296 KB40 KB201820252025Jeršič, Aljaštevilka:1letnik:29str. 113-127DOI:10.18690/analiza.29.1.113-128.2025ISSN:1408-2969COBISSID_HOST:272964611URN:URN:NBN:SI:doc-DKSG3EJBslUniverza v Mariboru, Univerzitetna založbaAnaliza (Ljubljana)capitalismfeminist philosophyfeministična filozofijakapitalizemliberalismliberalizempornografijapornographySvobodaKleveta svobode, diskriminacija dostojanstva| Defamation of freedom, discrimination of dignity|In contemporary Western liberalism, freedom of expression is often elevated to a fundamental value that is supposed to protect the plurality of opinions and the autonomy of each individual. However, in the context of pornography, this ideal becomes entangled in its own contradictory web, where freedom of expression threatens to become a means of reinforcing inequality. This article problematizes the liberal understanding of such freedom, which, in the name of tolerance, often overlooks the power relations that condition this discourse. In the first part of the article, we present R. Dworkin's understanding of freedom as uncoerced choice and C. A. MacKinnon's feminist critique, which argues that pornography is not only freedom of expression but also a discourse in which freedom of expression turns into freedom of oppression. In the second part, we argue that liberal tolerance of content that degrades (especially female) bodies reveals the paradox of tolerance, which loses itself in fear of censorship. In conclusion, we emphasize that freedom without ethical responsibility does not liberate, but discriminatesV sodobnem liberalizmu zahodnega sveta se svoboda izražanja pogosto povzdiguje v temeljno vrednoto, ki naj bi varovala pluralnost mnenj ter avtonomijo vsakega posameznika. Vendar pa se v kontekstu pornografije ta ideal zaplete v lastno protislovno mrežo, kjer svobodi izražanja preti, da postane sredstvo utrjevanja neenakosti. Pričujoči članek problematizira predvsem liberalno razumevanje takšne svobode, ki v imenu tolerance pogosto spregleda razmerja moči, ki ta diskurz pogojuje. V prvem delu prispevka predstavimo razumevanje svobode R. Dworkina, kot neprisiljene izbire, in feministično kritiko C. A. MacKinnon, ki opozarja, da pornografija ni le svoboda izražanja, temveč diskurz, v katerem se svoboda izražanja prelevi v svobodo zatiranja. V drugem delu zagovarjamo stališče, da liberalna toleranca do vsebin, ki degradirajo (predvsem ženska) telesa, razkriva paradoks tolerance, ki v strahu pred cenzuro izgubi samo sebe. V zaključku zato poudarimo, da svoboda brez etične odgovornosti ne osvobaja, temveč diskriminiraTEXTznanstveno časopisjejournalsSlovenian National E-content AggregatorNational and University Library of SloveniaDruštvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti