

International Journal of Euro-Mediterranean Studies *Table of Contents*

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Effects of European Transnational Cooperation on the Promotion of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency in IPA countries: The Experience of the MED Programme

JAVIER GOMEZ PRIETO

MED Programme, France

YORGOS J. STEPHANEDES

University of Patras, Greece

This paper addresses territorial development through cooperation practices between European Union Member States and candidate countries. The European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) is an objective of the European Union (EU) Cohesion Policy and constitutes a key driver to reducing disparities in the Union's territory. ETC instrument integrates the participation of third countries, namely those included in the categories: Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) and European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI). The ETC transnational programme for the Mediterranean area (MED Programme) covers ten member states of the European Union and three countries belonging to the IPA instrument: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and Montenegro. In 2013, the MED programme approved eight transnational projects integrating IPA partners and addressing the use and promotion of renewable energy sources (RES) and energy efficiency (EE). According to the current transitional period that entails a concluding cycle 2007–2013 and opening 2014–2020, ETC evaluation aspects, applied to specific thematic areas, are essential for better implementation of future strategies and learning from previous lessons. In this context, the purpose of this paper is to analyse the effects of ETC on the promotion of RES and EE in IPA countries by considering the experience of the MED programme. The methodological approach includes: (1) data gathering process (2) desk research and analysis of results and (3) validation of obtained results. The added value of this research represents supplementary evaluation

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input related to the ETC intervention in non-EU member states within the specific contexts of RES and EE.

Key Words: EU cohesion policy, European territorial cooperation, IPA countries, Mediterranean, renewable energy and energy efficiency

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INTRODUCTION

The European Territorial Cooperation (ETC), also known as INTERREG, is one of the two objectives of the EU Regional and Urban Policy and constitutes a key element of reducing economic and social disparities between regions and cities. The INTERREG MED Programme is part of the ETC objective and is co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and by the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA) funds. The Programme's main purpose is to contribute to the long term development of the Mediterranean area and to strengthen transnational cooperation among peoples of 57 regions in 10 different EU member states and three candidate countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro (MED Programme 2011).

Article 86(4) of IPA Implementing Rules (European Commission 2007) provides the possibility for candidate countries to participate in the initiatives of transnational scale through the cross-border cooperation component.¹ In the MED Programme this cooperation has been possible through priority axes related to (1) innovation capacities, (2) protection of the environment and sustainable territories, (3) improvement of maritime accessibility, and (4) promotion of a polycentric MED development space.

In February of 2012, within the framework of priority axes (1) and (2), the Programme launched its fifth call for project proposals focused on innovative technologies, know-how, promotion of RES, and improvement of EE. Nineteen transnational projects were approved, of which 16 included partners of IPA countries. In total, 25 partners benefited from IPA funding (including Croatia) representing local and regional public authorities (PAs), energy agencies, economic development agencies, universities and port authorities. Related projects were carried out in about 2.5 years within



TABLE 1 Renewable Energy Objectives (Framework of Energy Community Treaty)

Contracting party	Share of RES 2009	Target RES in 2020
Albania	31.2%	38.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	34.0%	40.0%
Montenegro	26.3%	33.0%

[7]

the period 2013–2015 and addressed several challenges, such as energy management; energy planning, implementation and monitoring; funding; public procurement; and private-public-partnerships (MED Programme 2013).

With these cooperation projects, IPA partners received financial stimulus to boost action towards the accomplishment of RES objectives defined by national and macro-regional (Balkans) energy strategies. At the national level, the strategy documents are the National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAPs) which define the priorities and types of action on sustainable energy for the next years. At transnational scale, all members of western Balkan region have subscribed to the energy community treaty (Energy Community 2006) which establishes binding renewable energy objectives for 2020. For IPA members of the MED Programme, these objectives are summarised in table 1. As for energy efficiency, achieved levels are still low. Countries such as Bosnia lack national regulation on energy efficiency; while Albania and Montenegro have recently integrated EE measures in their national policies (Better Project 2013).

According to Article 22 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 (Council of the European Union 2006) on the establishment of an instrument for pre-accession assistance (IPA), the Commission shall regularly evaluate the results and efficiency of policies and programmes with a view to improving future operations at policy level (ex-post evaluation). In addition, the MED Programme is expected to continuously improve its operation with lessons learnt from previous experiences. An evaluation plan for the period 2014–2020 should be submitted to the Commission prior to June 2016.

Hence, the purpose of this paper is to analyse the effects of ETC in the promotion of RES and EE in IPA countries by considering

[8] the experience of the MED Programme. The added value of this research represents supplementary assessment input to the ETC intervention in non-EU member states within the specific contexts of RES and EE. Obtained results are expected to contribute to evaluation process to be carried out by the Commission (ex-post) as well as to input motivating improvements at both programme and project levels in future EU operations.

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND DATA

The methodological approach of this work integrates three principal steps: (1) data gathering process, (2) desk research and analysis of results and (3) validation of obtained results. The assessment approach refers to the guide Evalsed (European Commission 2013) by addressing thematic evaluation applied to RES and EE as well as generating additional data (e.g. survey analysis).

Data Gathering Process

Information of reference was obtained through programme guidance documents (e. g. Call for projects and terms of reference), websites of targeted projects, internal reporting documents used within monitoring process (e. g. activities reports, minutes) and deliverables (e. g. plans, studies, tools, publications). In some cases, the analysis considered draft versions of targeted documents as final versions were still in progress. Key bibliography as EU regulation, related initiatives, policy and scientific papers were also taken into account.

Desk Research and Analysis of Results

This part focused on screening the results delivered by IPA partners of Albania, B & H and Montenegro in the framework of the MED programme projects addressing totally or partially renewable energy and/or energy efficiency. Particular attention was paid to qualitative aspects linked to the typology of activities and results as well as to the ways in which IPA partners implemented activities oriented to increasing or stimulating the contributions from RES and EE in their territories.



Validation of Obtained Results

In order to validate the observations made at the previous step, a sample of IPA partners' representatives was designed. The sample was constituted by 7 IPA beneficiaries who participated in 6 different MED projects. Taking as reference all projects belonging to the fifth call of the MED Programme, which integrated IPA partners (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro), the sample constitutes a representativeness quote of 77% of partners and 90% of projects. Several exchanges with stakeholders and one survey of reference integrating 12 questions were the central elements of this step. The survey focused on 9 fields of analysis such as experience with IPA funding, continuation of activities after IPA grants, and synergies with transnational, national and subnational initiatives of reference. The survey also integrated quantitative aspects linked to the effect of IPA partners' contributions throughout four variables of reference: (1) Number of reduced emissions of CO₂ (Ton equiv); (2) Installed power with renewable energy (MW); (3) Energy efficiency achieved (%); and (4) Investments triggered (€).

[9]

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

The results of the analysis indicate that the European Territorial Cooperation promoted by MED Programme has contributed positively to the stimulated increase of actions in RES and EE in IPA countries. Table 2 summarises the main output at desk research step by identifying (a) general contributions obtained within the cooperation dynamics established amongst partners (projects level) and (b) specific output facilitated by beneficiaries exclusively in their territories (IPA Partners).

Accordingly, IPA partners benefited in a twofold way: on one hand, the project implementation itself contributed to increasing capacity building of beneficiaries in issues related to EU funding management, understanding and practicing territorial cooperation, exchanging knowledge and experiences with other partners and stakeholders, identifying and implementing good practices, developing joint approaches and methodologies, among others (Koeth 2014). On the other hand, activities developed by IPA partners led

[10] to the achievement of key results in their specific territories oriented to the fulfilment of the objectives established by the MED Programme (Terms of Reference) and by the specific projects of reference (as described in each project application form). As these objectives are based on innovation measures applied to renewable energy and energy sector; IPA partners delivered, inter alia, local RES and EE roadmaps, guidance materials for energy management, energy audits, establishment of local working groups, provision of evidence for improving local, regional and national policies, sustainable energy action plans (SEAPS), state of the art and feasibility studies in related sectors, awareness raising campaign, training sessions and pilot activities (Wider Project 2015).

Projects co-financed by MED Programme normally follow a three-phase approach consisting of (1) diagnosis and strategies, (2) testing and demonstrative actions (3) transferability and capitalization (MED Programme 2015). Accordingly, the analysed output of IPA partners is situated mostly in phases 1 and 2. In the first phase, IPA partners carried out activities and delivered output normally related to identifying initial parameters and/or benchmarks of the sector of reference (e.g. state of the art of renewable energy; criteria for green procurement). In the second phase, test activities and pilot actions were the most typical products. However, pilot approaches remain in many cases incomplete as monitoring elements and evaluation process were absent or not integrated. As for the third phase, little evidence of capitalisation strategies in IPA partners were found, and synergies with initiatives of reference were scarce.

A positive aspect observed in activities developed by IPA partners was the engagement of civil society through the 'establishment of local groups.' These nominated stakeholders' groups, integrating several perspectives of civil society, not only contributed to better address local strategies and enriched the quality of the results but also meant additional support to awareness-raising considering the benefits of renewable energy and energy efficiency in terms of environmental quality and economic growth.



Effects of European Transnational Cooperation

TABLE 2 Summary of Output Delivered by MED Programme Projects Integrating IPA Partners and Addressing RES and EE in the Period 2007–2013

Projects/main outputs from contributions at project and partner level

GRASP (www.grasp-med.eu)

Joint contributions by projects' partners (including IPA)

Procurement System Analysis: Transnational Mapping and design of Common Operating Model; Knowledge database on e-procurement and solutions implemented by public operators in the fields of renewable energy and energy efficiency; Transnational networks; E-green procurement toolkit for supporting energy-efficient and renewable-based products and services; Pilot actions (common methodology, implementation and assessment).

Specific IPA partners' contributions

City Development Agency East Sarajevo-RAIS, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Establishment of Advisory Board and Evaluation Board; Benefited 16 SMEs directly; Regional and Comparative analysis; Registration of 10 products into the database using GRASP-DBA tool; GRASP seminar: Green procurement and energy efficiency technologies; Promotional audiovisual material.

University of Vlora, Albania: Regional analysis and comparison report related to e-procurement in Albania; Education materials and organization of theoretical training seminar in Tirana, Albania; Creation of the database for SMEs; Development of modules of the GRASP application, DB platform (module login, sign up, password reset, PA profile and SME profile template); Preparation of the specifications for the appropriate server configuration (toolkit).

ENERGEIA (www.energeia-med.eu)

Joint contributions by projects' partners (including IPA)

Joint methodology for renewable energy sector mapping; Good practices in supporting entrepreneurs in the renewable energy sector; Regional collaborative plans; Report on business support paths; Guide for pilot action implementations.

Specific IPA partners' contributions

SERDA Sarajevo Economic Region Development Agency, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Regional Survey on the renewable sources in B&H, including a SWOT and a CAME analysis of sector; establishment of working local involving policy makers at the Federal ministry of industry, energy and mining; Good practice selection indicating the first private company in B&H which is producing electricity from renewable energy sources 'Intrade-energija'; Pilot Actions focused on education of business support actors and business ideas or start-ups through workshops on topics as finance; Actions to raise the awareness in the field of renewable energy, as well as on innovation, research and development, technology transfer strategies and business models.

[11]

Continued on the next page

TABLE 2 *Continued from the previous page*

Projects/main outputs from contributions at project and partner level

REMIDA

Joint contributions by projects' partners (including IPA)

[12] Local EE and RES roadmap; Adhesion Support to the covenant of mayors in 9 municipalities; Sustainable energy action plans; Schemes of Private Public People Partnerships; Operational/investment assessment analysis; Investment plan; Handbook on case studies; Pilot actions.

Specific IPA partners' contributions

Capital City Podgorica, Montenegro: Constitution of local working group; Inputs for the definition of sustainable energy action plan Municipality Gračanica (including baseline emissions definition and calendar of activities); Identification of best practice on energy efficiency and public-private-partnership in B&H; Awareness raising activities, e.g. Organization of the Open Day.

WIDER (www.wider-project.eu)

Joint contributions by projects' partners (including IPA)

Joint measures to favour innovation for eco-smart housing for elderly; Pilot activities management and implementation (eco-innovation vouchers to SMEs); User feedback Report; Networking strategy/plan.

Specific IPA partners' contributions

SERDA Sarajevo Economic Region Development Agency, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Organization of 5 scenario local workshops; Innovation vouchers to 7 Bosnian small and medium enterprises working on energy efficiency and a sustainable and holistic approach towards Silver economy, eco smart housing and active ageing of the elderly: (1) Bright home my home, (2) Senior Tourism (3) urban roof garden (4) Sustainable and independent (5) Termoprost (6) Homes certification (7) Epsimax; Co-organization of Transnational Capitalisation Event on 'Eco-Smart Housing for Elderly (hosted by Central Europe Initiative, Trieste).

E2STORMED (www.e2stormed.eu)

Joint contributions by projects' partners (including IPA)

Regional Working Groups on Energy Efficiency; Storm water management system; Decision Support Tool on scenarios related to water storm management in terms of costs, benefits and CO₂ emissions reductions; Common approach for pilot activities on Greenroofs.

Specific IPA partners' contributions

Old Royal Capital Cetinje, Montenegro: Pilots on conventional drainage in historic centre and new development area (Gruda Donje polje); Water reuse benefits, runoff transport, flood protection, building insulation; Inputs to urban planning process of Old Royal Capital Cetinje; Strategic action plan; Constitution of local Working Groups on Energy Efficiency.

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TABLE 2 *Continued from the previous page*

Projects/main outputs from contributions at project and partner level

GREENPARTNERSHIPS (www.greenpartnerships.eu)

Joint contributions by projects' partners (including IPA)

Approaches definition for implementation of energy strategies; Common model for comparison of existing implementation approaches; Common list of obstacles in implementation of local energy strategies; Transnational Expert Working Groups; Database of existing models, best practices, methodologies and indicators on implementation of energy strategies; Guide for efficient implementation of local energy strategies by forming local partnerships.

[13]

Specific IPA partners' contributions

Agricultural University of Tirana, Albania: Pilot activity, School of Manza municipality, Albania. Use of biomass and municipality waste to produce energy for schools and kinder gardens including awareness raising and training courses; Establishment of local action group; Awareness raising events (e.g. open days, workshops); International conference: Green Energy and Environmental Science in Albania.

Hydro Engineering Institute Sarajevo (HEIS), Bosnia-Herzegovina: Pilot activity, increasing energy efficiency in eco-schools and public administration buildings.

Elementary School Vrhbosna and Gymnasium Dobrinja in Sarajevo: Feasibility study on creation and support fund for energy efficiency housing; Energy audit; Awareness raising campaigns in schools and public buildings administrations; Establishment of local action group.

Institute for Strategic Studies and Prognoses, Montenegro: Feasibility study on installation of hydro power plants in Montenegro; Pilot activity, connection of mini-hydropower plant Jezerstica to the energy network; Sustainable energy action plan; Establishment of local action group; Awareness raising events (e.g. open days, workshops).

Survey of Stakeholders

With an aim to count on the vision of IPA beneficiaries and validate collectively the observed results, the survey was addressed to a representative sample of partners (see details in methodological chapter), contained 12 questions and focused on 9 different fields of analysis as follows:

- 1 *Experience in management of IPA funding.* About 30% of surveyed partners indicated that MED Programme and co-financed project of reference allowed them their first experience in IPA

[14]

funding management. As for the remaining 70% of partners, IPA funding management experience oscillates between 2.5 (40%) to 6 years (30%). The main ETC programmes, where these partners have acquired related experience, were, in order of importance, South East Europe, IPA-Adriatic, Croatia-Montenegro CBC, Albania-Montenegro CBC and B&H-Serbia CBC. *Fields of intervention.* Energy efficiency and renewable energy were the main fields of intervention by IPA partners in their respective projects of reference. Seventy percent of analysed partners identified EE as their principal field of intervention in their territories (primarily 'cities'), with 'buildings' being the main target of related activities. Concerning RES, 30% of partners focused their interventions notably on solar thermic, mini-hydro power, biomass, and wind technologies.

- 2 *Typology of activities.* IPA funding granted to surveyed partners was allocated to several types of activity according to working plans and projects' specific objectives. For 42% of partners, the most important activities were those oriented at obtaining a general picture of the area of intervention (e.g. mapping, analysis and feasibility studies). For 30% of partners, pilot activities and demonstration actions were identified as the categories covering a substantial part of working plans. The remaining 30% corresponds to training, dissemination and communication activities. Capitalisation activities were scarce being noticed in 10% of the sample.
- 3 *Typology of deliverables.* Common products delivered by projects were mostly in form of reports, studies and publications. According to the obtained answers, the following deliverables were identified by IPA partners as the most important ones: Report on pilot activities (85% of partners), good practices identification and public consultation (71%), report on communication and benchmarking studies (57%), databases and reports on the state of the art (42%), tools and good practice implementation (28%). Additionally, 100% of surveyed partners indicated that these types of deliverable and associated



activities were the most appropriate for the achievement of their expected objectives.

- 4 *Project quantitative contribution.* This analysis field focused on four quantitative variables of reference: (1) Number of emissions of CO₂ (Ton equiv); (2) Installed power with renewable energy (MW); (3) Energy efficiency achieved (%) and (4) Investments triggered (€). For the first two variables, 100% of screened structures did not provide any information. As for values related to energy efficiency achieved and investments triggered, only two partners answered, indicating 30% and 2.539,55 € respectively. According to comments provided by partners, this absence of information can be a function of several reasons such as: project methodologies do not allow measurement and/or calculation; project stage is too early to allow obtaining the values; and lack of knowledge and skills to make calculations. [15]
- 5 *Perception on synergies with local, regional and national policies.* IPA partners established synergies with similar initiatives and policies, notably at the national and regional level. Seventy-one percent of the sample perceived these national and regional synergies as ‘satisfactory,’ while 14% considered that they were ‘excellent.’ With regard to local policies, established synergies were perceived as ‘satisfactory’ by 42%; ‘very good’ by another 42%, and ‘excellent’ by 16%. On the contrary, the level of synergies established with transnational initiatives (e.g. other projects, initiatives for Balkan or Mediterranean regions) was limited to 28% of partners, i.e., those who integrate Horizon 2020 and United Nations projects in their activities.
- 6 *Public targets and number.* Public targets identified by partners were in most cases Small and Medium Enterprises (90% of the sample). Other types of target corresponded to the public sector; within these, local authorities were addressed by 85% of partners, regional authorities (71%) and national authorities (42%). In addition, partners focused on other specific key targets, such as: consumers (71%), citizens (42%), students

[16]

(42%), and technicians (42%). Concerning the number of beneficiaries achieved by IPA partners in their specific territories, 85% of the sample estimate that project activities covered between 100–1000 beneficiaries, while the remaining 15% indicate that they achieved between 10.000 and 100.000 beneficiaries.

- 7 *Continuation of activities after the end of IPA grants.* Partners' strategies allow already the identification of ways to continue activities after the end of IPA grants. In 85% of cases, screened stakeholders see IPA funding through European territorial cooperation as the clearest way to assure continuation. From a thematic point of view, the core object of new ideas is identified in wind and solar sector (renewable energy) and public buildings and eco-smart housing (energy efficiency). Most partners will work on activities related to evolution from mapping towards investors' engagement, public procurement, capacity building mostly focused on public authorities and SMES, implementation (e.g. urban plans, SEAPS and good practices), awareness raising, follow-up actions of pilot activities, as well as replicability.
- 8 *Main difficulties faced in project implementation.* Financial difficulties derived from the slow payment process and reimbursements of expenditures were identified by 42% of sample as main administrative obstacles. Payments in advance corresponding to 10% of partners' budget are perceived as insufficient. From a thematic point of view, IPA partners considered that most important difficulties lie in national regulations gaps and incompatibilities with EU regulation, acquis criteria achievement.² and lack of knowledge, experience and skills of public targets.

CASE STUDY: GRASP PROJECT AND GREEN PROCUREMENT IN IPA COUNTRIES

An example of specific contributions is given by outlining the case of two IPA partners in project GRASP (Green pRocurement and Smart city suPport in the energy sector) that developed and tested



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[17]

FIGURE 1 Main Barriers Faced by Public Administrations of Albania in the Use of e-GPP

a method for electronic Green Public Procurement (e-GPP). The two IPA partners were from Albania and B&H (GRASP 2015).

Desk Research and Analysis of Results

Analysis of research results indicated that in Albania all knew what e-GPP is and were aware of their National legislation. All PAS use the National Public Procurement System but none uses Green Procurement Policies during tendering. Even though all of the questioned SMES stated that they offered green products, most did not know the requirements of the products/services they are offering. Save time, save money, and gain flexibility are the main reasons for PAS to use e-GPP. The main barriers that they face in the use of e-GPP are a higher cost of green products/services; lack of information and useful tools; and insufficient demand for green products/services (figure 2).

The main reasons for SMES not to participate in an e-GPP are the lack of information, lack of interest, and the low probability of success (figure 3).

For SMES, the main barriers for participating in an e-GPP are the insufficient demand and high cost for green products/services. Both PAS and SMES stated that they would like to receive training on: the identification of specs for Green products/services; and Quality Management and manuals elaboration.

In B&H most questioned users (PAS and SMES) knew, or at least had an overview of what Green Public Procurement is. However, almost all were not aware of the National and Regional Regulation




FIGURE 2 Main Barriers Faced by SMES of Albania in the Use of e-GPP

[18]

in GPP, and this is mostly due to lack of legislation, interest, information and education. Both SMES and PAS knew what e-GPP is, but they did not know if a National Regulation on electronic Public Procurement exists in Bosnia-Herzegovina; nor did they know its content. Nevertheless, the PAS seemed to have a bit more knowledge on these matters compared to the SMES. Even though 10/16 questioned SMES stated that they offered green products and services, only one was familiar with the requirements of the products/services he is offering, whereas the majority of the PAS (10/17) stated that they were not familiar with SMES that offer green services/products.

The main reason why PAS are not using electronic public procurement, is a lack of technical resources. This is followed by a low perceived probability of success, and lack of interest. Lack of legal experience and lack of information are the main reasons that none of the questioned SMES has ever participated in an electronic format e-GPP. Other important reasons are a lack of necessary skills, lack of time, and lack of human resources. For both PAS and SMES, the main reasons for participating in an electronic GPP are saving time, saving money, and environmental commitment – all equally important.

The most important barriers, identified by the SMES in accessing GPP, are: higher cost of green products or services, lack of information and useful tools on administration, long process of bureaucracy, and lack of coordination between regional and national PAS. For the PAS the main barrier for accessing GPP is the lack of information



and useful tools on the Administration side; which is followed by a lack of legal experience, and a higher cost of green products or services.

Regarding the training they would like to receive, the SMES are more interested in GPP legal framework and manuals elaboration. [19] Both SMES and PAS would like to be trained on IT tools for Energy Efficiency. Concerning the seminars about enterprises certificates, the SMES are mainly interested in seminars about Environmental management systems, Eco design management, Eco-labeling and Energy management systems standards; whereas the PAS would like to attend seminars about Eco labeling, Environmental management systems, Eco design management, Energy management systems standards, and Carbon footprint. PAS show greater interest in receiving training compared to the SMES.

Validation of Results

For validating research results, all GRASP partners piloted or tested the electronic Green Public Procurement tool developed by the project. Each partner selected a specific EE/RES category to test. The results were evaluated through the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) tool, developed by GRASP. This tool was mainly designed to compare two similar products, i.e. one with a lowest up-front price, and the other with a sustainable lowest price (green product). The LCC tool also provides (a) the calculation of the absolute cost of a new product by analysing its lifetime cost, and (b) the valuation of a new substitute product, which is based on examining the savings produced by this product. Having completed the evaluation, the winning product can be compared to others, in order to select the best option based on LCC. The aim of this tool is to show that the misunderstanding that green products are more expensive is often false, especially in long-term projects.

In the case of the University of Vlora (ALB), an auction tender was tested with reserved procedures and the lowest price as the award criterion. The tender was carried out with the participation of five SMES of the IT sector. Over the five-year period, the environment-friendly product failed to save more money than the

TABLE 3 Results of Testing Tool for Natural Gas

Category	Item	Lowest price	Highest price
Energy costs	Price of energy (€/l)	0.57	0.57
	Energy consumption (W)	26741.00	10899.00
	Lifetime energy cons. (kWh e/t)	668,534.50	272,466.00
	Total energy costs	383,070.27	156,123.02
Emissions	CO ₂ per kg (kg)	0.20	0.20
	Total CO ₂ avoided (t)	0.00	79.21
	Economic value of CO ₂ (€/t)	7.02	7.02
	Total econ. value of avoided CO ₂ (€)	0.00	556.10
Total life cycle costs		383,070.27	155,566.94

NOTES Calculations for 25 years, average usage time 1000 h/year.

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up-front lowest price alternative. However, it saved 0,124 tons of CO₂ compared to that alternative.

In the case of RAIS (B&H) the test-tender was an open procedure for the selection of facade works for the Administrative center of City of East Sarajevo, with the classical method compared to the GRASP method. The case has to do with a building retrofitting operation that uses multiple forms of energy source. Three different sources had to be taken into consideration: natural gas, fuel oil, and electricity. The overall cost is calculated as the sum of three different LCC sheets.

Table 3 describes the changes in the consumption of natural gas, electricity and fuel oil. Compared to the original building, the improved one obtains use of natural gas that is reduced by 50%. Beyond the energy saving that is due to the reduction of fuel consumption, the operation allows the reduction of CO₂ emissions. Table 4 shows the difference in electricity before and after building retrofitting. In this case the consumption of energy is higher in the improved building. Table 5 describes the use of fuel oil. Energy consumption for the improved building is zero, while prior to retrofitting the consumption was high (13764 l). The final assessment is based on the sum of the total LCC of all three different energy sources; it indicates that the environment-friendly option carries lower LCC but higher CO₂.



Effects of European Transnational Cooperation

TABLE 4 Results of Testing Tool for Electricity

Category	Item	Lowest price	Highest price
Energy costs	Price of energy (€/l)	0.04	0.04
	Energy consumption (W)	166,146.00	300,514.00
	Lifetime energy cons. (kWh e/t)	4,153,650.75	7,512,846.50
	Total energy costs	147,039.24	265,954.77
Emissions	CO ₂ per kg (kg)	0.39	0.39
	Total CO ₂ avoided (t)	0.00	-1296.89
	Economic value of CO ₂ (€/t)	7.02	7.02
	Total econ. value of avoided CO ₂ (€)	0.00	-9.104.20
Total life cycle costs		147,039.24	275,058.97

[21]

NOTES Calculations for 25 years, average usage time 1000 h/year.

TABLE 5 Results of Testing Tool for Fuel Oil

Category	Item	Lowest price	Highest price
Energy costs	Price of energy (€/l)	1.04	1.04
	Energy consumption (W)	13764.00	0.00
	Lifetime energy cons. (kWh e/t)	344,087.66	0.00
	Total energy costs	357,162.99	0.00
Emissions	CO ₂ per kg (kg)	0.27	0.27
	Total CO ₂ avoided (t)	0.00	94.62
	Economic value of CO ₂ (€/t)	7.02	7.02
	Total econ. value of avoided CO ₂ (€)	0.00	664.30
Total life cycle costs		357,162.99	-664.26

NOTES Calculations for 25 years, average usage time 1000 h/year.

CONCLUSIONS

In the period 2007–2013, the MED Programme contributed to increasing capacities of IPA partners engaged in projects of the programme 5th call. The analysed results were achieved by exercising European Territorial Cooperation amongst Mediterranean partners with a direct effect on the stimulation of use and promotion of RES and EE in IPA territories.

Achieved results should be considered as interface of new interventions in same or similar thematic and targeted territories. Although project outputs are of varied nature they could be used indi-

vidually or collectively to define starting points, references or baselines of future projects and initiatives.

[22] The MED Programme, along with most ETC Programmes, is placing high emphasis on capitalisation strategies addressed by projects and partners, which should be able to either improve what exists or create new and innovative solutions, based on acquired experiences. Accordingly, future IPA interventions should be more ambitious when addressing capitalisation in their daily activities.

At European Level, at least 12 different programmes exist which address cross-border and transnational cooperation through IPA funding. For the period 2014–2020 the instrument IPA will dedicate € 11.7 billion to support new projects. Accordingly, joint exercises at programme, project and partner level, looking for the enhancement of synergies between several initiatives (financed with both EU fund and others), would represent improvements and advancements in the efficient uptake of funding and related activities.

Measurement of projects' impact in quantitative terms provides additional and more concrete elements for assessing related activities. Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency interventions should integrate more extensively key indicators (e.g. renewable energy triggered), not only to allow better evaluation but also to follow specific objectives established by the Energy Treaty Community and Directive 2009/28/CE.

The case study of GRASP project provided evidence on green e-procurement applied to the RES and EE sectors. The experience reflects both the challenges and opportunities derived from integrating green practices in Public Administrations and SMES of Albania and B&H. Obtained results suggest the potential of implemented tools to motivate changes and improve policies at subnational and national sector.

DISCLAIMER

The scientific output expressed does not imply a policy position of the European Commission. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use which might be made using this publication.



NOTES

- 1 In the period 2007–2013 IPA implementation was based on five components: transition assistance and institution building, cross-border cooperation (CBC), regional development, human resource development and rural development.
- 2 Acquis is intended as the conditions and timing of the candidate's adoption, implementation and enforcement of all current EU rules. [23]

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The Mediterranean Moment in Israel: From National Borders to Geo-Political Zones

DAVID OHANA

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel

In the following article I shall analyze the rise of the support for the Mediterranean idea in Israel. I shall investigate and interpret the debate on the emerging Israeli Mediterranean identity through interviews with public figures and writers, and through media reports. The idea of a Mediterranean identity is not a foreign, imagined notion but rather an authentic expression of people living in the Mediterranean region. In Israel, the idea arose dialectically from the weariness of the Israeli people with the political dimension of the conflict with their Arab and Palestinians neighbors on the one hand, and on the other, from an increasing recognition of the importance of regional identity.

Key Words: Mediterranean moment, Israel, geo-political zones

TOWARDS A NEW GEO-POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

I propose to take a fresh look at the question of geopolitical borders between Israel and its Arab neighbors in a Mediterranean perspective. The question of borders has been the main issue facing the State of Israel since its foundation in 1948. Its temporary borders are not only a political matter and a problem of security with regard to Israel, the Arab states (and the Palestinians in particular), and the international community. Israel's borders are first and foremost a matter of its national identity, its place in its geographical area and its self-perception between east and west (Nocke 2009; Ohana 2011). Israel's self-definition with regard to its borders and its neighbourhood is what will determine its future (Hochberg 2011, 41–66; Ohana 1999, 81–100).

The Mediterranean option permits a new view of the Israelis' evolving spatial identity. In this article I am tracing the vicissitudes

[26] of Israel's Mediterranean option. What place, if any, has the possibilities open to the Israeli identity? Which geo-cultural group in the Israeli identity does it belong to: the Middle-Eastern, the Mediterranean, the European, the global village? Is the Mediterranean option, as a cultural and political possibility, in which Israel is not foreign to the region and not cut off from the West, intended as a programme for the future?

Borders, as formally defined, mark a clear distinction between states, set a precise dividing line between peoples. The term 'zone,' on the other hand, is liminal and less divisive than the term 'border.' 'Zone' permits one to speak of spaces, even shared spaces; there is no single demarcation line, it is not political and not unequivocal. In that context, one can speak of geopolitics, secondary spaces, common areas, and spheres of environmental, cultural and other forms of cooperation which transcend national and political boundaries (Newman 1998, 1–16). Thus, concerning the future geo-cultural map of Israel, I will speak of the Mediterranean zones that connect Israel to its neighbours rather than of divisive political borders (Ohana 2000, 48–53).

Following the intensive discussion in Israel in the last two decades concerning the Mediterranean identity, I analyze the possibility of a discourse that is concerned with zones instead of borders, a discourse which shifts the focus of the discussion from the political aspect of the Middle East, a political space defined through a colonialist discourse of the French and British (border-oriented discussion), to its geo-political and cultural aspects which rescue the area (zone-oriented discussion) from a one-dimensional definition. In other words, the Middle East is entirely Muslim, apart from Israel, which is thus isolated to its disadvantage, like a Crusader island. In the context of the Mediterranean, however, Israel is connected to the states of the Mashreq, its Arab neighbours – Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt – plus Turkey, the Mediterranean southern European states and the countries of the Maghreb.

In the last twenty years there have been three European initiatives aiming at creating a Mediterranean geo-strategic economic and cultural space transcending the political borders between the coun-



tries of Europe and the Mediterranean states, including Israel. The first initiative in 1994, was the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue; the second initiative, launched by the states of the European Union in 1995, created the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in what is known as the Barcelona Process; the third initiative, the Union for the Mediterranean, was launched by President Nicholas Sarkozy in Paris in 2008. The common feature of the three initiatives launched after the breakup of the Soviet Union was the creation of a political community which from an internal point of view would unite the forces of the European countries with those of the Mashreq and the Maghreb, and from an external point of view would challenge the new world-order. Each separate initiative emphasized a certain aspect, according to which a group of states was chosen and its aims were defined. [27]

The NATO-Mediterranean dialogue comprised five states – Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Israel – later joined by Jordan and Algeria. The dialogue was created to deal with the old problems of the cold war and the new problems of globalisation, the massive emigration of people from Africa and the Mediterranean basin to Europe, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the spread of terrorism.

The dialogue was couched in diplomatic language (Donnelly 2004, 26):

The Dialogue reflects the Alliance's view that security in Europe is closely linked to the security and stability in the Mediterranean. It is an integral part of NATO's adaptation to the post-Cold War security environment, as well as an important component of the Alliance's policy of outreach and cooperation. The Mediterranean Dialogue's overall aims are to: contribute to regional security and stability; to achieve better mutual understanding; to dispel any misconceptions about NATO among Dialogue countries.

The participation of Israel in a regional security context with some of its former enemies was possible owing to the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians signed in Oslo in 1993. The

[28] Oslo Accords created a revolutionary opening for the regional dialogue. It was the first initiative to envisage a strategic zone between former adversaries, an inspiring conception that gave rise to a new geo-political perspective, a partnership between contending parties with the mediation of additional countries. These were its guiding principles:

- *Non-discrimination*: all Mediterranean partners are offered the same basis for their cooperation with NATO.
- *Self-differentiation*, allowing a tailored approach to the specific needs of each of our MD partner countries. Particularly Individual Cooperation Programmes (ICP) allow interested MD countries and NATO to frame their practical cooperation in a more prospective and focused way, enabling interested countries to outline the main short and long-term objectives of their cooperation with the Alliance, in accordance with NATO's objectives and policies for the Mediterranean Dialogue.
- *Inclusiveness*: all MD countries should see themselves as shareholders of the same cooperative effort.
- *Two-way engagement*: the MD is a 'two-way partnership,' in which NATO seeks partners' contribution for its success, through a regular consultation process; a special emphasis is placed on practical cooperation.
- *Non-imposition*: MD partners are free to choose the pace and extent of their cooperation with the Alliance; NATO has no wish to impose anything upon them.
- *Complementarity and mutual reinforcement*: efforts of the MD and other international institutions for the region are complementary and mutually reinforcing in nature; such as, for example, those of the EU's 'Union for the Mediterranean,' the OSCE's 'Mediterranean Initiative,' or the 'Five plus Five.'
- *Diversity*: the MD respects and takes into account specific regional, cultural and political contexts of the respective partners ('Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements' 1993).



Despite the failure of the Oslo Accords that caused difficulties for the dialogue, the fact of Israel's participation with six Arab countries in a strategic framework pertaining to the area had an importance from both, the political and the conceptual point of view (Lerman 2007, 8–11). It represented a shift from hawkish attitudes to a solution of regional problems and technical cooperation. Although NATO is a western organization with its own strategic aims, one should remember that it was the body that initiated cooperation with some of the Mediterranean countries. This collaboration broadened within a year into a larger framework with additional objectives. [29]

The Barcelona Process of November 1995 created the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which aimed at making the Mediterranean a bridge between the countries of southern Europe and the countries of the Maghreb and Mashreq – the lands on the shores of the Mediterranean. The purpose was to create a correlation between the economic development and the progress of democracy or political liberalisation. Israel benefitted from the Barcelona Process because it was a kind of recognition on the part of Arab countries which had previously been enemies, such as Syria. The Mediterranean framework that came into being through a European initiative formed a geo-political context, in which former adversaries participated, a broader context which put the ethnic and national conflict between them into proportion. Although the Barcelona Process failed to fulfil the expectations it set itself, it should not be judged on the basis of a few years, but, to use Fernand Braudel's expression, on the basis of *longue durée* – long-term historical and political development (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014):

The Plan places emphasis on the resolution of the Middle East conflict, on the fight against terrorism, and on the need to combat anti-Semitism, racism and discrimination. It stresses the need to solve Human Rights and Common Foreign and Security Policy issues, as well as the importance of ensuring the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and encouraging the membership of international organizations. Other key

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points cover greater economic integration with the EU's internal market; reinforced co-operation, both on migration issues and on the transportation, energy, and science as well as technology sectors; increased emphasis on environmental issues; and closer co-operation regarding people-to-people contacts in education, culture, civil society and public health.

A trilateral EU-Israeli-Palestinian trade working group has been set up to help facilitate trade matters between Gaza Strip/West Bank, Israel and the EU, as well as internally between the Gaza Strip/West Bank, and its neighbours.

The direct result of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was to relocate Israel in a regional context, which was not one of a national political conflict, but one which lay outside its political definition. It was an attempt to break the correlation that had previously existed between the space in which Israel was situated and the conflict in which it was involved. The concept of the Mediterranean zone was not an escape from the conflict but the provision of a different perspective by bringing in new partners in addition to the previous neighbours. Thus, a change of perspective took place, and Israel was no longer a sole player in a hostile area but a participatory player in a community that included both, its close neighbours and its distant neighbours. Indeed, 'Israel cannot engage in being part of a Mediterranean region, so long as it has not sorted out what kind of state and society it wants to be' (Del Sarto 2003, 28).

If the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiative was based on economic considerations and if the NATO initiative was based on security considerations, Nicholas Sarkozy's initiative had a greater ideological ambition than the two others. It did not adapt itself to existing frameworks, but its starting-point was the spatial identity and the establishment of a regional community aimed at providing a sense of belonging and old-new identity. The Union for the Mediterranean was created by 43 Euro-Mediterranean Heads of State and Government in Paris on 13 July 2008.

The formulated aim was as follows (Lerman 2007, 14-17):



The Union for the Mediterranean is a multilateral partnership aiming at increasing the potential for regional integration and cohesion among Euro-Mediterranean countries. The Union for the Mediterranean is inspired by the shared political will to revitalise efforts to transform the Mediterranean into an area of peace, democracy, cooperation and prosperity. The creation of a joint secretariat is a keystone in this partnership. The Secretariat is contributing to reinforcing co-ownership of new Mediterranean relations through concrete regional cooperation projects. [31]

In this, Israel saw an opportunity of changing its image from that of a Western crusader-nation that does not belong to the Muslim or Arab Mediterranean. Through the Mediterranean umbrella – a new regional perspective which is not European or Arab, and not the colonialist West against the defensive East – a multicultural mosaic is revealed in which Israel and the Palestinians have a chance of finding their place. This opportunity can only be grasped if there is a de-fundamentalism among the Israelis and Palestinians, so that their common outlook will be based on a neighbourly space and not on the confrontation of civilizations or peoples. The following are the common goals of the Mediterranean countries as stated in the Paris declaration ('Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean' 2008):

De-pollution of the Mediterranean; maritime and land highways; civil protection; alternative energies: Mediterranean solar plan; higher education and research, Euro-Mediterranean University; the Mediterranean Business Initiative.

These projects were based on the following principles ('Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean' 2008):

Striving to contribute to the stability and peace in the whole Euro-Mediterranean region; maintaining the legitimate interests of any member of the UfM; taking into account the principle of variable geometry; respecting the decision of member coun-

tries involved in an ongoing project when it is subject to further development.

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About two-thirds of Israel's borders with its Arab neighbours (those with Egypt and Jordan) are borders of peace. Yet, at the same time, the conflicts with some of the Arab states and the Palestinians from the time that the State of Israel was founded in 1948; the Israeli conquest and evacuation of the Sinai Peninsula in 1956 and 1967; the settlements in Judea and Samaria from the time of the Six-Day War (1967); the separation from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and the abandonment of the Israeli settlements there; the protracted and exhausting negotiations with the Palestinians on the creation of a Palestinian state that would exist on agreed and recognized borders next to the State of Israel – all this demonstrates the fact that Israel is the only state in the world that from the time of its founding has had no fixed borders.

The Mediterranean option discussed here is not a substitute for the serious and protracted political attempt to establish permanent borders for Israel. Its purpose is to open up new horizons with regard to the future borders of the State of Israel in such a way that, in parallel with the discussion on national borders, one can envisage an original, challenging and fresh perception of geo-political areas, strategic zones, and spatial identity.

NATIONAL BORDERS IN THE ISRAELI MEDIA

In this chapter I will discuss three case-studies in which Israel was discussed in a practical way with regards to its borders and its Palestinian neighbors. In 1993 the Oslo Accords, officially called 'The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements,' were signed. It was the first time that an agreement was directly initiated between Israelis and Palestinians. In 2003, following the second Palestinian uprising (Intifada), the separation wall/barrier was built by Israel in the West Bank and along the 1949 armistice 'green line.'



Three years later, in 2006, the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip took place. Following the disengagement implementation law, Israel withdrew from its settlements in the Gaza Strip and from four settlements in the northern West Bank.

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The Oslo Accords were an attempt to promote a long-term comprehensive solution to the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as being the first face-to-face communication between the two sides. They allowed the Palestinians to acknowledge their own self-government parallel to a future Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank in accordance with UN security council resolutions 242 and 338. Few agreements were reached following the failure of the Camp David summit in 2000 and the outbreak of the second uprising in 2002.

Following the second uprising (the Al-Aqsa Intifada) that claimed thousands of victims, both Israeli and Palestinian, the Israeli government led by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon decided on a one-sided policy to determine the borders of the two peoples. Israel initiated the construction of a separation wall/barrier between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The construction of the wall in 2002 and 2003 aroused much opposition in the international community and brought Israel to the international court in the Hague. Many of the objections to the construction of the barrier concerned the damage to Palestinians lands and agriculture, while Israel tried to turn the allegedly temporary border into a permanent one.

