ANNALES

Anali za istrske in mediteranske študije
Annali di Studi istriani e mediterranei
Annals for Istrian and Mediterranean Studies
Series Historia et Sociologia, 30, 2020, 3

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FAIR COOPERATION AND DIALOGUE WITH THE OTHER AS A RATIONAL ATTITUDE: THE GRAMMARIAN ACCOUNT OF AUTHENTICITY

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to show how philosophical grammatical consideration can contribute to better understanding of rationality of religion, and increase respect, fair cooperation and dialogue between adherents of different religions and worldviews. I have picked three examples of such account: Wittgenstein's account of theology as grammar, Alvin Plantinga's criticism of classical foundationalism and Hilary Putnam's semantical externalism. In the second part of the paper, I analyse the connection between grammar, rationality, and authenticity. I show that understanding of this connection provides a rational ground for claiming the possibility of dialogue and fair cooperation with others even in case when their rationality is different from ours.

Keywords: grammar, non-trivial rationality, fair cooperation, dialogue, authenticity

EQUA COOPERAZIONE E DIALOGO CON L'ALTRO COME ATTEGGIAMENTO RAZIONALE: LA CONSIDERAZIONE GRAMMATICALE DELL'AUTENTICITÀ

SINTESI

Lo scopo di questo articolo è mostrare come la considerazione grammaticale filosofica può contribuire a una migliore comprensione della razionalità della religione e aumentare il rispetto, l'equa cooperazione e il dialogo tra aderenti di diverse religioni e visioni del mondo. Ho raccolto tre esempi di tali considerazioni: la concezione della teologia come grammatica di Wittgenstein, la critica al fondazionalismo classico di Alvin Plantinga, e l'esternalismo semantico di Hilary Putnam. Nella seconda parte dell'articolo, analizzo il collegamento tra grammatica, razionalità e autenticità. Mostro che la comprensione di questo collegamento fornisce una base razionale per difendere la possibilità del dialogo e di un'equa cooperazione con gli altri anche nel caso in cui la loro razionalità sia diversa dalla nostra.

Parole chiave: grammatica, razionalità non triviale, cooperazione leale, dialogo, autenticità

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Some might think there is no connection between Frege and Wittgenstein, on [the] one hand, and Rawls, on the other. For me there is a very close connection, and I hope to bring it out implicitly if not explicitly today (Dreben, 2003, 316).

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this paper is to show how philosophical grammatical consideration can contribute to better understanding of rationality of religion, to its respect, and help to ground and increase respect, fair coopera-tion[1] and dialogue between adherents of different re-ligions and worldviews. I have picked three examples of such account: Wittgenstein's account of theology as grammar, Alvin Plantinga's (hereafter CF) criticism of classical foundationalism, and Hilary Putnam's se-mantical externalism (hereafter CF). In the second part of the paper, I will analyse the connection between grammar, rationality, and authenticity. I will show that understanding of this connection provides a rational ground for claiming the possibility of dialogue and fair cooperation with others even in case when their rationality is different from ours.

There are two basic starting points of my analysis. The first concerns dialogue, and the second fair co-operation. The first point may be formulated as the following argument: 1. There is no true dialogue with-out mutual respect among participants; 2. There is no true respect without mutual recognition of rational-ity among participants; 3. Therefore, there is no true dialogue without mutual recognition of rationality between participants. The second, Rawlsian, starting point is that fair cooperation is not possible without mutual recognition and respecting of rationality be-tween the participants.

GRAMMATICAL ACCOUNT OF RELIGION AND THEOLOGY: SOME REFLECTIONS ON ITS SIGNIFICANCE, FRUITFULNESS AND IMPLICATIONS

Wittgenstein: theology as grammar

Late Wittgenstein understood a philosopher as being a kind of grammarian. Similarly, he under-stood theology as grammar (Wittgenstein, 1984, 398; Arrington, 2004). In this respect, his distinction between factual and grammatical propositions is of special importance (Arrington, 2004, 171, 173).

Let's take an example of the proposition »God ex-ists« (Arrington, 2004, 172–173, 175). According to Wittgenstein, this proposition functions in a religious language game, for instance the Catholic one, not as a factual proposition, but as a grammati-cal proposition. In the Catholic grammar, it doesn't express the fact that God exists (Wittgenstein, 1980, 82). Rather, we are dealing with a proper use of the word God in the Catholic grammar. The Catholic grammatical »justification« of such use of the word »God« is not by providing some proves for God's existence but by proving that such use of the word »God« is proper if one is Catholic (Arrington, 2004, 178). If one says that God doesn't exist then one is not Catholic because Catholics don't use the word "God" in such a way. The job of a Catholic theolo-gian is not to perform a scientific or metaphysical language game (Wittgenstein, 1966, 57; Arrington, 2004, 175; Hodges, 2004, 67) – and thus to provide scientific or metaphysical proves for the claim that God exists – but rather they are grammarians of the Catholic religion. They describe the proper rules and ways of talking, thinking, and in general of living according to the Catholic religion. They are experts for the Catholic way of life, for the Catholic form of life. An appropriate discourse belongs to this form. A Catholic theologian is a »guardian« of the Catholic discourse and Catholic form of life, or, to put it in Wittgenstein`s terms, of the Catholic gram-mar (Arrington, 2004, 173). This implies also that a Catholic theologian points out also the violations of the Catholic grammar. Following Wittgenstein, this is not true only for the Catholic religion and theology but also for other religions and theologies in general: other Christian theologies, Islamic, Buddhist theolo-gies etc. Following Wittgenstein, we may say that the religious grammar and theology are not a matter of scientific proving or disproving that some proposi-tion is factually true or not (Hodges, 2004, 69–70), but rather a matter of identity. If you are a Christian, you think and say that God is a Trinity »consisting« of Father, Son, and Holly Spirit. If one thinks and talks about God otherwise fine, they may do it. This doesn't mean that one may call them a bad person, or even infidel or apostate, but certainly they are not Christians. Christians simply don't think and talk that way (Arrington, 2004, 172, 174, 176).

Such understanding of religion enables Wittgen-stein to account for some characteristics of religious speech and thought, for instance certainty. A specific certainty is typical for religious statements and be-

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1   The formulation of the conditions of fair cooperation in an ethically heterogeneous society was one of the main aims of Rawls' philosophical endeavour. In this paper, I use the term *fair cooperation* in the Rawlsian sense, more precisely in the sense of the term as it is understood by the late Rawls (Rawls, 2001, especially pp. 5–8 (the introduction of the notion and its basic clarification)). For our purposes in this paper it is especially important Rawls' stress on reasonableness of the terms of cooperation from the point of view of all involved parties: "*The idea of cooperation includes the idea of fair terms of cooperation: these are terms each participant may reasonably accept*" (Rawls, 2001, 6). Rawls characterizes the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation as "*the central organizing idea of society*" (Rawls, 2001, 26).

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lieves. Such certainty is not scientific or metaphysical but rather grammatical. It originates in the certainty about the proper religious use of language, about the grammatically proper way of thinking and talking from the point of view of a particular religion.

Wittgenstein's account of religion shows that science is relevant for theology primarily as far as it can help to achieve the true interpretation or understanding of a particular religious identity and not as a means of falsifying a particular religion as a whole. Genuine religious propositions are not of the kind that can be falsified by scientific findings. Likewise, it is not possible to prove scientifically that a particular religious belief is irrational. Those who claim this confuse genuine religious propositions with factual propositions.

Plantinga's criticism of classical foundationalism

Foundationalists distinguish between basic and non-basic beliefs. So let us introduce the definition of a basic belief of a person S (Howard-Snyder, 2012, 37):

S's belief B is basic = df B is justified and B does not owe its justification solely to

(i) S's other beliefs,
or
(ii) the coherence of their belief system,
or
(iii) the combination of both.

CF claims that there are only three kinds of basic beliefs (Gutting, 2009, 112):

1. self-evident beliefs (for instance some truths of logic or mathematics),
2. incorrigible beliefs (like "I think"),
3. experiential beliefs (for instance that at the moment I am wearing brown trousers).

Consecutively CF claims that the only justified beliefs are either those three kinds of beliefs, or beliefs that deductively follow from those beliefs. Hence, rational and epistemically responsible person should accept only those three kinds of beliefs. Besides, if knowledge is a justified belief, any possible knowledge consists only of those three kinds of beliefs.

Plantinga has showed that CF is wrong. He proved that there are basic beliefs that don't belong to any of the three mentioned kinds of CF basic beliefs (Plantinga, 2000; Gutting, 2009, 111–120). This thesis can be demonstrated by the example of an imagined person whom we can call John (Plantinga, 2000, 100ff). John comes from totally religious environment and he is very religious. But he (surprisingly) chooses

to study philosophy at a secularized university, in a not exactly religious intellectual environment. He becomes acquainted with the criticism of religion given by Marx, Nietzsche, Freud and others but he remains quite unmoved by it. On the other hand, his faith enables him to cultivate a reach and satisfying inner spiritual and social life. So it might seem reasonable to say that John's religious beliefs are basic for they are not justified solely by some other beliefs, coherence or combination of both and it is perfectly rational for John to hold those beliefs.

