Discussion on Srotavya, Mantavya and Nididhy¯ asitavya in the Early Ved¯ anta Ivan Andrijanic University of Zagreb iandrij@ffzg.hr ©2022Ivan Andrijanic Abstract. This paper presents and compares different interpretations of the passage from Brhad¯aranyakopanisad 2.4.5/4.5.6, according to .. . whichoneshouldhearabout theSelf,reflect,andmeditateonit. Inhis commentary,Sa. nkaracitestheview,insub-commentariesattributedto Bhartrprapañca, according to which this cognitive process is divided .into three parts. Furthermore, different parts of the Upanisad are re­ . sponsibleforeachstageoftheprocess.Accordingtothisview,thethird part,whichstatesthatoneshouldmeditateontheSelf,isa vidhi, i.e. an injunctionformentalactionthatleadstoknowledge.Thispapershows whythis is unacceptablefor Sa. nkara and his followers,why thecogni­tive process can neither be separated nor enjoined. The paper shows thatthisdiscussion in AdvaitaVed¯ antais primarily hermeneutical be­cause in fact, in the background, it is a discussion of the hierarchy of importance of the texts of the Vedic canon; the Upanisad must be a .valid means of cognition, and thus more important than Br¯ahmanas, . which contain injunctions for action. Key Words: Sa.anta, knowledge, injunction, action nkara, Advaita Ved¯ Razprava o srotavyi, mantavyi in nididhy¯asitavyi v zgodnjiVed¯ anti Povzetek. V clanku predstavim in primerjam razlicne interpretacije odlomka iz Brhad¯aranyakopanisade 2.4.5/4.5.6, ki govori o tem, kako .. . naj slišimo, razmišljamo in meditiramo o Sebstvu. Sa. nkara v svo­jem komentarju navede stališce, ki je v podkomentarjih pripisano Bhartrprapañci, da je ta spoznavni proces razdeljen na tri dele. Za .vsako stopnjo tega procesa so odgovorni razlicni deli Upanisad. V . skladu s tem stališcem je tretji del, ki pravi, da naj clovek meditira oSebstvu, vidhi, tj. navodilo za umsko delovanje, ki vodi do spozna­nja. V clanku prikažem, zakaj je to za Sa. nkaro in njegove privržence nesprejemljivo, zakaj spoznavni proces ne more biti niti razdeljen niti https://doi.org/10.26493/2630-4082.54.13-29 zapovedan. Pokažem, da je ta razprava v Advaiti Ved¯anti predvsem hermenevticna, saj je v ozadju pravzaprav razprava o hierarhiji po­membnosti besedil vedskega kanona: Upanisade morajo biti veljavno .sredstvo spoznavanja in zato pomembnejše od Br¯ahman, ki vsebujejo . navodila za delovanje. Kljucne besede: Sa.anta,vednost,navodilo,dejanje nkara, Advaita Ved¯ Bhartrprapañca and Sa.au 2.4.5/4.5.6 nkara onb¯. In Brhad¯yaka-Upanisad 2.4.5 and 4.5.5, a well-known passage is .aran. . found that speaks of one’s Self (¯ atman) to be seen and heard, to be re­flected and concentrated on; by knowing one’s Self, the whole world is known (b¯ au (k andm) 2,4.5 (˜ [k andm] 4.5.6); Olivelle 1998, 69): aare drassrotavyo mantavyo nididhy¯ atm¯av¯¯.tavyahasitavyo .. maitreyi | ¯atmano v¯a are darsanena sravanena maty¯avijñ¯anenedam .. sarvamviditam || . You see, Maitreyi—it is one’s self (¯ atman)whichoneshould see and hear,andonwhichoneshouldreflectandconcentrate.Forbyseeing and hearing one’s self, and by reflecting and concentrating on one’s self, one gains the knowledge of this whole world. This short passage is located between two passages; the first part of the b¯atman as the substratum of all that is dear au 2.4.5 (4.5.6) extolls ¯(priya), while 2.4.6 (4.5.7), placed after our passage, describes ¯ atman as the essence of the universe. In between is this passage which describes ¯ atman as a substratum, the knowledge of which enables the knowledge of everything.¹ The notions dras..tavya/darsana, srotavya/sravan.a, mantavya/matya¯and nididhy¯ana² mentioned in this short passage provoked asitavya/vijñ¯ ¹ For a detailed account of interpretations of the conversation between Maitrey¯iand Y¯ ajñavalkyainIndologicalscholarshipupto2000,seeReinvang(2000).For,inmyopin-ion, amost convincing analysisof thetexthistory and emendations,seeBrereton (2006). As for the above-mentioned sectionb¯ au 2.4.5–6 (4.5.6–7), Deussen (1879, 417; see also Reinvang 2000, 177) considered that the quoted passage should be placed after 2.4.6 (4.5.7) Hanefeld, who analysed the entire dialogue in detail (1976, 71–115), also distin­guished three different sections in 2.4.5–6.b¯ au 2.4.5 was expanded under the influence of 2.4.6, and the quoted passage was inserted between them. ² Hanefeld (1976, 90) noticed that the first three terms match in the first and second sen­tences, but the last term does not. As terms derived from the verb vi jña¯play a promi­nent role in the continuation, and ni dhya¯no longer occurs, Hanefeld considers ni­didhy¯ asitavya to be a lectio difficilior. aninterestingdiscussioninearlyVed¯antaphilosophy.AlthoughSa. nkara’s commentary onb¯ au is the oldest preserved, it contains fragments and paraphrases of an earlier commentator whom Sa. nkara’s disciple Sures­vara,infour passages (b¯ aubhv 1.4.1164, p. 666, 1.4.1188, p. 671, 4.4.412, p. 1789, 4.4.741, p. 1843.) of his sub-commentary Brhad¯yakopanisad- .aran. . bh¯ya-V¯aubhv), calls Bhartrprapañca.³ Anadandagiri, author ¯ asartika (b¯ ..of a sub-commentary on Sa. nkara’s commentary,4 andasub-commentary on Suresvara’s b¯nkara refers to aubhv,5 identifies all passages where Sa.Bhartrprapañca. Apart from Bhartrnkara, Padmap¯ prapañca and Sa.ada, ..Suresvara, Bh¯acaspatimisra, as well as later followers of the Ad- askara, V¯vaita Ved¯anta school, gave their opinion on sravana ‘hearing’, manana . ‘reflection’, and nididhy¯asana ‘concentration’ and their role in the process of cognition. In this paper, I will present the development of this con­troversy and try to answer how and why Ved¯antic interpretations of this cognitive process came about. In Sa.au 2.5 ‘Mad­ nkara’sintroduction tohis commentary on the b¯hubrahman¯a’, a rather short passage is found (b¯ aubhtpu,p. 770, lines .7f): anyairvy¯akhy¯atam¯.s.tant¯ a dundubhidr¯ac chrotavy¯artham .¯pr¯nmadhubr¯¯artham agamavacanama.ahmanan mantavy¯ .. upapattipradarsanena madhubr¯ahmanena tu nididhy¯asanavidhir . ucyata iti | Others interpret that the utterance of the sacred text before the ex­ample with the drum serves to be listened to (srotavya), the part before ‘Madhubr¯a’ serves to be reflected on (mantavya)be­ ahman .cause it points to evidence, while the injunction of concentration (nididhy¯asana) is given with the ‘Madhubr¯ahmana.’ .Although this passage occurs at the beginning of Sa. nkara’s commen­taryonthe‘Madhubr¯ahmana’(‘ChapteronHoney’),itreferstob¯ au 2.4.5, .a part of the ‘Maitrey¯ibr¯a’ (‘Chapter on Maitrey¯ ahmani’). This is the pas­ .sage where it is said that it is one’s Self (¯ atman) that should be seen and heard of, and on which one should reflect and concentrate. According ³ On Bhartrprapañca see Andrijanic (2016), where further information on secondary lit­ .erature can be found. 4 ¯nkara’sb¯had¯yakopanisas­ Anandagiri’s sub-commentary on Sa.aubh is titled Braranadbh¯ .. .. ya-T¯a (b¯). ik¯aubht5 ¯had¯yakopanisasya-V¯.. Anandagiri’s sub-commentary on Suresvara’s Braranadbh¯artika is .. ..titled S¯asik¯¯a (.p). astraprak¯akhyatik¯ . to the interpretation mentioned by Sa. nkara, the part from the beginning of ‘Maitrey¯ibr¯a’ (b¯au 2.4.7, where the parable with a ahmanau 2.4.1) tob¯ .drumoccurs,servesforhearingabouttheSelf. Thetextfromb¯ au 2.4.7to theend(b¯ au 2.4.13)servesforreflectionontheSelf,whilethenextchap­ter, ‘Madhubrahman¯a’ (b¯ au 2.5), enjoins the concentration on the Self .(nididhy¯nkara conveys someone else’s opinion, asana). In this passage, Sa.butsimilartoSuresvara,doesnotspecifywhoseopinionitis. ¯ Anandagiri finally identifies him in hisbaubht¯and.p as Bhartrprapañca.6 .. Sa. nkara criticizes such an interpretation and argues that it is unneces­sary. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that everything said in the first two chapters of theb¯hriyate)in‘Madhubr¯a’ au is summedup (upasamahman . .(b¯and au 2.5), which emerges as the culmination of the first k¯a of the .. bau¯(‘Madhuk¯ana’).AccordingtoSa. dnkara, reflection (manana)guided ..by inference (tarka) must be in accordance with revelation (¯ agama), while concentration (nididhy¯asana) must be in accordance with reflec­tion, which already agrees with inference and revelation. This makes the separation of listening, reflection, and concentration meaningless (anarthaka). Thus, a separate injunction (vidhi)for concentrationisalso unnecessary. Sa. nkara does not agree with the separation, let alone with the gradation of the process of cognition that culminates in concentra­tion. In hiscommentary onthe passage inwhichthe statement onlisten­ing, reflection, and concentration occurs (b¯nkara explains au 2.4.5), Sa.that the unity of all three concepts (listening, reflection, and concentra­tion) leadsto acorrectperceptionofthe oneness ofthe brahman (b¯ aubh 2.4.5,tpu, p. 760, line 20f): yadaikatvam et¯any upagat¯ani, tad¯a samyagdarsanam . brahmaikatvavisayamidati | n¯asravanam¯ pras¯anyath¯atrena| .. .. Whentheunityoftheseconceptsisobtained,thecorrectperception oftheonenessofthe brahman isachieved,notonlythroughhearing. Suresvara,inhissub-commentary(b¯nkaraand aubhv),agreeswithSa.his claim that these three processes become one.7 He further analyses in depth the notion of concentration (nididhy¯asana), which for him means immersion, absorption (nisnata) in the object that has been heard from ¯ .. 6 baubht¯,p.365, line5;.p 2.5.14,p.1115(commentary on Suresvara’sb¯ aubhv 2.5.14). 