

Špela Boc

DOI:10.33179/BSV.99.SVI.11.CMC.24.4.1

DELITEV VOJAŠKIH BREMEN V ZAVEZNIŠTVU

MILITARY BURDEN-SHARING WITHIN THE ALLIANCE

Povzetek Vprašanja o ustrezni in pravični delitvi bremen v zavezništvu so zaveznice že od nekdaj razdvajala. V prispevku bodo izpostavljeni različna razumevanja in pristopi zaveznic o delitvi bremen v Natu, predvsem razlike med tako imenovanimi vhodnimi in izhodnimi merili ter dejstvo, da je zelo težko določiti ustrezno formulo in način za pravično delitev bremen držav. Bistvena ugotovitev je, da se še vedno prevelik pomen daje doseganju investicijskih parametrov oziroma vhodnih meril, ob tem pa so druge oblike prispevkov zaveznic premalo upoštevane. Članek bo zato omejen na prikaz zagotavljanja vojaških prispevkov držav kot izhodnih meril, s poudarkom na vojaških zmogljivostih za Natove operacije in misije.

Ključne besede *Zavezništvo, kolektivna obramba, delitev bremen, mednarodne operacije in misije, vojaški prispevek.*

Abstract Fair burden-sharing within the Alliance has always been a divisive issue and disagreements between the allies over this problem have been regular occurrences. The paper presents various ways in which the allies approach burden-sharing in NATO, stressing the differences between »input« and »output« measures, and the fact that it is very difficult to establish an appropriate formula and method for fair burden-sharing between the states. Too much emphasis is still being placed on »investment parameters« or input measures, while other forms of contributions by allies are not given enough weight. The paper focuses on the presentation of national military contributions as output.

Key words *Alliance, collective defence, burden-sharing, international missions and operations, military contribution.*

Introduction The transatlantic security Alliance rests on three pillars: common interests and values, political cohesion, and the sharing of the burden for collective defence (Hicks, 2018, p 1). When states become members of the Alliance, they also assume the obligation to take on equal or fair shares of the burden, one of the key functioning principles of the Alliance. Nevertheless, states have different views and positions on how the burden-sharing contributions are to be made.

As this paper will demonstrate, discussions and disagreements between the states with regard to burden-sharing within the Alliance are not a new phenomenon; they seem, however, to have gained prominence in the period before the 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels, in particular due to the sharp rhetoric of the former US President, Donald Trump¹.

As authors have examined the issue of burden-sharing within alliances and coalitions from various theoretical starting points, and carried out research based on a number of different variables, the body of literature on this subject is vast and multidisciplinary, and the proposed theories offer different levels of analysis. In spite of this, the most appropriate burden-sharing method has yet to be found or defined, as every important milestone for NATO presents the allies with a new challenge in terms of determining the most appropriate and fair method or formula for burden-sharing.

This paper will attempt to demonstrate that the fact which is particularly problematic is that the idea of burden-sharing within NATO is mostly centred around financial contributions to the joint operation of NATO, i.e. on achieving the »investment parameters«². In contrast, too little attention is given to burden-sharing between the states in the form of contributing personnel and material assets to individual NATO missions and operations, used by some states as an attempt to compensate for not achieving the investment parameters or criteria³, while still trying to present themselves as trustworthy and reliable allies. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is the most glaring example of such (disproportionate) burden-sharing and, consequently, of all the difficulties arising from the diverse interpretations and approaches of states with regard to burden-sharing.

Normally, discussions of the states' contribution and burden-sharing capacities are centred around the question of the extent to which individual states are capable or willing to contribute to the »production of public goods«, i.e. to the common interests of the Alliance. There is a common belief that wealthier and larger states,

¹ *Trump fiercely criticized and attempted to set conditions for the insufficient defence expenditure of the allies, even attempting to impose certain 'sanctionary mechanisms' on states which did not fulfill their commitments to NATO.*

² *The proportion of GDP allocated for defence and the proportion of defence expenditure on equipment and research and development.*

³ *While Denmark, for example, failed to achieve any of the defence investment criteria or goals (2% of GDP for defence and 20% of the defence budget for main equipment and research and development) in 2015, it still ranked high above other states in terms of capabilities and contributions provided to allied operations (Mattelaer, 2016, p 29).*

states with high expenditures on defence and their own armed forces, and states which are striving to become Alliance members or have done so recently, are more likely to contribute their share to the collective efforts of the Alliance.

As they often have fairly limited resources, small states in particular are faced with great challenges and pressures concerning their efforts to build adequate and trustworthy defence capabilities in the context of the Alliance. In terms of making military contributions, NATO missions and operations put a considerable strain on such states. Their capacities to contribute to such missions are therefore either limited to carrying out support functions and tasks, or they compensate for the capabilities they lack by making non-resource-consuming contributions⁴ (Männik, 2004).

Instead of merely presenting the traditional, i.e. investment criteria for burden-sharing, this paper aims to present other forms of burden-sharing, or »security benefits«, which can also be contributed to the Alliance by the states. To this end, the research is centred around that aspect of burden-sharing which concerns military contributions to NATO missions and operations, placing emphasis on presenting the burden-sharing policy and the states' military contributions in the largest NATO operation to date, the ISAF. In addition, the paper will attempt to demonstrate whether the most appropriate and fair method or formula for burden-sharing within the Alliance actually exists.

1 BURDEN-SHARING WITHIN AN ALLIANCE

Burden-sharing is the art of manipulating relationships between allies for political gain (Ringsmose, 2010, p 321). This is why, at the time of NATO's founding, Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty⁵ was designed to prevent the problem of allied burden-sharing in advance, stating the provisions and obligations of Member States in building their own defence capabilities and contributing to collective defence.

Nevertheless, as Becker notes, »'burden-sharing' has been an issue for NATO since its birth« (Becker, 2017). The various discussions of burden-sharing⁶ within the Alliance are as old as the Alliance itself (Zycher, 1990, p 1). In particular, burden-sharing tends to gain additional prominence during transitional phases of the Alliance. Events such as organizational reforms, enlargement, major changes in dominant military strategic thinking (for example shifting emphasis on conventional vs. nuclear weapons in defence policy), or new out-of-area operations, have often led

⁴ For example, by allowing their territory or infrastructure to be used by the Alliance.

⁵ »In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack« (NATO, 2019).

⁶ Discussions of burden-sharing within NATO took place in various disciplines: economics, international political economics and international relations. Each of these disciplines claimed to provide the best theory for studying the various behaviours of states when it came to burden-sharing (Zyla, 2016, p 5).

to intra-Alliance debate on how the new costs or additional responsibilities should be divided (Koivula, 2021, p 146).