The disengagement from the Gaza strip was planned almost in parallel to the construction of the wall in the West Bank in 2004–2005, and it included the evacuation of twenty-one settlements in Gaza and four in the West Bank. Prime Minister Sharon connected the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza to the empowerment of Israeli control and building of settlements in the West Bank (*Ynet*, 15 February 2005, 23 May 2005). The disengagement from Gaza was executed in the summer of 2005 and required a massive campaign of the IDF and the Israeli

police force that were personally responsible for the evacuation of the settlers. This campaign involved a face-to-face confrontation between the IDF and the Jewish settlers, and caused a profound upheaval in Israeli society following the evacuation.

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These three case-studies in which Israel engaged with its neighbors were reflected and discussed in the Israeli media. The Israeli media, as well as the whole of Israeli society, went through a significant process of privatization at that period. As a result, with the exception of one public TV channel, all the Israeli communication media are privately owned. Apart from 'Channel 1,' which is the only public TV channel in Israel, there are two commercial TV channels, 'Channel 2' and 'Channel 10,' and some other alternative cable channels. In Israel there are four daily newspapers, *Haaretz*, *Maariv*, *Israel Hayom* and *Yedioth Aharonoth*, each having an online edition. This study will discuss and analyse reports and articles dealing with the three border events mentioned above. I will explore these topics through media analysis that will focus on two newspapers: *Haaretz* and *Ynet*, the online edition of *Yedioth Aharonoth*.

Ynet and *Haaretz* appeal to different readers: *Ynet*, as subsidiary of *Yedioth*, addresses the consensual and mainstream public, neither right nor left. On the other hand, *Haaretz* has a clear liberal tendency and supports a leftist and dovish political agenda. After a general exploration of the coverage of the Israeli media, and especially *Haaretz* and *Ynet*, of the three border events mentioned above, I came to the conclusion that the attitude of media toward the Oslo agreements, the disengagement plan and the construction of the separation barrier, was positive, supportive and enthusiastic. This affirmative attitude of media toward the Oslo Accords and the disengagement plan, however, did not correspond to the attitude of the general public. The Israeli public was divided between supporters and objectors. Nevertheless, the media covered these controversial governmental decisions as allegedly consensual.



There was a correlation between the general public and the media only with regards to the coverage of the separation wall. With regards to the Oslo accords, the first reports revealed that there was a small majority of supporters that grew slowly from the moment the agreement was signed until the murder of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and later became a massive majority, following the peace agreement with Jordan in 1994. The peace agreement with Jordan involved minor Israeli concessions with regards to borders. It is important to stress the fact that the media strongly supported the Oslo peace accords and Israeli concessions from the beginning for the sake of peace.

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Ten years after the Oslo Accords, the Sharon Government began to construct the foundation of the separation wall/barrier in the West Bank. There was a minor debate about the construction itself, but a major controversy concerning the determination of its path and its location in Palestinian lands. The decision was made without negotiations or cooperation with the Palestinian Authority.

Three years after the beginning of the wall construction, Israel again acted in relation to the occupied Palestinian territories not through a dialogue and agreement with the Palestinians, but through a one-sided decision of the Ariel Sharon government. The plan for disengagement from Gaza in 2005 was an Israeli governmental decision in order to evacuate the Gaza strip without negotiation, demands or expectations from the Palestinians.

The Oslo Accords represented a revolutionary change toward mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestinian authority. Just a few months before the agreement, the PLO was regarded as a terrorist organization, and it now rapidly became a legitimate and representative authority. This point was reflected in the media coverage of the Oslo Accords. On August 30th, *Haaretz* reported: 'Israel will recognize the PLO if it will change its national covenant; the government will approve the "Gaza-Jericho" plan this evening.' On the Pales-

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tinian side, there was an optimism expressed in a title of August 19th, 1993: 'Arafat: the Gaza-Jericho idea will be a breakthrough.' The 'Oslo process' developed rapidly into a dialogue between two legitimate authorities that negotiated on borders and areas of control, and apportioned zones A, B and C, defining which entity exerted control in which area. The Israeli media encouraged the dialogue and expressed support for the Israeli government activities. The assassination of the Prime Minister Rabin attempted to stop this dialogue, but the media continued vigorously to speak on behalf of the implementation of the Oslo Accords, now by the government of Shimon Peres. The evacuation from all Palestinian cities in the West Bank was promoted by TV channels and newspapers. Despite the objections of the UN and the USA to the construction of the separation wall and the one-sided Israeli manoeuvre (*Ynet*, 29 June 2003, 30 June 2003, 24 July 2003, 4 October 2003, Sharon declared on August 2nd (*Ynet*): '80% of the Israelis fell in love with the separation wall.' Sharon was right, according to the reports in *Haaretz* and *Ynet* on public opinion concerning the construction of the wall.

Concerning the disengagement plan: this particular project did not enjoy such general consensus as the media tried to present. The vast resistance of the national-religious sector spread across the West Bank and Gaza settlements and revealed substantial and determined opposition to the Israeli government policy (1 May 2005, 12 May 2005). The connection between the separation wall and the disengagement is shown in the following title in *Ynet* on February 2nd 2004: 'Sharon is planning to evacuate 17 settlements from Gaza following the discussion in the Hague about the construction of the separation wall.' The international community's support for the disengagement plan was in keeping with the Israeli public agenda. On February 13th, 2004, *Ynet* declared: '77% of the Israeli public support the evacuation from Gaza.' A year later, on February 25th, 2005, the next poll reported that only 64% of the Israeli public supported the Gaza evacuation. With



regard to its international implications, it is important to say that following the support of the international community, there was an increased involvement of Arab countries such as Jordan and Egypt in the process (3 August 2005, 13 September 2005). Following this increased involvement of the Arabs and international bodies, the Israeli government was empowered, so that it was able to make concrete decisions regarding the evacuation process (*Ynet*, 12 June 2004, 4 May 2004). [37]

THE AFFINITY BETWEEN CULTURE
AND POLITICS

In the last two decades, many Israelis are calling for a new regional culture, stressing the awareness of the role and importance of the other as part of the inter-regional fabric. The Mediterranean Basin is a mosaic of interlocking influences; it has been the most important region of cultural, artistic and religious cross-fertilisation in the world. The consequences of these influences and collaborations manifest in all its sub-regions and countries. The Mediterranean as a whole comprises centres of multifaceted contact, trade routes and markets, in which commercial and cultural dialogue have flourished for thousands of years. In our own days, however, this vital dialogue does not find an appropriate expression.

The Mediterranean Sea links together three continents, three religions, and thousands of years of civilization, and has thus been a channel of mutual influences and cultural exchanges. These processes have formed the destiny of large Jewish communities. The historian Joshua Prawer drew attention to an interesting fact: 'It should be pointed out that, without any causal relationship, the period of the closure of the Mediterranean was – in relationships, in the exchange of ideas and in trade – the period of the greatness of Judaism [...]' (Prawer 1990, 9). According to the historian Shlomo Dov Goitein, the Jews lived along the coasts of the Mediterranean, and were open, mobile people that were not closed up in their own world but, in the countries where they lived, inherited the

[38]

culture of Greece and Rome and adapted it to Islamic culture. In his monumental five-volume work *A Mediterranean Society*, Goitein described a Jewish society of the Middle Ages that lived within the framework of Mediterranean geography and culture (Goitein 1967–1988).

Unlike the historian Henri Pirenne, who saw a division in the Mediterranean, Goitein revealed an extensive Mediterranean trade between Christians and Muslims from the eleventh to the thirteenth century. Goitein's geographical sociology, which deciphered documents of the *genizah*, portrayed the Jews of the Middle Ages as Mediterranean people that developed their sources, disseminated their wisdom and were prominent in trade and the liberal professions in the countries of the Basin (Goitein 1960, 29–42). His research depicted a Jewish society that was pre-modern in all respects: day-to-day life, commerce, law and way of thinking. It was an exemplary model for the study by Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea* (Horden and Purcell 2000), which added to the net-like Braudelian structure of the macro, alternative micro-networks of areas and sub-areas, in the same way as Goitein.

David Ben-Gurion, the founder of the State of Israel, called for the Mediterranean character of the state-in-the-making to be developed already at the ninth Zionist Congress in 1935. He said that throughout the period of the First Temple there was no Jewish harbor on the shores of the Mediterranean. Jaffa was the first Judean port and the only one on the Mediterranean in the late Second Temple period. In modern times, Ben-Gurion added: "The Mediterranean is the bridge between Eretz-Israel and Europe, and we must have a strong part in this. The Mediterranean does not have to be the frontier of our land but its continuation and extension, and our link with the great Jewish centers of the Diaspora and the cultural centers in Europe and America. We are returning to the east, but bringing to this country the light of western culture, and with all our efforts to be absorbed in our country in the east and



have friendly relations with our neighbors in the east, we shall preserve our connection with the centers of culture in the west' (Ben-Gurion 1972, 402).

But the borders of Israel are not only political borders but cultural borders of communities, sectors, and ethnic immigrants, Jews and Arabs, who seek a regional common denominator in the Mediterranean space. Israel is a multicultural society grappling with the ideological consequences of the melting pot. Has Israeli opened a window on the Mediterranean? The answers indicate that the connection between politics and culture is inseparable (Ghanayem 1985, 6):

[39]

One must speak about a cultural synthesis that cannot turn into a cultural invasion, even if the result is a cultural operation that brings together worlds that are different and even opposite to each other. In this respect, Israel can provide a good example of a broad spread of civilizations if it relates on an equal basis to the cultures of the minorities within it, Arabs and Jews, Ashkenasis and Sephardis, all of whom can make up a new Israeli cultural identity that can save the region from an expected cultural desolation.

A. B. Yehoshua is rightly considered the Mediterranean Israeli author par excellence. When asked about what he regards as Israel's Mediterranean orientation, he answered:

It is not good for us to be so dependent on the US in all respects. We should try to be connected to the European identity as much as possible. This will also neutralize the issue with the Arabs that perceive us as if we were foreigners. If you perceive us from the standing point of Saudia or Iraq we seem foreign. If one perceives us from the standing point of Egypt, from Tunisia, from Lebanon and from Turkey, or Greece, we are part of all this. It means that we need to insert ourselves in the Mediterranean context as much as possible. [...] It is also very important to the

Arabs, [...] especially our close neighbors, Israeli Arabs, Lebanese, Egyptians, that they want the Mediterranean identity; including the Turks and Greeks that live in natural spaces.