7 A very similar interpretation is offered by Jñ¯ . anaghana(in Tattvasuddhi 12, 56–57) where he claims that there is no indication in the Upanisad text that there is any temporal dis­ . tinction between the three. thetradition(sravana),whichisconfirmedbyinference(manana).8 Con­ . centration/absorption is also such vigilance for the unity of the Self that is aligned with the teaching of the scriptures and the teacher, intuition, and proof.. Heequatesrevelation(sruti)andtheteacher’sinstructionwiththecon­ceptof ¯nkara,while agama (whathascomedowntous)thatappearsinSa.the inference (tarka)for reflection (manana) is the same in both Sures­vara’s sloka and in Sa.aubhv 2.5.17; Hino nkara. Suresvara concludes (b¯and Jog 1988, 7): nididy¯asanasiddhyartho yatno ’to ’yam anarthakah| . pratyagy¯ath¯atmyasambodham¯atratv¯adeva hetutah|| .. Therefore, this effort (of this section of the Upanisad)for show­ .ing that (it is intended) to establish nididhy¯ asana (declared by Bhartrprapañca)asunnecessary,sincethecauseofone’s(acquisition .of)theknowledgeofthetruenatureoftheindividualconsciousness consists only in informing (one about it). Hino and Jog translate the word sambodha as ‘informing’ in this verse. Such a translation agrees with Suresvara’s (and Sa. nkara’s) idea that the information about the true nature of the Self from the scriptures is suf­ficient for its cognition. As it will be shown, V¯acaspatimisra will devi­ate from such an opinion. Nevertheless, this opinion will be accepted by Prak¯as¯atman. What Sa.ad text becomes an in- nkara wants to avoid is that the Upanis .junction (vidhi), as suggested by Bhartrprapañca. An injunction to act .with some desired effect in mind is different from knowledge because knowing injunctions leads only to the awareness that something needs to be done, which does not represent the true liberating knowledge of the Self. For Sa. nkara, knowledge cannot be the consequence of action, not even of mental action. Sa. nkaravividly describesthisinbsbh 3.2.21, wherehesaysthatb¯ au 2.4.5servestodrawattentiontoexpressionsinthe Upanisads that describethe true nature of brahman and that this leads to .knowledge of brahman in the same way other valid means of cognition (perception, inference) lead to knowledge of their respective objects. 8 sruta agamato yo ’rthas tarken¯¯|saev¯nato nididhy¯ api samarthitaharthas tu nis¯asanam ucyate || (b¯ .. .. aubhv 2.5.15). . sastr¯ac¯¯anubh¯| ¯gaik¯bodho nididhy¯ ary¯avanair hetubhis ca samarthitahidratmyasamasa­nam ucyate || (b¯... aubhv 2.5.16). Inb¯ aubh (1.4.7), a discussion takes place about the sentence ‘The Self alone should be meditated upon.’¹° In the course of this lengthy discus­sion, Sankara refutes two anonymous (Bhed¯.abhedav¯ada?)¹¹ views. The first one (p. 661, lines 1–21) equates knowledge (jñ¯ana) and devout med­itation (up¯ asana).¹² Inbsbh (4.1.7), Sa.asana as a ‘lengthened carrying on nkara defines up¯of an identical train of thought’ (Thibaut 1896, 349).¹³ Up¯ asana is always a contemplation on a section of holy text (most usually Upanisads, but .also Brahman¯as and ¯yakas; bsbh 3.3) which, according to Sa. Arannkara, .. speaks of a personal deity and is related to ritual, so up¯nkara asana for Sa. means devout contemplation on the conditioned brahman. This means that Sa.asana is something like ‘de­ nkara’s understanding of the term up¯vout contemplation’ or ‘devout meditation’.¹4 According to this objection, the optative up¯as¯ita ‘should be meditated upon’ must be understood as an injunction that leads to an unseen tran­ scendentalresult(ap¯ urvavidhi).¹5 Astheresultisunseen,itsaccomplish­ment acquires injunction. According to this view, the sentence ‘The Self alone should be meditatedupon’ is similarnot only to the usualritual in­junctionsbutalsotoinjunctionsformentalperformancesuchassrotavya, mantavya, and nididhy¯ asitavya. Gerundives mantavya ‘to bereflected on’ and nididhy¯ asitavya ‘to be meditated on’ therefore convey injunctions (vidhi) for meditation (up¯asana) and for knowledge that is the same as devoutmeditation.¹6 Knowledge is amentalact(m¯anas¯ikriy¯a),the same ¹° atmety evop¯¯as¯ita (b¯ au 1.4.7). ¹¹ Bhed¯abhedav¯ada teaches that knowledge can be acquired through a combination of knowledge and action (jñ¯anakarmasamuccaya). ¹² Up¯asana isanoun formed from the compound verb upa as,whichBodewitz(2011,414) ¯ translates as ‘to seat oneself near, to approach’, ‘to approach mentally’; ‘considering, ex­amining, contemplating, esteeming’; ‘to worship’. ¹³ up¯asanamn¯ama sam¯anapratyayaprav¯ahakaranam(bsbh 4.1.7). ¹4 For more on the practice of up¯asana andits relationship to meditation (nididhy¯asana)in Sa. . .. nkara, their psychological and epistemological properties, see Dalal(2014; 2020). ¹5 In M¯im¯am. s¯as¯utra 2.1.5(andSabara’scommentary),agenerallawisestablishedthatevery act enjoined in Vedas brings a transcendental result that is unseen at first (ap¯urva). In mims 2.1.6 rites are divided into Primary (pradh¯ana) and Subsidiary (guna). According . to Sabara’s commentary, a Primary Act directly leads to a transcendent result (ap¯ urva), while a Subsidiary bringssome concreteresultthatwillbeusedin the Primary ritual act. ¹6 Thisinterpretationisdifferentfrom Bhartrprapañca’s because to him, thewhole of Mad­ .hubr¯a is an injunction for concentration. It is therefore not surprising that com- ahman . mentators do not attribute this interpretation to him. as meditation. According to this view, there are three parts (amsatraya) . of such a mental act.¹7 Thefirst determines thesubjectofdevoutmedita­tion (kimup¯as¯ita), the second the means of meditation (kenop¯as¯ita), and the third the mode of meditation (katham up¯as¯ita). The fruit of such an act is liberation and the disappearance of ignorance (mokso’vidy¯ttir anivr ..va¯). According to the second view (p. 661, line 22–p. 662, line 1), medi­tation (upasana¯) creates a special kind of cognition (visistamvijñ¯ anam) ... that removes ignorance; according to this interpretation, Vedic dictum alone does not remove ignorance.¹8 Sa. nkara responds to these two objections with an important remark (tpu,p.662 lines1–7): na, arth¯antar¯abh¯av¯at | na ca ¯atmety evop¯as¯ita ity ap¯urvavidhih| . kasm¯at? ¯atmasvar¯upakathan¯an¯atmapratisedhav¯akyajanitavijñ¯ana- .vyatirekenaarth¯anasasya b¯ antarasya kartavyasya m¯ahyasya . v¯av¯. s¯yatra vidhiv¯. a- abh¯at | tatra hi vidhehaphalyamakyasravan . matrajanitavijñ¯anavyatireken¯apurusapravrttir gamyate | ...yathadarsap¯urn¯am¯amamo yajeta ityevam¯ asabhy¯¯svargak¯adau | .. na hi darsapurn¯am¯akyajanitavijñ¯ asavidhiv¯anam eva . as¯h¯ darsapurn¯am¯anus.tanam | .. No, on account of absence of another thing. [The sentence] ‘One should devoutly meditate on the Self’ is not an injunction with un-preceded result. Why? On account of absence of another thing, i.e. on account of absence of anything external and mental to be done, that is, beyond the knowledge that results from [Upanisadic] state­ . ments that deny the non-Self and reveal the Self’s own nature. The injunction is fruitful only there where one thinks of human activity beyondtheknowledgethatarisesonlyfromlisteningtothewordsof injunctions,justas[inthesentence]‘thosewhodesireheavenshould performNewandFullmoonsacrifice’¹. andthelike.Theknowledge thatarisesfromtheinjunctionstoperform NewandFullmoonsac­ rifice is certainly not the actual performance of the New and Full moon sacrifice. ¹7 ThesethreepartscanbecomparedtoBhartrprapañca’sthree-folddivisionoftheb¯.au text thatcorresponds to srotavya, mantavya, and nididhy¯ asitavya. None of the commentators specify who is the author of this view. ¹8 Suresvara and ¯nkara conveys. Anandagiri do not specify whose opinion Sa. ¹. darsapurn¯am¯abhy¯svargak¯as¯amamo yajeta. This a very common example of a vidhi that appears often in Sabara’s M¯im¯s¯utrabh¯ya (cf. 3.7.18, 6.1.1., 6.1.4 etc.). .. am. as¯as . But, according to Sa. nkara, the knowledge that arises from the sen­tences ‘The Self alone should be meditated upon’ (b¯ au 1.4.7), ‘(the Self) shouldbeheardaboutetc.’au 2.4.5/4.5.6)iseverythingthatisrequired, (b¯ andnothingbeyondthat(actualperformance ofritualininjunctions)ex­ ists. With the sentences atmety evop¯ita and srotavya etc., self-reflective as¯ knowledge is conveyed and not enjoined. These sentences are in them­selves the knowledge they should enjoin, unlike the ritual injunctions whichenjointheperformanceofritual.Inthesesentences,ifbothareun­derstoodasinjunctions,heavenandliberationareanalogousconcepts,as are ritual (which leads to Heaven) and knowledge (which leads to liber­ation, i.e. self-knowledge). Why is this wrong for Sa. nkara? The action, ritualistic or otherwise, may be enjoined, but the knowledge cannot be enjoined.Itcomesordoesnotcome,anditdoesnotdependonthewilling decision to carry out the process. In fact, the knowledge that arises from ritual injunction is merely the understanding that one attains Heaven by performingacertainritual;itisnotaperformanceoftheritualitself. The Upanisad reveals knowledge itself (more specifically, the Upanisadic text .. removes ignorance, knowledge is always here),²° not the knowledge of how knowledge is attained. The sentence ‘one should think about one’s Self’ refers to an intuitive flash of knowledge that is structurally differ­ entfromthejudgment‘ritualactionreachesheaven’.Upanisad statements . leadto knowledgethatcanonly meanthe cessationof action. Inthisway, Sa. nkara distinguishes denotative meaning from injunctive.