Since the early 1990s, four relatively recurring and potentially simultaneous turning points have been observed within NATO when the issue of burden-sharing became a source of political disputes between the Member States. These four factors or triggers – geopolitical changes in connection with Russia, major out-of-area operations, the withdrawal or return of the US, and European passivity or activism – did not occur sequentially or in a particular order, but at times appeared simultaneously within the political space. Thus, NATO has often faced both such disputes and their triggering factors at the same time (Koivula, 2021, p 154).

Table 1:
Cyclic drivers of post-Cold War NATO burden-sharing disputes (Source: Carry That Weight: Assessing Continuity and Change in NATO's Burden-Sharing Disputes (Koivula, 2021, p 155).)

Cyclic driver	Russian contraction or expansion	NATO/allied military operations	US retrenchment or renewal	European passivity or activism
Examples	Collapse of the Soviet Union	NATO operation Kosovo	A contest between competing US interests to share more of the cost of transatlantic security without ceding US leadership	European (strategic culture of) defence under-spending
	NATO enlargements, in particular in 1999	NATO operation Libya	US »pivot to Asia«; US Asia-first strategy	Disparities in NATO member's willingness to take risks in NATO operations
	Occupation of Crimea	NATO operation Afghanistan	America's disregard of Europe's policy priorities	The emergence and development of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy
	Exposure by Russia of Eastern NATO members and partners (e.g. Georgia)	US-led intervention in Iraq 1990-91 and 2003	The increased difficulty in sustaining NATO's »value narrative« during the Trump Administration	The relative weight of military vs. non-military contributions to collective security

In recent years, »revisionist efforts« aimed at altering the interpretations and understanding of burden-sharing seem to have gained importance. In particular, the period of expeditionary operations, or operations outside the territories of NATO Member States, represented a turning point, when it became evident that the burden-sharing measures and criteria originating from the Cold War period were no longer appropriate and sufficient, and that they were not always fair.

Given the rapid increase in the number of operations outside the territories of Member States, researchers began to study the states' contributions to specific missions,

causing a shift in the discussions of burden-sharing. The issues which became important were how and why states made their contributions to specific missions, as well as the issue of measuring the performance of states in crisis-response operations within NATO crisis management (Bogers, 2019, p 19).

Another turning point came after 2014, when NATO's purpose of providing collective defence became (more) central once again, this time particularly in the form of burden-sharing actions as a way of providing assistance to Member States and adjusting the military posture of the Alliance. These actions have mostly been centred on expanding the infrastructure to support the strengthening of Member States' forces and, in particular, improving their readiness (US budget 2023, 2022).

1.1 The definition of burden-sharing

The most widely used starting theory to understand the concept of burden-sharing is Olson's theory of collective action, which is based on his book, the *Logic of Collective Action*. Drawing from Olson's theory, Hillison states that a unified definition of the term »burden-sharing« describes it as the distribution of costs and risks among the members of a group striving to achieve a common goal (Hillison, 2014).

The theory proposed by Olson describes methods of providing »public goods«⁷, i.e. the participation of states in collective action, positing that Alliance members contribute to the collective provision of public goods according to their relative power, as well as private incentives and motives. According to this theory, superpowers shoulder the largest share of the collective burden, while smaller and weaker states contribute a marginal share of public goods, gaining undeserved benefits at the expense of large (super)powers. In doing so, smaller states supposedly rely on the idea that public goods will be provided by larger states in any case, without the need for small states to contribute anything. In general, this relationship is supposedly about smaller Member States taking advantage of larger Member States, which make disproportionately greater contributions while being exploited by smaller states, exhibiting a behaviour referred to as »free-riding« (Hillison, 2014).

Authors who have delved deep into the issues of burdens include Hartley and Sandler, and Forster and Cimbala. Hartley and Sandler (1999, p 669) stated that burden-sharing is usually defined in terms of the actual contribution of each state to collective defence, and in terms of the fairness of such a contribution. Forster and Cimbala (2005, p 1), on the other hand, define burden-sharing as the division of costs and risks among the members of a group in the pursuit of a common goal. Risks can be political, military or of other types.

In his research on the behaviour of small states which joined NATO during the enlargement process in the late 1990s and early 2000s and then began contributing to the ISAF, Hillison studied whether the small states were the recipients or suppliers

⁷ *In this case, the relevant public good is safety.*

of security. Examining their contributions and activities within the Alliance in the context of burden-sharing, he defined the responsibility for burden-sharing as »the distribution of costs and risks among members of a group in the process of accomplishing a common goal«, and carried out his research within the framework of the theory of collective action. He described states which did not contribute to the implementation or achievement of a collective goal as states which exploit the power or engagement of other states for their own interests (the »free-riding« states) (Hillison, 2009, p v).

Cooper and Zycher (1989, pp v-vi) stressed that the incessant disagreements over burden-sharing within NATO originate from the different interests and interpretations concerning the goals, resources, costs and benefits of activities carried out collectively by NATO. This is why no detailed burden-sharing formula has been devised in NATO, and it is unlikely that such a formula would be accepted either in principle or in practice; in addition, NATO itself has refused to establish a detailed burden-sharing regime for its members (Cooper, Zycher, 1989, p 6). Throughout various periods, it turned out that efforts to form a more binding and appropriate formula or method for burden-sharing among the allies were particularly dependent on the processes and activities taking place at the level of the Alliance in individual periods, and on political pressures from the most important allies.

1.2 The definition of a military contribution

While a number of definitions of burden-sharing can be found in the literature, this does not hold true for definitions of military contributions. Based on a review of the available literature, it has been established that there is no generally accepted definition of the term »military contribution«. Thus, the concept is most easily and accurately defined by attempting to explain it in terms of the forms in which it occurs. In the most general sense, military contributions involve the provision of military support in accordance with international law, without endangering the security of the civilian population, and with the aim of fulfilling specific commitments and obligations adopted in the context of specific security organizations.

In the most general sense, the provision of military contributions represents a state's military-level response, i.e. the response of the military component of a state within the framework of collective action, for the purpose of participation and burden-sharing in allied or coalition missions and operations. It occurs in various forms and ways, as it can entail:

- The provision of military assistance (deploying armed forces members to the state of intervention in order to engage in capacity building);
- The assumption of certain obligations in counteracting threats in the state where the intervention takes place (combat and non-combat activities or operations);
- The provision of various types of (air, naval, land) transport capabilities in crisis areas or in the rear area;

- Assistance in terms of military equipment and weapons or defence supplies (ammunition etc.);
- The provision of military personnel in order to fill various posts within missions and operations or other military activities.

A common characteristic of military contributions is that they involve forces and resources which are usually intended for stabilizing crisis areas or maintaining peace and security; military assistance in the reconstruction of a state and its institutions; or, recently, the performance of NATO peacetime activities in the form of a comprehensive and credible deterrence and defence posture of the Alliance.

Zycher, meanwhile, points out that with regard to military contributions in allied operations, it is important that the contributions made by an individual state also benefit other Member States. Goods or contributions which are purely private in nature, i.e. those which only benefit the state which provides them, should not count as contributions to the Alliance as a whole (Zycher, 1990, p vi).

2 BURDEN-SHARING MEASURES AND CRITERIA

A thousand different ways exist for evaluating Alliance burden-sharing. This has not only to do with methodology, but also with the tendency in all nations to discount the value of the efforts undertaken by others (Mattelaer, 2016, p 26). Authors who have addressed the issue of burden-sharing and the relevant measures and criteria have done so in various ways. Some have attempted to present and explain burden-sharing by developing various mathematical formulas or numerical definitions in order to measure contributions, resulting in several mathematical models of burden-sharing within alliances. Others have worked on more descriptive definitions, rejecting the numerical ones as too complex, insufficient and unable to provide credible or fair results. In addition, some authors (Sperling and Webber, 2009, Becker and Malesky, 2017) have studied burden-sharing predominantly in the context of making contributions (money, equipment, armaments, personnel) to NATO missions and operations.

Despite all this, NATO eventually had to formulate certain measures and criteria for contributions made by states in the context of burden-sharing. The level of defence expenditure corresponding to the proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) allocated for defence was established as the original quantitative criterion or measure, even though there were concerns about its deficiency (Hartley and Sandler, in Pavličková and Bartoszewicz, 2020, p 338).

Since the 1960s, scholars have used military expenditure as the key measure of a member's willingness to contribute to the NATO Alliance – sometimes using total military expenditure, sometimes disaggregating expenditure on military research and development, sometimes dividing military expenditure by the state's population, and so forth (Cooper, Stiles, 2021, p 2). After the end of the Cold War, when NATO

underwent a transformation and was becoming increasingly involved in global affairs – particularly by participating in missions outside the territories of NATO members⁸ – other types of contributions, such as the sustainability and deployability of defence capabilities, began to be taken into account as well (Hartley and Sandler, in Pavličková and Bartoszewicz, 2020, p 338).

Becker states that in the sense of collective security, and collective defence in particular, NATO views burden-sharing as the extent to which individual members mobilize their national resources for the purpose of common priority tasks. In practice, this means defence expenditure, and Becker describes the publicly available defence expenditure data as a consistent basis for comparing the defence efforts of Alliance members based on the common definition of defence expenditure (Becker, 2017). Further, Becker states that in order to facilitate the comparison, defence expenditure data can be broken down into personnel, equipment, miscellaneous (operating and maintenance) and infrastructure. Becker demonstrated the applicability of operating and maintenance expenditures as an adequate approximation of the operational burden-sharing in out-of-area operations conducted by NATO (Becker, 2017). While discussions in the period before NATO began to conduct such operations were mostly focused on how much expenditure was allocated to armed forces (the military), this later period has seen the focus shift to the issue of whether the Alliance members are capable of contributing to out-of-area operations. This brought to the fore debates on the methods of measuring the various contributions of Member States to these operations. Ringsmose points out that NATO accordingly adopted a set of new criteria for analyzing burden-sharing (Ringsmose, 2010).

So far, discussions and research concerning this issue have demonstrated that the greatest challenge, as Becker observes, is to »operationalize the ‘form of contribution’« (Becker, 2017).

Wales 2014 – Defence Investment Pledge (DIP)

The 2% defence expenditure threshold, which was not officially confirmed until the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, had been recognized as an unofficial measure of the defence expenditure or spending of NATO members for more than a decade⁹. In 2014¹⁰, the 2% expenditure share became the main method of measuring the contributions of NATO members to the Alliance (Hicks, 2018). It became known as the long-term Defence Investment Pledge, involving two quantitative input measures or figures which determine how much each ally must spend on defence, and nine output measures (Bell, 2022, p 2); in total, the DIP therefore encompasses 11 measures.

⁸ Referred to as »out-of-area« missions and operations.

⁹ At the 2002 NATO Summit in Prague, Member States reached a »gentlemen’s agreement« to reach a 2% defence expenditure threshold (Hicks, 2018).

¹⁰ In response to Russia’s unlawful annexation of Crimea and the military intervention in the eastern region of Donbas in Ukraine (Bell, 2022, p 2).

Chart 1:
Defence expenditure of NATO countries as a share of GDP (%) 2022 (estimates)
(Source: Defence Expenditure of NATO States 2014-2022 (NATO, 2022a, p 3)





Chart 2:
Weapons and equipment expenditure as a share of defence expenditure (%) 2022 (estimates)
(Source: Defence Expenditure of NATO States 2014-2022 (NATO, 2022a, p 3)



The two input measures (2% of GDP on defence expenditure and 20% of defence expenditure on capability development) became the reference criteria for measuring and comparing the performance of the Alliance members, as reflected in the NATO Secretary General's Annual Report (Bell, 2022, p 2). In the general sense, these two input measures are also understood as investment parameters. The remaining nine output measures indicate the effectiveness of each state in using its defence resources. These measures include: 1. The percentage of air, land, and naval forces that are deployable; 2. The percentage of deployable air, land, and naval forces that can be sustained in deployment; 3. The percentage of Capability Targets allocated to that ally in accordance with the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) that have been met; 4. The percentage of deployable air, land and naval forces deployed on NATO Operations and Missions abroad; 5. The percentage of deployable air, land, and naval forces deployed on non-NATO Operations and Missions abroad; 6. The percentage of deployable air, land, and naval forces deployed in support of NATO Assurance Missions; 7. The percentage of billets within the NATO Command Structure assigned to that ally that have been filled; 8. The percentage of billets within the NATO Force Structure Headquarters assigned to that ally that have been filled; and 9. The contribution by that ally to the Immediate Response Force (IRF) of the NATO Response Force (NRF) (Bell, 2022, p 2).

It is essential that these nine output measures involve military capabilities which are monitored by NATO planners and are assessed, and which reflect the actual contributions in the form of land forces, aircraft and vessels deployed on operations, and in the form of NATO missions and operations personnel and personnel assigned to posts within individual NATO structures.

Following the decision to adopt the nine output measures, the problems of such an open or public presentation of burden-sharing did not become evident until it was put into practice. Most allies actually refused to make their reports on the nine output measures public, so the national data sent to NATO had to remain classified. This means that the only DIP data which is released to the public each year merely concerns the achievement of the (2% and 20%) investment parameters (Bell, 2022), which is why the DIP is mostly treated as synonymous with these two quantitative metrics, while the other nine are neglected.

Stoltenberg's triple C

In 2017, prior to the NATO Summit in Brussels, and following numerous discussions within NATO and increasing objections by the US with regard to the European allies bearing too small a share of the burden and not achieving the 2% of the GDP for defence criterion, the NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, expanded the definition of burden-sharing to include not only »financial resources« but also Member State »capabilities and obligations« (Binnendijk, 2018). This period was seen as a revival of the discussions of burden-sharing within NATO, triggered, for the most part, by the then US President Donald Trump.

