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THE ROLE AND USE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FUTURE

Abstract
The current challenges of the contemporary operational environment determine not only the establishment of a force structure having the necessary high engagement and sustainment capacity (including logistics), but also the allocation of ISTAR capabilities to support the fulfilment of assigned missions and the achievement of desired effects by the armed forces. Their support will be permanently adapted to the specificity of the operations in which they will be engaged, focusing on commonality, interchangeability, interoperability and integrated functioning within multinational structures, depending on the way they will be organised, the deployment site, the climate, their sustainment capability in conflict areas and the legal institutionalised framework set up by the international organisations that will conduct those missions.

Key words
Capability[1], information superiority[2], engagement space[3], comprehensive approach[4].

Introduction
The resizing and reconfiguration of the global architecture as well as the redefinition of the way of managing multiple and complex crises require the change of specific policies at international level. The asymmetric risks and threats to global

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[1] *The ability to carry out a specified course of action or to obtain a certain established operational effect through the fulfilment of specific standards in the following domains: doctrine, training, organisation, structures, personnel, equipment, readiness status and deployment capability.*

[2] *The ability to carry out a specified course of action or to obtain a certain established operational effect through the fulfilment of specific standards in the following domains: doctrine, training, organisation, structures, personnel, equipment, readiness status and deployment capability.*

[3] *It is part of the engagement environment that comprises those acceptable/unacceptable conditions and circumstances related to the desired end state that influence the commanders' decision, the use of their own capabilities and the interaction with the other actors during the operation. It includes the air, land, naval, outer space, electromagnetic spectrum as well as the associated systems of enemies, friendly forces, allies, partners, neutrals that are relevant to the crisis (conflict) situation.*

[4] *The way in which the parties involved in resolving a crisis (conflict) are responding to a well-coordinated and coherent manner to that specific situation.*

security will increase in intensity and form of manifestation, their prevention and mitigation being an absolute priority for both democratic states and international security organisations. The dynamics and strategic trends of future events will show that security and, implicitly, defence will surpass the responsibilities of a single state, determining an increase in the role of traditional security organisations at global and regional level.

The international environment will be influenced by the powerful rise of the new globally relevant actors, the expansion of regional blocks, the reactivation and amplification of the effects of separatist, interethnic and religious conflicts, the massive decline of the ability of authorities to efficiently manage the own political, economic and social state of affairs, against the background of the transition towards new sources of renewable energy, increased needs for food and lack of critical stable water reserves.

The long-term trends suggest discontinuity, shock and surprise that are manifest through the overlap between the roles of states, institutions and non-state actors, which will lead to the proliferation of new political identities within the existing multilateral institutions. These will have difficulties in adapting to the new strategic environment, the role of non-governmental organisations will increase, also occurring a trend of establishing new regional technological, economic and financial artificial quasi-blocs, which will impose new standards at global level.

The degradation of the security status and the overlap between the effects of globalisation and the regional and fragmentation trends will generate new threats and risks that will be amplified by: increasing social unrest, natural disasters, global demographic growth, resources depletion, climate change as well as new asymmetric threats (terrorism, organised cross-border crime, illegal migration, cyber attacks, corruption, ethnical and religious politicisation, increasing mutual antagonism between different cultures, export of instability trade and natural environment degradation). Europe and its adjacent regions will probably face a possible discredit of the international principle concerning the respect of national sovereignty, the inviolability of frontiers as well as the disobeyance of traditional weapons control regime.

In these circumstances, Romania will seek to promote, protect and defend its national values and interests, by developing, through partnership, new military credible capabilities, suitable to the needs to defend it internally and in the allied context, and by *"promoting democracy, peace and stability in the close neighbourhood area and in other strategic interest regions"*[5].

The future engagement space will be multidimensional, dynamic and pulsating, multidirectional, automated and digitised, expanded, integrated and multinational, with modulated and demodulated military actions, with synchronised efforts and in

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[5] *Romanian Security Strategy, 2008.*

complete cooperation, quasi-transparent through the media information possibilities, through the visible actions.

It will be influenced by a series of probable and potential instability factors, such as the fight for power balance, rivalry, nationalism, religious disputes, demographic growth, proliferation and modernisation of weapon systems, as constitutive elements of a fully manifested phenomenon, being at the foundation of the possible threats to the national and global stability and security as well as the environmental risks caused by natural and man-made disasters.

The armed forces must be capable of conducting operations in complex environments (urban, mountain, desert, arctic areas etc.), with high precision, not just against enemy military objectives, avoiding collateral damages and casualties among the civilian population as much as possible. That will determine the research, development, experimentation and use of new unconventional "vectors", techniques, technologies and procedures.