²¹ Sa.au2.4.5/4.5.6 in Brahmas¯nkara onb¯utras In order to better understand Sa.aubh,it shouldbe nkara’s position inb¯consideredwhat he saysaboutb¯ au 2.4.5 inhis commentary onthe Brah­mas¯a, utras (bsbh). Inthis mostsignificantofhis works,the terms sravan . manana, and nididhy¯ asana and their related gerundive forms srotavya, mantavya, and nididh¯asitavya occurinseveral passages. ²° tasmadbrahmavijñ¯an¯¯laksan¯urvamapibrahmaivasadavidyay¯as¯adevamatp¯abrahm¯it...: . .. ‘Therefore, evenbefore thecognitionof brahman thatismarkedinthisway,hewasbrah-man,but becauseof theignoranceofthetruth,hewasnon-brahman’(b¯ aubh 2.5.15,tpu, p. 775, lines 13f). ²¹ Mandanamisra (1937, 74–76) interestingly argues that the knowledge of brahman can­ ..not be enjoined because, if we need an injunction to understand a sentence, we would alsoneedaninjunctiontounderstandthe sentencebywhichtheinjunctionis expressed, which would lead to an infinite regress. Activity, according to Mandanamisra, follows ..cognition, while listeningand comprehension take place simultaneously. In Brahma-S¯utra 1.1.4 (p. 13, lines 13ff), p¯urvapaksin seekstoshowthat . ignoranceisnotnecessarilyremovedafteronemerelyhearsthetruth.Ac­cordingtothisobjection,inb¯a)about au 2.4.5, after one listens (sravan . one’s Self, reflection (manana) and concentration (nididhy¯asana)are en- joined.Justaswithritualinjunctions,oneperformsaritualafterknowing thatritualactionleadstoHeaven. Listeningis,accordingtothisobserva­ tion, not sufficient to attain knowledge. Hearing needs to be followed by mental action. Therefore, s¯ads)can astra (scriptural authority, i.e. Upanis .serve asmeansofvalidcognition(pram¯a)of brahman onlyif brahman an. is related to injunctions (such as injunctions for reflection [mantavya] and contemplation [nididhy¯asitavya]).²² This explanation differs from Bhartrprapañca’s interpretation, accord­ .ing to which the entire Madhubr¯ahmana is an injunction; in objections .raised in b¯ aubh 1.4.7, as well as in bsbh 1.1.4, gerundives srotavya and others are treated as injunctions. In his extensive response, Sa. nkara first focuses on the difference be­tween the fruit of knowledge of brahman and fruits of action. The fruits ofactionareinritualliteraturedescribedintermsofinjunctionsandpro-hibitions.Thesearerelatedtophysicalandmentalexperiences,andexpe­riences are subjected to gradation. On the other hand, the knowledge of brahman means liberation, which is eternal, indivisible, and unchange­able. If brahman, likeaction,was connected withinjunctionsinthe sense that it would be a consequence of injunctions (for brahman and his cog­nition are the same), he himself would be structurally similar to the con-sequencesofinjunctions,i.e.brahman wouldbeperishable,divisible,and subjecttogradation.Onp.16, lines8–10, Sa. nkara clearly defines the re­lationship between knowledge and action: ato na purusavy¯aratantr¯a| ap¯abrahmavidy¯ .kimtarhi pratyaksadipram¯avisayavastujñ¯anavadvastutantr¯ ¯ana| . ...evambh¯utasya brahmanas taj jñ¯anasya ca na kay¯acid yukty¯a .. sakyahk¯ary¯anupravesahkalpayitum | .. Therefore, the knowledge of brahman does not depend on human activity but depends on the knowledge of things that are similar to the objects of valid means of cognition such as perception and oth- ²² sravanottarak¯asanayor vidhir darsan¯at pratipattividhi­ alayor manananididhy¯at | tasm¯visayatayaiva s¯anbrahm¯ . astrapram¯akamabhyupagantavyam iti | (bsbh 1.1.4, p. 13, lines 10–11). ... ers. It is inconceivable by reason to imagine the connection of such a brahman and his cognition with action. The Self cannot be connected to injunctions in the same way as an ob­served object has nothing to do with one’s urge to observe it, nor does it need any further actions to be enjoined to cognize it. We perceive an ob­jectornotregardlessoftheincentivesortheeffortswemake. Theknowl-edge of the Self does not depend on the daily activity;²³ it is similar to knowingthingsthataretheobjectofvalidmeansofcognitionsuchasper­ception and others. Here we see in what sense knowledge of the Self can­not be a consequence of action according to Sa. nkara. Knowledge arises spontaneously as in perception; it does not depend on enjoined action. We could drawthisanalogy: if the chairiswithin the rangeof valid means of cognition, i.e. perception, and if all is well with our cognitive apparatus and external conditions, we will know it. But although Heaven iswithinthereachofitsmeansofattainment,i.e.therite,wewillnotreach it immediately; we need action, we need an injunction to encourage and assure us to perform the rite. In the matter of cognition, therefore, no injunction is required, and thus no action. For Sa. nkara, in this analogy, the Upanisads correspond to valid means of cognition. The valid means . of cognition and ritual action are obviously substantially different. From these two examples (b¯ aubh 1.4.7; 2.4.5 and 2.5 on the one hand, and bsbh 1.1.4 on the other), it could be concluded that Sa. nkara is fo­cusing on the difference in the structure of self-reflexive (and liberating) knowledge