439 KB54 KB201820252024Justin, Martinštevilka:2letnik:28str. 241-262DOI:10.18690/analiza.28.2.241-262.2024ISSN:1408-2969COBISSID_HOST:246331651URN:URN:NBN:SI:doc-4ZJX83MQenUniverza v Mariboru, Univerzitetna založbaAnaliza (Ljubljana)dokazila višjega redaepistemologijaepistemologyhigher-order evidenceracionalnostrationalityscienceznanostHigher-order evidence in science| some problematic consequences of steadfastness and level-splitting| Dokazi višjega reda v znanosti| nekaj problematičnih posledicodločnostiin razdruževanja ravni|Despite our best efforts, we often fail to act in a perfectly rational manner. Recently, some epistemologists have suggested that we should admit our failings and develop a modest epistemology that would take our fallibility seriously. This includes accounting for the role of evidence of our irrationality, usually called higher-order evidence. It seems intuitive that modest reasoners should take such evidence into account. However, it turns out that incorporating higher-order evidence into a principled theory of what rationality requires is not an easy task. In this paper, I first review the debate about higher-order evidence, describing in detail the puzzle of higher-order evidence and the main positions about it in the literature. Then, I provide two novel examples of higher-order evidence, taken from science. I argue that these examples put pressure on the views that reject the role of higher-order evidence. These views commit themselves to the conclusion that some common scientific practices, such as evaluating evidence in systematic reviews or even running null hypothesis significance tests, are irrationalKljub prizadevanju po nasprotnem pogosto ravnamo iracionalno. V zadnjem času so nekateri epistemologi predlagali, da priznamo svoje napake in poskušali razviti skromno epistemologijo, ki bo v zakup vzela dejstva o naši iracionalnosti. Pomemben del takšne epistemologije predstavlja tudi opis vloge dokazil o naši iracionalnosti, t. i. dokazil višjega reda. Intuitivno se zdi, da bi morali pri tvorjenju prepričanj takšna dokazila upoštevati. Vendar pa se izkaže, da vključevanje dokazil višjega reda v teorijo racionalnosti ni lahka naloga. Vtem prispevku najprej pregledam razpravo o dokazilih višjega reda, podrobno opišem problem dokazil višjega reda in predstavim glavne odgovore nanj. Nato predstavim dva nova primera dokazil višjega reda, vzeta iz znanosti. Trdim, da ta primera pod vprašaj postavljata stališča, ki zavračajo vlogo dokazov višjega reda. Ta stališča implicirajo, da so nekatere vsakdanje znanstvene prakse, kot sta vrednotenje dokazil v sistematičnih preglednih člankih ali celo izvajanje testov statistične značilnosti, iracionalneTEXTznanstveno časopisjejournalsSlovenian National E-content AggregatorNational and University Library of SloveniaDruštvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti