DRUŽBOSLOVNE RAZPRAVE

Social Science Forum

Uredniška politika: Družboslovne razprave so revija, ki objavlja kolegialno recenzirane znanstvene članke in recenzije knjig. V recenzijski postopke sprejema članke v slovenščini in angleščini s področja sociologije, komunikologije, politologije in kulturologije ter tem raziskovalnim področjem bližnjih družboslovnih disciplin. Pri izboru člankov za objavo se upošteva njihova raziskovalna inovativnost ter aktualnost glede na trende v znanstveni skupnosti, v kateri je revija zasidrana. V teoretskem in metodološkem pogledu je revija pluralistično naravnana, posebno skrb pa posveča utrjevanju slovenske družboslovne terminologije.

Editorial policy: Družboslovne razprave is a peer reviewed journal which publishes papers and book reviews. Contributions are invited in fields of sociology, media studies, political science, cultural studies and other studies which are close to these fields. The published contributions should display high level of research originality and address the themes which seem relevant to the scientific communities in which the journal is grounded. Both in theoretical and methodological respects the journal stands for pluralism.

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INTRODUCTION

Drage bralke, dragi bralci,

Pred vami je tretja (in zaključna) letošnja številka revije *Družboslovne razprave*. Ta v nasprotju s prejšnjo (dvojno) številko ni tematska, pač pa zajema nabor samostojnih člankov in recenzij knjig, ki pokrivajo širok spekter aktualnih tematik in razprav tako na področju družboslovja in humanistike nasploh kot v ožjem, jugovzhodnoevropskem regionalnem kontekstu. Končni rezultat je vsaj toliko kompleksen, kot je videti; procesiranje in sestavljanje te številke namreč lahko označiva kot svojevrsten izziv, in ravno zato bi pričujoči uvodni zapis posvetili vsem tistim, ki so tvorno sodelovali pri celotnem procesu. Prav posebej se zahvaljujeva avtoricam in avtorjem člankov ter anonimnim recenzentkam in recenzentom. Nevidno delo slednjih je namreč eden od ključnih mehanizmov zagotavljanja kakovosti naše revije. Strast do produkcije znanja in stalna skrb za visoke standarde znanstvenih publikacij, ki odlikujeta naše recenzente, pomembno sooblikujeta vsebino *Družboslovnih razprav*, čeprav ostajajo recenzentska imena pod površjem objavljenih besedil.

Recenzentski postopek je nujna sestavina *Družboslovnih razprav*; brez recenziranja revije ni. Kot glavni urednici imava pravico in odgovornost vsako formalno, strukturno ali tematsko neprimerno besedilo zavrniti še pred recenzentskim postopkom, člankom, ki postopka niso prestali, pa objave ne smeva ponuditi. Vsako besedilo, ki ga prejmemo v uredništvo in zanj presodimo, da je zrelo za recenzijsko obravnavo, zato najprej anonimiziramo in pošljemo dvema področnima strokovnjakoma ali strokovnjakinjama oziroma – kadar takšne kombinacije ni – t. i. generalistu ali generalistki in področnemu strokovnjaku oziroma strokovnjakinji, da ga pregledata, analizirata in posredujeta napotke za izboljšave. Ta model odraža sodobne trende v znanstveni produkciji vednosti. Vse od konca druge svetovne vojne in še posebej v 21. stoletju velja namreč recenzentski postopek za »enega od temeljnih pogojev možnosti akademske vednosti in konstrukcije njene vrednosti« (Biagioli 2002: 11). S tem nikakor ne zanikava številnih upravičenih skrbi glede objektivnosti, namenskosti in konstruktivnosti samega postopka, zaradi katerih se tudi uredniki pogosto preizprašujejo o optimalnosti sprejetih modelov preverjanja besedil, ki naj bi preprečevali goljufijo v znanosti in prispevali k poenotenju akademskega diskurza, obenem pa dopuščali še zadostno mero inovativnosti in kritične misli.

V reviji *Družboslovne razprave* uporabljamo model »dvojno slepega« recenzentskega postopka, v okviru katerega zagotavljamo anonimnost tako avtorjev in avtoric kot recenzentk in recenzentov. In medtem ko tiskana izdaja kasneje uganko, kdo je avtorica oziroma avtor članka, razreši, ostanejo imena recen-

zentk in recenzentov še naprej anonimna. Širši javnosti postanejo dostopna le izjemoma, na primer, če se recenzent_ka anonimnosti eksplicitno odpove, avtor oziroma avtorica članka pa njeno oziroma njegovo ime navede v javni omembi, kot je denimo zahvala v opombi na začetku članka. Na primere recenzentk in recenzentov, ki se odrekajo anonimnosti, naletimo zelo redko, zaradi česar je tudi njihov prispevek h kakovosti končnih besedil težko javno izpostaviti.

Uredništva znanstvenih revij vse pogosteje, še posebej pa v zadnjem desetletju, uporabljajo opisani model »dvojno slepega« recenzentskega postopka, vendar to ne pomeni, da nimajo druge izbire; obstajajo namreč tudi alternativni mehanizmi, ki se zanašajo na drugačen pristop k vprašanju avtoričine oziroma avtorjeve identitete. V izrazito manjšino sodijo denimo revije, ki se zanašajo na načelo »neanonimnosti«; ta prepoveduje vsakršno zakrivanje podatkov tako avtorjev in avtoric kot recenzentk in recenzentov. Ta pristop je sicer najbolj transparenten, obenem pa ga je tudi najtežje učinkovito implementirati, sploh če stremimo k najvišjim standardom na področju zagotavljanja nepristranskosti recenzij. Poleg tega obstajata še dva alternativna modela, ki temeljita na delni anonimnosti postopka; ta zakrivata bodisi ime avtorja ali avtorice bodisi ime recenzentke ali recenzenta. Še pred desetimi leti je bilo v znanstvenih publikacijah na večini področij najpogosteje v rabi načelo »enojne anonimnosti«; ta predpostavlja anonimizacijo recenzentskih ocen za avtorja oziroma avtorico, ne pa tudi anonimizacije besedila za recenzente in recenzentke (Brown 2006: 1275). Aktualno preferiranje modela dvojne anonimizacije lahko pripišemo vse glasnejšim opozorilom glede vpliva številnih dejavnikov na ocenjevalni postopek, kot so denimo etnična in rasna pripadnost, spol, institucionalna umeščenost in uveljavljenost oziroma senioriteta avtoric in avtorjev. In če se morda sprašujete glede četrte različice recenzentskega postopka, obstaja tudi model, s katerim naj bi bila imena pisk in piscev tajna, imena recenzentk in recenzentov pa javna. Ta pristop se, predvidljivo, nikoli ni zares uveljavil, saj otežuje in kompromitira nalogo recenzentov in recenzentk; ne zagotavlja jim namreč nobene varnosti, pač pa jih morda pretirano razgalja, kar lahko vpliva tudi na samo ostrino njihovih ocen.

V uredništvu *Družboslovnih razprav* recenzentski postopek jemljemo izjemno resno, saj se zavedamo njegovega posebnega pomena za revijo, ki si med drugim prizadeva tudi za objavljanje del tistih avtoric in avtorjev, ki so šele na začetku akademske kariere, in želi prispevati k razpravam, ki presegajo meje določenih družboslovnih in humanističnih disciplin. Izvedbe teh ambicioznih ciljev si ne moremo zamisliti brez članic in članov širše akademske skupnosti, ki ocenjujejo, da je kolegialno branje in recenziranje prispevkov vredno njihovega časa in truda. Naj zgolj v pomoč ponazorimo obseg takšnega nevidnega dela: minimum, h kateremu se zavezujejo recenzenti in recenzentke, ki sprejmejo v

obravnavo besedilo, oddano v presojo uredništva *Družboslovnih razprav*, je izpolnitev kratkega pisnega vprašalnika, na koncu katerega je prostor za dodaten komentar v obsegu vsaj 150 besed. V praksi urednici praviloma prejemava veliko daljše recenzije, ki vključujejo zelo podrobna in poglobljena navodila za avtorice in avtorje. Recenzentske sugestije in komentarji obsegajo tako nasvete glede odprave morebitnih napak kot tudi priporočila, kako bolje oblikovati teze ter premisliti uporabljene koncepte in metode ali pa kako čim jasneje izpostaviti najprodornejše argumente v besedilu. Mednarodna sestava našega bazena recenzentov in recenzentk nenazadnje prispeva tudi k temu, da avtorji in avtorice končno različico besedila prilagodijo tako, da lahko z njim učinkovito nagovorijo širše mednarodno občinstvo. V določenih primerih morajo recenzenti in recenzentke (v nekaterih pa si to celo želijo!) pregledati in celo komentirati drugo in včasih še tretjo različico prebranega besedila. Pri pripravi pričujoče številke je aktivno in poglobljeno sodelovalo vsaj osem recenzentk oziroma recenzentov z različnih področij iz širše regije; njihov angažma je močno prispeval h kakovosti člankov, ki so danes pred vami.

K uresničevanju poslanstva *Družboslovnih razprav* seveda enako pomembno prispevajo odgovorni avtorice in avtorji. Z oddajo besedila v uredniško in kolegialno presojo se zavezujejo k pozornemu branju recenzij ter k dobro utemeljenim odločitvam glede upoštevanja oziroma neupoštevanja recenzentskih napotkov. Popravljenim člankom morajo namreč priložiti odziv na prejeti recenziji, ki obvezno vključuje obrazložitev popravkov in drugih sprememb v luči prejetih komentarjev. Polno odgovornost za profesionalizem tega vidika uredniškega postopka nosi tehnična urednica Jasmina Šepetavc, ki skrbi za anonimiziranje vseh elementov v pravkar orisani sestavljanki. Kot urednici pa zelo ceniva predanost reviji in produkciji akademske vednosti, ki jo izkazujejo vsi vpleteni in vpletene v nastanek posameznih številk. Upava, da enako čutite tudi naši bralke in bralci, in vas s tem vabiva, da prelistate izbor najnovejših besedil, do katerih so pripeljali vsi opisani postopki.

Številko odpira teoretsko bogat prispevek Aljoše Pužarja o sodobnih strukturah melodramatičnega občutenja. Avtor teoretska izhodišča podkrepi z (digitalno-) etnografsko študijo primera in diahrono primerjavo z drugimi dogodki. Pužar kolektivno žalovanje za nedavno preminulim jugoslovanskim in srbskim pevcem Đorđem Balaševićem, zelo prepoznavnim tudi v naši regiji, vzporeja z odzivi ljudskih množic na smrt drugih »junakov in junakinj ljudskih src«. V članku nakaže afektivne razsežnosti tovrstnega žalovanja, in oriše, kako se »ekonomije nemožnosti« pretvarjajo v »melodramatične izbruhe psevdopolitičnih (ne)možnosti«.

Razpravo o množičnem občutenju v naslednjem članku nadaljujeta Emanuela Fabijan in Marko Ribać, ki v izvirnem znanstvenem prispevku predstavita rezultate

empirične raziskave o populizmu v slovenskih medijih (televizijskih informativnih oddajah) v kontekstu migrantske krize v letih 2015 in 2016. Avtorico in avtorja zanimajo predvsem »populistični antagonizmi« v medijskih narativih, pri čemer se osredotočita na mehanizme njihovega nastanka v političnem in medijskem komuniciranju. V razpravi prav tako preizprašujeta vlogo političnih intervjujev na televiziji pri reproduciranju populizma, in sicer skozi preplet televizijske logike in ritualiziranih novinarskih konvencij.

V drugi polovici številke se vrnemo k duhu pandemije, ki zadnji dve leti preveva (tudi) področje znanstvene produkcije. Teoretska refleksija Marjana Svetličiča o filozofskem, političnem in družbenem pomenu krize, povezane z virusom SARS-CoV-2, prinaša obsežen pregled literature na omenjene tematike. Pri tem premišljuje tezo, da lahko o krizi produktivno razmišljamo kot o »točki preobrata« za človeštvo, ki z njo dobi priložnost, da se odreče antropocentrizmu v korist ekocentričnemu svetovnemu nazoru. V poskusu ponuditi izvedljivo podlago za tak načrt Svetličič analizira osnovne podmene kapitalističnega in socialističnega družbenopolitičnega programa, pri čemer išče »hibriden model« in poudarja pomen Države za uspeh tovrstne ideje.

Številko sklepa članek Marjana Smrketa in Mitja Hafnerja Finka, ki predstavita prizemljeno analizo lokalnih posledic in učinkov pandemije covida-19, pri čemer se posebej posvetita vzrokom za statistično gledano šibko uspešnost Slovenije pri poskusih zajezitve širjenja virusa. Avtorja predstavita sociološki pogled na problematiko, in sicer rezultate dveh anket javnega mnenja. V analizi razlogov, ki jih respondenti navajajo za (ne)upoštevanje nacionalnih ukrepov za prepre-čevanje širjenja bolezni covid-19, izpostavita, da gre za kompleksno matrico, kjer kot eden pomembnih dejavnikov za nesodelovanje pri nacionalni strategiji izstopa pomanjkanje zaupanja v vlado.

Poleg izvirnih znanstvenih člankov pričujoča številka Družboslovnih razprav vsebuje še štiri recenzije monografij. Tokrat predstavljamo nove slovenske prevode izbora klasičnih besedil, ki ga je pripravil urednik recenzij knjig Klemen Ploštajner. Rubrika kot taka izpostavlja še eno funkcijo akademskih recenzij: recenzije knjig so namreč med drugim tudi besedila, ki znajo navdušiti bralce in bralke ter jih spodbuditi k branju znanstvenih in strokovnih besedil. V tokratni številki si lahko preberete odzive na knjige Simone de Beauvoir (Starost II: *Biti v svetu*, o kateri razmišlja Metka Mencin), Paola Freira (*Pedagogika zatiranih*, ki jo recenzira Zala Gruden), Pierra Bourdieuja (*Praktični razlogi: o teoriji delovanja*, o kateri piše Marko Ribać) in bell hooks (*Naša pozicija: razred je pomemben*, ki jo pokriva Klara Otorepec).

Natalija Majsova in Tanja Oblak Črnič, glavni urednici

Literatura

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Dear reader,

This is the third (and final) issue for the year of *Družboslovne razprave – Social Science Forum*. Unlike the previous (double) issue, this one is not thematic; instead, showcasing a selection of articles and book reviews on a range of timely topics and discussions in the social sciences and humanities in general, as well as specifically in South-East Europe. The task at hand is as complex as it may seem, with the issue certainly proving to be a challenge to process and compile. We therefore dedicate this introductory note to everyone who took part in this laborious enterprise. Especially, we wish to thank the authors of the articles in this issue, and the anonymous peer reviewers whose invisible efforts are one of this journal's key quality assurance mechanisms. The reviewers' passion for knowledge production and ensuring high standards for scientific contributions shapes the content of *Social Science Forum* in considerable ways, yet their input remains under the radar.

Peer review is an integral part of the *Social Science Forum's* publication process. While the main editors hold the right and responsibility to reject formally, structurally or thematically inadequate submissions before peer review, they cannot publish papers that have not undergone peer review. Each article is therefore anonymised and sent off to two experts in the field or – if these prove difficult to find – an expert in the field and a generalist, who evaluate the submissions and provide guidelines for improvement. This model ensures the latest developments are included in academic knowledge production. Peer review has been increasingly viewed as "one of the fundamental conditions of possibility of academic knowledge and the construction of its value" (Biagioli 2002: 11) since the end of World War II, and is even more so in the 21st century. At the same time, many concerns have been voiced regarding the objectivity, purposefulness and constructiveness of the procedure, leading journal editors to frequently reconsider what are the optimal procedures for preventing scientific fraud and streamline academic discourse, while leaving enough room for innovation and critical thought.

Social Science Forum relies on the "double-blind" peer review model, meaning that the author and the reviewer are unaware of each other's identity throughout the review process. While publication dispels the mystery around the authors' identity, the reviewers' names remain anonymous unless they specifically request that they be revealed to the authors (and may hence become accessible to the broader public should the authors choose to explicitly thank or otherwise acknowledge the reviewers in their publication). So far, the practice of reviewer-

identity-disclosure has been rare, making it difficult to publicly acknowledge their impact on the quality of the journal.

While double-blind peer review has become ever more popular over the past decade, models which rely on varying degrees of anonymity also exist. A small minority of academic journals thus subscribes to the "no anonymity" model whereby both parties in the review process are aware of the other's identity. This model may be praised for its transparency, yet it is also seen as the trickiest one to implement if the goal is to ensure the highest standards of bias-prevention. Two other models employ partial anonymity, either concealing the author's name from the reviewer, or vice-versa. Until the 2010s, the latter, "single anonymity", namely, anonymisation of the reviewer's comments coupled with disclosure of the author's name to the reviewer, dominated in most scientific disciplines (Brown 2006: 1275). The recent preference for the double-blind model may be attributed to growing concerns over ethnicity-, race-, gender-, institution- and seniority-related biases. And, in case you have been wondering, the "reverse single-blind" model, which discloses information about the reviewers to the authors, but not vice-versa, predict-ably never gained traction, compromising the reviewers' task by failing to grant them protection while potentially overexposing them, and possibly skewing their assessments.

Social Science Forum takes peer review very seriously, appreciating its signifi-cance for a journal that aims to promote the work of early-career scholars (among others), and to facilitate conversations across the social sciences and humanities. Our mission would be unthinkable without the efforts of our academic peers who see reading and reviewing their colleagues' work as a rewarding investment of their time. To illustrate the scope of the endeavour: the minimal standard that Social Science Forum's reviewers accept involves a succinct questionnaire al-lowing space for a short comment of a minimum of 150 words. In practice, most of the reviews we receive are much longer, providing the authors with detailed instructions on how to refine their claims, re-think their concepts and methods, and asking them to rectify errors, or to highlight the most outstanding aspects of their argument. Further, the international nature of our pool of reviewers ensures the journal's articles are adapted to speak to a broader, international academic public. In some cases, the reviewers must – or choose to – comment on second or even third versions of manuscripts. Speaking in terms of this issue of the journal you are now reading, eight reviewers from different research areas within the broader region were heavily involved in the review process, helping to improve the publication results.

Equally, our mission would be unthinkable without responsible authors who we request to carefully consider all of the reviewers' suggestions, and to respond

to them, summing up their reflections, and describing the changes made. Finally, it is the journal's technical editor, Jasmina Šepetavc, who kindly agrees to bear full responsibility for the professionalism of this process, ensuring the authors' and reviewers' anonymity. As editors, we find this level of commitment helpful and inspiring, and hope our readers feel the same way. Accordingly, we invite you to leaf through the latest set of texts generated by the process described above.

The issue begins with Aljoša Pužar's theoretically rich discussion on the contemporary structures of melodramatic feeling, underpinned by a (digital) ethnographic examination of a specific case in point, and a diachronic comparison with similar events. Pužar aligns the recent collective bereavement of the regionally famous Yugoslav and Serbian singer Đorđe Balašević with popular reactions to the death of certain other "celebrity folk heroes". He thereby points to the affective dimensions of such bereavement, sketching out how "economies of impossibility" are transformed into "melodramatic bursts of pseudopolitical (im)possibility".

In the following article, Emanuela Fabijan and Marko Ribać follow up on popular sentiment, presenting the findings of an empirical study on populism in and by Slovenian media (television news programmes) in the context of the 2015–2016 migration crisis. The authors trace "populist antagonisms" in media narratives, shedding light on how these emerge in both political and media communication, and questioning the role of political television interviews in the reproduction of populism through the conundrum of television logic and ritualised journalistic conventions.

The second half of the issue returns to the spectrum of the pandemic that has haunted knowledge production over the past 2 years. Marjan Svetličič's theoretical reflection on the philosophical, political and social significance of the COVID-19 crisis offers an impressive literature review of these topics, expounding on the proposition that the crisis might be productively thought of as a "turning point", pushing humankind to part with anthropocentrism and to take on a more ecocentric worldview. In an attempt to provide a feasible basis for this ambitious plan, Svetličič revisits the basic tenants of capitalist and socialist sociopolitical programmes, seeking a "hybrid model", and stressing the importance of the State in these efforts.

The issue concludes with Marjan Smrke and Mitja Hafner Fink who offer an empirically grounded view on the local ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic, scrutinising the underlying causes of Slovenia's poor virus-containment figures. The authors offer a sociological take on the question, presenting the results of two public opinion surveys. Analysis of the respondents' reasons for (non)com-

pliance with (or defection from) the national pandemic-containment measures reveals a complex matrix, where the lack of trust in the government stands out as an important factor.

Apart from original research papers, this issue contains four book reviews. The books are all recent Slovenian translations of selected classics curated by *Social Science Forum's* book reviews editor Klemen Ploštajner, and revealing another dimension of the review process in academia: its capacity to excite the reader about scholarship. This month's selection includes books by Simone de Beauvoir (the second part of *The Coming of Age*, reviewed by Metka Mencin), Paolo Freire (*Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, reviewed by Zala Gruden), Pierre Bourdieu (*Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action*, reviewed by Marko Ribać), and bell hooks (*Where We Stand: Class Matters*, reviewed by Klara Otorepec).

Natalija Majsova and Tanja Oblak Črnič, editors in chief

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ČLANKI

ARTICLES

Aljoša Pužar

MELODRAMATIC STRUCTURES OF FEELING AND MASS BEREAVEMENTS OF CELEBRITY FOLK HEROES

ABSTRACT

This paper presents theoretical, methodological and political considerations pertaining to the affective configuration of public collective grief and bereavement. This configuration is described relative to the specific position held by celebrity folk heroes within the broader melodramatic cultural modality. The case of the bereavement for the singer Đorđe Balašević is compared here with two other historical episodes that involved similar affective patterning and related discursive formations. The article shows how the melodramatic modality underpinning all three cases operates beyond the representational and discursive dimensions of culture to form collective affective patterns or structures of feeling that transform the underlying economies of impossibility into melodramatic bursts of pseudo-political (im)possibility.

KEY WORDS: melodramatic structure of feeling, bereavement, celebrity folk heroes, Balašević, affect theory, (im)possibility

Melodramatične strukture občutkov in množično žalovanje zvezdniških ljudskih junakov

IZVLEČEK

Članek predstavi teoretične, metodološke in politične premisleke, ki se nanašajo na afektivno konfiguracijo javne kolektivne žalosti in žalovanja. Takšna konfiguracija je opisana v povezavi s posebnim položajem zvezdniških ljudskih junakov v kontekstu širše melodramatične kulturne modalitete. Primer žalovanja za pevcem Đorđejem Balaševićem se tukaj primerja z dvema drugima zgodovinskima

epizodama, ki sta vključevali podobne afektivne vzorce in z njimi povezane diskurzivne formacije. Članek prikaže, kako melodramatična modaliteta kot podlaga vseh treh primerov deluje onkraj reprezentativne in diskurzivne razsežnosti kulture, kako tvori kolektivne afektivne vzorce ali strukture občutkov, ki temeljno ekonomijo nemožnosti preoblikujejo v melodramatične izbruhe psevdopolitične (ne)možnosti.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: melodramatična struktura občutka, žalovanje, zvezdniški ljudski junaki, Balašević, teorija afekta, (ne)možnost

1 Introduction

A singer-songwriter, poet, and novelist Đorđe Balašević, born in 1953 in Novi Sad, Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia, died on February 19, 2021 in Novi Sad, Republic of Serbia, from COVID-19-related pneumonia. Balašević was a household name and a revered pop-cultural luminary in the countries of ex-Yugoslavia, with his work already a recognised subject of academic analyses in various fields and subfields (Mijatović 2004; Baker 2006; Asimopulos 2012; Tadić and Đurđević 2017).

At the time of Balašević's death, the COVID-19 pandemic in the countries of the former Yugoslavia had lasted for a year already, which is a fact of importance here. Any COVID-19-related death, even the best documented one, presents an exercise in pseudo-accountability that accompanies the systemic (and systematic, if not orderly) governance of life and death and the propagation of the new-old order of increasingly carceral algorithmic capitalism (Wang 2018). Stretched across the repertoire of conflicting biomedical narratives and mutually incompatible statistical models, various causes and effects, morbidities, and comorbidities merge into an obsession of numbers that mark some mildly reassuring loops within prolonged anxiety, a structure typical for the process of quantification of life (affective, discursive, and material alike), and the onset of "data fetishism" (Sharon and Zandbergen 2016). At the opposite pole of the work of public dying is the repertoire of "people's" mystification and obfuscation, of the neo-premodern tendencies uniting conspiracy theories and digital-tribal waves of cultural wars and identarian clashes.

Surprisingly, none of these aspects proved to be crucial in the discursive and affective organization of Đorđe Balašević's death and the subsequent collective bereavement. His death was medicalised only superficially and tangentially, and it was not immediately mystified, in stark opposition to some other contemporary

COVID-19 deaths.[1] Instead, across the region of ex-Yugoslavia, an unexpected number of people went into a dramatic mode of mourning, expressing signs of intense and uncontrollable grief. People publicly described their feelings as intense sadness, endless crying, confusion, and incredulity in the face of such an "intimate" loss.

> When I heard that he passed away, I couldn't believe it, the next day we headed from Aleksinac to Novi Sad to pay our respects to this legend. We could barely collect the money, and then went through Dositejeva Street 206 steps to house number 33 in Cvijićeva Street, huge tears fell, but no sobs were heard. My heart ached and my hands were shaking. A profound sorrow overwhelmed my entire family as we silently walked away from the house of the great man and singer. Rest in peace, our dear Đole. (S.G., YouTube comment)

> I listen to him, images of life pass before my eyes, scorching tears flow down my face, without a voice, without a sound. It is my soul that is crying. (Anonymous, YouTube comment)

In the span of just a few hours, the entire post-Yugoslav transnational mediasphere had already resonated with these loud "silent" voices. Thousands of narratives immediately proliferated, attempting to showcase the unique position of Balašević in what used to be, and still is, a shared cultural space of post-Yugoslav republics. Acts of individual and group commemorations in most cities of the region merged with this public media frenzy, while politics echoed this sentiment by almost immediately suggesting street names, monuments, commemorative plaques, and other such devices of institutional memorialization.

This paper came about through intense field observations and theoretical evaluations of these events. Yet, its purpose is not to provide a discourse analysis or to be an ethnographic article about Balašević and his grieving fans, as those options require different procedures and methodology. This cultural studies analysis uses those field observations to propose and test theoretical models of melodramatic collective grief. It reactivates the notion of the melodramatic structure of feeling, whose historical iterations and narrative materializations are well documented, yet insufficiently conceptualised in the context of public collective grief and bereavement.

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1. COVID-19-related deaths of the patriarch and two episcopes of the Serbian orthodox church that died shortly before Balašević present a good example. Their SARS-CoV-2 infection was widely debated in regional media, their death was medicalized (and, in parallel, mystified from the religious perspective). Their funerals were criticized as epidemiologically dangerous.

To better grasp the affective patterning of mass bereavements and to understand their adjacent discursive vestments, Balašević's death will be juxtaposed with two other celebrity deaths of a similar subtype (celebrity folk heroes), namely, the well documented and paradigmatic deaths of Princess Charlotte Augusta of Wales (1796–1817) and Diana, Princess of Wales (1961–1997).

2 Melodrama of resonances, synchronizations, and automations

2.1 Melodramatic structure of feeling

Williams's classical theory of "structures of feeling" recognises "elements" (expressions, manifestations, traces, accounts) of feeling, while trying to see how they make "configurations," that is, how they assume structural qualities, becoming a distinct spirit/taste/colour of an era, of a conjuncture, or some cultural formation (Williams 1978: 132).

> [Williams] locates affectivity, no longer according to the coordinates we normally use, interior/exterior, subjective/objective and so on, but as a distributive phenomenon, an assemblage of small parts of different provenance, which make up, due to an internal system of relations, an unmistakeable phenomenon, a feeling with a verifiable and identifiable structure. (Sharma and Tygstrup 2015: 5)

The one structure of feeling that I think deserves to be brought to the fore in the case of Balašević and other such celebrity folk heroes, structuring and colouring their life work, their death, and the processes of dramatic grief among their audiences and followers, is the melodramatic structure of feeling, that is, the one showing characteristics of melodrama. Defined by the standard Oxford dictionary as "A sensational dramatic piece with exaggerated characters and exciting events intended to appeal to the emotions" (Lexico 2021), the semantic field of melodrama extends far beyond the logic of this particular literary and theatrical genre.

Brooks's classical work from the early 1970s dislocated the crux of the debate from discussing genological (genre-related) and stylistic choices to acknowledging the "melodramatic imagination" or "melodramatic mode" that can also appear in hitherto venerated nonmelodramatic classical works of literature and other arts. Crucially, this mode is one of those "imaginative modes in which cultural forms express dominant social and psychological concerns" (Brooks 1976: viii). According to Brooks, not even our detachment through irony could change the role of melodrama in showcasing things that matter, but also in sustaining a

"Manichean outlook of things, of good and evil, vice and virtue, innocence and villainy" (Mercer and Shingler 2004: 85).

Melodrama as "a dialectical interaction between moral significance and an excess aimed precisely at noncognitive affects, thrills, sensations, and strong affective attraction" (Gunning 1994) explodes in "post-sacred" or "godless" times, but also in times of heightened uncertainty, anxiety, and rancour (or long-standing and controlled resentfulness). Effects of this interaction are superficially emulated by the operations of contemporary emotional capitalism (Illouz 2007), spectacular politics, and media production and consumption based on "emotionalisation" (Mujica and Bachmann 2013). Such flattened emotionality also charges the events of pseudomoral panic and is at the core of many particularistic identarian (and identitarian) games of passionate labelling, contemporary culture wars, and so-called cancel culture. These phenomena entail intemperate affective excessiveness, and while they operate through bursts of unreflected feelings, their "moral significance," that is, moral semantic anchoring, remains decisive. It is a type of communal or collective ethical balancing act around moments of loss or deprivation, usually standing for other losses and deprivations. The global COVID-19 pandemic, in itself dramatic and demanding (Lenarčič and Smrdelj 2020; Kamin et al. 2021), activated such mechanisms of (melo)dramatizing unspeakable loss.

These melodramatic mechanisms collapse the conventional opposition of the "intimate," of the "innermost personality" versus the "impersonal" of the "outer domain of social routines and pressures" (Mazzarella 2017: 200). Discussing Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, Mazzarella locates both the author's rejection of "direct transition of sentiments" and his trust in "a profoundly and spontaneously mimetic-corporeal faculty" that synchronises gazing mobs with the circus spectacle. That ambivalence is at the core of the "mass-mediated subjectivity": "It is the juxtaposition and the disjuncture between (ethical) identification and (mimetic) resonance that makes the peculiar self-relation established by the impartial spectator theatrical: a dynamic tension between distanced communicative representation and immersed sensuous participation" (Mazzarella 2017: 204). In short, what used to be a philosophical-political fiction of the impartial spectator/adjudicator that only occasionally sympathetically resonates with others, if at all, has turned into an endlessly (if superficially) resonating political subjectivity open to what one could call a publicised post-public.

2.2 From techno-sadness to digital mass bereavement

Due to the centrality of the mass-mediated subjectivity of constant spontaneous synchronization, paired with pseudo-autonomy of self-curation, and involving falsely safe distances between screens, the flows of public grief and bereavement

can easily become both amplified and simplified, emotionally flattened and formulaic, while remaining dramatically "activated" around things that seem to matter. That is especially true for the flows entirely located within the digital sphere, spurred by the effects of that sphere, or, increasingly, occurring in the hybrid digital-analogue continuum of affective distribution and patterning. A powerful combination of technological, corporeal, discursive, and affective "digital social media are broadly characterised by creating the 'immediatisation' of social time, erasing the gap between receiving, being affected, and acting" (Timm-Knudsen and Stage 2015: 199).

To that, one needs to add the effects of the platforms themselves, a form of structural imposition of interface designs, of algorithmic governance of communication, of limitations in numbers of words, in shapes of newsfeeds, etc. There is a double or triple coding in place, with social codes interwoven with programming; the reality, in turn, is saturated with the super-coded pseudo-flows of sociality. What Martin Roberts called "automated sociality" (Roberts 2019, personal communication)—be it "happy," as in felicitations and birthday greetings, or "sad," as in grief and bereavement—is decisively marked by formulaic repetitiveness (R.I.P., R.I.P., R.I.P., R.I.P., etc.) that showcases an ancient aspect of hidden orality amidst the digitally written words. Such rhythms of automated sociality are highly contagious, not only in ideas or concepts, but also (or in particular) in basic shapes and usages that get copied and multiplied due to previously described aspects of spontaneous synchronization (Sampson 2012; Mazzarella 2017).

A notorious Facebook experiment with mass-scale emotional manipulation (or social engineering) from 2012 (Kramer et al. 2014) showed how the patterns of affective organization and simple forms of emotional directionality (positive/negative) could be contagious and spread in waves, regardless of the precise content. A full and unbroken affective continuum between such waves and their nondigital counterparts is increasingly visible and documented.[2] What Geert Lovink recently called "the society of the social," that is, the mass-scale reformatting of interior lives by social media and the inseparability of individuals and platforms, while overly simplified, certainly remains telling.

For Lovink, one of the main default affective modalities of such reformatted masses is "sadness by design."

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2. A good example of such continuum occurred after the tragic accident involving the ferryboat Sewol in South Korea in 2014 (Woo et al. 2015). It is important to notice how this works in conjunction with the discursive position of Sewol as "the symbol of neoliberal South Korea" (Rhee 2018: 8).

No matter how brief and mild, sadness is the default mental state of the online billions. Its original intensity gets dissipated. It seeps out, becoming a general atmosphere, a chronic background condition. Occasionally—for a brief moment—we feel the loss. A seething rage emerges. After checking for the tenth time what someone said on Instagram, the pain of the social makes us feel miserable, and we put the phone away. (Lovink 2019: 48)

This short-lived awareness of loss is crucial for the analysis of public melodramatic grief and bereavements. Such "digital heterotopia" of briefly becoming both lost and connected in shared intensity happens in the background of the endless deflation and sadness, "a general atmosphere," conceptually similar to the structure of feeling. The substance of this sadness surely materialises from the insufferable tensions between the curation of the polished digital self and the hidden world of precarious labour, of the capitalist expropriation of care, of criminalization of organic communality, of the neo-feudal political economy of the era, of environmental concerns, of pandemic fears, and so forth. To partake in an occasional "true" sense of loss and rage is almost akin to the classical Turnerian anthropological model of liminoid events pervaded by the collective energies of communitas (Turner 1969; Pužar 2007).

For Lovink, the connection of all this sadness with the traditional notion of melancholia is clear but complicated: Kierkegaardian melancholia as "the deepest foundation of the human in a Godless society" is now replaced by "the democratization of sadness" spread "thinly" and "flatly" in "homeopathic doses" across the technological plateau (Lovink 2019: 55).

Differences between melancholia and techno-sadness are not only distributional and quantitative. This contemporary sadness is also different in a temporal sense, as it comes suspended in the endless present time of attention capitalism: "While for the archaic melancholic, the past never passes, techno-sadness is caught in the perpetual now. Forward focused, we bet on acceleration and never mourn a lost object" (Lovink 2019: 56).

Finally, techno-sadness is acted out in the middle of the crowd. It is Simmel's cool detachment of urban dwellers turned into a horror of juxtaposed lonelinesses:

Whereas melancholy in the past was defined by separation from others, reduced contacts and reflection on oneself, today's tristesse plays itself out amidst busy social (media) interactions. In Sherry Turkle's phrase, we are alone together, as part of the crowd—a form of loneliness that is particularly cruel, frantic and tiring. (Lovink 2019: 56)

We can see, therefore, how the dramatic collective grief and bereavement can act as a sudden and (un)expected affective intensification that cuts through the solitude and boredom of the "thinly spread" sadness of the global pandemic,

of social distancing and biopolitical interventions. Maybe even of the pandemic listlessness and ennui of the still privileged but increasingly frustrated middle classes.[3] Due to its commemorative or memorial focus (an intense engagement in temporal projections backward), such bereavement momentarily destabilises the endless nowness. A visible phase or jump from the thinly spread affectivity to the heightened and directed/focused intensity temporarily restores more visible melodramatic splits. It is "us" and "them" now, and "we" are hurting.

Image 1: "If I perish young/ Plant only rosemary at my grave/ Don't allow them/ to make a sad third act out of it" (Đorđe Balašević, Slovenska [Slavic]) – an ad hoc commemorative "altar" for Đorđe Balašević, a day after his passing; Ljubljana, Križanke.

Photo: Robert Waltl.

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3. Franco "Bifo" Berardi describes a tricky relationship of what he calls boredom and the ability to start a revolution. Boredom or deflation is a precursor for revolutionary bursts and movements. Intense contemporary neurostimulation, in his opinion, precludes it (Berardi 2018).

3 Celebrity folk heroes and the melodrama of (im)possibility

3.1 The affective patterning of mass bereavement and the role of secular saints

For a long time now, the melodramatic modality has been described as a dream-like realm, a "dream world inhabited by dream people and dream justice, offering audiences the fulfillment and satisfaction found only in dreams. An idealization and simplification of the world of reality, it is in fact the world its audiences want but cannot get" (Booth 1965: 14). Such a public dream (or fairy tale) builds upon the dualities or contrasts that cut across the fabric of social life: abstractions, simplifications, and flattening of the complex landscapes of intensities. Unresolved bipolarity of the typical social dream built upon loss and bereavement unites the structure of melancholy, the structure of melodrama, and the structures of the political (Anker 2015; Cauter 2016).

Melodramatic social mode, while expressing and accommodating the aesthetics (and ethics) of excess (Newlin 2011), and while being built upon splits, contrasts, and clashes, also (and this is crucial) hides or obscures a symbolic economy of impossibility (Goldberg 2016). Goldberg's queer reading shakes the polarities of melodrama. It is a structure of frustration and blockage, of suppression and obfuscation, that screams of love and hatred, of male and female, of us and them. It is that emotional "lockdown" that propels the excesses of public mourners without really giving them a chance to speak out.

Among the most notable historical examples of such a structure of melodramatic public grief and bereavement are the events of public mourning for Charlotte, Princess of Wales, who died in London in 1817 after giving birth to a stillborn son (Peacock 2015), and for Diana, Princess of Wales, who died following a car accident in Paris, in 1997. The latter case, related to "Lady Di," produced one of the most complete catalogues of ethnographic data and of cultural studies analysis of public grief and bereavement in living history (Ang 1997; Walter 1999; Parrot and Harré 2001; Thomas 2002; Thomas 2008; Maclean 2014). Comparing these two royal deaths with the death of a petit-bourgeois and mildly left-liberal post-Yugoslav singer-songwriter might seem strange or frivolous, but my claim is that these three deaths show deep structural analogies and considerable genealogical overlaps. They are quite different from superficially similar groups of public deaths (and from the adjacent bursts of dramatic collective public grief). The first of those pertains to deaths of the anchoring, stabilizing, or oppressive systemic figures, leaders, dictators, classics of various arts, and patriarchal tribal

fathers, with public expressions of grief accommodated within properly systemic patterns. While often producing dramatic and deeply felt expressions, the affective-discursive organization of these deaths largely showcases a positive linear relationship between systemic expectations and personal affective overspills. Such was the model of death, grief, and bereavement for the ex-prime minister Sir Winston Churchill in 1965, for president Josip Broz Tito in 1981, and for supreme leader Kim Jong-Il in 2011.

Tragic individual or collective deaths of hoi polloi present the other extreme of these dramatised public deaths, often marked by the seemingly anti-structural communitas of grief (liminal and not liminoid, in Turnerian terms), waves and eruptions with visible political consequences even for nonpolitical deaths.[4] Such public deaths often include a quick translation of the raw affect into an emotional spectrum of anger, rage, and indignation, even moral panic, along with more expected "sadness," but they are inconceivable in their final form without some organizing, relaying, shunting, or orienting mechanisms, even when they appear spontaneous or chaotic.

While this entire taxonomy seems almost ludicrously simplistic from the cultural studies point of view, considering complexities of subjectivation, individuation, ideological interpellation, symbolic structuration, and such, with every life and every death being (also) inherently "political," I still claim that grosso modo, such a simple classification (while not being in any sense precise or exhaustive) answers the analytical need to understand some finer nuances in how affects become socioculturally organised in the context of public deaths and bereavement.

Melodramatic collective grief requires character-people safely preshaped into character-types, and that invokes the old Russian formalist notion of "function." A function is what a character does, an action or lack thereof, something that affects the story. Unlike the character itself, it presents a stable and constant element in a tale, its fundamental component. More so, functions often come in binary splits or pairs of opposites, which is relevant for this article and its discussion of melodramatic opposites and contrasts. They can be assigned to different characters, or separated by the intermediary structures of the narrative, and are always bound to the inner temporal structures or flows (Propp 1984: 75–77).

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4. Recent global protests related to the death of police brutality victim George Floyd, as a part of the broader Black Lives Matter movement, and the previously mentioned waves of public anger of South Koreans after the tragic sinking of the ship Sewol are cases in point. The relationship of Korean developmental models and specific structures of feeling, including melodramatic, has been hypothesized before (Abelmann 2003; Pužar 2011; Rhee 2018).

This is not to say that characters (let us say a princess X, or a singer Y) are immaterial, but rather that they only serve in contingent and disposable roles, channelling some "outer" purpose. According to Brooks, this is exactly the quality of melodramatic affectivity.

> It is important that, in talking of affective structure...we not be deluded into thinking we are referring to the psychological structures of melodrama's characters. There is no "psychology" in melodrama in this sense; the characters have no interior depth, there is no psychological conflict. It is delusive to seek an interior conflict, the "psychology of melodrama," because melodrama exteriorises conflict and psychic structure, producing instead what we might call the "melodrama of psychology." (Brooks 1976: 35)

Two princesses of Wales and one singer-songwriter are, therefore, analysed principally as disposable entities (discursive, affective, and material alike), as narrative characters operating in public according to demands imposed by the dominant melodramatic structure of feeling, and whatever social or personal drama such structure reflects and hides. While cultural studies often work with the complexities of personal lives and deaths, it is also inherently culturalist to analyse how these complexities accommodate "functions," and what the role of this or that *dramatis persona* (dead celebrity) is in some other (broader) story.

For the two princesses and the singer (unlike, for instance, Sir Winston Churchill), that function is "celebrity folk hero," and the broader story is, I claim, the story of (im)possibility. It is that very underlying impossibility, as detected by Goldberg's (2016) queer reading, that turns melodrama into an aesthetic-political space beyond the heteronormative organization of truth (Goldberg 2016). Still, such a melodramatic opening transforms this underlying impossibility into an expressive and loud (im)possibility, without really being able to change it.

Melodrama is a timeless apparatus that redistributes suffering (Zarzosa 2013). Deaths that belong to the melodramatic social dream (or tale) of (im)possibility belong to deceased humans that were discursively and affectively shaped into "celebrities" and into "nobodies" at the same time, collapsing, at least superficially (or indeed, largely superficially), the social and philosophical distinction of "celebrity" and of "nobody" (Adler 2016), but also typically modernist tension between "an individual" and "an anyone" (or an "everyman").

"England's rose" (Princess Charlotte Augusta of Wales), "England's rose" (yet again), "Lady Di" (Lady Diana Frances Spencer; Diana, Princess of Wales) and "Đole" (Đorđe Balašević) performed a role of unwilling or shy celebrities standing right between the systemic and antisystemic realms, in the liminoid (if not liminal) narrative environment of "people's princesses" and "queens of people's hearts."

Their lives and deaths, and in a particular way the extensive and explosive mass bereavement upon their deaths, belong to the affective redistribution of suffering and achieve a temporary queering of the public space (along with heteronormativity, one can also think here of different other diagrams of power and their petrifactions: ethnic, national, class-bound, racialised, generational, etc.).[5]

To be vested with such a specific function in collective social dreaming, the personality behind the character needs to be shaped into a precise character-type. They are often required to be imaginary victims and enablers in one; they are often infantilised and kept in some place of purity and innocence (despite possible proofs to the contrary), in a prolonged post-Victorian childhood.[6] They often unexpectedly find themselves in discursive spaces of secular sanctity, while being considered close relatives by those separated by class, income, and amount of agency. They avoid the accusations of being populist by publicly denying their relations to the official anchoring points of the conventional hierarchical organization of social forces. They tend to be publicly and maybe even honestly appalled by the very structures that engender their discursive and affective position and material existence. In short, they tend to be decently paid and careful character-type rebels without ever fulfilling proper functions of social rebellion that could tear apart the fundamental aspects of social dream, changing the outcomes of the tale. In that sense, they are perfectly positioned to voice some of the social anxieties, but also to aestheticise and dissipate, possibly anaesthetise, social ferments and insurgent energies.[7]

Princess Charlotte Augusta of Wales was publicly recognised in her lifetime and her death, as a sort of victim of the royal machine, a child exposed to mutually estranged royal parents, a rebellious young woman in opposition to her strict and

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5. This limited article cannot give justice to the theorizing of the "celebrity" figure or the "folk hero" figure. Their broadly accepted meaning is assumed. For the celebrity studies approach to deaths in the digital era see Burgess, Mitchell and Muench (2019). My usage of the term "folk hero" is reminiscent of the usage in Burke's classical work on early modern Europe (Burke 1978), elaborated for the "in between" figurations in Pužar (2007).

6. Hundreds of plush toy bunnies that used to be thrown at Balašević during concerts in response to his song Neki Novi Klinci (Some new kids), which describes his poetic memory of being given a white toy bunny as a child, is a case in point. Cutification and infantilization of such a (melo)dramatis persona is crucial, in opposition to the "dirty world out there". Such an innocent body is weak, ready to be sacrificed. Of course, there is an important intellectual genealogy here, that pertains to the modernist idea of youth or childhood and to the "split" or "doubled" persona of an artist (Mijatović 2014).

7. Similarities between these political paradoxes and those lived by cultural studies academics are too apparent not to be mentioned, if only in passing.

imposing father (Stott 2019). Her attempts to escape these restrictions were the talk of the town and the matter of domestic politics (Plowden 1989). She was, on the other hand, discursively and affectively shaped into a (lost) hope for the system of hereditary transmission of power and the last (at that point) existing reservoir of beliefs in the mystical and pure quality of the Crown. As "England's rose," her role was, therefore, cocreated by the joint efforts of establishment propaganda and the dynamic field of political media and the wider public. Her death, and the unprecedented (in the living memory of her mourners) nationwide explosion of prolonged and intense grief, indicates this inner paradox or tension (Wood 1818; Plowden 1989; Peacock 2015).

Similar organization of affect and meaning can be assigned to the dramatis persona of "Lady Di." Her vacillation between conventional fairytale roles of a distant icon of style (and conventional respectability) on one hand, and her intense dedication to reaching a popular "heart" by performing populist mediatised emotionality and sentimental types of charity work as "one of us" on another, presented a captivating pair of opposites. This was only enhanced by the subsequent marital, health-related, and other intimate revelations shared with the public, in contrast to the ethereal quality and tricky nonsecrecy (visibility from a distance) of her celebrity life. One of her critics concluded that "her popularity rested upon both her extreme difference from common people and her similarity to them" (Dalrymple 1997: 1).

Đorđe Balašević enjoyed similar double-coded destiny: between his early role as a propaganda singer and mildly antisystemic "eternal boy"; between his subsequent soft activism and gloved antinationalist protest work, and the reactionary rustic fantasies and otherwise non-emancipatory contents of his songs; between the transnational, pacifist, and pro-Yugoslav sentiments on one hand, and his alleged nationalist or even anti-Albanian moments on the other. He was "one of us," and his death could therefore be easily depicted as a "family loss" or "a bereavement of the loved one" (Ilić 2021).

Yet such "familiality" does not need to be direct and based on an elusive romantic sense of "love" (as much as that sense was celebrated in the singer-songwriter's work). Like in some softened post-Wittgensteinian system of familial similarity, loving and mourning audiences synchronise with their "celebrity relatives" at different entry points (they connect and disconnect at different locations/shunts between affective circuits, and at different times), and the effects overlap and amalgamate rather than concatenate. It can be a story of love, or of sociocultural losers (Crow and Rees 1999); it can be about the normalization of sadness or pain at the background of endless and violent ideological interpellation into some contrived promise of happiness (Ahmed 2010).

In the view of the prominent Croatian writer and journalist Slađana Bukovac, Balašević became important and beloved for "allowing people to be sad," opening space for the outdated, proscribed, despised, and medically suppressed sadness, considered tasteless and kitschy by social winners. "Be melancholic, be sad, and be unsuccessful, he was saying in a way. These are your layers, your fullness" (Bukovac 2021, personal communication). According to Bukovac, his concerts and the veritable pilgrimages related to them amounted to collective therapy sessions. This is somewhat akin to Brana Mijatović's claim from the early 2000s that Balašević produced "cathartic effects by enabling his audience to experience deeply felt and yet often repressed emotions of grief, guilt, and shame" (Mijatović 2004: 101).

3.2 From misplacement of structural strains to the politics of sentimentality

While reasons for affective attachment, attunement, or synchronization can vary and can be very elusively political, the underlying ocean of societal (im)possibilities remains political in much more straightforward terms, verging on unpleasant determinism.

If one looks into the British social and political climate that pertains to the period of life, death, and bereavement of Princess Charlotte Augusta, one finds a landscape of heightened generational uncertainty and brutal mercantilist operations, of empty promises for hoi polloi, of the national debt, of failed anti-establishment secret societies and movements, and of increased repression and state violence. If one takes a look at the years of Diana, Princess of Wales, one encounters the consequences of Thatcherite dismantling of the social welfare state, the birth and explosion of neoliberal toxicity ruining the frail fabric of labour relations and communal solidarity. If one looks at the "political" (or better, antipolitical or postpolitical) destiny of Balašević, one finds a similar background of failed expectations, of almost millenarist endism ridden by anxieties, of mass spread popular pessimism and disenchantment of the endless "transition," and, ultimately, of the troublingly incompetent ship of state sailing across the pandemic uncertainties of 2020 and 2021.

No wonder, then, that these secular saints might be invoked to melodramatically channel and dissipate the expressions of suffering, hiding the impossibility of some real relief or social change. In the cynical insight of the conservative analyst, Diana was one such secular saint, or even a goddess.

On the Tuesday following her death, for example, two commentators in the Guardian, one of them a professor of politics at Oxford University,

asserted that she both created and reflected a more compassionate Britain after the heartless years of Thatcherite selfishness. She also changed us from a nation of people who keep our feelings bottled up inside into one of frank and openhearted self-revelation—a change all for the better, of course. (Dalrymple 1997: 1)

Exaggerations of individual roles aside (among haters and sycophants alike), it is notable how these dramatic reactions to the Princess of Wales's death in 1997 came only a few years after the famous *The End of History and the Last Man* by Francis Fukuyama. The book was widely misinterpreted as a manifesto for the new world order while invoking the collapse of traditional political sovereignty. At the time of princess's death, these endist readings, along with effects of a neoliberal realignment of the Thatcher era, could in no sense be mitigated by the cynicism of the Blairite "third way."

The expressions of grief could therefore be seen as inherently cryptopolitical, as they stood in strong relations to a very specific climate of lack and uncertainty. Still, such relations are not based on reflection (as in mirroring and as in reflecting upon) or on causality, but rather on the misplacement of structural strains marked by the confusion of sentiment. Zarzosa's vision of melodrama as "a distinctive interaction among bodies that involves an inverted image—an image according to which ideas act directly on bodies and bodies react to this suffering" (2013: 36) explains this paradox of misplaced effects of structural strain. Melodrama is about how ideas directly affect bodies and how bodies react. Being impotent to respond in kind to the affections of other bodies, their direct interaction is prevented. According to Zarzoza's almost Marxist gesture, a distorted image "occludes" the interaction between bodies.

We can clearly see that what critics have called the melodramatic imagination amounts to a cluster of inadequate ideas borne out of sad affections, an effect that postulates itself as a cause, the inverted image of the world in which we recognise our own sad affections as genuine. The melodramatic imagination turns the interaction among bodies into a stage for the dramatization of social ideas. (Zarzoza 2013: 36)

The folk might have been choosing their folk heroes and venerating their secular saints, but in an unpleasant analogy to the narrative taming of "Robin Hood the outlaw" into "Sir Robin the vassal to the righteous king" (Pužar 2007), the ship of state is (un)expectedly called to intervene. A reactionary collapse of pseudopolitical grief is usually imminent.

When Princess Charlotte Augusta died in 1817, Britain was plunged into deep dramatic mourning, with shops running out of black cloth, and with even the poor

and homeless (sic!) wearing black armbands (Peacock 2015). The captains of the ship of state were careful to support and channel this outpouring of popular grief, and the folk followed.

> Consternation seized all classes throughout the United Kingdom on the announcement of the melancholy event and the whole nation was filled with sorrow and mourning. No pen can at all adequately describe the universal lamentation at this national calamity. (Timpson 1846: 93–94)

It took a stubbornly simple revolutionary figure of a quaker—a religious reformer—to warn how it was entirely possible to be sad and experience loss without subjecting oneself to the rituals of collective bereavement that are always open to systemic abuses and political manipulations. Ephraim Wood's soul "was melted into sympathy," but he felt a "great aversion to the solemn pomp and parade." He did not put on the "habiliments of mourning," but was still dramatically sad in private: "How many heavy sighs heaved from my breast—how many tears ran down my cheeks when in secret, (though not altogether alone) God and myself can witness" (Wood 1818: 69). This was an important nuance and a rare one.

When Diana Princess of Wales tragically died, it famously took some days for the captains of the state to channel the chaotic grief and turn it into political gains and points. But they also acted upon the melodramatic requests of frustrated crowds that demanded stately rituals or even invented them.[8] Elites were criticised but also implored to symbolically adorn and celebrate people's princesses and other celebrity folk heroes.

Similarly, in the case of Balašević, the political and media elites of the ex-Yugoslav region (case in point: otherwise largely anti-Yugoslav Croatian state television) tried to follow up on and capture public sentiments and demands, much to the surprise of some mourners who themselves nurtured a paradoxical dream of the singer-songwriter as an antisystemic and, especially, antinationalist presence.

Yet, Balašević's relationship to the ship of state and various state ideologies was always a matter of some complexity, as he engaged with reactionary nostalgia and soft antisystemic gestures to gain some distance from the history of the present. His work does not really involve (or indeed affect) this regional mixture of ethnically coloured plutocracies and oligarchies, with their fresh and conflicting memories of the joint past.

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8. A case in point is a famous episode of the crowds imposing the ritual of Union Flag flown at half-mast on Buckingham Palace on the day of Diana's funeral, a ritual that was subsequently accepted and repeated over the years for other royal deaths and sad or tragic events.

Balašević's sentimental utopias of the "better past" or of the "timeless love" were pretty much the same in 1985, in 1995, and in 2015. They inhabited a mythopoetic space more akin to some imaginary and tacit pseudo-Austria-Hungary rather than the vision of Yugoslavia, which always seemed secondary, except in his rare and early propaganda work (Roić 2021, personal communication). A recurrent recent motif of "with him, Yugoslavia died at last" (Ilić 2021: 1) must therefore be rejected. Spectral states can, of course, always die when needed, only to be resurrected as needed, but Balašević was not into either of those operations with regards to Yugoslavia.[9]

His melodramatic impulse was to displace the living phantasm of the state and replace it with another: a distorted, timeless image of rustic and petit-bourgeois life, acting as a fabric softener of identarian clashes and dramas rather than a cure. Such impulse strongly corresponds to one of the main qualities assigned to melodrama: its encouragement of the "backward gaze" that is not confronting things as they are, but returning to how things ought to be, often shifting this latter focus (due to the impossibility of the present!) to some golden past, thus suspending the utopian work of imagining futures (Gledhill 1987: 21). His work was often seen by critics as purely sentimental, as was the lifework of Diana, Princess of Wales, and Princess Charlotte Augusta. Hugs, roses, bunnies, warm tears.

Yet, the politics of such sentimentality is not straightforwardly reactionary or anti-emancipatory; it assures initial attachment and relays between the affective circuits. The sentimentality crystallised in various discursive or narrative contents is also in tune or easily synchronised with "thinly spread sadness" or deflated forms of melancholy that precede the dramatic expressions of "grief politics." Right-wing critics often condemn this sentimentality. Comparing an old lady known to him who had lost a son and used to cry only at home, showing her "fortitude," with the outpouring of emotions upon the passing of Princess Diana, conservative pundit Dalrymple seemed utterly annoyed.

> Her fortitude is precisely the virtue that the acolytes of the hug-and-confess culture wish to extirpate from the British national character as obsolete, in favour of a banal, self-pitying, witless, and shallow emotional incontinence, of which the hysteria at the princess's death was so florid an example. (Dalrymple 1997: 1)

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9. His refusal to sing his old propaganda song Računajte na nas ("Count on us"), either before or after the collapse of the Yugoslav state, is a relevant example (Baker 2006; Radoš 2018), as is his recent ambivalent criticism of Yugoslavia as a "bad state" while he "still misses those times" (Radoš 2018).

When a group of conservative scholars edited an entire book about the "weakness" of "modern sentimentalization," an entire chapter was dedicated to Diana, Princess of Wales (Anderson and Mullen 1998). It did not take me long to find similar conservative critics for the bereavement of Đorđe Balašević. Right-wing pundits in Croatia were quick to criticise "tragicomic scenes," "hysterical showing off," "liberal, green, left, and Yugo-nostalgic trans" (Hodak 2021), "ideological yelping, a disgusting noise," and "general madness over manipulated deaths" (Vrabec 2021). Some cultural studies scholars might agree with them in part, considering traps of emotional capitalism, and of the mass-neurostimulation that splurges those precious political potentialities (Berardi 2018). Indeed, (melo)dramatis personae engaging in sentimental fairy tales and performing roles in (basically bourgeois) social dreams is not how cultural studies or the left thought (at least the non-American one) usually imagines political ideas and political action.

Nonetheless, while such structures might often be visibly and trickily flat and overly dissipating, they are also often class-bound and gendered. Sentimentality seen as "female," "trans," or "gay" is not easily rejected in the name of some generalised political action.[10] Yet, as it happens, political operations of sentimentality, while often enabling and cathartic, can only very rarely affect more general economies of impossibility, as they recruit energies for the aporetic realm of the (im)possible.

Image 2: "Flowers and tributes left at Kensington Palace soon after the death of Princess Diana on 31 Aug 1997".

Photo: Maxwell Hamilton/Flickr, converted to grayscale; Attribution 2.0 Generic [CC BY 2.0]).

10. Berlant's early work on the destiny of "female sentimentality" in American literature and culture is instructive here (Berlant 2008).

4 Conclusion

A (dead) melodramatic body is the "body seized with meaning" (Brooks 1994), acting as a relay or shunt of affectivity that temporarily accommodates the overspill, only to allow its dissipation to different other circuits (mediatic, political, commercial). Such organization of affect presents one of the regulatory alluviums for the contagious and threatening overspills of public affect, especially if digitally replicated and amplified. Many such events of dramatic public grief and bereavement could be traced to historical periods of great change, great challenge, and great deprivation (or better, those that for some reason feel like that). To study the melodramatic structures of feeling is, thus, of the utmost importance, be it in relation to the pre-Victorian labour relations, to the post-Thatcherite exhaustion, or to the never-ending post-Yugoslav "transition."

The death of Đorđe Balašević was yet another "news of the day" that unleashed itself and jumped into the lake of techno-sadness and boredom, making visible ripples and waves, moving pebbles for weeks upon weeks. There can be no denial that the long months and years of COVID-19, of fear, isolation, general lockdowns, the precariousness of income and employment, the ongoing loss of life and health, and the heightened societal regulation of life (intrusions of the state), contributed to the affective charge (the accumulation of intensities) ready to burst and dissipate laterally, as a transferrable charge or misplacement of the structural strain.

The pandemic situation, furthermore, expanded the pre-existing engagement with digital communication channels, media outlets, digital shopping, and digital intimacy, that is, with all those realms that for decades now have been marked by emotionalization and (quasi-) personalization, just as public politics is (or what remains of it). Add to that the broader effects of contemporary "emotional capitalism," shaping "homo sentimentalis" as one of its dominant figurations (Illouz 2007), and all ingredients were in place for the outburst of the mass-scale and passionate affective reconfiguration of grief and bereavement. About a month into it, these affects subsequently dispersed into many other configurations, leaving discursive traces, shaping future biographical feelings, and adding to memories.

In this cultural studies account of the affective patterning and discursive structuration of and around a recent public mass bereavement and of two among its comparable historical counterparts, I have attempted to mark several conceptual zones or possibilities, each deserving of further exploration. Among these, the effects of shaky or aporetic (im)possibility of the political, entailing specific affective bursts and patternings, require more precise work in affect studies of

death and bereavement. Ideally, some new intersectional qualitative studies, ethnographic or otherwise, including those of more recent (and therefore markedly digital) public mass bereavements, should both dynamically underpin our conceptual attempts and benefit from them. Such empirical and theoretical work will probably need to account for the "melodramatic" Manichean superficialities or dramatic surface polarizations that misplace and disguise the heavyweight effects of material conditions and societal divisions (class-bound, gendered, racialised, generational, etc.): the world of lived impossibilities.

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Emanuela Fabijan, Marko Ribać

POLITIČNI IN MEDIJSKI POPULIZEM V TELEVIZIJSKEM POLITIČNEM INTERVJUJU

IZVLEČEK

Osrednji cilj članka zajema analizo fenomena populizma, pri čemer se avtorja opirata na definicijo populizma kot stila komuniciranja. Specifike populističnega komuniciranja politikov in novinarjev z vizualno interakcijsko analizo preverjata v novičarskih intervjujih o migracijah v informativnih televizijskih oddajah Odmevi in 24UR ZVEČER. Na ravni populizma, ki se reproducira skozi medije, ugotavljata, da je diskurz temeljil predvsem na vzbujanju in krepitvi strahu pred Drugim, na izpostavljanju zaščite slovenskih meja pred nevarnim Drugim in na vizualnih reprezentacijah ljudstva kot homogene nacionalne skupnosti. Omenjeno ponazarjajo tudi grafični prikazi med govori političnih predstavnikov v televizijskih studiih analiziranih oddaj. Na ravni populizma s strani medijev pa je reprodukcijo populistične retorike in ekspresivnosti mogoče razumeti skozi prikaz vloge novinarjev in novinark kot ljudskih tribunov, ki z mehanizmom »premika osnove« delujejo za in v imenu ljudstva.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: politični populizem, medijski populizem, migracije, televizijske oddaje, politični intervju.

Political and media populism in television political interviews

ABSTRACT

The goal of the article is to analyse populism as a style of communication. By adopting the visual interaction method in empirical analysis, the authors examine the specificities of the populist communication reproduced by journalists and politicians in news interviews on the topic of migration in the television shows Odmevi and 24UR ZVEČER. At the level of populism through the media, the authors

argue that the discourse of politicians was primarily focused on generating and reinforcing fear of the Other. The discourse of the interviewees from the political field also underlined the protection of the Slovenian border, while the visual representation of the people as a homogenous national community followed as a visual element alongside graphic presentations in the studios of the analysed shows. Populism by the media as the reproduction of populist rhetoric and an expressive style is to be comprehended by analysing the role of journalists as tribunes of the people working for and on behalf of the people.

KEY WORDS: political populism, media populism, migration, television shows, political interview

1 Uvod: prepletanje političnega in medijskega populizma

Nekatere ključne značilnosti sodobnega množičnega komuniciranja, kot so prilagajanje poenostavljenemu podajanju vsebin, afektivnemu, senzacionalističnemu in melodramatičnemu stilu, značilnemu za tabloidno novinarstvo (Blumler 2003: xvii), se lahko spretno prepletajo s poenostavljeno manihejsko logiko populistične artikulacije razkola med neetičnimi elitami in krepostnim ljudstvom (Mazzoleni 2008). Pogosto lahko zasledimo predpostavke o »zavezništvu« nekaterih medijev in določenih populističnih akterjev, ki naj bi temeljilo na njihovem spretnem prilagajanju delovanju medijev ter interesu medijev za poenostavljene razlage in vznemirljive naslove. Pri preučevanju populizma je torej ravno medije smiselno postaviti v ospredje analize (Moffitt 2016: 70–94), saj so ključni za razumevanje procesov generiranja kot razširjanja populističnega komuniciranja, ki poteka na presečišču medijskega in političnega polja. Četudi večina medijev v splošnem ni eksplicitno naklonjena populističnim strankam ali politikom, imajo ravno mediji lahko vplivno mobilizacijsko vlogo v populistični retoriki: prispevajo k vidnosti populističnih akterjev in porastu populističnih stališč v javnosti, kar je še posebej izrazito v primerih, ko ima populistična stranka medijsko spretnega in/ali karizmatičnega vodjo[1] (Mudde 2007: 251).

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1. To sicer ne pomeni, da so le akterji s populistično retoriko vešči medijskih konvencij, poleg tega ne predpostavlja, da je karizmatičnost vodje edini dejavnik, ki prispeva k vidnosti ali večji prisotnosti populističnih perspektiv v javnosti. Pomembni dejavniki vključujejo na primer tudi poenostavljeno argumentiranje, neposrednost komunikacije ter zanimanje medijev za spektakel in afektivne zgodbe, kar kaže na to, da lahko določeni mediji delujejo kot vplivni mobilizacijski agensi populističnega komuniciranja (Mazzoleni 2008: 49–53).

Namen pričujočega članka je tako zapolniti vrzel na dveh pomembnih področjih preučevanja populizma: prvič, v polje preučevanja populizma prinesti vizualno analizo manifestacij populizma, saj so – za razliko od verbalnih manifestacij populizma, ki so predmet številnih raziskav (gl. npr. De Vreese in dr. 2018; Ernst in dr. 2019b; Jagers in Walgrave 2007; Pajnik in dr. 2016a; Pajnik in dr. 2016b; Wirz in dr. 2018) in predstavljajo dobro raziskano področje – vizualne manifestacije populizma po večini spregledan vidik znotraj študij populizma. Drugič, ker študije populizma v Sloveniji segajo na področje političnega populizma (gl. npr. Fink Hafner 2016; Fink Hafner 2019; Frank in Šori 2015; Lovec 2019; Pajnik 2019; Pajnik in dr. 2016b; Rizman 1999; Rizman 2008; Šori 2015) in na področje medijskega populizma, kjer se avtorji in avtorice osredotočajo na analizo tiska in spleta (gl. npr. Pajnik in Ribać 2021; Pajnik 2019; Pušnik 2017), želimo polje preučevanja fenomena populizma razširiti tako, da predstavimo ilustrativno analizo populizma na televiziji.

Ključni cilj pričujočega članka je zato razčlemba populizma, pri čemer bo teoretska podstat usmerjena v definiranje populizma kot stila komuniciranja in medijskega populizma (Moffitt 2016; gl. tudi Aslanidis 2018: 1244; de Cleen 2019: 35–36). V prvem delu postavljamo v ospredje definicijo populističnega stila, nato podrobno definiramo tri ključne elemente populizma oziroma tri populistične antagonizme – čaščenje ljudstva, protielitizem in Drugost – ter v nadaljevanju opredelimo medijski populizem. V empiričnem delu prikažemo preplet populistične retorike in ekspresivnih vidikov populizma na preseku političnega in medijskega polja, zato se v ponazoritvi naših argumentov omejujemo na analizo žanra televizijskih novic, znotraj tega pa na ključni element epistemologije novinarstva (Ekström 2002: 270), podžanr političnega intervjuja. Poleg verbalnih izrazov, ki se reproducirajo na televiziji, tako orišemo tudi številne vizualne elemente (npr. neverbalno komunikacijo govorcev in govork, ozadje v studiu, kote kamere ipd.), ki spremljajo populistične pozicije akterjev.

2 Populizem kot stil komuniciranja

Populizem razumemo primarno kot diskurzivno formo, manihejsko artikulacijsko logiko (Laclau 2005), retorično konstruiranje »ustvarjene«, »izumljene« in »zamišljene« (Anderson 2006: 4) skupnosti ali skupine (Laclau 2005: 33, 44; Aslanidis 2016a: 97–98), pri čemer lahko vidimo transfiguracijo ljudstva v Ljudstvo (Aslanidis 2016b: 306). Populistično komuniciranje torej kaže določeno *logiko artikulacije* (Laclau 2005: 33) oziroma formulacije političnih zahtev (de Cleen 2019). Kljub temu da populizem primarno definiramo kot

artikulacijsko logiko antagonističnega konstruiranja ljudstva, populizma ne razumemo le skozi optiko verbalnega izrazja, ampak tudi kot *način posredovanja* populističnega komuniciranja (Moffitt 2016: 39–40). Poleg diskurzivnih oziroma retoričnih aspektov so zato v celoviti obravnavi populizma pomembni tudi številni vizualni in avdiovizualni elementi, ki poleg populistične govorice vključujejo podobe, samoprezentacijo, govorico telesa in neverbalno komunikacijo nasploh.

Pristopi, ki populizem razumejo kot stil komuniciranja, poudarjajo »načine (pro)izvajanja politike«:[2] niz ekspresivnih, estetskih, afektivnih in performativnih elementov, ki poleg antagonističnih retoričnih elaboracij tudi praktično demonstrirajo akterjevo poosebljanje, bližino ali podobnost z ljudstvom ter njegovo ali njeno »distanco do elit« (Moffitt 2016; Aslanidis 2018: 1244). Pri populističnem stilu akterjev gre za performativnost bližine ljudskim množicam, ki temelji na vpadljivosti, razumljivosti in neposrednem komuniciranju, pri tem pa za mobiliziranje širokega spektra ekspresivnih, emotivnih in estetskih elementov: govor akterja je (lahko) posredovan v emocionalnem tonu ali z moralističnimi prispodobami; govor, ki je lahko tudi barvit, je običajno neposreden, personaliziran, občasno celo agresiven, kompleksne teme artikulira in argumentira zdravorazumsko (Krämer 2014: 46–56).

Benjamin Moffitt (2016: 51–52) v opredelitvi populističnega stila poudarja osrednjo vlogo ključnih populističnih antagonizmov, kot sta čaščenje ljudstva in protielitizem (gl. tudi Mudde 2004; Mudde 2007; Taggart 2000). Toda v performativnih gestah populističnih govorcev je poleg dihotomne artikulacije zanj ključna tudi demonstracija bližine ljudstvu: demonstrativnost obsega rabo ljudske govorice (pokrajinska narečja, rabo kletvic, politično nekorektnega govora), pa tudi zdravorazumsko razumevanje fenomenov, ki nasprotujejo suhoparnim strokovnim, birokratskim ali tehnokratskim razlagam kompleksnosti (Moffit 2016: 53; de Cleen 2019: 35–36). Tretji element stila je radikalna simplifikacija političnih debat, ki skozi dramatizacijo ali instrumentalizacijo situacije poustvarja ali perpetuira percepcijo krize, zloma ali grožnje. Splošni občutek nezaupanja v zahtevne politične rešitve in ukrepe, dolgoročno implementacijo ali formalistično deliberacijo strokovnjakov in elit je nadomeščen z artikulacijo odločnega, hitrega ali učinkovitega delovanja, kot ga zahteva ljudstvo (Moffit 2016: 53; de Cleen 2019: 36).

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2. Termin »*the way of doing politics*«, ki elaborira dimenzijo praktičnega političnega udejstvovanja, na tem mestu v slovenski jezik prevajamo z mehaničnimi ali operativnimi izrazi (delati, izvajati ali proizvajati), ki sicer niso najbolj primerni za opis omenjenih družbenih in političnih praks, zato jih je treba uporabljati previdno.

Populizem kot stil komuniciranja torej med drugim gradi na antagonističnih relacijah med ljudstvom, elitami in Drugimi, zato želimo na tem mestu opredeliti ključne elemente populistične artikulacije, t. i. populistične antagonizme: čaščenje ljudstva, protielitizem in Drugost.

3 Populistični antagonizmi – antagonistično pozicioniranje ljudstva, elit in Drugih

V novejših študijah populizma vlada splošen konsenz, da sta čaščenje ljudstva in protielitizem ključni dimenziji populizma (gl. npr. Mudde 2004; Mudde 2007; Taggart 2000). *Čaščenje ljudstva* temelji na sklicevanju na veliko večino prebivalstva,[3] pri čemer je v ospredju poudarjanje etičnosti »navadnih« ljudi in portretiranje ljudstva kot legitimnega političnega odločevalca (Aslanidis 2018: 1255). Poleg tega lahko bazira na referiranju na ljudstvo kot na specifični *etnos* ali narod (Farris 2017) oz. na ljudstvo kot podskupino etnično definiranega naroda (De Cleen in Stavrakakis 2017). Za Taggarta (2000: 91–95) je ljudstvo bistvena komponenta populizma, pri čemer poudarja koncept osrčja (ang. »*heartland*«), tj. prostora, kjer prebiva krepostno in združeno prebivalstvo. Ljudstvo skozi populistično perspektivo predstavlja enotno skupino brez notranjih razlik in je pogosto označeno z naslednjimi termini: javnost, državljani, populacija, volivci, davkoplačevalci, prebivalci, potrošniki ipd. V ospredju je prikazovanje bližine do »navadnih« ljudi, saj poskušajo akterji, ki reproducirajo populistični diskurz, prikazati, da jim je mar za skrbi ljudstva, da želijo braniti njegove interese, da niso odtujeni od ljudstva in da vedo, kaj ljudje želijo (Jagers in Walgrave 2007: 322–323). Čaščenje ljudstva torej vključuje poudarjanje njegove kreposti (Mudde in Kaltwasser 2012) ter zajema osredinjenost na poštenosti, kompetentnosti in delavnosti ljudstva; povzdigovanje dosežkov in koristnosti ljudstva, ki nosi odgovornost za razvoj; percepcijo homogenosti ljudstva in prikazovanje bližine do ljudstva, saj se populisti ravno s populistično retoriko predstavljajo kot glasniki in predstavniki ljudstva. Poleg tega so prisotne zahteve po suverenosti ljudstva, izvrševanju njegove skupne volje in s tem opolnomočenju ljudstva (Ernst in dr. 2019a: 168). Skozi populistično perspektivo je torej ljudstvo percipirano kot etično superiorna skupina, ki je v dihotomnem razmerju z elitami in/ali Drugimi. Populizem torej bazira na ločevanju ljudstva od (ekonomskih, političnih, medijskih, intelektualnih) elit in/ali etničnih, verskih, spolnih manjšin (npr. tujcev).

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3. Populizem gradi na dojemanju stališč večine kot izraza preudarnosti, saj je v ospredju prepričanje, da se večina ne more motiti (Krämer 2014: 56).

Poleg čaščenja ljudstva je *protielitizem* osrednji element populizma, ki poudarja distanciran odnos med ljudstvom in elitami. Akterji s populistično retoriko trdijo, da so na strani ljudstva, in ne elit, ki v svojih slonokoščenih stolpih visoko nad »navadnimi« državljani zasledujejo samo svoje interese. Elite so v tovrstni diskurzivni konstrukciji lahko politične (npr. politične stranke, vlada, ministri_ce, predsedniki_ce, EU), medijske (npr. medijski magnati, novinarji_ke, uredniki_ce), državne (npr. sodišča, sodniki_ce), intelektualne (npr. univerze, profesorji_ce, pisatelji_ce), ekonomske (npr. korporacije) in druge (Bobba in dr. 2018: 465; Jagers in Walgrave 2007: 324). Protielitistična perspektiva po Aslanidisu (2018: 1255) zajema sklicevanje na ozko manjšino nosilcev oblasti, ki je vpletena v kršenje suverenosti ljudstva. V tem pogledu je slednje predstavljeno kot glavna žrtev nelegitimnih elit, ki zapostavljajo interese »navadnih« ljudi (De Cleen in Stavrakakis 2017). Protielitistična dimenzija torej gradi na obtoževanju elit in ločevanju teh od ljudstva, saj temelji na dojemanju elit kot zlonamernih in nekompetentnih akterjev, ki ne predstavljajo ljudstva (Ernst in dr. 2019a: 168). Protielitistična perspektiva kaže na izvorni problem politične nesposobnosti, sabotaže in nepripravljenosti za izvedbo potrebnih ukrepov (Jagers in Walgrave 2007: 324), kar negativno vpliva na položaj ljudstva. Protielitizem torej temelji na antagonistični relaciji med elitami in ljudstvom, zato sama kritika elit, brez specifičnega sklicevanja na ljudstvo, ne velja za populistično sporočilo.

Nekatere študije (npr. Bobba in dr. 2018; Jagers in Walgrave 2007; Zulianello in dr. 2018) prištevajo med populistične antagonizme tudi izključevanje Drugih, saj konceptualizacija ljudstva temelji na dihotomni ideji pripadanja in izključevanja, zato prvotnima dimenzijama dodajamo še omenjeni antagonizem. *Konceptualizacija »zunanjih skupin«*, t. i. *Drugih*, je zasnovana na ločevanju ljudstva od Drugih, ki lahko zajemajo etnične, verske ali spolne manjšine in so portretirani kot grožnja ljudstvu (Jagers in Walgrave 2007: 324; Reinemann 2017: 20–21). Farris (2017: 66–67) pravi, da so Drugi predvsem zato, ker niso pripadniki večinskega naroda; simbolizirajo kulturne, verske, zgodovinske, ekonomske in druge razlike ter posegajo v verigo ekvivalentnosti, ki konstruira ljudstvo kot en politično-nacionalni subjekt. V tem pogledu populistično komuniciranje vključuje percepcije, da so vrednote in vedenje omenjenih družbenih skupin v nasprotju s splošnimi interesi ljudstva. Tovrstne skupine so v tem primeru obravnavane kot breme družbi in obtožene za vse težave ljudstva (Jagers in Walgrave 2007: 324).

4 Medijski populizem

Mediji imajo številne vloge v reprodukciji populizma: lahko delujejo kot »oder« (Moffitt 2016: 77), kot ugodne politične priložnostne strukture (Mudde 2017: 255) ali kot akter, ki je soodgovoren za legitimacijo populizma v populistični »sokrivdi« (Mazzoleni 2008). Razumevanje strukturnega ogrodja, medijskih tehnik in formatov ter organizacije praks v profesionalizirani medijski krajini je zato ključno v konceptualizaciji medijev kot mizanscene, ki omogoča učinkovito reprodukcijo populističnih govorov in njegovih vizualnih elementov. Kot je moč razbrati iz študij medijskega populizma (Mazzoleni 2008; Krämer 2014; Esser in dr. 2017), je reprodukcijo medijskega populizma treba razumeti znotraj krogotoka (najmanj) treh interaktivnih dimenzij: *verbalno-vizualne*, *platformne* in *produkcijske*.

Benjamin Krämer (2014: 48–56) opredeljuje prvo dimenzijo, saj medijski populizem razume skozi prisotnost antagonističnih retoričnih prvin v vsebinah nekaterih medijev, kot sta oblikovanje in favoriziranje »naše skupine« (osrediščenost na ljudstvo) ali sovražnost do elit (protielitizem), pa tudi s prisotnostjo stilskih elementov, kot so zdravorazumsko argumentiranje, emocionalni, personalizirani in neposredni diskurz.[4] Platformno dimenzijo medijskega populizma so podrobno opredelili Esser in sodelavci (2017: 367–371), saj zanje medijski populizem zajema tri različne platforme znotraj medijske sfere, posledično pa tudi tri različne skupine akterjev, ki poustvarjajo populistična sporočila: populizem s strani medijev, populizem skozi medije in populistična sporočila uporabnikov na platformah medijskih organizacij.[5]

Kot so pokazali Esser in sodelavci (prav tam), perspektiva *populizma s strani medijev* temelji na dojemanju medijskih organizacij kot akterjev, ki sami, torej brez povzemanja zunanjih glasov (npr. politikov), generirajo populistično komuniciranje. Medijski populizem je po Wettsteinu in drugih (2018: 478–479) smiselno obravnavati kot rabo in razširjanje določenih prvin populističnega komuniciranja, kar je lahko posledica namernega ali nenamernega delovanja medijev. Dve temeljni načeli novinarskega poklica, ki sta tudi temelj novinarske samopercepcije (novinarji kot »psi čuvaji« ali četrta nadzorna veja oblasti) in neposredna vez z občinstvom ali zagovorništvo ljudstva, lahko reproducirata

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4. Oba vidika verbalno-vizualne dimenzije smo obdelali v prejšnjih poglavjih, zato se na tem mestu posvečamo produkcijski in platformni dimenziji medijskega populizma.
5. Tretjo relevantno dimenzijo za razumevanje medijskega populizma, ki jo predstavljajo populistična sporočila uporabnikov na platformah medijskih organizacij (Esser in dr. 2017: 370–371), na tem mestu izpuščamo. V članku obravnavamo le populizem s strani medijev in skozi medije, saj sta ti dve dimenziji predmet naše podrobnejše analize.

antagonizem novinarske profesije kot zagovornika ljudstva na eni in nadzornika elit na drugi strani (Esser in sodelavci 2017: 368).

Perspektiva *populizma skozi medije* pa izpostavlja medije kot platforme za populistično komuniciranje (De Vreese in dr. 2018), kadar mediji razširjajo populistična sporočila političnih strank in drugih političnih akterjev ter s tem prispevajo k večji vidnosti in legitimnosti populističnih stališč. Mediji lahko v tem pogledu predstavljajo ugodne priložnostne strukture[6] za javno izražanje stališč populističnih akterjev.[7] Wettstein in drugi (prav tam), ko razlagajo interakcije med medijskim in političnim populizmom, med drugim omenjajo dve glavni vlogi novinarjev: novinarji lahko delujejo kot vratarji (ang. *gatekeepers*) za populistične akterje in njihova sporočila, saj lahko omogočijo ali onemogočijo pokrivanje v njihovem mediju; lahko pa so v vlogi (bodisi naklonjenih bodisi kritičnih) interpretov populističnih akterjev in njihovega komuniciranja.

Medijski populizem tako lahko zajema razširjanje sporočil populističnih akterjev, predstavljanje populističnih perspektiv kot legitimnih, spodbujanje protielitističnih, ljudskocentričnih idej ali izključevanja Drugih. To ne pomeni, da mediji ne morejo biti kritični do populističnih strank (Krämer 2014: 43). Mediji namreč lahko zavzamejo kritičen odnos do populističnih akterjev, se izogibajo poročanju o slednjih ali izpodbijajo populistične perspektive. De Jonge (2019: 193) na primer v svoji analizi relacij med mediji in populistično skrajno desnico poleg naklonjenosti medijskih delavcev do slednje predstavi še dva pristopa medijskih delavcev do slednje: razmejitev ali jasno demarkacijo, ki vključuje obravnavo populistične skrajne desnice kot izobčenca ali izogibanje poročanju o njenih akterjih (kar je mogoče v primeru njihove manjše politične pomembnosti; mediji strategije izogibanja ne morejo uporabljati, če postanejo te stranke opozicijske stranke ali del koalicije) ter konfrontacijo, ki zajema neposredno kritično relacijo prek demonizacije ali stigmatizacije.

»Medijsko sokrivdo« v reprodukciji populizma je treba razumeti tudi v *produkcijskem* smislu, znotraj niza logik (rutiniziranih formatov, žanrov, pristopov

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6. Ugodne politične priložnostne strukture delujejo spodbudno na politične stranke nasploh, kar pomeni, da samo s konceptom političnih priložnostnih struktur ni mogoče razložiti njihovih koristi le za populistične stranke (Mudde 2007: 255). Torej čeprav je v našem primeru koncept ugodnih priložnostnih struktur relevanten, predstavljajo televizija in drugi mediji ugodne priložnostne strukture tudi politikom in političarkam, ki ne aplicirajo populističnega komuniciranja, saj medijske pozornosti ne dobivajo samo populisti, zato ni mogoče samo s tem konceptom razložiti koristi le za populistične stranke.

7. Na primer tabloid Kronen Zeitung v Avstriji, ki podpira perspektive populistične skrajno desne stranke FPÖ (Mudde 2007: 250).

in praks v medijskem polju), ki pogojujejo televizijsko[8] in novinarsko produkcijo (de Vreese in dr. 2018; Krämer 2014: 46; Moffitt 2016: 82). Produkcijski vidik medijskega populizma kaže, da je pojavnost medijskega populizma odvisna od produkcijske logike selekcije in urejanja kaotične »realnosti« v medijskem polju (z nizom oblikovnih formatov, pristopov in žanrov v medijski praksi), ki pomembno pogojujeta reprodukcijo populistične politične komunikacije (Mazzoleni 2008). Gianpietro Mazzoleni (2008: 54–55) je pokazal, da na reprodukcijo populizma v medijih vplivajo specifična načela televizijske produkcijske logike, kot so spektakularizacija, personalizacija in dramatizacija političnih fenomenov, medtem ko primarnost vizualizacije in (re)prezentacije zgodb, simplifikacija in emocionalizacija sporočil, pa tudi takojšnjost in minljivost posredovanih vsebin (Bourdieu 2001; Ekström 2002) pogojujejo stilske populistične elemente (Moffitt 2016: 82).[9]

Populistični govor iz novinarskega in političnega polja se oblikuje in/ali uspešno reproducira tudi skozi praktično implementacijo profesionalnih novinarskih norm in praks, v obliki standardiziranih novinarskih rutin in vizualnih prijemov, ki novinarjem pomagajo organizirati in rutinizirati produkcijski proces v polju (Ekström 2002; Fiske 2004; Jontes in Luthar 2015; Luthar 2017). Profesionalni novinarski normi, kot sta aktualnost dogodkov/novic in epizodičnost upovedovanja resničnosti, vplivata na kontinuirano prisotnost populističnih voditeljev v središču političnih debat, posebej kadar so ti senzacionalistični ali kontroverzni (Mazzoleni 2008: 56). Standardiziran novičarski ritual, kot je personalizacija političnih in strukturnih problemov, karizmatičnim voditeljem s populistično retoriko omogoča popularizacijo specifičnih tematik (Moffitt 2016: 82). Upovedovanje novičarskih dogodkov kot škandalov pa predstavlja idealen oder za nastop populistov in verifikacijo njihovih stališč, ki s pomočjo medijskih psevdodogodkov (tiskovne konference, teatralni dogodki, fotopriložnosti) perpetuirajo »permanentno volilno kampanjo« (Mazzoleni 2008: 56).

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8. To ne pomeni, da je televizija v splošnem populistični medij, omeniti velja še žanrske diferenciacije, pri katerih je populistično komuniciranje lahko prisotno v večji meri ali večji intenzivnosti samih populističnih sporočil (npr. tabloidna televizija).

9. Televizija je še posebej v devetdesetih letih prejšnjega in na začetku novega stoletja predstavljala enega pomembnih medijev, ki je pripomogel k vzponu številnih populistov (in drugih politikov), kot so na primer Berlusconi v Italiji, Perot v ZDA ter Collor in Fujimori v Južni Ameriki (Moffitt 2016: 86–87).

5 Metodološki oris in vzorec

Ker smo z analizo želeli prikazati manifestacije medijskega in političnega populizma, pri čemer smo bili pozorni na združevanje verbalnih in vizualnih vidikov, ter preveriti tezo, da populistično komuniciranje ni omejeno le na politično polje, ampak se manifestira tudi v medijskem polju, smo si pred izvedbo empirične analize in na podlagi zgoraj elaboriranega teoretskega okvira zastavili naslednji raziskovalni vprašanji: Kako se v političnih intervjujih analiziranih televizijskih oddaj reproducirata politični in medijski populizem? Ali in v kateri obliki novinarske prakse in strategije lahko ponujajo platformo populističnemu komuniciranju?

Empirična analiza obsega izbrane novičarske intervjuje[10] o temi migracij v dveh večernih informativnih televizijskih oddajah,[11] oddaji Odmevi, predvajani na javni Radioteleviziji Slovenija, in oddaji 24UR ZVEČER, predvajani na zasebni televizijski postaji POP TV. Tematsko smo se pri končnem izboru vzorca analiziranih oddaj omejili le na oddaje in intervjuje, ki obravnavajo teme migracij, begunstva, azila in integracije v času »evropske begunske krize«. Med avgustom 2015 in marcem 2016 je zaradi vojaških konfliktov, represivnih vlad ali ekonomske negotovosti v azijskih in afriških državah več kot pol milijona ljudi migriralo v Evropo. Dogovor med Turčijo in EU marca 2016 je prinesel zapiranje meja na t. i. balkanski poti, ki je potekala v smeri od Turčije, Grčije, Makedonije, Srbije, Hrvaške, Slovenije do Avstrije, Nemčije in drugih držav v osrednji in Severni Evropi (REACH 2016; HRW 2015).

Izbor končnega vzorca oddaj smo zamejili na obdobje med marcem 2015 in decembrom 2017, ko so v Sloveniji potekale razprave in sprejem zakonov v

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10. Politični intervju je novičarski podžanr, značilen za večerne informativne oddaje (gl. Luthar 2017), in ima posebno funkcijo v narativni in dramaturški strukturi televizijskih novic, saj temelji na interpretativni obravnavi dnevnih dogodkov (Ekström 2002: 265; Montgomery 2010). V normativnem smislu generira poglobljeno tematizacijo problemov, s katerimi bi morala biti državljan in državljanka seznanjena in bi jih morala razumeti (intervjuji s strokovnjaki), omogoča pa tudi kontinuirano preizpraševanje in pritisk na politično polje (intervjuji s politiki), ki je v skladu z nadzorno vlogo novinarstva kot »psa čuvaja« (Clayman 2002; Montgomery 2010: 110–111).

11. Mancini (2008: 116) pravi, da določenim populistom televizija predstavlja poglavitno orodje za množično komuniciranje, saj v primerjavi z drugimi mediji še vedno dosega največje število ljudi in pogosto določa agendo drugim medijem. V Sloveniji je televizija (kljub generacijskim razlikam v potrošnji medijskih vsebin) še vedno medij z največjim dosegom občinstva (gl. Jontes 2017: 675–683; Jontes 2019: 129).

Državnem zboru RS (DZ), [12] ki neposredno zadevajo ali vplivajo na pravice, položaj in/ali obravnavo migrantov_k in beguncev_k v državi. Vsi omenjeni zakoni so bili predlagani, ko se je povečal obseg migracij na balkanski poti, tj. od jeseni 2015 dalje, zato smo jih določili kot mejnike, okrog katerih so se zgoščale javne razprave o migracijah. Slovenija je bila v tem času predvsem tranzitna država z nižjim številom prošenj za mednarodno zaščito. Država, nevladne organizacije in prostovoljci so sodelovali zlasti pri organizaciji transporta, začasnih nastanitev, prehrane in zdravstvene oskrbe beguncev (gl. Bajt in Kogovšek Šalamon 2016).

V obravnavanem triletnem obdobju (2015–2017) je na temo migracij v studiih obeh analiziranih oddaj (n = 37) gostovalo 60 ljudi. [13] Obseg vzorca analize smo v skladu s teoretskim uvodom in raziskovalnima vprašanjema zamejili na intervjuje s politiki_čarkami in neizvoljenimi političnimi funkcionarji_kami (to so predstavniki_ce strank in vlade, poslanci_ke, funkcionarji_ke, ki so zaposleni_e na ministrstvih).

Interpretativna ilustracija populističnih interakcij med novinarji in politiki, ki sledi v nadaljevanju, temelji na podatkih, pridobljenih z vizualno interakcijsko analizo, interpretativne videoanalize družbene interakcije (Knoblauch in Tuma 2011: 427), ki nadgrajuje konverzacijsko analizo političnih novičarskih intervjujev (gl. Clayman 2002; Hutchby 2011) ter omogoča podrobno obravnavo vizualnih in verbalnih elementov komuniciranja. Metoda predvideva najprej selekcijo gradiva, čemur sledi kodiranje z vpisom podatkov, ki skupaj tvorijo podatkovni korpus. Postopek se nadaljuje z internim vzorčenjem podatkov: priprava pregleda zbranih podatkov, določanje relevantnih sekvenc na podlagi raziskovalnih vprašanj in primerjava različnih sekvenc. Sledi podrobna analiza s podrobno interpretacijo izbranih sekvenc. Interpretativna videoanaliza temelji na zaporednosti kot osrednjem elementu podrobne analize posnete interakcije. Kot omenjeno, zbiranju videogradiva sledi selekcija smiselnih enot – relevantnih

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12. V analiziranem obdobju je bilo v DZ v razpravo predlaganih in končno tudi sprejetih sedem tovrstnih zakonov. Koalicijske stranke v mandatnem obdobju 12. vlade Republike Slovenije (2014–2018), v katerem se je odločalo o zakonih, predstavljajo Stranka Mira Cerarja (kasneje Stranka modernega centra – SMC), Demokratična stranka upokojencev Slovenije (DeSUS) in Socialni demokrati (SD). Predstavnici politične institucionalne desnice sta v tem mandatnem obdobju opozicijski stranki Slovenska demokratska stranka (SDS) in Nova Slovenija – Krščanski demokrati (NSi). V DZ so bili leta 2014 izvoljeni še predstavniki in predstavnice Zavezništva (kasneje Stranke) Alenke Bratušek in Levice, ki predstavljajo levo-liberalno opozicijo.

13. 40 je predstavnikov in uradnikov političnega polja, 20 gostov pa prihaja iz strokovno-operativnih polj, tj. varnostnih strokovnjakov (7), humanitarnih delavcev (3), operativnih uslužbencev (3), akademikov (5) in medijskih delavcev (2).

sekvenc za analizo (Knoblauch in Tuma 2011: 414–416). Ker so nas zanimale vizualne komponente populistične artikulacije, smo v prvem koraku izbrane sekvence vzorčili usmerjeno, tj. v transkribiranih zapisih izbranih novičarsko-političnih intervjujev (n = 16) smo identificirali zgolj tiste sekvence, ki so vsebovale enega ali več populističnih antagonizmov (n = 45). V tem primeru predstavljajo primarni predmet raziskovanja sekvence, tj. specifični zaključeni deli interakcije, ki se razlikujejo od predhodnih in nadaljnjih delov. Slednje si je za preverbo strukture, verbalnih in vizualnih karakteristik treba ogledati večkrat (Knoblauch in Tuma 2011: 414–423).

V televizijskih intervjujih je ključna diskurzivna izmenjava med govorcema ali govorci, ki jo lahko označimo tudi kot »verigo sekvenc vprašanj in odgovorov«. Enota analize je zato tematsko koherentna sekvenca: vprašanje novinarja_ke v televizijskem studiu, ki mu sledi, odgovor politika_čarke (Clayman in Heritage 2002: 21–22; Hutchby 2006: 24). Končni vzorec analiziranih sekvenc, ki predstavljajo enote analize in vsebujejo populistične antagonizme ter so bile primerne za poglobljeno vizualno analizo (n = 20), smo selekcionirali tako, da smo v majhnem končnem vzorcu sekvenc, kot kaže tabela 1, dobili nabor populističnih antagonizmov (n = 32), ki jih je izrekel širok in raznolik diapazon govorcev: novinarjev_k, predstavnikov_c političnih strank, predstavnikov_c ministrstev.

**Tabela 1: Distribucija populističnih antagonizmov
v končnem vzorcu analiziranih sekvenc (n = 20).**

Akterji	Populistični antagonizmi			
Politična stranka	Protielitizem	Čaščenje ljudstva	Drugost	Populistični antagonizmi (n)
SMC	/	**2**	**6**	**8**
DeSUS	/	**2**	**2**	**4**
NSi	/	**2**	**2**	**4**
SDS	**3**	/	**3**	**6**
Neizvoljeni uradniki	/	**1**	**1**	**2**
Populistični antagonizmi (n)	**3**	**7**	**14**	**24**
Novinarji/ke				
Uroš Slak (POP TV)	/	/	**2**	**2**
Slavko Bobovnik (RTVSLO)	/	/	**3**	**3**
Rosvita Pesek (RTVSLO)	/	/	/	/
Tanja Gobec (RTVSLO)	**1**	**2**	/	**3**
Populistični antagonizmi (n)	**1**	**2**	**5**	**8**

Metoda vizualne interakcijske analize, kot je bila uporabljena v empirični analizi izbranih televizijskih oddaj, napreduje postopoma, v dveh korakih ali fazah: razčlembi verbalne vsebine posnetka v prvi fazi sledi poglobljena vizualna analiza v drugi fazi analize (Knoblauch in Tuma 2011: 414–419). Drugi korak analize gradi na natančnem hermenevtičnem (p)opisu verbalnih in vizualnih značilnosti majhnega vzorca izbranih sekvenc (n = 20). Interpretacijo verbalnih in vizualnih pomenov je simultano izvedla skupina dveh raziskovalcev.

6 Populizem v televizijskem političnem intervjuju

V nadaljevanju podajamo nekaj ilustrativnih primerov, kako se v političnih intervjujih analiziranih televizijskih oddaj reproducirata politični in medijski populizem. Ker želimo ilustrirati primere populizma kot stila komuniciranja, bomo prikaz populističnih izjav prepletli tudi z vizualnimi elementi novičarske naracije: vizualizacijo nacionalističnega populizma in simplifikacijo sporočil. Najprej prikažemo elemente *populizma skozi medije*, pri čemer kombiniramo tri osrednje populistične antagonizme, ki so jih v analiziranih oddajah izrekli predstavniki političnih strank, s prikazom ikonografskih in scenografskih elementov. Nazadnje se posvetimo še reprodukciji *populizma s strani medijev*, predvsem verbalni reprodukciji populističnih antagonizmov, ki vzpostavljajo novinarstvo kot akterje, ki govorijo v imenu ljudstva, in ki novinarje vzpostavljajo kot ljudske tribune. Ob tem gre dodati, da je zbrane televizijske intervjuje in s tem izseke izjav treba misliti skozi predstavljeni kontekst »evropske begunske krize« ter prepoznati njihovo umeščenost v omenjeni prostor, čas in okoliščine dogajanja.

Analiza selekcije studijskih gostov v izbranih oddajah kaže, da je bilo vladnim parlamentarnim strankam in strankam desne opozicije v studijskih intervjujih odmerjeno bistveno več prostora: v triletnem obdobju (2015–2017) je na temo migracij v studiih obeh analiziranih oddaj (n = 37) gostovalo 60 ljudi. Med predstavniki političnega polja (n = 37) se je v studiih zvrstilo 19 predstavnikov treh vladnih strank, štirje uradniki notranjega ministrstva in 11 predstavnikov konzervativne desne opozicije. Prostor v studiih v tem obdobju dobijo zgolj trije glasovi levo-liberalne opozicije,[14] toda ne med samo »migrantsko krizo« leta

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14. Zaradi redkega pojavljanja predstavnikov levo-liberalne opozicije v analiziranih oddajah se primeri levega populizma pojavljajo sporadično, zato smo se v članku osredotočili na analizo najbolj prevladujočih diskurzov.

2015, kot je to značilno za desno opozicijo, temveč šele februarja 2016 in v letu 2017.[15]

Populistično artikulacijo ločevanja ljudstva od zunanjih ogrožajočih Drugih, ki se reproducira *skozi medije,* lahko ponazorimo z izjavami predstavnikov koalicijskih strank, ki reproducirajo argumentacijo, značilno za diskurz skrajno desnega populizma, ki kombinira elemente nativizma, avtoritarizma (red) in populističnega antagonizma Drugosti.[16] Ministrica za notranje zadeve Vesna Györkös Žnidar (SMC) migracije beguncev takole povezuje z nevarnostjo (redu) in grožnjo (varnosti državi):

> /S/prejeli bomo ukrepe za nadzor migracijskega toka. Jaz kot ministrica za notranje zadeve bom glede na varnostna in druga tveganja pravočasno vladi podala predlog za vse ukrepe, ki so nujni in primerni za to, da se ohrani nivo varnosti v državi, da se zagotovi spoštovanje javnega reda in miru in pa seveda, da se zagotovi tudi nemoteno delovanje države (Odmevi 2015a).

Argumentaciji ohranitve reda se v njenih drugih nastopih pridružuje tudi poudarjanje zaščite ljudstva (dimenzija osrediščenosti na ljudstvo): »Kar se tega tiče, pa lahko povem tudi to, da ne glede na to pa imamo *pravico zaščititi tako naše ozemlje in naše državljane* in dejansko tudi *zagotavljati kontroliran, nadzorovan prehod čez državno mejo*« (Odmevi 2015d). Takratni zunanji minister Karl Erjavec (DeSUS) je tako kot desna opozicija v zahtevah po varnosti in obrambi državne meje pred nevarnim Drugim v ospredje postavil slovensko ljudstvo: »/M/i smo odgovorni za schengen. Mi smo odgovorni tudi za *varnost naših državljanov,* tudi za *varnost migrantov* in pač mi smatramo, da te *tehnične ovire* prispevajo k temu, da lahko *bolje obvladamo nadzor naše schengenske meje*« (Odmevi 2015f). V ozadju govora (gl. slika 1) je mogoče opaziti grafiko posnetka, ki vizualno ponazarja vsebino populističnega govora ministra in prikazuje postavljanje rezilne žice na slovensko-hrvaški meji.

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15. V zadnjih treh mesecih leta 2015, na vrhuncu »begunske krize«, opozicionalni glasovi na splošno izginejo iz političnih intervjujev analiziranih oddaj, poleg vlade (11) in desne opozicije (4) množične migracije kot grožnjo uokvirjajo še »strokovnjaki« za varnost in obramboslovje (7) ter operativne službe na področju civilne zaščite in kriminalitete (3) ali humanitarnih organizacij (2).

16. Mudde (2007: 23) pravi, da skrajno desni populizem združuje elemente nativizma, avtoritarizma (red) in populizma. Avtoritarizem temelji na prepričanju o strogo urejeni družbi, v kateri so kršitve avtoritete strogo kaznovane.

Slika 1: Grafika postavljanja rezilne žice kot ozadje med intervjujem v oddaji Odmevi.

Vir: zajem zaslona.

Protielitistični in na slovensko ljudstvo osrediščen diskurz ponazarjajo naslednje izjave predstavnikov desnih opozicijskih strank, ki artikulirajo svoje nasprotovanje vladi. Predvsem izjavi Vinka Gorenaka, poslanca SDS, kažeta protielitistično perspektivo, ki temelji na antagonistični relaciji med elitami (v tem primeru vlado in predstavniki EU) in ljudstvom. Pri tem je treba izpostaviti, da opozicijska kritika elit – brez specifičnega sklicevanja na ljudstvo kot žrtev elit – ni populistično artikulirana kritika. Gorenak pravi: »Država Republika Slovenija mora ravnati samozaščitno, enako kot ravnajo vse druge države. Ta *vlada ni pripravljena zaščititi državljanov Republike Slovenije*, ta vlada očitno ni pripravljena postaviti kvot« (Odmevi 2016b). Ali na nekem drugem mestu: »Glejte, *gospod Tusk*, kar je bilo prvo vprašanje, on ima tam nekje *25.000, 26.000 EUR plače* in *njegovo delovno mesto je v Bruslju*, naj pa gre raje v Berlin in pa v Bruselj, *ne pa da hodi v Slovenijo učit Slovence*, ki sam nima rešitve« (24UR ZVEČER 2016a). Matej Tonin (NSi) svojo zahtevo po postavljanju ograje na meji z Republiko Hrvaško preplete z ljudskocentrično dimenzijo (poudarjanje skrbi do državljanov), ob tem pa zahtevo paradoksalno predstavi tudi kot skrb za migrante: »Če želimo biti *odgovorni do državljanov in tudi do migrantov*, potem je [*ograja*] *edina opcija /.../.*« V istem odgovoru doda še šovinizem, vezan na socialno državo (Mudde in Kaltwasser 2012: 160), značilen za populistično skrajno desne programe, ki temelji na upravičenosti le »lastnega ljudstva« do pravic socialne države in onemogočenem dostopu tujcev do večine socialnih transferjev:

/K/er če pogledate situacijo [migrantov], če se vživite v njihovo življenje in ugotovite, da morajo za 100 evrov na mesec trdo delati, v Nemčiji se jim pa slika slika, da dobijo 300 evrov neke socialne podpore brez dela, potem je jasno, da so pripravljeni vse tvegati in zaradi tega je lahko ograja pomembno sporočilo navzdol po poti, da bo marsikdo prej premislil, ali se bo na to pot podal (24UR ZVEČER 2015a).

Ob tem je v frontalnem kadru na levi strani suknjičev politikov jasno vidna pripeta slovenska zastava kot »opomnik nacionalnega« (Billig 1995), ki kaže na zastopanje ljudstva kot slovenske nacionalne skupnosti (gl. sliko 2).

Slika 2: Značke v obliki slovenske zastave na oblekah predstavnikov desne parlamentarne opozicije.

Vir: zajem zaslona.

Naslednji primer populistične artikulacije ljudstva kot evropske entitete z »evrop-skimi vrednotami« prikazuje, kako sta populizem *skozi medije* in populizem s *strani medijev* v določenih primerih nerazdružljivo povezana. Ko voditelj oddaje 24UR ZVEČER Uroš Slak pravi, da so »vsi obrambni ministri v Bruslju potrdili pomoč Franciji v boju proti terorizmu, kar je za zaščito temeljnih evropskih vrednot pravil-no« (24UR ZVEČER 2015b), grafika v ozadju, ko na njegovo iztočnico odgovarja politik, prikazuje sliko voditeljev EU, posneto ob podpisu Lizbonske pogodbe leta 2007. Ko Žan Mahnič (SDS), ki v asertivnem tonu zahteva zaprtje meje in trdi,

da je treba »nemudoma popolnoma *zapreti mejo za vse ilegalne migrante, med katerimi so tudi dokazano potencialni teroristi*« (24UR ZVEČER 2015b), s čimer vzbuja percepcijo ogroženosti in strahu, so na grafičnem zaslonu v ozadju prikazani vojaki (gl. sliko 3). Analiza populizma na verbalni ravni kaže, da politik poudari časovni imperativ ponujene rešitve, »nemudoma«, s čimer aludira na urgentno stanje, ki ga je treba takoj sanirati; vizualna komponenta pa potrjuje verbalno argumentacijo, ki migracije dojema kot akutno varnostno grožnjo (antagonizem Drugost), pri kateri bi bila potrebna vojaška pomoč. Populistični govor novinarja ali politika se lahko zdi povsem denotativen (»objektiven«), a integracija v kontekst televizijskega studia in izbor slik, premišljeno vstavljenih v scenografijo oddaje, ki sledita televizijski logiki vizualizacije, simplifikacije in reprezentacije sporočil, konotativno konstruirata specifične pomene in usmerjata gledalčevo interpretacijo, medtem ko naj bi ponazarjala avtentičnost izrečenega.

Slika 3: Sprememba vizualnega ozadja v oddaji 24UR ZVEČER.

Vir: zajem zaslona.

Skozi novinarsko naracijo se lahko reproducira tudi *populizem s strani me*dijev – torej populizem, s katerim novinarji sami, brez povzemanja na primer političnih akterjev, generirajo populistično komuniciranje. Populizem s strani medijev se lahko kaže skozi mobilizacijo retoričnega mehanizma, t. i. premika osnove (ang. *shift of footing*), ene od konvencionalnih novinarskih strategij, ki v novinarskem intervjuju s politiki voditelja ali voditeljico televizijske oddaje postavlja v vlogo »ljudskega tribuna«[17] (Clayman 2002). Retorična zamišljanja občinstva so v analiziranih oddajah ritualizirana – odrezani in ostri stavki (večkrat so vprašanja postavljena zgolj z eno samo besedo), značilni predvsem za retoriko voditeljev komercialne televizije, naj bi postavljali javne osebe pred odgovornost, toda v resnici tematizirajo malo vsebinsko substancialnega. Interakcijska narava intervjuja novinarjem, predvsem voditeljem informativnih televizijskih oddaj, omogoča večjo personalizacijo in interpretativnost pristopa k posredovanju dogodkov dneva, medtem ko ima retorična evokacija »ljudstva« ali »javnosti« vsaj trojno vlogo: odsotnost avtorstva izjave potrjuje novinarjev nevtralizem, novinar v temo pogovora uvaja nestrinjanje, s *čimer* lahko temi podeli pridih kontroverznosti, lahko pa zadevi, o kateri je govor, podeli pridih vsesplošne konsenzualnosti in univerzalne sprejetosti (Luthar 2017: 159).

Slednje lahko gre vzporedno s populistično naracijo, ki percipira stališča določene skupine kot splošno uveljavljene in si prizadeva za upoštevanje splošne volje ljudstva. Vprašanje voditelja komercialne televizije Uroša Slaka ilustrira retorični mehanizem, ki uokvirja občinstvo kot nacionalno zamišljeno skupnost, v interesu katerega nastopa voditelj, problematiko mednarodnih migracij pa lokalizira kot pritisk na nacionalno mejo: »Kaj bo pomenilo zaprtje balkanske poti za migrante? Bo *Slovenija manj izpostavljena njihovemu pritisku*« (24UR ZVEČER 2016b)?[18] Vloga novinarke (v tem primeru Tanje Gobec v Odmevih) kot ljudskega tribuna, ki deluje v dobro ljudstva, se kaže tudi v eni od oddaj Odmevov, v kateri v ospredje postavlja interese lokalnega prebivalstva in vzpostavlja pritisk na vladnega

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17. Erving Goffman v svojem seminalnem delu *Predstavljanje sebe v vsakdanjem življenju* (1959) strategiji pravi tudi »distanca vlog«, znotraj medijskih študij pa termin označuje strategijo novinarjev, ki so v praktičnem delu razpeti med željo, da v intervjuvanje (tj. postavljanje vprašanj oziroma trditev v imenu »ljudstva« ali »javnosti«) vnesejo lastna mnenja in stališča, obenem pa ohranijo videz nevtralistične drže, ki reproducira njihov status kredibilne novičarske avtoritete (Clayman 2002; Hutchby 2011; Luthar 2017).

18. Dramatizacijski učinek stopnjuje tudi izražanje emocij na vizualni ravni analize izbranih televizijskih sekvenc. Medtem ko jeza ni prisotna v verbalnem izrazju novinarjev, je ta vidna v njihovih gestah. Jeza je v dvajsetih analiziranih interakcijah verbalno izražena zgolj enkrat, medtem ko se vizualna gestikulacija jeze, analizirana brez zvoka, pojavi kar sedemkrat in tako predstavlja kar tretjino vizualno izraženih emocij.

predstavnika: »*Lokalno prebivalstvo,* slišali ste prispevke iz različnih koncev, *na robu moči so. Ali jih bo država poslušala? V financah, pomoči, kakšni*« (Odmevi 2015b)? Ti primeri kažejo, kot pravi Clayman (2002: 210), kako lahko »premik osnove« novinarja ali novinarko postavlja v vlogo zagovornika ljudstva. Ob tem gre opozoriti, da naracije novinarjev, ki temeljijo na prizadevanju za javno dobro, ne gre neposredno prevajati v populistično retoriko, ampak je slednje mogoče le v primeru, ko se naracija naslanja na antagonistično pozicioniranje ljudstva, elit in/ali Drugih.

7 Sklep

Med osrednje cilje članka smo umestili analizo populizma kot verbalno-vizualne artikulacije antagonizma med ljudstvom ter elitami in Drugimi, pri čemer smo se oprli na definicijo populizma kot stila komuniciranja. Specifike populističnega komuniciranja politikov in novinarjev smo preverjali v sklopu novičarskih intervjujev o migracijah v televizijskih oddajah Odmevi in 24UR ZVEČER. Ob tem gre dodati, da v pričujoči analizi ne zasledujemo pristopa opredeljevanja omenjenih politikov, novinarjev in medijev nasploh za populiste, ampak je fokus na razčlembi ključnih komponent populističnega komuniciranja, tj. populističnih antagonizmov, ki se pojavljajo tako v političnem kot medijskem komuniciranju. Medijski populizem torej ni skupna značilnost vseh novičarskih medijev (Krämer 2014: 43), toda tudi v medijski naraciji lahko zasledimo populistične antagonizme. V članku smo prikazali logiko retorike, ki se opira na antagonizme med ljudstvom ter elitami in Drugimi, ki med drugim sodijo med elementarne značilnosti populizma kot stila komuniciranja. Obenem smo se posvetili retoričnim strategijam, ki v ospredje postavljajo grožnjo in krizo (Moffitt 2016), saj pomembno zaznamujejo slog populistične naracije.

V ilustrativnem delu članka smo pokazali, kako lahko v diskusijah o migracijah – predvsem zaradi izbire gostov in diskurzivne umestitve govorcev – diskurz, ki temelji predvsem na vzbujanju in krepitvi strahu pred Drugim, zasede vidno mesto. Populistični govor vladnih predstavnikov in opozicijske desnice je v času množičnega prihoda beguncev v Slovenijo konstruiral begunce kot homogeno skupino, ki predstavlja le grožnjo redu in varnosti Slovenije, ter ob tem poudarjal zaščito slovenskega ljudstva kot enovite skupine. Ob tem je parlamentarna desnica v populističnih izjavah izražala tudi protielitistična stališča, usmerjena proti vladi in predstavnikom institucij EU, ki po njihovem niso uspeli ustrezno zavarovati slovenskega ljudstva. Pokazali smo, da je poenostavljeno in udarno populistično komuniciranje političnih predstavnikov prilagojeno televizijski logiki, pri čemer so politične reprezentacije ljudstva kot homogene nacionalne skupnosti

prilagojene načelu vizualizacije na televiziji; konotativni grafični prikazi, ki jih medijske hiše selektivno umeščajo v politične intervjuje, pa so eden izmed konstitutivnih elementov prostora reprodukcije populizma.

Primeri populizma skozi medije tako kažejo vlogo medijev pri razširjanju populističnih sporočil političnih akterjev in s tem vpliv na povečanje vidnosti populističnih stališč. Ta je vsaj dvojna, saj mediji, predvsem pa novinarji, poleg posredovanja lahko delujejo tudi kot generatorji populističnega komuniciranja (t. i. populizem s strani medijev) (Esser in drugi 2017). Z analizo mehanizma »premika osnove« je moč prikazati, kako novinarji in novinarke na televiziji nihajo med nevtralistično profesionalno kredibilnostjo in vlogo nadzornih »psov čuvajev«, ki nadzorujejo oblast ter delujejo za in v imenu ljudstva. Znotraj časovnih, profesionalnih in žanrskih omejitev, ki jih narekuje televizijsko novinarstvo, v interpelaciji občinstev novinarji in novinarke personalizirajo svoj diskurz z evociranjem »navadnega človeka«, javnosti ali ljudstva. Niz profesionalnih konvencij in vzpostavljenih ritualov (selekcija gostov, elitni viri, vizualizacija govora) pa potrjuje, zakaj so televizijske novice s svojo narativno strukturo, predvsem pa žanr političnega intervjuja znotraj televizijskih novic, zelo ugodno okolje za diseminacijo populističnega diskurza (Esser in dr. 2017: 166).

SUMMARY

The article addresses the gap between the burgeoning field of political populism research and the less researched subfield of media populism, providing the necessary focus on the reproduction of populist rhetoric and its representation on television. The authors conceptualise populism as a communication style and analyse its verbal and visual expressions, while empirically illustrating how visual elements form an intricate part of the reproduction of populism. The article thus grasps populism in the interplay of verbal and visual manifestations and at the crossroads of politics and journalism. Populism is defined as praising the people while emphasising their antagonistic relations with elites (political parties, oligarchs, corporations, media companies etc.) and Others (ethnic, religious, sexual minorities, in this case refugees and migrants, who are portrayed as a threat to the people). The simplification, emotionality and transience of television production on one hand and the adherence to the rules and principles of highly conventional journalistic genres (the political interview for example) on the other provide the framework in which to understand the interplay of populism as a verbal and visual expression. To illustrate populism as a communication style, the authors explore the specificities of politicians' and journalists' populist communication as they discussed the migrations on late evening Slovenian te-

levision news between 2015 and 2017. The authors examine visual and verbal elements present in political interviews in two news shows: one broadcast on the public broadcaster RTV Slovenija (Odmevi) and the other on the commercial television station POP TV (24UR ZVEČER). We interpret the data collected in an empirical analysis using the visual interaction method, designed to analyse the visual and verbal elements of communication practices. The interpretative part of the article combines the illustration of verbal populist expressions and graphic representations found in the political interviews. First, we explore manifestations of populism through the media, which show the role played by the media in spreading the populist messages of political actors and thereby increasing the visibility of populist views. Politicians from the coalition and right-wing opposition mainly focused on refugees as a threat to order and the state and on the need to protect the people as a Slovenian entity, while the right-wing opposition also expressed anti-elitist views towards the government and EU representatives who do not want to ensure the protection of the Slovenian people. We show that the simplified and striking populist communication of political representatives collides with the television logic mostly through the principle of visualisation and simplification on television.

The second part explores the reproduction of populism by the media as it explains the role of journalists and the accommodation of the populist style in TV journalism. Analysis shows that populism can be reproduced by the media when journalists perform the role of tribunes of the people by incorporating "shift of footing" mechanism that attempts to reaffirm their position as watchdogs working for and on behalf of the people. However, the narratives of journalists based on pursuit of the public good cannot be directly translated into populist rhetoric, which is only possible if the narrative relies on the antagonistic positioning of the people, elites and/or Others. The article concludes that the applied television logic and ritualised journalistic conventions help reproduce populism in the televised political interviews. In explaining its characteristics, we do not follow the approach of defining the mentioned politicians, journalists and media in general as populists, but focus on analysing the key components of populist communication, i.e. populist antagonisms that emerge in both political and media communication. Media populism is thus not a common characteristic of all news media, although we can also find populist antagonisms in the media narrative.

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SEARCHING FOR A REAL NEW NORMAL AFTER COVID-19

ABSTRACT

The objective of this article is to see which of three evaluated strategies can address the long-term challenges brought by the COVID-19 pandemic. It demonstrates that the health crisis caused by the virus has only added to the existing deeply-rooted climate, environmental and unequal development crises. The pandemic may be a turning point provided that humankind uses it as an opportunity to substitute the current anthropocentric development model with an ecocentric one. However, this cannot be done if the biologically unsustainable profit-maximisation capitalist system remains in place. A hybrid system based on the goods of capitalism and socialism and on eliminating their 'bads' is proposed. Such changes can only be materialised with a new role for government(s) and the public sector in a real new normal, without going back to business as usual.

KEY WORDS: COVID-19, system, crisis, government, development

Iskanje resnične nove normalnosti po covidu-19

IZVLEČEK

Cilj tega strateško usmerjenega članka je ugotoviti, katera od treh analiziranih strategij je primerna za reševanje dolgoročnih izzivov, ki jih povzroča pandemija covida-19. Dokazujemo, da je zdravstvena kriza le katapultirala že desetletja tlečo podnebno in okoljsko krizo ter neenak razvoj. Pandemija je lahko prelomnica, če jo bo človeštvo uporabilo kot priložnost za nadomestitev obstoječega antro-pocentričnega z ekocentričnim razvojnim modelom. Tega ni mogoče storiti, če se prevladujoči biološko nevzdržni kapitalistični sistem ne spremeni v pravičnejšega. Hibridni sistem, temelječ na dobrih straneh kapitalizma in socializma, odpravljajoč njune slabosti, je predlagan. To terja krepitev vloge države in javnega sektorja

v oblikovanje resnične nove normalnosti in ne, kot doslej, kozmetične reforme in povratka v »posel kot običajno«.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: COVID-19, sistem, kriza, vlada, razvoj

1 Introduction[1]

The seismic challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic has found developed countries (DCs) and especially less developed countries (LDCs) unprepared (Bergeijk 2021: 17). "For this war, the national state is as ill-prepared, as badly calibrated, as badly designed as possible because the battle fronts are multiple and cross each one of us. It is in this sense that the *general mobilization* against the virus does not prove in any way that we will be ready for the next one" (Latour 2020a). The pandemic might only be a foretaste of the next climate and environmental crises. It "has reminded the world of its fragility and inherent risks of high levels of interdependence" (NIC 2021: 1). The alarming health crisis with new and unfamiliar features has grown into an unprecedented socio-economic crisis placing whole economies on hold, not to mention the even deeper and longer-term environmental and climate crises that are expected to follow with all of their related more existential problems. The past crisis exit strategies have failed; addressing the symptoms can only contain, not eliminate, the causes of crises. It soon became obvious that similar pandemics and related crises will also be coming in the future unless we eliminate their deeply rooted (systemic) causes. "We also cannot rely on a medical cure for the next pandemic despite humanity's success in finding a solution for COVID-19" (Bergeijk 2021: 6).

The earliest reactions to the pandemic were not strategic, mostly oriented to the short term, just putting the fire out. First, to put a halt to globalization in order to prevent the virus from circulating, relying on the assumption that globalisation is the biggest cause of the pandemic. Yes, globalisation holds considerable responsibility for the virus' global spread, even though many analysts convincingly argue that the true causes of the pandemic have their roots in our anthropocentric consumerist development, in our war against nature, forgetting about nature, our habitat, what "endangered the ecosystem and favoured the spread of the virus to human communities" (Fasfalis 2020). This type of development has made the zoonic spillover of viruses possible. Social-Darwinist profit maximisation (*greed is*

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good, individualism is everything) as the founding stone of capitalism[2], apart from a market economy with private ownership, is incompatible with eco-compatible sustainable human development and been unable to address climate change, environmental degradation, the unsustainable inequalities, cybercrime, bioterrorism, pandemics and wars. According to Žižek (2021b), "European individualism can be blamed for the high number of infected and dead. There are fewer of them in Asia because there is supposed to be more sense of the common good there". He is right to look into the first European reactions, yet the EU has later worked more on common responses (developing and purchasing vaccines, coordinating the national policies).