Somebody can understand the intuitive power of the above example but can nevertheless object in the following way: "*I agree that the religious beliefs of John are in a sense basic. Still, these are not proper basic beliefs because they are only subjectively justified, and not objectively justified.*" We can reply to this objection by introducing the distinction between only subjectively justified beliefs and warranted beliefs. The claim which I held as correct is that warranted beliefs are objectively justified, and that among warranted beliefs there are also basic beliefs that don't belong to any of the mentioned three kinds of basic beliefs recognized by CF. The sufficient conditions for a warranted belief are that it is subjectively justified, and that it is a result of a proper functioning of our cognitive faculties. This means that the one who claims that John's religious beliefs are not warranted must prove that they result from improper functioning of John's cognitive faculties. Or to put it in general terms: those who claim that a warranted religious belief is not possible must prove that a religious belief that doesn't result from improper functioning of our cognitive faculties is not possible. In particular, they must prove that it is (logically) impossible that John's religious beliefs result from proper functioning of his cognitive faculties.

Let us now turn our attention to Christian beliefs (and assume that John is a Christian). Our question is now the following: Are Christian beliefs produced by improper functioning of cognitive faculties of Christian believers or not? Plantinga has convincingly argued that only if Christian beliefs are not true then it is reasonable to claim that they are not warranted. But if, on the other hand, they are true, then it is highly probable that they are warranted. The argument is the following: If Christian beliefs are true then they are caused by God who tries to redeem us by means of them. This God is absolutely good and omnipotent but he is also the designer of our cognitive faculties. Therefore, these faculties function as their designer desires. Hence, they work properly. Ergo our Christian belief is warranted if it is true (Plantinga, 2000, 285).

The last proposition already implies that the question of the rationality of Christian belief can't be separated from the question of its being true. Critics can't claim that Christian belief is non-warranted

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without at the same time claiming that it is false. If Christianity is true then it is warranted. The skeptic's objection "*I don't claim that Christian faith is true or false but just that it is non-warranted*" is therefore not reasonable. Basically, Christianity can't be questioned solely epistemologically but rather theologically. Fundamentally, we can criticize it by questioning its being true and not only by denying its warrantability or rationality. Until we prove that Christian belief can't be true we can't prove that it can't be warranted and therefore that it can't be rational. But the proposition that Christian belief can't be true has not been proved till now by anybody and it seems quite improbable that anybody will prove it. Therefore, one can't rationally claim that Christian belief can't be rational in the sense that it can't be warranted. Moreover: if we are certain that Christian belief is true then we can be sure that it is also warranted (Gutting, 2009, 114).

The moral of Plantinga's criticism of CF is similar to the one we have derived from Wittgenstein's account of religion. His account, as outlined above, can be interpreted as implying the particularity of rationality. There is no neutral intellectual framework or horizon, accessible to human beings, from which we could decide what is rational or not regarding the religious truth. Science certainly can't provide it. What is rational or not depends on a particular intellectual horizon and the "decision" – if there is any – for a particular horizon is the decision at the identity level. Rationality is contextually and horizontally marked. We can of course decide for a different identity, abandon one identity and take another … But such decisions are not a matter of science. And they are very particularistic. Thus it is perfectly rational to say that for person A it is rational to be a Catholic, for person B to be a Muslim, and for person C to be an atheist. They can be all rational because rationality is particularistic. It is neither just subjective nor arbitrary, but it is particularistic. Such an account of rationality and religion enables genuine dialogue between people with different beliefs and worldviews because they can treat each other - despite their mutually exclusive views – as rational. Recognizing of rationality is a condition for respect and dignity. And without mutual respect and recognition of dignity, a genuine dialogue is not possible.

Semantics of one and the same God: the religious relevance of Putnam's semantical externalism

SE is a position developed by Hilary Putnam. Putnam, through an imaginative thought argument, convincingly proved that "*meanings are not in the head*". This, to put it more precisely, means that, in most terms, their references cannot be determined without taking into account the speaker's (social) environment (Putnam, 1975; 1991a; 1991b; 1992). Putnam differentiates between intension of the term, and its extension or reference. Extension is called meaning, intensity stereotype. This difference roughly corresponds to Frege's distinction between *sense* (German *Sinn*) and *meaning* or *reference* (German *Bedeutung*). Frege's sense corresponds to intension, meaning to extension. The meanings are, according to Putnam, defined by the social causal chains that lead to the original act of naming. What does that mean? Let's take the example of Christian and Muslim believers when they talk about God. Their ideas about God are different, so they have different stereotypes or intensions about God. However, the meaning or reference of their utterances about God is the same, since they are all connected with one God by the same causal social chain to the original act of naming. They speak of the same God, according to the meaning spoken of by Abraham/Ibrahim, with whom they are related via the corresponding causal social chain formed by their ancestors in their linguistic communities. In this regard, all Muslims and Christians are related to Ibrahim/Abraham, who is further related to the original act of naming God. If we accept SE, then we can say: if all the speakers about transcendence are causally related to the same "object", then they talk about the same thing, they refer to the same referent, even if they perceive it differently, from different aspects, through different intensities or stereotypes.

