyzing China”. However, the reader who expects to find a critical assessment of how China has been studied will be disappointed. The (mainly Western) contributors to the special issue ignore the elephant in the room. None of them is brave enough to ask the key question: of all the Western scholars having occupied themselves with the “curious land” (David Mungello), who has really been in the business of “analyzing China”, *qua* China? We think the sad answer to this perfectly legitimate question is: nobody has! Let us explain.

The Study of China Evaluated

Sinologists—taken as such (students of *China*) and, we wish to stress, not taken as, *e.g.*, literary students engaged in the study of *Chinese* literature, or economists specialising in the *Chinese* economy—share a common interest in China, just as Japanologists share a common interest in Japan (and Sovietologists shared a common interest in the erstwhile Soviet Union). However, Sinology—and the same holds, *mutatis mutandis*, for any other country study—is not defined by the perspective on the object of inquiry (China) but by the object itself. ‘China students’ (not: Chinese students!) have no tidy description of their enterprise; they have no “research programme” (Imre Lakatos). Describing the scientific discourse is a prerequisite for meaningful exchange of ideas, but this requirement seems to have slipped from memory in the China debate. As a result, quite a bit of ambiguity has spread, which in turn has led to murky results. Sinologists are not in search of ordered/systematised knowledge of China *qua* China. Consequently, they do not see the structure of the country, its tapestry, its *Gefüge*, the intimate, evolving connections between its components, the features that determine its look and feel, the whole that differs from the sum of its parts. Nor do they see the

change pattern (*Wandlungsstruktur*), the relations between the transformations of the compound (the country).

‘China scholars’ do not really conceive of the enormous mass of things Chinese as belonging together, as constituting *one* thing. Having a material object, an *explanandum* (China), they do not have a formal object, an *explanans* (Sinological viewpoint), a fact they conveniently forget, try hard to gloss over, or do not like to be reminded of. Sinologists have not developed a domain ontology; they have no command of a body of theoretical concepts that would put them on the same footing as, but differentiate them from, linguists, literary students, demographers, geographers, archaeologists, law students, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, economists or political scientists, professionals who increasingly collaborate in international and—more important—interdisciplinary projects. The cosmos, the earth, the biosphere, man, language and society are the material objects studied by cosmologists, geologists, biologists, anthropologists, linguists and sociologists respectively. Sinologists, however, are holding their own territory but do not have their own theory. There is no Sinological counterpart of Franz Boas, Noam Chomsky, Ferdinand de Saussure, Georges Dumézil, Émile Durkheim, Ronald Dworkin, Mircea Eliade, Henri Fayol, Northrop Frye, Clifford Geertz, Erving Goffman, Torsten Hägerstrand, Herbert Hart, Leonid Kantorovich, John Maynard Keynes, Philip Kotler, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Kurt Lewin, Yuri Lotman, Erwin Panofsky, Jean Piaget, Adolphe Quételet, John Rawls, Carl Ritter, Georg Simmel, Herbert Simon, Ninian Smart, Herbert Spencer, Jonathan Turner, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Léon Walras, Max Weber or Wilhelm Wundt.

*The way of finding out whether Sinologists really are what they pretend to be (experts on China) is making inquiries about how comfortable they are with quantitative reasoning and information technology, about their familiarity with the mixed methods research, about their nomenclature (the key terms of their debate), about the property of the relations between their master concepts, about the underlying assumptions of their argument, about the kind and number of hypotheses they have framed, about the *Grundstein* and *Gipfel* of their conceptual *Gebäude*, about the core subject (*problématique*) of their discipline, about the landmarks/milestones in its history, or about the central point that assures its unity. Such a point would be a ‘black hole’, *eine grundlegende Aporie*, like the relationship between the continuous and the discrete in mathematics, between spacetime and matter in physics, between body and mind in psychology, between man and society (*Mitwelt*) in sociology, between positive and moral law in legal*

theory, between efficiency and justice in economics, or between organisms and their natural environment (*Umwelt*) in ecology.

‘China experts’ have a keen eye for details but do not let them speak as parts of a whole. They do not have an architecture for organising the details, for presenting them into an intelligible system. Their writings excel in multitude rather than plenitude, in *multa* instead of *multum* (Pliny). We are provided with an aggregate but not with a whole, with a heap of stones (a few segments at most) but not with a well-founded and well-structured house, *i.e.* with **a model representing China in and of itself**, as a complexity of coupled human and natural systems.² The mosaic, the score, the wiring of the country is not given. “The one is not shown in the many and the root is not connected with the twigs” (一不显于多, 本不贯于末). To be sure, the *plures* are insignificant so long as the *unum* is elusive. For “*Im Aufbau des Ganzen werden die Züge erst bedeutend*” (Goethe). In order to comprehend something, it is crucial to be able to see the ordinary in the extraordinary (type-token distinction).³ Not having their own model, and mistaking the cramming of facts for discernment in selecting the important ones, Sinologists are, therefore, not entitled to wear the sacred mantle of science, the hallmark of which is empirically and theoretically founded, systematised knowledge.

‘China students/scholars/experts’, taken literally, are undisciplined academics, dabbling in Chinese language, culture and history, but unable to point out the endogenous and exogenous variables of their research, let alone the (form of the) relations prevailing among them. Their publications, displaying breadth of scholarship rather than depth of insight, contain copious footnotes but a rigorous, sustained and substantive argument is difficult to find. Nobody knows whether their investigations suggested, or were guided by, a Sinological theory. Labouring through their (sometimes aggressively marketed) books, one feels like looking at the stars in company of an amateur astronomer, who keeps on pointing at objects

² There are iconic, analog, animal, verbal, symbolic, data-based, theory-based, and computational models. Visit http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/scientific_modelling and see Rose and Abi-Rached (2013, 92–102). Though models are always wrong (because the real world is more complex), modelling, *i.e.* approximating, is the essence of scientific labour. Models can be integrated; see Gray (2007, Preface). Metamodels, which are closely related to ontologies, highlight the properties of models; see Caplat (2008). Model theory forms an integral part of mathematical logic, which is an important subfield of mathematics and should be distinguished (but not separated) from philosophy of mathematics, which lies at the deep end of epistemology and its twin brother, metaphysics.

³ Visit <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/types-tokens>. Perhaps uniquely, art—and culture historian Jacob Burckhardt (1818–1897) knew how to describe ‘*das Einzelne als Andeutung für das Typische*’.

in the sky—without a powerful telescope, without any attempt to reduce the incomprehensible multiplicity of the universe to a comprehensible simplicity, to design a theory, that is. To be convinced of this, the reader should open a volume of *T'oung Pao*, “the foremost journal on Sinology, covering history, literature, art, history of science, in fact, almost anything that concerns China”.

The study of China in the West has a long history, but a coherent scheme of basic concepts concerning China *qua* China has never been developed, the meaning of which can only be: the country, now rapidly moving to centre stage (economically, politically, and—the West fears—militarily), has never been truly analysed. It has been variously (and wildly) speculated but never really theorised about. A host of distinguished scholars has amassed facts and figures about (pre)Imperial, Republican and Communist China, but none of them seems to have attempted to reduce the incomprehensible multiplicity of this universe to a comprehensible simplicity. *Monumenta Serica*, another important scholarly journal, founded in 1934 and devoted to China, runs into 61 volumes, with an average of more than 500 pages, but features no article on the foundations/underpinnings of sinology. *Principia Sinologica* is the title of a book yet to be written.

The study of China belongs to the fuzzy category of ‘area studies’, the numerous practitioners of which seem to believe they can do without a textbook comparable to, say, Samuelson and Nordhaus (2009), Rita Atkinson et al (1999), or Heywood (2007). Basically disoriented, they still have to get their act together by organising themselves, as the members of the International Geographical Union (IGU) and the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnographical Sciences (IUAES) did. **There is urgent need for an international journal devoted to the history, theory, methodology and philosophy of area/country studies**, that stranger among the academic disciplines.

Countering Likely Objections

It may be objected that China is a country *sui generis*, and that notions having their origin in the West are not applicable to it, all the more so because the connotations and denotations of the words concerned have changed in the course of time. The central proposition of those who adopt this relativistic attitude is that China must be understood from within. Indigenous terms such as *cheng* (诚), *dao* (道), *de* (德), *di* (谛), *fa* (法), *gong* (公), *gu* (故), *jing* (敬), *jue* (觉), *kong* (空), *li*

(礼, 理), *ling* (灵), *mei* (美), *ming* (命), *pin* (品), *pu* (朴), *qi* (奇, 气), *quan* (权), *rang* (让), *ren* (仁), *shan* (善), *shen* (神), (圣), *shi* (势, 是, 实), *shu* (恕), *ti* (体), *tian* (天), *tong* (通, 同), *wen* (文), *wu* (无), *xin* (心, 信), *xing* (性), *xu* (虚), *xue* (学), *xuan* (玄), *yi* (一, 义, 艺, 易), *yong* (用), *you* (有), *yu* (宇), *yuan* (缘), *zhen* (真), *zhi* (致, 知, 智), *zhong* (中, 忠) and *zhou* (宙) should be the analytical categories, and scholarly research should be presented within their framework. China can never be understood from without, a conviction upheld by the Chinese themselves, particularly by those having a strong sense of nationalism. However, this line of reasoning cannot be taken without some qualifications:

Firstly, bringing out different translations of the same indigenous term, Sinologists come under the suspicion of simply not knowing what they are talking about. On this account, the reader should compare Feng (1953) with Cheng (1997), Cheng and Bunnin (2002), Cua (2003), Jullien (2007), Lai (2008), Zufferey (2008), Mou (2009) and Fraser (2014). For example, *ti* (体) is confusingly rendered into “substance”, “body”, “model”, “style”, “principle”, “method”, “genre”, “essence”, “form”, “trend”, “nature”, “unity”, “*noumenon*”, “vigour”, “reality”, “foundation”, “constitution”, “*constitutivité*”, and “bone-structure”. Rendering *ti* into, say, “substance” is to overlook a fundamental difference between the Western and Chinese way of thinking. Whereas philosophy in the West, since Aristotle, has been biased in favour of “substance” (what a thing really *is*, without its accidental properties), Chinese educated in the wisdom of the *Yijing* and the *Daodejing* conceive of everything as something “all the time on the way to be something else” (Needham). Taking a dynamic/evolutionary perspective (strongly reminiscent of Whitehead’s *Process and Reality*), they consider everything/everybody as fundamentally *changing over time* instead of *existing at some time*. Where Westerners would say “yes” or “no”, Chinese, reluctant to embrace the “law of excluded middle”, reasoning “non-monotonically” and going beyond the “square of opposition” (Béziau and Gan-Krzywoszynska 2014), are likely to answer: “Well, not exactly”. They are alien to the philosophical concept of ontology and never engaged in a discussion about the distinction between *esse*/existentialism and *essence*/essentialism. They see *relations* as being essential (reality). They emphasise context and situation, mutuality and relationality (*guanxi*), because, in their view, being is belonging, *esse est inter-esse* (being-in-between), spatially, temporally, socially or otherwise. For them, individuals/entities are intersections/nodes of relationships. Chinese have difficulty in understanding Plato’s dialogue

Phaedrus, in which Socrates speaks, without fatuous redundancy, of the superlative reality of the forms as “really real reality”. The theological doctrines of “consubstantiality” and “transubstantiation”, over which so much ink and blood were spilt in the West, are beyond them, because they fail to see the (importance of the) difference in meaning between *homooousios* (of same substance) and *homoiousios* (of similar substance). In contrast to Westerners, who have been deeply influenced by, and are only just beginning to distance themselves from, the Aristotelian-Cartesian-Newtonian preference for causal/serial/catenary thinking (events/actions are concatenated), Chinese have been emphasising the importance of web-like/matrical/structure-related thinking (events/actions are multidirectionally interwoven). They are geared to the “whatness” instead of the “thatness” of things. They are not disposed to the Western logic of identity (logocentrism). In their view, and in (Buddhism-inspired?) Derrida’s view, *difference* (otherness) is prior to, and a condition of, *identity* (sameness); it is not itself identifiable.

