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Strokovni članek

ČETRTA GENERACIJA VOJSKOVANJA IN MEDAGENCIJSKEGA SODELOVANJA TER USKLAJEVANJA V BOJU PROTI TERORIZMU: MAKEDONSKA IZKUŠNJA

FOURTH GENERATION OF WARFARE AND INTERAGENCY COOPERATION AND COORDINATION IN COMBATING TERRORISM: MACEDONIA EXPERIENCE

Professional article

Povzetek   V tem članku poskušamo predstaviti drugačen pogled na medagencijsko sodelovanje. Izhodišče je trditev, da so potrebne prilagoditve glede na nove usmeritve v zvezi z vojskovanjem. Začenjamo ga z analizo evolucije vojskovanja, ki bo pomagala pri razumevanju glavnih sprememb in tega, kako prilagoditi trenutne zmogljivosti novim metodam vojskovanja, da bi lahko izkoristili vse mogoče sposobnosti. Članek na splošno podaja strategijo teroristov in poskuša prepoznati proces njenega uresničevanja. Nadaljujemo s splošno sliko strategije boja proti terorizmu v primerjavi s strategijo teroristov. Na koncu podajamo makedonsko izkušnjo kot primer, kaj se lahko dogodi državi, če obrambni sistem ne more pravočasno zaznati groženj vojskovanja zunaj pravil in išče rešitve za obrambo integritete države, ko vladne agencije ne sodelujejo med seboj.

Ključne besede   *Protiterorizem, vojskovanje, četrta generacija, medagencijsko sodelovanje, sodelovanje.*

Abstract   This article tries to give a different perspective on interagency cooperation. The starting point is that in the light of new trends of warfare adjustments are needed. It starts with giving an explanation of evolution of warfare. This analysis will help understand major changes, and how to adjust today's capabilities to new methods of warfare in order to exploit all potential capacities. It outlines terrorist strategy and identifies process in its execution. It continues with giving a general picture of strategy of combating terrorism as a comparison with the terrorist strategy. In the end it gives the Macedonian experience as an example of what happens in a country when the defense system cannot not identify the threats from irregular warfare and struggle for a solution in a timely manner to defend the country's integrity if governmental agencies do not cooperate with each other.

Key words   *Counter-terrorism, warfare, fourth generation, interagency, cooperation.*

Introduction The 9/11 became a point where all governmental agencies participants in defense of the country changed their mind set in countering threats. New stage of communication and cooperation between agencies was set, as a result of experiencing the consequences from the unknown and unexpected. The long-standing barriers built roadblocks among agencies, and now there is a felling that these blocks are crumbling down. The need for information in combating terrorism and criminal activities has become a main battle (Fusion Center Guidelines, 2005).

Combating terrorism is not just taking measures from one or two governmental agencies. There is no doubt that in some states this is the case. The terrorists are given the freedom of operations by failing to set the government system in place to combat terrorism. Successful combat against terrorism needs to include the whole governmental system with all its agencies. It is in human nature to compete and try to reach awards and credit, and so do the agencies. With the time, this selfishness turned into competition. However, there is no space for competition in combating terrorism. A lot of money, resources and time have been spent, and there is still a lack of quality in final products. In other words, terrorists gain the advantage.

On the other hand, there is a very big difference between structures in governments and terrorist organization. Governments are organized vertically. Terrorist's organizations are organized horizontally. Why is this important? Countering the threats requires a system that is capable of disrupting the enemy's tempo of operations. For example, making a decision and taking an action on the ground requires a chain of command, no matter whether it is a military or civilian agency. Next is making decisions and giving orders to the subordinates. This process takes time. Most of the time, targets are time sensitive. In this type of warfare, time is critical.

In comparison with government systems, terrorist organizations have full freedom of operations. This means that if it is necessary to make a decision and take actions, the cells are doing so, in order to fulfill the mission. Each of the cells is responsible for fulfilling the given mission. This is a one-way communication. Receiving the mission is the only communication with superiors. It is fast and effective with no bureaucracy.