If it is important for (interreligious) dialogue[2] that the speakers speak of the same God, despite their different intensions, then SE provides an important semantic foundation for interreligious dialogue in this respect.

Putnam's SE fits nicely with Wittgensteinian account which allows particularities, even highlights them, but on the other hand refuses any subjectivism or individualism because no private grammar is possible. Likewise, according to Putnam, referents are not private, only intensions are in the head. Wittgenstein, Plantinga and Putnam all converge in understanding that we must take into account the aspects of person's environment in order to understand and explain properly their semantical, epistemological and ethical aspects. In this sense, all three accounts are externalist. Such externalism provides a suitable basis for dialogic universalism. A dialogic universalist believes that despite ethical and moral differences between people, religions, cultures etc., it is possible to reach convergence about ethically and morally important matters – if we persist in dialogue and go deep enough, beyond the surface differences. Deep

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2 I think that it is. One reason is that I think that dialogic universalism (see below) is the right attitude.

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down, we all have something important in common and this common aspect provides the ground for fair cooperation and dialogue. The capability approach of Martha Nussbaum that we mention below provides a sound philosophical elaboration of such view.

The term *dialogic universalism* has been coined by Catholic theologian David Hollenbach. He first used it in 1979 (Hollenbach, 2003, 152, n. 23). He defined it 24 years later as follows:

> *Thus the Second Vatican Council reaffirmed the pursuit of the common good in a divided world while it simultaneously urged renewal of a distinctively Christian vision of the human good. This approach can be called dialogic universalism. It is a universalist, for it presumes that human beings are sufficiently alike in that they all share certain very general characteristics in common and that the same general outlines of well-being are shared in common as well. For example, the good of all human beings requires that basic bodily needs be met, that intelligence be developed and educated, that freedom of conscience be respected, and that participation in social and political life be a real possibility* (Hollenbach, 2003, 152).

After directing us to *Gaudium et Spes* (nos. 14–17, 25), one of the central documents of the Second Vatican Council, he draws our attention to the fact of close congeniality between the Catholic teaching and work of Martha Nussbaum:

> *There is a significant resemblance between what the Council says unsystematically about common human characteristics and what Martha Nussbaum develops more systematically in a number of her writings, including 'Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings,' in Martha C. Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover, eds., Woman, Culture and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 61-104. The resemblance stems from the influence of Aristotle on Nussbaum and of Aristotle through the mediation of Thomas Aquinas on the Council* (Hollenbach, 2003, 152–153, n. 24).

Despite my sympathies for dialogic universalism, I must at the same time stress that the aim of reaching convergence should not disturb and limit dialogue. A fully developed dialogue should be free of all aims beyond itself (Yankelovich, 2001, 40, 56–57; Žalec, 2010, 34–35). Paradoxically, we expect that an overlapping consensus can be the fruit exactly of such a free dialogue; exactly a free dialogue which doesn't primarily set itself the goal of reaching any aim be-

yond itself, is the most promising basis for reaching an adequate overlapping consensus between the particular participants in the dialogue. Such overlapping consensus can be very different – ethically, morally, culturally etc. – from some other overlapping consensus between some other ethically, morally or culturally different parties. Still, primarily important is that people reach some overlapping consensus and fairly cooperate, not on which basis they reach them. Those foundations are, can and may be very different.

RATIONALITY AND AUTHENTICITY ARE MATTERS OF GRAMMAR

In order to understand correctly and more completely the point of our arguments thus far, and the examples we have chosen, the term "rationality" should not be understood in the mere "trivial" sense, but more broadly, richer than the "impoverished" trivial notion of rationality: we must understand it in a particularistic way, and we could also say in the identity or existential sense. "Trivial" rationality involves adhering to formal logic, scientific methods, and the like. Whether one is rational or not in terms of respecting the laws of formal logic, mathematics, physics etc. does not depend on the identity of the person. But on the other hand, a well-founded answer to the question of whether or not it is rational for a particular person to belong to a particular religion must be very particularistic, sensitive to each particular individual, their particular context, life story etc. So for John from Plantinga's example embracing Islam would be unreasonable, but in Ahmed's case, on the contrary, this may be exactly the most reasonable choice. But if they deal with mathematics, both John and Ahmed are subject to the same criteria of mathematical rationality and the judgment of their mathematical rationality (rationality as mathematician) is much less, if at all, dependent on the particular features of Ahmed's and John's case. In addition, it should be emphasized that rationality is particular (or may be), but it is not and can never be arbitrary. The latter is by no means possible, either when it comes to trivial or non-trivial rationality. In any case, arbitrary rationality is a *contradictio in adiecto*.

