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The Rejection of Teaching in Philosophy

Deleuze, Nietzsche, and Stirner

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Abstract

The problematic of education in philosophy is related to the question of reproduction, progression, and transfer of knowledge. In the paper, I examine the Deleuzian interpretation of Nietzschean philosophy. I argue that such philosophy in a certain sense radically rejects teaching in philosophy. The rejection is driven by the recognition that mediation of thought often presents the enforcement of a particular thought. Such thought represents itself as being universal, even if it is merely an

expression of particular interest, type or form of living. According to Deleuze, Nietzsche rejected such a dogmatic image of thought and established thought as a singular expression of a concrete living individuum, who resists the enforced universalism of thought (morality, common sense, universal truth). This can be compared with the philosophy of Stirner. Despite the similarities, I argue that the final aim of resistance to teaching is in Deleuze's version of Nietzsche exactly the opposite as in Stirner: the aim is not the establishment of a nihilistic, in itself enclosed self. On the contrary, the aim is a radical opening of the self towards the outside. This opening is in the conclusion of the paper described with Deleuze's understanding of the learning process.

Keywords: Deleuze, Nietzsche, Stirner, philosophical teaching, image of thought.

Zavračanje poučevanja v filozofiji. Deleuze, Nietzsche in Stirner

Povzetek

Problematika poučevanja v filozofiji je povezana z vprašanjem reprodukcije, napredovanja in prenosa znanja. V članku obravnavam Deleuzovo interpretacijo Nietzschejeve filozofije. Zagovarjam mnenje, da takšna filozofija v določenem smislu radikalno zavrača poučevanje v filozofiji. Zavračanje povzroča pripoznanje, da posredovanje misli pogosto predstavlja vsiljevanje točno določene misli. Tovrstna misel se predstavlja kot univerzalna, čeprav je zgolj izraz partikularnega interesa, tipa ali oblike življenja. Po Deleuzu je Nietzsche zavračal takšno dogmatično podobo misli in vzpostavil misel kot singularen izraz konkretnega živečega individuuma, ki se upira vsiljenemu univerzalizmu misli (moralnost, zdrava pamet, univerzalna resnica). To je mogoče primerjati s Stirnerjevo filozofijo. Zagovarjam stališče, da je poslednji cilj upiranja poučevanju pri Deleuzovi različici Nietzscheja, kljub nekaterim podobnostim, natanko nasproten kakor pri Stirnerju: cilj ni vzpostavitev nihilističnega, vase zaprtega sebstva. Nasprotno, cilj je radikalno odprtje sebstva navzven. V zaključku članka takšno odprtje opišem z Deleuzovim razumevanjem procesa učenja.

Ključne besede: Deleuze, Nietzsche, Stirner, filozofsko poučevanje, podoba misli.

Introduction: the rejection of teaching in philosophy

Through all the diverse and heterogeneous traditions of the history of philosophy, we can find a repetitive problem regarding the role of education in philosophy.[1] The main question in this context is the question of reproduction, progression, and transfer of philosophical knowledge, which is, at the same time, also a paradoxical auto-referential question that in the act wherein it is being posed, that is, in a philosophical text, questions also that very same act, which is necessarily the act of reproduction, progression, and transfer of knowledge. What are we doing, therefore, when we are doing philosophy? What are we doing right now? What are we reproducing and transferring? Can we even think about what we are doing with thought, at least at this very same moment of thought?

It seems that the question of reproduction and transfer of knowledge always exposes the fundamental connection between a certain concrete philosophy and the certain specific environment in which it was produced. It exposes, what philosophers usually try to hide, as William James puts it at the beginning of his lectures on pragmatism, namely, that "[t]he history of philosophy is to a great extent that of certain clash of human temperaments" (James 1963, 6). Our question exposes the concrete and empirical origins of each and every system of philosophy. These origins can be hidden, but their influence remains present even in the most abstract philosophy. As James writes, the philosopher, "[w]anting a universe that suits [his temperament], […] believes in any representation of the universe that does suit it" (James 1963, 7).

Nietzsche may be the first who grounded his merciless critic precisely on the fact that philosophers, without knowing what they are doing, only reproduce their type: their temperament, affections, and way of life. Pierre Klossowski thus paraphrases Nietzsche's critique: "[philosophers] are not conscious that they are speaking of themselves—they claim it would be a question of 'the truth'—when at bottom it is only a question of themselves" (Klossowski 1997, 2). Such a reversal is in Nietzsche's writing most explicitly present at

1 The topic of philosophy and education has been addressed in many articles in the *Phainomena* journal (cf. Šimenc 2018; Barbarič 2012; Urbančič 1997).

the beginning of *Beyond Good and Evil*, where he asks: "*Who* is it really that questions us here? *What* in us really wills the truth?" (Nietzsche 2001, 5) Deleuze's line of thought, in his interpretation of Nietzsche (which is the main theoretical frame of the present paper), is based on the idea of the centrality of change of the main philosophical question: instead of "What is the truth?" one should ask: "who is seeking the truth? In other words: what does the one who seeks the truth want? What is his type, his will to power?" (Deleuze 1983, 94–95) That is why we, as a central question of this paper, propose the more precise question of philosophical education, the question which exposes the concrete philosophical practice: the practice of reproduction, progression, and transfer of philosophical knowledge.

Preliminarily, let us suppose that there are two ways of answering the question or two opposing ideas regarding the role of education in philosophy. On the one hand, we have the affirmation of education as the transfer of knowledge from teachers to pupils, from masters to apprentices, from past to present. On the other hand, we have the idea of philosophy, which has to break with the past, be polemical, critical. This corresponds to a certain extent with the two main representations of the world, one hierarchical, centralized, and rigidly structured, the other decentralized, conflictual, and more chaotic. On the one side, we have great philosophical masters such as Platon, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel. On the other side, are those who oppose the idea that philosophy is a process of the transfer of knowledge, which remains the same from the past to the present. Nietzsche may be the most prominent example of such a position. He opens his essay "On the Use and Abuse of History for Life" with an eloquent quote from Goethe: "I hate everything that merely instructs me without augmenting or directly invigorating my activity." (Nietzsche 1997, 59) Furthermore, his thought as a whole could be read as a distrust towards "the masters of the past," as a specific rejection of the history of philosophy and its educational value. Klossowski writes: "Nietzsche rejected, purely and simply, the attitude of the philosopher-teacher […] if by that we mean a thinker who thinks and teaches out of a concern for the human condition." (Klossowski 1997, 5)

What did Klossowski mean with this far-reaching statement? Could we extract some philosophical consistency in such a rejection of philosophical

teaching? Is this a rebellion without reason or even rebellion against reason? These are the key research questions of the present study. I try to sketch an answer to proposed questions mainly through Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche's philosophy in his works *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and *Difference and Repetition*. I also try to explicate the systematicity of such a strict philosophical disobedience and present the reasons for the rejection of a specific understanding of teaching in philosophy. I attempt to achieve this through a comparison of Deleuze's Nietzsche with a similar philosophical position, namely that of Max Stirner. Stirner's name plays a crucial strategic role in Deleuze's *Nietzsche and Philosophy:* he was namely the first to "rediscover the path of the question: 'which one?'" (Deleuze 1983, 159) and, as I argue, in a manner similar to Nietzsche radically rejected teaching in philosophy. However, through the comparison the difference between Nietzsche and Stirner will prove as being crucial for the establishment of specific, non-dogmatic understanding of the concept of learning.

The article has been organized in the following way. In the first chapter, we introduce the Nietzschean rejection of the mediation of thought, which could be only to a certain degree compared with the Marxist rejection of the mediation of ideology. What is similar in both contexts, is the recognition of the function of an enforcing of supposedly universal thought, but, contrary to the thinkers from the Marxist tradition, Nietzsche rejects the mediation of thought as such (and not only the mediation of ideological thought). Hence, he does not use the (moral) separation between the good and the bad mediation of thought (in the Althusserian terms between ideological and scientific discourse). Just the opposite, every enforced thought is, by definition, moral thought, which is based on the supposed connection between (common) thought, common good, and conventional truth.

In the second and the third chapters, we apply the idea of rejection of such a dogmatic image of thought to Deleuze's philosophical perspective. I argue that Deleuze's appropriation of Nietzsche exposes even more radically the anti-canonical nature of Nietzsche's work. Through Deleuze, I explicate why the rejection of enforced thought cannot become an imperative of some new major and canonical thought. This is directly connected with Klossowski's thesis, that Nietzsche not only rejects other philosophical teachers but

himself, in order to remain consistent with his thought, cannot become a philosophical teacher.

In the fourth chapter, we compare Deleuze's appropriation of Nietzsche with Max Stirner's rejection of obedience and leadership in thought. In Stirner, every mediation of thought from the outside is rejected by the all-mighty ego, which should not be bothered by anything external. On the contrary, Deleuze's rejection of philosophical teachers radically opens the individual to an outside influence, which, in the process of learning, radically transform and changes the individual inner structure.

In conclusion, we try to sketch the basic characteristics of such an understanding of the function of learning. We argue for an understanding of learning that is, at the same time, creative and self-transforming. Learning intensifies the process of thought, which should be the final aim of non-dogmatic thought rejecting the dogmatic function of thought as the transmission of a ready-made truth. Therefore, what brings together Deleuze and Nietzsche, is the idea that the critique of the dogmatic image of thought is at the same time also the act of creation, and, as I will argue, exactly this act must be repeated and reproduced through learning. Only such a repetition reproduces the difference, which is, according to Deleuze, one of the main points of Nietzsche's idea of eternal return.

Nietzsche's rejection of all forms of mediated thought

If we define education as the transfer of ready-made content (knowledge or a system of values) from one mind to another, we must presuppose certain sameness of the structure of universal thought. Otherwise, this transfer could be perceived as violence, as an enforcing of thought from the outside. Precisely this can be figuratively illustrated with Socrates teaching Meno's slave the universal mathematical laws. "I'm not teaching him anything, but just asking him questions," Socrates insists (Plato 2005, 116). The master can demand that the truth should be passed unchanged to the heads of his pupils because this is not master's own truth, but a universal truth that must be recognized by everyone. That is why such a gesture of the enforcing of thought is not perceived as an authoritarian one. However, Nietzsche questions such a self-

evident "truth" (upon which all other truths are based) without mercy: "[t]he will to truth that still seduces us into taking so many risks, this famous truthfulness that all philosophers so far have talked about with veneration […] Is it any wonder if we finally become suspicious, lose patience, turn impatiently away?" (Nietzsche 2001, 5)

If we pose the problem of education in this way, we are close to the concept of ideology. Ideology is in Marx' and Engels's *Th German Ideology* defined as thought that presents itself as being universal, even if it only presents the interests of those who possess the power to pass that thought to those who are powerless (and therefore subjected to ideology; cf. Marx and Engels 1974). In such a structure thought itself necessarily hides the truth about its own functioning. Ideological manipulation, therefore, in the wider sense, corresponds with a manipulation of a philosophical teacher, who presents his thought as universal, even if it only circularly affirms that particular form of thinking. This manipulation is the reason, why we are caught in a certain vertigo inside which it is difficult to distinguish ideology from the non-manipulative transfer of universal knowledge. Althusser describes this paradoxical topology in the essay "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in the following manner:

> […] what thus seems to take place outside ideology […] in reality takes place in ideology. What really takes place in ideology seems therefore to take place outside it. That is why those who are in ideology believe themselves by definition outside ideology: one of the effects of ideology is the practical denegation of the ideological character of ideology by ideology: ideology never says, "I am ideological." (Althusser 1971, 175)

Althusser searches for an answer to the ambiguity in the distinction between ideology and science: "It is necessary to be outside ideology, i.e. in scientific knowledge, to be able to say: […] I was in ideology" (Althusser 1971, 175). However, Nietzsche's style of resistance to the danger of enforcement in thought, which will be primarily discussed in this paper, is of a different kind and in a certain sense more radical. It does not only reject certain (ideological)

forms of forced ideas but rejects the form of the forced transfer of ideas as such, no matter what the content of the transferred thought is. If Althusser in a certain sense reproduces the ambiguity of ideology towards bad infinity (how can scientific discourse prove itself to be non-ideological?), Nietzsche rejects the very idea of mediation and transfer of thought.[2] As Klossowski writes, "[t]he very idea of a 'consciousness for itself mediated by another consciousness' remains foreign to Nietzsche" (Klossowski 1997, 12). He rejects any form of common knowledge, any form of thought that is good for all. "He made fun of himself for not being a philosopher […], if by that we mean a thinker who thinks and teaches out of a *concern* for the human condition." (Klossowski 1997, 5)

If there is no need for concern for the human condition, there is no need for the function of teaching in philosophy and no need for the transfer of "good" knowledge. The very link between thought and morality, the link which ensures that the gesture of a philosophical teacher is well-intended, is broken. Even more, for Nietzsche, thought is vital and healthy only if it is singular, only if it is the deviation from the common image of thought. Such thought is by definition immoral, not because it provides alternative morality, but because it rejects the very form of the transfer of thought, which is always based on supposed goodness or morality of thought. In that sense, one may say that Nietzsche is a rebel without reason, a rebel who is not resisting against the specific content of thought, but against the supposedly neutral form of the transfer of thought. The belief in "immediate certainities" that could be taught goes (for Nietzsche) hand in hand with "moral naiveté" (Nietzsche 2001, 34). Moralism is therefore often behind the supposedly neutral truth-seeking: "[i]t is no more than a moral prejudice that the truth is worth more than appearance" (Nietzsche 2001, 35).

The "anti-educational" aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy may have been most precisely and vigorously analyzed by Klossowski in his study *Nietzsche and the Vicious circle*. Already in the introduction, we can read that Nietzsche "destroyed not only his own identity" but "that of the authorities of speech" as

2 A similar interpretation of Nietzsche's understanding of education is developed in: Ansgar 2017.

such (Klossowski 1997, xix). As Nietzsche wrote in the letter to his mother: "I do not seek 'disciples'—believe me!—I enjoy my freedom and wish this joy to all those who have the right to spiritual freedom." (Klossowski 1997, 20) However, what is the purpose of Nietzsche's discourse, if he is not looking for followers and if his writing should not be perceived as teaching or preaching (although it sometimes seems precisely like that)?

It seems that his writing should be understood as an expression of a certain intensity of thought. Such an intensity must come out and be expressed, but not because it would involve something necessarily true, right, or something good for the humanity. Nietzsche introduces a different function of writing, which is almost a way of self-healing, through the expression of one's singularity. The purpose of such a discourse is thus not moral. It does not try to order a behavior or to lead thought to its supposed final purpose. On the contrary, "it is extraordinarily dangerous to believe that mankind as a whole will progress and grow stronger if individuals become flabby, equal, average […]" (Klossowski 1997, 153).

Every form of preaching and educating through discourse is, therefore, structurally necessarily problematic. It produces sameness in the form of common sense, prevalent customs, general morality. As Klossowski writes: "we think it is necessary to have lived in a totally 'antiphilosophical' manner, according to hitherto received notions, and certainly not as a shy man of virtue—in order to judge the great problems from lived experiences" (Klossowski 1997, 1). Every experience and each life-path is singular, and such should also be everyone's thought: not forced, not even oriented from the outside. Thought must express the inner intensive experience. Nietzsche's great invention is, according to Klossowski, that he broke the connection between what is healthy and what is gregarious, common, and majoritarian. Every deviation is not necessarily sick; on the contrary, great health can only be something singular, something that cannot be prescribed, taught, or commanded. It is therefore quite understandable, that in *Thus Spoke Zaratustra* Nietzsche connects "great sadness" with the formula: "Everything is empty, everything is the same, everything was!" (Nietzsche 2006a, 105)

Gilles Deleuze: Nietzsche's disciple?

Gilles Deleuze may be the one philosopher, who followed Nietzsche's rejection of philosophical teaching most strictly and dogmatically. One can already sense a paradox in what was just written: did he follow Nietzsche in a somehow similar way, as an apprentice follows his teacher? In order not to get caught in a trap, we have to explicate why this "following" is of a slightly different sort. What Deleuze namely inherited from Nietzsche, was maybe not so much the content of his thought, like a specific interpretation of the concept of will to power, eternal return, or *Übermensch,* but, as I will try to argue, more the whole philosophical gesture of rejection of the dogmatic image of philosophical thought. Such an act is the act of critique and a creative act at the same time. The basic idea of the dogmatic image of thought is, namely, that thought should be learned from the masters and reproduced without change, while the intention of Deleuze's whole work is exactly the opposite: to produce a (creative) difference. That is also one of the crucial points in his appropriation of Nietzsche, who is for Deleuze primarily the philosopher of pure affirmation of difference and differentiation, as I will explicate in this chapter.

The logic of creative differentiation is also embodied in Deleuze's own method of studying the history of philosophy. An interpretation of a work is, although it is on the one hand utterly loyal to the spirit of the original work, also different from it. As Deleuze explains, he understands "history of philosophy as a sort of buggery," in which he saw himself as "taking an author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous" (Deleuze 1995, 6). The relationship is in this case, therefore, significantly different from the simple reproduction of a master's thought. Deleuze's work on Nietzsche may in this context be more than just an example of a different style of "doing" history of philosophy, which "rather than repeating what a philosopher says, has to say what he must have taken for granted, what he didn't say but is nonetheless present in what he did say" (Deleuze 1995, 136). With such a procedure the "zone of indiscernibility" is formed, in which "Deleuze's own project and that of the author at hand [Nietzsche, in our case] seem to become indiscernible" (Smith 2012, 20).