[40]

The path to the Mediterranean of the writer Amos Oz, who initially did not wish to go there, is also interesting. Oz depicted the Israeli society-in-information as one with characteristic Mediterranean qualities: warm of heart and temperament, hedonistic, life-loving and emotional. Israel will continue to develop as a Mediterranean society, he concluded, for better or worse, if its conflict with its neighbors is resolved. Oz saw the development of the town of Ashdod, which is located on the western shore of Israel, as the national Mediterranean profile coming into being in front of his eyes. He looked at the town of Ashdod with resignation, with the sadness of a householder whose dream has evaporated like the dreams of those socialist world-reformers, the fathers of the kibbutz (Oz 1990):

I ask myself, when I travel, which part of the world reminds me more of home, and obviously Greece was closer than Germany. And the south of France more than Poland – not in terms of my ancestral heritage, but of the everyday reality. I feel more at home in Ashdod, in Tel Aviv, in Haifa, or in Arad, which are not situated by the Mediterranean, than I feel home in the north of Europe. I realized that we Israelis do not belong to an Ingmar Bergmann film but to a Fellini movie, and I like it this way. I find myself more at home. In the next phase I was asking myself: why not? I don't know where the Middle East is going, maybe it is becoming more and more fundamentalist, which in my vocabulary means less and less Mediterranean. It is not that I like the Mediterranean reality because it is a good bridge to Syria and Iraq.



POLITICAL ORIENTATION

The historian Prof. Shlomo Ben Ami, former Israeli ambassador to Spain and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Ehud Barak, is a well-known supporter of the Mediterranean option for Israel, and is opposed by Meron Benvenisti, former deputy mayor of Jerusalem. Benvenisti sees the Mediterranean option as an escape from the bloody Middle Eastern conflict to the sunny coasts of southern Europe.

[41]

Shlomo Ben-Ami was asked the question: *The Mediterranean reference is used in many different frameworks. What influenced the increased use of the term Yam Tichoniut (Mediterraneanism) in the Israeli public discourse?* He answered:

It is very difficult to tell you what the origins of this argument are. There are different phases and layers. There is also a historical reason that began even before the big Aliyah (the massive immigration from North Africa in the first years of the State of Israel). It was a special world of the Revisionists in the nineteen-twenties. For them it was an antithesis to the world of the *Mizrach ha-Tichon* (Middle East). They started to develop something like a maritime culture (culture of the sea), a Jewish culture which probably did not quite exist, but was something like an antithesis to the East. That's how it was born. In recent years, the Mediterranean debate has become an important issue for the intellectual elites in Israel. It is not a popular discussion, as the Israeli phenomenon is a strange one, and it is a very difficult situation where you have to define yourself. And what are we? What do we have here? New York? No, this is not New York, it is not London and not Berlin. But we don't want to be Kabul. So we are looking for some new definition.

One thing that was very popular in the days of Oslo and was spoken about with much excitement, was the New Middle East: essentially, total integration into the Semitic

[42]

world. Shimon Peres, for example, suggested including Israel in the Arab League. I never heard anything more stupid than that. An alternative idea is a Euro-Mediterranean space that fits the structure of Israeli society and the image that Israel has in the world and the economic ties it has with the world.

You have often mentioned your skepticism about the 'New Middle East Romanticism.' What is left of the concept of the 'New Middle East' today?

I believe that in the Israeli reality *vis-à-vis* the Arab world there is a possibility of establishing a common market, but we do not have a common morality, a common memory, a shared culture or a shared religion. [...] Europe is a Christian continent, even without bureaucrats in Brussels. Europe is united by history, by religion, by memory, by music, by landscapes, by food. That does not exist neither between us and the Palestinians, nor the Jordanians. They have no identity problem. The Arabs are an autochthonous society. [...]

On what basis could the different cultural codes find a common denominator?

I am not a peace romanticist, I am not a pacifist – I am a Zionist in the simplest meaning of the word. There needs to be a Jewish State here with an Arab minority that has rights and everything. But in order to know what to do with this strange thing that we live with, we cannot deal with it seriously until we have a border. We are trying to furnish an apartment that does not have any walls. There are no walls. And the furniture is a metaphor for the inner structures of Israeli society.

Can Mediterraneanism serve as a means of reorientation?



In addition, when you see the structure and collective mentality of Israeli society, it is not far from Palermo. I would have preferred it to be a little closer to Milano, but it is closer to Palermo. I would also have preferred Barcelona, but maybe we will get there one day. At the present time you have a kind of cultural fusion, which makes things easier. This also applies to the Ashkenasi aliyah. [...] When I was a youngster, the Mizrahi songs were the ghetto of the ghetto of the ghetto. Today soldiers in the army love it. There is some sort of acculturation to the melodies of the surroundings. [43]

Can Mediterraneanism serve as a political modus for co-existence?

Of course. I really believe so – it was also the idea of Jacqueline Kahanoff: the idea of a Mediterranean-society culture. When there was fascism, it was also a softer fascism than the European one [Mussolini as compared to Hitler]. Something you cannot ignore is that in the Mediterranean there was some sort of softness. When I speak about multiculturalism I always think of Tangier, the city where I was born. It is an international city. I lived in a house that was an incarnation of multiculturalism. [...] That is my memory of multiculturalism, and it was a soft way of life. I really believe that this is the right model for the Israeli society and also for our relationship with our neighbours.

Meron Benvenisti puts forward positions opposed to those of Ben-Ami. He was asked: *What role does the discussion about Israel play in times of strong political confrontation? Will it regain importance?*

I am very cynical about it. [...] The EU is promoting the Mediterranean idea, I am afraid, because they want to stop illegal immigration to Europe. [...] Israel, being a Mediterranean country, is benefitting from it. [...] I don't see this as an important Israeli project. It is not going to gain importance in the political discourse. In the cultural discourse it will [...]. I am very skeptical. I do not participate in any of the programmes and I see them com-

ing and going. This is all based on the fact that I do not believe that there will be a Mediterranean culture.

[44] *To what larger concept will the cultural orientation of Israel be linked in the future?*

Israel pretends that it is glued to the backside of Greece. For them, the Mediterranean is a geographical aberration. They believe that they are Europeans, South Europeans. [...] What they definitely don't want to be is part of the area in which they live. So what is the Mediterranean? Definitely not Arab, and if it is Arab, then it relates to the nostalgic romantic idea of Alexandria. [...] The whole situation is so complicated that the escapism to the Mediterranean is a symptom, not a solution.

A symptom, because you want to escape the harsh reality?

Yes. It is a situation where your culture confronts the culture of the locals, the natives. It is not unlike the situation in South Africa or other settler societies. It is very easy to say that there is an indigenusness of living on the shores of the Mediterranean. Camus had the same dilemma in Algiers. He believed in the Mediterranean because he needed something to resolve the question of who he was as a *pied noir* vis-a-vis the Arabs. So he had to invent something.

What can serve as a concept of cultural orientation for Israeliness?

[...] If only the Mediterranean concept had a strong element of Arabism in it, but there is none. Mediterraneanism has nothing to do with Arabs. The only relation could be the westernized Arabs of Lebanon or Egypt, but nothing else. How many Arabs belong to that Mediterranean idea? None. [...]

According to the critic Yoram Bronowski (1948–2001), a reinterpretation of Israel's place in the area is required (Bronowski 1987):



I am convinced, like many others, that the dream to which Israeli society should be directed, to which it can direct itself, is the most ancient of humanity's dreams – the Mediterranean dream. A sort of Mediterranean Scroll of Independence with Mediterranean inflections rings all the time in my ears: 'On the shores of the Mediterranean, the Jewish people arise, etc.' I think of the connections and ancient contexts – Phoenicia, Crete, Greece, all maritime countries – and those that came after them. And I dream of Israel as one of the centres of neo-Mediterraneanism, just as it was a centre and one of the sources of the ancient Mediterraneanism. [45]

There has been a notable tendency on the part of many Israelis to develop a strategic policy of supporting a regional culture that permits a dialogue between the peoples of different countries and between the different peoples in the Mediterranean Basin, especially at its eastern end. Many people in the Israeli society have begun to call for a strengthening of the peace process in the Middle East through an expansion of the cultural links between the states of the Mediterranean Basin and through a removal of the barriers between peoples. The Mediterranean option is put forward not only as a cultural proposition but as strategic geopolitical aspiration in its own right. Have the intensification of the Israeli occupation and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism made Mediterraneanism redundant?

An early proponent of the Mediterranean Basin as the proper sphere for Israel to relate to was Abba Eban (1915–2002), the first Israeli minister of foreign affairs. Already in 1952 he discerned two distinct advantages in the Mediterranean option: the chance of breaking Israel's political and cultural isolation (for in the Muslim and Arab Middle East, Israel was the exception), and the exploitation of the commercial and cultural connections that Israel had with most of the countries of the Mediterranean Basin (Eban 1952, 7):

If the State of Israel seeks to find its own way within the area as a whole, if it wants to find itself a world that would be more fitting for the expression of its political relationships and cultural

[46]

affinities, I think the concept ‘Mediterranean’ would be the most suitable: Israel, not as a Middle Eastern country but as a Mediterranean country. The Mediterranean is the only channel of intercourse between Israel and the rest of the world. All Israel’s trade and connections pass through that sea. If this is true as a geographical fact, it is all the more true from a historical and cultural point of view.

Zionism was born in Europe, and paradoxically the main choices of identity and cultural options for Israeli society – Socialism, Nationalism, Secularism, Messianism, Canaanism, ‘Crusaderism’ – originated not in the Holy Land, but in Europe. Mediterraneanism as a cultural idea is also a theoretical model nourished by cross-fertilisation. The Mediterranean is not only a geographical or historical area but also a metaphorical entity with frontiers and a variety of cultures and identities, which came into being through an incessant discourse among them. All these have helped to preserve its unique character. The perpetual interaction between them has created a culture that is basically multicultural (Malkin 2005, 12).

The Mediterranean idea has been effectively promoted in a number of Mediterranean countries as a program of collective ethos, suggesting directions of action, formulations of policy and cultural activities. More and more Israelis as portrayed especially in the media and in the political discourse lean towards seeing The Mediterranean option as a possible bridge between Israel and its Arab neighbours, Israel and Europe.

CONCLUSION

David Ben-Gurion, the founder of the Israeli state, called for the Mediterranean character of the state in the making to be developed already at the ninth Zionist Congress in 1935. Ben-Gurion resisted in his Mediterranean orientation. He wrote: “The sea covers the part of the surface, it has no frontiers, it is free. It is not divided among the state and the peoples that are on land, there are no partitions between oceans, no barriers or confining bounds. People with a ter-



ritorial base and port may sail the world over and sound every sea, may put a girdle about the globe and seek out every folk and speech. Land serves the nations, the sea unites them and brings them close, it advances the unity of mankind, opening new horizons and spaces invisible to us that stand on shore.’