All of this presents a big challenge to us. There are so many moving parts in the system that needs adjusting in order to achieve the desirable objective. Having a very good understanding of threat environment and how it fits into the new type of warfare is key to a successful cooperation between agencies. Moreover, the willingness to understand that threats are present throughout the whole specter of government system and willingness to accept mutual support will increase cooperation between agencies.

Having this in mind, let us first try to explain the evolution of warfare and threats.

1   EVOLUTION OF WARFARE: FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE

It is essential to understand warfare environment in order to successfully counter the threats to the national security. Understanding threats that are very flexible and adaptive to our security measures is not an easy job.

The fourth generation of warfare is a modern type of war which is characterized by overlapping the lines between war, politics, civilian realm, peace and conflicts, battlefield and security. Evolution of warfare environment will challenge international and interagency cooperation and collaborations.

This doctrine was first introduced in 1989 by a team of American analysts[1]. In the broader term, the fourth generation of warfare includes losing monopoly over armed forces by the nation/states and turning back towards uncontrolled ways of combat. In other words, the fourth generation of warfare includes every war in which adversaries are not just nation/states, but also violent ideological networks.

2   DEFINITION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF FOURTH GENERATION OF WARFARE

Although the fourth generation of warfare sounds very similar to or implies a form of guerrilla warfare, terrorism and asymmetrical warfare, there are some essential differences between them. It is very logical that this type of warfare is a successor to previous warfare as a result of rapid evolution of technology, society and the mindset of the people in the new era.

The first generation of warfare can be recognized by the tactics of lines and columns, which evolved in the time of muskets and rifles with single and slow reloads. It lasted until the introduction of the machine gun, barbwire and indirect fire.

The second generation of warfare is recognized by the tactics of linear fire which was supported by indirect fire (the original proverb was: "Artillery is the Queen of battle"). This type of warfare ended with WW I, with the appearance of the tank and aircraft.

The third generation of warfare is recognized by the tactics of infiltration behind enemy lines in order to round enemy positions (avoiding direct contact whenever possible) and defense in depth. The German *blitzkrieg* is a classic example of infiltration and encirclement, while Soviet defense is a classic example of defense in depth. Characteristics of this type of warfare are the use of the maneuver as the decision point of combat success. This warfare was a characteristic of WW II. It appeared at end of WW II and evolved during the Cold War, when the superpowers and other

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[1] *William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightingale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), i Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR) in the magazine "Marine Corps Gazette" with title "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation".*

colonial states tried to conquer new territories away from home, facing the enemy who was highly motivated, but not powerful, forced to employ guerrilla methods of warfare: secrecy, terror and confusion in order to fill the technological gap.

Fighting in the next generation of warfare with tactics of the third generation, on which modern armies base their doctrines, will take a toll due to their inertness and rigidity.

The fourth generation of warfare includes:
– complex and long-lasting wars with guerrilla tactics,
– terrorism,
– multinational adversaries and transnational bases,
– direct attacks towards adversary culture,
– psychological warfare through manipulation of media,
– using all available networks: political, economical, military, social etc.,
– low intensity conflicts, including all actors from above-mentioned networks,
– non-combatants or civilians (a controversial subject of discussion and a big dilemma for conducting operations).

It also includes insurgent groups or other organizations who want to overthrow the government and set up their own. However, most effective ones are those with an aim to delegitimize and disorganize it. In this case, their end state is to extort more manpower and finances from the government to in order to keep the environment secure until it collapses and starts to negotiate with insurgents.

This type of warfare can be recognized in the states that are unstable, very close to bankruptcy, also in ethnic, religious and civil conflicts. The number of reasons the states are losing monopoly on the wars increases every day because (of):
– modern technology and economic integration allow global operations;
– ascent of cultural, ethnical and religious conflicts which can be initiated by smaller groups of people;
– globalization itself (mainly through IT-connections which make open societies and economies highly vulnerable);
– technological development is boosting effectiveness of many independent combatants;
– global media saturation allows manipulation with public opinion;
– today's technology enables terrorists an easy life and allows the formation of in-surgents cells and network.

As regards classic weapons, the main weapon of the fourth generation of warfare is the idea – which is proved to be stronger than technology. A good example is Islamic fundamentalism which originates from a pan-Arabic idea.

Clashes between cultures, not states, are typical of this type of warfare. Many authors consider that after the WW II and colonial wars the old conflict between civilizations

and cultures is back. After 300 years of strategic defense, from the Ottomans at the door of Vienna in 1683, Islam is restoring its strategic offense against the western cultures and values, spreading in all directions. The invasion of Islamist emigrants into the western world, can be considered more dangerous that the invasion of armies (Lind, 2004).

Tactics of fourth generation of warfare

The fourth generation of warfare is still new to us, and nobody can fully understand it because it constantly evolves. The one to first understand the need of changes will gain the advantage and vice versa. The nations that will be slow in adapting the new way of warfare, will not survive.

Even if the goal is accomplished without violence and the process takes place in peace, it can be considered a victory, at least some kind of war (ideological in this case), in other words, a battle without a war.

All wars are fought on three levels, and the victory depends on their balance:
1. the physical level (armed battle itself),
2. the mental level (the will for fight, faith in victory) and
3. the moral level (justification of using violence).

In comparison with other types of warfare, physical force is less important and co-unter-productive. The moral level is very important and includes respecting cultural, sociological and religious values. The main dilemma lies in the fact that physical victory does not lead to moral victory. Big armies can win all battles, yet they can lose the war.

A battle can be fought without the physical level of fighting, employing non-violen-ce methods. A good example is Gandhi's resistance against Britain, who challenged them on moral and mental level through provocation of using violent methods against peaceful resistance. Thus the state was losing international support on moral level.

Every generation of warfare contributes to changing the battlefield. Today's or the fourth generation of warfare includes the whole society in the battlefield. It is not about the physical destruction of the enemy; more important is the destruction from the inside. The goal is to defeat people's support and destroy the enemy's culture. Accurate identification of the enemy's strategic center of gravitation is essential.

Tactical and strategic levels will combine when the enemy's political infrastructu-re and civilian society become military targets. Smaller groups of people can make more damage for a short period of time. Psychological operations will become the dominant strategic weapon in the form of media and information intervention.

Computer viruses and software will be used to attack military and civilian operations. Media manipulation will be normal in order to influence domestic and international

opinions. The domestic audience will become the enemy's target group in order to weaken their support. TV news might become the strongest weapon.

In the general fourth generation of warfare, the concept will be extended and undefined. The difference between war and peace will almost disappear or they will overlap. War is asymmetric from the point where battlefields and fronts are gone. There are no differences between combatants and civilians. There are no HQ and commands because of the vulnerability of strategic infrastructure. Success will require coordination between all actors: police, military, judicial system and other government agencies, because their responsibilities will overlap. The third generation of warfare had all of this, but in fourth these will be essential.

3   MACEDONIAN EXPERIENCE

The 11 September became a decision point in reforming national strategies in combating terrorism and reforming intelligence apparatus, not only for the US, but also for everybody else. Before the 9/11 attacks, terrorism threat was real and present, but no one was aware of its power. When the attacks happened and the US was struggling to recover from them and trying to set the next step in combating terrorism, the rest of the world realized that when a big power such as the US could not protect itself from the same threats, the 'wakening bell' started to ring.

It is very simple and logical. Once the threat pushes the right collapsing button, it will continue with its movement while we struggle with our recovery, security and intelligence reforms, interagency frictions and unity of effort (Krawchuk, 2005). This elusive threat will continue looking for new opportunities to strike again. It is essential to have a good understanding of terrorist's and insurgent's organization, tactics, policies, communication, ideologies and personalities. Only a cogent understanding of their networks would help to produce an appropriate strategy to defeat them. (Krawchuk, 2005).

In the same time of the US terrorists attacks, the Republic of Macedonia was threatened by Albanian insurgency, spilled over from Kosovo.

Before the conflict was started in Macedonia, the threats from a new type of warfare could be recognized the moment, when for the first time in fifty years' history, NATO went to war on March 24, 1999, against Milosevic regime (Daalagher, O'Hanlon, 2001). In same time the Albanian insurgency – KLA was active in Kosovo. The KLA was doing its best to overthrow Milosevic regime and gain Kosovo's independence. On the other hand, NATO had moral and strategic rectitude on its side in using military power in the Balkans. First, upholding human rights and alleviating humanitarian tragedy are worthy goals for American national security policy. Doing so reinforces the notion that the United States is not interested in power for its own sake but rather to enhance stability and security and to promote certain universal principles and values. Second, the United States and its allies have a special interest

in upholding these values in Europe, a continent that has become generally free and undivided since the cold war ended but that remains conflict ridden in the Balkans. Third, in addition to these humanitarian and normative rationales, traditional national interest argues for quelling violence in the Balkans because instability there can affect key allies more directly than instability in most other parts of the world (Daalagher, O'Hanlon, 2001:11-12).

After the Alliance air campaign, Serbian leaders and NATO agreed to a peace settlement in which Kosovo would be under UN governance, with the KLA demilitarized and transformed into the Kosovo Protection Corps. Encouraged by the success in Kosovo, the ideology of fighting for Albanian rights continued to spread around the region. Soon after, two organizations were identified in South Serbia and northwest Macedonia very similar to the KLA with the ideology of liberation of the ethnic Albanian territories: the NLA and UCPMB (Babanovski, 2002).

On the other hand, Macedonian defense was still in some kind of transition period, implementing new NATO tactics, techniques and procedures. While the defense system was sitting on two chairs, it was not just facing the insurgency, but also the new type of warfare, where there are no lines between soldiers and civilians; the fronts were gone. Macedonian military leaders in that time were officers from the former Yugoslavian Army. They had a leading role. This was not the case only in the Army. A majority of the leaders in the whole Macedonian defense system of that time were from the old system. In absence of a good understanding of consequences by the Kosovo insurgency since the conflict started, conventional military and police forces were triggered to fight the 'enemy' who could even hardly be seen. While the Macedonian Defense system was struggling to find the best way to fight the threat, suddenly the whole governmental system was under attack. The targets were Macedonian politics, military and police forces, intelligence and diplomatic system. The Albanian insurgents' strategy was: Building a close relationship with the media to give legitimacy to their terrorist actions and justify their cause in order to change future structure of the government and to consolidate their direct and complete control over territories where ethnic Albanians live. The Albanian insurgency strategy in Macedonia can be used as an example of processes of terrorist strategy (Maley, 2009):
– focusing attention (international more often);
– winning acknowledgement (international more often);
– obtaining recognition;
– seeking authority, and
– consolidating control.

The only answer to the threats that Macedonia experienced were conventional military and police units. Many times in the history of counterinsurgency was it proven that fighting insurgency with conventional forces equals failure. Besides, Macedonian military leaders were still using conventional tactics and procedures to fight Albanian insurgency. Many times, the Macedonian Parliament discussed

whether to declare the state of war or not. In absence of proofs to identify the enemy, Macedonian decision makers decided not to declare it. The enemies the Macedonian defense system could not identify were somewhere between combatants and civilians. They utilized psychological operations in order to gain international support and to show that Macedonian security forces were occupiers in their own country. The tactics of small insurgent groups against larger security forces delegitimized security operations. Their intent was not to fight for the territory. The goal was to overthrow the present political government[2]. Even though Macedonian intelligence agencies were trying to identify the real threat, they were not flexible enough to recognize the potential threat. On the other hand, the intelligence agencies for the first time faced the enemy who was very hard to define. The Macedonian intelligence was not the only to fail to identify threats from irregular warfare. A good example is the United States intelligence in general and the CIA in particular which failed to warn with sufficient clarity and specificity of the 11 September 2001 conspiracy that caused the deaths of nearly 3,000 civilians in the American homeland (Russell, 2007). The same thing happened to the Macedonian intelligence (Military Service for Security and Intelligence, Intelligence Agency and Department for State Security). By the time the conflict was over, all three agencies failed to succeed in achieving the unity of effort in intelligence operations[3]. Not only were the reports not coordinated between agencies, sometimes they were even contradictory. Since all three agencies were very well respected, additional time for confirming the information was asked for by National authorities in order to clarify the contradictions,The very slow progress of Macedonian defense system to adapt to the threats from irregular warfare made the system very vulnerable, allowing some of the irregular forces to enter into it.

Many lessons are learned from the conflict. Reforms at all levels of national power (military, law enforcement, informational, financial, diplomatic and intelligence) are constantly adjusting. It is finally understood that cooperation and coordination are needed between security and intelligence agencies. In 2003 with the decision of the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Macedonia, an Act was signed which regulates coordination and exchange of intelligence information and cooperation in order to achieve the unity of effort[4]. Also in 2005, an interagency working group was formed to implement NATO - Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism[5].

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[2] *These conclusions are from many analyses made in MOD of RM some years after the conflict.*

[3] *In that time I worked with Military Service for Security and Intelligence in MOD of RM, the operations that were planned and executed were without cooperation and coordination with other two civilian Intelligence Agency and Department for State Security in MOI.*

[4] *Act of President and Prime Minister of RoM (document - DT.br.07-9 from September 17, 2003 and document - DT.br.66/1 from March 16, 2003).*

[5] *MOI organizational structure and function of Department for Security and Counterintelligence.*

Conclusion   As a result of asymmetrical threats, a characteristic of this new type of warfare, it is very obvious that changes and adjustments are needed in interagency cooperation in order to adapt to the new threat environment. Agencies are very different in their perspectives and organizations, and most of the time they have overlapping responsibilities. On the other hand, most agencies continue with their evolution strategically and operationally in order to obtain effective and actionable intelligence (Krawchuk, 2005).

In the article "Combating Terrorism: An Interagency Approach", Krachuk (2005), talks about closing the interagency gaps, with the right leaders in the right places, who can be able to answer the following challenges:
– educating the interagency community on capabilities and limitations;
– shaping and sharpening interagency plans and operations;
– providing timely information that would potentially accelerate the national decision making process and improve the flow of critical information;
– helping establish systems and procedures to institutionalize the CT/COIN planning and operations and tighten the seams between the military, law enforcement, intelligence and diplomatic communities (vertically and horizontally); and
– developing relationships and networks that will provide better support for policymakers and operators alike at all levels.

Having in mind the fourth generation of warfare and it characteristics, it seems that Krachuk's challenges are in very close relationship. Combating terrorism requires actions and measures throughout the governmental spectrum. This was not the case with Macedonian defense system during the conflict in 2001. It has to be a joint effort. It is a national decision which agency will take a lead, but at the end it has to be done through mutual interagency support and cooperation.

Although terrorism campaign has international dimensions, it needs to be fought regionally. The reason is simple: neighboring countries share a lot of similarity, politically, economically, security threats. It is much easier to reach an understanding over definitions of threats between few neighboring countries and take joint initiatives to counter them.

Terrorism campaign is too strong to fight internationally. But trying to eliminate regional terrorism threats at the same time will have a greater effect. Throughout history it has been proven that unconventional threats cannot be defeated with conventional forces and methods.

As the old Macedonian saying goes: "With your stones, against your head". In other words: start fighting global insurgency by exploiting guerrilla tactics. Where "guerrilla" will be countries in the regions and the "insurgency" will be initiatives for combating terrorism. It seems odd, but it can be effective.

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