What Deleuze repeats most dogmatically after Nietzsche, is the form of relation to the past, to the history of philosophy. From Deleuze's perspective, we have to take a different relation toward the history of philosophy as mere

listening and obeying.[3] What Deleuze affirms in the history of philosophy in general, is exactly a certain non-dogmatic tradition, represented in what he called minor philosophy: "'[M]inor' philosophers—not in the sense that they were secondary, but that they challenged the 'major' conception of the canon, and what Deleuze would come to call its 'dogmatic' image of thought" (Smith 2012, 22; cf. Deleuze 2001, 131). Deleuze's minor philosophers (beside Nietzsche, the crucial names in this context are also Bergson and Spinoza) cannot form a new canon, which would replace the philosophical teachers of the dogmatic image of thought. On the contrary, their value is precisely in their challenging critique of thought, which is at the same time also a creation of difference in thought. Exactly this creative potential would be lost, if such thoughts would form a new, unchanged philosophical canon and if such thinkers would be perceived as new masters of thought.

The most apparent difference between Deleuze and Nietzsche may be explicated precisely from this point. It seems that Nietzsche sometimes still believed in the possibility of new masters, who could replace the current rule of slave morality. As Robert B. Pippin argues, "Nietzsche sometimes calls a 'noble' life, is still to be possible […] and he clearly believes that the major element of this possibility is his own effect on his listeners" (Pippin 2006, xviii). Nietzsche, as Klossowski wrote, hence, at certain parts of his writings believed in the "aristocracy of the future" (Klossowski 1997, 152), who could present the new teachers: "[o]ne day, these isolated cases will come into possession of their own methods for 'directing' the future of humanity" (Klossowski 1997, 7). In contrast, Deleuze completely abandoned the tendency to reach the position of a master of thought. He did not sympathize with the idea that power should come into the hands of those who supposedly deserve it: "[t]hose whom Nietzsche calls masters are certainly powerful men, but not men of

3 It seems that Deleuze was consistent in this context, even if we concentrate on his own philosophical "teaching," which was his main preoccupation ("giving courses has been a major part of my life, in which I've been passionately involved"). However, he tried to avoid being a philosophical master: "[lectures] are like a research laboratory: you give courses on what you are investigating, not on what you know. […] [W]e rejected the principle of 'building up knowledge' progressively: […] everyone took what they needed or wanted, what they could use […]" (Deleuze 1995, 139).

power since power is in the gift of the values of the day. A slave does not cease to be a slave by taking power, and it is even the way of the world, or the law of its surface, to be led by slaves" (Deleuze 2001, 54).

The idea that actual power in the world should represent the hierarchical relation between Nietzschean masters and slaves, therefore, the idea that there exists a natural hierarchy, which could be derived from a (too literal) reading of *On the Genealogy of Morality* (Nietzsche 2006b), is one of the great dangers of interpretations of Nietzsche. Klossowski, rightly so, asked:

> [d]id Nietzsche believe in the efficacy of these methods [for directing the future of humanity]? Or rather, did he simply want to *transmit the states of his own soul* in order to make sure others would have the *means* of reacting and acting under the worst conditions, thereby enabling them not only *to defend themselves* but also *to counter-attack*? (Klossowski 1997, 7)

While reading Nietzsche, one necessarily confronts the question: who are the others to whom Nietzsche's discourse is addressed? Following Klossowski, they are not a unified group with a collective identity, which would become a prevailing identity in the future of humanity. "Nietzsche is not concerned with the fate of humanity," on the contrary, the very concept of humanity is for Nietzsche (as also for Stirner, as will be showed in the chapter below) "a pure abstraction" (Klossowski 1997, 153). Humanity is worth something, not as a whole, but as an origin for something different. This difference cannot be a negation of current culture in the form of a new human culture, with its repressions, normalizations, and equalizations.

On the contrary, as Klossowski remarks, "future generations are and will only ever be valuable because of their rare successes, which are always individual" (Klossowski 1997, 153). In short: we cannot hope for a final solution and final equilibrium in which a majoritarian common sense would become amoral, non-gregarious, and free of resentment. Minor thought should be affirmed, not because it should become majoritarian, but precisely because it is worth something as being minor, deviant, and non-conformist. Instead of yearning for a final solution for the reactive forces, we must, at least in Deleuze's interpretation of Nietzsche, admit their eternal triumph:

> The genealogist is well aware that there is a health which only exists as the presupposition of a becoming-sick. The active man is that young, strong, handsome man, whose face betrays the discreet signs of sickness to which he has not yet succumbed, of a contagion which will only affect him tomorrow. The strong must be defended against the weak, but we know the desperate character of this enterprise. The strong man can oppose the weak, but not his own becoming-weak, which is bound to him by a subtle attraction. (Deleuze 1983, 167)

There is no teacher, no preacher, and no leader, who could detour the course of human history. "*Ressentiment* and bad conscience are constitutive of the humanity of man, nihilism is the a priori concept of universal history. This is why conquering nihilism, liberating thought from bad conscience and *ressentiment* means the overcoming and destruction of even the best men." (Deleuze 1983, 166) Nietzsche's praise of Romans, Greeks, or Napoleon is praise intended for those, who were only able to temporarily stop the necessary direction of history, in which we can observe the development of human's universal becoming to its reactive essence.