Stoltenberg wanted to imply that burden-sharing was not just about expenditure, which led to the implementation of the burden-sharing principle according to the three Cs: burden-sharing was to be measured in cash, capabilities and contributions to NATO missions (Žerjavič, 2017). For each of these three categories, NATO has agreed to formal mechanisms that allow allies to monitor, measure and, if appropriate, challenge each ally's performance (Bell, 2022, p 4).

NATO Defence Planning Process – fair burden-sharing

The purpose of a defence planning process is to coordinate capability planning, i.e. to convert defence expenditure into intermediate defence inputs which, as agreed by the states, represent priority tasks¹¹ (Becker, 2017). Arising as part of the requirement apportionment and target-setting phase (Step 3) of the Nato Defence Planning Process (NDPP) is the principle of fair burden-sharing, i.e. of taking on a proportional share, whereby (fair) burden-sharing is based on the evaluation of the national GDP in relation to the total Minimum Capability Requirement (MCR¹²), rather than on the evaluation of defence expenditure.

Within this step, the Minimum Capability Requirements are divided up among the individual Member States and NATO entities (such as agencies) in the form of »target packages«, taking into account the principles of fair burden-sharing and reasonable challenge (Ržen, 2013, p 48). The aim of this process, known as apportionment, is to implement these principles (NATO document, 2017).

According to findings by Ringsmose, »in parallel with NATO's transformation from a provider of defence and deterrence to an exporter of stability, the alliance has adopted a range of new measures of contribution«. The traditional input indicators – particularly defence expenditure as a share of national output – still serve as important indicators, but as the Alliance has developed from »an alliance in being« into »an alliance in doing«, other measures of contributions have gained prominence. According to the author, output measures are gaining prominence over the financial criteria of contribution, meaning that the assessment of contributions to joint NATO efforts made by individual states uses a greater number of measures than before (Ringsmose, 2010, p 326).

Hartley and Sandler express the opinion that states can contribute to the Alliance in various ways, either based on the benefits received or based on their capacity to make proportional or gradual payments. In the most general sense, contributions which can be provided or contributed to the Alliance by the states are defined by:

¹¹ *The NDPP aims to coordinate capability planning – in other words the conversion of defence spending into intermediate defence outputs that states agree are priorities (Becker, 2017).*

¹² *NATO determines its »Minimum Capability Requirement« through a structured process, based on »Political Guidance« agreed by the Nations. Among other things, this guidance incorporates the number, scale and nature of the operations which NATO should be able to conduct, referred to as the Alliance's »Level of Ambition« (NATO document, 2017).*

- »Input measures«: defence expenditure;
- »Output measures«: deployable forces, military contributions;
- »Risk-sharing measures«: national caveats, the number of casualties (Hartley and Sandler, in Bogers et al., 2020, p 5).

3 BURDEN-SHARING IN THE CONTEXT OF SECURITY MULTILATERALISM

Multilateral security structures are tools which function according to the will of the Member States, relative to their political and military commitment (Rotfeld, 1994). First and foremost, multilateralism is a way of sharing the physical burdens of an intervention during the combat phase and, in particular, in the subsequent reconstruction operations after the combat ceases (Kreps, 2007, p 66).

While most of the earlier literature on burden-sharing focused on general burden-sharing within the Alliance, more and more researchers began to examine burden-sharing in ad hoc coalitions and in multinational conflict prevention and crisis management operations (Ashraf, 2011, p 21).

To a large extent, multinational military operations prevent an individual armed forces overstraining from the perspective of shouldering burdens and carrying out too wide a range of activities. Multinational military operations allow the burdens to be shared between the military contingents of several contributing states. Regardless of the end of the military activity spectrum on which these operations are conducted, the main purpose and advantage of carrying out multinational activities is the faster achievement of common goals by way of operational burden-sharing between Member States, in conjunction with minimal financial costs and casualties. In addition to decreasing costs, joint operations also significantly increase combat power (Kingsley, 2014, p 17).

Commitments to international operations provide an excellent opportunity for states to demonstrate their trustworthiness as future NATO members (Paljak, in Molder, 2014, p 64). By participating in NATO operations and missions, the states striving for NATO membership, in particular, attempt to present themselves as suppliers, rather than mere consumers, of security. Through military contributions, these states attempt to create an impression of trustworthiness and being loyal allies or partners.

As suggested by Molder, the participation of combat units in international military operations depends on the political consensus, human resources and assets. In this context, limited resources sometimes limit the military capabilities which can be offered by a state for the purpose of international cooperation, even though there is the political will or backing for such cooperation (Molder, 2014, p 68). Thus, states with limited financial and material resources are unable to carry out missions independently, which forces them to liaise and cooperate with other states, particularly when carrying out extensive or riskier tasks.

When a unanimous decision to participate in a mission or operation is made within the Alliance at the level of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), states decide for themselves whether they will make contributions, except in the context of a collective defence operation under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Since NATO, as an organization, does not have its own armed forces, individual states need to contribute their own troops and equipment. Both originate from the states' own defence capabilities, while states also need to pay the deployment costs of troops and equipment themselves (NATO, 2022b). The actual military contributions to NATO missions and operations only occur after preliminary policy discussions and decision-making at the political and military levels. At the NATO level, states coordinate contributions among themselves at force generation conferences.

The process related to the contributions made by states to international operations is part of the operational planning of individual states. Operational planning¹³ deals with the planning and deployment of armed forces in potential operations according to the current or future security environment and the associated planning situations, and is carried out at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Operational planning consists of a package or set of operational plans which should include the entire spectrum of mission-related tasks. In order to be able to carry out the whole range of roles and tasks of the armed forces, both the Alliance and individual allied states must devise an operational planning system comprising advanced planning and contingency planning (Hudhra, 2018, p 14).

For states, contributions to military operations result in various burdens as the sustainment of troops and equipment in the area of operations can put a strain on defence budgets, particularly those of small countries. In addition, the political risks of such contributions, arising from the participation of troops in military operations in distant areas, should not be underestimated (Forster and Cimbala 2005, p 22). Military operations involving several states can cause attempts at cheap cooperation or even free-riding, as predicted by the theory of collective action.

Kavanagh et al. (2021, pp 37-38) see burden-sharing in operations as the sharing of the operational burdens (personnel, resources) or the costs of all the activities carried out as part of a mission. Coalition partners may provide financial resources, personnel and equipment for direct participation in combat or other operations, or support which is not directly related to warfare (such as military medical units or other forms of assistance).

Cooper and Stiles (2021, p 1) state that in post Cold War NATO, the number of troops (relative to the population) deployed to operations outside the territories of NATO Member States has been one of the strongest measures of national commitment to the Alliance. In spite of this, expeditionary operations, or operations outside the territories of the Alliance Member States, have so far demonstrated that the sharing

¹³ *In terms of hierarchy, operational planning is part of defence planning, which includes (in addition to operational planning) force planning and many other aspects (Hudhra, 2018, p 18).*

of the burden between the Member States is often very disproportionate, and mostly dependent on the gains and interests pursued by individual countries.

Although the size of the contingent and the financial contributions of a state to the mission have been the most widely used indicators of burden-sharing, many researchers have pointed out the drawbacks of both criteria (Beeres and Bogers, 2012; Oma, 2012; Bogers and Beeres, 2013, in Haesebrouck and Thiem 2018, p 751), causing some to further expand the set of criteria which constitute output measures.

Haesebrouck and Thiem (2018, p 751) also included the following criteria among the indicators of burden-sharing between the states:

- Risk exposure: different types of units are exposed to unequal levels of risk; particular distinction is made between the staff, medical, logistic and combat units forming individual contingents;
- Leadership responsibility: whether a state has assumed a leadership role at the strategic or tactical level by providing the operation commander or deputy, and/or the force commander or deputy. Filling such positions represents a large burden for the providing state, particularly if complications occur during the operation;
- Mission duration: the longer the military units need to be sustained, the greater the burden which the state must bear.

Ringsmose (2010, p 328) suggested that research into military contributions by individual states in the form of deploying their troops to NATO missions and operations should consider two significant limitations. First, burden-sharing is not just about, or mainly about, debates on the number of troops contributed to an operation by a state, but also about sharing the risks arising from deploying troops to the most dangerous or security-wise unstable areas. Therefore, some countries choose to invoke certain national caveats in order to attempt to decrease the potential casualties, particularly if the public and the political leadership are not very supportive of deployments to dangerous areas. Alternatively, states attempt to avoid the deployment of too large a number of troops to dangerous areas by providing mission-relevant armaments as capabilities which are critical to the conduct of the operation (such as aircraft), thus making risk-free kinetic contributions to multinational operations¹⁴.

Based on past research into national military contributions to NATO missions and operations, it can be established that the factors used by various authors as measures or criteria of burden-sharing have included:

- The number of participating/deployed troops relative to population size¹⁵;
- The number of participating/deployed troops relative to the percentage of troops from all states participating in a NATO mission or operation;

¹⁴ For example, Belgium (F-16 jets) or Germany (Tornado jets).

¹⁵ Cooper, for example, stated that due to the obvious impact of a state's population size on its capacity to deploy troops, the number of deployed troops should be divided by 100,000 people (Cooper, 2011, p 5).

- The number of fatal casualties relative to population size (Ringsmose, 2010);
- Risk acceptance and distribution (depending on whether states deployed their troops to stable or unstable areas) (Ashraf, 2011);
- Participation in offensive counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency military operations (Ashraf, 2011);
- Participation in defensive civilian and military operations aimed at stabilizing a conflict-ridden state (Ashraf, 2011);
- The invoking of national caveats (Ringsmose, 2010).

Table 2:
Rate of deployment to operations outside the territories of NATO Member States per 100,000 of the population (Source: Who commits the most to NATO? It depends on how we measure commitment (Cooper and Stiles, 2021, p 6)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Avg
Slovenia	8.9	7.5	10.8	7.4	21.4	22.5	19.7	19.3	19.3	17.4	15.9	15.2	12.6	12.5	12.0	14.8
Denmark	10.3	8.7	13.5	15.4	19.1	17.2	16.3	14.1	12.4	8.0	3.8	2.8	2.1	2.3	2.3	9.9
USA	1.0	0.7	4.7	5.6	6.9	9.6	23.2	29.1	26.2	20.5	9.6	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.8	9.8
UK	5.1	6.1	10.4	10.9	13.8	13.8	15.2	15.0	14.9	12.9	6.6	0.7	0.4	0.8	1.0	8.5
Estonia	3.8	2.5	11.0	10.7	11.7	12.7	11.4	12.2	11.6	12.4	5.1	0.5	0.5	0.5	2.4	7.3
Norway	7.2	9.5	9.4	12.1	10.7	10.6	9.3	8.5	8.0	2.6	1.6	1.0	0.7	0.8	1.1	6.2
Luxembourg	12.7	6.9	7.6	6.9	6.5	6.4	6.3	6.2	5.8	5.9	5.0	4.6	4.1	4.0	0.3	6.0
Italy	8.2	7.4	6.5	8.1	8.0	7.6	7.9	7.6	8.1	5.7	3.9	2.0	2.4	2.6	2.4	5.9
Greece	19.0	12.9	14.4	8.1	7.9	6.5	6.9	3.2	2.1	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	5.9
Germany	8.3	7.2	7.2	6.5	6.9	7.5	7.1	7.9	7.5	6.1	3.7	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.1	5.6
Hungary	5.7	6.7	4.4	6.9	5.5	5.7	6.3	6.9	6.2	5.3	4.5	4.6	4.6	4.7	4.9	5.5
Albania						5.3	9.0	9.3	9.3	5.9	2.2	1.9	1.9	3.4	4.9	5.3
Croatia						7.9	7.2	7.6	7.2	5.1	3.9	3.1	2.9	3.1	3.4	5.1
Netherlands	7.1	7.4	11.7	10.8	10.7	11.1	7.3	1.2	2.4	2.5	0.8	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.8	5.0
Romania	1.7	3.3	3.9	3.7	3.9	5.2	7.1	9.4	9.4	6.8	3.7	3.5	3.3	3.3	3.9	4.8
Lithuania	3.9	4.5	5.0	5.9	8.0	7.8	6.8	7.1	8.0	6.5	2.8	1.5	0.7	0.8	1.8	4.7
Czechia	4.6	5.1	7.1	7.7	7.4	8.0	5.5	6.1	4.8	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.7	4.7
Bulgaria	0.8	0.5	2.6	6.2	6.6	7.7	7.2	8.4	8.3	5.8	5.1	1.7	1.4	1.5	2.6	4.4
Canada	7.4	7.1	7.1	7.2	7.7	8.4	8.4	5.9	2.2	2.6	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.3
Belgium	7.2	6.9	6.5	7.0	5.4	6.3	5.1	4.7	4.1	1.8	1.1	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.7	3.9
Latvia	1.1	1.7	2.0	3.6	4.6	7.0	7.8	7.3	6.7	4.1	3.1	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.9	3.6
Slovakia	2.7	2.4	3.6	3.7	5.5	6.1	7.5	5.7	5.9	4.0	3.9	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	3.6
France	5.5	5.1	4.2	4.5	6.3	6.5	6.9	6.5	4.6	1.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.4
Poland	2.3	0.8	1.1	2.9	3.7	5.2	6.7	7.5	6.4	4.6	2.3	1.0	1.2	1.1	1.4	3.2
Portugal	6.2	4.6	4.6	4.4	3.5	3.4	4.1	2.7	2.9	3.1	2.4	1.9	1.9	0.2	1.4	3.1
Spain	4.3	3.0	3.1	2.8	3.0	1.7	2.9	3.2	3.2	1.8	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.1	2.0
Turkey	3.4	2.6	1.6	2.9	1.9	1.7	3.1	3.0	2.3	1.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.0	2.0
Iceland	0.0	6.7	0.0	2.6	2.8	2.5	1.3	1.3	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.5
NATO Avg	5.9	5.2	6.5	6.9	7.9	8.1	8.6	8.4	7.8	5.8	3.6	2.2	1.9	2.0	2.2	5.5

A recent piece of research into how much individual Member States contributed to NATO and how their contributions reflected their commitment to NATO was conducted by Cooper and Stiles (2021). Examining the number of troops (the deployment rate) deployed by individual NATO members to NATO missions in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq and Afghanistan from 2004 to 2018, they found large disparities in burden-sharing between Alliance members¹⁶. They found that states such as Slovenia, Denmark, the US and the United Kingdom contributed far more troops to NATO missions than Turkey, Spain, Poland or Portugal (Cooper and Stiles, 2021, p 1).