Amid the growing anti-globalisation climate, people have started to forget that globalisation also has a positive side. Pross (2020: 2) even contends that:

> *Nature can teach us about the globalization versus de–globalization dilemma, because the emergence of life has involved the evolution of a simple replicating chemical system of unknown origin into the complex and highly intricate network of chemical reactions that is the biological cell. That process was the chemical expression of globalization. /.../ But individuality and diversification also play a crucial role/.../. A population of interacting individuals of various kinds is more likely to survive life›s never–ending challenges than a single giant entity, no matter how complex, ingenious and sophisticated. /.../. The pandemic sweeping across our planet is a grim reminder that we humans are a collective, that, with all our differences, we are irrevocably connected to one another, that life is a global enterprise. /.../. An inadequately protected segment of society endangers the society as a whole. That is true whether the threat arises from disease or extreme poverty.*

COVID-19 could act as a detonator of paradigm shifts because the current development model is biologically unsustainable. It might be seen as some kind of historic test of whether we will treat the pandemic as a catalyst of changes or simply allow history to repeat itself. Without changing mind-sets, it is impossible to change things on the ground. Unfortunately, in the past pandemics were also ignored by social scientists, as they did not exist. We cannot find this issue in any textbook or being not frequently addressed in articles before 2019. Still, some reservation is called for because the research had not confirmed such a strong impact on our lives as experts have expected.

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2. According to Ellerman (2021: 9), the words "capitalism" or "socialism" are "useless for serious discussion".

Scientists and lay people tend to be quick to make judgments and slow to change their minds when faced with otherwise compelling evidence. Therefore, the main objective of this article is to locate the roots of the present pandemic crisis, determine which social/political implications it holds and elaborate on possible (systemic) solutions.

2 Objectives and methodology

The first objective of this strategy-oriented article is to evaluate the present COVID-19 pandemic's characteristics, determine their possible implications for the existing development models as well as for exit strategies. The search for systemic solutions in the new *post* pandemic *normal* and considering the implications held by COVID-19 for the roles of government and in this context also democracy are the final two issues to be addressed.

Building on a literature review of different diagnoses of the COVID-19 pandemic and proposed solutions, the article will elaborate on what should be done in the post pandemic real new "normal" in terms of development models and systemic changes.

The following general research questions will be addressed:

1. Are the today's development models appropriate and can they successfully address the complex challenges (crisis) that have surfaced during the pandemic?

2. Is the today's the capitalist system in its current form capable of resolving the accumulated problems so as to provide a long-term basis for sustainable ecocentric development or is a new system a precondition for long-lasting exit strategies?

3. Do we need to define new roles for government and democracy?

The rationale underlying these questions are:

T. 1. The existing development models have proven to be inadequate not only after the great recession (GR) but also for responding to the environmental and climate crises. Anthropocentric development has contributed to these crises and cannot address the environmental, climate or health crises. The escalation of these crises has made it obvious that we need to fundamentally rethink our mind-sets, theories and development models.

T. 2. Dissatisfaction with capitalism has been mounting, particularly during the GR and now the pandemic. "The lockdown forced everyone into a kind of retreat, a moment for reflection" (Latour 2020b: 1). Many have called for substantial reforms and others for even more radical changes to the system.

Complexity, the interconnectedness of many parallel crises, including the rise of China's authoritarian hybrid system, indeed constitute the new environment the existing models have been unable to address successfully.

T. 3. During the GR and now the pandemic, the role of government has been pulled *out of mothballs*. Governments have proven to be the only institutions able to address the crisis and the pandemic. The believe that such role will persist in the future is gaining more supporters, particularly in fields like health and education. At the same time, we face growing populism and mostly right-wing extremism eroding democracy and enhancing authoritarianism. Governments of almost all "colours" have frequently used/abused crises to suspend the already fragile democracy. Democracy is under attack.

These issues are to be addressed in an interdisciplinary/multidisciplinary way. Such problems are "wicked in nature and cannot be solved by applying rational--scientific methods" (Eden and Wagstaff 2020: 3), but require new policies and capabilities for a radical, non-ergodic, wicked world characterised by radical uncertainty (see Raškovič 2021). The single discipline method is no longer up to the job. Nobel prize winner Romer (2015: 89) warns of the over-mathematisation of economics (and increasingly also other disciplines, the author's observation), claiming that the "mathiness" in economic modelling "lets academic politics masquerade as science". Marcus et al. (1995) even claimed "there is no absolute trade-off between rigor and practical relevance".

It is also impossible to apply rigorous longitudinal analysis because COVID-19 has now only had its second "birthday". This has led to varieties of methodologies being applied from different disciplines, including history (lessons of previous pandemics) and even biology, medicine and epidemiology. It is easier to rely on abductive reasoning, meaning seeking the simplest and most likely conclusion from the observations and arriving at a conclusion based on the limited information we know about complex phenomena, in turn leading to the most plausible, yet not generalizable or positively verified conclusions (see Josephson J. and Josephson S. 1994).

The next section focuses initially on development model challenges induced by the pandemic. The third section addresses the systemic challenges, followed in section four by an evaluation of the new role of governments and democratic systems. The final section looks into what might be the long-term exit strategy for COVID-19, a *real new normal*.

3 Searching for a real new normal with a new development model

History shows that policies for the distant future should go beyond merely addressing how to become more resilient. Becoming more virus resilient cannot *do the trick* unless the pandemic's deeper causes and its context are addressed, such as huge economic, demographic, socio-political and technological changes (see Ahlstrom et al. 2020: 415) in the context of a VUCA ("Volatile", "Uncertain", "Complex" and "Ambiguous") world. Anthropocentrism as the dominant ideology around the world, obsessed solely with humans, maximising our consumption[3], created the environment as an incubator that created a perfect storm for the virus. "We, the people, are a kind of virus, contaminating our relations with nature" (Rizman 2020c).

The first dilemma concerning development strategy is thus to choose from:

a) a pandemic-proof or zero-COVID-19 development strategy;

b) a pandemic-resistant, low-Covid response strategy, minimising the risks and costs of the pandemic; or

c) a strategy of ex-ante containment of the pandemic (catastrophe planning).

Enormous investments (and the welfare costs implied) would be needed for a pandemic-proof model (somewhat less for a pandemic-minimising risk strategy, one which may have many supporters as it is less costly given that a pandemic is a rare event). This one happened more than 100 years after the real big pandemic of the Spanish flu. The question is whether the **pandemic-proof scenario** vs. a development model in which the emergence of pandemics remains possible is at all realistic in view of our still limited knowledge about the viruses. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2021) thinks the answer is probably not, because "a **zero-COVID-19 approach** is not sustainable. It risks becoming one that will undercut rather than support economic activity". A **"low COVID-19 model"** accepting "the likelihood that the virus will persist rather than be eliminated, but will use zero-covid-type policies—such as cheap, easily available testing and strong public health guidance—to manage caseloads at a low level" (ibid. 2021) seems more realistic. In the long run, such a combined model is more realistic and effective because it would prepare us ahead of time for potential pandemic(s) by including advance containment measures.

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3.   "Once this health crisis passes, our worst response would be to plunge even more deeply into feverish consumerism and new forms of egotistic self-preservation" claimed Pope Francis (2020: point 35).

The pandemic-proof model is similar to what Kate Raworth calls the *doughnut economy* (2017), completely transforming the prevailing development model (of endless GDP growth) and making sustainability and social goals the top priority. In a doughnut economy, 12 social foundations are met without overshooting any of the 9 ecological ceilings. Yet, is the model viable? According to Milanović (2018), it is idealistic because:

> *the world she has in mind is a world essentially devoid of major social contradictions. /.../. She writes in the first-person plural, as if the entire world had the same "objective"./.../ But in most of the real world economics and politics, there is no "we" that includes 7.3 billion people. /.../Her book is a book of miracles, as well as why in such a world of miracles, the real "miracle" which is Chinese growth that has pulled out of abject poverty some 700 million people goes all but unmentioned. The reason is that poverty was eliminated by "dirty" growth making—lives of millions incomparably better.*

Nevertheless, her model is a welcome wake-up call to transform our growth maximisation worldview into a more balanced, sustainable perspective that allows both humans and the planet to thrive. What is thus needed is to find a realistic way to achieve her nice and ambitious goals and adjust them to the specific needs, values and priorities of each society, its development stage (there is *no one fits all strategy*), as DCs did in their catching-up period. Such long-term sustainable goals seem achievable only if the whole global system is changed. "The international system – including the organizations, alliances, rules, and norms – is poorly set up to address the compounding global challenges facing populations" (NIC 2021: 2).

The exit recipes cannot be the same like in similar pandemics during history. The high growth rates advocated as the optimal exit crisis strategy during the GR have held negative implications for the environment, climate and exacerbated inequalities. One possibility is a zero-growth or degrowth scenario even though, according to Damijan (2021: 14), it cannot resolve the problems. It freezes them, preserves the existing inequalities in the world, maintains the poverty in LDCs. Therefore, degrowth holds some potential at least as the slowing growth variant eliminating the most pollution and climate damaging activities as already happening in DCs.

4 Systemic Challenges

After the GR, the world basically went back to business as usual, without creating a *real new normal*. This led Lamy (2019), former director general of the WTO, to conclude that, "addressing only the obvious signs on the surface of the pandemic is not enough. The right problem, is not globalisation but capitalism, because the present version of capitalism underlying globalisation, exacerbates its flaws: instability, social injustice, environmental degradation", which are "inseparable from capitalism" (Fasfalis 2020). Like the "crises, in built in the anarchic nature of the capitalist crises-prone system" (Etzioni 2021: 11). Such a system proved to be incompatible with an ecocentric-inclusive economy. The COVID-19 pandemic has simply flooded over the long-pressing problems bubbling below the surface, including the important role of the government.

As early as 1845–1846, in *The German Ideology* Marx wrote that capitalism: "at a certain stage in the evolution of the productive forces, only cause disasters". The American historian M. Davis (2021) reveals systemic links between globalised capitalism and swine flu (Fasfalis 2020). One of "the most important lesson from the COVID-19 pandemic is that inequalities are the Achille's heel of a society that has been hit by an epidemic" (Bergeijk 2021: 15) on different levels. "Deaths from COVID-19 have been lower in egalitarian Scandinavia or in than in Europe as a whole, or in France with lower Gini coefficient compared to UK. / .../A recent study by F. Elgar finds that 1% increase in Gini coefficient is associated with a 0.67% increase in the mortality rate from COVID-19. The message is clear: "high inequality is likely to continue to mean greater vulnerability to pandemics" (The Economist 2021a) because "inequalities are the breeding ground for the spread of disease and possible associated suffering. Reducing epidemic vulnerabilities requires lowering such inequalities. The rich may eventually see that it is in their self-interest to argue for a radical shift toward the real sharing of prosperity", claim the Nobel prize laureates Banerjee and Duflo (2019).

The pandemic has brought the system to a turning point, although J. Galbraith (2020b) thinks:

> that point has not quite arrived; we are still in the mind-set of getting back to normal. /.../The impossibility of returning to the previous abnormal-normal has not yet settled in. It will, in due course. At that point, the question of alternatives will have to be faced.

Some basic rules of capitalism have, for instance, already been suspended during the pandemic, revealing their weakness at addressing such huge problems. Already after the GR, Stiglitz talked about the need for a new capitalism (2010: xiii, 208) and later about progressive capitalism (2019).

Table 1 lists some ideas/proposals for a long-term approach to resolving the systemic dilemmas catapulted by the COVID-19 pandemic and related crises. They are grouped in three broad sections: those proposing within-system improvements, those reforms of the system, and those a substantive change of the system. Many are just a nice idea in favour of good things and against bad things. "Certain of the Milanović-types of criticism of the doughnut economy can also applied to some of them. They do not mean much without more detailed operationalisation" (Ellerman 2021, personal note).

Table 1: COVID-19 and selected proposals for reforming the existing system(s).

Author(s):	Proposal(s):
	Improving the system
IMF-WB, ADB, OECD (IBON 2020)	Fairer, green, smarter, more resilient, more inclusive and more sustainable economy
World Economic Forum (IBON 2020)	The "Great Reset of Capitalism"
Gurría OECD Secretary-General and Vatican	Inclusive Capitalism
Pope Francis (2020)	Community of belonging and solidarity; communal society
EU (official sources 2021)	Recovery Plan for Europe Common responses (vaccine development and purchasing, coordination of national policies, reinforcing public health sectors) The European Green Deal
USA, Biden (different sources 2021)	Rescue plan, vaccination, additional investment in vaccines and treatments, re-joining the WHO and the Paris Agreement
G 7 (June 2021 meeting)	Strengthening collective defences against threats to global health, recovery plans, fairer trade within a reformed trading system, supporting a green revolution
	Reforming of the system
Milanović (2019, 2020)	New type of people's egalitarian capitalism; a choice between "liberal, meritocratic capitalism" (USA) and "political capitalism" (China-type)
Etzioni (2021: 1)	Capitalism needs to be re-encapsulated
Stiglitz (2010: xiii, 208; 2019)	New progressive capitalism

Collier (2018)	Capitalism can be redeemed by returning to the "Ethical State"
Aghion, Maghin, Sapir (2020)	New model of capitalism in which both innovation and the protection of citizens are promoted
Ellerman (2021: 154)	The new system should abolish Human Rentals in favour of *workplace democracy*
	Changing the system
IBON 2020	Not only a "reset of capitalism", but system change
Mason (2020)	Capitalism can only survive by adopting features of "post-capitalism"
Piketty (2020)	Democratic, participative socialism
Soros (2020)	The coronavirus is paving the way for societal changes previously thought impossible
Žižek (2009: 20; and 2020, 46, 57, 104-105)	A choice between barbarism and re-invented Communism; Communism suitable for our times. A just social and economic system.
Azmanova; J. Galbraith (2020b)	The present precarity capitalism must be brought to an end
Kovač (2021: 39).	Global socialism of the 21st century
Adizes (Canjko-Javornik, 2013)	The self-management system as an alternative to capitalism
The author's proposal	A hybrid system combining the best of capitalism and authentic socialism

4.1 Improving or reforming capitalism

International organisations, the new US Administration, the EU, the G7 and Pope Francis are typical representatives of the improving capitalism group. Former OECD Secretary-General, A. Guria, for instance, launched the new Council for Inclusive Capitalism with the Vatican seeing the solution within the existing system. In his encyclical "Brothers All", Pope Francis claims the pandemic has shown that free-market policies cannot solve all of humanity's direst needs. He reiterates his vision for a more communal society. Yet, it is an open question as to whether such a passionate, emphatic, people's kind of capitalism is possible without rocking its basic fundaments. Hall and Soskice talked about liberal co-ordinated market economies (2001).

Reforming capitalism, not replacing it with another system idea, as the second variety of searching for a solution within the existing system is based on the

belief that capitalism has demonstrated that it is an effective engine of growth, technological development and capable of huge modifications and adaptations to the new environment, and thereby of consolidating, reinventing itself. Rodrik (2013) concludes that: "Capitalism has no equal when it comes to unleashing the collective economic energies of human societies. Others interpreted the response of governments to COVID-19 as a sign of the robustness of capitalism. The lesson is not that capitalism is dead. It is that we need to reinvent it for a new century". Although Rodrik (2020a), claims "that pretty much everybody understands that there really is no alternative to market-based systems, that still leaves huge room for arguing about the type of such a market system". Piketty and Krugman are the most influential here but, according to J. Galbraith (2020a), are not seeking:

> fundamental reform of the capitalist system, still less its overthrow. Instead the "progressive" view/.../is to seek redistribution within the system. /.../ Opportunities are to be delivered by education, affirmative action, anti-discrimination enforcement, and similar measures, plus a reorientation of the tax burden toward the ultra-wealthy in the name of social justice.

Nevertheless, P. Collier (2018) argues that capitalism is "morally bankrupt", although it could be redeemed by returning to the "Ethical State", by which he means social democracy is in its heyday. It is a brave nostalgic vision at a time when social democratic parties are in steep decline while hard-edged ethno-nationalism is on the rise.

Has the context changed so much that Rodrik's relatively (too) optimistic claim about a permanent rejuvenating of capitalism, or its many variants, is enough? Types of capitalism namely vary across nations (Hall and Soskice 2001), like crony capitalism, "cut-throat" and "cuddly" capitalisms (Aghion et al. 2020). Also in existence are: precarity, surveillance, disaster, human, stakeholder capitalism and, according to Sculos et al. (2019) green capitalism, ecosocialism (or eco-logical anti-capitalism more broadly). Not surprisingly, already in 1996 Thurow asked, "Can the battle between different types of contemporary capitalisms, in the absence of competing with socialism, after the Berlin wall substitute the battle between the systems, help finding the better system?".

Milanović sees the future as a choice between "liberal, meritocratic capitalism" represented by the USA and "political capitalism" (the China type) "because we are all capitalists now" (2020). He believes the "western model of capitalism seems to be heading toward its demise and transformation into a new kind of society, where the wealthiest control political power", unless it evolves towards people's capitalism or egalitarian capitalism.

4.2 Changing the system

The climate/environmental crisis or the immoral inequalities are a more serious long-term systemic crisis than COVID-19, calling for deep systemic changes. The present remedies have not *cured the patient, just contained its symptoms*. In a new context, societies and companies will focus less on maximising efficiency and more on securing resilience, following shifts in peoples' preferences demanding more profound changes in the modern type of *surveillance capitalism* (Zuboff 2018), in which big data companies are controlling too much of our lives, also to some extent taking control away from politicians and governments. In N. Klein's words, rent-seeking crony or *disaster capitalism* (2007, 2020), meaning a society in which the success of business depends on the political class–business class nexus rather than a free market and the rule of law.

This has led many authors to contemplate the need for substantial changes to the system. Žižek concluded already during the GR that today's capitalism is at an apocalyptic point[4] and cannot survive for more than 20 years (2009: 20), also asserting in a visionary way that the authoritarian type of capitalism would strengthen. Authoritarianism is spreading even within traditionally exemplary democracies, revealing that historical turning points are a fruitful platform for tyrants' ideas that appeal to the public with their simplicity, offering quick-fix solutions (example of Hitler). The counterweight of such abuse of powers is to enhance the rule of law and human rights. In a later book (2020: 46, 57), Žižek claims the pandemic requires that the contemporary social order abandon the usual logic of global "free market" capitalism, raises the possibility of progressive revolutionary change. For him, the pandemic has forced upon us a choice between re-invented Communism[5] as the only alternative to barbarism (like Marx previously; the author's note). Talking of communism, he is not referring to the "old-school" states of the 20th century, but the need for a "global organization that can control and regulate the economy as well as limit the sovereignty of nation states when needed", and a "coordinated shift away from the market". His Communists of today are those who have pondered how liberal values are being threatened and who acknowledge that true freedom will only be achieved through radical change amid the crisis of global capitalism. Communism will come to the West, Žižek believes, not as a "utopian Communist vision" but as a "Communism suitable for our times imposed by the necessities of bare survival. It is through our effort to save humanity from self-destruction that we are creating a

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4. Earlier capitalisms, which some call vampiric or inhuman capitalism, have been even worse; just read C. Dickens or look at the crisis in the USA in 1893.
5. It is basically a theoretical concept not yet put into practice like socialism was.

new humanity[6]. It is only through this mortal threat that we can envision a unified humanity" (ibid. 2020: 104–105).

Piketty (2020) proposes *democratic, participative socialism* (characterised by equality in education/educational justice, co-determination of workers, and progressive taxation), unrelated to socialism as practised in the past. He seeks solutions partly within and partly outside of the capitalist system. Adizes proposes a *self-management* system as an alternative to capitalism, noting that the one practised in former Yugoslavia was not implemented well (see Adizes and Canjko-Javornik 2013).

Although most of the proposals of international organisations call for improving/reforming the system, they also believe that: "What is required is not just a 'recovery' or 'reset', but system change", a big reset of capitalism, claims IBON (2020) while summing up the views held by many international organisations, including the IMF, WB, and OECD. "It is not a case of a few 'rotten apples' in a capsule of capitalism", writes Etzioni (2021: 1) "in an otherwise healthy barrel—but a barrel whose contents are decomposing as a whole. Public opinion polls and political preferences indicate that large segments of the public are disenchanted with the current form of the capitalist system". As much as 56 percent of more than 34,000 respondents included in a survey by the Edelman Trust Barometer (2020) published shortly before the COVID-19 pandemic believed that globally capitalism was doing more harm than good. In order to prevent status quo, within-system rehabilitations, the search for new recipes is high in priority. Some tendencies of convergence also point in this direction. China has implemented a market economy system, albeit in a mixed economy dominated by state-owned firms, while traditional market economies applied considerably to the socialist type of instruments (free masks, tests, hospitals, huge fiscal interventions by government...). This might give a basis for the revival of the convergence theories from the 1950s.

5 The role of the government(s)

Any changes within the system or outside it must consider the role of the government. The state in capitalism has widely been seen "as antithetical constructs because capitalism was equated with market and invisible hand, while states were seen as the unwelcome visible hand that intervenes in the functioning of the market. Nevertheless, there are many situations of imperfect markets that require government intervention to ensure efficient outcomes" (see Wright et al.

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6. Similar to Fromm's *human capitalism* (1941).

2021: 3). Not surprisingly, the role of governments in the economy has thus, in both practice and theory, ranged from powerless to a bigger, even crucial role like during the "2008 crisis, demonstrating that Keynes had been right all along" (Krugman 2021). This pandemic has rediscovered Keynes.

Still, the growing mismatch between what publics need or expect and what governments can or are willing to deliver continues to grow. In such volatile and unpredictable conditions, a panoply of concerns has emerged. People faced with threats to their existence are looking for a new way of life, changing their priorities and searching for new meaning. The demand for a more pro-active government to address such concerns is rising. This "would require deep changes and move more in the direction of an inclusive ecocentric development model and adjust institution which can carry out such changes. The final objective should be ecologically sustainable civilization" (Rizman 2020c).

Not surprisingly, Mazzucato (2020b) claimed that:

> we can't get out of the COVID problem unless we actually rethink the role of the state. /.../ Conventionally the belief, that government is there to clean up disasters and fix egregious market imbalances, to fix market failures, but it should otherwise get out of the way. That kind of thinking led to the 2007–08 financial crisis and the damaging wave of government austerity that followed, especially in Europe.

The Washington Consensus that has made governments *ever more powerless* (Rizman 2020a: 61) is now crumbling. Governments have become a solution; they are no longer a problem. T. Stanovnik, even claims "the state was the only agent able to address effectively the crises, that it is the only entity that can save capitalism from self-destruction" (2020). However: "the period of Keynesian cancellation had a heavy cost. Many economists entered the crisis ignorant of basic concepts./.../ This intellectual impoverishment weakened and distorted the policy response" (Krugman 2021). Now many governments have turned inwards for solutions, to economic nationalism and trade protectionism to selective self--sufficiency. In the struggle for technological supremacy, almost all countries support key industries with a promising future with targeted support (vertical industry policy). Industrial policy has re-emerged as especially relevant in the area of innovation (see Bluth and Petersen 2020). What we may observe is the "transformation of the state, not its diminution" (Cox 1987: 254). The coronavirus crisis has appeared as some kind of stress test for governments. The pandemic has proven that: "states may have less autonomy than earlier but it clearly has more to do" (Meyer and Ramirez 1997: 157) in the globalisation environment. After the welfare state's erosion, its expansion has been now the *greatest in*

living memory (The Economist 2021c: 16) because there is no alternative to the solidarity these states provide.

Governments have proven, together with the public sector (health or research & development for instance), to be the only effective institution capable of containing the pandemic and stimulating long-term remedies (vaccines). The challenge is "to engineer a new balance, a new social contract between market and society, one that will continue to unleash the creative energies of private entrepreneurship without eroding the social basis of cooperation" (Rodrik 1997: 85). According to Shafic, the director of the London School of Economics and Political Science (2021), it is not about higher taxes, more redistribution, and a bigger welfare state. It is about fundamentally reordering and equalising how opportunity and security are distributed across society.

The real issue is not the size of the state but its competences and capabilities. There is increasing evidence that people now prioritise health and well-being higher than societal values over economic growth. "The economic impact of better health could, for instance, add $12 trillion to global GDP in 2040—an 8 percent boost, or 0.4 percent a year faster growth" (Dash et al. 2020).

The pandemic has revealed the weakness of the private sector, of the market *fixing everything*. New government–firm relationships are thus called for because:

> *For too long, governments have socialized risks but privatized rewards./.../ In times of need, many businesses are quick to ask for government help, yet in good times, they demand that the government step away. /.../ For too long, people have acted as if the private sector were the primary driver of innovation and value creation and therefore were entitled to the resulting profits. But this is simply not true. Pharmaceutical drugs, the Internet, nanotechnology, nuclear power, renewable energy—all were developed with an enormous amount of government investment and risk taking, on the backs of countless workers, and thanks to public infrastructure and institutions (Mazzucato 2020b).*

Views on the public sector (public goods) have broadened from an instrument to correct market failures to a value co-creator. If there is a genuine lesson of this pandemic, it is "that we need global public goods[7] for a well-functioning world economy" (Bergeijk 2021: 14). The training for the challenges of the future, to

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7. In areas like health, education, climate, biodiversity, ozone-shield depletion, cyber-security, preserving biodiversity, reducing transnational terrorism, maintaining world peace, discovering scientific breakthroughs, migrations and refugee flows, property rights, industry standards, or general economic and monetary stability.

educate the new generation with the motivation to keep our planet green and to push for more just societies is a high priority.

Such challenges are not limited to the internal role played by the governments but global governance as well. The priority is to establish a balance between short- (medium-) term tendencies (containing the crisis) and long-term multilateral solutions aimed at preventing crises from happening in the future because they can, along with all anti-democratic movements, disrupt the contemporary system (domestically and internationally). It is a high priority because:

> *states will leverage these diverse sources of power to jockey over global norms, rules, and institutions, with regional powers and non-state actors exerting more influence within individual regions and leading on issues left unattended by the major powers. The increased competition over international rules and norms, together with untested technological military advancements, is likely to undermine global multilateralism, broaden the mismatch between transnational challenges and institutional arrangements to tackle them, and increase the risk of conflict* (NIC 2021: 67).

COVID-19, jointly with the economic, social, environmental and climate crises, has also brought to the surface the erosion of already fragile democracy (the democracy index declined between 1980 and 2020; NIC 2021: 84). Accumulated inequalities have been exacerbated, creating dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the system among the great majority of the population. Such conditions of people looking for ways to be extricated from a disastrous crisis have provided fertile grounds for populism, extremism, authoritarianism, nationalism, xenophobia or sovereigntism (Brexit being a typical example). Their quick-fix solutions have become more attractive. The situation is not that dissimilar to the 1933 crisis when Nazism and fascists abused democracy by offering a quick-fix solution for taking power. Today, emerging authoritarians[8] (and not only them) have used the pandemic as a pretext to suspend civil/political rights, repress

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8. Examples are easy to find in new democracies (Orban, J. Kaczynski and A. Duda, Janša...) or in old states like Russia (Putin), Erdogan in Turkey, Bolsonaro in Brazil, not to mention China's Xi Jinping. But authoritarianism is also gaining attraction in old democracies (Trump). They almost completely fit into Fromm's (1941) definition of active authoritarianist personalities as those who want to rule, to gain control over other people, but at the same time wishing to destroy something they cannot bring under control. All of the above characteristics are deeply rooted in their fears. At the same time also confirming Al Aswany's thesis as to why autocrats need conspiracy theories to enhance their position. They need passive authoritarianist followers or conformists who submit, obey or even acquiesce to humiliation (2019).

democracy and the media under the guise of fighting against the virus. Historically, "democracy emerged out of mass struggle against inequality, privilege and social injustice" (Therborn 2020). Now such inequalities can again call for reforms to capitalism of which democracy is a constituent part. Governments generally may be tempted to sustain such powers, to curb democratic rights, also when the emergency situation has ended, like tyrants have done in the past. Such abuses of the pandemic to suspend democracy have and especially in the future jeopardise entire democratic systems.

These trends have been facilitated in an environment where such a non-democratic country as China has prospered economically. Globalisation does not seem to have tilted such autocratic regimes in the direction of a liberal democracy that promotes more inclusive institutions, as Fukuyjama predicted in his end of history thesis (1992, revised in 1994). "It is illusory to think that democracy can be exported, or imposed from the outside, but it must grow from the inside, when the conditions are ripe" (Kissinger 2011). Afghanistan is the latest example of this. The policy President Sadat relied on while discussing the opening of the Suez Canal which Israel had demanded after an aggression seems very appropriate in this regard. He told Kissinger; "we can do it, if you stop demanding it". "Experience has shown", stated Kissinger (2011) "that to seek to impose human rights, dignity and popular participation by confrontation is likely to be self-defeating, especially in a country with such a historical vision of itself as China".

6 Conclusion

In human history, all crises have pointed to problems with the existing system and encouraged a rethinking of the prevailing paradigms, mind-sets and theories. COVID-19 is a systemic shock, having rocked the boat of our anthropocentric development model and the capitalist system generally, including our selfish, individualistic behaviour and way of life.

With respect to the research questions, the article provides three sets of conclusions.

Regarding the first one (**development strategies**), it is concluded that the return to the old normal is not a solution as the dearly-paid lesson of the GR demonstrates because in the new environment there is a need for a new development paradigm(s)/model(s). Simply improving the strategy without changing the system is not enough. A rethinking of the existing anthropocentric development model and the system based on it is a must. It is up to us whether the opportunity provided by this turning point will be used to address the real causes of all such crises. We agree with Gupta (2021: 2) when arguing "for an inclusive development

approach that can lead to a virtuous cycle by emphasising human health, well-being and eco system regeneration; by treating these as merit and public goods; by investing in accountable states and tax justice in order to address inequality; and by enabling greater global solidarity". The world is at a turning point. The pandemic is not the only disruptive force that humankind is facing today in the totally new context because: "the battle of humans against the virus is not complicated; the solution and treatment are not complicated either. Our immune system can eventually beat viruses. But, with the current COVID-19, it is not the virus beating us; it is us beating us" (Zhang 2020: 9). Among the three **scenarios** evaluated, the least probable is the zero-COVID-19 one (too costly) whereas the pandemic-resistant and containment ones are more realistic. A new balance between the idealistic, welfare and expensive pandemic-proof development model, vis-a`-vis a pandemic-reactive, resilient and ex-ante containment model must be established in the real new normal. The trade-off is not simple since it is an intertemporal one. Policies adopted now, with immediate costs, hold implications for future infections and future deaths, and these implications work themselves out in highly non-linear ways (see Susskind and Vines 2021: 1). The more realistic short- and medium-term alternative, provided that there are no fundamental systemic changes, is between minimising the risks of pandemics scenario and the pandemics-containment model. No such changes can be made nationally, only more globally within a framework of an accordingly modernised inclusive multilateral system.