Nietzsche's critique is, as Deleuze writes, "not directed against an accidental property of man, but against his very essence" (Deleuze 1983, 167). There is no hope, therefore, for the salvation of humankind as a whole. On the contrary, active force is always singular, always individual. It takes on the form of a deviation from the universal human culture; a deviation, which, in order to remain active, cannot become the new leading power in human history. The master, as described by Nietzsche, as "man of war, of division, as warrior" (Nietzsche 2006b, 15), cannot function as a positive ideal. Old masters cannot return in the future as a victorious group, nation, or race.

This same Nietzschean idea remains present through all of Deleuze's work and could be implicitly found in many of his concepts. For example, the concept of the line of flight or line of escape (*ligne de fuite*) designates a leaking or escaping from the main culture's norms, rules, and habits. Such an activity, which is a precondition for deterritorialization, is always individual and singular. Similar logic could be observed in Deleuze's and Guattari's use of the concept of minority. A minority can never become a majority. The opposition

between the two "is not simply quantitative." A minority is a deviation from the majoritarian norm that is not defined by its self-identity but as a deviation from the reproducing static majoritarian self-identity. "It is important not to confuse 'minoritarian' as a becoming or process, with a 'minority,' as an aggregate or a state." (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 291) The concept of minority does not signify identity, but certain crucial aspect of the concept of becoming, which is always minoritarian. The minoritarian is "a potential, creative and created, becoming" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 106). The great task is not to establish a new majority, a new identity, and a new norm (a trap, in which the process of becoming is stopped), but to reproduce the minoritarian becoming. "The problem is never to acquire the majority, even in order to install a new constant. There is no becoming-majoritarian; majority is never becoming. All becoming is minoritarian." (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 106)

The dogmatic image of philosophical thought

Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche is characterized by a rejection of the dogmatic image of thought, which relies upon the natural harmony between thinker, truth, and the activity of thought. This harmony plays a crucial role in the legitimization of the figure of the philosophical teacher: he knows the truth, therefore, he is good. He is good, because he knows the truth. There is no possibility of a rebellion here, since every resistance to the philosophical teaching is, by definition, immoral, irrational, and excluded from the field of universal truth. Just imagine that the slave would reject Socrates when he tries to explain to him the geometrical truths.

Geometrical laws embodied in different regular shapes such as a triangle or a square could serve us as a great example in this context. It is not a coincidence, namely, that in their immobility they often serve as an illustration of eternal ideas, essences, truths. Such truths are what they are in their essence. They are indifferent to thought that thinks them. They just have to be recognized by thought. All the lines and all the correct shapes were already drawn (by God himself). The eternal beauty, which is at the same time also the eternal good and the eternal truth, must only be recognized by everybody. Here is the point, where philosophical teaching comes to the stage, since it is needed for

the passing of that truth onward, which must, during the process of transition, remain the same, self-identical, regular, and "square."

Nietzsche's and Deleuze's idea of the process of learning is quite different: truth cannot be something already given; it has to be produced. All the godly geometrical lines that define the structure of the world are not given but have to be drawn. So, new lines are drawn only by those who can draw while walking on the as yet not established lines. "It is therefore true," writes Deleuze, while explaining the Nietzschean logic of differentiation, "that God makes the world by calculating, but his calculations never work out exactly," they are never in peace with themselves in the static self-identity, "and this inexactitude or injustice in the result, this irreducible inequality, forms the condition of the world. The world 'happens' while God calculates; if the calculation were exact, there would be no world." (Deleuze 2001, 222) Truth is nowhere to be found, neither outside nor inside thought.

"To think is to create: this is Nietzsche's greatest lesson […]" (Tomlinson 1983, xiv). "Of all that is written I love only that which one writes with his blood […]," writes Nietzsche (Nietzsche 2006a, 27). If thinking is itself creating (of truth), then thinking, by definition, cannot be transferred, ordered, or oriented, since also its purpose has not been created yet. Ordered thought is, namely, not even a thought: it is a mere repetition, following the authority of thought. There is something in thought, according to Deleuze's Nietzsche, that rejects the function of the teaching of thought, something that drives the critique of the dogmatic image of thought. This critique, which criticizes the idea that the truth should only be recognized since it is already there, is already an act of creation. It is in a conflict with the philosophical teacher since it creates the truth, which is not yet universally recognized, the truth, which is in accordance only with its own process of production. Deleuze writes:

> The conditions of a true critique and a true creation are the same: the destruction of an image of thought which presupposes itself and the genesis of the act of thinking in thought itself. Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter. (Deleuze 2001, 139)

This same series of ideas, which is within Deleuze's oeuvre already present in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, is further developed in the chapter "Image of Thought" in *Difference and Repetition*. The idea of universal knowledge, which could be transferred into anyone's head, is namely embodied in the statement "everybody knows." This statement itself functions as a pressure: "if there is something, what everybody knows, you have to know that too!" It seems self-evident that the method of the enforcing of a universal truth functions in such a way that it wants to exclude the possibility of any alternative truth, the possibility of any reasonable objection. Deleuze writes:

> Everybody knows, no one can deny, is the form of representation and the discourse of the representative. When philosophy rests its beginning upon such implicit or subjective presuppositions, it can claim innocence, since it has kept nothing back except, of course, the essential—namely, the form of this discourse. (Deleuze 2001, 130)

This discourse is formed as order: one should recognize the truth, which is not commanded from the outside, even if it is perceived as such. It is only a matter of time, effort, and good will when this same truth would be found in the most inner structure of everyone's mind. However, this commanding form of the discourse remains hidden, precisely because this discourse represents itself as being objective and merely descriptive:

> […] everybody knows what it means to think and to be. […] As a result, when the philosopher says "I think therefore I am," he can assume that the universality of his premises—namely, what it means to be and to think […]—will be implicitly understood, and that no one can deny that to doubt is to think, and to think is to be. (Deleuze 2001, 130)