Next, despite our emphasis on the particularistic character of rationality and consciousness (as a form of practical rationality), they are not as relative as moral relativists claim. This is evidenced for instance by the evidence provided by the proponents of World Ethos idea (Küng, 1995; Grabner-Haider, 2006; Bader, 2007), or the emergence of opposition to particular harms just from the members of cultures in which those harms are in accordance with their social and moral norms (e.g. opposition of the members of traditional societies to the violence against

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women where tradition permits it, for instance in India (Nussbaum, 1999, 7)). According to Nussbaum, cultural relativism is in general a bad option. As a descriptive thesis, it is wrong because there is no homogeneous reality to which cultural relativism is referring. As a normative thesis, it is burdened with hard problems: 1. It has no bite in the modern world of media; 2. It is not obvious why we should prefer some local values instead of the best one; 3. It is self-undermining: the thesis that we should prefer local cultures and their values is a universal evaluative thesis (Nussbaum, 1999, 15).

Non-trivial rationality in the just outlined sense is a part of our in depth identity. Our in depth identity is determined, shaped and actually constituted by our deepest grammar – we may say existential grammar – we belong to. This grammar can't be private, for the same reason that private language is not possible[3] but that doesn't mean that we can articulate it discursively. It is partly unspeakable. It is a matter of practical wisdom, of knowledge how.

We may enlighten this last point by invoking the idea of universal human religion (hereafter UHR) as understood by Jan Assmann in his book Totale Religion (Assmann, 2018, 130, 135). Here Assmann presents the idea of Moses Mendelssohn who finds in the Bible the same problem as Lessing: they both realised the problem that the Bible is exclusivist, given to only one people, and at the same universal, valid for all people. In this contradiction they see the origin of intolerance and violence and thus they want to relativize the notion of revelation (Assmann, 2018, 131).

Mendelssohn makes the distinction between particularistic religions like Judaism, Christianity and Islam, on one hand, and UHR, on the other. He understands UHR as religiosity common to all people and founded on their common participation in God's Creation. So according to Mendelssohn we can speak about religio duplex (Assmann, 2018, 134–135; Petkovšek, 2017, 630) because every man belongs to two religions: to particular religion, in which they are born or converted to, and to UHR. This double belonging creates – only when people are aware of it – a mutual recognition of religions and peace among them.[4]

UHR doesn't set itself above particularistic religions but beside them. UHR is actually the religion of

reason. The truths of UHR are truths of reason and not of revealed religion because the truths necessary for good life shouldn't be revealed. These truths are not revealed exclusively to only one religion (Assmann, 2018, 135). Mendelssohn distinguishes between dogmas and natural "revelation" on one hand, and life rules and written revelation on the other. The dogmas are eternal truths which are revealed to people in the Creation and they can know them, at least indirectly, by means of reason given to them by the Creator. They are the truths of reason, not of faith. According to Jewish understanding, they can't be and shouldn't be codified. They should be communicated through live teaching adjusted to the changes of times and circumstances. Only historical truths – like the Law communicated to Moses - may be written down but not the "eternal" truths. Only about historical truths it is proper to teach people with word and letter (Assmann, 2018, 134).[5] In this sense, UHR is "unspeakable". We can use spoken and written words when communicating about it, but we must be aware that those are only auxiliary and very, very insufficient means, and that UHR manifests itself primarily in good deeds. UHR is a part of the deep grammar of people. However, the fact that it is "unspeakable" doesn't mean that it can't be a matter of dialogue, because dialogue is not limited to verbal communication.[6] Actually, a fully developed dialogue itself is much deeper communication, much more primordial and bodily than (solely) verbal communication. It can involve verbal communication, but not necessary, and it is not reducible to it (Luckmann, 2007, 158–162).

Regarding moral relativism, UHR is another case against moral relativism because the good deeds and main goods that people usually and normally desire and want are very much similar in different cultures all around the world. This fact may be again explained by driving to Martha Nussbaum, this time to her theory of human capabilities. The main capabilities that belong to every human being are universal because of the universal aspects of any human condition: we are all mortal, we can all suffer, become ill, we all can be affected by the violation of our dignity, honour … We all wish to realize our intellectual and emotional potential and can feel oppression to do it. And so on. On this basis, Nussbaum formulates her main capabilities and claims that discourse about universal

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3 Wittgenstein introduced the notion of private language in *Philosophical Investigations* in §243 (Wittgenstein, 1984, 356). He argues for its impossibility in §244–§271 (356–366). The most important are §256–§271 (360–366). In §201 and §202 (345) he showed that private rule-following is not possible what is the crucial part of his argument against the possibility of private language.

4 This account of UHR and *religio duplex* fits very well with dialogic universalism. In fact, we may consider it as a version of it.

5 The historical truth of the Law is valid only for Jews, but the eternal truths are valid for the whole humanity. (Assmann, 2018, 134–135)

6 We may say – in Kierkegaardian way – that it is communicable only through indirect communication or even existence-communication. The most important text for understanding those Kierkegaard's notions is Kierkegaard, 2009 (see also Tietjen, 2013, especially 51–57). In it, Kierkegaard claims that Christianity is existence-communication (Kierkegaard, 2009, 312 (n. b), 318, 468, 471, 478-80, 486, 510, 512).

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human rights is only the translation of the discourse about capabilities. What we are actually talking about when we talk about human rights are, according to her, capabilities. It is just that the discourse of human rights is more established, and thus it is more practical and efficiently to use it than the discourse about capabilities. But in fact human rights are reducible to capabilities (Nussbaum, 2001b, 96–100).

Nussbaum's article Non-Relative Virtues was first published in 1993 and there she already gave a list of capabilities (Nussbaum, 2001a, 218–220). Later she further developed an original capability ethics based on Aristotelian virtue ethics. In her seminal work (Nussbaum, 2001b), she provided a list of core functional capabilities, which later stabilized (Nussbaum, 2006). The following are listed: 1. life; 2. bodily health; 3. bodily integrity; 4. senses, imagination, and thought; 5. emotions; 6. practical reason; 7. affiliation; 8. other species; 9. play; 10. control over one's environment (material and political) (Nussbaum, 2001b, 78–80). Central functional capabilities set a universal minimum standard for prosperity and well-being of each person, and they enable us to evaluate the quality of life. In doing so, they form the basis of universalist ethics. The basic question for the capability approach is not whether the person is satisfied or not, or how many options and resources they have available, but whether or not they will work, allowing the person to develop and function in a fully human way. The measure of well-being is, in fact, prosperity, the flourishing of a person in the areas marked by the above ten points. As I have already mentioned, Nussbaum believes that (human) rights can also be reduced to (combined) capabilities (Nussbaum, 2001b, 98). It distinguishes three types of capabilities: basic (Nussbaum, 2001b, 78–80) (these are more or less innate or genetic), internal (Nussbaum, 2001b, 84–86) (these are advanced states of a person), and combined. The last are intrinsic capabilities combined with appropriate external conditions to perform the function (Nussbaum, 2001b, 84–85). Citizens of repressive regimes e.g., they may have an intrinsic but not combined capability to exercise their capability to speak according to their conscience. Nussbaum's list of core capabilities is a list of combined capabilities (Nussbaum, 2001b, 86). People must therefore be given at least the minimum and, where possible, the best possible conditions for exercising all three types of their capabilities.

One final note about UHR: Today we don't speak any more about universal human religion, because the idea of humanity is totally secularised. It is a principle that doesn't invoke God and revelation, but reason and knowledge. It relativizes religious and cultural differences and at the same time respects them. Today we don't focus any more on the origin,

but on the goal. We don't derive human dignity, protection of minorities etc. from (one understanding of) human nature, but from common goals and needs. (Assmann, 2018, 136) As Pope Benedict XVI (2011) observed, the human rights are not the child of the Bible, but of the Enlightenment. So the idea of *religio duplex* still lives also in the Catholic Church (Assmann, 2018, 137).

From what we have said above it is clear that trivial rationality is ethically and morally insufficient. Second, if our in depth grammar is constitutive for our in depth identity, and if non-trivial rationality is a matter of such grammar then non-trivial rationality is constitutive for our in depth identity, i.e. authenticity. Therefore not to follow rationality, not being rational, is to renounce one's own (deep) identity, what one (in depth) is, their authenticity. It means being inauthentic. In this sense, we may say that man is a rational being. What one authentically is, in their core, is their grammar, i.e. their non-trivial rationality. To betray oneself means betraying one's in depth rationality.

CONCLUSION

Equality and respect between the participants belong to the necessary conditions and main positive factors of a true and fully developed dialogue. The understanding of the connection between grammar, rationality and authenticity that I have enlightened above provides a good basis for actual cultivation of respect and equality toward the other. There is no actual recognition of equality and respect of the other without recognition of their rationality. Our grammarian account makes possible a rational recognition of the other as rational although their rationality is different from ours and may ground truths which are incompatible with truths implied by our rationality.

Jürgen Habermas has shown that only persons who consider themselves and others as authentic can mutually recognize themselves as autonomous and equal (Habermas, 2005, 71, 84–85, 87, 97, 99; Habermas, 2007, 152–155; Žalec, 2019, 631, 634, 637–638; Strahovnik, 2018, 302–304; Ambrozy, Králik & Martín, 2017; Valčo & Šturák, 2018). This recognition is (another) condition for a fully developed dialogue and for actual working of liberal democracy. We have shown how rational people can be authentic in incompatible ways and still mutually recognize themselves as rational and authentic. Such view fits very well with the distinction between ethics and morality which is an integral part of the modern Western moral and political grammar. According to this distinction, ethics deals with good or good life, and morality is about what is right or just. In modern times, philosophy can no longer directly judge what

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a good life is. It is characterized by refraining in this respect, and it is difficult to object to this refraining posture (Habermas, 2005, 11–12; Žalec, 2019, 632–633). The ideal of authenticity is formal in nature (Junker-Kenny 2011, 124; Žalec, 2019, 633; Klun, 2019, 597). It can be applied to worldviews that are completely different in content and even incompatible, contradictory. Thus, for example, an authentic life can be achieved both by an atheist and by a theist. Therefore, the ideal of authenticity is acceptable to our age and its moral grammar, since it does not violate the division into morality and ethics that is an integral part of that grammar. Respecting of this distinction is a way to carry out liberal and democratic coexistence in modern, ethically heterogeneous societies.

A further virtue of our grammarian account is that it provides a good basis for cultivation of fair cooperation in Rawlsian sense. This is grounded on the respect of the rationality of the other. Two parties can fairly cooperate in Rawlsian sense only if they give the other reasons and proposals which respect the rationality of the other, and are acceptable by the criteria of the other's own rationality. At the same time, those reasons and proposals must be rational also by the criteria of rationality of the proponent. Only in this way, a true overlapping consensus may be achieved. The insight in the grammatical and (hence) particularistic nature of rationality shows that overlapping consensus and thus fair cooperation are possible even among people and groups with significantly different (understanding of) rationality because there is no rational reason to deny the rationality of the other just because their rationality is different from mine. Moreover, sometimes I should recognize such persons as rational if I apply the same criterion of non-trivial rationality to them as to myself. There is such a criterion but of course it is of formal nature. It is called authenticity. If the other in their different rationality is authentic, then I must admit that they are rational.

SOME FINAL ELUCIDATIONS

Let me finally point out a few scruples that might arise to the reader after reading this article, and answer them briefly.

The first is related to religious traditions e.g. mystical ones, which are not supposed to consider rationality important, at least not at certain levels, or even consider it harmful. How is my account in this article applicable to these traditions? Here again it is crucial to distinguish between trivial and non-trivial rationality. My answer is that these traditions do not actually belittle or reject rationality in the sense of non-trivial rationality as I defined it here. Representatives of these traditions believe that their position or attitude or approach are right, correct

and in this sense rational, at least as applied to themselves. They think they are rational even if they reject any rationality in a trivial sense as relevant, or even consider it harmful. But they think that this rejection itself is rational, that they are rational in a non-trivial sense. They also believe that their grammar or form of life in general is rational in a non-trivial sense. Of course they may use different terms than "rational" for their view. They may even strongly refuse the term "rational" as appropriate for description of their view. But as I use the term here, their own view, attitudes and way of life are properly described as being rational, at least as applied to themselves by themselves. In short, they themselves believe that their way of thinking and living is rational. A mere terminological dispute is not important here. The question however is whether they think so only for themselves, or for some people, or they believe that their position and attitudes are the only right, i.e. rational for anybody else. If their answer is yes, then their attitude – at the levels at which they claim this - is non-dialogical. If the answer is no, then they are dialogical. In the article, I do not go into the question of who in particular is or is not up to dialogue or why people are not or are up to dialogue. I limit myself to the importance of understanding rationality and of its ascribing to others for cultivation of dialog with them. Whether mystics are dialogical or not, which are and which are not, these are important questions, but I am not dealing with them in this article. I argue, however, that if one, a mystic or anybody else, does not accept rationality of others as relevantly equal, then they do not have a dialogical relation to them. The same is true of any religious tradition that considers rationality of others to be inferior. Of course, different levels of non-dialogical attitude must be taken into account. Thus, e.g. we should be aware that religious exclusivism does not imply political exclusivism (Volf, 2017, 150–160). Therefore, a believer can be dialogical at the political level, but not at the level of the highest theological truths.

Another possible second thought about my position is that it is relativistic. Regarding it I would first of all like to emphasize that in this article I am interested in the possibilities of dialogue and fair cooperation and the importance of rationality in this respect. Secondly, my focus here is on particularity, not on relativism, and it is crucial to distinguish between particularity and relativism. It is true, however, that the question of relativism as a factor of dialogue and fair cooperation arises and that some total or excessive divergence of views certainly hinders or even prevents dialogue and fair cooperation. However, I argued – with reference to Assmann, Nussbaum, capability approach and dialogical universalism (Hollenbach) – that extreme relativism is neither a well-grounded position nor a

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desirable option, in terms of cultivating dialogue and fair cooperation. "Relativism" which derives from my thesis about particularity of rationality, therefore certainly has its limits, and particularity of rationality also has its limits. From the fact that rationality is particular does not follow that every position can be rational. In the article, I draw constraints of what can be rational even in a non-trivial sense. I describe these constraints in terms of capability, identity, and authenticity.

Finally, a comment on the possible designation of my position as an example of a postmodern paradigm or thesis. I prefer here to avoid the term "postmodern paradigm," even though it is true that the thesis of particularity of rationality is a part of the views of postmodern thinkers. However, the term "postmodern" has a problematic property that it can be understood as the opposite of modernity, the latter being understood – (also) in terms of rationality – as a kind of monolith. I certainly do not think that modernity is such a monolith. Historical evidence falsifies this thesis (McGrath, 2019, 44–45).[7] The

same conclusion follows also from my discussion in this paper. In this sense, one could say that empirical historical evidence supports my findings from the article. However, I am only pointing out this claim here. Proving it goes certainly beyond the scope of this article.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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7   McGrath points out that the rootedness and contextual characterization of rationality do not imply irrationalism and radical skepticism: "*Recognizing the 'constitutive significance of place' in the production of meaning does not entail a decent into irrationalism or radical skepticism, but rather calls for a warranted attentiveness to the complex historical and cultural geography of human reason. Human rationality is rooted in, and hence shaped by, the realities of human biological and social existence*" (McGrath, 2019, 46). Relativism is harmful when it leads to complete skepticism or irrationalism. However, particularity of rationality that I myself advocate does not in any way imply these two.

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POŠTENO SODELOVANJE IN DIALOG Z DRUGIM KOT RACIONALNA DRŽA: SLOVNIČNA POJASNITEV AVTENTIČNOSTI

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POVZETEK

Namen tega prispevka je pokazati, kako lahko filozofska slovnična obravnava prispeva k boljšemu razumevanju racionalnosti religije, njenemu spoštovanju ter pomaga pri utemeljevanju in povečanju spoštovanja, poštenega sodelovanja in dialoga med pripadniki različnih religij in svetovnih nazorov. Izbrali smo tri primere takih pojasnitev: Wittgensteinovo pojasnitev religije kot slovnice, kritiko klasičnega fundacionalizma, ki jo je podal Alvin Plantinga, in semantični eksternalizem Hilaryja Putnama. V drugem delu prispevka analiziramo povezavo med slovnico, racionalnostjo in avtentičnostjo. Pokažemo, da razumevanje te povezave daje racionalno podlago za trditev, da sta dialog in pošteno sodelovanje z drugimi mogoča, tudi če je njihova racionalnost drugačna od naše. Naša analiza ima dve osnovni izhodišči. Prvo zadeva dialog, drugo pa pošteno sodelovanje. Prvo izhodišče lahko formuliramo v obliki naslednjega argumenta: 1. ni pravega dialoga brez medsebojnega spoštovanja udeležencev; 2. brez medsebojnega pripoznavanja racionalnosti med udeleženci ni pravega spoštovanja; 3. zato ni pravega dialoga brez medsebojnega pripoznavanja racionalnosti med udeleženci. Drugo, rawlsovsko izhodišče, je, da pošteno sodelovanje ni mogoče brez tega, da udeleženci drug drugega pripoznavajo kot racionalne in racionalnost drugega tudi dejansko spoštujejo. Vpogled v slovnično in partikularistično naravo racionalnosti razkrije, da sta prekrivajoče se soglasje in s tem pošteno sodelovanje (v Rawlsovem pomenu obeh izrazov) možna tudi med ljudmi z bistveno drugačno racionalnostjo, saj ni razumnega razloga, da bi zanikali racionalnost drugega samo zato, ker je njegova racionalnost drugačna od naše. Še več. Včasih takšne osebe moram pripoznati kot racionalne, če zanje uporabim isto merilo za netrivialno racionalnosti kot pri sebi. Takšno merilo obstaja, seveda pa je formalne narave. Imenuje se avtentičnost. Če je drugi v svoji drugačni racionalnosti avtentičen, potem moram priznati, da je racionalen.

Ključne besede: slovnica, netrivialna racionalnost, pošteno sodelovanje, dialog, avtentičnost

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