{"?xml":{"@version":"1.0"},"edm:RDF":{"@xmlns:dc":"http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/","@xmlns:edm":"http://www.europeana.eu/schemas/edm/","@xmlns:wgs84_pos":"http://www.w3.org/2003/01/geo/wgs84_pos","@xmlns:foaf":"http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/","@xmlns:rdaGr2":"http://rdvocab.info/ElementsGr2","@xmlns:oai":"http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/","@xmlns:owl":"http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#","@xmlns:rdf":"http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#","@xmlns:ore":"http://www.openarchives.org/ore/terms/","@xmlns:skos":"http://www.w3.org/2004/02/skos/core#","@xmlns:dcterms":"http://purl.org/dc/terms/","edm:WebResource":[{"@rdf:about":"http://www.dlib.si/stream/URN:NBN:SI:doc-OJPLKQV9/46ca123e-f6e6-41da-b891-2039ea0cf448/PDF","dcterms:extent":"369 KB"},{"@rdf:about":"http://www.dlib.si/stream/URN:NBN:SI:doc-OJPLKQV9/cf5d3221-bfc0-45ba-b26d-c521ec0bac40/TEXT","dcterms:extent":"59 KB"}],"edm:TimeSpan":{"@rdf:about":"2018-2025","edm:begin":{"@xml:lang":"en","#text":"2018"},"edm:end":{"@xml:lang":"en","#text":"2025"}},"edm:ProvidedCHO":{"@rdf:about":"URN:NBN:SI:doc-OJPLKQV9","dcterms:isPartOf":[{"@rdf:resource":"https://www.dlib.si/details/URN:NBN:SI:spr-QVBBDN4R"},{"@xml:lang":"sl","#text":"Analiza (Ljubljana)"}],"dcterms:issued":"2025","dc:creator":"Toplak, Aljoša","dc:format":[{"@xml:lang":"sl","#text":"številka:1"},{"@xml:lang":"sl","#text":"letnik:29"},{"@xml:lang":"sl","#text":"str. 49-72"}],"dc:identifier":["DOI:10.18690/analiza.29.1.49-72.2025","ISSN:1408-2969","COBISSID_HOST:272626947","URN:URN:NBN:SI:doc-OJPLKQV9"],"dc:language":"sl","dc:publisher":{"@xml:lang":"sl","#text":"Univerza v Mariboru, Univerzitetna založba"},"dc:subject":[{"@xml:lang":"sl","#text":"Fenomenologija"},{"@xml:lang":"sl","#text":"fenomenologija časa"},{"@xml:lang":"sl","#text":"filozofija duha"},{"@xml:lang":"sl","#text":"filozofija jezika"},{"@xml:lang":"en","#text":"phenomenology of mind"},{"@xml:lang":"en","#text":"philosophy of language"},{"@xml:lang":"en","#text":"philosophy of time"}],"dcterms:temporal":{"@rdf:resource":"2018-2025"},"dc:title":{"@xml:lang":"sl","#text":"Analiza časa pri Wittgensteinu in Merleau-Pontyju| Analysis of time in Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty|"},"dc:description":[{"@xml:lang":"sl","#text":"I will argue that Wittgenstein distinguishes three senses in which we speak of seeing the content of our perception. These senses are: seeing in the literal sense, as colors and shapes; seeing in some consciously established regard, such as recognizing a rabbit in the duck-rabbit illusion; and seeing an aspect in some spontaneous regard. I will compare this starting point with the idea of the conceptual horizon, through which Merleau-Ponty interprets time as an existential situation. I will show the surprising similarities in the thought of these two philosophers, especially when they meet in the reflections in Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, where Wittgenstein imagines a hypothetical person who is “aspect- blind,” and the interpretation of the anomalous behavior of a patient suffering from brain damage, which we find in Merleau- Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. I will then situate Merleau- Ponty within the discourse surrounding three models of temporal consciousness, which I roughly divide into retentional, extensional, and kinematic models. I conclude the contribution with Wittgenstein’s distinction between time as a phenomenal and a public coordinate system. Through this, we will develop some fruitful images for thinking about the concept of time"},{"@xml:lang":"sl","#text":"Trdil bom, da Wittgenstein razloči tri smisle, v katerem govorimo, da vsebino naše zaznave vidimo. Ti smisli so: videti v dobesednem smislu, kot barve in oblike; videti v nekem zavestno vzpostavljenem oziru, kot prepoznati zajca v iluziji raca–zajec; ter videti v nekem spontanem oziru. To izhodišče bom primerjal z idejo pojmovnega horizonta, s katero Merleau-Ponty čas tolmači kot eksistencialno situacijo. Pokazal bom presenetljivo podobnosti misli dveh filozofov, še posebej, ko se srečata v razmislekih v Opazkah o filozofiji psihologije, kjer si Wittgenstein zamišlja hipotetičnega človeka, ki je »slep za pomene«, ter interpretaciji anomaličnega vedenja bolnika, ki trpi za možgansko poškodbo, ki jo najdemo v Merleau-Pontyjevi Fenomenologiji zaznave. Merleau-Pontyja bom nato umestil v diskurz okoli treh modelov časovne zavesti, ki jih grobo delim v retencijske, razsežnostne ter kinematske modele. Prispevek sklenem z Wittgensteinovo delitvijo med časom kot fenomenalnim in javnim koordinatnim sistemom. S tem si bomo izdelali nekaj plodovitih podob za razmišljanje o pojmu časa"}],"edm:type":"TEXT","dc:type":[{"@xml:lang":"sl","#text":"znanstveno časopisje"},{"@xml:lang":"en","#text":"journals"},{"@rdf:resource":"http://www.wikidata.org/entity/Q361785"}]},"ore:Aggregation":{"@rdf:about":"http://www.dlib.si/?URN=URN:NBN:SI:doc-OJPLKQV9","edm:aggregatedCHO":{"@rdf:resource":"URN:NBN:SI:doc-OJPLKQV9"},"edm:isShownBy":{"@rdf:resource":"http://www.dlib.si/stream/URN:NBN:SI:doc-OJPLKQV9/46ca123e-f6e6-41da-b891-2039ea0cf448/PDF"},"edm:rights":{"@rdf:resource":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"edm:provider":"Slovenian National E-content Aggregator","edm:intermediateProvider":{"@xml:lang":"en","#text":"National and University Library of Slovenia"},"edm:dataProvider":{"@xml:lang":"sl","#text":"Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti"},"edm:object":{"@rdf:resource":"http://www.dlib.si/streamdb/URN:NBN:SI:doc-OJPLKQV9/maxi/edm"},"edm:isShownAt":{"@rdf:resource":"http://www.dlib.si/details/URN:NBN:SI:doc-OJPLKQV9"}}}}