369 KB59 KB201820252025Toplak, Aljošaštevilka:1letnik:29str. 49-72DOI:10.18690/analiza.29.1.49-72.2025ISSN:1408-2969COBISSID_HOST:272626947URN:URN:NBN:SI:doc-OJPLKQV9slUniverza v Mariboru, Univerzitetna založbaAnaliza (Ljubljana)Fenomenologijafenomenologija časafilozofija duhafilozofija jezikaphenomenology of mindphilosophy of languagephilosophy of timeAnaliza časa pri Wittgensteinu in Merleau-Pontyju| Analysis of time in Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty|I will argue that Wittgenstein distinguishes three senses in which we speak of seeing the content of our perception. These senses are: seeing in the literal sense, as colors and shapes; seeing in some consciously established regard, such as recognizing a rabbit in the duck-rabbit illusion; and seeing an aspect in some spontaneous regard. I will compare this starting point with the idea of the conceptual horizon, through which Merleau-Ponty interprets time as an existential situation. I will show the surprising similarities in the thought of these two philosophers, especially when they meet in the reflections in Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, where Wittgenstein imagines a hypothetical person who is “aspect- blind,” and the interpretation of the anomalous behavior of a patient suffering from brain damage, which we find in Merleau- Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. I will then situate Merleau- Ponty within the discourse surrounding three models of temporal consciousness, which I roughly divide into retentional, extensional, and kinematic models. I conclude the contribution with Wittgenstein’s distinction between time as a phenomenal and a public coordinate system. Through this, we will develop some fruitful images for thinking about the concept of timeTrdil bom, da Wittgenstein razloči tri smisle, v katerem govorimo, da vsebino naše zaznave vidimo. Ti smisli so: videti v dobesednem smislu, kot barve in oblike; videti v nekem zavestno vzpostavljenem oziru, kot prepoznati zajca v iluziji raca–zajec; ter videti v nekem spontanem oziru. To izhodišče bom primerjal z idejo pojmovnega horizonta, s katero Merleau-Ponty čas tolmači kot eksistencialno situacijo. Pokazal bom presenetljivo podobnosti misli dveh filozofov, še posebej, ko se srečata v razmislekih v Opazkah o filozofiji psihologije, kjer si Wittgenstein zamišlja hipotetičnega človeka, ki je »slep za pomene«, ter interpretaciji anomaličnega vedenja bolnika, ki trpi za možgansko poškodbo, ki jo najdemo v Merleau-Pontyjevi Fenomenologiji zaznave. Merleau-Pontyja bom nato umestil v diskurz okoli treh modelov časovne zavesti, ki jih grobo delim v retencijske, razsežnostne ter kinematske modele. Prispevek sklenem z Wittgensteinovo delitvijo med časom kot fenomenalnim in javnim koordinatnim sistemom. S tem si bomo izdelali nekaj plodovitih podob za razmišljanje o pojmu časaTEXTznanstveno časopisjejournalsSlovenian National E-content AggregatorNational and University Library of SloveniaDruštvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti