
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA

Družboslovna revija



Let. LIX, št. 1, str. 1 – 182
Ljubljana, januar–marec 2022
UDK 4, ISSN 0040-3598

USTANOVITELJ IN IZDAJATELJ
Fakulteta za družbene vede,
Univerza v Ljubljani

GLAVNI UREDNIK
Anton GRIZOLD

SEKRETARKA REVIJE
Tina ČERNČIČ TOMAŽEVIČ

UREDNIKI
Anton GRIZOLD,
Tina KOGOVŠEK,
Marko LAH,
Igor LUKŠIČ,
Breda LUTHAR,
Peter STANKOVIČ,
Zdenka ŠADL,
Tomaž KRPIČ (recenzije)

UREDNIŠKI SVET
Milica ANTIČ GABER,
Marjan BREZOVŠEK,
Ljubica JELUŠIČ,
Maca JOGAN,
Andrej KIRN,
Miran KOMAC,

Janez KREK,
Vlado MIHELJAK,
Zdravko MLINAR (predsednik),
Klement PODNAR,
Rudi RIZMAN,
Marjan SVETLIČIČ,
Zlatko ŠABIČ,
Metka TEKAVČIČ,
Niko TOŠ,
Mirjana ULE

MEDNARODNI UREDNIŠKI SOSVET
Luigi GRAZIANO
(University of Torino, Italija),
Philippe MANIGART
(Bruselj, Belgija),
Helmut WILLKE
(University of Bielefeld, Nemčija),
Peter DAHLGREN
(University of Lund, Švedska)

OBLIKOVALEC
Ismar MUJEZINOVIČ

PRELOM
Leon BETON

TISK
Tiskarna CICERO, Begunje, d.o.o.
Naklada 250 izvodov

REVIJA TEORIJA IN PRAKSA V BIBLIOGRAFSKIH IN BESEDILNIH ZBIRKAH PODATKOV SCOPUS, Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI), DLib, EBSCO, PROQUEST, COBISS.SI/COBIB, COBISS.SI/ODKLJ, International Political Science Abstracts (IPSA), CSA Worldwide Political Science Abstracts (CSA WPSA), CSA Sociological Abstracts (CSA SA, Internationale Bibliographie der Rezensionen geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlicher Literatur / International Bibliography of Book Reviews of Scholarly Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBR-Online), IBZ-Online, Internationale Bibliographie der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Zeitschriftenliteratur / International Bibliography of Periodical Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences / Bibliographie internationale de la littérature périodique dans les domaines des sciences humaines et sociales (IBZ-Online), CSA Social Services Abstracts (CSA SSA).

Naslov: Kardeljeva pl. 5, 1000 Ljubljana, tel.: 01/5805-147, e-pošta: teorija.praksa@fdv.uni-lj.si
Revija je dostopna na <http://www.fdv.uni-lj.si/revije/znanstvene-revije/teorija-in-praksa>.

Celoletna naročnina za leto 2022: za študente in dijake 40,00 eur, za druge individualne naročnike 50,00 eur, za podjetja in ustanove 100,00 eur.

Cena posamičnega zvezka v prosti prodaji je 20 eur.

Revija izhaja ob podpori ARRS – Javne agencije za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije.

TEORIJA IN PRAKSA

Interdisciplinary journal of social science



Vol. LIX, No. 1, pp. 1 – 182
Ljubljana, January – March 2022
UDK 4, ISSN 0040-3598

FOUNDER AND PUBLISHER
Faculty of Social Sciences,
University of Ljubljana

EDITOR IN CHIEF
Anton GRIZOLD

ISSUE MANAGER
Tina ČERNČIČ TOMAŽEVIČ

ASSOCIATE EDITORS
Anton GRIZOLD,
Tina KOGOVŠEK,
Marko LAH,
Igor LUKŠIČ,
Breda LUTHAR,
Peter STANKOVIČ,
Zdenka ŠADL,
Tomaž KRPIČ (Book reviews)

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Milica ANTIĆ GABER,
Marjan BREZOVŠEK,
Ljubica JELUŠIČ,
Maca JOGAN
Andrej KIRN,
Miran KOMAC,

Janez KREK,
Vlado MIHELJAK,
Zdravko MLINAR (Chairman),
Klement PODNAR,
Rudi RIZMAN,
Marjan SVETLIČIČ,
Zlatko ŠABIČ,
Metka TEKAVČIČ,
Niko TOŠ,
Mirjana ULE

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD
Luigi GRAZIANO
(University of Torino, Italy),
Philippe MANIGART
(Bruxelles, Belgium),
Helmut WILLKE
(University of Bielefeld, Germany),
Peter DAHLGREN
(University of Lund, Sweden)

GRAPHIC DESIGN
Ismar MUJEZINOVIČ

PAGE LAYOUT
Leon BETON

PRINT
Print run: 250
Printing House CICERO, Begunje, d.o.o.
Impression: 250

ABSTRACTING AND INDEXING SERVICE
SCOPUS, Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI), Dlib, EBSCO, PROQUEST, COBISS.SI/COBIB, COBISS.SI/ODKJ, International Political Science Abstracts (IPSA), CSA Worldwide Political Science Abstracts (CSA WPSA), CSA Sociological Abstracts (CSA SA, Internationale Bibliographie der Rezensionen geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlicher Literatur / International Bibliography of Book Reviews of Scholarly Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBR-Online), IBZOnline, Internationale Bibliographie der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Zeitschriftenliteratur / International Bibliography of Periodical Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences / Bibliographie internationale de la littérature périodique dans les domaines des sciences humaines et sociales (IBZ-Online), CSA Social Services Abstracts (CSA SSA).

Address: Kardeljeva pl. 5, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia; Tel.: 00 386 1/5805-147,
E-mail: teorija.praksa@fdv.uni-lj.si.

Teorija in praksa is available at <http://www.fdv.uni-lj.si/revije/znanstvene-revije/teorija-in-praksa>.

The annual subscription fee for 2022 is EUR 40.00 for students, EUR 50.00 for other individual subscribers, and EUR 100.00 for companies and institutions. The price of an individual issue is EUR 20.00.

The journal is subsidised by the Slovenian Research Agency.



ČLANKI

ANG

- Danica FINK-HAFNER, Tamara DAGEN: RAZPRAVA O RAZMERJU
MED ZNANSTVENIKI IN PRAKTIKI NA VISOKOŠOLSKEM POLJU 5–24
- Jure SPRUK: VLOGA DRŽAVE PRI ZAŠČITI TEMELJNIH
ČLOVEKOVIH PRAVIC IN SVOBOŠČIN 25–41
- Matjaž NAHTIGAL: REFORMA POGODBE O VESOLJU
IN DOLGOTRAJNO TRAJNOSTNO RAZISKOVANJE VESOLJA 42–59
- Emre ÇAKIRDİKEN: POPULIZEM IN POTROŠNIŠKA DRUŽBA:
UČINKI POTROŠNIŠTVA NA POLITIČNO KULTURO 60–76
- Hajdeja IGLIČ: POZICIONIRANJE V POLITIČNEM PROSTORU
IN MOBILIZACIJSKI POTENCIAL DISKUSIJSKIH OMREŽIJ 77–94

SLO

- Metka KUCHAR, Gaja ZAGER KOCJAN: POVEZANOST MED
OBREMENJUJOČIMI IN POZITIVNIMI IZKUŠNJAMI V OTROŠTVU
TER ŠOLSKIM USPEHOM PRI MLADIH V SLOVENIJI 95–114
- Damjan MANDELIC, Vanja GAJIĆ: ODNOS VEČINSKEGA PREBIVALSTVA
DO PRISELJENSKIH SKUPNOSTI: CELJE IN PRISELJENCI ALBANSKE
NARODNOSTI 115–137
- Jure PERPAR: NEMOČ FEMINIZMA 138–155



PRIKAZI, RECENZIJE

- Thomas Picketty: Kapital in ideologija (Capital and Ideology)
(Andrej Kirn) 156–162
- Mickaël Labbé: Zavzemimo prostor: Proti arhitekturi prezira
(Klemen Ploštajner) 162–165



AVTORSKI POVZETKI

166–170

CONTENTS



ARTICLES

ENG

Danica FINK-HAFNER, Tamara DAGEN: DEBATING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACADEMICS AND PRACTITIONERS IN THE HIGHER EDUCATION FIELD 5-24

Jure SPRUK: THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE PROTECTION OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 25-41

Matjaž NAHTIGAL: OUTER SPACE TREATY REFORM AND THE LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY OF SPACE EXPLORATION 42-59

Emre ÇAKIRDİKEN: POPULISM AND CONSUMER SOCIETY: THE EFFECTS OF CONSUMERISM ON THE POLITICAL CULTURE 60-76

Hajdeja IGLIČ: POSITIONING OF INDIVIDUAL AND THE MOBILISATION POTENTIAL OF POLITICAL DISCUSSION NETWORKS 77-94

SLO

Metka KUCHAR, Gaja ZAGER KOČJAN: THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN ADVERSE AND POSITIVE CHILDHOOD EXPERIENCES AND SCHOOL SUCCESS AMONG YOUTH IN SLOVENIA 95-114

Damjan MANDELIC, Vanja GAJIĆ: HOW THE MAJORITY POPULATION VIEWS IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES: CELJE AND IMMIGRANTS OF ALBANIAN NATIONALITY 115-137

Jure PERPAR: THE INABILITY OF FEMINISM 138-155



BOOK REVIEWS

Thomas Picketty: Kapital in ideologija (Capital and Ideology) (Andrej Kirn) 156-162

Mickaël Labbé: Zavzemimo prostor: Proti arhitekturi prezira (Klemen Ploštajner) 162-165



AUTHORS' SYNOPSES

166-170



*Danica FINK-HAFNER and Tamara DAGEN**

DEBATING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACADEMICS AND PRACTITIONERS IN THE HIGHER EDUCATION FIELD**

Abstract. *In this article we present findings from focus groups (FGs) consisting of academics and practitioners in the higher education (HE) field from different parts of the world, who debated their perceptions of the current state of the art in the HE field. The main findings, which call for further research, as well as activities of academics, practitioners and policymakers at various levels, are as follows: 1) there is a gap between basic academic research and applied research (with the latter often not meeting the appropriate conceptual level), which needs to be closed; 2) this gap is expressed also in the global context of the HE field; 3) multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, transdisciplinarity, methodological quality of both basic and applied research need to be developed and 4) scholars', practitioners' and governments' (policymakers') responsibilities need to be addressed.*

Keywords: *higher education (HE), research, academics, practitioners, government, policy*

Introduction

The aim of this article is to contribute to academic critical self-reflections on the issue of relationships between academics and practitioners (as first developed by Caplan, 1979) generally and in the HE field in particular. We do this by presenting focus group (FG) debates related to the various kinds of fragmentation in the higher education (HE) field and the need to 'speak to each other' more while giving special attention to the relationship between academics and practitioners in this field. The in-depth debate among focus group participants (FGPs) coming from different geopolitical contexts is valuable both for further academics' and practitioners' reflections based on research as well as for critical policy reflections in various institutions at the national and international levels.

* *Danica Fink-Hafner, PhD, Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia; Tamara Dagen, PhD, University of Zagreb, Croatia.*

** *This article is based on research work in the framework of the Political Science Research Programme (P5 0136) financed by the Slovenian Research Agency (ARRS).*

DOI: 10.51936/tip.59.1.5-24

As a rule, the relation between academic research and practice has been an issue debated in many fields. Among them have been international relations (Hill and Beshoff, eds., 1994), finances (Cagle *et al.*, 1997), management (Brennan, 2004), computer science, education, healthcare, information systems, library and information science, management, nursing, political science, psychology, sociology and social work (Belli, 2010; Lahat, 2019), emergency management (Cwiak, 2007), disaster management (Browne *et al.*, 2018) and increasingly the field of public health (Smith and Wilkins, 2018) as well as library and information science (Chang, 2021).

The HE field is no exception. As a relatively young research area, HE is significantly influenced by intertwining relations among researchers, various stakeholders and actors, and especially, specialised centres and institutions in HE as well as international organisations that have all initiated many projects, which have largely impacted the development of HE worldwide. Indeed, analysts of the HE field have different motivations for entering into HE research. Often they simultaneously play several different roles. Also, they are active in various organisations and forums. Streitwieser and Ogden (2016) talk about a hybrid group of scholar-practitioners, who primarily work in administration in the USA but at the same time contribute to analysis in the field.

What has become a particularly burning issue in the HE field is the dominant global impact of both – academics and practitioners – coming from the western part to other parts of the world. In this article, we focus on two research questions: Are the *state of the art* of the HE field generally and the relationships between academics and practitioners in the HE field in particular perceived in the same way by HE academics and practitioners from different parts of the world? Can insights from experts belonging to non-Western parts of the world add to a new quality to the academic and practitioner knowledge and practice in the HE field?

Our research approach is qualitative and exploratory. In order to answer these research questions, we consider the changing real-life context as well as perceptions of these issues expressed by academics and practitioners in the HE field coming from various parts of the world in order to participate in focus groups (FG). In the article, we summarise the findings of FG participants' (FGPs') debates on their perceptions of the current *state of the art* of the HE field, including the several critical issues in relations mentioned between academics and practitioners.

Based on good practices in analysing and reporting FG results (Krueger, 1998), in the following sections, we first draw the background of our research and explain in more detail the methodology used in our research. The following section presents summaries of the FG debates – the actual voices of the FGPs. We conclude with several interpretations and a few

research and policy ideas for further engagement of academics and practitioners in the HE field.

Background

Developments in the HE field

In the last 30 years, the HE research field became more vivid due to several preconditions: 1) the emergence of various international organisations, which tremendously contributed to the rise of policy analysis in HE; 2) the contemporary development and rising numbers of universities and higher education institutions (HEIs), its changed roles in society and increased networking and new collaboration models; 3) the growth of various research and policy centres in the HE field across the globe; 4) the development of individual courses and full study programmes in HE at all three study levels (bachelor's, master's, and doctoral) worldwide; 5) growing numbers of various actors and policymakers participating in the global HE arena at various levels; and 6) professionalisation of administration inside the HEIs, various agencies, organisations and institutions that are involved in HE. In addition, the process of Europeanisation and various supranational initiatives, policies, programmes and recommendations created in policy coordination at the EU level significantly influenced European research of HE.

In the process of globalisation, many new actors inside the emerging HE arena were eager to get actively involved in processes inside HE. It consequently led to the initiation of many projects and the preparation of publications by various stakeholders, e.g. national and supranational financed projects and international organisations' collaborations with researchers in the HE field (e.g. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), International Association of Universities (IAU), Magna Charta Observatory, European University Association (EUA), Academic Cooperation Association (ACA), British Council, Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD), etc.).

In the last twenty to thirty years, this new context significantly impacted the development of HE research by bringing a wide spectrum of diverse topics to the field. By the 2000s, theoretical, policy and practical developments in different areas of the HE field had been more broadly recognised (e.g. Teichler and Sadlack, eds., 2000; Fumasoli and Stensaker, 2013). In relation to the scope of our article, the literature shows that since recently, researchers have been increasingly analysing, for example, collaboration models among academics, executives and professionals in the HE (Jones *et al.*, 2012), the changing role of the academic profession (Kehm and Teichler, eds., 2012), the rise of management and administration professionalisation

inside the university (e.g. Middlehurst, 2009; Zinner, ed., 2016; Macfarlane and Burg, 2019), and roles and identities related to their increasing involvement in various analytical projects on different HE topics (Whitchurch, 2012).

Academics vs practitioners in the HE field

The relationships between academics and practitioners have been gaining interest not only in the HE field. Indeed, a whole new wave of debate on the relevance of the 'two communities theory' (Caplan, 1979) has been taking place in many disciplines and fields. Caplan's distinction between knowledge producer and policymaker is challenging European Union practices of triggering analyses in the HE field, mostly by the development of supranational umbrella policies in HE (notably the Bologna Process and Lisbon Process) and the variety of programmes and projects initiated and financed at the EU level. In such a context, the roles of policymakers and stakeholders inside HEIs and HE in general have rarely been analysed (e.g. Marshall, 2018; Wise *et al.*, 2020).

There have, however, been some case studies that, for example, focused on the emergence of different models of HE in the global context (e.g. Marginson, 2011), the particular role of the OECD as a policy actor in the interplay of organisational, governmental and stakeholder interests (Harmsen and Braband, 2021), public sector reforms as a contextual factor which may impact the HE (Friedrich, 2021), and the peculiar Chinese context and principal philosophies in the HE field (Wu and Li, 2021).

Still, the connections and relations between researchers, policymakers and stakeholders have not yet been systematically analysed in the HE literature. Nevertheless, a widening diversity of the roles which practitioners and scholars play has been recognised (Hudzik, 2016) as well as the shaping of scholar-practitioner identity (Heyl, 2016) and the isolation of scholars and practitioners within their own worlds (Hunter and Rumbly, 2016).

Rare examples (e.g. Streitwieser and Ogden, eds., 2016) do present multiple views on the relationships between academics and practitioners. However, they are primarily linked to case studies in one particular subfield, such as international education.

Research method

In this article, we present empirical results gathered using the FG method (e.g. Krueger, 1998; Ferguson, 2000; Wilkinson, 2016; Brown, 2018). As an FG is a participatory process (Mukherjee *et al.*, 2018) which enables discussion with a synergistic output (Ferguson, 2000), the empirical results gathered

in two FG sessions held in the last quarter of 2019 in a neutral environment are outcomes of spontaneous interactions among participants. Experts discussed their perceptions, estimations and opinions on the current *state of the art* in the HE field.

The strategy for the selection of FGPs was to sample them from the pool of potential FGPs (Krueger, 1998: 71). This pool was revealed based on the *snowball* sampling (identifying potential respondents based on publications on issues of internationalisation, Europeanisation and globalisation in HE field, which was later amended according to the suggestions of the respondents contacted). Besides that, additional criteria for the selection of FGPs were applied (gender, representation of scholars and practitioners, variation in main disciplines, countries, geographical locations and more/less international orientation). The participants' main disciplines included educational sciences (including higher education, and science and technology studies), political science, sociology, philosophy, psychology, anthropology, history, public policy and organisational studies. More details and some of our findings have already been presented in Dagen and Fink-Hafner (2016), Fink-Hafner and Dagen (2017) and Fink-Hafner et al. (2019).

The aim was to select an optimal number of FG participants (around eight); however, extraordinary natural circumstances in 2019 prevented the actual arrival of all the invited participants on the spot. This is why in the first FG six scholars and practitioners participated – three male and three female scholars – coming from younger, middle and senior generations, from six countries (England-UK, Ethiopia, Hong Kong, Mexico, Scotland-UK and Slovenia), in which they have current positions and are involved in teaching and/or research in the HE field in institutions of various kinds – national but also one very globalised institution. In the second FG, seven participants took part – four male and three female scholars and practitioners from younger, middle and senior generations, from seven countries (England-UK, Finland, Hong Kong, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden and USA), in which they currently have positions. They are involved in teaching and/or research in the HE field in institutions of various kinds – national and also two very globalised institutions. In addition (due to extraordinary travelling circumstances in autumn 2019), prior to this FG session, one interview was conducted with a participant from Hong Kong with his approval to share his thoughts.

The analysis is based on transcripts. In line with the rules for FG reporting (Krueger, 1998) we present a summary description of the FG debates including the observations of their characteristics like (dis)agreements and illustrative quotes. The presentation is followed by an interpretation and concluding thoughts.

Summary of focus group findings

In this section we present the voice of the FGPs while debating the *state of the art* in the HE field. At the end of the quotes, we note the country from which the particular FGP came to take part in an FG meeting. Quotes have only been minimally language edited to be readable.

Context: Pressure from governments and the economy challenging the HE field, including academic–practitioner relationships

FGPs took time to debate complex pressures under which the HE field has been developing, particularly pressures coming from governments at various levels, as well as economic pressures, which have all contributed to multiplication of academic–practitioner issues.

Government pressures on the HE field have been estimated from different angles, which might be, at least to some extent, linked to the various contexts from which FGPs were coming. On the one hand, FGPs stated that the pressures have worked in favour of the development of the HE field. For example, an FGP from Mexico (FG1) revealed the positive role of governments in Latin American countries. More precisely, governments' need for the information on HE institutions to monitor the HE system contributed to the creation of particular units dedicated to producing such information. Later, those units developed into research centres or research units in the HE field (e.g. inside the universities).

On the other hand, other FGPs pointed at government pressures, which have been restricting the development of the HE field. Among such examples are the utilisation of the HE field for the nationalist national agenda and the diminishment of opportunities for development of the HE field.

...in the South-West Pacific and in Africa... universities are seen by governments as very important drivers of nationalisation, nationalism, and of development. But is a two-edged sword because at the same time those governments are very unwilling to tolerate what they might call dissent or disagreement in universities. (USA, FG2)

Furthermore, HE researchers have been pressured to support particular government's policies without question. As stated by one FGP, governments' expectations are that

higher education researchers collect data that confirm the brightness and great ideas of the government in the field of higher education... they

do not expect critical views on trends analysed in depth where the present policy doesn't work, where we have to change. (Slovenia, FG1)

At least indirectly, public policies contribute to economic pressures on the HE field. Some governments use funding as a soft policy tool in ensuring supportive HE research. As an FGP from England-UK (FG1) revealed, this mode of government pressure does not appear in interpreting data, but it is rather seen in *'the direct funding of proposals that appeal to the government based on the American model. It's a phenomenon that we need to be concerned about'* (England-UK, FG1).

However, it is not only national governments that put pressure on the HE field. FGPs agreed that government pressures also come from the supranational level, particularly in the case of the Bologna Process research. The interference of governmental and economic pressures has been particularly noticed in the marketisation of universities and in pressures to meet the needs of the labour market and job transformations. Here, somewhat different FGP views were expressed. On the one hand, the economically adaptive HE field was acknowledged together with a notion that educators have a responsibility to train. In contrast, some FGPs stressed the importance of keeping researchers' critical distance when working on the projects initiated by governments and (international) organisations in which various stakeholders participate, as they use data analysis for setting the new agenda at different levels and make policies related to the HE. This is why several FGPs clearly supported the idea that concepts like job transformation should only be accepted in the HE field together with the need for critical thinking. This is very important, as HE is not only about educating workers but also about educating citizens.

Internal challenges of a very fragmented HE field

The complex academic-practitioner relationship came forward while FGPs debated the overall characteristics of the HE field.

Double challenges related to the recognition of the HE field. Even today, the HE academic field is found to be challenged by misunderstandings on the part of some university teachers who argue that *'we all teach at universities'* (Ethiopia, FG1). HE as an independent research field also often faces doubts from scholars in other disciplines. FGPs do not have a black-and-white answer to these challenges of the HE field, as stated by one FGP:

...it was defined in the 1990s that higher education is a field of research defined by the object of research, which is HE. We all are interested in HE as a social phenomenon from different aspects. Sociologists of science

say: 'You are not theoretical, you are not real, you are just studying the organisation.' This is both true and untrue. (Finland, FG2)

This statement is also strongly supported by participants, who, besides having academic careers, also have previous experience in the management of international organisations.

Differences in engagement around the globe. FGPs acknowledge that different levels of engagement in the HE field exist around the globe. They pointed out that approaches in HE vary significantly across the globe, which consequently impacts the field of HE research.

FGPs who have previous experience in working for various global and international organisations, especially in less developed countries and world regions, or who originate from a non-Western part of the world, more clearly emphasise the global predominance of westernisation and the Western way of thinking in HE, both among academics and practitioners. As stated by one participant, *'I think that the whole discussion we are having is very often Western-centric'* (Ethiopia, FG1).

However, an FGP from Hong Kong (FG1) pointed to a unique example of Chinese development of the HE field. This FGP revealed the pragmatic embracing of mainstream concepts in international education while presenting their shortcomings in relation to research in China. This strategy also includes encouraging English language learning in China and engaging Chinese readers in communicating with the rest of the world while universities are simultaneously encouraged to produce their own work in their own language and publish internationally as well.

All in all, FGPs with experiences beyond the academic milieu more openly express their personal opinion on differences in HE research field and policies worldwide in comparison with their colleagues, who more cautiously address certain issues in HE and build their attitudes from scientific empirical evidence.

Furthermore, the debate showed there are vast differences between centres and peripheries in HE, even across the European HE landscape. For example, an FGP from Slovenia (FG1) stressed that the Balkans region is very different from Western Europe because of the delay in establishing HE as an academic field. Similarly, an FGP from Mexico (FG1) pointed out the delayed and still poor development of the HE field in Latin America compared with the USA, especially as scholars study HE in a fragmented way, as the HE research field is not supported by communities, associations, conferences and journals specialising exclusively in HE.

Directions of making an impact. FGPs agreed that, although criticised, HE research is still broadly perceived to be mainly Western-centric and fragmented. Consequently, scholars and experts who belong to the HE research

field community sometimes speak even of hegemony over the less developed, both in academic and practitioners' activities. The leaders'-followers' difference was illustrated particularly with the rhetorical question, *'If you have research projects together, who is really setting the agenda?'* (Ethiopia, FG1).

Nevertheless, FGPs with experience in the African and Asian HE context noticed very different strategies and outcomes of HE policies in less developed countries. The debate showed that the engagement of Western world scholars and experts in the development of HE systems in less developed world regions is one side of the coin while HE policies of the less developed countries are in reality the other side of the same coin. In addition, there are also mutual misunderstandings.

FGPs pointed to peculiarities they found in non-Western regions. They experienced that African governments often seek recommendations from the outside, and generally, from a *'high-level Western people'* (Ethiopia, FG1). However, conflictual issues arise in the process of 'importing' from the West regarding the following questions: who sets the priorities?; which issues are included in the trainings?; and what examples are used? In the case of Ethiopia, an example of a diversity issue was pointed out as very important topic in this country. However, as one FGP explains, the training on gender equality was criticised as being *'all about European policies'* (Ethiopia, FG1) that *'simply do not apply to an Ethiopian situation'* (Ethiopia, FG1).

Still, insights from other FPGs show that some countries and regions, especially those belonging to the Third World, in some cases also use policies of sending their own students to international universities in the West and promote elite students on the way to the international arena. Consequently, this also affects HE research tremendously.

Nevertheless, FGPs recognised that in some parts of the world with delays in developing the HE field, following what is produced in the USA and Europe may appear as a conscientious strategy. The understanding that following the *state of the art* is necessary while trying to build one's own capacity was explicitly noted by one FGP:

We keep translating theories, approaches, methodologies... because... we are also embedded in this globalised world where you have to chase the best universities all the time. (Mexico, FG1)

In contrast, in some of the countries with colonial historical roots, there are heated debates on what kind of policies should be developed in HE and how this field should be analysed. One FGP cited a new quality emerging in such debates in Africa, stressing the need to assume responsibility for their own development: *'we Africans should stop blaming everything*

on colonialism because otherwise we will never move on...' (England – UK, FG1).

Another alternative strategy was revealed in the case of China. While stressing the necessity of taking part in the global arena in which HE issues are being discussed, the FGP from Hong Kong (FG1) estimated that concepts developed in the West are not sufficient, appropriate and ready just to be copied in conceptualising the situation in the world. However, instead of a debate on internationalisation as westernisation and as Americanisation, the FGP rather suggested to open a debate, which would

bring out the new insights, or hopefully we can have a new paradigm in understanding the world through comparative and international perspectives... the world is so different, so we can accept that we are different and also embrace diversity. (Hong Kong, FG1)

Disciplinarity vs multidisciplinarity vs interdisciplinarity

Issues of academic–practitioner relationships in the HE field are additionally complicated by HE field fragmentation in terms of the scientific disciplines involved.

State of the art. Insights from the FG sessions showed a broad diversity among the participants in analysing the current state of the art in the HE research field with respect to the existence of specific theories and methodologies used in HE research.

Even more, the community appears to be split into two more or less opposite groups. One sees the HE research field as a community of individuals who are coming from various disciplines with the goal of analysing and clarifying certain issues related to HE from various angles using various sets of theories and methodologies. The other group is formed among those who are actually exclusively devoted to the analysis of topics related to HE. Regardless of the notion of whether it is fundamental or applicative research, this 'small HE sub-community' is self-perceived to be a certain 'mainstream' inside the HE field, with individuals who might be seen as 'gatekeepers' (Hong Kong, FG2). Nevertheless, FGPs acknowledged that there are different valuable contributions in the same field on the same topic by people from different academic disciplines and areas, who in reality very rarely speak to each other:

I think... we are a field of research more than a discipline. If there is a discipline, it's based on epistemic tradition. And we in higher education, we don't have one epistemic tradition, we have many. (Finland, FG2)

This statement is supported by another FGP who highlighted difficulties in finding special education (and HE) theories developed in the field of pedagogy, except for ones that emerge from the analysis of the teaching methods and learning process. While FGPs agreed that there is no theory specific to the HE field, several theoretically possible alternative strategies were noted in a debate: 1) building theories from scratch by using grounded theory approaches; 2) borrowing theories from other disciplines while grouping them (revealing what kind of theories we use in HE studies and seeing what that means in terms of the way we interpret different aspects of HE); and 3) mapping the theoretical framework and concepts used in the HE field as a starting point for further work on synthesis in the HE field.

Interdisciplinarity. FGP debates show additional division in the HE community with respect to understanding the relationship between multidisciplinary and interdisciplinarity in HE research. Some FGPs are very open to tight collaboration with individuals coming from a broad range of social sciences (understood as interdisciplinarity), believing that it is a good alternative. Nevertheless, problems were acknowledged when looking at interdisciplinarity in practice, as projects may be declared to be only interdisciplinary but are in fact multidisciplinary; contributions to the same topic are offered by people from different disciplines.

FGPs acknowledged both weaknesses and strengths in the multidisciplinary of the HE research field. They argued that multidisciplinary contributes to the fragmentation of HE research, as it borrows theories from many disciplines, particularly psychology, sociology, economics and political science. Multidisciplinary also results in tensions between disciplinary approaches (e.g. between approaches to the same phenomena from economists, sociologists or anthropologists). In contrast, multidisciplinary was also linked to the strength and ability of the HE field to adapt to new topics quite quickly.

Individual approaches. The debate was not only about disciplines. The important role of individuals in the HE field was stressed in two ways. First, some FGPs confirmed that they are more eager to build own individual interconnections with a broad scientific community that covers all research disciplines (multidisciplinary). Second, the critical role of individual (world) scholars with a base in a particular social science discipline was recognised as a huge advance in the HE field while bringing together people who are coming from traditional academic disciplines.

The methods issue

This issue appeared in the FGP debate as very critical. It was pointed out both when debating academics' and practitioners' work in the HE field. In a

more focused academic debate, the FGPs agreed that it should be an object of study along with the research question that determines research methods and techniques to be used.

What is often missing in research is the revelation of real-life situations and processes. This is why FGPs accepted a note from an FGP, an anthropologist, who stressed *'the need to have some ground-level data to figure out... the really right questions to ask'* (USA, FG2). Indeed, multiple and various kinds of research methods were embraced, such as bottom-up, inductive research about lived experiences in the real world, e.g. the lived experience of students and faculty members influenced by technological, financial and ideological aspects and the fact that people are moving around the world (e.g. based on ethnographic research, as is typical for anthropology). Also, other qualitative research methods were embraced together with historical research methods and sophisticated quantitative methods and mixed methods. FGPs agreed that the multimethod approach is needed to help grasp the researched phenomena by acknowledging the general picture and achieving a deep understanding of the phenomena.

In this context, severe criticism was focused on analysis methods used by practitioners. It has been revealed that practitioners' work has too often been below professional standards.

Fluid identity

According to FGPs, disciplinarity remains the critical issue in the field of HE despite attempts at interdisciplinarity (e.g. a consortium of big projects that analyse specific aspects of HE systems and HE policies in a large number of countries, international research teams that are gathered for a specific topic, etc.). More precisely, as FGP discussions showed, there is a rather small core of the HE community which has evolved and is able to understand researchers who come from other disciplinary traditions, as illustrated by this statement:

We have a certain number of core connects that we all share... So we tend to understand their disciplinary approach and how it is related to HE research. (Finland, FG2)

But is there an identity common to academics (and practitioners) directly linked to the HE field? FGPs revealed several challenges in forming of such an identity. They point to fluidity in many terms, such as the following:

- study programmes from which academics are recruited (e.g. from sociology, economy, history, philosophy, international relations);
- practices of academic positioning (academic tenure appointments in HE

field based on disciplinary-determined positions, such as political science, public policy, etc.);

- publishing fluidity, particularly in discontinuities of publishing research on HE phenomena (most researchers are not dedicated to the field and do not publish constantly in the HE field);
- attending conferences that are disciplinary based and different conferences focused on the HE field;
- hybrid identity, typical for the HE field (researchers in the HE field having several identities at the same time – identity related to particular academic discipline and identity of a HE reresearcher – without seeing that as a problem at the individual level).

Lack of discussion and synthesis: the role of journals, professional associations and conferences

The critical lack of discussion and synthesis in the HE research field was very much stressed in the FGP debate. FGPs broadly agreed that the lack of communication between various groups of researchers and practitioners is a crucial issue inside the field of HE, as it prevents a synthesis of this very fragmented field. Journals, professional associations and conferences were shown to contribute to such developments.

In the case of journals, it was noted that their role is at least to some extent determined by a search for an identity for the HE field and its borders. As the field is challenged by the fact that 'many people are interested in the topic of HE', journal editors play important roles in this context. Indeed, journal editors participating in FG debates openly note that they act as gatekeepers by enforcing a certain conditionality in accepting articles for publication in HE journals. In particular, the condition to 'cite the right literature' is applied to address the legitimacy of the HE field. However, this hegemonic approach was criticised by other FGPs for, among other reasons, following a global trend of pressure on researchers to publish 'for points' and for applying additional pressure on authors to follow certain hegemonic scopes, approaches and methodologies preferred by certain journals. This was found to be '*catastrophic for science*' (Slovenia, FG1).

Furthermore, FGPs recognised that there were conferences organised in the past by professional associations bringing together different disciplines contributing to the HE field. However, recently they noticed a trend of conferences contributing to the closing of a debate within narrow circles. According to FGP insights, only one or two disciplines usually come together, or conferences only bring together certain practitioners. The quality of presentations (particularly from the methodological point of view) has been found to be increasingly questionable. Several FGPs reported that

they tend to solve these issues by avoiding certain conferences in the HE field and by combining attendance at only a selection of conferences both inside and outside the HE field.

The responsibility of academics and practitioners

FGPs did not exclusively recognise a division between academics and practitioners in the HE field. They also exposed the split between the research ON policy and FOR policy (basic vs applied research). On the one hand, FGPs believe that academic research is no ivory tower, but rather, as one FGP illustrated *'a platform that needs to connect to society'* (England-UK, FG2). On the other hand, FGPs criticised the focusing on a narrow problem in research since, as one FGP put it, *'the problem-driven approaches that we use to research in this field do not allow us to understand the changes in broader terms'* (Mexico, FG1).

The question of how to solve the tensions that arise from conceiving higher education as an academic research field and as an endeavour contributing to improved problem-solving was found to be critical for the field. Similarly, the questions of what the benefits are of having insider knowledge of the social phenomena being studied and how can you appropriately distance yourself from the studied social phenomena remain on the agenda.

Indeed, FGPs criticised practices of both the research 'for' and 'on' policy. They did not accept the thesis that academic research is superior to applied research. On the contrary, the joint conclusion was that the only legitimate distinction between the types of research is that of good and bad research.

Critical theoretical and conceptual issues were pointed out with a reference to Macfarlane's archipelago (2012), such as a need to search for some general concept which would integrate fragments (islands) of the HE field, looking beyond the separate fields of thinking (islands) and looking at the bigger picture as well as the revelation of a wider context, a world around 'the archipelago'. FGPs also raised the question of why critical science is not having an impact. Several potential answers were offered. The challenges regarding the essential roles of universities, particularly regarding the critical position against the object of research, stood out, as was clearly pointed by an FGP from Slovenia: *'We are apologists, we are not creative critical thinkers'* (Slovenia, FG1). When looking at the whole HE field, the presence of two extremes were found inappropriate – the reflective approach of practitioners and very narrow disciplinary approaches.

The issues of both academics' and practitioners' responsibilities as actors in the HE field were not avoided. FGPs expect that both clusters of HE actors act responsibly in finding alternatives to the current developments, in connecting independent research data and analysis with the policymaking

process, in developing alternatives to the ways of doing research and performing other academic activities so as to achieve/maintain appropriate professional standards in both academia and in directly policy-focused efforts.

Suggestions for solving the issues of the he field

The FGPs agreed on several imperatives:

- The acknowledgement that the HE field has been developing in the context of changing internationalisation and globalisation trends. As there is no single process of internationalisation or globalisation, internationalisation is neither a linear expanding process nor the same at the centre and on the periphery.
- It needs to be critically acknowledged that favouring the English North American point of view is obvious in the HE academics' and practitioners' communities and in the key concepts that dominate the HE field.
- One of the greatest challenges facing researchers in HE is to look at HE from outside HE and to take account of the dynamics of change on both the inside and outside.
- There is a need for more communication and cooperation among scholars and practitioners in the HE field.

Furthermore, FGPs acknowledged several main specific tasks that need to be fulfilled in the HE field, as follows:

1. Analyse the *state of the art* in the HE field, starting with the categorisation of the issues on which HE researchers are focused, followed by categorisation according to disciplines and concepts. This could be built on rigorous analysis (e.g. analysis of journals) and building typologies according to several aspects, such as the following: What do researchers do? What issues do they analyse? Which methodologies are used? Can we see regional, country and institutional differences? Can we see North-South cleavages? etc.
2. Map the HE field based on the analysis of citations and other elements of bibliometrics.
3. Analyse continuities and discontinuities in developments in the HE field, such as innovations, trends and the cross-country relevance of case study research.
4. Reveal what the international community of HE researchers needs to understand better while taking into account the context (national, social, institutional) of the HE phenomena.

Among the suggested approaches and strategies for making progress in the HE field, the following stand out:

1. Promotion of diverse approaches in scientific work
2. Promotion of the development of knowledge as a sum of the knowledge of all five global continents
3. Inclusion of ideas which go beyond Western hegemony into courses for students so that students will be aware of the contextual diversity
4. Organisation of conferences of distinct and various types (involving various selections of disciplines, academics and practitioners) while increasing the quality of research and the quality of debate in the field
5. Organisation of HE symposiums which will bring together the HE community, teaching and learning, policy and governance, also including people from the government.

Conclusions

(1) The first research question addressed in this article was “Are the *state of the art* of the HE field generally and the relationships between academics and practitioners in the HE field in particular perceived in the same way by HE academics and practitioners from different parts of the world?”. Based on the presented focus group discussions, the answer is not simply black-and-white. What appears to be critical is experts’ experiences of working as either academics or practitioners in various contexts around the globe. The real-life experiences of western experts in non-western contexts have made them sensitive to global variations and the western-biased transfer of HE knowledge and policies, as well as research agendas to other parts of the world, viewing the recipients of these as objects rather than subjects in the process of international exchange. Academics have also been building on their international experiences but tended to focus more on critical thinking about the current characteristics of the HE field, as well as the need to grasp the ongoing changes related to (de)globalisation. In addition, they wanted to reveal and take account of the variety of contexts and the HE phenomena in the current world, while noting the dynamics in changes and the emergence of certain new phenomena. In a way, a considerable number of FG participants – among both practitioners and academics – expressed the need for more holistic and inclusive academic and practitioner practices in terms of contributions from different parts of the world. Last but not least, the FGPs themselves revealed that what actually occurs in real life in the HE field depends on the following: 1) the part of the globe; 2) the research focus (discourse only, or also other focuses); and 3) the level of analysis (macro, meso, micro) on which the HE phenomena are being viewed.

(2) The second research question asked whether insights coming from non-Western parts of the world can add a new quality to academic and practitioner knowledge and practice in the HE field. While the findings speak strongly in favour of this thesis, this positive assessment also includes several critical issues. Among them are: 1) the position and prerequisites for the development of HE knowledge in the current periphery, which is now more in a position to translate and 'catch up' with the western-centred knowledge; 2) the alternative of creating paradigmatic developments in the HE field while we are facing de-globalisation processes and growing global inequalities; 3) the development of strategies by academics and practitioners from non-western parts of the world for making contributions to currently western-biased debates and to the further development of the HE field.

(3) In the article, we also explored whether the perceptions of the focus group participants from different parts of the world differ relative to the *state of the art* of the HE field generally and the relationships between academics and practitioners in the HE field in particular. In relation to the distinction between academics and practitioners in terms of making a difference between knowledge producers and policymakers (as suggested by Caplan, 1979), we cannot say the FGPs made it very clear. What was explicitly exposed by both the academic and practitioner participants was the subordination of the HE field to various forms of government – researchers being subordinated to government interests, researchers working as international actors generally closely linked to intergovernmental organisations dominated by government interests of developed countries, or practitioners analysing selected aspects of the HE field. Nevertheless, some implicit tensions between the academics' and practitioners' points of view are obvious. The key tensions appear to be linked to the academics' demands for critical thinking, rigorous methodology, independence from government in terms of agendas, policies and actual research process, the need to take account of the bigger picture of HE phenomena and a dynamic view on societies, the world and the HE field. The academics tended to think very similarly regardless of the part of the world they came from. All in all, the HE field appears to be an area field of multiple (sub)worlds, which – according to the FG participants – must communicate among themselves much more, and in different ways than today if we are to ensure the HE field's successful development.

(4) As is typical in FG research, the FGPs offered valuable but not generalisable insights that encourage the development of large-scale research designed specifically for generalisations (Krugger, 1998: 69). What deserves special attention is an array of consensual suggestions for solving the burning issues of the HE field (presented in detail in previous sections). Also,

as in other fields (e.g. Reddin, 2021), it may be worthwhile to reveal both what academics can teach practitioners and what practitioners can teach academics. We hope that the presented findings will encourage cross-disciplinary and perhaps also interdisciplinary critical academic research on the relationship between academics and practitioners that takes account of the dynamic social, economic, technological and political changes in the world.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Belli, Gabriella (2010): Bridging the Researcher-Practitioner Gap: Views from Different Fields. In Chris Reading (ed.), *Data and Context in Statistics Education: Towards an Evidence-Based Society*, 11–16. Proceedings of the Eight International Conference on Teaching Statistics. Ljubljana, Slovenia.
- Brennan, Ross (2004): Should We Worry about an “Academic Practitioner Divide” in Marketing? *Marketing Intelligence & Planning* 22 (5): 492–500.
- Brown, Jennifer (2018): Interviews, Focus Groups and Delphi Techniques. In Paula Brough (ed.), *Advanced Research Methods for Applied Psychology: Design, Analysis and Reporting*, 95–106. New York: Routledge.
- Browne, Katherine E., Caela O’Connell and Laura Yoder Meitzner (2018): Journey through the Groan Zone with Academics and Practitioners: Bridging Conflict and Difference to Strengthen Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery Work. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Science* 9 (3): 421–428.
- Cagle, Julie A. B., Priscilla M. O’Clock, Cynthia J. Rooney and Shelly E. Webb (1997): Bridging the Theory Practice Gap: Academics, Students, and Practitioners in Research Teams. *Journal of Financial Education* 23: 64–69.
- Caplan, Nathan (1979): The Two-Communities Theory and Knowledge Utilization. *American Behavioral Scientist* 22 (3): 459–470.
- Chang, Yu-Wei (2021): Academic Impact of Articles by Practitioners in the Field of Library and Information Science. *College & Research Libraries* 82 (1): 59.
- Dagen, Tamara and Danica Fink-Hafner (2016): The Globalisation and Internationalisation of Universities. Paper presented at the 8th Slovenian Social Science Conference on Contemporary Social Transformations: Reflecting Inter-Cultural Encounters; 17 September, Piran, Slovenia.
- Devereaux Ferguson, Sherry (2000): Focus Groups, Delphi Technique, Stakeholder Assemblies, and Q Methodology. In Sherry Devereaux Ferguson (ed.), *Researching the Public Opinion Environment: Theories and Methods*, 199–222. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Fink-Hafner, Danica and Tamara Dagen (2017): Globalisation in Higher Education Policies: Multidisciplinary Insights. *Teorija in praksa* 54 (3–4): 572–591.
- Fink-Hafner, Danica, Tamara Dagen, May Doušak, Meta Novak and Mitja Hafner-Fink (2019): Delphi Method: Strengths and Weaknesses. *Advances in Methodology & Statistics/Methodološki zvezki* 16 (2): 1–19.
- Friedrich, Philipp Emanuel (2021): Organizational Change in Higher Education Ministries in Light of Agencification: Comparing Austria and Norway. *Higher Education Policy* 34: 664–684.

- Fumasoli, Tatiana and Bjørn Stensaker (2013): *Organizational Studies in Higher Education: A Reflection on Historical Themes and Prospective Trends*. Higher Education Policy 26: 479–496.
- Harmsen, Robert and Gangolf Braband (2021): *The OECD and Higher Education Policy: Agenda-Setting, Organizational Dynamics and the Construction of Convening Authority*. Higher Education Policy 34: 582–602.
- Heyl, John D. (2016): *The Emergence of the Scholar-Practitioner Identity in International Education: A 25-year review*. In Bernhard Streitwieser and Anthony C. Ogden (eds.), *International Higher Education's Scholar-Practitioners: Bridging Research and Practice*, 55–71. Oxford: Symposium Books.
- Hill, Christopher and Pamela Beshoff (eds.) (1994): *Two Worlds of International Relations: Academics, Practitioners and the Trade in Ideas*. London – New York: Routledge.
- Hudzik, John K. (2016): *Internationalization Practitioners and Scholarship: Dichotomies and Srosswalks*. In Bernhard Streitwieser and Anthony C. Ogden (eds.), *International Higher Education's Scholar-Practitioners: Bridging Research and Practice*, 39–54. Oxford: Symposium Books.
- Hunter, Fiona and Laura Rumbley (2016): *Exploring a Possible Future for the Scholar-Practitioner*. In Bernhard Streitwieser and Anthony C. Ogden (eds.), *International Higher Education's Scholar-Practitioners: Bridging Research and Practice*, 297–308. Oxford: Symposium Books.
- Jones, Sandra, Geraldine Lefoe, Marina Harvey and Kevin Ryland (2012): *Distributed Leadership: A Collaborative Framework for Academics, Executives and Professionals in Higher Education*. Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management 34 (1): 67–78.
- Kehm, Barbara M. and Ulrich Teichler (eds.) (2013): *The Academic Profession in Europe: New Tasks and New Challenges*. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Krueger, Richard A. (1998): *Analyzing & Reporting Focus Group Research*. Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: SAGE.
- Lahat, Lihi (2019): *Academics and Practitioners: The Challenge of Collaboration – An Example from Social Work and Social Services in Israel*. International Review of Administrative Sciences 85 (1): 173–190.
- Macfarlane, Bruce (2012): *The Higher Education Research Archipelago*. Higher Education Research & Development 31 (1): 129–131.
- Macfarlane, Bruce and Damon Burg (2019): *Legitimation, Professionalisation and Accountability in Higher Education Studies: An Intergenerational Story*. Studies in Higher Education 44 (3): 59–469.
- Marginson, Simon (2011): *The Confucian Model of Higher Education in East Asia and Singapore*. In Simon Marginson and Sarjit Kaur, Erlenawati Sawir (eds.), *Higher Education in the Asia-Pacific*, 53–75. Higher Education Dynamics Vol. 36. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Marshall, Stephen James (2018): *Internal and External Stakeholders in Higher Education*. In Stephen James Marshall (ed.), *Shaping the University of the Future. Using Technology to Catalyse Change in University Learning and Teaching*, 77–102. Singapore: Springer.

- Middlehurst, Robin (2009): Developing Higher Education Professionals: Challenges and Possibilities. In Celia Whitchurch and George Gordon (eds.), *Academic and Professional Identities in Higher Education: The Challenges of a Diversifying Workforce*, 223–244. New York – London: Routledge.
- Mukherjee, Nibedita, Aiora Zabala, Jean Hugé, Tobias Nyumba, Blal Adem Esmail and William J. Sutherland (2018): Comparison of Techniques for Eliciting Views and Judgements in Decision-Making. *Methods in Ecology and Evolution* 9 (1): 54–63.
- Streitwieser, Bernhard and Anthony C. Ogden (2016): Heralding the Scholar-Practitioner in International Higher Education. In Bernhard Streitwieser and Anthony C. Ogden (eds.), *International Higher Education's Scholar-Practitioners: Bridging Research and Practice*, 19–38. Oxford: Symposium Books.
- Teichler, Ulrich and Jan Sadlack (eds.) (2000): *Higher Education Research: Its Relationship to Policy and Practice*. Oxford: Pergamon / IAU Press.
- Whitchurch, Celia (2012): *Reconstructing Identities in Higher Education. The Rise of 'Third Space' Professionals*. London: Routledge.
- Wilkinson, Sue (2016): Analysing Focus Group Data. In David Silverman (ed.), *Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice*, 83–100. London: Sage.
- Wise, Graham, Connie Dickinson, Tuntiak, Katan and Maria Cristina Gallegos (2020): Inclusive Higher Education Governance: Managing Stakeholders, Strategy, Structure and Function. *Studies in Higher Education* 45 (2): 339–352.
- Wu, Hantian and Mei Li (2021): Three Phases of De Facto Quasi-Decentralization of Higher Education in China Since 1949. *Higher Education Policy* 34: 685–705.
- Zinner, Lucas (ed.) (2016): *Professionals in Doctoral Education. A Handbook*. PRIDE. Vienna: University of Vienna.

SOURCES

- Cwiak, Carol L. (2007): *Issues, Principles, and Attitudes – Oh My! Examining Perceptions from Select Academics, Practitioners and Consultants on the Subject of Emergency Management*. Report. Fargo, USA: North Dakota State University. Accessible at <https://training.fema.gov/hiedu/emprinciples.aspx>, 6. 11. 2021.
- Reddin, Gavin (2021): Practitioners have a lot to teach academics – and vice-versa. *Times Higher Education*. Accessible at <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/blog/practitioners-have-lot-teach-academics-and-vice-versa>, 9. 10. 2021.
- Smith, Shakiyla L. and Natalie Wilkins (2018): Mind the Gap: Approaches to Addressing the Research-to-Practice, Practice-to-Research Chasm. *Journal of Public Health Management and Practice* 24 (1): S6–S11. Accessible at <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6051530/>, 6. 11. 2021.

THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE PROTECTION OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

Abstract. *The article addresses the question of the role of the state in the protection of human rights and freedoms. Like states, rights and freedoms are also created on the basis of social conventions, and any reference to the universal nature or natural character of rights and freedoms is only an ideological moment in the pursuit of political goals. The basic prerequisite for the protection of rights and freedoms is the establishment of organised coercion in the form of state power which brings under its authority the multitude of different interests and diverse ways of implementing justice. The conclusive findings show that for its successful introduction into the lives of individuals, the moral discourse of universal human rights and freedoms needs effective state authority that embeds these rights and freedoms into the foundations of the legitimacy of its own existence.*

Keywords: *Constitutionalism, the state, human rights and freedoms, Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes*

Introduction

The theory of the modern state represents a historical response to the shortcomings of feudal social order which in a political sense stemmed from, amongst other things, the dispersed exercise of sovereign power. To this aim the theory of the modern state has put the exercise of legitimate force in the hands of the sovereign and centralised state authority. This arrangement has strongly reinforced the central state power, and in turn this reinforcement has brought multiple authorities which have made state power the central violator of basic human rights and freedoms. Internationally, the bitter experiences of the two World Wars subsequently lead to the emergence of numerous conventions, such as the *European Convention of Human Rights* of 1950, which legally binds 47 signatory states and members of the

* Jure Spruk, PhD, PhD candidate at the Faculty of Law, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, sprukjure@gmail.com.

DOI: 10.51936/tip.59.1.25-41

Council of Europe, as well as institutions, such as the *European Court of Human Rights*. The basic principle of the latter is to ensure the judicial protection of human rights *vis-à-vis* the national authorities within the Council of Europe. At the same time, the trend developed in the democratic political systems of the Western type with the increasing influence of constitutional courts as the highest institutional ramparts of constitutional principles. In time these courts came to reach beyond the doctrinal foundations of the so called Kelsen's constitutional court and started to move towards acquiring the role of an active legislator, which is one of the central premises of the so called new constitutionalism.¹ This trend gained additional impetus after 1989, when the principles of the political system of the Cold War's victors started to show their influence. Furthermore, Eastern European countries, which before belonged to the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, at least formally started to adjust to the principles of constitutional democracy and today have mostly become full members of the European Union. Yet, are national states really only the mass violators of human rights or can they at the same time be understood as their defenders? Our argument in this article will take the direction of explaining this other dimension of the functioning of national states. Namely, we will attempt to show why the existence of state power is actually the *conditio sine qua non* of any effective protection and the implementation of basic human rights and freedoms. The main idea of our argument is that basic human rights and freedoms remain caught up in the abstract or ideational frameworks of human intellectual efforts until the emergence of sovereign state power. This, in turn, takes on as its normative and actual responsibility the protection of human rights and freedoms codified in one or another way. The aforementioned normative and actual responsibility comprises of much more than just the listing of certain rights of persons and citizens in constitutions and legal acts; rather it is about the establishment of the institutional architecture of the state that reflects structural commitment to the protection of these rights and freedoms. Essentially, this is about the establishment of diverse institutional entities, i.e. legislative, executive and judicial branches of power (the principle of the separation of powers). These are mutually checked, preventing each establishment going beyond the constitutionally defined competencies in exercising that state authority (the principle of checks and balances), while their actions are bound by constitution and laws (the principle of the rule of law). From the aspect of the efficient protection of basic human rights and freedoms, the existence of state power is necessary, as it is only through this that the process can be set in motion toward adoption (by the constitution-maker, lawmaker), execution (the government) and the judicial protection

¹ Cf. Stone Sweet (2000).

(ordinary judiciary, constitutional judiciary) of constitutional and legislative grounds for the recognition of individual rights and freedoms. This process must always be supported by a certain power that guarantees the holders of rights the *de facto* exercise of individual legal acts. This is why state power is only considered to be an internally sovereign power, when the use of force on the part of the state is monopolised. Historically, all the above mentioned principles and the process originate from the concept of the modern state, which is distinguished from its predecessors by its moral, political and legal foundations. The modern state is the first legal and political project in the history of humankind that accepted the protection of rights and freedoms of persons and citizens as its fundamental task. Thus, making the public-law aspect of the development of the concept of the state to qualitatively shift from empirical to normative constitutionalism.

Our starting thesis says that states are only allowed to violate basic human rights and freedoms because, basically, they enable them. The ability of the state to curtail rights and freedoms and at the same time defend them is the reflection of its autonomy, *i.e.*, its abstraction both from concrete persons who exercise power as well as from the people from whose, according to the modern theory of the state, power originates. The principle of the rule of law can only start to take effect when governing is not in the domain of an arbitrary judgement of a concrete person or a group of people, but becomes the domain of abstract law which concrete holders of power are obliged to exercise in accordance with the predefined processional and material legal regulations. The requirement for the rule of law is rooted in distrust toward human nature and is actually a corrective measure for the human antisocial dimension. Therefore, state authority formally establishes rights and freedoms, which is why it can also defend them throughout its institutions. In other words, the state can only violate the rights and freedoms which it has been legally committed to defend and create conditions for their actual implementation. In this respect, the natural-law discourse of the universality of basic human rights and freedoms acts ineffectively to the extent that it does not recognise the defining influence of the constitution of state power as the mightiest guarantor of the respect of human rights and freedoms. What remains of the idea of the universality of human rights and freedoms is only empty abstraction, insofar as at the same time there is no real force which makes these rights and freedoms become concrete and, therefore, that *de facto* exercises them. Thomas Hobbes, the founder of the modern theory of social contract, understood this logic very well, when in his masterpiece, *The Leviathan*, he gave a comprehensive explanation of the causes for the constitution of political power whose fundamental mission is to protect the natural rights of the members of this community. While the circumstances of his life and work lead Hobbes to defend the idea of

natural-law absolutism, which from today's perspective is anachronistic, some of his ideas hold persuasive intellectual foundations regarding the understanding of the modern state as the first form of political community taking on, as mentioned before, the obligation to protect basic human rights and freedoms. Our aim is not to look for the seeds of liberal ideas in Hobbes, but rather to contribute to the return of the state into public discourse, at a time when the importance of the state for an individual's freedom seems to have been largely excluded by the neoliberal conceptualisation of an individual's freedom, and considered as being organically attached to the individual and, in turn, independent of the constitutive principles of the modern state and its real power.

Empirical and normative constitutionalism

The foundations of the modern conception of the state have been built since circa the 17th century on, when classical texts were written by the founders of the modern theory of social contract, starting with Thomas Hobbes and John Lock. Also, the first bourgeois revolution, the so called Glorious Revolution in England, took place between 1688 and 1689, which provided an important model for the revolutions in the 18th century, both in Europe, e.g. France in 1789, and, a few years earlier, in the United States. Certainly, it is no coincidence that it was in England that the process of radical social and political change started, which fundamentally rejected the idea of the absolutist rule of the monarchy, akin to the French model. In England, deep in the Middle ages, specific historical circumstances lead to the creation of the *Magna Carta Libertatum*, which enabled the then rebellious aristocracy to pose, with the help of the bourgeoisie, a "public-law" demand to limit the king's power. Historical experience of continental European states differed from the English one in that the liberal bourgeois ideas about the restriction of sovereign power only gained ground more than a century later. These experiences are mainly related to the continental tradition of the centralised power of the monarchy which, as opposed to the English tradition of power that was balanced between the aristocracy and the monarchy, propagated absolute power within the feudal body politic. The first modern theory of the state is the constitutional theory of the state, whose key idea is the idea of limited power. This idea stems from the wider principle of an individual's freedom – which modern conception mainly defines in negative terms, i.e. in terms of the prohibition of the state authority to interfere with one's personal space – the two main values of which being one's life and (private) property. The space of negative freedom is the space with which the state power has no authority to interfere, as it is the space where everything that is not explicitly prohibited is allowed. It is only

possible to constitute (*constituere*) such space under the circumstances in which the existence of basic rules enframes this space and guarantees the observance of these rules. The explanations of the emergence of the space of negative freedom are not to be looked for in the principles of the law of nature, which are said to be temporally and territorially unlimited. Rather, they are to be found in the specific conception of the state, which builds its own legitimacy on the protection of “natural” human rights. While state authority does not create “natural” rights, it creates the conditions for their recognition. Namely, the exercise of these rights primarily stems from the real power of the state authority to establish the conditions in which the rights of the weak are protected from the arbitrary demands of the powerful, which, as it were, is the first principle of the law, *per se*. The state, which normatively takes on the burden of protecting “natural” human rights, is the constitutional state which definitively takes away from those in power the status of *legibus solutus*, which was one of the basic principles of the absolutist state. The constitutional state needs a formalised hierarchy of rules which in the modern era replaces the archaic feudal social and political hierarchy. If the monarch, as God’s representative on Earth, was at the top of the medieval feudal hierarchy², in modernity, after the definite dissolution of the ideals related to the principle of the sovereignty of people, this status was gradually acquired by the legal system with the constitution at its pinnacle.³ These are the roots of one of the central principles of the modern state, *i.e.* the principle of the rule of law. Therefore, the principle of the rule of law is the catalyst for the formal equality of the citizens that replaces the medieval integration of unequal individuals into a corporative body⁴, while at the same time imposing restrictions on state power which, primarily in the 16th and 17th centuries, were proven necessary through the lessons of arbitrary absolutist power.⁵

The first modern theory of the state, being the theory of the constitutional state, does not mean that political communities existing in premodern historical periods did not know the concept of constitution.⁶ As has been pointed out, the central idea of *modern* constitutionalism is the (self) limitation of state power, and this idea most obviously separates the modern conception of constitutionalism from its premodern predecessors. While premodern constitutionalism is limited to the definition of the form of rule within a certain political community, modern constitutionalism, in defining

² For more details on feudal social and political relations see Bloch (1961) and Reynolds (1994).

³ Cf. Shapiro (2011), especially chapter 12.

⁴ Corporative nature of medieval political community is exhaustively described by Kantorowicz (1957), Ullmann (1961) and Gierke (2008).

⁵ For an insight into the then influential attempt of the defense of absolutism see Figgis (1914/2015).

⁶ For more on historical development of constitutionalism see McIlwain (1975).

the form of rule, at the same time and through different institutes introduces the idea of limited state power. The key institutional mechanisms of the limitation of power include, for example, the separation of powers and a system of checks and balances (Vincent, 1987: 98). The difference between the premodern and modern conceptions of the constitution is related to the transition from the empirical conception of the constitution, which reflects political conditions in a certain territory at a certain time, to the normative conception of the constitution, that establishes the rules based on which the exercise of political power is legally regulated (Grimm, 2016: 3). The concept of constitution acquires its modern meaning only with the division of legal order in two parts, *i.e.* traditional customary law stemming from the state and a new law proclaimed by the sovereign and which is binding for state power (*ibidem*: 11). This new law is a public law which serves the regulation of the authority of the respective holders of power. Therefore, the meaning of the existence of constitutional rules lies in the fact that they are positioned above the whims of the lawmaker, *i.e.* these are laws that govern the state and not laws with which the state governs (Vincent, 1987: 78). Actually, the rule of law, and not the rule of people, is fiction, but this fiction is necessary in order to preserve the concept of prior, *i.e.* constitutional rules that prevent the state (power) to exercise arbitrary power. The rule of law in this sense rejects the submission of person to person, while requiring the submission of one's actions to laws. Here, the question arises of the ideological relations between law and politics. In general, it applies that law always reflects the actions of the political power or ideology of those social groups that largely define the legal content. However, at the same time, law is also a relatively autonomous social phenomenon, defining, with its autonomy in relation to political power, the nature of the political system: the weaker the autonomous power of the law, the larger the deviation from democratic principles (Cerar, 2011). The meaning of the limitation of state power and the entirety of modern public law lies in its enabling the individual to change from a passive subject to an active citizen, who can claim their rights and freedoms in courts. The latter, while being integrated in the state power structure as the judicial branch of power, preserve their autonomy, through the aforementioned separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, from the other two – “political” – holders of power, *i.e.* the parliament and the government.⁷ The great ideal hiding behind these guiding principles is the ideal of human freedom and the related conception of justice. In the period of the bourgeois revolutions of the 18th century, the modern conception of freedom and justice became radically distanced from medieval conceptions, which 16th century absolutism intended to preserve,

⁷ Cf. Bickel (1962).

together with feudal social relations. This happened first on the continent, in France, and then also in England, where the Glorious Revolution definitively defeated the Stuarts' intentions to introduce the "divine right" of the monarch to exercise absolute power, and instead appointed the parliament as the sovereign and thereby created the foundations of the constitutional monarchy.⁸ Therefore, historically, modern constitutionalism is the response to the absolutist tendencies of the monarchies of the time, which is why (mainly written) constitutions, limiting the power of the state, became a symbol of the individual's freedom and the introduction of justice in social and political relationships, where social predetermination would no longer prevail, and the empowerment of the individual would be based on their rights and capabilities. Many supporters of the bourgeois movements in Europe and North America were full of such an exhilaration, imbued with the Enlightenment spirit. This was aptly illustrated by the British-American political theoretician Thomas Paine for whom the (written) constitution was not an act of a government, but of a people, who are the only able to constitute the government, and a government without a constitution equalled mere power without right (McIlwain, 1975: 2).

The modern era, with all its characteristics, *i.e.* economic, political, cultural, *etc.*, that made it differ from previous periods, required a state order which would better reflect the changed social relations of power. It is no exaggeration to define the modern state a legal and political project of the bourgeoisie that, on the wings of the triumph of capitalism, managed to resist and also defeat the feudal remnants of the time, where there was no longer room for the stifling conceptions of man's freedom and his "inborn" rights and freedoms. Historically, this legal and political project mainly took place under the ideological label of liberalism, which highlights as its core value the freedom of the individual, defining thereby as its goal a society which will establish the conditions for attaining the self-fulfilment and dignity of each individual. Liberalism begins its historical march at the barricades of the political and economic privileges of feudal aristocracy, also mapping the positive side of its political programme through advocating the industrialised and market-oriented economic order as "free" as possible from state interference (Heywood, 2012: 25). For the bourgeoisie even the enlightened absolutist ruler had proven to be untenable by imposing, through mercantilism, far too many restrictions, mainly on the market, and in disposing with private property, which lead to the changed relationship between state authorities and civil society (Poggi, 1990: 53). In the 18th and

⁸ *An indictment from 1649 reproached Charles I. His appropriation of unlimited tyrannical power stemming only from his own personal will. The indictment describes Charles's seizure of power as his tendency to abolish the existent applicable rights and freedoms, which would destroy the foundations of the political order. For a more detailed description see Skinner (2003).*

19th centuries the concept of constitution gained ground to characterise this changed relationship. This relationship could only be able to develop in the circumstances in which society was economically and culturally developed enough to create its own capacities for development and self-regulation, while the bourgeoisie became strong enough to be no longer interested in the competition with the aristocracy for royal privileges (ibidem: 54).

Human rights and freedoms in relation to the great Leviathan

The aim of this chapter is to explain how Hobbes's theory of the state, which he most thoroughly elaborated on in the *Leviathan*, can help us understand the co-dependence of the existence of political power and the exercise of individual human rights and freedoms, which are presumed to be universal in nature. Of the main importance in our choosing Thomas Hobbes was his pioneering role in the grounding of modern contractual theory, in which he encompassed both the elements of (modern) natural law and legislative positivism. Thomas Hobbes provided the explanation of the emergence of political community, which differed in key starting points from the predominant explanations that existed up to that time. He did this in the circumstances of the conflict between the intellectual tradition of absolutism and natural-law ideas of the universal and inalienable rights of the individual that arose from the ashes of feudalism and the rise of capitalism. These circumstances were marked by the civil war in which, basically, two political visions were confronted, each of them addressing the changing social structures in their own way. On one side there was the monarchy, which tried to integrate its vision of absolutist power in the ideological construction of the divine right, and on the other there was the coalition of aristocracy and bourgeoisie building its vision of limited sovereign power, which would be kept within the centuries old framework within which basic political relations were outlined. While Hobbes's *Leviathan* represents his direct response to these circumstances, his text also offers important analytical highlights that reach beyond the meaning of historiographical contextualisation. Within the latter, Hobbes can easily be considered an advocate of natural-law absolutism and a member of the monarchy, while an analytical examination of his text shows that he importantly contributed to the development of positivist legal tradition that was later further developed by Jeremy Bentham, John Austin *etc.* This contribution is vital in the very part that touches on the two basic aspects of the relationship between law and politics, *i.e.* the transformation of the political (power, interest) into legal (right, duty). When Hobbes describes the emergence of the political community, he is actually describing the embryonic stage of this relationship, for the understanding of which we need to understand the concept

of power or coercion. For the purpose of this article it is thus of key importance to explain how it is only the existence of power that can guarantee the respect of rights or how the established force transforms the content of its own “orders” into the legal norm.

Thomas Hobbes considered his own work as pioneering, namely, from the aspect of political science (*civil science*). However, some authors place Hobbes's work in political jurisprudence.⁹ Political jurisprudence stems from the combination of sociological jurisprudence and judicial realism, as well as substantive and methodological aspects of political science, the basic premise of which is the assumption that law is an integral part of the social system rather than an independent organism (Shapiro, 1963: 294). At the heart of this approach lies the basic positivist maxim of law as the product of human will and reason, unrelated to any metaphysical ideas of discovering law that are typical of various natural-law approaches. Nonetheless, Hobbes did not neglect the influence of natural law: quite the contrary, he placed it at the centre of his doctrine on the emergence of the political community, thereby actually arguing in favour of the moral obligation of the individual to subordinate themselves to the established law, created only by the sovereign state power, which, however, is rejected by most of the modern and contemporary positivist legal tradition.¹⁰ For Hobbes it was not even possible to avoid natural law, as he was not only interested in the authority of established law but also its legitimacy (Loughlin, 2012: 11).

Hobbes's intellectual legacy belongs to the modern era. To corroborate this estimate it is his obvious intention to fundamentally unburden societal life of the metaphysical ideas that looked for, and found the source of, authority in theological interpretations, with which they attributed the legitimacy for governing to God's will and God's deputies on earth.¹¹ Though such interpretations were more influential in continental Europe, even England could not avoid them as can be seen from the claims of the Stuart dynasty that triggered the English Civil War. For Hobbes, political community is the product of the rational will of the people who commit contractually to the emergence of political power. The unbearable co-existence in the natural state dominated by the unlimited desire to interfere with the individual's life and property forces people to connect with each other. It is in relation to property that modern authors took the standpoint that the world was given for use to all people, implying the absence of private property, which is why they had to look for just reasons for its private appropriation

⁹ E.g. Loughlin (2012).

¹⁰ Cf. Raz (2009) and Murphy (2014).

¹¹ *The great Leviathan is not of divine descent, it is a human invention. In a way its great power equals it with divinity, but this divinity is mortal rather than eternal, i.e. it is not part of the inevitable destiny, but stems from human convention.*

(Lukšič, 2016: 633). Of course, the natural state is only a theoretical construct used throughout history by authors who belong to the tradition of social contract, with the intention to explain the reasons for the creation of politically organised communities linked to allegedly intrinsic human characteristics, *i.e.* human nature, from which the most appropriate forms of social and political structures are then deduced to ensure human coexistence.¹² Thomas Hobbes followed this logic, which is why in *Leviathan's* Chapter 13 he explains the nature of human life in the state of nature, *i.e.* a pre-political state in which state power does not exist, and as a result the criteria of law or (conventional) justice do not exist. In the glory of the modern age Hobbes rejects Aristotle's conception of natural inequality, and explains that nature makes people equal despite some of the obvious differences between them, *e.g.* physical or mental abilities. However, it is this equality that represents the source of trouble, because of which the life of individual man in the state of nature sooner or later becomes unbearable (Hobbes, 1651/1996: 87). Human equality in capabilities leads people to aspire to acquire the limited resources that obviously cannot be enjoyed and appropriated by everybody at the same time, which is why any two people who want to take possession of the same thing find themselves in a hostile relationship (*ibidem*). Hobbes discerns human tendency to conflict from human nature, namely, one aspires to gain for their own personal benefit, safety and respect, in which their aim is to dominate over other people and their property (*ibidem*: 88). In this state man is primarily an enemy to his fellow man (*homo homini lupus*), and even the strongest or wisest of people have no guaranty for physical survival, while the absence of any effective mechanisms of control and stability drives people into a permanent state of fighting for property, domination and glory (*bellum omnium contra omnes*). In these circumstances the existence of the *Lex Naturalis*, that Hobbes describes as a general rule stemming from human reason and prohibiting man to do anything that would be destructive to his life, and at the same time permitting him to do what is to his benefit, in no way contributes to peaceful coexistence. Both are in accordance with the *Right of Nature* and man's natural freedom (*ibidem*: 91). Every man has a natural right to everything he deems necessary to fulfil his needs including other people's lives, which in fact means that man exercises his inborn executive power with total arbitrariness. The

¹² A similar approach can be found in the Bible, which through the original sin explains the reasons for the expulsion of the first humans, Adam and Eve, from Eden. Adam and Eve were expelled from Eden because they violated God's command, and for this their lives and the lives of their descendants became harsh, because they were pushed to the state of nature which corresponded to human characteristics of humanity's first parents, *i.e.* Eve's slyness and Adam's disrespect of authority. Throughout the Middle Ages especially influential was the discussion by St. Augustine from the 5th century who integrated the biblical explanation in political philosophy. For more see Augustine (1998).

objective criteria of justice and law do not exist in this natural state, and man can never even commit unjust or unlawful acts. Hobbes clearly says that in the state of nature the ideas of justice and injustice have no place, because it applies that where there is no power there is no law, and where there is no law there is no injustice (ibidem: 90). Instead of law or obligation what rules in the state of nature is the right, an individual's right to freely pursue his own interests as he sees fit. Hobbes explains that there is an important distinction between the natural right and the natural law, namely, the natural right highlights individual's freedom, while the natural law restricts it (ibidem: 91). The problem is that in the state of nature the law of nature does not have any practical value, which in turn leads to the absolutisation of the individual's natural right to freedom. An individual's exercise of their natural right to freedom is unbearable for everybody, because everybody has the same right, which means that in reality nobody has it. The individual who would take the life of his fellow person could soon become the victim of another individual, and if that happened, it would not be counted as punishable or unjust. It is then logical that the natural right should be replaced by the natural law, which will limit human freedom to the extent that it will stop interfering with the lives of other people. This is why Hobbes introduces the basic natural law in his theory, which prescribes that every person seeks peace. In practice, they can only do so by respecting the second natural law, which prescribes to every individual that in the name of peace they renounce their rights and are satisfied by those rights that they themselves recognise for other people (ibidem: 92). In Chapter 15 of *Leviathan* Hobbes lists a further 17 natural laws to be obeyed by all those who are committed to respect the basic natural law, *i.e.* striving for peace. For our purpose mainly the third natural law is important, which tells people to respect the agreements that they have made (*pacta sunt servanda*), because Hobbes attaches the definition of justice to it. In Hobbes, injustice always occurs when the individual does not hold to what they have previously committed to, and it is very telling that Hobbes's definition of justice is only negative, namely, for him, everything that is not unjust, is just (ibidem: 100). The listed natural laws are unchangeable and eternal, because they come from human reason. However, they have an important weakness of being, as Hobbes argues, binding to the individual only *in foro interno* and not *in foro externo*. This means that there is no external force that would make the individual obey these laws. Because these are "only" moral principles, Hobbes calls the science of these principles moral philosophy, which basically deals with the questions of good and evil (ibidem: 110). Moreover, it is misleading to call these moral principles "laws" as in truth they are theorems rather than laws, which by definition are the words of those who have the right to command over others (ibidem: 111). It is this, Hobbes's definition of law, which is the

reason that within legal theory he is classified in positivist tradition. Namely, modern legal positivism understands established law as an autonomous system that includes its own criteria of just and unjust, and this understanding originates in Hobbes's work (Loughlin, 2012: 11).

Hobbes resolved the riddle of how to connect people into a unified political community in which the sovereign's power will not only be effective but also legitimate by relating it to the contractual relationship between people. Because people are free and rational, they have the possibility to become connected to each other by contract, and create, in this way, a political power which speaks and acts in their name, as their representative, while at the same time accepting, as its basic mission, to protect their rights, that before in the state of nature were unbearably violated. Political community emerges with the intention of protecting an individual's rights, and it emerges when the multitude becomes unified in one person, *i.e.* a feigned or artificial person that represents the words and acts of natural persons (Hobbes, 1651/1996: 111). The transformation of the multitude into a unified whole is completed only when this multitude creates its representative who speaks and acts in their name, which must happen with the explicit consent of each individual. Again Hobbes clearly writes that it is the unity of the representative and not the unity of the represented that creates a unified (artificial) person (*ibidem*: 114). Individuals make the social contract between themselves and by doing so create the authority of power to which they transfer the competence of adopting obligatory social rules, thereby renouncing their own natural freedom. The latter, however, does not mean that the individual has revoked the right to make decisions, because each individual remains the author of each individual act of power. However, this decision-making is indirect, carried out through the authority created to this aim. Consequently, any ignoring of the acts of power is a direct violation of the third natural law, that requires the observance of the agreed, and the potential violation of the acts of power is not aimed directly at the holder of power but against the other parties with which the individual who violates the acts of power made the social contract. Hobbes addresses the individual that would directly break the third natural law as the fool, *the Foole*, who denies both the existence of justice and God (*ibidem*: 101).

Therefore, the emergence of the political community is marked by the emergence of the institution of power that abolishes the state of nature. The natural state by definition is a pre-political state. In the natural state there are no laws that would be really binding and effectively executed. Hobbes insists that laws have to be written and published (*ibidem*: 188) and at the same time external signs should exist showing that they stem from the will of the sovereign (*ibidem*: 189). "Laws" that do not fulfil these criteria are natural laws. In general, a law is a command not a recommendation, but this

is not just any command of an individual to another individual, but it is a command to the one who previously made a commitment to obey the command. (ibidem: 183). In other words, only the command that has legitimate grounds can be considered law, which basically means that it is issued or proclaimed by an authorised person or institution. Fundamentally, Hobbes explains the legitimacy of political order based on coercion, namely through the principle of mutual consent (Loughlin, 2000: 163). The individual is obliged to obey the law, because it was issued by the authority that was authorised for this purpose by the individual himself. This is not only a legal obligation, but also a moral one. For a political community to exist it is not enough that individuals are only bound by the law *in foro externo*, meaning that the individual obeys the law, because they are afraid of coercion behind the exercise of laws, but the law also has to bind them *in foro interno*, that is, morally. Obeying laws *in foro externo* is guaranteed by strong coercion, while only reason, disclosed by natural laws, works *in foro interno*. The just sovereign power adopts just laws, *i.e.* laws that protect man's natural rights, while power only protects those natural rights which it recognises and acknowledges as such. Therefore, the substantive judgement of natural rights is on the side of the sovereign power and this is the key to peaceful and stable civil society, which is impossible to achieve in the circumstances where each individual explains the content of justice according to their own mind and ability. The grand challenge of political theory lies in its telling of how to ensure the peaceful coexistence of people with the indisputable fact that in their understanding of substantive justice people often have different views, or how to subject people with different interests to one political power (*ex pluribus unum*). Naked force is not enough to resolve this challenge and it seems that Hobbes understands this when he claims that the law of nature and civil law are contained within one another, and the relationship between them is equalised (Hobbes, 1651/1996: 185).

Moral principles put on the pedestal of natural rights by the modern era were different from those in previous epochs. Modern natural rights come from individualist moral principles that were better suited to the growing influence of capitalist economic order than to stiff medieval ideas about the divine body, and the "natural" inequality derived from it, which in Antiquity Aristotle had defended with different arguments. Medieval corporativism became too narrow for the modern individual who had freed himself from collective identities, which before integrated him into the divine community (Spruk and Lukšič, 2017: 473). The rights of nature could start to serve their purpose only with the emergence of stronger state authority, which excluded these rights from the metaphysical deductions on human nature and made them obligatory in reality in relation to state authority itself. This, in fact, means that the legislator enacted them, the judiciary used them in

concrete judicial procedures, and the government implemented them. In apportioning the power to the state, Thomas Hobbes went much too far to be referred to even by those who today claim more state interventionism is necessary. However, this does not change the fact that Hobbes left us a valuable treatise about the key prerequisite for respecting either natural or constitutional rights, namely: the existence of the legitimate state authority whose power guarantees the implementation of these rights. From then on it applies that the state is not simply a potential violator of human rights and freedoms, but at the same time their strongest rampart. While the law, certainly, is not simply a command as could be discerned from Hobbes's definition, its coercive nature is certainly a quality not to be ignored, if we want to understand what law is in the first place, even if contemporary analytical jurisprudence would disagree.¹³ Finally, one of the basic aims of law is the peaceful resolution of conflicts. In civilised society the scope of our rights is considered to end, where the rights of other people begin. When we forget about this, it is just that a more powerful instance reminds us of this. It is just that a more powerful instance reminds us when we neglect our legal obligations either to the state or to our fellow person. This more powerful instance is the state authority which, on presuming the rule of law, warns us by referring to processual and material regulations applied in the territory in which we live, and, if necessary, punishes us on the same grounds. In the debate about the relation between law and coercive power we could say that the law makes us do things we do not want to do (Schauer, 2015: 1). This aspect is extremely important when or if we decide not to respect other people's rights. In this case it is necessary that a legitimate state power tries to stop us and make us do something we do not want to.

Conclusion

Most countries today have written constitutions which, amongst other things, state basic human rights and freedoms, to the observation of which the holders of state power are committed. Therefore, first and foremost, the constitutional act is the act that limits state power in the way that it guarantees each individual the rights and freedoms listed in this act. This protects an individual's freedom with the intention of preventing any arbitrary interference of the respective political majority in their legally protected interests. Democracy alone cannot achieve this purpose, which is why it is necessary to upgrade it qualitatively to the level of constitutional democracy, *i.e.* a political system within which state power comes from the will of the people. Rather than being supreme power, this power is itself subjected to

¹³ Cf. Hart (2012).

the supremacy of the constitutional order outlined in the formally supreme legal act. Of course, the constitution is not only a legal act but also a political one. It lays down the basic principles adopted by a political community, when it is constituted, as constitutive elements of its own statehood. Therefore, a constitution's primary function is to formally constitute the state and define the basic relations between its authority and its citizens. The essence of the state is its institutional architecture, which does not only determine the authority of individual institutions but also establishes certain relations between them. The latter are important from the aspect of the prevention of the accumulation of political power, which is why legislative, executive and judicial powers have to lean on the principle of distrust in relation to each other, while belonging to the same entity. Although lawmakers, ministers and judges have different authorities, they all work in the name of the state. In exercising their authorities they are all obliged to respect basic human rights and freedoms, but the question arises, who actually defines their concrete contents. They are abstractly defined by the creator of the constitution or the lawmaker, and their concrete implementation lies in the domain of the judiciary, which is two state institutions. Basic human rights and freedoms can be derived from different sources, from God's will or human nature, whereas the modern era found them in human reason. Regardless of where we find them, the breaking point is always where these rights and freedoms are recognised by some organised coercive power (the state), which is legitimised for their implementation. Their abstract determination in the constitution and legal acts is not enough: the conditions for their observation are only fulfilled with the establishment of an institutional framework for their concrete judgement. This institutional framework is represented by independent courts as the part of state authority which enables the individual to represent their concrete claims. From this aspect the most important human right is the individual's processual right to access the independent arbiter, who fills abstract provisions with concrete content. It is not the individual themselves that makes judgements of the content of human rights and freedoms. This is done by a state body which holds the required legitimacy for this. And most importantly, this state body leans on organised coercive power which guarantees for the implementation of each individual judiciary decision. Legal history teaches us that the meaning of law is peaceful conflict resolution. Thomas Hobbes explained to us that for this goal to be achieved there should first be a state authority, which brings the multitude under one authority. This is the only guarantor for the prevention of violence, depicted by Hobbes as existing in the state of nature. The state of nature is but a pre-political state, where every individual uses their own mind to define justice and their own physical power to actually execute the content of justice.

We wrote in the introduction to this article that the state can only violate human rights and freedoms because it basically enables them. The state and the law are human creations, and any metaphysical explanations for their existence are superfluous. Their being human creations primarily means that people not only create them but also have the ability to change them. There are human rights and freedoms that can be considered universal, independent of time and space, the eternal moral maxims. However, such a view only makes sense when put in the context of pursuing a concrete political programme. It only has any real grounds insofar as these grounds are built by concrete people in concrete time and space. Throughout history, many people died for the rights and freedoms that we today consider eternal. Although these people are referred to when discussing the rights and freedoms they died for, they weren't necessarily subject to them during their lifetimes. Based on moral discourse, a person could be given countless rights and freedoms which could also be called natural rights, but their real power is only exercised when they are recognised in the sphere of law and in the political sphere. The basic prerequisite for this to occur is the existence of real power or coercion which can and wants to protect this process. While it is true that such real legitimate power takes away some of a person's freedom, it takes it away in order to actually, to a greater extent, protect it.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Augustine (1998): *The City of God Against the Pagans*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bickel, Alexander (1962): *The Least Dangerous Branch*. New Haven, London: Yale University Press.
- Bloch, Marc (1961): *Feudal Society*. London: Routledge.
- Cerar, Miro (2011): The Ideology of the Rule of Law. *Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie* 97 (3): 393–404.
- Figgis, John Neville (1914/2015): *The Divine Right of Kings*. London: Forgotten Books.
- Gierke, Otto (2008): *Political Theories of the Middle Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Grimm, Dieter (2016): *Constitutionalism. Past, Present and Future*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harrison, Ross (2012): The equal extent of natural and civil law. In: David Dyzenhaus, Thomas Poole (ed.), *Hobbes and the Law*, 22–38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hart, Herbert Lionel (2012): *The Concept of Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Heywood, Andrew (2012): *Political Ideologies*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Hobbes, Thomas (1651/1996): *Leviathan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kantorowicz, Ernst (1957): *The King's Two Bodies. A Study in Medieval Political Theology*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

- Lukšič, Igor (2016): Aktualnost in akutnost Lockove koncepcije zasebne lastnine. *Teorija in praksa Journal* 53 (3): 625–644.
- Loughlin, Martin (2000): *Sword & Scales. An Examination of the Relationship Between Law & Politics*. London: Hart Publishing.
- Loughlin, Martin (2012): The political jurisprudence of Thomas Hobbes. V David Dyzenhaus, Thomas Poole (ed.), *Hobbes and the Law*, 5–21. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McIlwain, Charles Howard (1975): *Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern*. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
- Murphy, Liam (2014): *What Makes Law. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Poggi, Gianfranco (1990): *The State. Its Nature, Development and Prospects*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Raz, Joseph (2009): *Authority of Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Reynolds, Susan (1994): *Fiefs and Vassals*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schauer, Frederick (2015): *The Force of Law*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Shapiro, Martin (1963): Political Jurisprudence. *Kentucky Law Journal* 52 (2): 294–345.
- Shapiro, Scott (2011): *Legality*. Cambridge: Belknap Harvard University Press.
- Skinner, Quentin (2003): States and the Freedom of Citizens. V Bo Strath, Quentin Skinner (ed.), *States & Citizens*, 11–27. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Spruk, Jure in Igor Lukšič (2017): Thomas Hobbes: od krščanskega korporativizma k individualizmu. *Teorija in praksa Journal* 54 (3): 458–476.
- Stone Sweet, Alec (2000): *Governing With Judges*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ullmann, Walter (1961): *Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages*. New York, London: Routledge.
- Vincent, Andrew (1987): *Theories of the State*. Oxford, New York: Blackwell.

OUTER SPACE TREATY REFORM AND THE LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY OF SPACE EXPLORATION**

Abstract. *The challenge of ensuring the space environment's long-term sustainability in the context of the exploration and commercialisation of outer space raises several important issues and dimensions with respect to both international environmental law and sustainable development. The research question analyses the extent to which such exploration benefits humanity and expands the province of all humankind. In this article, historical achievements of the international legal framework governing the area of space exploration are presented. Opportunities for further developing and strengthening this framework to ensure the cooperative, transparent, inclusive and equitable development of space exploration are deliberated, notably those that do not limit the interests and opportunities of space-faring countries. The key finding and proposition of this article is that while discussing the need to improve and strengthen the international regulatory framework, developing countries' needs and interests should also be effectively incorporated. More equitable, inclusive and sustainable development is as much in the interest of developed countries as it is of developing countries.*

Keywords: *The Outer Space Treaty, space law, UNCOPUOS, space commercialisation, Sustainable Development Goals, inclusive and balanced development, international environmental law*

Introduction

The challenge of ensuring the space environment's long-term sustainability in the context of its exploration and commercialisation raises several important issues and dimensions from the perspectives of both international environmental law and sustainable development.

* Matjaž Nahtigal, PhD, Associate Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia.

** The author acknowledges the financial support from the Slovenian Research Agency research core funding No P5-0177.

DOI: 10.51936/tip.59.1.42-59

These international legal challenges and issues could become overshadowed by the heightened geopolitical competition, which today increasingly encompasses competition in outer space (Broad, 2021). As established by the Outer Space Treaty, adopted in 1967¹, and the Moon Treaty, a UN multilateral agreement negotiated in the 1970s, the exploration and use of outer space is to be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries and to be the province of all humankind. States should avoid the harmful contamination of space and celestial bodies (Tronchetti, 2017: 791).

Support for the commercialisation of outer space as part of the near-future expansion of space exploration should not become a goal in itself. This would replicate a similar strategic confusion seen with the liberalisation of international trade in the past few decades as a goal in itself. Today, we understand much better that the real goal of international trade and economic integration should be to facilitate more equitable, sustainable and inclusive international development. To overcome the WTO impasse and avoid further populist backlash against free trade even from some of the world's leading economies, an institutional and policy reimagining on the national and international level is necessary.

The reconceptualising of development policies should be a priority in all domains of international law, from trade, finance and the environment to fishing and outer space exploration. The most difficult part of such efforts is not reimagining instruments, tools and policies within the reformed regulatory framework on the international and the national levels. Instead, the most difficult part is ensuring that the leading global actors recognise and are aware that such reconceptualisation involves a Pareto-efficient approach which serves the true interests of humanity. It does not jeopardise the legitimate goals, interests and strategies of the major powers. Such opportunities are extended to other parts of the world currently excluded from the benefits of global developments.

A discouraging example is the most recent experience with the lack of universal access to the COVID-19 vaccine, with the leading countries having mostly succumbed to vaccine nationalism despite the strong international public interest and scientific evidence that only sufficient global inoculation can stem the pandemic. Not only may this situation further deepen inequalities between the global North and global South, but it might also prolong and complicate the pandemic containment efforts. The lack of global coordination of the production, distribution and access to vaccines mirrors the

¹ *Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (usually referred to as the Outer Space Treaty or OST), ratified in Slovenia, Zakon o ratifikaciji Pogodbe o načelih, ki urejajo dejavnosti držav pri raziskovanju in uporabi vesolja, vključno z Luno in drugimi nebesnimi telesi (MPRUV), Official Journal of the Republic of Slovenia, no. 1/2019.*

absence of global leadership and short-sighted and narrow interests of the leading international powers, together with weakness of many international organisations and international programmes, such as the Covax programme.

The experience with the global commitments to the Paris Agreement on Climate Change is similar. Rich countries, that for many decades were also the largest contributors of global emissions, have committed themselves to allocating funding to the developing countries to ensure their transition from fossil fuels. The funding for such support should be around EUR 100 billion. Yet, 10 years later, the rich countries have not stood behind their pledges, thereby leaving the developing countries to their own devices (Hook, 2021). Moreover, although most developing countries have only been negligibly responsible for global emissions, many developing countries are the most exposed to extremes of weather like disastrous droughts, floods, and land erosion. This is seeing both global inequalities and structural inequities growing, instead of a globally sustainable, inclusive and diverse framework for overall development being secured.

Fortunately, there are several encouraging good practice examples and a more inclusive regulatory framework. These examples include sharing information about deforestation of the Amazon rainforest to develop more sustainable policies; information about land erosion along the rivers in Bangladesh to develop safer housing policies; and enabling access to telecommunication via satellites. The opportunities to apply space exploration and technologies to the developing countries' agricultural, environmental, health, educational and other policies are practically limitless, as a recent UNCTAD study shows (2021).

Opportunities exist on both the global level and level of various forms of regional cooperation. For example, according to an UNCTAD study, Brazil has signed an agreement with the European Union on the Copernicus programme that gives Brazil access to images to help monitor fragile eco-systems, tropical forests, and spills in the ocean and other areas. Another example is a UN Office for Outer Space Affairs' memorandum of understanding with the National Space Administration of China, which enables the provision of imagery for disaster management, monitoring the effect of climate change, and supporting efforts to attain the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In 2018, for instance, NASA shared data from its satellites for forecasting cholera in Yemen, which worked with an accuracy rate of 92%. Thanks to space data and tools, future health and development workers may be both more efficient and effective in their campaigns against disease outbreaks (UNCTAD, 2021: 4).

The process of space commercialisation could become another example of the global race to the bottom because certain privileged companies and individuals can benefit from the vast public investments, research, and

development of technologies (Mance, 2021). In contrast, the creation of stricter, coherent and transparent international legal governance tailored to the needs of humanity, sustainable development and global public goods in the new era of space exploration and commercialisation could lead to development that would benefit all.

Leaving aside that relatively few countries have ratified the Moon Treaty (just 18 countries) and that space exploration has accelerated in recent decades in only a small number of leading countries, including the participation of a handful of non-state actors, one research question for discussion should concern the extent to which these explorations benefit humanity and expand the province of mankind. In this sense, the discussion is a continuation of the challenges in providing a general framework for improved responsibility for sustained legal and environmental protection beyond national jurisdictions. Governing common spaces requires that international cooperation be strengthened (Crawford, 2019: 331–335). The ethics and politics of space should go hand in hand with the common vision of inclusive global developments. The most recent experience concerning the access to, production and distribution of vaccines against COVID-19 shows that such a common international vision is missing, while the international legal rules of patent protection have been prioritised over international public health needs.

More specifically, the research question for discussion should be oriented to the challenge of how to link space exploration with benefits for all of humankind.

A partial analogy arises from the arrangements for deep-sea mining within the regulatory framework developed by UNCLOS and the International Seabed Authority. It may offer an example of a more balanced approach where the interests and capabilities of leading countries and multinational companies are balanced against the interests of the entire international community on the premise of preserving the province of all humankind. Perhaps this is not an ideal example, but it is at least an attempt to protect global public goods without hindering the legitimate interests of advanced countries and their multinational companies.

On the other hand, “asymmetries of information can adversely affect different market actors, if shared unequally, in which case some users of satellite data can exploit fish reserves or negotiate unfair mining contracts” (UNCTAD, 2021: 12).

In this context, the space environment’s long-term sustainability is simply a further dimension of unresolved issues in providing a more inclusive, sustainable, participatory and experimental international legal framework that will serve the needs of all humankind and beyond the global tragedy of the commons.

Like in other areas of international environmental law, the conceptual and normative arguments should go beyond the usual calls for international solidarity, responsibility, accountability and transparency. International scholarship should strive to espouse an institutional reimagining of inclusive and sustainable development that embraces the legitimate needs, concerns and interests of developed and developing countries, existing and aspiring global superpowers, elites, technocrats and of ordinary men and women from around the world.

This article proceeds in the following way: in the next section, the technological possibilities of space exploration and commercialisation are briefly discussed. A section follows on the existing legal framework, highlighting the need to clarify, strengthen and improve the framework to secure inclusive and sustainable development. The next section considers the need to advance international cooperation in space exploration in a way that fully embraces the Sustainable Development Goals. Concluding remarks are then presented with respect to where and in which ways the activities of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPOUS) should develop.

The normative premise for the discussion assumes that the ethics and politics of space for the Anthropocene can acquire the form of meaningful multilateral cooperation that will benefit all without undercutting the legitimate interests of the main actors and stakeholders in space exploration (Valtonen et al., 2020). As shown by Elain Ostrom, there is always more than one way possible to develop a framework to govern the commons and overcome the collective action problem (Ostrom, 2009). A commitment by every participant to the cooperative strategy can be equally a plausible outcome as the alternative fragmentation/privatisation of the common space. Similar to climate change, only the cooperation of all participants can lead to meaningful and structural improvements for all stakeholders.

A new era of space exploration and commercialisation

It is clear that a new era of the exploration and potential commercialisation of space is emerging fast (Weinzierl and Sarang, 2021). New actors from both public and private spheres have been launching various attempts and experiments in different orbital layers. Private sector initiatives have benefitted and developed on the basis of public investments, developments, support and in some cases also direct cooperation.

In so doing, it is vital that a new race to the bottom does not occur whereby private actors become ever more skillful at privatising the public benefits and socialising the private risks. We saw this development pattern in many other domains of international law, like in the area of environmental

protection with weak enforceability against the leading polluters; in the area of the international taxation of multinational companies; in the area of sharing protected intellectual property; and in the area of global public health.

Space exploration, the advancement of basic science, telecommunications, the gathering and dissemination of relevant information about the earth's patterns of weather, environment and other crucial information all belong to the important progress of human activities in outer space. The extent to which complementarity exists between public and private interests in space exploration seems unclear. There are two main ways of exploring space. By far the most dominant way is space-for-earth exploration, still, the recent rapidly emerging way is space-to-space exploration. Both approaches to exploration are becoming increasingly commercialised. Space-for-earth exploration includes telecommunications, Internet infrastructure, earth observation, and national security. Revenues deriving from this type of space exploration are estimated at USD 366 billion according to a study mentioned in the Harvard Business Review (Weinzierl and Sarang, 2021). For the time being, space-for-earth revenues account for 95% of the space exploration sector. On the other hand, space-for-space exploration includes "goods and services produced in space for use in space, such as mining the Moon or asteroids for material with which to construct in-space habitats or supply refueling depots" (id.) It is the sector that has attracted considerable attention over the last decade, envisaging the developing of an economy in space and for space. NASA's approach has thereby shifted from "using cost-plus contracts to fixed-price contracts" to stimulating more risk and burden sharing with the private sector in the hope of future rewards from expanding the commercialisation of space (id.) A shift to a more risk-taking private sector in expectation of high future rewards is also characterised as the emergence of "New Space" development featuring the private sector's stronger involvement. It is reasonable to expect that many other countries around the world may follow suit.

More important achievements of "New Space" development over the last decade include several successes. The manufacturing of a wrench with the help of a 3D-printer on board the International Space Station is one – "in space, for space". High-quality fibre-optic cable manufactured in zero gravity for potential terrestrial customers is another (id.)

Axiom Space announced the "first full private commercial mission to space" in 2022 on board SpaceX with the aim to start "building and operating space infrastructure such as habitats, laboratories, and factories". Other corporations like Maxar Technologies plan to develop robotic construction and a variety of construction and repair tools as part of the future stages of the space economy (id.)

Not all experts and astute observers of "New Space" development believe

that such a “New Space” era should be endorsed and that the benefits flow for all humanity. Mariana Mazuccato, for example, is critical of this development. From the perspective of international law and otherwise, she is convinced that privileged extremely wealthy individuals are riding on the back of public investments without proper accountability. Her criticism builds on extensive research of the Apollo mission, namely “one of the riskiest public sector projects in the last 100 years and it involved a great deal of experimentation” (Mazuccato, 2021: 64). Many important institutional, structural and organisational differences on the national and international levels from the period of the Apollo mission through to the period of successful international cooperation in the International Space Station context need to be considered seriously before the “New Space” era takes off.

One of Mazzucato’s important insights is that the existing rules and enforceability of corporate social responsibility are too limited to guarantee proper levels of accountability, let alone benefit all of the stakeholders in the enterprise. Even the current corporate governance reforms, such as the adoption of environmental, social and governance guidelines (ESG), cannot secure structural changes without a broader redefinition of the interaction between governments, markets and businesses (Mazuccato, 2021: 24).

There are other broader issues that deal with the challenges, opportunities and limitations of space commercialisation. The nature and character of corporate short-termism is only one important structural impediment. More important is understanding the role of the proactive public sector in stimulating and supporting market and business activities. The proactive role of the public sector should aim at delivering benefits and opportunities to all citizens and businesses and enhancing public goods by strengthening the economy and society’s overall capabilities. In the current setting, sometimes labelled as “winner-takes-all”, such a dissemination of new technologies, discoveries, benefits and opportunities is precluded by the many structural impediments in place. Unlike the Apollo-mission era, when not only the “technological, social, organizational and political innovations” were part of the entire enterprise, today we live in an era of strong hierarchical segmentation of markets and business. The gap between the advanced sectors of the economy with access to new technologies, finance, skills and capabilities, as well as all other necessary resources, and the rest of the stagnating economy and society is growing. The period of secular stagnation, with the public sector’s weak role in securing broadly based and inclusive development, might simply be expanded the “New Space” with the after-effect of only further deepening the divisions between advanced and backward spheres of the economy and society at large. Economic and social dualism of this nature characterises many developing countries and is increasingly characteristic of many developed countries.

Public and international support, including adequately regulated international space law, could decisively shape the future development of space exploration. Strategic cooperation between public and private sectors on the national and international levels could deepen opportunities for all stakeholders and disseminate benefits to them all. As emphasised by Mazzucato and other insightful scholars, markets, corporations and businesses, and the market economy itself are not the natural outcome of spontaneous economic development; they are the outcome of a deliberate regulatory design (Mazuccato, 2021: 55–56).

Therefore, national and international markets can be shaped and reshaped in substantially different ways. More markets for more people and their businesses would be a step toward more inclusive and sustainable socio-economic developments than we are witnessing at present. The “New Space” era should become an era of an inclusive knowledge economy for both developed and developing countries. It should spur the transformation of the work of modern economies and societies toward more innovative, sustainable and inclusive ways than we are currently witnessing in the developed and developing countries.

The challenges, opportunities and constraints of an inclusive knowledge economy assume the structural changes and institutional innovations that mirror the pioneering age of space exploration. They should be put in the context of other challenges humanity is facing: climate change, global public health protection, global inequalities, depletion of resources, and biodiversity. “New Space” exploration, if properly organised and supported, can greatly help address other common challenges faced by humanity. International law, international legal scholarship and international institutions can contribute considerably to strengthening and improving the existing international normative framework to ensure that “New Space” exploration genuinely benefits all of humanity.

International legal framework: the current state of development and opportunities for future sustainable development

Article I of The Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967 is clear and straightforward:

The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.

Other key provisions of the OST are similarly clear. The moon and other celestial bodies cannot belong to a state but are for the benefit of the international community. There are provisions on international cooperation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. Others express international responsibility for national activities in outer space, whether such activities are carried out by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities. Article 2 of the OST stipulates that “outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means”.

The OST was developed during a period when states were playing the chief role in space exploration (Isnardi, 2019; Mallick and Pillai, 2019; Doshi, 2016). Hence, the focus was directed at states’ role in space exploration. The virtue of the OST was a generally acceptable international legal framework for space exploration, allowing sufficient room for national legislation to build upon the commonly agreed international framework. Some OST provisions were abstract and held general meaning, allowing different countries to interpret particular provisions differently. However, so long as technological progress and the entry of private corporations did not occur too rapidly, these open-texture provisions were not a potential cause of international disagreement like we may witness in the near future. International legal expertise in space law has also developed along with technological progress, the increased interest in space exploration and the main international powers’ renewed strategies concerning space exploration.

The OST is one of five treaties that lay international legal foundations for space exploration. The others are the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1968); the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972); the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space; and the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1979).

Especially the last treaty, the “Moon Agreement”, helps clarify some of the OST provisions. For example, paragraph 3 of Article 11 stipulates that

Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become property of any State, international intergovernmental or non-governmental entity, national organization or non-governmental entity or of any natural person.

Other important provisions have further clarified and expanded the OST since 1967. However, the difficulty from an international law perspective is that only a few countries have ratified the “Moon Agreement”. According to the international database, just 18 countries have ratified the treaty. Despite

clarifying some important ambiguity from the OST and adding to the international legal infrastructure to facilitate space exploration, the Moon Agreement indicates current limitations in regulating this important area of international activities.

It is thus not surprising that, in absence of a global agreement on how to move forward in regulating, supervising and enforcing international space law, certain leading space-faring powers have opted to proceed unilaterally based on their own national legislation. The United States, for example, in 2015 adopted the US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act that grants “space resource” and “asteroid resource” rights to US citizens: “A US citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an asteroid resource, or a space resource shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained”. American lawmakers are convinced that such a national legislative step will provide certainty for commercial space pioneers and strengthen the USA’s leading role in the space commercial sector (Mallick and Pillai, 2019).

Luxembourg followed suit and adopted similar legislation, which grants mining companies the “right to keep the plunder”, while going one step further. Specifically, the Luxembourg legislation does not require a company’s major shareholder to be based in the country (id.). Many other countries around the world, real space powers, prospective space powers, and countries with commercial interests without having developed real space programmes may adopt legislation that will suit their own (commercial) interests more than comply with the international norms of preserving and maintaining space as a province of all humankind.

It is not a purpose of this section to more deeply discuss the national legislation adopted in the absence of an international consensus on the future development of international space law. Some international legal scholars like Michael Listener are convinced that it is impossible to grant rights to someone to harvest resources without having ownership of those resources (Davies, 2016). Other space lawyers, such as Frans von der Dunk, argue that the loopholes in the international treaty rules enable countries to authorise companies to claim exclusive ownership over resources extracted (Mallick and Pillai, 2019).

The normative analysis in this section stems from the conviction that developing collective solutions to collective challenges and opportunities is preferable to the unilateral approaches taken by the space powers. This approach is not only advisable from the conceptual perspective, but could ultimately benefit the leading space powers themselves.

Space lawyer Joanne Gabrynowicz disagrees with the US lawmakers and contends that the US legislative approach is not a step in the right direction. She was the only space lawyer to testify during the congressional hearings.

The legislative act does not solve certain basic issues, such as the legality of mining under international law (Kelvey, 2014). Even if Congress provides a certain interpretation of the OST, other space powers may hold their own substantially different interpretation of the same treaty. Such an approach may bring geopolitical consequences and may encourage similar steps in other domains, like in the Arctic pole. Disagreements over space could trigger international disputes on earth. This is one reason she advocates an internationally agreed approach to any further space exploration.

Based on the premises of the OST, other experts disagree with the notion of needing to discuss and adopt a new layer of international agreements primarily due to the complexity, divergent opinions, and interests, as well as the potentially long time that might be needed to reach a new international consensus (id.) On the other hand, space exploration is so extensive and expensive that even billionaires cannot provide all of the money needed to facilitate future development, despite many promises and hopes of anticipated revenue. Better still, a transparent, well-regulated international approach in place would bring certainty and clarity for all participants and stakeholders, and a new opportunity for international cooperation and fair competition, notwithstanding the growing geopolitical tensions. An international approach of this nature might ultimately work better for the space powers, for the new actors, and for all of humanity.

In this section, we presented some of the OST's virtues across the several decades of its history and experience. A major weakness of the OST from today's perspective, however, is the lack of mechanisms to enforce its key provisions. Perhaps at the outset such a regulatory approach allowed for the OST to be generally accepted, but with rapid technological progress and the emergence of new actors new solutions are required from the international law standpoint.

The international body dealing with space exploration for the benefit of humanity was established by the General Assembly of the UN in 1959. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) is a committee for advancing international cooperation, research, and legal and technical issues regarding outer space, with a view to encouraging national, regional and global space exploration efforts. In 2018, for example, UNCOPUOS became dedicated to the legal issues arising with the exploration of space resources (COPUOS, 2018). The deliberation is also continuing within the Hague Space Resources Working Group.

Many new legal proposals have been developed by these bodies, as well as by groups of space legal experts, to solve the existing legal issues in a collective way that will reach a new international consensus, strengthen the international legal framework and expand its enforceability to the new actors. One such proposal is to establish an international regime analogous

to the International Seabed Authority, which is responsible for organising, carrying out and controlling all activities on the seabed. Fiscal benefits derived from seabed mining must be shared among all State parties, while State parties must obtain authorisation before beginning resource exploitation (Mallick and Pillai, 2019; Škrk, 2016: 89). Another proposal deals with adopting an Additional Protocol to the OST to make UNCOPUOS not only a forum for discussion and exchange, but a body with its own enforcement and legal powers to adjudicate procedures for different categories of violations of space laws (Ishola et al., 2021). Potential solutions to force private actors to comply with space laws have also been contemplated (Isnardi, 2019).

This section does not intend to discuss in more detail a variety of legal proposals to strengthen the existing international legal infrastructure. The aim is to show that many valuable and elaborated proposals have been offered to build upon the OST and other existing international treaties to support and develop space exploration for the benefit of all stakeholders and all of humanity. Such an approach may show that international law can be enabling and not only a negative instrument. It can even decrease certain geopolitical tensions without harming the legitimate interests of various stakeholders. Partial solutions, such as the Artemis Accords or establishment of the Dubai's Courts of Space, might in the absence of a coherent international approach only further fragment space exploration without ensuring clear benefits for all mankind.

In so doing, the proposal of this article is to contemplate the possibility of effectively incorporating certain Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) into the new layers of international space law. Such an effort would not merely strengthen international solidarity but increase opportunities for all. The SDGs are ultimately not an instrument of solidarity, but for facilitating more inclusive, sustainable and diverse global development that may benefit not only the developing but also the developed parts of the world. The reinforced international legal infrastructure for space exploration should become part of broader international legal, economic, social and political efforts to develop an international legal infrastructure conducive to more inclusive, equitable and sustainable global development than we have experienced in the last few decades.

Space exploration and the SDGs

Space exploration, including “New Space” commercialisation, should remain faithful to the original idea expounded in Article 1 of the OST, namely, to serve “the benefit and in the interests of all countries”. To put the stated commitment into operation, the strengthening of the international

space treaties should include specific commitments to implementing the SDGs by all stakeholders participating in space explorations in all stages of current and future progress.

A variety of possibilities exist to apply space science, technology and data for the realisation of the SDGs. A recent study by UNCTAD on space technologies and sustainable development deserves to be analysed at length to show the unexploited opportunities for disseminating the benefits for humanity in the context of the SDG commitments. Space technologies provide valuable information and data to facilitate high-quality policy decisions about the SDGs. Even some of the least developed countries in the world have launched their own satellites, such as Bangladesh and Bhutan (UNCTAD, 2021: 1).

Several of the most important areas of the application of space science and technology for the developing countries and implementation of the SDGs relate to food and agriculture, health applications, access to telecommunications, disaster risk reduction and humanitarian crises, natural resources and management, and poverty reduction. All of these areas are crucial for achieving or failing to achieve the SDGs. For example, in agriculture, accurate information about the soil, snow cover, drought and crop development can help improve agricultural innovation and precise agriculture as already practised by the most advanced countries in the world (UNCTAD, 2021: 2). In the health area, information and data provided by remote-sensing technologies can predict and monitor disease patterns, understand environmental triggers for the spread of diseases, predict risk areas, and define regions that require disease-control planning.

According to UNCTAD, public health services are a “prime example of a sector in which the use of satellite communication and remote sensing is vital” (UNCTAD, 2021: 4). In the introductory section, the outbreak and spread of cholera in Yemen is mentioned as an example. The campaigns against outbreaks of the disease can be made more efficient with the help of space technologies and international collaboration. During the COVID pandemic, there has been no need to emphasise the global importance of such use of science, technologies and international cooperation. On top of the value and importance of space science and technologies for public health in the developing countries, the use of space science to advance medical research that would be difficult to conduct in the terrestrial environment can add to medical treatment in diseases that very often affect people in the developed world, such as Parkinson’s disease and cancer (UNCTAD, 2021: 4).

Access to telecommunications by developing countries that have extensive rural areas and poorly developed network technologies is another important opportunity for the developing countries to reduce the

digital divide. The telecommunication satellite launched by Bangladesh is an attempt to improve access to network technologies, including the Internet in the near future, telemedicine, and distance learning facilities (UNCTAD, 2021: 4–5).

Space technologies, often integrated with other technologies for gathering information in sensitive local, regional and national sites, can help reduce disaster risks and humanitarian crises, while significantly expanding the ability to collect, analyse and disseminate relevant data. For example, volcano hazards, drought hazards, flooding, and other natural, technological and biological disasters can be monitored and analysed to provide critical information to public safety authorities (UNCTAD, 2021: 5–6).

Another important area of applying space technologies and space science concerns natural resources and environment management as a highly relevant and noteworthy area for monitoring and achieving the SDGs. Information relevant to agricultural production, fisheries, freshwater and forestry belong to some of the most important SDGs. The recent establishment of an early warning system to detect illegal deforestation in Brazil in cooperation with the local Brazilian authorities is as an example of opportunities for space technologies to help make development of the Amazon rainforest more sustainable (UNCTAD, 2021: 7).

Another interesting and potentially useful example is the use of space technologies to support education, especially the e-education initiatives. Even the mapping of sites of poverty and analysing and monitoring the spread of poverty can help public authorities prepare more adequate and more efficient measures that may help achieve the SDGs (UNCTAD, 2021: 8).

We have seen some concrete examples of how space technologies and space exploration can meaningfully benefit humanity, and which SDGs stand to win the most if proper collaboration among science, technologies, policymakers and citizens is effectively established. Some of the described space exploration activities are perhaps not initially commercially interesting, and some forms of application might never become commercially interesting, yet they can bring vast improvements to large parts of the world and populations.

Still, apart from disseminating the benefits of space technologies and space exploration, some important bottlenecks must be considered. The most important limitation is obviously the cost of participating in space exploration. It was a substantial burden on Bangladesh to launch its own telecommunication satellite. Also important, but perhaps less obvious, is the risk of space debris. Developing countries have again contributed very little to the already full array of debris that could hamper future progress in space exploration, but it could limit even more their own resource-demanding

attempts to join in space exploration. Lack of awareness and lack of education in space science and space technologies could impose another important structural impediment in developing countries' efforts to join in space exploration and to use its potential to secure more inclusive and sustainable development, including realisation of the SDGs and beyond (UNCTAD, 2021: 10–12; David, 2021).

Mariana Mazuccato is correct to point out that certain current global challenges, such as climate change, the transition toward a global and equitable new green deal, and implementation of the SDGs, require the globally coordinated and sustained efforts of all stakeholders across the world (Mazuccato, 2021: 109). They call for a comprehensive structural reimagining of the economy and society in terms of reshaping the markets, coordination between public and private sectors in participatory, experimental and innovative ways to enhance public and private capabilities, organisational improvements to secure the fair and equitable sharing of the risks and rewards among all stakeholders, and many other structural improvements. Structural improvements should be made on the local, regional, national and international levels. International law, including the regulation of outer space activities, is not a neutral tool, but creates distributive effects among several stakeholders. The biggest concern with all space law improvements should be to not exacerbate the inequalities between countries that already exist in the area of space exploration.

It is hoped that the working groups within UNCOPUS and in other settings, such as the Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group (HSRGWG), comprising stakeholders from governments, business, academia and civil society, will be able to bring the OST closer to well-regulated, sustainable, inclusive and balanced space research exploration in the future. Early analysis of improvements to the existing regulatory framework, called the Building Blocks, reveal certain signs of encouragement, as analysed by the Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group (2019). The proposed guidelines seek to establish a balanced approach to the commercial incentives. They specifically recognise that “without proper governance, commercial incentives may lead to a number of problems, such as inequality among actors, overexploitation of resources, and environmental degradation” (Xu et Su, 2020: 2). Still, the risk remains that the guidelines are not sufficiently precise, leaving countries with an opportunity to lower the standards and begin a “race to the bottom” (id.: 2).

Risks are similar with other guidelines proposed, such as the guidelines dealing with property rights, resource rights, common benefit and interests, environmental protection, sustainable development and the sharing of monetary and non-monetary benefits (id.: 4). All of these regulated areas might establish a cooperative international framework or further exacerbate the

international divisions, depending on the exact details of individual guidelines, the mechanisms for implementation, and the overall commitment of all stakeholders to pursue space exploration as part of the province of all humankind.

From the perspective of developing countries and the accomplishment of the SDGs, an important milestone would be establishing an international fund to “support space resource capacity building for developing countries”, as suggested by Xu and Su (*id.*, 6). The importance of such funding would not only lie in providing necessary financial resources to the developing countries, but also in disseminating knowledge, technologies and know-how to the developing countries within the UNCOPUS framework. These vital elements are missing in other international legal frameworks, such as the framework of international trade and intellectual protection. Perhaps the reform of the OST gives an opportunity to bring the international legal rules and international legal regimes closer to a more sustainable and equitable framework that may serve the real needs of humanity without jeopardising the legitimate interests of the leading space-faring countries in the world.

Conclusion

In this article, we have seen the achievements of the current international legal framework in the area of space exploration and future opportunities for development, and discussed several possibilities and how to further develop and strengthen the international legal framework to ensure the cooperative, transparent, inclusive and equitable development of space exploration while preserving the interests and opportunities of the space-faring countries.

The key finding and proposition of this article is that, while discussing the need to improve and strengthen the international regulatory framework, the needs and interests of developing countries should be incorporated. This step would not be only consistent with Agenda 2030 and the efforts to implement the SDGs, but would ultimately also serve the interests of the developed countries. More equitable, inclusive and sustainable development is as much in the interest of the developed countries as it is of the developing countries. It will expand technological, economic and development opportunities not merely in the developing countries, but also in the developed parts of the world.

Proper reform of the international norms and institutions and the mechanisms for implementation could substantially help in achieving such equitable and sustainable development. The present article argues that by meaningfully and effectively incorporating the SDGs into the reform of the

OST, the reform could become a model for the reform of international legal regimes, most notably in the areas of trade and preserving global public goods.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Crawford, James (2019): *Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law*, 9th edition.
- Doshi Priyank, D. (2016): *Regulating the Final Frontier: Asteroid Mining and the Need for a New Regulatory Regime*, 6 *Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law*. Accessible at <https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1055&context=ndjicl>, 1. 2. 2022.
- David, Leonard (2021): *Space Junk Removal Is Not Going Smoothly*. *Scientific American*, 14 April 2021. Accessible at <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/space-junk-removal-is-not-going-smoothly>, 1. 2. 2022.
- Ishola Feyisola, Ruth, Oluwabusola Fadipe, Olaoluwa Colin Taiwo (2021): *Legal Enforceability of International Space Laws: An Appraisal of 1967 Outer Space Treaty*. Accessible at <https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/space.2020.0038>, 1 February 2022.
- Isnardi, Christina (2019): *Problems with Enforcing International Space Law on Private Actors*, 58 *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*. Accessible at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3397463, 1 February 2022.
- Kelvey, Jon (2014): *Asteroid Mining Could Become a Reality in Our Lifetimes. Is It Even Legal?* *Slate*, October 13, 1 February 2022.
- Mallick, Senjti and Rajagopalan Pillai (2019): *If Space is 'the Province of Mankind', Who Owns its Resources? The Potential of Space Mining and its Legal Implications*, ORF Occasional Paper. Accessible at <https://www.orfonline.org/research/if-space-is-the-province-of-mankind-who-owns-its-resources-47561/>, 1 February 2022.
- Mazzucato, Mariana (2021): *Mission Economy: A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism* Harper Business.
- Ostrom, Elinor, *Governing the Commons* (2009): *The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*, Cambridge University Press.
- Škrk, Mirjam (2016): *OZN in pravo morja, Teorija in praksa* 53 (1): 86–102. Založba FDV, Ljubljana.
- Tronchetti, Fabio (2017): *Legal Aspects of Space Resource Utilization*. In Frans Von der Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti (eds.), *Handbook of Space Law*, Edward Elgar Publication.
- Valtonen, Ann, Outi Rantala and Paolo D. Farah (2020): *Ethics and Politics of Space for the Anthropocene*, Edward Elgar Publication.
- Weinzierl, Matt and Mehak Sarang (2021): *The Commercial Space Age Is Here*. *Harvard Business Review*, 12 February 2021.
- Xu, Fengna and Jinyuan Su (2020): *New Elements in the Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group's Building Blocks*, 20 *Space Policy*. Accessible at <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026596462030028X>, 1 February 2022.

SOURCES

- Broad, W. (2021): How Space Became the Next 'Great Power' Contest Between the U.S. and China, *New York Times* (25. 1. 2021), 1 February 2022.
- Davies, Rob (2016): Asteroid mining could be space's new frontier: the problem is doing it legally. *Guardian* (2 June 2022), 1 February 2022.
- Hook, Leslie (2021): UN climate talks hit a wall over tensions about finance. *Financial Times* (18. 6. 2021), 1 February 2022.
- Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS, Draft report – Information on the activities of international intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to space law (2018). Accessible at https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2018/aac_105c_2l/aac_105c_2l_304add_3_0_html/AC105_C2_L304Add_03E.pdf, 1 February 2022.
- Mance, Henry (2021): Branson, Bezos and the pointless billionaire space race. *Financial Times*, 16. 7. 2021. Accessible at <https://www.ft.com/content/b495e39d-97f6-4cc4-9566-a39f16a57ea0>, 1 February 2022.
- Official Gazette, Republic of Slovenia, international treaties, no.1/2019 (Uradni list Republike Slovenije, mednarodne pogodbe, št. 1/2019).
- The Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group, Building Block for the Development of an International Framework on Space Resource Activities (2019). Accessible at <https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/rechtsgeleerdheid/instituut-voor-publiekrecht/lucht-en-ruimterecht/space-resources/bb-thissrwg-cover.pdf>, 1. February 2022.
- Space Supporting Sustainable Development Goals – How Space Can Be Used in Support of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Accessible at <https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/space4sdgs/index.html>, 1 February 2022.
- Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, United Nations, *Treaties series* 610 (8843). Accessible at https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2017/stspace/stspace61rev_2_0_html/V1605998-ENGLISH.pdf, 1 February 2022.
- UNCTAD (2021): Exploring Space Technologies for Sustainable Development. Accessible at https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/dtlstict2021d1_en.pdf, 1 February 2022.

*Emre ÇAKIRDİKEN**

POPULISM AND THE CONSUMER SOCIETY: THE EFFECTS OF CONSUMERISM ON POLITICAL CULTURE

Abstract. *This study considers how today's growing consumer culture affects political trends in representative democracies. In recent years, a significant populist upsurge has been seen around the world. While political approaches are vital, to properly understand populism it is also necessary to take sociological perspectives into account. The questions considered in the study are therefore examined from both political and sociological perspectives. The results of the study show that today's increasing consumer culture is paving the way for the rise of populism in representative democracies. Should the consumer culture experience a significant crisis, populism is likely to become stronger through the support provided by abstaining, blank and pragmatist voters.*

Keywords: *Populism, democracy, consumer society, consumerism, politics*

60

Introduction

Around the world today, the democratic revolution is gathering new strength... From Stettin on the Baltic to Varna on the Black Sea, the regimes planted by totalitarianism have had more than thirty years to establish their legitimacy. But none –not one regime– has yet been able to risk free elections. Regimes planted by bayonets do not take root. We must be staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few, but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings. (Reagan in Simms, 2014: 458)

In the above statement by former US president Ronald Reagan made in June 1982, he argued that the whole world would embrace liberal democracy as the most ideal form of government because there would be no other alternative challenging it in the long run. In the wake of the Cold War, liberal democracy declared victory. Still, some authors remained sceptical of

* Emre Çakirdiken, PhD Student at Bielefeld University, emre.cakirdiken@uni-bielefeld.de.

DOI: 10.51936/tip.59.1.60-76

this alleged triumph of liberalism (Fukuyama, 1992; Huntington, 1993). One of these was Francis Fukuyama (1992) who argued that liberal democracy would stagnate and not regenerate itself due to it lacking any opponents, although it would continue to remain the most viable option for a long time. Further, the end of history had not arrived à la Hegel or Marx.

This argument has proved to be correct as liberal democracies are going through difficult times. Populism as an alternative option has become a reality in the last decade. Brexit and the victory of Donald Trump in the USA have caused grave concerns among liberal circles. In addition, populist parties in Europe relying on anti-cosmopolitan rhetoric have seen their votes more than triple in the last 20 years (Barr et al., 2018). One should bear in mind that the majority of representative democracies are currently witnessing populist temptations. Many populist political parties and politicians have thus already firmly established themselves in national parliaments. In various countries, they have even managed to become the most powerful political force. This points to the importance of observations that we are seeing “growing social and economic inequality within democratic societies even though citizens do have equal political rights” (Flügel-Martinsen and Martinsen, 2019: 66). This rising inequality means that more and more people have little interest in mainstream politics and are looking for alternatives.

In the literature scholarship, the nexus between the rise of populism and the consumer society is under-emphasised. Many authors primarily focus on questions within contemporary political theory (Mudde, 2004; Mouffe, 2005; Moffit, 2016). Although political reasons are essential for clarifying the populist zeitgeist of today, it is also necessary to consider sociological developments. In recent years, however, some authors have written about the connection between populism and socioeconomic factors. For example, David Goodhart (2017) divides contemporary societies into *anywheres* and *somewheres*, i.e., some people (students, professors, business people etc.) favour cosmopolitan policies, while others (people who cannot see the benefit of globalisation) tend to support populism. Inglehart and Norris (2019) also concentrated on economic factors to clarify the populist temptations observed these days. Accordingly, white workers in particular (who cannot truly benefit from globalisation) in the USA contributed considerably to the victory of Donald Trump. While these works are crucial and helpful, in this article a different and broader approach is taken. On one hand, populism is an intrinsic part of representative democracies while, on the other, the rise of populism (mostly nationalist populism) seen today should be viewed as the outcome of the growing consumer culture found among industrial democracies. It is also noted that one can speak of a consumer society only in industrial states.

In the last decade, industrial societies have undergone major changes. One could even say that industrial societies have transformed into consumer societies. A consumer society basically means a society in which consumption takes precedence over other notions becoming the key activity for most citizens (Baudrillard, 1968/1996). As such, people spend their earnings for their own pleasure and happiness in the hope of providing them with socio-economic identity in society. Many people do not just focus on their necessities, but also purchase objects or participate in activities with a view to them giving status and prestige. One could argue the transformation of industrial societies into consumer ones marks the beginning of a new era in politics, noting that the rise of (nationalist) populism is observed in countries where the consumer culture prevails. This means, it is useful to connect two phenomena (populism and consumer society) to ensure a better understanding of the rise of populism.

In this article, the rise of populism in democratic consumer societies is explained. As mentioned, for this it is useful to combine political and sociological factors. It is necessary to particularly emphasise the under-emphasised link between the rise of populism and the growing consumer culture. First, the meaning of populism is explained to facilitate the analysis below as it remains uncertain what is meant by the concept of populism. It is then considered within a theoretical framework how the growing consumerism affects the electorate and is paving the way for a populist upsurge in representative democracies.

What is Populism?

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way- in short the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only. (Dickens, 1859/1988: 7)

The above passage was written to describe the atmosphere of the era when the French Revolution was shaking the very structures of multinational dynasties, empires and city-states. However, the description also fits perfectly within a delineation of contemporary populism. Certainly, one of the universally accepted hallmarks of populism is anti-elitism. Populism also divides society into good and virtuous people versus adverse elites

who betray the rights of good citizens. Accordingly, politics always occurs between these two antagonistic groups.

Populist logic is also seen in romantic novels (e.g., *Les Misérables* by Victor Hugo) in which the good are always benevolent, caring and helpful, while the bad are malicious characters acting only in their own interest even at the expense of other people's happiness. For romantics, the heart takes precedence over the mind, and thus emotions replace rationality. Populism adheres to the values of romantics through its rejection of realist approaches.

In the literature, one finds various definitions and interpretations of populism. Defining populism is a formidable task owing to the ambiguity and vagueness of the term (Brentin and Pavasović Trošt, 2016). In fact, populism resists "generalisations" as it may take on religious, nationalist or secular characteristics (Urbinati, 2018: 17). Moreover, it is inconceivable to speak of a single type of populism since it can fall under different headings (Revelli, 2019). In this case, one may speak of three types of populism: populism such as the socio-political movements in the nineteenth century, populism as an ideological substitute in the twentieth century peculiar to Latin American politics, and contemporary populism as a political strategy taking on global significance.

First, the populism that emerged in the nineteenth century involved protest movements against the political establishment. When a significant number of people had felt their voices were not heard, i.e., their government and dissident politicians did not take account of their demands, they started to protest. One could mainly observe this in the USA. For instance, the radical right Know Nothing movement was opposed to immigration to the United States from other countries. It was a people's movement claiming that the people's interests were being betrayed by their government and opposition parties. Despite their rapid and temporary success, the movement lost significance when the American Civil War commenced.

In addition, the left-leaning populist American People's Party emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. It started as a protest movement in response to economic troubles as they complained about the power held by major corporations and banks. Once their demands were adopted by the Democratic Party, the People's Party vanished from the political scene as well. In this case, populism in the nineteenth century entailed ephemeral protest movements only giving voice to ignored socio-political demands. Seen in this light, they were democratic protests made by groups on both the right and left. Nevertheless, these movements cannot be completely associated with contemporary populism as the socio-political and economic structures of the time were different to those today.

After the devastating world wars, populism reappeared in Latin America albeit in a different form. Juan Peron and Getulio Vargas were considered

to be populist leaders in their countries. For Peron, populism is the most exceptional ideology that justified the legitimacy of political ascendancy over other opponents. Peron stated that “We are not sectarian. If there is something in communism that we can take, we take it, names do not scare us. If fascism, anarchism or communism have something good, we take it” (Finchelstein, 2017: 151). Populism thus re-emerged as a new ideology that functioned as a reaction to all the other ideologies, ranging from liberalism to communism. One could say that populism then operated like remedy against all the maladies of the world caused by the other ideologies.

Yet, for other representative democracies populism did not become such a mighty force, leaving populism to be regarded as a concept peculiar to Latin America. However, the situation has changed. In the last 10 years, populism has become a pressing issue in many representative democracies. The success of populism in countries with a longer tradition with democracy has sent shockwaves around the world. It signalled that populism was no longer local phenomenon. Basically, the populism of today has different characteristics than its predecessors and has assumed global significance.

Hence, it is important to detect features of contemporary populism to identify populist actors. Since various scholars refer to similar characteristics of populism, it is useful to summarise its most crucial properties. Drawing and building on previous studies, (Germani, 1978; Moffit, 2016; Finchelstein, 2017) the main features of populism may be summarised as follows:

1. Appeal to the people as a single unit
2. A Manichean outlook that divides people into good virtuous people versus corrupt elites (anti-elitism)
3. A sense of acute crisis
4. An apocalyptic vision of politics based on antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite
5. Dislike for the neoliberal cosmopolitan order across the globe

It is necessary to elaborate on these five aspects. Populism appeals directly to the people who are perceived as virtuous and good. Politicians try to convince themselves that they are one of the good people, and there is no reason for bifurcations within the same political ideological camp. Populist strategy aims to unify people who share the same ideological concerns. Conservative populism endeavours to unite conservative people, while nationalist populism desires to gather all nationalists together. Thus, there would be no need for several conservative or nationalist parties. Moreover, the crucial point is that they would like to include those who avoid participating in political life.

One can divide potential voter groups into four: ideological, pragmatist, protest (blank), and abstaining voters. People who abstain from voting

are mostly underemphasised in political theory (Lagasnerie, 2021), but for populist politics they account for the most important group that should be included in politics. The aim of populism is to include as many citizens as possible. This is one of the most effective strategies because it is easier to convince those who have not yet made up their mind. People adhering to a specific political party/ideology do not tend to change their minds. Following the Cold War, voter turnouts and political participation beyond elections have decreased in many states (Leggewie, 2017: 69). In some countries voter turnouts have even fallen below 50%. For instance, voter turnout in the French parliamentary election in 2017 was lower than 50% (Worley, 2017) while the Romanian parliamentary election in 2020 was around 30% (Barberá, 2020). This shows that there is a huge number of people whose votes can still be tapped. One should note the fact that abstaining and pragmatist voters play a key role in the outcome of national elections.

The question is: Why do citizens abstain from voting? It is not because citizens' great dissatisfaction with politics leads them to not pay particular attention to politics – that would be a misinterpretation of the situation. On the contrary, it is because abstaining voters are not satisfied with the current socio-political order and do not trust the established political parties. Marginalised citizens are looking for political alternatives. Populist politicians see this gap and wish to include those who do not vote, even though they are entitled to do so. To this end, they introduce the nativist demands of marginalised groups in the realm of politics. In this case, while populism is inclusive, it also excludes others like immigrants, foreigners and radical dissidents.

Apart from abstaining voters, pragmatist voters need to be taken into account to understand the rise of populism. Pragmatist voters are those who vote non-ideologically, which means they cast their ballots for candidates and parties that seem to be more beneficial for their own interests. These interests are related to pecuniary factors in the first place. Pragmatist voters may support a socialist party in one election and then vote for a nationalist party in the next national elections. They basically have no ideological attachments. Politics is a matter of convincing the electorate, and populist politicians have the upper hand to persuade pragmatist voters with their populist promises. Although it is difficult to measure their share as a percentage within the electorate, they play a decisive role in the outcomes of national elections. One could also argue that serious crises lead to an increase in the number of pragmatist voters.

Populism mainly occurs as a result of serious crisis. Namely, populism would not rise provided there is widespread content with the socio-political order within the state. The ignoring of socio-political demands by government and opposition alike transform the people as a political subject

holding political significance when the people find individuals advocating their needs in the realm of politics. Their solution to crises is in effect anti-corruption politics. Populist parties must therefore follow anti-corruption politics in the first place. Corruption has two meanings in this setting. First, it means corruption in the emphatic sense of the word, i.e., many corruption scandals have occurred over the last few decades in many representative democracies. Not only have advances in information technology proven effective for exposing incidents of corruption to the general public but rising education levels have made many citizens in democracies responsive to such irregularities. Given that all citizens are taxpayers, they do not like it when their hard-earned money is usurped by politicians for their own gain. Second, taxes can be invested in projects and activities that seem unnecessary to the general public. Accordingly, one may argue that the mismanagement of taxes can cause considerable resentment among the general populace. It is here that politicians appear as a fresh force to criticise the establishment due to serious corruption on the political level and to take sides with the general public.

Moreover, populism thrives on an apocalyptic vision of politics. In populist logic, politics takes place between the virtuous people and elites harbouring adverse and cynical intentions. The success of populism arises from the unification of people who come from similar ideological camps and convincing those who have not yet become attached to any ideological group. Further, pragmatist voters are more easily convinced in times of crisis. It is important to mention the crisis factor which implies that all populist parties become appealing during a socio-political and economic crisis. Social demands are the smallest unit for the emergence of populism (Laclau, 2005). Modern societies consist of different people who have different demands and expectations from their states. As long as these demands are met, there is no basis for populism.

However, when the government does not respond to the demands of a particular group of people, the accumulation of these unresolved demands turns into a more serious situation that leads to the bringing together of various demands under a single banner, which is referred to as an empty signifier (Laclau, 2005). Populism manages to produce the people as a single political subject by bypassing the ideological differences among the people as it subtly convinces people that the ideology of the political party and the people are the same. Here one must note that although one cannot change the *Weltanschauung* of people, what they attempt to achieve is to unite people adhering to right ideologies (left ideologies for left populism) and convince others who cannot yet decide who to elect.

Nonetheless, the success of populism is not limited to its capability to produce the people as the political subject. It is also important to understand

which sociological factors have impact on the rise of populism. Indeed, while populism is a political concept its rise is due to current sociological developments like the growing demands for consumption, which is the most important factor in this context. Thus, in what follows, how consumerism affects political trends in representative democracies is explained.

The Arrival of the Consumer Society

What is the consumer society?

Populism is a more political concept, yet its success today rests on sociological grounds. The concept of the consumer society can be particularly helpful for clarifying the rise of populism. It is important to ask what is meant by the consumer society or consumerism? It is natural that people need to consume, as has been always the case. Still, that would amount to reductionism here because the theoretical conceptualisation of the consumer society dates back to the twentieth century. Jean Baudrillard was a leading author who wrote on the subject. He argued that we had arrived at a point in history where consumption holds priority over production (Baudrillard, 1968/1996). The question thus arises as to why many people attach greater importance to consumption today? The growing consumer culture is mainly due to four factors: (1) consumerism as an indicator of success and happiness; (2) the internal dynamics of capitalism; (3) psychological and generational differences; and; (4) advance in technology. These factors are discussed below.

As concerns the first factor, it is quite obvious that people feel content and satisfied if they can afford to purchase objects since purchasing power is considered to be a personal achievement. In this case, it is an achievement that makes individuals happy. "Personal achievement is indeed an obligation haunting the modern consumer in the context of the forced mobility" (Baudrillard, 1968: 152). "Objects carry functional imperative, because objects decide our status in terms of social advancements" (Baudrillard, 1968/1996: 158). It is irrefutable that a range of factors define our identities in societies in today's world. Consumer goods hold a symbolic power that define our status in society, how we dress, whether we have a car, and how we spend our holidays (Deutschmann, 2012: 517).

It is natural that many people wish to be successful in this world, yet being successful requires more wealth and effort in contemporary industrial societies. There are countless products and services that can be purchased. Many people would like to purchase a house/flat in a classy neighbourhood, buy cars, stylish clothes and smartphones, go on a vacation several times a year. It is also necessary to replace products occasionally

with newer models. Investing in oneself (education, courses, travel etc.) is also desirable. All of the above is definitely a lifestyle that could not be followed in previous centuries. Some people attempt to stay away from the consumer culture, albeit with little success, because the consumer culture forces individuals to buy and keep up with the latest trends. Objects are bought that are actually not needed just to keep one's social status intact or even boost it.

There is no doubt that having more objects and greater luxury does not necessarily make a person wealthy. A wealthy individual is one who can purchase the objects they desire. Today people desire many more things than they can actually acquire. In pre-modern societies, consumption did not hold a crucial role in their lives as they could be satisfied with what they possessed (De Botton, 2005). Of course, industrial society led to a major transformation in the socio-economic sense. Although production started to take place on an interminable scale, there was still a limited number of products that could be purchased. There were no smart phones, cars or exotic holidays. The space for luxury was reserved for wealthier citizens. The situation has now changed, which does not imply that all people necessarily want a luxury lifestyle. Instead, individuals tend to spend as they can. Consumption is not an activity of the upper classes anymore, and it is currently possible to speak of the democratisation of the consumer culture (Dal, 2017).

For most medieval societies, life was important so long as people could fulfil their religious obligations. Industrial society redefined social life by putting a strong emphasis on production and the accumulation of wealth. Working and frugality were the most valuable characteristics of a human life. Yet, frugality is becoming less and less important in this consumer age. The most important difference between the industrial and consumer societies lies in the fact that the former sought prosperity through production, frugality and altruism, while the latter rejects frugal and altruistic attitudes.

Those who could produce and accumulate wealth were certainly regarded as the most successful people in industrial society. Further, an altruistic worldview must be underscored here in order to comprehend their lifestyle. Not only production on a larger scale stemming from the technological advances, but also a frugal and altruistic lifestyle brought prosperity to industrial states. Nonetheless, frugality and altruism do not have a crucial place in consumer societies today. The modern consumer society focuses on consumption in the first place. Basically, many people consume to feel successful and become happy. Happiness is defined ever more through success, and success comes from the power of consumption based on general perceptions.

Regarding the second factor, individuals need to buy in order to ensure the economy keeps growing. There is a huge number of people who sell

their products or services to earn a livelihood, and one feels compelled to buy their products or services. In other words, we do not have the complete luxury to stay away from the consumer culture as that would negatively affect many people in our surroundings. If people were to start saving money and spending their money only for their basic needs, a grave economic crisis would be sure to follow because the capitalist mode of economy functions in accordance with constant growth. This then makes it very important to sell products also to those who do not need them. The most successful companies are those that succeed in selling their products/services to those who do not actually need them. Advertisements, discounts and special offers in particular whet people's appetite for consumption.

In relation to the third factor, people compete with each other on the personal level just like states do on the international stage. Certainly, this was not the case before. Previously, "objects were acquired in the full sense for they were the material expression of work done" (Baudrillard, 1968/1996: 158). In our age, "consumption precedes the production as we purchase the objects and services provided that we keep paying for them over and over again" and we must "replace them" in order to catch up with the rest of the people (Baudrillard, 1968/1996: 158). One can easily find myriads of objects and services that can be purchased in the market. Most people, particularly younger generations, are not interested in saving money like their grandparents did, but intend to spend as much as they can. Older generations tended to save money or invest in real estate as they were subconsciously afraid of any calamity scenario such as another world war. Psychological effects set the scene for the arrival of consumer culture. Given that calamity scenarios like another world war or the threat of famine have lost significance for many societies, especially younger generations are inclined to spending their earnings to enjoy life and create a social status for themselves.

Since this fear dropped in significance, more people have been inclined to spend their earnings with a view to creating a social identity and status for themselves. The aim is to produce a social space in which one may feel happy, successful and associate with people of a similar status. It is not so important to consume excessively, but to keep up with the latest trends (Sinemoğlu, 2017; Bauman, 1998). New cars, smartphones, laptops, and clothes all function as boosters of social mobility. One can reasonably argue that the *raison d'être* of the modern age has become consumption in the first place.

With regard to the fourth factor, the Industrial Revolution did not lead to the consumer society directly, but the advances in informational technology produced credit cards and other facilities for payment methods, thereby paving the way for the consumer culture to grow. Credit cards and other payment facilities are effective for regulating and administering the

capitalist world since capitalism might have come to an end without such payment method possibilities. Advances in technology and science also made the consumer society possible.

Populism and the consumer society

In the literature, the nexus between the consumer society and populism has not been studied carefully. So long as people consume and keep their social space intact, there would be no rise of populism at least for economic reasons. One could argue that people are afraid of any possible downward mobility (Inglehart and Norris, 2019). This makes it possible to speak of status anxiety posing a threat to democracy (Delhey and Steckermeier, 2019: 108; Miller, 1999). When social equality is threatened, one may observe an upsurge in populist discourse. If the number of people affected by a crisis increases, populism tends to become more powerful. Particularly the global financial crisis in 2008 led to huge economic troubles for many states and people. Rising prices, stagnant wages, unemployment and rampant corruption (genuine or perceived) are catalysts for populism.

The 2008 global economic crisis put neoliberal economic policies in jeopardy because a considerable number of citizens started to question the reliability of technocratic politicians and experts (Runciman, 2014). Major street protests (e.g., Occupy Wall Street) revealed such discontent. Trust in professional politicians has since started to lose ground especially in countries where consumption practices are interrupted due to crisis. Therefore, populist logic accuses politicians of corruption that basically implies mismanagement of taxes. Populists believe that their taxes are spent for neoliberal and cosmopolitan policies that bring no benefit to the general population in their country. This means these policies serve the interests of elites, immigrants and foreigners. The primary populist demand is that the state should focus on its own citizens and spend the taxes collected solely for their interests. This would entail a rise in wages, greater financial assistance in education and health services and the like. Especially nationalist politicians promise to implement these populist policies and garner support from politically marginalised citizens. Since the demands of citizens are increasing and wages are remaining stagnant, a political crisis is emerging. Further, in times of crisis the ego comes into existence. As a result, international cooperation and solidarity face a serious challenge, as more and more people start to concentrate solely on their own issues.

Once consumption is interrupted, people would start to put the blame on politicians, which would also lead to the rise of populism. Consumption practices can be interrupted for various reasons such as a huge economic crisis or stronger demand for consumption. What were once luxuries have

become necessities for many contemporary citizens. The average citizen needs to produce and earn more to keep up with the people surrounding them. Otherwise, a dissatisfactory situation would emerge for people unable to keep up with their circles. This is because this situation is interpreted as some sort of failure, which leads to resentment. As such, citizens (faced with the threat of downward mobility) resort to politics and pay special attention to populist politicians who seem to be changing the situation to their advantage.

In addition, a significant number of people migrate to more developed countries in the hope of becoming successful and wealthier (excluding those who fleeing wars and extreme poverty). Whereas a number of average citizens are not content with their situation, since they believe that their state is not paying attention to their problems and their taxes are being spent for the benefit of elites, immigrants and foreigners. This means, they tend to resort to nationalist populism because populist promises seem to them the only plausible remedy for the position they find themselves in.

The question remains: Why does politics need to express itself in a populist manner? Green politics addresses similar problems, and yet its solutions to major problems require long periods of time. However, national elections take place in a relatively shorter time period that compels populist politicians to focus on short-term policies. They do this because most people wish to hear about what will occur in a few years rather than a decade or more. As mentioned, a sense of acute crisis is a feature of populism, and populist politicians have the upper hand in societies dealing with a serious crisis given that populism offers simple solutions to socio-economic problems that combine cosmopolitan policies and major socio-political issues such as injustice, poverty, unemployment, insecurity and alienation (Kaya, 2020). Populism namely considers non-native people and ideas as a threat to the state and their well-being (Aknur, 2020). Here, a threat chiefly refers to an economic threat. What people demand from politics is not their direct participation but the protection of their freedom (Comtesse, Flügel-Martinsen, Martinsen and Nonhoff, 2019). This freedom also entails economic protection. In other words, protection of the welfare state is becoming the top priority for populist actors. They differ from other non-populist citizens in that they are afraid of the outcomes of cosmopolitan policies, i.e., a huge number of immigrants and providing economic help to other countries could lead to the end of their welfare state. They also demand greater welfare assistance for themselves. Populist politicians thus question the relevance of cosmopolitanism and globalisation within contemporary politics, thereby rejecting the neoliberal cosmopolitan order.

Accordingly, they are against mass immigration to their country particularly if the immigrants do not bring economic benefits to the state. For

populist politicians, immigration causes a loss of employment, increasing rents and decreasing welfare benefits for native citizens since the state must pay for the basic needs of immigrants and integration courses. Many populist parties undermine international/supranational organisations, aiming to reduce international aid and cooperation especially in the area of the economy. They hold the view that they should not concentrate on the maladies and problems of the world if they do not concern them. Populist reasoning asserts that the priority of the state should be to economically protect the native citizens vis-à-vis alterity. We can see such logic in the Brexit campaign claiming that the United Kingdom should stop paying the European Union, with the state instead being able to fund the National Health Service to ensure the citizens have better healthcare (Stone, 2018). This is fundamentally important because this indicates that a significant number of people do not wish to share their wealth with others, and focus solely on the pursuit of their happiness through consumption.

We can observe the rise of populism in societies where the majority of citizens takes part in consumer practices. There would namely be no rise of populism in societies in which consumerism does not play a key role. Certainly, advanced industrialism and capitalism are one of the factors that are leading to the consumer society. It is critical to note that we are merely witnessing the rise of right-wing populism (especially nationalist populism) rather than its left variant. Yet, the question arises as to why left populism cannot influence politics, given that consumerism is the main driver of the rise of populism.

There are two main answers to the above question: first, left populism accuses banks and major companies (the wealthiest 1%) as being the source of maladies within society, whereas right-wing populism is against international/supranational organisations and immigrants that have no or little say in national politics. Namely, their promises are easier to implement. Banks and major companies are the ones that generate wealth in society in the first place. This then makes it more difficult to challenge them.

Second, over the last few decades left and liberal policies have made great inroads in international politics. Economies have been liberalised and societies have largely been secularised leading to resentment and anger among right-wing supporters. Even centre-right parties have become liberal in many ways, which means their conservatism is considered insufficient especially in the eyes of populists. Therefore, the rise of populism is associated with right-wing political actors as a reaction to the recent liberal and centre-left success. Particularly nationalist populism (Brexit, Trump, Le Pen, Zemmour etc.) is on the ascent in several democracies. Conservative populism is mostly the result of cultural factors, whereas nationalist populism is mainly becoming assertive due to the consumer society.

The aim of populism is to unite the citizens in the name of the people. An important point here is to draw support from those who vote pragmatically and abstain from voting. Securing votes from these groups is a game-changer. It is highly likely that they may opt for populist parties if they suffer from the economic consequences where economic consequences refer to any interruption in consumer practices. Populism provides hope by offering basic solutions through effective discourse. In doing so, they may convince such people that the party and its ideology are the best option for them. The growing consumer culture naturally causes greater expenses. As such, a significant number of citizens are unable to realise their life goals and also connect their personal troubles with politics since democracy allows them this possibility. In other words, they demand/accept nativist approaches and solutions from politicians.

Conclusion

In this article, we have tried to explain the original meaning of populism and how the growing consumerism has been doing the groundwork that supports the rise of right-wing populism in democracies. Populism should be understood as a political strategy because populism takes on significance when politicians bring populist resentments and demands into the political sphere. Populism is as an effective strategy for politicians in this regard when they give a voice to the ignored demands of a considerable number of citizens. Populism appeals directly to the people by thriving from the conflict between the people and the elites. The ruling elites are accused of betraying the rights of the people.

Especially in times of crisis, populism becomes stronger as people look for alternatives. While it is possible to consider populism from various perspectives, in this study, the rise of populism was linked to the theory of the consumer society. It is crucial to acknowledge the transformation from industrial societies to consumer ones. The consumer society refers to today's societies where consumption is becoming the most crucial activity that decides the status of individuals in society. The industrial societies were different as they emphasised the importance of producing and accumulating wealth. Although production is still important, our contemporary societies differ from the industrial ones in that they do not attach importance to frugality. For industrial societies, a frugal lifestyle was crucial since people were afraid of grave calamities like famines and wars. In the last few decades, this fear has lost its significance given that such disaster scenarios seem unrealistic for many people. Therefore, more people are deciding to spend their earnings rather than accumulating wealth. People feel it is necessary to buy objects to keep up with the latest trends, thereby protecting

their social status among their circles. It is also necessary to purchase constantly due to the dynamics of the capitalist economy. The increasing availability of consumer goods and payment method facilities have paved the way for the growth of the consumer society.

For various reasons, this consumption activity could be interrupted such as due to global/national economic crises or growing demands. It is here that politics comes into play. Populist politicians take advantage of the crisis and offer hope to the masses. They do so through by unifying the people. For populism, the point is to secure the votes of all who share the same ideological concerns with the party. Still, the established parties also seek to achieve this. Populist politicians differ from them, as they aim to include those people who abstain from voting, even though they are entitled to vote. They also wish to include pragmatist and blank voters. Since these people are estranged from mainstream politics, the established parties have difficulty convincing them. Populism (especially nationalist populism) introduces alternative politics, utopias, and basic nativist solutions to major socio-economic problems. In this way, it succeeds in receiving votes from these stigmatised masses in society.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aknur, Müge (2020): *Almanya'da Radikal Sağın Yükselişi: Almanya için Alternatif Partisi, Popülizm ve Demokrasi*. International Journal of Social Inquiry 13 (2): 415–446.
- Baudrillard, Jean (1968/1996): *The System of Objects* (J. Benedict Trans.). London/New York. Verso.
- Bauman, Zygmunt (1998): *Globalization: The Human Consequences*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Comtesse, Dagmar, Oliver Flügel-Martinsen, Franziska Martinsen and Martin Nonhoff (2019): *Demokratie*. In: Dagmar Comtesse, Franziska Martinsen, Martin Nonhoff and Oliver Flügel-Martinsen (eds.), *Radikale Demokratietheorie: Ein Handbuch*. 457–483. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
- Dal, Nil Esra (2017): *Tüketim Toplumu ve Tüketim Toplumu Yöneltilen Eleştiriler Üzerine Bir Tartışma*. Mehmet Akif Ersoy Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi 9 (19): 1–21
- De Botton, Alain (2005): *Statü Endişesi* (Bayer, A. S. trans.). Istanbul: Sel Yayıncılık.
- Delhey, Jan and Leonie C. Steckermeier (2019): *Statusängste in Deutschland: Wachsendes Problem oder zeitdiagnostisches Mythos*. In: Jan Delhey and Christiane Lübke eds. *Diagnose Angstgesellschaft? Was wir wirklich über die Gefühlslage der Menschen wissen*, 105–136. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag.
- Deutschmann, Christoph (2012): *Die Dynamik des Konsums und die moralische Integration moderner Gesellschaften: ein Konzeptualisierungsversuch*. Leviathan 40 (4): 517–535.
- Dickens, Charles (1859/1988): *A Tale of Two Cities*. New York: Oxford UP.

- Finchelstein, Federico (2017): *From Fascism to Populism in History*. Oakland: University of California Press.
- Flügel-Martinsen, Oliver and Franziska Martinsen (2019): *Rather Topics Than Disciplines: Pierre Rosanvallon's Interdisciplinary Political Thought*. In: Daniel Schulz, Franziska Martinsen, Oliver Flügel-Martinsen and Stephen Sawyer (eds.), *Pierre Rosanvallon's Political Thought. Interdisciplinary Approaches*. 61–74 Bielefeld: Bielefeld University Press.
- Fukuyama, Francis (1992): *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.
- Germani, Gino (1978): *Authoritarianism, Fascism and National Populism*. New Brunswick and New Jersey: Transaction Books.
- Goodhart, David (2017): *The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics*. London: C. Hurst & Co.
- Huntington, Samuel (1993): *The Clash of Civilizations?* *Foreign Affairs* 72 (3): 22–49.
- Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris: (2019): *Cultural Backlash and the Rise of Populism: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Kaya, Aydın (2020): *Avrupa'da Popülist Sağın Yükselişi: Çeşitlilik ve Birlik içinde Kaybolanlar*. *Eğitim Bilim Toplum Dergisi* 18 (69): 128–155.
- Laclau, Ernesto (2005): *On Populist Reason*. London: Verso.
- Lagasnerie, Geoffroy (2021): *Das politische Bewusstsein (Steuerer-Boulard, R. trans)*. Vienna: Passagen.
- Leggewie, Claus (2017): *Populisten verstehen!?* In: W. Brömmel, W., König, H., & Sicking, M. eds. *Populismus und Extremismus in Europa: Gesellschaftswissenschaftliche und sozialpsychologische Perspektiven* (63–78). Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag.
- Miller, David (1999): *Principles of Social Justice*. Cambridge/London: Harvard UP.
- Moffit, Benjamin (2016): *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation*. Stanford: Stanford UP.
- Mouffe, Chantal (2005): *The End of Politics and the Challenge of Right-Wing Populism*. In: Panizza, F. ed. *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy* (50–71). London & New York: Verso.
- Mudde, Cas (2004): *The Populist Zeitgeist*. *Government and Opposition* 39 (4): 541–563.
- Revelli, Marco (2019): *The New Populism: Democracy Stares into the Abyss* (Broder, D. trans.). London: Verso.
- Runciman, David (2014): *Politika* (A. C. Altunkanat, trans.). Istanbul. Domingo.
- Simms, Brendan (2014): *Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy, 1453 to the Present*. London: Penguin Books.
- Sinemoğlu, Olkan (2017): *Tüketim, Tüketim Toplumu ve Tüketim Kültürü: Karşılaştırmalı Bir Analiz*. *Insan ve insan* 4 (12): 66–86.
- Urbinati, Nadia (2009): *Me the People: How Populism Transforms Democracy*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP.

SOURCES

- Barberá, Marcel Gascon (2020): Romanian Left Wins General Election Amid Record Low Turnout. *Balkan Insight*. Accessible at <https://balkaninsight.com/2020/12/07/romanian-left-wins-general-election-amid-record-low-turnout/>, 2. 10. 2021.
- Barr, Caelainn, Seán Clarke, Josh Holder, Niko Kommenda and Paul Lewis (2018): Revealed: One in Four Europeans Vote Populist. *The Guardian*. Accessible at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/nov/20/revealed-one-in-four-europeans-vote-populist>, 2. 10. 2021.
- Brentin, Dario and Tamara Pavasović Trošt (2016): Populism from the Below in the Balkans. *Contemporary Southeastern Europe* 3 (2): 1–16. Accessible at http://www.contemporarysee.org/sites/default/files/papers/introduction_troost_brentin.pdf, 20. 9. 2021.
- Stone, Jon (2018): British Public Still Believe Vote Leave ‘£350 million a week to EU’ Myth from Brexit Referendum. *Independent*. Accessible at <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/vote-leave-brexit-lies-eu-pay-money-remain-poll-boris-johnson-a8603646.html> 11. 10. 2021.
- Worley, Will (2017): French Election Turnout Worst in Modern History as Emmanuel Macron Heads for Landslide Victory in Parliament. *Independent*. Accessible at <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/french-election-turnout-emmanuel-macron-parliament-france-victory-fn-marine-le-pen-national-front-a7785366.html> 30. 3. 2022.

*Hajdeja IGLIČ**

POSITIONING OF INDIVIDUAL AND THE MOBILISATION POTENTIAL OF POLITICAL DISCUSSION NETWORKS

Abstract. *In the article, we discuss how the political communication and interpersonal influence found in discussion networks add to fragmentation of the political space and the strengthening of political parties at the extremes of the political continuum. To this end, we analyse the mobilisation potential held by discussion networks of people who position themselves on the margins of the left-right political spectrum and compare them with the networks of those positioned in the centre and those who do not align themselves politically. The analysis focuses on four features of discussion networks: size, homogeneity, frequency of political discussion, and frequency of trying to persuade others. The results of the analysis show the most extensive mobilisation potential is found among people in the centre of the political continuum, while people on the far right and far left have networks that are the basis of intense political communication with people holding different political views but lack opportunities for the broad network dissemination of their political views and attitudes.*

Keywords: *discussion networks, political communication, left-right political orientation*

Introduction

In recent years, major changes have been underway in Europe as concerns the structure of the political space in the direction of fragmentation and polarisation (Judis, 2016; Carothers and O'Donohue, 2019). Left and right parties in the political centre have been losing electoral power even though the majority of voters still locate themselves in the centre. The legitimacy and stability of today's multi-party systems are challenged by the dissenting minorities represented by political parties found on the left and right margins of the political spectrum.

* Hajdeja Iglíč, PhD, Associate Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia.
DOI: 10.51936/tip.59.1.77-94

The literature relates the changes on the political map we have been witness to the social fabric's transformation in an age of "great reversal" (Rosanvallon, 2013) in which inequality in both income and wealth has almost returned to the very high levels seen one century ago. But the political views held by voters are both a reaction to changes in their objective circumstances and a result of political mobilisation engaged in by political actors, the media, and discussion networks. Studies show that discussion networks, namely the focus of this article, influence the individual's political knowledge, political attitudes, voting behaviour etc. (e.g., Eveland, 2004; Eveland et al., 2005; Holbert et al., 2002; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992; Klostad, 2007; Leighley, 1990; McClurg, 2003; Mutz, 2006; Nieuwbeerta and Flap, 2000; Nir, 2005). Although it is recognised that political discussion in one's family, circle of friends, co-workers and acquaintances has been gradually losing its role to the mass media as a source of political information, the informal exchange of political views remains an important mechanism for the interpretation and evaluation of political news. This exchange occurs in the context of everyday communication within personal networks in which political topics are intertwined with subjects from personal and professional life (Bennett et al., 2000).

In the article, we study the mobilisation potential of discussion networks of people found on the margins of the political spectrum to understand their role in strengthening the electoral power of extreme parties. We assume that an individual's positioning on the margins of the political spectrum affects the key characteristics of their discussion network: the size and homogeneity of the network, the frequency of political discussion, and the frequency of political persuasion. These network characteristics are also crucial for understanding mobilisation potential held by discussion networks working via the processes of political influence: the size and heterogeneity of networks reflect the *extensity* (or range) of political communication, and the frequency of communication and political persuasion its *intensity* (or strength).

Accordingly, we consider two specific questions in the analysis. First, are there any difference in the mobilisation potential of political networks of people at the extremes of the political spectrum compared to those located in the political centre or those that do not align themselves politically? Second, to what extent does the varying mobilisation potential of networks indeed depend on political positioning as opposed to other social and political characteristics of people, like political interest, age and education, political and social trust, exposure to the media etc.? An important assumption is made in our analysis that those who position themselves at the extremes of the political spectrum are still in a minority in the community which defines the dynamics of network formation.

The analysis considers data arising from an online survey carried out in Slovenia in 2017. Questions about political discussion were part of a longer questionnaire designed to collect detailed information about personal networks in general, complemented with information about political attitudes and behaviour.

Characteristics of political discussion networks and their mobilisation potential

The analysis of political discussion networks is one area within a wider research programme in political communication. Typically, political discussion networks involve informal and two-way conversations in which, however, no exact balance of influence is established between the discussants. Such political communication takes place in everyday situations and is found in the context of the family, friends, neighbours, and co-workers with whom the individual already has long-term and close relationships (Mutz and Mondak, 2006; Kotler-Berkowitz, 2005; Stoker and Jennings, 2005; Zuckerman et al., 2005). While political discussion is considered the most frequent and basic form of political action, it is also part of everyday life. This makes it unsurprising that political discussion on the individual level is influenced by both political and social factors. While our main variable with which we aim to explain the mobilisation potential of political discussion networks is the position in the political space, the control variables include various political factors and social factors.

Classical studies of political discussion include the works of Lazarsfeld and colleagues written just after the Second World War (1944 [1968], 1954) and best known for the two-step flow model of communication concept with which they explained voting behaviour, and Festinger's (1957) discussion of cognitive dissonance. Lazarsfeld's occupation with the social conditions of political behaviour later contributed to the development of the discipline of political sociology (Lipset, 1960), while the concept of cognitive dissonance gained ground well beyond its original domain of social psychology, for example, in organisation studies (Simon, 1965). In both types of studies, the research assumed that the processes of political influence occurring in social networks work through political discussion and the exchange of political views in which the individuals must confront and compare their political choices with the views held by other members in the network. Situations in which individuals find themselves when discussing politics with others can vary; the views of network members can be consonant or dissonant and, when dissonant, the individual's views might represent a majority or minority position in the network.

Political discussion lies in the core of the normative model of democracy

where the role of citizens' is to make key decisions in society, whether about concrete policies or about representatives who are to make decisions on their behalf. Mutz (2002) stresses that the beneficial consequences of political discussion for democratic political decision-making depend on meeting the conditions of the 'ideal communication situation', which typically involves the equality of partners, openness to interact with people holding different views, and in-depth two-way discussions. Any deviation from the ideal communication situation, due to the discussants being in unequal positions, the network being strongly homogeneous or the discussion being superficial, can negatively impact society, including decision-making based on demagoguery or a deepening of existing political disagreements.

The mobilisation potential of political discussion is greater the bigger and more heterogeneous the discussion network is, the more frequently the individuals discuss politics with each other, and the more they strive to change their discussion partners' views. The four characteristics of networks mentioned above describe the extensiveness as well as the intensity of political networks. Mobilisation thus depends on the reach of political discussion network, as captured by the network's size and heterogeneity, and on the strength of political discussion determined by the frequency of conversation and the persuasion. The studies by Mutz (2002a, 2002b) inform us that people might be high on some but not on all dimensions of the mobilisation potential and that various types of networks possess different kinds of mobilisation potential. She suggests that homogeneous and smaller networks hold high mobilisation potential in the sense of stronger interpersonal pressure, which leads to the cementing of pre-existing views, forming a high level of political cohesion and considerable readiness for political action, including voting. On the other hand, people whose personal networks have higher extensity, i.e., networks that are larger and more heterogeneous, are less politically active and less likely to take political positions or take them later in the process. However, their collective action has a greater range and connects different groups, mobilisation potential in this case stems from the cooperation of different groups.

The heterogeneity of discussion partners is one of the most important and frequently studied network characteristics. From the perspective of democratic theory, a political discussion can reach its goal mainly when it occurs between individuals holding different views. The theory of cognitive dissonance states that political deliberation in everyday life is threatened by the avoidance of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), meaning that while talking about politics individuals attempt to lower the degree of divergence in their political views. They can do this in many ways: by subjectively minimising or suppressing the perception of the extent of divergence, by trying to change the dissonant views of their partners, by avoiding political

discussion with people having opposing views, and by selectively choosing discussion partners with whom they share opinions. Studies confirm that the perceived and actual homogeneity of political viewpoints in networks is relatively high.

However, heterogeneity still plays a role in political discussion. Research by Huckfeldt and colleagues (2004) shows that at the end of an election campaign no more than two-thirds of discussion partners held a presidential candidate preference that coincided with the preference of the respondent whose network was being observed (called “ego” in the network literature). Despite the tensions cognitive dissonance causes and the strategies people employ to avoid it, heterogeneity exists in personal networks. This raises the question of which forces enable heterogeneity to be maintained despite the well-known pressures towards conformity. The key part of the answer lies in the structure of personal networks. When networks include many weak ties and have a structure of cross-cutting social ties (Simmel, 1955) with a lot of structural holes (Burt, 1995), individual strategies for avoiding cognitive dissonance are less likely to result in a completely homogeneous network. Sparse and cross-cutting network structures with structural holes and weak social ties reduce the pressure due to the lack of a central tendency. While the pressure stemming from cognitive dissonance is universal, the strength of the pressure and thus individuals’ ability to cope with that pressure depend on the structure of their personal networks (Huckfeldt et al., 2005). Classical studies of cognitive dissonance presumed a dense group structure with many overlapping contacts, which allowed the conclusion that pressure for conformity always leads to a high degree of political homogeneity.

Hypotheses

The following section present the empirical hypotheses about the relationship between the individual’s position on the left–right political spectrum and the characteristics of their political discussion networks, focusing on both their intensity and extensity. We shall examine the impact of political positioning on the four network characteristics mentioned above: size and homogeneity of the network, frequency of discussion, and frequency of persuasion. We should also mention what is not attempted in the article: our hypotheses do not deal with the content of political orientations, which are obviously different for the far-left and far-right political extremes. Since the preliminary analyses show the left–right distinction does not significantly affect the characteristics of political networks, we leave this aspect out of the analysis. Instead, we explain the mobilisation potential of networks of people occupying the extreme political positions regardless of

ideology. We assume that extreme position is a minority position implying that people are in communities in which they live and work encircled by others who mainly hold different (majority) political views.

The Size of the Network

The impact of an extreme position on the size of a network must be understood with respect to the structural obstacles created by a smaller number of discussion partners holding similar views in the individual's local environment. The assumption is that when choosing their discussion partners people consider the similarities in views (the cognitive dissonance thesis). Differences between respondents who are positioned in the centre and those at the poles might be reflected in people in the centre having larger discussion networks because they have a larger choice or fewer structural limitations. On the other hand, as one empirical study reveals (Ikeda and Richey, 2012), people on the poles can compensate for the lack of similar discussion partners in their local environments by choosing partners in a more immediate social context – in the narrow circle of their family and friends instead of neighbours and acquaintances, because strong ties tend to entail a high level of homogeneity. When adding to this the possibility of finding discussants online, the impact of structural limitations might actually prove to not be significant. Nevertheless, we formulate the hypothesis in the line with the classical argument:

Hypothesis 1a: People positioned at the extremes of the political spectrum have smaller political discussion networks than those positioned in the centre.

Regarding those who are not politically aligned, we posit a hypothesis based on personal characteristics and spurious effect. We assume these individuals have little political interest and knowledge, explaining why they also lack a clear political identification and are unable to position themselves. Moreover, the comparatively smaller size of their networks may be ascribed to the fact that they are generally less politically engaged. We propose:

Hypothesis 1b: People who do not align themselves politically have smaller networks than those who hold a position (either in the centre or at an extreme).

Homogeneity of networks

The argument about the political positioning and homogeneity of networks again stems from the assumption that extreme political positions represent a minority. Due to their minority status, people perceive the majority that surrounds them as a threat, and they feel called to defend their views

and even more strongly connect with those holding similar views. This means that they censor political communication more than people in the centre because they use their political networks as a defence against the majority view (Huckfeldt et al., 1998; Mutz and Martin, 2001). This results in the networks of people at the political extremes being more homogeneous than those of the people in the centre. On the other hand, it might be that due to the structural limitations they suppress their views and engage in conversation with the majority without exposing the difference. Empirical studies corroborate the former view that while political networks are generally homogeneous and tend to strengthen the individual's prior beliefs, the selection process stands out even more in minority positions. Thus:

Hypothesis 2a: The networks of people positioned at one end of the political spectrum or the other are more homogeneous than the networks of those positioned in the centre.

The selection process is present the least among those who do not hold a position, which is why their networks are expected to be the least homogeneous:

Hypothesis 2b: The least homogeneous are the networks of people who do not position themselves on the political spectrum.

Frequency of political discussion

Frequency of political discussion relates to the individual's political involvement and their positioning in the political space. According to Noelle-Neumann's (1984) thesis on the spiral of silence, the minority and in turn those at the extremes of the political spectrum may be expected to silence their voice and contribute to the spiral of silence to avoid conflicts. In this case, social conformity would lead to less political discussion related to a specific position in the political space:

Hypothesis 3a: Those positioned at one extreme or the other of the political spectrum discuss politics less often than those positioned in the centre.

Individuals who do not hold any position at all are expected to be the least active in political discussion given their lack of political interest and knowledge. Hence:

Hypothesis 3b: Those who do not align themselves politically participate the least frequently in political discussion.

Pressure to accept one's views

Those who are the farthest from the majority views and attitudes are the ones who hold the strongest views, from which they do not withdraw easily and are not necessarily that quickly willing to be silenced when confronting

the majority public opinion. When they engage in political communication, they might be more eager to persuade others with the aim of expanding support for their views among the majority population. This thesis is corroborated by an empirical study (Glynn and McLeod, 1984). We thus propose:

Hypothesis 4a: Those who are positioned at either extreme of the political spectrum defend their views more strongly than those positioned in the centre.

Like in the previous section on frequency of discussion, those who do not position themselves on the political spectrum are assumed to reveal the lowest intensity of political communication, which can be circumstantially explained by their smaller political interest and knowledge.

Hypothesis 4b: Those not positioning themselves on the political spectrum are the least active in defending their views.

The survey

Sample

84

The survey was conducted in 2017 on a quota sample through online surveying. Quotas for the sample were prepared based on gender, age, education, and region, drawing on data for 2016 from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia. The survey included Slovenian people aged 18 to 65. When first sending the invitations to samples of panellists from the online panel, the sample framework was also defined by considering quota limitations and the expected response rate. When concluding the survey, the sending of additional invitations was adjusted to the information about individual groups that were missing from the survey, with the aim of achieving the maximum correspondence of the sample with the population. The sample was also weighted. The sample consists of 1,001 respondents.

Explained variables

Questions about political discussion networks formed part of a wider battery of questions on personal or ego-centric networks. To identify the contacts with whom individuals discuss political topics, the following *name generator* was used: "Please think of the past 6 months and of persons with whom you have discussed politics during this time. (Including, for example, talking about elections, national and foreign politicians, and political events. Who did you talk to?)". Respondents could list up to eight people, who they tagged with a name or a nickname. They were then asked about the characteristics of the people they had named and the frequency of conversing

with them, which helped us form the indicators that in our statistical models played the role of explained variables, the size and heterogeneity of networks, frequency of political discussion, and frequency of trying to persuade others to change their views.

The *size* of a political discussion network is sum of all people that an individual listed while answering the name generator item.

The measure of the *homogeneity* of political discussion networks was a question asking about the extent to which the political views of each of the respondent's contacts or names that they had listed as partners in political discussions are similar to the respondent's, namely: "Do you and this person hold similar political views? (Your best estimate will suffice)". Similarity was estimated on a scale from 1 (Not at all similar) to 10 (Very similar). The average level of similarity between the respondent and the people they had mentioned was used for the purpose of the analysis on the respondent level.

We measured the *frequency* of political discussion by asking how often a respondent talks to each person they had named: "How often do you talk to this person?". Possible answers were chosen on a scale from 1 (Less than once a month), 2 (At least once a month), 3 (At least once a week) to 4 (Every day or almost every day). This variable was treated as an interval variable and its average value was used in the analysis.

The question about how often the individual puts pressure on others should they hold opposing views was formulated as follows: "When you have a very strong view about a certain political issue, do you try to persuade your friends, relatives, neighbours, or co-workers to adopt your view? How often do you do this?". Responses are scaled from 1 (Never or almost never) to 5 (Very often).

Explanatory variables

The main explanatory variable *positioning in the political space* was formed based on the following question: "In politics, we typically speak about the "left" and the "right". Where would you place your views on a scale from 1 (Very left) to 10 (Very right)?". Respondents who chose answers situated on the far left (values 1 or 2) and far right (values 9 or 10) were defined as holding extreme positions, while the rest were positioned in the centre. Respondents were also allowed to choose "I do not know" and "I do not wish to answer". Those who answered with "I do not know" are considered as not aligned politically because they do not have a clear political identification. Respondents who answered "I do not wish to answer" were ascribed the missing value.

Control variables

The analyses also include several control variables shown by previous research to affect the characteristics of political discussion networks. The first set of controls contains demographic variables: *gender*, *age*, and *education*. Age was re-coded to three age classes: 1 (18 to 30 years of age), 2 (31 to 55 years of age) and 3 (56 to 65 years of age). Education was re-coded to five education classes: 1 (incomplete or complete elementary school), 2 (secondary vocational or technical education), 3 (secondary general education), 4 (undergraduate education) and 5 (postgraduate education). Alongside the demographic variables, a measure of *social trust* was used, on a scale from 1 (Almost none) to 10 (Very much). Since social trust influences one's tendency to establish contacts with other people generally, it is assumed to also be important for understanding the respondents' contacts with others for the purpose of political discussion.

Political control variables include variables like *political interest*, *following political news in the media* and self-assessment of political knowledge and skills called *self-assessed political competencies*. The first was measured with the question: "In general, how much are you interested in politics? Please describe your political interest on a scale from 1 (I am not interested at all) to 10 (I am very interested)". With respect to the self-assessed competencies, respondents were asked: "Do you think you possess adequate competence and knowledge to participate in politics?", which they answered on a scale from 1 (No, not at all) to 10 (Yes, completely). Regarding actual political competencies, we were interested in how often they were following the political news in the mass media. Answers were on a scale from 1 (Never or almost never) to 5 (Every day). Since they were asked about how often they followed political news in different kinds of media (the press, radio and television, the Internet), data were reduced by conducting principal components analysis (PCA) which gave us a single dimension. Regression estimates of factor scores were used as values of the new variable.

Empirical analysis

The political discussion networks of our respondents are small, which corresponds to findings in other surveys (Byungkyu and Bearman, 2017). Having one or more political discussion partners was declared by as few as 36.5% of respondents. Of these, 61.4% mentioned one, 23.0% two, and all the others three or more of such partners. On average, each respondent mentioned just 0.5 of a discussion partner. The frequency of discussions, the similarity of views, and frequency of trying to persuade others were calculated only for respondents who had named at least one discussion

partner. On a scale from 1 to 4, the average value of the frequency of discussion of the average respondent whose political network size was estimated at one or more amounts to 1.76. This means that they often talk politics with their discussion partners: ranging between every day and at least once a week. The people with whom they discuss politics hold very similar views to their own, although the similarity is far from complete. On a scale from 1 to 10, the average similarity level is 7.71. The respondents are, on average, quite active in trying to persuade others to adopt their views. Those who mentioned at least one person with whom they discuss politics often try to persuade this particular person that they are right. The average value is 2.21, corresponding to the answer “frequently”.

Three analyses were carried out for each characteristic of the political discussion networks, with the results being presented in three columns in Tables 1–4. The first column shows the statistical relationship between the network characteristics and the positioning in the political space. The second column shows the results when socio-demographic variables are added to the model (gender, age, education, social trust), while the remaining column shows the results when political variables are included (political interest, media exposure, self-assessed political competencies). In all statistical analyses, being located at an extreme position (i.e., far-right or far-left) represents a base category.

The size of the network

The political discussion network is at its greatest size among respondents in the centre of the political space and (Table 1). The results of the bivariate analysis seem to support *Hypothesis 1a*. Adding social factors to the model shows that network size also depends on age, education, and social trust. The expected positive effect of age is confirmed, noting that the upper age limit of our survey is 65 years, which is why, unlike other surveys, a curvilinear effect of age is not obtained. Education also has a positive effect on the size of the network, together with social trust. Thus, older, better educated people and those with a higher level of social trust discuss politics with a larger number of social ties than others. Still, the influence of socio-demographic factors disappears when political factors are added to the model, which means social factors influence political discussion networks only indirectly by affecting political factors, namely, political interest and media exposure.

Also, the effect of political positioning weakens and becomes statistically non-significant when political variables are added to the model. Being well informed about politics and having a strong political interest explain the variation in the size of the networks. This means that the relationships

between one's positioning and the size of one's networks is spurious. Older and more educated people who are positioned in the centre have a stronger political interest and more frequently follow political news in the media, causing them to have larger political discussion networks. This leads us to reject *Hypothesis 1a*.

On the other side there are respondents who do not align themselves politically. As expected, and in line with *Hypothesis 1b* their networks are the smallest. This is again explained by political variables such as their lack of political interest and low exposure to political news in the media.

Table 1: REGRESSION OF THE SIZE OF POLITICAL DISCUSSION NETWORKS ON SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL VARIABLES

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	β	β	β
Extreme	base	base	base
Centre	0.072*	0.072*	0.053
Don't know	-0.097**	-0.069*	-0.025
Gender (male = base)		0.009	0.005
Age		0.069*	0.035
Education		0.063*	0.030
Social trust		0.062*	0.050
Political competencies			0.009
Media exposure			-0.113**
Political interest			0.197***
R ²	0.023	0.035	0.093
N	1000	997	997

Source: Own analysis.

Homogeneity of networks

Next, we look at the factors that impact network homogeneity in terms of similarities of political views between the respondents and their discussion partners (Table 2). The analysis of the homogeneity of networks was performed on a smaller number of respondents, namely, only those who have at least one partner in the network with whom they discuss politics.

The results of the analysis show that positioning in the political space has a strong impact on the similarity of political discussants. Individuals whose views are defined and located at the poles have more homogenous networks. The influence of political positioning does not disappear when we

add social and political variables to the model. This supports *Hypothesis 2a* stating that people holding extreme political views censor political communication more than those in the centre, enclose themselves in 'echo chambers' and use political networks as a defence against the majority view. The least homogeneous are the discussion networks of those who do not align themselves politically, as suggested by *Hypothesis 2b*.

The only other variable explaining homogeneity of networks is gender. The networks of women are more homogeneous than those of men. Further analysis would show whether this is linked to the choice of discussion partners. It could be that women tend to discuss politics in a narrower circle of close social ties than men, which tend to be more similar than distant social ties.

Table 2: REGRESSION OF THE HETEROGENEITY OF POLITICAL DISCUSSION NETWORKS ON SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL VARIABLES

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	ß	ß	ß
Extreme	base	base	base
Centre	-0.139*	-0.139*	-0.137*
Don't know	-0.197**	-0.188**	-0.147*
Gender (male = base)		0.112*	0.128*
Age		0.091*	0.072
Education		0.040	0.025
Social trust		-0.013	-0.014
Political competencies			-0.016
Media exposure			-0.079
Political interest			0.063
R ²	0.029	0.052	0.062
N	350	349	349

Source: Own analysis.

Frequency of political communication

The frequency of discussion is the first of the two measures of the intensity of political communication. Table 3 shows that communication is most frequent among respondents in the centre, followed by respondents at the extremes of political communication. This seems to support *Hypothesis 3a* stating that those holding extreme political views are, because of their minority position, silenced in the political discussion compared to those in the centre of the political space.

However, the differences between groups disappear once we include social and political variables in the model. The frequency of political discussion is a result of a stronger political interest, education, and age. Older people and those with a higher education have a stronger political interest and more often discuss politics with others. *Hypothesis 3a* thus must be rejected. There is no effect of an extreme position on the frequency of political discussion.

Non-positioned respondents have a statistically significant lower frequency of political discussion than the other two groups, which is due to lower education, trust, and political interest as predicted by *Hypothesis 3b*.

Table 3: REGRESSION OF THE FREQUENCY OF POLITICAL DISCUSSION ON SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL VARIABLES

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 5
	β	β	β
Extreme	base	base	base
Centre	-0.119*	-0.032	0.040
Don't know	-0.110*	-0.093	-0.070
Gender (male = base)		-0.012	0.028
Age		0.080	0.092*
Education		0.166**	0.147**
Social trust		0.093*	0.084
Political competencies			0.007
Media exposure			-0.010
Political interest			0.226**
R ²	0.012	0.048	0.078
N	364	363	363

Source: Own analysis.

Frequency of persuading others

The frequency with which one tries to persuade others is again a measure of the intensity of political discussion. Respondents at the poles are much more likely to try to persuade others, thereby confirming *Hypothesis 4a*. Central and especially non-positioned people put much less pressure on others to adopt their own political views, giving support for *Hypothesis 4b*.

Positioning in the political space also influences the effort to persuade others when control variables are included in the model. Socio-demographic variables have no influence on the persuasion effort; however, the frequency of trying to persuade others is linked to a stronger political interest

and a higher level of self-assessed political competence. People who very often try to persuade others believe they have high levels of political knowledge and skills, controlled for other factors.

Table 4: REGRESSION OF THE PERSUASION EFFORT ON SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL VARIABLES

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	β	β	β
Extreme	base	base	base
centre	-0.129*	-0.131*	-0.110*
Don't know	-0.200**	-0.181**	-0.100*
Gender (male = base)		0.008	0.043
Age		0.010	0.007
Education		0.035	0.008
Social trust		0.039	0.030
Political competencies			0.137*
Media exposure			-0.052
Political interest			0.201**
R ²	0.028	0.032	0.074
N	364	363	363

Source: Own analysis.

Conclusion

The results of the analysis show significant differences among the political discussion networks of the three groups under study with respect to their mobilisation potential. The networks of people who do not align themselves politically have small range (extensiveness) and intensity of political communication; their networks are small, political communication is less frequent, and they less often seek to persuade others to adopt their political views. However, their networks are the most heterogeneous of all, meaning that due to them only sporadically engaging in political discussion they are less selective in their choice of political discussants. The political discussion networks of this group of respondents reflect their general political disengagement. Additional analysis (not presented here) shows that, compared to the other two groups, they are less educated, have lower social trust, lower political interest, lower self-assessed competence, and less frequently follow political news in the media, which all decrease mobilization potential of their political discussion networks.

Very differently, networks of people in the centre of political space are large and they frequently discuss politics with the discussion partners who hold different political views. However, in this communication, they avoid putting pressure on their partners to change their views. We can characterise their networks as having high range and moderate strength. Such networks are characteristic of people who have higher levels of education and social trust as well as higher levels of political engagement in terms of political interest and following the media.

Finally, people who position themselves on the far-right or far-left have networks with moderate range and high intensity. Their networks are relatively small, although not as small as the networks of the first group (those who are not politically aligned), and very homogeneous. They less often discuss politics with others, albeit again more often than the first group. Most important, when they do discuss politics, they very often try to persuade their discussion partners. In terms of personal characteristics, they have a low level of education, rather weak political interest and are also less likely to follow political news in the media. However, they do have a very high level of self-assessed political competencies, which causes some incongruity with respect to the objectively measured political competence indicated by education and media exposure. Thus, people on the far right and far left have networks that are the basis of intense political communication with people holding different political views but lack opportunities for the broader network dissemination of their political views and attitudes. Their networks also make them ready for political action, also a high-profile one.

We may conclude that positioning in the political space matters for the structuring of one's political discussion network and the way one conducts political conversations and influences others, although the impact is not as strong as expected. While political orientation affects the heterogeneity of discussion partners and persuasion, it has no effect on the size of the networks and frequency of political discussion. Positioning at the extremes leads to more homogeneous networks due to the selection process, since people avoid discussing politics with those who hold different political views. Moreover, when those in the extreme political positions who generally less often engage in political discussion, begin a political conversation with someone they do not agree with, they defend their position and attempt to overcome the cognitive dissonance by persuading their discussion partners as to the correctness of their views. Both effects speak to the importance of the cognitive dissonance mechanism for the network dynamics among people at the extremes of political spectrum.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Beck, Paul Allen, Russell J. Dalton, Steven Greene and Robert Huckfeldt (2002): *The Social Calculus of Voting: Interpersonal, Media, and Organizational Influences on Presidential Choices*. *American Political Science Review* 96: 57–73.
- Bennett, Stephen E., Richard S. Flickinger and Staci L. Rhine (2000): *Political Talk Over Here, Over There, and Over Time*. *British Journal of Political Science* 30: 99–119.
- Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee (1954): *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Burt, Ronald S. (1995): *Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Carothers, Thomas and Andrew O'Donohue (2019): *Democracies Divided: The Global Challenge of Political Polarization*. Washington: The Brookings Institute.
- Eveland, William P. Jr. (2004): *The Effect of Political Discussion in Producing Informed Citizens: The Roles of Information, Motivation, and Elaboration*. *Political Communication* 21: 177–193.
- Eveland, William P. Jr., Andrew F. Hayes, Dhavan V. Shah and Nojin Kwak (2005): *Understanding the Relationship between Communication and Political Knowledge: A Model Comparison Approach Using Panel Data*. *Political Communication* 22: 423–446.
- Festinger, Leon (1957): *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Holbert, R. Lance, William Benoit, Glen Hansen and Wei-Chun Wen (2002): *The Role of Communication in the Formation of an Issue-based Citizenry*. *Communication Monographs* 69: 296–310.
- Huckfeldt, Robert and John Sprague (1987): *Networks in Contexts: The Social Flow of Political Information*. *American Political Science Review* 81: 1197–1216.
- Huckfeldt, Robert and John Sprague (1992): *Discussant Effects on Vote Choice: Intimacy, Structure and Interdependence*. *Journal of Politics* 53: 122–158.
- Huckfeldt, Robert and John Sprague (1995): *Information, Persuasion and Political Communication Networks*. In Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingeman (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, pp. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Huckfeldt, Robert, Paul E. Johnson and John Sprague (2004): *Political Disagreement: The Survival of Diverse Opinions within Communication Networks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Huckfeldt, Robert, Paul E. Johnson and John Sprague (2005): *Individuals, Dyads, and Networks: Autoregressive Patterns of Political Influence*. In Zuckerman, A.S. (ed.), *The Social Logic of Politics: Personal Networks as Contexts for Political Behavior*, 21–50. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Ikedo, Ken'ichi, Sean Richey (2012): *Social Networks and Japanese Democracy: The Beneficial Impact of Interpersonal Communication in East Asia*. New York: Routledge.

- Judis, John B. (2016): *The Populism Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics*. New York: Columbia Global Report.
- Klofstad, Casey A. (2007): Talk Leads to Recruitment: How Discussions About Politics and Current Events Increase Civic Participation. *Political Research Quarterly* 60: 180–191.
- Lazarsfeld, P. F., B. R. Berelson and H. Gaudet ([1944] 1968): *The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign* (3rd ed.). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin (1960): *The Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. London: Doubleday & Company.
- McClurg, Scott D. (2003): Social Networks and Political Participation: The Role of Social Interaction in Explaining Political Participation. *Political Research Quarterly* 56: 449–464.
- Mutz, Diana C. (2002a): The Consequences of Cross-Cutting Networks for Political Participation. *American Journal of Political Science* 46: 838–855.
- Mutz, Diana C. (2002b): Cross-cutting Social Networks: Testing Democratic Theory in Practice. *American Political Science Review* 96: 111–126.
- Mutz, Diana C. (2006): *Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative Versus Participatory Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mutz, Diana C. and Jeffery J. Mondak (2006): The Workplace as a Context of Cross-cutting Political Discourse. *The Journal of Politics* 68: 140–155.
- Neuwbeerta, Paul and Henk Flap (2000): Crosscutting Social Circles and Political Choice: Effects of Personal Network Composition on Voting Behavior in the Netherlands. *Social Networks* 22: 313–325.
- Nir, Lilach (2005): Ambivalent Social Networks and Their Consequences for Participation. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 17: 423–442.
- Simmel, George (1955): *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*. New York: Free Press.
- Simon, Herbert (1965): *The Shape of Automation for Men and Management*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Stoker, Laura and M. Kent Jennings (2005): Political Similarity and Influence between Husbands and Wives. In Zuckerman, A. S. (ed.), *The Social Logic of Politics: Personal Networks as Contexts for Political Behavior*, 51–74. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman and Nancy Burns (2005): Family Ties: Understanding the Intergenerational Transmission of Political Participation. In Zuckerman, Alan S. (ed.), *The Social Logic of Politics: Personal Networks as Contexts for Political Behavior*, 95–116. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Zuckerman, Alan S., Jennifer Fitzgerald and Josip Dasović (2005): Do Couples Support the Same Political Parties? Sometimes: Evidence from British and German Household Survey. In Zuckerman, Alan S. (ed.), *The Social Logic of Politics: Personal Networks as Contexts for Political Behavior*, 75–95. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Metka KUHAR, Gaja ZAGER KOCJAN*

POVEZANOST MED OBREMENJUJOČIMI IN POZITIVNIMI IZKUŠNJAMI V OTROŠTVU TER ŠOLSKIM USPEHOM PRI MLADIH V SLOVENIJI**1

Povzetek. V članku predstavlja razširjenost obremenjujočih in pozitivnih izkušenj v otroštvu (OIO in PIO) na panelnem (pod)vzorcu 18- do 30-letnikov/-ic v Sloveniji ter njihovo povezanost s samoocenjenim šolskim uspehom. Skoraj petina 18- do 30-letnikov iz prve slovenske OIO-raziskave je poročala o podpovprečnem šolskem uspehu do 18. leta starosti. Skladno s predhodnimi študijami so o takem uspehu pogosteje poročali tisti, ki so doživeli večje število OIO, pa tudi tisti z manjšim številom PIO. Rezultati kažejo, da PIO zmanjšujejo tveganje za slabši šolski uspeh tudi ob sočasni prisotnosti OIO ter blažijo učinek OIO na slabši šolski uspeh. Članek opozarja na nujnost ozaveščanja šolskih strokovnih delavcev o psihološki travmi, pa tudi o oblikovanju politik, programov in praks, ki bi travmo v šolskem kontekstu eksplicitno in sistematično naslovili.

Ključni pojmi: obremenjujoče izkušnje v otroštvu, travmatične izkušnje, pozitivne izkušnje v otroštvu, šolski uspeh, šole, utemeljene na razumevanju travme

Uvod

Enake izobraževalne možnosti v procesu pridobivanja kvalifikacij oz. dostopa do njih so eden od temeljev javnega šolanja. Omogočanje socialne mobilnosti ter zasedanje selektivnih družbenih položajev sta osnovna mehanizma pravičnosti (Sardoč, 2013). Dosežena raven izobrazbe napoveduje različne življenjske izide, npr. zdravje, brezposelnost, višino dohodkov, revščino, kriminaliteto (npr. Cutler & Lleras-Muney, 2006; Jereb, 2011),

* Dr. Metka Kuhar, redna profesorica, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija; dr. Gaja Zager Kocjan, docentka, Filozofska fakulteta, Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija.

** Izvirni znanstveni članek.

DOI: 10.51936/tip.59.1.95-114

¹ Raziskava je bila finančno podprta s strani Javne agencije za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije iz državnega proračuna (ciljni raziskovalni program št. V5-1712 in raziskovalna programa št. P5-0200 in P5-0110).

šola predstavlja tudi pomemben del življenja otrok in mladostnikov. Zato je pomembno poznati dejavnike tveganja in varovalne dejavnike šolske (ne) uspešnosti. Mnoge raziskave so se, tudi po zgledu obsežne pionirske severnoameriške študije »Equality of Educational Opportunity Report« (Coleman et al., 1966), osredinile na značilnosti posameznih šol (proračun, pravila, izkušnost učiteljev) in/ali socialno-ekonomske dejavnike, povezane z družino (npr. socialnoekonomski status, velikost in struktura družine) ter posameznega učenca (npr. spol in rasa oz. etnična pripadnost). Ameriške raziskave kažejo na zmerno povezavo med socialnoekonomskim statusom (SES) družine in različnimi pokazatelji šolske uspešnosti (npr. metaanalizi Sirin, 2005; White, 1982), analiza podatkov pri nas je prav tako pokazala, da je SES družine močno povezan z dosežki učencev na nacionalnem preverjanju znanja in z izbiro srednješolske ravni izobraževanja (Cankar et al., 2017; 2020). Starši z višjim SES lažje ustvarijo družinsko okolje, ki pripomore k večji šolski uspešnosti, tako prek bogatejšega učnega okolja, lastnega zgleda, razvijanja vrednot in norm, pomembnih za otrokovo uspešno šolsko funkcioniranje, pa tudi prek bolj kakovostnih starševskih praks, kot je demokratično starševanje (npr. Conger & Donnellan, 2007; Melby et al., 2008). Metaanaliza 37 študij (Castro et al., 2015) je pokazala na pomen starševske vključenosti v otrokove učne aktivnosti za šolski uspeh, tako v smislu splošnega nadzora, izobrazbenih pričakovanj, pa tudi podporne komunikacije.

Poleg SES in socialnih vidikov so pomembni tudi psihološki dejavniki šolske uspešnosti, kot so inteligentnost, osebnostne lastnosti, govorna kompetentnost (pri nas npr. Marjanovič Umek et al., 2007; Smrtnik Vitulić & Lesar, 2014). V zadnjih desetletjih je pomembna tema tujih raziskav povezava med travmatičnimi izkušnjami ali/in simptomi travme ter šolskim funkcioniranjem učencev in njihovimi šolskimi izidi.

Sodobne opredelitve (Gross, 2020; SAMHSA, 2014) izpostavljajo tri komponente travmatične izkušnje: dogodek, subjektivno doživljanje dogodka kot travmatičnega ter odzive, ki jih identificiramo kot učinke travme ali kot travmatske simptome. Travmatične izkušnje lahko razvrstimo na kontinuum od skritih do očitnih, od manj do zelo intenzivnih, od enkratnih dogodkov do ponavljajočih se in dolgotrajnih; lahko so naravnega izvora ali pa jih povzročajo ljudje. Gre za izkušnje, ki so za posameznika preveč intenzivne, da bi se z njimi lahko uspešno spoprijemal na ustaljene načine. Še posebej negativne in dolgoročne učinke na telesno in duševno zdravje ter različne vidike funkcioniranja imajo obremenjujoče izkušnje v otroštvu. Kako dogodek vpliva na posameznika in ali ga bo doživel kot travmatičnega, pa je odvisno od številnih individualnih dejavnikov (v nadaljevanju izpostavljamo rezilientnost), pa tudi od vrste in značilnosti dogodka ter družbeno-kulturnih dejavnikov (npr. pomen, ki se pripisuje posameznim izkušnjam, podporne strukture itd.).

Perfect et al. (2016) so v sistematičnem pregledu 83 raziskav od 1990 do 2015, izvedenih na vzorcih mladostnikov z izpostavljenostjo travmi (vključno z OIO) ali njenimi simptomi, ugotovili večje tveganje za slabše kognitivne funkcije, vključno z inteligenčnim količnikom, spominom, pozornostjo in jezikovno sposobnostjo, slabši učni uspeh, slabšo disciplino, nižjo stopnjo prisotnosti pri pouku, višji osip ter višjo pojavnost vedenjskih težav in simptomov internalizacije – v primerjavi z mladostniki, ki travmi niso bili izpostavljeni.

Obremenjujoče oz. potencialno travmatične izkušnje pa niso omejene le na manjši delež posameznikov. V različnih raziskavah običajno okoli dve tretjini udeležencev poroča, da so bili (do vključno 18. leta) izpostavljeni vsaj eni OIO, analize pa kažejo neposredne in tudi vseživljenjske posledice za zdravje, kakovost življenja in različne vidike funkcioniranja, zlasti pri tistih, ki so bili izpostavljeni štirimi ali več OIO (Felitti et al., 1998; Felitti & Anda, 2010; Hughes et al., 2017). Študije OIO se osredotočajo večinoma na izkušnje znotraj izvirnega gospodinjstva, kot so čustvena in fizična zloraba, čustveno in materialno zanemarjanje, t.i. disfunkcije v gospodinjstvu (nasilje med odraslimi člani gospodinjstva, zasvojenost ali duševne težave odraslega člana gospodinjstva, zapustitev otroka oz. ločitev/razvezo, odrasel član gospodinjstva v zaporu) ter spolno nasilje ali zloraba (ne glede na povzročitelja). Rezultati različnih raziskav o razširjenosti teh izkušenj in njihovih posledicah so podobni (npr. Felitti et al., 1998; Hughes et al., 2017; Nagy et al., 2019).

V Sloveniji smo prvo študijo OIO izvedli leta 2019 na velikem panelnem vzorcu odraslih prebivalcev, starih od 18 do 75 let. 76,5% udeležencev raziskave je poročalo, da so v otroštvu doživeli vsaj eno OIO, 27,3% pa je doživelo štiri ali več OIO, kar velja za kritično število z vidika negativnih posledic (glej npr. Hughes et al., 2017); med 18- do 30-letniki je o vsaj eni OIO poročalo 74,9%, o štirih ali več OIO pa 22,7% (Kuhar in Zager Kocjan, 2020). Ti podatki torej kažejo, da je vsak četrti posameznik doživel vsaj eno OIO, vsak peti pa štiri ali več OIO, pri čemer niti ne vključujemo drugih (potencialno) travmatičnih izkušenj (npr. dolgotrajna bolezen, težja nesreča, izkušnja vojne ali naravne katastrofe itd.²), ki prav tako lahko pustijo negativne posledice, med drugim na funkcioniranje v šoli.

Dosedanje študije, ki so se ukvarjale s povezavami med OIO in različnimi izidi na področju šolskega funkcioniranja, so pokazale, da imajo učenci z eno ali več OIO višje tveganje za slabši učni uspeh, kronično odsotnost od pouka, ponavljanje razreda, osip, izključitev in vedenjske težave (npr.

² Obstajajo poskusi koncipiranja razširjenega števila OIO (Cronholm et al., 2015; Finkelhor et al., 2015), ki obsega dodatne potencialno obremenjujoče izkušnje, npr. viktimizacijo s strani vrstnikov, različne oblike nasilja na ravni skupnosti, ki jih doživljajo zlasti rasno, etnično in socialnoekonomsko deprivilegirane skupine itd.

Bethell et al., 2014; Burke Harris et al., 2017; Crouch et al., 2019a; Hunt et al., 2017; Iachini, 2016; Kasehagen et al., 2017; Robles et al., 2019; Stempel, 2017). Burke et al. (2011) so npr. pokazali, da je v podskupini otrok s štirimi ali več OIO³ 51,2% otrok izkazovalo učne in/ali vedenjske težave, medtem ko je bilo med tistimi z 1–3 OIO 20,7% udeležencev s težavami, med tistimi, ki OIO niso imeli, pa le 3%.

Zlasti najzgodnejše izkušnje t.i. toksičnega stresa, obsežnega, ponavljajočega, dolgotrajnega stresa (NSCDC, 2005), značilnega tako za zlorabe kot tudi za zanemarjanje in kronično neuglašenost otrokovih skrbnikov, vodijo do izrazito senzitiviziranega stresnega odzivanja (nepredvidljive, hitre ali nenehne aktivacije sistemov stresnega odzivanja) ter funkcionalnih in strukturnih sprememb na številnih možganskih področjih (DeBellis & Zisk, 2014; Hambrick et al., 2019). Našteto se lahko z različno intenziteto izraža tudi v šolskem kontekstu, kot so težave na vzgojnem ali pa na izobraževalnem področju.

Vendar pa izpostavljenost OIO lahko različno vpliva na posameznike. Vse več raziskav kaže, da različne t.i. pozitivne izkušnje v otroštvu zmanjšujejo tveganje za številne negativne učinke OIO v otroštvu in tudi kasneje v življenju (npr. Bellis et al., 2018; Bethell et al., 2019; Crandall et al., 2019; Karatzias et al., 2020; Kuhar & Zager Kocjan, 2021). V skladu z ekološko-transakcijsko perspektivo lahko varovalni dejavniki ob obremenjujočih ali travmatičnih izkušnjah obstajajo na več ravneh (z medsebojnimi vplivi): na individualni ravni (npr. samoučinkovitost), na ravni družine (varni in podporni odnosi z različnimi skrbniki – ne nujno samo s starši, lahko tudi npr. s starimi starši) in ravni skupnosti (pozitivni odnosi s prijatelji, učitelji, podpora skupnosti itd.) (Cicchetti & Toth, 2016; Masten & Cicchetti, 2016). Takšne izkušnje vodijo do t.i. rezilientnosti oz. prožnega odzivanja v smislu pozitivnih prilagoditev ter uspešnega čustvenega, kognitivnega, vedenjskega in/ali socialnega funkcioniranja kljub obremenjujočim izkušnjam; imajo pa tudi dolgoročen ugoden učinek na zdravje in različne vidike funkcioniranja (npr. Afifi & MacMillan, 2011; Gartland et al., 2019; Masten & Cicchetti, 2016).

Razumevanje povezanosti obremenjujočih izkušenj ter dejavnikov, ki krepijo rezilientnost učencev, z njihovo šolsko uspešnostjo je ključnega pomena, da lahko šole učinkoviteje podpirajo vse učence pri izkoriščanju izobraževalnih in tudi vzgojnih možnosti.

Vloga pozitivnih izkušenj v otroštvu

OIO ne vodijo neizogibno do negativnih posledic. Vse več študij kaže, kako pozitivne izkušnje v otroštvu (PIO) blažijo tveganje za različne

³ Njegov vzorec je tvorilo 701 otrok, povprečno starih 8 let, iz Bayview Child Health Centra v San Franciscu.

negativne izide v odraslosti zlasti v duševnem zdravju, z zdravjem povezanem vedenju in samooceni zdravja (npr. Bethell et al., 2019; Chung et al., 2008; Crandall et al., 2019; Crouch et al., 2019b; Hillis et al., 2010; Karatzias et al., 2020; Narayan et al., 2018; Kuhar in Zager Kocjan, 2021). PIO so bile v navedenih študijah operacionalizirane na različne načine – vključevale so individualne značilnosti, varne, negovalne odnose in/ali podporo na ravni skupnosti (Bethell et al., 2019; Crandall et al., 2019; Karatzias et al., 2020; Narayan et al., 2018; Kuhar in Zager Kocjan, 2021). Nekatere študije so se osredotočile na specifične PIO, npr. na vsaj en podporen odnos z odraslo osebo (Bellis et al., 2017; Crouch et al., 2019b) ali na pozitivne izkušnje v družinskem okolju (Chung et al., 2008; Hillis et al., 2010) kot dejavnike, ki zmanjšujejo povezavo med OIO in negativnimi izidi. Vsekakor je odnosni vidik izrazitega pomena. Številne študije (glej poročilo NSCDC, 2015) kažejo, da so imeli otroci s težjimi obremenjujočimi izkušnjami, ki dobro funkcionirajo in izkazujejo rezilientnost, vsaj en stabilen odnos s podpornim odraslim. Prisotnost poznanih ljudi, ki signalizirajo sprejemanje, empatijo in razumevanje, ima močan regulativni učinek: pomirja stresno odzivanje in daje občutek varnosti. Vloga tovrstnih podpornih odnosov v življenju otrok je tako varovalna kot korektivna. Zlasti zgodnje odnosne izkušnje pomembno oblikujejo otrokove razvijajoče se možgane (Hambrick et al., 2019; Schore, 2019) ter s tem tudi kapaciteto za učenje in socialno-čustvene veščine, ki so pomembne v šolskem okolju.

Raziskovalni problem

Obstoječe raziskave so se obsežno ukvarjale z različnimi dejavniki šolske uspešnosti, kot so SES družine, starševska vključenost v otrokovo delo za šolo, starševske prakse, individualne značilnosti otroka. Prav tako obstaja precej raziskav, ki kažejo, da je šolska uspešnost značilno povezana s travmatičnimi izkušnjami oz. simptomi travme (Perfect et al., 2016). Dosedanje študije pa niso celoviteje preučile, v kolikšni meri lahko PIO ublažijo negativen učinek OIO na šolsko uspešnost. Blažilna vloga PIO pri negativnih izidih, povezanih z OIO, je novejša raziskovalno področje; dosedanje raziskave so se osredotočale predvsem na zdravstvene izide (npr. Kuhar in Zager Kocjan, 2021). Robles et al. (2019) so pokazali, da izbrani družinski in skupnostni varovalni dejavniki zmanjšajo negativen učinek OIO na ponavljanje razreda ter otrokov šolski angažma (npr. sprotno reševanje šolskih nalog). V pričujoči analizi pa se osredotočamo na povezavo OIO in PIO (varovalni dejavniki na individualni, družinski in skupnostni ravni) s samoocenjenim šolskim uspehom.

Šolski uspeh v raziskavi ni bil natančneje opredeljen; obstoječe študije ga definirajo na različne načine, npr. kot obiskovanje šole, redno

sodelovanje in napredovanje (Kasehagen et al., 2017). V primerjavi z objektivnimi merami uspeha, kot so šolske ocene, so subjektivne ocene pod vplivom napak, tipičnih za samoocenjevanje (npr. socialno zaželeno odgovarjanje; Paulhus, 1991), in so zato lahko pristranske. Vendar pa je pristranskost v samooceni lahko tudi odraz tega, kako posameznik vidi samega sebe, torej njegove samopodobe, in ni posledica zavestnega izkrivljanja. Prav zato so lahko subjektivne samoocene dober pokazatelj in celo boljši napovednik različnih življenjskih izidov od objektivnih mer. V skladu z dosedanjimi raziskavami pričakujemo, da izpostavljenost več OIO (1, 2, 3, 4 ali več) napoveduje večje tveganje za samooceno podpovprečnega šolskega uspeha. Pričakujemo tudi, da večje število PIO (tj. nad mediano) napoveduje manjše tveganje za samoocenjen podpovprečen šolski uspeh. Poleg tega ugotavljamo, ali so PIO značilno povezane s samooceno šolskega uspeha tudi ob navzočnosti OIO ter ali PIO oslabijo povezavo med OIO in samooceno šolskega uspeha.

Metoda

Udeleženci in postopek

Raziskava je bila izvedena na spletnem panelu raziskovalne agencije, ki je izvedla vzorčenje po kvotnih skupinah (spol, starost, statistične regije in izobrazba) glede na splošno populacijo 18- do 75-letnikov. Zbiranje podatkov je potekalo med februarjem in aprilom 2019 v obliki spletnega anketiranja. Anketo je v celoti izpolnilo 5397 oseb. Za zagotovitev kvalitete odgovorov smo iz končnega vzorca anketirancev po tehnični (prehitro izpolnjene in tehnično neprimerne ankete) in vsebinski analizi (nekonsistentno odgovarjanje, nerealni odgovori) izločili 457 anket. Končni vzorec tako zajema 4940 oseb. Podatkovno bazo smo utežili po spolu, starosti, izobrazbi in statističnih regijah, da bi čim bolje odražala stanje v slovenski populaciji v obdobju anketiranja. V pričujočo študijo smo zajeli le osebe, stare od 18 do 30 let, brez manjkajočih odgovorov pri obravnavanih vprašanjih (tj. vprašanja o OIO in PIO, samoocena šolskega uspeha, demografska vprašanja). Ta starostni razpon udeležencev obsega relativno homogeno skupino s podobnimi izkušnjami – generacijo mladih, ki so v izobraževalni proces vstopali od tranzicije naprej, v obdobju, ko se je začel poviševati delež mladih v sekundarnem in terciarnem izobraževanju (Kuhar & Reiter, 2012). Vzorec 18- do 30-letnikov je skupaj zajemal 909 oseb. Struktura vzorca je podrobneje predstavljena v Tabeli 1. Raziskavo je odobrila Komisija Republike Slovenije za medicinsko etiko (št. 0120–236/2019/4).

Inštrumenti

Obremenjujoče izkušnje v otroštvu (OIO) smo merili z vprašalnikom, ki je natančno opisan v Kuhar in Zager Kocjan (2020). Vprašalnik z več vprašanji ugotavlja navzočnost desetih različnih OIO, in sicer:

- čustvenega nasilja,
- telesnega nasilja,
- spolne zlorabe ali nasilja,
- čustvenega zanemarjanja,
- fizičnega zanemarjanja,
- telesnega nasilja/zlorabe med odraslimi člani gospodinjstva,
- težav v duševnem zdravju pri odraslem članu gospodinjstva,
- zasvojenosti odraslega člana gospodinjstva,
- razveze staršev, smrti biološkega starša ali zapustitve s strani starša ali skrbnika ter
- kriminalnih dejanj odraslega člana gospodinjstva.

Točkovanje posameznih OIO je dihotomno (vrednost 0, če izkušnje ni bilo, in 1, če je bila), točke pa nato seštejemo, da dobimo skupno število OIO, ki jih je doživel posameznik (to število lahko variira od 0 do 10). V skladu s predhodnimi študijami (npr. Bellis et al., 2017; Bethell et al., 2019) smo število OIO razvrstili v pet kategorij oz. stopenj izpostavljenosti OIO, in sicer 0, 1, 2, 3 in ≥ 4 OIO.

Positivne izkušnje v otroštvu (PIO) smo merili z Vprašalnikom rezilientnosti (angl. Resilience questionnaire; Rains & McClinn, 2013). Vprašalnik vključuje 14 postavk, ki se nanašajo na varovalne dejavnike, ki prispevajo k prožnemu funkcioniranju posameznika v oz. po stresnih okoliščinah, npr. pozitivne izkušnje v kontekstu družine in širše skupnosti, kot so ljubezen, skrb, socialna in instrumentalna opora (npr. Ko sem bil/a otrok, so mi bili učitelji/ce, trenerji/ke in/ali drugi ljudje izven družinskega kroga na voljo za pomoč ali podporo.) ter občutek samoučinkovitosti (npr. Prepričan/a sem bil/a, da je življenje v mojih rokah.). Udeleženci odgovarjajo na postavke na petstopenjski ocenjevalni lestvici (1 – sploh ne drži, 5 – povsem drži). Zaradi nizkega factorskega nasičenja smo postavko 9 (Moja družina, sosede in prijatelji so pogosto govorili o tem, kako bi izboljšali naša življenja.) izločili. Kot PIO smo identificirali vse postavke, na katere so udeleženci odgovorili s 4 (drži) ali 5 (povsem drži). Točke smo nato sešteli, da smo dobili skupno število PIO, ki jih je doživel posameznik (možnih je od 0 do 13 PIO). V skladu s predhodnimi študijami (npr. Beutel et al., 2017; Crandall et al., 2019) smo število PIO na podlagi mediane ($Mdn = 10$) razvrstili v dve kategoriji ($< Mdn$ vs. $\geq Mdn$).

Udeleženci so odgovorili na vprašanje, ali so imeli v šoli do 18. leta podpovprečen uspeh (da/ne). Poleg tega so podali odgovore na demografska

vprašanja o spolu, narodnosti in izobrazbi staršev ter samooceno materialnega položaja v otroštvu.

Analiza podatkov

Podatke smo uredili in analizirali s programom SPSS, verzija 27.0 (IBM Corp, 2020). Preliminarna analiza je zajemala prikaz deleža posameznikov, ki so poročali o podpovprečnem šolskem uspehu do 18. leta starosti, in sicer glede na različne demografske podatke (spol, narodnost) in okoliščine v otroštvu (samoocena materialnega položaja, izobrazba matere in očeta) ter glede na število PIO ($PIO < Mdn$ vs. $PIO \geq Mdn$) in OIO (0, 1, 2, 3, ≥ 4). Povezanost demografskih kategorij, okoliščin v otroštvu ter PIO in OIO s šolskim uspehom smo preverjali s χ^2 -testom. Izračunali smo tudi velikost učinka, to je koeficient phi (pri 2 x 2 tabelah; povezave s spolom, narodnostjo, materialnim položajem in PIO) oz. Cramerjev V (pri večjih tabelah; povezave z izobrazbo staršev in OIO). Po Cohenu (1988) vrednost 0,1 predstavlja majhen učinek, 0,3 srednji učinek, 0,5 pa velik učinek.

V nadaljevanju smo z logističnimi regresijskimi analizami izračunali razmerje obetov za podpovprečen šolski uspeh pri posameznikih z različno izpostavljenostjo PIO in OIO v otroštvu. Kot referenčni kategoriji smo obravnavali število $PIO < Mdn$ ter 0 OIO in ugotavljali, ali obstaja za posameznike, ki so poročali o večjem številu PIO ($PIO \geq Mdn$), značilno manjše tveganje za podpovprečno samooceno šolskega uspeha, in ali je za tiste, ki so poročali o izpostavljenosti eni ali več OIO, značilno večje tveganje za podpovprečno samooceno šolskega uspeha. Razmerje obetov smo izračunali ob kontroli narodnosti in materialnega položaja v otroštvu, ki sta bila v preliminarni analizi značilno povezana s samooceno šolskega uspeha. Preverili smo tudi, kako se spremeni tveganje za podpovprečen šolski uspeh pri posameznikih z eno ali več OIO, če dodatno kontroliramo število PIO, ter kako se spremeni tveganje pri posameznikih s $PIO \geq Mdn$, če dodatno kontroliramo število OIO.

Rezultati

O podpovprečnem šolskem uspehu do 18. leta starosti je poročalo 17,7% posameznikov. V Tabeli 1 prikazujemo povezanost spola, narodnosti, materialnega položaja v otroštvu, izobrazbe staršev ter števila PIO in OIO s samooceno šolskega uspeha. Narodnost je bila s samooceno šolskega uspeha značilno, vendar zelo šibko povezana. Posamezniki tuje narodnosti so pogosteje poročali o podpovprečnem šolskem uspehu kot posamezniki slovenske narodnosti. S samooceno šolskega uspeha se je povezovala tudi samoocena materialnega položaja v otroštvu, velikost učinka pa je bila

majhna. Posamezniki, ki so poročali o slabšem materialnem položaju v primerjavi z vrstniki, so pogosteje navedli, da so imeli podpovprečen šolski uspeh kot tisti, ki so poročali o enakem ali boljšem materialnem položaju. Spol ter izobrazbi matere in očeta se niso značilno povezovali s samooceno šolskega uspeha.

Tabela 1: POVEZANOST SAMOOCENE ŠOLSKEGA USPEHA S SPOLOM, NARODNOSTJO, MATERIALNIM POLOŽAJEM V OTROŠTVU, IZOBRAZBO STARŠEV TER ŠTEVILOM PIO IN OIO

	N [#]	Podpovprečen šolski uspeh	Povprečen ali nadpovprečen šolski uspeh	$\chi^2(df)$	$\phi /$ Cramerjev V
Vsi	909,3	17,7 %	82,3 %		
Spol				,823(1)	,030
Moški	475,2	16,5 %	83,5 %		
Ženski	434,1	18,9 %	81,1 %		
Narodnost				5,445(1)*	,077
Slovenska	849,6	16,8 %	83,2 %		
Druga	59,7	29,1 %	70,9 %		
Materialni položaj v otroštvu				13,479(1)***	-,122
Slabši	226,3	25,7 %	74,3 %		
Enak ali boljši	683,0	15,0 %	85,0 %		
Izobrazba matere				4,348(2)	,070
Osnovna šola ali manj	153,6	16,4 %	83,6 %		
Srednja šola	500,1	19,8 %	80,2 %		
Višja šola ali več	247,4	13,8 %	86,2 %		
Izobrazba očeta				3,413(2)	,062
Osnovna šola ali manj	143,6	18,3 %	81,7 %		
Srednja šola	548,9	18,4 %	81,6 %		
Višja šola ali več	183,3	12,7 %	87,3 %		
Pozitivne izkušnje v otroštvu				31,961(1)***	-,188
PIO < <i>Mdn</i>	349,5	26,7 %	73,3 %		
PIO ≥ <i>Mdn</i>	559,8	12,0 %	88,0 %		
Obremenjujoče izkušnje v otroštvu				42,309(4)***	,216
0 OIO	230,9	9,9 %	90,1 %		
1 OIO	191,7	11,5 %	88,5 %		
2 OIO	173,2	16,1 %	83,9 %		
3 OIO	105,5	21,5 %	78,5 %		
≥ 4 OIO	208,1	31,2 %	68,8 %		

Opomba. * $p < ,05$, ** $p < ,01$, *** $p < ,001$.


[#] Zaradi uporabe vzorčnih uteži numerusi niso cela števila.

Vir: lastni prikaz.

Posamezniki, ki so doživeli večje število PIO (PIO ≥ *Mdn*), so redkeje poročali o podpovprečnem šolskem uspehu kot tisti, ki so doživeli manjše

število PIO ($PIO < Mdn$). Velikost učinka je bila majhna. Najmočneje se je s samooceno šolskega uspeha povezovalo število OIO, čeprav je bila tudi v tem primeru velikost učinka majhna. O podpovprečnem šolskem uspehu so pogostejše poročali tisti, ki so doživeli večje število OIO, v primerjavi s tistimi, ki so doživeli manjše število OIO. Samooceno šolskega uspeha kot podpovprečnega oz. povprečnega ali nadpovprečnega glede na število OIO in PIO prikazuje Slika 1.

Slika 1: DELEŽ POSAMEZNIKOV, KI SO POROČALI O PODPOVPREČNEM ŠOLSKEM USPEHU GLEDE NA ŠTEVILO OIO IN PIO



Vir: lastni prikaz.

Rezultati logistične regresijske analize, prikazani v Tabeli 2, so pokazali, da imajo posamezniki z več PIO ($PIO \geq Mdn$) manjše obete za podpovprečno samooceno šolskega uspeha v primerjavi s tistimi, ki so doživeli manj PIO ($PIO < Mdn$). Povezava je ostala značilna tudi ob dodatni kontroli števila OIO, vendar se je nekoliko znižala. Ti rezultati kažejo, da lahko PIO zmanjšajo tveganje za podpovprečen šolski uspeh tudi ob sočasni navzočnosti OIO. Posamezniki z večjim številom OIO imajo večje tveganje za podpovprečno samooceno šolskega uspeha. Tisti s 3 OIO imajo 2,4-krat, tisti s ≥ 4 OIO pa kar 3,7-krat večje obete za podpovprečno samooceno šolskega uspeha v primerjavi s posamezniki, ki niso doživeli nobene OIO. Ob dodatni kontroli števila PIO se je moč povezave OIO s samooceno šolskega uspeha zmanjšala, kar pomeni, da lahko PIO ublažijo negativen učinek OIO na samooceno šolskega uspeha.

Tabela 2: TVEGANJE (RAZMERJE OBETOV) ZA PODPOVPREČEN ŠOLSKI USPEH GLEDE NA ŠTEVILO PIO IN OIO

	Podpovprečen šolski uspeh			
	AOR	95 % IZ	AOR [#]	95 % IZ
Pozitivne izkušnje v otroštvu				
PIO < <i>Mdn</i> (referenčna skupina)				
PIO ≥ <i>Mdn</i>	,416***	[,290; ,594]	,563**	[,379; ,838]
Obremenjujoče izkušnje v otroštvu				
0 OIO (referenčna skupina)				
1 OIO	1,164	[,626; 2,166]	1,084	[,580; 2,024]
2 OIO	1,683	[,928; 3,052]	1,454	[,792; 2,668]
3 OIO	2,387**	[1,257; 4,532]	2,007*	[1,040; 3,872]
≥ 4 OIO	3,658***	[2,111; 6,339]	2,608**	[1,434; 4,743]

Opomba. $N = 909$. * $p < ,05$, ** $p < ,01$, *** $p < ,001$. AOR = Razmerje obetov v logističnem regresijskem modelu ob kontroli narodnosti in materialnega položaja v otroštvu.

[#] Razmerje obetov ob dodatni kontroli OIO oz. PIO.

Vir: lastni prikaz.

Razprava

Namen analize je bil preučiti, kako so OIO in PIO povezane s samoocenjenim šolskim uspehom med slovenskimi 18- do 30-letniki. Preverili smo tudi, ali izpostavljenost PIO zmanjšuje tveganje za slabši šolski uspeh ob sočasni navzočnosti OIO.

Skoraj petina 18- do 30-letnikov iz prve slovenske raziskave OIO je poročala o podpovprečnem šolskem uspehu do 18. leta starosti. O podpovprečnem uspehu so pogosteje poročale osebe tuje narodnosti in tiste, ki so ocenile materialni položaj družine kot nizek (prim. Cankar et al., 2017; 2020). O podpovprečnem šolskem uspehu so pogosteje poročali tisti, ki so doživeli večje število OIO in manjše število PIO. Tudi ob kontroli socialno-demografskih spremenljivk, značilno povezanih s samooceno šolskega uspeha, imajo posamezniki z večjim številom OIO večje tveganje za podpovprečno samooceno šolskega uspeha, pri čemer je velikost tveganja posebej visoka pri tistih s 4 ali več OIO. Rezultati te analize so skladni z izsledki obstoječih raziskav, ki kažejo na negativni učinek OIO na različne vidike šolskega funkcioniranja, npr. slabši učni uspeh, ponavljanje razreda, osip (npr. Bethell et al., 2014; Burke Harris et al., 2017; Crouch et al., 2019a; Iachini et al., 2016; Kasehagen et al., 2017). Ujemajo se tudi z dognanji, kako lahko nevrobiološke, kognitivne, čustvene, socialne in vedenjske težave, inherentne simptomom travmatskega stresa, motijo šolsko funkcioniranje (Gross, 2020).

Učenci z OIO ali drugimi travmatičnimi izkušnjami se hitro in pogosto odzovejo z avtomatskim fiziološkim odzivom boja in postanejo npr. bolj trmasti, kljubovalni in agresivni ali s preživetvenim načinom bega ali

zamrznitve in postanejo bolj odsotni, zmedeni, sanjavi itd. (Gross, 2020; Perry, 2009). Prav tako je pomembno razumeti, da otroci z izkušnjo zgodnjih in več OIO pogosteje zaostajajo v razvoju vsaj določenih veščin, npr. jezikovnih, samoregulativnih (Perry, 2009), zato je šolsko okolje s svojimi pričakovanji, pravili in kurikuli zanje lahko prekomerno stresno in ne morejo v polni meri sodelovati v učnem procesu in razvijati socialno-čustvenih veščin.

Če strokovnjaki, udeleženi v procesu podpore takemu otroku, ne razumejo, da so čustvene in/ali vedenjske težave, pa tudi učno zaostajanje povezani z OIO oz. drugimi travmatičnimi izkušnjami, so intervencije običajno neučinkovite (Perry, 2009). Diagnoze, ki so jih učenci s prekomerno aktivnim in reaktivnim stresnim odzivom pogosto deležni (npr. ADHD), zakrijejo ključen vzrok težav, ki jih je mogoče učinkovito obravnavati. Prav tako so ti učenci neredko neupravičeno etiketirani (npr. problematičen, neposlušen, nemotiviran, len, počasen, neumen) ter podvrženi discipliniranju in kaznovanju, namesto da bi bili podprti pri prepoznavanju sprožilcev in učenju samoregulacije. Pri tem se lahko vzpostavi cikel neuspeha, ki je rušilen za samopodobo (Perry, 2009).

Naša analiza je pokazala tudi, da imajo posamezniki z več PIO manjše obete za podpovprečno samooceno šolskega uspeha v primerjavi s tistimi, ki so doživeli manj PIO, in sicer tudi ob kontroli OIO. Ta rezultat lahko primerjamo z Bethell et al. (2014) in Kasehagen et al. (2017), ki so s svojimi študijami pokazali, da so rezilientni otroci bolj angažirani v šoli kljub izpostavljenosti OIO. V obeh študijah so rezilientnost opredelili kot pridobljeno s kombinacijo podpornih odnosov, prilagoditvenega oblikovanja veščin in drugih pozitivnih izkušenj. PIO, npr. izkušnje varnih in podpornih odnosov ter pripadnosti, vključenosti, pa tudi individualne značilnosti, kot je samoučinkovitost, omogočajo razvoj in krepitev samoregulativnih kapacitet (med drugim nadzor impulzov, zmogljivost za pozornost, načrtovanje ipd., npr. McCrory et al., 2011), socialno-čustvenih veščin, izgrajujejo temeljni občutek lastne vrednosti (Perry, 2009; Schore, 2019) – vse to pa spodbuja učno napredovanje in tudi socialno prilagajanje v šolskem okolju.

Rezultati kažejo še, da PIO slabijo moč povezave med OIO in slabo samooceno šolskega uspeha. Podobno ugotavljajo Robles et al. (2019), in sicer da zaščitni dejavniki na ravni družine in skupnosti zmanjšujejo tveganje za negativne učinke OIO. Najmočnejši zaščitni dejavnik v njihovi študiji je otrokov odnos s staršem, s katerim se otrok lahko pogovarja o stvareh, ki so mu/ji pomembne, in z njim deli svoje ideje. Predvsem konsistentni varni, spodbudni odnosi so tisti, ki tudi pri otroku, zaznamovanem s toksičnim stresom, aktivirajo sistem za socialno angažiranje in pomirjajo senzitivizirane stresne odzive (Payne et al., 2015; Porges, 2011; Schore, 2019). Npr. Perry (2009) poroča o ugodnih možganskih spremembah pri otrocih s stabilnimi in podpornimi odnosi z odraslimi (ne samo s starši).

Glede na visoko pojavnost OIO ter njihovo povezavo s šolskim uspehom bi bilo smiselno, da šole (zgodaj) prepoznajo travmatične izkušnje in njihove posledice ter prispevajo k čimprejšnji podpori, pa tudi zaščiti otrok (Mešl et al., 2021), s čimer lahko naredijo veliko za otrokov razvoj. Obenem lahko šole delujejo kot pomemben varovalni dejavnik v življenju otrok s posledicami obremenjujočih izkušenj, npr. tako da zavestno zagotavljajo PIO (vse, kar se tiče ustvarjanja varnega, podpornega, spodbudnega učnega okolja). V tujini je vse več zahtev, da se šole preoblikujejo v ustanove, ki temeljijo na razumevanju travme (Chafouleas et al., 2016). V ZDA npr. so v ta namen leta 2019 oblikovali t. i. »Trauma-Informed School Act«, ki naj bi poleg zavedanja o travmi pospešil oblikovanje konkretnih strategij odzivanja. Vpeljevanje pristopa, utemeljenega na razumevanju travme, v šole pomeni paradigmatški premik na makro- in mikroravni, pri čemer obstajajo številni modeli dobrih praks in smernice, ki pa jih je potrebno prilagoditi konkretnim skupnostim ter idealno vpeljati v celotno obdobje vzgoje in izobraževanja, torej od jasli do visokega šolstva (Gross, 2020; Mešl idr., 2021). Naslavljanje obremenjujočih izkušenj oz. njihovih posledic v šolskem okolju je bistveno več kot npr. identificiranje čustvenih in/ali vedenjskih težav ter nudenje pomoči učencem s temi težavami. Razumevanje in podporo je potrebno razširiti ter vključiti tudi preventivna prizadevanja za celotno populacijo učencev, zgodnje prepoznavanje in intervencije za učence s prepoznanimi tveganji (Mešl idr., 2021), pa tudi individualizirano podporo učencem z diagnozami velja osnovati na razumevanju travme (Kasehagen, 2017). To pomeni tudi združevanje znanj in izkušenj različnih strok, sektorjev in tudi staršev ter otrok samih, kot pravi Gross (2020: 9): »Za zdravljenje travme je potrebna cela vas.« Ker družinsko okolje predstavlja zelo pomemben dejavnik tveganja in hkrati varovalni dejavnik, velja dodaten trud vložiti v prepoznavanje učencev z družinami, ki povečujejo tveganje za njihovo slabšo šolsko funkcioniranje in uspešnost, ter jih čim bolj celovito podpreti.

Kot primer lahko vzamemo modele in strategije⁴ odkrivanja in pomoči učencem z učnimi težavami, ki šolskim strokovnim delavcem pomagajo udeležati petstopenjski kontinuum pomoči (sistematično diagnostično ocenjevanje in spremljanje napredka učenca, učinkovito obravnavo ter evalvacijo uspešnosti obravnave) (Kavker et al., 2008; Košak Babuder & Velikonja (ur., 2011; Magajna & Velikonja (ur.), 2011; Šugman Bohinc, (ur.), 2011). V tej in tudi kasnejši slovenski strokovni literaturi (npr. Križnar et al., 2018) na temo pomoči učencem z učnimi težavami sta osrednja poudarka na oblikovanju okoliščin za timsko soustvarjanje z vsemi udeleženci procesa, vključno z

⁴ Z dokumentom *Učne težave v osnovni šoli: koncept dela* (Magajna et al., 2008) so bile postavljene strokovne osnove za razvoj učinkovitejših pristopov na področju obravnave učencev z učnimi težavami, čemur je sledilo dopolnjevanje in razvijanje modelov.

učenci in njihovimi starši, ter na specifični strokovni dodatni pomoči ob posameznih učnih primanjkljajih. Naslednji korak bi bila poglobitev in dopolnitev teh konceptov, modelov in strategij z razumevanjem obremenjujočih izkušenj ter njihovih posledic.

Omejitve študije in predlogi za nadaljnje raziskave

O nekaterih omejitvah raziskave, ki se nanašajo na panelni vzorec, spletno zbiranje podatkov in samoporočanje o OIO in PIO, smo že poročali (Kuhar in Zager Kocjan, 2020; 2021). V kontekstu tega članka dodatno izpostavljamo, da obstoječa empirična operacionalizacija OIO ni izčrpen in povsem zanesljiv način za ugotavljanje tako subtilnega fenomena, kot je travma. Izpostaviti velja tudi, da nabor PIO, ki smo ga zajeli, ni standardiziran in izčrpen. Koncept dejavnikov, ki odsevajo in krepijo rezilientnost otrok, je širok, v razvoju pa so različni merski instrumenti. Čeprav smo predpostavili, da so OIO in PIO dejavniki samoocenjevanega šolskega uspeha, presečna narava naše raziskave onemogoča kavzalno zaključevanje. Omejitev raziskave prav tako predstavlja uporaba enotne samoocene šolskega uspeha za celotno šolsko obdobje do 18. leta starosti.

V prihodnje bi veljalo preveriti povezave OIO in PIO z objektivnejšimi kazalniki šolskega funkcioniranja oz. uspešnosti (npr. učni uspeh, merjen v ocenah, rezultati standardiziranih preverjanj znanj, izostajanje od pouka, osip itd.), pa tudi povezave po posameznih OIO (prim. Crouch et al 2019a; Kasehagen et al., 2017). Prav tako bi bilo v analizo smiselno zajeti ostale relevantne dejavnike šolske uspešnosti, zlasti socialno deprivilegiranost, pa tudi dejavnike, kot so npr. dolgotrajna bolezen ipd. Pomemben dejavnik ni samo vrsta, ampak tudi trajanje OIO, pa tudi, v katerem obdobju odraščanja so se zgodile oz. dogajale (Hambrick et al., 2019). Relevantno bi bilo preveriti, v kolikšni meri lahko negativne učinke OIO blažijo PIO, ki so povezane s šolo vs. izkušnje, ki se navezujejo na družino, pa tudi v kolikšni meri PIO blažijo učinek OIO, če te izkušnje niso simultane. To vprašanje se zastavlja zlasti v kontekstu šol, ki lahko zagotovijo določene PIO, vendar neredko kasneje, kot je prišlo do OIO.

Sklep

Trije od štirih 18- do 30-letnih udeležencev raziskave so poročali, da so do 18. leta doživeli vsaj eno OIO, vsak peti pa kar štiri ali več. Z večjo izpostavljenostjo OIO narašča tveganje za samooceno podpovprečnega šolskega uspeha do 18. leta starosti, ki je posebej visoko pri posameznikih s 4 ali več OIO. Tveganje za podpovprečen šolski uspeh pa je manjše pri tistih z več PIO. PIO tudi ob navzočnosti OIO zmanjšajo tveganje za podpovprečen

šolski uspeh ter blažijo negativen učinek OIO na samooceno šolskega uspeha.

Rezultati pričujoče analize kličejo k ozaveščanju šolskih strokovnih delavcev, pa tudi strokovnih delavcev v ostalih sistemih podpore učencem (npr. pediatrov) o travmatičnih izkušnjah in njihovih potencialnih negativnih učinkih ter o blažilni vlogi varovalnih dejavnikov v otroštvu. Zavedanje pa je le prvi korak, nujen prispevek dobrobiti otrok je tudi senzitivnost do travme in pa odzivnost nanjo, zato tudi v Sloveniji rabimo politike, prakse, programe, ki v šolskem kontekstu eksplicitno in sistematično naslavljajo OIO (prepoznavajo učence z več OIO, zmanjšujejo izpostavljenost in blažijo negativne učinke) ter krepijo varovalne dejavnike (za smernice glej Mešl idr., 2021). S tem ne koristimo zgolj zdravstvenim in socialnim življenjskim potekom posameznikov, to pomeni tudi naložbo v naslednjo generacijo.

LITERATURA

- Afifi, Tracie O. in Harriet L. MacMillan (2011): Resilience following child maltreatment: A review of protective factors. *Canadian Journal of Psychiatry* 56: 266–272.
- Bellis, Mark A., Katie A. Hardcastle, Kat Ford, Karen Hughes, Kathryn Ashton, Zara Quigg in Nadia Butler (2017): Does continuous trusted adult support in childhood impart life-course resilience against adverse childhood experiences – a retrospective study on adult health-harming behaviours and mental well-being. *BMC Psychiatry* 17 (1): 110.
- Bethell, Christina, Jennifer Jones, Narangerel Gombojav, Jeff Linkenbac in Robert Sege (2019): Positive childhood experiences and adult mental and relational health in a statewide sample: Associations across adverse childhood experiences levels. *JAMA Pediatrics* 173 (11): e193007.
- Bethell, Christina. D., Paul Newacheck, Eva Hawes in Neal Halfon (2014): Adverse childhood experiences: Assessing the impact on health and school engagement and the mitigating role of resilience. *Health Affairs* 33 (12): 2106–2115.
- Beutel, Manfred E., Ana N. Tibubos, Eva M. Klein, Gabriele Schmutzer, Iris Reiner, Rüya-Daniela Kocalevent in E. Elmar Brähler (2017): Childhood adversities and distress – The role of resilience in a representative sample. *PLoS ONE* 12 (3): e0173826.
- Burke, Nadine J., Julia L. Hellman, Brandon G. Scott, Carl F. Weems in Victor G. Carrion (2011): The impact of adverse childhood experiences on an urban pediatric population. *Child Abuse & Neglect* 5 (6): 408–413.
- Cankar, Gašper, Matevž Bren in Darko Zupanc (2017): Za večjo pravičnost šolskega sistema v Sloveniji. Ljubljana: Državni izpitni center.
- Cankar, Gašper, Matevž Bren in Darko Zupanc (2017): Pravične možnosti izobraževanja v Sloveniji. Ljubljana: Državni izpitni center.
- Castro, María, Eva Expósito-Casas, Esther López-Martín, Luis Lizasoain, Enrique Navarro-Asencio in José Luis Gaviria (2015): Parental involvement on student academic achievement: A meta-analysis. *Educational Research Review* 14: 33–46.

- Chafouleas, Sandra M., Austin H. Johnson, Stacy Overstreet in Natascha M. Santos (2016): Toward a blueprint for trauma-informed service delivery in schools. *School Mental Health* 8: 144–162.
- Chung, Esther K., Leny Mathew, Irma T. Elo, James C. Coyne in Jennifer F. Culhane (2008): Depressive symptoms in disadvantaged women receiving prenatal care: The influence of adverse and positive childhood experiences. *Ambulatory Pediatrics* 8 (2): 109–116.
- Cicchetti, Dante in Sheree L. Toth (2016): Child maltreatment and developmental psychopathology: A multilevel perspective. V: Dante Cicchetti (ur.), *Developmental psychopathology: Maladaptation and psychopathology*, 457–512. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc..
- Cohen, Jacob (1988): *Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences* (2. izd.). Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Coleman, James S. (1988): Social capital in the creation of human capital. *American Journal of Sociology* 94: S95–S120.
- Coleman, James S., Ernest Q. Campbell, Carol J. Hobson, James McPartland, Alexander M. Mood, Frederic D. Weinfeld in Robert L. York (1966): *Equality of educational opportunity*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Conger, Rand D. in M. Brent Donnellan (2007): An interactionist perspective on the socioeconomic context of human development. *Annual Review of Psychology* 58: 175–99.
- Crandall, AliceAnn, Jacob R. Miller, Aaron Cheung, Lynne Kirsten Novilla, Rozalyn Glade, M. Lelinneth B. Novilla, Brianna M. Magnusson, Barbara L. Leavitt, Barnes Michael D. in Carl L. Hanson (2019): ACEs and counter-ACEs: How positive and negative childhood experiences influence adult health. *Child Abuse & Neglect* 96: 104089.
- Cronholm, Peter F., Christine M. Forke, Roy Wade, Megan H. Bair-Merritt, Martha Davis, Mary Harkins-Schwarz, Lee M. Pachter in Joel A. Fein (2015): Adverse childhood experiences: Expanding the concept of adversity. *American Journal of Preventive Medicine* 49 (3): 354–361.
- Crouch, Elizabeth, Janice C. Probst, Elizabeth Radcliff, Kevin J. Bennett in Selina Hunt McKinney (2019b): Prevalence of adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) among US children. *Child Abuse & Neglect* 92: 209–218.
- Crouch, Elizabeth, Elizabeth Radcliff, Peiyin Hung in Kevin Bennett (2019a): Challenges to school success and the role of adverse childhood experiences. *Academic pediatrics* 19 (8): 899–907.
- Cutler, David M. in Adriana Lleras-Muney (2006): *Education and health: Evaluating theories and evidence* – NBER working paper No. W12352. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economics.
- De Bellis, Michael D. in Abigail Zisk (2014): The biological effects of childhood trauma. *Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Clinics of North America* 23 (2): 185–222.
- Felitti, Vincent J. in Robert F. Anda (2010): The relationship of adverse childhood experiences to adult medical disease, psychiatric disorders and sexual behavior: Implications for healthcare. V: Ruth A. Lanius (ur.), Eric Vermetten (ur.) in Clare

- Pain (ur.), *The hidden epidemic: The impact of early life trauma on health and disease*, 77–87. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Felitti, Vincent J., Robert F. Anda, Dale Nordenberg, David F. Williamson, Alison M. Spitz, Valerie Edwards in James S. Marks (1998): Relationship of childhood abuse and household dysfunction to many of the leading causes of death in adults: The adverse childhood experiences (ACE) study. *American Journal of Preventive Medicine* 14 (4): 245–258.
- Finkelhor, David, Anne Shattuck, Heather Turner in Sherry Hamby (2015): A revised inventory of Adverse childhood experiences. *Child Abuse & Neglect* 48: 13–21.
- Gartland, Deirdre, Elisha Riggs, Sumaiya Muyeen, Rebecca Giallo, Tracie O. Afifi, Harriet MacMillan, Helen Herrman, Eleanor Bulford in Stephanie J. Brown (2019): What factors are associated with resilient outcomes in children exposed to social adversity? A systematic review. *British medical journal* 9: e024870.
- Gross, Karen (2020): *Trauma doesn't stop at the school door: Strategies and solutions for educators – Pre-K-college*. New York: Teacher College Press.
- Hambrick, Erin P., Thomas W. Brawner in Bruce D. Perry (2019): Timing of early-life stress and the development of brain-related capacities. *Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience* 13: 183.
- Harris, Nadine Burke, Sara Silvério Marques, Debora Oh, Monica Bucci in Mark Cloutier (2017): Prevent, screen, heal: Collective action to fight the toxic effects of early life adversity. *Academic Pediatrics* 17 (7): S14–S15.
- Hillis, Susan D., Robert F. Anda, Shanta R. Dube, Vincent J. Felitti, Polly A. Marchbanks, Maurizio Macaluso in James S. Marks (2010): The protective effect of family strengths in childhood against adolescent pregnancy and its long-term psychosocial consequences. *The Permanente Journal* 14: 18.
- Hughes, Karen, Mark A. Bellis, Katherine A. Hardcastle, Dinesh Sethi, Alexander Butchart, Christopher Mikton, Lisa Jones in Michael P. Dunn (2017): The effect of multiple adverse childhood experiences on health: A systematic review and meta-analysis. *The Lancet Public Health* 2 (8): e356–e366.
- Hunt, Tenah K. A., Kristen S. Slack in Lawrence M. Berger (2017): Adverse childhood experiences and behavioral problems in middle childhood. *Child Abuse & Neglect* 67: 391–402.
- Iachini, Aidyn L., Aliza F. Petiwala in Dana D. DeHart (2016): Examining adverse childhood experiences among students repeating the ninth grade: Implications for school dropout prevention. *Children & Schools* 38 (4): 218–227.
- Jereb, Andreja (2011): *Ekonomske posledice učne neuspešnosti*. V: Suzana Pulec Lah (ur.) in Marija Velikonja M. (ur.), *Učenci z učnimi težavami – izbrane teme*, 52–66. Ljubljana: Pedagoška fakulteta Univerze v Ljubljani.
- Karatzias, Thanos, Mark Shevlin, Claire Fyvie, Graeme Grandison, Maria Garozi, Emma Latham, Michael Sinclair, Grace Wing Ka Ho, Grainne McAnee, Julian D. Ford in Philip Hyland (2020): Adverse and benevolent childhood experiences in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Complex PTSD (CPTSD): Implications for trauma-focused therapies. *European Journal of Psychotraumatology* 11 (1): 1793599.
- Kasehagen, Laurin, Laurel Omland, Melissa Bailey, Charlie Biss, Breana Holmes in Patsy Tassler Kelso (2017): Relationship of adverse family experiences to

resilience and school engagement among vermont youth. *Maternal and Child Health Journal* 22 (3): 298–307.

Košak Babuder, Milena in Marija Velikonja (2011): Učenci z učnimi težavami – pomoč in podpora. Univerza v Ljubljani, Pedagoška fakulteta.

Križnar, Sandra (2018): Pomoč učencem z učnimi težavami v osnovni šoli: [primeri uspešnih praks v osnovnih šolah]. Ljubljana: Supra, zavod za izobraževanje.

Kuhar, Metka in Gaja Zager Kocjan (2020): Konglomerat travme: Obremenjujoče izkušnje v otroštvu in njihovo socialnodemografsko ozadje. *Teorija in praksa* 57 (2): 209–526.

Kuhar, Metka in Gaja Zager Kocjan (2021): Associations of adverse and positive childhood experiences with adult physical and mental health and risk behaviours in Slovenia. *European Journal of Psychotraumatology* 12 (1): 1924953.

Kuhar, Metka in Herwig Reiter (2012): Frozen transitions? Young people in the former Yugoslavia. V: Carmen Leccardi (ur.), Carles Feixa (ur.), Siyka Kovacheva (ur.), Herwig Reiter (ur.) in Tatjana Sekulić (ur.), 1989 – Young people and social change after the fall of the Berlin Wall, 75–98. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.

Magajna, Lidija in Marija Velikonja (2011): Učenci z učnimi težavami – prepoznavanje in diagnostično ocenjevanje. Univerza v Ljubljani, Pedagoška fakulteta.

Magajna, Lidija, Gabi Čačinovič Vogrinčič, Marija Kavkler, Sonja Pečjak in Ksenija Bregar Golobič (2008): Učne težave v osnovni šoli: Koncept dela (Program osnovnošolskega izobraževanja). Ljubljana: Zavod RS za šolstvo.

Marjanovič Umek, Ljubica, Gregor Sočan in Katja Bajc (2007): Vpliv psiholoških dejavnikov in izobrazbe staršev na učno uspešnost mladostnikov. *Psihološka obzorja* 16 (3): 27–48.

Masten, Ann S. in Dante Cicchetti (2016): Resilience in development: Progress and transformation. V: Dante Cicchetti (ur.), *Developmental psychopathology: Risk, resilience and intervention*, 271–333. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc..

McCrory, Eamon, Stephane A. De Brito in Essi Viding (2011): The impact of childhood maltreatment: A review of neurobiological and genetic factors. *Frontiers in Psychiatry* 2: 48.

Melby, Janet N., Rand D. Conger, Wickrama Fang, K. A. S. Shu-Ann in Katherine J. Conger (2008): Adolescent Family experiences and educational attainment during early adulthood. *Developmental Psychology Journal* 44 (6): 1519–1536.

Mešl, Nina, Zalka Drglin in Metka Kuhar (2021): Posledice travmatičnih izkušenj otrok: Prepoznavanje in odzivanje v slovenskih vrtcih in šolah. *Teorija in praksa* 58 (4): 947–970.

Nagy, Anikó Ujhelyi, Ildikó Kuritár Szabó, Endre Hann in Karolina Kósa (2019): Measuring the prevalence of adverse childhood experiences by survey research methods. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health* 16 (6): 1048.

Narayan, Angela J., Luisa M. Rivera, Rosemary E. Bernstein, William W. Harris in Alicia F. Lieberman (2018): Positive childhood experiences predict less psychopathology and stress in pregnant women with childhood adversity: A pilot study of the benevolent childhood experiences (BCEs) scale. *Child abuse & Neglect* 78: 19–30.

- National Scientific Council on the Developing Child (NSCDC) (2005): Excessive stress disrupts the architecture of the developing brain. working paper 3. 2005. Dostopno prek https://developingchild.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2005/05/Stress_Disrupts_Architecture_Developing_Brain-1.pdf, 4. 8. 2021.
- National Scientific Council on the Developing Child (NSCDC) (2015): Supportive relationships and active skill-building strengthen the foundations of resilience, working paper No. 13. Dostopno prek www.developingchild.harvard.edu, 4. 8. 2021.
- Paulhus, Delroy P. (1991): Measurement and control of response bias. V: John P. Robinson, Phillip R. Shaver & Lawrence S. Wrightsman (ur.), Measures of personality and social psychological attitudes, 17–59. San Diego: Academic Press.
- Payne, Peter, Peter Levine in Mardi A. Crane-Godreau (2015): The preparatory set: A novel approach to understanding stress, trauma, and the bodymind therapies. *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience* 9: 178.
- Perfect, Michelle M., Matt R. Turley, John S. Carlson, Justina Yohanna in Pfenninger Saint Gilles Marla (2016): School-Related outcomes of traumatic event exposure and traumatic stress symptoms in students: a systematic review of research from 1990 to 2015. *School Mental Health* volume 8: 7–43.
- Perry, Bruce D. (2009): Examining child maltreatment through a neurodevelopmental lens: Clinical applications of the neurosequential model of therapeutics. *Journal of Loss and Trauma* 14: 240–255.
- Porges, Stephen W. in Senta A. Furman (2011): The early development of the autonomic nervous system provides a neural platform for social behaviour: A polyvagal perspective. *Infant and child development* 20 (1): 106–118.
- Robles, Angelica, Annie Gjelsvik, Priya Hirway, Patrick M. Vivier in Pamela High (2019): Adverse childhood experiences and protective factors with school engagement. *Pediatrics* 144 (2): e20182945.
- SAMHSA (2014): SAMHSA's concept of trauma and guidance for a trauma-informed approach. HHS Publication No. (SMA) 14–4884. Rockville: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.
- Sardoč, Mitja (2013): Enake (izobraževalne) možnosti in družbena neenakost. *Sodobna pedagogika* 2013 (2): 48–62.
- Schore, Allan N. (2019): Right brain psychotherapy (Norton Series on Interpersonal Neurobiology). New York: WW Norton & Company.
- Sirin, Selcuk (2005): Socioeconomic status and academic achievement: A meta-analytic review of research. *Review of Educational Research* 75: 417–453.
- Smrtnik Vitulič, Helena in Irena Lesar (2014): Prepričanja učencev, staršev in učiteljev o notranjih dejavnikih učne uspešnosti. *Revija za elementarno izobraževanje* 7 (1): 19–32.
- Stempel, Hilary, Matthew Cox-Martin, Michael Bronsert, L. Miriam Dickinson in Mandy A. Allison (2017): Chronic school absenteeism and the role of adverse childhood experiences. *Academic Pediatrics* 17 (8): 837–843.
- Šugman Bohinc, Lea (2011): Učenci z učnimi težavami – izvirni delovni projekt pomoči. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za socialno delo Univerze v Ljubljani.

White, Karl R. (1982): The relation between socioeconomic status and academic achievement. *Psychological Bulletin* 91 (3): 461–481.

VIRI

IBM Corporation (2020): IBM SPSS Statistics for Macintosh, Version 27.0. Armonk: International Business Machines Corporation.

Rains, Mark in Kate McClinn (2013): Resilience questionnaire. Dostopno prek https://www.sos.wa.gov/_assets/library/libraries/projects/earlylearning/resilience_questionnaire_in_english.pdf, 17. 8. 2021.

*Damjan MANDELČ, Vanja GAJIČ****ODNOS VEČINSKEGA PREBIVALSTVA DO
PRISELJENSKIH SKUPNOSTI: CELJE IN PRISELJENCI
ALBANSKE NARODNOSTI****

Povzetek. V članku raziskujemo odnos večinskega prebivalstva tretjega največjega slovenskega mesta Celje do albanske priseljske skupnosti, ki se je v zadnjem obdobju številčno okrepila in med večinskim prebivalstvom generira odklonilni odnos in etnično distanco. Na podlagi teoretskih predpostavk v polju sociologije in migracijskih študij je bil oblikovan raziskovalni načrt z integracijo metod. Analiza rezultatov je pokazala, da ima večinsko prebivalstvo prevladujoče negativen odnos, opazili smo delna ujemanja s predpostavljenimi teoretičnimi izhodišči, pri čemer se je pokazalo, da imajo posameznice z višjo izobrazbo in višjimi dohodki nekoliko bolj naklonjen odnos do priseljencev kot moški respondenti z nižjo izobrazbo in nižjimi prihodki.

Ključni pojmi: priseljenci albanske narodnosti, odnos večinskega prebivalstva, albanofobija, Mestna občina Celje

115**Uvod**

Preteklost je pomembno zaznamovana s selitvami posameznikov in skupin. V sodobnih migracijah sta drugačna obseg le-teh in njihova politizacija (Zavratnik, 2011); nikoli doslej niso bile selitve tako številčne, razloge za povečan obseg pa je iskati tudi v spremenjenih tehnoloških možnostih, kot sta hitrost in dostopnost transporta, ter v mnogih nestabilnih regijah sveta, od koder ljudje migrirajo v varnejša okolja. Priseljske družbe se srečujejo z dilemami integracije priseljencev, ustrezne politike priseljevanja in njihova implementacija so namreč ključ do sožitja med večinskimi in manjšinskimi skupnostmi. Kot ugotavlja Zavratnik, so izzivi sodobnih migracij izzivi liberalni nacionalni državi, ključna vprašanja pa, kako se bo politika soočila s problemi državljanstva, vključno z dimenzijo socialnega državljanstva imigrantov, s participacijo, z vprašanjem tolerance, manjšinskih

* Dr. Damjan Mandelč, izredni profesor, Filozofska fakulteta Univerze v Ljubljani, Slovenija; mag. Vanja Gajič, Filozofska fakulteta Univerze v Ljubljani, Slovenija.

** Izvirni znanstveni članek.

DOI: 10.51936/tip.59.1.115-137

pravic, multikulturalizma in ksenofobije (ibid., 56). Slovenija v tem pogledu ni izjema. Kljub temu da s priseljevanjem intenzivno sooča od 60. let prejšnjega stoletja, državne integracijske politike niso iznašle ustreznega načina za hitrejšo in učinkovitejšo integracijo ter našle ustrezne podpore javnosti, ki še naprej večinsko pričakuje omejevanje priseljevanja. V zadnjem obdobju, še posebej od migrantske krize leta 2015,¹ smo deležni poglobljenih raziskav, primerjalnih, etnografskih in longitudinalnih študij, kamor želimo umestiti tudi naš članek, ki gradi na spoznanjih drugih ter kompleksni fenomen priseljevanja preverja s terensko študijo.

V članku reflektiramo nekatere pretekle in sodobne teoretske zastavitve, da zagotovimo podlago za premišljanje o položaju izbrane priseljenške albanske skupnosti v tretjem največjem slovenskem mestu. Prevprašati želimo odnos večinskega prebivalstva do omenjene priseljenške skupnosti, preveriti, kako dejanske spremembe v demografiji odzvanjajo v njihovih stališčih do priseljevanja, v širši perspektivi pa se sprašujemo tudi o učinkovanju medijskih reprezentacij, o slovenski integracijski politiki ter soočamo svoje empirično raziskovanje z dognanji sorodnih raziskav v polju migracijskih študij. Refleksija takšne vrste se gotovo ne more izogniti vprašanju o sodobnem slovenskem nacionalizmu in z njim povezano albanofobijo. Ob tem dodajmo, da pridobivanje empiričnih podatkov za tovrstno družbeno občutljivo področje, kot je raziskovanje mnenja javnosti o priseljevanju, pri naša številne pasti, ponoviti velja opozorilo, da je javnomnenjska raziskovanja treba dopolnjevati z diskurzivnimi analizami, ki pokažejo na pluralne načine nastajanja mnenj (Pajnik v Zavratnik, 2011: 58).

Pridobljeni podatki Statističnega urada Republike Slovenije (SURS, 2021) izkazujejo, da je prišlo v zadnjem desetletju do povečanja albanske priseljenške skupnosti v Sloveniji. V letu 2018 se je v Mestno občino Celje priselilo 1.076 oseb, 1. januarja 2019 pa je bilo med vsemi prebivalci v Celju zabeleženih 1.012 posameznikov in posameznic s kosovskim državljanstvom. Podatkov o narodnostni sestavi Slovenije in posameznih občin sicer ni mogoče pridobiti, ker se tovrstni podatki na Popisu prebivalstva od leta 2002 ne zbirajo več, zato za jasnejši vpogled uporabljamo razpoložljive podatke o prebivalstvu glede na državljanstvo, saj so kljub pomanjkljivostim najboljši približek dejanskega stanja. Ideja o raziskovanju albanske priseljenške skupnosti izvira iz dveh dejstev: prisotnost albanske skupnosti v Sloveniji se povečuje, obenem pa gre med vsemi priseljenškimi skupinami

¹ *Evropske države so se leta 2015 znašle pod pritiskom prihoda številčnih skupin migrantov, predvsem z območij severne Afrike, Bližnjega vzhoda in srednje Azije, od koder so pred revščino in negotovimi varnostnimi razmerami bežali stotisoči. Slovenija je bila zaradi prehodne geografske lege eno od območij množičnega prehajanja (samo konec leta 2015 več kot 400.000 migrantov, kljub velikim potrebam pa je leta 2015 podelila zgolj 46 statusov azilanta in leta 2016 170 tovrstnih statusov). Dostopno prek http://vlada.arhiv-spletisc.gov.si/pomoc_beguncem/index.html, 4. 7. 2020.*

z območij nekdanje SFRJ za edino neslovansko skupino, in je zato jezi-kovna komponenta pomembna okoliščina, ki prispeva k etnični distanci do priseljske skupnosti.

Temeljno raziskovalno vprašanje, ki smo ga preverjali z naključnim vzorčenjem, je vprašanje o tem, kakšen je odnos večinskega prebivalstva do priseljencev albanske narodnosti v Celju, na kakšen način in na podlagi česa se oblikuje. Članek strukturiramo v dva sklopa: v prvem zastavimo teoretske opredelitve, v drugem predstavimo metodološki okvir ter rezultate. Raziskovalno delo je sledilo štirim korakom, izboru preučevane priseljske skupnosti ter premisleku, ki ga je generiralo frekventno medijsko poročanje in javni diskurz o zadevni skupnosti. Drugi korak je bilo zbiranje dostopnih statističnih podatkov, ki so nakazali demografska ozadja in vzpostavili preliminarni okvir raziskovanja. V tretjem koraku smo opravili pregled raziskav na temo merjenja odnosa do priseljskih skupnosti ter najbolj relevantnih teoretskih pristopov in konceptualnega aparata, ki razlaga naravo in oblike odnosa do priseljevanja. V tem pogledu nismo mogli mimo specifik slovenskega (etno)nacionalizma, ki so že v preteklosti generirale dva ključna stebra formiranja »Drugega«: balkanofobijo in albanofobijo, na eni strani torej etnično distanco do priseljskih skupnosti z območij nekdanje države Jugoslavije in na drugi, bolj specifično, etnično distanco do priseljencev albanske narodnosti. Četrty korak je bila empirična raziskava, ki se je osredotočila na območje Mestne občine Celje, kjer smo v dveh raziskovalnih korakih preverjali odnos večinskega prebivalstva do priseljencev albanske narodnosti: v prvem smo izvedli deset polstrukturiranih intervjujev, ki so nam služili pri opredelitvi elementov, ki generirajo odnos do preučevane priseljske skupnosti. Intervju je zajemal 23 vprašanj, ki smo jih oblikovali na podlagi obstoječih metod polstrukturiranega intervjuja, med njimi so bila nekatera preoblikovana v odprti tip vprašanj. Pridobljeni podatki so služili oblikovanju anketnega vprašalnika, ki je zaradi večje preverljivosti in primerljivosti prav tako zajemal že preverjena in mestoma nekoliko prilagojena vprašanja raziskav, kot sta ESS (Evropska družboslovna raziskava)² in ISSP (Mednarodna družboslovna anketa)³, ki med drugim merijo odnos večinskega prebivalstva do priseljencev. Zanimali so nas mehanizmi, ki vplivajo na prepoznavne poteze odnosa do izbrane skupine priseljencev.

Evropska celina se že vrsto leto sooča z izzivi migracij (Bade, 2005: 7–8), strahovi pred priseljenci se od vrhov politike prelivajo v odnos lokalnega prebivalstva do priseljskih skupnosti, raziskovanje migracij in odnosa do priseljevanja pa se srečuje z dilemami empiričnega preučevanja. Koncept odnosa do izbranega družbenega fenomena je težko merljiv, preučevati

² Dostopno prek <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/country/slovenia/>, 4. 7. 2020.

³ Dostopno prek <https://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/opisi/issp/>, 4. 7. 2020.

ga je mogoče zgolj skozi procese sklepanja in razumevanja posameznih fragmentov in zatem njihovega umeščanja v celoto. Problemi v empiričnem raziskovanju pokažejo na težave pri iskanju odgovora, kako se takšen odnos formira (Blumer, 1969: 90–91). Ker odnosa ni mogoče preučevati kot enotnega koncepta, ga je v okviru odnosa do priseljencev in priseljevanja smiselno preučevati skozi posamezne dejavnike, ki vplivajo na nastanek določene vrste odnosa. Obenem se ob raziskovanju srečujemo z dvema ločenima, četudi vsebinsko sorodnima konceptoma, ne eni strani preučevanja odnosa do priseljencev, na drugi odnosa do priseljevanja. Ker oba izhajata iz enakih teoretskih predpostavk (Ceobanu in Escandell, 2010: 313), ju lahko preučujemo skupaj, čepravno bi bila ločena obravnava obeh ustreznejša, ker se razlike med njima nanašajo na dejstvo, da je mogoče znotraj odnosa do priseljencev zaslediti večjo mero etničnih predsodkov kot v odnosu do priseljske politike, ki se bolj navezuje na dojemanje ekonomskih in družbenih posledic priseljevanja za celotno družbo (Barcelo, 2016: 88–89). Na tem mestu zato metodološko pojasnilo, da oba koncepta obravnavamo skupaj, na mestih, kjer je to mogoče, pa izpostavimo razlikovanje med njima. Kot pokaže Javdani (2020: 3), na odnos do priseljencev vplivajo tako osebne značilnosti in kvalifikacije priseljencev (izobrazba, dohodek, znanje jezika) kot osebne značilnosti med respondenti večinske skupnosti (starost, izobrazba, politična orientacija), zato odnosa do priseljencev in priseljevanja ni mogoče preučevati izključno skozi stališča večinskega prebivalstva.

Glede na izjemno heterogeno področje se obračamo h klasičnim in novejšim pristopom, ki omogočajo raznovrstne poglede na preučevanje odnosa do priseljencev in priseljevanja. Obstoječe študije se v pomembni meri osredotočajo na evropski prostor, kjer je bilo opravljenih veliko visokokakovostnih raziskav (Barcelo, 2016: 87–88), obenem pa se naslanjamo tudi na ameriške tradicije pri preučevanju odnosov do priseljencev in priseljevanja, v katerih najdemo raznovrstne teoretske pristope predvsem glede na ekonomske značilnosti (Dennison in Dražanova, 2018: 33).

Simbolični interakcionizem

V najširšem smislu sega teoretično preučevanje odnosov v okvir teorij simboličnega interakcionalizma, ki orisuje, kako posamezniki oblikujejo odnos do sebe in drugih ter širše družbe skozi proces komunikativne interakcije z drugimi (Chandler in Tsai, 2001: 178). Simbolični interakcionizem zajema ugotavljanje pomena dejanj ali opazk druge osebe, razlago in prenos znakov drugi osebi, kako naj ta ravna (Mead v Blumer, 1969: 65–66). Za sociološko misel je značilno, da redko obravnava družbo kot skupek posameznikov, ki imajo lastno sebstvo; skupnosti opazuje kot organizme,

ki imajo svojo organizacijo in se odzivajo na različne dejavnike, kot so družbeni sistem, družbena struktura, kultura, status, družbene vloge, institucije, norme, vrednote itd. Ljudje naj bi se torej obnašali na določen način prav zaradi vpliva omenjenih dejavnikov. Vendar takšni dejavniki postavljajo zgolj okvir za posameznikova dejanja, ne določajo pa dejanj samih (ibid., 78–88).

Koncept simboličnega interakcionalizma nima osrednjega mesta v preučevanju odnosa do priseljencev, je pa skoraj v vseh primerih vsaj delno izhodiščna teorija za vse nadaljnje teoretske pristope, med katerimi je najbolj smiselno omeniti dve tradiciji: politično-ekonomsko in socio-psihološko tradicijo. Prva razlaga odnos do priseljavanja na podlagi ekonomskega interesa v kontekstu tekmovanja med domačini in priseljenci glede dostopa do družbenih virov, situacije na trgu dela in državne blaginje, socio-psihološki dejavniki pa se osredinijo na vpliv medskupinskih odnosov in simboličnih interakcij, ki temeljijo na rasi, religiji, običajih, tradicijah ter pripisanih značilnostih posameznikov (Javdani, 2020: 1–3). Kot ugotavljamo v luči raziskovanja odnosa do albanskih priseljencev, ima slednja večji vpliv na oblikovanje odnosa, zato se osredotočamo prav na socio-psihološke dejavnike.

Politično-ekonomska tradicija

Teorije politično-ekonomske tradicije v splošnem izhajajo iz ekonomskih vplivov priseljavanja in razlagajo odnos do priseljavanja glede na osebni interes posameznika. Vpliv ekonomskih dejavnikov se v grobem navezuje na strukturo delovne sile v državi priseljavanja, znotraj omenjene tradicije pa se strokovnjaki na empirični ravni ukvarjajo predvsem s tekmovalnostjo med večinskim prebivalstvom in priseljenci za družbene vire, pri čemer gre tako za situacijo, vezano za trg dela, kot za stroške, ki jih oblast namenja priseljavanju. Gre torej za poudarek na osebnem materialnem interesu, tako znotraj trga dela kot skozi davke in transferje (Hainmueller in Hopkins, 2014), pri čemer se posameznikov odnos do priseljavanja oblikuje na podlagi ne samo omenjenega osebnega ekonomskega interesa, temveč tudi interesa skupine, s katero se posameznik identificira (Dennison in Dražanova, 2018: 6).

Politično-ekonomski model predvideva, da porast nizkokvalificirane priseljske delovne sile povečuje ponudbo nizkokvalificiranih delovnih mest, nižanje plač in stopnjo zaposlenosti nizkokvalificiranega večinskega prebivalstva ter povišanje plač visokokvalificirani domači delovni sili (Hainmuller in Hopkins, 2014). Na drugi strani naj bi pritok visokokvalificirane priseljske delovne sile imel obratni učinek, saj bi zmanjšal ponudbo nizkokvalificirane delovne sile. Prevladujoči hipotezi sta, da so nizkokvalificirani delavci

bolj nagnjeni k nasprotovanju priseljevanja nizkokvalificirane delovne sile, višje izobraženi delavci pa imajo do tovrstnega priseljevanja pozitivnejši odnos (Javdani, 2020: 5). Prav tako naj bi bilo pri slednjih zaslediti manj etnocentričnega sentimenta in več razumevanja za kulturno raznolikost ter bolj pozitiven pogled na ekonomske posledice migracij (Hainmueller in Hopkins, 2014: 4–5), medtem ko slabše ekonomske in socialne razmere posameznika vodijo do negativnega odnosa do priseljevanja (Dennison in Dražanova, 2018: 6). Pozitivna korelacija med kompetencami delavca (kar zajema posameznikovo izobrazbo in osebni dohodek) in njegovim odnosom do priseljevanja naj bi bila značilna za države, kjer je večinsko prebivalstvo bolj izobraženo kot priseljenci. Pri tem je treba opozoriti, da se korelacija med stopnjo izobrazbe in podpiranjem priseljevanja ne navezuje samo na posameznikovo ekonomsko situacijo, temveč tudi na razlike v kulturnih vrednotenjih in prepričanjih o družbenih posledicah priseljevanja. Poleg osebnega interesa igra pomembno vlogo pri oblikovanju odnosa tudi širše ekonomsko stanje v državi. Posamezniki, zaposleni v rastočih sektorjih, naj bi bili bolj pozitivno naravnani do priseljevanja. Po drugi strani strah, povezan s tekmovanjem na trgu dela, nima tako močnega učinka na oblikovanje odnosa, saj tako visoko- kot nizkokvalificirani posamezniki izražajo bolj pozitiven odnos do visokokvalificirane delovne sile in bolj negativen odnos do priseljevanja nizkokvalificirane delovne sile. To vodi do zaključka, da sfera trga dela ni močan indikator odnosov večinskega prebivalstva do priseljencev (Hainmueller in Hopkins, 2014: 3–6). Odnos do priseljevanja poleg trga dela oblikujejo tudi predstave o stroških in finančnem bremenu, ki ga ima država s priseljenci. Prevladuje prepričanje, da so nizkokvalificirani priseljenci veliko finančno breme, saj se z njihovim povečanjem povečujejo tudi davki, ki prizadenejo večinsko prebivalstvo. Ugodnosti, ki jih uživajo nizkokvalificirani priseljeni delavci, naj bi presegali višino davkov, ki jih plačujejo. Tako naj bi tudi domačini z višjimi dohodki bolj nasprotovali nizkokvalificirani priseljeni delovni sili in po drugi strani podpirali visokokvalificirano priseljeno delovno silo. Posledično pripelje ta predpostavka do zaključka, da premožnejše pripadnike večinskega prebivalstva bolj skrbi za višje državne stroške in so posledično manj naklonjeni priseljevanju (ibid.).

Poleg delovanja države v zvezi s priseljevanjem se politično-ekonomska teorija ukvarja tudi z vplivom kvalitete delovanja demokratične države pri izpolnjevanju svojih odgovornosti, kar merimo na podlagi predstave o varnosti sosesk, korupcije, kriminala ipd., na takšni podlagi pa se oblikuje odnos posameznikov do priseljevanja in posledično priseljencev (Dennison in Dražanova, 2018: 7). Raziskave med drugim kažejo, da večina prebivalcev razvitih držav preferira strožje politike priseljevanja, ki bi omejile prihod priseljencev, še posebej tistih z drugačnim etničnim ozadjem (Javdani, 2020). Podatki sedmega kroga raziskav o odnosu do priseljencev in njihovih

potomcev za države EU kažejo, da ima evropska javnost nekoliko pozitivnejši pogled na priseljence z enakim etničnim ozadjem in bolj negativen odnos do priseljencev iz revnejših držav zunaj Evrope. Omenjeni podatki odsevajo težave oblikovalcev politik priseljevanja pri regulaciji pričakovani evropske javnosti (European Social Survey, 2016: 12). Dejstvo, da se evropska javnost nagiba k strožji politiki priseljevanja, je v korelaciji z negativnim pogledom na ekonomske posledice priseljevanja, strahom pred porastom kriminala in negativnim vplivom priseljevanja na večinsko kulturo, s podporo homogenosti družbe, občutkom nacionalnega ponosa in patriotizma ter nizko željo po stopanju v stike s priseljenci (Javdani, 2020).

Socio-psihološka tradicija

Socio-psihološka tradicija je v primerjavi s politično-ekonomskim pristopom bolj heterogena in zajema vse družbene (tako ekonomske kot kulturne) dejavnike, ki vplivajo na državo priseljevanja, obenem pa razlaga vpliv ekonomskega interesa z upoštevanjem globljih, zavednih in nezavednih, preferenc posameznikov do oblikovanja homogene družbe ter strahu pred ogroženostjo kulturne in etnične identitete (Javdani, 2020: 77). Znotraj tega pristopa gre predvsem za fokus na relevantnost medskupinskih odnosov in simbolov, ki oblikujejo odnos do priseljevanja, vključno z dejstvom, da odnos do priseljevanja oblikujejo raznolikosti med priseljenci in domačini, ki izhajajo iz etničnega ozadja, religije in drugih askriptivnih značilnosti posameznikov. Ena veja pristopa poudarja pomembnost občutka ogroženosti lastne skupine in s tem potrebo po asimilaciji priseljencev (predvsem kar zadeva znanje večinskega jezika). Druga veja se osredotoča na stereotipe in predsodke do priseljencev, v veliki meri v navezavi na vpliv medijev in stikov na lokalni ravni (Hainmueller in Hopkins, 2014: 7).

Pri preučevanju odnosa do priseljencev je prišlo do širšega konsenza, da je tovrsten odnos najpogosteje preučevan prav skozi teorije medskupinskih odnosov (prim. Berry, 2001 in Ceobanu in Escandell, 2010). Avtorji v grobem vztrajajo pri dveh teoretskih pristopih: individualnem in kolektivnem oz. kontekstualnem (Ceobanu in Escandell, 2010; Rustenbach, 2010). Individualni se v tem kontekstu navezuje na razlike v stopnji izobrazbe, osebnem dohodku, zaposlitvenem statusu in drugih pripisanih značilnosti priseljencev in domačinov ter na specifične kulturne razlike, medtem ko se kolektivni pristop ukvarja predvsem s številom priseljencev in stopnjo brezposelnosti v državi (Botrić, 2016; Javdani, 2020). V raziskavah o percipiranih posledicah priseljevanja in oblikovanju odnosa do priseljevanja prevladujeta dva vplivnejša pristopa v proučevanju medskupinskih odnosov: teorija realnega konflikta in pristop skozi socialno identiteto. Prva se nanaša na to, da se odnos do drugih skupin določa skozi tekmovalnost za družbene

vire, druga pa, da pripadnost in istovetenje z lastno skupino oblikujeta negativni odnos do druge skupine. Kot omenja Botrić (2010), imajo v skladu s tovrstno opredelitvijo v kontekstu preučevanja stališč do priseljevanja in priseljencev velik pomen tako socio-ekonomski pokazatelji kot identitetni in simbolni interesi. (2010: 423). Chandler in Tsai (2001) se v svoji študiji o vplivu posameznih družbenih dejavnikov na odnos do priseljencev ukvarjata s sklopi, ki razlagajo vpliv stopnje izobrazbe in vpliv dojemanja kulturnih groženj ter ideologij posameznika (politična prepričanja, predispozicije in vrednote) na oblikovanje odnosa do priseljevanja. V prvi vrsti gre za pripisane značilnosti, kot so spol, starost in etnično ozadje, obenem se mnenja oblikujejo tudi na podlagi osebnih interesov (ekonomska varnost, višina dohodkov) posameznikov. Zadnji sklop vključuje Tajflav prispevek (2001: 178) o socialni identifikaciji in skupinski kategorizaciji. Kategorizacija ljudi v skupine ima namreč precejšnje posledice tako znotraj kot zunaj skupin, saj povečuje razlike med skupinami in pripomore k temu, da člani preferirajo lastno skupino. Izpostavljeni avtorji vztrajajo na tezi, da večina ljudi poseduje tovrstne predispozicije, ki so posledica politične socializacije (ibid., 175–179). V luči procesov globalizacije, glocalizacije in transkultuiracije je navzočnost priseljskih skupnosti bistveno prispevala k »defiksaciji« pojma homogene nacionalne identitete (Jurić Pahor, 2020: 569), kar pomeni pomemben korak k postnacionalizmu ter večkulturnosti sodobnih družb, obenem pa med večinskim prebivalstvom sproža zaskrbljenost in izgubo občutka ontološke varnosti.

Priseljenci albanske narodnosti v Sloveniji in Celju

V Sloveniji je leta 2018 prebivalo približno 250.000 priseljencev, kar predstavlja 12,1 % celotnega prebivalstva, med državami EU je Slovenija po deležu priseljencev uvrščena na 16. mesto. V Sloveniji še vedno prevladujejo priselenci iz nekdanje Jugoslavije, med katerimi jih je največ iz Bosne in Hercegovine (43 % vseh priseljencev). Hkrati je mogoče zaslediti tudi povečanje števila priseljencev s Kosova, glede na podatke SURS-a (2018) jih je bilo v primerjavi z letom 2007 dvakrat več. Popis prebivalstva od leta 2002 dalje ne ponuja podatka o narodni oziroma etnični identiteti, še vedno pa se zbirajo podatki o prebivalstvu glede na državljanstvo, ki vsaj okvirno pokažejo delež priseljencev albanske narodnosti v Sloveniji. Po podatkih SURS-a zasedajo priselenci s Kosova v Sloveniji drugo mesto (16.748)⁴, število priseljencev s kosovskim državljanstvom se je v Sloveniji od leta 2011, ko jih je bilo zabeleženo 9.034, do leta 2019 dvignilo na 16.748.

⁴ *Priseljencev albanske narodnosti, ki se priselijo iz Severne Makedonije, ta številka ne zajema, prav tako tudi ne tistih z državljanstvom Republike Albanije.*

Podoben trend je opaziti tudi na primeru Celja, kjer prebivalci s kosovskim državljanstvom zasedajo drugo mesto (1.012) za prebivalci z državljanstvom Bosne in Hercegovine (2.934).

V zgodnjem poosamosvojitvenem obdobju, v katerem je zaradi vojaških spopadov na Kosovu v Slovenijo zgolj leta 1999 pribežalo 2.500 beguncev (Kalčič, 2007: 11), so Albanci v Slovenijo prihajali predvsem kot ekonomski migranti, pri čemer je šlo za »gastarbajtersko« priseljevanje z gospodarsko manj razvitih območij nekdanje skupne države (Dolenc, 2007: 89). V obdobju med letoma 2002 in 2006 se selitvena gibanja v Sloveniji precej povečajo in celo presežejo rekordne vrednosti iz sredine 80. let. Po vstopu Slovenije v EU so priseljenici iz bivše skupne države predstavljali kar 85% vseh priselitev tujcev, pri čemer izstopata državi Bosna in Hercegovina ter (nekdanja) Srbija in Črna gora (ibid., 91–93). V letu 2002 je albanščino kot materni jezik navedlo 7.177 prebivalcev Slovenije, kar nakazuje porast omejene priseljenke skupnosti (Josipović, 2009: 33).

Odnos večinskega prebivalstva do priseljencev v pomembni meri oblikujejo ekonomski dejavniki, ki se navezujejo na zaposlitveni status priseljencev, priseljenici navadno zasedajo delovna mesta, ki jih lokalno prebivalstvo ne želi opravljati. Potrebe po nekvalificirani delovni sili v Sloveniji tako zapolnjujejo prav priseljenici. Njihovo število iz nekdanje skupne države je v Sloveniji visoko v prvi vrsti zaradi geografske bližine, obenem pa se prav ta skupina v Sloveniji srečuje z različnimi oblikami izkoriščanja in diskriminacije ter jih posledično ob padcu povpraševanja delodajalci hitro vrnejo v državo, od koder so prišli (Medica in Lukić, 2011: 70). V Sloveniji je bilo leta 2020 med približno 17.000 priseljenici albanske narodnosti 9.711 delovno aktivnih, med njimi prevladujejo moški, ki predstavljajo 8.747 delovno aktivnih oseb, medtem ko so ženske zaposlene v znatno manjši meri (964 oseb) (SURs, 2020). Albanski priseljenici se največ zaposlujejo v sektorjih predelovalne dejavnosti (1412 oseb) in gradbeništva (6827 oseb). Tudi za izobrazbeno strukturo je mogoče pokazati, da je ta v povprečju nižja od večinskega prebivalstva. Med vsemi priseljenici imajo najvišjo izobrazbo priseljenici iz Črne gore, Češke in Poljske, Bošnjaki, Albanci in Romi pa so v povprečju manj izobraženi (Medvešek et al., 2009: 30). Statistika izkazuje, da jih ima od 9.711 priseljencev s Kosova največ osnovnošolsko izobrazbo (5.338), sledijo tisti s srednješolsko izobrazbo (4.301), najmanj pa je takih z višje- ali visokošolsko izobrazbo (72).

Albanofobija, medijske reprezentacije in politike priseljevanja

Albanofobija je eden od atributov novejšega slovenskega nacionalizma. Z njo označujemo predsodke, etnično distanco, diskriminacijo in ksenofobijo do Albancev in priseljencev albanske narodnosti. Termin je mogoče

razumeti v dveh pomenih: v ksenofobnem kontekstu, ki zajema stereotipe o Albancih v državah z visokim številom albanskih priseljencev, ter v nacionalističnem kontekstu, povezanem s stereotipi o Albancih v državah, kjer poteka odprti konflikt med večinskim prebivalstvom in albansko etnično manjšino (Albanian Studies, 2020). Po takem razumevanju sodi Slovenija v prvo skupino, zato pojav albanofobije obravnavamo skozi prizmo ksenofobije. Takšen strah, povezan z antipatijo do določenih skupnosti, žal hitro postane sovraštvo do tujcev, drugih etničnih skupin ter kultur in njihovih vrednot (Mandelc, 2011: 140). Balibar dokazuje, da je teritorij zamišljene evropske skupnosti med drugim oblikovala tudi opozicija do Turkov, muslimanov, temnopoltih in drugih južnih narodov. Ker gre pri albanskem narodu za neslovansko poreklo, ki (prevladujoče) prakticira islam, bi mogli albanofobijo, torej odnos do albanske priseljske skupnosti v Sloveniji, razumeti tudi v luči Saidovega koncepta orienta (Vidmar Horvat, 2004: 113–117), ki je najpogostejše v službi kulturnega imperializma in večvrednosti. Ker se Slovenija nahaja blizu stičišča zahodnega, pravoslavnega in islamskega sveta, se v glavah nacionalistov krepi percepcija branika »zahodne civilizacije«. Socio-ekonomski in politični prelom v zgodnjih devetdesetih je skupaj s tranzicijo, ki mu je sledila, ponudil plodna tla za razraščanje nestrpnosti in diskriminacije, ki je v Sloveniji kulminirala v diskriminacijo in predsodke do postjugoslovanskih skupnosti, ki so ob osamosvojitvi živele na ozemlju Slovenije. Nestrpnost do priseljencev z območij skupne države ima sicer daljšo brado, povezana je s priseljevanjem v Slovenijo v 60. in 70. letih 20. stoletja (Mandelc, 2011: 141), a je bila v prejšnjem političnem sistemu utišana in je šele skozi proces oblikovanja nacionalne države postala izrazitejša.

Berishaj v članku *Albanci v Sloveniji: različnost percepcij* (2004) izpostavi dve najbolj pogosti stereotipizirani predstavi o Albancih, zadržanost v komuniciranju ter slabše znanje slovenskega jezika (ibid., 138). Na podlagi kvalitativne raziskave, ki smo jo opravili v prvi fazi raziskovanja (intervjuji), smo med respondenti evidentirali tudi nekatere druge predsodke, denimo o temnejši polti, o »problemu« zakrivanja žensk, motenju javnega miru ter o povezavah s kriminalom in nasiljem.

Kot ugotavljata Dennison in Dražanova (2018: 8), mediji v pomembni meri oblikujejo odnos do priseljevanja in priseljencev, imajo monopol nad produkcijo in distribucijo informacij, dostop do tega monopola pa imajo politične elite, ki sooblikujejo poglede širše javnosti (Bučar Ručman, 2011: 23). Ko pride do poročanja o marginaliziranih skupinah, je moč opaziti, da mediji prevladujoče ponujajo eno vrsto diskurza, redki so tisti, v katerih novinarji ponujajo pluralen pogled in dajejo glas tudi preslišanim in marginaliziranim (Pajnik, 2003: 87–88). Prejemniki medijskih vsebin seveda ne sprejemajo informacij povsem pasivno, ampak so z njimi v interakciji,

pogosto jih s pomočjo poobjav na družbenih omrežjih tudi soustvarjajo. Ker marginalizirane skupine niso tržno zanimive, najdejo mesto v medijskih objavah najpogosteje takrat, ko je govora o kriminaliteti. Prav kriminalizacija marginaliziranih skupin je eden od načinov, ki reproducira govor o izbrani manjšinski skupnosti kot (varnostnem) problemu. Takšna reprezentacija etničnih manjšin je v medijskem kontekstu samoumevna in na manjšinsko prebivalstvo aplicira stereotipe in predsodke, pogosto brez preverbe in dokazov (Pajnik, 2003: 88–89), posameznikom pripisuje kolektivno krivdo, skupina je zato v očeh občinstva percipirana kot nezaželena in kot potencialna grožnja. Še ena manipulativna oblika je strategija diferenciacije, njena skrajna forma vodi v dehumanizacijo celotne manjšinske skupnosti. Gre za utrjevanje predsodkov, za večinsko skupnost se uporabi diskurz žrtve, kar dodatno prispeva k legitimaciji sovražnega govora do targetirane skupnosti (ibid., 89–91).

Omenjene strategije lahko opazujemo tudi z natančnim pregledom medijskega portretiranja priseljencev albanske narodnosti v Celju in Sloveniji, kjer je poročanje večinoma negativno, priseljence povezuje s kriminalom. Pregled spletnih člankov,⁵ ki so v zadnjih letih pokrivali dogajanje v Celju, pokaže, da sta o priseljenkih v novicah uravnoteženo poročala zgolj portala rtslo.si in delo.si, drugi analizirani mediji pa so se posluževali negativnega portretiranja in poročanja.⁶ Poleg spletnih medijev so poligon za izražanje sovražnosti tudi družbena omrežja in forumi, na katerih anonimni avtorji obračunavajo s albanskimi priseljenki v sovražnih, nasilnih in skrajnih komentarjih.⁷

Poleg medijskih reprezentacij igra pomembno vlogo pri oblikovanju albanofobije med večinskim prebivalstvom tudi politika priseljavanja, ki je navkljub nominalno demokratičnim in evropskim standardom izključujoča in restriktivna (Kralj, 2008: 171). Ne samo v Sloveniji, politike priseljavanja so postale izpostavljen družbeni in politični problem v celotni EU. Namesto upravljanja migracij se države ukvarjajo z njihovim preprečevanjem, kar v javnosti odzvanja na način, da še povečuje negativno dožemanje migracij, priseljenkam pa se onemogoča polnopravno članstvo v politični sferi in se jih postavlja v vlogo Drugega (Učakar, 2017: 13). Evropa je postala »trdnjava«,

⁵ Opravili smo pregled naslednjih spletnih medijev: Nova24TV, Radio 1, Novice.si, Sobotainfo, Delo, RTV SLO, Dnevnik, Media24, Reporter, Demokracija, Primorska 24.si in Slovenske novice.

⁶ Prostorska omejitev onemogoča podrobnejšo predstavitev in analizo, omenimo zato zgolj nekaj izpostavljenih primerov naslovov: »Srhljivo: Dvašet Albancev nad celjske dijake z bejzbolskimi palicami« (Nova24TV, 2016), »Mladoletni Kosovci napadli dijaka, ju ob tem hudo pretepli in z njima poniževalno ravnali« (Sobotainfo.si, 2016), »Velenje postaja albanska oaza, priseljenci izkoriščajo Slovenijo« (Glücks, 2018), »Prvi uradni jezik na OŠ Jakoba Aljaža v Kranju albanščina« (Nova24TV, 2020), »Organizirani socialni kriminal: Med priseljenki s Kosova se stopnjujejo zlorabe socialnega sistema« (Glücks, 2020).

⁷ Primer tovrstnega diskurza, ki se nanaša na Celje: Politični čvek: »Mladoletni Albanci v Celju spet ustrahujejo« – grozljivo« (Gogliini, 2016).

osrednji fokus je namenjen varovanju meja in okrepljenim nadzorom nad priseljivanjem (ibid., 2017: 26–28). Med večinskim prebivalstvom se krepi strah pred priseljenci, ki naj bi Evropejcem jemali delovna mesta, pomenili naj bi breme za socialno državo, ogrožali večinsko kulturo in prispevali k višji stopnji kriminala (Bešter, 2003: 2).

Stališča stroke in evropskih institucij so sicer korak v pravo smer; govorijo o potrebi po oblikovanju vključujoče in strpne družbe, ki različnim etničnim manjšinam omogoča mirno sobivanje z večinskim prebivalstvom, v nasprotnem primeru pride do razraščanja diskriminacije, socialne izključenosti in ksenofobije (Entzinger in Biezeveld, 2003: 3–4), vendar je pristojnost oblikovanja priseljenke zakonodaje v rokah nacionalnih politik, pri čemer populizem in notranjepolitične kalkulacije zameglijo pogled in potrebe tako večinske skupnosti kot manjšinskih, priseljenkih. Temeljni dokument, ki določa slovensko politiko priseljivanja, je Resolucija o migracijski politiki Republike Slovenije (ReIPRS, 1999), in zajema zaščito beguncev in prosilcev za azil, integracijo v slovensko družbo in preprečevanje nedovoljenih migracij. Stališča Resolucije se uresničujejo skozi Zakon o tujcih, Zakon o azilu in Zakon o nadzoru državnih meja, ki deluje v skladu s postopki vključevanja v EU in schengensko območje. Kasneje jo je v luči vse kompleksnejših migracijskih dinamik in potrebe po približevanju EU leta 2002 dopolnila Resolucija o migracijski politiki (ReMPRS, 2002), ki je prinesla konkretnejše aktivnosti in ukrepe za uveljavitev migracijske politike, ki bi bila v skladu z evropskim pravnim redom in temeljnimi evropskimi načeli (European Migration Network, 2020).

Za slovensko integracijsko politiko je značilen pluralistični model, ki priseljencem nominalno omogoča enakopravno vključitev v slovensko družbo, hkrati pa jih podpira pri ohranitvi kulturne identitete. Omenjeni model je zajet v obeh resolucijah o migracijski politiki, temelji na načelih svobode, enakopravnosti in vzajemnega sodelovanja, hkrati pa zajema še aktivno preprečevanje diskriminacije, ksenofobije in rasizma. Žal na zakonski ravni ni prišlo do proaktivnega preprečevanja diskriminacije (Bešter, 2003: 14–16), in četudi je diskriminacija nezakonita, to ne velja za predsodke in stereotipe, ki generirajo subtilno diskriminacijo, ki pa se v pravnih kontekstih ne kaznuje (Brezigar, 2005: 183).

Omenjene okoliščine, ki zajemajo razraščanje albanofobije, negativno medijsko portretiranje albanskih priseljencev in restriktivne politike priseljivanja, sooblikujejo splošno družbeno vzdušje in prevladujoč negativen odnos do albanskih priseljencev. Takšno korelacijo lahko pokažemo na primeru odgovorov naših intervjuvancev, ki – četudi podrobnosti slovenske priseljenke politike po lastnih besedah ne poznajo najbolje – jo prevladujoče ocenjujejo kot neučinkovito in kaotično. Večina od desetih intervjuvancev očita albanskim priseljencem zapiranje vase, pomanjkljivo znanje jezika

večine in premalo vloženega truda v učenje slovenščine, kritični so do kriterijev, po katerih se albanskim priseljencem dovoljuje priselitev v Slovenijo. Ponudimo lahko oceno, da ozadje oziroma širši družbeni kontekst vpliva na mnenja sogovornic in sogovornikov, vključenih v raziskavo.

Empirična raziskava in metode raziskovanja

Kombinirana metoda je bila izvedena v dveh korakih. Najprej so bili izvedeni intervjuji, zatem pa še zaprti anketni vprašalnik, ki je bil oblikovan na podlagi ugotovitev, pridobljenih z intervjuji in že izvedenih raziskav na temo priseljevanja in odnosa do priseljencev. Deset polstrukturiranih intervjujev smo opravili na priložnostnem vzorcu z namenom, da se evidentirajo prevladujoči pogledi na priseljence albanske narodnosti (stereotipi, prepričanja in predsodki). Intervjuvanci, naključno izbrani na terenu iz splošne lokalne populacije, so bili pred izvedbo pogovora seznanjeni s tematiko, vprašanja so zajemala ključne demografske podatke, sledila so vprašanja, vezana na odnos do albanskih priseljencev v Sloveniji s poudarkom na albanskih priseljenicah v Celju. Vzorec je zajemal 5 intervjuvank in 5 intervjuvancev, starih med 21 in 56 let, vsi prebivajo v Mestni občini Celje. Intervjuji so se odvijali na javnih mestih in so trajali med 30 in 60 minut.

V drugem koraku smo uporabili metodo anketnega vprašalnika zaprtega tipa, ki je zajemal 35 vprašanj. Za izvedbo smo uporabili spletno stran 1KA. Spletni vprašalnik je bil aktiven med 10. in 29. avgustom 2020; da bi dosegli čim več ljudi, smo ga delili prek družbenih omrežij. Izpolnjevanje je v povprečju trajalo 10 minut, vseh 176 vprašalnikov je bilo izpolnjenih v celoti. Podatke oziroma odgovore smo izvozili v program za obdelavo podatkov SPSS.

Na naše izhodiščno vprašanje o odnosu večinskega prebivalstva Celja do priseljencev albanske narodnosti smo odgovarjali s pomočjo korelacij med podatki, pridobljenimi z intervjuji in anketo, pri čemer smo analizo omejili na naslednje indikatorje: spol, stopnja izobrazbe in višina mesečnega neto dohodka na gospodinjstvo.

Z vprašanji smo preverjali stališča in ocene respondentov o številu albanskih priseljencev v Celju, učinkih priseljevanja albanskih priseljencev, stopnji asimilacije albanskih priseljencev, stikih s priseljenici ter vplivih priseljevanja na gospodarstvo, kulturo, vero in stopnjo kriminala.

Interpretacija rezultatov anketnega vprašalnika

V raziskavi je sodelovalo več respondentk (57%) kot respondentov (41%), 2% respondentov spola nista hotela opredeliti. Starostna struktura respondentov zajema letnice rojstva od 1932 do 2003, pri čemer je največ

anketirancev rojenih leta 1991 (17 %) in 1992 (11 %). Med anketiranimi jih ima največ končano višjo, visoko šolo ali fakulteto (50 %), na drugem mestu so tisti s končanim poklicnim izobraževanjem ali srednjo šolo (24 %), sledijo posamezniki s končanim magisterijem in doktoratom (22 %). Po narodnosti so bili respondenti v največjem odstotku slovenske narodnosti (81 %), sledila je srbska (13 %), hrvaška (10 %), bošnjaška (3 %), črnogorska (2 %), makedonska in albanska (po 1 %) narodnost, 5 % respondentov pa označilo kategorijo »drugo«. Med sodelujočimi jih je 67 % s statusom zaposlenega, 9 % s statusom nezaposlenega, ostalo pa so predstavljali študentje in dijaki (13 %), upokojenci (5 %), gospodinje (2 %), 2 % sta neopredeljena.

Glede višine dohodka na gospodinjstvo rezultati pokažejo, da jih 12 % prejema med 300 in 800 EUR, 39 % med 800 in 1.500 EUR ter 36 % nad 1.500 EUR. Z domačim mestom jih je močno povezanih 68 %, 32 % jih na domači kraj ni preveč navezanih. Na vprašanje o učinkovitosti slovenske priseljske politike je zgolj 9 % z njo zadovoljnih, vsi ostali so z njenim delovanjem nezadovoljni oziroma močno nezadovoljni. Zadnji sklop vprašanj glede stikov s priseljenci albanske narodnosti je pokazal, da jih ima 11 % stike večkrat tedensko, 8 % jih ima stike vsak dan, 4 % večkrat mesečno, 5 % enkrat mesečno ali manj, preostali se do stikov s pripadniki manjšine niso opredelili.


Rezultati in vsebinska analiza

V nadaljevanju izpostavljam nekaj za našo analizo in interpretacijo ključnih podatkov, na podlagi katerih smo se opredeljevali so prevladujočega odnosa večinskega prebivalstva do albanske priseljske skupnosti.

Večina respondentov (91 %) ocenjuje, da se je število priseljencev v Celje v zadnjem desetletju povečalo, obenem pričakuje (Graf 1), da bo Slovenija v prihodnjem desetletju priselitev v državo omogočila le nekaterim (45 %) oziroma zelo redkim (32 %). Ocenimo lahko, da večina sodelujočih izpostavlja potrebo po omejevanju priseljevanja oseb albanske narodnosti in da takšno stališče izraža negativni pogled na priseljsko skupnost.


Kot je razvidno iz grafa 2, v sklopu, ki se nanaša na oceno kakovosti bivanja v Celju glede na priseljevanje oseb albanske narodnosti, večina (54 %) ocenjuje, da je postalo Celje slabše mesto za bivanje, da se bo kakovost bivanja v naslednjem desetletju v tem kontekstu še poslabšala, meni 62 % respondentov. Enak delež jih ocenjuje, da se stopnja nestrpnosti v primerjavi s preteklimi leti narasla, medtem ko jih zgolj 25 % meni, da je stopnja nestrpnosti ostala nespremenjena oziroma se je zmanjšala (6 %). Tudi v tem segmentu prepoznamo, da respondenti prisotnost omenjene skupnosti glede na kakovost bivanja označuje kot negativno.

Graf 1: V KOLIKŠNEM OBSEGU NAJ SLOVENIJA DOVOLI PRISELJEVANJE LJUDI ALBANSKE NARODNOSTI?



Vir: Lastni prikaz.

Graf 2: ALI MENITE, DA BO CELJE V PRIHODNOSTI ZARADI PRISELJEVANJA ALBANSKE NARODNOSTI POSTALO SLABŠE ALI BOLJŠE MESTO ZA BIVANJE?




Vir: Lastni prikaz.

Vprašanje o stopnji asimilacije albanskih priseljencev (Graf 3) je pokazalo, da 40 % respondentov ocenjuje, da priseljenci niso dovolj asimilirani, 29 % jih meni, da sploh niso asimilirani, 19 % pa, da so asimilirani do neke mere. Na vprašanje o znanju slovenskega jezika med albanskimi priseljenci jih 45 % meni, da albanski priseljenci ne obvladajo slovenskega jezika, visokih 61 % respondentov je mnenja, da albanskim priseljencem ne bi smeli omogočati šolanja v njihovem jeziku, zgolj 1 % jih meni, da bi jim takšno šolanje morali omogočiti.

Pomemben vidik sprejemanja omenjene skupnosti v okolju je merilo vprašanje (Graf 4) o tem, ali bi jih motilo, če bi v ulici ali soseski živele večje število priseljencev albanske narodnosti. 36 % respondentov bi to motilo, 24 % bi to zelo motilo, verjetno (46 %) oziroma zagotovo (31 %) se jih ne bi preselilo v ulico ali sosesko, kjer bi živele večje število albanskih priseljencev.


Graf 3: ALI BI VAS MOTILO, ČE BI V VAŠI ULICI ALI SOSESKI ŽIVELO VEČJE ŠTEVILO PRISELJENCEV ALBANSKE NARODNOSTI?



Vir: Lastni prikaz.

Ker nam omejitve prostora ne omogočajo predstavitev vseh elementov, želimo v skrženi obliki predstaviti še nekatere druge izsledke, s pomočjo katerih bomo v sklepnem delu odgovorili na izhodiščno raziskovalno vprašanje.

Graf 4: ČE BI SE ODLOČALI ZA SELITEV: ALI BI SE PRISELILI V ULICO ALI SOSESKO, KJER BI ŽIVELO VEČJE ŠTEVILO PRISELJENCEV ALBANSKE NARODNOSTI?



Vir: Lastni prikaz

Respondenti so na vprašanja o vplivu priseljevanja omenjene skupnosti na gospodarstvo v 38% odgovorili, da je priseljevanje slabo za slovensko gospodarstvo, 38% jih meni, da ni niti slabo niti dobro, 13% jih je mnenja, da je priseljevanje Albancev za slovensko ekonomijo dobro. 47% jih je menilo, da slovenska kultura zaradi tovrstnega priseljevanja ni ogrožena, 55% jih ocenjuje, da niso ogroženi vera in verske tradicije, na drugi strani pa jih 41% meni, da je ogrožena kultura in 31%, da so ogrožene vera in verski običaji. Če so deleži odgovorov na področju vpliva na gospodarstvo, vero in kulturo približno enaki, je drugače pri vprašanju o kriminaliteti v povezavi z albansko priseljenko skupnostjo, kar 59% vprašanih je namreč mnenja, da je kriminala več, 34% jih verjame, da se stopnja kriminala ni spremenila, nihče pa ni izbral odgovora, da se je stopnja kriminala zmanjšala.

Na podlagi zbranih odgovorov lahko ponudimo oceno, da respondenti v povprečju izrekajo bolj negativne kot pozitivne ocene do albanskih priseljencev v Celju. Naša predpostavka, da bo višja stopnja izobrazbe generirala bolj pozitiven odnos, se ni potrdila.


Naša naslednja predpostavka, ki je izhajala iz dosedanjih raziskav in po kateri naj bi imele ženske bolj toleranten odnos do priseljencev kot moški

(Ponce, 2017), se ni potrdila. Rezultati anketnega vprašalnika kažejo, da večjih razlik med spoloma ni zaznati, edina omembe vredna razlika se je pokazala pri vprašanju o varnosti v mestu in kvaliteti bivanja, pri katerih je več moških (69 %) kot žensk (44 %) ocenilo, da je Celje postalo slabše mesto za bivanje, pri vprašanju stopnje asimiliranosti v slovensko družbo je 21 % respondentk in 40 % respondentov odgovorilo, da albanski priseljenci sploh niso asimilirani, pri vprašanju o priselitvi v okoliš, kjer bi živelo večje število priseljencev, je odgovor, da se tja zagotovo ne bi preselili, odgovorilo 26 % žensk in 39 % moških.

Vpliv izobrazbe na odnos do priseljencev študije (prim. Borgonovi in Pokropek 2019, Quillian, 1995) izpričuje, da imajo višje izobraženi ljudje bolj toleranten odnos do priseljencev. Izsledki naše študije temu ne pritrjujejo v celoti, saj z nekaj izjemami ni velikih razlik v odnosu respondentov glede na njihovo končano stopnjo izobrazbe. Izpostavljamo vprašanja, pri katerih do razlik prihaja. Pri vprašanju (Graf 5), ali bo Celje v prihodnje zaradi albanskih priseljencev postalo slabše za bivanje, so vsi respondenti z zaključeno osnovno šolo odgovorili pritrdilno, medtem ko je bilo takega mnenja 63 % tistih s poklicno ali srednjo šolo, 65 % tistih s končano visoko šolo ali fakulteto ter 55 % tistih s končanim magisterijem ali doktoratom. Razlike v izobrazbi najdemo tudi pri vprašanju o znanju slovenskega jezika med albanskimi priseljenci, na katerega vsi respondenti z osnovno šolo odgovarjajo, da večina albanski priseljencev ne obvlada slovenskega jezika, s takim stališčem se strinja 54 % tistih s srednjo ali poklicno šolo, 44 % tistih s končano fakulteto ter 39 % tistih s končanim magisterijem ali doktoratom. Podobno je pri vprašanju o ogroženosti slovenske kulture, na katerega so vsi respondenti s končano osnovno šolo ali manj odgovorili, da je kulturno življenje ogroženo, medtem ko se drugi s takšno oceno strinjajo v manjšem odstotku.

V naslednjem sklopu smo analizirali ujemanje vpliva višine osebnih dohodkov na odnos do priseljencev, pri čemer do večjih razlik med respondenti po višini dohodkov nismo zaznali, izjema sta bili vprašanja po vsakodnevnih stikih z ljudmi albanskega izvora, kjer je 60 % respondentov z najnižjimi dohodki označilo, da imajo stike večkrat mesečno, vse druge kategorije po višini dohodkov imajo takšne stike večkrat tedensko. Na vprašanje o selitvi v ulico ali soseseo z visokim deležem albanskih priseljencev je 70 % respondentov s prihodki med 300 in 800 EUR odgovorilo, da se tja verjetno ne bi preselili, odstotki drugih dohodkovnih kategorij pa so bili občutno nižji; v takšno soseseo se verjetno ne bi preselilo 40 % tistih z najnižjimi prejemki, 48 % tistih s prejemki med 800 in 1500 EUR ter 34 % tistih s prejemki nad 1.500 EUR).

*Graf 5: ALI MENITE, DA JE KULTURNO ŽIVLJENJE V SLOVENIJI ZARADI
PRISELJENCEV ALBANSKE NARODNOSTI NA SPLOŠNO OGROŽENO
ALI OBOGATENO (PO STOPNJI IZOBRAZBE)?*



Vir: Lastni prikaz.

Sklep

Hipoteze o prevladujoče negativnem odnosu do izbrane priseljske skupnosti v Celju med respondenti, ki so sodelovali v raziskavi, so se potrdile. V luči negativnega medijskega portretiranja, razraščanja sovražnega govora in nestrpnosti do priseljencev in priseljavanja, vplivom družbenih omrežij ter socialnih mrež, ki prispevajo k oblikovanju ter utrjevanju stereotipov, v kontekstu restriktivne priseljske politike in naraščajoče albano-fobije, ki jo ugotavljajo različne študije, je bil prevladujoče negativen odnos med respondenti pričakovan.

Ugotoviti smo želeli, ali prihaja do znatnejših vplivov pripisanih in pridobljenih značilnosti posameznikov na oblikovanje njihovega odnosa do priseljencev. Ugotovitve smo analizirali v navezavi na izhodiščni teoretski okvir s pričakovanjem, da bomo potrdili predpostavke o ženskah respondentkah, posameznikih z višjo izobrazbo in višjimi mesečnimi dohodki, ki imajo pozitivnejši odnos do priseljencev in priseljavanja. Takšne predpostavke smo potrdili le do določene mere, izpostaviti velja, da gre za minimalna odstopanja in da je raziskava pokazala, da imajo respondenti – ne glede na spol, izobrazbo in dohodek – v povprečju bolj negativen kot nevtralen ali pozitiven odnos do albanskih priseljencev, kar je glede na povečanje priseljavanja (v

preteklosti in pričakovanjih v prihodnje) oseb albanske narodnosti zaskrb-ljujoče, nakazuje namreč na težave, ki slovensko družbo, vključno z mestom Celje, čakajo v prihodnje.

Glede na statistike porasta priseljevanja oseb albanske narodnosti je mogoče pričakovati, da bo albanska skupnost preseгла doslej največjo priseljsko skupnost v Celju in Sloveniji, torej priseljence iz Bosne in Hercegovine. Slovenija in Celje bosta v prihodnje gotovo še bolj multikulturna, zato bodo morale državne in lokalne politike nameniti več pozornosti ne le ekonomski, ampak tudi socialnim platem priseljevanja, iskati načine za izboljšanje odnosov med večino in manjšinskimi skupnostmi ter okrepiti izobraževalne in medijske kampanje v širši skupnosti. Upanje je, kot zapiše Zavratnik (2011: 68), v mlajših in višje izobraženih prebivalcih urbanih središč, žal pa empirični podatki takšen optimizem le šibko nakazujejo. Bolj verjeten je »scenarij latentnih konfliktov«, pasiven pristop javnosti oziroma zanikanje dejstva migracij, ki izhaja iz nesprejemanja migrantov, ki jih večinsko prebivalstvo vidi kot grožnjo in ki so prepoznani kot dežurni krivci za nakopičene družbene probleme. Med rešitvami se ponujajo sprememba zakonodaje, ki bi resneje in učinkoviteje naslovila širjenje predsodkov, stereotipov in ksenofobije v medijih in na družbenih omrežjih; državne institucije bi morale ustrezneje nasloviti skrbi in strahove večinskega prebivalstva z medijskimi kampanjami in izobraževalnimi projekti, lokalne skupnosti pa bi morale poiskati načine, kako priseljence bolje vključevati v družbeno življenje in jim pomagati pri učenju večinskega jezika.

LITERATURA

- Bade, Klaus Jürgen (2005): *Evropa v gibanju*. Ljubljana: Založba /*cf.
- Barcelo, Joan (2016): *Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration Policy in Asia and the Pacific: a Quantitative Assessment of Current Theoretical Models Beyond Western Countries*. *Asias Journal of Political Science* 24 (1): 87–132.
- Berishaj, Martin (2004): *Albanci v Sloveniji*. *Razprave in gradivo* 45: 144–159.
- Berry, J. W. (2001): *A Psychology of Immigration*. *Journal of Social Issues* 3 (67): 615–631.
- Bešter, Romana (2003): *Migracijska politika Slovenije in EU*. Primerjava zakonodaje, strateških dokumentov in priporočil, s poudarkom na integracijski politiki. Ljubljana: Mirovni inštitut. Dostopno prek <https://www.mirovni-institut.si/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Bester01.pdf>, 21. 5. 2020.
- Blumer, Herbert (1969): *Symbolic Interactionism Perspective and Method*. London: University of California Press.
- Borgonovi, Francesca, Artur Pokropek (2019): *Education and Attitudes Toward Migration in a Cross Country Perspective*. *Front. Psychol.* 10: 2224.
- Botrič, Valerija (2016): *Attitudes Towards Immigrants, Immigration Policies and Labour Market Outcomes: Comparing Croatia with Hungary and Slovenia*. *CIRR XXII*, 76: 5–28.

- Brezigar, Sara (2005): Etnična diskriminacija na trgu delovne sile: dileme in izzivi pri ugotavljanju obstoja etnične diskriminacije na notranjem trgu delovne sile. *Razprave in gradivo* 47: 168–189.
- Bučar Ručman, Aleš (2011): Medijsko poročanje o kriminaliteti v Sloveniji. *Revija za kriminalistiko in kriminologijo* 62 (1): 23–38.
- Ceobanu, Alin M. in Xavier Escandell (2010): Comparative Analyses of Public Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration Using Multinational Survey Data: A Review of Theories and Research. *The Annual Review of Sociology* 36: 309–328.
- Chandler, Charles R. in Yung-mei Tsai (2001): Social Factors Influencing Immigration Attitudes: An Analysis of Data From the General Social Survey. *The Social Science Journal* 38 (2001): 177–188.
- Dolenc, Danilo (2007): Priseljivanje v Slovenijo z območja nekdanje Jugoslavije po drugi svetovni vojni. V: Miran Komac (ur.), *Priseljenci – Študije o priseljivanju in vključevanju v slovensko družbo*. Ljubljana: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja.
- Entzinger, Han in Renske Biezeveld (2003): Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration. Rotterdam: European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations. Dostopno prek https://www.researchgate.net/publication/251998179_Benchmarking_in_Immigrant_Integration, 20. 7. 2020.
- Hainmueller, Jens in Daniel J. Hopkins (2014): Public Attitudes Toward Immigration. *The Annual Review of Political Science* 17: 225–249.
- Javdani, Mohsen (2020): Public Attitudes Toward Immigration – Determinants and Unknowns. *IZA World of Labour*, 473, 1–11. Dostopno prek <https://wol.iza.org/articles/public-attitudes-toward-immigration-determinants-and-unknowns/long>, 28. 12. 2020.
- Josipovič, Damir (2006): Učinki priseljivanja v Slovenijo po drugi svetovni vojni. Ljubljana: Založba ZRC.
- Jurić Pahor, Marija (2020): Nacionalna identiteta v luči globalizacije, glocalizacije in transkultuiracije. *Teorija in praksa* 57 (2): 561–580.
- Kalčič, Špela (2007): Slovenski muslimani: kdo so, organiziranost in državnopravno normiranje v antropološki presoji. *Dve domovini* (26): 7–29.
- Kralj, Ana (2008): Nezaželeni? Medijske in politične konstrukcije tujcev v Sloveniji. *Dve domovini* (27): 169–190.
- Mandelc, Damjan (2011): Na mejah nacije: teorije in prakse nacionalizma. Ljubljana: Filozofska fakulteta.
- Medica, Karmen in Goran Lukić (2011): Migrantski circulus vitiosus. Delovne in življenjske razmere migrantov v Sloveniji. Koper: Univerzitetna založba Annales.
- Medvešek, Mojca, Sara Brezigar, Romana Bešter (2009): Položaj priseljencev in potomcev priseljencev z območja nekdanje Jugoslavije na trgu dela v Sloveniji. *Razprave in gradivo*, (58): 24–57.
- Pajnik, Mojca (2003): Poročanje medijev o marginaliziranih skupinah. *Socialno delo*, 42 (2): 87–94. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za socialno delo.
- Ponce, Aaron (2017): Gender and Anti-immigrant Attitudes in Europe. *Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World*, (3): 1–17.

- Quillian, Lincoln (1995): Prejudice as a response to perceived group threat: population composition and anti-immigrant and racial prejudice in Europe. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 6: 586–611.
- Rustenbach, Elisa (2010): Sources of Negative Attitudes Toward Immigrants in Europe: A Multi Level Analysis. *Integrational Migration Review*, 44 (1): 53–77.
- Učakar, Tjaša (2017): Migracijska politika EU: nove artikulacije izključevanja v 21. stoletju. Ljubljana: Filozofska fakulteta.
- Vidmar Horvat, Ksenija (2004): Uvod v sociologijo kulture. Ljubljana: Filozofska fakulteta.
- Zavratnik, Simona (2011): Sodobne migracije v mnenjih slovenske javnosti. Dve domovini: razprave o izseljenstvu = Two homelands: migration studies, (33): 55–71.

VIRI

- Albanian Studies. b. d. Albanofobia. Dostopno prek <https://albanianstudies.weebly.com/albanophobia.html>, 6. 6. 2020.
- Dennison, James in Lenka Dražanova (2018): Public Attitudes on Migration: Rethinking How People Perceive Migration: An Analysis of Existing Opinion Polls in the Euro-Mediterranean Region. Dostopno prek <https://migrationpolicycentre.eu/public-attitudes-on-migration-rethinking-how-people-perceive-migration/>, 16. 6. 2020.
- European Migration Network. b.d. Migracije in Slovenija. Dostopno prek <http://emm.si/migracije-in-slovenija/>, 13. 9. 2020.
- European Social Survey (2016): Odnos do priseljevanja, priseljencev in njihovih prednikov: Ključne ugotovitve 7. vala Evropske družboslovne raziskave. Dostopno prek https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/findings/TL7_Immigration-Slovenian.pdf, 4. 9. 2020.
- Glücks, Nenad (2018): Velenje postaja albanska oaza: priseljenci izkoriščajo Slovenijo. *Reporter*, 11. marec. Dostopno prek https://reporter.si/clanek/slovenija/velenje-postaja-albanska-oaza-priseljenci-izkoriscajo-slovenijo-627251?fb_comment_id=1582131711901341_1601634886617690, 4. 9. 2020.
- Glücks, Nenad (2020): Organizirani socialni kriminal: med priseljenci s Kosova se stopnjujejo zlorabe socialnega sistema. *Reporter*, 15. november. Dostopno prek <https://reporter.si/clanek/slovenija/organizirani-socialni-kriminal-med-priseljenci-s-kosova-se-stopnjujejo-zlorabe-socialnega-sistema-825938>, 2. 12. 2020.
- Goglini (2016): Mladoletni Albanci v Celju spet ustrahujejo – grozljivo. *Med.over.net*, 20. junij. Dostopno prek <https://med.over.net/forum5/viewtopic.php?t=11016811>, 3. 12. 2020.
- Nova24TV (2016) Srhljivo: Dvajset Albancev nad celjske dijake z bejzbolskmi Paličami. *Nova24TV*, 17. marec. Dostopno prek <https://nova24tv.si/slovenija/crna-kronika/zdi-se-kot-mafijska-zgodba-iz-policijskega-porocila-dijak-iz-celja-se-je-pred-albanci-komaj-resil-z-begom/>, 18. 12. 2020.

- Nova24TV (2020) *Prvi uradni jezik na Oš Jakoba Aljaža v Kranju albanščina*. Nova24TV, 20. marec. Dostopno prek <https://nova24tv.si/slovenija/prvi-uradni-jezik-na-os-jakoba-aljaza-v-kranju-albanscina/>, 7. 9. 2020.
- Resolucija o imigracijski politiki Republike Slovenije (ReIPRS) (1999): Uradni list Republike Slovenije, št. 40/99.
- Resolucija o migracijski politiki Republike Slovenije (ReMPRS) (2002): Uradni list Republike Slovenije, št. 106/2002.
- Sobotainfo (2020): Mladoletni Kosovci napadli dijaka, ju ob tem hudo pretepli in z njima poniževalno ravnali. Dostopno prek <https://sobotainfo.com/novica/kronika/mladoletni-kosovci-napadli-dijaka-ju-ob-tem-hudo-pretepli-z-njima-ponizevalno>, 5. 9. 2020.
- SURS (2020a): Delovno aktivno prebivalstvo. Dostopno prek <https://www.stat.si/statweb/File/DocSysFile/9538/07-009-1-MP.pdf>, 30. 5. 2020.
- SURS (2020b): Prebivalstvo po državi državljanstva, petletnih starostnih skupinah in spolu, Slovenija, letno. Dostopno prek <https://pxweb.stat.si/SiStatData/pxweb/sl/Data/-/05E1008S.px/table/tableViewLayout2/>, 4. 7. 2020.
- SURS (2018): Vsak osmi prebivalec Slovenije se je v Slovenijo priselil iz tujine. Dostopno prek <https://www.stat.si/StatWeb/News/Index/7830>, 4. 7. 2020.
- Zakon o državljanstvu Republike Slovenije (ZDRS) (1991): Uradni list Republike Slovenije, št. 24/07.

*Jure PERPAR****NEMOČ FEMINIZMA****

Povzetek. Prevladujoči strukturno pogojeni falocentrični vzorci družbenih interakcij »ženskam« še vedno onemogočajo dostop do realne in reprezentacijske moči. Feminističnim gibanjem, ki so ujeta v spolni esencijalizem in/ali reprodukcijsko epistemé patriarhalne/falocentrične kulture, (nepresenetljivo) spodleti odprava družbene diskriminacije med »spoli«. Enako tistim, katerih analize sežejo onkraj spolnega esencijalizma in reprodukcijske epistemé, a se oklepajo »superstrukturnih« strategij, ki na današnji stopnji (bio)tehnološkega razvoja ne dajejo zadovoljivih rezultatov. V članku postavim tezo, da spolnoidentitetni antagonizem in vprašanje spolnega/reprodukcijskega esencijalizma v »družbeni nadstavbi« nista razrešljiva in da je razgradnja strukturno pogojenih diskriminacijskih praks, vključno z razveljavitvijo binarnih spolnoidentitetnih reprezentacij, mogoča (a ne samoumevna), če v znanstveno-tehnološkem delu »družbene baze« nastopi nova paradigma, pogojena z znanstvenim prebojem na področju reprodukcijskih biotehnologij.

Ključni pojmi: spolna binarnost, feminizem, resignifikacija, designifikacija, materinstvo, reprodukcijska biotehnologija

Uvod

Čeprav se v zahodnjaških družbah razumevanje ponekod že nagiba k temu, naj »ženske« ne bodo arbitrarno izključene, to zavzemanje za spolno nevtralnost/enakopravnost ne onemogoča seksističnih družbenih praks. Dandanes spolna neenakovrednost ni toliko posledica arbitrarne iracionalne diskriminacije kot posledica dejstva, da družba kot celota sistematično daje prednost »moškim« pri opredeljevanju delovnih mest, zaslug in raznih družbenih ugodnosti. Morebitna odsotnost spolne samovoljne diskriminacije ni dokaz odsotnosti spolne neenakovrednosti oziroma odsotnosti »moške«

* Jure Perpar, magister politologije, perjure@amis.net.

** Pregledni znanstveni članek.

DOI: 10.51936/tip.59.1.138-155

dominacije v družbi in njenih strukturah (Kymlicka, 2005: 533, 534). Postavijo se vprašanja, katere so te izključevalne strukture oziroma prakse, kaj je razlog njihove trdoživosti, kako se zoper njih in diskriminacijo, ki jo omogočajo, borijo različne struje feminizma in zakaj njihovim strategijam spodleti. Namreč rezultati feminističnega boja ne dosegajo zelenih ciljev, diskriminacija »žensk« ter z diskriminacijo povezane socialnoekonomske, politične, statusne in druge razlike, na katere opozarja zdaj že četrti val feminizma, na mnogih področjih še vedno vztrajajo. Še v slabšem položaju kot »ženske« so »medspolne« osebe, ki jih ideologija spolne binarnosti povsem odmisli, ter osebe, ki zavračajo ideologijo cisspolnosti in heteronormativizem.

V članku sta uporabljeni deskriptivna in tipološka metoda pri opisu feminističnih in marksističnih teoretskih zastavkov/poudarkov. Tipološka je uporabljena pri sistematiki znanstvene in neznanstvene vednosti ter posameznih konceptov, nanašajočih se na fenomene spola, spolnih identitet, binarnosti. Primerjalno-zgodovinska metoda pa pri opisu razvoja feminističnih ontoloških ter epistemoloških specifik in primerjavah le-teh z marksističnimi.

Ideološke meje feminizma in njegova realna nezmožnost

Po Marxu je reformiranje kapitalizma nemogoče. Boj delavstva za svoje pravice in dejanska emancipacija v kapitalizmu sta obsojena na neuspeh. Delavstvo lahko razreši antagonizem med delom in kapitalom ter doseže svoje osvobodilne cilje le z revolucionarno odpravo kapitalizma – socialnoekonomskega reda, temelječega na ideologiji proste tržne konkurence, zasebni lastnini produkcijskih sredstev, razlaščanju zaposlenih v procesu proizvodnje ter posledično akumulaciji kapitala v rokah lastnikov produkcijskih sredstev – in uvedbo *brezrazredne družbe*. Marksistični revizionisti in reformatorji, ki so položili filozofske in ideološke temelje socialne demokracije 20. stoletja, so ta Marxov uvid prezrli oziroma opustili. Zahodnoevropska socialna demokracija je svoje socialnoekonomske »reformatorske« politike prilagodila boju za pravice delavstva v okviru kapitalističnega socialnoekonomskega reda. Kljub temu da ji je še zlasti po drugi svetovni vojni uspelo občutno izboljšati položaj delavstva in uzakoniti vrsto socialnovarstvenih ter delavskih pravic, izpeljati niz socialnoekonomskih projektov in implementirati redistributivne politike, ostaja dejstvo, da je tudi v najbolj socialno-tržni verziji kapitalizma kapital še vedno primarni označevalec. Tudi najbolj socialno-tržno usmerjene kapitalistične družbe so »kapitalocentrične«.

Reformatorska naivnost, podobna naivnosti socialne demokracije, v veliki meri zaznamuje tudi feminizem, ki je s prvim »egalitarnim« valom razvnel boj za enakopravnost »žensk« v okviru falocentričnih družb, z drugim

»ontološkim« pa boj za njihovo *avtonomijo*.¹ Pravnoformalna enakost, za katero vpeljava in implementacijo se je zavzemal prvi val feminizma, se je postopno uveljavila, a kriteriji enakosti v družbah, v katerih prevladujejo falocentrični vzorci socialnih interakcij, niso ideološko nepristranski. Posledica pristranskosti je, da rezultati feminističnega boja ne dosegajo želenih ciljev in da diskriminacija »žensk« na mnogih področjih še vedno vztraja. Odprava diskriminacije »žensk« je tudi cilj ontološke struje feminizma. Njene politike avtonomije poudarijo posebnosti »žensk« ozirom »ženskega pristopa« in zaostrijo spolnoidentitetni antagonizem med družbeno priznanim spoloma. Feministična političnoteoretska in aktivistična stremjenja, ki se zatečejo k spolni ontologiji, izpostavijo naslednje »pristope«: i) ontološki feminizem, ki si prizadeva falično organizacijo in normativnost patriarhalnih družb *uravnotežiti* z materničnima (na primer feminizem »etike skrbi«), ii) ontološki feminizem, ki opozarja, da bi maternično uravnoteženje faličnih struktur prispevalo k utrditvi *patriarhalnega imperativa spolne reprodukcije* ter z njim povezanih reprodukcijskih vlog, in zato zagovarja *uravnoteženje* falične družbene organizacije s klitorično,² ter iii) ontološki feminizem, ki zagovarja odpravo falocentrizma s *prevlado* »ženskega principa« v družbi in družini. Ontološki pristopi, ujeti v »moško-žensko« matrico socialnih interakcij, ne izumijo lastnega pojmovnega aparata in ontološko osnovo – »žensko« z ali brez materinske/reprodukcijske konotacije – prevzamejo od diskurza patriarhata. Ker pojmovni aparat in razmerja družbenih moči, ki omogočajo specifične pomenske utrditve pojmov, določajo meje vednosti, prevzamejo tudi njegovo binarno epistemé.

¹ »Avtonomija predpostavlja pravico, da sebe razumemo, kakor hočemo /.../ Na drugi strani pa enakost predpostavlja merjenje v skladu z danim merilom. Enakost je enakovrednost dveh (ali več) pojmov, od katerih ima en nesporno vlogo norme ali zgleda. V nasprotju s tem avtonomija implicira pravico, da posameznik takšne norme ali merila sprejme ali zavrne glede na njihovo ustreznost njegovi samoopredelitvi« (Grosz, 1986: 193). Paradigmo – nočemo enakosti, hočemo avtonomijo – objame feminizem, ki bi ga prosto po Anni Yeatman lahko poimenovali »ontološki«. Po Yeatman (v Squires, 2009) je slogan »osebno je politično« mogoče raztegniti v tri različne smeri: depatriarhalizacijo, ontologizacijo in politizacijo. Pri depatriarhalizaciji gre za uporabo državne in državno sankcionirane sile družbene sfere za delegitimiranje in deprivatiziranje patriarhalne moči; ontologizacija je utemeljitev politike na identiteti (beri: identitetnem razločevanju in avtonomiji); politizacija pa je strategija »dereifikacije« patriarhalne organiziranosti osebnega življenja.

² S poudarjanjem materinske vloge v kulturah »moške« dominacije se izvrši simbolna klitoridektomija (potlačitev klitoris), v nekaterih kulturah pa simbolno spremlja tudi realna. Ta naj bi služila nadzoru seksualnosti bioloških žensk in jo zadrževala v reprodukcijski orbiti. Za razliko od bioloških moških, pri katerih je orgazem pospremljen z reprodukcijskim dejanjem (ejakulacijo), lahko biološke ženske dosežejo vaginalni in klitoralni orgazem; slednji uhaža reprodukcijski logiki in po mnenju Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1981: 183) simbolno zastopa »žensko« osvoboditev. Za Judith Butler (2020) je družbeni spol v prvi vrsti (a ne izključno) zgodovinska kategorija, katere pojavnost in družbeni pomen se nenehno spreminjata skladno s socialnozgodovinsko dinamiko. Meni, da bi bili priča polomiji feminizma, če bi se slednji zopet zatekel k biološkemu esencializmu in zvedel družbeno vedenje ali spolne vloge na posamezni del telesa (na primer maternico ali klitoris). In prav to stori ontološki feminizem.

Tretji val feminizma se je le mestoma oprl na prakse in institucije, ki jih je navrgel drugi val (ženske študije na univerzah, publikacije, feministične organizacije). Pojav feminizma *moči* (»girl power«) je sovpadel s širjenjem informacijsko-komunikacijske tehnologije v devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja, z njo povezanih storitev ter vznikom informacijske družbe. Ne preseneča, da je bil opazen na področju kibernetične kulture, tj. umetniške/medijske produkcije, pogojene z informacijsko-komunikacijskimi tehnologijami, često kot kontrakultura, ki gradi na podobi samozavestne, brezkompromisne, po potrebi napadalne »ženske«, katere »direktna akcija« se včasih izteče v »žensko« pozerstvo oziroma manifestira kot »ginocentrizem«. Sprejel je idejo o možnosti spolnoidentitetne resignifikacije in z njo stališče, da sta iskanje avtentičnega spola ter seksualnost izključno pravica in domeni posameznika, ne stvar prisile, pogojene z družbenimi normami oziroma imperativi. Vprašanje spolnoidentitetnih reprezentacij je povezal tudi z vprašanji spolne inklinacije, rasizma, razrednih delitev in družbene razslojenosti (»interseksionalnost«). Četrti val feminizma v veliki meri prevzame agendo tretjega vala, s to razliko, da zahteve, vsebovane v agendi, še bolj zaostri in s pomočjo vse bolj razširjenega »participatornega spleta« (»Web 2.0«), ki se pojavi na začetku 21. stoletja, k uporabi zoper diskriminacijo, kulturo mizoginstva in spolnega nadlegovanja spodbudi še večjo množico somišljenikov ter dodatno olajša tvorjenje novih virtualnih in realnih aktivističnih skupnosti.³

Judith Squires (2009, 4–5) razloči tri teoretske strategije feminizma:

Pri prikazu teh treh pomembno različnih pristopov k spolu v politični teoriji uporabljam tipologijo »vključitve«, »obrata« in »premestitve«. Tiste, ki sledijo strategiji vključitve, hočejo vključiti ženske v politično, iz katerega so zdaj izključene. Običajno si prizadevajo za nepristranskost/

³ Kljub mobilizacijski moči feminizma izbojevanih »ženskih« pravic/svoboščin ne gre povezovati izključno s feminističnim aktivizmom. Spremembe v družbenih strukturah, ki zadevajo javno, civilnodružbeno in intimno (družinsko) sfero, so vezane predvsem na prakse države socialne blaginje (slednja ni posledica feminističnih, prej delavskih političnih bojev), pa tudi na ekonomske, politične, znanstvene in tehnološke spremembe (po drugi industrijski revoluciji in še zlasti po drugi svetovni vojni v Evropi in ZDA), ki botrujejo korporativnemu kapitalizmu, ekonomiji obsega, posledično potrošništvu in »komercialni desublimaciji« (Marcuse, 1981) oziroma uveljavitvi družbenega imperativa užitka. Našteti dejavniki/prakse vplivajo na spremenjeno socializacijo posameznikov v industrializiranih/potrošniških družbah, botrujejo slabitvi avtoritete očeta in marsikje omajajo tudi paradigmo patriarhalne družine. Država socialne blaginje s svojimi politikami in socialno varovalno mrežo »od zibelke do groba« v veliki meri jamči za reprodukcijske in druge pravice/svoboščine »žensk«, jim omogoča dostop do izobraževanih ustanov, lajša zaposlitvene možnosti, spodbuja ekonomsko samostojnost, pomaga v primeru zasnove (enostarševske) družine. Omenjene prakse in dosežki, ki so posledica premikov v ekonomskih, političnih, kulturnih strukturah družb industrializiranih držav, imajo večji ali vsaj enak pomen za izboljšanje položaja »žensk« kot feministični aktivizem. Jasno, tudi varovalni socialnoekonomski ukrepi ter omajana avtoriteta očeta in družbeni status tradicionalne heteronormativne družine niso odplaknili družbenih struktur, ki izključujejo »ženske« in so v znatni meri še vedno prilagojene »moškim«.

neutrlnost, ljudi pojmujejo kot avtonomne in se zavzemajo za politiko enakosti. Pogosto jih imenujejo liberalne feministke. Tiste, ki sledijo strategiji obrata, hočejo preoblikovati politično, kot je pojmovano zdaj, tako da bo postalo bolj odprto za spolno zaznamovano specifičnost. Običajno uporabljajo interpretativno metodologijo, govorijo o »Ženski« ali »ženskah« in se zavzemajo za politiko razlike. Pogosto jih imenujejo maternalistične ali kulturne feministke. Tiste, ki sledijo strategiji premestitve /.../, običajno uporabljajo genealoško metodologijo, govorijo o pozicijah subjekta in raje o spolnem zaznamovanju kot spolu ter se zavzemajo za politiko raznolikosti. Pogosto jih imenujejo postmoderne ali poststrukturalistične feministke. Strategija vključitve si prizadeva za spolno nevtrlnost; strategija obrata za priznanje specifično žensko spolno zaznamovane identitete; strategija premestitve pa si prizadeva dekonstruirati tiste diskurzivne rede, ki subjekt zaznamujejo s spolom.

Strategija obrata kot »ženski« seksizem?

Premisa ontološkega feminizma je, da »ženske« ne potrebujejo le enake obravnave, pač pa svoj prostor avtonomnosti, v katerem same na novo opredelijo svoje vloge. Postavi se vprašanje, ali je hkratno udejanjanje avtonomije kateregakoli od obeh priznanih spolov sploh mogoče, še zlasti če spola dojemamo na način, kot ju je dojemala »iniciatorka« drugega vala feminizma Simone de Beauvoir (1949), in sicer kot zakovičena v temeljno (reprodukcijsko) Sobit. Tj. opozarjam na dejstvo, da kakršnakoli »zakovanost« ni ravno jamstvo avtonomije kogarkoli oziroma če že, potem tistega, ki je v »temeljni enoti bivanja« močnejši.

Po de Beauvoir ima »ženska« v totalnem paru reprodukcijske Sobiti vlogo konstitutivnega D drugega, ki »moškega« vzpostavi kot Prvega. To je mogoče, ker posamezni »moški« »ženske« ne dojemata kot *človeka za sebe* – torej kot posebnega, a enakovrednega sebstva, ki je zmožno lastnih predstav o sebi, drugih in svetu nasploh –, ampak z ozirom *na sebe*. V »moških« predstavah je On vedno dominantna, popolna referenca »ženske« in »ženska« nikoli referenca »moškega«. »Moški« je zmožen (avto)reprezentacije, »ženska« (v »moških« predstavah) pač ne. Zato On določi, kaj »ženska« sploh je. V falocentričnem diskurzu »ženska« ni le Njegov konstitutivni Drugi na ravni simbolnega, tudi njena reprodukcijska vloga je vrednotena slabše kot »moška«. V totalnem paru Sobiti, v katerem sta »zakovičena«, je ona vedno Drugi. Ne le v sferi zasebnega (družini), pač pa tudi v sferi javnega. Ker je obsojena na življenje v Sobiti, bo ostala sužnja.

Za de Beauvoir bi bila razgradnja reprodukcijske Sobiti nesprejemljiva, čeprav je prav ta razgradnja pogoj možnosti avtonomnosti, enakopravnosti

in svobode vseh oseb ne glede na njihovo spolno (samo)opredelitev oziroma identiteto. Svobode »žensk«, meni de Beauvoir, ni v razgradnji reprodukcijske Sobit in ločitvi »žensk« od »moških«, ampak v tem, da v kontekstu Sobiti vzpostavijo sebstvo po lastnih merilih in si družinske, posledično tudi družbene vloge pišejo same. »Ženska« lahko najde svobodo v nekakšni človeški esenci: svobodna bo takrat, ko se bo »učlovečila«, prenehala biti moški Drugi in bo postala človek-sebstvo. In tu sledi zaplet. Namreč de Beauvoir, sklicujoč se na Hegla, že sama ugotavlja, da neka subjektiviteta, neko sebstvo lahko postane to le, če se vzpostavi kot »esencialno« naproti nečemu, kar je oziroma bo dojeta kot objekt oziroma kot »ne-esencialno«, nebstveno. Rečeno drugače: »ženska« osvoboditev, ki naj bi se zgodila skozi vznik »ženskega« sebstva, lahko uspe le, če »ženska zavest« najde svojega konstitutivnega, omalovažujoče dojetega Drugega. Če drži, da sta »moški« in »ženska« vkovana v Sobit, in če podobno kot de Beauvoir ne vidimo onkraj heteronormativnega para, potem je edini kandidat za vlogo »ženskega« Drugega – »moški«. Ideja, da je »ženska« svoboda možna le skozi vznik heglovske sovražne zavesti pri »ženskah« in posebnega dominantnega »ženskega« sebstva, ki bi nastalo avtonomno od označevalnih diskurzov in simbolizacijskih praks »moških«, implicira način boja za osvoboditev »žensk«, ki vodi skozi politiko podrejanja, razčlovečenja »moških« in ponižujočih označevalnih praks. De Beauvoir je iskala poseben, tj. »ženski« način emancipacije. Posebno »žensko« sebstvo po njenem mnenju terja posebne, izvirne emancipacijske prijeme, ki vključujejo tudi izum »ženske« hegemonije. Navkljub želji po izvirnosti je iskanje lastne »ženske« poti k »ženskemu sebstvu« na način, kot ga je zastavila de Beauvoir, le repriza že videne »moške« matrice dominacije in podrejanja, ki implicira razčlovečenje Drugega.

Feministična strategija premestitve

Razčlovečenje kot sredstvo upora zoper falokracijo ni lastna le feminizmu Simone de Beauvoir. Denimo francoski »antifeminizem«, sklicujoč se na Derridajevo odkritje falocentrizma v zahodnjaškem humanizmu, zagovarja razvrednotenje splošnega (beri: metaspolnega) označevalca »človek« (kot ga oblikuje »metafizična« tradicija). Padec falokracije pogojuje z anti-humanizmom: če falocentrični red temelji na razčlovečeni »ženski« (človek-sebstvo je le »moški«), če ontološki feminizem napeljuje k razčlovečenju »moškega« (človek-sebstvo naj bo le »ženska«), potem antifeminizem teži k razčlovečenju obeh priznanih spolov in s tem k razveljavitvi sebstev, »ženskega« in »moškega«.⁴ Po razveljavitvi s spolom zaznamovanih sebstev naj bi

⁴ »Feministična praksa je lahko le negacija. /.../ 'Ženske' ne more zastopati noben označevalec, je onkraj vsake nomenklature in ideologij. /.../ Feministične zahteve, utemeljene v spolni identiteti, so naivno romantične. Vera v spolno identiteto je obrnjeni falocentrizem« (Julia Kristeva v Spivak, 1981: 169).

ostala le fizična telesa skupaj z vsemi prirojenimi razlikami. Razvrednotenje »človeka« naj bi navrglo nekakšna »neidentitetna bitja« s posebnimi kompleti prirojenih specifik organizma, medtem ko bi bili »krovni označevalec« (»človek«) in z njim sebstvi odpravljeni (Spivak, 1981: 169–176). Antifeminizem svoj emancipacijski boj bije predvsem na ravni Simbolnega, a spregleda dejstvo, da mrežo Simbolnega, ki vzdržuje seksizem, *prvenstveno pogojujejo realne reprodukcijske prakse. Razvrednotenje obstoječega reda Simbolnega lahko vodi le preko razgradnje realnih praks, ki Simbolno sploh omogočajo.* »Premeščanje« na ravni Simbolnega se zdi jalovo početje.

Podobno kot antifeminizem »radikalni feminizem« teži k razveljavitvi s spolom zaznamovanih sebstev, a se ne odreče metaspolnemu označevalcu »človek« in svoj »projekt« feminističnega materializma oblikuje s pomočjo humanizma: »*Nisem ne ženska ne moški v pomenu zdajšnjega zgodovinskega obdobja: sem Oseba v telesu ženske*« (Spivak, 1981: 176). Tudi radikalni feminizem spregleda učinkovanje reprodukcijskega realnega in tudi rezultati njegove strategije simbolnega »premeščanja« so jalovi. Če je cilj revolucionarnega marksizma brezrazredna družba, pa feministična strategija obrata ne vključuje brezspolne družbe. Slednjo lahko vključuje feministična strategija premestitve, a le v redu Simbolnega, torej v družbeni nadstavbi, ne na ravni reprodukcijskih in z njimi povezanih realnih družbenih praks.

Očitno se političnoteoretske strategije različnih struj feminizma – strategija vključitve, značilna predvsem za egalitarni val feminizma, obrata, značilna za ontološki val in deloma tudi za feminizem moči, ter »postfeministične« premestitve, značilna za, denimo, antifeminizem in radikalni feminizem – pri razgrajevanju struktur na ravni reprodukcijskih in z njimi povezanih realnih družbenih praks, skonstruiranih za »moške«, slabo obnesejo. Izkaže se, da pomemben del feminističnih struj ne zmore izdelati miselnih sistemov, potrebnih za preseganje epistemé, ki omogoča (re)produkcijo ideologije spolov oziroma spolne dihotomije. Struje, ki lahko mislijo onkraj binarnosti, še vedno ne podajo zadovoljive rešitve glede preseganja reprodukcijske logike; tiste, ki lahko presežejo reprodukcijsko epistemé, pa se oklepajo strategij, ki na današnji stopnji (bio)tehnološkega razvoja ne morejo obroditi zadovoljivih rezultatov. Za primerjavo: revolucionarni marksizem izdela lastni pojmovni aparat, gradi na zaostritvi razrednega antagonizma ter se ne slepi, da je v kapitalističnih družbah mogoče doseči dejansko enakovrednost ali spravo med delom in kapitalom. Zato med cilje delavskega gibanja postavi prevrat in odpravo razredne družbe. Še pomembneje, socialnoekonomski prevrat včasih tudi spodbudi. Feministična pobuda ne obeta prevrata, ni ga zmožna izpeljati in razveljaviti uveljavljenih spolnoidentitetnih reprezentacij ter reprodukcijskih vlog. Prvih ne zato, ker bi si glavnina feminističnih struj z razveljavitvijo spolnoidentitetnih reprezentacij spodkopala (ideološka, ontološka) tla pod lastnimi nogami; drugih ne zato, ker na

voljo še ni razvitih (bio)tehnoloških sredstev, ki bi omogočila revolucijo na področju človeške reprodukcije.

Za Slavojem Žižka (2003) so politični projekti, ki se sklicujejo na identitetno/partikularno »substanco«, nazadnjaški. Efektivno in pristno emancipacijsko gibanje se ne bori le za »substancialne« pravice partikularnih skupin, ki sodelujejo v njem, pač pa želi odpraviti tudi paradigmo/pogoje, ki omogoča(jo) partikularnosti celote. Po drugi strani pa Butler (1990: 147–148) poudarja, da so feministični aktivizem in cilji *obsojeni na okvire patriarhalne kulture*. Naloga feminizma je ustvarjanje alternativnih avtonomnih prostorov in reinterpretacija pomenov, ki naj bi načeli »integriteto« spolnih identitet, a ne zunaj dominantno kulturnih okvirov. Feminizem nima izbire, ali bo vstopil na teren spolnih označevalnih praks, saj je subjekt »ženska« že del patriarhalnega diskurza. To, kar lahko stori, je, da premesti ter preizpraša spolne norme in prakse ter s tem nemara tudi ontologijo spolov. Butler verjame, da je subverzija spolnih vlog v okviru falocentrične družbe možna, ker zanemari oziroma podceni pomen *človeške spolne reprodukcije* oziroma *reprodukcijskega imperativa* pri utrjevanju ne le spolnih vlog oziroma spolnoidentitetnih reprezentacij, pač pa tudi pri utrjevanju ontoloških temeljev patriarhata, ideologije spolne binarnosti, cispolnosti in heteroseksualnega normativizma dominantne kulture.

Pomemben del feminističnih gibanj torej stavi na bolj ali manj reformistične politike enakopravnosti in avtonomnosti *na terenu* falocentrične družbe.⁵ Če se socialna demokracija sprijazni z razredno delitvijo oziroma razrednim esencijalizmom kapitalističnega reda in svoje delovanje posveti manjšanju družbenih razlik – tj. pristaja na razredne, a ne na družbene razlike –, se znaten del feminističnih struj sprijazni s spolnoidentitetnim in/ali reprodukcijskim esencijalizmom ter svoje delovanje usmeri na manjšanje družbenih razlik med »spoloma«. Tudi najbolj socialno-tržni kapitalizem je kapitalocentričen in tudi patriarhalna družba z največ uzakonjenimi pravicami za »ženske« je še vedno falocentrična. Tako kot je kapital primarni označevalec v kapitalizmu, ima falus označevalni primat v družbah »moške« dominacije.

Reprodukcijski esencijalizem je stara »strategija« patriarhata. Kanonizacija falusa kot poglavitnega izvora življenja in njegovo čaščenje v kulturi klasične Grčije, še zlasti v Atenah, naj bi izhajala iz občutka reprodukcijske manjvrednosti pri »moških« in njihovega strahu pred prevlado »žensk« oziroma »ženskega principa« v družbi. Cilj atenske falokracije ni bila le ohranitev moške dominacije, ampak tudi prilastitev ter podreditev teles bioloških žensk in

⁵ Izborjeni enakopravnosti »ženske«, ki se na političnem področju odraža kot pasivna in aktivna volilna pravica za polnoletne državljanke, ni sledilo opazno povečanje zastopanosti »žensk« v sferah javne oblasti. Tudi uvajanje spolnih kvot za volitve marsikje ni bistveno povečalo prisotnosti »žensk« in njihove avtonomnosti v strukturah oblasti.

vzpostavitev totalnega nadzora nad človeško reprodukcijo (Neumann v Keuls, 1985: 66). *Sklicevanje na reprodukcijsko »zakonitost« oziroma utrjevanje družbenih vlog s pomočjo reprodukcijske logike je še vedno najpomembnejši »moški« način nadzora seksualnosti »žensk« in ohranjanja družbene prevlade »moških«.* Pomemben del feminističnih gibanj je lahko uspešen pri mobiliziranju za pravice »žensk«, a pojem »ženska« in njegova pomenska materializacija, ki ju prevzamejo nekatere feministične struje, nista njihova produkta. Ne le »ženska-mati«, tudi »moški-gospodar/falus« in sploh binarna spolna matrica so diskurzivni objekti, izšli iz *reprodukcijske logike*, prilagojene falocentrični družbi.⁶ Kdor uporablja pojmovni aparat svojega tirana, je v uporuh lahko le delno uspešen.

Resignifikacija in designifikacija (razveljavitev spolnih reprezentacij)

Teoretičarka postkolonialnega feminizma⁷ Spivak (1981: 154–184) meni, da problem, ki zadeva »ženske« v sodobnih zahodnjaških družbah, ni toliko v onemogočanju dostopa do realne moči kot v tem, da falocentrizem »ženskam« onemogoča dostop do *reprezentacijske* moči. Podobno tudi postfeminizem prepozna problem v sami reprezentaciji (tj. performativnosti) in (nehote?) spodbudi idejo, naj rekonstrukciji spolnih binarnih reprezentacij (resignifikaciji) sledi še njihova razveljavitev oziroma izničenje (designifikacija).⁸ Spolnoidentitetna resignifikacija – tj. prevrednotenje normativne »integritete« označevalcev »moški« in »ženska«, kot ga zastavi Butler (1990) – sama po sebi ne odpravlja naravnih reprodukcijskih praks oziroma logike spolne reprodukcije, na katerih se utemeljujejo spolne subjektivacije in spolnoidentitetna interpelacija. *»Subjekt vznikne tedaj, ko je potopljen v družbeno simbolno mrežo. Vznik subjekta je možen s podreditvijo*

⁶ Vsaj od tridesetih let 20. stoletja je znano, da družbeni spol ni ne binaren, ne naravno dan in tudi ne nespremenljiv. V študiji *»Spol in značaj v treh prvotnih družbah«* (1935/2002) Margaret Mead pojasni tudi razliko med spolom kot biološko deskriptivno kategorijo in spolom kot družbeno vlogo ter strne, da družbena spolna vloga ni stvar biološke konstitucije in da je vednjeje v zvezi s spolom kulturno pogojeno. V kasnejših delih, denimo v *»Male and Female«* (1949/1963), takisto opiše, kako je materinstvo v službi obnavljanja in utrjevanja »ženske« ter »moške« družbene vloge.

⁷ Postkolonialni feminizem izpostavlja, da so nekateri spoznavnoteoretski poudarki zahodnjaškega feminizma del zahodno centristične naracije, ki se je prek preteklih kolonialno-orientalističnih diskurzov ohranila do danes, in da so emancipacijski pristopi, ki jih zagovarja, neredko izvedbeno nemogoči, neuporabni in celo žaljivo pokroviteljski do »ženske« v nezahodnih kulturah.

⁸ V francoskih šolah so iz formalne rabe izločili označevalca s spolno konotacijo »oče« in »mama« ter ju nadomestili z označevalcema »starš 1« in »starš 2«. Svojevrstno designifikacijo so izpeljali švedski luterani. Boga ne označujejo oziroma ne nagovarjajo več kot moškega (očeta), saj je pripisovanje spolne identitete in spolnih atributov nadnaravni, transhistorični, metafizični »entiteti«, kar naj bi bog po mnenju kristjanov bil, nesmiselno. Bog je nespolna psevdoidentiteta. Predstavlja simbolna kastracija abrahamskega boga teološki prispevek k razgradnji falocentričnega reda?

simbolnim strukturam» (Lacan v Završnik, 2009: 72). Če zadovoljivo izpeljan projekt spolne resignifikacije ne vključuje le rekonstrukcije simbolne »integritete« posameznih označevalcev, ampak tudi rekonstrukcijo same simbolne mreže, ki se nanaša na spolno reprezentacijo, pa projekt designifikacije terja njeno *destrukcijo* in *iznajdbo alternativ za realne reprodukcijske prakse*, ki to mrežo omogočajo. Spolna reprodukcija je pojavnost, ki zaenkrat v fazi spočetja še vedno vključuje združitev heterogenih gamet. Naravno ali umetno spočetje ter z njima povezane pojavnosti tvorijo *realno strukturo*, s katero se največkrat in najbolj vztrajno opravičuje simbolna struktura in iluzija spolov.

Posamezna ideologija se lahko sklicuje na neko specifično strukturo realnega, a Resnice, ki jih širi s sklicevanjem na realno, imajo strukturo iluzije/fantazme. Falocentrična ideologija posamezni biološki spol ali spolno vlogo opravičuje prav s sklicevanjem na realno spolne reprodukcije in neredko (v vulgarni maniri) tudi s sklicevanjem na realno reprodukcijskih organov (spolovil). Ideološkim fantomom se zdijo fantazme oziroma konstrukti, ki se jih oklepajo, realni/substancialni; kažejo se jim kot samoumevne totalitete, celo kot naravne danosti. Tako se spolnoidentitetnim »tradicionalistom« ideološka fantazma spola prikazuje kot realna/substancialna entiteta ali kot imanentni del realne entitete spolovila oziroma realne reprodukcijske funkcije. S Heideggerjem rečeno, ne opazijo ontološke razlike med spolovilom ter reprodukcijo kot dogodjema in spolom kot bitjo bivajočega.

Zastarelost konstruktov o spolih

Družbena realnost ima strukturo iluzije, ki se pod vplivom raznovrstnih dejavnikov ter dogodkov *rekonstruira*. Konstrukte lahko delimo na socialnozgodovinsko posredovane konstrukte in konstrukte, ki so posredovani s (psevdo)izkušnjami posameznika. Socialnozgodovinsko posredovane lahko pogojuje znanstvena ali neznanstvena vednost. *Znanstveno* vednost praviloma spremlja zavedanje, da je grajena na konstruktih, saj so pogoji njihovega vznika/nastanka in (re)produkcije znani. *Neznanstvene* vednosti ne spremlja podobno zavedanje. Neovédene konstrukte se pogosto razlaga kot samoumevne totalitete, očitne resnice, dokonča spoznanja, fiksirane komponente naravnih ali nadnaravnih, historičnih ali transhistoričnih (psevdo)pojavnov, fizičnih ali metafizičnih (psevdo)entitet, onkraj katerih je svet težko ali celo nemogoče misliti (Perpar, 2018: 70). Med neznanstvene vednosti sodijo ideologije. Denimo identitetne, ki omogočajo specifične oblike subjektivacij, a posameznikom, ki zasedejo diskurzivne subjektne pozicije, ne omogočajo razbrati realnih okoliščin vznika teh pozicij, pogojenih z vsakokratnim socialnozgodovinskim spoznavnim okvirjem oziroma režimom Resnic, in s tem tudi ne prepoznanja identitetnih konstruktov kot konstruktov.

Znanstvena vednost

Če je *biološki spol* (sex) deskriptivni objekt znanstvene vednosti, torej *teoretsko-interpretativni konstrukt*, v veliki meri ujet v reprodukcijsko logiko in utemeljen na prirojenih specifikah organizma, ki služijo kot *arbitrarno* izbrani spolni indikatorji, je *družbeni spol* (gender) kulturno identitetni, torej *ideološki konstrukt*, ki se nanaša na specifične družbene vloge in le-tim predpisane prakse. »Spol« je *v vsakem primeru* deskriptivna kategorija, ne naravna/fizična/realna danost; je kulturni fenomen, ne naravni noumenon.

Znanstveno odbiranje in kategorizacija prirojenih specifik, na katerih je utemeljen konstrukt biološkega spola, opozarjata na kompleksnost spolnega diferenciranja in vsebujeta vrsto nekonsistentnosti, povezanih z normativom »moško-ženske« binarnosti. Jacques Derrida (v Kaufman, 2016) je kritiziral *psihološki proces* kategoriziranja, saj naj bi se za njim skrivalo *motivirano izključevanje*, ki služi (re)produkciji specifičnih oblik vednosti, z njimi opravičevani dominaciji in utrjevanju specifičnih razmerij moči. Matematik in filozof Kurt Gödel je dokazoval veljavnost pravila, da noben miselni sistem ne more biti hkrati popoln (tj. vse vsebujoč, univerzalen) in konsistenten. To pravilo gotovo velja za biološko tezo o spolni dvovrhnosti: če naj ostane ontološko konsistentna, mora vse prirojene posebnosti organizma, ki odstopajo od normiranega/idealiziranega biološkega konstrukta spolne binarnosti, nujno izločiti kot (statistično) »presežno entropijo«, ki ne ustreza »normalni porazdelitvi«. »Presežna entropija«, nanašajoča se na konstrukt biološkega spola, služi za opisovanje vseh naravnih odstopanj od deskripcije normiranih spolov, spolne binarnosti in tej binarnosti prilagojenih povprečij.

Naj navedem nekaj primerov s področja nevroznanosti. Nekateri kot prirojeno specifiko organizma, ki jim služi kot spolni indikator, navajajo število kortikalnih nevronov – slednje naj bi koreliralo s kognitivnim potencialom osebe; »žensko« statistično povprečje naj bi bilo 19 milijard, »moško« 23 milijard (Ankney in Rushton, 2007: 139). »Porazdelitve« števila kortikalnih nevronov se od osebe do osebe razlikujejo, a to pestrost je moč z izračunavanjem statističnih povprečij zvesti na le dve »normalni porazdelitvi«. Potem ko je že utemeljen biološki konstrukt o dveh spolih, se statistiko, ki se nanaša na število kortikalnih nevronov, prilagodi spolni binarnosti. In ko sta povprečni števili nevronov za oba normirana spola izračunani ter prilagojeni, nekaterim celo služita kot dokaz spolne binarnosti. Statistika je vnaprej prilagojena modelu, ki bi ga morala dokazati.

Podobno je z razmerjem med sivo in belo možganovino. To je pri osebah z enako velikimi glavami enako – ne glede na biološki spol, ki je pripisan tem osebam (Rippon v Eliot, 2019). Kljub temu izračunani povprečni

razmerji za oba normirana spola nekaterim služita kot spolna indikatorja in v (psevdo)znanstveni literaturi celo najdemo koncepta »moških možganov« in »ženskih možganov«. Lahko se zgodi, da oseba z manjšimi telesnimi dimenzijami – torej tudi manjšo glavo – in s prirojenimi specifikami, ki se jih pripisuje biološkim moškim, obvelja za »moškega z ženskimi možgani«, torej za »medspolno osebo«, pri kateri razmerje med sivo in belo možganovino obvelja za »presežno entropijo«, ki ne ustreza »normalni porazdelitvi« za biološke moške. V družbah, kjer se vse meri skozi dioptrijo spolne binarnosti, se lahko tudi določene prirojene specifikke (možganov) deli na moške in ženske, čeprav so variacije specifik pri posameznem deskriptivnem spolu večje od normiranih/izračunanih variacijskih povprečij med spoloma. Opozoriti gre tudi na to, da nekatere dokazane razlike med možgani, ki jih nevroseksisti izpostavljajo kot spolne indikatorje, sploh niso prirojene. Nenehno reorganiziranje sinaptičnih struktur, ki ga omogoča nevroplastičnost možganov, je pogojeno s stimuli, katerih izvor je v telesu, v še večji meri pa s stimuli, ki jih sproži (družbeno) okolje (Kitayama et al., 2015). Dominanti diskurzi kultur določajo spolno-identitete reprezentacije in z njimi povezane družbene vloge ter prakse, prav slednje pa na nevrnalni ravni vplivajo tudi na specifikke povezav in organizacijo posameznih omrežij v možganih. Rečeno drugače, specifične spolne vloge in z njimi povezane družbene prakse pri posameznikih poskrbijo za »genderizacijo« njihovih možganov (Rippon, 2019).

Na vprašljivo odbiranje prirojenih posebnosti, prirejeno normativni ideji spolne binarnosti, kaže tudi že omenjeni fenomen »medspolnikov« – oseb, rojenih s *kombinacijo* telesnih specifik, ki se jih pripisuje obema normiranima biološkima spoloma. Genske, gonadne in anatomske karakteristike »medspolnikov« variirajo in v različni meri odstopajo od naborov specifik, na katerih sta utemeljena oba normirana biološka spola. Številni »medspolniki« so ne glede na varianto odstopanja plodni in tudi v tem oziru predstavljajo »presežno entropijo«, ki načenja ekskluzivistično ideologijo »moško-ženske« reprodukcije. Tovrstna »presežna entropija« vodi k sklepu, da ni diskutabilen le konstrukt spolne dvovršnosti oziroma binarnosti, pač pa tudi »zakonitost« »moško-ženske« reprodukcije – še zlasti slednja podpira arbitrarnost pri izbiranju prirojenih specifik organizma, ki služijo kot deskriptivni spolni indikatorji –, saj reprodukcijskega potenciala nimajo le osebe z nizom prirojenih telesnih specifik, na podlagi katerega jim je moč pripisati enega od dveh normiranih bioloških spolov.

Neznanstvena vednost

Pri »vprašanju spola« ne gre le za nove teoretske reinterpretacije fizičnega, naravnega sveta, temveč tudi za zavedanje, da je konstrukt »moško-ženske«

binarnosti v temelju diskriminacije ljudi, ki jih ni moč ukalupiti v paradigmo te binarnosti.⁹ Prav nekonsistentnosti, ki zadevajo normativizem spolne binarnosti, implicirajo možnost resignifikacije in celo designifikacije tako bioloških kot družbenih spolov, saj je, kot rečeno, posamezni »spol« le označevalec, ki označuje niz prirojenih specifik organizma ali družbenih vlog oziroma praks, in ne realna entiteta. Je le izraz, ki ga ideološko/kulturno zaznamovane prakse in razmerja družbene moči povežejo s specifičnim pomenom. In *namenom*.

Ker je popolna razveljavitev spolnih vlog v družbah, kjer prevladujejo falocentrični družbeni vzorci ter »moško-ženska« paradigma reprodukcije, neuresničljiva, hkrati pa se soočamo z »okolščino« »presežne entropije« tako pri znanstvenem izbiranju prirojenih specifik organizma, zadevajočih biološki spol, kot pri družbenih praksah, zadevajočih spolne vloge, se v družbah, ki težijo k idealu enakih možnosti za vsakogar, postavi ideološka, politična, identitetna nuja po priznanju oziroma legalizaciji *novih* bioloških in družbenih spolov.¹⁰ Butler (1990: 113) prepozna manifestacijo tretjega spola v lezbistvu, saj naj bi lezbistvo (kot politična strategija) botrovalo deseksualizaciji »ženskega telesa« in ga lansiralo onkraj binarne »moško-ženske« reprodukcijske matrice. Utemeljitev je neprepričljiva, saj lezbistvo, kljub temu da ga ni moč utiriti v heteronormativistično reprodukcijsko orbito, ne razveljavlja reprodukcijske objektifikacije in ne spodbuja opustitve prakse pripisovanja bioloških spolov oziroma spolnoidentitetne (re)socializacije oseb.

⁹ Na zaplete, ki jih prinaša vztrajanje pri spolni binarnosti, opozarja primer južnoafriške atletinje Caster Semenye. Ker raven testosterona služi kot en izmed bioloških spolnih indikatorjev, je Mednarodno arbitražno razsodišče za šport maja 2019 odločilo, da mora atletinja Semenya znižati raven testosterona v svojem telesu, če hoče nastopati na velikih športnih prireditvah v »ženski konkurenci«. Razsodišče je s to odločitvijo potrdilo veljavnost pravila o hiperandrogenizmu Mednarodne atletske zveze, utemeljenega na biološkem konstrukt spolne binarnosti. Ne glede na to, kakšno spolno identiteto goji, oseba z »androgenskim hormonskim ekscesom« ne ustreza normativni deskripciji osebe z ženskim biološkim spolom. Mednarodne atletske avtoritete ne razmišljajo o uvedbi tekmovalne konkurence za »medspolnike«, v kateri bi lahko športniki, kot je Semenya, nastopali brez hormonskih terapij. Če bo želela nadaljevati svojo profesionalno športno kariero, bo morala s pomočjo hormonskih terapij znižati naravno raven testosterona. Nazoren primer, kako ideologija spolne binarnosti in znanstvena vednost (v konkretnem primeru predvsem vednost endokrinologije in genetike) reproducirata konstrukt spolne dvournosti, pri čemer »medspolniki« izpadejo kot »presežna entropija«.

¹⁰ V Nemčiji je bil 2018. legaliziran biološki, ne tudi družbeni »tretji spol«. Obe obliki nebinarne spolne opredelitve pa sta bili 2019. legalizirani na Tasmaniji; spolnoidentitetna resocializacija oziroma izbira družbenega spola ni pogojena s predhodnim ugotavljanjem biološkega, torej je presežen tudi imperativ cisspolnosti. V mnogih družbah je spolnoidentitetna resocializacija tabu, v tradicionalistični afganistanski družbi pa včasih celo stvar prisile. V patriarhalni družbi je »gospodar družine« brez potomcev neredko predmet posmeha, zato tradicija dopušča, da »gospodar« moški družbeni spol pripiše kateri izmed svojih potomk. Prisilno spolno resocializacijo nekatere osebe doživljajo travmatično, druge kot osvoboditev, saj je nabor svoboščin in pravic za družbene moške v afganistanski družbi obsežnejši od nabora svoboščin in pravic za družbene ženske. Oseba, ki se sprijazni s spolnoidentitetno resocializacijo, morda izboljša svoje možnosti, a ne izboljša položaja družbenih žensk v Afganistanu.

Socialno zgodovinske prakse in specifična razmerja moči določijo število normiranih družbenih spolov in nosilec pripisanih/privzgojenih spolnih identitet določijo tudi vlogo v posamezni družbi. Število »tradicionalnih« družbenih spolov in manifestacije spolnih vlog se razlikujejo od kulture do kulture.¹¹ Emancipacijski boj oseb, ki v družbah z uveljavljeno spolno binarnostjo gojijo nebinarno spolno identiteto, je boj za družbeno priznanje ter vključenost in seveda ne pomeni zavzemanja za razpustitev ali razveljavitev spolnih identitet, prej za njihovo *namnožitve*.

Razvoj znanosti in tehnologij v službi razveljavitve spolnih reprezentacij

Kot rečeno, spolna diskriminacija ni nujno posledica samovolje, njena trdoživost je strukturno pogojena. Strukture, ki dajejo prednost »moškim«, heteronormativizmu, spolni binarnosti in cisspolnosti, opravičujeta neznanstvena in znanstvena vednost. Slednja dandanes še vedno v veliki meri služi diskriminacijskim strukturam, kdaj v prihodnosti pa bo nemara najpomembnejši katalizator njihovega razkroja.

Po Marxu je družbena zavest del družbene nadstavbe, ta pa vedno odseva dinamiko in razmerja moči v družbeni bazi. Na to dinamiko in razmerja družbene moči vplivata predvsem razvoj tehnologije in s tehnološkim razvojem pogojena ekonomija. Nobena revolucija »duhá« oziroma družbene zavesti ne predhodi tehnološki revoluciji. Primer: »duhá« informacijske družbe ni bilo pred razvojem in razmahom informacijsko-komunikacijskih tehnologij. Dokler ne bo tehnologija omogočala proizvodnje človeških zarodkov brez spočetja in donositve zarodka s pomočjo ektogeneze, bosta patriarhat in »maternični« feminizem pojem »ženska« povezovala (tudi) z vlogo »matere«. »Nekroza« *biološke matere ne bo posledica feministične radikalizacije, prej znanstveno-tehnološke*. Če bi tehnologija omogočila opustitev spolnih reprodukcijskih praks, s tem tudi razpustitev spolnih identitet, institucije »matere« ter z njo specifične reprodukcijske vloge, ne bi nastopil čas okrepitve in/ali dodatne politizacije feminizma, prej čas njegovega zatona. V družbah z razveljavljenimi spolnimi reprezentacijami in prevlado nespolnih reprodukcijskih praks bi bržčas tudi feminizem postal odveč.

Razveljavitev spolnih reprezentacij pogojuje znanstveno-tehnološki razvoj, ki bi omogočil *nespolno* reprodukcijo pri homo sapiensu, tj. nastanek novega organizma brez naravnega ali umetnega spočetja, pri čemer se spočetje razume kot združitev »moške« in »ženske« gamete. Nekateri

¹¹ Na Samoi so priznani trije »tradicionalni« družbeni spoli. Samoanski tretji spol označuje izraz »fa'afafine«, ki v prevodu pomeni »kakor ženska«. »Kakor ženske« osebe se ne opredeljujejo kot »ženske«, hkrati pa zavračajo zahodnjaško sistematiko, po kateri jih nekateri umeščajo med geje, lezbijke, trans- ali kvirosebe (UH Manoa).

eksperimenti na področju reprodukcije, ki jih zaenkrat izvajajo na miših, so up vzbujaajoči. Embrio v zgodnjem stadiju je, enostavno rečeno, skupek treh tipov matičnih celic: embrionalnih, primitivnih endodermских in celic trofoblasta. Raziskovalcem na univerzi v Cambridgeu v Angliji je uspelo že iz dveh tipov matičnih celic *sestaviti* embrio, ki se je po tvorbi razvijal podobno kot spočeti embrio (Harrison et al., 2017). V poskusu so uporabili (genetsko modificirane) pluripotentne embrionalne matične celice, ki so jih predhodno izolirali iz mišje blastociste. Pluripotentne matične celice z lastnostmi, ki so podobne lastnostim embrionalnih matičnih celic, pa je moč pridobiti tudi na druge načine, na primer s pomočjo »indukcije« iz diferenciranih odraslih somatskih celic (NobelPrize.org, 2012; University of Helsinki, 2018), in jih preoblikovati v matične celice trofoblasta (Tsuchida et al, 2020) ali primitivne endodermске matične celice (Shafa, 2018). Možnost pridobivanja slednjih dveh tipov matičnih celic iz induciranih pluripotentnih, teh pa iz diferenciranih somatskih budi obet, da bo sinteza embriov iz matičnih celic kdaj v prihodnosti omogočala nesporno razmnoževanje tudi pri homo sapiensu. Ko bo izpopolnjena še tehnologija, ki omogoča ektogenezo, bo tlakovan teren za vznik nove nesporne reprodukcijske paradigme, v kateri bo označevalec »ženska-mati« bržkone ostal brez označenca.

Antagonizmi, lastni specifični paradigmi, lahko z nastopom nove paradigme postanejo preseženi in nepomembni. Opisani poskusi na področju reprodukcije, med katerimi so sicer nekateri še v zgodnji eksperimentalni fazi, obetajo vznik in razvoj novih paradigem ne le v »biotehnoški bazi«, pač pa tudi v »družbeni nadstavbi«, tj. v »sferi« (spolnih) reprezentacij. Obetajo vznik paradigme, ki bo omogočila preseganje reprodukcijske logike, ujete v »moško-žensko« binarnosti, »odmrtnje« reprodukcijskih ter spolnoidentitetnih vlog in razveljavitev koncepta spola.

Sklep

V sklepu naj strnem ugotovitve iz osrednjega dela besedila in odgovorim na vprašanja, zastavljena v uvodu. Strukture, ki odločilno prispevajo k izključevanju »žensk« in obnavljanju falocentrizma, so povezane s spolno reprodukcijo in z le-to utemeljenimi družbenimi vlogami. Naravno ali umetno spočetje ter z njima povezane pojavnosti tvorijo realno strukturo, s katero se največkrat in najbolj vztrajno opravičujejo spolni/reprodukcijski esencionalizem ter le-temu prilagojena simbolna struktura in iluzija spolov. Sklicevanje na reprodukcijsko »zakonitost« oziroma utrjevanje družbenih vlog s pomočjo reprodukcijske logike je še vedno najpomembnejši »moški« način nadzora seksualnosti »žensk« in ohranjanja družbene prevlade »moških«. Reprodukcijski esencionalizem je stara falocentrična »strategija«. Ugotavljam, da se feministične protidiskriminacijske strategije izkažejo za nemočne v

boju zoper reprodukcijski esencializem. Feministična strategija obrata ne vključuje brez-spolne družbe. Slednjo lahko vključuje strategija premestitve, a le v redu Simbolnega, torej v družbeni nadstavbi, ne na ravni reprodukcijskih in z njimi povezanih realnih družbenih praks. Izkaže se, da pomemben del feminističnih struj ne zmore izdelati miselnih sistemov, potrebnih za preseganje epistemé, ki omogoča obnavljanje ideologije spolov oziroma spolne binarnosti. Struje, ki lahko mislijo onkraj binarnosti, še vedno ne podajo zadovoljive rešitve glede preseganja reprodukcijske logike; tiste, ki lahko presežejo reprodukcijsko epistemé, pa se oklepajo strategij, ki na današnji stopnji (bio)tehnološkega razvoja ne morejo obroditi zadovoljivih rezultatov. Dodatno oviro prizadevanjem za emancipacijo »žensk« in oseb, ki se ne uklanjajo heteronormativizmu, cišspolnosti in spolni binarnosti, predstavlja znanstvena vednost, ki neredko opravičuje diskriminacijske strukture, z njimi povezane normativne prakse, spolne vloge in identitete. A morda bo prav ta vednost kdaj v prihodnosti najpomembnejši katalizator njihove razgradnje. Namreč vprašanje spolne reprodukcije, reprodukcijski esencializem in spolnoidentitetni antagonizem v »družbeni nadstavbi« sploh niso razrešljivi – njihova razgradnja/razveljavitev je pogojena z znanstvenim prebojem na področju reprodukcijskih biotehnologij.

Feministična pobuda ne obeta prevrata, ni ga zmožna izpeljati in razveljaviti uveljavljenih spolnoidentitetnih reprezentacij ter reprodukcijskih vlog. Kljub temu, da so feministične teorije in z njimi navdahnjen politični aktivizem marsikje pripomogli k izboljšanju družbenega položaja oseb, ki se jim pripisuje ženski biološki spol oziroma se jim privzgoji ženski družbeni spol, pa tudi LGBTQIA+ oseb, diskriminacija teh oseb na mnogih ravneh družbenega življenja še vedno vztraja. Diskriminacija bo verjetno vztrajala do nastopa nove, z razvojem na področju reprodukcijskih tehnologij pogojene družbene paradigme, v kateri bodo spolni/reprodukcijski esencializem, spolnoidentitetne reprezentacije, vloge in z njimi povezani antagonizmi izginili oziroma bili preseženi.

LITERATURA

- Butler, Judith (1990): *Gender trouble: feminism and the subversion of identity*. New York: Routledge.
- Grosz, Elizabeth (1986): What is Feminist Theory? V: Carole Pateman (ur.) in Elizabeth Grosz (ur.), *Feminist Challenges: Law and Social Theory*: 190–205. Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin.
- Keuls, Eva (1985): *The reign of the Phallus*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Kitayama, Shinobu, Jiyoung Park in Yay-hyung Cho (2015): Culture and Neuroplasticity. V: Michele Gelfand (ur.), Chi-yue Chiu (ur.) in Ying-yi Hong (ur.), *Handbook of Advances in Culture and Psychology*: 38–100. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Kymlicka, Will (2005): *Sodobna politična teorija*. Ljubljana: Krtina.
- Marcuse, Herbert (1981): *Zastarelost psihoanalize*. V: Rastko Močnik (ur.), *Psihoanaliza in kultura*: 173–194. Ljubljana: DZS.
- Mead, Margaret (1963): *Male and female: a study of the sexes in a changing world*. New York: William Morrow.
- Mead, Margaret (2002): *Spol in značaj v treh prvotnih družbah*. Ljubljana: Pedagoška fakulteta.
- Perpar, Jurij (2018): *Sebstvo, konstrukt sinergije med biofizično pogojenimi mentalnimi psevdofenomeni in socialno zgodovinsko pogojenimi sprevrnjenimi zavestmi*. *Anthropos* 50 (1–2): 67–84.
- Rippon, Gina (2019): *The Gendered Brain*. London: The Bodley Head.
- Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (1981): *French Feminism in an International Frame*. *Yale French Studies* (62): 154–184. Dostopno prek <https://philpapers.org/archive/SPIFFL.pdf>, 12. 12. 2020.
- Squires, Judith (2009): *Spol v politični teoriji*. Ljubljana: Krtina.
- Završnik, Aleš (2009): *Homo criminalis: upodobitve zločinskega subjekta v visokotehnološki družbi tveganja*. Ljubljana: Institut za kriminologijo.
- Žižek, Slavoj (2003): *Subtraction: Jewish and Christian*. Dostopno prek <https://theoryreader.org/2021/03/23/subtraction-jewish-and-christian-by-slavoj-zizek/> amp/, 25. 3. 2021.

154

VIRI

- Ankney, Davidson in Philippe Rushton (2007): *The Evolution of Brain Size and Intelligence*. V: Platek, Steven (ur.), Julian Keenan (ur.) in Todd Shackelford (ur.), *Evolutionary Cognitive Neuroscience*: 121–161. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Butler, Judith (2020): *On the culture wars, JK Rowling and living in »anti-intellectual times«*. Dostopno prek <https://www.newstatesman.com/international/2020/09/judith-butler-culture-wars-jk-rowling-and-living-anti-intellectual-times>, 26. 12. 2020.
- de Beauvoir, Simone (1949): *The Second Sex*. Dostopno prek <http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/ethics/de-beauvoir/2nd-sex/introduction.htm>, 31. 10. 2021.
- Eliot, Lise (2019): *Neurosexism: the myth that men and women have different brains*. Dostopno prek <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-00677-x>, 26. 2. 2021.
- Harrison, Sarah Ellsy, Berna Sozen, Neophytos Christodoulou, Christos Kyprianou in Magdalena Zernicka-Goetz (2017): *Assembly of embryonic and extraembryonic stem cells to mimic embryogenesis in vitro*. Dostopno prek <https://science.sciencemag.org/content/356/6334/eaal1810>, 18. 12. 2020.
- Kaufman, Scott Barry (2016): *The Personality of Political Correctness*. Dostopno prek <https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/beautiful-minds/the-personality-of-political-correctness/>, 6. 12. 2020.
- NobelPrize.org (2012): *Press release*. Dostopno prek <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/medicine/2012/press-release>, 4. 8. 2021.

- Shafa, Mehdi, Fan Yang, Thomas Fellner, Mahendra Rao in Behnam Baghbaderan (2018): Human-Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells Manufactured Using a Current Good Manufacturing Practice-Compliant Process Differentiate Into Clinically Relevant Cells From Three Germ Layers. Dostopno prek <https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmed.2018.00069/full>, 3. 8. 2021.
- Tsuchida, Nanae, Junya Kojima, Atsushi Fukuda, Mayumi Oda, Tomoyuki Kawasaki, Hiroe Ito, Naoaki Kuji, Keiichi Isaka, Hirotaka Nishi, Akihiro Umezawa in Hidenori Akutsu (2020): Transcriptomic features of trophoblast lineage cells derived from human induced pluripotent stem cells treated with BMP 4. Dostopno prek <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0143400419306782>, 3. 8. 2021.
- UH Manoa: Gender Identity and Sexual Identity in the Pacific and Hawaii: Introduction. Dostopno prek <https://guides.library.manoa.hawaii.edu/Pacific-sexual-identity>, 8. 12. 2020.
- University of Helsinki (2018): New method for turning skin cells into pluripotent stem cells. ScienceDaily. Dostopno prek www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/07/180706091723.htm, 2. 8. 2021.



Andrej KIRN
redni profesor v pokoju,
Fakulteta za družbene vede, UL

Thomas Piketty
Kapital in ideologija
(**Capital and Ideology**)
The Belknap Press, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, London,
England 2020,
1093 str., 39,90 EUR
(ISBN 978-0-67-98082-2)

Knjiga Thomasa Pikettyja je v bistvu nadaljevanje dela *Kapital v 21. stoletju*, ki je bilo prevedeno tudi v slovenščino. Izdala ga je Mladinska knjiga leta 2014. Avtor sodi, da je knjiga nadgradnja ideje Marxa in Engelsa iz *Komunističnega manifesta*, da je bila vsa dosedanja zgodovina zgodovina razrednih bojev. Nadgradnja naj bi obstajala v analizi zgodovine ideoloških opravičevanj in utemeljevanj družbene neenakosti v različnih družbenih sistemih. Takšna nadgradnja je umestna, saj ni bilo zgodovine razrednih bojev brez zgodovine ideoloških bojev in konfliktov. Piketty razlikuje suženjske, trifunkcionalne, kolonialistične, socialdemokratske in komunistične ideologije opravičevanja neenakosti. V marksistični terminologiji bi se vse te ideologije nanašale na razredne družbe. Izjema bi bila komunistična ideologija, ki ni opravičevala, ampak zaničala neenakost. Ideologijo Piketty razume pozitivno kot sistem določenih idej in pravi, da jo jemlje zelo resno. Treba pa je dodati, da so ideološke samo skupinske,

slojevske, stanovske, razredne ideje, ki imajo interesno razsežnost. Čisto individualne ideje, čeprav so interesno obremenjene, še niso ideološke.

Piketty zatrjuje, da je njegov pristop različen od marksističnega. V bistvu pa je različen od dogmatičnega marksizma, v katerem je »ideološka nadstavba« mehaničen odraz stanja produkcijskih odnosov in produkcijskega načina. V Marxovem in Engelsovem pomenu ideologije gre za sprevrnjeno vzročno-posledično razumevanje zgodovinskega procesa ali določenih družbenih pojavov. Piketty poudari »resnično avtonomijo« ideologije (str. 147). Kaj naj to pomeni? Ni mogoče, da gre za njeno popolno nepovezanost z lastninskimi in ekonomskimi odnosi, saj ideološko opravičevanje neenakosti le-te predpostavlja. Gre za medsebojno učinkovanje in povezanost obeh sfer. Piketty sodi, da so režimi lastnine in politike povezani že zelo dolgo. S to povezavo je povezano tudi splošno ideološko opravičevanje družbene neenakosti in znotraj nje specifična ideološka opravičevanja različnih vidikov neenakosti med spoloma. S to neenakostjo se Piketty ne ukvarja. Piketty zavrača običajno konservativno opravičevanje neenakosti, da ima ta svoj temelj v naravi. Mislim, da ideološko opravičevanje družbene neenakosti v kapitalizmu obstaja v zanikanju izkoriščanja in v postvarelosti kapitala, da je kapital stvar, ne pa specifičen družbenolastninski odnos. Ideološko opravičevanje neenakosti je miselna razlaga in utemeljevanje obstoječega. Sodobno opravičevanje

neenakosti vpliva na socialni dialog, socialno zakonodajo, na mezde in profite. Piketty ima zelo prav, ko ugotavlja, da so pragmatiki dejansko najbolj ideološki. Vzemimo na primer delitev dobička. To še zdaleč ni samo pragmatična tema, ampak je tudi ideološka, saj se okoli nje razgrinjajo vrednotno zainteresirane ideje različnih akterjev. Eni nasprotujejo temu, da bi se dobiček delil med vse zaposlene in da bi bila ta delitev zakonsko obvezna. Ta različica temelji na osnovnem aksiomu, da naj se dobički privatizirajo, izgube pa socializirajo.

Ker sta ideologija in kapital povezana, ni samo pomembno, kako se razume ideologija, ampak tudi, kako se razume kapital. Ta se pogosto razume samo kot stvar (na primer finančni, trgovski, tehnološki kapital), ki prinaša večji donos od glavnice, ne pa tudi kot družbenolastninski ekonomski odnos. Kapitalizem temelji na koncentraciji ekonomske moči v rokah lastnikov kapitala (str. 971). Po Pikettyju gre za ideološko opravičevanje kapitala in družbene neenakosti. Zaradi tega bi bil bolj primeren naslov knjige *Ideologija kapitala*, ne pa *Kapital in ideologija*. Levo razmišljajoči intelektualci bi se lahko popolnoma strinjali z avtorjem, da je opravičevanje neenakosti in koncentracije bogastva tudi opravičevanje koncentracije in lastništva produkcijskih sredstev. Drugačna porazdelitev bogastva vključuje drugačen produkcijski način, a drugačen produkcijski način vključuje drugačno razdelitev bogastva. Čeprav gre za nadgradnjo knjige *Kapitalizem v 21. stoletju*, pa

se *Kapital in ideologija* od nje razlikuje v več vidikih.

Uveljavljen je multidisciplinaren pristop. Če bralec ne bi vedel, da gre za svetovno znanega ekonomista, bi mislil, da je knjigo napisal široko strokovno razgledan sociolog, politolog ali zgodovinar. Takšen pristop je rezultat avtorjevih pogledov na nezadostnost disciplinarno izolirane avtonomne ekonomije, ki je sama prostovoljno prekinila povezavo z drugimi družboslovnimi znanostmi (str. 1034). Po Pikettyju je možen napredek v razumevanju socioekonomskega pojava samo v kombinaciji ekonomskih, zgodovinskih, socioloških, kulturoloških in političnih pristopov (str. 1040). Avtonomija ekonomije je po njegovem onkraj raziskovanja škodila civilizacijski in politični sferi. Novinarji in državljani nasploh so se vse preveč pogosto priklanjali ekonomskim ekspertizam in se obotavljali izreči mnenje o mezdah, profitih, davkih, dolgovih, trgovini in kapitalu (str. 1040). Je pa treba dodati, da so se, obratno, tudi mnogi ekonomisti ne samo priklanjali politiki, ampak so bili tudi njeni oblikovalci in celo protagonisti neoliberalnega razvojnega modela, politiki pa so izrabili ekonomijo za kritje svojih odločitev. Med ekonomisti pa seveda obstajajo tudi idejno vrednotna politična in ne samo strokovna in znanstvena razhajanja. Piketty ugotavlja, da je med ekonomisti, ki so delali za take institucije, kot sta Svetovna banka in Mednarodni denarni sklad, prevladala ideologija neoliberalizma. Ti ekonomisti so bili bolj blizu Thatcherjevi

in Reaganovemu modelu kapitalizma kot pa evropski socialdemokraciji in nemško-nordijskemu soupravljanju (str. 602–603). Tranzicijsko »šok terapijo« so zagovarjali ne samo politiki, ampak tudi nekateri ekonomisti. Po Pikettyju naj bi izhajala iz prepričanja, da samo hitra privatizacija prepreči vsako možnost vrnitve v komunizem. Šlo je za povezavo politike s podjetniško elito podjetij, prek katerih so odtekali profiti v države Zahodne Evrope. Ti profiti, ki so se izmaknili domačemu kapitalu, so prispevali k nezaslišanemu trgovskemu presežku Nemčije. Piketty sodi, da je težko zanikati, da države Zahodne Evrope niso imele trgovskih in finančnih koristi od integracije vzhodnega bloka v EU. Seveda ne samo vzhodnega bloka, ampak tudi Slovenije. Če bi se za 30 % zmanjšal odtok profitov iz Madžarske in Češke, bi se BDP teh držav povečal za 2 do 3 % (str. 641). Vprašamo se lahko, ali tudi v tovrstnih odtokih ne tičijo ekonomski razlogi za vzpon nacionalizma in suverenizma nekaterih novih članic EU.

Gospodarska kriza leta 1928 je bila v bistvu kriza ekonomskoliberalnega kapitalizma in njegove vere v dereguliran trg. Obnovitev zaupanja v svobodni trg naj bi se ohranila v neoliberalizmu. Sam izraz »neoliberalizem« se je pojavil na kolokviju Walter Lippmann v Parizu leta 1938. Prisotna sta bila tudi Hayek in Polany. Neoliberalni kapitalizem je za Pikettyja hiperkapitalizem.

Knjiga Kapital in ideologija je izredno obsežna glede predmeta raziskovanja. Ni se omejila na ekonomsko

ter znanstvenotehnološko najrazvitejše države (ZDA, EU, Japonska), ampak vključuje tudi Rusijo, Kitajsko, Indijo, Brazilijo idr. Navkljub geslu »égalité« se je lastninska neenakost povečala po francoski revoluciji (str. 128). Obljuba o enakosti je ostala neizpolnjena. Ostane pa odprto, ali so bili za to krivi akterji francoske revolucije ali pa to kaže na moč opozicije.

Rast neenakosti v 19. stoletju je močno pripevala k pojavu socialističnih, socialdemokratskih, komunističnih, delavskih gibanj v drugi polovici 19. stoletja (str. 195). Verjetno pa je bila tudi podlaga za teoretične koncepcije ekonomskega determinizma o nujnem zlomu kapitalizma in absolutnega osiromašenja delavskega razreda. Je pa rast neenakosti po Pikettyju prispevala k vzponu nacionalizmov in verjetno tudi k svetovni vojni (str. 197). V zvezi z rastočo neenakostjo Piketty ocenjuje Bernsteina, da je bil pretirano optimističen o difuziji lastnine in redukciji neenakosti (str. 425). Treba pa je dodati, da je Bernstein nastopil proti naturalizaciji znanstvenosti socializma, ki je znanstvenost zožila na naravoslovje.

Po letu 1980 se neenakost ni večala samo v ZDA in Evropi, ampak tudi v Indiji, Kitajski, Rusiji, skratka na vseh kontinentih. V obdobju 1950–1980 so bile države, kot so Rusija, Kitajska, zahodnoevropske države in do določene mere tudi ZDA in Indija, relativno egalitarne, potem pa so vstopile v fazo neegalitarnosti. Stopnje ekonomske rasti so bile večje v egalitarnem obdobju 1950–1980 kot pa v neegalitarnem. Posplošena

ugotovitev globalnega pristopa je, da so bili progresivni davki uvedeni na vseh kontinentih v 20. stoletju (str. 559). Vzroke naraščanja neenakosti Piketty ne išče v izkoriščanju, ampak v opustitvi progresivnega obdavčenja dohodkov, premoženja in dediščine. Po njegovem pa tudi nazadovanje investiranja v izobraževanje pomaga razložiti ne samo rast neenakosti, ampak tudi upočasnitev ekonomske rasti. Francija je bila zadnja med bogatimi državami, ki je sprejela progresivno obdavčenje (Danska 1870, Japonska 1887, Prusija 1891, Švedska 1903, Velika Britanija 1909, ZDA 1913, Francija 1914). Koncentracija bogastva je v Franciji naraščala vse do začetka prve svetovne vojne (str. 151).

Navaja primer ZDA in Velike Britanije za obdobje 1950–1980, ki vzbuja dvom v argument konservativcev in zagovornikov ekonomske rasti, da znižanje zgornje davčne stopnje spodbuja ekonomsko rast. Gibanje za zmanjšanje progresivnega obdavčenja v ZDA in Veliki Britaniji je prispevalo k večanju neenakosti v obeh državah v obdobju 1980–2018. Analiza kaže, da so visoki progresivni davki združljivi s hitro ekonomsko rastjo. S takšno trditvijo se najbrž ne bi strinjali slovenski neoliberalni politiki, neoliberalni ekonomisti in arhitekti naše davčne politike.

Pikettyjev pogled na zgodovino je alternativno odprt, ne pa deterministično enosmerno zaprt. Vedno obstaja možnost izbire, drugačne poti, alternative. Pravi, da ga je zgodovina prepričala, da je možno preseči

sedanji kapitalizem (str. 967). Zago-varja alternativne možnosti in je proti ovekovečenju tako državne kot tudi privatne lastnine. Alternativno Piketty vidi v participativnem (deležniškem) socializmu, ki presega tako kapitalizem kot sovjetsko obliko komunizma, tako privatno kot državno lastnino. Izhod iz sedanjega neoliberalnega kapitalizma vidi v možnosti egalitarne in redistributivne koalicije v prihodnosti. Alternative so po Pikettyju vedno obstajale in vedno bodo (str. 8). Tako bi Rusija po oktobrski revoluciji po razmišljanju Pikettyja lahko sprejela nordijski stil socialdemokratskih institucij z visokim progresivnim davčnim sistemom, z razvitim sistemom socialne zaščite, s soupravljanjem sindikatov in delničarjev in obenem bi bilo možno ohraniti določeno raven enakosti in dviganje določene ravni produktivnosti in življenjskega standarda. Putin se je posmehoval Gorbačovovemu poskusu ohranitve socializma. Po njegovem je treba opustiti egalitarizem in socializem v vseh oblikah, ker naj bi bilo le tako mogoče ohraniti veličino Rusije (str. 604). Tudi slovenska tranzicija bi bila lahko drugačna, kot je bila. Razmerje političnih sil je vodilo k uresničitvi določene možnosti in onemogočilo druge. Nekateri naši desničarji sodijo, da alternativa demokratičnega socializma ogroža ustavno ureditev, zato jo je treba zakonsko prepovedati in onemogočiti.