The temporal and spatial expansion of the engagement environment, in order to accomplish the set objectives, will diversify the way joint operations will be executed at both strategic and operational level and will influence the horizontal integration of new branches and operational components. Therefore, the armed forces will have the task to destroy the enemy ability to react, by synchronising the direct and indirect actions in a joint manner, establishing a variety of targets, narrowing the gaps and designing in an efficient way the actions that are normally directed towards specific objectives.

Future military operations will be of high intensity, carried out simultaneously or successively, in an dynamic way, at the strategic, operational and tactical level, aiming at information supremacy, based on a fair distribution of risks, responsibilities, roles and costs, according to the configured situation, in connection with the established objectives set by political decision-makers, the evolution trend of the force ratio between warring factions, the increase or decrease in the number of allies and supporters, including the measures taken by them, in accordance with the level of security at regional and global level. They will be characterised by:
– complexity, diversity and multidimensionality;
– integrated use of all instruments of power;
– increased number of low intensity asymmetric conflicts (terrorism, deception, psychological influence, insurgency and clashes in the border area);
– increased involvement of non-states actors.

In accordance with the new strategic concept of ensuring security through dynamic engagement, the focus will be on making flexible and maintaining the consensus rule, ensuring the high readiness, deployment and sustainment of the forces in the theatres of operations and implementing a single chain of command and control at strategic distances from allied territory.

At the same time, efforts will be made to minimise national caveats and apply an effective comprehensive approach, focused on the flexible combination of military capabilities specific to the unconventional, nuclear and anti-ballistic missile defence. There will be an image change of the way the forces will behave within the engagement space, as well as an increase in the air, cyber and information operations in support of the desired end state of the conflict, concomitantly with the use of new components (imaginary, psychological, economic or of any other nature).

Concurrently, the expansion of the engagement space will trigger the setting up and training of some hard and soft capability packages, of specific procurement programmes and organisations, in order to be able to execute the whole spectrum of joint and multinational operations, in a specified multinational environment.

The place, role and use of the armed forces will firstly depend on future asymmetric, traditional and disruptive threats that will influence the choice of the decision-maker, of the time and of the legitimate use of them, according to the situation on the ground. In the same context, future conflicts will require the engagement of unconventional forces at the highest level, in order to counter some low intensity, destabilising, manipulation and shock asymmetric threats and to accomplish the strategic effects by using certain capabilities at tactical level.

The change of the pre-emptive policy and of the unilateral way to act towards the international legality and legitimacy, based on achieving consensus and on defending strategic interests, will require the establishment of some objective criteria regarding when, where and how the military forces will be used, under the auspices of the United Nations or of a Coalition of Will.

At the same time, the future competition for vital resources and areas of geostrategic importance, as well as for proactive engagement in preventing a crisis situation will require to maintain a permanent cooperation with the allies and coalition partners within the unified and integrated headquarters, an interagency synchronisation in specific domains (diplomatic, political, medical, educational, economic and development ones), with a proper allocation of financial resources, for a better regional direction of efforts, in accordance with the allied and national interests.

Therefore, the military forces will be also used in a complementary way, having a support role of those elements of power at the national level, in order to dominate the kinetic and non-kinetic spectrum of the conflict. The current conflicts have decisively changed the role and responsibilities of the armed forces, from the main fighting force into an active contributor to minimising the effects of natural disasters, to participating stability, reconstruction and development process or to ensuring the security of non-military participants in theatres of operations or alongside other international organisations specialised in crisis management.

The way the armed forces will be used and the need for rapid, joint and combined collective response will continue to have at the foundation the consensus, national caveats and a limited authority of the designated mission commander, until the "Transfer of Authority" is achieved, as well as the standardisation of the multinational logistic support.

A clear definition and preparation of the authorities that will be responsible for the command and control of operations and for the Reach-Back capability will have a major impact, contributing to the success of the operations.

The ever-changing international environment will determine the armed forces to operate in complex environments and situations (urban, mountain, desert and polar areas). In this context, the complexity, physiognomy and scale of military actions, beside the diversity of the operational environment, will require the structural and actional reorganisation of forces, in order to ensure a joint, modular and flexible organisational structure, having professionalised forces, equipped with intelligent, highly capable means, able of providing timely and reliable information, decisive manoeuvre and high mobility.

The forces will have to have a high degree of availability, versatility, mobility and autonomy, interoperability, a high capacity of adaptation, readiness and information superiority, integrating potential and joint manoeuvre ability, in a modular structure, with multidimensional protection and sustainment with network-enabled capability.

The armed forces will have to have the ability to innovate during peacetime and to adapt themselves in times of war to the realities and opportunities of the asymmetric and hybrid engagement space, when the fear of war and friction will distort, hide and influence the perception over the reality of the engagement space.

The changes that will happen in all domains will determine the change of mentality (a new understanding of the concept of solidarity between allies, of equally sharing the tasks, roles and costs and the establishment of new forms of cooperation within the international community, based on the comprehensive approach), the finding of immediate military solutions as well as risky and costly preventive or long term engagements.

In the same context, the main challenges of the future war will be:
– the disappearance of the classical framework of confrontation and use of the fluid, digitised, dynamic and multidimensional engagement space;
– the use of some "noble strategies" as an effect of the use of sophisticated and efficient weapon systems, which will comprise artificial intelligence that will significantly reduce the human lack of precision;
– the promotion of a philosophy of dissimulating the aggressive actions in peaceful ones, that are subtle and insignificant, of psychologically influencing and

intoxicating the communication means, concurrently with the simultaneous enga-
gement in the whole confrontation space;
– the priority use of non-lethal weapons to defeat the adversary and, in a limited
manner, in critical situations, of the lethal ones against strategic objectives;
– the deployment of strategic air and naval assets, mechanised and armoured forces
in reserve components, at the same time with the setting up of a lethal active
component, comprising small, rapidly deployable, high readiness, easy-to-engage
force packages, which have capabilities able to counter the asymmetric and hybrid
emerging threats.

The future national forces will have to accomplish the whole spectrum of operati-
ons (joint, multinational, inter-agencies, independent and inter-arms) and the whole
range of missions, having the diversity of the comprising capabilities as a comple-
mentary and multiplier factor.

The use of the armed forces in the future will aim at the following priority trends:

1. Timely deterrence and effective strategic defence will require reorganising ope-
rational nuclear forces, declaring an interim operational missile defence capability
and reaching an agreement with respect to the consultation process, the command
and control, based on a revised deterrence posture plan that will provide a balance
between the political and military instruments, between the conventional forces, the
missile defence and the nuclear forces, the essential role being held by the Air Force.

Its future structure will be an unbalanced one, with capabilities distributed unequally
for clearly identifying and countering possible threats. The following will be
essential: multi-role capabilities, based on platforms having an increased adaptable,
versatile and relevant survival capacity for a wide spectrum of missions, focusing on
the new multi-role aircraft, reduction of the radar footprint, joint electronic warfare
actions and development of highly capable, nano, plausible and precise unmanned
air attack systems.

2. Ensuring information supremacy within the Network Centric Warfare will aim
to coordinate in detail all the efforts of the instruments of power involved in ope-
rations, which is essential for the timely situational awareness of the decision-ma-
kers at strategic, operational and tactical level. Viable and robust, adaptable and
flexible enough networks will be created, the main effort being made on the qualita-
tive aspect of the information provided, focused on the fusion and integration of the
analytical activities with the operational ones, in order to allow the accomplishment,
in a dynamic environment, of the whole spectrum of missions and of the punctual
actions.

3. Rethinking the way to support civil authorities in order to provide the essential
needs and to shape the engagement and security environment in support of the
national interests will require the identification and drawing up of a horizontal

collaborative engagement model based on a partnership between the government, multinational corporations and the civil society, as well as on inter-sectorial partnership with non-governmental and private-volunteer organisations/NGOs and PVOs, as an intervention solution when the reaction to a specific situation is slow and there are not enough capabilities.

The model will be based on (with specific properties, terminology, protocols and objectives) a common understanding of the place, role, responsibilities and objectives of everyone involved, on the adaptability and synergy in the common collaborative action of different sectors of the society, in order to solve a complex situation.

The armed forces will act as an initiator and will establish potential partners, tactics, techniques and procedures required by cooperation, common interaction and operation, as well as a system of best practices based on trust and clear intellectual property rights, centred on the premise that no organisation will have the required capabilities and operational and support tools to simultaneously conduct multiple assignments and incident management, in order to create a symmetry of objectives, concepts and resources.

4. The support of stability and reconstruction processes, where the armed forces will focus their efforts on supporting the economy and the creation of new jobs, as precursors of stability and security (organising free elections, reconstructing the critical infrastructure, providing humanitarian aid, law enforcement, reconstructing social institutions and their related capital, implementing economic policies etc.).