[47]

Since then, Israel became a Mediterranean state, it is not committed to the Islamic Middle-East, nor to the Christian Europe, but holds both shores together, and thus – truly belongs only to the Mediterranean sea.

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Foreign Direct Investment as a Driver of Economic Development in Thailand

ANITA MAČEK

Doba Faculty, Slovenia

VITO BOBEK

FH Joanneum Graz, Austria

TINA VUKASOVIĆ

*Doba Faculty, International School for Social and Business Studies,
and University of Primorska, Slovenia*

The article addresses some of the most important impacts of foreign direct investment (FDI) to emerging economies, focusing on Thailand. With the help of selected research methods, the proposed paper proves stylized facts concerning FDI in Thailand. Using the PESTEL analysis, authors analysed the macro-environment for FDI in Thailand and with correlation models, the correlation between FDI and selected economic variables was analysed. The results of statistical analyses fulfilled the expectations. Thailand is an attractive destination for FDI which has a positive effect on economic growth, employment and export. However, the results also demonstrated that FDI is positively correlated to air pollution in Thailand, therefore economic policy will have to pay more attention to environmental protection when attracting FDI. If we compare elements of PESTEL analysis of Thailand with Euro-Med states' conditions, we can expose that some elements are very similar. Especially Southern Euro-Med states' faced numerous political crises in the past. Corruption, government instability, and inefficient government bureaucracy are characteristic also for Southern Euro-Med states and are influencing negatively on the international capital flows. On the other hand, there are also some elements in the PESTEL analysis that are valid not just for Southern Euro-Med but for the whole Euro-Med region. These are especially the threat of terrorism and environmental challenges. Both present a major common challenge in the whole Euro-Med region.

Key Words: foreign direct investment, economic development, Thailand, effects of FDI, PESTEL analysis

INTRODUCTION

[50] There are several studies showing determinants and impacts of foreign direct investment (FDI) on emerging markets. When examining the determinants of FDI inflows into emerging markets Green and Häusler (2003) found that investors predominantly select their investment destinations based on growth prospects, market size, the overall productivity of labour, the availability of sufficient infrastructure, political stability and supportive conditions, a low level of corruption, a predictable legal framework and the validity of the rule of law. Others found that firms seek macro-environmental opportunities, such as high and stable economic growth, low inflation rate, and low labour costs, and favour supportive government policies, strong market potential, and no exposure to import duties or quotas (Techakananont 2008; Walsh and Yu 2010; Duscha 2012; Trunk and Stubelj 2013).

According to Kumar and Anupam (2011) FDI offers attractive benefits that include technology, investments, savings and growth. Angresano, Zhang, and Zhang (2002) analysed the effects of FDI in emerging economies and found that FDI reflects a dynamic style of leadership, and openness to change and new technology. According to Arbatli (2011) FDI was viewed in emerging market economies as a tool to increase productivity, finance development, and import new technologies. In general, FDI fosters human capital development by providing employee training and transferring advanced technologies to the host country. It also strengthens corporate institutions by exposing host countries to developed economies' best business practices and corporate governance. FDI reduces unemployment, affects the development potential of the economy, increases engagement of local companies in supplier and subcontractor networks, generates additional tax revenue for the state, supports development strategies of individual sectors, develops managerial knowledge, and generates better utilisation of the local infrastructure and service activities (Wang and Blomström 1992; Stephan 2005; Perez 2008; Maček and Ovin 2014). Studies analysing benefits of FDI in Euro-Med countries show similar results (Adamo and Garonna 2009). In 2002, OECD reports that countries with weaker economies consider FDI



as the only source of growth and economy modernization. Many governments, particularly in developing countries, therefore give special treatment to foreign capital (Carkovic and Levine 2002).

Simultaneously, firms investing in foreign countries, face several macro-environmental risks and uncertainties, such as natural disasters, political instability, increasing (minimum) wages, and corruption (WKO 2012). By analysing the driving forces behind FDI in emerging markets, Tulug (2004) identified that political and economic factors are considered to be the main obstacles to foreign investors. Among the political factors, political instability, excessive bureaucracy and government interference, as well as corruption, are identified as the most significant, while among economic factors especially high inflation, economic instability and high credit costs account for the highest economic risks (Tulug 2004).

[51]

While studies in the field of analysing determinants and threats of FDI in emerging markets are present, on the other side there has not been a lot of focus on the determinants and effects of FDI in Thailand and Euro-Med states. Therefore, this article presents the analysis of the determinants and selected effects of FDI in Thailand and exposes those that are similar also to Euro-Med states. It starts with the presentation of FDI development in Thailand. After a brief discussion of the PESTEL analysis for FDI in Thailand in the third chapter, in the fourth chapter authors present some of the Thailand characteristics that are the same also for Euro-Med states. The fifth chapter demonstrates results of the regression analysis on selected economic and ecological effects and FDI in Thailand. The last chapter presents conclusions.

FDI DEVELOPMENT IN THAILAND

With their significant GDP growth and infrastructure, developing emerging markets present a major destination for FDI. FDI presents the strongest source of growth for investors because it encounters some sort of control and ownership, as well as a long-term commitment by the investing firm (Noeth and Sengupta 2012, 10–11).

According to the *Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Report* (2014)

and the *World Investment Report* (2014), Thailand is an important destination for FDI. Data in FDI inflow in the figure 1 show that, especially after 1986, FDI has been an important element of economic development in Thailand.

[52] The value of FDI inflow to Thailand has been increasing since 1986. In particular depreciation of the US Dollar against the Japanese Yen and the German Mark in 1986, caused many export-oriented companies from overseas to shift their production to Thailand. Thailand rapidly became a major destination for FDI in the region. The main reasons for FDI growth were the investment promotion by the BOI (Board of Investment of Thailand), relatively cheap labour costs, and the devaluation of the local Thai Baht, which granted company access to cheaper factors of production (Tambunlertchai 2009). Furthermore, a rapid appreciation of the Japanese Yen forced many Japanese industrial firms to shift their production sites to Southeast Asia, including Thailand (Tambunlertchai 2009). During the Asian financial crisis the level of FDI inflows dropped but the post-crisis era was characterized by an increase of FDI, especially with M&A (OECD 2011).

In 2011, just after the first recovery from the economic crisis, Thailand was severely hit by historical flooding, which forced many firms to change their investment plans. The consequence was a 35 percent decline in FDI inward flows. At the same time, FDI outward flows increased by 45 percent (*Financial Times* 2012). Restoration of political stability in the second half of 2014 also slowed down the FDI flow, but since then FDI flows have again been rising. Today Thailand is among the 8 priority destinations for foreign investment destinations within emerging economies for the period 2014–2016. It is the 7th largest FDI recipient in East and South-East Asia.

In recent years the surge in FDI has been driven mainly by a rise in mergers and acquisitions. In 2013, Thailand was the second-largest target of M&A purchases in Southeast Asia, behind Singapore, with concluded sales worth \$6 billion. A major deal was the acquisition of Bank of Ayudhya by Bank of Tokyo for \$5.3 billion. In 2013 Japan was the main investor followed by Hong Kong and the Netherlands. In table 1 the main investing countries in Thailand are



Foreign Direct Investment as a Driver of Economic Development

TABLE 1 FDI Inflows by Country and Industry (2013)

Main investing countries	%	Main invested sectors	%
Japan	60.6	Metallurgy and machinery	30.6
Hong Kong	8.1	Electronic and electric. goods	25.3
Netherlands	6.9	Services	18.9
Malaysia	4.5	Paper and chemical goods	15.0
Singapore	4.2	Agricultural products	5.1
USA	2.0	Light industry, textiles	4.0
Taiwan	1.6	Minerals and ceramics	1.1
The Cayman Islands	1.2		
Switzerland	1.1		

NOTES Based on data from the Thailand Board of Investments (<http://www.bo.go.th>).

shown.

Table 1 shows the 9 countries that invested the most in Thailand. As it can be seen, Japan invested 60 percent of all investments in Thailand in 2013. Among European countries the Netherlands was the biggest investor, investing around 7 percent of all investments in Thailand. In table 1 also FDI inflows by industry are shown. The main invested sectors in Thailand, according to the last available data, are metallurgy and machinery, followed by electronic and electrical goods, services, and paper and chemical goods.

PESTEL ANALYSIS FOR FDI IN THAILAND

A determinant of FDI is demonstrated by PESTEL analysis (political, economic, social, technological, environmental and legal). Using an analysis of variables that have direct and indirect impact on FDI flow, authors try to prove which variables are the most important determinants of FDI.

Political

Since becoming a constitutional monarchy in 1932, the country has faced numerous political crises. The politics of Thailand were conducted within the framework of a constitutional monarchy, whereby the Prime Minister was the head of government and a hereditary

[54] monarch the head of state, until 22 May 2014. Since the coup d'état of 22 May 2014, the 2007 Constitution has been revoked, and Thailand has been under the rule of the military organization called the National Council for Peace and Order, which took control of the national administration. The Chief of the NCPO abolished the National Assembly and assumed all responsibility for the legislative branch.

According to the WEF (2015) corruption, government instability, and inefficient government bureaucracy are the major concerns of foreign investors in Thailand.

The problem of corruption is deeply embedded in the culture of the Thailand and has become so serious that many Thais tolerate corruption as long as politicians 'do something for the nation.' On the annual corruption index, published by Transparency International, which measures the perceived degree of corruption in the public sector, Thailand is ranked 85th of 174 countries in the year 2014 (Transparency International 2014). In order to keep Thailand an attractive investment destination, the government is encouraged to effectively address corruption.

Political instability characterised Thailand during the last few years. Particularly between 2007 and 2010, and 2013 and 2014 political unrest repeatedly had a strong negative impact on the economy and also on foreign investors in Thailand.

Another factor within the political environment influencing investor decision is the threat of terrorism. There have been terrorist attacks in several southern provinces and border regions, as well as in the major cities Bangkok and Chiang Mai (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2013).

An index indicating the ease of doing business ranks Thailand to the 46th position of 189 economies across the globe. In this index the business regulatory environments across economies are compared with one another in areas such as starting a business, dealing with construction permits, registering property, protecting investors, paying taxes, enforcing contracts and others. While Thailand is ranked particularly high in the areas of getting electricity (11th), and protecting minority investors (33th), there is plenty of



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TABLE 2 2015 Index of Economic Freedom

Rule of law	Index	Limited government	Index
Property rights	40.0 ↓	Government spending	81.4 ↓
Freedom from corruption	35.0 ↑	Fiscal freedom	81.5 ↑
Regulatory efficiency	Index	Open markets	Index
Business freedom	72.5 ↑	Trade freedom	75.4 ↑
Labor freedom	63.5 ↑	Investment freedom	45.0 –
Monetary freedom	69.9 ↑	Financial freedom	60.0 ↓

[55]

NOTES Adapted from The Heritage Foundation (<http://www.heritage.org>).

room for improvement in the areas of getting credit (97th) and starting a business (96th) (WEF 2015).