Regarding the second question (**is the system adequate** for a real new normal exit strategy?), we conclude that in the long run more fundamental changes to the capitalist system are needed. Improving its operation or reforming the profit maximisation consumerist model seems insufficient for addressing the seismic challenges the pandemic has induced. Going back to the old normal like after the GR, and making cosmetic changes within the existing system, are no solution because they:

> will only lead to a vicious cycle of further ecological degradation, inequality, and domestic abuse that exacerbates both the drivers of the pandemic and the vulnerability of poorer populations. When this is accompanied by narratives of nationalism and securitization, and global systems head towards greater socio-ecological disruption, this "new normal" becomes even more hazardous (Gupta et al. 2021: 2).

The Covid crisis might be an opportunity to move towards a new model of capitalism in which both innovation and the protection of citizens are promoted.

The issue is therefore not either-or, but more the convergence of the virtues of each system and elimination of their failures. "Mainstream capitalism is good

for creating wealth but does not distribute this wealth in socially acceptable terms while socialism is good in distributing but not creating wealth" (Ellert 2021). One way forward may be a **hybrid system** that combines the best of capitalism (private ownership, efficient allocation of resources, engine of growth, private incentive, democracy...) and a modern unorthodox socialism, or authentic socialism (social security, social solidarity/justice, public goods' broad availability, co-decision, equality, inclusiveness ...) and eliminating all of their major downsides (logic of greed, inequalities, lack of social justice and unavailability of public goods in capitalism and an antidemocratic political system and the economic inefficiency of socialism). The Nordic welfare state or, in Piketty's words, democratic, participative socialism are two possible avenues. Still, there is no *one size fits all* solution. Multiple ways to the real new normal are possible. The Scandinavian model of flexi-security shows that countries can have both generous social protection and vibrant innovation (Aghion et al. 2020). The problem is that "we cannot all be like the Scandinavians, because Scandinavian capitalism depends in part on the knowledge spill overs created by the more cutthroat American capitalism" (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012: 36). They question the possibility of the simultaneous existence of welfare capitalism globally and the desire is to keep the growth potential untouched. "Whether we like it or not, COVID-19 has brought us to the limits of global socialism of the 21st century" (Kovač 2021: 39).

The third question concerned whether we need to define a **new role of the government**. Despite some failures, governments have proven to be the only institutions capable of effectively handling this pandemic. On this basis, it is concluded that the above development model and systemic changes can only be materialised by a rediscovered new, enhanced role for government(s) and the public sector in a *real new normal*. The pandemic has revealed that business needs government, as well as government needs business, based on new relationship types. "Government should shape markets rather than simply fixing failures" (Mazzucato and Kattel 2020).

The final crucial question in terms of the role of governments and the system in general is will we be using democratic ways to handle such crises or will authoritarian instruments/policies be imposed in line with Condorcet's opinion ("Sur la nécessité, l'excuse des tyrans", 1789). The contours of the entire system depend on the outcome of this struggle. We thus conclude that democracy is at a crossroads. There has been the backsliding but also enhancement of democracy. There have been considerable abuses of democracy in autocracies and even traditional democratic states under the guise of fighting COVID-19. Yet, "democracies have turned out to score better in health and human development

indicators in the long run, being quite successful at containing the pandemic keeping emergency measures largely within constitutional limits" (Youngs 2021: 7, 9). Nevertheless, democracy has been eroded and fears of the regression of democracy are real. Not surprisingly, the "Call to Defend Democracy" was signed by almost 100 organisations from around the world, as well as nearly 500 prominent individuals from 119 countries, including 13 Nobel Laureates and 62 former heads of state or government (ibid.: 4). We see continuing struggles between the democratic and anti-democratic on the national as well as global levels, which calls for multilateral solutions. It would be an illusion to think that democracy can be imposed on countries from the outside, as recent history (Afghanistan, Arab spring) demonstrates.

It has become clear that: "We must not go back to where we were. It was a terrible world that we are coming from. So, we want to go another direction, a new world, so that all those terrible things do not exist" (2006 Nobel prize winner M. Yunus 2020). Hopefully, Gramsci is still right in saying: "I'm a pessimist because of intelligence, but an optimist because of will" (1929), because COVID-19 has revealed itself as "an unprecedented moment of reflection and imagination about alternative futures" (Klieman 2021). This means we must find a *silver lining* to help us get out of this complex crisis situation.

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DEJAVNIKI (NE)KOOPERATIVNOSTI PRI PREMAGOVANJU PANDEMIJE COVIDA-19 V SLOVENIJI

IZVLEČEK

Slovenija je zabeležila evropsko nadpovprečno število žrtev na prebivalca za-radi covida-19. Na osnovi analize javnomnenjskih podatkov skušamo ugotoviti, katere kategorije prebivalstva so bile najbolj kooperativne in katere najmanj, če na epidemijo gledamo kot na situacijo dileme javnih dobrin in na (izrekano) upoštevanje zaščitnih ukrepov kot na kooperativnost. Od prvega do drugega vala se je začetna visoka kooperativnost zmanjšala, število žrtev pa se je moč-no povečalo. Višjo kooperativnost izražajo starejši in tisti z močnim občutkom ogroženosti. Nižja kooperativnost se povezuje z mladimi in z nižjim zaupanjem v vlado. Zdi se, da ima metoda analize javnomnenjskih podatkov omejen doseg, zato je razlage za relativen neuspeh Slovenije treba iskati še na druge načine.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: pandemija covida-19, dileme javnih dobrin, kooperacija, defekcija

Factors of cooperation and defection in overcoming the COVID-19 pandemic in Slovenia

ABSTRACT

Slovenia has been one of the worst affected European states as regards per capita fatalities from COVID-19. We analysed data from two public opinion surveys in an effort to find a sociological explanation for this situation. Approaching the pandemic as a case of a public goods dilemma, we distinguished cooperative from non-cooperative players (citizens) in terms of their (reported) level of respect for a set of measures of safe behaviour. Cooperation declined during the second wave of the pandemic (compared to the first one), with the number of victims

dramatically increasing. Stronger cooperation is positively correlated with (more advanced) age and (greater) concern for health (fear). Weaker cooperation or defection is correlated with youth and less trust in the government. Analysis of public opinion surveys has its strengths and limitations. Additional explanations for Slovenia's relative failure should be researched using other methods as well.

KEYWORDS: COVID-19 pandemic, public goods dilemmas, cooperation, defection

1 Uvod

12. 3. 2021, natanko eno leto po razglasitvi epidemije covida-19 v Sloveniji, je bilo mogoče ugotoviti, da je bila dvomilijonska država do tedaj tretja po številu žrtev covida-19 na prebivalca na svetu in šesta po številu okuženih na prebivalca.[1] Umrlo je več kot 4100 oseb ali 1989 na milijon prebivalcev. Do razglasitve konca drugega vala epidemije 15. 6. 2021 so se rezultati nekoliko izboljšali: število mrtvih se je povzpelo na 4408 ali 2120 na milijon; to je na ta dan po Worldometru pomenilo 11. mesto po številu umrlih na prebivalca med 45 evropskimi državami.

Ta dejstva lahko štejemo za neuspeh, ki upravičuje sociološki premislek o razlogih za takšno stanje. Kaj je šlo narobe? V primerjavi s prvim valom, ki je vzbujal občutke nacionalnega ponosa – končal se je 15. 5. 2020 s slavnostnim preletom letal čez državo, ki je »prva v Evropi razglasila konec epidemije« –, so drugi val, katerega uradni začetek je bil 19. 10. 2020, spremljala medsebojna obsojanja. Vzbujal je občutke neobvladljivosti, kaotičnosti in nesposobnosti. Na preizkušnji je bila samopodoba Slovencev kot discipliniranih in prilagodljivih prebivalcev »na južni strani Alp«.

Iskanja odgovorov se je mogoče teoretsko in empirično lotiti na različne načine. V naši raziskavi problematiko teoretsko umestimo na področje *družbenih dilem*, katerega osrednje družboslovno raziskovalno zanimanje je proučevanje človekove *kooperativnosti*, njenih problemov, pogojev, dejavnikov – in njenega upravljanja. Med epidemijo/pandemijo je bila ključna kooperativnost na različnih ravneh, od lokalne do globalne, med različnimi družbenimi podsistemi in med igralci – državljani na različnih družbenih položajih. Korpus znanj s področja družbenih dilem hrani tudi bogato znanje o dejavnikih izostale kooperativnosti oz. nekooperativnosti (»defektorstva«), ki nas v primeru te globalne *real-world* oz. *real-life* družbene dileme še posebej zanima.

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1. Do tovrstnih lestvic moramo imeti nekaj zadržkov, saj se podatki držav po natančnosti precej razlikujejo. Več držav je naknadno občutno povečalo oceno žrtev covida-19. Zato se je položaj Slovenije na teh lestvicah izboljšal.

Empirično se opiramo na podatke iz raziskave SJM 2020/1 in na podatke iz raziskave SJM 2020/3. Prva je potekala med prvim, druga med drugim valom epidemije. Obe sta vsebovali niz spremenljivk, ki se tičejo zaznavanja epidemije in samozaščitnega vedenja državljanov. To nam omogoča oblikovanje raznovrstnih hipotez in njihovo empirično verifikacijo. Ugotoviti skušamo, katere sociodemografske, čustvene, socialne in politične značilnosti so najbolj določale stališča, ki indicirajo kooperacijo ali nekooperacijo (»defekcijo«).

2 Pandemija kot situacija družbenih dilem

Doseganje sodelovanja med ljudmi je osrednja tematika raziskovalnega področja družbenih dilem (Axelrod in Hamilton 1981; Kollock 1998; Van Lange in dr. 2014). Družbene dileme so napetosti med kratkoročnimi interesi posameznika in dolgoročnejšimi interesi kolektiva (Van Lange in dr. 2014: 6). Družbene dileme so situacije, v katerih »so širši kolektivni interesi v konfliktu z neposrednimi individualnimi interesi« (Dorfman 2014: 105). Napetosti oz. konflikti se nanašajo na težave pri doseganju kolektivnega cilja, ki izhajajo iz dejstva, da je v situaciji družbene dileme nesodelovalno vedenje za posameznika vsaj kratkoročno lahko (naj)boljša izbira (Dawes 1980; Kollock 1998), hkrati pa velja: če bi tako delovali/izbrali vsi, bi bilo to škodljivo za vse.

Ob brezštevilnih drugih družbenih problemih, so družbene dileme tudi mnoga zdravstvena vprašanja (Van Lange in dr. 2014: 139; Attari in dr. 2014). Dobršen del jih tipološko spada med t. i. dileme prispevanja oz. dileme javnih dobrin (*public goods dilemmas*). V dilemah prispevanja (*give-some dilemmas*) neka dobrina obstaja, če zanjo posamezni igralci v zadostnem številu/deležu nekaj prispevajo. Težava je v tem, da je mogoče dobrino, ki je splošno dostopna (*non--excludable*), uživati, ne da bi prispevali – če je dovolj drugih, ki prispevajo. To pomeni, da je s stališča posameznika mikavno biti zastonjkar (*free-rider*). Toda če je zastonjkarjev preveč, dobrina propade. Če je delež posameznikov, ki ne prispevajo, znaten, a ne tako velik, da bi dobrina propadla, pa je količina javne dobrine suboptimalna. Taka dobrina je lahko tudi javno zdravje.

Številni strokovnjaki s področja družbenih dilem so pandemijo covida-19 že spomladi in poleti 2020 umestili na svoje področje. Mnogi so se angažirali v smislu formuliranja priporočil odločevalcem glede doseganja čim višje kooperativnosti državljanov (med prvimi Johnson in dr. 2020; Van Bavel in dr. 2020; Karlsson in Rowlett 2020; kasneje na primer Campos-Mercade in dr. 2021; Capraro in dr. 2021). Opažene so bile različne stopnje takšne kooperativnosti v različnih državah oz. delih sveta, kar bo nedvomno še predmet analiz.

Stališče, da je epidemija oz. pandemija situacija družbene dileme (ali več njih), v tej razpravi utemeljujemo takole: predstavljajmo si, da so igralci v

določenem trenutku in vsi hkrati soočeni z zdravstvenim problemom, ki ga lahko rešijo le s takojšnjim in hkratnim sodelovanjem večine. Sodelovanje predstavlja določen strošek (prispevek) v obliki začasnega sprejemanja vedenja, ki odstopa od običajnega. Cilj je mogoče doseči tudi, če manjši del igralcev ne sodeluje (ne prispeva). Pod takimi pogoji obstaja napetost med interesom posameznika, da bi dobrino (rešitev problema) užival brez lastnih stroškov (prispevka), in interesom kolektiva, da svoj delež h kolektivnemu cilju prispeva dovoljšen delež igralcev. Pandemija kot *real-life* situacija je od tega abstraktnega primera drugačna po tem, da traja dlje časa (je kontinuirana) in se odvija v družbenem prostoru, ki ga sestavljajo posamezniki in skupine z različnimi lastnostmi in v različnih družbenih položajih. Nesodelovanje pomeni tudi tveganje v smislu izpostavljenosti okužbi. To uveljavlja raznolike in kompleksne razmere mešanih motivov. Podobno je s cepljenjem kot zadnjo fazo epidemije. Tudi tu gre za dilemo prispevanja: če bi bilo cepljenje dejanje, ki naj bi ga igralci lahko izvršili ali ne v določenem trenutku in hkrati, ob tem pa bi za čredno imunost zadostovala okoli 70 % precepljenost populacije, bi obstajala napetost med posameznikovim interesom, da koristi precepljenosti uživa brez lastnega prispevka (npr. tveganja stranskih učinkov), in interesom kolektiva, da se cepi dovoljšen delež posameznikov. Številna zatikanja pri cepljenju proti covidu-19 so potrdila obstoj tega konflikta.

Težavnost doseganja kooperativnosti pri reševanju pandemije določa več dejavnikov. Med njimi je tudi »narava« virusa. SARS-CoV-2 življenjsko ogroža predvsem nekatere kategorije prebivalstva. Najmočnejši demografski dejavnik tveganja je starost, s katero stopnja umrljivosti (CFR – *case fatality rate*) močno narašča (Staerk in dr. 2021; Undurraga in dr. 2021): življenjska ogroženost najstarejših je večstokratnik ogroženosti najmlajših odraslih. Zato je mogoče upravičeno pričakovati, da bodo starejši izražali višjo stopnjo kooperativnosti glede ukrepov za zajezitev pandemije. Poleg starosti so pomemben dejavnik ogroženosti že obstoječa bolezenska stanja, ki mnoga narekujejo manj aktivno življenje. Takšni se potem v kontekstu pandemije v večji meri počutijo ogrožene zaradi možnosti okužbe.

Ljudje se tudi mimo tega nahajamo v različnih življenjskih situacijah, v bolj in manj aktivnih in »stičnih« vlogah. Ukrepi, ki naj bi privedli do kolektivnega cilja – upočasnitve ali ustavitve širjenja virusa – nas lahko različno prizadenejo tudi glede na socialni status. Glede na to bi lahko dejali, da pričakovani pri-spevki posameznikov dejansko niso enaki. To je eden poglavitnih razlogov za pričakovanje, da kooperativnost ne bo enakomerno porazdeljena. Okvirno bi pričakovani prispevek h kolektivnemu cilju lahko opredelili kot seštevek med (a) splošnim prispevkom (zaščitni ukrepi, ki naj bi jih upošteval posameznik) in (b) specifikami prispevka (stroškov) glede na različne vidike socialnih statusov.

Drugače rečeno: mlad človek z nizkim tveganjem za fatalni izid okužbe in z odpovedjo aktivnostim, ki bi jih sicer opravljal, mora objektivno prispevati več od človeka, ki je v pokoju in objektivno mnogo bolj ogrožen. Ukrepi, ki so jih sprejemale vlade, tudi slovenska, so bili v mnogočem bolj ali manj premišljene in učinkovite kompenzacije za neenake izgube, ki so jih s svojim prispevanjem utrpele različne kategorije prebivalstva.

Epidemija sama in ukrepi v spopadu z njo v imenu javnega dobra, kot je javno zdravje, imajo na lokalni in globalni ravni tudi različne eksternalije, pozitivne in negativne. Mnoge zadevajo javno zdravje. Med pozitivne zdravstvene eksternalije *lockdowna* (ki je svojevrstna, nepričakovana in poučna antropopavza) spadata zmanjšanje onesnaženosti okolja ter manj smrtnih žrtev v prometu in zaradi slabega zraka. Med negativne eksternalije *lockdowna* spadajo nezaposlenost, ekonomska oz. finančna ogroženost zlasti določenih poklicnih skupin, prikrajšanost za socialne stike, ki so v različnih življenjskih obdobjih različno potrebni, z vsem tem povezano povečevanje duševnih stisk in nereševanje drugih zdravstvenih težav. To pomeni, da gre pri odločanju za kooperativnost tudi za tehtanje med pozitivnimi učinki kooperativnosti in negativnimi »stranskimi« učinki istega ravnanja. Tudi glede na to je upravičeno pričakovati razlike v kooperativnosti.

3 Raziskava: podatki in hipoteze

Problematiko kooperativnosti pri premagovanju epidemije bomo analizirali na podlagi podatkov dveh raziskav Slovensko javno mnenje (SJM), ki sta bili izvedeni v letu 2020. Raziskava SJM 2020/1 je potekala med prvim valom (N = 853); vsebovala je primerljiv niz spremenljivk, ki se tičejo covida-19.[2] Raziskava SJM 2020/3,[3] ki je vsebovala primerljiv niz spremenljivk na temo covida-19, je vključevala tudi vprašanja modula mednarodne raziskave ISSP 2020 *Environment*. Izvedena je bila prek spleta ali pisnega vprašalnika na reprezentativnem vzorcu N = 1102 med 10. 11. 2020 in 31. 1. 2021. To pomeni, da je v celoti potekala med drugim valom pandemije, ki se je uradno pričel 15. 10. 2020 (Hafner Fink in dr. 2021). V delu analize smo podatke obeh raziskav združevali, v delu pa smo jih obravnavali ločeno.

Izbrali smo variable-indikatorje samoizjavljane (*self-reported*) (ne)kooperativnosti (odvisna spremenljivka) in variable-indikatorje, ki jih štejemo za neodvisne spremenljivke, tj. domnevne dejavnike odvisnih spremenljivk.

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2. Podatki raziskave so dostopni v Arhivu družboslovnih podatkov (ADP) (glej Hafner Fink in dr. 2020).
3. Podatki raziskave so dostopni v Arhivu družboslovnih podatkov (ADP) (glej Hafner Fink in dr. 2021).

Kooperativnost opredeljujemo kot opredelitev za vedenja, ki naj bi privedla do upočasnitve oz. obvladanja epidemije in s tem ohranitve javnega zdravja kot javne dobrine (*public good*) ter čimprejšnjo vrnitev v normalnost na drugih področjih. Defekcijo opredeljujemo kot opredelitev za neupoštevanje pravil. Če bi se vsi ali zadosten delež prebivalstva vedli kooperativno, bi bil rezultat obvladovanje epidemije. Če bi zadosten delež ravnal nekooperativno, bi bil rezultat neobvladovanje epidemije, mnogo mrtvih in kolaps zdravstvenega sistema.

Za indikator (ne)kooperativnosti štejemo opredelitve (na lestvici od 1 do 5) glede štirih vprašanj, ki zadevajo (samo)zaščitno vedenje. To so: ne družim se z ljudmi izven svojega doma; bolj redno in temeljito si umivam roke; v trgovino hodim le po nujnih nakupih; pri nujnih osebnih stikih ohranjam fizično razdaljo vsaj dva metra.[4] Rezultat Cronbachovega testa v primeru obeh raziskav upravičuje oblikovanje sestavljenega indeksa kot enotnega indikatorja (ne)kooperativnosti iz navedenih spremenljivk (Cronbach's Alpha = 0,755). Povprečna vrednost indeksa (4,42 na lestvici od 1 do 5) kaže na visoko kooperativnost populacije. Glede na te opredelitve med anketiranci razlikujemo kooperatorje, defektorje in vmesneže. Ker je bila povprečna vrednost indeksa visoka, smo morali postaviti »stroge« kriterije za pripadnost skupini kooperativnih. Tako smo med kooperatorje razvrstili tiste, ki so na indeksu dosegli vrednost vsaj 4,5, defektorji pa so bili tisti z vrednostjo indeksa pod 4.

Naše temeljno raziskovalno vprašanje je bilo, ali lahko s teorijo družbenih dilem pojasnjujemo oz. razumemo ravnanja ljudi v kontekstu pandemije covida-19. Da bi odgovorili na to vprašanje, smo oblikovali naslednje specifične hipoteze:

H1: Od merjenja med prvim valom do merjenja med drugim valom se je povečal delež nekooperativnih.

Teoretska osnova te hipoteze je opažanje več avtorjev, da je časovna komponenta v reševanju družbenih dilem pomemben dejavnik. Po več raziskavah kooperativnost v kontinuiranih (*continuous*) oz. ponavljanih (*iterated*) dilemah prispevanja sčasoma upada (Neugebauer in dr. 2009; Fischbacher in Gächter 2010, Gächter in dr. 2010). Ta tendenca je bila opažena v različnih kulturnih okoljih. Ni pa zmanjšanje kooperativnosti neizogibno: obstajajo načini premagovanja te tendence.

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4. V drugem valu (jesen 2020) smo spraševali tudi o nošenju maske. Ker pa tega vprašanja ni bilo v prvem valu (pomlad 2020), ga pri oblikovanju indeksa kooperativnosti nismo upoštevali. Anketiranci so se opredeljevali na petstopenjski lestvici, kjer je 1 pomenilo, da sploh ne upoštevajo posameznega ukrepa, 5 pa pomeni, da v celoti upoštevajo ukrep.

H2: Obstaja (pozitivna ali negativna) povezanost med izbranimi sociodemografskimi variablami in (ne)kooperativnim vedenjem.

Teoretsko se opiramo na korpus znanj o razlikah v kooperativnosti v n-osebnih dilemah prispevanja oz. dilemah javnih dobrin glede na različne sociodemografske značilnosti.

Kot neodvisne spremenljivke tu upoštevamo spol, izobrazbo, starost, samoopredeljeni družbeni sloj in zaposlitveni status. Predvsem nas zanima, ali izstopa kateri izmed možnih dejavnikov oz. katera izmed sociodemografskih kategorij. Katera izraža najvišjo in katera najnižjo kooperativnost? Glede na opisano naravo virusa je smiselno pričakovati, da bo pomemben dejavnik kooperativnosti starost. Naša pričakovanja so tako nedvoumna samo glede tega dejavnika – pričakujemo namreč, da bodo starejši najbolj kooperativni. Za druge demografske dejavnike pričakovanja niso tako nedvoumna in jih zato v našem analitskem (multivariatnem) modelu razumemo predvsem kot kontrolne spremenljivke.

H3: Obstaja pozitivna povezanost med (subjektivno) skrbjo glede nevarnosti koronavirusa in kooperativnostjo glede epidemije.

Teoretsko hipotezo opiramo na raziskave o odnosu med čustvi (Wubben 2005), npr. strahom, skrbjo, ponosom (*pride*) (Dorfman 2014), in (ne)kooperativnim vedenjem v situacijah, ki so dileme prispevanja.
Kot neodvisno spremenljivko upoštevamo variablo o občutenju skrbi za zdravje zaradi koronavirusa.

H4: Posamezniki, ki izražajo defekcijo glede novega koronavirusa, so manj kooperativni tudi glede namena cepljenja.

Hipotezo opiramo na opažanje, da je tudi cepljenje (nasploh in v primeru covida-19) primer družbene dileme prispevanja oz. dilema javnih dobrin (Attari, Krantz in Weber 2014; Capraro in dr. 2021); kolektivni cilj – čredna imunost – je dosežena le, če je cepljen dovoljšen delež populacije.
Tu upoštevamo variablo, ki meri namen cepiti se proti covidu-19.

H5: Obstaja pozitivna povezanost med (ne)kooperativnostjo glede premagovanja epidemije in med (ne)kooperativnostjo glede okoljevarstva.

Če v okviru hipoteze 4 preverjamo povezanost med kooperativnostjo glede dveh vprašanj, ki sta neposredno povezani, saj se obe tičeta epidemije, tu dodajamo vprašanje kooperativnosti glede okoljevarstva, ki je spletišče družbenih dilem jemanja in dilem prispevanja. Izkoriščamo dejstvo, da je bila raziskava ISSP 2020 (SJM 2020/3) namenjena okoljevarstvu. Ali so posamezniki glede svoje kooperativnosti področno selektivni? Nekatere raziskave to možnost potrjujejo (glej npr. Attari, Krantz in Weber 2014, kjer je bil Cronbach za pet različnih dilem prispevanja le 0,26 (2014: 319)). Ali na tem primeru lahko najdemo potrdila za

domnevo o splošnem kooperativnostnem nagnjenju (*generalized cooperative intent*) (Bogaert in dr. 2008: 461)?

Teoretsko lahko to hipotezo opremo tudi na teorijo zastonjkarstva, po kateri je zastonjkarstvo (*free-riding*) splošna tendenca v skupinah (Albanese in Van Fleet 1985), in na raziskovalno domnevo, da obstajajo kooperatorji oz. zastonjkarji ali *prosocials* oz. *proselfs*, ki so ali prvo ali drugo na mnogih področjih.

Če se povezanost ne bo pokazala, bo smiselna domneva, da se razlika pojavlja iz nekega (področno specifičnega) razloga, npr. zaradi razlike v objektivnem tveganju, ki jo za različne skupine predstavlja covid-19, medtem ko se jih (objektivno) manj selektivno tičejo okoljevarstvene grožnje.

Kot indikator za spremenljivko okoljske kooperativnosti smo upoštevali indeks, ki je predstavljal povprečje odgovorov na dve vprašanji o pogostosti (rednosti) recikliranja in okoljsko prijaznega nakupovanja na lestvici od 1 (nikoli) do 5 (vedno).

H6: Posamezniki, ki menijo, da drugi le malo sodelujejo, so v večji meri defektorji.

V literaturi o družbenih dilemah najdemo več raziskav, ki ugotavljajo, da posamezniki svojo kooperativnost uravnavajo oz. prilagajajo glede na vedenje drugih. Empirično so v igrah dilem javnih dobrin mnogi opazili pojav pogojne kooperativnosti (Fishbacher in dr. 2014). Bogaert in dr. (2008) menijo, da na kooperativnost vplivajo »specifična pričakovanja glede ravnanja drugih«. Več avtorjev je ugotovilo, da defekcija (zastonjkarstvo) spodbuja defekcijo (Raihani in Hart 2010).

Kot neodvisno spremenljivko lahko tu uporabimo mnenje anketirancev o kooperativnosti drugih. Primerno je vprašanje »Ali se po vašem mnenju ljudje držijo ukrepov?«, pri katerem so možni odgovori na lestvici od 1 (»bistveno premalo«) do 5 (»v celoti«).

H7: Nekooperativnost je pomembno povezana s političnim dejavnikom, kakršen je odnos do aktualne vlade.

Teorija družbenih dilem močno poudarja dejavnik zaupanja. Zaupanje je pomembno zlasti v doseganju kooperativnosti v nekaterih tipih dilem. Višje zaupanje se povezuje z višjo stopnjo sodelovanja tudi v dilemah prispevanja (De Cremer in Van Vugt 1999). Nekateri avtorji menijo, da lahko tudi nezaupljivci pod določenimi pogoji močno zvišajo svoje prispevke, tj. delujejo kooperativno (De Cremer in dr. 2001). Ker je reševanje pandemije v rokah politike, se zastavlja tudi vprašanje o dejavniku zaupanja v aktualno politiko.

Teorija družbenih dilem v obravnavi politike izpostavlja pomen negativnega učinka politične polariziranosti na kooperativnost (Van Bavel in dr. 2020). Za

kazalec politične polariziranosti pa je lahko šteta polariziranost zaupanja. Tu upoštevamo kazalec zaupanja v vlado oz. zaupanja v vlado glede njenega delovanja v času epidemije. Dodajamo še vernost, da bi preverili hipotezo o učinku vernosti na kooperativnost.

4 Ugotovitve

1. Opazili smo (statistično značilen) upad kooperativnosti med prvim in drugim valom: od (povprečja) 4,57 do 4,30. Delež defektorjev se je povišal z 10,7 % na 23,5 %, delež kooperativnih pa se je zmanjšal s 76,3 % na 57,5 % (Tabela 1). Rezultat je v skladu z rezultati več raziskav o upadanju kooperativnosti v ponavljanih dilemah javnih dobrin skozi čas.

Tabela 1: (Ne)kooperativnost v prvem in drugem valu epidemije.

	pomlad 2020	jesen 2020	Skupaj
defektorji	10,7 %	23,5 %	18,0 %
nekje vmes	13,0 %	18,9 %	16,3 %
kooperativni	76,3 %	57,5 %	65,7 %
N	839	1100	1939
Hi-kvadrat = 79,094 (sig. = 0,000); Cramer's V = 0,202			

*Vir: lastne analize na podlagi podatkov SJM 2020/1 in SJM 2020/3.*

S potekanjem časa se kopiči količina zahtevanih prispevkov (stroški), s tem pa upada zanimanje za sodelovanje. Opaženi pojav je mogoče imenovati tudi pandemična utrujenost (*pandemic fatigue*). Lilleholt in dr. (2020: 5) jo opredeljujejo kot »splošen občutek demotiviranosti glede upoštevanja zdravstvenih ukrepov zoper covid-19). Neugebauer in dr. (2009) menijo, da je poglaviten dejavnik za upadanje kooperativnosti skozi čas koristoljubna pristranskost (*self-serving bias*). V slovenskem (in še katerem evropskem) primeru bi sem lahko prišteli učinek paradoksa uspešnosti (*prevention paradox*) (Cayetano in Crandall 2020) ob prvem valu. Gre za razlago »prepoceni smo jo odnesli v prvem valu«, ki jo izpostavljajo tudi nekateri slovenski vladni politiki. Tudi nekatere druge države, ki so bile uspešne ob prvem valu, naj bi ravno zato podcenile resnost drugega vala. Ta upad je zanimiv zlasti v luči razmerij med mrtvimi med prvim (okoli sto) in med drugim valom (več kot 4300), kot tudi z ozirom na razmerja med okuženimi z resnimi zapleti.

Glede kooperativnosti so popustile predvsem nekatere kategorije, npr. mladi (Graf 2) in samozaposleni. Bržkone gre to razumeti tudi kot posledico spoznavanja, da (prvi) ne spadajo med ogrožene (tudi zaradi uvajanja študija oz. dela na daljavo) oz. da so (drugi) zaradi narave njihovega delovnega okolja razmeroma

varni. Edina kategorija, ki je v drugem valu postala (še) bolj kooperativna, kot je bila v prvem, so tisti z najvišjim občutkom ogroženosti (glej Graf 5).

2. Ugotovili smo rahlo višjo in statistično pomembno kooperativnost žensk (4,52 vs. 4,31) (Graf 1). Ne da bi se spuščali v širšo razpravo o odnosu med kooperativnostjo in spolom, pripomnimo, da je ta razlika v tem primeru morda tudi odraz dejstva, da so med žrtvami covida-19 v Sloveniji prevladovale ženske. To kaže povezovati z dejstvom, da so nadpovprečno zastopane med starimi in da so mnoge vključene v poklice, ki so bili bolj izpostavljeni okužbi.

Graf 1: Kooperativnost in spol.

Vir: lastne analize na podlagi podatkov SJM 2020/1 in SJM 2020/3.

Opazna je pozitivna korelacija kooperativnosti s starostjo (0,264), pri čemer je povezanost v drugem valu precej močnejša (Graf 2). To kaže razumeti kot odziv na očitno in javno poudarjeno dejstvo, da so ogrožene predvsem starejše osebe. Ne moremo pa trditi, da je to edini razlog. Van Lange in dr. (1997) menijo, da s staranjem (a le do določene starosti) narašča posameznikova splošna prosocialna orientiranost. Nižja kooperativnost mladih je deloma gotovo tudi odraz dejstva in opažanja, da so pričakovani prispevki (stroški) mladih dejansko višji, tveganje pa razmeroma majhno. Če bi virus enakomerno ogrožal vse igralce – prebivalce, bi nedvomno zaznali drugačno starostno razporeditev kooperacije. Pri tem je očiten paradoks: lahko bi dejali, da bi morali biti višji prispevki (stroški) razlog višjega sodelovanja mladih, da bi se izredne razmere (in s tem prispevki) čim

prej končale, a očitno ni tako. S strukturo kooperativnosti po starosti se ujema tudi kooperativnost glede na delovni status: najmanj kooperativni so šolajoči se (mladi), najbolj pa upokojenci (stari); med njima so z zelo podobno ravnjo kooperativnosti zaposleni in nezaposleni (srednja generacija).

Graf 2: Kooperativnost in starost.

Vir: lastne analize na podlagi podatkov SJM 2020/1 in SJM 2020/3.

Na ravni bivariatne analize smo opazili negativno korelacijo z izobrazbo: z višanjem izobrazbe se kooperativnost zmanjšuje, vendar lahko o statistično značilnih razlikah govorimo le v drugem valu epidemije (Graf 3). Bolj kooperativni so predvsem nižje oz. poklicno izobraženi. Morda je tu dejavnik tudi narava dela: medtem ko so visoko izobraženi lahko v veliki meri delali ali morali delati na daljavo, je narava dela nižje oz. poklicno izobraženih zahtevala fizično navzočnost in večjo izpostavljenost okužbi. Kooperativnost ni izrazito povezana s subjektivno razredno pripadnostjo – kot statistično značilno se kaže le zmanjšanje kooperativnosti pri srednjih slojih (Graf 4).

Graf 3: Kooperativnost in izobrazba.

Vir: lastne analize na podlagi podatkov SJM 2020/1 in SJM 2020/3.

**Graf 4: Kooperativnost in družbeni sloj.**

Vir: lastne analize na podlagi podatkov SJM 2020/1 in SJM 2020/3.

3. V jesenskem merjenju so anketiranci izražali višjo stopnjo občutkov ogro-ženosti zaradi virusa kot spomladi. Ob tem pa se je kooperativnost, kot smo

zabeležili pod točko 1, od prvega do drugega vala na splošno zmanjšala. Ponovno je opazno nasprotje med občutki in objektivnimi podatki o žrtvah. Po drugi strani smo na ravni posameznikov ugotovili statistično značilno (pozitivno) povezanost med občutkom ogroženosti zaradi virusa in kooperativnostjo (Pearson corr. = 0,316; p < 0,01). Ta je precej močnejša med drugim valom (0,439) kot med prvim (0,199) (Graf 5). Večji ko je posameznikov občutek ogroženosti, večja je kooperativnost; manjši ko je občutek ogroženosti, nižja je (sčasoma) kooperativnost. To je v skladu s teoretskimi in empiričnimi ugotovitvami o strahu kot dejavniku kooperativnosti.[5] Strah ima realne temelje v stopnji smrtnosti (CFR) oz. v empirično, vsakodnevno izkazanih statistikah glede težkih primerov in smrtnosti zaradi covida-19. S tem pojasnjujemo tudi prej ugotovljeno povezanost s starostjo. Do podobnih ugotovitev so prišli nekateri v drugih okoljih: Jørgensen in dr. (2021) so ugotovili, da je zaznavanje nevarnosti očiten dejavnik soglašanja z zaščitnimi ukrepi v Veliki Britaniji. Yildirim in dr. (2021) so v Turčiji kot take prepoznali občutke ranljivosti, tveganja in strahu.

Graf 5: Kooperativnost in občutek ogroženosti zaradi virusa.

*Vir: lastne analize na podlagi podatkov SJM 2020/1 in SJM 2020/3.*

5. Pri tem je pomembno, kaj je vir strahu: ali so to možne posledice, ki izhajajo iz nekooperativnosti, ali možne posledice, ki izhajajo iz kooperativnosti. Če gre za strah pred posledicami nekooperativnosti, se bo strah pozitivno povezoval s kooperativnostjo; če gre za strah pred posledicami nekooperativnosti, se bo strah pozitivno povezoval z defekcijo.

4. Ugotovili smo znatno povezanost med kooperativnostjo glede upoštevanja pravil varnega vedenja in namenom cepljenja. Skoraj polovica tistih, ki jih lahko štejemo za defektorje glede štirih ukrepov, se je izreklo za stališče, da se ne namerava cepiti. Znaten je delež neopredeljenih (»ne vem«) glede namena cepljenja. Delež pozitivno opredeljenih za cepljenje je v celotnem vzorcu pod 50 % in nakazuje problem, ki je postal očiten, ko je v Sloveniji stekel proces cepljenja: zanimanje za cepljenje je bilo v prvi polovici leta 2021 razmeroma nizko, zato Slovenija ni dosegla precepljenosti v načrtovanem času. Slovenija tako ni le med najbolj prizadetimi evropskimi državami zaradi covida-19, temveč je tudi med najmanj precepljenimi.

Graf 6: Kooperativnost glede ukrepov in glede cepljenja.

Vir: lastne analize na podlagi podatkov SJM 2020/1 in SJM 2020/3.

5. Odnos med kooperativnostjo glede epidemije in kooperativnosti glede okoljevarstva nas je zanimal iz dveh razlogov: 1. Kot preizkus teze o (ne)odvisnosti med področnimi kooperativnostmi oz. kot preizkus teze o splošnem kooperativnostnem nagnjenju. 2. Kot osnova za komentar k diskusiji, ki je vzniknila v Sloveniji med prvim valom: izraženo je bilo mnenje, da je vprašljivo, ali so starejši, ki v boju z epidemijo računajo na solidarnost mlajših, pripravljeni biti solidarni do (prihodnosti) mladih, kar zadeva okoljevarstvo.

Rezultati kažejo, da gre za zmerno močno pozitivno povezanost med obema vrstama kooperativnosti – višja okoljska kooperativnost pomeni tudi višjo kooperativnost glede epidemije (*Pearson's correlation* = 0,304). Glede dejavnikov kooperativnosti pa smo ugotovili podoben vzorec pri obeh vrstah kooperativnosti. Statistično relevantna dejavnika sta v obeh primerih starost in spol: starejši in ženske so bolj kooperativni tudi glede okoljevarstvenega vprašanja. Nizko in poklicno izobraženi v primeru okoljevarstva ne izstopajo kot bolj kooperativni (ni statistično značilne povezave) (Tabela 2). Menimo, da rezultati še ne upravičujejo domneve o splošnem kooperativnostnem nagnjenju, saj bi morali upoštevati več področij. Menimo pa tudi, da rezultati ne upravičujejo domneve o do mladih nesolidarnih starejših, kar zadeva ekologijo.

Tabela 2: Dejavniki okljske kooperativnosti in kooperativnosti glede ukrepov za preprečevanje covida-19 (jesen 2020).

	Odvisna spremenljivka: okoljska kooperativnost			Odvisna spremenljivka: covid-19 kooperativnost		
	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
spol	11,547	0,001	0,011	8,868	0,003	0,008
starost	21,125	0,000	0,056	30,504	0,000	0,079
izobrazba	0,975	0,404	0,003	0,846	0,469	0,002
zaposlitveni status	0,306	0,736	0,001	4,805	0,008	0,009
vernost	0,828	0,437	0,002	1,764	0,172	0,003
zaupanje v ljudi	2,549	0,038	0,010	2,272	0,060	0,009
	Adjusted R Squared = 0,070			Adjusted R Squared = 0,131		

Vir: lastne analize na podlagi podatkov SJM 2020/3.

6. Ugotovili smo, da so višjo raven kooperativnosti izražali tisti, ki so menili, da se ljudje premalo držijo ukrepov. Drugače rečeno: kritičnost do stopnje kooperativnosti drugih indicira višjo stopnjo kooperativnosti. Zadovoljstvo s kooperativnostjo drugih (»v glavnem se držijo ukrepov«) pa indicira nižjo kooperativnost. Ta povezava je očitnejša v drugem valu, ko kooperativnost na splošno upade. Kritično moramo oceniti, da na osnovi izbranega indikatorja ne moremo oceniti pojava pogojne kooperativnosti.

**Graf 7: Odnos med kooperativnostjo in mnenjem
o kooperativnosti drugih.**

Vir: lastne analize na podlagi podatkov SJM 2020/1 in SJM 2020/3.

7. Multivariatna analiza na združenem vzorcu prvega in drugega vala (Tabela 3) pokaže nepomembnost nekaterih in pomembnost drugih dejavnikov, ki jih je kot potencialno relevantne izpostavila bivariatna analiza: Izobrazba izgubi svoj učinek. Povezanosti ni. Tudi vernost, ki na ravni bivariatne analize kaže določen vpliv na kooperativnost, izgubi svojo moč. Pozitivna povezanost vernosti s kooperativnostjo na ravni bivariatne analize je učinek posredujočega dejavnika – (višje) starosti, ki se bolj povezuje z vernostjo.

Generalizirano zaupanje Slovencev, ki je (v mednarodnih primerjavah) nizko, ni dejavnik večje kooperativnosti glede epidemije znotraj slovenske družbe: to pomeni, da ljudje z višjim zaupanjem ne izražajo višje kooperativnosti. To pa ne pomeni, da generalizirano zaupanje ne uveljavlja razlik v kooperativnosti med družbami v smislu: višje ko je zaupanje, višja je kooperativnost.

Tabela 3: Dejavniki kooperativnosti – skupni vzorec iz meritve pomlad 2020 in jeseni 2020 (analiza variance z več faktorji).

	model 1			model 2		
	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
pomlad-jesen	68,082	0,000	0,035	92,147	0,000	0,049
spol	24,334	0,000	0,013	18,115	0,000	0,010
starost	30,468	0,000	0,046	9,150	0,000	0,015
izobrazba	0,548	0,650	0,001	0,432	0,730	0,001
zaposlitveni status	4,308	0,014	0,005	4,148	0,016	0,005
vernost	6,089	0,002	0,006	1,530	0,217	0,002
zaupanje v ljudi				5,246	0,001	0,009
zaupanje v vlado				10,781	0,000	0,024
občutek ogroženosti				38,567	0,000	0,079
	Adjusted R Squared = 0,115			Adjusted R Squared = 0,222		

Vir: lastne analize na podlagi podatkov SJM 2020/1 in SJM 2020/3.

Se pa kot dejavnik večje kooperativnosti v Sloveniji izraža zaupanje v vlado. Kako to razumeti? Zaupanje v politiko je v Sloveniji že dalj časa nizko, kar se izraža v nizki volilni udeležbi. Ta situacija je bila v času epidemije posebna po tem, da je prišlo do menjave vlade dan pred pričetkom epidemije. Sestavila se je vlada, ki jo vodi stranka SDS. Ta ima pod vodstvom Janeza Janše učinke družbene polariziranosti, ki po našem mnenju nima pozitivnih učinkov na kooperativnost glede epidemije. V prvem valu je vladi glede ukrepov ob epidemiji zaupalo (vrednosti 4 in 5 na petstopenjski lestvici) 32,6 % anketirancev, nezaupanje (vrednosti 1 in 2) pa jih je izražalo nekoliko več (35,3 %). V drugem valu se je zaupanje znižalo – vladi je zaupalo le še 28,9 % anketirancev, medtem ko je nezaupanje izražala skoraj polovica anketirancev (45,1 %). Zato domnevamo, da je ugotovljena (sicer šibka povezava) med zaupanjem v vlado in kooperativnostjo druga plat polariziranosti, ki ima negativne učinke na kooperativnost. Na te možnosti učinkov političnega dejavnika so v zvezi s pandemijo opozorili Van Bavel in dr. (2020), empirično Charron in dr. (2020), na splošno pa pred tem že Harell in Simpson (2016).

5 Diskusija

Uspešnost neke države v spopadanju s pandemijo lahko analiziramo tudi z vidika znanosti o družbenih dilemah, ki si je že pred desetletji za nalogo zadala raziskovanje človekove kooperativnosti. Menimo, da bodo post festum analize s tega gledišča produktivne tudi, ko gre za razlike v uspešnosti spopadanja s covidom-19 med širšimi kulturami na globalni ravni. Zlasti nekatere razlike so že očitne, ob tem pa obstaja obsežno znanje o medkulturnih razlikah v kooperativnosti glede dilem javnih dobrin izpred časa pandemije. Ko se bodo bilance glede covida-19 zbistrile, bo položaj posameznih držav (in kultur) najverjetneje v okvirih njihovih predispozicij za sodelovalno vedenje. Tako bo bržkone tudi s Slovenijo.

Čeprav so družbene dileme kot interdisciplinarna znanost zelo primeren teoretski okvir obravnave (ne)kooperativnosti v pandemiji, pa vseh odgovorov gotovo ni mogoče najti s te perspektive. Teoretska vprašanja, ki jih tu ne kaže odpirati, so: Kje so meje pojasnjevanja (ne)kooperativnosti s perspektive družbenih dilem? Ali v teoretski okvir družbenih dilem spada vsaka, kakorkoli motivirana (ne)kooperativnost?

Na osnovi opravljenih analiz lahko prepoznamo vrsto dejavnikov, ki so določali kooperativnost oz. defekcijo, ne moremo pa podati jasnega odgovora na vprašanje, zakaj se je Slovenija znašla med najbolj prizadetimi evropskimi državami. To pomeni, da bi bilo za celovit odgovor smiselno raziskovanje razširiti z drugačnimi vrstami podatkov, razširiti geografski okvir in uporabiti še druge metode, tudi kvalitativne. S temi bi bile vsekakor dostopnejše specifične osebne situacije, ki morebiti vplivajo na kooperativnost.

(1.) Če bi vztrajali pri uporabi javnomnenjskih podatkov in pri teoretskih izhodiščih družbenih dilem, bi bila priporočljiva mednarodna primerjava, v kateri bi Slovenijo primerjali z več primerljivimi evropskimi družbami, zlasti s sosednjimi in z bolj uspešnimi. Tu je odprto vprašanje nabor primernih variabel. Celovita evropska raziskava, ki bo to omogočila (npr. ISSP Health 2021, ki vključuje nekaj vprašanj na temo covida-19), je v času zaključevanja tega članka šele v pripravi.

(2.) Tako raziskavo bi bilo vsekakor smiselno dopolniti z analizo idejnih gibanj, ki so v tej ali oni državi privedle do (morebitne) nekooperativnosti nekaterih kategorij prebivalstva. Ko gre za odločne in vztrajne defektorje, bi bilo primerno izhodišče znanje o teorijah zarot (glej Ančić in Cepić 2021) ter spoznanja o vplivu spletnih družabnih medijev na (dez)informiranje in (ne)kooperativnost. Vtis je, da so ravno novi, digitalni načini ustvarjanja skupnosti v nekaterih okoljih prispevali h krizi skupnosti v smislu znižanega razumevanja in zavzemanja za skupno dobro.

(3.) Nekatere pomembne osnove za odgovor na vprašanje, kaj je šlo narobe, so že podali nekateri drugi slovenski raziskovalci. Izpostavimo analizo politik Alija Žerdina (2021). Avtor je na način letalske »črne skrinjice« skrbno in ažurno beležil vse tekoče ukrepe vlade ter jih izpostavil kritičnemu premisleku. Ni pa slovenske situacije sistematično primerjal z drugimi. Nekatere njegove ugotovitve je mogoče integrirati v pristop z vidika družbenih dilem: tako je ugotovil, da so poglavitni nosilci politične moči, ki so uvajali ukrepe, uživali zelo nizko zaupanje, s tem pa niso dosegali primernega odziva (kooperativnosti) državljanov. V tem kontekstu je še precej možnosti za presojo protikoronskih politik v luči razlikovanja motivacijskih, strukturnih in strateških ukrepov za reševanje (Kollock 1998) družbenih dilem.

(4.) Več epidemiologov je izpostavilo nekatera organizacijska vprašanja. Stroka epidemiologov naj bi bila premalo upoštevana (Kraigher 2021). Zato naj bi bilo zagrešenih več napak v komuniciranju s prebivalstvom in glede ravnanja v kritičnih situacijah, zlasti v domovih za ostarele občane, kjer je bilo približno polovica žrtev. K temu bi lahko dodali še vprašanje o (ne)upoštevanju družboslovnih strok.

(5.) Inovativno metodo, ki jo omogočajo moderne tehnologije, so ubrali so-delavci študije Od zgodbe o uspehu do katastrofe (Manevski in dr. 2020; Ružič Gorenjec in dr. 2021). Na osnovi Googlovih podatkov so analizirali količino in vzorce mobilnosti. Ugotovili so, da je vlada ob nastopu drugega vala za mesec dni zamudila z ukrepi, ki bi zmanjšali mobilnost. Če bi ukrepe za zmanjšanje mobilnosti sprejeli septembra, in ne šele novembra 2020, bi po njihovem modelu imeli za 80 % manj mrtvih.

Menimo, da bo šele na osnovi upoštevanja različnih pristopov in njihovih rezultatov sčasoma mogoče izoblikovati sklepe, ki bodo koristili v morebitnih bodočih primerljivih zdravstvenih krizah.

Zahvala

SUMMARY

Slovenia was one of the worst affected European societies as regards per capita fatalities from the COVID-19 pandemic. What might explain this? In this research paper, we look for sociological explanations. Theoretically, we view the pandemic as a public goods dilemma situation in which players (citizens) face a choice between their (immediate) individual interests and their (long-term) collective interests. In this context, we distinguish cooperative citizens from defec-

tors (free-riders). Our research goal is to identify the sociological characteristics of co-operators and defectors.

Method: The research is based on data collected in the Slovenian public opinion survey during the pandemic's first and second waves: in spring 2020 (N=853) and in autumn/winter of 2020/21 (N=1102), respectively. As indicators of (non)cooperation (dependent variable), we consider the following statements addressing the extent to which respondents had complied with a set of four recommendations for safe behaviour: 1) I do not socialise with people outside of my household; 2) I wash my hands more regularly and thoroughly than I did before the pandemic; 3) I go to the store only for necessary purchases; and; 4) I maintain a physical distance of at least 2 metres during necessary personal contact. As independent variables, we consider time, age, gender, type of employment, education, socio-economic status, concern for health, trust in the current government, religiosity, willingness to be vaccinated, and awareness of ecological issues. We propose seven hypotheses which we place in the context of the corpus of research and knowledge about social dilemmas.

Results: 1) The initially strong cooperation dropped considerably from the first to the second wave, especially in certain categories (for example, young people). The share of defectors, as defined in our research, rises from 10.7% to 23.5%. 2) Older citizens (Pearson corr. = 0.234) and women express higher levels of cooperation in both surveys. 3) Concern about health (fear) relative to the virus is another important factor in stronger cooperation (Pearson's corr. = 0.316 in both waves together; 0.439 during the second wave). 4) There is a positive correlation between cooperation as concerns COVID-19 and the willingness or intention to be vaccinated. Only 28.6% of defectors intended to be vaccinated. 5) There is a positive correlation between cooperation (Pearson's corr. = 0.304) with respect to COVID-19 and the indicator of ecological awareness. 6) More cooperative citizens (relating to COVID-19) are strongly critical of the non-cooperative behaviour of their fellow citizens. 7) Our multivariate analysis shows that religiosity as such is not a factor of stronger cooperation. It also shows that in a state where general trust is low, trust in politics is declining, and political polarisation is relatively deep, trust in the current government is slightly positively correlated to cooperation.

Discussion: The COVID-19 pandemic has been a challenge to which societies have needed to respond with greater cooperation among its members. We identify certain sociological characteristics of the co-operators and defectors in our research. It is evident that (more advanced) age, concern about health, trust in government and certain other variables are positively correlated to cooperation, and that younger segments of the population tend to be less cooperative.

However, we cannot claim to have found the main 'culprit' for the health crisis' relatively unsuccessful management in Slovenia. This may be because both our theoretical approach and method suffer from certain limitations.

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RECENZIJE KNJIG
BOOK REVIEWS

Klara Otorepec

hooks, bell: Naša pozicija: Razred je pomemben.
Ljubljana: Sophia, 2019.
224 strani (ISBN 978-961-7003-42-0), 18 EUR

V času, ko je »modno govoriti o rasi ali spolu« (str. vii), ne preseneča, da se tudi slovenske založbe vse bolj odločajo za prevode del znamenitih in že dolgo uveljavljenih feminističnih avtoric. Mednje nedvomno sodi ameriška pesnica, feministična teoretičarka in aktivistka bell hooks, ki je s svojimi deli temeljno zaznamovala feminizem drugega vala. Prek svojega dolgoletnega družbenega delovanja in pisanja je svoj kritični pristop razvila v metodologijo, ki jo danes poznamo pod imenom intersekcionalnost in ki upošteva preplet seksizma, rasizma in razrednosti, ki podpirajo kapitalistični »beli« patriarhat. Pri tem je ključnega pomena njena pozicija črnske ženske, prek katere naslavlja tako strukturni rasizem v družbi kot manko naslavljanja rasnih razlikovanj in diskriminacije znotraj samega feminističnega gibanja. Njena dela zaznamuje edinstven slog pisanja, v katerem s povezovanjem lastnih izkustev in vizijo emancipacijske politike širšemu bralstvu na dostopen in razumljiv način prespravšuje pogosto zamolčane družbene probleme.

V zbirki esejev *Naša pozicija: Razred je pomemben*, ki je izšla v prevodu Mojce Dobnikar in s spremno besedo Marine Gržinić, se bell hooks loti naslavljanja najbolj pereče in hkrati najbolj zamolčane strukturne neenakosti: razreda. Razmisleka se loti na način, ki je edini možen, če želimo o razredu resno spregovoriti – tako da prek avtoetnografskih motivov kritično ovrednoti in premisli lastno razredno pozicioniranost v svetu. Takšen pristop ji omogoči, da na razumljiv, a izredno kritičen način predstavi teoretsko kompleksno analizo razredne neenakosti, hkrati pa z njim ponudi tudi metodološko orodje, ki je predpogoj za razumevanje in posledično spreminjanje sveta okoli sebe. Med teorijo in prakso za bell hooks namreč ni praznega prostora. S tem ko iz sebe naredi objekt analize in popiše lastni proces razrednega ozaveščanja, ki je vpet v obdobje (ameriških) političnih, ekonomskih in družbenih sprememb od konca druge svetovne vojne do prehoda v novo tisočletje, pokaže, kako lahko šele prek lastne pozicije začnemo zares razumeti razredna in druga oblastna razmerja. Radikalnost takšne metodologije je nujna, saj se nam razredne neenakosti neprestano izmikajo in maskirajo kot rasne ali spolne neenakosti. Razred prav tako ni določen zgolj z višino individualnega dohodka in dostopnostjo do proizvodnih sredstev. Kot poudari Rita Mae Brown v svojem eseju *The Last Straw* (1974), ki ga povzema hooks, je »razred [...] veliko več kot Marxova definicija odnosa do proizvajalnih sredstev. Razred vključuje tudi tvoje vedenje, tvoje temeljne domneve, kakšnega vedenja so te učili, kaj pričakuješ od sebe in drugih, tvoje pojmovanje prihodnosti, kako razumeš probleme in jih rešuješ, kako razmišljaš, čutiš, deluješ« (str. 115). Zato je samorazkrivanje lastne pozicije izredno naporen proces, še posebej če ga preči intersekcija spol – rasa – razred, v kateri zavzemamo pozicije z manj družbene moči znotraj teh kategorij. To priznava tudi sama bell hooks, ko pove,

da je njen premik iz delavskega razreda v t. i. svet blaginje proizvedel številne proti-slovne občutke tako v njej sami kot v njenih bližnjih. Spregovoriti o razrednih razlikah kot črnka-ženska-delavka namreč pomeni zamajati rasno solidarnost in s tem iluzorno predstavo o tem, da rasizem na vse vpliva enako, hkrati pa nasprotovanje razrednemu zatiranju izzove strah, da bomo tudi sami postali revni. bell hooks kljub temu vztraja pri svoji metodologiji »Eden od načinov izražanja spoštovanja do tega sveta delavskega razreda je bilo pisanje o njem na način, ki bi bolj avtentično osvetlil našo realnost. Čutila sem, da bi s pisanjem o konstruktivnih vrednotah in prepričanjih tega sveta lahko sprožila prespraševanje stereotipov. Obenem nisem hotela postati ena izmed akademskih ljudi, ki izhajajo iz delavskega razreda in nostalgično fetišizirajo to izkušnjo, zato sem pisala tudi negativnih izkušnjah« (str. 164).

Svoje teorije in pisanega jezika ne vidi kot objektivne forme poročanja nepristranske opazovalke niti kot abstraktno razmišljanje privilegiranega in ekskluzivnega akadem-skega prostora, temveč kot prakso osvoboditve. To simbolizira tudi njen psevdonim, ki si ga je ob prehodu v akademski svet in z njim v višji družbeni razred nadela po imenu svoje babice. Izbor imena nakazuje na pomembnost sveta, iz katerega izhaja pri raziskovanju lastnih razrednih vrednot in političnih prepričanj, ter zavezanost temu, da svoj izborjeni glas uporablja za artikulacijo utišanih in prezrtih družbenih glasov. Njeno raziskovanje lastne pozicije nas v prvih štirih poglavjih obravnavanega dela najprej popelje skozi njeno otroštvo in odraščanje v revni družini na segregiranem ameriškem jugu v petdesetih in šestdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja. Njena izkušnja z revščino je posredna, saj odrašča v skupnosti, ki prek skromnosti, vzajemne pomoči in religioznega vzgajanja o spoštovanju revnih blaži učinke kapitalističnega sistema. Sočasno v patriarhalnem domačem okolju spoznava pomen ženske ekonomske neod-visnosti, zato svoje moči usmeri v študijske napore, ki obljubljajo možnost spremembe družbene pozicije. Ob prihodu na prestižno univerzo Stanford v sedemdesetih letih, kjer se sreča z belsko in črnsko elito, resnično spozna pomen razreda – ugotovi ne le, da je revščina izvor srama, temveč tudi strahu in sovraštva, da rasa ni vir solidarnosti in da je akademski prostor pridržan le za tiste, ki so se pripravljeni asimilirati v vedenjski in miselni kod srednjega in višjega razreda. Ob zaključku njenega izobraževanja se v družbi že povsem uveljavi predstava o revnih kot plenilcih, ki jo napaja ameriški mit o uspehu s trdim delom. Revščina tako postane dojeta kot posledica zavestne izbire ne-dela, ne pa strukturnih neenakosti plenilskega kapitalističnega sistema, in občutek solidarnosti zamenja strah za lastno ekonomsko blaginjo. Sodobna skupna obsedenost revnih in bogatih s potrošnjo pomaga ohranjati napačno predstavo, da je družba brez-razredna, saj imamo revni in bogati enake želje, vključno z željo po moči nad drugimi. Pri tem imajo po bell hooks ključno vlogo množični mediji in cenzura javnega govora o denarju, ki bi omogočila občutek ekonomske odgovornosti do drugih ljudi: »Veliko siromašnih ljudi po svetu množični mediji zapeljejo v prevzemanje ideološkega mišljenja in vrednot vladajočih razredov. Na ideološki ravni se v vsakdanjem življenju pridružijo bogatim pri varovanju razrednih interesov premožnih« (str. 85).

Svet hedonističnega potrošništva v nadaljnjih poglavjih razdela skozi prizmo rasiz-ma reformističnega feminizma, položaja revnih belcev v odnosu do temnopoltih revnih,

skozi kritiko gentrifikacije in medijske socializacije v prid bogatim ter z vidika razmaha problema mamil med mladimi. Tukaj se pojavi tudi težava knjige, saj se začetne osnovne teze začnejo ponavljati ter se porazgubijo v številnih pavšalnih in poenostavljenih trditvah, ki namesto v politični pristop k spremembi družbe prej vodijo v moralizem. Njeni opisi razrednega sramu, rasnega kapitalizma in kulture pohlepa so resda nazorno predstavljeni vidiki kapitalističnega reda, vendar jim umanjka kompleksnejša teoretska analiza, katere ne morejo nadomestiti anekdote in primeri iz njenega življenja. Prav tako umanjka podrobnejša razdelava pojmov, s katerimi operira v knjigi – konceptualizacija razreda je pogosto omejena zgolj na govor o denarju, ne pa tudi na vprašanje lastnine in produkcijskih sredstev oziroma izvora bogastva in revščine; rasa je razumljena tipično ameriško, torej kot naravna danost; njena spodbuda k solidarnosti premožnejših z manj premožnimi ostane v okviru obstoječega sistema, namesto da bi zahtevala sistemsko porazdelitev dobrin in reproduktivnega dela.

Njena trditev o tem, da je danes ključni problem revnih (in tudi drugih razredov) pomanjkanje lastne razredne zavesti, »ki bi jih ščitila pred sprejemanjem ideje, da njihovo vrednost določajo materialne dobrine« (str. 141–142), se pojavi na več mestih. To nakazuje, da gre pri zbirki esejev *Naša pozicija: Razred je pomemben* za poskus obuditve feminističnega etosa prebujanja zavesti iz sedemdesetih let, ki je stavila na aktivacijo posameznikove revolucionarne zavesti prek ozaveščanja o družbenih neenakostih. Ozaveščenost žal še ne pomeni organiziranega razrednega boja; in bell hooks tudi sama večinoma ponuja rešitve, ki so bolj lokalizirani upori kapitalističnemu sistemu kot pa poskus temeljnega preobrata. Toda pomembnejši učinek njenih esejev je, kot v spremni besedi opozarja Marina Gržinić, poziv k »osebni in državni odgovornosti – gre za poskus dekolonizacije uma zatiranih« (Gržinić, str. 193). Prek izpraševanja teoretskih predpostavk lastnih izkušenj in prikazovanja možnosti lastne preobrazbe se bori za ponovno vzpostavitev politike kot upravljanja skupnih zadev v korist skupnosti, obenem pa na poti do tega cilja bralstvu ponudi upanje, da je moč »živeti kljub razredni segregaciji – se proti njej boriti z dajanjem vrednosti življenju, ne životarjenju« (Gržinić, str. 205).

Marko Ribać

Pierre Bourdieu: Praktični razlogi. O teoriji delovanja.
Ljubljana: Založba Krtina, 2019.
193 strani (ISBN 978-961-260-122-5), 25 EUR.

Devetdeseto obletnico rojstva sociologa Pierra Bourdieuja (1930–2002) je v Sloveniji javno obeležil (le) prevod zbornika z naslovom *Raisons pratiques: Sur la théorie de l'action*, v slovenski jezik prevedenega kot *Praktični razlogi: O teoriji delovanja*, ki je izšel tik pred vstopom v pandemično leto 2020.

Da bi lahko celovito razumeli namen prevedenega dela, ga moramo najprej umestiti v niz številnih knjižnih objav, ki predstavljajo Bourdieujev znanstveni opus. Leta 1994, ko je bilo delo objavljeno, so bili vsi največji Bourdieujevi znanstveni dosežki že zgodovina. Za njim so bile empirične raziskave o Alžiriji ter dela o izobraževalnem in umetnostnem sistemu, ki so zaznamovala njegovo raziskovalno delo v šestdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja. Za njim so bila ključna dela sedemdesetih in osemdesetih let, kot so *La distinction* (1979), *La sens pratique* (1980), *Homo academicus* (1984), *La noblesse État* (1989) ali *Les règles de l'art* (1992). Za njim je bila ustanovitev revije *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* (1975), Bourdieu je tudi že zasedal stolico na *Collège de France* (1981), podelili so mu tudi že najprestižnejše priznanje v francoski znanosti *Médaille d'or du CNRS* (1993). Devetdeseta leta prejšnjega stoletja je tako v Bourdieujevem življenju in znanstveni produkciji zaznamoval predvsem intenzivnejši vstop v druga nacionalna akademska okolja in v mednarodni znanstveni prostor. To se je zgodilo z nizom vabljenih predavanj na največjih svetovnih univerzah, z deli, ki popularizirajo njegove empirične ugotovitve, ali s publicističnimi intervencijami v protineoliberalnih in protiglobalizacijskih bojih.

V to obdobje se umešča zbornik relacionalne zgodovine družboslovnih znanosti *Praktični razlogi: O teoriji delovanja*, hevristično delo, ki v medsebojna razmerja lucidno postavlja ključne Bourdieujeve koncepte, ki tvorijo jedro sistema njegove sociološke teorije. Temelji na transkripciji Bourdieujevih predavanj, ki so ustvarjena ali pa zelo hitro po izvirni izdaji prevedena v angleški jezik in omogočajo internacionalizacijo njegovih del, občinstvom pa podrobno razlago konceptov, metod in epistemoloških premis ter odpravo recepcijskih nesporazumov. Omogočajo tudi slikovit vpogled v drobovje francoske sodobne zgodovine, v procese razvoja sodobnih sistemov kulturne produkcije, v razprave o antinomijah sociologije itd. Zbornik je po svoji zasnovi podoben drugim tovrstnim zbornikom, kot so *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (1992), *Manet, une révolution symbolique: Cours au Collège de France 1998–2000* (2013), delno tudi, toda precej manj, *Méditations pascaliennes* (1997).

Kot didaktično delo skušajo *Praktični razlogi* skozi prikaz specifične (francoske) realnosti vzpodbuditi generalizacijo specifičnih logik, družbenih determinizmov in mehanizmov reprodukcije partikularnega (francoskega) prostora, medtem ko si prizadevajo preseči vse ključne dihotomije oziroma antinomije, ki jih proizvaja intelektualna delitev

dela: antinomijo med subjektivizmom in objektivizmom, med teorijo in empirijo, med zavednim in nezavednim, med intenco in nezainteresiranostjo, med delovanjem in strukturo. Zato se v nadaljevanju recenzije ne osredotočam na kritike posameznih segmentov knjige, za katero je uredniški odbor založbe Krtina presodil, da sodi v zbirko *Temeljnih del*, temveč na skopo odmerjenem prostoru z razgrnitvijo njenih temeljnih ugotovitev opozarjam na dve temeljni zagati, ki bi zaradi predolgega prevajalnega zamika (četrt stoletja) lahko botrovali zgrešeni in dekontekstualizirani interpretaciji prevedenega dela. Zdi se, da ima knjiga, ki poskuša razložiti sociološko koncepcijo *relacionalne* filozofije znanosti in *dispozicionalno* filozofijo delovanja (str. 7) trikotno narativno zgradbo. Prva tri poglavja knjige razlagajo objektivistične elemente Bourdieujevega konceptualnega aparata, kot so družbeni prostor, polje razredov (1. poglavje), šolski sistem (2. poglavje) in polje (3. poglavje). Četrto poglavje predstavlja vrh pripovedne zgradbe, saj kulminira v historizaciji geneze sodobne države in orisu mehanizmov njene kontinuirane (re) produkcije. Preostala tri – iztekajoča se – poglavja poskušajo integrirati objektivistične koncepte Bourdieujeve teorije s subjektivističnimi oziroma utelešenimi pojmi, kot *illusio*, habitus (5. poglavje), simbolno nasilje (6. poglavje) in sholastični pogled (7. poglavje). Dve vzajemno povezani spoznanji, kot sem že omenil, spodbijata najpomembnejše zastavke navedenega dela, ki želi izzvati utrjene mentalne (konceptualne) strukture družboslovne in humanistične skupnosti. Prvo spoznanje, ker je delo prevedeno v *slovenski* jezik, pripoznava učinke in posledice fragmentacije ter ignorance Bourdieujevske sociologije v Sloveniji, zaradi katere v prostoru vlada manko rigorozne aplikacije ključnih konceptov v empirično prakso. Drugo, s tem povezano spoznanje zadeva integracijske zmožnosti družboslovno in humanistično izobraženega občinstva v znanstvenem (pod) polju, ki mora »kulturno arbitrarnost družbenega sveta« (str. 80) preučiti topično: v vzajemnem združevanju spoznanj in produktivni integraciji niza koherentnih in logično elaboriranih teoretskih paradigem.

Prvič, *Praktični razlogi* bi morali biti podlaga močnega sociološkega programa, Bourdieujevske paradigme, ki bi z »množico kvantitativnih in kvalitativnih, statističnih in etnografskih, makrosocioloških in mikrosocioloških metod in meritev« (str. 12) uspela skonstruirati in odkriti temeljno diferenciacijsko načelo, ki strukturira distribucijo oblastnih form (raznolikih vrst kapitalov) (str. 42). Slovenska znanstvena skupnost v tem trenutku ne premore ustrezne – relacionalne – zgodovinske obravnave »zaporvrstnih stanj« raznolikih družbenih polj niti »objektivnih razmerij«, ki jih strukturirajo (str. 70–71). Koncept polj(a) v lokalni znanosti ni bil množično apliciran v empirično prakso že v času, ko smo zapuščali obdobje ekonomskega, sociološkega in kulturnega nacionalizma keynesianskega obdobja, zato niti ni bila izpeljana geneza postopnih zgodovinskih, tj. konjunkturnih transformacij tega načela in ni bila izpeljana zgodovina konstituiranja državnega monopola nad legitimnim fizičnim in simbolnim nasiljem (str. 43). Delne obravnave Bourdieujevih konceptov in mikroštudije lokalnih hierarhij – hvale vredne, kot so – ne ponujajo ustreznih relacionalnih zgodovinskih analiz, transformacije polja družbenih razredov, konstitucije (in transformacije) posameznih družbenih polj, dinamike bojev v družbenih prostorih ali razporeditve agensov in nosilcev specifičnih kapitalov v lokalnih poljih.

Prevod dela, ki naj bi tlakovalo pot internacionalizaciji Bourdieujevske sociologije, prihaja tudi v času, ko so nacionalna polja že globalizirana in močno transnacionalno integrirana. Empirične raziskave, ki bi analize dinamike družbenih polj zaprle v okvire metodološkega nacionalizma, ki je bil značilen za Bourdieujeve analize, in ne bi upoštevale integracije lokalnih formacij v mednarodni prostor, bi radikalno poenostavile relacionalne značilnosti ter neprimerno popačile dinamiko sodobnih družbenih polj. Podobno popačeno in dekontekstualizirano kritiko sodobnih institucionalnih procesov bi, drugič, dobili, če bi Bourdieujev konceptualni aparat poskusili razvijati brez spoznavnih sklepov teorije faznega razvoja kapitalističnega sistema in geokulture kapitalističnih območij (oboje prepričljivo teoretizira npr. Rade Pantić). Neupoštevanje strukturne transformacije relacij med (nekdanjo) periferijo in (nekdanjim) centrom ali transformacij globalnih in regionalnih razrednih struktur (pojava globalnih vladajočih ali globalnih srednjih razredov), ki so spremenile razredno strukturo nacionalnih držav, bi sodobno dinamiko družbenih procesov zaprlo v substancialistično mišljenje, proti kateremu je svaril Bourdieu: lastnosti skupin na določenih razrednih pozicijah v določenem trenutku namreč niso večne lastnosti te skupine ali razredne pozicije (str. 15).

Številni dejavniki (neoliberalna transformacija temeljev visokošolskega sistema, fragmentacija družboslovnega raziskovanja, komodifikacija znanstvenih objav) vse bolj onemogočajo rigorozno empirično preverjanje – potrjevanje ali spodbijanje – obče veljavnosti Bourdieujevih modelov v primerjalni, tako diahroni kot tudi sinhroni perspektivi. Zato kljub dragocenemu prevodu *Praktičnih razlogov* v slovenski jezik ostaja bojazen, da razgrnjeni Bourdieujevi koncepti in statistične metode, ki te koncepte empirično operacionalizirajo, prihajajo v raziskovalno skupnost, ki jih ni zmožna ustrezno empirično aplicirati, implementirati in spodbiti. Heterogena akademska »interpretativna skupnost« (B. Zelizer) bo zato ob prevodu, se zdi, še naprej reproducirala predvsem tri uveljavljene recepcijske strategije: koncepti bodo a) zapisani pozabi in ignoranci, b) namenjeni ljubiteljskemu prostočasnemu malikovanju konceptov brez aplikacije v temeljno raziskovalno delo ali pa bodo koncepti vneseni v univerzitetni kurikulum c), podpirali strategije distinkcije akademikov in akademičark, s katerimi ti dodatno utrjujejo svoje mandarinske pozicije.

Metka Mencin

Simone de Beauvoir: Starost II. Biti v svetu.
Ljubljana: Opro, Zavod za aplikativne študije, 2020.
328 strani (ISBN 978-961-94813-1-8), 29 EUR.

Dve leti po izidu slovenskega prevoda prve knjige Simone de Beauvoir *Starost* (2018), v kateri, kot nakazuje podnaslov *Stališče zunanjosti*, obširno analizira podobe in položaj starih in starosti v različnih kulturno-zgodovinskih obodbjih, je v slovenščini izšla tudi druga knjiga z naslovom *Biti v svetu* (2020). Osrednji predmet analize je fenomenološki vidik drugosti, ki ga de Beauvoir dosledno kontekstualizira kot vselej-že-družbenega. V svetu, ki staranje obravnava kot nezaželeno preobrazbo in stare kot breme, namreč biti star pomeni biti drugi: drugi_a ne le kot obstranec, obstranka, temveč tudi druga_i sami_ samemu sebi.

V *Uvodu* k drugi knjigi de Beauvoir svojo analizo povzame kot refleksijo odnosa človeka do svojega telesa in svoje podobe v starosti, do lastne preteklosti in do časa nasploh, do drugega in do sveta (str. 333). Kar takoj opozori tudi na omejitev (ki ji jo med drugim očita tudi avtorica spremne besede Hammarström): »*Ena od pomanjkljivosti mojega proučevanja je ta, da so vsi moji primeri privilegiranci*« (prav tam). Nad izborom »primerov« je marsikdo razočaran tudi zato, ker de Beauvoir v prvi knjigi z izjemno občutljivostjo opozarja na družbene in politične neenakosti, ki v starosti zaradi svojega kumulatvnega učinka izrazito naraščajo. A ta izbor pojasni z okoliščinami: privilegirani so žal »skorajda edini, ki imajo sredstva in čas pričati o svoji izkušnji«. In v svoji razpravi se specifičnega položaja vsakega od »primerov« ves čas zaveda, saj natančno razišče okoliščine vsakega od pričevanj: od starosti, poklica, aktivnosti, zdravja do prijateljskih, ljubezenskih in družinskih razmerij. De Beauvoir hkrati verjame, da je ta izbor manj usodna pomankljivost njenega dela, kot se mogoče zdi na prvi pogled: meni namreč, da izkušnje ljudi, ki so »empirično gradivo« njenega raziskovanja, pogosto »*presegajo njihov lastni primer.*« Težko bi srečali človeka, starega recimo osemdeset let in več, ki ni izkusil posledic psihofizičnega pešanja, dvojno zamejene prihodnosti (zaprte in kratke hkrati) ter s tem povezanih sprememb percepcije časa; objektivacije, naraščajoče tesnobe in negotovosti, povečane odvisnosti, občutkov krivice in krivde ... Vse to de Beauvoir razbira iz pričevanj in biografij številnih »velikih mož« (večinoma pisateljev in pesnikov, ki so zapustili največ avtobiografskih zapisov, pa tudi slikarjev, glasbenikov, znanstvenikov, filozofov, politikov) in redkih »velikih žensk« (te očitno niso bile dovolj velike, da bi bile zanimive za biografe, po drugi strani pa še danes o staranju bistveno več pišejo moški kot ženske). Breme sprememb v starosti nekateri_e občutimo prej, drugi_e pozneje, hitrost spreminjanja je različna, prav tako teža bremen, s katerimi se spoprijemamo različno, odvisno od naših (z)možnosti. A nihče, pa naj bo privilegiran politik, umetnik, flozof, znanstvenik ali izmučen rudar, gospodinja ali dama iz francoske visoke družbe, psihoanalitičarka, žena ali/in ljubica se bremenu ne more izogniti, če le dovolj dolgo živi.

V prvem poglavju, *Odkrivanje in sprejemanje starosti – izkušnja telesa*, de Beauvoir odpre problem objektivacije in že na začetku opravi z mitom, da smo stari toliko, kot se počutimo: starosti namreč ne definiram sama, starost se definira v odnosu med tem, kar sem za drugega, in samozavedanjem, ki je posredovano preko drugega (str. 337). Če ne prej, se te odnosnosti zavemo takrat, ko nas preseneti sodba drugih, da smo stare_i: šele preko tujega pogleda odkrijemo lastno starost. Ta tuji pogled pa ni katerikoli pogled, ampak gre za mladostno strukturo pogleda. Vse dokler se ne soočimo s to sodbo, s tem pogledom, lahko znamenja staranja in starosti z nekaj iznajdljive racionalizacije interpretiramo kot začasno bolezensko poslabšanje (str. 338), in če se spremembe dogajajo postopno, brez šokov, se jim lahko sproti prilagajamo, jih kompenziramo, kar nas varuje pred tem, da bi se prepoznale_i kot stare_i. Z nekaj nelagodja se dojemamo kot to, kar smo bile_i, le nekaj tegob smo si nakopale_i. Prvo poglavje je pravzprav pripoved o bolečini odkrivanja starosti in ne(z)možnosti sprejemanja sebe kot starega človeka. »*Starost tako težko sprejemamo, ker smo jo od nekdaj dojemali kakor tujo vrsto – ali sem potemtakem postala nekdo drug, čeprav ostajam jaz*« (str. 337)?

De Beauvoir govori o intelektualnem škandalu, s katerim se soočimo, ko moramo prevzeti »*stvarnost, ki nedvoumno je mi sami, ki se nas dotika od zunaj, a nam je hkrati nedoumljiva.*« (str. 344). Tega, kar smo za drugega, nadaljuje, ne moremo »*živeti na način za sebe*«. Ujeti smo v zanko neuresničljivosti (tu se sklicuje na Sartra), ki je »*moje bitje na distanci*« (prav tam). To nas lahko vodi do tega, da prezgodaj izjavljamo, da smo stari, ali do tega, da se do konca vidimo kot mlade (str. 346) in iz sebe ustvarimo karikaturo. Procesi staranja so, trdi de Beauvoir, za moške praviloma težji kot za ženske, ker zaradi ugodnejših poziciji v mladosti in zreli dobi z upokojitvijo izgubijo več (kar se z visoko stopnjo zaposlenosti in izobraženosti žensk seveda spreminja – op. M. M.). Tezo o težavnejšem staranju moških implicitno relativizira z analizo družbenih omejitev žensk na področju seksualnosti – ženske se ji zaradi načel spodobnosti in vloge objekta odpovedo prej kot moški, čeprav za to ni prav nobenih bioloških razlogov.

De Beauvoir je neprizanesljiva do vseh racionalizacij, ki pomagajo, da nam sprememb ni treba imenovati s pravim imenom: interpretira jih kot obrambni mehanizem in opozarja na ceno, ki jo moramo plačati zanje. Nič bolj prizanesljiva ni do osebnostnih sprememb, kot bi jih poimenovali psihologi, ki so pogost odgovor na telesne, kognitivne, socialne, ekonomske, simbolne izgube: ljubosumnost, častihlepnost, maščevalnost starih. Pa vendar, zapuščenost, zavrženost v starosti lahko, pravi de Beauvoir, tudi osvobaja: osvobaja dvoličnosti (str. 540). Zapuščeni in zavrženi si lahko privoščijo ravnodušnost do javnega mnenja – Aristotel jo je poimenoval »brezsramnost« – saj nimajo kaj dosti izgubiti. De Beauvoir navaja, kako so se celo na Japonskem, ki je bila konec šestdesetih, ko je pisala Starost, izrazito patriarhalna, ženske pri sedemdesetih letih ločile ter končno namesto za moža in otroke začele skrbeti zase (str. 541). A hkrati opozarja, kako se prav zaradi spoštovanja načela spodobnosti stari ljudje, predvsem ženske, odpovedujejo seksualnosti, umikajo v osamo in opuščajo vrsto aktivnosti. V tem konteksu velja omeniti njeno kritiko moralistov, ki trdijo, da starost človeka osvobaja telesa, kar naj bi bil pogoj za vedrost. De Beauvoir trditev zavrne, češ da je »*vztrajnost starčevskega libida precej pogosta*« (str. 377): teza o osvobajanju od telesa ni nič drugega kot slavljenje

gašenja seksualnosti, ki jo moralisti razumejo kot sužnost (str. 370). Tudi upokojitev, ki je zaradi spremembe socialnega statusa, zaradi občutka nekoristnosti za marsikoga težka izkušnja, lahko odpre prostore svobode, ker odpadejo obveznosti in pritiski, ki smo jih težko prenašale_i, in končno lahko počnemo, česar prej nismo utegnile_i. A samo če imamo na voljo tudi druge vire, ne zgolj čas. Starost nas lahko osvobaja tudi iluzij, s čimer ohranjamo bistrovidnost (str. 544). Vendar sta svoboda in bistrovidnost nekaj vredni le, če nas spodbujata k cilju, k načrtovanju in k temu, da bi načrte tudi uresničili, k transcendenci. Tega ne gre brati kot zagovor sodobnih teorij aktivacije starih, temveč kot odgovor na izgubljanje smisla življenja, izgubljanje radovednosti in strasti v starosti. De Beauvoir se tudi tu ne pusti zapeljati mitu svobodne izbire, prav tako ne upanju, da je »*bogato in pogumno življenje vedno nagrajeno z ,lepo starostjo'*« (str. 573): njena refleksija različnih odgovorov na izgube v starosti ne sporoča, da so vse poti odprte ali da je dovolj, če samo spremenimo pogled na lastno telo in na lastni položaj, pa se nam bo dobro godilo.

V *Sklepu* na vprašanje, »*kakšna bi morala biti družba, da bi človek na stara leta ostal človek*«, de Beauvoir odgovori, da bi morali z njim vedno ravnati kot s človekom (str. 596). Poudarek je na »vedno«: to, kar se dogaja starim, je določeno z ravnanjem z mladimi – z izkoriščanjem, s krajo eksistence, z nemožnostjo, da bi vplivali na svet. Da bi s človekom vedno ravnali kot s človekom, je treba spremeniti življenje (str. 597).

Zala Gruden

Paolo Freire: Pedagogika zatiranih. Ljubljana: Krtina, 2019. 194 strani (ISBN - 978-961-260-126-3), 20 EUR

Monografija *Pedagogika zatiranih*, ključno delo kritične pedagogike, je svoj prvenstveni prevod v slovenščino dočakala leta 2019, ko jo je na pobudo pedagoga in filozofa Tomaža Grušovnika, avtorja spremne besede, prevedla Blažka Müller. Delo je v Sloveniji pogosto študijsko gradivo pri študentih andragoških smeri, ki pa so do nedavnega prevoda iz izvirne portugalščine (verjetno) najpogosteje brali prevoda v hrvaški in angleški jezik. Na posvetu Besedne postaje (2019) ob izdaji prevoda knjige v slovenski jezik, ki je na Filozofski fakulteti potekal decembra 2019, je prevajalka poudarila, da je slaba kakovost prevoda v angleški jezik bralce lahko prikrajšala za niansiranost Freirejevega jezikovnega sloga, ki se povezuje tudi s teoretskim sporočilom dela, in jih s tem oropala presežne sporočilnosti literarnega dela. Da bi se sama izognila pomanjkljivosti omenjenega prevoda, je ohranila avtorjeve značilne kratke, udarne stavke, ki so včasih delovali kot samostojni odstavki: »Skoraj nikoli se revolucionarno vodstvo ne zaveda, da se nahaja v protislovju z množicami« (str. 155); pogoste apele, ki bralca vabijo, naj se skozi branje zave krivic, prepozna vzorce zatiranja: »Bodite pozorni na to, kako je Guevara [...]« (str. 160); in takoj zatem »Poglejte, kako je vodja, kot je Guevara [...]« (prav tam); pogosto ponovljene konstatacije, ki so pravzaprav preigravanje vedno iste ugotovitve: »V pokorjeni zavesti zatiranega kmečkega prebivalca bomo našli ponotranjenega zatiralca, kar pojasnjuje njihov strah in njihovo neučinkovitost« (str. 155). Avtorjev jezik je čustven, ekspresiven, subjektiven:

Menimo, da ni nujno uporabiti statističnih podatkov, da bi pokazali, koliko ljudi je v Braziliji in v Latinski Ameriki na splošno »živih mrtvecev«, so »sence« ljudi, moških, žensk, otrok, obupani so in podvrženi nenehni »nevidni vojni«, v kateri še tisto malo življenja, ki jim ga je ostalo, žrejo tuberkuloza, shistosomiaza, otroška driska, na tisoče bolezni, ki nastanejo zaradi bede, mnoge od teh pa zatiralci imenujejo preprosto »tropske bolezni« (str. 161).

Pa tudi iznajdljiv, domiseln. Prevajalka je poudarila, da so mnogi od izrazov, ki jih je prevajala, imeli večplasten pomen ali pomen, ki se je spreminjal s kontekstom. Tako se je težko odločala o prevodih izrazov, ki so pomenili na primer dualnost, saj so v drugem kontekstu pomenili razdvojenost ali dvojnost. Podobno je bilo z izrazi, ki sploh ne zvenijo kot »pravi«, izven konteksta zmotijo, med branjem pa postanejo zvezani in opredeljujoči deli besedila, na primer *nepreverjena izvedljivost*, *dejanje preverjanja*, *izobraževanje problematiziranja* in očlovečenje ali *počlovečenje*.

O jezikovnih in slogovnih posebnostih besedila smo se razpisali, ker te in njihov prevod sooblikujejo, poglabljajo sporočilnost knjige. Avtor v delu predstavlja idejo novega izobraževanja, ki ga najmočneje opredeljuje dialoškost; in prav to dialoškost producira skozi besedilo. V delu Freire v štirih poglavjih govori o osvobajanju zatiranih, ideji, ki jo je razvijal in izvajal skozi kulturne krožke. Freire najprej utemelji potrebo po

pedagogiki zatiranih, predstavi idejo zatiralcev, zatiranih in osvobajanja. V besedilu nagovarja bralce, naj se ne bojijo svobode, ki jim jo bo prineslo zavedanje njihove pozicije, vseskozi pa jih spremlja in uči, da se znajo z novonajdeno osvobojenostjo spoprijeti in na novo zaživeti. Posebej močna so v delu pogosto ponovljena sporočila o vzajemnem, kontinuiranem medsebojnem izobraževanju ljudi, ki jih zoperstavlja bančni zasnovi izobraževanja, pri kateri je upravljalec z znanjem učitelj, ki je učencem nadrejen. Bralci smo ob branju nagovorjeni, celo prisiljeni, da premislimo svoj položaj v sistemu, ki ga zasedamo, da premišljujemo pozicijo državljana in lastne vpetosti v lokalno okolje, vpliva na potek družbenega, državljanskega življenja, in da reflektiramo svojo pozicijo državljanov svetovnega severa ter tega, kakšna znanja in ideje produciramo do svetovnega juga. Ob koncu branja smo, hočeš nočeš, (vsaj malo) *prebujeni*.

Kljub temu da je *Pedagogika zatiranih* predvsem andragoško delo, v katerem avtor opisuje revolucionarno idejo preizobraževanja odraslih, pa smo mnenja, da nosi pomembne ideje tudi za pedagoške delavce, torej tiste, ki delajo z otroki. Te običajno obravnavamo kot objekt vzgoje, dokler nam ne pokažejo, da zmorejo nalogo vzgoje in samostojnega življenja prevzeti nase. Ker v omenjeni recenziji ni dovolj prostora za temeljitejše razvijanje misli, jo bomo orisali le na kratko in s tem tvegali nekaj nejasnosti.

Preoblikovalci šolskega sistema so ob kurikularni prenovi leta 1995 oblikovali odličen, notranje povezan in zanesljiv sistem vzgoje in izobraževanja. Prenovljeni šolski sistem je vključeval logične notranje spremembe učnih in vzgojnih načrtov, spremembe zakonov, izobraževanje strokovnih učiteljev, sistem ugotavljanja in zagotavljanja kakovosti ... A po skoraj 30 letih rabe se zdi, da ima sicer dobro zasnovan sistem vsaj eno pomanjkljivost – ne predvideva angažmaja otrok, vsaj ne na ravni obveznega (osnovnošolskega) in gimnazijskega izobraževanja. Angažma otrok in njihovi interesi so upoštevani predvsem v vrtcu, katerega značilnost je procesno-razvojna naravnanost, kar pomeni predvsem to, kar smo že navedli: doseganje razvojnih ciljev otrok z upoštevanjem njihovih interesov. To lahko interpretiramo tudi s Freirejevimi idejami; v obravnavanem delu se je namreč zavzemal za odpravo transmisijskega oziroma – kot ga je sam poimenoval – bančnega sistema izobraževanja, v katerem učitelj zaseda hierarhično višji družbeni položaj, predvsem pa je tisti, ki deli kapital, tj. znanje. Od učencev tak izobraževalni proces zahteva predvsem ponavljanje resnic, zapiše Freire.

Naša želja je, da bi slovenski šolski sistem iz *Pedagogike zatiranih* prevzel predvsem idejo o možnosti odpiranja za družbeni angažma. Institucije, v katerih lahko otroci izražajo svojo državljansko zavest, se družbeno angažirajo, so razmeroma neobstoječe, predvsem pa precej benigne. Tak je na primer otroški parlament, ki na videz ponuja angažma otrok, a v resnici pogosto angažira predvsem otroke, ki so že »del sistema«. Poročilo Sveta Evrope o participaciji otrok v Sloveniji (Narat in Rosič 2020) je pokazatelj, kako slabo slišani so glasovi otrok pri nas. Še težavneje od pomanjkanja možnosti za participacijo otrok pa je to, da so v strukture odločanja o prihodnosti mladih, v katere se vključujejo otroci, v rokah tistih udeležencev, ki imajo specifične lastnosti: so starejši, imajo visoke izobrazbene dosežke, prihajajo pa iz socioekonomskih in kulturno nedeprivilegiranih družin, niso pripadniki etničnih manjšin, nimajo vedenjskih, čustvenih in učnih težav, nimajo telesnih okvar (str. 20). Omenjene skupine otrok verjetno niso tiste,

ki si jih pred očmi naslikamo, ko govorimo o zatiranih iz naslova recenziranega dela. In čeprav je dajanje prostora otrokom za izražanje misli vedno pozitivno in pomembno, nas znova razočarajo ugotovitve Poročila Sveta EU: motivacija za aktivno državljanstvo se s starostjo zmanjšuje, tudi zaradi občutka otrok, da niso slišani.

Vprašanje, s katerim bomo zvezali Freirejeve misli in vprašanje sodobne pedago-gike, je: zakaj bi do »prebujanja« udeležencev družbe čakali do odraslosti? Mladi pogosto imajo jasne predstave o spremembah, ki jih hočejo doseči. To kaže na primer izjemno močno gibanje za podnebno pravičnost pri nas, velika obiskanost t. i. petkov za prihodnost in angažmaji mladih proti zapiranju izobraževalnih institucij, ki smo jim bili priča med pandemičnim zaprtjem. Seveda pa ni nujno, da se otroci takoj angažirajo v politično življenje. Gotovo bi bilo marsikateremu prijetno svoje želje izraziti na lokalni ravni, se združiti s skupino prijateljev in podati pobudo lokalni skupnosti za spremembo malo uporabljanega parkirišča v igrišče ali da se na obronku mesta namesto trgovinskih centrov zgradi park, ki ohranja naravno dediščino in ponudi zatočišče v naravi. Kot odrasli pogosto ne vemo, kaj bi si želeli otroci. A če jim damo priložnost, jih (ne nujno samo v šolskem okolju) izobražujemo dialoško; tako bodo sposobnosti samozavedanja ter vplivanja nase in na svojo okolico razvili sami.

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