and action and that he tries to prove that knowledge cannot have anything to do with injunctions. According to Sa. nkara’s interpreta­tion,inthefirststep,someknowledgeismediated. Inb¯ au 2.4.5(srotavya, mantavya, etc.), knowledge of the nature of the Self is mediated; in sac­rificial injunctions the knowledge is mediated in that by performing a certain rite one attains Heaven. In the first case, however, there is no sec­ond step, since the knowledge has already been attained, whereas, in the case of injunctions, the second step, the actual performance of the ritual takes place. In Sa.utra4.1.1,asurprisinglydifferent nkara’scommentary on Brahmas¯kind of discussion on sravana, manana, and nididhy¯asana occurs. Fol­ . lowing the s¯utra 4.1.1, Sa. nkara discusses the role of repetition of certain notions (pratyaya) incognition. Accordingtohim, notionsshouldbe re- ²³ ato na purusavy¯aratantr¯a (bsbh 1.1.4, p. 16, line 8). ap¯abrahmavidy¯. peated, as in the example of sravana etc., until they culminate in ‘seeing’ . (darsana). Most probably,Sa. nkara refers to theintuitivecognitionby us­ing the word darsana.²4 Inbsbh 4.1.1, Sa.asana with nkara equates nididhy¯up¯asana, ‘devout meditation, contemplation’. Inbsbh 4.1.1, Sa.asana and nididhy¯ nkara claims that both up¯asana are actions (kriya¯) that involve repetition (¯tti). The question that arises avr.here is how Sa.asana inbsbh 4.1.1 as an act nkara may understand nididhy¯(kriya¯), even though in numerous passages, he emphasises that knowl­edge has nothing to do with action. Inbsbh 4.1.2, the objection is raised as to what repetition may have to dowiththeknowledgeof brahman whoisthe universalSelf?Ifthisisnot known the first time it is heard, it will not be known even if it is heard more than once. The possible solution suggested is that listening is not enough, itmustbeaugmented by reflection and concentration. And this is the same objection that we find inb¯nkara aubh 1.4.7 andbsbh 1.1.4. Sa.also responds extensively here, but the core of his response is found in bsbh 4.1.2, at p. 462, lines 6–7: drsyante hi sakrad v¯an mandaprat¯v¯artham c chrut¯aky¯itamaky¯ ... ¯abh¯an¯ah| avartayantas tat tad ¯asavyud¯asena samyak pratipadyam¯. When listening to a sentence for the first time, when the meaning of the sentence is not fully understood, it is evident that correct understanding, with the cessation of false appearances, is achieved through repetition. From this, however, it is evident that Sa. nkara maintains his view, in which he sharply distinguishes and separates cognition from the action. The only concession he makes is that he admits that cognition need not arise immediately at first hearing. But that does not detract from the idea that cognition arises immediately. Post Sa.anta on Srotavya, Mantavya, and Nididhy¯asitavya nkarian Ved¯ Relatively early after Sa.askara nkara, about one generation after him, Bh¯composed a commentary on the Brahmas¯abheda­ utra.²5 However, bhed¯v¯askara has a different view ofb¯ adin Bh¯au 2.4.5/4.5.6, which reflects his ideas about the combination of knowledge and action. If for Sa. nkara and V¯ad statements such as srotavya and others are acaspatimisra,the Upanis . ²4 Thibaut and Gambhirananda translate darsana as ‘intuition’. ²5 For Bh¯ askara’s date, see Kato (2011, xxiv–xxv). only denotative, for Bh¯askara they can also be injunctive. For Bh¯askara, devout contemplation (up¯asana) is enjoined in the form of injunctions such as nididhy¯asitavya. Bh¯askara interprets the terms srotavya and oth­ers (b¯ au 2.4.5/4.5.6) on p. 7 (lines 7–15). He explains that cognizing Self, vijñ¯atman, is revealed with drasavya, ‘has to be shown’; the real state an¯.t .of the highest Self is revealed with listening (srotavya), mantavya reveals the knowledge that is the essence of sacred texts, while nididhy¯ asana is the meditation (dhy¯ ana) on the sacred texts. All four constitute the four­fold injunction (caturvidhena vidhina¯). ko’sav¯atmetyapeks¯.ay¯am¯. svarup¯avabodhapar¯¯.i‘idam. sarvamyad an. ayam ¯a’[b¯= 4.5.7] ‘sa ya eso’natmyam idam atm¯au 2.4.6 imaitad¯ .. . sarvam’ [e.g.chu 4.8.7; 9.4; 10.3] ity ¯ini pratived¯. ad¯antam . pravartante | vidite c¯atmatattve pratyay¯avrttilaks.an.am. tadup¯asanam upadisyate ‘nididhy¯asitavyo’[b¯ au 2.4.5; 4.5.6] ‘vijñ¯aya prajñ¯amau 4.4.21] iti kurv¯ita’ [b¯. With regard to the inquiry: ‘What is the Self (¯ atman)?’ there are statementsineveryUpanisadsuchas‘allthatisnothingbutthisself,’ .‘thefinestessencehere –thatconstitutestheselfofthiswholeworld’ andsoon, that servetoteach thetruenature[of ¯ atman]. When thenatureof ¯ atman is known, then the dedication to it, which is characterised by the repetition of knowledge, is taught as follows: ‘[on which] one should concentrate,’ ‘by knowing [that very one a wise Brahmin] should obtain insight for himself.’ [Kato 2013, 144– 145; 2011, xxxiii–xxxiv] Bh¯askara’s view is close to that of Sa.askara allows nkara’s objector. Bh¯for the possibility that the Upanisad text srotavya, mantavya expresses .injunctions,andformeditativeaction. Thus,justlikeBhartrprapañca, he .allows the process to be divided first into listening and observing, and thenintoreflectionandconcentration.Reflectionandlistening,however, are forms of imposed action, and the Upanisad text takes on adenotative . and injunctive aspect. Sa.nkara. nkara’s successors follow in principle the path laid out by Sa.We have already set forth Suresvara’s remarks on the unity of listen­ing, reflection, and concentration culminating in intuitive cognition. Padmap¯ada discusses in the ninth varnaka of his Pañcap¯adika whether . brahman is the object of the injunction for meditation. In connection with this discussion, he cites the objection that nididhy¯asana should be enjoyed after hearing to facilitate cognition. On p. 93 (lines 21ff), Padmap¯ada states that sravana, ‘hearing’, serves for deliberation (vic¯ara) . into Upanisad statements and conceiving the Self, and manana is for in­ .terpretingUpanisadparablessuchastheparablewiththedrumfromb¯ .au 2.4.7. Nididhy¯asana means becoming steadfast in the realm of the mean­ing of a sentence established by manana.²6 It is interesting to note here the formal similarity with Bhartrprapañca’s interpretation of manana as .applied to parables with the drum and others. The meaning, however, is different, becauseforBhartrprapañca nididhy¯ asana is an enjoined action .that follows and complements listening, while in Padmap¯ ada, just as in Sa.asana is part of the indivisible process of nkara and Suresvara, nididhy¯cognition.On p. 94, Padmap¯adaoffers anew grammaticalinterpretation of the gerundives srotavya, mantavya, and nididhy¯asitavya. According to him, the suffix krtya (-tavya gerundive, or participium neccesitatis)does .not imply injunction, but the meaning ‘deserving’, ‘worthy of’ (arha). According to Padmap¯ada, srotavya, mantavya, and nididhy¯asitavya do not enjoin listening, reflecting, and concentration, but indicate that the Self is worthy of listening, reflecting, and concentrating on. Padmap¯ ada refers here to the P¯ini’s sutra 3.3.169 arhe krtyatrcas ca ‘Affixes krtya an ....and trC, and LIN.as well, occur after a verbal root,whenthe agentis . denoted as deserving’ (Sharma 1995, 582). It is interesting to note that Sarvajñatman gives the same grammatical explanation in ¯samks. 2.51. ..According to Sarvajñ¯atman (samks. 2.50–2.51), the notions of dras.tavya ... and others are not injunctions, but notions that convey the fact that cog­nition is present in the Self because the truth about the Self is unknown, i.e. obscured by ignorance. Insamks. 2.52, Sarvajñ¯atman explains (1972, .. 282–283): r¯upy¯adivibhramamapeksyahisuktik¯adausatsamprayogajanitaivatu .. buddhivrttih|t¯am apy apeksya sati samhrtasarvabhede .. ...satsam. prayogajanit¯a matir abhyupey¯a|| The mental state of the form of shell, etc, may be regarded as aris­ing from the contact of sense of sight with a real object (shell) only when contrasted with the mental state of illusory silver. But when contrasted with the mental state of shell, the mental state of the self ²6 tath¯acasravanam. n¯ama ¯atm¯avagataye ved¯antav¯akyavic¯arah,s¯ar¯irakasravan.amca | vastunisthav¯adidrt¯ac¯. . .. mananam. ..aky¯apeks.itadundubhy¯.s..antajanmasthitilayav¯arambhana­tvadiyukt¯arthav¯¯anusandh¯,v¯arth¯an¯anam ad¯anamaky¯avirodhyanum¯anusandh¯ca|nididh- .. yasanam¯mananopabrhitav¯arthavisibh¯, vidheyasyop¯apary¯ maky¯aye sthir¯avahasan¯ayasya ... ..nisphalatv¯ at | (pañcp, p. 93, lines 21–25). . which is free from any difference should beaccepted as arising from the association of the sense (that is, intellect) with a real object (the self). V¯acaspatimisra follows Sa. nkara in his commentary on the passage frombsbh 1.1.4 (Suryanarayana Sastri and Raja 1992, 239–240) and ar­gues that mantavya and nididhy¯asitavya cannot be injunctions. He first eliminates the possibility that mantavya and nididhy¯asitavya are injunc­tions like those that enjoin principal rites (pradh¯anakarman)that pro­duce invisible results. Reflection and concentration make brahman di­rectly known (brahmasaks¯atk¯ ¯ara) becausethe Selfofallisnotunknown. . Hearing Vedicwords(sravana), onthe other hand, conveys only indirect . knowledgeof brahman anddoesnotbringliberation.Theword,eventhe Vedic, conveys meaning through symbols, not directly. V¯ acaspatimisra holds(Suryanarayana SastriandRaja1992,162)thatiflistening(sravana) . alone is sufficient, then why are reflection and concentration mentioned inb¯ au 2.4.5/4.5.6 inadditiontolistening? Mantavya and nididhy¯asitavya are not comparable