Concepts constitute the building blocks of man’s thinking and galvanise him into action; they form, subtly interconnected, the fabric of his life. Consequently, as long as some important notions and their cognates remain vague, others must share this defect, making human thought and behaviour elusive. The requirement not to be vague about ideas that have been most potent and persistent in Chinese history is thus paramount. Though the argument about “meaning” continues (especially among philosophers), with the *Siku Quanshu* (Emperor Qianlong’s library, counting about 840,000,000 characters) now electronically accessible and various types of computer software available, a thorough investigation of the interconnected concepts basic to Chinese thinking through the ages has been greatly facilitated, a plain fact some ‘China experts’ do not seem to be aware of.

Secondly, epistemic relativism, the view that the truth of knowledge-claims is relative to the standards a society/culture uses in evaluating such claims, is an incoherent doctrine, unable to defend itself, because, if it is right, the very notion of rightness is undermined, in which case epistemic relativism itself cannot be right. However, if the relativistic stance is untenable, the non-relativist (universalist) also faces a tall problem: how to develop a view that includes an acceptable account of rationality and rational justification which is non-dogmatic, rejects any notion of a privileged framework in which knowledge-claims must be couched, and is self-referentially coherent (Krausz 2010). Universalists tend to be ethnocentric, arrogant and intolerant. We disagree with the relativist, who maintains that culture-bound disciplines are blocking our ability to understand

another country, but we also have a different opinion from the universalist, who denies this.

The “emic-etic debate” among cultural anthropologists revolves around the question whether an account of actions should be given in terms that are meaningful to the actors belonging to the culture under study, or in terms applicable to actions in other cultures as well. Whereas the emic perspective focuses on intrinsic distinctions, only meaningful to the members of a given society, the etic view relies upon the extrinsic concepts and categories of scientific observers. This contradiction seems to be mistaken, for the points of view can be reconciled. A sensible *combination* of the emic and the etic lens yields a binocular vision, making depth perception possible (Kuijper 2014).

The fact that the great bulk of the ordered knowledge of social and human scientists is only based on the investigation of Western data does not imply the impossibility of cross-cultural dialogue, being a process in which the parties gradually *learn* to understand each other. The Okanagan (syilx) people, living in British Columbia and Washington (State), call this *en'owkin*, understanding through a gentle process of clarification and integration. A dialogue is not a debate. The former is geared to reaching an agreement (consensus), the latter to scoring a victory (meaning: somebody else's defeat!); the one aims at inclusion, the other at exclusion. In an “authentic dialogue” (Gadamer) the participants do not talk at cross-purposes (*dialogue de sourds*) but actively listen to each other; rather than being bent on proving themselves right, they are eager to gain insight. A dialogue, or *saṃvāda* (Mayaram 2014), being a real, genuine conversation, will inevitably lead to comparing (not to be confused with equating), to the placing together and examining of two things in order to discover similarities and differences, an activity that plays a crucial role in every scientific discipline. And this comparing (which should never be the comparing of an ideal situation here with the messy reality there!) may result in a change of mind, a mental leap, a conceptual re-configuration.

It may also be objected that after the Second World War Sinology split into specialisms, making the jacks-of-all-trades-but-masters-of-none with regard to China a dwindling species. We think this assertion is to be taken *cum grano salis*. The change from ‘China study’/‘*Chinakunde*’ to ‘Chinese studies’/‘*China-wissenschaften*’, or “*Sinologie als eine willkürliche Ansammlung von Einzelfächern*” (Hans-Wilm Schütte), has not improved the situation. On close

inspection, many so-called experts, focusing on one or another aspect of China, turn out to be amateurs only—sometimes gifted amateurs, able to express their ideas and opinions well, but non-professionals nonetheless.

What is necessary here is to “rectify names” (*zhengming*). For Confucius said: “If names are incorrect, language is not in accordance with the truth of things, and if language is not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success” (*Lunyu*, Book XIII, Chapter 3). ‘Professor of Chinese’ doesn’t make sense (not any more than ‘professor of life’, ‘professor of man’, or ‘professor of society’ does), unless this appellation of distinction is shorthand for “professor of linguistics with principal research interest in the *Chinese* language, or linguistics in China”.

In much the same vein, we doubt whether every ‘professor of Chinese literature’ can be safely assumed to hold an academic degree in literary studies. ‘Lecturer/reader in Chinese economics’ will not do either, for *Chinese* economics is a nonexistent subject matter. To be sure, Chinese economists lecturing on the economy of, or the application of economic theory in, China (or another country) *do* exist. There are Chinese, Japanese, American, Indian, Arabic, Russian, European and Australian logicians, mathematicians, scientists and philosophers, some of them being of very high caliber, but there cannot in reality be such things as Chinese, Japanese, American, Indian, Arabic, Russian, European and Australian logic, mathematics, science or philosophy, a major point many Sinologists/area-students, muddle-headed about the subject they are writing on, seem to overlook.

Many ‘China experts’, acknowledging the impossibility of being a scientific all-rounder in regard to the country, have the bad habit of putting on the hat of a scientist without filling his shoes, that is, the habit of delivering lectures on the Chinese language, communication style, literature, legal system, political system, military system, educational system, health care system, financial system, economy, agriculture, energy sector, transportation sector, business activities, society, art(s), religion(s), psyche, culture or environment without any degree in linguistics, communication studies, literary studies, law, political science, military science, educational science, medicine, (corporate, public or international) finance, economics, agronomy, energy science, transportation studies, business administration, sociology, art history/criticism, science(s) of religion, psychology, *Kulturwissenschaft(en)* or ecology/sustainability science respectively. Only a few ‘China experts’ have taken the trouble to obtain a degree in any of the disciplines

mentioned before ascending the pulpit. However, lecturing on a subject that lies within their purview, they often stray into forbidden domains—without duly notifying their credulous audience.

More, much more interesting things could be written on, for example, the concept and practice of law in China if, paradoxically, the authors were also well up in the writings of Plato, Cicero, Aquinas, Suárez, Althusius, Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, Montesquieu, Cesare Beccaria, Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, Henry Maine, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Otto von Gierke, François Géný, Roscoe Pound, Benjamin Cardozo, Giorgio Del Vecchio, Gustav Radbruch, Hans Kelsen, Carl Schmitt, Karl Llewellyn, Herman Dooyeweerd, Alf Ross, Lon Fuller, Patric Devlin, Herbert Hart, Julius Stone, Norberto Bobbio, Harold Berman, John Rawls, Joel Feinberg, Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz, Richard Posner, John Finnis, Duncan Kennedy, Robert Alexy, Roberto Unger, Jeremy Waldron, Ernest Weinrib, Dennis Patterson, and Andrei Marmor, among others.

Similarly, books, or articles, about ‘Chinese art’ would tremendously gain in importance if, in a way that only *seems* to be contradictory, the writers thereof were acquainted with the aesthetic views of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Brunelleschi, Alberti, Hume, Baumgarten, Winckelmann, Kant, Burke, Lessing, Schiller, Hegel, Coleridge, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, John Ruskin, Nietzsche, Heinrich Wölfflin, Benedetto Croce, Clive Bell, Collingwood, Erwin Panofsky, Walter Benjamin, Roman Ingarden, Susanne Langer, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Theodor Adorno, Harold Osborne, Nelson Goodman, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Ernst Gombrich, Clement Greenberg, Mikel Dufrenne, Monroe Beardsley, Richard Wollheim, Frank Sibley, Arthur Danto, Joseph Margolis, George Dickey, Stanley Cavell, Jacques Derrida, Roger Scruton, and Noël Carroll, among others.

A mature science consists of several subdisciplines. The workers in these special vineyards occupy themselves with a part without losing sight of the whole (see note 3). Biology, for example, deals with living things at different levels in the biosphere (as distinct from the litho-, hydro-, atmo- and noösphere). Its growth was triggered by a division of labour. Zoologists are interested in animals, ethologists in their behaviour, botanists in plants, mycologists in fungi, phycologists in algae, and microbiologists in bacteria and viruses. Here the ramification does not stop. Mammalogists are concerned with mammals, entomologists with insects, carcinologists with crustaceans, arachnologists with spiders and their relatives, ornithologists with birds, ichthyologists with fishes,

malacologists with molluscs, and herpetologists with reptiles and amphibians. The point is that, despite their apparent differences, all the divisions and subdivisions are interrelated; mother, daughters and granddaughters are akin. The splitting of biology into specialisms has been guided by the same principles. There may be differences in dialect, the *language* spoken is the language of biologists, “cell” being the key concept. After World War II, Sinology also started to diversify. By any stretch of the imagination, though, we cannot see how the subgroups thereof form a family; there is no intellectual kinship, no scientific lineage, no academic genealogy. The new style ‘China experts’ have nothing in common, in a distinctively scientific manner, that is. They still have no command of a characteristic network of basic notions related to *China*. There is an endless stream of books and articles ‘about China’, but there is no real *Sinological* debate. There are no schools of *Sinological* thought (comparable to schools of thought in political science, law, IR theory, psychology, learning theory, sociology, cultural anthropology, linguistics, literary theory, economics, or philosophy), simply because there is no *Sinological* language, a remarkable fact that seems to have gone unnoticed.