Piketty vidi prihodnost v participativnem (deležniškem) socializmu. Njegovi elementi izhajajo iz preobrazbe režimov neenakosti (str. 960).

Prednost daje izrazu »participativni socializem«, da bi izpostavil razlikovanje tega projekta od hipercentraliziranega državnega socializma v 20. stoletju v Sovjetski zvezi, ki se še prakticira v javnem sektorju na Kitajskem (str. 969). Pri participativnem socializmu ima osrednjo vlogo izobraževalni sistem, prehodno lastništvo (temporary propriety) in progresivno obdavčenje (str. 969–970). Nova oblika participativnega socializma v 21. stoletju naj bi po Pikettyju presegla kapitalizem in njegovo posvečenje lastnine. Takšen socializem, ne komunizem iz *Komunističnega manifesta*, sedaj straši v Evropi in po svetu. Skrajna desnica se pred njim skuša zavarovati tako, da bi ga ustavno prepovedala. Ovekovčenjima privatne lastnine v kapitalizmu in državne v socializmu sta ustrezala dva strahova: strah, da bi dopustitev malih lastnikov korak za korakom vodil v kapitalizem, in strah kapitalizma, da bi se odpiralo vprašanje lastnine (str. 591).

Študija se zaključuje z avtorjevo vizijo možne prihodnosti. Pravi, da je globoko spremenil svoja stališča kot rezultat branja, srečanj in razprav, v katerih je bil udeležen, in da bo popravljaj svoje poglede tudi v prihodnosti (str. 991). Sam sebe ocenjuje, da je bil na začetku akademske kariere bolj liberalen in manj socialist, kot je sedaj (str. 1030). Njegovo razumevanje družbenega razvoja je povzeto v ideji, da je zgodovina človeških družb v iskanju pravičnosti in gibanju k demokratičnemu socializmu (str. 1036). Če gre v zgodovini za iskanje pravične družbe, potem to kapitalizem

gotovo ni. Konservativne revolucije v letu 1980 in padec komunizma so zaustavile to gibanje. Propad komunizma je prispeval k opustitvi razmišljanja o preseganju kapitalizma in regulacije trga v letih 1990–2010. Okrepila se je vera v samoreguliran trg in zasebno lastnino produkcijskih sredstev.

Omenja pozitivne rezultate socialne demokracije v 20. stoletju, zlasti v Zahodni Evropi. Sodi, da beseda »socializem« še vedno zasluži, da je uporabljena v 21. stoletju, da obuja to tradicijo, četudi si jo prizadevamo preseči. Po Pikettyju nekateri socializem izenačujejo s sovjetskim izkustvom ali z dejanji sodobnih vlad v nekatere država, ki so samo po imenu socialistične (str. 970). Sodim, da bi bilo treba raziskovalno razkriti, če in koliko so vlade kapitalističnih držav z ekonomskimi sankcijami prispevale k izolaciji, revščini, represiji in nedemokratičnosti teh držav. Razmišljanje Pikettyja o socializmu je pomembno tudi za slovenski politični prostor, v katerem se socializem pri mnogih povezuje samo s totalitarizmom, enostrankarskim enoumjem, skratka zgolj z negativnim.

Demokratični socializem je pri nas za nekatere logično protislovje. V pojmu socializem ni ničesar, kar bi izključevalo demokratičnost. Ta izključevalnost se izvede iz politične prakse do sedaj obstoječih socializmov. Kot demokratični socializem tudi krščanski socializem ni protisloven pojem. Protisloven pojem je na primer okrogel kvadrat, kjer okroglost izključuje kvadratost in obratno.

Protislovnost se pojavi tedaj, če se pojem socializem izenačuje s totalitarizmom in ateizmom. V tem primeru pa socializem ne more biti demokratičen in krščanski. Toda to izključevanje ni logično, ampak kontekstualno zgodovinsko.

Piketty je prepričan, da kapitalizem in privatno lastnino produkcijskih sredstev lahko nadomesti pravična družba na temelju participativnega socializma in družbenega federalizma. Tako bi se vzpostavil sistem lastnine, ki bi imel malo skupnega s sedanjim privatnim kapitalizmom in bi predstavljal njegovo resnično preseganje, ki se je začelo v poznem 19. in na začetku 20. stoletja. To se je kazalo v delitvi moči v podjetju in progresivnemu obdavčenju, ki izhaja iz tega obdobja. Ta razvoj naj bi zastal, ker socialdemokrati niso uspeli inovirati in internacionalizirati svojega projekta zaradi dramatičnega padca komunizma sovjetskega tipa, kar je svet pahnilo v neomejeno deregulacijo in zavrnitev vseh egalitarnih ambicij (str. 989).

Boj za soupravljanje, sodoločnost se je začel že konec 19. stoletja in je bil velik dosežek (str. 973). Škoda, da v tej zvezi, pa tudi ne nikjer drugod, ne omenja dosežkov in neuspelov jugoslovanskega samoupravnega socializma. Nemčija in nordijske države so razvile ekonomski in socialni model, ki je bil bolj produktiven in manj neenak. Po Pikettyju je mnogo poti za soupravljanje, kot obstaja sedaj. Ta stališča so zelo podobna tem, ki jih pri nas razvija direktor Študijskega centra za industrijsko

demokracijo Mato Gostiša, ki je zapisal, da se demokracija »začne na delovnem mestu, ne v parlamentu« (Delo, 15. 4. 2021) in da »kapitalizem kot sistem potrebuje temeljito rekonstrukcijo« (Delo, 16. 8. 2017). K »temeljiti rekonstrukciji kapitalizma« pa gotovo sodi tudi družbena odgovornost podjetij.

Med letoma 1990 in 2010 se je okrepila vera v samoreguliran trg in privatno lastnino produkcijskih sredstev. Da bi se presegel kapitalizem, predlaga izboljševanje progresivnega obdavčenja in prehod v participativni socializem. Toda samo progresivno obdavčenje dohodka in dediščine po njegovem ne bo dovolj. Dopolnjeno mora biti s progresivnim letnim obdavčenjem premoženja, ker le-to vodi k resničnemu krogotoku kapitala (str. 996).

Avtor vidi tri komplementarne načine preseganja privatne lastnine: a) javna lastnina, b) družbena lastnina na ravni podjetij, ki obstaja v delitvi moči, in c) preprečevanje izredno velikih holdingov (str. 494). Z vidika lastnine in njene preobrazbe v 20. in začetku 21. stoletja Piketty razlikuje tri obdobja: a) padec lastninske družbe v letih 1914–1945, b) socialdemokratske družbe 1950–1980, c) obdobje krize socialdemokratskih družb od leta 1980 dalje.

Soupravljanje (comanagement) sodoločnost (Mitbestimmung) je tržna znamka nemškega in skandinskega kapitalizma, ne pa angloameriškega, latinskoameriškega, japonskega ali francoskega (str. 501). Mar ne tudi jugoslovanskega?

Novi obrazi v slovenski politiki ne vključujejo tovrstne ideje v svoj politični program. Ne samo strankarska demokracija, človekove pravice, boj proti korupciji, skrajšanje bolniških vrst, dolgotrajna oskrba, gradnja stanovanj, odprava prekarne delo in drugo, ampak tudi preseganje kapitalizma, soupravljanje v podjetjih, obvezna delitev dobička in podobno bo moral postati politični cilj levih in levosredinskih strank. Radikalno zmanjšanje družbene neenakosti bo odpravilo življenje pod pragom revščine in omogočilo večji razcvet individualnosti. Če hočemo preživeti, mora politiko rasti in velike neenakosti zamenjati politika trajnega obstoja v naravi in dostojnega življenja v družbi.

Piketty se ne spušča v povezavo naraščajoče neenakosti in naraščajoče ekološke degradacije planeta. Oba procesa pa sta povezana. Razširjena reprodukcija in akumulacija kapitala uničuje oboje, tako naravo kot človeka. Koriščenje narave in človeka s pomočjo nenehnih tehničnih in organizacijskih inovacij je postalo izvor profitnega bogatenja, ki koplje grob sedanji civilizaciji. Smo v obdobju kapitalocena kot posebne oblike antropocena. Nadovestiti ga mora socioekocen. Če ne bo prišlo do tega družbenoekološkega obrata, obstaja zelo realna možnost, da bo propadla sedanja civilizacija in bo celo izginila sama človeška vrsta. Predvideni ukrepi svetovne konference o podnebnih spremembah v Glasgowu septembra 2021 so vsebinsko pre malo radikalni, časovno pa preveč zamaknjeni, zato je možnost družbenoekološke katastrofe zelo verjetna.

Klemen Ploštajner,
Fakulteta za družbene vede, UL
Mickaël Labbé

Zavzemimo prostor:

Proti arhitekturi prezira

Založba Krtina, Ljubljana 2021,
171 str., 22.00 EUR
(ISBN 978-961-260-140-9)

Prevod kratkega dela Mickaëla Labbéja v slovenski prostor vnaša kratek in koncizen opis sodobne produkcije urbanega prostora ter vloge, morebiti bolje rečeno odsotnosti arhitekture pri njegovem snovanju. Avtor si zada nalogo oblikovanja nekakšnega programskega besedila za arhitekturo, ki je izgubila svoje mesto, s tem ko se je ujela v produkcijo na eni strani spektakularnih prostorov občudovanja in na drugi tehnicističnih prostorov pretočnosti in menjave. Pravilneje rečeno, arhitektura se je odpovedala svojemu mestu, s tem ko je opustila svojo politično in družbeno držo, s tem ko je nehala misliti družbo – ali mesto, kar pa je v očeh Labbéja isto –, in se podredila diktatu birokratskega uma države ali pa menjalnega imperativa trga. Postala je bodisi gola tehnika bodisi čista forma, s tem pa je arhitekt postal inženir ali pa umetnik. V obeh primerih pa se je odpovedal primarni vlogi arhitekture, ki je oblikovanje in snovanje prostorov družbenih odnosov. Zato avtor piše: »Zoper spektakularizacijo arhitekturne forme, zoper estetski populizem in zoper tehnokratsko in tržno upravljanje prostora moramo utrditi dejstvo, da je značaj arhitekture pretežno socialen in političen« (str. 29).

Mogoče ravno ta programska, celo manifestna narava besedila, ki veje tudi iz njegovega naslova, prispeva k temu, da delo ne prinaša veliko izvirnih uvidov tako v razmisleke o odnosu med prostorom in družbo kot o stanju arhitekture, njeni vlogi ali nalogi. Morebiti je bolje rečeno, da ne prinaša veliko originalnega na področju obče produkcije tekstov o proizvajanju/ustvarjanju prostora, v slovenski intelektualni in jezikovni prostor pa vnaša precej svežih idej. Pa vendar, originalnost ali prebojnost zagotovo nista močni plati besedila. A od manifestov tega niti ne pričakujemo, saj si ne zadajo naloge poglobljenih premislekov ali izvirnih izpeljav, ampak ciljajo predvsem na učinkovitost besedila ter prenos idej v praktično delovanje. Zato je treba delo oceniti predvsem z vidika njegovih izhodišč, se pravi teoretskih temeljev ter njegovih usmeritev za prakticiranje »zavzemanja prostora«, k čemur nas spodbuja njegov naslov.

Besedilo ima tridelno strukturo: zaznavanje in analiziranje problematike, ki predstavlja njegov analitični temelj; zamišljanje in razmišljanje o alternativah, ki deluje kot nekakšno načrtovanje programskih izhodišč; razmislek o akterju, morebiti celo nosilcu sprememb, ki ga lahko razumemo kot poskus oblikovanja programa nove arhitekture. Analitični del je zgrajen okoli idej socialne filozofije priznavanja (Labbé v veliki meri uporablja delo Axela Honnetha, medtem ko podobna besedila v anglosaksonskem jezikovnem okviru pogosteje temeljijo na podobnih teorijah Iris Marion

Young), katere temelj je ideja intersubjektivnosti kot jedra subjektivnosti in tudi družbe. Družba se oblikuje prek dejanj vzajemnega priznavanja subjektov in obratno, subjekti vznikajo ravno prek družbenega priznavanja. Dejanja priznavanja so hkrati individualna in tudi kolektivna, saj skozi njih vznikajo raznolike skupnosti, pa tudi identitete. To priznavanje pa je lahko tudi negativno in se izvaja v obliki prezira, ki ni zgolj zavračanje ali aktivno nasprotovanje priznanju, ampak je tudi temelj stigmatiziranja, s tem pa izločevanja. Tako prek odnosov priznavanja ali prezira kot temelja družbenih vezi vznikajo politične skupnosti, te pa so neločljivo povezane z določenim krajem, se pravi »mi« vedno vznika »nekje«. Še močneje: vznikajo skozi kraj, ki uteleša pretekle in sedanje odnose ter jih okrepi, (re)producira. »... nas ni brez kje, kjer se mi instituirajo, zakoreninijo, razcvetijo, se odkrivajo in se prenašajo. Če nimamo nadzora nad tem, kje smo, ne moremo opredeliti, kdo smo ali kdo bi želeli biti« (str. 21). In ravno to je točka, kjer avtor vzpostavi povezavo med socialno filozofijo in arhitekturo.

To vez med prostorom in družbenimi odnosi Labbé poudari prek treh form sodobnega mesta (antisocialno povišanje, turistifikacija in »Business Improvement District«), ki jih uporabi kot ponazoritve in tudi paradigmatične primere arhitekture prezira. To razume kot osnovni pristop oblikovanja sodobnega mesta, ki je zgrajeno okoli zavračanja, izključevanja določenih vedenj in kategorij prebivalstva, razlastitve in privatizacije ter

temelji na inherentnem nezaupanju do uporabnikov prostora. Defenzivna arhitektura tako utrjuje strah, krepi ločevanje, hkrati pa jemlje avtonomijo uporabnikom, da bi souporabljali in posledično sooblikovali prostor. Nadzor nad prostorom in njegovo rabo odvzame njegovim osrednjim akterjem, se pravi prebivalcem, in ga preda drugim logikam, kot so varnost, birokratska učinkovitost ali tržna vrednost. To pa posledično pomeni, da takšni prostori onemogočajo oblikovanje odnosov spoštovanja, vzajemnosti, posledično pa tudi avtonomije in svobode. »Če nimamo nadzora nad tem, kje smo, ne moremo opredeliti, kdo smo ali kdo bi želeli biti« (str. 21). Zato so ti prostori v temelju antidemokratični.

Na podlagi povzetega si v drugem delu avtor zastavi vprašanje, kakšni naj bi bili »prostori spoštovanja«, ki bi temeljili na zaupanju v skupnost in priznavanju avtonomije ter enkratnosti njenih članov, predvsem pa, kje jih zgraditi. Zavrne strategije umika, ki ga udejanja ekološki eskapizem »Zone a Defendre«, kakor tudi zasedba simbolnih mest reprezentacije v obliki »zasedb trgov«, saj obe temeljita na odmiku od vsakdana. Zato raje mobilizira znano tezo Lefebvra o »pravici do mesta« in se zavzame za »polastitev« prostorov vsakdanjega življenja. Tezo interpretira kot kolektivno prilagajanje najbolj banalnih in vsakdanjih prostorov s strani prebivalcev in uporabnikov, saj so ravno ti temelj našega zasebnega in skupnega sobivanja. S tem zavrne idejo umikanja iz urbane in njegovega prepuščanja silam

špekulacije ter zagovarja njegovo osvobajanje, zavzemanje in reorganizacijo v smeri krepitve družbenih odnosov spoštovanja.

Prek te razprave se premakne tudi k tretjemu razdelku dela in programu nove arhitekture, ki bi moralo biti, če delo razumemo kot programsko besedilo, najmočnejše in najbolj jasno. A ravno na tem mestu začne delo izgubljati svojo moč in postane nejasno. Tako začne avtor operirati z izrazi, kot so »razcvet urbanega življenja« (str. 133), »arhitektura, ki nam dobro dene, ki nam dobro želi« (str. 131), »forme, ki omogočajo svobodo« (str. 137). Izjemno nejasno izrazoslovje vodi in rezultira tudi v nejasni vlogi arhitekture, ki niha med njenim osrednjim, da ne rečemo avantgardnim poslanstvom in sledenjem družbeni dinamiki ter skorajšnji odvečnosti. Tako onkraj nejasnih usmeritev Labbéjev program za novo arhitekturo ne ponuja veliko. Morebiti je najbolj originalna, predvsem pa močna usmeritev in hkrati teza (saj izhaja iz njegovega analitičnega okvira), da je arhitektura vedno kolektivno delo in ne umetnina s podpisom ter lastništvom avtorja. Dobro arhitekturno delo je praktična umetnost, ki je uporabna, ki funkcionira in – predvsem – ki jo posvojijo uporabniki in jo s svojo uporabo predelujejo, preoblikujejo in tudi spreminjajo. Je »brezosebno in kolektivno delo« (str. 144), katerega kakovost se meri z njegovim opravljanjem funkcije. Vendar, ali ni to na nek način ravno izraz odrekanja pomena arhitekturi in njeni vlogi, saj, kakor zapiše Labbé: »Dobra

arhitektura ta čudež najpogosteje izpelje nezavedno ...» (str. 146)?

Ta šibka in nejasna opredelitev programa arhitekture, s tem pa njene vloge in naloge, izhaja iz nejasnega in ambivalentnega odnosa avtorja do ideje načrtovanja in ideje skupnosti. Ker sta obe ideji medsebojno povezani, ju bomo obravnavali skupaj. Avtor kot nasprotje špekulativnemu trgu in birokratski državi, ki naj bi bila utemeljena v sovražni arhitekturi, mobilizira idejo skupnosti, s čimer ne odstopa od mnogih kritik sodobnega urbanizma. Težava je v tem, da je skupnost izjemno nejasen termin, ki bolj deluje kot prazen označevalec, in je v tej maniri podoben izrazu ljudstvo, ki ga mobilizira populizem. S tem izraz ne pojasni veliko, saj sam rabi pojasnilo, ki pa ga Labbé ne ponudi oz. ga ponudi v ohlapni obliki vznikanja skupnosti skozi kolektivne prakse. Mobilizacija ideje skupnosti ob tem vodi v zgrešeno predstavo, da je ta skupnost v konfliktu z nečim zunanjim, ki pa ni človeško. Skupnost proti državi, skupnost proti kapitalu sta le dve obliki, ki zameglita vpogled v to, da je skupnost sama razklana in da je konflikt vedno medoseben. To deloma nakaže tudi Labbé, a nato vseeno hitro zapade v romantizacijo skupnosti kot čiste, neposredovane forme človeških odnosov, ki najbolje pozna lastne potrebe in jih tudi najbolje razrešuje, če se ji to dopusti. Tako ne čudi, da se delo v veliki meri opira na delo Jane Jacobs.

S tem pa se premaknemo k avtorjevemu drugemu težavnemu odnosu, in to je odnos do načrtovanja. Ravno

zato, ker Labbé svojo idejo »arhitekture spoštovanja« tako močno utemelji v vprašanju vzpostavljanja in delovanja skupnosti, v tej koncepciji umanjka jasne opredelitve vloge načrtovalcev prostora, se pravi arhitekture. Tako avtor na določenih mestih arhitekto opredeli kot akterje, ki so nujni za produkcijo kakovostnih prostorov, saj imajo »avtentično prostorsko kulturo« (str. 133), in so zato poklicani, da urejajo nove družbene prostore. Na drugih mestih pa odvzame pomen arhitekturi in okrepi pomen skupnosti, ki naj bo osnovna načrtovalka prostora, njenim potrebam naj arhitektura zgolj sledi. Obe tezi sta problematični, ohranjanje obeh pa toliko bolj. Ta napetost se odraža tudi v avtorjevih zgledih, saj na določenih mestih v tekstu z naklonjenostjo obravnava modernistično arhitekturo, se pravi arhetipski pristop načrtovanja družbe, medtem ko na drugih v svoj zagovor mobilizira Jane Jacobs, ki je svoje pisanje utemeljila v kritiki in celo nezmožnosti načrtovanja.

Avtor tako ne uspe jasno opredeliti vloge načrtovanja, s tem pa tudi ne jasneje opisati vloge načrtovalcev prostora, kar arhitekti so in kar nena zadnje Labbé od njih zahteva. To pa tudi pomeni, da delo kot manifest ne uspe, saj ne začrta jasnega programa. Uspe pa kot zanimiva, produktivna in uporabna vaja v razmisleku ter spodbuja k bolj poglobljenemu razmisleku o vlogi načrtovanja. In to ne le arhitekturnega, temveč tudi na drugih področjih, ki so ravno tako izgubila svojo politično usmeritev.



Danica FINK-HAFNER, Tamara DAGEN: RAZPRAVA O RAZMERJU
MED ZNANSTVENIKI IN PRAKTIKI NA VISOKOŠOLSKEM POLJU
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2022, let. LIX, št. 1, str. 5–24

V članku predstavljamo ugotovitve fokusnih skupin, v katerih so znanstveniki in praktiki s področja visokega šolstva iz različnih delov sveta razpravljali o stanju na visokošolskem polju. Ključne ugotovitve, ki terjajo tako nadaljnje raziskovanje kot tudi dejavnost znanstvenikov, praktikov in političnih odločevalcev na različnih ravneh, so: 1) med znanstvenim raziskovanjem in uporabnim raziskovanjem (slednje pogosto ne dosega primerne konceptualne ravni) je prepad, ki ga je treba odpraviti; 2) ta prepad se izraža tudi v globalnem kontekstu visokošolskega polja; 3) potrebno je razviti multidisciplinarnost, interdisciplinarnost, transdisciplinarnost in metodološko kvaliteto tako bazičnega kot uporabnega raziskovanja; 4) potrebno je nasloviti odgovornost znanstvenikov, praktikov in vlad.

Ključni pojmi: visoko šolstvo (VŠ), raziskovanje, znanstveniki, praktiki, vlada, javna politika

Jure SPRUK: VLOGA DRŽAVE PRI ZAŠČITI TEMELJNIH ČLOVEKOVIH
PRAVIC IN SVOBOŠČIN
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2022, let. LIX, št. 1, str. 25–41

Članek obravnava vprašanje vloge države pri varovanju človekovih pravic in svoboščin. Avtor zastopa stališče, po katerem države pravice in svoboščine lahko kršijo, ker v stvarnosti omogočajo njihovo realno izpeljavo. Tako kot država tudi pravice in svoboščine nastajajo na podlagi družbenih konvencij, vsakršno sklicevanje na univerzalnost ali naravnost pravic in svoboščin je zgolj ideološki moment v zasledovanju političnih ciljev. Prvi pogoj za varovanje pravic in svoboščin je vzpostavljena organizirana prisila v obliki državne oblasti, ki pod svojo avtoriteto zvede mnoštvo različnih interesov in različnih izpeljav pravičnosti. Hobbesov *Leviathan* daje pomemben prispevek k razumevanju teh procesov, njegov poudarek na vseobsegajoči moči države ga sicer odmika od liberalnega ideala omejene oblasti, a njegova temeljna lekcija vendarle vzdrži: kjer ni suverene oblasti, ni učinkovitega varstva pravic in svoboščin. Sklepne ugotovitve pokažejo, da moralni diskurz o univerzalnih človekovih pravicah in svoboščinah za uspešno vpeljavo v življenja posameznikov potrebuje učinkovito državno oblast, ki te pravice in svoboščine umesti v temelje legitimnosti svojega lastnega obstoja.

Ključni pojmi: konstitucionalizem, država, človekove pravice in svoboščine, *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes

Matjaž NAHTIGAL: REFORMA POGODBE O VESOLJU
IN DOLGOTRAJNO TRAJNOSTNO RAZISKOVANJE VESOLJA
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2022, let. LIX, št. 1, str. 42–59

Izziv, kako zagotoviti dolgoročno trajnostno delovanje v vesolju v kontekstu vesoljskih raziskav in komercializacije, ustvarja z vidika mednarodnega prava okolja ter trajnostnega razvoja vrsto vprašanj. Raziskovalno vprašanje analizira obseg, koliko tovrstne vesoljske raziskave prispevajo k dobrobiti človeštva in krepitvi razvoja vseh. V članku so predstavljeni zgodovinski dosežki obstoječega mednarodnega pravnega okvira. Podani so razmisleki o priložnostih, kako krepiti mednarodni okvir za zagotovitev sodelovanja, za transparenten, vključujoč in enakopraven razvoj vesoljskih raziskav, ne da bi omejevali interese in priložnosti vodilnih držav na področju vesoljskih raziskav. Ključna ugotovitev in predlog članka sta, da je potrebno v razpravah o izboljšavah in krepitvi mednarodnega regulatornega okvira upoštevati potrebe in interese razvijajočih se držav ter jih učinkovito vključevati. Bolj enakopraven, vključujoč in trajnostni razvoj je v interesu razvitih in razvijajočih se držav.

Ključni pojmi: pogodba o vesolju, pravo vesolja, UNCOPUOS, komercializacija vesolja, cilji trajnostnega razvoja, vključujoč in uravnotežen razvoj, mednarodno parvo okolja

167

Emre ÇAKIRDİKEN: POPULIZEM IN POTROŠNIŠKA DRUŽBA:
UČINKI POTROŠNIŠTVA NA POLITIČNO KULTURO
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2022, let. LIX, št. 1, str. 60–76

Z raziskavo poskušamo osvetliti, kako naraščajoča potrošniška kultura vpliva na politične trende v predstavniških demokracijah. V zadnjih letih smo priča precejšnjemu porastu populizma po vsem svetu. Čeprav so politični pristopi ključnega pomena, je za razumevanje populizma potrebno upoštevati tudi sociološki pogled. Zato bomo obravnavali in razjasnili vprašanja s kombiniranjem političnega in sociološkega pogleda. Rezultati raziskave kažejo, da naraščajoča potrošniška kultura tlakuje pot vzponu populizma v predstavniških demokracijah. Ko potrošniška kultura pride v večjo krizo, je večja verjetnost, da bo populizem postajal močnejši in dobival podporo zaradi volivcev, ki se bodisi ne udeležijo volitev, oddajo prazno glasovnico oz. pragmatičnih volivcev.

Ključni pojmi: populizem, demokracija, potrošniška družba, potrošništvo, politika

Hajdeja IGLIČ: POZICIONIRANJE V POLITIČNEM PROSTORU
IN MOBILIZACIJSKI POTENCIAL DISKUSIJSKIH OMREŽIJ
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2022, Vol. LIX, No. 1, pp. 77–94

V članku odgovarjamo na vprašanje, kako diskusijska omrežja, v katerih se odvijajo procesi politične komunikacije in medsebojnega vplivanja, prispevajo k fragmentaciji političnega prostora in h krepitvi političnih strank na skrajnih polih političnega kontinuuma. V ta namen analiziramo mobilizacijski potencial diskusijskih omrežij, ki so značilna za ljudi, ki se uvrščajo na skrajne položaje na levo-desni politični orientaciji, in jih primerjamo z omrežji tistih, ki se uvrščajo v sredino ali pa se ne uvrščajo. Analiza se osredotoča na naslednje značilnosti diskusijskih omrežij: velikost, homogenost, pogostost diskutiranja o političnih zadevah in pogostost prepričevanja drugače mislečih. Rezultati analize kažejo, da je najbolj ekstenziven mobilizacijski potencial značilen za ljudi na sredini političnega kontinuuma, medtem ko ljudje na desnem in levem polu posedujejo omrežja, ki so osnova za intenzivno politično komunikacijo, a ne omogočajo široke omrežne diseminacije političnih stališč.

Ključni pojmi: diskusijska omrežja, politična komunikacija, levo-desno politična orientacija

Metka KUHAR, Gaja ZAGER KOCJAN: THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN
ADVERSE AND POSITIVE CHILDHOOD EXPERIENCES AND SCHOOL
SUCCESS AMONG YOUTH IN SLOVENIA
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2022, Vol. LIX, No. 1, pp. 95–114

The article presents the prevalence of adverse and positive childhood experiences (ACEs and PCEs) in a panel (sub)sample of 18- to 30-year-olds in Slovenia and their association with self-assessed school success. Almost one-fifth of the 18- to 30-year-olds from the first Slovenian ACE survey had reported below-average school success by the age of 18. Consistent with previous studies, below-average school success was more frequently reported by those who had experienced a higher number of ACEs, and also those with fewer PCEs. The results show that PCEs reduce the risk of below-average school success even in the presence of concurrent ACEs and buffer the negative association between ACEs and poor school success. The article draws attention to the need to increase school professionals' awareness of psychological trauma and to develop policies, programmes and practices that explicitly and systematically address trauma in the school context.

Keywords: adverse childhood experiences, traumatic experiences, positive childhood experiences, school success, trauma-informed/sensitive schools

Damjan MANDELČ, Vanja GAJIĆ: HOW THE MAJORITY POPULATION
VIEWS IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES: CELJE AND IMMIGRANTS OF
ALBANIAN NATIONALITY

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2022, Vol. LIX, No. 1, pp. 115–137

The article examines the ways the majority population of Celje, Slovenia's third-biggest city, view the Albanian immigrant community, one that which has recently grown in size and is being met with a negative attitude and ethnic distance from the majority population. Based on theoretical assumptions in the fields of sociology and migration studies, a research plan of mixed methods was designed. Analysis of the results demonstrated that the majority of the population mainly held a negative attitude, while partial correlation was observed with the assumptions made in the theoretical starting points, namely, that female respondents with a higher education and higher income hold slightly more favourable attitudes to immigrants than males with a lower education and lower income.

Keywords: immigrants of Albanian nationality, attitude of the majority population, Albanophobia, media representation, Municipality of Celje

169

Jure PERPAR: THE INABILITY OF FEMINISM

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2022, Vol. LIX, No. 1, pp. 138–155

The structurally conditioned phallocentric patterns of social interactions that dominate today deprive »women« of access to genuine social and representative power. Feminist movements struggle to ensure greater power for »women«, yet still fail to eliminate social discrimination among genders/sexes. One reason for this is that some continue to embrace the reproductive episteme of the patriarchal/phallocentric culture or sexual essentialism. Those movements whose analyses exceed the reproductive episteme are also clinging to »superstructural strategies« that are unable to provide adequate results in the current stage of biotechnological development. The article argues that the questions of reproductive essentialism and gender/sexual antagonism are not solvable on the level of the social superstructure. However, we can probably move beyond both essentialism and antagonism if a new paradigm that builds on scientific breakthroughs in reproductive biotechnologies emerges on the level of the social base. Such a new paradigm could create the conditions for doing away with the structures/practices that support reproductive essentialism and sexual antagonism, but also binary sexual/gender representations, i.e., the conditions for

de-signification, in the social superstructure. A breakthrough like this would introduce new (e.g., agamic) reproductive modes that transgress the hitherto-possible human reproduction methods.

Keywords: sexual/gender binary, feminism, resignification, designification, motherhood, reproductive technologies

Teorija in praksa sprejema v presojo za objavo izvirna znanstvena besedila, ki še niso bila objavljena drugje ali niso v recenzentskem postopku pri kateri drugi znanstveni reviji oziroma monografiji. Objava članka ali knjižne recenzije v Teoriji in praksi je brezplačna.

Besedilo pošljite na elektronski naslov teorija.praksa@fdv.uni-lj.si. Besedilo naj bo v formatu A4 z 1,5-vrstičnim razmikom, tip črk Times New Roman, velikost 12, obojestransko poravnano, z robovi 2,5 cm. Vse strani besedila morajo biti zaporedno oštevilčene. Ime in priimek avtorice/avtorja naj bo izpisano na posebni naslovni strani pod naslovom prispevka, skupaj s strokovnim nazivom in trenutno zaposlitvijo, s polnim naslovom, telefonsko številko in naslovom elektronske pošte. Priimek avtorice oziroma avtorja naj bo izpisan z velikimi tiskanimi črkami. Prva oziroma začetna stran besedila naj vsebuje le naslov besedila in povzetek besedila. Besedilo mora spremljati izjava avtorice oziroma avtorja, da besedilo še ni bilo objavljeno oziroma ni v pripravi za tisk pri kateri drugi znanstveni reviji ali monografiji. Avtorica/avtor naj v izjavi navede svoj predlog uvrstitve besedila v skladu s tipologijo dokumentov/del (izvirni, pregledni članek ali knjižna recenzija) za vodenje bibliografij v sistemu COBISS. O končni uvrstitvi odloča uredništvo revije.

ČLANKI

Znanstveni članki v slovenskem ali angleškem jeziku naj ne presegajo 6.500 besed. V kolikor želi avtorica oziroma avtor objaviti daljše besedilo, naj se o tem predhodno posvetuje z glavnim urednikom. Članek naj bo opremljen s povzetkom v slovenskem in angleškem jeziku v obsegu do 100 besed. Povzetek naj vsebuje natančno opredelitev teme besedila, metodo argumentacije in zaključke. Avtorica/avtor naj navede tudi do sedem ključnih pojmov, tako v slovenskem kakor tudi v angleškem jeziku. Naslovi morajo biti jasni in povedni. Glavni naslov, izpisan s krepkimi velikimi tiskanimi črkami, ne sme presegati dolžine 100 znakov. Besedila, daljša od 1.500 besed, morajo vsebovati podnaslove, ki so lahko največ dvonivojski. Podnaslovi druge ravni naj bodo tiskani poševno.

Tabele, grafi in slike morajo biti izdelani kot priloge (in ne vključeni v besedilo) z jasnimi naslovi, pri čemer naj avtorica/avtor uporabi velike tiskane črke v poševnem tisku; biti morajo zaporedno oštevilčeni (Slika 1: NASLOV SLIKE, Graf 2: NASLOV GRAFA, Tabela 3: NASLOV TABELE). Vsaka tabela in slika mora biti izpisana na posebnem listu papirja. V besedilu naj bo okvirno označeno mesto, kamor sodi. Avtorica/avtor naj pri vsaki tabeli, grafu in sliki opredeli, koliko prostora zavzema v besedilu. Tabele, grafe in slike naj avtorica/avtor šteje v obseg besedila bodisi kot 250 besed (pol strani) ali 500 besed (celotna stran). Pod tabelami in grafi je potrebno navesti vir. Navedba vira naj se zaključuje s piko. Uporabljajte orodje za oblikovanje tabel v programu Word.

Tabela 1: UČINEK ODBOROV

Regulativni učinek	Mešani učinek	Distribucijski učinek
BUDG, TRAN, IMCO,	ECON, ENVI, ITRE, LIBE	EMPL, AGRI, PECH, REGI
JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA	JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA	JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA

Vir: Yordanova, 2009: 256.

Opombe morajo biti v besedilu jasno označene z zaporednimi številkami od začetka do konca, napisane na ustreznem mestu v besedilu in po enakem vrstnem redu razvrščene pod besedilom. Število in dolžina opomb naj bo omejena. Opomba o avtorici/avtorju in morebitna zahvala naj vključujeta informacije o organizacijski pripadnosti avtorice/avtorja, ki so relevantne za obravnavano problematiko v besedilu, ter o finančnih in drugih pomočeh pri pripravi besedila.

Dobesedni navedki, ki so dolgi tri ali več vrstic, naj bodo postavljeni v poseben odstavek, robovi odstavka naj bodo obojestransko zamaknjeni, besedilo naj bo v poševnem tisku in brez narekovajev.

Če so gibanja za pravice vložila svoja telesa v aktivizem in mobiliziranje novih oblik diskurza, da bi tako omajala njihovo marginalizacijo in zatiranje, so filozofske in teoretske kritike kartezijanstva na novo pretehtale subjekt in ga opredelile kot hkrati razsrediščenega (ki v sebi ni v celoti koherenten) In utelešenega (ne čisti "kogito"). (Jones, 2002: 239)

RECENZIJE KNJIG

TIP sprejema v objavo recenzije domačih in tujih znanstvenih del, ki niso starejša od dveh let. Recenzija naj ne bo daljša od 1.500 besed. V recenziji naj se avtorica/avtor dosledno izogiba navajanju literature in virov. Recenzija naj ne vsebuje naslova ali podnaslovov. Na začetku recenzije naj navede podatke o sebi in recenzirani knjigi v spodaj navedeni obliki:

Ime PRIIMEK

Institucionalna pripadnost

Ime in priimek avtorja knjige

Naslov knjige: podnaslov

Založnik, Kraj letnica objave, število strani, cena (ISBN številka)

Janez NOVAK

Fakulteta za družbene vede, UL

Eviatar Zerubavel

Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past

The University of Chicago Press, Chicago in London 2003, 184 str., 25.00 \$
(ISBN 0-226-98152-5)

NAVAJANJE

Osnovna oblika reference v besedilu je (Novak, 1994). Za navajanje strani naj avtorica oziroma avtor uporablja naslednjo obliko navajanja: (Novak, 1994: 27–29). Če sta avtorja reference dva, naj avtorica oziroma avtor navede oba: (Novak in Kosec, 2007). Če je avtorjev reference več, naj se v tekstu uporablja naslednja oblika navajanja: (Novak et al., 1994: 27), v seznamu LITERATURE pa naj se navedejo vsi avtorji. Če avtorica oziroma avtor besedila ne uporablja prve izdaje knjige, naj pri navajanju zabeleži tudi letnico prve izdaje: (Novak, 1953/1994: 7). Več referenc hkrati naj avtorica oziroma avtor loči s podpičjem: (Novak, 1994: 7; Kosec, 1998: 3–4; 2005: 58). Pri navajanju večjega števila referenc enega avtorja, objavljenih v istem letu, naj avtorica oziroma avtor reference med seboj loči s črkami a, b, c itd.: (Novak, 1994a: 27–29; Novak, 1994b: 1), in sicer v zaporedju, v kakršnem se prvič pojavijo v besedilu.

Seznam referenc sodi na konec besedila in naj ima podnaslov LITERATURA. V seznam referenc naj avtorica oziroma avtor vključi vso uporabljeno literaturo. Morebitne vire naj navede za seznamom referenc, in sicer s podnaslovom VIRI. Seznam referenc mora biti urejen po abecednem redu priimkov avtorjev referenc ter v primeru istega avtorja po časovnem zaporedju izdaj.

Knjige

Priimek, ime (letnica izdaje knjige): Naslov knjige: Podnaslov. Kraj: Založba. Geertz, Clifford (1980): *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Zborniki

Priimek, Ime (ur.) (letnica izdaje knjige): Naslov knjige: Podnaslov. Kraj: Založba.

Featherstone, Mike (ur.) in Mike Hepworth (ur.) (1991): *The Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory*. London: SAGE Publications.

Samostojni sestavek ali poglavje v monografiji

Priimek, Ime (letnica izdaje monografije): Naslov prispevka v zborniku. V: Ime Priimek urednika (ur.), Naslov zbornika, strani prispevka. Kraj: Založba. Palan, Ronen (1999): *Global Governance and Social Closure or Who is to Governed in an Era of Global Governance?* V: Martin Hewson (ur.) in Timothy J. Sinclair (ur.), *Approaches to Global Governance Theory*, 55–72. Albany: State University New York Press.

Članki

Priimek, Ime (letnica izida članka): Naslov članka. Ime revije letnik (številka): strani.

Bachrach, Peter in Morton S. Baratz (1963): *Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework*. *American Political Science Review* 57 (3): 632–42.

Svetovni splet (WWW)

Priimek, Ime (letnica): Naslov. Dostopno prek Internetni naslov, datum dostopa.

Deluze, Gilles (1978): Spinoza. Dostopno prek <http://www.imaginet.fr/deluze/TXT/420178.html>, 10. 1. 2001.

Viri

Avtorica/avtor je sam odgovoren za spoštovanje materialnih in moralnih avtorskih pravic, povezanih z uporabo podatkov, datotek, reprodukcij in del (v nadaljevanju vir) drugih fizičnih in pravnih oseb v njegovem članku. Avtorstvo vira, ki ga avtorica oziroma avtor uporablja v članku in ki ni plod njegovega raziskovalnega dela, mora biti jasno razvidno v obliki ustreznega navajanja vira v seznamu VIROV in v navajanju vira v besedilu članka.

Avtorica oziroma avtor naj smiselno navede čim več podatkov o viru, kot so na primer avtor vira, mesto oziroma institucija, v kateri se vir nahaja, naslov, ime ali opis vira, evidenčna številka vira, naslov spletne strani, kraj in leto nastanka vira in podobno. Pri tem je smiselnost navajanja opredeljena kot zmožnost sledenja viru oziroma zmožnost intersubjektivne preverljivosti uporabljenega vira. Avtorica oziroma avtor naj navede tudi datum, ko je bil vir pridobljen, če gre za elektronski vir.

Priimek, Ime (letnica nastanka vira): Naslov/nosilec vira. Mesto hranjenja vira. Dostopno prek Internetni naslov, datum dostopa.

Koprivec, Daša (2005–2008): Avdio kasete. Kustodiat za slovenske izseleljence in zamejce SEM. Dostopno prek <http://www.imaginet.fr/deluze/TXT/420178.html>, 10. 1. 2010.

ali

Luthar, Breda, Samo Kropivnik, Tanja Oblak, Blanka Tivadar, Mirjana Ule, Slavko Kurdija in Samo Uhan (2006): Življenjski stili v medijski družbi 2001. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov.

Če gre za vir iz zasebnega arhiva avtorja članka, kakega drugega raziskovalca ali posameznika, naj bo to jasno navedeno. Navajanje identitete lastnika vira iz zasebnega arhiva je zaželeno, vendar ne nujno, kadar gre za zaščito njegovih materialnih pravic ali varovanje njegove osebne identitete.

Priimek, Ime morebitnega avtorja (morebitna letnica nastanka vira): Ime ali opis vira/arhivska številka. Mesto hranjenja vira. Zasebni arhiv.

Zbirka navijaških šalov. Avtoštoparski muzej, Kanal ob Soči. Zasebni arhiv Mirana Ipavca.

ali

Zbirka pisem Janeza Novaka. 1953–1989. Privatni arhiv.

Avtorica oziroma avtor naj v primeru znanega avtorja in leta nastanka vira

uporabi enako določilo o navajanju v besedilu članka, kot je to v primeru navajanja članka, prispevka v monografiji ali monografije. Kadar avtor in leto nastanka vira nista znana, naj avtorica oziroma avtor v besedilu članka smiselno uporabi naslov, ime ali opis vira. V primeru, da so naslov, ime ali opis vira daljši od petih besed, naj avtorica oziroma avtor pri navajanju vira smiselno uporabi začetne besede iz naslova, imena ali opisa vira tako, da bo nedvoumno razpoznavno, kateri v seznamu literature navedeni vir navaja.

(Poročilo o delu državnega zbora, 2000)
ali

(Zbirka navijaških šalov)

Glede ostalih dodatnih oblik navajanja uporabljene literature ali virov naj se avtorica oziroma avtor obrne na uredništvo TIP.

RECENZENTSKI POSTOPEK

Uredništvo TIP uporablja za vse vrste člankov in za knjižne eseje obojestransko anonimni recenzentski postopek. Članke in knjižne eseje recenzirata vsaj dva recenzenta. Postopek recenziranja, od oddaje besedila do seznanitve avtorice/avtorja z recenzentskimi mnenji, traja dva meseca. Uredništvo TIP lahko brez zunanjega recenziranja zavrne objavo besedila, če ugotovi, da avtorica oziroma avtor besedila ni pripravil v skladu z zgoraj navedenimi navodili, ali pa če oceni, da besedilo ne sodi na znanstveno področje, ki ga revija pokriva.

Uredništvo ima pravico, da prispevkov, ki ne ustrezajo merilom knjižne slovenščine (ali angleščine, če je članek oddan v angleščini; upošteva se British English) ne sprejme v recenzentski postopek. Stroški obveznega lektoriranja angleških besedil se avtorjem zaračunavajo po predhodnem dogovoru.

Avtorica/avtor ima od trenutka, ko je seznanjen z recenzentskimi mnenji, tri tedne časa, da v besedilo vnese popravke in popravljen besedilo vrne v uredništvo TIP. V primeru, ko recenzenti zahtevajo temeljitejše popravke, se popravljen besedilo ponovno vrne recenzentu v presojo. Avtorica/avtor naj popravljenemu besedilu priloži poseben obrazec "avtorjevo poročilo", ki ga dobi skupaj z recenzijama besedila, v katerem naj obrazloži, katere dele besedila je popravil in kako. Če avtorica/avtor oziroma avtor meni, da so pripombe recenzenta neutemeljene, pomanjkljive ali kakorkoli nerazumljive, naj neupoštevanje recenzentskih pripomb pojasni in utemelji v posebnem poročilu glavnemu uredniku.

Avtorica/avtor in soavtorji ob objavi dobijo po en brezplačen izvod številke revije, v kateri je bil objavljen njihov prispevek. Vsak dodaten izvod stane 10 evrov (plus poštnina). Na zahtevo lahko avtorici/avtorju pošljemo brezplačen izvod njegove objave v formatu pdf.

Avtorica/avtor prenese materiale avtorske pravice za objavljeni prispevek na izdajatelja revije.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

Submitted texts should not be previously published or the subject of a peer-review procedure for another journal or book/monograph. The publishing of an article or a book review in *Teorija in praksa* is free of charge.

Texts should be sent to the e-mail address: teorija.praksa@fdv.uni-lj.si. A text should be in A4 format with 1.5 spacing, Times New Roman of 12-point font size, and the centre aligned with 2.5 cm margins. All pages of the text should be numbered consecutively. The first and last name of the author/s should be placed on a separate cover sheet showing the title of the article, along with their academic title and current employment, full postal address, telephone number and e-mail address. The last name of the author/s should be printed in uppercase. The initial page of the text should only include the title of the text, and the abstract. The text should be accompanied by the author/s' statement that the text has not previously been published or is not in press with any other journal or monograph. In the statement, the author/s should also make a proposal for the article's classification in compliance with the typology of documents/works (an original article, a review article, or a book review). The Editorial Board shall decide on the final classification of a submitted text.

ARTICLES

Original or review articles written in the English language (British English) should not exceed 6,500 words. If the author wishes to publish a longer text, they should first consult the Editor. An article should be accompanied by an abstract of up to 100 words, written in both Slovenian and English, containing a definition of the subject under scrutiny, methods of argumentation, and conclusions. The author should also provide up to seven key words. The titles should be clear and indicative. The main title, printed in bold uppercase letters, should not exceed 100 characters. Texts longer than 1,500 words should contain subtitles of no more than two levels. The subtitles of the second level should be italicised.

Tables, graphs and figures should be designed as attachments (and not included in the text), with informative titles, in uppercase letters and italics; they should be numbered consecutively (Figure 1: TITLE OF FIGURE, Graph 2: TITLE OF GRAPH, Table 3: TITLE OF TABLE). Each table and figure should be on a separate sheet. Their approximate positions in the text should be marked in the text. The author should determine how much space each table, graph or figure will occupy in the text. The space required for tables, graphs and pictures should be included in the total text length, as either 250 words (1/2 page) or 500 words (1 page). The sources of tables and graphs should be written below the table and graph and should end with full-stop. Use the table feature in Word to create tables.

Table 1: COMMITTEE EFFECT

Relugative effect	Mixet effect	Distributional effect
BUDG, TRAN, IMCO,	ECON, ENVI, ITRE, LIBE	EMPL, AGRI, PECH, REGI
JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA	JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA	JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA

Source: Yordanova, 2009: 256.

Footnotes should be clearly marked in the text with consecutive numbers from beginning to end; written in appropriate places in the text; and arranged in the same order under the text. Footnotes must be limited in both number and length. Notes about the author/s, as well as any acknowledgements, should include information on the organisation to which the author/s belongs when relevant to the subject addressed in the text, and should also include information regarding any financial or other assistance given for preparing the text.

Quotations of three or more lines in length should be placed in a separate centre-aligned paragraph, with the text appearing in italics and without inverted commas.

The fact that most of the posts have been liked is an evidence that citizens find the posts made by the local government interesting and useful, but they do not show any further interest by sharing the information with friends or by engaging in dialog commenting on them. (Bonsón et al., 2013: 12)

BOOK REVIEWS

Book reviews not older than 2 years are accepted for publication in *Teorija in praksa* and should contain up to 1,500 words. In a book review, the author should strictly avoid making any references to any sources and literature. The book review should not include title or subtitles. Information about the author and the reviewed book should be given at the review's start in the form shown below:

First Name LAST NAME

Institutional affiliation

Author's First and Last Name

Title: Subtitle

Publisher, City Year of publication, number of pages, price (ISBN number)

John SMITH

Oxford University

Eviatar Zerubavel

Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past

University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 2003, 184 pages, USD 25.00 (ISBN 0-226-98152-5)

REFERENCES

The basic form of an in-text reference is (Smith, 1994). To indicate the page, use the following form: (Smith, 1994: 27–28). If two authors are referred to, they should both be stated: (Smith and Doe, 2007). When there are three or more authors, the following form should be used: (Smith et al., 1994: 27), while all authors should be mentioned in the reference list. If the author does not use the first edition of the book, the year the first edition was published should also be given: (Smith, 1953/1994: 7). Several simultaneous references should be separated by a semicolon: (Smith, 1994: 7; Doe, 1998: 3–4; 2005: 58). When citing several references by the same author published in the same year, references should be separated by letters a, b, c etc.: (Smith, 1994a; 27–29; Smith 1994b: 1) in the order they first appear in the text.

The list of references should be placed at the end of the text, under the heading BIBLIOGRAPHY. It should only include units of literature used in the text. Sources should be listed after the list of references under the heading SOURCES. The bibliography should be arranged in alphabetical order of the last names of the authors and, in the case of multiple works by the same author, by the consecutive order of editions.

Books

Last Name, First Name (year of publication): Title of the Book: Subtitle. City: Publisher.

Geertz, Clifford (1980): Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Edited Books

Last Name, First Name (ed.) (year of publication): Title of the Book: Subtitle. City: Publisher.

Featherstone, Mike and Mike Hepworth, Bryan S. Turner (eds.) (1991): The Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory. London: SAGE Publications.

Chapters or Essays in Monographs

Last Name, First Name (year of publication): Title of the Chapter/essay in the Edited Book. In First Name Last Name of the editor (ed.), Title of the Edited Book, pages of the chapter/essay. City: Publisher.

Palan, Ronen (1999): Global Governance and Social Closure or Who is to Be Governed in an Era of Global Governance? In Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair (eds.), Approaches to Global Governance Theory, 55–72. Albany: State University New York Press.

Articles

Last Name, First Name (year of publication): Title of the Article: Subtitle. Name of Journal Volume (Number): pages.

Bachrach, Peter and Morton S. Baratz (1963): Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework. *American Political Science Review* 57 (3): 632–642.

Internet (WWW)

Last Name, First Name (year of publication): Title. Accessible at Internet address, date of access.

Deluze, Gilles (1978): Spinoza. Accessible at <http://www.imaginet.fr/deluze/TXT/420178.html>, 10. 1. 2001.

Sources

It is the author's sole responsibility to respect the material and moral copyrights related to the use of data, files, reproductions and works (hereinafter: the source) of other natural and legal persons in his or her article. The authorship of a source an author uses which is not the outcome of their own research must be clearly identifiable by properly including the source in the list of SOURCES and by citing the source in the text.

The author should give as much data as reasonably necessary about the source such as its author, city or institution, address, name or description, evidence number, webpage address, place and year of its creation, and similar. Such details should allow the traceability or intersubjective verifiability of the source. With electronic sources, the author should also include the date the material was accessed.

Last name, First name (year of creation of the source): Address/holder of the source. Place of keeping the source. Accessible at Internet address, date of access.

Featherstone, Mike (2005–2008): Audio cassettes. National Museum of New Zealand. Available at <http://www.imaginet.nz/deluxe/TXT/420178.html>, 10. 1. 2010.

or

Activity Report of the National Assembly of Republic of Slovenia, 1996–2000. Ljubljana: National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, 2000.

If a source is the author's private archives or those of another person, this should be clearly stated. An indication of the identity of private archives' owner is recommended, but not necessary if this may affect the protection of their material rights or personal integrity.

Last name, First Name of any author (potential year of creation of the source): Source name or description. The place where the source is kept. Private archives.

Collection of supporters' scarves. Hitchiker Museum, Richmond upon Thames. Private archives of James Longfield.

or

Collection of letters by Janez Novak. 1953–1989. Private archives.

When a source's author and year of creation are known, the same way of citing it in the article text applies as for the citation of articles, chapters in a book or books. When the source's author and year of creation are unknown, the source's title, name or description should be used sensibly in the article text. If the title, name or description of the source consist of more than five words, the initial wording of the source's address, name or description should be used when citing the source in the main text so that it will be clearly identifiable in the Bibliography.

(Activity Report of the National Assembly, 2000)

or

(Collection of supporters' scarves)

Concerning other ways of citing the literature or sources used in articles, please contact the Editorial Board of *Teorija in praksa*.

PEER-REVIEW PROCEDURE

All types of articles undergo a mutually anonymous peer-review procedure organised by the Editorial Board of the journal. Articles and book essays are to be reviewed by no fewer than two reviewers. As a rule, the review procedure takes 2 months from submission of a text to notification of the reviewers' opinions. The publication of a text can be rejected by the Editorial Board without any external review if the text does not follow the instructions given above, or falls outside of the scientific fields covered by *Teorija in praksa*.

The author shall improve the text and re-submit the improved text to the Editorial Board within 3 weeks of being notified of the reviews. When extensive improvements are required by the reviewers, the author should resubmit the improved text for the reviewers' reassessment. A special sheet, "Author's Report", sent to the author along with the reviews of the text, must be sent as an attachment to the improved text by the author, explaining which parts of the text have been improved, and how. If the author finds a reviewer's comment to be unfounded, deficient or unclear in any way, they should justify their potential disregard of the reviewer's comment in a special report to the Editor in Chief. The Editorial Board reserves the right

not to commence the review procedure of papers which failed to meet the standards of formal written language.

Every author is entitled to one free copy of the issue in which their article appeared. Each additional copy may be purchased for EUR 10, plus postage. Upon request, the author(s) may be provided with a pdf file of their article free of charge. The cost of mandatory language editing of English texts will be charged to authors on prior agreement. Published papers become the material copyright of the Journal's publisher.