However, if this knowledge is already there in the thought, why do we even need philosophical education? Why do we even need someone, who explains what it means "to be" and "to think?" This is already a question of a rebellious pupil, who tries to expose the form of the discourse that can be authoritarian precisely because of the supposed universal structure of thought. To perceive

such a discourse as a discourse with good intentions, as a discourse, which would transfer only knowledge, which would reproduce the good, one has to believe, as we already observed, that the philosopher/teacher is good and that there is a natural alliance between thought and goodness. As Deleuze writes:

> [w]hen Nietzsche questions the most general presuppositions of philosophy, he says that these are essentially moral, since Morality alone is capable of persuading us that thought has a good nature and the thinker a good will, and that only the good can ground the supposed affinity between thought and the True. (Deleuze 2001, 132)

This is the reason why we should understand Nietzsche's rejection of morality, not as a specific philosophical stance, which would try to enforce an alternative morality, but as a structurally necessary result of a rejection of the dogmatic image of philosophical thought as such. Nietzsche is primarily not excited about transgression of the law or about certain immoral lifestyles. On the contrary, in order to expose the dominant form of a dogmatic image of thought, which enforces the recognition of a certain thought, thought does not have any other possibility as to be immoral: "[t]he free human being is immoral because in all things he is determined to depend upon himself and not upon a tradition: in all the original conditions of mankind, 'evil' signifies the same as 'individual,' 'free,' 'capricious,' 'unusual,' 'unforeseen,' 'incalculable'" (Nietzsche, 2006b, 133). Immoral thought is therefore primarily thought without presuppositions, thought which tends to be independent of common sense as an expression of the prevailing morality in a certain environment. Deleuze states:

> The implicit presupposition of philosophy may be found in the idea of common sense […] On this basis, philosophy is able to begin. […] Postulates in philosophy are not propositions the acceptance of which the philosopher demands; but, on the contrary, propositional themes which remain implicit and are understood in a pre-philosophical manner. In this sense, conceptual philosophical thought has as its implicit presupposition a pre-philosophical and natural Image of

> thought, borrowed from the pure element of common sense. (Deleuze 2001, 131)

It is not a coincidence, therefore, that philosophers habitually tend to affirm the established moral system, to establish the state, beliefs, and customs. The crucial question is, which is the appropriate form of a rebellion against such a form of discourse? Discourse, which demands universal recognition of thought, is delegitimized if there is a thought that does not recognize itself in that discourse. The principled rebellion against the gregariousness of group thinking cannot take the form of a recognition of some alternative group thinking, the form of an alternative image of thought, which should become universal. On the contrary, such rebellion is always singular. Deleuze writes: "[b]ut here and there isolated and passionate cries are raised. How could they not be isolated when they deny what 'everybody knows …'? And passionate, since they deny that which, it is said, nobody can deny?" (Deleuze 2001, 130) Individuality and loneliness are hence directly written in the structure of a rebellion against the dogmatic image of thought. Such a rebellion cannot claim universal recognition; it is necessarily particular and minoritarian; the latter was, however, often, even by Nietzsche himself, mixed up with aristocratic mentality, which favored the chosen few. Yet, as Deleuze remarks,

> [s]uch protest does not take place in the name of aristocratic prejudices: it is not a question of saying what few think and knowing what it means to think. On the contrary, it is a question of someone—if only one—with the necessary modesty not managing to know what everybody knows, and modestly denying what everybody is supposed to recognize. Someone who neither allows himself to be represented nor wishes to represent anything. (Deleuze 2001, 130)

A rebellious thinker, who does not recognize the dogmatic image of thought, is, hence, not a new messiah, a teacher of alternative truth, or an aristocrat, who would laugh at the ideals of the masses. What may surprise us, is that a rebellious thinker, at least at the most fundamental level, follows the ideal, which is set up by the philosophical teacher in the dogmatic image of thought:

to establish philosophy without any presuppositions. As Deleuze notes, only the individual, who does not recognize the dogmatic image of thought, is "an individual without presuppositions. Only such an individual effectively begins and effectively repeats." (Deleuze 2001, 130) The ideal beginning, which again and again fails, is the beginning without presuppositions, beginning in the zone free of morality, custom, and prejudices.

Max Stirner: the "ego" destroys everything

Everything written thus far brings us to a single formula that designates the new image of thought: singular individuality against the universality of established moral values and customs, against the established state. Deleuze writes: "[a] new image of thought means primarily that truth is not the element of thought" (Deleuze 1983, 104), which implies that "setting up a new image of thought" destroying the established truth also means "freeing thought from the burdens which are crushing it" (Deleuze 1983, 195). However, it seems that this liberating effect of thought from the truth is the only content of the new image of thought. Maybe that is why Deleuze later gave up the idea of a new image of thought. Nietzsche's gesture namely primarily shows that thought cannot have an image, which could be learned or transferred from one thought to another.[4]

The Deleuzian idea of rejection of the dogmatic image of thought is in a certain sense very close to the philosophical project of Max Stirner as developed in his book *The Ego and Its Own*. What is common in both contexts, is the idea of singularity and individuality of thought, which reject every form of universalism and every form of recognition. However, Stirner is even more explicit in his rejection of philosophical teachers. According to Stirner, "[m]en are sometimes divided into two classes: *cultured* and *uncultured*." The former "demanded a servile respect for the thoughts recognized by them […]. State,