The claimed post-war “split of Sinology into specialisms” is a case of deceptive appearances. Books giving a general picture of China keep on rolling from the press, books not written by reporters, whose unscientific *modus operandi* may be excusable, but by tenured professors and those behind them. Whoever believes that the all-rounders in respect of China are dead and gone is grossly mistaken. The *touche-à-tout sans profondeur* is still around; the jacks-of-all-trades-but-masters-of-none (or: only-one) are still alive and kicking. Some of these all-purpose China scholars do not even shrink from predicting the country’s future, clearly unaware of the nonlinear-science revolution of the 1970s, that emphasised the certainty of uncertainty and led to a redefinition of causality. If pretending to be, or making no objection to be introduced as, an expert on some aspect of China, without a degree in the discipline concerned, is reprehensible, downright unforgivable is it to make no bones about changing bonnets and to masquerade as connoisseur of China *tout court*. Those who are guilty of doing so (one only needs to watch the programme “Fareed Zakaria GPS” on CNN) corroborate Alexander Pope’s statement: ‘Fools rush in where angels fear to tread’.

The Way Ahead

What is to be done (Что делать)? Advising 'China experts' to go home and to look for another job is certainly not what we are thinking of. For one shall not throw the baby out with the bath water. Sinologists are (we hope) fluent in classical and modern Chinese. So, first and foremost, let them cultivate their talent! There are plenty of books eagerly awaiting translation.

Over the last 150 years or so, numerous books belonging to any of the four categories into which Chinese bibliographers traditionally put their sources, viz "classics"(*jing*), "history"(*shi*), "philosophy"(*zi*), and "literature"(*ji*), have been translated into a European language. However, not every author who has participated in the great Chinese conversation about the basic principle of order (in nature and society) has found a translator of his work, the assiduity and diligence of Édouard Biot, Cyril Birch, Édouard Chavannes, Séraphin Couvreur, Robert des Rotours, Homer Dubs, Jan Duyvendak, Alfred Forke, Esson Gale, Olaf Graf, David Hawkes, James Hightower, Wilt Idema, Wallace Johnson, David Knechtges, John Knoblock, Franz Kuhn, James Legge, Victor Mair, Göran Malmqvist, Georges Margouliès, Richard Mather, William Nienhauser, Max Perleberg, Rainer Schwarz, Nancy Lee Swann, Erwin von Zach, Arthur Waley, Burton Watson, Stephen West, Richard Wilhelm, Martin Woesler and other translators notwithstanding.

Remarkably, there is no translation of the Great Books of the Chinese World comparable to the *Great Books of the Western World*. The latter, published by Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., is a set of 60 volumes containing 517 works (by 130 authors) in mathematics, physical sciences, life sciences, social sciences, history, philosophy, and imaginative literature. Three criteria governed the selection (by Robert Hutchins and Mortimer Adler) of these books, which made their appearance in a time span covering more than 25 centuries (from Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey* to Claude Lévi-Strauss' *Structural Anthropology*). They were chosen by virtue of their dealing with issues, problems or facets of human life that are of major concern today as well as at the time in which they were written. They are worth reading carefully many times or studying over and over again. And they have very broad and general significance; their authors have something of importance to say about a large number of great ideas making up the abstract and complex infrastructure of Western thought.

Only a fraction of the rich Chinese literature has found its way to Gallimard's world-famous *Bibliothèque de la Pléiade*. The integral, annotated translation of the *Zhengshi* (*Dynastic Histories*), the importance of which can hardly be exaggerated, is the dream of many historians. Sima Guang's *Zizhi Tongjian* (*Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government*); the *Shitong* (*Ten Encyclopedic Histories of Institutions*); the monumental *Gujin Tushu Jicheng* (*Complete Collection of Illustrations and Writings from the Earliest to Current Times*), which—in the 18th century—attempted to embody the whole of China's cultural history; the extant collections of *Zhaoling Zouyi* (*Edicts and Memorials*); the treasure troves known as *Daozang* (*Daoist Canon*), *Daozang Jiyao* (*Essentials of the Daoist Canon*) [extra-canonical texts] and *Dazangjing* (*Chinese Buddhist Canon*); the invaluable Dunhuang manuscripts; and thousands of *Difangzhi* (*Local Gazetteers*) are waiting to be (further) opened up by Sinologists for scientists unable to read Chinese. So are the works mentioned in the three-volume *Zhongguo Fazhishi Shumu* (*Annotated Bibliography of Chinese Legal History*), compiled by Zhang Weiren and published, in 1976, by Academia Sinica. In addition, a new, philosophically as well as historically annotated⁴ translation of the *Zhuzi Jicheng* (*Complete Collection of the Works of Ancient Philosophers*) would be warmly welcomed; and an incomplete list of modern and contemporary books deserving (in our view) to be translated reads as follows:

- Jin Yuelin, *Luoji* (*Logic*), 1935;
- Fu Qinjia, *Zhongguo Daojiao Shi* (*The History of Daoism in China*), 1937;
- Cai Yuanpei, *Zhongguo Lunlixue Shi* (*A History of Chinese Ethics*), 1937;
- Tang Yongtong, *Han Wei Liangjin Nanbei Chao Fojiao Shi* (*The History of Buddhism in the Han, Wei, Jin, and Northern and Southern Dynasties*), 1938;
- Feng Youlan, *Zhen Yuan Liu Shu* (*Six Books on Purity and Primacy*), 1939–1946;
- Jin Yuelin, *Lun Dao* (*On Dao*), 1940;
- Sun Benwen, *Shehuixue Yuanli* (*Principles of Sociology*), 1944;
- Chen Yinke, *Tangdai Zhengzhi Shi Shulungao* (*Draft of a Political History of the Tang Dynasty*), 1946;
- Zhang Dongsun, *Zhishi yu Wenhua* (*Knowledge and Culture*), 1946;

⁴ See Reck (2013, 1–13 and 21–23). Readers interested in analytic(al) philosophy, which is sometimes pitted against continental philosophy, may see Soames (2014), and Critchley and Schroeder (1999). In addition, they may visit www.iep.utm.edu/analytic, www.esap.info and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/index_of_continental_philosophy_articles.

- Liang Shuming, *Zhongguo Wenhua Yaoyi (The Essence of Chinese Culture)*, 1949;
- Hou Wailu, *Zhongguo Sixiang Tongshi (Comprehensive History of Chinese Thinking)*, 1957–1963;
- Xiong Shili, *Tiyonglun (On Ti and Yong)*, 1958;
- Xiong Shili, *Mingxinpian (Illuminating the Mind)*, 1959;
- Hu Jichuang, *Zhongguo Jingji Sixiang Shi (A History of Economic Thought in China)*, 1962–1981;
- Chen Guofu, *Daozang Yuanliu Kao (On the Origin and Development of the Daoist Canon)*, 1963;
- Zhou Jinsheng, *Zhongguo Jingji Sixiang Shi (A History of Economic Thought in China)*, 1965;
- Xu Fuguan, *Zhongguo Yishu Jingshen (The Aesthetic Spirit of China)*, 1966;
- Yin Haiguang, *Zhongguo Wenhua de Zhanwang (The Future of China's Culture)*, 1966;
- Tang Junyi, *Zhongguo Zhexue Yuanlun Yuanxing Pian (Fundamental Discussions of Chinese Philosophy: Human Nature)*, 1968;
- Mou Zongsan, *Xinti yu Xingtì (Mind and Nature)*, 1968;
- Tang Junyi, *Zhongguo Zhexue Yuanlun Yuandao Pian (Fundamental Discussions of Chinese Philosophy: Dao)*, 1973;
- Qian Mu, *Guoshi Dagang (Outline of (Our) National History)*, 1974;
- Lao Sze-kwang, *Zhongguo Zhexue Shi (A History of Chinese Philosophy)*, 1974–1981;
- Tang Junyi, *Shengming Cunzai yu Xinling Jingjie (Human Existence and Spiritual Horizon)*, 1977;
- Li Zehou, *Zhongguo Jindai Sixiang Shilun (Historical Treatise on Modern Chinese Thought)*, 1979;
- Zhu Guangqian, *Tan Meishu Jian (Letters on Beauty)*, 1980;
- Zhang Dainian, *Zhongguo Zhexue Dagang (Outline of Chinese Philosophy)*, 1982;
- Jin Yuelin, *Zhishilun (Theory of Knowledge)*, 1983;
- Huang Gongwei, *Fajia Zhexue Tixi Zhigui (Guide to the System of Legalist Philosophy)*, 1983;
- Sun Longji, *Zhongguo Wenhua de 'Shenceng Jiegou' (The 'Deep Structure' of Chinese Culture)*, 1983;

- Liang Shuming, *Renxin yu Rensheng (Human Heart and Human Life)*, 1984;
- Sa Mengwu, *Zhongguo Zhengzhi Sixiang Shi (A History of Chinese Political Thought)*, 1984;
- Wu Hui, *Zhongguo Gudai Liu Da Jingji Gaigejia (Six Great Economic Reformers in Ancient China)*, 1984;
- Mou Zongsan, *Yuanshanlun (A Treatise on the Highest Good)*, 1985;
- Shen Jiaben, *Lidai Xingfa Kao (On the Penal Code in Successive Dynasties)*, 1985 (reprint);
- Li Zehou, *Zhongguo Gudai Sixiang Shilun (Historical Treatise on Ancient Chinese Thought)*, 1985;
- Tao Jianguo, *Liang Han Wei Jin zhi Daojia Sixiang (Daoist Thought in the Han, Wei and Jin Dynasty)*, 1986;
- Li Zehou, *Zhongguo Xiandai Sixiang Shilun (Historical Treatise on Contemporary Chinese Thought)*, 1987;
- Jin Wulun, *Wuzhi Kefenxing Xinlun (A New Theory on the Divisibility of Matter)*, 1988;
- He Lin, *Wenhua yu Rensheng (Culture and Human Life)*, 1988;
- Zhu Bokun, *Yixue Zhexue Shi (A History of the Philosophy of Yi(jing) Study)*, 1988;
- Tang Liquan, *Zhouyi yu Huaidehai zhi Jian (Between the Yijing and Whitehead)*, 1989;
- Li Kuangwu, *Zhongguo Luoji Shi (A History of Chinese Logic)*, 1989;
- Huang Renyu, *Zibenzhuyi yu Nianyi Shiji (Capitalism and the 21st Century)*, 1991;
- Hu Weixi, *Chuantong yu Renwen (Tradition and Culture)*, 1992;
- Gu Xin, *Zhongguo Qimeng de Lishi Tujing (History and Prospect of Chinese Enlightenment)*, 1992;
- Zhang Dainian, *Zhang Dainian Xueshu Lunzhu Zixuan Ji (Collection of the Academic Writings of Zhang Dainian Selected by Himself)*, 1993;
- Feng Qi, *Zhihui San Lun (Three Essays on Wisdom)*, 1994;
- Zhang Liwen, *Zhongguo Zhexue Fanchou Jingxuan Congshu (Compendium of Selected Categories in Chinese Philosophy)*, 1994;
- Mou Zongsan, *Renwen Jiangxilu (Lectures on Culture)*, 1996;
- Chen Shaofeng, *Zhongguo Lunlixue Shi (A History of Chinese Ethics)*, 1997;
- Li Qiang, *Ziyou Zhuyi (Liberalism)*, 1998;

- Ge Zhaoguang, *Zhongguo Sixiang Shi (A History of Chinese Thinking)*, 1998–2000;
- Bai Shouyi (ed.), *Zhongguo Tongshi (Comprehensive History of China)*, 1999;
- Chen Lai, *YouWu zhi Jing (The Realms of Being and Nonbeing)*, 2000;
- Chen Lai, *Zhuzi Zhexue Yanjiu (A Study of Master Zhu's Philosophy)*, 2000;
- Lao Sze-kwang, *Wenhua Zhexue Jiangyan Lu (Lectures on Cultural Philosophy)*, 2002;
- Lao Sze-kwang, *Xujing yu Xiwang (Illusion and Hope)*, 2003;
- Yu Ying-shih, *Zhu Xi de Lishi Shijie (The Historical World of Zhu Xi)*, 2003;
- Zhang Jialong, *Zhongguo Luoji Sixiang Shi (A History of Logical Thinking in China)*, 2004;
- Li Zehou, *Shiyong Lixing yu Legan Wenhua (Pragmatic Reason and the Culture of Contentment)*, 2005;
- Sun Zhongyuan, *Zhongguo Luoji Yanjiu (Studies on Chinese Logic)*, 2006;
- Zhang Liwen, *Hehexue (The Philosophy of Harmony)*, 2006;
- Ji Xianlin, *Sanshinian Hedong, Sanshinian Hexi (Thirty Years East of the River, Thirty Years West of the River)*, 2006;
- Lao Sze-kwang, *Weiji Shijie yu Xin Xiwang Shiji (A World of Crisis and the New Century of Hope)*, 2007;
- Wang Hui, *Xiandai Zhongguo Sixiang de Xingqi (The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought)*, 2008;
- Li Bozhong, *Zhongguo de Zaoqi Jindai Jingji (China's Early Modern Economy)*, 2010;
- Yao Dali, *Dushi de Zhihui (The Wisdom of Reading History)*, 2010;
- Liu Yingsheng, *Hailu yu Lulu (Maritime and Continental Routes)*, 2010;
- Wang Liqi, *Yantielun Jiaozhu (Discourses on Salt and Iron Collated and Annotated)*, 2011;
- Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng, *Zhongguo Xiandai Sixiang de Qiyuan (The Origins of Modern Thought in China)*, 2011;
- Yi Wu, *Yijing de Chubian Xue (Yijing: Learning to Deal with Changes)*, 2012;
- Huang Ying-kuei, *Wenming zhi Lu (The Path towards Civilisation)*, 2012;
- Tang Yijie and Li Zhonghua (eds.), *Zhongguo Ruxue Shi (A History of Confucianism)*, 2012;

- Jin Yaoji, *Zhongguo de Xiandai Zhuanyang* (*China's Modern(ity) Turn*), 2013;
- Yang Kuo-shu, *Zhongguoren de Jiazhi guan* (*Chinese Views of Values*), 2013.

Finally, over the last three decades, eminent Chinese economists have variously written about the unprecedented growth of their country's economy. Their main theoretical/empirical work has, alas, seldom been translated into a Western language.

Translating, that humble, yet ever so important activity, is the strength, doing scientific research the weakness of Sinologists not graduated in any of the social or human sciences. They should, therefore, concentrate on the former and link up with scientists for the latter. If they desire to embark on the study of a subject related to China, we would counsel them not to run the risk of being shipwrecked because of shortage of seamanship. Instead, they should look around for China oriented scientists to set up a joint venture. In this way, the party lacking disciplinary grounding has the right analytical tools at his disposal, whereas the party unable to read Chinese has access to primary sources. For “There is no more excuse for sinologists writing incompetently on technical subjects than for scientists working incompetently upon texts” (Denis Twitchett). It would be wrong, however, to conclude that partial views add up to a *Totalbild*, to a complete and coherent picture of the articulated, multileveled whole of China. What we have got when the various joint ventures finally come out with their product is a patchwork rather than a tapestry, a juxtaposition rather than a composition, a pile of well-made bricks rather than a house, an ‘aggregate’ (*Gesamtheit*) rather than a ‘whole’ (*Ganzheit*).

China Is a Complex System of Complex Systems

Each country is a territory-bound, history-moulded, multi-minded, at one time open, at another time closed system of inextricably intertwined physical, chemical, biological and social systems. It has a “face” (*Gestalt*), a style, a character, a distinctive “sound” or “beat”, a particular “flavor” (*rasa*), a cultural heritage expressing its soul. Constantly changing, sometimes revolutionarily, it has properties none of its constituent subsystems has (much in the same way as the nature of water is irreducible to the attributes of hydrogen and oxygen; and a computer or television picture is more than the sum total of the bits of the pixels into which it can be decomposed). Not being an aggregate of (groups of) humans

who live on an expanse of land, but a superorganism, a hierarchically ordered, non-fragmentable *holon*, an exceedingly complex system of complex systems, and an intricately evolving compound/composite (the elements of which are held together by a mysterious kind of chemistry), a country cannot be understood by studying its parts one by one, by considering each or some of them out of its/their context. It can only be understood across the disciplines, that is to say, inter- or transdisciplinarily.

Like the ant that cannot see the pattern of the carpet, a country student can never grasp the whole picture of it, not only because it is hard enough to be expert in one scientific domain and enormously difficult to learn two (let alone more than two) disciplines, but also because the whole of the country is something else than the sum total of its parts. Composition goes far beyond juxtaposition. So we need genuine scientific collaboration. The human body can only be dissected/analysed at the price of cutting vital connections. Breaking a country up into morsels for scientists from separate, non-communicating departments to chew on (the *multidisciplinary* approach) amounts to destroying a “system” (σύστημα, constitution) in order to comprehend it. The crux of the matter is that the parts and the whole are interconnected, intertwined and interinvolved; they are inseparable from, and non-subordinatable to, each other. Quite simply: it takes two to tango.⁵

Countries, big or small, have to be thrown into a fresh perspective. Concepts borrowed from the burgeoning science of complex systems must be applied to them. Studies have been done on the complexity of cells/neurons, brains, organisms, companies/organisations, cities, polities, economies, societies, ecosystems and ‘social-ecological systems’ (SESSs), even on the complexity of the entire globe (complexity being defined as “elements that react to the pattern they together create”). It is time to explore the possibility and feasibility of studying the complexity of *countries*, of recasting the issues related to them in terms of complex systems. At this critical juncture, when mankind’s survival is at stake, we can no longer afford to think and behave as if the intricately patterned and dynamically evolving economic, financial, political, legal, military, social, cultural, educational, religious, ecological, and foreign-relations systems of a nation-state are not interconnected, are not corresponding to, interfacing with, or mapping onto each other. It is time to imagine China through the miraculous language of

⁵ Language use is another form of *joint action*. See Clark (1996). “Classicism is the subordination of the parts to the whole; decadence is the subordination of the whole to the parts”, Oscar Wilde aptly said.

mathematics/logic, “the cosmic eye of humanity” (Eberhard Zeidler);⁶ time to look for links and loops, for homologies and isomorphies, for correspondences and correlations, for analogies and similarities, for kinds and grades of embeddedness, for dynamic interfaces, for relationships between structures (category theory), for the invariance/constant in the variety/change; time to elucidate the pathways underlying China’s functioning; time to map and computationally visualise the network(s) of its variously connected and continually changing multilayered institutions; time to investigate how the whole of the country, being a huge one-many, a complex “system of systems” (SoS), is held together and differs from that of another country, like Rembrandt’s *Night Watch* from Picasso’s *Guernica*.

Basically, complex systems scientists are exclusively interested in properties common to all complex systems, leaving it to non-formal scientists, in the fields of natural or cultural research, to study the differences between these systems. Practically, however, they confine themselves to a particular system and follow essentially one of two approaches. The first method is the building and study of a mathematical model that only contains the most important properties of the system. The tools used in such studies include, but are not limited to, dynamical systems—, game—, and information theory. The second approach is building a more comprehensive and realistic model, usually in the form of a computer simulation, representing the interacting parts/agents of the system, and then watching and studying the emergent behaviour that appears. The power of computer simulation, aka computational modelling, has far exceeded anything possible using traditional paper-and-pencil mathematical modelling. The two approaches can be combined. The science of complex systems encompasses the study of particular systems and the study of systems in general; any advance in one of them makes a contribution to the other.⁷

Mark Newman, who is associated with the renowned Center for the Study of Complex Systems, at the University of Michigan, concludes a recent survey as follows:

Complex systems [science] is a broad field, encompassing a wide range of methods and having an equally wide range of applications. The resources

⁶ See Chaitin (2005). For logic, visit <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-classical> and other logic-related entries.

⁷ Visit www.socio.ethz.ch/modsim/index. In addition, see note 2 and 6.

reviewed here cover only a fraction of this rich and active field of study. For the interested reader there is an abundance of further resources to be explored when those in this article are exhausted, and for the scientist intrigued by the questions raised there are ample opportunities to contribute. Science has only just begun to tackle the questions raised by the study of complex systems and the areas of our ignorance far outnumber the areas of our expertise. For the scientist looking for profound and important questions to work on, [the study of] complex systems offers a wealth of possibilities.⁸

The science of complex systems is an early 1980s outgrowth of *a*) the science of systems (the study of the general properties of systems), *b*) cybernetics (the study of control and communication in systems), *c*) system dynamics (the study of the behaviour of systems over time), *d*) synergetics (the study of the fundamental principles of pattern formation in systems), *e*) nonequilibrium statistical mechanics (the study of the emergence of dissipative structures), *f*) catastrophe theory (the study of sudden shifts in the behaviour of a system arising from small changes in its environment) and *g*) mathematical biology (the mathematical study of the mechanisms involved in biological processes). In the late 1990s, the ‘complexity turn’ took place: social scientists changed their attitude to, and became increasingly interested in, complexity science.⁹

The *SAGE Handbook of Complexity and Management*, published a few years ago (Allen et al 2011), is “the first substantive scholarly work to provide a map of the state-of-the-art research in the growing field emerging at the intersection of complexity science and management studies”. Given that each company belongs to an industry (line of business), which is one of the sectors of an economy, which in turn is one of the systems a country consists of, we hope that this paper will convince the reader of the importance of redesigning Sinology, of the significance of forging bridges between complexity science(s) and ‘China studies’.

Scientific Collaboration

China can be compared with a brilliant-cut diamond, that sparkles in the sun. There will be no sparkling/brilliance until variously educated scientists shed light on the country. Having many faces/facets, it should be approached integratively.

⁸ Visit <http://arxiv.org/abs/1112.1440>. For an interesting study on the complexity of cells, see Ji (2012). We would also recommend reading Starr et al (2013) and Batty (2013).

⁹ Explore http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_complexity, www.nessnet.eu and <http://comdig.unam.mx>; visit <http://cams.ehess.fr>, www.santafe.edu and www.lsa.umich.edu/cscs; and click on ‘ICCS’ at www.necsi.edu. See also Wolf-Branigin (2013), Byrne and Callaghan (2014), McCabe (2014) and Johnson (2014).

The scientific ‘attack’ on China should be a concerted one; the operation should be a combined, joint effort. Like every country, it should be studied interdisciplinarily and depicted cubistically (with different viewpoints amalgamated into a multifaceted whole), because the whole and the parts of China are mutually implicated. China is a universe the centre of which is everywhere.

There are different ways of scientific collaboration,¹⁰ but they have a common denominator. The scientists involved understand that reality, being the nexus of interrelated phenomena irreducible to a single dimension (*ordo connexio rerum*), can never be grasped by separate disciplines, which have formed the layout of universities since the 18th century. While specialisation (read: fragmentation) has yielded sharper analytical acuity within particular knowledge domains, where the *ceteris paribus* clause has been the self-imposed, unrealistic rule of operation (unrealistic because other relevant things never remain unaltered!),¹¹ the goal of reaching integrated understanding has receded. Depth of focus has been achieved at the expense of breadth of view. Some scientists begin to realise that difficult, real-life problems require the pooling of disciplinary knowledge and analytical skills. It may be very hard for one (wo)man to become an expert in two disciplines, but two (wo)men jointly well-versed and well-trained in two disciplines, *e.g.* physics and chemistry, chemistry and biology, biology and psychology, psychology and sociology, sociology and economics, or—and here the circle closes—economics and physics, can co-produce something of great value.

Interdisciplinary research is not a simple case of summing (Σ), of aggregating several disciplines into one, multidisciplinary research project. Extra effort is needed to achieve the promise of synergy, by forming a cohesive team that combines the expertise of different (groups of) people. Cross-disciplinary collaboration is difficult, because it requires a conceptual turnaround, lacks prestige in classical academia, seems to threaten the position of deeply entrenched colleagues, has to overcome institutional barriers, and places one outside the circle of standard job slices. However, it has considerable added value: not only personal, because it enriches the life of those involved, and social, because its results tend to be more robust, but also scientific, because the collaboration minimises duplication, lights up blind spots, fosters analogical reasoning, leads to cross-fertilisation and—most important—stimulates innovation and creativity (provided

¹⁰ This subject is connected with the issue of unity of science. Visit <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-unity>.

¹¹ For more on *ceteris paribus* clauses, visit <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ceteris-paribus>.

the members of the team actively listen to, and challengingly question, each other; provided they attempt to argue on the same wavelength, so to speak). The adversaries of interdisciplinary (as distinct from: *international*) collaboration do not have to worry: it means integration, not fusion, of disciplines; it is based on the salad bowl concept, on the principle $1 + 1 > 2$. Its participants are comparable to the members of a symphony orchestra who are professional players of different instruments *put in tune*.¹²

Workers in both the natural and the cultural (*i.e.* cognitive, behavioural, social, and human) sciences are increasingly using mathematical methods and techniques. Since the bridge between these sciences and mathematics (the wider, higher and deeper growing study of topics such as quantity, structure, space, and change)¹³ is heavily traveled, the interdisciplinary dialogue is stimulated. Moreover, scientific collaboration is facilitated by e-research, which may be called a major breakthrough in science and technology. It combines *a*) vast quantities of digitised data (digital libraries), *b*) supercomputers running sophisticated software, and *c*) high-tech connectivity between computers (cloud- and grid computing, semantic web). With modern computers, almost any form of knowledge can be precisely expressed, and multi-dimensional computations of complex multi-scale phenomena are not beyond reach anymore. The potential of the Internet, implying the availability of all information for everyone, instantly and everywhere, seems to be boundless.¹⁴

Wide and Deep

Unmistakably, there is something terribly wrong with Western Sinology (*Zhōngguóxué*). The field is not circumscribed. Unable to define their disciplinary matrix, lacking a research agenda, not having built a domain ontology (a precise explanation of the basic terms of their discourse), not commanding a theory of their own, and not searching for systematised knowledge with regard to China in and of itself, the so-called China experts in Europe and America are not scientists,

¹² See Frodeman et al (2010), Bhaskar et al (2010), Bammer (2013), Thorén and Persson (2013), Montuori (2013), Bourguin (2013), and Mathieu and Schmid (2014). For an interesting but unconvincing counterpoint, see Jacobs (2014). In 2012, the Centre for Interdisciplinary Methodologies (CIM) was established at the University of Warwick.

¹³ Visit www.zbmath.org and www.ams.org/mathscinet/msc/msc2010.html. In addition, see note 6.

¹⁴ See Dutton and Jeffries (2010), Anandarajan and Anandarajan (2010), Hesse-Biber (2011), Nielsen (2012) and Floridi (2014). Also visit www.digitalhumanities.org, www.supercomputing.org and <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/internet>.

even if ‘science’ is broadly defined. Ignoring the elephant in their room and refusing a *Reflexion auf eigenes Tun*, these scholars boldly claim to synthesise the results of all kinds of professional study regarding the country of their choice, but—without a conceptual framework, *i.e.* without a model representing China as such—they are not able to present a comprehensive and coherent picture of the country, not to mention a lucid exposition of its dynamics, its phase transitions, its transformation logic. Browsing and trespassing rather than really “putting together” is what these heroic polymaths are good at. Having no degree in any of the disciplines concerned, they do not shrink from rushing in where angels fear to tread. Implicitly claiming to be scientific all-rounders in respect of China, these jacks-of-all-trades keep the reader/listener/viewer in the dark as to how the parts fit into the whole and, conversely, how the whole stands interconnected with the parts. Their China approach is *mile-wide-but-inch-deep*. Though their population is dwindling, they are by no means extinct, their scholarship often being the pretentious garbed in the unintelligible.

The claimed post-war “split of sinology into specialisms” has worsened the situation, because there is confusion and obfuscation as to who has a thorough grounding in a scientific discipline and who has not. Some, and we believe many, ‘China experts’ are actually amateurs who have the bad habit of donning the hat of a scientist without filling his shoes. Others have no qualms about introducing themselves simply as “Professor at the University of ... (name of city)”. A courteous request to present academic credentials is considered a token of disrespect, and deeply ingrained customs (old boys network) preclude fundamental internal criticism, causing intellectual inbreeding, a deplorable situation politicians choose to turn a blind eye to. Occasionally—we confine ourselves to one example—someone, knowing very well that studying a language is not the same as studying the literature written in that language, decided to enrol for literary studies before hurling him/herself at the *Chinese* literature. His/her monodisciplinary approach to the country is then *mile-deep-but-inch-wide* (the truth would be intolerably stretched if such a person permitted people to call him/her “*China* expert”). However, the problem with these one-dimensional scientists, who Max Weber would have derogatorily called *Fachmenschen* (de- or compartment people), is that they are accusable of silo/stovepipe thinking, of not seeing the big country-picture, of being unable to think systemically (to discern the parts as well as the whole). To remove this odium, they have a tendency to cross boundary lines, blissfully ignorant about the dangers of skating on thin ice. Readers taking pains to

check the list of contributors to 'Chinese/Asian Studies' journals will discover that the editorial boards of these competing periodicals (the number of titles runs into the dozens) have not been consistent in their declared policies on the professionalism of authors. All too often, published articles are *not* "of the highest academic standard". In our view, the wheat has not always been separated from the chaff, and experts in their own field of study are still allowed by editors who may not be kosher themselves to veer off course, that is, to leave their academic home turf and to enter unlawfully upon somebody else's professional domain. Goodbye, intellectual integrity!

The fork in the road ahead for Western Sinologists is two-pronged: **translating** or **collaborating**. They are reported/supposed to be fluent in classical and modern Chinese. So our advice would be: cobbler, stick to your last. There are numerous important Chinese books eagerly awaiting translation. If their desire is to embark on the study of a China related subject, we would counsel them not to venture forth on too vast a sea, but to look around for China oriented experts (*i.e.* scientists [in the first place] who have a special interest in China) to set up a joint venture, with the caveat that partial views do not add up to a picture of *the whole* of China. For making good use of organised and structured databases, they need to be interconnected.¹⁵ Partial studies that are not nicely dovetailed or firmly interlocked with each other present the reader with a *spectacle coupé*, with a Humpty-Dumpty broken into bits. Such studies (one may think of those collected in the only chronologically ordered set of hefty tomes entitled *Cambridge History of China*, this work being a far cry from a profound, multiperspective narrative/story of China's past) do not constitute a coherent whole. They lack the critical and unifying (not: uniforming) framework that could be provided by the science of systems and the related science of networks, the theoretical parts of which must appeal to researchers really willing to work together and fully aware of the awesome power of making the right distinctions and abstractions.

Parceling up neglects relations that matter. Compartmentalisation, or departmentalisation, the breaking down (mentally) of a complex system into "more manageable" subsystems easily results in losing sight of the context, of the

¹⁵ The online *Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems* (www.eolss.net) is a striking example. Being an "integrated compendium of twenty one encyclopedias", the EOLSS body of knowledge "attempts to forge pathways between disciplines in order to show their interdependence". It "deals in detail with interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary subjects, but it is also disciplinary, as each major core subject is covered in great depth by world experts." See note 12.

environment, of the surroundings, of the conditions under which these subsystems operate within their suprasystem. A good physician and a commander-in-chief know this. We need a cubistic, multi-professional perspective, a multimodal integration. If and only if they are orderly and specifically put together (assembled), single parts/modules/entities/agents make up a whole, as every architect, astronaut, *chef de cuisine*, choreographer, composer, flower arranger (*ikebana*), novelist, even a football coach can tell. The interactions and interfaces between the components of a country (*e.g.* its political, legal, military, economic, financial, social, educational, and cultural system) need to be investigated, much in the same way as the fundamental structure of the human language faculty is examined in current linguistics, that is to say, the interfaces between phonetics, phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. (Ramchand and Reiss 2007, 1–13; O’Grady et al 2009, ch. 2–6 and 12–14).¹⁶ For, as the ancients intuitively knew already, the perpetual interplay of components (a process involving exclusiveness-dissimilarity-uniqueness-discreteness as well as inclusiveness-similarity-commonness-continuity) is the basic principle of life and the core of all matter; it is the very essence of intelligence, creativity and harmony. In the words of Chinese-American theoretical physicist Kerson Huang: “Interaction makes the world tick”. Studying China multidisciplinarily is fatally flawed; it will lead to *hamartia*, to “missing the mark” (illuminating the whole country); it is bound to result in a building not held together by cement, in the sterile juxtaposition of accounts forming a picture of incompatible colours. Partition walls must be lowered (but certainly not removed). What we need is detribalisation, collaborative scholarship, a well-coordinated joint effort, a disciplinarily integrated approach, that facilitates consilience, the joyful jumping together of scientific knowledge.

The main thrust of this debunking argument is that China ought to be seen under the aspect of its whole, *sub specie totius*, which is not to say that analysis, as understood in analytic philosophy, is unimportant (see note 4). The country must be depicted not in a “flat”, or “curved”, but in a “fully rounded” way. For knowledge of the whole is knowledge of each and every part of it, and the other way around. It cannot be overstressed: in order to be scientific, the approach to China should be integrative, orchestral. Professional players should put their

¹⁶ According to French (2014): “At the most fundamental level, modern physics presents us with a world of *structures* and making sense of that view is the central aim of the increasingly widespread position known as *structural realism*”.

various instruments in tune and perform a symphony. Different perspectives must be brought together into the same dialogue space. Being a large, intricate and culture-soaked society *cum* polity *cum* economy *cum* geography *cum* history, China has to be studied truly interdisciplinarily. *L'unité fait la force*. Besides collaboration between Sinologists and China oriented scientists, we need ICT-driven collaboration between these scientists. In other words, we are in need of Sinologists who are prepared to work together with scientists having *a*) profound knowledge in a particular discipline, *b*) a special interest in China, *c*) proficiency in communicating with other “T-shaped” experts, and *d*) skill in using the tools provided by rapidly developing e-research; with scientists being, additionally, conscious of the important but often forgotten fact that geography (the study of who, what, how, why and where) is nothing but history in space, while history (the study of who, what, how, why and when) is only geography in time.

The methods of grounded theory and “structured dialogic design” (Flanagan and Christakis 2010) could be used to engage the stakeholders in a productive conversation; the newest techniques of categorisation, concept mapping, (big) data mining, information visualisation/virtualisation and PowerPoint presentation could be applied to stimulate their imagination; and much could be learned from those having first-hand experience in operations—and/or project management. First and foremost, however, Sinologists (presumed to be highly competent to translate) and China oriented scientists willing to team up with each other should consult people versed in network—and (complex) systems science. For these are the fast evolving fields of research that may provide a conceptual framework within which the closely intertwined patterns of China can be described and analysed in a meaningful way. What is more, these are the disciplines that can play a crucial role in understanding any country/nation and, ultimately, *die ganze verknötete und vernetzte Welt*, which is—we hope those involved in global, or international (relations), studies will really realise it—a hypercomplex system of complex systems of complex systems in the cosmos (the grand total).¹⁷

¹⁷ For network science, see Newman (2010), and visit www.barabasilab.com and www.cnn.group.cam.ac.uk. For the science(s) of systems, see Ramage and Shipp (2009), Hofkirchner (2009), and Capra and Luisi (2014). In addition, visit www.iss.org, www.ifsr.org, www.iascys.org and www.collegepublications.co.uk/systems. For a short cut through the vast literature on the science(s) of complex systems, visit [www.springer.com/physics/complexity](http://www.springer.com/physics/complexity?SGWID=0-40619-6-127747-0)? SGWID=0-40619-6-127747-0. In addition, see note 8 and 9. More than a decade ago, Taylor (2001) captured a whole new *Zeitgeist* in the making.

Multidisciplinarity is certainly not the solution to the problem of Western Sinology. Changing from the *mile-wide-but-inch-deep* approach of the generalist ('China study') to the *mile-deep-but-inch-wide* approach of juxtaposed partial studies ('Chinese studies'), one gets out of the frying pan into the fire. (Western) Sinologists should decisively act, attempt to engage the interest of scientists from various quarters, and treat China as a *Ganzheit*, as a territory-bound, history-moulded and goal-directed totality of identifiable and yet interdependent actors and factors. The study of China, in particular the long overdue interdisciplinary study of its modernisation,¹⁸ should be **mile-wide-and-mile-deep**, and the most important words should be "coordination" and "integration". The dilemma as to whether to take the road to "knowing nothing about everything" or to "knowing everything about nothing" in respect of the country will then be broken, and both the wood and the trees will be seen. Firmly distancing itself from multidisciplinary research, the study of China we have in mind requires a well-thought-out, perfectly balanced division of labour, *i.e.* the specialisation of cooperating individuals valued by Adam Smith and Émile Durkheim. Parts and whole, the reader will remember, are mutually implicated and inseparable from each other. It takes two different persons to perform a *pas de deux*. Entangled, *Yin* and *Yang* form *Taiji*, the fundamental concept that was created in ancient China and has been visualised as the suggestive ☯ diagram but that the West appears to have great difficulty in understanding. Working together as a scientific team informed about the latest developments in (complex) systems—and network science is the key to understanding China in and of itself, to comprehending the country taken as a single but not isolated or separated entity.

The change to interdisciplinary research in the study of China will be a paradigm shift. Reading John King Fairbank's widely acclaimed book *China: A New History* (Belknap, 1992), one might be impressed by the ease with which the great American China-scholar wrote about all kinds of subjects related to the country he had fallen in love with. However, it should not be overlooked that Professor Fairbank, whose well-known students were Benjamin Schwartz, Mary C. Wright, Rhoads Murphey, David Nivison, Albert Feuerwerker, Merle Goldman, Thomas Metzger, Philip Kuhn, Paul Cohen, Orville Schell, Andrew Nathan and Ross Terrill (to name but a few influential Sinologists), is to blame for

¹⁸ The key question here is: **Can China become a modern nation without liberty?** For "liberty", "*liberté*" or "*Freiheit*", explore Wikipedia. Schelling (1809) and Lisin (1995) are must readings for Chinese intellectuals. See Kuijper (2013).

encroaching upon foreign territory, for having entered without announcement/permission the domains of professionals. Now let J.K. Fairbank & Co. be a legal person with many cross-communicating heads, each graduated in, and familiar with the history of, geography, demography, archaeology, linguistics, literary studies, economics, agronomy, (corporate, public and/or international) finance, business administration, political science, law, military studies, medicine, psychology, sociology, anthropology, mythology, pedagogy, semiotics, cybernetics, informatics, communication studies, transportation studies, religious studies, *Kunstwissenschaft*, energy studies, ecology (sustainability science) or philosophy, and—common denominator—having mainly research interest in a particular, discipline related aspect of China. We dare say this scientific, the university spirit epitomising community, by focusing on the process of finding answers to carefully formulated shared questions and then pooling the resources of its members, would be able to produce a book on the complex and multi-faceted history of the country entirely different from, and more thoroughly researched than, the one written by JKF, provided the poly-dimensional mapping project is well managed, provided the scientific orchestra is well conducted. Were such a comprehensive, diasynchronically focused book (series) published, the giant step from multi- to interdisciplinary research and production would have been taken, a decisive move those subscribing to the fundamental idea of *Das Bauhaus* would loudly applaud but no automobile—, aircraft—, or spacecraft manufacturer would be surprised at. Having only superficially dealt with this matter of utmost importance, we leave it to be further discussed at the highest echelon of the world's top universities.¹⁹

Conclusion

With philosophy, mathematics, science and technology changing their character, the study of China should be lifted onto a higher plane, higher than what 'China experts' at the School of Oriental [*sic*] and African Studies (SOAS), the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), the National Institute of Oriental [*sic*] Languages and Civilisations (INALCO), the Institute of Far Eastern [*sic*] Studies (RAS), the Brookings Institution, the University of California (Berkeley), the

¹⁹ In December last year, we sent a copy of this article to the current and a former director of the highly prestigious Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University. We suggested discussing the subject of the paper at the next "advisory committee" meeting. The former let us badly down; the latter, student of JKF, did not even care to respond to our e-mails. Nobody at this famous China policy advising centre seems to be interested in uplifting the study of China!

University of Tokyo, the East Asian Institute (Singapore), *Collège de France*, CECMC, *Academia Sinica* (Taipei), Fudan–, Tsinghua–, Columbia–, Princeton–, Stanford–, Yale–, Heidelberg–, Leiden–, Lund–, Aichi–, Keio–, Kyoto–, Jawaharlal Nehru– and/or Australian National University allegedly aim at; higher than the declared objective of the leadership of CCPN Global, that “unique global academic society for advancing the study of China and the Chinese from a comparative perspective”, launched in March 2013. If the purpose of Sinology, *Chinakunde*, Синология or *Chūgokugaku* is to make a fine weave, its approach should be diachronic and synchronic at the same time; it should be historical/longitudinal as well as cross-sectional/transversal. That is to say, those embarking on the study of China *as such* should take a leaf out of the historical sociologist’s manual; they should from the very outset bear in mind that *paths* and *patterns* are point-counterpointedly related, on macro-, meso- and microscale.

With each and every one of the cultural sciences beginning to realise that without the help of the other neither will be able to proceed very far, **the heyday of Sinology is yet to come**. However, this crucial point (*Wende!*) in the history and evolution of that odd field of research called “China study”, or “Chinese Studies”, cannot be reached until one thing has been accomplished: the official opening of a truly scientific, genuinely interdisciplinary, and professionally managed China research centre, this being an **Institute for Advanced China Study** fitting neatly into the university imagined by Elkana and Klöpper (2012), affiliated with a yet to be established International Union of Area/Country Studies, and linked up with the global e-infrastructure. Meanwhile, the organisation of an international conference on (comprehending, and coping with) the complexity of China, *i.e.* a world forum co-organised by Associations/Societies of Sinologists (e.g. EACS) and really committed to improving the current state of the study of China, might be worth considering. “Really”, because the high-profile “World Forum on China Studies”, co-sponsored by the State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China and the Shanghai Municipal Government, is a complete farce, a shameless show of partisanship.²⁰ The active participants in the *onsite* and/or *online* conference/congress we are thinking of, especially the

²⁰ It should be noted that the Chinese Communist, or Capitalist (?), Party, used to falsify the history of China and pursuing a policy of *chanxin* (mind binding) rather than *chanzu* (foot binding), attempts, by any means possible, to prevent social and human scientists from doing serious research in/on the country—a major subject “China experts” thinking of their next application for a visa to visit China refuse to discuss at public meetings and/or do not dare to write about.

younger generation among them, will undoubtedly benefit from a fundamental, critical, open, and professionally moderated discussion.

