DIVINE COMMAND ETHICS, COSMOPOLITANISM, FUNDAMENTALISM AND DIALOGUE

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ABSTRACT

The paper aims to investigate the relationship between divine command theory of morality, ethical cosmopolitanism framework and correlated challenges pertaining to the questions of a plausible universalism and dialogue in the globalized world. The methods used include an analysis of commitments of divine command ethics and claims about objectivity and authority of morality. Next, a compatibility between divine command ethics and cosmopolitan framework is investigated. The main claim is that divine command ethics is not committed to and does not succumb to fundamentalism or unjustified absolutism and that a proper understanding varieties of universalism reveals this.

ETICA DEL COMANDO DIVINO, COSMOPOLITISMO, FONDAMENTALISMO E DIALOGO

SINTESI

Il lavoro ha voluto analizzare il rapporto tra la teoria del comando divino, il quadro etico del cosmopolitismo e le sfide legate alla domanda di universalismo e di dialogo plausibili in un mondo globalizzato. I metodi usati comprendono l'analisi degli impegni richiesti dall'etica del comando divino e la richiesta di obiettività e di autorità della morale. Viene quindi analizzata la compatibilità tra l'etica del comando divino e l'ambito cosmopolita. La conclusione principale è che l'etica del comando divino non implica a e non si confonde con il fondamentalismo o con l'assolutismo ingiustificato, come mostrato da una corretta comprensione della varietà dell'universalismo.

INTRODUCTION

The paper investigates the relationship between divine command theory of morality, ethical cosmopolitanism framework and correlated challenges pertaining to the questions of the rationality of religious commitment, plausible universalism, and dialogue in the globalized world. After presenting a key tenor behind divine command ethics and ethical cosmopolitanism, a question about the compatibility of both ethical frameworks is posed. This is an important question for the challenges of the globalized world, in which we see tendencies of different religious fundamentalisms and prevalence of some collective identities. The claim will be that divine command ethics is not committed to and does not succumb to fundamentalism or unjustified absolutism and that a proper understanding of divine command ethics, religious commitment and varieties of universalism reveals this. At the end, some consequences of this for the debate on dialogue are addressed.

DIVINE COMMAND ETHICS AND AUTHORITY OF OBLIGATION

In this section, the paper defines the basic characteristics of a moderate divine command theory. In this endeavour it relies primarily on the work of Stephen Evans in his recent book *God and Moral Obligation* (2013). The reason is not that Evans is alone in defending divine command ethics, on the contrary, we are witnessing its wide revival.[1] Divine command theory of morality was for the most part of the development of the 20th century moral theory not considered as a particularly viable. Its recent revival is partly due to the fact that divine command ethics is particularly well suited to accommodate some of the central aspects of morality, including its phenomenology, especially those related to authority of moral obligation.

In elaborating a viable divine command ethics account, it is best to start with an ontological understanding of divine command theory, according to which moral obligations depend on God ontologically (God is thus the ground of moral obligations) and God as a command-giver represents the best explanation of objective moral obligations. This is different from a somewhat less plausible epistemic claim that one cannot believe and have knowledge of moral obligations without the belief

in God. Further details of a former view can be spelled out in different ways. One prosperous manner to do so is to further spell it out as the claim that moral obligations are or express divine requirements, as "God's will for humans insofar as that will has been communicated to them" (Evans, 2013, 25) and thus as commands of a good and loving God. This view is narrow in a sense that it does not presuppose that there cannot be any ethical truths that do not depend on God and also it is primarily focused on aspects of moral obligation. In a somehow similar manner Audi (2011) closely relates divine command theory with the notion of a moral authority of God as part of the religious commitment of an individual. In the ontological terms, one can thus claim that e.g. the property of obligatoriness of actions can be equivalent to the property of divine commandedness. Divine commandedness can also be understood as divine commandability in the sense that it is not necessarily that every obligatory act is understood as being commanded by God, but merely that it is commandable, i.e. of being eligible to be commanded by omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good and loving God.

