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Michael Strubell

The Catalan Independence Process and Cold Repression (2003-2016)

The recent Catalan independence process has already attracted a great deal of scholarly attention, quite apart from the media coverage. Some good chronologies are available, making it superfluous to present another, albeit more updated one. Opinion polls and surveys, as well as election results, have been analysed, as have the upheavals suffered by most political parties. The paper highlights and documents some apparently lesser-disseminated aspects of the process. Special attention is devoted to the cold repression, or deactivating mechanisms, that the Spanish authorities have put in place, with varying degrees of success. The paper asks to what extent these strategies are likely to solve the current conflict with Catalonia, and whether they are all admissible in a modern (western) democracy. In the conclusion the long-term effectiveness of such mechanisms, in practice, will be discussed, in the face of the clash between democratic legitimacy and the legal constraints of a Constitution written shortly after the end of a 36-year-long dictatorship.

Keywords: Catalonia, independence movement, social movements, deactivating mechanisms, politics.

Katalonski proces osamosvajanja in hladna represija (2003-2016)

Čeprav še ni dolgo aktualno, je vprašanje katalonske neodvisnosti vzbudilo precejšnjo pozornost strokovnjakov v nasprotju z mediji, ki o tem niso veliko poročali. Na voljo je veliko izčrpnih kronoloških pregledov tega procesa, zato bodo v tem prispevku izpuščeni, čeprav za ceno večje ažurnosti. Narejenih je bilo tudi veliko analiz mnenjskih anket, volilnih rezultatov in pretresov, ki jih je proces sprožil povsod razen v najbolj zakrknjenih strankah. V članku bo osvetljenih nekaj manj znanih vidikov procesa in vsak posebej bo podprt z dokumentarnim gradivom. Posebna pozornost bo posvečena deaktivacijskim mehanizmom, ki so jih uporabile španske oblasti – ponekod uspešno, spet drugje ne. V zaključnem delu bo poudarek na dolgoročni učinkovitosti omenjenih mehanizmov v praksi, še posebej v luči razkoraka med demokratično legitimnostjo in legalnimi zadržki, zapisanimi v ustavi, ki je nastala nedolgo po koncu 36-letne diktature.

Ključne besede: *Katalonija, gibanje za neodvisnost, socialna gibanja, deaktivacijski mehanizmi, politika.*

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1. Introduction

Any attempt to look at present-day Catalonia needs to start with its historical context. For over three centuries Spain as a nascent political project has had to cope with ethnic (ethnolinguistic is a preferred term) diversity, with the more or less openly confessed aim of assimilating the Catalans (including Valencians and Majorcans), the Basques (including the Navarrese) and the Galicians into a unified nation based on the Castilian people and their language, culture, history, laws and form of government. The Portuguese managed to escape from this project and restore their independence in 1640. Other former Christian kingdoms and independent countdoms (one, Catalonia, had developed a considerable empire in the Mediterranean in the 14th–15th centuries) that had grown up in the wake of the reconquering of the Iberian Peninsula from the Moors, gradually became part of a huge empire stretching across much of the world.

This assimilationist policy was the hallmark of the incumbent Bourbon monarchs that defeated the Hapsburg pretender in the War of Spanish Succession, with French help, the early 18th century. To hispanify the occupied territory, the King's 1716 secret instruction to his new leadership in Catalonia following its fall (which followed the painful withdrawal of the allies, following the Treaty of Utrecht), was that

> The governor will take the greatest care to introduce the Castilian language to which end he will make the most temperate and dissimulated provisions so that the effect is obtained without the care being noticed (Monés i Pujol-Busquets 1988, 432). [1]

The political reawakening of the Catalans as a people took part in the general context of the Romantic revival across Europe, though until close to the end of the 19th century it was a cultural, rather than political, movement. At that time the loss of the last Spanish colonies in America and Asia led to a backlash that led, for instance, to Catalan being banned in catechism and on the telephone.

In 1920 the most influential Spanish philosopher of the day wrote:

> Let us not beat about the bush: Spain is a thing made by Castile, and there are reasons to suspect that, in general, only Castilian heads have adequate organs to perceive the great problem of an integrated Spain (Ortega y Gasset 2009 [1920]). [2]

Yet the growing power and influence of Catalonia's political institutions, in the 1920s, with a great burgeoning of Catalan culture in all its forms, and with modern 20th century policies in many fields, was resisted by the Madrid elites, and first the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923-1930) and then the Franco dictatorship (1939-1975) – which only managed to conquer Catalonia and

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put an end to the Republic after a bloody three-year war – cruelly repressed the Catalans and abolished their self-government institutions. In the year before that war broke out, many thought the Catalans and the Basques (at least) were moving towards independence, and indeed the right-wing leader José Calvo Sotelo said he preferred "a red Spain to a broken one" (Anasagasti 2006, 197), a few months before being assassinated in a revenge attack.

After Franco died in his bed in 1975, the Catalans' and Basques' claim to self-government was partially fulfilled in the 1978 Constitution the text of which was, however, was in part imposed by the powers-that-be that insisted that it highlight the unity and indivisibility of Spain and the role of the armed forces (Vidal-Aparicio 2012). The Constitution allowed some degree of home rule to be granted not just to Catalans and Basques but to fifteen regions, most of which had never dreamt of asking for it. During the 1980s and 1990s Catalonia took over powers in the fields of education, health, planning, prisons, social welfare and others. However, the level of home rule varied in practice according to the party in power in central government, and to a number of Constitutional court rulings that cut back regional powers, thanks in both cases to one-sided interpretations of the (probably) deliberately ambiguous parts of the text. During that period (1996-2003) the People's party was in power in Madrid, and one of its raisons d'être is precisely to cut back regional powers and recentralize Spain, The leasing parties in Catalonia and the Basque country resisted and resented this, regarding it as a betrayal of the consensus spirit of the political transition.

Arguably the starting-point for the present – and most deeply rooted – phase of Catalonia's political process towards independence movement can be pin-pointed in 2003, when the political parties who were to win 89 per cent of the seats in the Parliament at the regional election included in their manifestos a thorough revision of the content of the 1979 Statute of Autonomy (Generalitat de Catalunya 1979), or regional constitution; others jump ahead to 2010 following the Constitutional Court ruling (Tribunal Constitucional, 2010), requested by the Popular party, that annulled or disfigured substantial parts of the new 2006 Statute, (Generalitat de Catalunya 1979) after the draft had been severely lathed in the Spanish Parliament (or Cortes). Domènech (2013a, 2013b) presents a detailed chronology of the process, starting in 2003 and closing it at the end of 2013 (the annual publication covered events in 2013).

Whichever date is chosen, sufficient time has passed for academics to have devoted attention to the process, on several scores, and the remainder of this paper will concentrate on this period, during which time the number of publications on the subject has been considerable. Though the aim of this paper is not to offer a review of research publications, nevertheless a brief overview may be of some relevance.

Some treatises (at least, those the author has tracked down in the English language) have included Catalonia by taking an overall look at recent secession

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processes, mostly placing the Scottish case in the first place (Moreno 1988, Flamini 2013, Bourne 2014, Liñeira and Cetrà 2015, Martínez and Zubiaga 2014); but see also Nagel 2001 in Scottish Affairs). Others include Scotland and Catalonia in wider-ranging studies: Guibernau et al. (2014) include Quebec, for instance. In actual fact, there are plenty of comparative studies, both earlier (e.g. Shafir 1995, on Catalonia, the Basque Country, Latvia, and Estonia) and more recent (Calzada 2014, 2015, Lluch 2014, Requejo and Nagel 2014). In this area, several academics have been recently invited to give their views on US policy towards such issues, which in the past has been insensitive, in the main, to those peoples that challenged – and felt threatened by – a politically hegemonic group in a multinational country (Williams 2016, Sorens 2016, Vejvoda 2016).

Many studies are in the field of contemporary Spanish history and politics, and particularly the post-Franco era construction of a regionalised Spain. The understandable interest in comparing Basque and Catalan nationalism goes well back in time (e.g. Payne 1971) but continues today (e.g. Gillespie 2015). Martínez and Zubiaga (2014) compare Catalonia and the Basque Country using a conflict dynamics analysis approach: Triggering (or catalyzing) mechanisms, Mobilizing mechanisms, Facilitating mechanisms and Deactivating mechanisms, all interacting with processes: Desertion, Polarization, Diffusion, and "Contentious episode: Secession + State-building" (Martínez & Zubiaga 2014, see Figure 1). We shall return to the last of these mechanisms below.

Figure 1: Mechanisms and Processes in a Secessionist Contentious Episode

Source: Martínez and Zubiaga (2014).

Many studied regard it as an outstanding social movement sparked off by a grassroots Assemblea Nacional Catalana founded in 2011 (Strubell 2013, Crameri 2014, 2015, Guibernau 2012, 2014a, Burg 2015, Medir 2015), while others completely ignore this fact (e.g. Petithomme & Fernández Garcia 2013). Its first, huge demonstration, on September 2012, gave the president of the day, Artur Mas, the courage to see independence as the only way forward for his people (Harrington 2016).

Some papers concentrate on identity issues, sometimes highlighting the field of sports (Flamini 2013, García 2012, Serrano 2014a), and issues of political discourse (Serrano 2014b). Others make theoretical contributions. Montserrat Guibernau, for instance, has developed the concept of "emancipatory nationalism" (Guibernau 2014b) to distinguish the emancipation movements of state-less nations from the nationalist ideologies that wreaked havoc in 20th century Europe.

A few have underlined the apparently centuries-old prejudice, or negative stereotypes, in relations between Catalans and Castilians (or Spaniards as a whole) (Strubell, M. 2008, 2011; Bel 2015).

In the rest of this paper, and without any claim to thoroughness, brief mention will be made of research into the causes of the recent developments in Catalonia, and into likely or possible political outcomes. However, the main thrust of the paper will be on the cold repression, or deactivating mechanisms introduced to counter the pro-independence movement, mainly by the Spanish authorities.

The research question that will be dealt with below is as follows: whereas Spain in the past has used openly violent methods to repress the claims of the so-called peripheral nationalisms; some actually hold that they pre-date and gave rise to an explicit Spanish nationalism as a reaction (De Blas 1991, Archilés Cardona 2011, 301, Fusi 1985, 55-56). In a 21st century scenario, without many deeply-held beliefs about Spain's unity having evolved, how are Spain's central authorities attempting to solve, or at least accommodate, the current conflict with Catalonia, and to what extent are they admissible in a western democracy?

2. Researching the Causes

The explanation of the massive rise in support for independence is blurred, or distorted, by the economic crisis that hit Spain (including Catalonia, of course) in 2008. Nevertheless, many authors point to the June 2010 Constitutional court judgment (Tribunal Constitucional 2010) that deemed part of the 2006 Statute of Autonomy (Generalitat de Catalunya 2006) unconstitutional as the catalyst (e.g. Ruiz-Huerta 2015, 200, Strubell 2013).

Newspaper and media coverage in general, at least until the last two or three years only, tended to suggest that the economic crisis sparked off the apparently sudden surge in pro-separatist sentiment in Catalonia. It is healthy to see objective studies of such media coverage (e.g. Martín & Camon 2014, Gironès i Soler, 2015; while Dhoest and Bastiaensens (2013) compare French- and Dutch-language media coverage in Belgium). This does not mean to say that Catalan media do not get blasted too (deservedly or otherwise; see, for instance, Román (2014).

Others place financial issues firmly at the centre of the growing support of the pro-independence movement, usually hinting at the selfish attitude of the wealthy Catalans without appreciating the vast annual net outflow of public money which meant, in effect, that Catalans were receiving sub-standard public services … or that their government was becoming increasingly indebted in order to assure quality services. The root cause was more likely the slaps in the face that the whole Statute of Autonomy affair gave rise to, from the presentation of the draft to the Spanish parliament for approval, late in 2005, until the infamous 2010 Constitutional court ruling which, in spite of the fact that the Statute had been ratified by the Catalans in a referendum, basically buried any hope of a quasi-federal interpretation of the 1978 Spanish Constitution.

Academic coverage has been far less prone to this simplification. Many authors adopt a strictly non-committal academic position, describing and contextualizing events. Crameri (2014) presents an excellent detailed overview of developments and the root causes of the current phase of Catalonia's political history. Though other elections are to be found in the literature (e.g. Davis 2004, Lago et al. 2007, Rico 2012, Colino 2013), the 2012 regional election gained prominence (largely because it marked the formal start of the institutional phase of the independence process): for instance, Hopkin, in an LSE blog (2012), and Rico and Liñeira (2014). With the results, "not only is traditional autonomist and federalist Catalonian nationalism enfeebled, but the ideological distance, the polarization between the different political options, has also increased" (Petithomme & Fernandez Garcia 2013, 17).

And though recent, there are also papers on the 2015 election watershed (Martí & Cetra 2016, Orriols & Rodon 2016). Medina and Molins (2014) describe the position of SMEs in the face of the prospect of Catalonia's independence. The role of schooling in the rise of pro-independence sentiment is discussed, often superficially (this is not however the case of Clots-Figueras and Masella 2013). In a different vein, a book of interviews gave a wide range of people, mostly Catalans, the chance to explain their position, in English (Strubell 2011).

Guntermann (2013) analyzes survey data to explain support for, and opposition to, Catalonia's independence, while Serrano has both analyzed emerging Spanish nationalism in its response to Catalonia's grievances (Serrano

2008), and studied the degree of congruence in citizens' opinions (Serrano 2010). Elias (2015) gives prominence to the important issue of credibility, while economic issues feature to the fore in papers by Muñoz and Tormos (2015) and Boylan (2015). Bladé (2014) attempts to go beyond identity and economic issues.

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3. Looking into the Future

Some authors venture personal opinions as to whether or not Catalonia will become independent in the foreseeable future. Griffiths et al. (2015) work on a model based on the hypothesis of a prior independence (or declaration of independence) by Catalonia. Weiler, after making some very controversial and hotly contested comments on the pro-independence process (among his respondents, Krisch, 2012, stands out) closes the discussion by seemingly punishing Catalonia: "I repeat: Independence? Bon Voyage. But not in the EU" (Weiler 2012). This categorical statement contrasts with much more dispassionate papers (Paço 2015, Fassbender 2013, Oskam 2014), and calls for specific solutions (e.g. Guibernau 2012). One young academic explores the reasons for the secessionist movement and concludes that she does not believe "that Catalonia will be granted independence" (Marinzel 2014). A CSIS chair-holder is rotund in his belief that "A potential breakup of Spain by Catalonia is not in the U.S. interest, not in Europe's interest, not in Spain's interest and ultimately, not in Catalonia's interest" (Runde 2015). Another academic, who holds a chair at Bard College, speaks out for a federal solution, saying that "the time has come for Spanish regional and national leaders to rethink their aversion to federalism" (Encarnación 2016). However, and leaving aside a number of factual errors in the paper, he obviously ignores the fact that almost all political support for Spanish federalism always came from Catalonia (e.g. Ferrer 2012), and that the 2010 Constitutional Court judgment on the 2006 Statute of Autonomy – the drafting of which had been spear-headed by a staunch federalist, President Pasqual Maragall – effectively knocked that option out of the window.

4. Cold Repression

This central part of the paper is aimed to fill in a gap in academic research on Catalonia's independence process, and, in the Catalan context, we shall do as Martínez and Zubiaga (2014) and

> …make reference to the deactivating mechanisms that impede the development of the secessionist contentious episode: we refer to the adaptation of the subject of the demand to repressive contexts and/or to alternative political proposals made by the kin-state (Martínez and Zubiaga 2014, 6).

The kin-state, Spain, has been very active in trying to defuse the pro-independence movement, but it would be misleading to call it simply repression.

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> The repression of social movements refers to attempts by individuals, groups, or state actors (e.g., militaries, national police, and local police) to control, constrain, or prevent protest. Historically, this has often involved increasing the costs associated with social movement participation (e.g., through violence, arrest, etc.). Commonly studied forms of repression include police action at public protest events, such as arrests and police violence, military suppression of protest events, 'disappearances' of activists, arrests and/or imprisonment of activists, infiltration of social movements by informants, covert counterintelligence programs, restrictions of free speech and assembly, assaults on human rights, and murders of social movement activists (Earl 2013).

The measures discussed below are not as drastic, as shall be seen. They are more in line with (perhaps ironically, for he writes about the Spanish civil war) a concept described by Rodrigo as "cold repression" (Rodrigo 2008, 149), see also Adorno and Horkheimer:

> Chronologically asymmetric is also the mode in which in both rearguards passed over from 'hot' terror to 'cold' repression, or from 'revolutionary order' to 'public order' (Adorno & Horkheimer 2001, 207).

Nevertheless, it is an understatement to claim merely that the Spanish government "has blocked all Catalan initiatives to deliver a vote on independence" (Martí 2014). To authorize a binding referndum would be tantamount to accepting that the Catalans (and by extension, the Basques and Galicians) are a people with the right of self-determination. No accommodation whatsoever has been even hinted at by political leaders in power. The so-called *tercera via* – or middle road to solve the constitutional crisis – between no change at all and full sovereignty, by redesigning the Constitution to build a federal structure (whatever that may mean), was defended for a time in Catalonia (Calvo 2014), where it enjoyed fairly wide support (Noguer 2013) but received no concrete, positive response and fizzled out, having led several parties into crises, splits and even a dissolution (Unió Democràtica de Catalunya). Nevertheless, it is clearly in Madrid's interest to revive it from time to time (Cot 2016).

Madrid has adopted a confrontational attitude, quoting the 1978 Constitution as regarding sovereignty and the unity of Spain as indivisible, and insistently saying that Catalonia's independence (which is therefore constitutionally impossible), would be up to all Spaniards to decide (Rajoy 2014). The Spanish government has taken hundreds of local councils to court, for instance, on their stance. According to the local authority organization AMI, by October 2016 councils had been reported or taken to court on 401 counts directly related to the independence process (AMI 2016).

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The key question is to what extent the deactivating mechanisms, or instances of cold repression, are the result of specific plans. And as might be expected there is only indirect, and often non-substantiated, evidence for this. What follows, therefore, is based on newspaper reports, but not on reliable first-hand, verifiable evidence.

Reports that there was a detailed written plan to wage a "dirty war" (Directe 2016) emerged in 2013. They speak of a 500 page "Operación Después" (Rueda 2013, Montero & Rendueles 2013, El Confidencial Digital 2013a), a detailed plan designed by the CNI (the Spanish secret service), including the smearing of leading Catalan politicians with police reports (and some were indeed published before being proved false), apparently to prevent the Catalan nationalists winning the 2012 election, with a €10 million budget. The original source can in no way be construed as supporting or being biased towards Catalan independence. In 2012 Manuel Cuyàs reported a source that claimed incriminating dossiers (with true or false information) were in Madrid drawers, ready to be used as ammunition to discredit leading Catalans (Cuyàs 2013). El Punt Avui (2013) summarized elements of the campaign, including the so-called La Camarga incident, with the leak of a taped recording of a meeting between an opposition leader and someone claiming to have incriminating evidence against a member of the former Catalan President's family.

The existence of an "Operación Cataluña" (El Periódico de Catalunya 2016, Bayo & López 2016) was revealed in another leaked tape recording of interior minister Jorge Fernández-Díaz with the head of Catalonia's anti-fraud office, and by a high-ranking police officer in court (La Vanguardia 2016b) who worked against the independence process until 2012. Some opinion leaders believe that the leak of the two-year-old conversation, just before the June 2016 general election, actually boomeranged back in the face of the leakers, as the Popular Party subsequently improved its results (Antich 2016, Sáez 2016), despite a host of its members being in the dock on charges of corruption. Nevertheless the minister was eventually dropped from the government formed in November. Smear campaigns were directed against the then-mayor of Barcelona, Xavier Trias (El Mundo 2014, La Sexta 2016, Lázaro 2016), just before the local election, which he narrowly lost; and the then-President Artur Mas (Ruiz 2015). The fact that such accusations are made not in the courts but in smear press campaigns (arising from police sources, not journalist investigation) speaks for itself and merits attention.

One report claims that the "dirty war" is waged on four fronts, not only in the press, but also on the legal front – in search of evidence of corruption, for instance –, on the police front (infiltrating pro-indy organizations, informers, spying…) and through intense tax tooth-combing (including Barcelona football club as a prime target – several players face prison sentences on tax evasion charges –, as well as SMEs). It hints that the creation of a Unionist organization,

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pretentiously called Societat Civil Catalana, was a government initiative and that it is funded by leading Spanish enterprises (see McCoy 2015). That organisation does enjoy clear support from the Popular Party – it was controversially (Nació Digital 2015) awarded a European Citizen's prize just a few months after being founded. However, the paper offers no sources for this information and the purported four fronts should be regarded merely as a hypothesis, however plausible. A similar conclusion can be reached as regards de De Porrata-Doria's insightful predictions (2013) on Spain's attempts to divide Catalan society into confrontational sides. His reflection obviously builds on former prime minister Aznar's incendiary statement to the effect that "Spain could only be broken once Catalonia had been broken as a society" (RTVE 2012).

The offensive, which has a very strong additional diplomatic front, has tried to counter claims the pro-indy camp made as regards the potential advantages of independence. It has published and distributed reports in various languages (particularly through embassies) (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores 2013, 2014) predicting a catastrophe. Official bodies such as Real Instituto Elcano (a think-tank for international and strategic studies) devote considerable attention to the constitutional crisis brought about by Catalonia, and republish selected papers (e.g. "Catalonia torn in two" by Molina and Otero-Iglesias 2015; both are senior analysts at the Instituto). The Spanish government has subsidized other reports, such as the 82 page paper published by the Popular Party's foundation, FAES (2013) which admits the government grant on page 2. And it has helped unionist news media (e.g. Maqueda 2013, Mezcua & Miranda 2013, Manso et al. 2015). Such reports often appear at crucial political moments in time. Though it is a matter of speculation whether or not they acted at the suggestion of the Spanish government, two banking organizations issued dire warnings just nine days before the September 27 2015 Catalan election. The Asociación Española de Banca (AEB), and the Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros (CECA) issued a joint statement claiming that:

> The exclusion of Catalonia from the Eurozone, as a consequence of the unilateral break-up of the current constitutional framework, would mean that all banking institutions with a presence in Catalonia would face serious problems of legal uncertainty.

> These difficulties would force the entities to reconsider their implementation strategy, with the consequent risk of a reduction of the banking supply and, with it, of financial exclusion and cost increase and credit shortage (EFE 2015).

On almost the same day the Barcelona-based conservative Circulo de Economía said in a declaration that it did "not share unilateral decisions that could jeopardize the principle of legality and membership in the European institutions and the euro" (Cercle d'Economia 2015).

Yet despite the offensive, what Madrid strategists and analysts hoped would blow over in time, is proving resilient: the soufflé is not deflating: it seems to be made of granite (Culla 2016).

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To complete this section, a number of recurring issues are worth outlining and briefly illustrating. They clearly share a common aim of frightening the Catalan population and its representatives and in the author's view, some are unprecedented in modern western European countries and amount to cold repression.

4.1. Military Intervention

A number of threats from the military have been aired in the media (El Periódico de Catalunya 2015), and the Minister of Defence has said that if everyone "does their duty, the army will not be needed" (Europa Press 2015). Before that, a retired general, Juan Antonio Chicharro said that "the Fatherland comes before democracy" (EFE 2013), in reference to the Catalan independence process. A retired colonel, Amadeo Martínez Inglés, was quoted as warning of the existence of an "Operación Estela" (Globedia 2014), in January 2014, a planned lightning night-time military intervention which was to prevent Catalonia from holding the 9 November 2014 non-binding poll on independence. Others point out that the run-down of the army means that it would be quite incapable of controlling such a large territory, in the face of widespread social mobilization (Buesa 2012). Some media said that low-flynig F-18 jet fighters, up Catalan Pyrenean valleys several weeks before the 2012 election were deliberate provocation, a claim hard to verify, though the timing was hardly opportune (Casas & Mas 2012). Nevertheless, there are suspicions that the massive cyber attacks on websites of the Catalan government and pro-independence organizations immediately before the 9N poll were organized by the Spanish secret service (Borràs 2014; Sala 2015). Finally, whether the permanent deployment of a hundred tanks to an army base in Catalonia in 2016 is coincidental or deliberate is, of course, open to debate (Sallés 2016a).

4.2 Pensions

The issue of pensions has received a lot of attention in the Unionist camp, to try and raise anxiety in a particularly sensitive and cautious segment of the voting population. FAES (2013), the Instituto de Estudios Económicos, El Confidencial Digital (2013b) and Societat Civil Catalana (2014) all hold that they would collapse in an independent Catalonia. Just days before the September 27 2015 election foreign minister García-Margallo claimed pensions in an independent Catalonia would drop by 40 per cent and that 689,000 jobs would be lost (El Diario 2015a). Just a couple of days later prime minister Rajoy was forced to admit that Spain is duty-bound to pay pensioners who spent their working life

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paying contributions to the Spanish pension system, wherever they live once they retire (Vilà 2015). The damage to the credibility of his Government's previous stance had been done, despite immediate efforts to backtrack (Maqueda 2015). Moreover, Bosch and Espasa (2015) among others, have shown that a Catalan pensions scheme would not run on a deficit as Spain's does right now, and would actually be able to raise them.

4.3 EU Membership

Continued EU membership is another Damocles sword being swung in the air. Spain in effect claims it will veto Catalonia's membership: foreign minister García-Margallo stated that an independent Catalonia would "wander through space and would be excluded from the EU for centuries" (La Vanguardia 2014). An answer by president Juncker, manipulated inside the Commission, to a question put to him by a Popular Party MEP, made front page news – again, just before an election – until the scandal broke out almost immediately (ABC 2015). The truth is the EU cannot take a stance on Catalonia, if and when it declares independence, unless it first recognizes it as a sovereign state. And that cannot happen before Spain's authorities do so… having swallowed their pride. Until then, of course, Catalan citizens will still be Spanish and therefore EU citizens, whether or not Catalonia decides to press for EU membership. Moreover, Prime Minister Rajoy was caught off his guard in a widely distributed interview, when asked about this issue: yet again, in the run-up to the crucial 2015 Catalan election (El País 2015). The journalist reminded him that the Spanish constitution forbids Spanish citizens from being deprived of their nationality.

4.4 Threatening Officials

Another strategy being used is to scare officials. The former president of Catalonia and three former ministers face political disqualification (González & Cué 2016) or even gaol, on the grounds of disobedience and misconduct, for having set up a poll (an election pledge) – very deliberately *not* a referendum, simply an exercise to test public opinion (Gisbert 2014) –, and holding it on 9 November 2014 despite a speedily-delivered Constitutional court injunction (Fabra 2014) to block it. Just before that poll school principals – as were mayors – were sent letters by the Spanish authorities to remind them of "their duty" (Ara 2014), in a last-ditch, and unsuccessful, attempt to prevent them from opening their schools as polling stations (Ara 2014).

In another sphere, 22 judges were threatened with disciplinary action for having published a manifesto on Catalonia's "right to decide" (Vilaweb 2014), claiming that the Constitution does not prevent a referendum being held. A year earlier the chief prosecutor in Catalonia had been forced to resign after claiming something very similar (Ara 2013). The judges won their case (e-Noticies 2014).

However, their pictures (many taken from their identity cards, a database only open to the police) were published in a right-wing Madrid newspaper (La Razón, traces of the page can be found in El Comunista 2014). They sued the police and the newspaper, for allegedly infringing their right to privacy of personal data, but though the police official responsible for the report was identified (El Periódico 2014) the courts eventually dismissed the case (La Vanguardia 2016a). However, one of these judges, Santiago Vidal, was disqualified for three years for belonging to a group of legal specialists that wrote, in their spare time and of their own free will, a draft Catalan Constitution (Rincón 2015). His appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected.

At the time of writing the Spanish government plans to continue its strategy of denying the Catalans the right to decide their future at the ballot box, having issued instructions to the Prosecutor to apply for Catalan Parliament's Speaker Carme Forcadell to be barred from office for allowing a debate, despite an explicit Constitutional court prohibition, on what from the central government's point of view is (another) unconstitutional road map towards independence, which includes at some stage a ratifying referendum (ACN 2016).

4.5. Blocking Catalan Legislation

The growing political conflict between Catalonia and central government, particularly when the Popular party is in power in Madrid, can be quantified by the number of laws and decrees being taken to the Constitutional court, usually by the Spanish government, but also by the Ombudsman or the Senate. In March 2015 the Catalan authorities were awaiting no fewer than 58 judgments (Vázquez 2015). In content, most of the issues are not directly linked to the independence process, but are of an economic or social nature. Under six months later the Consumer Code of Catalonia and the Emergency Housing law were added to the list (El Diario 2015b).

Precisely in order to be able to deal with the Catalan political crisis, the Popular Party gave executive powers to the Constitutional court, as if it were an ordinary court of law, in a highly controversial law (Jefatura del Estado 2015) that was taken, ironically, to the Constitutional court itself so that it can decide whether such powers fit within the Constitution. It duly decided they do (Financial Times 2016).

5. Conclusion

In the quest for independence of the Catalan people (more strictly, a very large proportion of the Catalan people) the issue at hand is one of democracy, not of nationalism. "The Unity of Spain is Sacred" (La Vanguardia 2015), in the words not of the Spanish church – for whom voting on independence is, nevertheless,

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"morally unacceptable" (Servimedia/InfoCatólica 2013) –, but of the incumbent prime minister, Mariano Rajoy and the long-standing discourse of his Popular Party (La Vanguardia 2015). Given this stance and the refusal to even consider modifying the Constitution to accommodate Catalonia's demands (Blay 2015), the long-awaited "head-on train collision" (Pareja 2016) seems closer by the day.

This may seem odd, for the conflicting parties can surely draw on…

> forms of conflict mediation and resolution, often involving more or less neutral and mutually respected third parties. This type of conflict resolution is an integral and defining characteristic of democratic systems under the rule of law. Such polities offer many institutionalized forms of conflict resolution and mediation that can help to stabilize contentious interactions and prevent their escalation to revolutionary or civil war proportions. These forms of conflict resolution and mediation include third parties, such as the electorate, parliament or the courts, whose legitimacy is accepted by all conflict parties, and which may settle conflicts authoritatively (Koopmans 2004, 27).

Moreover Vidal-Aparicio (2015) argues against regarding the Catalan process as based first and foremost on identity and cultural matters. After recalling that the United States declared independence by primarily invoking the political philosophy of John Locke, especially the idea that governments are legitimate only insofar as they fulfil the purpose for which they were established by the governed, he claims that

> the process that is underway in Catalonia announces a new era where independence movements will go back to using Lockean political principles, after a 20th century when the general trend was instead to justify independence processes putting an emphasis on the classical principles of nationalism, primarily based on identity and cultural homogeneity (Vidal-Aparicio 2015).

Many documented examples of this are to be found. Largely because such a high proportion of the current population of Catalonia is of only fairly recent Catalan extraction, identity issues are not in the fore in the pro-independence camp, though they are constantly evoked by the unionist camp. Instead, the main thrust of the reasoning for independence is based on economic and pragmatic issues linked to the general well-being of the Catalan people or, to be more precise, of all people living in Catalonia regardless of their political persuasion.

The two camps are therefore at loggerheads. Unionists appeal to the rule of law, while separatists call for a democratic vote and, increasingly, disobedience (e.g. El Mundo 2016, Cardús 2016). Unionists insist that it is up to all Spaniards, and not just to Catalans, to decide whether Catalonia can split from Spain. Sadly, in the words of Castillo, "the rule of law thus becomes politicised as a result of the tension around the judicialisation of the so-called Catalan sovereignist process"

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(Castillo 2015). The Constitutional Court, in particular, is a frequent resort, and leading judges resent the courts being used to dodge the negotiation of a political solution to what is, after all, a political problem (Rubio 2014). After all, as a unsigned Financial Times opinion article put it over two years ago, "This is a political problem that requires a political answer" (Financial Times 2014). Its advice, that "Madrid needs to act fast over the Catalonia separatist question" (Financial Times 2014), has been followed, but not in the direction of sitting down to find a solution.

Leaving ideological and nationalist considerations aside, the Popular Party is aware that the Yes vote could well win (e.g. Postdigital 2016). It also knows that it is perceived in Catalonia as an anti-Catalan party (Juliana 2008), and the irony is that its policies have fuelled the pro-independence flames for years in Catalonia.

This text has been completed this shortly after the Catalan President, Carles Puigdemont, has won a parliamentary vote of confidence and has announced that a binding referendum will be held, come what may (in Puigdemont words "o referèndum o referèndum", cited in Etxearte 2016), but offering to negotiate the terms with the Spanish government, before the end of September 2017 (Etxearte 2016). It is very doubtful that the Spanish government and authorities will call a truce on this issue, unless of course outside institutions apply pressure, presumably on financial and economic grounds, to bring about a change in their current policy. Such pressure could come on human rights grounds, and the Catalan president has asked the United Nations and the Council of Europe to mediate (Sallés 2016b). But it is hard to envisage, at least in the medium-term, anything other than a binding referendum on Catalonia's independence, either before (only if it can take place with democratic guarantees) or after a declaration of independence by the Parliament of Catalonia.

In answer to the basic research question, the evidence supports the hypothesis that the Spanish authorities have hitherto failed to apply the procedures laid down in democratic regimes for conflict prevention and resolution. Far from this, they have fanned the flames with measures that have entrenched the opposing positions, while the pro-independence parties continue along the road map that the Catalan electorate endorsed by giving them an overall parliamentary majority in November 2015. It remains to be seen whether a proclamation of independence, coupled with immediate tax-raising measures, would force Spain to sit down in order to negotiate a solution to its ailing pension system and its very high sovereign debt.

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Notes

[1] "Pondrà (el corregidor) el mayor cuydado en introducir la lengua castellana cuyo fin dará las providencias más templadas i disimuladas pera que se consiga el efecto sin que se note el cuydado."

[2] "Porque no se le dé vueltas: España es una cosa hecha por Castilla, y hay razones para ir sospechando que, en general, sólo cabezas castellanas tienen órganos adecuados para percibir el gran problema de la España integral."

Michele Gazzola, François Grin, Johan Häggman, Tom Moring

The EU's Financial Support for Regional or Minority Languages: A Historical Assessment

The EU professes to have a positive policy towards RMLs, as enshrined in Article 22 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. Since the beginning of the 1980s the then European Economic Community has shown some awareness of the issue and has tried to support RMLs in a variety of ways. This support, nevertheless, has decreased over time, in particular since 2000. The goal of this article is to provide a detailed financial assessment of EU support to RMLs from 1994 to 2006 and to present the main trend in RMLs support after 2006. This article, based on official data, shows that the amounts concerned, even during the relatively more favourable 1990s, have remained small. We also conclude that RML-specific programmes and actions (as opposed to mainstreaming support) have been much more successful at channelling resources towards RMLs. We conclude the article by discussing the most important trends in RML support after 2006, showing that support from the EU in this area has remained modest.

Keywords: Regional and minority languages, European Union, language policy evaluation, costs.

Evropska podpora regionalnim in manjšinskim jezikom: finančni pregled in ocena

EU se ponaša s pozitivno politiko do regionalnih in manjšinskih jezikov, kar določa tudi 22. člen Evropske listine o temeljnih pravicah. Že v zgodnjih 80. letih prejšnjega stoletja je tedanja Evropska gospodarska skupnost pokazala določeno občutljivost za to področje, ki pa je sčasoma še posebej po letu 2000, precej upadla. Članek prinaša podrobno finančno oceno podpore EU regionalnim in manjšinskim jezikom v obdobju med letoma 1994 in 2006 ter prikaz trenda te podpore po letu 2006. Zneski podpore so bili celo v relativno ugodnih 90. letih nizki, specifični programi in akcije (v nasprotju z uradno podporo) veliko bolj uspešni v zagotavljanju sredstev. Članek zaključujemo z obravnavo trendov po letu 2006, ki kažejo, da je EU manjšinskim in regionalnim jezikom namenjala le skromna sredstva.

Ključne besede: *regionalni in manjšinski jeziki, Evropska unija, evaluacija jezikovne politike, stroški.*

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1. Introduction

1.1 On the Need for an Assessment

According to the official figures published by the European Commission, there are more than 60 indigenous regional and minority languages (RMLs)[1] in Europe, in addition to the 24 official languages of the European Union (EU).[2] These languages are spoken by about 40 million people, and in the future the degree of linguistic diversity in the Union is likely to rise as a result of increasing flows of new immigrant communities. RMLs have neither working nor official status in the European Union if they do not also happen to be the official language of a Member State. It would, however, be misleading to conclude that the absence of minority languages from the set of the official languages of the EU implies an absence of Community activity in the field. Generally speaking, the EU professes to have a positive policy towards RMLs, as enshrined in Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which states that "the Union respects cultural, religious and linguistic diversity", and since the beginning of the 1980s the then European Economic Community has shown some awareness of the issue and has tried to support RMLs in a variety of ways. This support, nevertheless, has decreased over time, in particular since 2000 when the budget line that provided regular funding earmarked for RMLs was cancelled, and by the tightening (European Parliament 2016), in 2003-2004, of conditions imposed on project-based funding to the European Bureau for Lesser-used languages (EBLUL) that was eventually closed in 2010. Nevertheless, after 2007 the Lifelong Learning Programme of the EU funded some new networks that are active in the promotion of RMLs such as the Network for the promotion of linguistic diversity (NPLD), the Federal Union of European Nationalities (FUEN),[3] and the Mercator Research Centres.

The picture, therefore, is neither a rosy nor completely bleak one, making it necessary to provide a historical financial assessment of the extent of EU support to RMLs. The goal of this article is to provide just such an assessment, drawing on the SMiLE report,[4] where SMiLE stands for Support for Minority Languages in Europe (Grin et al. 2003) and updating it with some more recent references. This report, which was commissioned by the EU, represents, to our knowledge, the first complete tally ever made of the different EU sources of support to RMLs and of the amounts involved. Yet its results are still relatively unknown by specialists.[5]

1.2 State of the Art and Goals of the Article

Systematic empirical studies of the economic conditions for (minority) language maintenance with an international perspective are rare. Since seminal works, such as Joshua Fishman's work on language revitalization (Fishman

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1991), comparative research has covered minority language conditions (e.g., the Euromosaic reports I-IV, see Nelde et al. 1996, updated with data on new member states 1999, 2004 and 2009; for revised methodology, see Darquennes et al. 2004). Also language policy issues have been extensively covered since early works by, e.g., Williams (1991), and today several international journals specialise in this field (for an example, focusing particularly on the same geographical region as this article, see European Journal of Language Policy, edited in co-operation with the European Language Council).[6] Nevertheless, none of these contributions addresses the question of RMLs support from a financial point of view, pointing out and summarising the amount of resources invested in the promotion of minority languages.

EU policies in this field have been critically assessed in the literature since a ruling of the European Court of Justice in 1998, requiring a legal base for all types of EU support, was carried out in practice. Efforts to install a legal base for minority language projects were not successful, and the specific budget line for such projects was suppressed in 2001 (see, e.g., Cormack & Hourigan 2007). Also, the European Parliament has passed several resolutions and been confronted with initiatives at different levels on this matter (see Grin et al. 2003, Jones 2013).

In this context a more strict theoretical and methodological grounding of research on the economic base for language policies was called for, as a result of the spread of policy analysis and evaluation as disciplines aimed at improving the accountability of decision makers and the evaluation of the costs and effectiveness of public policies. The need for economically sound policy analysis in support for political decision-making was particularly urgent in contexts representing the type of linguistic diversity that was – and is – a fundamental characteristic of most of the world, not least Europe. Research focusing specifically on the economic aspects of language was developed by, e.g., Price (1997), and Grin and Vaillancourt (1997).

The study that this article draws on is informed by a theoretical approach that builds on empirically informed estimations of how economical investments in language policy outputs delivers outcomes in the form of sustained or increased use of the language in everyday life (see Grin & Vaillancourt 1998). The SMiLE Report represents the only comprehensive effort to place EU funding into such a perspective. Studies with more narrow focus (i.e., Jones 2013) have also informed this article and been helpful in our effort to update our data.

The aims of this article, nevertheless, are deliberately modest: we do not venture into explanation of how policy analysis theories and methodology can be applied to the study of minority languages (on this point, see Grin 2003). Our chief goal is to provide an information base that at the service of scholars, language planners, and other users as part of broader, yet systematic assessments of the extent of EU support for small languages. The SMiLE Report provides a

suitable basis for this purpose because it departs, both in terms of methodology and results, from the usual emphasis on legal-institutional or sociolinguistic issues. Though necessary, these approaches are not always adequate for guiding the policy-maker who has to choose between policy alternatives, and must therefore understand which specific measures should be adopted in order to implement those choices effectively and cost-effectively. All this underscores the need for an analytical framework that can focus on policy choices, their effects and their costs, which, in turn, calls for a review of the financial amounts involved.

The figures drawn from the SMiLE Report and discussed in this article, therefore, offer a systematic listing of programmes and actions in favour of RMLs. For the benefit of non-European readers, let is point out that in the context of EU policies, action is not necessarily the same thing as programme. The word action carries two meanings, both of which are significantly different from programme. The first refers to EU activities in the implementation of a given policy, but at a fairly general level. For example, an action can be been undertaken in favour of RMLs, and be embodied in particular programmes. In this sense, action is broader than a specific programme. The second meaning refers, by contrast, to a more specific, limited part of a certain programme. For example, the Erasmus+ programme speaks about key actions promoting different kinds of learning. In this case, therefore, action means a sub-programme, or a budget line within a bigger programme.

Anyone familiar with the complexity of EU action in any given domain will appreciate the effort to provide a complete list of them, along with the corresponding expenditure figures. Identifying the relevant programmes and actions, and gathering information on the corresponding financial appropriations is a difficult task at the best of times, made harder by the fact that no integrative approach had been attempted so far, whether within the Commission or outside of it, to comprehensively list forms of EU action in favour of RMLs.

This article is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a general overview of EU interventions in favour of RMLs and of the methodology followed in this article. Section 3 reports on support measures and figures for the 1994-2000 period. Section 4 examines at closer range support measures for the period 2000-2006 – namely, after the suspension of the specific budget line for RMLs. Section 5 provides an overview of the most important initiatives of the EU in supporting RMLs after 2006. Section 6 is devoted to brief concluding remarks.

2. Methodology

2.1 Forms of Financial Supports for Regional or Minority Languages

The first initiative on minority languages adopted by the EU was the Resolution of the European Parliament on a Community Charter of Regional Languages and Cultures and on a Charter of rights of Ethnic Minorities (OJ C 287 9 November 1981). The resolution was authored by Gaetano Arfé MEP; in 1983 a separate budget line was created to provide support to projects particularly benefiting RMLs. This resolution was followed by different resolutions and own-initiative reports, the most recent one being the European Parliament on RMLs is the European Parliament Resolution on Endangered European Languages and Linguistic Diversity in the European Union, authored by François Alfonsi and adopted on the 11th September 2013.[7] Before 1992 the Commission has had a near monopoly on initiating legislation in the European Communities. The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 gave the European Parliament an equivalent right. Under Article 192, the Parliament, with an absolute majority of its members, can request that the Commission "submits any appropriate proposal on matters on which it considers that a Community act is required for the purpose of implementing this Treaty". (Corbett et al. 2005: 230-231). Between 1992 and 2015 only 37 resolutions inviting the Commission to submit such proposals have been adopted by the Parliament, one of them being the legislative own-initiative report and resolution regional and lesser-used languages 14 July 2003. As a result of the Ebner resolution,[8] all funding programmes were opened up to all languages and a Commission portfolio exclusively for multilingualism was created. Generally speaking, during the three decades, the EU's attempt to protect and promote RMLs followed three different directions.

The first form of EU support to RMLs was the separate budget line (B3-1006 since 1998, and then B3-1000), which from 1983 to 2000 provided funding to projects particularly benefiting RMLs. In 1998, the budget line for RMLs was suspended as a result of a ruling delivered by the Court of Justice.[9] The suppression of the budget line for RMLs resulted from legal implications that had nothing to do with RMLs, but this ruling made it clear that the continuation of EU support to particular projects in favour of RMLs – among other EU actions not covered by a legal base – would henceforth explicitly require such a base. In practice, support to projects was allowed to continue for three years, while a legal base was being prepared. The Commission has not been successful in installing a legal base of this kind.

The second form of EU support for RMLs has been through funding for the setting up of structures to support networking and co-operation between RML communities and projects. The European Bureau for lesser-used languages (EBLUL) was established in 1982 and closed in 2010. The Bureau was an

independent Non-Governmental Organisation working for languages and linguistic diversity. The Bureau had a role of central importance to European networking in the field of language promotion. The budget line B3-1006 also served to fund EBLUL and the three Mercator Centres (Mercator Education, Mercator Legislation and Mercator Media). These three research and documentation centres on RMLs still exist, although sometimes under a different label, and they are part to the Mercator network. This network was founded in 1987. Its mission is to connect multilingual communities across Europe, promoting knowledge sharing and facilitating structured exchange of best practice and cutting edge initiatives through its programme of activities. The network consists of five members, i.e., the Mercator European Research Centre on Multilingualism and Language Learning, Mercator Legislation, Mercator Media, the Research Institute for Linguistics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest, and Stockholm University. It was funded by the Lifelong Learning Programme of the European Union. This programme also contributed to the financing of the Network for the Promotion of Linguistic Diversity. This network was established in 2009, and it is a pan-European government-based institution made up by regional governments but also by some states such as Ireland. Its full members are all governments, whereas its associate members are research centres and non-profit associations. It was created with the support of the European Commission and led by different state and regional governments comprising universities, associations and NGO's working in the field of language policy and planning for Constitutional, Regional and Small-State Languages (CRSS) across Europe. Another organisation receiving funding under the Lifelong Learning Programme for promoting RMLs, as mentioned before, was the Federal Union of European Nationalities. The European Language Equality Network receives funding under Erasmus+ through the Digital Language Diversity Project.

Finally, a third form of support to RMLs was offered by including them in projects carried out within a broader framework (a strategy known as mainstreaming), along with other (non RML-related) projects fulfilling the requirements of the programme objectives. In this article, we leave aside the support institutions in order to focus on the two other types of actions. As a first step, it is necessary to understand the structure and the evolution over time of EU programmes that are, to a greater or lesser extent, related to languages. This gives rise to a representation of these programmes on a diagram bearing no less than four dimensions, namely:

- the time period (1994-2000 and 2000-2006);
- the extent to which the programmes and actions considered are explicitly language-related, partly language-related, or non-language related;
- the languages eligible in each case;
- and finally, the administrative position of each activity in terms of its affiliation to other actions and programmes, in particular Socrates.

Figure 1: Categorisation of EU Activities with Relevance to Support for Language
Updated of figure 2.1, SMiLE Report, pag. 242

Our discussion introduces a further distinction between projects directly aimed at RMLs and projects that merely include a partner from an RML community. As in the SMiLE Report, the former are called A-list projects (for which exhaustive figures are provided) and the latter B-list projects.

2.2 Data Collection

In order to develop these two lists, the following methodology has been adopted: these lists are based on the official archives of the EU institutions (mainly the Commission), complemented with information received from various actors, such as regional authorities, NGOs and academic institutions. The analysis and description of the allocation of funds focuses on the A-list, that is on projects that are specifically intended to promote RMLs. This listing is not exhaustive, since some of the actors contacted (for example, regional authorities) never answered the requests for information of the authors of the SMiLE report, and project lists received from them are incomplete. For these reasons, budget figures for some projects are missing. Thus, the percentages indicating the share of a programme's or action's funding should not be considered as an exact figure. Rather, they constitute an approximation. Another limitation that must be mentioned is that, both in the table and in the commented listing, some RMLs or some regions tend to be overrepresented, while others are underrepresented. This is due to the fact mentioned above that some regional authorities and their EU representations have been very co-operative, while others did not send or simply do not possess information requested. The long list of Basque projects funded under the regional programmes in the A-list (as opposed to the near-absence of other regions) is explained by these constraints.

The A-list is furthermore divided into projects according to the number of partners, as well as three categories; projects with only RML partners, projects where RML partners form the majority and finally, projects with a minority of partners representing RMLs. The projects are also listed according to their size: there is a category with projects under €30 thousand in turnover, a second group with projects that have a turnover between €30 thousand and €100 thousand and a third and final column with projects with a turnover over €100 thousand.

3. EU Funding from 1994 to 2000

This section is divided in three parts in order to reflect three different degrees of inclusion of the language dimension into EU programmes or actions. As shown in Figure 1, a distinction is made between language-related programmes, partly-language-related programmes and non-language-related programmes that have been funding language-related actions.

3.1 Programmes Directly Related to Languages

These programmes are presented in the first section[10] from the bottom in Figure 1.

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- The Community action for the Promotion and Safeguard of Regional and Minority Languages and Cultures (here referred to as the RML action);
- The Lingua action (part of Socrates, see below);
- The Multilingual Information Society programme (or MLIS);
- Language engineering (LE) and Human Language Technologies (HLT).

The Community action for the Promotion and Safeguard of Regional and Minority Languages and Cultures was an action targeting specifically those languages traditionally used within the European Union, meaning that dialects and migrant languages could not apply for funding under this action. As noted before, the budget line for RMLs was launched in 1983. In current euros, this budget line has increases regularly until 1995, before decreasing from 1996 to 1998; the same holds in real terms, albeit with a slight dip in 1994.[11]

Table 1: The development of the European Parliament B-line support for Regional and Minority Languages (millions of current euros)

Year	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98
€ Mil - current euros	0.1	0.2	0.34	0.68	0.86	1	1	1.1	2	2.5	3.5	3.5	4	4	3.7	3.4[12]
€ Mil - constant euros (1995)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	2.21	2.66	3.66	3.59	4	3.89	3.6	3.27

Source: Grin et al. (2003: 30).

[a] Values in constant Euros are not provided for 1990 or earlier, since the price index series used reaches back to 1991 only.

[b] n.a.= not available

The RML budget line was replaced by the provisional B3-1000 line for 1999 and 2000, in order to fund ongoing projects, but even this line was finally suppressed because of the failure to install a new legal basis for RMLs actions. The total amount of resources available from the B3-1000 line over this two-year period was €2.5 million. The RML action provided co-financing up to fifty percent of eligible costs. Considering only the period from 1997 to 2000, the RML action had funded some 392 A-list projects by allocating them the entirety of the available €9,182,860; thus, the RML action has financed more RML-related projects than the other programmes. It has supported projects in various fields including education, culture and from general language promotion as well as conferences on language issues. We shall return in detail on the comparison between the RML action and the other programmes at the end of Section 4 and in Appendix 2.

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The Lingua action, on the contrary, was specifically geared to the official languages of the EU; it included Irish, which was not an official language of the EU until 2007, Lëtzeburgesh, Icelandic and Norwegian. From the point in time where it became applicable, this action was open to new Member States and the pre-accession countries participating in the Socrates programme.[13] Under the Socrates programme – the most important EU instrument devoted to education (see below) – Lingua was a horizontal measure designed to promote language learning by European citizens, also through higher mobility for teachers and learners. According to Lingua principles, special priority had to be given to lesser used and taught EU languages.

Other programmes are directly related to languages, but not linked to any specific group of languages; therefore, both projects concerning official languages and RMLs were *a priori* eligible under these programmes. The Multilingual Information Society (MLIS) programme, concluded in 1999, was devoted to the promotion of linguistic diversity in the information society. About 4.3 per cent of the MLIS budget was devoted to A-list projects, and in absolute terms, the programme had funded four RML projects for a total amount of €647,675. Also relevant are the Language engineering (LE) programme, which was a part of the Telematics Applications Programme (TAP) programme (itself a part of the Fourth Framework Programme) and the Human Language Technologies (HTL) programme, which was the successor of LE when TAP was replaced and integrated[14] into the Information Society Technologies (IST) programme. IST was the largest single programme under the Fifth Framework, and its aim was to create a user-friendly information society. The HTL action, in particular, concerns the areas of interactivity between human beings and computers, multilingualism in general, and cross-lingual information management.

The main figures on the language-related programmes or action for the period 1994-2000, can be summarised as follows:

Table 2: EU Spending on Language-related Programmes or Actions, 1994-2000 (Figures are expressed in current euros of the first year of the respective programmes)

Languages concerned	Title	Budget line	Period	Initial Budget (€)
RMLs	Promotion and Safeguard of Regional and Minority Languages and Cultures action	B3 – 1006	1994 – 1998	18,600,000
		B3 – 1000	1999 – 2000	2,500,000
Official Languages	Lingua	B3 –1001	1995 – 1999	See *Socrates I – Tab. A2* - (no separate budget figures available)
Any Languages	Multilingual Information Society	B3 – 2004	1996 – 1999	15,000,000
	Language engineering (part of TAP)	B6 – 7111	1994 – 1998	78,000,000
	Human languages technologies (part of IST)	B6 – 6121	1998 – 2002	564,000,000

Source: adapted from Grin et al. 2003.

Except for the RML budget line, these programmes supported any languages and were not, in fact, principally devoted to RMLs. In most cases, the total amount financing RML-related projects was a very small percentage of the total (see Table A1 in the Appendix 1). This is a point to which we shall return later.

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3.2 Programmes or Actions that are Partly Related to Languages

These programmes are presented in the second section from the bottom in Figure 1.
- European multilingual radio and television services;
- Open and Distance Learning (an action under Socrates);
- Others actions under Socrates;
- The Youth for Europe, Leonardo da Vinci, Connect, Kaleidoscope, Raphael, Ariane, INFO 2000, Media II and Philoxenia programmes.

As we can see from Figure 1, there is no partly-language-related programme specifically designed to include RMLs. This does not mean, however, that RMLs are excluded from participating in programmes targeting any language. Before turning to the latter, let us briefly consider those partly language-related programmes designed for official languages only.

The European multilingual radio and television services programme was created to support European initiatives in the domain of media with a multilingual dimension. The programme was suspended in 1998 because there was no legal basis for this budget line.

Open and Distance Learning (ODL) was an action in the first phase of the Socrates programme. ODL, which was intended to promote the use of multimedia in education, turned out to be difficult to implement across the EU because of the limited spread of information and communication technologies in some countries.

Socrates has already been mentioned in relation to the Lingua action; more detail on Socrates is necessary at this point in order to clarify the links between partly-language-related programmes or actions devoted to official languages only, and those open to any languages. Socrates is the EU programme that aims to promote co-operation, equal opportunities and mobility between the Member States in the fields of education at every level. Socrates comprises several actions and gives special attention to the teaching of foreign languages, which is assumed to play an important role for mutual understanding between Member States. The first phase of Socrates, Socrates I, started in 1995 and continued until 1999. The second phase, Socrates II, was set up for the 2000–2005 period. In this subsection, we focus on Socrates I, which included the following actions: Lingua, ODL, Erasmus, Comenius, Arion and Adult Education. The first two having already been described, we now discuss the others.

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Erasmus is the main EU intervention in the field of higher education. It is mainly devoted to the exchange of university students and teachers. As regards languages, universities can use their Erasmus block grant to finance language preparation courses for participating students. Minority languages are eligible when they are used by the host university. Therefore, if RMLs are used as a medium of education, Erasmus can be a useful source of support for RMLs. However, none of the A-list projects was funded through Erasmus.

Comenius is an action focusing on school education, particularly on inter-cultural education through transnational projects. It is aimed at all members of the education community. As to languages in general, projects limited to official languages must involve two schools from two European countries and focus on the learning of foreign languages, with a priority for less widely used and taught languages. Two A-list projects have been funded under the first phase of Comenius (1995-1999) for a total amount of €230 thousand. As to RMLs, Comenius, as well as Lingua have sponsored projects in relation mainly with educational institutions, such as schools or even universities, or with authorities responsible for education, often regional or local ones. In general, Comenius is relevant to RMLs where educational institutions teach minority languages or use them as a medium of instruction. Comenius had also funded thirteen B-list projects to improve the situation of the Roma, though in socio-economic rather than linguistic terms.

Arion is an action that supports the meeting of decision-makers and specialists in the field of education. These visits and the exchange of experience have also concerned language teaching. The relevance of Arion for RML promotion lies in the fact that the RMLs that are taught or otherwise used in the education system are eligible.

Finally, Socrates I also included the Adult Education programme, which aimed to foster the European dimension through the cultural and social education of adults. In 1997-1998, the Adult Education programme has funded two A-list projects for a total of €201,605. Adult Education was renamed Grundtvig under Socrates II. In recent years, these programmes have been merged in the large Erasmus+ Programme.

Several other programmes, even if not directly related to languages, could include a language dimension both for official languages and, though infrequently, for RMLs.

Leonardo da Vinci (now part of Erasmus+) was a programme promoting translational initiatives in vocational training in order to support Member States' policies. Improving language skills and cross-cultural understanding within the framework of education and professional training was one of the main aims of Leonardo. Between 1995 and 2000, Leonardo funded two A-list projects, where the recipient institutions were tertiary-level institutions providing vocational training. Leonardo also funded at least two B-list projects to improve the situation of the Roma.

Between 1995 and 1999, Youth for Europe (YFE III) was in its third phase. At the time of writing, YFE was an action under the broader Youth programme. Youth for Europe was a programme designed for young people aged 15 to 25 from the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA) Member States, as well as applicant states[15]. The aim of Youth for Europe was to encourage youth mobility, voluntary work and non-formal education in order to increase the awareness of European citizenship. Youth for Europe can be used to promote youth exchanges among RMLs communities or associations. Projects with a linguistic or intercultural dimension receive priority.

Media II (1996–2000), a new edition of Media (now part of Creative Europe), was the EU programme supporting the European audiovisual industry. Respect for linguistic and cultural diversity in European audiovisual production was one of the objectives of Media II. In this respect, "particular attention was given to the specific needs of countries with low production capacity and/or a restricted geographical and linguistic area" (Grin et al. 2003: 53).

Three EU programmes have been devoted to culture: Raphael, Kaleidoscope, and Ariane. These programmes respectively concerned cultural heritage, cultural life and, finally, books and reading. From 1996 to 1999, Kaleidoscope has funded only one A-list project – an itinerant festival in the Occitan-speaking regions – representing 0.27 per cent of the programme budget, that is, €70 thousand. By contrast, Ariane had funded 31 A-list projects between 1997 and 1999, amounting to 0.59 per cent of its budget, that is, a total of €177,647.

Connect was a link-programme connecting European programmes in different domains, such as training, education, innovation, culture, research and new technologies. In 1999, Connect funded two A-list projects, one in the domain of culture, while the second can be classified as a media project. The corresponding total expenditure was 1.7 per cent of the budget, that is, €262,380.

In concluding this paragraph dedicated to the EU programmes that are partly related to (any) language, let us also mention the existence of the INFO 2000[16] and Philoxenia[17] programmes.

The total amount of funding for partly language-related programmes or actions for the 1994-2000 period is provided in Appendix 1 (Table A2).

3.3 Non-language-related Programs that have Funded Language-related Actions

These programmes are presented in the third section from the bottom in Figure 1. We have to consider the programmes financed by the Structural Funds. Together with the Cohesion Fund, the Structural Funds represent the second largest European item of expenditure after agriculture. The Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund were created in order to implement the drive for economic and social cohesion. There are four Structural Funds:

•   European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)

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- European Social Fund (ESF)
- European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)
- European Maritime & Fisheries Fund (EMFF)

During the period examined here, structural funds financed three different kinds of interventions:
1. interventions related to priority objectives[18]: over the 1994-1999 period, there were seven priority objectives, while from 2000 they were consolidated into just three;
2. interventions related to Community initiatives: over the 1994-1999 period, there were 13 ongoing initiatives, while after 2000 just four remained, namely, Interreg III, Leader +, Equal, and Urban II;
3. interventions related to innovative measures.

Even if such programmes do not concern languages, they can provide useful complements to support linguistic diversity. In particular, ESF financial support can be used for cultural projects – if they contribute to job creation – and therefore indirectly to languages. The projects related to priority objectives financed by ERDF, for instance, could assist in the maintenance of RMLs through the development of infrastructures for tourism, which could, in turn, slow down out-migration from RML-speaking areas.

Two programmes are worth noting within Community initiatives, namely, Interreg II and Leader II. The Interreg programme, funded by the ERDF, was adopted in 1990 and renewed and renamed Interreg II for the 1994-1999 period. The main aim of this programme was to support cross-border cooperation and stimulate interregional integration. With respect to languages, the promotion of language learning and regional cultures was taken into consideration under Interreg II. Over the 1996-1999 period, Intereg II has funded 73 A-list projects for a total amount of €1,204,092 – that is, 0.03 per cent of its budget. In 2000, it has funded one A-list project, for which cost figures are not available.

The Leader programme, funded by the EAGGF Guidance section, was launched in 1991, and renewed and renamed Leader II for the 1994-1999 period. Leader II was designed to help rural development. In 1997, Leader II has funded one A-list project, but no budget figures are available. As to B-list projects, Leader has sponsored several projects in the so-called Celtic fringe, but this could at best promote RMLs indirectly, since the RMLs projects within Interreg and Leader mainly aim at improving infrastructure and living conditions, also in RML-speaking areas.

The total amount of funding for non-language related programmes in the 1994-2000 period is provided in Appendix 1 (Table A3). The characteristics of the projects that are directly aimed at the promotion and development of RMLs from 1997 to 2000 are presented in Appendix 2.

4. EU Support from 2000 to 2006

Many of the programmes already presented in the preceding section were simply relabelled and renamed for the 2000-2006 period. However, crucial differences are particularly relevant to RMLs.

4.1 Programmes Directly Related to Languages

There were three such programmes:
- the Lingua action;
- the Human Language Technologies (HLT) action;
- the European Year of Languages 2001 (EYL 2001).

As shown in Figure 1, there was no longer any programme specifically related to RMLs from 2000 onwards. Following the 1998 ruling of the European Court of Justice, and after the 1999-2000 transition period, no legal basis was provided for programmes or actions specifically devoted to RMLs. However, some significant initiatives[19] could ultimately encourage the re-introduction of some form of direct support for RMLs. At the end of this section, we shall return in detail to the effects that the suppression of the RMLs action line has had on the distribution of funds for RML-related projects.

Let us now turn to the programmes or actions that concerned official languages only. This category included only the Lingua action, but whereas, under Socrates I, Lingua was a horizontal measure, under Socrates II, the new Lingua was an objective of Socrates II as a whole, and of the Erasmus, Comenius and Grundtvig actions in particular. In other words, Lingua completed and enriched the measures to promote language learning that were present in the other actions of the Socrates II programme. The new Lingua action was designed to encourage and support linguistic diversity throughout the EU and to help improve language teaching and learning. It also strove to promote access to lifelong language-learning opportunities appropriate to each individual's needs. Lingua could be relevant also for RMLs, considering that many of them were official languages of new Member States and of the pre-accession countries. The new *Lingua* action funded one education-related A-list project for the amount of €460 thousand.

The Human Language Technologies (HTL) action and the European Year of Languages 2001, by contrast, did not target any particular group of languages. However, they were open both to national-level official languages and to RMLs. HLT, which was a part of the Information Society Technologies programme-IST, has already been mentioned in the preceding section. In principle, therefore, IST-HLT offered possibilities for research in relation to RMLs. EYL 2001 was an action organized jointly by the European Union and the Council of Europe in 2001, with some 45 countries participating. The implementation of EYL 2001 in the EU and in the EEA was under the responsibility of the Commission.

The aims of the EYL 2001 were to celebrate European linguistic diversity, to provide information about resources for language learning and to promote the lifelong learning of languages. EYL 2001 deserves special attention because the percentage of its budget allocated to RML projects was considerably larger than in the other programmes, and in this respect it was second only to the erstwhile RML action. The languages admissible to the EYL 2001 were all the EU official and semi-official languages, as well as other languages recognised by the Member States. As to RMLs, 14.73 per cent (€758,008) of the EYL 2001 budget was devoted to A-list projects, and most of the RML projects sponsored under the EYL 2001 programme included language boards and schools, revealing a clear emphasis on core language issues.

The total amount of funding for language-related programmes in the 2000-2006 period was provided in Table 3.

Table 3: EU Spending on Language-related Programmes or Actions, 2000-2006 (Figures are expressed in current euros of the first year of the respective programmes)

Languages concerned	Title	Budget line	Period	Initial Budget (€)
RMLs	No one	-	-	-
Official Languages	Lingua	B3 – 1001	2000 – 2005	See *Socrates II – Tab. A4-* (no separate budget figures available)
Any Languages	Human languages technologies (part of *IST*) – see Tab.2	B6 – 6121	1998 – 2002	564,000,000
	European Year of Languages 2001	B3 – 1003	2000 (preparatory year) and 2001	4,350,000

Source: adapted from Grin et al. 2003.

4.2 Programmes or Actions Partly Related to Languages

These programmes are presented in the second section from the bottom Figure 1.
- Innovative multilingual radio and television channels;
- Socrates II (except the Lingua action cf. above);
- The programmes: Youth, Leonardo da Vinci II, Minerva, eContent, Culture 2000 and Media Plus.

Both for the 1994-2000 and for the 2000-2006 periods, there was no partly-language-related programme specifically designed to include RMLs; here again, however, this does not mean that RMLs were excluded from participating in such programmes.

Let us first consider partly-language-related programmes meant for official languages only. The Innovative multilingual radio and television channels programme (2000-2001) served to relaunch objectives of the European multilingual

radio and television services programme (suspended by the Court's 1998 ruling). It offered a maximum of fifty per cent co-financing of total project costs for projects involving at least three languages. The Minerva action was in fact the earlier Open and Distance Learning (ODL) action renamed under the new phase of Socrates (Socrates II). Minerva sought to encourage European co-operation in the field of open and distance learning (ODL) and information and communication technology (ICT) in education. The fact that Minerva's objectives included the promotion of distance learning made it relevant for minority communities, in particular the more dispersed ones. As to the B-list, Minerva has mainly funded projects against intolerance and racism.

The other partly-language-related programmes listed above did not deal exclusively with official languages, and could therefore be of interest to RMLs. Within Socrates II, it is relevant to mention Comenius, Arion[20] and Erasmus again. Comenius funded three A-list projects for a total amount of €1,137,400 during the 2000-2005 period. Comenius funded projects mostly in the domains of culture and education, and like Minerva, it mainly funded projects against racism and intolerance. None of the A-list projects was funded through Erasmus or Arion. The former Adult education action was renewed under the name of Grundtvig. *A priori*, there was nothing to prevent adult education projects from being related to RMLs.

Media Plus was the updated and renewed version of the Media II programme, without apparent linguistic constraints, implying that Media Plus (now Creative Europe) could be of considerable potential for producers of TV programmes in RMLs.

eContent – European digital content for the global networks was the follow-up of the Multilingual Information Society (MLIS) programme and of the INFO2000 programme. eContent shared the main objectives of the preceding programmes, in particular the promotion of multilingualism and cultural diversity in global networks. In the 2001-2005 period, eContent funded one A-list project to the amount of €81 thousand, representing 0.08 per cent of the programme budget. Culture 2000 was dedicated to culture, and encompasses Raphael, Kaleidoscope and Ariane. Over the 2000-2004 period, Culture 2000 funded six cultural projects related to RMLs, mostly in publishing. These projects represent 0.15 per cent of its budget, or €255,280 in absolute terms. The RML element in the cultural programmes such as Culture 2000 (and before, Ariane, Kaleidoscope and Raphael) has been of secondary relevance in the B-list projects.

Leonardo da Vinci II was the continuation of Leonardo da Vinci I, while Youth was a broad EU programme supporting youth mobility and non-formal education. As noted before, Youth actions include the former Youth for Europe. Leonardo da Vinci II, Youth and Culture 2000 were programmes jointly linked to Socrates II in order to reinforce inter-sectorial cooperation.

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The total amount of funding for partly language-related programmes in the 2000-2006 period is provided in Appendix 1 (Table A4).

4.3 Non-language Related Programmes that Funded Language Related Actions

There is little to add to what has been already said in subsection 3.3, beside the fact that programmes were renamed Leader + and Interreg III. Funding possibilities for RMLs under Interreg III were significant, since it was one of the largest sources of EU funding. However, "different parties who have been participating in the application procedures have commented on problems because of the decentralised structure and complicated application procedures that might discourage small organisations […] Similar critical remarks [are] directed also at Leader +" (Grin et al. 2003: 57). Corresponding figures are provided in Appendix 1 (Table A5).

It is possible to categorize support actually given to RMLs by type of recipient institution, domains of intervention, financial amount, language(s) supported, domain of EU intervention and number of projects supported. Some of these figures have already been incorporated in the preceding overview. General patterns, however, may be summarized as follows:

- Recipient institutions: the type of institution funded under different actions varied considerably from one programme to the other and covered extremely different situations in practice. Generally, recipient institutions were often universities and schools, but they also included news articles, radio stations, or festivals.
- Domain: with the exception of the RML action, projects in the domain of culture dominate, followed by education, media and social cohesion projects respectively. As a general observation, programmes that sought to encourage language learning and to promote linguistic diversity, such as the EYL 2001, were more likely to support RML projects than others.
- Languages supported: it is impossible to reveal a clear pattern. However, several projects also included non-regional languages, and most of the Information Society Technologies (IST) programme and regional programmes (Interreg and Leader) projects included only the larger RMLs.
- Total expenditure for RMLs: the actual extent of EU financial support was quite limited. These limits are apparent first in the fact that only a small part of the various programmes and actions from which RMLs can benefit was actually spent on them. With the exception of the RML action, the EYL 2001, Connect and the Multicultural Information Society programme, the share of the respective programme budgets assigned to RML-related projects was always less then 1 per cent. As for the programmes that have, in absolute terms, funded more A-list projects in recent years, the conclusion is

that the RML action was far and away the most important support channel, followed by Comenius, Interreg, the European Year of languages 2001 and by the Multilingual Information Society programme (cf. Table A1).

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Table 4: RML Funding per Year, by Programmes and Actions (figures in euros), A-list Projects only[21]

Year	RML action	%	Other programmes and actions	%
1997	3,726,858	90.8%	375,855	9.2%
1998	3,350,305	76.4%	1,094,613	24.6%
1999-2000	2,105,697[22]	42.2%	2,878,401	67.8%
2001	-	0%	839,008	100%
Subtotal	**9,182,860**	**64.8%**	**5,187,877**	**35.24%**
Total	**14,370,737**			

Source: adapted from Grin et al. (2003: 65-66).

The pre-eminence of the RML action over other programmes and actions in funding RML-related projects emerges clearly from Table 4, which compares the relative weight of different sources of funding. As shown in Table 4, funding from the programmes other than the RML budget line increased during the last two years of its existence. Apart from the impact of the European Year of Languages, which included RMLs, this could be explained by the awareness, among organisations and authorities promoting RMLs, of the impending disappearance of the budget line. In any case, the RML action financed more A-list programmes than all others; in particular, whereas from 1997 to 2000 it funded some 392 A-list projects, all other EU programmes for which data were available funded just 152, that is, less than a third of the total (cf. Table A1).

Beside financial support, EU intervention in favour of RMLs was very important for two other reasons. First, EU support made possible the creation of common structures such as EBLUL, and network effects such as experience sharing or information exchange. In numerous cases, the EU also functioned as a catalyst for securing funds from other sources, allowing for a better implementation of the projects. In fact, in most of the programmes, at least half of the total funding was provided by non-EU sources[23]. Second, EU intervention had a paramount symbolic importance, since "the spectacle of EU institutions coming out in support of RMLs and offering tangible assistance provided a significant morale boost for small, marginalised language communities" (Grin et al. 2003: 31).

Policy intervention in favour of RMLs could differ in terms of how it is carried out. In particular, after the suppression of the RML action, the internal EU debate on how best to protect and promote RMLs edged towards a mainstreaming[24]

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rather than a direct and targeted approach. The SMiLE Report warned that for a mainstreaming approach to be effective,

> clear criteria and a set of fundamental principles regarding modes of support to RMLs should be included in the specific programmes /.../. These criteria and principles would have to take into consideration the particular conditions affecting the possibilities for RML-related projects to be funded (such as the complexity of the partnerships required, and the required minimum size of projects) (Grin et al. 2003: 44).

A report of the European Parliament confirms this view, arguing that "the actual rules to gain EU funding act to exclude smaller language groups, member state or otherwise" (Joan i Marí 2006: 9).

5. Trends after 2006

In practice, the mainstreaming approach adopted by the Commission since 2000 resulted in a substantial decrease in actual possibilities of accessing EU funding from RML communities. According to Jones,

> whilst [the mainstreaming approach] does open the door on a much larger potential sources of funding, the competition for this funding is far greater and the tasks associated with submitting such an application may well be beyond the scope and reach of small language communities, especially in terms of the match funding of project work. Also, the EU now requires a guarantee against this funding in many contexts. Being able to do provide a guarantee for large sums may be very problematic in the context of endangered languages (Jones 2013: 25).

Although from 2007 to 2010 the EU had a fully-fledged Commissioner for Multilingualism who was responsible for language policy of the European Union,[25] and all funding programmes were made accessible for all languages, not only for official languages. RMLs was not one of the priority objectives of EU funding programmes during that period. Since 2007 new opportunities were provided for all language groups, but "it does not appear that equal access to these funds has been provided, especially for the smaller language communities" (Jones 2013: 26); officially all languages were on an equal footing legally speaking, but due to the mainstream approach the bigger languages had an advantage. It was more difficult competing for smaller languages.

To our knowledge, no official figures on the amounts spent for support to RMLs have been collected or retrieved since the SMiLE Report. Nevertheless, evidence available shows that financing has been meagre. As noted by Cullen et al. "in the major education and training programmes funded by the EU – like Socrates and Leonardo – only around 10 per cent were devoted to minority

languages" (2008a: 75), and this notwithstanding the fact that these programmes were pointed out as potential sources of support for RMLs in the Action Plan of the European Commission (2003).

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Funding was also channelled via programmes such as Media and Culture, but the net contribution of these programmes to RMLs projects has be marginal. According to Cullen et al. facts show that

> compared with multilingualism, minority languages [...] have consistently been 'short changed' with regard to concrete actions. An example to support this view is the relative lack of response at the level of the European Commission and in member states of the recommendations recently developed by the European Parliament via the 'Ebner Report'[26] [...], which, inter alia, called for practical measures like a legal act to establish a multi-annual programme for linguistic diversity and the establishment of concrete financial measures to promote projects in the field (Cullen et al. 2008a: 12).

The picture has not improved since 2010. In 2010 with the disappearance of a Commissioner exclusively for multilingualism, the funding decreased. As noted in the European Parliament Resolution of 11 September 2013 on Endangered European Languages and Linguistic Diversity in the European Union, "over the last two multiannual financial framework periods (2000-2007 and 2007-2013), European funding for these languages has been cut drastically". Minority language organisations are small, which makes it difficult to compete with majority languages organisations for the same money. In previous programmes priority was given to smaller or less-widely spoken languages. Not only has this positive discrimination disappeared in the new generation of programmes, but many of the new programmes are limited to the 24 official languages. Some or the largest programmes of the EU aimed at supporting education and culture such as Erasmus+ and Creative Europe give priority to the official languages of the EU, particularly to the largest languages among those. For instance Erasmus+ gives priority to the five languages more frequently used in mobility, as the EU defines them, that is, English, French, German, Italian, Spanish), the translation and publication of fiction in the Creative Europe programme is limited to the official languages of the EU and EFTA and priority is given to the four biggest (English, French, German, and Spanish).

While funding opportunities for regional and minority languages have almost vanished, some projects contributing to RMLs – fully or partly – are still worth mentioning. A couple of research projects have been funded under the Seventh Framework Programme for Research, for instance European Language Diversity for All (ELDIA), a project on the Finno-ugric minority languages coordinated by Johannes-Gutenberg-Universität in Mainz. Another is the Advancing the European Multilingual Experience (Atheme) project, coordinated by the University of Leiden, which has produced two reports on the preservation of regional languages and on their grammatical diversity. The project

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Regional Languages and the Multilingual Challenge for the European Citizen, coordinated by the University of Trento is also funded under the programme. The project Mobility and Inclusion in a Multilingual Europe (MIME) explores multilingualism in the European Union and its implications in terms of inclusion and mobility. The programme on adult learning called Creactive – Create Active Aging –, which was financed under the Grundtvig line of the Lifelong Learning Programme during 2012-2014. Some of the partners of the project represented minority languages (i.e., the Aromanians from Romania and the Sardinians from Italy). Finally, let us mention the LangOER project that also received funding under the Lifelong Learning Programme 2014-2016. LangOER is a European network focused on enhancing the linguistic and cultural components of OER (open educational resources) by offering OER in less used languages (including regional and minority languages) and by enhancing sustainability through OER reuse.[27]

Under its predecessor, the Sixth Framework Programme, two projects including aspects relating to RMLs namely Language dynamics and management of diversity, (DYLAN), and Languages In a Network of European Excellence, (LINEE) received funding.

A project funded under Erasmus+, is GO TO the FUTURE (Gaelic Occitan TOgether For language Users Through United Roots and Experiences). The aim is to transform the way people see local languages, from a perceived handicap into an economic resource, stimulating tourism and related activities. In the programme proceeding Erasmus+, called Lifelong Learning, a project called Language and Education addressed through Research and Networking by Mercator (LEARNme) was financed. It provides policy guidelines and recommendations for policy stakeholders and practitioners in the field of language education.

By reducing financial support to RMLs, the EU gives up the only tool it has to influence the language policy of its Member States in this area. Symbolically, it also gives up its endorsement to small languages. There are several reasons for the vanishing EU support for minority languages. Members of the European Parliament are not active enough in the Committee on Culture and Education of the European Parliament, and proposing amendments in Commission proposals does not bring too much visibility to them. Further, the previous ambition to enhance integration has been replaced by increasing demands of devolving back power to the Member States, and the European Parliament does not use all the tools at its disposal to push for financial support in favour of RMLs. The EP has on several occasions actively deleted any reference to RMLs in Commission drafts for new programme proposals. As a result, there will be less future funding for projects promoting RMLs. This is somewhat a paradox, because the Maastricht Treaty (art.192) gives the European Parliament an equivalent right to initiate legislation. The Parliament can request, by an absolute majority of its members, that the Commission "submits any appropriate proposal on matters on which

it considers that a Community act is required for the purpose of implementing this Treaty". Since the Treaty came into force only 37 legislative initiative reports have been adopted by the EP, and only one was about regional and lesser-used languages.

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6. Concluding Remarks

The SMiLE report contains a number of results that can be useful for scholars and practitioners interested in the promotion of RMLs. Its chief goal is to offer a retrospective look through a detailed review of the lines and types of EU funding available for the protection and promotion of regional or minority languages up to and including 2001. This article starts from the point where the SMiLE report stopped. We present and revise a set of figures on the financial support provided by the EU for the protection and promotion of RMLs from 1994 to 2006 on the basis of the SMiLe Report, and we discuss some recent trends in EU support drawing from existing sources.

The paper therefore makes accessible, in a structured fashion, information which most people (scholars or citizens in general) were generally not aware of. Although lack of data often makes full-fledged cost-benefit evaluations, let alone comparisons, impossible, our findings highlight a whole range of noteworthy points. First, the unit cost of the promotion of small languages is modest. For example, the gross per-year cost per child of attending Irish-medium preschool stood, in the early 2000s, at about 400 euros; the Welsh language initiatives, called Mentrau Iaith which help to anchor and stimulate the use of a language at local community level, cost approximately two euros per Welsh speaker and per year. Another interesting set of findings concern transfrontier cooperation, in which the Slovenian television was involved as well.[28] Transfrontier cooperation can significantly enhance the cost-effectiveness of language policies by extending services (such as minority-language television programming) at a very modest marginal cost. These strategically powerful findings, at the same time, can only highlight, by contrast a sobering diagnostic: the extent of support enjoyed by RMLs in Europe in recent decades has remained, for a variety of (mostly political) reasons, rather limited.

Apart from a retrospective look, the approach developed in this paper is also an invitation to look into the future. This paper also provides tools for thinking about the protection and promotion of RMLs, and the most generally useful of those tools may well be its analytical framework itself. This framework has been applied to 17 types of actions, which can be viewed either as independent interventions and evaluated for their own sake, or analysed as policy measures reflecting a set of social and political priorities – even when they have not been adopted and implemented by state authorities. The critical conceptual connection between a proper policy plan and these specific actions rests on the possibility of interpreting the latter in terms of the main areas of intervention listed in the

European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. The implication is that any specific measure being contemplated, in one or another context, to protect and promote a regional or minority language, can be conceptualised, presented and defended *vis-à-vis* the outside as a coherent, properly thought-through enterprise. This contributes to the legitimization of policies in favour of RMLs in general.

Three main ideas can be singled out:

- first, the figures reported and analysed in the paper indicate that EU support to RMLs is both manageable and politically relevant;
- second, precisely because our detailed account, based on official data, of the extent of such support from 1994 to 2006 shows that the amounts concerned, even during the relatively more favourable 1990s, have remained small, they reveal that there is a con-siderable room for improvement. The RMLs of the EU have certainly not been cush-ioned or pampered;
- third, RML-specific programmes and actions (as opposed to mainstreaming support) have been much more successful at channelling resources towards RMLs. This is a particularly important finding, whether for citizens involved in the protection and promotion of RMLs or for decision-makers at the European level with responsibility for funding language policies in favour of RMLs.

Given the current evolution towards mainstreaming in the EU's approach to support for RMLs, we consider it essential for particular attention to be devoted by all stakeholders (RML users or activists, relevant language boards, scholars, as well as by the Commission itself) to ensure that the implementation of the mainstreaming strategy offers adequate safeguards for RMLs, particularly smaller ones. Let us emphasise that mainstreaming is a double-edged sword. If part of a policy approach animated by a sincere commitment to the long-term prospects of RMLs, it can herald significant advances in their situation. But mainstreaming can also hide ulterior motives, coming only just a little short of a first-class funeral for RML protection and promotion. Safeguards are therefore essential; they may include, for example, explicit and specific mentions of support to RMLs in the general objectives of relevant programmes. It is striking how often much more frequently-asked questions of gender equality *are* mentioned among overall policy goals in various substantive policies, for example in areas such as education and health; by the same token, a greater visibility of the cause of RML protection and promotion would be amply justified. Along the same lines, safeguards could also include specific targets for all relevant programmes, expressed in terms of the percentage of total programme budget that is actually spent on the protection and promotion of RMLs, or less demanding requirements in terms of non-EU matching funds secured by RML applicants.

While article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union can be regarded as perhaps the biggest legal setback for regional and minority

languages, since it underlines the different competences between the Union and its Member States[29], directly implying that language policy would be a competence of the Member States, its article 22 would go in the opposite direction. As noted at the outset of this paper, generally speaking, the EU professes to have a positive policy towards RMLs, as this Article states that "the Union respects cultural, religious and linguistic diversity", without distinguishing between the official status of languages. This would indeed call for attention to RMLs, and a Union policy that does not make undue distinction between its languages.

Summing up, this article may be useful not only as a contribution to the understanding of language policies undertaken so far, but also as a resource in the process of development of more robust and effective Community support for RMLs in the future. The very targeted angle adopted in this article, therefore, should not be seen as a restrictive one, because we believe that ploughing through these figures, despite (or perhaps because of) its admittedly limited entertainment value, is a necessary prerequisite for efficient advocacy and successful policies. Ultimately, the protection and promotion of RMLs is a political matter, and the exercise proposed in the foregoing article is intended as a modest contribution to a transparent political debate on RML protection and promotion.

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Appendix 1

Table A1: Funding for Regional and Minority Languages Projects: Overview

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Programme or action budget (€) RML share per year (%)	Year	Number of RML projects financed	Average amount spent per project (€)	Total amount spent on RML projects (€)
Multilingual Information Society € 15,000,000 RML share per year : 4.3 %	1998	1	139,925	139,925
	2000	3	169,250	507,750
Subtotal		4		**647,675**
eContent € 100,000,000 RML share per year: 0.08 %	2001	1	81,000	81,000
Subtotal		1		**81,000**
	1996	21	10,820	227,210
	1997	14	11,638	162,940
	1998	11	50,759 (1 project without budget figures)	558,351
	1999	25	10,223 (1 project without budget figures)	255,591
	2000	2	-	No budget figures available
Subtotal		73		**1,204,092**
Leader II € 1,400,000,000 RML share per year: no data available	1997	1	-	No budget figures available
Subtotal		**1**		-
Connect € 15,000,000 RML share per year : 1.7 %	1999	2	131,190	262,380
Subtotal		2		**262,380**
Leonardo da Vinci I € 620,000,000 RML share per year: no data available		2	-	No data available
Subtotal		2		-
Comenius (1) (1995-1999) (Action under Socrates I ; no separate budget figures available) RML share per year: no data available	1998	2	115,000	230,000

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Comenius (2) (2000-2005) **(Action under Socrates II ; no separate budget figures available)** RML share per year: no data available	2000	3	379,133	1,137,400
Subtotal		5		**1,367,400**
Lingua (2) (2000-2005) **(Action under Socrates II ; no separate budget figures available)** RML share per year: no data available	2000	1	460,000	460,000
Subtotal		1		**460,000**
Adult Education **(Action under Socrates I ; no separate budget figures available)** RML share per year: no data available	1997	1	81,605	81,605
	1998	1	120,000	120,000
Subtotal		2		**201,605**
Culture 2000 **€ 167,000,000** RML share per year : 0.15 %	2000	6	42,547	255,280
Subtotal		6		**255,280**
Kaleidoscope **€ 26,000,000** RML share per year : 0.27 %		1	70,000	70,000
Subtotal		1		**70,000**
Ariane **€ 30,000,000** RML share per year : 0.59 %	1997	13	10,101	131,310
	1998	18	2,574	46,337
Subtotal		31		**177,647**
European Year of Languages 2001 **€ 5,144,768** RML share per year : 14.73 %	2001	23	64,006	758,008
Subtotal		23		**758,008**
RML action **€ 9,182,860** RML share per year : 100 %	1997	152	24,519	3,726,858
	1998	171	19,592	3,350,305
	1999 - 2000	69	30,517	2,105,697
Subtotal		392		**9,182,860**
General total		544		**14'667'947** [30]

Source: adapted from Grin et al. (2003: 65).

Table A2: EU Spending on Programmes or Actions Partly Related to Languages - from 1994 to 2000 (Figures are expressed in current euros of the first year of the respective programmes)

Languages concerned	Title	Budget line	Period	Initial Budget (€)
RML	No one	-	-	-
Official Languages	European multilingual radio and television services	B3 – 2012	1998 (end of the programme)	4,775,000
	ODL (Socrates I)			See Socrates I (no separate budget figures available)
Any Language	Socrates I: Erasmus	B3 – 1001	1995 – 1999	850,000,000 (55% of Socrates I budget
	Comenius			(10% of Socrates I budget)
	Arion Adult Education (Lingua) – see Tab.2 (ODL)			(together: 25% of Socrates I budget)
	Leonardo da Vinci I	B3 – 1021	1995 – 1999	620,000,000
	Youth for Europe III	B3 – 1010	1995 – 1999	126,000,000
	Media II	B3 – 2010	1996 – 2000	310,000,000
	Raphael	B3 – 2000	1997 – 1999	30,000,000
	Kaleidoscope	B3 – 2001	1996 – 1999	26,000,000
	Ariane	B3 – 2002	1997 – 1999	30,000,000
	Connect	B3 – 1002	1999	15,000,000
	INFO 2000	B5 – 3300	1996 – 1999	65,000,000
	Philoxenia	Information not available	1997 – 2000	25,000,000

Source: adapted form Grin et al. (2003).

Table A3: Non-language Related EU Programmes that have been Funding Language Related Programmes or Actions - from 1994 to 2000 (Figures are expressed in current euros of the first year of the respective programmes)

Languages concerned	Title	Budget line	Period	Initial Budget (€)
RML	No one	-	-	-
Official Languages	No one	-	-	-
Any Languages	Objectives 1 to 7		1994-1999	Approximately 148,500,000,000
	Leader II	B2 – 146	1994 – 1999	1,400,000,000
	Interreg II	B2 – 1410	1994 – 1999	3,544,000,000
	PEACE		1995 – 1999	509,000,000

Source: adapted from Grin et al. (2003).

Table A4: EU Spending on Programmes or Actions Partly Related to Languages - from 2000 to 2006 (Figures are expressed in current euros of the first year of the respective programmes)

Languages concerned	Title	Budget line	Period	Initial Budget (€)
RMLs	No one	-	-	-
Official Languages	Innovative multilingual radio and television channels	Information not available	From 2000/2001	1,865,000,000
	Minerva (Socrates II)			See Socrates II (no separate budget figures available)
Any Language	Socrates II:	B3 – 1001	2000 – 2005	1,850,000,000
	Erasmus			(51% of Socrates II budget
	Comenius			(27% of Socrates II budget)
	Arion Grundtvig (Lingua) – see Tab.3 (Minerva)			No separate figures available
	Leonardo da Vinci II	B3 – 1021	2000 – 2006	1,150,000,000
	Youth	B3 – 1010	2000 – 2006	520,000,000
	Media Plus	B3 – 2010	2001 – 2005	400,000,000
	Culture 2000	B3 – 2008	2000 – 2004	167,000,000
	eContent	Information not available	2001 - 2005	100,000,000

Source: adapted from Grin et al. (2003).

Table A5: Non Language Related EU Programmes that have been Funding Language Related Programmes or Actions - from 2000 to 2006 (Figures are expressed in current euros of the first year of the respective programmes)

Languages concerned	Title	Budget line	Period	Initial Budget (€)
RML	No one	-	-	-
Official Languages	No one	-	-	-
Any Languages	Objective 1, Objective 2, Objective 3		2000 – 2006	Approximately 183,300,000,000
	Leader +	B2 – 140	2000 – 2006	2,020,000,000
	Interreg III	B2 – 1410	2000 – 2006	4,875,000,000

Source: adapted from Grin et al. (2003).

Appendix 2. The Structure of the A-list Projects

In this section, we focus on the characteristics of the projects that are directly aimed at the promotion and development of RMLs, and we review EU funding for RMLs on three dimensions: the importance of partners representing regional and minority languages, the type of projects, and their size. The appendix provides a variety of analytical breakdowns of the total amount of financial support spent on RMLs. Depending on the analytical angle chosen, the information available does not always enable us to assign a particular item of expenditure to a specific category. In such cases, we have decided to err on the side of caution and to keep the items concerned out of the respective summary tables. Consequently, the figure for total spending (occasionally for some subtotals) may differ between tables.

As shown in Table A6, most of the projects funded included one partner only. However, if projects funded by the RML budget line are left out, the most common kind of project included at least three partners. This reflects the fact that many EU programmes require the participation of at least three partners from three different Member States. This type of requirement complicates matters for some organisations and authorities involved in RML protection and promotion. Language barriers hinder the efficient search for partners in other countries and not all stakeholders have the resources to overcome them. Smaller RMLs cannot always compete for EU funding on an equal footing with the state languages or the bigger RMLs.

Table A6: Funding Level by Category of Project, According to Number of Partners per Project (1997-2000) – figures in euros, A-list Projects only

	Amount spent on projects including:			
	Only one partner	Two partners	Three partners	Four partners or more
RML action	9,182,860	-	-	-
All other programmes and actions	1,964,883	70,000	717,071	2,733,340
Subtotal	11,147,743	70,000	717,071	2,733,340
Percentage (Total: € 14,668,154 [31])	76.00%	0.47%	4.89%	18.63%

Source: Grin et al. (2003: 67).

With respect to the size of the projects: the main part of the support both regarding the RML action and the other programmes or actions as a whole, was directed to comparatively big projects. More than 70 per cent of the funding under the RML action went to projects of over €30 thousand, and almost 60 per cent of the funding under other actions went to projects of over €100 thousand. The main figures are shown in the Table A7.

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Table A7: Comparison of Funding in Relation to the Size of the Project (1997-2000) – figures in euros, A-list projects only

	Total amount spent on projects in budget range of:		
	Under € 30,000	€ 30,000 to € 100,000	Over € 100,000
RML action	2,442,282	3,031,535	3,709,043
All other programmes and actions	960,541	1,362,253	3,162,500
Subtotal	3,402,823	4,393,788	6,871,543
Percentage (Total: € 14,668,154)	23.20%	29,95%	46,5%

Source: Grin et al. (2003: 67).

However, if we consider the number of projects funded, overall some 300 projects under €30 thousand were funded, whereas less than 100 projects received EU funding between €30 thousand and €100 thousand, and only some 20 projects received more than €100 thousand. Funding under the RML action was clearly more accessible for small and mid-range sized projects than other programmes and actions.

Table A8: Comparison of Funding in Relation to the Importance of Partners Representing Regional and Minority Languages (1997-2000) – figures in euros, A-list projects only

	Projects with:		
	RML partners only	Majority of RML partners	Minority of RML partners
RML action	9,182,860	-	-
All other programmes and actions	2,756,304	1,647,740	1,081,250
Subtotal	11,939,164	1,647,740	1,081,250
Percentage (Total: € 14,668,154)	81.40%	11.23%	7,37%

Source: Grin et al. (2003: 68).

Finally, the great majority of A-list projects concerned RML partners only (Table A8). Nevertheless, if *the RML action is* excluded from the calculation, the percentage of projects with RML partners only is not particularly high. This suggests that programmes directly designed for RMLs were more likely to concern RML partners only.

It was also quite common for a project to involve a linguistic minority while the language itself was not directly promoted or did not play a central role in the project. Exceptions can be found among some of the Interreg projects, as well as most of the EYL 2001 projects included in the A-list. Other projects included a partner representing an RML, but its main goal did not need to be language protection or promotion.

Finally, it is worth noting that RML projects tended to benefit mainly from programmes with a one-off character, in the sense that they were not part of an explicit and integrated language promotion strategy. It could be important to include into the next generation programmes some criteria to cover all the issues relevant to the long-term survival of RMLs.

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Notes

[1] In this article, no analytical difference is made between regional or minority languages (RMLs) and Lesser-used languages (LULs), and the former expression will be used throughout.

[2] Source: http://ec.europa.eu/languages/policy/linguistic-diversity/regional-minority-languages_en.htm.

[3] FUEN received money under the Lifelong Learning Programme to carry out the project RML2future and the follow up project Language Diversity.

[4] This article draws in particular on results presented in Chapter 2 of the SMiLE project report. A few misprints in figures quoted in the original Report have been corrected in this article.

[5] Additional evidence, but limited to the 1998-2002 period, is provided in Delgado, Baltà and Staiger (2004).

[6] European Journal of Language Policy. Liverpool University Press (see http://online.liverpooluniversitypress.co.uk/loi/ejlp).

[7] A complete overview on the articles of the Treaties, European Parliament or Council resolutions, opinions, statements and decisions, is available in Jones (2013), Cullen et al. (2008b), Cullen et al. (2008a) and Grin et al. (2003).

[8] European Parliament resolution with recommendations to the Commission on European regional and lesser-used languages – the languages of minorities in the EU – in the context of enlargement and cultural diversity (2003/2057(INI)). OJ 076 E, 25 March 2004.

[9] Court of Justice ruling C-106/96 of 12th May 1998.

[10] These programmes are presented in the first of the two areas or (sections) evoking semicircles.

[11] Note that the B3-1006 line has decreased in real terms when the European Parliament was renewed (1989 and 1994, but not in 1984).

[12] Because of a printing error, the amount of resources indicated in the SMiLE report for 1998 is €4 million instead of €3.4 million.

[13] Gradually all of the central and Eastern European countries, as well as Cyprus, became involved in Socrates (and therefore in Lingua) between 1997 and 1999.

[14] Jointly with the programmes Advanced Communication Technologies and Services (ACTS) and Information Technologies-Esprit (IT-Esprit).

[15] A programme to foster exchanges with third countries, such as Mediterranean or Latin American countries, was also launched.

[16] INFO 2000 (1996 – 1999) was a programme aimed to increase the use of multimedia products and to encourage the development of a European multimedia content industry.

[17] Philoxenia (1997 – 2000) was a programme supporting European tourism, which could also encourage language learning.

[18] Among others, we should mention Objective 1, which deals with helping regions whose development was lagging behind to catch up; Objective 2, which supports economic and social conversion in areas facing structural difficulties; Objective 3 which aims at modernising systems of training and promoting employment.

[19] See the European Parliament Resolution on Regional and Lesser-Used Languages of 13 December 2001 (OJ C 177 E, 25 July 2002), and the already quoted European Parliament resolution with recommendations to the Commission on European regional and lesser-used languages – the languages of minorities in the EU – in the context of enlargement and cultural diversity of 4 September 2003.

[20] Arion belongs to the observation and innovation programme of Socrates II, along with Eurydice, the information network on education (the Eurydice report on language learning in schools included RMLs) and NARIC (Network of Academic Recognition Centres).

[21] Figures do not include an amount of €227,210 from 21 A-list projects funded in 1996 by the Interreg II programme and an amount of € 70 thousand from the Kaleidoscope programme, since the latter ran from 1996 through 1999, and the information available did not allow us to determine the amount concerning the 1997-2000 period relevant to this table (see table A1).

[22] This figure differs from that given in table 2 (budget line B3-1000: €2.5 million) probably because the initial budget was not completely used.

[23] This reflects the fact that, statutorily, the EU only plays a secondary role in the promotion of cultures and languages, because according to the principle of subsidiarity, Member States and local authorities retain leading competencies in these domains.

[24] The mainstreaming approach can be described as the practice of incorporating a particular issue into all general programmes or policies. For example, support to a RML might be a chapter in a broader programme on the revitalisation of rural areas, together with infrastructure building or agricultural diversification programmes.

[25] From 2004 to 2007, multilingualism was a responsibility of the European Commissioner for Education, Training, Culture and Multilingualism, and after 2010 it was re-merged into the education and culture portfolio.

[26] See the aforementioned European Parliament resolution with recommendations to the Commission on European regional and lesser-used languages – the languages of minorities in the EU – in the context of enlargement and cultural diversity.

[27] Cf. http://langoer.eun.org/home.

[28] The SMiLE report included two case studies of EU-funded projects involving the Slovenian language, i.e., the Slovene-German radio service (Radio Agora) and the Slovenian television cooperation.

[29] "…with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity, [the Charter is applicable to] the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights in accordance with their respective powers".

[30] Depending on the analytical angle chosen, the information available does not always enable us to assign a particular item of expenditure to a specific category. Consequently, the figure for total spending differs from those provided in Table 4, Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7.

[31] For the same reason explained in the previous footnote, the figure for total spending differs from that provided in Table 4.

Maja Mezgec

Linguistic Landscape as a Mirror: the Case of the Slovene Minority in Italy

Linguistic landscape studies represent a new approach in the research on multilingualism based on the analysis of the language(s) in signs. Linguistic landscape refers to linguistic objects marking the public space. The language used in writing reflects the status and social use of languages. This paper focuses on the linguistic landscape of the area where the Slovene minority in Italy is settled. Its aim is to analyse the visibility of the Slovene language and draw a comparison between the use of the Slovene language in the linguistic landscape and the official language, i.e. Italian. The empirical research follows the methodology developed by Cenoz and Gorter (2006) with some minor adjustments. The hypothesis is that in the case studied, the status of the Slovene language is visible throughout the linguistic landscape. The discussion focuses on the importance of the visibility of minority languages and the impact of language policies on the linguistic landscape.

Keywords: linguistic landscape, sociolinguistic situation, Slovene minority in Italy, language status, sociolinguistic context, language policies.

Jezikovna krajina kot ogledalo: primer slovenske manjšine v Italiji

Študije o jezikovni krajini predstavljajo novejši pristop k proučevanju večjezičnosti, ki izhaja iz analize jezika/-kov na napisih. Jezikovna krajina se nanaša na jezik/-e v javnem prostoru. Jeziki, ki se uporabljajo na napisih, odražajo status in družbeno rabo jezikov. V prispevku je zajeta analiza jezikovne krajine ozemlja, kjer je naseljena slovenska manjšina. Namen dela je proučiti vidnost slovenščine in primerjati njeno rabo v jezikovni krajini v primerjavi z uradnim jezikom – italijanščino. Empirični del sledi metodologiji Cenoza in Gorterja (2006) z nekaterimi manjšimi prilagoditvenimi spremembami. Preverja se hipoteza, ali se na izbranem primeru status slovenskega jezika zrcali v jezikovni krajini. V razpravi sta poudarjena pomen vidnosti manjšinskega jezika in vpliv jezikovnih politik na jezikovno krajino.

Ključne besede: *jezikovna krajina, sociolingvistična situacija, slovenska manjšina, status jezika, socioligvistični kontekst, jezikovne politike.*

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1. Introduction

Linguistic landscape research is a relatively recent field of study that is rapidly expanding. A large number of research projects, scientific papers, journals and volumes (e.g. by Gorter 2006a, Shohamy & Gorter 2009, Backhaus 2007, Shohamy et al. 2010, Jaworski & Thurlow 2010, Gorter et al. 2012) indicate an increasing interest in applied linguistics in the use of written texts in urban spaces, especially in bilingual and multilingual settings (Shohamy & Gorter 2009, Gorter 2013). Backhaus (2007) presented a first detailed review of previous research in the field of linguistic landscape and listed 30 publications, while Troyer (2012) presented an updated bibliography of publications edited in English and listed 116 publications since 2007.

As can be inferred from one of the most prominent books on this topic called "Linguistic Landscape: a new approach to multilingualism" (Gorter 2006a), this is a new approach to multilingualism based on the analysis of the language in signs. The recent establishment of a scientific journal on this topic provides evidence to the growing interest in this field.

Multilingual contexts give the opportunity to analyze languages in context by focusing on the written information that is available on language signs in a specific area (Cenoz & Gorter 2006, 67). Furthermore "the study of linguistic landscape aims to add another view to our knowledge about societal multilingualism by focusing on language choices, hierarchies of languages, contact-phenomena, regulations, and aspects of literacy" (Gorter 2013, 193).

A large number of researchers have recently investigated the presence and status of minority languages in linguistic landscapes (e.g. Cenoz & Gorter 2006, Lado 2011, Coluzzi 2009, Marten 2012, Moriarty 2012, Shohamy & Abu Ghazaleh-Mahajneh 2012, Blackwood & Tufi 2012, Comajoan Colomé & Long 2012, Muth 2012, Salo 2012, Syabó et al. 2012).

The definition of linguistic landscape that has been used since the seminal paper by Landry and Bourhis is that "the language of public road signs, advertising billboards, street names, place names, commercial shop signs and public signs on government buildings combines to form the linguistic landscape of a given territory, region, or urban agglomeration" (Laundry & Bourhis 1997, 25). Therefore, linguistic landscape can be considered as an additional source of information about the sociolinguistic context (Cenoz & Gorter 2006).

This paper focuses on the relationship between linguistic landscape and the sociolinguistic context in the area where the Slovene minority in Italy is settled. As stated by Cenoz and Gorter (2006) the relationship between linguistic landscape and sociolinguistic context is bidirectional: on the one hand, the linguistic landscape reflects the relative power and status of the different languages in a given sociolinguistic context; on the other, it contributes to the construction of the sociolinguistic context, since people process visual information from the

surroundings and the language in which signs are written can influence their perception of the status of the different languages, affect their linguistic behavior and - in the writer's opinion - their ideology about languages.

The language used in signs has an informational and symbolic function (Spolsky & Cooper 1991, Landry & Bourhis 1997, Ben-Rafael et al. 2006). With reference to the informational function, the writings and the language used reflect the social use of the languages spoken in a given area, the behavior towards languages, the borders between them, and the (un)balanced power relations among linguistic groups. On the contrary, the symbolic function refers to the use of different languages mainly when the language is a key factor of social identity in a linguistic group (Landry & Bourhis, 1997). Minority languages are seen as important markers of identity. Therefore, their visibility is important for its members, as it helps to give visibility to and define the territory where the minority is settled.

While research on linguistic landscape and minority languages is spreading at European level (e.g. Cenoz & Gorter 2006, Lado 2011, Coluzzi 2009, Marten 2012, Moriarty 2012, Blackwood & Tufi 2012, Comajoan Colomé & Long 2012, Muth 2012, Salo 2012, Syabó et al. 2012), in Italy only five pieces of research on autochthonous minorities settled in Italy have been conducted. The first one has been carried out in Bolzano/Bozen (Plank 2006), the second one in Cortina D'Ampezzo (Grazioli 2006), the third one in Formazza (Piemonte) (Dal Negro 2009), the fourth one in Udine/Videm (Coluzzi 2009) and the fifth one in Trieste/Trst (Tufi 2013). At a later stage, one piece of research analysing the linguistic landscape of Southern Carinthia (Austria) - an area where the Slovene minority is settled - was found (Rasinger 2014).

This paper outlines an extract of the research performed by SLORI (Mezgec 2015) in the linguistic landscape of the territory where the Slovene minority in Italy has historically been settled. A corpus of 3.879 scripts collected in the three provinces of Trieste/Trst, Gorizia/Gorica and Udine/Videm was analyzed. Main streets and squares, which are considered to be more representative, were included in the sample. All recorded scripts were analyzed in terms of languages used (monolingual/bilingual or multilingual signs) and the rule of one language over the other/s.

2. Background Information on the Slovene Minority in Italy

Slovenes in Italy are an autochthonous minority that is mainly settled along the border between Italy and Slovenia in three provinces of the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region: Trieste/Trst, Gorizia/Gorica and Udine/Videm. In this area - also characterized by the presence of the Friulian and German minorities - Italian is the official and dominant language. Slovene is the language of the Slovene

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national minority in Italy and the official language of the bordering Republic of Slovenia[1]. Slovene minority members are considered bilingual, since they develop bilingual competencies in both Italian and Slovene, whereas majority members do not speak nor understand Slovene with few exceptions (Bogatec 2015, Jagodic & Čok 2013, Pertot 2011).

The current border was defined after the Second World War, when the Slovene community in Italy turned into a minority community within the political and socio-economic context of a different country (Čok & Pertot 2010, 66)[2].

The protection of the Slovene minority in Italy was defined by the post-war treaties, whereby minority members were granted specific rights by the State of Italy (see Vidau 2013, 2015). The right to use Slovene in public has been regulated by legislation arising from national and regional laws or municipal and provincial statutes (see Vidau 2015). These rights have been fully acknowledged by the Italian State with Law 38/2001 Regulations on the Protection of Slovene Linguistic Minority in the Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, also known as Protection Law. Articles 8[3] and 10 provide for the obligation to give visibility to the Slovene language in the public administration.

The conditions and development of the Slovene language have always been influenced by a series of factors linked to the impossibility to use Slovene in public affairs. Even when legal measures have been adopted - even nowadays, fifteen years after the signing of the Slovene minority protection law, regulations have not yet been fully implemented - Slovene and Italian are not equal in public and private life (Čok & Pertot 2010). A recent study (Sussi et al. 2011) evaluating the implementation of the Protection Law confirms that public administrations have obligations in this respect but implementation is too slow.

3. Aim of the Research and Research Questions

The aim of the research was to investigate the presence of the Slovene language and the wider linguistic landscape in the region of Friuli Venezia Giulia, where the Slovene minority has been historically settled and acknowledged by Law 38/2001 (Protection Law). The main point was to determine whether Slovene is present in the linguistic landscape and to what extent it is used with respect to the official language (Italian). Public signs (such as street signs, signs on government buildings, announcements, plaques) and private signs (advertising billboards, shop names and other forms of writing such as graffiti, event announcements, etc.) were included in the sample. The corpus of data includes all the texts that can be seen in the streets of the sample areas.

Therefore the present study is not intended as an evaluation of the implementation of Protection Law regulations that provide visibility for the Slovene language in the public administration (articles 8 and 10), but in a broader

sense it investigates the visibility of Slovene in the linguistic landscape. Such landscape represents a public space and its linguistic features are determined by private and public entities.

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This paper focuses on the Slovene language and its use in signs. The assumption is that the status of the language is visible through the linguistic landscape, which reflects power relations among the linguistic groups of the area.

The research questions were the following:

1. Which are the languages displayed in the linguistic landscape of the sample area and their relative weight?
2. What are the characteristics of bilingual and multilingual signs?
3. What does the linguistic landscape analysis show about the status of Slovene in the sample area?

The methodology adopted by Cenoz and Gorter (2006) was followed in this research. The overall concept of the methodology was maintained but some adjustments were made, as the analysis focused on each text as described below.

4. Methodology

4.1 Sample

The research considered the areas where the Slovene minority has been historically settled[4] and acknowledged by law. For sampling purposes, different areas were selected according to their representativeness and sections of their main streets were taken into account. Such sections had to be representative and were chosen based on the availability of public and private services, such as shops, bars, restaurants, libraries, schools, supermarkets, etc. In the main settlements - i.e. the cities of Trieste/Trst, Gorizia/Gorica and Cividale/Čedad - two main streets were considered, each with a section of approximately 500m. In small settlements and villages the whole center was considered including the main street, square, locations with shops, bus station, notice boards and other services[5] covering approximately the same length (Table 1).

Table 1: Sample Areas

Province	Place	Name of city and street or name of settlement	Number of texts/ units
Trieste/ Trst	Trieste/Trst city center	Trieste/Trst: Carducci Street	780
		Trieste/Trst: San Nicolò Street	404
		Trieste/Trst: Oberdan Square	75
	Village near Trieste/Trst	Prosecco/Prosek	244
	Village near Trieste/Trst	Aurisina/Nabrežina	124

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Gorizia/ Gorica	Gorizia/Gorica city center	Gorizia/Gorica: Vittoria Square and Roma Street	341
		Gorizia/Gorica: Corso Italia	591
	Village near Gorizia/Gorica	Sant'Andrea/Štandrež	128
	Village near Gorizia/Gorica	Doberdò/Doberdob	91
Udine/ Videm	Valli del Natisone/Benečija	San Pietro/Špeter	180
		Cividale/Čedad	306
	Val Canale/Kanalska Dolina	Tarvisio/Trbiž	292
		Camporosso/Žabnice	110
	Valli del Torre/Terska Dolina	Lusevera/Bardo	37
		Taipana/Tipana	59
	Resia/Rezija	Stolvizza/Solbica	50
		Prato di Resia/Ravanca	67
Total			3.876

Source: Mezgec (2015).

4.2 Data Collection

Data collection was made in spring 2015. The field work was carried out with the support of a digital camera and a data collection form. Digital pictures of all the texts seen in the streets were taken. That resulted in a corpus of 3.879 units including the complete inventory of the linguistic landscape for the sample areas. Pictures in each settlement were taken on one day.

4.3 Coding

Codification of the units required making some methodological decisions, as reported by previous research in this field (see Cenoz & Gorter 2006, 71, Ben-Rafael et al. 2006).

For the purposes of this research, each text was the unit of analysis and the following items were included:
- all texts (on entrances, shop doors and windows including names), even small ones if visible and readable from the street;
- temporary texts such as renting, selling, etc.;
- road signs and place names;
- logos with texts.

On the contrary, the following items were not included:
- texts on products (such as t-shirts, newspapers, magazines, etc.);
- short technical texts (such as number of light poles, etc.);
- texts inside shops and offices if not readable from outside;

- unreadable texts;
- flat-panel displays.[6]

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Exceptions:
- shop windows (e.g. real estate agencies or supermarkets) full of small posters with announcements or promotions using the same corporate layout and linguistic features were considered as one unit;
- in small settlements road signs bearing place names were included; in bigger settlements they were not available in the sample section of the street;
- unclear names of shops or businesses were coded apart as not defined;

English terms used in Italian texts that have become common in Italian were not considered as foreign terms (e.g. wireless, club, etc.).

A coding scheme was developed including a series of variables related to the place where the sign was located, the type of sign, the number of languages in the sign, the language in the sign, top-down versus bottom-up signs, intrinsic features of multilingual signs revealing the predominant language (e.g. order of appearance of different languages in multilingual signs, amount of information in each language, or size and font used for each language).

4.4 Data Analysis

The SPSS software, descriptive statistics, the Anova test and the crosstab analysis were used for data analysis.

5. Results

5.1 Presence of the Slovene Language

The following section shows the most significant data concerning the research questions above.

Out of 3,876 signs, the majority are monolingual (83.4 per cent), 15.1 per cent are bilingual or multilingual and for the 1.5 percent were not defined (they were mainly names) (Figure 1). As for monolingual items, the majority are in Italian (91.4 per cent), followed by English (5.8 per cent), Slovene (1.4 per cent) and Slovene dialects in the province of Udine/Videm[7] (0.5 per cent) values for other languages are low.

The signs where two or more languages are used were classified as multilingual (e.g. Picture 1 and 2). In that case Italian is almost always present (99 per cent of the cases), Slovene in over half cases (53.2 per cent), and the Slovene dialect spoken in the province of Udine/Videm in 6.8 per cent.

Figure 1: Number of Languages on Writings

Source: Mezgec (2015).

Picture 1: Examples of Multilingual Sign

Source: Mezgec (2015).

Picture 2: Examples of Multilingual Sign

Source: Mezgec (2015).

Data show that in the sample area the linguistic landscape is mainly monolingual Italian (84.7 per cent of signs are monolingual, out of which 91.4 per cent are in Italian only), although this is the area where the Slovene, Friulian and German minorities are settled[8] and officially acknowledged. This situation results from the Italian monolingual language policy pursued in the state of Italy and in the Region of Friuli Venezia Giulia: though being a multilingual region, it has not been promoting its language diversity. The Italian nation state has never promoted ethnic or language diversity (Vidau 2015, 26). In the XX and XXI centuries major changes in the language policy were introduced providing for the use of minority languages in the public administration. However, *de facto* minority languages are not considered as regional or state official languages, although recent legislation on visible bilingualism has slowly been implemented. This progress can be seen in the local linguistic landscape as - by way of a paradox - plurilingualism is mostly made visible by the public administration and public entities. This phenomenon will be described in the paragraphs below.

As for Slovene, previous research has already pointed out its absence in Trieste/Trst city center (Tufi 2013, Kaučič-Baša 1997), as shown by our data. In Trieste/Trst city centre, Slovene is present only in 1.7 per cent of signs, while in Gorizia/Gorica in 6.9 per cent (see Figure 2). As Tufi stated (2013), Slovene is virtually absent in the linguistic landscape of Trieste, which leads to a visual silence where Slovenians are left invisible.

The limited presence of Slovene in signs is common in the whole province of Trieste/Trst (see Figure 3), where it accounts only for 9.2 per cent of the corpus although significant variances exist.

As Shohamy (2006) argues, the presence or absence of certain languages in the public arena sends a message that reveals the centrality versus the marginality of these languages in society.

Figure 2: Writings in Slovene by Place

Source: Mezgec (2015).

Figure 3: Writings in Slovene by Province

Source: Mezge (2015).

In the surrounding area of Trieste/Trst and Gorizia/Gorica, there are settlements where the Slovene population is larger in number or belonging to bilingual municipal administrations. The latter settlements are located in areas where the Slovene population is or used to be the majority. However, data show that even in this case the linguistic landscape is not predominantly Slovene nor completely bilingual (e.g. in the village of Aurisina/Nabrežina, signs with Slovene writings

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account for 58.1 per cent), and Italian is still predominant. This is evidence of the inferior status of the Slovene language and reflects the sociolinguistic situation: Slovene is mainly an in-group language (Kaučič-Baša 1997) used for oral communication only. When it comes to writing and official writing, its use becomes troublesome. Italian is traditionally used as an official language, while Slovene is used in official communication only by public authorities and only when its use is defined by law or other regulations. Slovene-only signs are more of an exception (45 items).

If only multilingual signs are considered (585 items), Slovene is not present in approximately one third of multilingual signs in the province of Trieste/ Trst and Gorizia/Gorica (30.6 per cent respectively Gorizia/Gorica and 36.6 per cent for Trieste/Trst). That means that even when signs are not only Italian monolingual, Slovene is not present by default. Therefore, the linguistic landscape is mainly monolingual - Italian only - and when multilingual signs are used Slovene is not necessarily included, which again might be a clear sign of the status of the Slovene language. In the current language policy, multilingual signs are addressed to the readers who do not understand Italian and are not designed to recall the presence of other language communities in the area. Actually, the Italian language policy tries to deny the symbolic value of the presence of minority languages.

Moreover multilingual signs where Slovene is also used were analyzed. In that case Slovene has the same status as Italian: the font and size of letters are the same as Italian (94.2 per cent and 91.4 per cent), the contents and length of the text are the same[9] (81.9 per cent and 82.6 per cent). In any case, the predominant position of Italian is obvious due to the order of appearance: Italian always comes first.

5.2 Private versus Public Signs

The types of institutions using signs were also analyzed. Two main categories were considered: public and private institutions. Slovene is more present in signs of public institutions (among writings by public administration is present in 17.8 per cent of cases, among writings by public authorities in 21.8 per cent of cases) than in private ones (5.1 per cent).

If a distinction is made between bottom-up and top-down signs[10] (see Ben-Rafael et al. 2006, 14, Cenoz and Gorter 2006, 71, Coluzzi 2009, 303-304 and Tufi 2013, 399), results are still the same: Slovene is more rarely present in bottom-up signs (6.5 per cent) than in top-down signs (17.8 per cent) (Figure 4) (see e.g. Picture 3 and 4). Data show that public administrations (i.e. municipalities, provinces, region and State) are more consistent in using the minority language and play a major role in shaping a multilingual linguistic landscape, although they lag behind in the application of minority rights as established by Law 38/2001,

and especially by Article 10 on visual bilingualism (Sussi et. al. 2011). Evidence shows that there are conflicting trends between the public and private sectors (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006, Cenoz & Gorter 2006, Coluzzi 2009, Lado 2011). Official top-down signs are the result of the legislation introduced in 2001 (Law 38/2001), which however has not had [or only partially had] an impact on the linguistic landscape of Trieste (Tufi 2013).

That means there is still room for improving the presence of the Slovene language in the linguistic landscape by promoting its use in the private sector.

Picture 3: Example of Top-down Sign with Slovene

Source: Mezgec (2015).

Picture 4: Example of Bottom-up Sign with Slovene

Source: Mezgec (2015).

Figure 4: Top-down and Bottom-up Writings with Slovene

Source: Mezgec (2015).

6. Discussion

The study of the linguistic landscape is particularly interesting in the context of minority languages as it mirrors their use and their status. "The linguistic landscape can provide information about the sociolinguistic context and the use of the different languages in signs can be compared to the official policy of the region /…/" (Cenoz & Gorter 2006, 68). Moreover, the linguistic landscape provides double feedback on the impact of the language policy: on the one hand, it shows its will to promote and make minority languages visible, as reflected in top-down writings; on the other, it shows the impact on individuals and society as a whole, as reflected in bottom-up signs (Landry & Bourhis 1997, Cenoz & Gorter 2006, Coluzzi 2009).

Data confirm a clear predominance of the national language and that the minority language must struggle for visibility. This is why a language policy is highly needed and must be fully implemented. If no action is taken the linguistic landscape tends to be monolingual.

The predominant position of Italian was also highlighted by Coluzzi (2009) and Gorter (2007, 21 cited in Coluzzi 2009, 306). Both authors conclude their research stating that the Italian linguistic landscape is basically monolingual, with a limited presence of English. Coluzzi (2009) mentions that some areas such as Friuli Venezia Giulia (where the Slovene minority is settled), the province of Bolzano (where the German and Ladin minorities are settled) and Aosta Valley (where the French minority is settled) should be excluded from the predominance of Italian. However, collected data show that Italian is still predominant even in the area where the Slovene minority is settled and its status recognized by law.

Data also confirm previous findings for Trieste/Trst (Tufi 2013), whereby the Slovene language does not enjoy a high status. An unbalanced situation was detected: Slovene is often present only where it is required by law, while its spontaneous use (e.g. in private and bottom-up signs) is very limited.

Rules and regulations - in particular Law 38/2001 - provide for the use for the public entities, but not for the private one. Consequently, it is not compulsory to use Slovene in public signs of private entities. Even in bilingual municipalities by statute, there is no obligation for private players to use Slovene (whereas it is compulsory for municipal administrations). This research shows that legislation is lacking in this respect, as shown by Coluzzi (2009) with reference to the Friulian language. Slovene would be much more visible if legal provisions were adopted to urge the private sector to use it, at least partially. Kaučič-Baša (1997) also highlighted that public written communication in the minority language needs to be developed with institutional support. This would have a number of positive effects on the perceived status of the Slovene language amongst both Slovenians and Italians.

The truth is that current legislation does not provide for the use of Slovene in private business. Nor has Slovene such a high status that would encourage its use in public signs, nor there is sufficient cultural awareness[11] on the symbolic importance of minority languages in public writings. Such lack of awareness is present even among Slovene entrepreneurs. Additional research would be needed to further investigate this phenomenon, which is supposedly related to the perception that the minority language is of little use for conducting public affairs. To quote Landry and Bourhis:

> Exclusion of in-group language from public signs can convey a message to the effect that one's own language is not valued and has little status within society. Further, such exclusion conveys the notion that the in-group language is of little use for conducting public affairs / … / (Landry & Bourhis, 1997, 28).

To conclude, the private sector has an interesting potential to promote the use of Slovene, which has to be considered in order to shape a more bi- or multilingual environment.

7. Conclusions

As already stated by Cenoz and Gorter (2006), the study of the linguistic landscape is limited to the analysis of linguistic signs that does not necessarily reflect the use of languages in oral communication, though providing information on their written use. Therefore, the relationship between the linguistic landscape and the languages spoken is not straightforward (Coluzzi 2009, 307). In this paper, the linguistic landscape reflects the impact of the language policy implemented in

the area where the Slovene minority is settled. When considering the results of the study, we would like stress two important limitations of the study: firstly, the research is limited to sample areas and gives a picture of the *status quo*. Further research could include e.g. writings on streets outside inhabited centers. Secondly, the current status quo might change in future, as regulation about visible bilingualism for public authorities has not been fully implemented, yet.

Picture 5: Example of Actors Shaping the Linguistic Landscape that are not Acting Coherently

Source: Mezgec (2015).

To conclude, Slovene certainly does not enjoy a high status in the linguistic landscape where the Slovene minority has historically been settled. This is particularly highlighted by the small number of writings in Slovene among private players, that are neither obliged nor willing to use it. Special efforts to promote Slovene in the private sector might bring about changes in the linguistic

landscape. As can be inferred from the case of the Basque Countries presented by Cenoz and Gorter (2006), a language policy promoting the minority language has an important impact on its visibility in the linguistic landscape, with both top-down and bottom-up signs.

As Lado (2011) shows for Valencian, the visibility (of lack thereof) of the minority language in the streets seems to be a reflection of the socio-historical, linguistic, political and ideological factors, which favor the use of the majority language.

Literature on the linguistic landscape (e.g. Backhaus 2006, Ben-Rafael et al. 2006, Cenoz & Gorter 2006, Gorter 2006b, Huebner 2006, Coluzzi, 2009, Lado 2011) shows that the linguistic landscape reflects discrepancies between top-down and bottom-up signs due to ideological or political considerations. Linguistic landscape is not static, but a complex dynamic entity subject to changes and shaped by vast numbers of actors that participate in molding it (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006). A large variety of actors shape the linguistic landscape: public institutions, associations, firms, individuals, etc.[12] Such actors do not necessarily act harmoniously, nor even coherently (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006, 8) (e.g. Picture 5). Using Bourdieu (1991) considerations on social reality, each typology of agents is to be analyzed in terms of its power dynamics and unequal power relations between linguistic communities in the local linguistic market.

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Notes

[1] For further reading about legislative and sociolinguistic issues on the Slovene minority in Italy see Mezgec 2012, 65-80, Vidau 2015, 129-227, Brezigar 2007, Bogatec 2004, Stranj 1992.

[2] For a thorough historical analysis of the legal framework of the Slovene minority in Italy see Bajc (2004).

[3] Article 8 defines the use of Slovene in the public administration; Article 10 defines the use of Slovene in public writings and place names. The decree of the president of the region Friuli Venezia Giulia n. 346 from 2008 (decree of the president of the region Friuli Venezia Giulia n. 346/2008) define the territory for the implementations of article 10. The city centre of Trieste/ Trst and Gorizia/Gorica are not included in the area where these regulations have to be adopted and implemented.

[4] Including the provinces of Trieste/Trst, Gorizia/Gorica and Udine/Videm.

[5] Following the approach adopted by Dal Negro (2009).

[6] An exhaustive description of all the methodological details is available in Mezgec 2015.

[7] By effect of regional law n. 26/2007 (Regional law 26/2007), rights acknowledged to Slovene language by regional regulations are acknowledged to Slovene dialects in the province of Udine as well.

[8] The Friulian minority is officially present in the province of Udine/Videm and partly in Gorizia/ Gorica; the German minority is settled in the northern part of the province of Udine/Videm.

[9] Reh (2004) identifies different types of arrangements: duplicating multilingualism, fragmentary multilingualism, overlapping multilingualism and complementary multilingualism.

[10] Top-down linguistic landscape items included those issued by public and national bureaucracies, such as public institutions, signs in public sites, public announcements and street names. Bottom-up signs included those issued by social players (shop owners and companies) such as shop names, business signs and personal announcements (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006, 14).

[11] That can be seen as a consequence of a language policy.

[12] Gorter refers to the distinction made by Itagi and Singh (2002, cited in Gorter 2013) between linguistic landscape and linguistic landscaping, suggesting that the gerund form means the planning and implementation of actions, while the noun form includes the final results of the landscaping activity.

Matejka Grgič

The Identification and Definition of the Minority Community as an Ideological Construct: the Case of Slovenians in Italy

When identifying the language/-s spoken by different members of a community, we first categorise and then further merge it/them into definitions. The author discusses some such definitions often used in discourse on the Slovenian language in Italy. The author gathered and analysed these definitions using the method of critical analysis of media discourse on language. She discusses the material from an epistemological perspective that transcends the linguistics field and reaches to other fields of humanities and social studies. Namely, the social dynamics and cultural paradigms of a language-speaking community are reflected in the perceptions of languages, their practices, and language policies. In this article, the author shows examples of language definitions found in the analysed material and explains when and why these definitions could be problematic.

Keywords: linguistics epistemology, critical discourse analysis, language ideology, mother tongue, standard language, dialect.

Opredeljevanje in definicija jezika narodne manjšinske skupnosti kot ideološki konstrukt: primer Slovencev v Italiji

Ko želimo opredeliti jezik/-e, ki ga/jih uporabljajo različni govorci neke skupnosti, ga/jih po navadi razvrstimo v kategorije, ki jih nadalje strnemo v definicije. V nadaljevanju članka avtorica obravnava nekatere take definicije, ki se pogosto pojavljajo v diskurzu o slovenskem jeziku v Italiji; definicije so bile zbrane in analizirane s kritično analizo medijskih diskurzov o jeziku, v tem prispevku pa gradivo obravnava kot epistemološko vprašanje, ki ne sega samo na področje jezikoslovnih ved, ampak tudi na druga področja humanistike in družboslovja. Skozi percepcije jezika ter prakse in politike, ki so z jezikom povezane, se namreč odražajo družbene dinamike in kulturne paradigme skupnosti govorcev. V članku avtorica ob primerih definicij jezika, ki jih je zasledila v analiziranem gradivu, pokaže, kdaj in zakaj so lahko te definicije sporne.

Ključne besede: *epistemologija jezikovnih ved, kritična analiza diskurza, jezikovna ideologija, materni jezik, knjižni jezik, narečje.*

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1. Introduction

In this article, I introduce some results from the first part of the research conducted in 2009–2015, which I explain in detail later on.

The aim of this article is to show the ideologically motivated use of some, originally otherwise neutral language definitions and phenomena. This question is significant since the ideologically motivated use occurs predominantly in the media discourse and, at the same time, reflects and determines public opinion. The language can in certain circumstances become an element that represents grounds for establishing relations between belonging and excluding, power and discrimination, knowing (knowledge) and not knowing (ignorance). Knowing these dynamics can contribute to more informed identifications of the language and language phenomena, and can at the same time offer some tools for the implementation of more efficient language planning policies. A comprehensive critical analysis of language definitions that occur in a certain context is rare in scientific literature, even though there are some studies that discuss in depth some views that I will point out further on.

The goal of this article is to review the five most common definitions of language and language phenomena that occur in the selected corpus of texts and thus show how specific definitions gain an ideological connotation if used outside the epistemological context in which they originate.

2. Theoretical Framework

In the period of 2009–2015, the first research series was conducted on the language discourse of those speakers identified as the Slovenian national community (minority) in Italy (Grgič 2016). Predominantly those texts were examined that were published in the three printed media published in the population area of the Slovenian minority in Italy – i.e. Primorski dnevnik, Novi glas and Novi Matajur. One of the aspects I have analysed is the use of specialised terminology from different linguistics studies; I have focused on certain terms that the authors have used frequently in the analysed texts to define (Slovenian) language. This research is currently ongoing by gathering material from public and publicly available sources, mostly those on-line. Besides other findings (Grgič 2011, 2016), the analysis so far has also opened some epistemological questions, related to generally recognised definitions and terminological identifications of the language that overcame the boundaries of specialised texts and have become a part of a general discourse on language.

These are mostly sociolinguistic, psycholinguistic and language didactics terms, such as mother tongue or first language, the language of the environment, second language, foreign language, and others, as well as some identifications of different types of language, e.g. standard language or dialect. These definitions

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are used to identify different aspects of language and its use, though they do not necessarily belong to the same epistemological context. That is why an individual definition can become questionable or at least unsuitable. Each one of these identifications or definitions namely arose in a certain context, with certain goals, and with certain boundaries; they were products of individual linguistics studies' necessity to define its subject of examination and to verbalise it as precisely as possible (Grgič 2016, 15). That is why we can form a hypothesis that each of these definitions is ideologically neutral within its original context (Van Dijk 2006); as soon as they are used outside that context and with different intentions, they become more or less ideologically motivated.

The use of a certain language definition in epistemological contexts that are different to the definitions' original contexts can be especially questionable when it spreads into linguistically more exposed areas and when it becomes a part of a general discourse on language perception, on attitude towards the language, and on knowledge of the language. In such cases, the use of individual definitions may no longer have (only) cognitive, gnoseological function, but (mostly) a distinctive ideological background, so that within language discourses, it starts creating divisions between us and them, starts raising the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, superordination and subordination, of knowing (knowledge) and not knowing (ignorance) that can, in the end effect, be even discriminatory (Van Dijk 2006, Elias & Scotson 2008).

Language definitions and identifications that were supposed to be professionally neutral, non-ideological and aprioristic can thus be – the same as the use of language itself – the element that reflects social relations and cultural formations if not even generates them. This is especially obvious in linguistically exposed areas where seemingly neutral language identifications can also represent the identity option of speakers and community (Pertot 2014, 14). In other words: the community is not only formed through its language but also through perceptions and definitions of this or other languages with which this community is in contact (Grgič 2016, Petrović 2006).

3. Methodology

The research is based on the examination of the text corpus by using the method of critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 2010, Van Dijk 2006, 2008, 2012). Unlike classical discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis (CDA) that is based on the prior findings of Althusser, Foucault and other theories focuses mainly on the two aspects: the identification of language as a social practice and a discourse as a space where relationships of power, domination, and exclusion (can) form (Wodak & Meyer 2001, 2-12). The critical discourse analysis thus does not only discuss textual elements and narration processes but also the contexts from which these texts and processes derive. That is why it calls for a

distinctively interdisciplinary approach that should take into consideration different elements (texts, social interaction, culture formations and others), and for orientation towards concrete goals and changes in current social situations (Van Dijk 1993, 253). Critical discourse analysis is thus a method that is especially useful and usable there, where it is presumed that the processes of exclusion and domination are a consequence of subtle discourse practices, and where we believe that by using this analysis, we can contribute to more aware and structured discourses as well as to the introduction of different development politics – even with the language.

4. Analysis: Definitions and Language Identifications

In the analysed texts, we can see frequent use[1] of mainly those terms that are introduced later in this paper. The speakers use them to identify not only the language as an object but also this language's place in the society and their attitude towards it. In short, the expert terms and definitions introduced in this paper are not only the a posteriori marks that place language in a certain scientific paradigm but also identification options that shape language as a cultural formation.

4.1 Mother Tongue

The terminology linking the language learning process with the role of a mother, and language proficiency and its use with the concept of the nation, was established primarily in the 19th century (Hobsbawm 1992) but was already formed before that time. Dante Alighieri, e.g. defined that concept in a slightly different way by saying that folk language is the language learned by children spontaneously when in contact with their nannies – as opposed to the Latin that they had to learn later, intentionally and with teachers.[2] Despite the terminological inconsistency, some key features can be observed in the Dante's and the later definition of mother tongue: Early learning and consequentially optimal language proficiency that represents the primary (if not the only) option of individual's identification and thus the primary (if not the only) nationally constitutive element (Formigari 2001, 272).

The concept of mother tongue is generally linked with the formation of the ideal – and not necessarily real – speaker whose language knowledge and skills are intertwined with the speaker's origin (Saniei 2011, 77), i.e. the family as well as the social, cultural and national (Mufwene 1994). Mother tongue thus represents a static category since it is clear that no speaker can a posteriori influence the language used by their parents from the speaker's birth to about the third year of age. Mother tongue cannot be changed – it is some sort of a birthmark, presumably given by the family, especially by the family member that nurtures the baby: the mother (Davies 2003). While the interpretation of

the language as a static formation that equates learning processes, identification options and the proficiency level was in line with classical philosophical, social and linguistic theories of the 19th century, in the 20th century epistemological, cultural, and social frame changed fundamentally. The concept of mother tongue remained present in popular literature but was reshaped into the concept of a native speaker or the first language in scientific contexts (Bonfiglio 2010), as we will see later on.

The term mother tongue is mostly used in popular texts where it may have entirely different meanings. In the analysed corpus of texts, the following options that define mother tongue are most frequent: "the language that the speaker knows the best"; "the language that the speaker learned first"; "the language with which the speaker identifies themself."[3] Mostly the combination of these three meanings and uses is questionable or ideologically motivated: it is namely by no means self-evident or certain that the speaker knows the first taught language the best and that this is the language with which the speaker primarily and exclusively identifies themself – even within the speaker's options of ethnic belonging (Myhill 2003). In the analysed text corpus, the minority language (Slovenian) is predominantly identified as the mother('s) tongue of the speakers that identify themselves as a part of this group.

In the analysed pool of 250 texts, this term occurred twenty-one times. For comparison: a related term first language bearing the meaning "the language that the speaker learned first in early childhood / the family" recurred four times, and the term primary language does not occur at all. We can see from the texts that the term mother tongue always occurs in one possible combination of meanings that derive from the above-mentioned options (the language that the speaker knows the best and has learned as the first and with which they identify themself): "mother tongue is a language that a child learns in early childhood from its environment, most times from the mother"; "[mother's tongue] is a gift"; "this is the language that belongs to us." The quantity and the collocations of these occurrences – mostly in comparison to other related identifications of the minority language – show a certain paradigm predominant in a community of speakers. This is a national-bourgeois paradigm of the 19th century that equated the language with the nation and furthermore linked both with the family: the speaker – a member of the nation was born and raised in that language; something that clearly happens within the family where the mother plays the crucial role.

Given the fact that the media considered in this article is widespread and given the number of term occurrences, we can assume that this media discourse paradigm is spreading and is becoming generally accepted in the entire community of Slovenian-speaking speakers in Italy. Alongside other factors, this can additionally influence the establishment of a static, nostalgic identification of the language and can thus also steer language planning policies and strategies in the same direction.

4.2 First Language (Also Native Speaker)

The term first language that is to some extent related to the term mother tongue, occurs rarely (four occurrences) in the analysed text pool; the term native speaker meaning "the speaker that has been learning the language since birth or has already learned it by the third year of age" does not occur in the analysed texts. I only mention it here because it is frequently used[4] in contemporary linguistics and also in popular texts.

Both terms (fist language and native speaker) summarise some aspects of the term mother tongue but were based on the generative grammar theory and cognitive linguistics that were established in the second half of the 20th century; in such context, their function is neutral and thus enable scientists to understand certain formation and transformation processes. By defining the term of a native speaker, Chomsky set foundations for his generative grammar that sees the transformational processes as intuitive derivations of the internal language, referred to as the I-language by the generativists (Isac & Reiss 2013, 77).

The terms first language or native speaker can, though, become problematic when they are used in sociolinguistics and language didactics without appropriate identification, especially when discussing linguistically exposed and multilingual areas (Bonfiglio 2010). As with the definition mother tongue, the terms first language and native speaker also presume a static condition – that the speaker presumably has the best knowledge of the same language through their entire life and that this is the language the speaker has learned in early childhood –, which is, at least in such environments, more an exception rather than the rule. This is where the presumption that becomes a general fact in an ideological discourse derives from (Van Dijk 2006): that a native speaker is a better and more competent speaker in comparison to someone that has learned a language at a later time in life; equating presumably all native speakers – all speakers that have learned a certain language in their earliest childhood, regardless of their later language skills development – is also ideological. Nevertheless, this concept also became a part of language competence (self)evaluation where a degree of level proficiency is often marked simply with terms mother tongue, native speaker or first language that only state the fact of which language the speaker has learned as the first or in their early childhood but not also how the speaker is using this language at the moment of their proficiency (self)evaluation.

By doing so, the concept that contemporary didactics and the theory of language learning discuss as essential mainly for learning minority languages, loses its meaning entirely: this is the concept of exposure. The research has namely shown that exposure to the language is a key factor for achieving a certain language proficiency level (Thordardottir 2011). Even with the concept of exposure, the speakers' age is one of the factors that influence the effectiveness of language learning: early exposure is in principle more effective than the one later in life. Nevertheless, exposure to language also includes other factors that are

considered as fundamental elements of the learning processes. Learning is more effective if the exposure is continuous (if the speaker is exposed to the language all the time or at least in different periods of their life) and diverse (if the speaker is exposed to different uses and communication practices of this language – i.e. different codes, genres and idioms or lects[5]).

Based on the research focusing on the concept of exposure it is, though, important to promote spontaneous language learning in the earliest period (0–3 year). At the same time, language planning policies and implementation of didactic models should ensure further continuous exposure to diverse language practices. These should not only enable but also demand from the speakers the use of different language codes, genres and idioms of a certain language continuum[6]. Language proficiency that is in epistemological context perceived as a lever of language skills development (Meisel 2007, 496) is thus a result of different factors, environments and strategies – it changes over time and is not just an end product. Whether a certain language is the speaker's mother tongue or not, or the first language or not, is thus in this perspective only one of the three key factors that influence what we could – lastly – name language proficiency. The role of the family (and, presumably, of the mother) in the language learning processes and achieving a certain level of language proficiency or skills is in this epistemological paradigm somewhat redimensioned. Whether a speaker is more or less proficient or skilful in different ways of using a given language – code, genre, idiom – depends only to some (though important) extent on the fact in which language the speaker communicated (presumably with parents, relatives and caretakers) in their earliest period of life. The responsibility for successful learning and lastly even for language proficiency is thus, at least partially, shifting from the family to the society or the community of speakers which is in such model implicitly responsible for forming proper strategies that will ensure continuous and differentiated exposure of speakers to different uses of the language.

In the analysed pool of texts, I did not come across the term exposure (meaning exposure to language or different language usage in the language learning processes). This can mean that the models of indirect or direct support of practices that supposedly retain only certain forms, structures and types of use of the Slovenian language are becoming more established than the active and professionally examined language policies. Further ongoing studies in the community of speakers of the Slovenian language in Italy show that these are mostly normalised, standard/literary models and uses that supposedly display the authenticity and autarchy of the local language.

Next to the term mother tongue examined in this article, the identification our language is most frequently used in the analysed pool of texts. This is an explicit use of a deictic term that authors of the texts use with very different references: Sometimes they identify with it the entire continuum of the Slovenian

language and its idioms, and sometimes only local use, dialects and even certain specific occurrences of language contact, e.g. different compensation strategies, code-mixing and code-switching. Such use of the label our language shows that the speakers identify themselves with different idioms of the Slovenian language continuum, predominantly with the local variants (Pertot 2014).

4.3 Language of Environment

If we presume that a corresponding exposure is necessary in order to achieve a certain level of language proficiency that enables the speaker to competently use the language in presumably all communication environments, the presence of the language in the environment becomes essential. In the discussed pool of texts, the minority language is in fact identified as the language of the environment where it is presumed that the speakers can (also) learn it spontaneously – within their living environment where they are sufficiently exposed to this language. In the analysed texts, I found this term in connection with the Slovenian language in Italy seven times, most (five) in texts that can be classified as popular scientific.

The definition of the minority language as the language of the environment is also not always self-evident, even though it is established in many areas.[7] What is in fact regarded as the term environment, is namely already problematic. The fact that the presence of a language in only some environments – e.g. family, neighbourhood, informal communication situations – and only in a certain development period – e.g. childhood – leads into a sociolinguistic situation referred to as diglossia that was already proven a long time ago (Schiffman 1993, 120). But not only that: Even in the areas where the use of the minority language is possible in more prestige environments, e.g. school, public space, legal administrative procedures or other public administrative contacts, it can occur that the language use is weakening in other contexts and is thus abandoned in the long run as the general means of communication (Cooper 1989).

When defining the environment in which the language should be present for successful spontaneous learning and language skills development, one of the effective exposure factors is most often not taken into account: diversity. (Legal) status and (perceived) prestige that are also defined by the presence of the language in some formal contexts, mostly public, do not ensure the use of the minority language in potentially all communication situations. This would enable speakers to use different, even not standardised and less formal codes – from general colloquial language to different types of slang and jargon.

Furthermore, the environment cannot be understood merely as a physical space in which speakers exist. The language environment is also an environment with which the speakers are in indirect contact through their communication practices and do not require all participants of such communication processes to be present at the same time. In the past, mostly books and letters made such practices possible, then newsletters and magazines, and later on even television

and radio shows, films, and records. Language environment today is largely virtual and on-line: social networks, web media, chat rooms and other e-content and channels represent an important segment of communication. If in a world where such communication practices blur the line between the local and the global (even within a single language continuum) the speakers remain in contact only with local variants of certain language continuum, it may happen that their spectrum of available codes, genre and idioms or lects drastically decreases or it at least does not develop in line with new communicational requirements.

One consequence of that is the fact that even languages of a community that is otherwise not a language enclave or island (Auer & Schmidt 2010), are reduced to the level of so-called heritage languages (Benmamoun et al. 2010) that in the end only have a symbolic value but no functional ties with a wider community of speakers of a certain language continuum (Cooper 1989). The second consequence is the establishing of a parallel standard in all environments and communicational situations. The speakers are no longer familiar with types of use that are distinctive for presumably the entire language continuum but only with those distinctive for their own narrow environment or even geographical space. That is why they begin to develop compensation strategies (Winford 2003) that at first enable them to communicate in a dialect, perceived as a part of their own language continuum; at some point, though, these usages can be very different from otherwise standard use in this given language continuum.

The identification of a minority language as the language of the environment is thus not self-evident. This definition is entirely arbitrary and thus ideological if it is not founded on empirically provable information[8] that can prove that there is enough of such language presence in an environment that spontaneous learning processes of a wide spectrum of language codes of a certain continuum can be established. On the level of language strategies, planning and didactics such establishing can be problematic since it is founded on false or at least unconfirmed assumptions.

4.4 Second and Foreign Language

In a context where definitions of the mother tongue and the first language, the native speaker and the language of the environment are problematic, the line between the mother tongue and the foreign language or between the first and the second language (or languages) also starts to weaken or shift in a different way.

At least until the second half of the 20th century, it was generally considered that every speaker has their own mother tongue and that they can know one or more foreign languages. Of course, this division was not entirely up to date even in a pre-globalised world: it mostly reflected the ideology of one nation – one language. In the second half of the 20th century, rapid social changes and new epistemological models brought some kind of a tripartite division to the

first language (or languages), learned in early childhood and definitely before all other languages, the second language (or languages), learned in different life periods in environments with such language exposure, and foreign languages, learned in a didactically structured environment, presumably without contact with an environment or environments in which these languages are generally present (Schmidt 2010).

In such model, the first language of a member of a certain minority community is supposed to be a minority language, the second language the majority language with which this member would be in contact in the environment, and the foreign language or the third language the language learned only in school. This division should also reflect the proficiency level and type – the first language is the language the speaker knows the best, sequentially then follow the second and the foreign language (languages) – and the individual's identification with the language or the community that uses this language: in such paradigm, the language of the identification is strictly mother tongue or the first language. Right after the beginning of the 21st century, it became clear that such divisions are obsolete (Canagarajah 2005).

The exposure to first and non-first languages in multilingual and generally heterogeneous and dynamic societies can be very different. That is why the learning processes, language proficiency and types of use of different languages with which the speakers are in contact also differ. Modern technologies, mainly web access to examples of language use, enable certain forms of spontaneous learning. Up until recently, this was impossible or even unimaginable. At the same time, interim phases of language perception and knowledge are appearing in the multilingual, dynamic and heterogeneous communities. These phases cannot be identified within the mentioned divisions.

The complex dynamic of language learning and identification with different communities of speakers occurs precisely in minority communities; as a consequence, e.g., the proficiency level of the second (majority) language is higher with some minority speakers than the level of the first (minority) language, and the speakers identify their belonging to different groups of speakers in different periods of their lives, thus creating fluid and multiple identities (Pertot 2014, 20). Next to that it can occur that speakers only develop certain codes, idioms or functions (though they may be prestige, literary or formal) in the minority language – even though this is their first language – and are not familiar with the broad spectrum of use in a different communication context (Cooper 1989).

4.5 Standard Language and Dialect

In the analysed texts, the terms standard language[9] and dialect occurred twelve and nine times respectively. A label standard also occurred several (six) times in certain collocations, e.g. "standard use", "this is not standard" etc.; a label dialect is also used in phrases such as "all that is in dialect", "dialect poetry" etc. (seven

times). Standard language has very unambiguous connotations: It represents a standardised, high-standard language that the speakers should have used as often as possible; it is a model and a canon for the language use. As we will see further on, the connotation of a dialect is not as unambiguous.

The concept of the standard language as the highest language level that all cultivated speakers should try to achieve, was lastly formulated in the 19th century, hand in hand with the rise of the bourgeoisie and with the processes of modern nation-states formation. In this context, standard language played a part in connecting and in nation formation (Joseph 1987). This role at least partially changed in the social context of the transition from the 20th to the 21st century.

The idea that every country (nation) should have an own language that defines it and with which it can identify, and is at the same time used for communicating at the highest social levels was already present in the Middle Ages and began spreading rapidly during the Renaissance: When the individual standard languages formed and became standardised, Dante's dream of a national idiom came true – it was to be *illustre* (prestige), *cardinale* (standard in normative sense), *aulico e curiale* (suitable for use at court, i.e. for political and state matters).

Standard language is an ideal and always also at least partially an artificial construct. Different from other idioms, it namely does not develop only spontaneously (Lippi-Green 1997): It is also defined and delineated by individual groups that are formed in a certain context as the (scientific, expert, artistic) elites that gain power and the role of setting the language norm (Petrović 2006). These groups then set the models and criteria under which they will form the standard language: The language that undergoes these standardisation processes and lastly becomes the standard language is a result of discarding language elements based on the criteria of geography, history, and genre. At the same time, language learning methods are defined in these processes thus implicitly and explicitly limiting the group of speakers that have the option to access genres of this language that are perceived as the highest (Tollefson 2000).

The perception of the standard language as the highest and most prestigious language level and also the only standard for language proficiency evaluation changed in the 20th century. On one side, the quantity and the diversity of texts created by the community of speakers, distinctively influenced the emergence and the development of different language genres that became the most suitable or that were established as a canon of an individual text genre (Kodrić 2010). On the other side, because of social movements and the emergence of new, different groups of speakers, it became more and more apparent that the standard language cannot be the only idiom that is considered *cardinale* in a particular language context. With the development of (language) technologies nowadays, even the concept of standardisation or the norm essential for standard language has different dimensions and valences.

The problem of the language genre study, established during the transition from the 19th to the 20th century, is especially distinctive on language exposed areas and considering the lack of natural language learning processes. It can thus potentially occur that mainly the speakers of non-autochthonous minorities, e.g. migrants, never achieve the proficiency level of the hosting country's standard language that would be comparable to the level of other speakers which can lead to social inequalities and discrimination (Lippi-Green 1997). Inversely, it can occur that individual speaker communities know and use standard language because they learn it in didactically structured environments, but do not know any other language genres because they are not adequately exposed to them – e.g. this happens to the national minority communities that live outside areas where this language is primary. As a consequence, the use of this language is being discarded (Pauwels 2016) since the (formal, written) standard language is not suitable for use in certain, especially less formal contexts that represent the most common communicational practices and thus the use of the language. Next to that, speakers do not always identify themselves with a standard language since they perceive it as distant and partially artificial (Kordić 2010); when analysing communities of speakers it is more distinctive that – perhaps because of the lack of a not-normalised yet still standardised general colloquial idiom – the speakers do not identify themselves with uses that are typical for the entire Slovenian language continuum, but rather more and more distinctively with local variants of the Slovenian language (Pertot 2014).

In emphasising and supporting the local community, the dialects and their functions have a special place within a broad spectrum of language uses and communicational practices. A dialect is on one side a carrier of authenticity values, locality and belonging to a (smaller) community, and on the other a lower lever genre of the non-cultivated speakers (Grgič 2016). It is sometimes hard to establish a synthesis between these two positions that would bridge such purely dichotomic divisions. Because of that, the attitude towards a dialect is always only partial and thus problematic. After all, this can also be reflected in the policies of language planning, language revitalisation, and the development of the minority community languages (Dorian 1994, 486-487). Though this dualism is typical for the history and epistemology of linguistic studies of the 20th century, it is even more apparent in certain geographical and cultural contexts.

In a very distinctively diachronous 19th century linguistics that tried to reconstruct mainly the historical development of the language with then current language uses, the dialect was one of the ideal examples that supported such research (Petrović 2006). The desired purity, originality and authenticity were insured by its distance in time and space – e.g. the oldest possible speaker in the most remote areas is regarded as a typical informant (Williams 1973).

In the analysed texts, dialect overtakes some roles and functions of a standard language (Auer 2011): This occurs in the environments where standard language

would normally be expected (e.g. even in media language[10], toponymy, and publicly available inscriptions) and represents an idiom with which the speakers identify themselves. Both occurrences can on one side represent a bottom-up experiment of language revitalisation and language use promotion, or can lead to language secessionism on the other (Kordić 2009): Speakers can at some point perceive a dialect as the independent (Abstand) language formation that is no longer a part of certain language continuum – namely Slovenian. It should be noted that the perception processes of a language (non-)continuum and (non-)identification with the language are independent from scientific or expert language discussions; more than scientific argumentation, are they subject to broader social, even political and economic factors.

5. Conclusion

Some definitions that were supposed to be potentially neutral but are in fact ideologically motivated arise from the language discourse that is, at the same time, also a discourse on this language speakers' identity option and on communities formed by the use of a certain language. They were created within certain epistemological paradigms and models with its function to study a specific linguistic phenomenon but are used also in other and different contexts by the media discourse that reflects and generates the discourses of the (entire) speakers' community.

When definitions are used in contexts that are different to those in which they were created without appropriate modification, can this contribute to creating ideological centres that furthermore influence the perception of linguistic phenomena, identification processes, language formation, language policies formation and the decision-makers' implementation plans.

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Notes

[1] Critical discourse analysis does not foresee quantitative analyses of individual term recurrences in the analysed texts. I thus define as frequent those recurrences that I found in different text types (news articles, columns, sections, readers' letters...) and recurred continuously in the entire time frame.

[2] "/ ... / vulgarem locutionem appellamus eam qua infantes assuefiunt ab assistentibus cum primitus distinguere voces incipiunt; vel, quod brevius dici potest, vulgarem locutionem asserimus quam sine omni regola nutricem imitantes accipimus." De vulgari eloquentia, I.2.

[3] For more details about the quotes from the analyzed texts please cfr. Grgič 2016, 47.

[4] Given the fact that this term is also used in some texts published in the Slovenian-Italian linguistic area, we cannot rule out the possibility that the term does also occur in the media discourse but that the analysis of the pool of texts in the given corpus did not yield such result.

[5] I use the terms idiom and lect as potentially neutral terms that encompass "also language, dialect, local language system, and any type of sociolect and specific language of an individual (or. idiolect). /.../ 'Idioms' [are] therefore all language codes used by a community in question" (Petrović 2006).

[6] The term language continuum is used as a potentially neutral concept for denoting potentially all possible languages, variants, dialects, and codes that are perceived as a standalone language, disregarding their diversity.

[7] It is used, e.g., to label the position of the Italian language in bilingual municipalities in Slovenia (Istria), that is predominantly in the scientific literature that deals with minority language teaching/learning.

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[8] Such research was conducted for the specific case of the Slovenian minority in Italy in 2015 but only considered the so-called language landscape of a population area of the said minority (Cf. Mezgec 2015).

[9] In Slovenian: knjižni jezik (the most formal level of the language, used especially in written texts and standardized by norm – rather then by use –, deduced at least in part from classical literary examples).

[10] The majority of the analysed texts published in the weekly paper Novi Matajur is written in a dialect.

Špela Gale

Vrednotenje uspešnosti jezikovnih politik in jezikovnih pobud za rabo vališanskega jezika v Walesu

Urejanje področja manjšinske zaščite se je v Evropi pogosto razvijalo v negotovem zgodovinskem okviru. Močna evropska regionalna gibanja so s poudarjanjem vrednosti regionalnih, jezikovnih in družbenih posebnosti evropskih perifernih skupnosti zaznamovala sredino 60. let prejšnjega stoletja. Wales predstavlja danes uradno dvojezično regijo, za katero sta značilni enojezična večinska in dvojezična manjšinska skupnost in ki predstavlja pester laboratorij inovativnih jezikovnih praks in strateško premišljenih jezikovnih pobud, zasnovanih na celovitih družbenih mrežah (sistemu mreženja). Na osnovi analize primarnih in sekundarnih podatkovnih virov ter dodatnega terenskega raziskovanja smo poskušali povzeti vrednotenje uspešnosti jezikovnih politik in izbranih jezikovnih pobud ter med njimi poiskati primere, ki so bili z vidika sprememb razširjenosti rabe jezika inovativni in učinkoviti.

Ključne besede: jezikovna zakonodaja, jezikovna politika, jezikovne prakse, promocija manjšinskega jezika, družbena raba jezika, vališanski jezik.

Evaluation of Performance of Language Policies and Language Initiatives for the Use of Welsh Language in Wales

Editing of the minority protection area in Europe often evolved in an uncertain historical context. Strong regional movements, which emphasized the value of regional, linguistic and social particularities of the European peripheral communities, marked the middle of the 60s of the last century. Wales represents the officially bilingual region, which is characterized by a monolingual majority and bilingual minority. The Welsh language represents a rich laboratory of innovative best practices and strategically premeditated language initiatives in the areas of planning of the use of Welsh language, and the strategically thoughtful language initiatives, designed on comprehensive social networks (networking). Based on an analysis of primary and secondary data sources as well as with an additional field work, we have tried to summarize the evaluation of the performance that shapes language policies and selected language initiatives, and find among them examples that were innovative and efficient in terms of the language use prevalence changes.

Keywords: language legislation, language policy, language practices, promotion of minority language, social use of language, Welsh language.

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1. Uvod

Zgodovinske ali avtohtone manjšinske skupnosti po Kosicevi idr. (2013) predstavljajo skupnosti, ki se od večinskega prebivalstva neke države razlikujejo po svojem jeziku in kulturi, število njihovih pripadnikov pa je nižje od števila pripadnikov večinskega prebivalstva – mednje avtorji uvrščajo narodne ali nacionalne manjšinske skupnosti[1], narode brez države[2] in etnične manjšinske skupnosti[3]. Člani manjšinske skupnosti so ponavadi dvojezični, kar pomeni, da že od otroštva obvladajo svoj jezik in tudi uradni jezik države, v kateri živijo. Ker je jezik običajno ena izmed glavnih značilnosti, po katerih se manjšinske skupnosti razlikujejo od večinske, se poleg oznake zgodovinske večkrat uporablja tudi naziv jezikovne manjšinske skupnosti; poseben primer jezikovnih manjšinskih skupnosti so jezikovne manjšinske skupnosti regionalnih jezikov[4].

Obdobje urejanja področja manjšinske zaščite v evropskem prostoru, pri čemer so imeli ključno vlogo Združeni narodi, Svet Evrope, Organizacija za varnost in sodelovanje ter Evropska skupnost, se je po navedbah Kovačičeve (2010) pogosto razvijalo v negotovem zgodovinskem okviru. Najprej ga je zaznamovala dekolonizacija, od sredine 60. let prejšnjega stoletja dalje pa so se oblikovala močna regionalna gibanja, ki so poudarjala vrednost regionalnih, jezikovnih in družbenih posebnosti evropskih perifernih skupnosti. V obdobju klasičnega razvoja evropskih nacionalnih držav v 19. in 20. stoletju so bile manjšinske skupnosti predmet teritorialne delitve evropskih držav; stremele so k homogenosti lastne države. Ob koncu 20. stoletja je urejanje manjšinske zaščite dodatno zaznamoval razpad nekaterih večnacionalnih držav, začel se je tudi proces tranzicije.

Klopčič (2006, 324–325) poudarja, da je sistem mednarodnopravnega varstva človekovih pravic na univerzalni in regionalni ravni po drugi svetovni vojni postopoma spreminjal vlogo države, ki je do tedaj edina presojala raven uresničevanja človekovih pravic; oblikovali so se mehanizmi, ki so postopoma začeli priznavati kolektivno razsežnost manjšinskih pravic. Žagar (2002) ugotavlja, da je na deklarativni ravni manjšinam sicer posvečena precejšnja pozornost, dodeljevanje in uresničevanje posebnih pravic pripadnikom narodnih manjšin pa sta ostala notranja zadeva držav in predmet bilateralnih meddržavnih odnosov. Zupančič (2005) dodaja, da je večina zakonodajnih vsebin v evropskih dokumentih posplošenih, prav tako na evropski ravni še ni podana opredelitev narodne ali etnične manjšine. Vloga jezikovnih in drugih manjšinskih skupnosti se ob močni vpetosti v evropski družbeni in prostorski kontekst vse bolj spreminja. Odprt evropski prostor je obmejnim območjem po eni strani prinesel veliko priložnosti, predvsem projektno sodelovanje, saj so periferna območja v vsej Evropski uniji deležna raznih pobud in subvencij, po drugi strani pa predstavlja tem območjem še vedno velik izziv konkuriranje močnim osrednjim krajem.

RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA 77 / 2016
Š. GALE Vrednotenje uspešnosti jezikovnih politik in jezikovnih pobud za rabo valižanskega jezika v Walesu

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Poleg konvencij in deklaracij, ki na evropski ravni določajo etična in splošna politična načela za zaščito jezikovnih manjšin (Kosic idr. 2013), sta zaščita jezikovne različnosti kot kulturne dediščine in spoštovanje neodtujljive pravice do uporabe regionalnega jezika v javnem in zasebnem življenju ali jeziku narodne manjšine urejena v Resolucijah Evropskega parlamenta o jezikovnih in kulturnih manjšinah v Evropski skupnosti (1981 in nadaljnje). Evropska listina o regionalnih in manjšinskih jezikih (1992) ter Okvirna konvencija za varstvo narodnih manjšin (1995), ki ju je odobril Svet Evrope, sta postali prva pravno obvezujoča mednarodna dokumenta o varstvu manjšin.

Proces evropske integracije je poenostavil in povečal obseg čezmejne komunikacije in medregionalnega sodelovanja, manjšine so postale povezovalni element, spodbujevalke in nosilke dejavnosti, njihove institucije pa most med regijami in državami (Zupančič 2005). Jezikovna izbira v večjezičnih okoljih postaja posebej aktualna zaradi vse intenzivnejših migracijskih in globalizacijskih tokov. Williams (2005) ugotavlja, da so globalizacijski procesi, ki so se zaradi spremenjenih oblik vladanja pojavili v 80. letih prejšnjega stoletja, vplivali na povečano politično vlogo regij. V mnogih evropskih državah centralna vlada suverenosti več ne izvaja na absoluten način, upravljanje ni več hierarhično od zgoraj navzdol (top-down) in tehnokratsko, temveč temelji na višji stopnji izenačenosti in decentralizacije ter vključuje različne družbeno-socialne skupine. Poudarek na lokalizaciji, subsidiarnosti in decentralizirani vladi je vplival na decentralizacijo odločanja od centralne vlade k lokalnim nivojem civilne družbe in predstavniški vladi. Nekatere evropske manjšinske jezikovne skupnosti so se na evropske integracijske in globalizacijske procese odzvale z oblikovanjem informacijskih mrež, reformami izobraževalnih sistemov in oblikovanjem zavezništev z odločujočimi vladnimi telesi. Veljavna jezikovna politika, ki jo razumemo kot institucionalizirane postopke, s katerimi družba vpliva na usmerjanje jezikovne zavesti svojih pripadnikov, predstavlja pa splošne jezikovne cilje, opredeljene s strani socialnih institucij, lahko predstavlja odločilni dejavnik stopnje političnega in gospodarskega razvoja.

Ena izmed posledic evropskih in integracijskih procesov je sprememba paradigme evropske jezikovne politike (Williams 2007). Konvencionalne evropske jezikovne politike so v glavnem temeljile na teritorialnem principu načrtovanja za kontaktna jezikovna območja, medtem ko se v procesih globalizacije oblikujejo nove oblike medregionalnih stikov. Z omejitvijo teritorialnega principa na ključna družbena področja rabe jezika (npr. uprava in izobraževanje), ustvarjanjem neodvisnih jezikovnih mrež in ukrepi jezikovnega načrtovanja se je potencialnim konfliktom lažje izogniti.

Uradni status valižanskega jezika[5], ki predstavlja enega izmed regionalnih manjšinskih jezikov Združenega kraljestva, se je oblikoval v specifičnem družbeno-socialnem okolju, v katerem izraz narodna manjšina[6] nima posebnega pravnega pomena. Pojmovanje se razlikuje od klasičnega pojmovanja manjšine

v drugih evropskih državah, zato za urejanje statusa družbenih skupin država nima ustreznega mehanizma (Kovačič 2010). Kot samostojni jezik se je oblikoval v 6. stoletju, od 11. stoletja dalje pa ga povezujejo z razširjeno rabo na današnjem ozemlju Walesa[7]. Tradicionalni jezikovni domeni sta predstavljala cerkev in ruralno okolje. V sredini 20. stoletja je zaradi upada števila govorcev in migracijskih procesov enojezična valižansko govoreča skupnost razpadla (Williams 2000). Do konca 19. stoletja je valižanski jezik še predstavljal jezik večinskega prebivalstva, medtem ko je za večino 20. stoletja značilen stalen trend krčenja (upadanja številčnosti) jezikovne skupnosti; število govorcev valižanskega jezika se je po podatkih popisa prvič ponovno povečalo leta 1981 v kategoriji otrok. Do prelomnih sprememb v zgodovini rabe valižanskega jezika je prišlo v 70. letih 20. stoletja z oblikovanjem jezikovnega gibanja za valižanski jezik, ustanovitvijo televizijskega programa SC4[8] (leta 1982) in sprejemom Zakona o reformi izobraževanja (1988). Wales danes predstavlja uradno dvojezično regijo, za katero sta značilni enojezična večinska in dvojezična manjšinska skupnost.

Wales v evropskem in svetovnem merilu na področju družbene rabe jezika predstavlja pester laboratorij inovativnih in celostnih dobrih praks, pri čemer jezikovne pobude odlikujejo strateška premišljenost, predanost in celovito načrtovanje socialnih in družbenih mrež (mreženje) (Williams 2005). Namen prispevka je zato orisati družbenopolitični razvoj in oblikovanje jezikovne zakonodaje v Walesu ter na osnovi analize popisnih podatkov prikazati časovne spremembe nekaterih jezikovnih praks rabe valižanskega jezika. V prispevku prikazujemo nekatere zanimive jezikovne pobude za revitalizacijo valižanskega jezika ter na osnovi primarnih in predvsem sekundarnih virov poskušamo povzeti vrednotenje njihove uspešnosti in uspešnosti valižanskih jezikovnih politik.

V prvem delu prispevka prikazujemo zgodovinski razvoj jezikovne zakonodaje v Walesu, ki je s sprejetjem ključnih dokumentov in njihovih glavnih določil postopoma uveljavila priznanje jezikovnih pravic za rabo valižanskega jezika ter postavila temelje za njegovo rabo v različnih domenah. V nadaljevanju z analizo popisnih podatkov za obdobje 1971–2011, pri čemer je poseben poudarek na podatkih zadnjih dveh popisov prebivalstva (2001 in 2011), in z analizo statističnih podatkov s področja izobraževanja poskušamo prikazati spremembe številčnosti in geografske razporeditve valižanske jezikovne skupnosti ter dinamike rabe valižanskega jezika v družinskem in šolskem okolju, ki so bile med drugim posledica postopnega oblikovanja jezikovne zakonodaje.

V drugem delu prispevka preverjamo, ali je veljavna jezikovna zakonodaja v Walesu spodbudila mobilizacijo različnih socialnih in družbenih skupin oziroma oblikovala dobre prakse, ki so imele dejanski učinek na številčnost govorcev valižanskega jezika, in poskušamo poiskati primere inovativnih in učinkovitih jezikovnih pobud za rabo valižanskega jezika, ki bi se morda lahko uporabile pri jezikovnem načrtovanju drugih manjšinskih jezikov. V zaključku povzemamo

glavne prednosti in slabosti jezikovnih politik in izbranih valižanskih jezikovnih pobud ter prednostna področja prihodnjega jezikovnega načrtovanja.

2. Metodologija

V okviru priprave prispevka smo analizirali domačo in tujo znanstveno literaturo s področij evropske jezikovne zakonodaje, jezikovne politike ter jezikovnih pravic in jezikovnega načrtovanja rabe valižanskega jezika. Analizirani so bili primarni in sekundarni podatkovni viri, ki se nanašajo na izbrano tematiko, pregledani pa so bili tudi popisni podatki zadnjih nekaj popisov prebivalstva (1971–2011). Izčrpno dodatno gradivo smo pridobili s terenskim delom in več študijskimi obiski Walesa.

3. Družbenopolitični razvoj Walesa in oblikovanje jezikovne politike

Družbenopolitične razmere in politični razvoj Walesa so vplivali na dinamiko jezikovnih praks valižanskega jezika. Kot urejeno v Zakonu o uniji (1536 in 1542), je po Williamsu (2000) valižanski jezik izgubil vlogo prevladujočega družbenega jezika, saj je ta vseboval določilo o prepovedi njegove rabe. Šele s sprejemom Zakona o rabi valižanskega jezika v sodstvu (1942), prav tako po Williamsu (2000), so bila določila, ki so rabo valižanskega jezika prepovedovala, ukinjena. Po Williamsu (2000) je jezik dodatno priznanje pridobil z uvedbo Zakona o valižanskem jeziku (1967), ki je sicer vseboval nejasno opredelitev enake obravnave angleškega in valižanskega jezika v Walesu – ta se je nanašala na rabo valižanskega jezika v sodnem pravu in pravnih postopkih, ne pa tudi na širok spekter rabe v javni upravi in formalnih jezikovnih pravic.

Britanska vlada je s procesom decentralizacije[9] načrtovanju revitalizacijskih jezikovnih politik dala večjo politično težo, z asimetrično vladno organiziranostjo in pojavom novih oblik regionalnega in lokalnega upravljanja pa so pridobile večji pomen. Z ustanovitvijo valižanske vlade se je začelo obdobje jezikovnega načrtovanja in oblikovanja vizije dvojezičnega Walesa, pristojnosti in odgovornost za načrtovanje jezikovnih politik so se iz centralne britanske vlade prenesle na civilno družbo in izvoljene predstavnike regionalne dvojezične vlade Walesa. Wales je uradno dvojezičnost prepoznal kot družbenopolitično realnost ter jo z oblikovanjem jezikovnih politik in poglobljeno dvojezičnostjo javnih institucij zakonodajno in institucionalno uredil.

Po Williamsu (2007) so bile centralne britanske vlade pri oblikovanja jezikovne zakonodaje[10] večkrat neodločne ter so sprejemale nezadostna in nejasna zakonodajna določila. V procesih evropske integracije ter večjega pomena evropskih regij in večjezičnosti se je njihov odnos do oblikovanja jezikovne

zakonodaje nekoliko spremenil. V Walesu se na nekaterih političnih področjih, na primer na področju jezikovne politike, vse bolj uveljavlja posvetovalna demokracija[11]. Jezikovna zakonodaja je v Walesu postopoma urejala področja družbene rabe valižanskega jezika. Z ureditvijo v Zakonu o valižanskem jeziku (1993) je bila uzakonjena enakovredna obravnava angleškega in valižanskega jezika, ustanovljen je bil tudi Odbor za valižanski jezik[12], ki je dobil vlogo osrednjega jezikovnega telesa pri načrtovanju rabe valižanskega jezika v različnih družbenih domenah. Eden izmed njegovih prednostnih ciljev je bil načrtovanje rabe valižanskega jezika, ki je bilo utemeljeno na sistemu jezikovnih načrtov javnih organizacij. Z reformo izobraževanja je bilo urejeno tudi področje rabe jezika v sistemu izobraževanja – valižanski jezik je kot samostojni obvezni predmet postal redni del nacionalnega kurikula (Zakon o reformi izobraževanja 1998). Z Zakonom o valižanskem jeziku (1993) so bila opredeljena tudi prednostna jezikovna vprašanja[13] različnih področij jezikovne politike. Kot je urejeno v Jezikovni strategiji za valižanske jezikovne ukrepe (2011), je bil po prenehanju delovanja Odbora za valižanski jezik v letu 2012 ustanovljen Urad jezikovnega komisarja[14]. Načini regulativnih vidikov uradne jezikovne politike so se spremenili, aktualne družbene jezikovne pobude na lokalni in regionalni ravni, ki so se oblikovale kot rezultat postopnega razvoja jezikovne zakonodaje, pa predstavljajo zgodovinsko zavezo vlade k oblikovanju in utrditvi dvojezičnega Walesa (Williams 2007).

4. Analiza popisnih statističnih podatkov

Jones (2012) navaja, da je bil prvi statistični popis v Walesu izveden leta 1801, pri čemer do popisa leta 1891 popisi niso vsebovali vprašanj o jezikovni rabi. Od leta 1891 je bilo v popis vključeno vsaj eno vprašanje o jeziku. Vprašanje se je do leta 1971 nanašalo na zmožnost govora v valižanskem ali angleškem jeziku. Do leta 1971 je popis vključeval vprašanje o zmožnosti branja in pisanja v valižanskem jeziku za tiste, ki so se opredelili za govorce jezika. Zadnji popis, ki je vseboval splošno vprašanje o zmožnosti govora v valižanskem jeziku, je bil izveden leta 1981. Leta 2001 se je oblika vprašanja spremenila v bolj nedvoumno v zvezi z jezikovnimi zmožnostmi in spretnostmi, hkrati pa je bilo prvič zastavljeno vprašanje, ali vprašani razumejo valižanski jezik. Popis iz leta 2011 je prvič vseboval tudi vprašanje o nacionalni identiteti prebivalstva.

Leta 1901 je v Walesu 50 odstotkov oziroma 929.800 prebivalcev govorilo valižansko. Število govorcev se je do leta 1971 znižalo za 29 odstotnih točk; leta 1971 je bilo 21 odstotkov oziroma 542.400 govorcev valižanskega jezika. V letu 1981 sta se število in delež govorcev še znižala, saj je valižansko govorilo 19 odstotkov oziroma 508.200 prebivalcev Walesa. Leta 1991 je bilo govorcev 18,5 odstotka oziroma 500.000 prebivalcev Walesa. Za obdobje 1971–1991 je bil pozitiven obrat značilen za število govorcev v mlajših starostnih skupinah. V

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starostni skupini 3–4 leta je leta 1971 valižansko govorilo 11 odstotkov otrok, leta 1991 pa 16 odstotkov. V enakem obdobju je bilo zaznati tudi povečanje deleža govorcev v vseh starostnih skupinah do 25 let (IWA 2016).

Podatki popisa iz leta 2001 so pokazali, da se je število govorcev po dolgem trendu upadanja ponovno povečalo, saj je v tem letu valižanski jezik govorilo 21 odstotkov oziroma 582.400 prebivalcev Walesa. Število govorcev se je do leta 2011 ponovno nekoliko zmanjšalo (562.200 govorcev), prav tako tudi delež znotraj celotne populacije Walesa (19 odstotkov) (IWA 2016).

Slika 1, 2: Delež govorcev valižanskega jezika, Wales, 1961 in 1991

Vir: prirejeno po Aitchinson in Carter (1994).

Po Jonesu (2012) se je med letoma 1991 in 2011 precej spremenila geografska razporeditev valižanske jezikovne skupnosti. Znatno se je povečal delež govorcev na jugovzhodu Walesa, kar je bila posledica reforme izobraževanja (1988), v štirih osrednjih okrajih s tradicionalno najvišjim deležem govorcev (Anglesey, Gwynedd, Ceredigion in Carmarthenshire) pa se je delež govorcev v tem obdobju znižal. Jones (2012) prav tako ugotavlja, da se je postopno začel zniževati tudi delež gospodinjstev, v katerih so bili vsi člani govorci valižanskega jezika, in ocenjuje, da je to z vidika vitalnosti jezikovne skupnosti in možnosti za njeno revitalizacijo velikega pomena – člani teh gospodinjstev namreč valižanski jezik najpogosteje uporabljajo tudi izven družinskega okolja. V letu 2011 je bilo v Walesu 1.209.000 gospodinjstev. Jones (2012, 6) ocenjuje, da je bilo od tega 11 odstotkov (ali 135.000 gospodinjstev) takih, v katerih so bili vsi

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člani zmožni govoriti valižansko. 28 odstotkov so predstavljala gospodinjstva, v katerih je bil govorec valižanskega jezika vsaj en član gospodinjstva. Kar 34 odstotkov vseh govorcev jezika (193.000) je živelo v gospodinjstvih, v katerih drugi člani valižanskega jezika niso govorili; od tega jih je tretjina živela v enočlanskem gospodinjstvu (Jones 2012, 54). V letu 2011 se je nadaljeval trend krčenja jezikovne skupnosti v tradicionalnih govornih okoljih. Za valižansko jezikovno skupnost sta značilni vse večja razpršenost in posledično izolacija govorcev (posebej tistih, ki se selijo v urbana lokalna okolja[15]), ki so vse pogosteje izpostavljeni le pasivni rabi jezika prek uporabe spleta in drugih sredstev obveščanja.

Slika 3: Primerjava deležev govorcev valižanskega jezika, Wales

Vir: prirejeno po Jones (2013).

Po Jonesu (2012) se je z reformo izobraževanja (1988) in oblikovanjem gibanja za valižanski jezik prek pobude Mudiad Meithrin začelo povečevati število oblikovanih predšolskih in šolskih skupin s poukom v valižanskem jeziku, pa tudi število vpisanih otrok v te skupine. V Walesu se je od 70. let prejšnjega stoletja do danes oblikovalo in deluje okrog 500 predšolskih in 500 šolskih skupin, ki jih v glavnem vodijo prostovoljci. V letu 1992 je predšolske skupine obiskovalo 10.246 otrok, v šolskem letu 2008/2009 pa že 12.031 otrok; od tega se jih je 87 odstotkov vpisalo naprej v osnovno šolo s poukom v valižanskem jeziku. Primerjava popisnih podatkov iz let 2001 in 2011 kaže, da je delež otrok v starosti 3–4 leta, ki so govorili valižansko, leta 2011 znašal 23,6 odstotka, medtem ko je leta 2001 znašal 18,8 odstotka. To dokazuje vitalno vlogo dvojezičnih predšolskih in šolskih skupin s poukom v valižanskem jeziku (Welsh. The Welsh Language in Education in the UK 2014).

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Povečalo se je tudi število šol s prevladujočim valižanskim jezikom pou-
čevanja. V šolskem letu 1993/1994 je delež teh šol znašal 27 odstotkov, v šolskem
letu 2008/2009 pa 31 odstotkov. Jones (2012) poudarja, da je povečanje
števila tovrstnih šol pomenilo pomembno ustvarjanje novih vstopnih mest za
usvajanje jezika učencev. Pozitiven učinek obveznega učenja valižanskega jezika
po vpeljani reformi je pomenilo tudi povečanje deleža učencev, ki (so) se jezika
učijo (učili) kot drugega jezika, in deleža razredov s poukom v valižanskem
jeziku. Od šolskega leta 1991/1992 (ko je 16 odstotkov učencev obiskovalo
razrede s poukom v valižanskem jeziku) do šolskega leta 2010/2011 se je delež
razredov s poukom v valižanskem jeziku povečal (21 odstotkov vseh razredov).
Delež razredov s poukom v valižanskem jeziku se je povečal v celotnem Walesu.
Povečevanje deleža učencev, tako Jones (2012), ki se valižanski jezik učijo
kot drugi jezik, se je začelo v šolskem letu 1987/1988, ko je bilo z ureditvijo v
Zakonu o reformi izobraževanja (1988) uvedeno obvezno učenje valižanskega
jezika kot drugega jezika.

Po Jonesu (2012) je v šolskem letu 2009/2010 7.090 učencev obiskovalo
uvajalno valižansko šolsko skupino; število vpisanih otrok je bilo podobno
strokovni oceni števila otrok, ki zapustijo igralne predšolske skupine. Najmlajši
otroci (stari 3–5 let) so vključeni v vrtčevske skupine ali sprejemni razred, kjer
ostanejo 1–2 leti, preden začnejo obiskovati 1. razred osnovne šole.

Po pričakovanjih naj bi bilo v višjih razredih osnovne šole že zaznati višji
delež otrok, ki so tekoči govorci valižanskega jezika, vendar podatki tega niso
pokazali. Jones (2012) tudi povzema, da je bilo v šolskem letu 2011/2012 med
otroki, starimi 5 let ali več, ki so doma govorili valižansko in so opravili 6 razredov
osnovne šole, le 8 odstotkov tekočih govorcev manjšinskega jezika in 5 odstotkov
govorcev valižanskega jezika med otroki, ki doma jezika niso uporabljali. Popisni
podatki iz leta 2001 so pokazali, da je 39 odstotkov vseh otrok v starosti 6–11 let
govorilo valižansko; delež je do leta 2011 padel na 38 odstotkov.

Število govorcev v starosti 7 let, ki so bili ocenjeni v valižanskem jeziku, se
je v obdobju 2003–2013 povečalo iz 6.538 učencev (19 odstotkov) v letu 2003
na 7.468 učencev (nekaj več kot 22 odstotkov) v letu 2013. Število učencev v
starosti 11 let, ki so bili ocenjeni v valižanskem jeziku, se je v enakem obdobju
zmanjšalo iz 6.961 na 6.193 v letu 2013, vendar se je njihov delež povečal iz 18
odstotkov na 20 odstotkov. Število učencev v starosti 16 let, ki so bili ocenjeni
v valižanskem jeziku, pa se je v tem obdobju povečalo iz 4.899 učencev (13
odstotkov) na 5.638 učencev (16 odstotkov) (Welsh. The Welsh Language in
Education in the UK 2014).

Dejstvo, da je valižanska jezikovna skupnost postala dvojezična, spreminja
naravo in kontekst jezikovne produkcije in reprodukcije. Valižansko jezikovno
skupnost danes označujejo številčna majhnost, krčenje tradicionalnih govornih
okolij, selitve v urbana okolja in nastanek vse bolj razpršenih in (večkrat)
izoliranih urbanih, virtualnih jezikovnih skupnosti. Jezikovna skupnost se sooča z

nizkimi stopnjami medgeneracijskega prenosa jezika, vse večjo razdrobljenostjo in omejenimi možnostmi izobraževanja v manjšinskem jeziku. Do sredine 20. stoletja so relativna marginalnost in sorazmerno stabilne stopnje jezikovne reprodukcije v družinskem okolju še ohranjale stabilnost jezikovne skupnosti, gospodarski in infrastrukturni razvoj ter urbanizacija in modernizacija skupaj z novimi migracijskimi tokovi pa so vplivali na demografsko transformacijo regionalnega območja Walesa. Zaradi nezmožnosti družin in družbe pri zagotavljanju zadostne stopnje reprodukcije za preživetje jezika je področje izobraževanja postalo prednostno področje revitalizacijskih pobud. Po Hodgesovi (2011, 57) Wales predstavlja regijo z decentraliziranimi pristojnostmi, v kateri se je od ustanovitve dvojezične valižanske vlade leta 1999 postopno povečal občutek valižanske identitete. Oblikovanje valižanske dimenzije nacionalnega kurikula, ki je sledila reformi šolstva leta 1989, prav tako ponuja vpogled v povečano zavedanje o valižanski identiteti in spoštovanju valižanskega jezika. Zakon o valižanskem jeziku (1993) je uzakonil enakovredno obravnavo angleškega in valižanskega jezika v javnem sektorju, aktualna ureditev v Jezikovni strategiji za valižanske jezikovne ukrepe (2011) pa naj bi z ustanovitvijo funkcije jezikovnega komisarja zagotovila njeno večjo zakonodajno pristojnost, kar bo morda lahko v bodoče dodatno vplivalo na javno mnenje.

5. Izbrani primeri inovativnih jezikovnih pobud za revitalizacijo valižanskega jezika

Za manjšinske jezikovne skupnosti je jezikovna zakonodaja, ki predvideva ustrezne jezikovne politične ukrepe, potrebna zaradi večinskega okolja, ki je večkrat odklonilno do obstoja in širše rabe manjšinskega jezika. Prispeva k uradnemu priznanju jezika in predstavlja okvir med pravom, birokratskim aparatom in javnostjo. Williams (2005) ugotavlja, da veljavna jezikovna zakonodaja postavlja standardne norme in jezikovna določila za manjšinske jezikovne storitve ter ustvarja normativne spremembe družbenega okolja, ki lahko posledično spodbujajo mobilizacijo različnih socialnih in družbenih skupin; vpliva namreč na izboljšanje vrednosti manjšinskega jezika in poglablja jezikovne zahteve znotraj posameznih jezikovnih domen. Te z oblikovanjem aktualnih jezikovnih pobud, ki odgovarjajo na potrebe jezikovne skupnosti, povečujejo možnosti za razširjeno rabo, vidnost in prestiž jezika. Williams (2005) še dodaja, da Wales v evropskem in svetovnem merilu na področju družbene rabe jezika predstavlja pester laboratorij inovativnih in celostnih dobrih praks, pri čemer jezikovne pobude odlikujejo strateška premišljenost, predanost ter celovito načrtovanje socialnih in družbenih mrež (mreženje).

Celovit sistem zgodnjega stika s starši novorojencev in nadaljnjega jezikovnega razvoja otrok v skupinah v okviru družbene pobude TwF (Rast) ter sistem predšolskih skupin do začetka osnovnega šolanja v okviru družbenih pobud

Mudiad Meithrin (2016) predstavljata primera dobre prakse. Koordinacija teh skupin z jezikovnimi tečaji, namenjenimi staršem, učinkovito odgovarja na razvojne potrebe valižanske jezikovne skupnosti. Po Edwardsovi in Pritchard Newcombovi (2005) inovativna pobuda TwF predstavlja učinkovit sistem svetovanja staršem v predporodnem in zgodnjem poporodnem obdobju. Namen te, v svetovnem merilu pionirske pobude je spodbujanje staršev k rabi preprostih fraz v valižanskem jeziku pri vsakodnevni komunikaciji z otrokom ter promocija dvojezičnosti v družinskem okolju in sistemu javnega zdravstva. Pobuda vključuje terenske strokovnjake, ki sodelujejo z valižansko govorečim medicinskim osebjem, patronažnimi delavci, babicami in zaposlenimi v poporodnih klinikah, s ciljem promovirati prednosti rabe valižanskega jezika v družinskem okolju in izobraževanje v tem jeziku. Namen prizadevanj je spodbuda staršem, da uporabljajo valižanski jezik (v družinah, kjer sta oba starša govorca valižanskega jezika) in da oblikujejo jezikovne prakse z uporabo angleškega in valižanskega jezika pri komuniciranju z otrokom v najzgodnejšem obdobju (v družinah, kjer je govorec eden izmed staršev). Za starše, ki niso govorci valižanskega jezika in ki jim primanjkuje samozavesti pri jezikovni pomoči svojim otrokom, v okviru pobude TwF terenski strokovnjaki pripravljajo in izvajajo delavnice za mlade starše in male otroke. TwF je oblikovala uporabno spletno stran z novicami, različnimi jezikovnimi viri za starše, nasveti in drugimi informacijami. Po Edwardsovi in Pritchard Newcombovi (2005) uporabno vrednost predstavlja kakovostno zasnovano izobraževanje terenskih strokovnjakov, ki pridobijo znanja za učinkovito soočanje z raznolikimi jezikovnimi situacijami; v valižansko govorečih družinskih okoljih je njihova prednostna vloga krepitev starševske odločitve za vsakodnevno rabo valižanskega jezika pri komunikaciji z otroki, v večinoma angleškem družinskem okolju pa predvsem podpora otrokom pri zgodnjem usvajanju jezika. Dodano vrednost predstavlja tudi zasnova socialno vključujočega koncepta, ki povezuje širok nabor javnih organizacij. Pobuda je bila strateško usmerjena na področje javnega zdravstva z intenzivnim sodelovanjem z mladimi starši. V naslednji razvojni fazi bodo v okviru pobude opredeljene ciljne skupine družin s specifičnimi demografskimi, jezikovnimi in osebnimi značilnostmi, ki potrebujejo intenzivnejšo podporo, v načrtovanje pa bodo vključeni tudi stari starši.

Mudiad Meithrin je prostovoljna družbena organizacija, ki je specializirana za ponudbo dejavnosti v valižanskem jeziku za otroke v zgodnjih otroških letih. Terenski sodelavci (predvideni so trije terenski delavci v posameznem okraju) delujejo na lokalni ravni. V lokalnih skupnostih, kjer primanjkuje organiziranih skupin za starše in otroke do 2. leta starosti, sodelujejo pri organiziranju teh skupin. Terenski sodelavci skupine spremljajo prvi 2 leti delovanja, nato pa delovanje prevzame lokalna skupnost. Terenski sodelavci skupinam nudijo vse potrebne informacije in podporo, spremljajo pa tudi oblikovanje podpornih igralnih skupin (igralnic) – Cylchhoedd Meithrin, ki jih je po Jonesu (2012) do

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danes v Walesu nastalo okrog 500, namenjene pa so otrokom, starim 2–4 leta. Pozitiven učinek delovanja skupin je oblikovanje številnih družbenih lokalnih starševskih omrežij. Mudiad Meithrin prek svetovalnic in spodbud staršem za domačo rabo valižanskega jezika omogoča podporo 60–65 odstotkom staršem, ki niso govorci manjšinskega jezika, hkrati pa pripravlja svetovalne sheme za družine z otroki s posebnimi potrebami.

Za celovitejše načrtovanje sprememb jezikovnih vzorcev pri izbiri jezika in za starševsko podporo sta bila znotraj valižanske jezikovne skupnosti oblikovana sistema družinskih jezikovnih tečajev in tečajev za starše z dojenčki. Jezikovni tečaji Valižanski jezik od zibelke predstavljajo sistem podpore staršem z dojenčki. Vključujejo učenje preprostega besedišča in pesmi, ki se uporabljajo pri komunikaciji z dojenčki pri vsakodnevnih dejavnostih (pri hranjenju, kopanju itd.). Sistem 2-letnih družinskih tečajev Valižanski jezik za družino, ki ponuja podporo staršem in varuhom otrok, je namenjen usposobljenju družin za rabo jezika v vsakodnevni domači komunikaciji, v katerih starša nista govorca valižanskega jezika. Cilj tečajev je tudi spodbujanje zanimanja otrok za branje vse od najzgodnejših let in spodbujanje staršev h kasnejšemu vpisu otrok v šole s poukom v valižanskem jeziku. Kot dopolnitev te ponudbe so organizirane jezikovne učne delavnice za starše Učni dnevi valižanskega jezika za družino, ob katerih je organizirana igra otrok v valižanskem jeziku (Williams 2007).

Po Williamsu (2007) je Athrawon Bro inovativna mreža področnih terenskih učiteljev, ki zagotavlja podporo priseljenskim družinam. Predstavlja specialistično ekipo učiteljev, ki prihajajo iz štirih tradicionalnih govornih okrajev, in pripravlja gradivo v podporo učiteljem pri zagotavljanju odličnosti izobraževanja v valižanskem jeziku ob srečevanju z najrazličnejšimi okoliščinami vse intenzivnejših selitvenih tokov. Vloga specialistične ekipe je v promociji in izmenjavi primerov dobrih praks visokokakovostnega poučevanja in učenja v valižanskem jeziku z namenom spodbujati oblikovanje lokalnih mrež šol.

6. Vrednotenje jezikovnih pobud in perspektive za prihodnje načrtovanje jezikovnih politik v Walesu

Williams (2007) poudarja, da je Wales pridobil mednarodni sloves zaradi inovacij in pionirskega razvoja jezikovne revitalizacije in kulturne vitalnosti v 60. in 70. letih prejšnjega stoletja. Valižanske jezikovne pobude so bile med drugim uspešne zaradi vztrajnega spodbujanja posvetovalne demokracije, celostnega jezikovnega načrtovanja vseh deležnikov jezikovne rabe in mreženja na različnih nivojih. Prednosti načrtovanja družbene rabe valižanskega jezika so njegova strateška premišljenost, zavestno načrtovanje in dokaj celovit razvoj nekaterih segmentov jezikovne podpore (npr. starševska podpora, podpora zgodnjemu stiku z manjšinskim jezikom). Prednostne pobude za normalizacijo rabe jezika so se nanašale na načrtovanje rabe manjšinskega jezika v družinskem

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okolju ter med otroki in mladimi, pa tudi na celovito načrtovanje šolstva v valižanskem jeziku, da bi zagotovile ustrezni nivo določil in standardov javnih jezikovnih storitev. Omejitve za še učinkovitejše revitalizacijske jezikovne politike predstavljajo strukturne nedorečenosti veljavne jezikovne zakonodaje, nezadostna razpoložljivost jezikovnih storitev in nezadostno spremljanje (monitoring) uresničevanja jezikovnih ciljev. Zagotavljanje polno delujočih in uspešnih jezikovnih politik bo v prihodnje možno prek sistema družbenega inženiringa, ki za svoje delovanje potrebuje finančne injekcije, usposobljenost kadra in (še prej) politično podporo. Kljub družbenopolitičnemu prehodu k bolj horizontalnim oblikam vladanja in poudarjenemu pomenu posvetovalne demokracije v Walesu obstaja nevarnost, da jezikovni načrti v praksi zaradi (še vedno) prevladujočega vodenja politike od zgoraj navzdol in pomanjkanja lokalnih zavez ne bi bili uspešni.

Po predhodnih raziskovalnih ugotovitvah Williamsa (2000) ključen izziv dvojezičnega okolja in jezikovnih izbir Walesa predstavlja optimizacija pogojev za spontano rabo jezika v vseh vidikih družbenega življenja. Nekateri valižanskim jezikovnim pobudam očitajo tudi zapostavljenost načrtovanja jezikovne reprodukcije v vse bolj jezikovno razdrobljenih tradicionalnih govornih okoljih, zato bo v prihodnjem obdobju za nadaljnjo revitalizacijo valižanskega jezika in uspešno doseganje strateških ciljev jezikovnih politik potrebno spodbujanje jezikovne reprodukcije v večinskih valižansko govorečih družinah. Ob tem velja poudariti veliko vlogo dvojezičnega šolstva in produkcije jezika prek izobraževalnega sistema, ki lahko močno vpliva na mlajše generacije govorcev, hkrati pa se postavlja vprašanje jezikovne lojalnosti mlajše generacije, če bo živela v okolju, kjer se valižanski jezik večinoma uporablja kot drugi jezik in ni prva logična jezikovna izbira. Fragmentacija in upad domen rabe jezika sta odraz mnogih valižanskih jezikovnih skupnosti na lokalni ravni. Vprašanje, ki se ob tem postavlja, je, ali se valižanski jezik lahko ohrani brez avtohtonega teritorialnega osrčja kot osnove jezikovnih virov. Za prebivalce Walesa velik izziv predstavlja prilagoditev večinskega prebivalstva spreminjajoči se sestavi prebivalstva. Mestna območja Walesa (Cardiff, Swansea in Newport) se soočajo z dvojnim izzivom absorpcije novih govorcev angleškega jezika in šolskim sistemom izobraževanja v valižanskem jeziku, ki išče načine za ohranitev vpeljanega dvojezičnega izobraževalnega sistema ob novih tokovih priseljencev z vsega sveta. Kljub naporom za revitalizacijo valižanske jezikovne skupnosti v okviru izobraževanja, uvedbi obveznega predmeta valižanskega jezika in povečevanju števila šol s poukom v valižanskem jeziku glavni jezik rabe pri otrocih večinoma ostaja angleški. V območjih z nizkim deležem govorcev valižanskega jezika in brez staršev govorcev imajo otroci relativno malo možnosti za rabo jezika izven šolskega okolja, kar ima velik vpliv na pogostost rabe manjšinskega jezika. Poudarek dosedanjih jezikovnih pobud je bil na področjih izobraževanja in javne rabe manjšinskega jezika, zaostaja pa področje načrtovanja jezikovnega

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razvoja v zasebnem in prostovoljnem sektorju (Williams 2007). Za čim učin-
kovitejše načrtovanje in izvajanje jezikovnih politik po Williamsu (2005)
navsezadnje ni zanemarljivo odgovoriti tudi na vprašanje, kako lahko partnerstva
med centralnimi in lokalnimi javnimi organizacijami ter prostovoljni sektor
v prihodnje zagotovijo mobilizacijo družbene energije in okrepijo jezikovno
promocijo in izvajanje jezikovnih pravic v praksi.

7. Zaključek

Povečevanje jezikovne raznolikosti zaradi evropskih migracijskih procesov,
aktiven proces revitalizacije manjšinskih jezikovnih skupnosti in tudi vse večja
jezikovna raznolikost urbanih regij ter večkrat neurejena raba manjšinskih jezikov
na področjih javnih storitev v sodobnem času pogojujejo princip oblikovanja
jezikovnih politik. V regionalnem okolju Walesa se je uveljavil model, ki temelji
na principu enakosti posameznikov in lokalnih območij; upravljanje državnega
aparata temelji na višji stopnji izenačenosti in decentralizacije ter predstavlja
pluralistični proces, ki vključuje različne družbeno-socialne skupine. Politiko
jezikovnega načrtovanja v Walesu oblikujejo v glavnem vladne agencije in krovna
jezikovna telesa, ki delujejo v tesnem sodelovanju z regionalno vlado. Politični
konsenz in zaveza jezikovne zakonodaje k utrjevanju in spodbujanju širše rabe
valižanskega jezika sta vodila v spremenjen odnos javnosti do njegove rabe in
dvojezične družbe. Rezultat družbenih jezikovnih pobud je bil tudi oblikovanje
ločenega nacionalnega kurikula za izobraževanje v valižanskem jeziku. Zaradi
migracijskih in globalizacijskih tokov se valižanska jezikovna skupnost sooča z
vse kompleksnejšimi spremembami identitete v lokalnih okoljih, ki postajajo vse
bolj večjezična; del naporov za revitalizacijo jezikovne skupnosti je bil uspešen
in je prek oblikovanja družbenih in socialnih lokalnih mrež vplival na povečanje
števila govorcev valižanskega jezika, na zanimanje za rabo valižanskega jezika s
strani negovorcev ter na družbeno mobilizacijo in standard jezikovnih storitev.

Učinek najinovativnejših jezikovnih pobud, ki so se nanašale na zgodnji stik
z valižanskim jezikom (pobuda TwF in različni jezikovni tečaji), in promocija
izobraževanja v valižanskem jeziku (prek pobud Mudiad Meithrin) sta po
Williamsu (2005) povečala zanimanja staršev, ki niso govorci valižanskega jezika,
za vpis otrok v šole s poukom v valižanskem jeziku, saj se poleg povečevanja
števila šol in razredov, ki nudijo pouk v valižanskem jeziku, povečuje tudi število
otrok, vpisanih v te šole. Spodbudno je tudi, da se je število govorcev v starosti
5–15 let povečalo, prav tako se je povečala raba jezika v novih kontekstih/
domenah (Welsh. The Welsh Language in Education in the UK 2014). Kljub
povečanemu številu mladih, ki so vpisani v šole s poukom v valižanskem jeziku in
v dvojezične šole, ter kljub večji razširjenosti rabe valižanskega jezika v različnih
domenah rabe jezika pa še vedno ostaja razlog za skrb. V severnem in zahodnem
delu Walesa, ki sta predstavljala tradicionalni govorni okolji valižanskega jezika,

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se delež govorcev zmanjšuje. Na zmanjšanje deleža govorcev je med drugim vplivalo razmerje med priselitvami in odselitvami, veliko mladih se je v iskanju zaposlitve odselilo v urbana okolja (Welsh Language Strategy 2012-2017). Postavlja se tudi vprašanje v zvezi z obsegom dejanske rabe valižanskega jezika med mladimi po koncu šolskega obdobja. Za zagotavljanje prihodnje rabe valižanskega jezika tako postaja vse pomembnejše načrtovanje rabe valižanskega jezika v gospodarskem sektorju, pojavlja pa se tudi potreba po poklicnem izobraževanju v tem jeziku (Welsh. The Welsh Language in Education in the UK 2014).

Prednostna prihodnja zaveza Walesa je v skladu z aktualno jezikovno strategijo (Welsh Language Strategy 2012-2017utrditev rabe valižanskega jezika v vsakodnevnem življenju. Prednostni cilji se nanašajo na povečanje števila prebivalstva, ki govori in uporablja valižanski jezik v vsakodnevnih situacijah, ustvarjanje novih priložnosti za rabo jezika, utrjevanje jezikovne spretnosti govorcev in položaj valižanskega jezika v Walesu, pa tudi na zagotovitev močnejše zastopanosti valižanskega jezika v sodobnih digitalnih medijih.

Izkušnja nekaterih izbranih jezikovnih pobud v Walesu dokazuje, da miroljubni in vztrajni pritiski za družbene reforme lahko preobrazijo stoletja trajajočo državno diskriminacijo in vodijo v bolj pluralno, demokratično in pozitivno zasnovano civilno družbo (Williams 2013) ter da načrtovanje rabe valižanskega jezika predstavlja laboratorij, ki je oblikoval nekatere dobre prakse, ki so imele pozitiven učinek na odnos do valižanskega jezika, zaradi povečanega zanimanja staršev za izobraževanje v valižanskem jeziku pa tudi na številčnost valižanske jezikovne skupnosti.

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Notes

1   Narodne ali nacionalne manjšine običajno predstavljajo podaljšek naroda, ki živi v sosednji ali drugi državi. Najpogosteje so to obmejne manjšine, katerih večina matičnega naroda živi v sosednji državi (Kosic idr. 2013).

2   Narodi brez države so narodi, ki so oblikovali idejo o lastni državi, a je iz različnih političnih in družbenih razlogov nimajo (npr. Kurdi ali Katalonci) (Kosic idr. 2013).

3   Etnične skupnosti so skupnosti, katerih pripadnike združujeta jezik in kultura, a niso razvili političnih idej o samostojni organiziranosti ali svoji državi (Kosic idr. 2013).

4   Regionalni jeziki so (evropski) zgodovinski ali avtohtoni jeziki, ki so značilni za omejena območja, govorci pa nimajo naroda s svojo državo, v kateri je ta jezik državni ali uradni jezik (npr. valižanski jezik v Združenem kraljestvu) (Kosic idr. 2013).

5   Najsorodnejši je bretonskemu in kornižanskemu keltskemu jeziku, podoben pa je tudi irskemu in škotskemu keltskemu jeziku ter jeziku manx.

6   Po Kovačičevi (2010) zakonsko podlago predstavlja Zakon o rasnih odnosih (sprejet 1976, spremenjen 2000), v katerem se uporablja izraz rasne skupine; ta izraz vključuje širok razpon opredeljevanja manjšin, mednje pa spadajo naslednje manjšinske skupnosti: Škoti, Irci, Valižani itd.

7   Pokrajina na jugozahodu Združenega kraljestva, ki obsega območje med Liverpoolom na severu, bristolskim kanalom na jugu in približno upravno mejo iz trinajstega stoletja na vzhodu (Brezigar 2001).

8   Http://www.s4c.cymru/en/.

9   Po Williamsu (2007) decentralizacija britanske vlade predstavlja proces asimetričnih strukturnih sprememb, ki je leta 1998 oblikoval nov statut (Zakon o valižanski vladi) in v Walesu ustanovil dvojezični državni zbor. Ta decentralizacija je med drugim vplivala na spremembo oblik vladanja. Slabost decentraliziranega sistema je, da administracije decentraliziranih območij niso obvezane zagotoviti izvedbe britanskih političnih ciljev, britanska vlada pa nima političnih mehanizmov znotraj posameznih področij, ki bi ji omogočali uskladitev s cilji regionalnih območij.

10 Temeljno jezikovno zakonodajo predstavljajo Zakon o valižanskem jeziku (1993), Zakon o reformi izobraževanja (1988), Zakon o valižanski vladi (1998), jezikovne pobude Mentrau Iaith, Nacionalni akcijski načrt za dvojezični Wales Iaith Pawb (2003), Jezikovna strategija za valižanske jezikovne ukrepe Welsh Language Measures (2011) ter Jezikovna strategija za valižanski jezik A living language (Welsh Language Strategy 2012-2017).

11 Posvetovalna demokracija pomeni horizontalno obliko vladanja, ki poudarja posvetovalno načrtovanje regionalnih izobraževalnih programov, programov javne kulture in javnega financiranja, vključuje pa posvetovalne ankete, vladne pobude, spletne programe in skupinske analize ter javna posvetovanja.

12 Odbor za valižanski jezik je predstavljal osrednje enotno jezikovno telo, katerega vloge so bile svetovanje javnim organizacijam, ki pripravljajo jezikovne načrte, določanje prioritet jezikovnega načrtovanja, zasledovanje strateških ciljev, oblikovanje inovativnih tržnih promocijskih kampanj

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in pobud za prostovoljni in javni sektor ter oblikovanje mrežnih partnerstev za širitev domen rabe vališanskega jezika.

[13] Prednostna jezikovna vprašanja se nanašajo na promocijo rabe manjšinskega jezika, uvedbo jezikovnih standardov rabe jezika za zagotavljanje enakovredne rabe vališanskega in angleškega jezika ter spodbujanje širitve domen za rabo vališanskega jezika.

[14] Funkcija jezikovnega komisarja je bila ustanovljena leta 2012 po prenehanju delovanja Odbora za vališanski jezik zaradi težnje vlade po kontroli področja jezikovne politike ter predstavlja glavnega promotorja družbene rabe vališanskega jezika v Walesu in na evropski ravni (Williams 2013).

[15] Jones (2012) ocenjuje, da v urbanih okoljih Walesa danes živi okoli 40 odstotkov vališanske jezikovne skupnosti.

Andreja Sršen

Konstrukcija identiteta u sociološkom diskursu

U radu se propituje postmoderni sociološki diskurs o identitetu koji ga promatra kao formu individualne i društvene egzistencije. Unutar te forme uvijek je prepoznatljiv njegov prirodno-povijesni i esencijalistički koncept. Unutar sociologijske analize pojma identiteta potiču se dvije istraživačke tradicije. Prva je, simbolički interakcionizam, prema kojemu se identitet oblikuje kao međusobno djelovanje socijalnih aktera. Druga istraživačka tradicija naslanja se na uporabu pojma smisla, odnosno na važnost smisla u oblikovanju socijalnog djelovanja. Procesi moderne dovode u pitanje tradicionalno jedinstvo identiteta. Tezom o presudnoj važnosti identiteta kao refleksivne stvarnosti moderniteta danas se mogu pokrivati svi društveni akteri i oblici društvenog djelovanja koji postaju prikladna diskurzivna jezgra za stvaranje nove identitetske paradigme.

Ključne riječi: identitet, refleksivnost, modernitet, postmoderni diskurs, simbolički interakcionizam, socijalno djelovanje.

The Construction of Identity in Sociological Discourse

The paper deals with post-modern sociological discourse on identity; this is viewed as a form of individual and social existence. Within it, identity is always recognizable by virtue of its natural-historical and essentialist concept. Within the sociological analysis of the concept of identity two research traditions are pursued. The first is symbolic interactionism, according to which identity is formed by the interactions of social actors. The second tradition relies on the use of the term "sense," i.e., sense of the importance of shaping social action. Modern processes question the traditional unity of identity. Nowadays the theory about the crucial importance of identity as a reflexive reality of modernity relates to all social actors and forms of social action that become the appropriate discursive core for the creation of a new paradigm of identity..

Keywords: *identity, reflexivity, modernity, postmodern discourse, symbolic interactionism, social action.*

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Konstrukcija identitete v sociološkem diskurzu

V prispevku je obravnavan postmoderni sociološki diskurz o identiteti, ki jo ima ta za obliko individualne in družbene eksistence. Identiteta je znotraj te oblike vedno prepoznavna po naravnem zgodovinskem in esencialističnem konceptu. V okviru sociološke analize koncepta identitete se pojavljata dve raziskovalni tradiciji. Prva je simbolični interakcionizem, po katerem se identiteta oblikuje kot interakcija družbenih akterjev. Druga raziskovalna tradicija pa sloni na rabi pojma smisel oziroma pomembnost oblikovanja socialnega delovanja. Moderni družbeni procesi izpodbijajo tradicionalno enovitost identitete. Dandanes se teze o bistvenem pomenu identitete kot refleksivne realnosti modernega časa lahko nanašajo na vse družbene akterje in oblike družbenega delovanja, ki tako postajajo priročno diskurzivno jedro za oblikovanje nove identitetne paradigme.

Ključne besede: *identiteta, refleksivnost, modernost, postmoderni diskurz, simbolični interakcionizem, družbeno delovanje.*

1. Uvod

Identitet je kao pojmovni konstrukt danas postao nositeljem najrazličitijih konkretnih određenja upozoravajući tako na karakter i značenje postmoderne obnove identitetske tematike. U tom kontekstu tema rada ima za cilj rasvijetliti međuodnos njegove diskurzivne i empirijske pojavnosti. Stoga se u radu iznose razlozi zašto ovaj pojam postaje sve više središnji interes praktičnog djelovanja i zašto zbog svoje višeznačnosti ostaje i dalje razapet između esencijalističih težnji i konstruktivističkih objektivnosti. Potom se razrađuje teza da ovaj pojam danas, u želji da sudjeluje u ravnoteži socijalnih, političkih, ekonomskih i kulturnih društvenih subjekata, postaje zapravo manipulativni koncept. Postmodernistička fragmentacija društva svakako pogoduje tomu zbog narušavanja, više ili manje, ustaljene strukture društva u kojoj se pojam identiteta dovodi u dvije krajnjosti – od njegova apsolutiziranja do njegove relativizacije.

Početkom 19. stoljeća identitet se pojavljuje kao znanstveno, političko i kulturno pitanje. Nije nikakva slučajnost da se upravo s pojavom prosvjetiteljstva, procesom industrijalizacije, nestajanjem feudalizma i opadanjem religijskog autoriteta pojavljuju rasprave o uspostavljanju nove društvene ravnoteže naslanjajući se na tezu o emancipaciji pojedinca i različitih društvenih grupa. Svi ti procesi ruše dotadašnji sustav vrijednosti što je posljedično dovelo i do jačanja novih uporišta individualnog i kolektivnog doživljavanja, percipiranja i reflektiranja svijesti o identitetu. Takvo stanje dovelo je do krize identiteta u socijalizaciji pojedinca. Naime, novi društveni koncepti zahtijevali su nove društvene forme za oblikovanje identiteta, pa je takvo "anomično sociokulturno stanje zahtijevalo model jastva koji će s jedne strane omogućiti osjećaj kontinuirane osobne

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istosti jastva kroz vrijeme, a s druge strane, omogućiti prilagodljivost na brze društvene promjene i procese diferencijacije" (Cifrići & Nikodem 2006, 174). Nove društvene promjene dovele su do procesa destabilizacije i delegitimizacije određenih društvenih struktura budući da su čimbenici na kojima se temeljio osjećaj kontinuiteta, kao što su preci, tradicija, zavičaj, zajednica, klasa, bili destabilizirani, a oni koji su pružali osjećaj različitosti, primjerice, društveni položaj i religija bili delegitimizirani. U svjetlu takvih promjena Kalanj (2010) navodi kako identitet postaje "prikladno diskurzivno pribježište za nove kanonizirajuće rekonstrukcije ili revizije povijesti, za rastakanje društvene sadašnjosti i za oblikovanje društvene budućnosti koja počiva na pretpostavkama najrazličitijih, teško uskladivih identitetskih strategija i fragmentacija" (Kalanj 2010, 118). Ideja identiteta u moderni postaje nova osnova po kojoj se pojedincima i grupama počinju pripisivati univerzalna građansko-politička prava u duhu nove liberalne doktrine "iz koje, u javnoj sferi, izrastaju stranke i parlamenti kao organizirani pluralistički oblici izražavanja individualnih volja i njihovih interesnih projekcija" (Kalanj 2007, 114). U tom svjetlu samoprepoznavanje grupe prati percepcija činjenica da se u novim vrijednostima i simbolima prepoznaju, ili ne prepoznaju, pa tako vrijednosti u koje su donedavno svi vjerovali, postaju zamijenjeni novom idejom zajedništva. Ta ideja zajedništva ogleda se u kontekstu postmodernističke koncepcije nacije Benedicta Andersona (1990) koji daje svoju definiciju nacije: "To je zamišljena politička zajednica, i to zamišljena kao istodobno inherentno ograničena i suverena" (Anderson 1990, 17). Smith u tumačenju Andersonove definicije zamišljene građanske zajednice navodi kako "pod uvjetom da je politička, omeđena i suverena, svaku zamišljenu zajednicu – bio to grad-država, kraljevstvo ili neko kolonijalno carstvo s jedinstvenim *lingua franca* – njezini pripadnici mogu odrediti kao naciju" (Smith 2003, 141). Iz Andersonovog modernističkog okvira da se zaključiti kako pojavu novih tipova identiteta, unutar kojih se pojavljuju novi oblici društvene integracije temeljene na novim granicama individualnog i kolektivnog identiteta, prati ideja "da se nacija otpočetka doživljavala u jeziku, ne u krvi, i da je mogla biti 'izumljena' kao zamišljena zajednica" (Anderson 1991, 145).

S obzirom na navedenu temu, kao i njezin cilj, pravac rasprave ide u smjeru tako da se u prvom poglavlju raspravlja o konceptualnoj tvorbi identiteta, tj. odnosu esencijalizama i konstruktivizama koji proizlazi iz disimetričnih odnosa moći. U drugom se poglavlju raspravlja o identitetu kao novom pojmovnom konstruktu gdje se određuju njegova najopćenitija uporišta unutar društvenog područja identitetskih analiza. Potom će, u idućem poglavlju, biti riječi o ulozi simboličkih kôdova kolektivnog identiteta gdje se analizira njihova tipologija. I konačno, rasprava završava s poglavljem o postmoderni gdje se identitet sagledava u refleksiji globalizacije.

2. Konceptualna tvorba identiteta – esencijalizam i konstruktivizam

Kada je riječ o pojmu identiteta u sociološkom diskursu njegovo značenje ovisi o povijesnim i društvenim prilikama u kojima se koncipira, pa je kao takav "konceptualna tvorba koja ima određenu funkciju, bez obzira da li je relativiziramo ili apsolutiziramo" (Kalanj 2010, 120). Drugim riječima, konceptualizacija identiteta općenito može se opisati kao shvaćanje identiteta kao fiksnog, trajnog, esencijalnog, za razliku od promjenjivog i socijalno konstruiranog identiteta. Problem s konstrukcijom identiteta uvijek se veže uz značenje identiteta koje je "uvijek uklopljeno u neke međuljudske i društvene odnose i stoga su, sa sociološkog stajališta, najbliže zbiljskoj istini stvari oni koji drže da je to relacijski ili relacionistički koncept" (Kalanj 2010, 120). Prema nekim autorima (Kalanj 2008, Barth 1997) "relacijskoj naravi identiteta očigledno najviše odgovara konstrukcionistički pristup, koji danas prevladava u području identitetskih analiza" (Kalanj 2010, 120). Esencijalističko shvaćanje identiteta počiva na esencijalnoj prirodi "kao bit koja ne podliježe evoluciji i na koju ni pojedinac ni grupa nemaju nikakva utjecaja" (Kalanj 2003, 53). U tom smislu esencijalistički pristup kao takav "nije daleko od uvjerenja da je identitet praktički upisan u genetsko naslijeđe, iz čega vrlo lako može proizaći rasijalizacija pojedinaca i grupa" (Kalanj 2003, 54). U tom kontekstu identitet uvijek izražava određeni tip odnosa koji počiva na tenziji između esencijalizma i konstruktivizma gdje "osnovni put osporavanja esencijalizma je upozoravanje na socijalne i kulturne procese na kojima su identiteti konstruirani i koji ih mijenjaju" (Calhoun 1994, 14). Esencijalistički shvaćen identitet uvijek počiva na nekoj svojoj prirodnoj datosti, objektivnosti, biološkoj određenosti, povijesnoj zadanosti i nikada ne podliježe rekonstrukciji. Sa stajališta esencijalizma opravdano je postaviti pitanje o "pravom" identitetu (Sekulić 2010, 29). Nasuprot tomu, konstruktivistički shvaćen identitet počiva na socijalnim i kulturnim konstruiranim granicama. Osnovni put osporavanja esencijalizma za konstruktiviste jest da esencijalistički mišljen koncept identiteta kao takav ne postoji, te da shvaćanje identiteta nije ništa drugo do razumijevanja povijesnog procesa njegove konstrukcije. Iz ovih dviju orijentacija se i izvlače fundamentalno različita sociološka stajališta kada je riječ o konceptualnoj tvorbi identiteta. Postmodernističko shvaćanje identitetske fragmentacije (Anderson 1990, Giddens 1991) ide u smjeru narušavanja više ili manje ustaljene strukture nekog društva. U tom smislu, kada je riječ o strukturi u kojoj se percipira i reflektira identitet, bilo u svojoj esencijalističkoj ili konstruktivističkoj formi, ona uvijek obuhvaća unutrašnje i vanjsko, pojedinačno i opće, individualno i društveno. Identitet unutar tih odnosa i veza uvijek proizlazi iz zbiljskih nejednakosti i disimetričnih odnosa moći. Konstrukcija identiteta prvotno polazi od simboličkog zamišljanja samoga sebe, a ta slika uvijek ovisi i o drugima. Zbog toga dolazi do određene vrste

sučeljavanja unutar društvene strukture individualnog djelovanja i čovjekove sposobnosti da prerađuje prirodu oko sebe kao i dio vlastite prirode. To se najprije očituje u odnosu urođenog i stečenog u konstituciji identiteta. Neki autori različito gledaju na takav odnos, pa ih u jednoj općoj klasifikaciji možemo podijeliti na nativiste i kulturaliste (Katunarić 2010, 52). Nativisti vjeruju da je u tvorbi osobnog identiteta presudno prirodno naslijeđe, genetska struktura, odnosno biološka podloga čovjeka, za razliku od kulturalista[1] koji su uvjereni u presudnost stečenog kao i u čovjekove sposobnosti da prerađuje prirodu oko sebe kao i dio vlastite prirode (Katunarić 2010, 52).

Značenje identiteta je uvijek uklopljeno u neke međuljudske i društvene odnose. Kako su ti odnosi konstantni ili raznoliki, shodno tomu, su konstantni ili raznoliki koncepcijski pojmovi identiteta. Relacijskoj naravi identiteta, ipak najviše odgovara konstrukcionistički pristup, koji danas prevladava u području identitetskih analiza (Kalanj 2008; Barth 1997).

3. Identitet kao novi pojmovni konstrukt

Najopćenitija uporišta identiteta unutar društvenog područja identitetskih analiza su: obitelj, religija, klasa, rod i etnicitet zbog čega Brubaker "predlaže tri pojmovne inačice koje su, po njegovu mišljenju, analitički operacionalnije, a to su zajedničnost, grupnost i povezanost" (Brubaker 2001, 66). U skladu s tim, identitet kao forma društvene i individualne egzistencije uvijek ide u dva smjera. Prvi se odnosi na to kako netko vidi samoga sebe i kako ga vide drugi, a drugi se očituje u želji i mogućnosti da se te želje ostvare unutar čovjekove prirode koju sam prerađuje i prilagođava svojim potrebama. S obzirom na potonju činjenicu vidimo da je čovjekov identitet zapravo vezan uz stvaranje uvjeta svojega postojanja. U tom kontekstu sagledavamo i tezu o čovjeku kao *conditio humana*,[2] kao generičkom biću koji neprestano stvara i uvijek je otvoren budućnosti. Stoga, u konceptualnoj tvorbi identitet danas sve više određuje ono što će biti, a ne ono što jest. Upravo na tom tragu u okviru teorije refleksivne modernizacije Ulricha Becka (Beck & Grande 2006) očituje se razlikovanje kolektivnih identiteta u doba druge moderne ili globalizacije. Postmodernističko shvaćanje identiteta unutar sociološkog diskursa ne dvoji da su identiteti promjenjivi, fluidni i da uvijek postoji mogućnost stjecanja novih (Beck & Grande 2006). U tom smislu temeljna razlika u teorijskom pristupu proučavanja identiteta obično se odnosi na procese koji utječu na identitet i subjekte koji ga kao takvog definiraju. Društveni subjekti su, ne tako davno, imali mnogobrojne okosnice oko kojih su konstruirali svoj identitet, kao što su, obitelj, nacija, društvena klasa, etnička skupina i druge. Međutim, moderna društva, a napose postmoderna, uvode više izvora identiteta koji presijecaju prijašnje proizvodeći složeniji obrazac identiteta i pripadnosti. U tom kontekstu kada promatramo identitet kao pojmovni konstrukt unutar sociološkog diskursa on se prikazuje kroz određene relacijske odnose koji se prema nekim autorima mogu svesti na pet temeljnih individualnih ili kolektivnih

odnosa: "odnos prema sebi, prema drugima, prema svijetu, prema prirodi i prema Bogu" (Cifrić 2004, 221-255). Kao što je prethodno rečeno relacijskoj naravi identiteta najviše odgovara konstrukcionistički pristup. U znanstvenoj praksi napušta se koncept esencijalizma gdje se upozorava sve više na socijalne i kulturne procese na kojima su identiteti konstruirani (Calhoun 1994, 14). Smjer socijalno biheviorističke kulturalne antropologije Georga Herberta Meada daje teorijski uvid u složenost osobnog identiteta kroz simbolički interakcionizam uma, osobe i društva (Mead 2003). Za Meada je o identitetu teško govoriti kao o priključenosti na društvenu strukturu ili politički poredak, već je od primarne važnosti doživljaj i percepcija društvenog obzorja vrijednosti. Za razliku od funkcionalizma koji je koncentriran na objektivnu stranu socijalne strukture simbolički interakcionizam polazi od subjektivnog svijeta kojeg pojedinac gradi u interakciji s drugima (Mead 2003). Za daljnju raspravu važno je napomenuti kako polazišna točka simboličkog interakcionizma nije svijest kao takva, već ključnu ulogu ima jezik kao skup značenjskih simbola. Ipak, Mead smatra kako svijest ima puno važniju ulogu kao društveni proces gdje se jasno razlikuje individua i uloga koju igra. Na toj razlikovnoj osnovi i zasniva se koncept shvaćanja da uloge jesu identiteti. Polazeći od radikalne biheviorističke pretpostavke da socijalna psihologija započinje s proučavanjem opažljivih aktivnosti, dakle sa socijalnom akcijom i interakcijom, "Mead proširuje biheviorizam u dva smjera: u područje svijesti i u područje društva" (Ritzer 1997, 185).

Svijest u Meadovoj teoriji poprima karakter društvenog procesa, odnosno za njega "svijest je funkcionalna, a ne supstantivna" (Mead 1934, 112). Dakle, mogli bismo reći da je riječ o identitetu koji nastaje kroz razmišljanje pojedinca o tome što ih veže uz društveni svijet i kroz njihovo simboličko predstavljanje samih sebe. Sažeto rečeno, daje se prioritet socijalnim uzrocima naglašavajući "da društvo, prema Meadu, postoji prije osobe, a mentalni odnosi proizlaze iz društva" (Ritzer 1997, 189).

U daljnjoj raspravi o konceptualizaciji identiteta koja se oslanja na manjkavosti funkcionalističkog pristupa unutar simboličkog interakcionizma možemo primijetiti jednu zanimljivu sintezu funkcionalizma i simboličkog interakcionizma u radovima Ervinga Goffmana (Goffman 1963, 1959, 1971). Za razliku od funkcionalista koji socijalnoj strukturi pristupaju kao objektivno postojećem izvorištu identiteta i socijalne integracije, Goffmanova analiza je šira i dinamičnija od klasičnog funkcionalizma jer dopušta širok stvaralački prostor za individualnu akciju i kreaciju (Sekulić 2010, 28). Goffman stvara razlikovnu osnovu uloge i osobe. Budući da na različite načine u izvođenju uloge svaki pojedinac unosi sebe, shodno tomu, i na različite načine igramo svoje uloge. Iako je ovakva tvrdnja u svjetlu Meadove analize ja i mene, gdje je "osoba proizvod odnosa između ja i mene" (Mead 1934), Goffman ipak naglašava kako postoji procjep "između onoga što bi osoba trebala biti, a što naziva virtualnim socijalnim identitetom, i onoga što osoba zapravo jest, odnosno aktualnog socijalnog identiteta" (Rizter 1997, 200). Dok su funkcionalisti zainteresirani ponajprije za

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socijalnu strukturu kao objektivno postojeći identitet i za socijalnu integraciju, Goffman "je nezainteresiran za pitanja institucionalne integracije društva kao cjeline" (Collins 2004, 16). Različita pitanja koja se odnose na fragmentiranje identiteta posljednjih desetljeća razlog su zbog kojeg se problem identiteta i modernosti našao u središtu interesa suvremenih socioloških pristupa, posebice onih koji se oslanjaju na tradiciju simboličkog interakcionizma i objašnjenja identiteta što su ih u toj tradiciji ponudili Mead, Goffman, te Herbert Blumer (Mead 1934, Goffman 1959, Blumer 1969). Meadova teza kako identitet nije fiksan, već promjenjiv i fluidan, što je na tragu i Beckove teze (Beck & Grande, 2006), presudno je utjecala na simboličko-interakcionističke analize.

Dalekosežne su promjene u formi i sadržaju pojma identiteta u postmoderni gdje se problem osobnog identiteta kao modernog subjekta sagledava kroz razumijevanje društvene akcije u kojoj "refleksivni projekt identiteta stvara nove aktualizacije i vještine, a identitet postaje nešto što se mora stvoriti i učvrstiti u refleksivnim aktivnostima individue" (Tomić-Koludrović & Knežević 2004, 114). U socijalnopsihološkoj perspektivi možemo navesti teoriju identiteta Erika Eriksona (1968) koji kao osnovnu karakteristiku identiteta ističe "subjektivni osjećaj ojačane istovjetnosti i kontinuiteta" (Cifrić & Nikodem 2006, 176). Ovakve je koncepcije dalje razvijao Blumer koji je tvrdio da osoba djeluje prema sebi, odnosno, upravlja svojim akcijama na osnovi pretpostavki o samoj sebi kao o predmetu, stoga, ona pomaže drugim ljudima da započnu djelovati (Blumer 1969). U tom kontekstu Blumer je kritičan prema "sociološkom determinizmu [u kojem] se socijalna akcija ljudi razmatra kao neki tijek ili izraz sila koje njima upravljaju, a ne kao djelovanja koja su ljudi ostvarili svojim interpretacijama situacija u koje su stavljeni" (Blumer 1969, 84).

Razvidno je kako je kod spomenutih teoretičara pojam identiteta važan element za razumijevanje postindustrijskih moderniziranih društava. Teoretičari koji su osobito pripomogli razumijevanju takvih društava su svakako Giddens (1991), Beck (Beck & Grande 2006) i Bauman (2004), gdje posebice valja naglasiti Giddensovu teoriju djelovanja aktera koja se odvija unutar strukture koju, međutim, ne treba shvatiti kao prisilu. Ona, iako pruža okvir za individualna djelovanja, istodobno nastaje kao njihova posljedica. Giddens (1991) je, oslanjajući se na Becka (Beck & Grande 2006), postavke teorije strukturacije doveo u kontekst refleksivne modernizacije gdje se moderno društvo i refleksivnost isprepl9ću. Jedna od bitnih odlika modernizma za Giddensa je raskidanje s uvriježenim normama i vrijednostima, odnosno s naučenim ponašanjem. U modernosti postoji diskontinuitet prema tradiciji i tradicionalnom poretku gdje

prošlost o kojoj govorimo je prije zajednička nego individualna /.../ Svaki kontekst detradicionalizacije nudi mogućnost veće slobode djelovanja od one koja je postojala prije – ovdje govorimo o oslobođenju čovjeka od okova prošlosti. Kod tradicije prošlost strukturira sadašnjost kroz zajednička vjerovanja i osjećaje (Giddens 2005, 61).

U tom kontekstu društvo kasne modernosti (Giddens 2005), ili kako ga Beck naziva "postindustrijski modernizirano društvo, postaje društvo rizika" (Beck & Grande, 2006) gdje se razlika predmodernog i modernog vremena najbolje vidi kroz dijalektički odnos povjerenja i rizika.

4. Uloga simboličkih kôdova kolektivnog identiteta – primordijalni, građanski i sveti

Na tragu idealnih tipova Maxa Webera, autori Shmuel Eisenstadt i Bernhard Giesen postavljaju opći model za analizu kolektivnog identiteta (Eisenstadt & Giesen, 1995). Unutar tog općeg modela ovi analiziraju tipologiju simboličkih kôdova kolektivnog identiteta (Eisenstadt & Giesen 1995, 72-102). U tom kontekstu, osnovni kôd konstrukcije kolektivnog identiteta zasniva se na razlici mi – drugi, što je posebice značajno kod društvenih politiziranih identiteta.[3] Svojstvo kolektivnog identiteta prema postavkama Eisenstadta i Giesena (1995) jest da on može ispuniti svoju funkciju samo ako društveni procesi koji ga konstituiraju ostanu na latentnoj razini. U svom modelu naglašavaju kako kolektivni identitet nije prirodno generiran, već društveno konstruiran, odnosno, proizveden društvenom konstrukcijom granica čijem procesu prethodi simboličko kodiranje razlika. Osnovni kôdovi konstrukcije kolektivnog identiteta su primordijalni, građanski i sveti temeljem čega se određuju i tri ideal-tipa kolektivnog identiteta (Eisenstadt & Giesen 1995, 72-102).

Kada je riječ o primordijalnom idealnom tipu kolektivnog identiteta on se temelji na rodu, generaciji, srodstvu, etnicitetu i rasi, što ujedno sačinjava njegovu granicu između onog izvanjskog i unutrašnjeg.[4] Ovaj tip kolektivnog identiteta se u sociologiji često referira i na razne vrste društvenih veza o čemu je prvi govorio Edward Shils (1957). Shils je razlikovao "javne, građanske veze moderne države i primordijalne veze obitelji te vjerskih i etničkih skupina" (Smith 2003, 155) te na taj način "dokazivao da su primordijalne veze srodstva i religije ostale vrlo žive i u modernim svjetovnim društvima, o čemu svjedoče njihovi simboli i javne svečanosti" (Smith 2003, 155). Naime, ovaj kolektivni identitet je često i višestoljetni, budući da se referira na rod, etnicitet, rasu, te kao takav predstavlja skup zapamćenih događaja koji su sabrani u našu osobnost. On se kao takav odnosi na pitanje moći koje je vladalo nekim prostorom kroz neko vrijeme. Temu primordijalnih veza, koja podsjeća na "Durkheimovu tezu da se jezgra starijeg srodstva, moralnih i vjerskih veza – sličnosti uvjerenja i savjesti u mehaničkoj solidarnosti – zadržala i u modernim, industrijskim društvima" (Smith 2003, 155) razradio je Clifford Geertz (1973) koji je tu postavku "primijenio na nove države, a često stara društva, Azije i Afrike" (Smith 2003, 155). Geertz daje naglasak ulozi moderne države u poticanju vjerovanja i osjećaja primordijalnost razlikujući unutardržavne i međudržavne primordijalne vezanosti (Geertz 1973, 270) polazeći od klasifikacije etničko-državnih odnosa

gdje obrasci primordijalne identifikacije "nisu fluidni, bezoblični i beskonačno različiti, nego su jasno omeđeni i razlikuju se na sustavne načine" (Geertz 1973, 268). U tom kontekstu on dokazuje da nastanak političke svijesti vezane uz modernu državu potiče primordijalne osjećaje. Međutim, prema Geertzu, upravo primordijalne veze u novim državama, sagledavajući ih kao društva, postaju osjetljive na nelojalnost izazvanu upravo tim vezama, pa u svezi s tim Geertz objašnjava:

> Pod primordijalnom vezanošću podrazumijeva se vezanost koja proistječe iz 'danosti' – ili, točnije, budući da je u te stvari neminovno upletena kultura, navodne 'danosti' – društvene egzistencije: poglavito neposrednog susjedstva i rodbinskih veza ali, osim njih, i danosti koja proistječe iz rođenja u određenoj vjerskoj zajednosti, govorenja određenim jezikom ili jezičnim narječjem, te prihvaćanja određenih društvenih običaja ….Opća snaga primordijalnih spona i tipovi tih veza koji su važni razlikuju se od osobe do osobe, od društva do društva i od razdoblja do razdoblja (Geertz 1973, 259-260).

Sagledavajući uloge primordijalnih tipova simboličkog kodiranja Smith (2003), slijedeći problem sociobioloških objašnjenja, postavlja pitanje

> ne odlazeći u drugu krajnosti i smatrajući etnije, i još više, nacije čisto apstraktnim zamišljenim zajednicama, kako možemo znati da naša mišljenja o etničkom srodstvu imaju genetsku osnovu ili da se veza obitelji i klana mogu proširiti nepotizmom velikih razmjera na istoj fizičkoj i reprodukcijskoj osnovi na relativne strance zato što, eto, govore istim jezikom i imaju istu religiju i običaje itd? (Smith 2003, 154).

U okviru ove teme svakako treba spomenuti Pierrea van den Berghea (1978) glavnog predstavnika sociobiološkog pristupa etničnosti i nacionalnosti, koji ističe kako čovjekova društvenost počiva na trima načelima: rodbinskom odabiru, uzajamnosti i prisili (Van den Berghe 1978, 404). Njegovo poimanje etničnosti, kasta i 'rasa' koje su obično "definirane zajedničkim podrijetlom, općenito naslijedne i često endogamne [te kao takve nastaju iz malih 'plemena' i pretvaraju se] u nadobitelj" (Van den Berghe 1978, 403-404). No, kritike na ovu argumentaciju daje Vernon Reynolds (1980) ističući: "Ako njegova primordijalna međugurpna teorija utemeljena na sociobiologiji ne može objasniti zašto novi negenetski prijenos srodstva i pripadnosti skupini mora slijediti logiku staroga genetskoga, ona se ruši" (Reynolds 1980, 311). Razvidno je kako se primordijalni tipovi simboličkog kodiranja u osnovi oslanjaju na sociobiološke prikaze prirođenih, konstitutivnih granica unutarnje i vanjske grupe, zanemarujući cijeli spektar društvenih i kulturnih pojavnosti na koje se oslanjaju građanski i sveti kodôvi konstrukcije kolektivnog identiteta.

Drugi temeljni kôd kolektivnog identiteta sačinjava građanski koji se zasniva na prisnosti koja podrazumijeva implicitna pravila, tradiciju i socijalne rutine,

te se kao takav temelji na implicitnim pravilima života u zajednici (Eisenstadt & Giesen 1995, 73-83). Ovaj tip kolektivnog identiteta polazi od činjenice da se pojedincima i grupama mogu normativno pripisati univerzalna građansko-političke prava. Međutim, međuidentitetske snošljivosti i obzirnosti koje čine temelj građanskog kolektivnog identiteta, što podrazumijeva priznavanje drugoga i drugačijega, ipak u praksi ne ostvaruju puninu političke izvedbe. U provedbenom smislu politika priznavanja bi trebala biti okosnica rješavanja problema posebnih kulturnih prilika i potreba različitih etničkih manjina, što se danas posebno očituje u multikulturalnoj formi identitetske politike (Sršen, 2013). Ona je danas gotovo najzaslužnija za politizaciju identiteta, a njeno uporište stvaraju situacije multietničkih društava i potrebe vladajuće državne volje da očuva i osigura poštivanje i jednaku vrijednost različitih kultura koje supostoje unutar neke teritorijalno određene zajednice (Kalanj 2010, 129). U tom smislu, politika multikulturalizma identitetska uporišta različitih grupa unutar određene zajednice stavlja kao osnovu za razmatranje administrativnih i financijskih mehanizama važnih za regulaciju poštivanja načela građanstva, što se napose danas odnosi na ujedinjenu Europu. Kulturne raznolikosti identiteta u europskoj stvarnosti danas odaju pesimističku perspektivu procesa koji teži sjedinjenju strukturalnih dimenzija nacionalnog identiteta s instrumentalnom racionalnosti novog europskog nadnacionalnog identiteta (Sršen & Piskač 2012, 160). U tom smislu rekonstrukcija socijalne zbilje popraćene inter-akcijskom politikom priznanja treba svakako voditi računa o priznanju njenih komunitarnih obilježja. Od suvremenih autora koji se nalaze na tom tragu svakako je najrelevantniji Charles Taylor (2011) koji drži da identitetska sebstva imaju društvene izvore i njihova autentičnost dolazi do izražaja samo ako je relacijski i interakcijski priznata, a ne samo nominalno i normativistički konstatirana (Kalanj 2010, 128). U tom kontekstu Kalanj (2010) ističe kako je postmodernost "indicirala krizu identitetske refleksije, ali joj ni u promijenjenim društvenim i komunikacijskim uvjetima nije oduzela moć traganja za sebstvom" (Kalanj 2010, 124).

Treći temeljni kôd kolektivnog identiteta je koncepcija svetoga, koji se zasniva na ograničenom i privilegiranom pristupu svetom (Eisenstadt & Giesen 1995, 73-83). Ovaj tip kolektivnog identiteta u osnovi se oblikuje na osnovi svetoga i to bez obzira je li sakralno definirano kao Bog, progres ili racionalnost: ono svoj izraz dobiva u ideologijama ili religijama (Cipek 2000, 63). Religijski je identitet jedan od svakako najdubljih oslonaca u svijesti pojedinca, ali i društva. Njegova snaga počiva na uvjerenju koje može biti, kako povoljan tako i nepovoljan, okidač različitih društvenih konflikata. U tom smislu uvjerenje pojedinca u određeni sustav vrijednosti kojeg mu nameće vjera predstavlja izbor, koji kao takav postaje osnova svakog drugog djelovanja. Racionalisti se tako predaju razumu, koji postaje oslonac ideja i pokretač djelovanja, dok se vjerska svijest artikulira s obzirom na dvije međusobno povezane ideje: transcendenciju i vjeru (Parekh

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2008, 114). Prelazak religijskog identitetskog kôda u ideologijski predstavlja novo opasno identitetsko uporište društvenog djelovanja. Smith (2003) navodi kako je moguće naći povijesne primjere koji dokazuju "stanoviti kontinuitet između postojećih etničkih zajednica (etnija) i modernih nacija [čiji je identitet oblikovan] nekom skripturalnom religijom; najpoznatiji su, ali nipošto i jedini, primjeri Armenci i Židovi" (Smith 2003, 179). Povijesno gledano, neki autori kao što je Susan Reynolds (1984) ulogu svetog kôda kolektivnog identiteta vidi kao poveznicu "između srednjovjekovnog 'naroda' i njegova kraljevstva, na jednoj strani, i moderne 'nacije' i njezine države, na drugoj" (Reynolds 1984, 253). To upućuje na činjenicu da je na "srednjovjekovnom Zapadu, regnalna svijest, koja je ideja srodstva i običaja združila s kraljevskom vladavinom, definirala 'narode' tog područja, te je na taj način pojam etnički gotovo uvijek spajao konotacije i podrijetla i kulture" (Smith 2003, 178). Slijedom navedenoga moguće je zaključiti kako je pitanje religijskog identitetskog kôda spona spajanja, ali i razdvajanja, kada je riječ o traženju povijesnih primjera koji dokazuju stanoviti kontinuitet između postojećih etničkih zajednica (etnija) i modernih nacija. U današnjem globaliziranom svijetu veliki povratak iskonu, odnosno primordijalnim temeljima zajednice kroz ideologiju fundamentalizma, što se ogleda u religijskog identitetskog kôdu, dovodi u pitanje sociologijsko razumijevanje svjetskog rizičnog društva.

5. Identitet u refleksiji globalizacije

Postmodernost je indicirala krizu identitetske refleksije. Upravo u toj krizi nije slučajna Beckova (Beck & Grande 2006) i Giddensova (2005) kritika globalnog kapitalizma u kojoj nastaje i kriza identiteta. Takvoj analizi identiteta, gdje je jedno od ključnih pitanja - pitanje moći suvremenog svijeta - pridružio se i Manuel Castells (2002). On u tom kontekstu identitet definira, ukoliko se on naravno odnosi na društvene aktere, kao proces stvaranja smisla na temelju kulturnog atributa ili srodnog niza kulturnih atributa. Njima je dana prednost u odnosu prema drugim izvorima smisla. Identiteti uključuju i proces pregovaranja između osobe i vanjskih čimbenika, te u tom smislu identitet u odnosu na društvene aktere podrazumijeva proces stvaranja smisla temeljem kulturnog atributa ili srodnog niza kulturnih atributa kojima je dana prednost u odnosu prema drugim (vanjskim) izvorima smisla (Castells 2002, 16). Gledajući identitet u informacijskom društvu kao strukturalnoj posljedici utjecaja novih informacijsko-komunikacijskih tehnologija na politiku, ekonomiju i kulturu, Castells ističe važnu ulogu kulturnog identiteta koji se pojavljuje kao najekspresivnija identitetska paradigma (Castells 2000, 2002). Shodno tomu autor navodi tri izvora izgradnje tog identiteta: legitimirajući identitet – uvode ga dominantne društvene institucije radi proširenja i racionalizacije svoje dominacije nad društvenim akterima; identitet otpora – kojeg stvaraju subjekti u podređenim

položajima i koji se temelje na načelima suprotnim od onih koja zastupaju institucije, te projektni identitet – koji označava stvaranje novih identiteta na temelju različitih kulturnih čimbenika, te koji utječu na promjene u samoj društvenoj strukturi (Castells 2002, 12-18). Odgovori koje daje Castells unutar kulturno-identitetskog diskursa jesu da za kolektivnog aktera može postojati mnoštvo identiteta. Međutim, to mnoštvo postaje izvor proturječja u samopredstavljanju kao i u društvenom djelovanju. Stoga Castells ističe kako "umjesto različitih društvenih uloga pojedinca – od, primjerice, radnika, profesora, navijača, turista, homoseksualca, vjernika – u novom se društvenom kontekstu identiteti stječu kao ustrajno djelovanje izvan dominantnih institucija modrenog društva. Proces individualizacije odlučuje o identitetu" (Castells 2002, 17-19). Stoga, identitet kao pojmovni konstrukt u globalizirajućem svijetu postaje medij njegove kulturalizacije čime on ostaje jedini fundamentalni modus dokazivanja i obrane svoje vlastitosti. U tom smislu "individualizacija u suvremenim društvima označava stanje u kojem se osobno Ja ne pokazuje tek kao puki nositelj društvenih uloga, nego kao potpuna osobnost koja racionalno i emocionalno nadzire vođenje vlastita života" (Paić 2005, 98). Najvažniji razlog novoprobuđenog interesa za probleme identiteta unutar suvremenih socioloških teorija su procesi karakteristični za refleksivnu modernizaciju. U tom procesu se identitet konceptualizira kao samo-refleksivni individualni projekt u kontekstu višestrukih šansi koje društvo nudi za njegovu realizaciju.[5] Neki autori (Cifrić & Nikodem 2006) navode da je suvremena kriza identiteta povezana s četiri problema jastva koja karakteriziraju razdoblje kasnog moderniteta:

1. Problematiziranje samospoznaje (spoznaje jastva). U pred-modernim društvima jastvo je uglavnom bilo transparentno i nezanimljivo, no početkom 20. stoljeća jastvo se promatra kao 'unutrašnji kontinent' koji se teško može istražiti bez stručne pomoći (psihoanaliza).

2. Isticanje ljudskog potencijala. Procesi moderne sekularizacije kao prioritet postavljaju postizanje samoostvarenja u ovom svijetu, a ne zadovoljstvo s ovim svijetom i čekanje 'onog svijeta'.

3. Rastvaranje hijerarhijske društvene strukture, razvoj individualizma i socijalne mobilnosti, te stvaranje potencijala za brze društvene promjene otvorili su mogućnost konstrukcije novih identiteta.

4. Nova fleksibilnost u određivanju jastva, odnosno u samoodređivanju. (Cifrić & Nikodem 2006, 179).

Upravo je problem rastvaranja hijerarhijske društvene strukture najvidljiviji unutar globalizacijskih procesa. Naime, u ranijim društvenim epohama tradicija je pružala jasno definirane uloge i bila temelj društvenog uređenja, a s procesom globalizacije jača proces individualizacije i pluralizacije identiteta. Moderni društveni procesi potaknuti globalizacijom potkopavaju, između ostalog, i osjećaj pripadnosti naciji. Étienne Balibar (2003) smatra kako se, unutar post-

modernističke koncepcije, "nacija reproducira kroz mrežu (ideoloških) aparata što znači da se pojedinac svakidašnjom praksom oblikuje kao homo nationalis" (Balibar 2003, 395) smatrajući tako da je pojedinac ključan čimbenik u definiranju pojma nacije. U tom smislu "nacija ne nastaje samo kolektivnim ocrtavanjem imaginarne političke zajednice koja je istovremeno inherentna i suverena, nego je riječ o procesu u kojemu pojedinac internalizacijom granica postaje pripadnikom određene nacije" (Božić Blanuša 2010, 313).

U tom procesu nestaju velike društvene klasne formacije i sve više dobivaju na važnosti identiteti koji se temelje na mnogostrukosti životnih stilova. Suvremeno društvo dokida tradicionalne veze gdje pojedinac gubi vezu sa svojom prirodnom bazom, kao što je obitelji, ali i širom okolinom. Razlog tomu je sve veća prostorna mobilnost, ali i činjenica da on kao jedinka sam izabire što želi biti, jer su mu tradicionalne zadatosti nestale iz sjećanja.[6] Sukladno Giddensovu shvaćanju jedno od glavnih svojstava modernosti jest ono što se naziva "refleksivnim projektom sebstva" (Giddens, 1982), odnosno, refleksija i kontinuirani rad pojedinca na vlastitome identitetu. Giddens kao teoretičar modernizacija zajedno s Beckom "dijeli shvaćanje globalizacije u smislu uspostave prostorno-vremenskog udaljavanja prema nacionalno i teritorijalno homogenom području djelovanja subjekta/aktera" (Paić 2005, 56). Upravo na političkom području globalizacije "subjekti/akteri globalnog političkog poretka su nacije-države, a ekonomskog poduzetničke elite djeluju transnacionalno" (Paić 2005, 56).

Od osamdesetih godina dvadesetog stoljeća unutar sociologije se uspostavlja konsenzus o uporabi analitičkog povezivanja mikro i makro aspekata društva, što se u teorijskom smislu da primijeniti na pojmu identiteta u kasnoj modernosti, ili kako ga Giddens naziva razdoblju, "refleksivne modernizacije" (Tomić-Koludrovići & Knežević 2004, 113). Upravo posljednjih desetljeća u sociološkim raspravama dominiraju teze o tome da je primarni zadatak socioloških teorija prevladavati mikro-makro dualizme, te u tome povezivanju politika refleksivne modernizacije je naizgled optimistička verzija moći političkog subjekta kao samosvrhe kolektivnog djelovanja.

6. Umjesto zaključka

O identitetu se može govoriti i od najranijih oblika čovjekove društvenosti kada je čovjek svoje kolektivno ja oblikovao u najranijim zajednicama najčešće putem religijske identifikacije u odnosu na drugi kolektiv. Većina sociologa se slaže s tvrdnjom da su svi ljudski identiteti donekle društveni jer su vezani uz značenja, a ona su uvijek rezultat sporazuma ili nesporazuma, i uvijek donekle zajednička. Pitanje identiteta jest povijesna, ali nadasve kulturna specifičnost zapadnog moderniteta u kojemu se očituju elementi društvene refleksivnosti. Među teoretičarima sociologije postoji niz različitih tumačenja

pojma identitet kada se on promatra u postmodernom globalizacijskom kontekstu kao nešto imaginarno, ali ništa manje snažno uporište individualnog i kolektivnog doživljaja. U skladu s time javljaju se i različite interpretacije o njegovoj ulozi u društvu. Postmoderni diskurs u svojim pristupima i modelima identitet promatra kao formu individualne i društvene egzistencije u kojoj je prepoznatljiv njegov prirodno-povijesni i esencijalistički koncept. Identitet zbog svoje sadržajne arbitrarnosti ima tu moć da potiče na preispitivanje dubinski strukturirane i tradicijom nataložene svijesti o individualnoj i kolektivnoj pripadnosti. Pojedincima daje spoznajni okvir za afirmaciju individualnosti, a široj zajednici mobilizacijsko djelovanje u stvaranju kolektivnog subjektiviteta. Ovaj posljednji faktor ovisi o tome gledali li se društveno-kulturna ili politička dimenzija grupe. Kolektivno pamćenje, tradicija, vrijednosti, svi ti elementi koji se održavaju u svijesti pojedinca daju smisao kolektivnom subjektivitetu. Oni neprestano potiču potvrdu o pripadnosti grupi gdje je značenje grupnog identiteta utemeljeno u simboličkom kodiranju granica. S druge strane, identitet istovremeno ima tu moć da relativizira javno-diskurzivne konjunkture s obzirom da sudjeluje ne samo u rekonstrukcijskim, već i u različitim dekonstrukcijskim zahvatima postmodernističke zbilje. U tom kontekstu valja naglasiti kako je u suvremenim društvima identitet izrazito fragmentiran kao odraz refleksivne modernizacije. Danas se suvremene kritike takva identiteta u javnim raspravama najčešće odnose na rastući proces individualizacije gdje se oblikuju novi mehanizmi osobnog identiteta. U toj promjeni identitet predstavlja odraz erozije tradicionalnih statusnih položaja i slabljenja društvene klase kao dominantne unutar društvene strukture. Takvim postmodernističkim konceptom identiteta sociolozi se koriste u različitim, ali ipak, povezanim kontekstima. Postmoderni diskurs o identitetu upozorio je na krizu identiteta smatrajući da su njihovi socijalno-ekonomski i ideološki temelji, klasni i nacionalni, toliko dotrajali da više ne mogu biti čvrsto uporište pojedinačne i zajedničke identifikacije.

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Notes

[1] Sa stajališta kulturalista upravo interakcija čovjeka s okolinom upućuje na gledišta Meada koji je još u 20-im godinama 20. stoljeća zaključio da je identitet uopćeni drugi (Usp.: Mead 2003).

[2] Autorica H. Arendt situaciju kojom ljudski rod stvara uvjeta svoje egzistencija naziva *conditio humana* (Usp. Arendt 1991).

[3] U analizi stupnjeva društvenog identiteta Harriet Bradley predlaže tri stupnja identiteta: pasivni, aktivni i politizirani. Pasivni identiteti su potencijalni identiteti koji proizlaze iz skupa odnosa u koje su pojedinci uključeni (klasa, spol, etnicitet...). Pojedinci ih obično nisu svjesni i ne određuju se kroz njih, osim kada određene društvene okolnosti probude svijest o takvom načinu identifikacije. Tada dolazi do aktivnih identiteta koji čine temelj djelovanja. No oni su nestalni, kratkotrajni. Ukoliko postanu trajni, odnosno ukoliko se pojedinci stalno određuju kroz njih, onda je riječ o politiziranim identitetima (Cifrić & Nikodem 2006).

[4] Primordijalni tipovi simboličkog kodiranja oslanjaju se na naturaliziranje konstitutivnih granica jer su srodstvo, rod i etnicitet smješteni izvan mogućnosti komunikacije, definicije i konstrukcije, pa će i svaki pokušaj propitivanja tako postavljenih granica propasti, jer su te granice po definiciji postavljene iznad društvenog određivanja i promjene (Eisenstadt & Giesen 1995, 72-102).

[5] U današnjem društvenom kontekstu, institucije modernosti oblikuju nove mehanizme osobnog identiteta, gdje Giddens upozorava da identitet zrcali promjene nastale globalnim načinima društvenog povezivanja. (Giddens 1991).

[6] U knjizi P. Connertona "Kako se društva sjećaju" autor zanimajući se za pamćenje zamjećuje da se naše spoznaje o sadašnjosti umnogome zavise o našem znanju o prošlosti. U tom kontekstu naš sadašnji svijet doživljavamo u kontekstu koji je uzročno povezan s prošlim događajima i stvarima (Connerton 2004).

Barbara Riman

Delovanje Slovencev v Osijeku med drugo svetovno vojno

V času druge svetovne vojne je bilo v Neodvisno državo Hrvaško izgnanih približno 10.000 Slovencev. Izgnani so bili predvsem v kraje, oddaljene od današnje slovensko-hrvaške meje. Izseljenci so se v krajih, ki so jih naselili, povezovali s tam že živečimi Slovenci. V prispevku bo prikazano, na kakšen način so se priseljeni Slovenci povezovali s Slovenci, ki so živeli v Osijeku v času med obema svetovnima vojnama, kakšen pomen je imelo kulturno-umetniško društvo, ustanovljeno leta 1938, in kako je postalo shajališče izgnancev. Poudarjena bo tudi vloga Ferda Delaka, umetnika, ki je bil s svojim delovanjem aktivno vključen v narodnoosvobodilno delovanje – organiziral je združeno delovanje Slovencev v Osijeku in Slavoniji ter bil iniciator ustanovitve mestnih odborov Osvobodilne fronte na območju Osijeka.

Ključne besede: izgnanci, Slovenci na Hrvaškem, Osijek, druga svetovna vojna.

The Activities of Slovenes in Osijek during World War II

During WWII about 10,000 Slovenes were deported to the territory of the Independent State of Croatia, especially to localities remote from the present Slovene-Croatian border. In the places where they were settled, deportees soon made contact with the Slovenes that had already lived there. The present article highlights the nature of these contacts in Osijek in the interwar period, the importance of the cultural and artistic association that was founded in 1938, and how it evolved into the meeting place of the deportees. The paper also highlights the role of Ferdo Delak, an artist who actively participated in illegal actions, organized yje Slovene people and initiated the founding of town committees of the Liberation Front in the territory of Osijek.

Keywords: deportees, Slovenes in Croatia, Osijek, WWII.

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1. Uvod

Prisotnost Slovencev na Hrvaškem opažamo že več stoletij. Razlogi za njihov prihod so različni. V zgodovini slovensko-hrvaških odnosov so bili ti prihodi predvsem prostovoljni in pogojeni z različnimi ekonomskimi ali družbenimi razlogi, medtem ko sta dve zgodovinski obdobji posebni. V teh dveh obdobjih so bile zabeležene prisilne migracije oziroma so prihode zaznamovali političnovojni razlogi.[1] Raznarodovalni ukrepi, pritiski okupatorjev in vojne razmere so povzročili velike premike tedanjega prebivalstva Slovenije, vendar jih je zaradi pomanjkanja zanesljivih podatkov nemogoče natančneje določiti. Druga težava je, da je bilo slovensko etnično ozemlje v času druge svetovne vojne razdeljeno med tri okupatorske države, kar je eden izmed dejavnikov, ki onemogočajo celoten vpogled v preselitve prebivalstva (Ferenc 2006, 576). Madžari so več tisoč Slovencev večinoma deportirali v koncentracijsko taborišče Sárvar. V tako imenovani Ljubljanski pokrajini pod italijansko oblastjo je bilo interniranih in v koncentracijska taborišča poslanih približno 25.000–30.000 oseb oziroma 7–9 % prebivalstva (Repe 2010, 245).

Po prvotnem načrtu naj bi bila z nemškega okupacijskega območja pregnana približno tretjina prebivalstva, natančneje 220.000–260.000 Slovencev, pregnani pa naj bi bili tudi koroški Slovenci, s čimer naj bi bilo dokončno rešeno tako imenovano "slovensko vprašanje" na sedanjem avstrijskem Koroškem (Repe 2010, 245). Vendar niso bili izpolnjeni vsi načrti, ki so bili že od vsega začetka dokaj nerealni, zato je bilo v Srbijo, Neodvisno državo Hrvaško (NDH) in Nemčijo za vedno izgnanih približno 10 % okupiranega prebivalstva. Iz Posavja in Obsotelja je bilo izgnanih in preseljenih v Srbijo, NDH in Nemčijo 37.000 ljudi. Z nemškega okupacijskega območja na Štajerskem in Gorenjskem je bilo že pred tem izgnanih 17.200 ljudi. Leta 1942 je nemška oblast iz Koroške izselila 990 Slovencev. Od leta 1942 do leta 1944 je bilo v Nemčijo izgnanih še 8.000 sorodnikov partizanov in ustreljenih talcev. Približno 17.000 prebivalcev pa je z nemškega okupacijskega območja zaradi nasilja in raznarodovalne politike zbežalo v Ljubljansko pokrajino (Ferenc 2006, 576).[2]

Izgnanci so bili v težkem položaju in so bili pogosto travmatizirani in v depresiji. So pa v tem zapletnem položaju iskali način, kako bi se med sabo povezali. Povezavo so razvijali tudi s tistimi Slovenci, ki so se v določen kraj priselili že pred drugo svetovno vojno. Pogosto so se priseljeni Slovenci vključevali v Osvobodilno fronto (OF) oziroma so na kakšen drug način sodelovali v ilegalni obliki združevanja.

V prispevku bodo predstavljena nova dognanja o omenjeni temi. Predstaviti želimo, na kakšen način so se priseljeni Slovenci povezali s Slovenci, ki so živeli v Osijeku v času med obema svetovnima vojnama, ter kako je kulturno-umetniško društvo, ki je delovalo v Osijeku leta 1938, v času med drugo svetovno vojno postalo shajališče izgnancev, deportirancev in staroselcev. Predvsem bo pou-

darjena tudi vloga Ferda Delaka, umetnika, ki je imel pomembno vlogo pri organizaciji Slovencev v Osijeku in drugih manjših krajih v Slavoniji med drugo svetovno vojno. S svojim delovanjem je zbiral Slovence na območju Osijeka in podpiral ustanavljanje mestnih odborov Osvobodilne fronte (MOOF).

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V slovenskem in hrvaškem zgodovinopisju je opisano organizirano delovanje Slovencev na Hrvaškem v času druge svetovne vojne, s tem prispevkom pa bomo poskusili pridobiti celovitejšo sliko o omenjeni temi.

Iz gradiva na temo prikritega združevanja in organiziranja Slovencev v času druge svetovne vojne je razvidno, da se je o tem malo pisalo. Gradivo se navezuje predvsem na delovanje slovenskih društev v času pred drugo svetovno vojno, ki so potem prikrito nadaljevala z delovanjem tudi med drugo svetovno vojno. To je povezano z Zagrebom in živahnim delovanjem slovenskih društev v medvojnem času.[3] Obravnavane so tudi druge teme, ki so se dojemale kot pomembnejše ali zanimivejše. Največ gradiva je o procesu tranzita in izseljevanja na območje NDH, o položaju Slovencev v taboriščih ter nekaj malega o legalnih in ilegalnih organizacijah, ki so bile vključene v celotno vprašanje o problematiki Slovencev v NDH.

Eden izmed prvih, ki je pisal o prisilnem preseljevanju Slovencev, je Tone Ferenc. Temi Slovencev v NDH je posvetil poglavje v knjigi Nacistična razna-rodovalna politika v Sloveniji v letih 1941–1945 (Ferenc 1968, 436–474). V poglavju Na Hrvaškem in v Bosni podaja natančne številke in potek izseljevanje Slovencev v NDH. Na podlagi njegovih ugotovitev so z raziskovanjem nadaljevali drugi raziskovalci.

Vera Kržišnik-Bukić v nekaterih svojih prispevkih omenja izseljence in organizirane prevoze Slovencev v NDH ter tudi organiziranje in delovanje po-sameznikov med drugo svetovno vojno. V svojem prispevku omenja tudi MOOF (Kržišnik-Bukić 2006, 45–48).

To temo so spotoma obravnavali tudi hrvaški zgodovinarji. Predvsem je o tem pisala Marica Karakaš Obradov, ki omenja delovanje Rdečega križa Slovenije, delovanje državnih institucij NDH v povezavi s prihodom in organizacijo naselitve deportiranih Slovencev ter samo repatriacijo (Karakaš Obradov 2014, 203–238, Karakaš Obradov 2012, 139–174). O tej temi piše tudi v prispevku, ki ima za prvotni cilj prikazati migracije srbskega prebivalstva na območju NDH (Karakaš Obradov 2011, 801–826). To je razumljivo, saj je ta tematika povezana z usodo slovenskega naroda v času med drugo svetovno vojno. V povezavi s temo organiziranega izseljevanja Srbov z območja NDH je pisal tudi Filip Škiljan, ki je eno poglavje v tem prispevku, Kolonizacija Slovenaca na imanja iseljenih Srba, posvetil problematiki slovenskega vprašanja v NDH (Škiljan 2014, 278–299). Pomembna je tudi knjiga Slavka Alojza Kramarja, enega izmed pripadnikov slovenske skupnosti na Hrvaškem (Kramar, 2016).

Na tem mestu so omenjena samo nekatera dela, čeprav jih bomo v prispev-ku uporabili in citirali več. Razen tiskanih del bodo v prikazu problematike

združenega delovanja med Slovenci v Osijeku v času druge svetovne vojne predstavljeni tudi podatki, pridobljeni iz arhivskega gradiva, ki se hrani v Arhivu Republike Slovenije. Predvsem bodo uporabljeni podatki iz poročila Slovenskega mestnega odbora enotne narodnoosvobodilne fronte (SMOJNOF) v Osijeku iz leta 1945. Poročilo je sestavljeno iz poročil voditeljev pododborov MOOF v Osijeku.[4]

Zakaj se ni pisalo o prikritem delovanju? Zato ker obstaja relativno malo podatkov, ki jih je težko pridobiti. Treba bi bilo narediti obsežnejšo raziskavo, ki bi zajela neposredne akterje takšnega delovanja, in zbrati še njihove spomine.

V prispevku nam ne bo uspelo prikazati celotnega gibanja in vseh aktivnosti, prav tako ne vključenosti različnih članov in njihove pomembnosti za omenjeno temo. Ta tema bo prikazana na primeru Osijeka in nekaterih manjših slavonskih krajev ter je pomembna za zgodovino slovenstva na Hrvaškem. Tema je zanimiva, ker se o njej ni veliko pisalo, je pa hkrati tudi sporna.

Cilj prispevka je prikazati temelje, na katerih so se Slovenci v Osijeku organizirali, in njihove glavne naloge. Hkrati bomo poskusili prikazati glavne akterje, ki so sodelovali v taki obliki organiziranja odpora v Osijeku, in ob tem predstaviti delovanje Ferda Delaka, enega izmed teh glavnih akterjev. Ti temelji so osnova kasneje nastalih organizacij, ki so imele pomembno vlogo za Slovence po drugi svetovni vojni. Člani teh odborov so skrbeli za organizirano repatriacijo slovenskih izgnancev in vrnitev v Slovenijo.

2. Deportiranci, izgnanci, pregnanci, preseljenci

O procesu in poteku preganjanja Slovencev na območje nekdanje NHD se je, kot je bilo že omenjeno, veliko pisalo, vendar je določena dogajanja treba ponovno omeniti, ker so ključna za razumevanje kasnejših dogodkov.

Sestanki o reševanju vprašanj, kam s Slovenci z območja Štajerske in Gorenjske, so se začeli že na začetku maja 1941 (Karakaš Obradov 2012, 141–142), končali pa na konferenci 4. junija 1941. V Zagrebu se je Vlada NDH dogovorila o načrtu deportacije prebivalstva iz slovenskih krajev, po katerem naj bi se na območje NDH pripeljalo toliko Slovencev, kolikor Srbov se bo izselilo v Srbijo (Lisac 1956, 125–145). Glede na dogovorjeni načrt naj bi se na območje nekdanje NDH preselilo približno 260.000 Slovencev, vendar je bila kasneje ta številka zmanjšana na 170.000, saj naj bi se toliko Srbov s tega območja izselilo v Srbijo (Karakaš Obradov 2011, 805).

Določeni so bili trije valovi izseljevanja. V prvem valu, ki je trajal do 5. julija 1941, je bila glede na sklepe konference načrtovana izselitev 5.000 Slovencev, večinoma profesorjev, učiteljev ter tudi drugih politično vplivnih in izpostavljenih posameznikov (Ferenc 2006, 578) v Srbijo ter slovenskih duhovnikov v NDH.[5] Za drugi preselitveni val v NDH, ki je trajal od 10. julija do 30. avgusta 1941, je bila načrtovana izselitev približno 25.000 Slovencev iz Spodnje Štajerske,

ki so se na to območje naselili po letu 1914 (Karakaš Obradov 2012, 143). Tretji val naj bi trajal od 15. septembra do 31. oktobra 1941, ko bi moralo biti na območje NDH izgnano obmejno prebivalstvo, približno 65.000 slovenskih kmetov iz Spodnje Štajerske in okoli 80.000 kmetov iz Koroške[6] (Ferenc 2006, 278, Karakaš Obradov 2012, 143). Vendar pa je tretji val izostal in je bilo zato slovensko prebivalstvo namesto v NDH in Srbijo izseljeno v Nemčijo (Škiljan 2014, 279).

O končnem številu izseljencev, ki so bili naseljeni v NDH, lahko samo sklepamo. Na koncu je na Hrvaško in v Bosno prišlo okoli 10.000 slovenskih izgnancev (Ferenc 1993, 82).

Oblasti so se soočale s številnimi težavami pri izvedbi deportacij. Vlada NDH na začetku ni ustanovila posebnega organa, ki bi pomagal pri naseljevanju slovenskih izgnancev (Ferenc 1968, 437). Tako je bil šele kasneje ustanovljen urad za priseljevanje in izseljevanje.

Takoj po dogovoru je državno ravnateljstvo v svojih prvih okrožnicah za vsak okraj določilo po 2.500 deportirancev. Kmalu so se okrajne oblasti začele pritoževati nad tako velikim številom izgnanih Slovencev oziroma jih niti niso hoteli sprejeti. Razlogi so bili različni (Ferenc 1968, 438–439). Med drugim so omenjali, da Slovencev ni dobro naseliti ob meji, saj bodo na ta način ostali v stiku s svojim domačim krajem, kar bo "onemogočilo hrvatiziranje tega elementa" (Škiljan 2014, 284). Omenjali so tudi, da so Slovenci "negotov in nezaupen element" in da so "Slovenci kulturno superiorni Hrvatom in muslimanom in bi si jih kulturno podredili", zato so svetovali: "Slovence naseljujte v kulturno močnejše kraje, kjer se bodo prej asimilirali, naseljujte jih stran od meja." (Ferenc 1968, 439).

Od 140 okrajev NDH jih je bilo približno 55 pripravljenih sprejeti vsaj nekaj slovenskih pregnancev, pa še to pod pogojem, da lahko še hitreje izselijo preganjane Srbe (Ferenc 1968, 443).

Vsi slovenski pregnanci naj bi bili zbrani v Zbirnem izseljenskem in naselitvenem taborišču Slavonska Požega (Sabirni iseljenički i useljenički logor Stara Požega) (Kramar 2016, 14).[7] Tam so jih razdelili po posameznih okrajih, pri čemer so bili pozorni, da so družine ostale skupaj, pa tudi na poklice teh pregnancev, da so jih enakomerno razporedili. Težave pa so predstavljale politične usmeritve priseljencev, ki so bile pogosto tudi nasprotne politični usmeritvi NDH. Tako je državno ravnateljstvo v NDH sklepalo, da so "taborišča kot zbirni kraji zelo primerna za politično propagando nam sovražno razpoloženih elementov. Takšna propaganda se lahko zlahka prenaša med naše ljudstvo preko priseljencev, razposlanih po okrajih" (Ferenc 1968, 464).

Na koncu je bilo odločeno, da bodo Slovenci razposlani na vsa območja NHD, razen v okraje pasivnih predelov (Hercegovina, Lika in Dalmacija). Poleg tega je bilo prepovedano naseljevanje v Zagrebu in obmejnem območju nasproti slovenske Štajerske (Ferenc 1968, 441). S tem so se strinjale tudi lokalne oblasti:

"Da bi se v Humu na Sotli lahko izvajal sistem vzgajanja prebivalstva v hrvaškem duhu, je potrebno, da na območju občine Hum na Sotli ne dobi dovoljenja za bivanje noben Slovenec, bodisi da je kmet, delavec, trgovec ali duhovnik." (Ferenc 1968, 465).

Čeprav so se oblasti NDH trudile, da izgnanci ne bi bili v stiku s svojim domačim krajem, jim tega ni vedno uspelo preprečiti, o čemer pričajo številna poročila lokalnih oblasti iz NDH (Ferenc 1968, 465–466).

Iz taborišča v Slavonski Požegi so izseljence pošiljali v Bosno, Slavonijo in Srem. Zaradi nemirnih razmer v Bosni so kasneje Slovence preselili iz bosanskih v hrvaške kraje v Slavoniji (Ferenc 1968, 448–451).

3. Mestni odbor Osvobodilne fronte in Ferdo Delak

Delovanje OF v Osijeku je povezano z elementi slovenstva, ki so bili prisotni v javnem in kulturnem življenju že v času med obema svetovnima vojnama.

Zgodovina slovenstva in Slovencev v Osijeku ni raziskana, poznamo samo posamezne dele o obstoju Slovencev v Osijeku. Dejstvo je, da so Slovenci v Osijeku bili prisotni. Da je tako, potrjuje tudi slovensko društvo, ki je delovalo v Osijeku med obema svetovnima vojnama. So pa na voljo tudi podatki, da so v Osijek odhajala delat dekleta in žene (Slovenec 1934, 3), ki so prevzemala vloge čistilk, guvernant, skrbnic za otroke in starejše, pravzaprav so sprejele katerokoli delo za zaslužek (Riman 2015, 125–134). Zabeležen je tudi odhod moških na delo v Osijek, kjer so delali v industriji (Kržišnik-Bukić 2006, 41–44). V Osijek se je preselilo predvsem relativno veliko državnih uslužbencev (delavci na železnicah, učitelji in drugi) (Kalan 1922, 271–274).[8]

Prav ti priseljenci so med obema svetovnima vojnama ustanovili Slovensko prosvetno in podporno društvo v Osijeku, ki je svoja pravila registriralo leta 1938 (Riman 2014, 111). O delovanju tega društva se ne ve veliko, čeprav smo podatke iskali v hrvaških arhivih ter v dnevnem slovenskem in hrvaškem časopisju.[9]

V vsakem primeru je obstoj tega društva pomemben, ker so njegovi člani takoj po prvih prihodih slovenskih izgnancev poleti 1941 začeli organizirati pomoč ter povezovati skupine in posameznike (Krajnc 1967, 7). Po podatkih, ki jih je zbral Tone Ferenc, naj bi se v Osijek preselilo vsaj 66 družin z 205 člani (Ferenc 1968, 450).[10]

Kasneje je društvo preraslo v prikrito organizacijo, v kateri so delovali člani, ki jih lahko zasledimo kot aktivne člane MOOF v Osijeku. To so bili Julij Toporiš, Petelin, Hočevar, Kovačič, Kobal, Slavko Klančar, Gnus, Mušič in Ignac Krajnc (Glas Slavonije 1961b, 2, Krajnc 1967, 7). Žal za vse navedene posameznike v virih ni bilo mogoče pridobiti tudi imen. Članom prej omenjenega slovenskega društva se ni uspelo povezati s slovensko OF v času, ko še ni bil ustanovljen mestni odbor, so pa sodelovali pri delovanju hrvaških antifašističnih organizacij (SMOJNOF 1945, 14).

RAZPRAVE IN GRADIVO REVIJA ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA **77 / 2016**
B. RIMAN Delovanje Slovencev v Osijeku med drugo svetovno vojno

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Za nekatere posameznike vseeno vemo, kakšne so bile njihove naloge. Tako je Slavko Klančar, član Slovenskega prosvetnega in podpornega društva, bil izbran, da skuša pridobiti dovoljenje nekdanjega velikega župana Heferja za zbiranje pomoči za naše rojake. Dovoljenje je bilo od župana Heferja pridobljeno, ne pa tudi od tedanjega šefa policije Puratića (SMOJNOF 1945, 20). Razen zbiranja pomoči so izseljencem dostavljali še dnevnik Jutro, ki so ga prejemali brezplačno, poleg tega so poskusili vzpostaviti stik z društvom Slovenska kmečko-delavska sloga[11] v Zagrebu. Ko je bilo leta 1943 tudi to prepovedano, so nadaljevali s prikritim delom ter zbirali podatke in izvajali propagando za OF (SMOJNOF 1945, 21).

Na podlagi pisnih virov je mogoče sklepati, da so nekatere izmed njih, ker so oblasti NHD izvedele, da delujejo v OF, poslali v taborišče. To je na določen način upočasnilo organiziranje in nadaljnje aktivnosti njihovega delovanja.

Pomembno je omeniti, da so se Slovenci vključevali tudi v narodnoosvobodilni boj v Slavoniji in da niso bili izključno v slovenskih organizacijah (Krajnc 1967, 7).

V združenem delu slovenskih priseljencev v Slavonijo je posebno vlogo imel Ferdo Delak,[12] ki je bil aktivni član Komunistične partije že pred drugo svetovno vojno. Na začetku vojne je deloval v Narodnem gledališču v Zagrebu (Moravec & Predan 2001, 97), takoj po vzpostavitvi NDH pa je bil kot režiser odstranjen iz zagrebškega gledališča in poslan v Banjaluko. Pred odhodom mu je uspelo dobiti dokument, s katerim je dokazoval, da je Hrvat iz Gorskega kotarja in član zaslužne družine Delak (SMOJNOF 1945, 1).

Delak v svojih spominih omenja, da mu je kot Hrvatu v Banjaluki uspelo iz taborišča rešiti Lojzeta Štandekerja[13] in njegovo ženo ter ju zaposliti v banjaluškem gledališču, kjer sta ostala do konca druge svetovne vojne.

Ferdo Delak je nadaljeval s povezavo med Zagrebom in ostalimi kraji Hrvaške. Ko se je moral srečati z inženirjem Jožetom Kanklom, je za banjaluško gledališče zbolel. To je bilo oktobra 1942, ko mu je bilo naloženo, da organizira ustanovitev MOOF v Osijeku (SMOJNOF 1945, 2). Takrat so se začele priprave na ustanavljanje OF v Slavoniji. MOOF je bil najprej ustanovljen v Zagrebu, ker je bila tam močna organizacija Komunistične partije Jugoslavije z njenimi številnimi simpatizerji. Manj znano je, da so bili MOOF ustanovljeni tudi v drugih krajih NDH. Močna organizacija je bila v Varaždinu, opazni so bili člani v Karlovcu (Kržišnik-Bukić 2006, 46), obstoj MOOF pa je zabeležen tudi v Slavoniji.

Ko je Ferdo Delak odšel iz Banjaluke, se ni več vrnil. Najprej je odšel v Osijek, kjer je bil zaznamovan kot komunist, zato tam ni mogel ostati. Pogodbo je podpisal z gledališčem v Dubrovniku, vendar tudi tja ni odšel. Ostal je na bolniškem dopustu v Zagrebu in čakal na priložnost, da bi odšel v Slavonijo. Da bi preprečili prihod Ferda Delaka v Osijek, je od tam na ministrstvo prosvete odšla delegacija, ki so jo sestavljali Andjelko Štimac, Stjepan Dobrić in Ante Šoljak. Zahtevali so, da se Ferda Delaka ne pošlje v Osijek. Trdili so, da ne more

biti direktor drame, ker je bil v Kraljevini Jugoslaviji znan kot komunist in ker je v Novem Sadu iz predstav Bele bolezni ter Hlapec Jernej in njegova pravica naredil politično propagando, zaradi česar je bil odpuščen. Proti njegovemu prihodu je bil tudi tedanji intendant osiješkega gledališča Ivan Štajcer (SMOJNOF 1945, 10–11). Če se to vstavi v kontekst, da so bile v različnih kulturnih ustanovah v času med drugo svetovno vojno na vodilna mesta v različnih kulturnih institucijah postavljene izrazito režimske osebe (Jelić-Butić 1977, 210), potem sta mogoče jasnejša tako situacija tega protesta kot dejstvo, da so na ministrstvu ta protest sprejeli in vsaj deloma onemogočili Ferdu Delaku odhod v Osijek.

Kmalu se je situacija umirila in Ferdo Delak je prvič odšel v Osijek novembra leta 1942, vendar le na gostovanje, da bi videl, kakšna je tam situacija in ali se je negativno vzdušje, ki ga je bil deležen prvič, spremenilo. Ker se je situacija spremenila, je Delak na začetku leta 1943 odšel v Osijek in začel z ustanavljanjem podružnice zagrebškega MOOF. Tam je stopil v stik s Slavkom Klančarjem. Z intenzivnim delom mu je v Osijeku uspelo organizirati tudi pododbore. MOOF, ki je imel torej tudi pododbore, je bil v Osijeku ustanovljen na začetku leta 1943, njegovi člani pa so bili: Ferdo Delak, Karlo Kamuščič, Ignac Krajnc, Slavko Klančar in Franjo Blatnik. Mogoče so bili kateri izmed navedenih posameznikov, na primer Slavko Klančar, člani prej omenjenega slovenskega društva tudi pred svetovno vojno, vendar za to ni jasnih dokazov.

Poleg MOOF v Osijeku je bil v novembru 1943 ustanovljen tudi zunanji odbor MOOF v Đakovu, katerega zaupnik je bil Peter Mravljak, ki je k temu delu pritegnil še dva Slovenca (SMOJNOF 1945, 32). Žal v arhivskem gradivu nista navedeni njuni imeni. Nalogi tega MOOF sta bili razširjanje radijskih poročil ter zbiranje podatkov o Slovencih in njihovem delu v Đakovu ter o njihovi politični orientaciji. Poročila o delu je prepošiljal Ferdu Delaku (SMOJNOF 1945, 31). Ustanovljeni so bili še zunanji odbori v Vinkovcih, Belišću in Vukovarju (SMOJNOF 1945, 4).

4. MOOF v Osijeku

Ko je bil organiziran MOOF v Osijeku, je med njegove zadolžitve spadala pridobitev kopije transkriptov pogovorov, ki jih je tedanji konzul NDH v Ljubljani, odvetnik Ivanić, imel s predstavniki Slovencev o zedinjenju Slovenije in Hrvaške.[14] Ivanić je bil doma v Osijeku in je hranil kopije transkriptov teh pogovorov. Po nekaterih virih naj bi MOOF to uspelo dobiti in je po Marici Lubejevi, tedanji članici osiješkega gledališča, ta material poslal glavnemu odboru v Zagreb (Glas Slavonije 1961a, 2).

Druga naloga, ki jo je MOOF imel, je bilo občasno emitiranje radijskih novic za člane. Novice so emitirali prek radijskih postaj zavezniških vojakov in tudi prek radijske postaje Slobodna Jugoslavija. Pomembno vlogo je imel osiješki novinar Mirko Trišler, ki je pisal za Hrvatski list.[15] Trišler je bil v povezavi s Ferdom

Delakom in je na ta način pogosto prejel informacije, ki so bile težko dostopne (Glas Slavonije 1961b, 2). Že naslednje leto je MOOF v Osijeku imel svojo lastno radijsko postajo, za katero so skrbeli in prek katere so pošijali obvestila njegovi člani (Glas Slavonije 1961c, 2). Poleg tega je MOOF imel povezavo s VI. korpusom in člani narodnoosvobodilnega boja na terenu (Glas Slavonije 1961c, 2).

Ob različnih aktivnostih, ki so jih izvajali člani MOOF, je Ferdo Delak deloval v smeri ustanavljanja organizacij, kot so Antifašistična fronta žena, Slovenska antifašistična mladina in Slovenski pionirji. Organizacija za pionirje je zaživela šele, ko je bil Osijek osvobojen (SMOJNOF 1945, 5). V arhivskem gradivu je bil najden tudi popis članov slovenske antifašistične mladine. V odboru za Gornji Grad so bili: Dušan Grabnar, Vida Zupan in Bojana Vodlan, drugi člani pa so še bili: Špelca Pezevšek, Ivanka Malin, Ljubica Bratuš, Milena Flakus in Vinko Prelog. V odboru za Donji Grad so bili: Majda Dobrila, Vida Koblar, Jože Arh, Gojča Bradač, Janez Arh, Viktor Kunc in Marjan Keber. Člana v Tvrđi sta bila: Leon Časl in Albert Gzelman, v Retfalu pa: Boris Gogina in Martin Kos (SMOJNOF 1945, 32). Iz poročila SMOJNOF o delu za organizaciji Slovenska antifašistična mladina in Slovenski pionirji je razvidno, da je Štefica Grabnar "od tovariša Ferde Delaka / … / dobila nalog, da prevzamem organizacijo Slovenske antifašistične mladine in Slovenskih pionirjev" (SMOJNOF 1945, 32).

Leta 1943 so z večjimi ali manjšimi težavami ustanovili tudi pododbore, ki so nosili naziv delovnega mesta ali institucije, v kateri so delovali člani MOOF v Osijeku: Donji Grad, Gornji Grad, Novi Grad, Retfala, Gledališče in Bolnišnica. Dejavnost teh članov bo prikazana po pododborih. Vse aktivnosti so bile osredotočene na prej omenjene naloge, ki jih je imel MOOF v Osijeku.

V Donjem Gradu so na iniciativo Ferda Delaka ustanovili Pododbor MOOF Osijek – Donji Grad, v katerega so bili vključeni Slavko Klančar, Josip Gruden, ki ga je kasneje zamenjal Marjan Pahor, in že omenjeni Ignac Krajnc. Pododbor MOOF Osijek – Donji Grad je bil ustanovljen marca 1943. Delo se je v glavnem navezovalo na širjenje radijskih poročil ter na agitacijo in organizirano delovanje v OF. Hkrati so razdeljevali propagandni material in vzdrževali mrežo med izseljenimi Slovenci. Ob pomoči drugih članov MOOF, predvsem Iva Skarpe, so zbrali podatke o premikanju vojakov in jih posredovali Ignacu Krajncu, ki jih je nato posredoval naprej (SMOJNOF 1945, 19).

Člani so zbirali tudi podatke o drugih Slovencih, ki so živeli zunaj področja Pododbora MOOF Osijek – Donji Grad. Poleg že omenjenih članov so se v delovanje pododbora vključili posamezniki iz podjetij, ki so delovala na območju Donjega Grada. Tako so se iz podjetja Schicht v delovanje Pododbora MOOF Osijek – Donji Grad vključili nekateri delavci, na primer Udovič in Mira Ferenc, pozneje tudi že omenjeni Ivo Skarpa in soproga inženirja Pirje.

Iz Kožare je bil v Pododboru MOOF Osijek – Donji Grad aktiven Jože Sternad. Pavel Kozina in usnjarski mojster Strelec sta bila zaznamovana kot

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hitlerjanca (SMOJNOF 1945, 16), aktivna pri nemški narodni skupnosti, zato nista imela zaupanja članov Pododbora MOOF Osijek – Donji Grad (SMOJNOF 1945, 15). Člani odbora navajajo:

> Obadva sta bila trdno prepričana, da rešitev Evrope, Slovenije in civilizacije zavisi samo od sodelovanja z Nemčijo. To njihovo sodelovanje s to skupino se more posebno zameriti ing. Kozini, ki je mlajši človek in odgojen za časa bivše Jugoslavije, edina delna olajševalna okolnost za oba je samo to, da sta kljub vsemu pomagala s podporo našim rojakom ob raznih zbirkah, to pa seveda samo do tedaj, dokler se je še kdo obrnil na njo za to. (SMOJNOF 1945, 16).

Tudi v Ljevaonici so delovali Slovenci. Pododbor MOOF Osijek – Donji Grad so vzpostavili brata Gruden in Gnusa. Za Antona Grudna so napisali, da je bil član Volksgruppe, vendar je bil na določen način v to primoran, ker je bil aktiven član slovenskega društva iz leta 1938, in da bi bil gotovo pregnan, če tega ne bi storil. Napisali so tudi, da "sploh pa je cela družina Gruden znana kot zavedena in popolnoma zanesljiva in strogo antifašistično razpoložena" (SMOJNOF 1945, 16). Za Gnusa so napisali, da je sodeloval v neznani skupini, da je bil aretiran, obsojen zaradi podpiranja partizanov in odveden proti Đakovu (SMOJNOF 1945, 16). Poleg tega so v poročilu omenjali še fotografa Šoštariča, za katerega so napisali, da se je zavedal svoje krivice in da je "odšel z nemškimi izseljenci leta 1944 v Nemčijo" (SMOJNOF 1945, 17).

Iz podatkov, ki so jih zbirali aktivni člani MOOF Osijek, pa je razvidno, da so svojo nalogo, da bi povečali število aktivnih v organizaciji, sprejeli zelo resno. Prav zato, da bi bili uspešni, so morali biti izjemno previdni pri tem, komu lahko zaupajo. Z druge strani pa zapisani podatki nekatere osebe, ki so bile tudi kasneje aktivne v hrvaškem ali slovenskem javnem življenju, v nekaterih situacijah postavljajo v drugačno luč. Vsekakor je pomembno poudariti, da so verjetno posamezniki, ki so pisali poročila, pogosto imeli subjektivno stališče. Ker zapisanih podatkov ni bilo mogoče primerjati z bolj objektivnimi viri, je treba te pripombe sprejeti z določenim zadržkom.

V poročilu so člani Pododbora MOOF Osijek – Donji Grad omenili še nekatere Slovence, ki so delovali v Slovenskem taborišču na Vukovarski cesti: Debenjaka in Geelmana, ki sta odšla v partizane, ter Dimnika, ki je bil prostovoljni član Kulturbunda in mu niso zaupali. Omenjen je tudi generalštabni polkovnik Jurij Mušič (SMOJNOF 1945, 17–18).

V Pododbor MOOF Osijek – Gornji Grad so bili vključeni Karlo Kamuščič,[16] Anton Ogorelec[17] in Ivan Buždon. MOOF je bil ustanovljen na predlog Ferda Delaka 14. junija 1943. Njegovi glavni nalogi sta bili pridobivanje zaupnih oseb in kontroliranje gornjegrajskih Slovencev, ki so bili pri SMOJNOF opisani kot nezanesljivi oziroma so bili v službi okupatorjev in ustašev. Tako so dobili nalogo, da nadzirajo dr. Marjana Ogrizka in Ivana Šoštariča (SMOJNOF 1945, 6). Poleg tega je bil Ivan Buždon poštar, ki je skrbel za pošto Pododbora

MOOF Osijek – Gornji Grad in za pošto, ki bi prišla iz Oblastnega odbora v Zagrebu. Posredoval je tudi informacije o Slovencih in slovenskih družinah, ki jih niso poznali (SMOJNOF 1945, 6–7). Anton Ogorelec je bil v Laslovu in je bil zadolžen, da skrije posameznike, ki so bili kompromitirani, in jim pridobi nadaljnje zveze za pot v gozdove. Sestajali so se vsakih štirinajst dni. Naloga Karla Kamuščiča je bila pretipkati vse novice, ki jih je Ferdu Delaku posredoval tedanji novinar Hrvatskega lista Mirko Trišler.[18] Nato so te novice širili naokoli kot "slovenske radijske novice" (SMOJNOF 1945, 9).

Člani Pododbora MOOF Osijek – Gornji Grad so med drugim dobili nalogo, da opazujejo in na določen način rešijo vprašanja gledaliških igralcev oziroma da poizvedo za informacijami o Slovencih, ki so bili zaposleni v gledališču. To nalogo so prepustili članom Pododbora MOOF Osijek – Gledališče. Njegovi člani so bili Miro Kopač,[19] Olga Kocijančić in Karlo Kamuščič (SMOJNOF 1945, 9).

Pododbor MOOF Osijek – Gornji Grad je k delu poskusil pritegniti tudi kaplana Jelena, ampak glede na poročilo je ta povedal, da ni komunist, vendar je "pripravljen pomagati S. M. O. J. N. O. F.-u posebno pri organizaciji vrnitve v domovino" (SMOJNOF 1945, 9).

V Pododboru MOOF Osijek – Retfala sta bila aktivna Dragotin Vodlan in Časl. Posebnost tega odbora je bila v tem, da dolgo ni mogel dobiti nobene zveze. Tako se je ustanovil šele oktobra 1943. V odboru je deloval tudi Močnik, ki je sodeloval pri raznih vojaških podjetjih in se je izkazal kot zaveden sodelavec OF. Vodlan je zbiral podatke o Slovencih v Retfali (SMOJNOF 1945, 19) in mu je skupaj s pomočjo Martina Kosa uspelo zbrati enainsedemdeset ljudi.[20] Poleg te mreže, ki jo je ustanovil Dragotin Vodlan, je izdelal tudi načrt mesta Osijek v merilu 1 : 5700 in deloma Retfale z označbo utrdb (SMOJNOF 1945, 29).

Organizacija OF v Šečerani, Lanari in Novem gradu je bila zaupana Marjanu Pahorju (Klančar 1945, 20), ki je v delovanje v Pododboru MOOF Osijek – Novi Grad vključil tudi Franja Bezjaka in Vekoslava Špangerja. Po podatkih so v njem sodelovali še: Sidonija Černigoj, Jakob Dobriha, Dimitrij Lapajne, Irma Bezjak in Milovan Godina, vsi zaposleni v tovarni Lana. Vekoslav Španger je imel nalogo, da zbira Slovence v Laneni industriji (SMOJNOF 1945, 30).