Both France and Turkey have a high proportion of defence expenditure, but contribute a less-than-average number of troops to NATO missions. In contrast, Slovenia and Denmark provide a much higher degree of support to NATO operations than one might expect based on their defence expenditure. In terms of the number of troops deployed to NATO missions and operations per 100,000 of the population, in the period between 2004 and 2018 Slovenia had the highest deployment rate, with nearly 15 deployed members per 100,000 people. With an average of two deployed troops per 100,000 people, Turkey ranked at the bottom (Cooper and Stiles, 2021, pp 2-5).

4 ALLIED INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN – A TEST OF BURDEN-SHARING

The mission in Afghanistan was the most ambitious and extensive in terms of the contributions of multinational forces (land, air and naval units and assets) and the types of operational task (Hanagan, 2017). The ISAF operation represented a new era in terms of views and positions on burden-sharing and in terms of implementing new, more complex perceptions of burden-sharing between the states (Jakobsen, 2018). It represented the beginning of an increase in the number of NATO military operations, while the nature of the operations gradually began to shift from peacekeeping to warfare, requiring extensive military contributions (Paljak, in Molder, 2014, p 64). Larger Alliance members saw the ISAF as a litmus test of the capabilities of the Member States and their preparedness to counter threats to their security (Kaluga, 2011, p 59). Furthermore, the operation was a test to verify the concept of partnerships established by NATO.

While the ISAF was a NATO-led operation, it was not a NATO-only operation, as it involved both NATO allies and a large number of non-NATO countries, each of which operated according to its own rules of engagement (Bjerg Moller, 2021). The ISAF operation became a network connecting NATO with partner states around the world both militarily and politically (Appathurai, in Flockhart, 2014, p 35).

¹⁶ As their deployment indicator, the authors used the number of troops deployed to operations outside the territories of NATO Member States per 100,000 of the population.

Similarly to other crisis areas, larger, more ambitious and wealthier states with greater military power took on a relatively larger share of the burden in Afghanistan. This was also reflected in the extent and scope of assistance, in the size of individual national contingents, and in the scope and difficulty of military tasks. The US was the only country capable of carrying out the entire scope of tasks completely independently (Milovac, 2016, p 256).

In defining the roles of the participating states in the ISAF operation, McNamara (2015, p 4) summarized Hynek and Marton, who determined four main roles assumed and performed by NATO allies in the context of joint burden-sharing within the ISAF operation:

- The owner of the mission: the US, as controlling Afghanistan was a direct objective of its security policy;
- The strivers: states reliant on NATO's security provision, which as a consequence motivated them to make contributions (goods) judged as premium or very important by the mission owner;
- Servants: states contributing goods deemed less important by the lead nation;
- Onlookers: states with a weak motivation which made only superficial contributions.

Above all, the ISAF operation and the subsequent RSM mission represented great challenges for smaller states – both for Alliance members and partner states striving or already preparing for NATO membership. While contributing to activities in Afghanistan, some of these states were also part of other NATO, UN and EU-led military operations. This posed a great challenge to the military planners of small states, as these states needed to find additional capabilities for the most extensive NATO operation of the time.

Therefore, as Urbelis writes (2015, p 67): »The NATO mission in Afghanistan provided a good opportunity for small states to prove their resolve, solidarity and demonstrate military capabilities«. The type of qualitative and quantitative military contributions, in particular, was an indicator of the political will of the small states, as it reflected their commitment and responsibility in the context of burden-sharing within NATO, and of their efforts to become NATO members.

Some authors also applied quantitative or mathematical methods in their research into burden-sharing in the ISAF operation. Becker, for example, examined whether the evolution of burden-sharing within NATO was also reflected in the participation of NATO Member States in the ISAF operation. To that end, he devised the

Burden-Sharing Index (BSI)¹⁷, aimed at illustrating the operational cooperation of NATO allies in the ISAF operation (Becker, 2011).

Figure 1:
The Burden-Sharing Index (BSI)
(Source: Becker, 2011, p 50)

$$\begin{aligned} \text{BSI} &= \frac{\text{NATO Cost Share}}{\text{NATO Benefit Share}} \\ &= \frac{\text{Member MILEX} \mid \text{Total NATO MILEX}}{(\text{Member GDP} + \text{Member Pop.} + \text{Member Urban Pop.}) \mid \text{NATO Total}} \end{aligned}$$

Becker established that NATO members had operationalized their military expenditure in Afghanistan in very diverse ways, and that the operation had been a serious test of the cohesion of the Alliance. In his assessment, the most concerning issue was the fairly disproportionate burden-sharing between NATO Member States within the ISAF operation, with particularly significant disparities between the contributions of the US and European allies (Becker, 2011, pp 64-65).

Conclusion The assessment and determination of appropriate and, above all, fair burden-sharing within the Alliance is not an easy process, as it takes many forms and is particularly dependent on periods and turning points of strategic importance for NATO. It has been confirmed that the evaluation of the scope and size of burden-sharing is complicated even if the individual elements are measurable. The evaluation of quantitative criteria, in particular, can therefore lead to different results due to specific difficulties in measuring, quantifying and interpreting the data. The analysis of the issues of burden-sharing and contributions made by states has confirmed that the interpretation of the term burden-sharing, and the approaches to addressing it, have varied throughout the different periods of the Alliance’s development and during the various security challenges it has faced.