One prominent feature of divine command ethics is that it can easily accommodate and explain the authoritative nature of moral obligations. This characteristic of moral obligation was persuasively exposed by Elizabeth Anscombe in her famous essay on modern moral philosophy (1958), marking the turn towards rejuvenation of virtue ethics in the second part of 20th century. Anscombe emphasizes several distinctive features of obligation or an "ought", among them its law-like aspect.[2] The basic tenets of such a view can be summarized as the claim that moral obligations (as experienced and as part of moral discourse) have a unique character, which any moral theory that attempts to explain obligation must illuminate and accommodate in the explanation offered (cf. Evans, 2013, 12). The mentioned unique character is closely related to objectivity, authority, universality, the verdict on the action, accompanying motivational pull and a close connection to phenomena of responsibility, blameworthiness, and punishment.[3]

Moral judgments involve a feeling of their objectivity; they seem independent of our interests and desires; it appears as if their force comes from outside (that they have external origin) i.e. from the relevant moral circumstances that exert

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1   Among them are the works of Robert Adams (1999), Philip Quinn (1979; 1990) and most recently John E. Hare (2015).

2   Anscombe proposed the following diagnosis: "*But they* [i.e. terms like 'ought' or 'should'; n. VS] *have now acquired a special so-called 'moral' sense-i.e. a sense in which they imply some absolute verdict (like one of guilty/ not guilty on a man) on what is described in the 'ought' sentences used in certain types of context: not merely the contexts that Aristotle would call 'moral' – passions and actions – but also some of the contexts that he would call 'intellectual'. The ordinary (and quite indispensable) terms 'should', 'needs', 'ought', 'must' – acquired this special sense by being equated in the relevant contexts with 'is obliged', or 'is bound', or 'is required to', in the sense in which one can be obliged or bound by law, or something can be required by law*" (Anscombe, 1958, 5).

3   This is also the central question that Korsgaard addresses in *The Sources of Normativity* (1996). She exposes the special nature of obligation in the following way: "*the day will come, for most of us, when what morality commands, obliges or recommends is hard: that we share decisions with people whose intelligence or integrity do not inspire our confidence; that we assume grave responsibilities to which we feel inadequate; that we sacrifice our lives, or voluntarily relinquish what makes them sweet*" (Korsgaard, 1996, 9).

pressure on us to act in a certain way, limiting the range of our choices; the agent experiences a felt-demand on behaviour (Potrč & Strahovnik, 2014, 162).

It is this special character which is driving Anscombe's astonishment about a modern concept of obligation, which was not at all so prominent in ancient Greek ethics. And this is why she explicitly relates such a conception of moral obligation with a law-like character of morality, a law-conception of moral obligation and God as a law-giver, and further pinpoints Christianity as an origin of it.

How did this [i.e. such conception of an 'ought' and obligation; n. VS] come about? The answer is in history: between Aristotle and us came Christianity, with its law conception of ethics. For Christianity derived its ethical notions from the Torah. […] To have a law conception of ethics is to hold that what is needed for conformity with the virtues failure in which is the mark of being bad qua man (and not merely, say, qua craftsman or logician) - that what is needed for this, is required by divine law. Naturally it is not possible to have such a conception unless you believe in God as a law-giver; like Jews, Stoics, and Christians. But if such a conception is dominant for many centuries, and then is given up, it is a natural result that the concepts of 'obligation', of being bound or required as by a law, should remain though they had lost their root; and if the word "ought" has become invested in certain contexts with the sense of 'obligation', it too will remain to be spoken with a special emphasis and a special feeling in these contexts (Anscombe, 1958, 5–6).

Anscombe's further proposal is quite radical, i.e. that modern moral philosophy should drop such a conception of obligation, mainly because the law conception of morality lack justification, given that God does not play the role of the law-giver anymore and furthermore such a groundless conception can also be harmful. But this is just one possible route to take out of this apparent dilemma. Another option is to take the above mentioned experiential aspects of moral obligation seriously (together with the platitudes that Anscombe is relating with the notions of ought and obligation), and try looking hard at which moral theory (or theories) can accommodate them in their fullest sense. This is part of what motivates the return of divine command ethics.

Among the strengths of divine command theory is the one that it can easily accommodate the above mentioned aspects of the moral obligation related to

authority and objectivity. First, divine command theory is an objectivist theory in the sense that there is a truth of the matter about the content of moral demands. Secondly, given the presupposition that God created human beings in a way that their final goal is establishing the relationship with God, then establishing and maintaining such relationship is of supreme importance. And if moral obligations are part of this relationship, then this readily explains their importance and overridingess. Third, according to this theory the motivating power of moral obligations emerges out of our tendency to satisfy the requirements of a supreme being to which we owe gratitude and whose love for us is such that we can enjoy eternal happiness in communion. And lastly, since all human being are understood as God's creatures, thus all participate in social relation that grounds universality of moral obligations (Evans, 2013; Audi, 2011).

Formulated in this way, i.e. divine command theory of morality as the foundation for explicating moral obligation, such a theory is also compatible with other types of moral theories and normative frameworks, complementing them and accommodating other aspects of morality. It is thus compatible and complementary with natural law approach and virtue ethics since the former could represent a viable ground for a theory of value and the latter a basis for a theory of character (Evans, 2013, 54–87).[4]

But how does such a view fare in relation to the pluralistic nature of a globalized and plural world? Can a viable moral universalism sustain divine command ethics? Is such a conception of morality also compatible with ethical cosmopolitanism and its basic tenets? How do different religious traditions fall into such a picture? We turn our attention to these matters now.

ETHICAL COSMOPOLITANISM

Contemporary ethical cosmopolitanism arises on the basis of a recognition of living in a "world of strangers" (Appiah, 2007) and at the same time possessing the means to affect the lives of others, to get to know those lives and confront different ways of living. Within such a context K. A. Appiah puts forward an influential defence of cosmopolitanism, in which he attempts to reconcile liberal universalism and cultural relativism. The result is a comprehensive account of ethical cosmopolitanism.

One of the aspects of the phenomenon of globalization is the increasing interconnectedness and interdependence of the world as a whole in all of the aspects of human life. The most pertinent challenges that the humankind is facing, e.g. climate change and other environmental pressures toward a planet that cannot grow, economic questions and migration issues, the global rule of law and protection of basic human rights, the proper

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4   This then goes against Anscombe's "either–or" position, which she uses as a basis for the argument and an appeal towards developing virtue account of morality as a substitute to existing contemporary moral theories.

role and effectiveness of international organizations and many others are global in their nature and demand a global response (Singer, 2004).

Such a response is only possible as a result of dialogue and cooperation between communities across the globe. The ethical dimensions of this process are related mainly to the questions of what we owe to other members of this global community and on which grounds can we develop common understanding.[5] Several authors[6] have started to address the issues mentioned from the distinctively global perspective, also in ethics. Based on such presuppositions some authors started to defend cosmopolitanism as a possible solution (or at least a first step towards such a solution) to the mentioned challenges or as a proper perspective for ethical discourse given the global framework. In most cases this is a defence of a version of ethical cosmopolitanism as a view that we have obligations and responsibilities to others in a global world, and not necessarily a political cosmopolitanism (defending an idea of some kind of concrete global polity, world government and citizenship), cultural cosmopolitanism (a kind of an open-minded interest in different cultures and ideas about an emerging universalistic culture), critical cosmopolitanism or other types of cosmopolitanism.

Appiah starts with an initial assumption that the need to accept ethical cosmopolitanism emerges out of recognition of a fact that we possess the means both to get to know about the lives of others and to substantially affect these lives affect lives, which establishes responsibility on our side. His preferred account of "rooted" ethical cosmopolitanism encompasses two related ideas, namely (i) universal concern: that we have obligation to others, to all "citizens of the cosmos" so that this set extends beyond that of members of our country, kind, race, class, social group, etc., and (ii) legitimate difference: that we have to value lives of others in a sense of taking an interest in the practices and beliefs that they cultivate and find important (Appiah, 2007, xi–xiii). Both of these ideas can also clash among each other. One of the presuppositions of such a position is also that at least some values are universal across cultures and societies, though their comparative importance or ranking is most usually left open. Such universal values are correlated with basic human needs; in the background of basic values is a belief that "we all have a good reason to do or to think or feel certain things in certain context, and so, have reasons to encourage these acts and thoughts and feelings in

others" (Appiah, 2007, 26). We use the very language of values in order to coordinate our lives with another, given the interconnectedness of the world, every community, culture, tradition, civilization is important for revealing to us the values that were possibly unrevealed till now and ways of leading lives in accordance with these values. A conclusion from all this for ethical cosmopolitanism is a very optimistic one:

Armed with these terms, fortified in a shared language of value, we can often guide one another, in the cosmopolitan spirit, to shared responses; and when we cannot agree, the understanding that our responses are shaped by some of the same vocabulary can make it easier to agree to disagree (Appiah, 2007, 30).

But it is precisely the disagreement that often is the source of problems and conflict. It is therefore crucial to analyse its nature and offer a model of a moral dialogue in order to resolve conflicts and overcome disagreements. How is this disagreement strengthened within the perspective of divine command ethics? Moral disagreement can be defined as a situation in which the parties involved agree upon and have sufficient understanding of all the facts, but nonetheless disagree what the morally appropriate attitude toward some object of evaluation (action, practice, tradition, situation, outlook, …) is.

Appiah identifies three main sources or kinds of moral disagreement. Either (i) the two parties fail to share a common evaluative vocabulary, or (ii) they might share it but gave it a different interpretation, or (iii) they can assign different weight to particular values. Either way, it seems that in a cross-cultural or trans-cultural dialogue we will be left with a considerable moral disagreement. Divine command ethics faces similar issues regarding a plausible universalism and possible disagreements between different religions and religious traditions. The responses could also be analogous.

Both defenders of cosmopolitanism and proponents of divine command ethics can argue first, that there can be a disagreement about why we should do something and at the same time agreement about what to do (disagreement in reasons *vs* disagreement on reasons; cf. Audi, 2014). In other words, some disagreements are benign in practice. Second, the role of reasoned argument resulting in agreement about values is often exaggerated. And at last, most of the conflicts that the

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5   "*The main problem is the lack of dialogue on these questions. All partners lack the willingness to train the ways of dialogue. ... Yet global development demands dialogue and cooperation. It seems there is no way than living dialogue about the civic and cultural foundations of our development*" (Juhant, 2010, 49–50).

6   Among them e.g. John Rawls, Peter Singer, K. A. Appiah, Marta Nussbaum, Seyla Benhabib, David Held, Peter Unger and others. In this vein Nussbaum argues: "*If our world is to be a decent world in the future, we must acknowledge right now that we are citizens of one interdependent world, held together by mutual fellowship as well as the pursuit of mutual advantage, by compassion as well as self-interest, by a love of human dignity in all people, even when there is nothing we have to gain from cooperating with them. Or rather, even when what we have to gain is the biggest thing of all: participation in a just and morally decent world*" (Nussbaum, 2006, 324).