Against this background, the pursued aims are to achieve the flexibility and availability of the instruments of national power required to increase the efficiency and economy of using the armed forces, inter-agency integration starting from the early planning stages, unity of command, development of expeditionary and non-military capabilities to meet the essential requirements of the population, enforcing law and order, creating conditions for social justice and ensuring the transition to the legitimacy and civil governance.

5. The cooperation in the field of security will take into consideration the role, place and use of the military force against state and non-state actors, which will require a new set of skills and measures of intervention in a complex, unstable and extremely costly environment, a common understanding of how to provide assistance in stabilisation and reconstruction operations, based on a new interagency communication, control, and cooperation strategy, on specific capabilities, as well as on the use of the military in non-traditional roles, which would require a different kind of training and operating.

Within these areas, the interagency cooperation will aim to: establish common goals (a permanent exchange of information, ensuring access to some military facilities, mutual trust and common understanding of threats); ensure an integrated planning

(tracking terrorists, protecting the infrastructure, ensuring energy security, creating "safe havens" for displaced persons and refugees etc.); support specific collaborative security operations by creating joint teams for economic cooperation in the field of governance and security at battalion, district and provincial level.

A possible model to be employed is based on Ali Laidi's theory on the types of current security. In his vision, "economic security is the foundation, political security is the principle, military security is the guarantor, technological security is the key and cultural security will be the rescue".

The ability to work together with the allies will also be aimed at, in order to be able to influence the global security environment, to create the ability to develop, through multilateralism, mechanisms of sharing the risks and responsibilities caused by the current complex challenges, in political, military, economic, environmental and human areas. Other sub-domains add to these – border security, individual security documents, containers and energy infrastructure security, fight against piracy, drug trafficking, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction/WMD and their vectors, pandemic diseases – in an attempt to rather complement, support and not duplicate the efforts of the international community, complementary to the collaborative cooperation.

6. The national measures and the strategies of all international organisations having responsibilities in **crisis management** should be carefully reviewed and coordinated, so that strategic information-sharing could be conducted in real-time, aiming mainly at transforming the command, control and force structures, which are essential in ensuring the effective crisis management, including in specific areas, such as: transport and border security, identity integrity, prevention of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear/CBRN terrorism etc.

7. The training to conduct counterinsurgency operations will require: a change of mentality and "modus operandi" in a dangerous environment, establishing and ensuring security while providing humanitarian assistance and essential elements needed for the population, promoting effective governance and supporting economic development, supporting reconciliation and social change, creating specific capabilities for special forces and law enforcement and employing women military personnel in permissive and non-permissive environments, in support of tactical operations.

8. In the area of resource security and mitigation of climate change effects, the armed forces will have to understand the vulnerabilities of human communities caused by hydro-meteorological risks, through developing interdisciplinary studies, as well as drafting patterns of evolution and prediction of such a kind of risks. It will also be necessary to adjust the structure of military organisations and to develop flexible mechanisms to design and sustain the armed forces, adapted to the new asymmetric threats, able to operate effectively, regardless of the climate and geophysical conditions in the theatres of operations.

It will be necessary to ensure the training in conducting specific operations related to: eco-terrorism, providing vital resources for the population, consequence management of extreme-weather, pandemic and natural disasters. Under these circumstances, on short term, it will be necessary to:
– prepare studies and forecasts in order to foresee the effects of climate change within the most vulnerable areas;
– adopt a comprehensive training programme for the military personnel, to prepare them on how to limit the effects of extreme events (earthquakes, flooding, mudslides, tornadoes, drought etc.);
– gain the support of local communities, to participate in the elimination of the effects of extreme events, in the relief and reconstruction efforts (through the presence of political factors in the affected areas, as soon as the initial phase of operations);
– procure compatible technical equipment, needed for interventions in the event of natural disasters, change TOEs by introducing specific equipment for extreme climatic conditions; and procure transport and intervention equipment to be used in extreme weather conditions.

9. In the area of doctrine and training, it will be necessary to review the principles, doctrinal provisions, force training modalities, tactics, techniques and procedures required to move from force projection to the accomplishment of the full spectrum of missions, focusing on three main areas: the development of knowledge databases and information gathering methods, creation of necessary combat structures and procurement of required equipment (digitising the force and the engagement space, with an emphasis on computer communications, horizontal integration of technologies, virtual and constructive simulation, global positioning systems, real-time situational awareness, lethality and survival capability) and the increase in the fighting forces' operational tempo.