One of the crucial findings is that burden-sharing concerns capacities to contribute to the security of the Alliance which are reflected and measured in various ways or forms and based on various parameters. Despite all the attempts to reduce the disparities, the different national positions on appropriate burden-sharing, and the search for

¹⁷ »To get to the ISAF BSI and the PR, »military burden« is used to measure military expenditures and their economic significance and impact, and is defined as the ratio of military expenditures to the Gross Domestic Product. The »burden sharing index« (BSI) is an indicator developed specifically for this paper; based on the work of Sandler and Hartley (1999). The index is designed as a proxy for the cost/benefit ratio associated with each member’s participation in NATO. BSI is calculated by dividing the NATO Cost Share of each member (member military expenditures divided by total NATO military expenditures) for each year by the NATO Benefit Share of each member (member benefits divided by total NATO benefits). Benefit share expresses benefits as a function of economic goods protected (GDP) and human lives protected (population, with urban population weighted additionally to account for both the increased vulnerability of urban dwellers and their disproportionate contribution to GDP) (Becker, 2011, p 50).«

appropriate criteria for contributions, it is easier to understand input measures than to determine and evaluate output measures. This is mostly because the output measures are not visible enough, as some states refuse to disclose them publicly.

The case of the ISAF operation, in particular, confirmed that some NATO Member States can remain credible allies, which do not act as free-riders, despite not fulfilling the »investment measures and criteria«. It has been demonstrated that states with limited financial resources can largely make up for not achieving the input measures by making other visible contributions to NATO's military activities, operations and missions (including peacetime ones). Arguably, using an indicator which is focused solely on defence expenditure does not provide an insight into the increasingly diverse or multidimensional defence contributions made by the allies (such as deterrence, response, defence, crisis management operations or national operations) (Bogers, 2019: p 20).

In spite of this, and in the light of all the criticism levelled at the too-narrow focus (solely) on the 2% defence expenditure criterion of burden-sharing, this measure must be understood, first and foremost, as an expression of political will or national commitment. The proportion of defence expenditure would be a credible measure of fair burden-sharing if those states which spend a high percentage of their GDP on defence also contributed equally large or extensive military capabilities towards achieving common goods (security).

In the current, increasingly complicated and unpredictable security environment, one could give credence to Cooper and Stiles' assessment that future research should continue to focus on commitment indicators which encompass the broader contributions to the Alliance (2021, p 10). A single indicator for measuring burden-sharing is hardly applicable to all Member States, since states make their contributions in various ways. In addition, states will increasingly have to adapt their contributions as NATO's Level of Ambition (LOA) changes. The most objective representation or calculation of burden-sharing would be based on accounting for both quantitative and qualitative criteria for measuring contributions, since the total impact of measurable and non-measurable contributions reflects how productive and successful an individual state is as an Alliance member, and what its actual share in the collective burden-sharing is. Even more importantly, analyses of defence expenditure data, and the expenditure on NATO operations and missions, should focus on how such expenditure is used, rather than how much of it is spent.

It has turned out that NATO is undergoing adjustment processes in which the proportion of GDP allocated for defence will no longer be the main burden-sharing criterion for which states should strive. States will increasingly have to contribute to NATO's persistent federated approach, aimed at achieving interoperability standards to ensure constant readiness (Delaporte, 2018).

In the current period of the Alliance, when the allies are mostly engaged in activities of deterrence, defence and resilience to emerging or changed security threats and challenges, research into appropriate burden-sharing should also be directed towards attempts to search and define criteria for states to contribute to such (changed) Alliance activities.

References

1. Ashraf, A., 2011. *The Politics of Coalition Burden-Sharing: The Case of the War in Afghanistan*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh.
2. Bell, R. G., 2022. *Fixing NATO's 2014 Defense Investment Pledge. and CSDP Policy Brief, 2022 (3)*. https://brussels-school.be/sites/default/files/CSDS%20Policy%20brief_2203.pdf.
3. Becker, J., 2011. *Transatlantic Burden Sharing and Out of Area Operations: Afghanistan in the Context of Historic Trends*. *Chicago Policy Review*, 2011 (15), pp 47-67.
4. Becker, J., 2017. *Transatlantic Burden-Sharing: Origins and Strategic Implications*. <https://defenceindepth.co/2017/11/15/transatlantic-burden-sharing-origins-and-strategic-implications/>, 12/8/2022.
5. Becker, J., and Malesky, E., 2017. *The continent or the 'grand large'? Strategic culture and operational burden-sharing in NATO*. *International Studies Quarterly* 61(1): pp 163-180.
6. Binnendijk, H., 2018. *What NATO's burden-sharing history teaches us*, <https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nato-priorities/2018/07/09/what-natos-burden-sharing-history-teaches-us/>, 22/7/2022.
7. Bjerg, Moller, S., 2021. *Five Myths About NATO and Afghanistan*. <https://www.lawfareblog.com/five-myths-about-nato-and-afghanistan#>, 10/5/2022.
8. Forster, P. K., and Cimbala, S. J., 2005. *The US NATO and Military Burden Sharing*. London, New York: Frank Cass.
9. Cooper, S., and Stiles K. W., 2021. *Who commits the most to NATO? It depends on how we measure commitment*. *Journal of Peace Research* XX(X): pp 1-13.
10. Cooper, C., A., and Zycher, B., 1989. *Perceptions of NATO Burden-Sharing*. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3750.html>, 19/8/2022.
11. Delaporte, M., (2018). *NATO's Backstage: Working the »3 Cs« Rules at Allied Command Transformation*. <https://defense.info/featured-story/2018/04/natos-backstage-working-the-3-cs-rules-at-allied-command-transformation/>, 12/7/2022.
12. Flockhart, T., 2014. *Introduction. Changing Partnerships in a Changing World, Cooperative Security: NATO's Partnership Policy in a Changing World, DIIS Report, pp 17-34*. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/177617/WP2014-01_NATO-partnerships_TFL_web.pdf, 25/10/2021.
13. Hanagan, D. L., 2017. *NATO And Coalition Warfare In Afghanistan, 2001-2014*. London: King's College.
14. Hartley, K., and Sandler, T., 1999. *NATO Burden-Sharing: Past and Future*, *Journal of Peace Research*. 36 (6), pp 665-80.
15. Haesebrouck, T., and Thiem, A., 2018. *Burden Sharing in CSDP Military Operations*. *Defence and Peace Economics*, 29 (7), pp 748-765.