humankind faces today are not the result of conflicting values and moral disagreement at all (Appiah, 2007, 45–67). Instead of clinging to unsuccessful attempts to overcome moral disagreement Appiah as a defender of ethical cosmopolitanism expresses what could be called *the primacy of practice optimism*, a view according to which we can "agree about practices while disagreeing about their justification" (Appiah, 2007, 70). For example, we can agree that we should allow people to exercise the freedom to express their religious belief without agreeing on the grounds for this. The point of cross-cultural dialogue is most often even not that of coming to agree about values but to learn about others and their values. It is the practice that changes things and ameliorates problems and conflicts. But, one could reply, that the most pressing problems arise exactly when we disagree about practice and when it seems that the source of this is the disagreement in justification. The tragedy of the world is, one might object, on the other hand, that practices might easily go the other way, even to a point of being morally evil. This is the core of the primacy of practice optimism that cosmopolitanism defends. For cosmopolitanism it is the practices and not principles or values that enable us to live together in peace. Appiah is therefore defending that practice(s) changes things and overcomes conflicts and not reasonable argument. The condition for this is that there is enough overlapping between cultures and peoples and that there is enough contact between them; if those conditions are fulfilled the optimistic cosmopolitan picture will start to realize itself. Cosmopolitanism thus is a kind of universalism that usually includes among core virtues tolerance (together with intolerance against actions and practices that are evil), intellectual modesty and fallibilism, curiosity, openness to new things, responsiveness, and pluralism. The rationality of religious commitment exposes exactly the need for such virtues to complement it. Recognizing and being responsive to other is then the basis for a deeper dialogue with others that goes beyond a mere acquaintance with other cultures and traditions out of some very general cosmopolitan curiosity.

Is the above describe divine command ethics framework at all compatible with cosmopolitanism and dialogic universalism? The answer depends on whether it can avoid fundamentalism and absolutism, and on the other hand harbour moderate moral universalism.

DIVINE COMMAND ETHICS BETWEEN FUNDAMENTALISM, ABSOLUTISM AND UNIVERSALISM

Ethical cosmopolitanism is clearly committed to a sort of universalism and a similar presupposition is plausible regarding divine command ethics. MacIntyre, and he is not alone in this, warns us before unjustified universalism and argues that

[t]he notion of escaping from it [i.e. particularities] into a realm of entirely universal maxims which belong to man as such, whether in its eighteenth century Kantian form or in the presentation of some modern analytical philosophies, is an illusion and an illusion with painful consequences. When men and women identify what are in fact their partial and particular causes too easily and too completely with the cause of some universal principle, they usually behave worse that they would otherwise do (MacIntyre, 1981, 221).

To briefly reiterate MacIntyre's worry; is such universalism in this model at all feasible? In order to answer this, it will prove useful to look at a comprehensive and useful understanding of different kinds or types or universalism. We can differentiate between different types of universalism, namely: (a) *essentialist universalism:* fundamental human nature and human essence enables us to derive universal moral truths, norms, and standards of life; (b) *justificatory universalism*: on the basis of normative content of human reason we can use generally valid forms of cognition and justificatory strategies to justify universally valid moral norms; (c) *moral universalism*: all human beings, independently of race, status, religious belief, etc. are entitled to the equal moral respect or dignity; (d) *legal (juridical) universalism*: even in the absence of essentialist universalism, we must recognize basic human rights to all persons based on the legitimacy of social and legal systems (Benhabib, 2011, 62–64).[7] Legal universalism presupposes justificatory universalism and the latter presupposes moral universalism (since justificatory universalism presupposes recognition of dialogic freedom of others, which on the level of moral universalism means recognition of equal dialogic respect to others), while between all those there is not a simple relation of constitution, in