4 In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze wrote: "[i]t is not a question of opposing to the dogmatic image of thought another image borrowed, for example, from schizophrenia, but rather of remembering that schizophrenia is not only a human fact but also a possibility for thought—one, moreover, which can only be revealed as such through the abolition of that image." (Deleuze 2001, 148)

emperor, church, God, morality, order, are such thoughts or spirits, that exists only for the mind." (Stirner 2014, 65–66). The enforcing of ideas, which are ideas of certain (dominant) group and demand universal recognition, is the basis for inequality and hierarchy in the world. "Hierarchy is dominion of thoughts, dominion of mind!" (Stirner 2014, 67) To expose this, one has to expose not only the "change of form" of hierarchy (from the despotic ruler and religious authorities to the rational liberal state), but also what remains the same during that change, namely the structure of "obedience and possessedness" (Stirner 2014, 78). In liberalism, for example, "one is rid of orders indeed, and 'no one has any business to give us orders,' but one has become so much the more submissive to the—*law*. One is enthralled now in due legal form." (Stirner 2014, 99) Stirner would like to find the thought which would be able to exit the structure of "ordering" and "possessing," a thought which would not be intimately connected with the state, as it is the case in German idealism from Kant to Hegel: "[t]he state always has the sole purpose to limit, tame, subordinate, the individual—to make him subject to some generality or other; it lasts only so long as the individual is not all in all, and it is only the clearly-marked restriction of me, my limitation, my slavery." (Stirner 2014, 211)

Only the individual can oppose the state, since any collective rebellion would end up in a new state, where new collective morality would suppress the individual: "[s]olely from the principle that all right and all authority belong to the collectivity of the people do all forms of government arise." What Stirner means with the concept of state, is namely exactly the abstract principle in which "the collectivity is above the individual, and has a power which is called legitimate, which is law" (Stirner 2014, 183). Stirner does not, as Saul Newman shows, argue against a particular state, but declares war "against establishment itself" (Newman 2009, 4): "[l]ittle scruple was left about revolting against the existing State or overturning the existing laws, but to sin against the idea of the State, not to submit to the idea of law, who would have dared that?" (Stirner 2014, 78)

The initial problem for Stirner is that the structure of law itself most literally represents the functioning of the hierarchy of mind: we have to subordinate to it, no matter if we believe in it, no matter if it is in accordance with our thought. In opposition to that, Stirner counts on only one law, on the law of the

egoistic self and his property (the original title of his book is *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum*). He tries to oppose the ideal of a liberal state or, better, to fulfill the ideals which are promised by a liberal state, which claims to take care for the individual and the individual's private property. Nevertheless, according to Stirner, in reality precisely the opposite happens: "[t]he state always has the sole purpose to limit, tame, subordinate, the individual—to make him subject to some generality or other; it lasts only so long as the individual is not all in all, […] everyone who wants to be his own self is its [state] opponent and is nothing." (Stirner 2014, 211) Stirner, thus, opposes the state, the concept which represents the enforcing of a universally recognized thought, with the concept of *der Einzige*: individual, who is not an abstract individual, but a concrete and singular individual, with concrete and singular desires, which cannot be fulfilled by any state or protected by any law.

This individual is "you" (whoever you are, with your particular qualities), as Stirner often addresses his reader. Such egoists, unable to form a common state, are by definition against the state and society, since those structures, as Stirner writes, emerged

> […] without our making them, are united without our uniting, are predestined and established, or have an independent standing of their own, are the indissolubly established against us egoists. The fight of the world to-day is, as it is said, directed against the "established." (Stirner 2014, 207–208)

The similarity between Deleuze's Nietzsche and Stirner is more than apparent. As Saul Newman exposes, Deleuze too (in his work with Guattari) treats the state as "an abstract machine rather than a concrete institution," capable of capturing individual desire and coupling it with established norms. Another common aspect among both thinkers arises from the idea, that "common sense" and "common morality" are "fixed ideas or spooks, […] ideological abstractions that nevertheless have real political effects—they provide the State with a formal justification for its domination." (Newman 2009, 6) In order to resist such structures, we have to change the structure of thought, primarily, since authoritarianism in thought directly corresponds with authoritarianism

as manifested in the social order. "Only thought is capable of inventing the fiction of a State that it is universal by right, of elevating the State to de jure universality." (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 375). "For Deleuze this model of thought is also the model for political power—the authoritarianism of one is inextricably linked with the authoritarianism of the other: 'Power is always arborescent' […]" (Newman 2009, 7). In short, the main similarity between Deleuze's Nietzsche and Stirner is already inscribed in one of the tasks of the new image of thought, namely in "turning thought into something aggressive, active and affirmative" and "[c]reating free men, that is to say men who do not confuse the aims of culture with the benefit of the State, morality or religion" (Deleuze 1983, 106).

However, beside similarities, we have to expose also the main differences between Deleuze and Stirner. As Deleuze, the self-described anti-dialectical thinker, himself emphasized, Stirner has "a place apart, the final, extreme place" in the history of dialectic: he tried to "reconcile the dialectic with the art of the sophists" and he was able "to rediscover the path of the question: 'which one?'" (Deleuze 1983, 159). His attack on Hegel and dialectic was based on the conceptual question "Who is man?" which replaced the abstract question "What is man?" (cf. Deleuze 1983, 159). The question "who" instead of "what" is, as we argued, crucial also for the appearance of the Nietzschean image of thought. For example, to expose the role of philosophical teachers, we have to replace the question "What is truth?" with the question: "Who is this truthful man, what does he want?" (Deleuze 1983, 95)

Nevertheless, according to Deleuze, Stirner cannot reach the Nietzschean sphere of "going beyond" humanity as such. He is caught in the dialectic between the individual and the state. He rejected the state, but he remained trapped in the self, in the ego, in the "I." As Deleuze writes, in Stirner not only "[s]tate and religion, but also human essence are denied in the EGO, which is not reconciled with anything because it annihilates everything, for its own 'power,' for its own 'dealings,' for its own 'enjoyment.'" (Deleuze 1983, 161) As Stirner himself explains: "it is not that the ego *is* all, but the ego *destroys* all" (Deleuze 1983, 161). The end of dialectics, embodied in Stirner, is nihilism: his ego is nothing, the nothing that destroys everything. Such an EGO, denying any teaching and any other influence from the outside, remains an in itself

enclosed entity or a pure insideness, and cannot be anything else but this in itself returning nothingness. This is the reason, writes Deleuze, why Stirner "plays the revelatory role" in the history of dialectics. Nietzsche, on the other hand, "never stops attacking the theological and Christian character of German philosophy […], the incapacity of this philosophy to end in anything but the ego, man or phantasms of the human" (Deleuze 1983, 162).