16. Hicks, K. H., Rathke, J., Daniels, S. P., Matlaga, M., Daniels, L., and Linder, A., 2018. *Counting Dollars or Measuring Value. Assessing NATO and Partner Burden Sharing*. Washington, DC: CSIS.
17. Hillison, J., R., 2014. *Stepping Up: Burden Sharing by NATO's Newest Members*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press.
18. Hudhra, T., 2018. *Defence Planning System of Albania in the Framework of NATO Collective Planning System*. Tirana: Academy of the Armed Forces.
19. Jakobsen, J., 2018. *Is European NATO Really free-riding? Patterns of Material and Non-Material Burden-Sharing After the Cold War*. *European Security* 27(4): 1-25. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2018.1515072>, 22/7/2022.
20. Jazbec, G., 2009. *Foreign Policy Formation in the Context of Understanding Peacekeeping Operations*. *The Slovenian Armed Forces Bulletin*, 11(1), SAF GS, Ljubljana, 2009, pp 99-116.
21. Kaluga, B., 2011. *The International Context of the Central European States Participation in the Afghan Stabilization mission*. Morgantown: Eberly College of Arts and Sciences at West Virginia University.
22. Kavanagh, J. et al., 2021. *Building Military Coalitions. Lessons from U.S. Experience*, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4859-1.html, 12/7/2022.
23. Kivimäki, T., 2019. *Power, Contribution and Dependence in NATO Burden Sharing*. *European Security*, 20:1, pp 66-84.
24. Kingsley, R., 2014. *Fighting against Allies: An Examination of »National Caveats« Within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan and their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness 2002-2012*. Manawatu: Massey University.
25. Koivula, T., 2021. *Carry That Weight: Assessing Continuity and Change in NATO's Burden-Sharing Disputes*. *Defense & Security Analysis*, 37:2, pp 145-163.
26. Kreps, S., 2007. *When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition? The Logic of Multilateral Interventions under Unipolarity*. Washington, DC: Graduate School of Arts and Science of Georgetown University.
27. Mannik, E., 2004. *Small States: Invited to NATO – Able to Contribute?* *Defence & Security Analysis*, 20;1, pp 21-37.
28. McNamara, M. E., 2015. *When Contributions Abroad Mean Security at Home? The Baltic States and NATO Burden-Sharing in Afghanistan*. https://www.academia.edu/9027180/When_Contributions_Abroad_Mean_Security_at_Home_The_Baltic_States_and_NATO_Burden_Sharing_in_Afghanistan, 12/10/2020.
29. Milovac, B., 2016. *Značilnosti teoretičnega obravnavanja načina vojskovanja razvitih držav po koncu hladne vojne (»Characteristics of a Theoretical Study of a Way of Warfare of Developed Countries in the Post-Cold War Era«)*. Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences.
30. Mattelaer, A., 2016. *Revisiting the Principles of NATO Burden-Sharing*. *Parameters* 46. <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2821&context=parameters>, 12/7/2022.
31. Molder, H., 2013. *Estonia and the ISAF: Lessons Learned and Future Prospects*. *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, 23(2): pp 61-78.
32. NATO, 2019. *The North Atlantic Treaty*. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm, 19/7/2022.
33. NATO, 2022a. *Defence Expenditure of NATO States (2014-2022)*. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220627-def-exp-2022-en.pdf, 20/7/2022.
34. NATO, 2022b. *Funding NATO*. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm, 20/7/2022.

35. NATO document, 2017. *Summary Note to Council on the Need to Improve NATO's Capability Package Process*. https://www.nato.int/issues/iban/performance_audits/170201-improve-capability-package-process-eng.pdf, 17/8/2022.
36. Oma, I., 2012. *Explaining States' Burden-Sharing Behaviour Within NATO*. *Cooperation and Conflict* 47(4): pp 562-573.
37. Pavličková, K., and Bartoszewicz M. G., 2020. *To Free or not to Free (Ride): A Comparative Analysis of the NATO Burden-Sharing in the Czech Republic and Lithuania*. *Defense & Security Analysis*, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337199208_To_Free_or_Not_to_Free_Ride_A_Comparative_Analysis_of_the_NATO_Burden_Sharing_in_the_Czech_Republic_and_Lithuania, 20/7/2022.
38. Polajžer, T., 2013. *Jugosfera: fikcija ali resničnost? (»Yugosphere: Fiction or Reality?«)*. Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences.
39. US Budget, 2023. *North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security Investment Program*. April 2022. https://comptroller.defense.gov/portals/45/documents/defbudget/fy2023/budget_justification/pdfs/11_nato_security_investment_program/fy23_nato_security_investment_program.pdf, 17/7/2022.
40. Ringsmose, J., 2010. *NATO Burden-Sharing Redux: Continuity and Change after the Cold War*. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 31(2), pp 319-338.
41. Rotfeld, A., D., 1994. *Europe: Towards a New Regional Security Regime*. *SIPRI Yearbook 1994*. <https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/1994/07>, 24/7/2022.
42. Ržen, J., 2013. *Vpliv vključenosti Republike Slovenije v sistem obrambnega planiranja Nata na razvoj zmogljivosti njenega obrambnega Sistema (»The Impact of the Republic of Slovenia's Inclusion in the NATO Defence Planning System on the Capabilities Development of its Defence System«)*. Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences.
43. Sperling, J., and Webber, M., 2009. *NATO. From Kosovo to Kabul*, May 2009, *International Affairs* 85(3): pp 491-511, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227652515_Nato_From_Kosovo_to_Kabul, 18/7/2022.
44. Šavc, P., 2009. *The Slovenian Experience of Defence Planning and NATO Membership*. *The Slovenian Armed Forces Bulletin* (11/No. 3), pp 41-58 Ljubljana: General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces.
45. Urbelis, V., 2015. *The Relevance and Influence of Small States in NATO and the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy*. *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review, 2014-2015, Volume 13*, pp 61-78.
46. Zyla, B., 2016. *NATO Burden Sharing: A New Research Agenda*. *JIOS*, 7 (2), pp 5-21 http://journal-iostudies.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/JIOS_Fall2016_Zyla-NATO_0.pdf, 20/7/2022.
47. Zycher, B., 1990. *A Generalized Approach for Analysis of Alliance Burden Sharing*. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N3047.html>, 15/7/2022.
48. Žerjavič, P., 2017. *Trump, Nato in trojni C (»Trump, NATO and the Triple C«)*. *Delo*, 25/5. <https://old.delo.si/svet/evropa/trump-nato-in-trojni-c.html>, 15/7/2022.

email: spela.boc@mors.si

e-mail: spela.boc@mors.si

Špela Boc je magistrica politologije s specializacijo iz obramboslovja. Podiplomski študij je zaključila na Fakulteti za državne in evropske študije, kjer je doktorska kandidatka. Na Ministrstvu za obrambo je zaposlena od leta 2004, sodelovala je v treh mirovniških operacijah in na misijah ter dodatno strokovno znanje pridobivala na različnih domačih in mednarodnih izobraževanjih, konferencah in seminarjih. Je avtorica ali soavtorica več člankov. Obiskovala je tečaje na Harvard Kennedy School of Government v Bostonu.

Špela Boc holds an MA in Political Studies with a specialization in Defence Studies. She completed her postgraduate studies at the Faculty of Government and European Studies, where she is a PhD candidate. Employed by the Ministry of Defence since 2004, she has participated in three peacekeeping operations and missions and gained additional expertise in various national and international training programmes, conferences and seminars. She has authored or co-authored several papers and attended courses at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government in Boston.

*Prispevki, objavljeni v Sodobnih vojaških izzivih, niso uradno stališče Slovenske vojske niti organov, iz katerih so avtorji prispevkov.

*Articles, published in the Contemporary Military Challenges do not reflect the official viewpoint of the Slovenian Armed Forces nor the bodies in which the authors of articles are employed.