186 KB60 KB196920252024Šuster, Daniloštevilka:2letnik:56str. 317-339ISSN:0587-5161DOI:10.26493/2630-4082.56.317-339COBISSID:228536067URN:URN:NBN:SI:doc-3TR9Q4J9slZaložba Univerze na PrimorskemAnthropos (Ljubljana)epistemska možnostepistemske vrlinenevednostskepticizemširokomiselnostvzdržanje sodbeEpistemologija vrlin in Nezemljani|Open-mindedness is a central epistemic virtue. Sometimes it is inferred as a conclusion in the scheme: ‘No one has disproved that p. It is possible that p is true. Therefore, we should keep an open mind as regards p.’ The conclusion is unjustified when we commence with ignorance (an intellectual failing), infer weak epistemic possibility (bare compatibility with the knowledge base) and conclude with mere openness. However, radical skeptical arguments are not fallacious, but they are not cogent either, one of the premises can be rationally refuted. Moreover, even a weaker type of possibility, if serious, can justify inquiry. The seriousness of an epistemic possibility sometimes depends on pragmatic factors of the epistemic situation (pragmatic encroachment). I accept the distinction between suspension (active, goal oriented, connected with inquiry) and agnosticism (merely being neutral). Some questions remain inherently unanswerable, serving as a testament to our deep ignorance—a stark contrast to the rationality of open-mindedness. Epistemic dilemmas are illustrated with the con troversies surrounding UAP (unrecognized anomalous phenomena)Širokomiselnost je osrednja epistemska vrlina. V članku analiziram izpeljavo: »Nihče ni dokazal, da ne p. Mogoče je, da p. Zato bi morali biti širokomiselni glede resnice p.« Sklep je neupravičen, kadar sklepanje začenjamo z ignoranco (intelektualna pomanjkljivost), izpeljemo šibko epistemsko možnost (golo združljivost z védenjem) in sklenemo z golo odprtostjo. A tudi nevednost, ki ni ignoranca, ne vodi vedno do krepke epistemske možnosti. Skeptični argumenti niso prepričevalni (prvi premisi lahko utemeljeno nasprotujemo), vendar niso zmotni (ne temeljijo na ignoranci). Resnost dane možnosti je včasih odvisna od pragmatičnih dejavnikov. Sprejemam razliko med agnosticizmom kot nevtralno epistemsko držo in raziskovalno usmerjenim vzdržanjem sodbe. Nekatera vprašanja so nerešljiva, gre za globoko nevednost, zaradi katere širokomiselnost ni upravičena. Spoznavnoteoretske dileme ponazarjam z aktualno temo neprepoznanih anomalnih pojavov (nap, angl. uap – unindentified anomalous phenomenaTEXTznanstveno časopisjejournalsSlovenian National E-content AggregatorNational and University Library of SloveniaSlovensko filozofsko društvo