MOOF je imel svoje ljudi tudi v Narodnem gledališču v Osijeku, kjer je bil organiziran Pododbor MOOF Osijek – Gledališče, katerega člani so bili Miro Kopač, Olga Kocijančić in Karlo Kamuščič. Pododbor je bil ustanovljen avgusta 1943, ko je v osiješko gledališče prišel Miro Kopač iz Sarajeva. Pododbor je bil ustanovljen zato, ker je v osiješkem gledališču delovalo veliko Slovencev. Iniciator njegove ustanovitve je bil Ferdo Delak, ki je osebno govoril z Olgo Kocijančić in želel, da se k delu pritegne tudi Maksa Rogarja. Rogar je zavrnil sodelovanje, ker je imel informacijo, da "bodo polovili končno to slovensko grupo, ki buni Slovence proti današnjem ustaškemu režimu, namesto da so Hrvatom hvaležni, da jih tukaj rešijo" (SMOJNOF 1945, 10). Ker je bila Olga Kocijančić izjemno dobra prijateljica Maksa Rogarja, je pogosto niso klicali na

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pomembnejše sestanke, saj so se bali, da mu slučajno ne bi izdala pomembnih podatkov (SMOJNOF 1945, 10).

Člani Pododbora MOOF Osijek – Gledališče so opazovali zaposlene v osiješkem gledališču in tehtali, koga bodo še dodatno pritegnili k delovanju v MOOF. Nekateri zaposleni so bili nevtralni in jih niso povabili, pa ne zato, ker niso bili zvesti Slovenci, temveč zato, ker so imeli dovolj lastnih skrbi. Tako je bil eden izmed njih tudi že omenjeni Maks Rogar, ki so ga dojemali kot zelo neorientiranega Slovenca, ki je bil vesel, da je v Osijeku preživel ta štiri leta in da je bil zdrav. K delovanju niso povabili niti Pavle Udovič niti njenega brata. Tako o možu Pavle Udovič[21] kot o njenem bratu Milanu Udoviču je MOOF pridobil slabe informacije, ki niso bile povezane z ustaši ali Nemci in niso želeli tvegati. Podobno je bilo tudi z Borisom Gerbcem, ki je bil "kot Slovenec vedno zaveden, v pokret ga nismo vzeli, ker je preveč pil in lajal" (SMOJNOF 1945, 12). Za Josipa Šuteja so napisali, da je "bil klerikalno nastrojen, slabih informacij o njem nimamo" (SMOJNOF 1945, 12). Elvira Levar ni prišla v poštev, ker so "jo stalno videli v nemški družbi" (SMOJNOF 1945, 12). V orkestru je bil še Slovenec Matko, vendar tudi njega niso povabili, čeprav o njem niso imeli nobenih slabih informacij (SMOJNOF 1945, 12). Pomembno vlogo je imela že omenjena Marica Lubejeva,[22] ki je skrivala material in prinašala pošto iz Zagreba (SMOJNOF 1945, 12). Slabe informacije so dobili o Maksu Furijanu,[23] članu mariborskega gledališča, ki je nekaj časa deloval tudi v Skopju. Zanj so izvedeli, da se je po prihodu vpisal v Kulturbund in da je v Zagrebu organiziral nemško gledališče, s katerim je prišel tudi v Osijek. O njegovih aktivnostih so člani poslali poročilo zagrebškemu MOOF (SMOJNOF 1945, 13).

Pododbor MOOF Osijek – Bolnišnica je bil organiziran v Zakladni bolnišnici v Osijeku, kjer je delovala tudi skupina zdravnikov, ki so za potrebe OF zbirali zdravila in nabavljali lažno bolniško dokumentacijo ter na svojih oddelkih v bolnišnici skrivali kompromitirane posameznike. Nekaj časa je bil v tej bolnišnici tudi Ferdo Delak (Glas Slavonije 1961b, 2).

Vsi opisani pododbori na območju Osijeka so imeli po deset članov, vse skupine pa so bile vključene v prikrito delovanje.

5. Zaključne misli

Obdobje med drugo svetovno vojno je bilo izjemno tragično in težko za vse, ki so bili neposredno ali posredno vključeni v vojno dogajanje. Ko spoznamo položaj Slovencev v času druge svetovne vojne na območju NDH, je možno sklepati, da je bil njihov položaj zelo težek. V tem vojnem viharju so se poskusili znajti na različne načine. Prav to je razvidno iz prispevka. V njem so omenjeni Slovenci, ki so se v Slavonijo priselili v času med obema svetovnima vojnama, in tudi tisti, ki so bili s svojih domov pregnani. Nekateri so se odločili priključiti MOOF in se po svojih močeh boriti za cilje, ki so jih dojemali kot ustrezne.

Nekateri posamezniki, ki so imeli priložnost, pa so se odločili dočakati konec vojne in se niso preveč izpostavljali.

Možno je sklepati, da je bil MOOF v Osijeku v času druge svetovne vojne dobro organiziran. Imel je pomembno vlogo, predvsem med slovenskimi priseljenci v Osijeku in okolici. Poleg obveščevalnih aktivnosti so bile zabeležene tudi aktivnosti, povezane s humanitarnim delom, na primer zbiranje pomoči za deportirance. Člani MOOF v Osijeku so imeli razširjeno in dobro organizirano mrežo v različnih delih mesta ter tudi v pomembnejših institucijah (bolnišnica) in organizacijah, kjer so bili zabeleženi Slovenci. Poleg tega so ohranjali in vzdrževali mrežo med pregnanci, ki so prispeli v Osijek in njegovo okolico.

Pri delovanju MOOF je vidna pomembna vloga Ferda Delaka v samem procesu organiziranja in tudi povezovanja MOOF v Osijeku z osrednjim centrom MOOF v Zagrebu. Razvidno je, da je MOOF v Osijeku temeljil na osnovah, ki so jih zasnovali člani slovenskega društva iz leta 1938. Pomembno je tudi ponovno poudariti, da so člani tega društva na začetku druge svetovne vojne in po prihodu prvih pregnancev v Osijek in okolico začeli z organizacijo MOOF. Da je to slovensko društvo imelo pomembno vlogo v organiziranju in delovanju MOOF v Osijeku, potrjuje Slavko Klančar, ki je vidno ime v delovanju pododborov MOOF v Osijeku.

Člani so s svojim aktivnim delovanjem dobili dober vpogled v situacijo med pregnanimi Slovenci in širili svoj delokrog.

Zaključimo lahko, da je treba narediti kontinuirano in celovito raziskavo, v katero bi bili zajeti različni kraji, v katere so bili deportirani Slovenci in v katerih so delovali MOOF. Verjetno se za številne še ne ve. Samo na ta način bi se lahko v celoti ocenila njihova vloga in uspeh pri izpolnjevanju nalog, na podlagi česar bi lahko uspešno podali sklepne misli o združenem delovanju Slovencev na Hrvaškem med drugo svetovno vojno.

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Seznam kratic

NDH – Neodvisna država Hrvaška
MOOF – mestni odbor Osvobodilne fronte
OF – Osvobodilna fronta
SMOJNOF – Slovenski mestni odbor enotne narodnoosvobodilne fronte

Opombe

[1] Vera Kržišnik-Bukić opredeljuje najpomembnejše razloge priseljevanja Slovencev na Hrvaško. Navaja, da so se na Hrvaško v najširšem smislu priseljevali zaradi službe oziroma zaslužka, drugi vzrok pa je bil odhod iz Kraljevine Italije po prvi svetovni vojni, pri čemer gre za politično-vojni vzrok, saj so posamezniki bežali pred tedanjo politiko Kraljevine Italije. Med te politično-vojne vzroke se štejejo že omenjene deportacije in preganjanje s strani Nemčije v času druge svetovne

vojne. Poleg tega je treba kot družinske in osebne vzroke omeniti še poroke in vzpostavljanje drugih oblik zvez med Slovenci in prebivalci Hrvaške, študij in šolanje na Hrvaškem ter selitev Slovencev po upokojitvi v obmorske kraje na Hrvaškem (Kržišnik-Bukić 1994–1995, 92). Za omenjene vzroke (razen politično-vojnih vzrokov) pa ne obstajajo natančne številke in je to vsekakor ena izmed tem, ki bi jo bilo treba dodano raziskati. Možno je trditi, da so bili procesi odseljevanja na Hrvaško intenzivni do šestdesetih let dvajsetega stoletja, ko je možno zaslediti obratne procese. Ostaja pa odprto vprašanje, koliko Slovencev se je po upokojitvi odločilo trajno preseliti na Hrvaško. Slovenci so namreč v času turistične sezone še vedno najštevilnejši turisti na Hrvaškem.

2 Drugo obdobje, ki je bilo obeleženo s političnimi migracijami, je obdobje med dvema svetovnima vojnama, ko so se prebivalci z območja Julijske krajine v Italiji odločili za beg oziroma odhod na območje Kraljevine Jugoslavije. Posledično so nastajala številna emigracijska društva na območju Kraljevine Jugoslavije, ki so imela za člane Slovence in Hrvate (Vovko 1979, 68–70, Riman 2014, 108–109). Veliko emigrantov (70.000) iz Julijske krajine je bilo v Kraljevini Jugoslaviji povezanih v različna emigrantska društva, ki so spontano nastajala v vseh večjih krajih, še posebej v večjih urbanih centrih. Najdemo jih predvsem na območju Dravske banovine (Pelikan 2010, 457), mogoče pa jih je zaslediti tudi drugod na območju Kraljevine Jugoslavije (Riman 2014, 108–109). Društva so bila zbrana v Zvezo emigrantskih združenj v Jugoslaviji, ki se je kasneje preimenovala v Zvezo jugoslovanskih emigrantov iz Julijske krajine. Glasilo zveze je postal tednik Istra, ki je izhajal od januarja 1932 do leta 1940. Objavljali so se članki v slovenščini in hrvaščini (Pelikan 2010, 457).

3 Zgodovina slovenskega združevanja na Hrvaškem je zelo bogata in dolga. Prvo slovensko društvo je bilo zabeleženo že leta 1886 v Pulju (Riman 2011, 77). Od tedaj do danes je bilo na območju Hrvaške zabeleženih vsaj enainpetdeset slovenskih društev (Riman 2016, 267–277). Zgodovina in delovanje slovenskih društev na Hrvaškem je dokaj dobro raziskana tema in se o njej relativno veliko pisalo. Slovenska društva na Hrvaškem se omenjajo že v Enciklopediji Slovenije (Javornik 1990, 74). Prvo večje delo na to temo pa je napisala Vera Kržišnik-Bukić 1995, 133–188). Za več literature o slovenskih društvih na Hrvaškem glej Riman 2016, 266–285. Kot pomembno je treba omeniti, da je v času med obema svetovnima vojnama delovalo veliko število slovenskih društev in jih tako najdemo vse od Sušaka (danes vzhodni del Reke) do Splita in Osijeka. Samo v Zagrebu je v tem času delovalo vsaj trinajst slovenskih društev, ki so bila različna oziroma so temeljila na različnih smereh delovanja (Riman 2014, 101–130, Kržišnik-Bukić 1995, 133–188). Danes na Hrvaškem obstaja šestnajst slovenskih društev (Josipovič & Kržišnik-Bukić 2010, 153–157, Riman 2016, 266–285).

4 Kot podpisani na poročilih pododborov MOOF v Osijeku so bili: Franjo Blatnik, Ivan Buždon, Ferdo Delak, Štefica Grabnar, Slavo (Slavimir) Klančar, Olga Kocijančić, Karlo Kamuščič, Miro Kopač, Ignac Krajnc, Peter Mravljak, Jurij Mušič, Anton Ogorelec, Marjan Pahor in Dragotin Vodlan. Navedeni so po abecednem redu priimkov.

5 V prvem preselitvenem valu, ki je potekal na začetku julija, naj bi bilo pregnanih tudi 349 slovenskih duhovnikov, ki so bili razporejeni po samostanih in župnijah v Slavonski Požegi, Đakovu in Zagorju. Zanje se je zavzemal predvsem škof Alojzije Stepinac (Grbešić 2002, 132). To tematiko sta omenjala tudi Škvorčević (2008) in Kolar (2007).

6 Za več o vprašanju Koroške in izselitve koroških Slovencev med drugo svetovno vojno glej Zorn 1966, 73–82, Ferenc 1993, 71–73.

7 Taborišče je začelo delovati 9. julija 1941 v prostorih vojašnice v naselju Glis. Sprejelo je lahko 10.000 oseb. Z bodečo žico je bilo razdeljeno na dva dela, enega za Slovence in drugega za Srbe (Kramar 2016, 14).

8 Do zdaj se je nekaj pisalo o Slovencih, ki so se izselili v različne hrvaške kraje, vendar dosedanje raziskave niso prinesle podrobnejših podatkov, iz katerih slovenskih krajev so se posamezniki odseljevali v Osijek in njegovo okolico. Ve se, da so v Osijek odhajali zaradi dela in da so bili tja premeščeni. Poleg teh ekonomskih migrantov je možno trditi, da so se v Osijek odselili tudi

pregnanci z območja Julijske krajine. Vsekakor je to še ena tema iz slovenske zgodovine, ki bi jo bilo treba podrobneje raziskati.

[9] Podatkov o delovanju tega društva je malo. Največ je o delovanju društva mogoče izvedeti iz pravil, ki so shranjena v Državnem arhivu v Zagrebu. Iz teh pravil je možno razbrati nekatere člane, ki se kasneje, v času med drugo svetovno vojno, več ne omenjajo. Tako so bili aktivni Josip Rijavec, Franc Drofenik, Jože Sternad, Martin Zajšek, Jože Zaleznik, Karlo Kvas in Josip Koprivše (Riman 2014, 111).

[10] Tone Ferenc navaja tudi število pregnanih družin in njihovih članov za druge kraje v Slavoniji. Tako je bilo v Đakovo poslanih 161 oseb, v Grubišno polje 388 oseb, v Vinkovce 134 oseb, v Našice 189 oseb, v Novo Gradiško 128 oseb, v Pakrac 127 oseb, v Podravsko Slatino 96 oseb, v Slavonski Brod 192 oseb, v Virovitico 93 oseb, v Županjo 203 osebe, v Daruvar 103 osebe, v Donji Miholjac 102 osebi, v Valpovo 127 oseb in v Slavonsko Požego 147 oseb. Vse skupaj je bilo pregnanih 763 družin in 2355 oseb (Ferenc 1968, 450).

[11] Slovenska kmečko-delavska sloga je bila ustanovljena takoj po vzpostavitvi NDH. Po dosedanjih podatkih je to bilo edino legalno slovensko društvo na območju NDH. Pavle Horvat je kot predsednik Slovenske kmečko-delavske sloge pomagal tedanjemu slovenskemu društvu Narodni dom, ki je bilo prepovedano, pri zbiranju pomoči za razseljene Slovence. Poleg tega je številne Slovence zaposlil v konzularnih predstavništvih NDH v Gradcu, Ljubljani, Beogradu in Trstu. Posredoval je tudi pri napotitvi Slovencev na delo v Tretji rajh in je tudi na ta način pomagal, da bi se izseljeni Slovenci lahko vrnili nazaj domov. Pri vrnitvi v domovino je v času od leta 1941 do leta 1943 pomagal tudi duhovnikom. Deloval je dve leti. Že v obdobju vojne se je slutilo, da se dogajajo nezakonita dejanja in poneverbe denarja (Karakaš Obradov 2014, 207, Karakaš Obradov 2012, 148–149).

[12] Ferdo Delak (Gorica, 29. 6. 1905 – Ljubljana, 16. 1. 1968), gledališki režiser, organizator in publicist. Študiral je na Filozofski fakulteti v Ljubljani in diplomiral na umetniški akademiji Mozarteum v Salzburgu leta 1935. Do leta 1936 je deloval na gledališkem področju, predvsem v Ljubljani, nato pa dve desetletji v gledališčih zunaj Slovenije, v Beogradu, Novem Sadu, Skopju in Zagrebu. Med drugo svetovno vojno je bil v Banjaluki in Osijeku, kjer je sodeloval v narodnoosvobodilnem gibanju. Bil je predsednik Slovenskega mestnega odbora enotne narodnoosvobodilne fronte Osijek. Po osvoboditvi je deloval v gledališčih v Trstu, Zagrebu, na Reki, v Banjaluki in nato v Ljubljani, kjer je bil ravnatelj Mestnega gledališča Ljubljana (1957–1962), nakar je postal umetniški vodja mariborske Drame (1962–1963) (Moravec & Predan 2001, 97).

[13] Alojz (Lojze) Štandeker (Gačnik pri Jarenini, 8. 7. 1911 – Virovitica, 11. 12. 1983), režiser, dramatik, publicist. Kariero je začel graditi leta 1932 v Slovenskem ljudskem gledališču v Mariboru, kjer je ostal do druge svetovne vojne, ko je bil deportiran v Banjaluko. Tam je deloval v banjaluškem gledališču in istočasno sodeloval s partizanskim gibanjem. Po drugi svetovni vojni se je vrnil v Maribor, a se nato na poziv Ministrstva za prosveto in kulturo LR BiH vrnil v Narodno gledališče v Banjaluki. Od leta 1951 je bil v Pulju, leta 1971, ko je bilo gledališče v Pulju zaprto, pa je odšel v Virovitico. Pokopan je v Mariboru (Bizjak 2006, 34).

[14] Podrobnejših informacij o tej ideji ni bilo mogoče najti in je možno samo domnevati, da je šlo za idejo, ki jo je razvijal Pavle Horvat, predsednik Slovenske kmečko-delavske sloge v Zagrebu. Bil je namreč v zelo dobrih odnosih s tedanjim ministrom Mladenom Lorkovićem. Njegova ideja je bila, da se Bela krajina in pas do Zidanega Mosta s pomočjo oblasti NDH pripojita NDH, po kapitulaciji pa je zagovarjal idejo, da bi se NDH pripojila tudi Ljubljanska pokrajina. Po kapitulaciji Kraljevine Italije je poslal s svojimi sodelavci vodji NDH Anteju Paveliću prošnjo, v kateri so zahtevali, da se pri vodstvu Tretjega rajha zavzame za "združevanje celotnega slovenskega ozemlja" in ustanovitev "državne zveze" med NDH in Slovenijo, v kateri bi Slovenija obdržala svoje slovensko ime, narodnost, jezik in grb (Karakaš Obradov 2012, 149). Dejstvo pa je, da se je do sedaj v hrvaški literaturi o tej problematiki pisalo zelo sporadično in se ta ideja ne omenja (Jelić-Butić 1977, Kisić Kolanović 1998, Matković 2002). Tej problematiki je obsežnejši članek posvetil

Boris Mlakar v reviji Borec (1984, 361–371), omenja pa jo tudi v prispevku Nekaj podatkov k razjasnitvi stikov med slovenskimi protirevolucionarnimi vodstvom in Zagrebom ob koncu druge svetovne vojne (2012, 141–150).

[15] Hrvatski list in Sarajevski novi list sta bila glavna časnika na območju NDH, čeprav so izhajali tudi drugi, ki so obstajali že pred drugo svetovno vojno (Jelić-Butić 1977, 203).

[16] Karlo Kamuščič (Trst, 22. 10. 1914 – Maribor, 30. 1. 1968), operni pevec. Šolal se je na Glasbeni akademiji v Zagrebu (1935–1939) in nato debitiral v Mariboru. Kot operni solist je bil angažiran v Slovenskem narodnem gledališču v Mariboru od leta 1939 do leta 1941. Med drugo svetovno vojno je bil član opere in gledališča v Osijeku, po osvoboditvi pa se je vrnil v Maribor in tam deloval do smrti (Lisac 1982, 16).

[17] Anton Ogorelec (Reka, 23. 5. 1924), slovenski inženir elektrotehnike, univerzitetni profesor. Diplomiral je leta 1950 in doktoriral leta 1957 na Tehniški fakulteti Univerze v Ljubljani. Znan je kot znameniti slovenski elektroenergetik, oče relejne zaščite, avtomatizacije v elektroenergetiki, prometu in industrijskih procesih (Zakonjšek 2014, 15).

[18] Mirko Trišler (Trischler) (Osijek, 6. ali 24. 7. 1919 – Zagreb, 5. 8. 1995), novinar, književnik. Končal je osnovno šolo in Trgovsko akademijo v Osijeku. Večji del svojega življenja je preživel v Zagrebu. V hrvaški zgodovini je znan predvsem kot humorist. V času druge svetovne vojne je delal kot član uredništva in stenograf v osiješkem Hrvatskem listu, pri katerem je delal že od leta 1938. Poleg tega je pisal tudi za Vrabca, Za vas in druge tedanje časopise. Do konca druge svetovne vojne je objavil več kot 140 novičarskih besedil (Belošević 2012, 66–67).

[19] Miro Kopač (Gorica, 8. 5. 1901–Ljubljana, 2. 12. 1961), dramski igralec. V Ljubljani so mu zaupali samo manjše vloge, zato je odšel v Varaždin. Deloval je tudi v Osijeku, Trstu, na Cetinju in v Beogradu. V Narodnem gledališču v Sarajevu je deloval trideset let. To je bilo hkrati njegovo najplodnejše obdobje, ko je doživljal posebne uspehe ob sodelovanju z Radom Pregarcem. Kot zrel karakterni igralec se je vrnil v Mestno gledališče v Ljubljani, kjer je igral zadnje desetletje (Stanonik & Brenk 2008, 722, Lisac 1982, 117)

[20] V poročilu je bilo imensko navedenih štirideset oseb, prav tako sodelovanje z redovnicami (SMOJNOF 1945, 30).

[21] Pavla Udovič-Smojver (Trst, 25. 1. 1904 – Reka, 14. 12. 1987). Iz Trsta se je leta 1920 preselila v Maribor, kjer je postala članica gledališča. Pela je v opernem zboru ter študirala solopetje in dramatiko. V obdobju od leta 1936 do leta 1949 je delala v gledališču v Osijeku. Od leta 1949 do leta 1960 je delovala v gledališču na Reki. V svoji karieri je pela v šestdesetih operetah in operah (Stanonik & Brenk 2008, 1218, Hećimović, Barbieri & Neubauer 2010, 265).

[22] Marica Lubej (Borovnica/Braunitzen pri Šmohorju/Hermagor, 20. 3. 1902 – Maribor, 9. 2. 1983), operna pevka. Leta 1920 je postala članica opere v Mariboru. Po sedmih letih je odšla za pol leta v Beograd k Vesničevi zasebni opereti, nato pa v zagrebško gledališče in je tam delovala sedem sezon (Slavčeva 1936, 2). Med drugo svetovno vojno je bila angažirana v Osijeku, nakar se je vrnila v Maribor (Javornik 1992, 332). Največji uspeh je doživela v opereti Mala Floramye Ive Tijardovića (Hećimović, Barbieri & Neubauer 2010, 173).

[23] Maks Furijan (Goričak, 19. 9. 1904 – Šmarje–Sap, 25. 7. 1993), gledališki in filmski igralec. Kot mizar je delal v mariborskih železniških delavnicah. Od 1921 je obiskoval dramasko šolo M. Skrbinška, kasneje R. Pregarca. Od leta 1929 do leta 1936 je bil v Narodnem gledališču v Mariboru, naslednjo sezono je igral v Osijeku, od leta 1937 do leta 1941 je bil v Skopju in od leta 1941 do leta 1943 v Hrvaškem narodnem gledališču v Zagrebu. Od leta 1947 do upokojitve leta 1962 je deloval v Drami SNG v Ljubljani (Javornik 1989, 162).

About the Contributors / *O avtorjih*

Michael Strubell

The author read psychology and physiology at Oxford University, and took an MSc in the Psychology of Education at the London University Institute of Education. He also holds a degree in Psychology and a Diploma in Advanced Studies from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. After teaching in international secondary schools, he directed two offices in the newly re-established government of Catalonia (Generalitat de Catalunya) — the Language Promotion Office (1980-1990) and the Institute of Catalan Sociolinguistics (1990-1999) — before becoming a lecturer in Sociolinguistics and Language Planning at the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (2000-2014), including the position of Chair in Multilingualism, until his retirement. He chairs the Fundació Congrés de Cultura Catalana, and is a Member of the Board of Linguapax International. His main areas of research are minority language communities in Europe and status language planning. He coordinated a number of EU-co-funded or tendered projects and reports including Euromosaic (1994).

Michael Strubell je študiral psihologijo in fiziologijo na Univerzi v Oxfordu ter magistriral iz pedagoške psihologije na Inštitutu za izobraževanje Univerze v Londonu. Ima tudi diplomo iz psihologije in diplomo iz višjih študij, ki jo je pridobil na Universitat Autònoma v Barceloni. Po poučevanju na več mednarodnih srednjih šolah je bil direktor dveh uradov novoustanovljene vlade v Kataloniji (Generalitat de Catalunya): Urada za promocijo jezika (1980–1990) in Inštituta za katalonsko sociolingvistiko (1990–1999). Kasneje je postal predavatelj za sociolingvistiko in jezikovno načrtovanje na Universitat Oberta v Kataloniji (2000–2014). Do upokojitve je vodil tudi Center za multilingvizem. Je direktor fundacije Fundacio Congres de Cultura Catalana in član upravnega odbora organizacije Linguapax International. Glavno področje njegovega raziskovanja so manjšinske jezikovne skupnosti v Evropi in jezikovno načrtovanje. Vodil je številne projekte in urejal poročila, ki jih je financirala EU, med njimi tudi projekt Euromosaic (1994).

Michele Gazzola

Dr. Michele Gazzola is post-doctoral research fellow at the REAL group (Research Group in Languages and Economics), Department of Education Studies, Humboldt-Universität, Berlin, where he is currently working on a research project on language policy, mobility and inclusion in the European Union (project "MIME"). He holds a PhD in Multilingual Communication Management (University of Geneva). His research interests include the economics of languages, language policy evaluation, public economics, policy analysis, multilingualism management, and language planning. He worked as a post-doctoral research fellow at the Institute of Public Economics, Department of Economics, Humboldt-Universität, on a project on the evaluation of linguistic justice in the EU from 2011 to 2015, thanks to a fellowship from the Swiss National Science Foundation and to a Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship.

Michele Gazzola je podoktorski znanstveni sodelavec v skupini REAL (Raziskovalna skupina za jezike in ekonomijo) na Oddelku za izobraževalne študije Humboldtove univerze v Berlinu. Trenutno sodeluje v raziskovalnem projektu, ki proučuje jezikovno politiko, mobilnost in vključevanje v Evropski uniji (projekt »MME«). Na ženevski univerzi v Švici je doktoriral iz menedžmenta večjezične komunikacije. Njegovo raziskovalno področje obsega jezikovno ekonomijo, evaluacijo jezikovne politike, javno ekonomijo, analizo politike, upravljanje večjezičnosti in jezikovno načrtovanje. Kot podoktorski znanstveni sodelavec ter dobitnik štipendije Švicarske nacionalne znanstvene fundacije in interevropske štipendije Marie Curie je bil od leta 2011 do leta 2015 zaposlen na Inštitutu za javno ekonomiko v okviru Humboldtove univerze v Berlinu, ukvarjal pa se je z evaluacijo jezikovne pravičnosti v Evropski uniji.

Francois Grin

Professor François Grin teaches economics and diversity management at the Faculty of Translation and Interpreting of the University of Geneva. He has previously held teaching and research appointments at the Université de Montréal and the University of Washington (Seattle). He has served as Deputy Director of the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) in Flensburg, Germany, and as Adjunct Director of the Education Research Unit (SRED) of the Geneva Department of Education. He has specialised in language economics, educational economics and policy evaluation in these areas. He is the author of numerous articles, books and book chapters, and has steered several large-scale research projects for research agencies and international organisations. He also advises national and regional governments on language policy issues. He is the Coordinator of the MIME project (Mobility and Inclusion in Multilingual Europe, 2014-2018) financed by the European Commission under the Framework Programme 7.

Profesor Francois Grin poučuje ekonomiko in upravljanje raznolikosti na Fakulteti za prevajalstvo in tolmačenje Univerze v Ženevi. V preteklosti je deloval kot predavatelj in raziskovalec na Univerzi v Montrealu in Univerzi Washington (Seattle). Bil je tudi pomočnik direktorja Evropskega centra za manjšinska vprašanja (ECMI) v Flensburgu v Nemčiji in delni vodja šolskega raziskovalnega oddelka v okviru ženevske univerze. Francois Grin je strokovnjak za ekonomiko jezikov in izobraževanja ter za evaluacijo politik na teh področjih. Je avtor številnih člankov, knjig in poglavij v knjigah, bil pa je tudi vodja številnih obsežnih raziskovalnih projektov za raziskovalne agencije in mednarodne organizacije. Je tudi svetovalec za vprašanja jezikovne politike državnim in pokrajinskim upravam ter koordinator projekta MIME (Mobilnost in vključenost v večjezični Evropi, 2014–2018), ki ga financira Evropska komisija znotraj Okvirnega programa 7.

Johan Häggman

Johan Häggman has worked for 16 years in Brussels promoting regional and minority languages and developing the language policy of the European Union: first as project officer for the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages, then as a policy advisor for

the Liberal group in the European Parliament, and during the last eight years for the European Commission as a member of cabinet of Leonard Orban, the Commissioner for Multilingualism, and as an Information and Communication officer and team coordinator, in charge of multilingualism studies and events. He graduated in Political Sciences (politices magister) from Åbo Akademi University in Finland and the Escuela Diplomatica, Spain. He holds an MA (magíster universitario) in International Relations from the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain. He is currently a PhD student at Louvain-la-neuve university in Belgium and lectures at the Universitat de les Illes Balears.

Johan Häggman je šestnajst let delal v Bruslju, kjer je promoviral regionalne in manjšinske jezike ter razvijal jezikovno politiko Evropske unije. Najprej je deloval kot projektni uradnik na Evropskem uradu za manj razširjene jezike, nato kot svetovalec politik liberalne skupine v Evropskem parlamentu, nazadnje pa še osem let v Evropski komisiji kot član kabineta komisarja za multilingvizem Leonarda Orbana, uradnik, zadolžen za informacije in komunikacijo, ter timski koordinator za multilingvizem. Diplomiral je iz politologije na Abo Akademi na Finskem in na Escuela Diplomatica v Španiji. Ima tudi magisterij iz mednarodnih odnosov, ki ga je zagovarjal na Universidad Complutense v Madridu. Trenutno dela doktorat na belgijski univerzi Louvain-la-neuve in predava na Universitat de las Iles Balears.

Tom Moring

Tom Moring (Dr.Pol.Sc., Swedish School of Social Science, University of Helsinki, Finland) is Professor of Communication and Journalism. He also holds a position as Professor II at the Sámi University of Applied Science in Norway. He has worked as a journalist, as the Director of Radio Programmes, and as Chair of the Board of a newspaper publishing house. Between 1999 and 2001 he was Secretary General of the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages. He was grant holder and one of two main authors of the final report of the project Support for Minority Languages in Europe (2003). Between 2001 and 2004 he was a member of the Committee of Experts of the Charter for Regional or Minority Languages of the Council of Europe. He has published widely on linguistic minorities and the media, and he has participated as grant holder in several projects funded by the EU.

Dr. Tom Moring (Swedish School of Social Science, Univerza Helsinki, Finska) je profesor komunikologije in novinarstva. Zaposlen je kot Profesor II na Univerzi za uporabne študije na Norveškem. Delal je kot novinar, direktor radia in predsednik upravnega odbora časopisno-založniške hiše. Med letoma 1999 in 2001 je bil generalni sekretar Evropskega urada za manj razširjene jezike. Bil je dobitnik štipendije in eden izmed dveh glavnih avtorjev končnega poročila o projektu Podpora manjšinskim jezikom v Evropi (2003). Med letoma 2001 in 2004 je bil član ekspertnega odbora Listine za regionalne in manjšinske jezike pri Svetu Evrope. Veliko je pisal in objavljal o jezikovnih manjšinah in medijih ter sodeloval v številnih projektih, ki jih je financirala Evropska unija.

Maja Mezgec

Maja Mezgec graduated at the Faculty of Education of the University of Trieste and received her Ph.D. at the Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana. Since 2002 she has been a researcher at the Slovene Research Institute, Trieste (SLORI), and since 2008 she has been an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Education of the University of Primorska. Her major research interests focus on pedagogic issues, the education of adults, bi and multilingual education, in particular in minority environments. She worked on several research projects about education in minority situaions.

Maja Mezgec je diplomirala na Pedagoški fakulteti Univerze v Trstu in doktorirala iz pedagogike na Filozofski fakulteti Univerze v Ljubljani. Od leta 2002 sodeluje s Slovenskim raziskovalnim inštitutom (SLORI), od leta 2008 pa je zaposlena kot docentka za področje andragogike na Pedagoški fakulteti Univerze na Primorskem. Njeno znanstveno raziskovanje zajema pedagogiko, andragogiko, dvojezično in večjezično izobraževanje s posebnim poudarkom na manjšinski stvarnosti. Sodelovala je v več projektih s področja vzgoje in izobraževanja v manjšinskih in večetničnih okoljih.

Matejka Grgič

Matejka Grgič studied philosophy and Slovenian language at the University of Trieste. She graduated in semiotics (1997); afterwards, she obtained her M.A. (2001) and Ph.D. (2005) at the University of Ljubljana. She has been a researcher, assistant, lecturer and assistant professor. Since 2000 she has been working with several universities in Italy and Slovenia as adjunct professor. In 2014 she obtained the Italian qualification "associate professor". During 2008-2016 she was the Scientific director of the Slovenian Educational Consortium (Slov.I.K.) in Italy. Her research includes pragmatics, the philosophy of language, epistemology, and the history of linguistics and semiotics. Since 2010 she has focused on language and linguistic ideologies in the Slovenian-Italian contact area. She is also a translator, interpreter, and editor.

Matejka Grgič je študirala filozofijo in slovenščino na Univerzi v Trstu, kjer je diplomirala iz semiotike (1997). Magistrirala (2001) in doktorirala (2005) je na Univerzi v Ljubljani. Bila je mlada raziskovalka, asistentka, lektorica in docentka. Od leta 2000 sodeluje z različnimi univerzami v Italiji in Sloveniji. V Italiji je habilitirana izredna profesorica za področje slavistike. Od leta 2008 do leta 2016 je bila znanstvena direktorica Slovenskega izobraževalnega konzorcija – Slov.I.K. Ukvarja se z različnimi področji jezikoslovja, na primer s pragmatiko, filozofijo jezika, epistemologijo in zgodovino jezikoslovnih ved ter semiotiko. Od leta 2010 se posveča predvsem raziskovanju jezikovnih ideologij in pojavov slovensko-italijanskega jezikovnega stikanja. Je tudi prevajalka, tolmačka, avtorica radijskih oddaj in strokovnih prispevkov.

Špela Gale

Špela Gale completed her B.Sc. in Geography at the University of Ljubljana in 2005, and her M.Sc. in Contact Geography at the University of Primorska in 2016. Her expertise relates to the backgrounds, development and current features of language policies in different Celtic environments, especially the Welsh and Scottish Gaelic ones; changes within the Slovene minority area in Italy due to the process of European integration; and cross-border cooperation dynamics between Slovenia in Italy. She works as a Senior Counsellor at the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, with more than 10 years of experience in official statistics, especially in forestry and agricultural statistics and ESS decision-making processes in the EU.

Špela Gale je leta 2005 diplomirala iz geografije na Univerzi v Ljubljani in nato leta 2016 magistrirala iz geografije stičnih prostorov na Univerzi na Primorskem. Je strokovnjakinja za zgodovino, razvoj in vprašanja jezikovnih politik različnih keltsko govorečih območij, še posebej Walesa in Škotske, ter tudi za slovensko manjšino v Italiji, za spremembe, ki jih je ta doživela zaradi evropskih integracijskih procesov, in za čezmejno sodelovanje Slovenije in Italije. Zaposlena je kot višja svetovalka na Zavodu za statistiko RS in ima več kot deset let izkušenj z uradno statistiko, še posebej na področju gozdarstva in kmetijstva ter procesov odločanja v Evropskem socialnem skladu.

Andreja Sršen

Andreja Sršen is a Senior Research and Teaching Assistant at the Center for Croatian Studies, University of Zagreb. She graduated in 1999 in Croatian Studies as Croatologist and Sociologist. She acquired an M.Sc. in political science, has directed International Relations in 2004 at the Faculty of Political Science, Zagreb University, and in 2012 defended her Ph.D. dissertation, Croatian National Identity in the Process of European Integration, in the interdisciplinary field of Politics and Croatian Studies at Zagreb University. She became Associate Assistant in field of Sociology in Croatian Studies in Zagreb. Nowadays she teaches undergraduate and graduate courses on Contemporary Sociological Theory, Sociological Theory, the Sociology of Croatian Society and the Sociology of Identity. She has published several articles related to national and european identity analysis.

Andreja Sršen je višja raziskovalna in pedagoška sodelavka na Centru za hrvaške študije Univerze v Zagrebu. Leta 1999 je diplomirala iz hrvaških študij in si pridobila naziva kroatologinje in sociologinje. Naziv magistra znanosti iz socialnih ved, politologije in mednarodnih odnosov je pridobila leta 2004 na Fakulteti za politične vede Univerze v Zagrebu, doktorsko disertacijo z naslovom Hrvaška narodna identiteta v procesu evropske integracije iz interdisciplinarnega področja znanosti in kroatologije na Centru za hrvaške študije Univerze v Zagrebu pa je zagovarjala leta 2012. Trenutno na dodiplomski in podiplomski stopnji poučuje predmete, kot so sodobna sociološka teorija, sociologija hrvaške družbe in sociologija identitete. Objavila je več člankov s področja narodne in evropske identitetne analize.

Barbara Riman

Barbara Riman was born in Rijeka and graduated in the Faculty of Arts of the University of Rijeka in 2005. Since 2006 she has worked as a junior researcher at the Institute for Ethnic Studies. In 2011 she received her Ph.D. (thesis: Slovenes in Gorski kotar, Istria and the Kvarner Gulf from 1918 to 1991). In 2014 she was appointed lecturer. Since 2011-12 she has been teaching the optional subject "National minorities: approach to research" at the Faculty of Arts in Rijeka. In 2013-14 and 2015-16 she has also been teaching as an optional subject "Slovene-Croatian cultural and historical ties." She has co-authored a number of books and published several academic papers, and attended various scientific and expert meetings at home and abroad. Her professional interests focus on the history of minorities in Croatia, with special emphasis on the Slovene community.

Barbara Riman se je rodila na Reki. Diplomirala je na Filozofski fakulteti Univerze na Reki leta 2005. Od leta 2006 je bila zaposlena na Inštitutu za narodnostna vprašanja kot mlada raziskovalka in potem kot raziskovalka. Leta 2011 je doktorirala na temo Slovenci v Gorskem kotarju, Istri in na Kvarnerju od leta 1918. do leta 1991. Leta 2014 je pridobila naziv docentke. Od šolskega leta 2011/2012 na Filozofski fakulteti Univerze na Reki poučuje izbirni predmet Narodne manjšine: pristop k raziskovanju, v šolskem letu 2013/2014 ter 2015/2016 je izvajala tudi izbirni predmet Slovensko-hrvaške kulturne in zgodovinske vezi. S soavtorji je objavila nekaj knjig, več znanstvenih prispevkov, udeležuje pa se številnih domačih in mednarodnih znanstvenih in strokovnih srečanj. Njeni raziskovalni interesi so povezani z zgodovino manjšin na Hrvaškem s posebnim poudarkom na slovenski skupnosti.

Reviewers in 2016

Recenzenti prispevkov v letu 2016

We highly appreciate the help of all the experts who reviewed the articles submitted for publication in Treatises and Documents, Journal of ethnic studies, in 2016.

Zahvaljujemo se strokovnjakom, ki so v letu 2016 recenzirali prispevke za revijo Razprave in gradivo, Revija za narodnostna vprašanja.

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Guidelines for Contributors

General — The editorial board of **Treatises and Documents**, **The Journal of Ethnic Studies** welcomes the submission of scholarly articles in the field of ethnic and minority studies, especially on racial and ethnic relations, ethnic identity, nationalism, xenophobia, the protection of (ethnic, national, linguistic, religious, and other) minorities, migration, multiculturalism and related subjects. The journal is particularly interested in discussions regarding ethnic and minority issues in the so- called Alpine-Adriatic-Panonnian area and all comparative studies, which include – only partially or as a whole - this geographic area. This area comprises the Alpine arc, the hinterland of the eastern Adriatic and Panonnian Basin. More technically, this area includes the following countries: Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Italy, Germany (especially the southern part), Hungary, Kosovo, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. Also Macedonia and Bulgaria may be interesting cases.

Two issues of the journal are published every year, usually in June and December.

Articles that are submitted must be original, unpublished material and should not be simultaneously under consideration - either in whole or in part - for publication elsewhere.

The journal encourages the submission of articles in English, since this enables authors to present their ideas and work to a broader public. However, articles in other languages – with a special emphasis on the Slovenian language – are also welcome. The abstracts of the articles are always published in the language of the article and in English.

Authors who do not have native or equivalent proficiency in English must prior to submission have the article read by someone with this proficiency. This step ensures that the academic content of your paper is fully understood by journal editors and reviewers. Articles which do not meet these requirements will most likely not be considered for publication.

Manuscripts should be submitted in electronic form and must include:
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- an abstract of the article in the language of the article and in English; this should include a brief presentation of the issues discussed, the methodology used, the main findings and the conclusions;
- 3 – 7 key words in the language of the article and in English.

The length of the title, the abstract and the key words in one language should not exceed 1,100 characters (including spaces). More detailed information about the form of submitted manuscripts is presented in the prescribed template, available at the journal's website (http://www.inv.si).

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