One of the most distinguishing features of Deleuze's appropriation of Nietzsche is, quite contrary, its strict separation from the horizons of the self, subjectivity, and identity. Regarding Nietzsche's idea of the eternal return, Deleuze writes: "How could the reader believe that Nietzsche, who was the greatest critic of these categories, implicated Everything, the Same, the Identical, the Similar, the Equal, the I and the Self in the eternal return?" (Deleuze 2001, 299) What returns, are not identities, argues Deleuze, but differences:

> [w]e fail to understand the eternal return if we do not oppose it to identity in a particular way. The eternal return is not the permanence of the same, the equilibrium state or the resting place of the identical. It is not the "same" or the "one" which comes back in the eternal return but return is itself the one which ought to belong to diversity and to that which differs. (Deleuze 1983, 46)

The most significant task of thought for Deleuze is, therefore, not to preserve the Self and the Ego, as in Stirner. On the contrary, thinking means "discovering, inventing new possibilities of life" (Deleuze 1983, 101). It opposes established universalities, but not in order to defend the self, but to change it and overcome it, to reproduce the difference of the self. Moreover, Deleuze emphasizes certain continuity between subjection to the state and subjection to the self: "[t]he more you obey the statements of dominant reality, the more you command as speaking subject within mental reality, for finally you only obey yourself […] a new form of slavery has been invented, that of being a slave to oneself." (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 130; cf. Newman 2009, 10)

Conclusion: Deleuze's concept of learning

Throughout the present paper, we have been following the line of thought, which is driven by the idea of the rejection of philosophical teaching. However, this idea is not always based on the same motifs. As explicated, Deleuze's Nietzschean philosophy may have in a certain context exactly the opposite intentions as Stirner's philosophy, even if they may seem very close to one another. The crucial difference originates in the structure of the self: Deleuze's self is something that should be changed through the encounter with the outside and not something that should be defended from outside influences, which is the case in Stirner.

The difference between Deleuze and Stirner is directly connected with the function of learning. In Stirner, there seems to be no place for learning of the all-mighty self, who only cares about his desires, claims, and possession. In Deleuze, exactly the opposite is the case: the dogmatic image of thought has to be rejected, in order to release the possibilities of learning. Such thought is not closed in itself, as in the case of Stirner, but radically opened for different encounters that force us to think. Such encounters cannot be reduced to encounters with philosophical teaching. Deleuze writes: "do not count upon thought to ensure the relative necessity of what it thinks. Rather, count upon the contingency of an encounter with that which forces thought to raise up and educate the absolute necessity of an act of thought or a passion to think." (Deleuze 2001, 139)

According to Deleuze, thought comes from the outside, but it is impossible to predict its source. What forces us to think, if it is not philosophical teaching revealing a universal truth? This is the main problem of Antonin Artaud, as presented by Deleuze: how can we find something that stimulates thought? The answer is tricky. The link between thought and truth is namely broken; thought is not driven by truth, but by the creation of it. However, in order to create, the thought has to think what forces its thinking. "To think is to create—there is no other creation—but to create is first of all to engender 'thinking' in thought." (Deleuze 2001, 146) The re-birth of thinking in thought represents the never-ending process of learning. "Henceforth, thought is also forced to think its central collapse, its fracture, its own natural 'powerlessness'

which is indistinguishable from [its] greatest power." (Deleuze 2001, 147) If Stirner rejected philosophical teaching and the mediation of thought because he believed in an isolated self, Deleuze rejected them because teaching should not be superior to the process of learning. If Stirner wanted to isolate the self, Deleuze tends to open it even more for the outside sources which radically transform it through the process of learning.

The rejection of the role of philosophical teaching, as well as the rejection of the dogmatic image of thought, in Deleuze's philosophy corresponds with the idea of learning as a process, which cannot be understood solely as a process of the recognition of truth. On the contrary, the process of learning designates the activity of creative thought, activity, which is at the same time creative and contemplative, and radically different from the idea that the function of thought is the recognition of something already created. As Claire Colebrook argues: "[a]s long as we define mind as a closed being that may or may not encounter some external world, and as long as we see that world as being encountered through knowledge, or perception as a mode of 'picturing,' then we will never understand the life of thought." (Colebrook 2011, 21)

Thinking is, therefore, not a process of the internalization of an outside truth, but a process which is indistinguishable from learning as a process of creative modification. As Deleuze and Guattari explained in *What is Philosophy?*, to use our brains means to create new neural connections, new habits of thought (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 209). Learning is, for Deleuze, the subjective act "carried out when one is confronted with the objecticity of a problem (Idea)" (Deleuze 2001, 164), and it "always takes place in and through the unconscious, thereby establishing the bond of a profound complicity between nature and mind" (Deleuze 2001, 165). To go in search "of the place of vital ideas in the nonobjectifiable brain is to create" (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 70).

Learning is, therefore, much more than the process of gaining knowledge, which, for Deleuze, designates "only the generality of concepts or the calm possession of a rule enabling solutions" (Deleuze 2001, 164).[5] The rejection of the dogmatic image of thought thus coincides with the rejection of the idea that

5 Bibliography regarding Deleuze and education is quite extensive. Cf., for example, Beighton 2015; Semetsky and Masny 2013; Olsson 2009.

knowledge is superior to learning as Anna Cutler and Iain Mackenzie argue (cf. 2011, 54). Learning is the process, which cannot, by its very definition, be subordinated to any goals, because its goal is the reproduction of difference, the change of the learning self. This self is itself nothing else but a subject of change, a subject changed through learning, which corresponds with Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche's idea of the eternal return.

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