Phrases like “systems thinking”, “research synthesis”, “nonlinear behavior”, “circular causality”, “agent-based modeling”, “pattern formation”, “data compression”, “level of analysis”, “concept mapping”, “upper ontology”, “conceptual modeling”, “knowledge integration,—cartography, and—management”, “network evolution”, “sub/superlinear scaling”, “system dynamics”, “scientific collaboration”, “soft computing”, “multi-formalism modeling”, “intelligent information systems”, “e-research” and “semantic web” are increasingly used, not only in the natural but also in the cultural sciences. The main reason for this is the closing of the gap that has been yawning between the two worlds. This deliberately provocative article is nothing but a wake-up call for ‘China experts’, not only in Europe and the USA but also elsewhere, to be aware of this and to act accordingly, that is, to make the complexity turn in order to reveal the *whole* elephant. It has been our intention throughout the paper to convince the reader that there is an elevated place (a meta position) where the huge body and bewildering variety of data on a country can be compressed into a falsifiable or refutable theory, where multiplicity (*multa*) can be turned into simplicity (*multum*), where—in the case at issue—a breathtaking view of the whole of China can be gained. At that high altitude, long-held convictions will be disestablished and the Eureka effect, the *Aha-Erlebnis* will be, that—by seeing both the many in the one and the one in the many; by realising that kinds of fruit, like apples and oranges, can be compared—one finally “com-prehends” (*fasst zusammen*). Beautiful and profound is, therefore, the old Chinese proverb: “the pattern is one, the parts are different” (理一分殊).²¹

China, being a universe the centre of which is everywhere (like an organism the hereditary material of which is encountered in each and every one of its cells), should be studied 1) professionally (*i.e.* by China oriented people not only running the gamut of the natural and cultural sciences, but also taking full advantage of the latest in information and communications technology), 2) on the basis of reliable/primary sources, and 3) with the translation skill of sinologists being put to good use. The country (indeed, *each* country) should be approached respectfully

²¹ In 1970, the author wrote a MA thesis on ‘the key character 理’. The 264-page piece of writing has never been published but its subject has intrigued him ever since, because 理 (pattern, structure), he learned, is intimately connected with 道 (path, the way of nature). For recent research on 理, see Liu (2005), Krummel (2010) and Rošker (2012).

(account also being taken of its history), looked at with an open, unbiased mind, and presented in a critical but fair and honest way. China is a *Gestalt*; it is a dense and intricate network of ties developed over a long period of time; it is an organisation of numerous agents/individuals having different, often convoluted and sometimes strained relations with each other; it is a cluster of institutions (commonly cognised patterns by which societal games are recurrently played and expected to be played); it is a complex system of evolving hierarchical systems; it is a non-linear universe, to be studied as such by China oriented, truly collaborating experts from various disciplines, linguistics, or literary theory/criticism, being only one of them. China is a partly self-organising system, to be defined in terms of space, time, structure and agency; it is an entirety, a *holon*, to be described holographically. China, “*l'autre du monde indo-européen*”, somehow *behaves*; it has a personality, symbolised by its flag and national anthem, and embodied/personified by its head of state, because its people have a sense of belonging (sustained by the Chinese script)²² and constitute a values-sharing community of destiny; it has its own particular culture, the *rayonnement* of which cannot be measured. The country has unique, emergent properties, that cannot be attributed to any of its constituent subsystems; it is an *individuum*, something that cannot be divided up without losing its history and geography-related identity.²³

The argument advanced in this bold article boils down to a single, deceptively simple statement: without scientific collaboration, there will be no (empirically and theoretically founded) knowledge of a country. To know a man, it has been said, you have to walk a mile in his shoes; and to know a city, you have to walk a thousand miles. To know a country, we would like to add, you need nothing less than a scientific team. Our inspiration came from the work of Ludwig von Bertalanffy, the creator of *Allgemeine Systemlehre* who has been described as “the least known intellectual titan of the 20th century”. His *Leitmotiv* was “unity-through-diversity” (providing space for different perspectives while sharing a common goal).²⁴ Our hope is that “the brick we have thrown will attract a

²² The reader will remember Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s speech *Das Schrifttum als geistiger Raum der Nation* (1927).

²³ See Blitstein (2008). For “identity”, see Parfit (1984), Straub (2004), Descombes (2013), and Gasser and Stefan (2013);

²⁴ Visit www.issf.org/lumLVB.htm and www.bcass.org. In addition, see note 17. For multiple *interacting* perspectives, visit <http://www.lhn.uni-hamburg.de/article/multiperspectivity>. Philosophically seasoned readers should also visit <http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perspektivismus> and <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anekantavada> (nota bene: the references are the German and English wikipedia respectively).

jadestone from others” (抛砖引玉)—for the improvement of *intercultural* and *international* understanding, for more peace and harmony in this hyperconnected yet deeply troubled world.²⁵

CHINA ORIENTED EXPERTS FROM ALL DISCIPLINES, UNITE!

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²⁵ Taking the study of countries (not to be confused with *Kulturkunde*, *Kulturologie* or *Kulturwissenschaft*) to a higher level, we believe, will make a critically important contribution to understanding the dynamic nature–culture /society interactions, the negative manifestations of which are often referred to as “the human predicament”. See Ehrlich and Ehrlich (2013), Kelly (2013), Parker (2014) and McCabe (2014); visit www.clubofrome.org, www.uncsd2012.org, www.ecologyandsociety.org, www.energysustainsoc.com, www.millenniumassessment.org, www.resalliance.org, www.globalchange.gov, www.futureearth.info, www.isecoeco.org, www.earth.columbia.edu, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/sustainability>, www.stockholmresilience.org and www.beijer.kva.se. Conversely, a detailed understanding of those interactions, in particular thorough knowledge of the global-regional-local problem attendant on them, will help to better comprehend the complexities of countries.

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Book Reviews

Huang, Chun-chieh 黃俊傑, ed.:

***The Study of East Asian Confucianism: Retrospect and Prospect* (東亞儒學研究的回顧與展望)**

(525 pages, 2005, Taipei: National Taiwan University Press)

The present book has been published as a part of the research program of East Asian Confucianisms in the Institute of Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences, National Taiwan University, which has been established at the National Taiwan University in 2006. The research program was focused upon East Asian Confucianisms and it resulted, among others, in seven extensive book series.

The book *Retrospect and Prospects of the Research in Eastern Asian Confucianism* has been edited and published by Chun-chieh Huang, one of the most well-known experts on Confucianism in contemporary Taiwan. The editor (who is also author of several contributions included in the book), is National Chair Professor of Ministry of Education, Taiwan, a research fellow at the Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy at the Academia Sinica in Taipei, Honorary President of Chinese Association for General Education and Dean of the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences at the National Taiwan University in Taipei. In his function of the director of the Program of East Asian Confucianisms at this university he has edited several books on this traditional stream of thought in the scope of his comprehensive book collection on East Asian Civilizations (東亞文明研究叢書) which has been brought to life due to the increasing relevance of these regions on the global level.

In the 21st century, East Asian societies have namely redraw the map of progress: the balance of economic—and increasingly also political—power, is shifting from the Euro-American to the East Asian areas. This shift confronts us with many new questions linked to transformations of material and intellectual paradigms, defining not only the development of East Asian societies as such, but also decidedly influencing international relations. Strategic solutions to these issues need to consider broader perspectives within the context of particular cultural backgrounds. They are not limited to economic and ecological issues, but also include political and social roles of ideologies and culturally conditioned values, representing the central epistemological grounds on which the most

characteristic and enduring institutions of these societies are resting. Hence, the series is dealing with many crucial aspects defining these idea foundations, including a several volumes dedicated to the research of Confucian theories and practices. The present book represents one of the most comprehensive volumes of this series and an indispensable source of valuable information for every scholar dealing with East Asian Confucianism.

Speaking of Eastern Asia as a concept, however, can be a risky issue. Thus, Prof. Huang Chun-chieh clarifies the notion already in the Foreword. He points out that such a clarification is important, for in the academic worlds within these areas, there are still many prejudices and “unnecessary misunderstandings” regarding the notion of Eastern Asia. The concept has namely often been understood as implying certain historical connotations linked to the Japanese imperial tendencies in the respective geographic area. Prof. Huang lays stress upon the fact that in the present anthology, the term East Asia has by no means been applied in such a universalistic and/or essential manner. It has rather been understood as a term, implying multicultural dimensions and rooted in a free interaction between multifarious Eastern Asian cultures on the one hand, and in the historical contemporary interrelations between them and other cultures of our common world.

Thus, the notion of Eastern Asia as has been implied in the present anthology, is not following the strict demarcation lines between the “Center” and “Periphery” as applied in Wallerstein’s world system theory and similar earlier discourses within the postcolonial studies. In the two millenniums of history which delineates the scholarly research of which the present book is consisting, these demarcation lines were never static enough to form such categories; they were a dynamic part of mutually influencing cultures and histories and have in their courses undergone several profound changes.

In my opinion, however, the importance of the book introduced in the present review is easy to understand, especially regarding the fact that for centuries, Confucianism has represented the central foundation of cultures in the majority of East Asian regions and that it still forms many aspects of their contemporary value systems. Here, we could mention another common cultural ground which bounded the area together during longstanding centuries, namely the pictographic writing.

The main goal of the present anthology is thus twofold: first, through the lens of researching their common Confucian grounds, it aims to introduce comparisons

and mutual influence between the major East Asian countries, namely China, Japan and Korea, and, secondly to evaluate the interaction in this research field between these countries and the Western world.

The anthology consists of nine comprehensive studies, dealing with various aspects of East Asian research in Confucianism. It opens with a study written by Huang Chun-chieh, the editor of the entire anthology. This study contains a detailed general introduction of the present state and the future prospects of interpreting Confucian classics in Eastern Asia. The introduction and the critical evaluation of the present state in these research areas forms a basis that enables the author to delineate the most probable future directions and guidelines in the research of Confucian classics on the one hand, and to design the most relevant research questions still open to investigations in this field that has, as the study shows, an immense potential for further development. As the author points out, the study does not represent a catalogue of all works that were written in this research field in Eastern Asia, but rather a theoretical evaluation of the respective discourses, focusing upon problems, linked to their scope, their contents, as well as to their cultural and social backgrounds, mainly aiming to raise awareness on these issues.

The second study that has been compiled by the Japanese scholar Masayuki Sato, contains six chronologically structured sections introducing the Japanese research in Xunzi during the 20th century. This overview does not represent a critical evaluation of the material, but rather aims to introduce the main Japanese currents, works and authors, working in this research field, to the Chinese academic readership. This section is followed by a chapter on the Ritual books from the Tang and Song dynasties through the lens of the controversial thesis, according to which the end of the Tang and the beginning of the Song dynasties represent the demarcation line between ancient China and the Chinese middle age. Chang Wen-Chang, the author of these six chapters has based his investigation on previous research results derived from Japanese scholars who carried out a broad scope of research in the reforms and social transformation that have been taking place in both abovementioned dynasties. The relatively detailed analyses of their ritual books which, of course, were containing the main criteria and central codes for formal social interactions, were carried out in order to shed further light upon the abovementioned controversy.