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7   Benhabib uses this framework to defend her approach to human rights based global ethics. First, one should make justification for them and their theoretical foundations more robust and at the same time extend their scope (e.g. in contrast to some other viewpoint, such as the one by Rawls (1999), which limits their scope to the right to life, the right to freedom, the right to property and the right to formal equality) and thus move away from minimalism. Minimalism is on the one hand very appealing position since it places its hopes to manage to get to an overlapping consensus on the core of human rights and basic moral principles, without having to presuppose any particular standing point. Benhabib opts for a different approach and defends a single foundational human right, which is the "right to have rights", which is a right of every human being to be recognized by others (and to recognize others in turn) as a person entitled to moral respect and legally protected rights in human community (Benhabib, 2011, 59–60) on the basis of a common humanity. Human rights derived from such foundation at the same time determine moral principles that protect the communicative or dialogical freedom of an individual. But human rights are only one domain with which we can relate concerns about a plausible universalism.

the sense that one can also, reversely, derive a set of basic human rights that must be legally recognized out of moral universalism itself.

In order for a moral position to be plausible and avoid essentialism, absolutism, and fundationalism, one can defend moral and justificatory universalism as founded on the theory of dialogue and dialogical freedom. Dialogic justification is based on justification through which we – "you and I, in dialogue, must convince each other of the validity of certain norms" (Benhabib, 2011, 67) and that requires the assumption of respect of dialogic/discursive freedom, on the basis of which one can only see the other as someone who can accept or reject a certain justification. This model thus begins with the notion of the individual as embedded or immersed in a dialogue, in communication and interaction with others. The role of such dialogue is in forming our life ideals, regulating common living together, and resolution of conflicts. Theories of dialogue and argumentation help us to recognize, that moral dialogue is not a simple, one-dimensional phenomena or process, but that it consists of various justificatory and normative structures and burdens of proof (e.g. convincing, revealing, determining information, intending, negotiation, disputing, etc.) and different kinds of arguments (moral, political, pragmatic, strategic, etc.) (Testa, 2012); at the same time also going beyond mere argumentative or discursive sphere.

An overall outlook, which could harbour all the mentioned perplexities is the approach of dialogic universalism, which was originally developed by David Hollenbach (2002). The approach defends an aspiration for a universally valid ethics, which is established through a process of dialogue as a form of solidarity.[8] This approach is aware that merely collecting universal ethical components of different cultures and traditions does not necessary lead to the best set of universal values and justification for them.

> Another way, as such in no way incompatible, I see it rather as complementary to the first, is to try to find the set of values acceptable as values for every rational person or culture. It is this last group to which Nussbaum's and capability ethics efforts in general belong. […] There obtain universals of human condition as such that demand cultivation of values that share important universal features in order to make possible flourishing of individuals and societies. All people as such are subjected to some common limitations or problems we must cope with: we will all die, we are all as bodily creatures vulnerable, we all need recognition, etc. Successful coping with these limitations are rational values that are shared by most if not all of us (Žalec, 2008, 55).

One charge that it is often raised against divine command theory is a charge of absolutism and (religious) fundamentalism. But this applies merely to some extreme formulations of divine command theory, which take God's will as a direct basis for moral obligations and conjoin with that usually only revelation in some concrete form as an epistemic origin of our knowledge of these obligations. If we define religious fundamentalism in relation to morality as a stance that takes revelation, sacred text or some other moral authority as an absolute, definite and final form of all (moral) truth, while at the same time not even being willing to consider other views, then we can argue that the divine command theory of morality does not need to fall within such a domain. We can return to the virtues noted above (tolerance, intellectual modesty, fallibilism, curiosity, responsiveness, pluralism, etc.) and complement them with divine command ethics. One suggestion is to point to several possible epistemic routes to moral beliefs and truths one understand as framing the basis of a moral outlook. Recognizing something as a divine command or as being divinely commendable is not a prerequisite for moral knowledge.

> The existence of many non-theological ways of apprehending and discovering our obligations might enhance the probability of right conduct for both theist and non-theist; they would each have more ways to discover it, including, of course, non-religious ways. For religious people, a diversity of routes to moral discovery and moral knowledge might reinforce moral conduct (Žalec, 2011, 139).