to the main ritual act, but neither are they compara­ble to secondary rites such as cleansing rice. Indeed, if the knowledge of brahman is the resultofactioncomparableto secondary ritual acts,then brahman wouldbesomething that canbeusedlater (inthe main act). Therefore,V¯ acaspatimisracompletelyrejectsthepossibilitythattheseare injunctions, but he does not admit the possibility that sravana could suf- . fice for the realization of brahman (cf.bs 4.1.1–2). ItisinterestingtonotethatPrak¯atmanreversesthehierarchyofcon­ as¯ceptsand,quiteunlikeV¯ acaspatimisra,designatesreflectionandconcen­trationasaidstolistening,sravana,whichbecomesinstrumentalofdirect . knowledge of brahman (pañcpv, p.104,lines 9–13; cf. Cammann 1965, 160–161). Concluding Remarks There are two main reasons why the followers of Advaita Ved¯ anta can­not accept the claim that the gerundives srotavya, etc. are injunctions. The first is that knowledge becomes more important than action, which makes the Upanisads, i.e. parts of the Vedic corpus dealing with knowl- .edge (jñ¯anak¯an.da), more important than the Br¯ahmanas, the part deal­ . .ingwithsacrificialinjunctions(karmak¯ana).Sa.dnkara, inacommentary .. onbsbh 1.1.4, claims that knowledge is not mental action (m¯anas¯ikriy¯a) becauseactiondependsonthewilloftheperson.Anyactioncanbedone, not done, or done differently because it depends on the person,²7 unlike knowledge, which arises spontaneously from the valid means of cogni­tion.²8 Knowledge, whose object is truth, cannot be done or not done. It does not depend on injunctions that enjoin the act ofcognition, but only on the object.². Therefore, the parts of the sacred text that leadto knowl­edge have greater authority in describing reality than those that enjoin action. Injunctions only guide awareness of what needs to be done but cannot create knowledge. If Sa.prapañca that different parts of the text re-nkara admits to Bhartr . fer to different parts of the mental process of knowing one’s Self, knowl­ edge ceases to be something that arises spontaneously, and brahman can be known by the command to know it. This also puts Sa.nkara in danger of accepting that the parts of the injunction for (mental) action are separate, thus recognizing the authority of the Br¯ahmanas whose . main parts are injunctions to perform the rites. For the representatives of the Bhed¯ada, this equation would not be a problem because abhedav¯ they taught a combined path of action and knowledge. Thus, the repre­ sentatives of the P¯im¯sa claim that action is above knowledge, urvam¯am . bhed¯adins claim that they are equal, while Sa. abhedav¯nkara claims that knowledgeisaboveaction.AccordingtoBhed¯ada,theUpanis abhedav¯ads . also enjoin,i.e.encourage mental action that leadstoknowledge,unlike P¯urvam¯im¯am. sa, according to which only the Br¯ahmanas enjoin, while . the Upanisads serve only as an explanation/eulogy (arthav¯ada)for the . injunctions. Sa.antaandturnsthehierarchy nkara radicalizestheattitudeoftheVed¯of sacred texts completely in favour of the Upanisads. If we understand .P¯urvam¯im¯ams¯a as the first step, Bhed¯abhedav¯ada would be a transi- . tionalstepinthedevelopmentthatendswithSa.anta, nkara’s Advaita Ved¯ where, by reversing the significance of knowledge and action, the hier­ archywithin the sacred canonisreversed. In this way, the Upanisads . lead directly to the knowledge of the brahman, which becomes the only measure of the authority of the sacred text. ²7 purusenakartumakartumanyath¯akartumsakyampurusatantratv¯ av¯at (bsbh 1.1.4,p. 18, lines 14f). ²8 jñ¯tu pr¯ajanyam (bsbh 1.1.4, p. 18, line 15). .... anam. aman. ². pram¯amabh¯ayam ato jñ¯kartum akartum anyath¯a|kar­ anca yath¯utavastuvisanamav¯tumasakyam,kevalamatantram | n¯atantram | .. .. vastutantrameva tat | na codan¯api purus(bsbh 1.1.4, p. 18, lines 15f). .. . Abbreviations bau¯(k)= Brhad¯yaka-Upanisad (K¯ .aran. .an.va). b¯had¯yaka-Upanisad (M¯adhyamdina). au (m)= Br.aran. . . b¯.had¯yaka-Upanis.asya, see Sa. aubh (tpu)= Braranad-Bh¯.nkara (1964). . ... baubht¯. = Brhad¯aran.yakopanisadbh¯asya-t.¯ik¯a, see Suresvara (1892a; 1892b; 1893). b¯=had¯yakopanisasya-V¯artika,seeSuresvara(1892a;1892b; aubhv Braranadbh¯ .. .. 1893). pañcp = Pañcap¯adik¯a, see Padmap¯ada (1891). samks. = Samksepas¯ar¯iraka, see Sarvajñ¯atman (1972). ..... pañcpv = Pañcap¯adik¯avivarana, see Prak¯as¯atman(1892). .p = S¯astra-Prak¯asik¯a, see ¯ Anandagiri (1891). bsbh = utrabh¯ya, see Sa. Brahmas¯asnkara (1985). .mims = im¯s¯utras. M¯ama-S¯ . bs = utras, see Sa. Brahma-S¯nkara (1985). chu = andogya-Upanis Ch¯ad, see Olivelle (1998). . References ¯astra-Prak¯adeva Ciman¯Apate. Anandagiri. 1891. S¯asika.¯Edited by Mah¯aji ¯ .. ¯ Anand¯ asrama Sanskrit Series 15. Poona: ÁnandásramaPress. 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