Lee Bong Kyoo introduced some focal points and central issues guiding the Korean research in Confucianism in the next chapter. This chapter concentrates especially upon the Korean investigations and elaboration of the Jeong Yak-yong's (wider known as Dasan) teachings, that have been later even more extensively elaborated in Huang Chun-chieh's book *The East Asian Perspective of the Dasan Discourse and the Korean Confucianism* (東亞視域中的茶山學與朝鮮儒學) which has been published in 2006 in the scope of the same series as the present anthology. Divided into seven different sections, this chapter offers a comprehensive introduction of the Korean research material on this important scholar who wrote highly influential books about philosophy, science and theories of government, held significant administrative positions, and was noted as a poet. His philosophical position is often identified with the Neo-Confucian school of practical learning 實學 (in Korean: Silhak), focusing upon the research in his philosophy, his interpretations of the Confucian classics and rituality, as well as on his theories on statecraft.

The next chapter, written by Hung Yueh Lan, is dedicated to the research and a critical evaluation of Japanese Confucianism. In six sections, it analyses the post-war Japanese interpretations of Masao Maruyama's classical work *Investigations in the Japanese Political Thought* and establishes a fundamental critique of Maruyama's theories. These theories were rooted in a search for the specific origins of Japanese enlightenment and modernity through the analysis of Dong Zhongshu's reformed Confucianism, known under the name Dezhou Confucianism. Through this critique and through the exposition of certain errors in interpretation, the author aims to underline the future guidelines for possible directions in researching Dezhou Confucianism. These essays are followed by another chapter which also focuses upon the Confucian research in Japan. It is written by Kun-Chiang Chang and mainly deals with the Japanese research in the teachings and discursive developments of the most important represent of the Neo-Confucian School of the Heart-mind (Xin xue 心學), namely with Wang Yangming's work. The chapter which is subdivided in eight different sections, points out the importance of this Japanese research field due to its contribution to the widening and the internationalization of the influential sphere of this important philosopher. Because of respective Japanese research works, Wang Yangming's philosophy and its theoretical implications were not only upgraded, but also placed in a broader East Asian context. In this sense, they represent a good example of

fruitful cooperation and interaction between particular cultures that were (and still are) profoundly influenced by Confucian philosophy.

Chapter 7, which was written by Shyu Shing-Ching, deals with the Chinese and Japanese research of the works created by Zhu Shunshui 朱舜水 (Shu Shun-Sui, 1600–1682), a Chinese scholar from the Ming dynasty who lived and worked in Japan, thus contributing immensely to the exchange between China and Japan, as well as to Japanese education and intellectual history.

The next chapter that has also been written by the main editor of this anthology, Prof. Chun-Chieh Huang, represents an important excursus to the main line of writings that have primarily been focused upon East Asian research in Confucianism. It namely deals with the post-war Confucian research that has been carried out in the period between 1950 and 1980 by sinologists from the USA. This excursus is significant because it widens the horizon of the central conceptualization of the discussed book which is based upon exposing the intercultural dimensions of Confucian research. The author points out that in contrast to European Sinology which dates back to the 13th century and which has been well documented especially regarding its research in the area of Confucian studies, the North American research in this field has hitherto not been considered enough. Thus, he decided to order and introduce to the wider Chinese academic public the immense amount of respective research work implemented by American sinologists, especially regarding the fact that after the WWII, the leading guidelines of Chinese, and also of Confucian studies in respect of both, their methodology as well as their contents, were gradually shifted from the European to the North American region. Previous research that has been heavily relying upon the philological research has thus been replaced by more topical methods that concentrate upon placing the particular subject matters of Confucian research into their respective social, political and historical contexts. Chun-Chieh Huang points out that after the beginning of the seventies of the previous century, American sinologists have, however, also begun to apply certain modernized text bounded research methods, implying the analyses of conceptual and axiological aspects of Confucian teachings. The author concludes that both methods that have still been applied by foreign scholars are mutually complementary and can contribute a lot to the further development of Confucian research not only in the East Asian, but also in the wider, global context.

The last, eight chapter of the anthology was written by Chao-yang Pan introduces the specific features of the post-war Confucian research in Taiwan, focusing upon both, its central problems as well as upon its broader significance. The author points out that Taiwanese research in traditional Chinese philosophy cannot be divided from its social and political contexts including its colonial past as well as its Westernized present. Hence, the chapter exposes that a reconstruction of the core traditional values prevailing in classical Chinese philosophy and their incorporation into the modern Taiwanese society belongs to the main tasks that should direct the future Taiwanese research in Confucianism.

We could add that in this way, modern investigations in Confucianism could be significantly contributing to the re-establishment of the local cultural identities, shaping new, modernized images not only of the Taiwanese, but also of Chinese and East Asian cultural heritages. The book that has been introduced in the present review is representing an important step on this significant path of academic inquiry.

Jana S. Rošker

Huang, Chun-chieh:

Humanism in East Asian Confucian Contexts

Edited by Jörn Rüsen, Oliver Kozlarek, Jürgen Straub, and Huang Chun-Chieh
(165 pages, 2010, transcript Verlag, Bielefeld)

This book deals with the most relevant issue connected to the question of the specific Confucian humanism. Not only many Western, but also several East Asian contemporary scholars are namely still following the presumption according to which humanism is a specific Western concept, deeply rooted in the European intellectual history. The book, written by Professor Huang Chun-Chieh, challenges this Eurocentric presumption and shows through brilliant analyses that humanism can manifest itself in various cultural forms, including the Confucian one. And not only this: the author also clearly illuminates the fact that humanism is not only an inherent part, but rather the very essence of classical Confucian thought, even though it manifests itself in a form that is quite different from the forms that can be found in the extensively individualized contexts of European humanistic tradition.

The author of this book, Prof. Huang Chun-Chieh, is a distinguished National Chair Professor of Ministry of Education, the Dean of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences at the National Taiwan University (NTU), and the Director of the Program of East Asian Confucianisms at the same academic institution. He is also a research fellow at the Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy of the Taiwanese Academia Sinica in Taipei. He is a well-known expert in traditional and modern Confucianism and has written and edited numerous excellent works in this research field.

The book *Humanism in East Asian Confucian Contexts* was published in English and can thus reach a wider readership in Western, and especially in European academic circles. It consist of 5 chapters and 3 appendices and represents modified and upgraded studies dealing with diverse traditions of East Asian Confucian humanisms.

The author opens every chapter with an introduction which offers the conceptualization and the structure of each topic and closes with a conclusion which summarizes particular cross sections of each delineated content.

The extensive and very informative introduction guides us through the chapters of the book, offering a brilliant overlook over the crucial concepts in the East Asian Confucian thought. The author places these concepts into a wider cultural context, explaining their developments in the entire geopolitical region which has historically been influenced by Confucianism, focusing upon the area of China, Japan and Korea.

The second chapter, entitled The Unity of Body and Mind, explains the basis of Confucian discourses that manifest themselves through intertwined relations of the human body and the heart-mind (*xin*) and their connections to the social environment. The author shows why and how this unity is thoroughly representing the basics of Confucian humanist spirit which is rooted in the continuum of mind and body, in the harmony between oneself and the others, in the unity of heaven and humanity, and, above all, in a profound historical consciousness. The bodily recognition of the heart-mind and its relation to the culture and society is essential for the practice of self-cultivation which is a platform for regulation and pacification of “everything that is under Heaven (*tianxia*),” i.e. of the social order.

In this context, the author refers to Xu Fuguan’s concept of mesophysics which places the heart-mind (*xin*) in the center of human reasoning, allowing men to obtain an insight into the basic cosmic structures, simultaneously offering them possibilities of proper value judgments. Here, Xu follows the Mencian distinction of great and small bodies (*dati*, *xiaoti*) which refers to the Confucian binary category of the nobleman (*junzi*) and small man (*xiaoren*). Only when reasoning follows the bodily heart-mind, one can become a great human person, the nobleman or *junzi*. The body is then perceived as a manifestation of spiritual cultivation or the cultivation of humanness (*ren*). What Mencius called the great body is the reasoning performed by our bodily heart-mind which consists of the enduring quest for self-improvement and self-cultivation. This self-cultivation is regarded as a cultivation of the unity of body and mind.

The third chapter is based on the conceptualization of this unity and places it into its cultural and political context, defining it as the human moral self. The chapter further deals with the relation between the self and the others in terms of intellectual interactions between China and Japan from the 17th century onwards.

The next chapter discusses the relationship between the human person and nature, focusing upon their connection to *ren* (humanness). Since every human being is an inherent part of nature, as an organic and holistic whole which is

constantly in dynamic motion, he/she constantly seeks harmony with it. As far as *ren* (humanness) is immanent in both, the human person and the nature or cosmos, it manifests itself as a moral imperative that strives for the harmonization of personal and cosmic aspects of being. The author exposes the fact that in traditional Confucian discourses, this harmonization should thoroughly be based on the self-realization of the individual moral self. By acting in accordance with humanness (*ren*), the individual could be united with Heaven/Nature (*tian ren heyi*) and thus comprehend the genuine meaning and value of existence.

This section is followed by the last, fifth chapter which clarifies some general questions related to the historical consciousness which underlies the theoretical platform of the central topic. Following Qian Mu's interpretation of historical reasoning, the author points out that in order to understand the social, political and cultural background of Confucian humanism, it is by no means sufficient to analyze it merely through the lens of the Aristotelian concept of *homo politicus*, nor exclusively through the optics of the modern (Western) concept of *homo economicus*. In this context, the author draws our attention to the fact that humans are both, shaping and being shaped by history; thus, in understanding and interpreting traditional functions of Confucianism, the concept of *homo historicus* also plays an important role.

The second and the fifth chapter of the book are deepened and explained in a more profound and detailed way by three appendices that follow the last chapter.

The present book is by no means limited to clarifications of the basic concepts delineated above. Moreover, Huang Chun-Chieh's contribution clearly shows that East Asian Confucianisms are, in fact, specific forms of East Asian humanism. The fact that the author gives Confucianism the plural form is linked to the urgent need to highlight that Confucianism is not a monolithic entity, but has various forms in regard to the particular cultural and political backgrounds. Furthermore, the author wants to express the dynamic and creative ability of Confucian thought throughout the East Asian intellectual histories. Prof. Huang's contribution is of great importance to the contemporary understanding of classical and modern Confucian thought and its significance for possible future developments in the global world which is confronted with a profound crisis of values during the last decades.

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