Hare argues in this very direction that:

> there is no conceptual requirement to connect divine command theory with fundamentalism, Christian or Muslim or Jewish. […] As a meta-ethical theory, divine command theory does not tell us what the commands of God in fact are. But it gives no ground for inferring that these commands will be any less or any more liberal than the prescriptions generated by the various versions of natural law. Having said that, however, it is also true that a theory that has an honoured place for both revelation and reason will find conversation with other traditions easier to sustain (Hare, 2015, 187).

As a consequence of this one can add that "it may be possible not only to indicate how a religious commitment can be combined with a plausible ethical view, but also to bring divine command and secular perspectives

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8   The view is discussed in-depth by Žalec (2008) and also coupled with ethics of capabilities. Solidarity must be understood in a wider sense, including experiential solidarity since *"[o]ur aim ought to be to participate on the experience of the other and we should help other to participate in our intellectual and emotional life too. Intellectual participation is the realization of a genuine dialogue"* (Žalec, 2008, 37).

closer together and at the same time facilitate communication and debate in moral matters between religious and non-religious people" (Audi, 2011, 140)

Divine command theory of morality thus can accommodate moral disagreement, since the existence of disagreement is not a decisive argument against moral objectivity, but can be on the other hand a mark of engagement in a genuine moral dialogue in search for the right answers or at least acceptable ones. Another reason to understand divine command ethics as non-fundamentalist is that it is usually formed and accepted in a dialogic stance of the believer which accepts is. In the Christian tradition this means the embodiment of the "call – answer" model, based on an understanding God as a limitless closeness, which included an experience of this closeness on the side of the believer and a response on her or his side (Petkovšek, 2016). It is the human refusal to accept basic truth about the self that can lead to psychopathologies, violence and non-compassion. "Religious fundamentalism (and the violence originating from it, e.g. terrorism) is a disturbance on the vertical axis human – God" (Žalec, 2015, 223; cf. Bellinger, 2008), which means that a fundamentalist neglects other dimensions of human life (e.g. social dimension or individual, biographical dimension) and accepts a static – and in this regard non-dialogical and non-open – mode of existence. This is also a reason that e.g. religious traditions like Judaism, Christianity, Islam can be part of the non-absolutist, cosmopolitan ethics.

The above described dialogic universalism is an overall position that arises out of moral universalism (as a thesis about the common humanity and dignity that derives from it) and at the same time providing the space for dialogue and dialogical freedom regarding basic moral principles together with the content of moral obligations that can be subsequently amended with mid-level principles that would contextualize the former. Parts of this dialogic sphere could be occupied by divine command ethics, especially those ones that are related to moral obligations.

ETIKA BOŽJEGA UKAZA, KOZMOPOLITIZEM, FUNDAMENTALIZEM IN DIALOG

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POVZETEK

Prispevek razišče več razsežnosti etike božjega ukaza ter jih poveže z razmisleki o posebni naravi moralne obveznosti, ki vključuje objektivnost in avtoriteto. V nadaljevanju je etika božjega ukaza vzporejana s ključnimi vidiki etičnega kozmopolitizma, s ciljem vzpostaviti skladnost med obema. Naslovljena so vprašanja o racionalnosti verske zavezanosti, prepričljivosti univerzalizma in dialoga v globaliziranem svetu. Ta vprašanja so pomembna za izzive globaliziranega sveta, v katerem vidimo težnje različnih verskih fundamentalizmiov in prevlado izbranih kolektivnih identitet. Glavna teza je, da etika božjega ukaza ni zavezana in ne podleže fundamentalizmu ali neutemeljenemu absolutizmu ter da to razkrije ustrezno razumevanje etike božjega ukaza, verske zavezanosti in vrst univerzalizma. Na koncu so izpostavljene nekatere posledice za razpravo o dialogu.

Ključ**ne besede:** etika božjega ukaza, moralna obveznost, kozmopolitizem, univerzalizem, fundamentalizem, dialog

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