Education and training will remain key elements to prepare an educated and trained fighter, able to operate in a tactical environment, where military actions spectacularly transitioned from *surface* to *point*, from *massive* to *agile*, from *conventional* actions to *asymmetric* actions, including *clean* cyber and IT-based actions. The standardisation will relate to interoperability, interchangeability, compatibility and commonality of training.

The future training process requires the forces to prepare and carry out joint military exercises, which are to include components related to humanitarian assistance, medical and veterinary care, community projects, building of schools, transport, water supply and health systems and the formation of joint inter-agency teams to model the space of engagement.

Another very important area is to enhance the cultural and language awareness, by aiming at building cultural and language capabilities (related to social and societal

structure, national interests, culture, language, structures of power and authority, history, behaviour etc.).

At lower levels, the military training should be focused on: the study of specific regions and countries, international relations, sociology, public policy and administration, geography, comparative religions, traditions, language training, socio-cultural education, tactics, techniques and procedures of the counterinsurgency theory, non-military components and uncommon foreign languages. Last but not least, the interagency training on intelligence, human resources, security and management will need to be conducted.

10. In the field of technology development and cyber attacks, in a future war, the stress will be laid on destroying and disrupting the opponent's computer networks and automated communication systems, before the start of the attack, by using very dangerous and powerful logical bombs and computer viruses, able to harm the software. The fighting weapon systems of the future war will include a new type of fighter, called the *Land Warrior*, which is going to represent more than just a weapon system, by being also a complex system of intelligence. The future battlefield requires a new phrase – *the Holography of the Cyber War*, which would reveal its informational and energy links and is a better concept to describe the requirements for cyber-structure and dynamism. The essential purpose of the use of *smart weapons* will be to effect the human actions, without directly placing the human being in the area of impact.

The capabilities of the future and the military actions are going to be influenced by a variety of factors whose effects will often be decisive. Accordingly, the future basic directions for capability development will have to comprise:
– an orientation towards *expeditionary missions*;
– the reduction of the personnel;
– the investments in key areas (transport and communications, space capabilities, intelligence and reconnaissance);
– the pooling of resources and equipments, opening defence markets and encouraging competition.

There will be a need for forces able to carry out multiple missions, equipped with multiple-role systems, able to be structured in units, flexible enough to be reconfigured in accordance with different purposes and missions, and there will be a need for integrating military forces with other instruments of power in order to achieve the desired end state.

Some other trends are concerning the building of:
– capabilities for defence, counter information/intelligence operations and cyber attacks of a potential adversary;
– combined capabilities: for strategic deterrence, counter-terrorism and counter-
-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction/WMD threats;

– effective capabilities in employing the military instrument of power with a reduced cost of military intervention, use of modern technologies in countering asymmetric threats and strategies, employed by groups which will be difficult to identify and separate (combatant and non-combatant forces), in particular in urban areas, strategic engagement of terrorist or other groups which would not comply with the principles of the law of armed conflict;
– capabilities shared with coalition partners and allies;
– credible pre-emptive and defensive capabilities, including the development of a strategy to maximise the joint efforts of the agencies and institutions, that are to counter violent political movements, terrorist networks, or organised crime attempts to obtain the technology required for the production and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction/WMD;
– capabilities required for quick deployment of civilian and military expert teams to identify and counteract urgent needs, which emerge in the initial phase of a crisis;
– capabilities enhancing the ability to determine the requirements for intervention in case of predicted disasters (by joint teams of liaison officers and civilian experts), thus creating a capacity for monitoring the needs for assistance, the negotiating terms, the determination of objective conditions, useful in setting the criteria for the transition from military to civilian control of operations;
– the harmonisation of strategies, short-term political objectives and procurement procedures with the long-term contracts that provide forces' equipment.

To conclude, the future operations are going to be conducted in a instable security environment and will determine a change of mentality regarding the place, role and use of the armed forces in creating an effective mechanism of joint coordination between different instruments of power, such as diplomatic, economic, informational or of reconstruction and development ones, in order to achieve the goals at all levels.

The near future will determine a change of the force missions, of the way to tackle international conflicts and to conduct military operations. The new force structures will have to be modern, flexible, professionalised, properly equipped, deployable, interoperable, self-sustainable and multidimensionally protected, able to meet both the current operational needs and the future political requirements and commitments.

The development of a common global network for data and information exchange will definitely be necessary, to also include the other organisations involved in the field of defence and security, the construction of a new security environment, the shaping of an innovative thinking at political and military leaders' levels and within the military forces, as well as the review of doctrinal principles in order to minimise the use of military forces and the integration of the other partners and agencies in the common effort to manage the future spectrum of missions and conflicts.

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