The ease of starting business stands out negatively, as there are several regulations put in place by the Thai government in order to restrict foreign investments and entrepreneurship. For instance, foreign entrepreneurs need to employ at least 4 local employees in order to obtain a work permit. Furthermore, investments in several sectors are entirely prohibited and, again, there are strict rules to be followed in order to obtain a work permit for foreign staff. If a certain business is not promoted by the BOI (Board of Investment), foreign investors are only permitted to hold up to 49 percent of the shares of that business entity (Dubout 2012). The details about FDI regulation are presented later.

According to the 2015 Index of Economic Freedom, published by the Heritage Foundation (in partnership with the *Wall Street Journal*), Thailand ranks 75th of 185 countries. The index measures criteria such as the rule of law, limited government (measuring the tax burden, government spending, the budget balance and public debt), regulatory efficiency and open markets (tariff- and non-tariff barriers, foreign ownership, etc.), and it supports a global move towards greater economic freedom (see <http://www.heritage.org/index/>). Table 2 shows the individual segments of the Index of Economic Freedom in detail, where a score of 100 accounts for the maximum of each.

The value of 40.0 for Property Rights indicates that the court system is highly inefficient, and delays are so long that they deter the

[56] use of the court system. Corruption is present, and the judiciary is influenced by other branches of government. Knowing that in an economically free country, where there would be no constraints on the flow of investment capital the score of Investment Freedom would be 100, the score of 45 in Thailand therefore indicates a variety of restrictions on investments.

In order to increase trade flows with other countries and to foster economic integration, Thailand is a member of the following trade organizations: WTO, APEC, ASEAN (USTR 2012) and the World Bank (Aussenwirtschaft Austria 2012). Furthermore, Thailand signed bilateral investment treaties (BIT) with 40 countries, including Germany, China and Switzerland (UNCTAD 2014).

Economic

Thailand's economic development was very successful between the years 1960 and 1996. The economic growth rate was nearly 8 percent p. a. and was mainly the result of growing FDI inflows and exports. The key challenge to Thai-based producers, domestic and foreign, by the mid-1990s was to enhance production capabilities and move up the value-added ladder as competition from lower wage countries like China, India, Indonesia and Indochina intensified.

In 1997 the GDP declined by 1.4 percent and by a further 10.5 percent in 1998 because of the economic crisis. After levels of around 5–6 percent for many years inflation reached around 8 percent in 1998. While the financial collapse was primarily a short-to-medium term phenomenon caused by inadequate financial regulations and weak public and private sector governance, deteriorating industrial competitiveness exacerbated the situation. Export performance worsened dramatically in 1996, falling by 1.3 percent after many years of 10 to 20 percent growth rates.

The economy returned to 4.4 percent growth in 1999, albeit with continuing low capacity utilization and significant disruptions in the real sector, and continued to grow by 4.6 percent in 2000. In 2001 GDP growth slowed to 1.8 percent due to weak export demand caused by the global slowdown. This decline placed pressures on the fiscal balance that was recovering from negative levels caused by the



economic crisis, and makes the economy more vulnerable to weak performance in the US and Japan.

Over the last ten years, the macro-environmental landscape in Thailand was in continuous shape with some extreme events that required foreign investors to re-evaluate their external business environment and to reconsider their direct investments in the country. In 2004, the country suffered from the worst natural disaster that has ever hit Thailand. A tsunami off the coasts of Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand caused the deaths of about 8,000 people in Thailand. In 2006, the country was plunged into a political crisis, when the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was ousted from his position in a military coup. Since that event, pro-Thaksin supporters, the 'red shirts,' gather together and rally against the new government on a regular basis, sometimes peacefully, sometimes not. In 2010, the situation escalated again and led to violent demonstrations aimed at bringing down the new government. Finally, a military intervention caused deaths of more than 50 people, attracting considerable international attention (BBC 2010).

[57]

In 2011, citizens suffered from natural disasters again, both personally and from the related economic slowdown. The tsunami in Japan in March 2011 forced numerous Japanese investors to cut their spending in Thailand, and, later that year, historical flooding in Northern and Central Thailand paralyzed the country for months. Consequently, a multitude of manufacturing companies had to shut down their production. These events brought down economic growth to 0.1 percent in the year 2011, from the previously estimated 4–7 percent (Bank of Thailand 2011). Such events had a huge impact on current and future investments of companies in Thailand. Nevertheless, the strategic move towards an export-oriented industrialization particularly helped the country to achieve the status of an important emerging market. This transition is underlined by the fact that the industrial and service sectors each contribute about 44 percent to the country's GDP nowadays (WKO 2012). In 2014 GDP growth in Thailand was 0.7 percent and is projected to rebound to 3.5 percent by the end of 2015.

Historically, Thailand has been characterised by very low unem-

[58] ployment. Whilst this is usually considered a favourable economic indicator, companies face a big challenge to fill open positions with skilled labour within several key areas, restricting growth within these industries. Consequently, manufacturers are partly forced to move their investments into other countries with higher labour availability (EABC 2012). In 2014, the unemployment rate was about 0.56 percent and is among the lowest in the world. The reason for a very low unemployment rate is in the structural problems of a country: because of a lack of unemployment insurance there is no impetus to stay jobless for long. Those who lose their jobs invariably enter the so-called informal sector or seek out a part-time job, and are counted as employed. Private consumption is relatively high, which is due to favourable household income, continuous stimulus by the Thai government, and the low saving rates in Thailand. Therefore, private spending is one of the key drivers for the economic growth and stability.

Social

Thailand made remarkable progress in terms of human development in the last two decades (United Nations Thailand 2008). In 2008, the Thai government launched several programs to generate sufficient income and to grant access to loans to everyone, including low-income groups. As the government seems to understand that a strong social system contributes to the further development of the nation, Thailand has an extensive social security and welfare system in place, which provides coverage to most of its citizens. This system is funded by contributions from workers, and additional contributions from employers and self-employed people (Euromonitor 2010). Social security measures include pensions, disability pensions, sickness and maternity leave, unemployment benefits, child allowance and medical coverage. However, the rates highly depend on individual contributions, and their volume cannot be compared to western standards. On the International Human Development Index (which is published annually by the United Nations and which is part of the United Nations Development Programme) Thailand ranks 89th of 186 countries worldwide (UNDP 2014).



Challenges within the social environment include high levels of maternal mortality in the most southern part of Thailand, child malnutrition in some northern parts, and the very unsustainable (ab)use of natural resources. Even though educational reforms were established and Thai people rank amongst the highest educated populations in the world (Euromonitor 2010), the quality of education, and its adaptability to global economic needs, remains a problem. Furthermore, vulnerable minority groups, such as informal workers or migrants, are not benefiting from Thailand's economic progress equally (ILO 2012). Poverty in Thailand is primarily a rural phenomenon. Some ethnic groups and some regions-particularly the North and Northeast lag greatly behind others. Benefits of economic success have not been shared equally, especially between Bangkok and the rest of the country. The value of GINI coefficient 0.4 in 2014 indicates income inequality and a lack of equal opportunities in Thailand (CIA 2015). [59]

Technological

According to the Global Competitiveness Report 2014–2015 Thailand's 'technological adoption is generally poor' (65th out of 144), and 'less than a quarter of the population accesses the Internet on a regular basis.' However, if analysing the overall infrastructure (the infrastructure in terms of railroads, ports, electricity supply, the collaboration between universities and the industry in terms of R&D and mobile telephone networks) it is about world-average (WEF 2015).

In The Global Innovation Index 2014, published by the WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organisation), Thailand ranks 48th of 143 countries. This index is based on 7 categories: Institutions (94th), Human capital and research (36th), Infrastructure (71th), Market sophistication (34th), Business sophistication (55th), Knowledge and technology outputs (47th) and Creative outputs (60th). According to this index, the category Institutions and within them political environment (95th) as well as regulatory environment (122nd) are the most worrying (WIPO 2014).

According to the World Economic Forum, Thailand ranks 72nd of

[60] 144 countries in terms of property rights, 104th with regard to intellectual property protection and 68th in terms of judicial independence (WEF 2015). The protection of intellectual property is one of the most important drivers for R&D, the production of technological advanced products, creativity, innovation and high-skilled employment. Because IP-protection can be considered a major source of foreign investments and competitiveness, the Thai government positively shaped the IP environment and legal framework within the last two decades. A dedicated IP rights jurisdiction was put in place, the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the Paris Convention were accessed, and various public campaigns on awareness and IP were launched.

According to Gil Sander (2011), Thailand is characterized by an on-going noteworthy transition in the development of technological products. Besides the changing nature of products – the country has gone from merely exporting raw commodities such as rubber or rice to becoming one of the largest exporters of cars and auto parts, hard discs and integrated circuit packages – there is now a strong focus on sophisticating tasks and processes. Nowadays, more and more manufacturing parts are imported from different countries, while only the assembling of final products is done in Thailand, including testing, packaging and marketing. This innovation moved Thailand up the value chain, since more Thai workers are performing complex tasks, and, in return, can expect better wages (Gil Sander 2011).

However, the research, development and design of these products is still mainly performed outside Thailand. While lots of innovation comes from learning by doing, R&D is the major driver of technological advancement and real innovations. In this respect Thailand is still lagging in both, the amount of money invested, and the number of research and development professionals (Gil Sander 2011).

Environmental

Thailand is characterized by a strategic location right at the heart of Asia – home to what is regarded today as the largest growing



economic market. It serves as a gateway to Southeast Asia and the Greater Mekong sub-region, where newly emerging markets offer great business potential. Thailand also has long supported economic integration with neighbouring countries.

Between the years 1992 and 1996 Thailand introduced the Seventh Economic and Social Development Plan. Since then, environment protection has become one of the top priorities of the Thai government. Nonetheless, today Thailand faces problems with water and air pollution, soil erosion, deforestation, water scarcity, and hazardous waste issues. [61]

High levels of air pollution in Thailand are the result of industrial growth. Particularly in Bangkok vehicles and factories contribute to air pollution. Some actions have already been taken to reduce damage; the Pollution Control Department and other agencies have developed standards in order to reduce air pollution. Factories and power plants were required to reduce emissions.

The next critical environmental problem is water pollution. Similarly as air pollution, water pollution is most serious in the populous central region, with high levels of industrial and domestic waste water. The government has already introduced some steps in this area in protecting water and continues to invest in wastewater treatment plants. The government is also investigating more effective and modern techniques such as constructed wetlands.

Another challenge in Thailand is the presence of natural disasters, ranging from tsunami in 2004 to the heavy flooding of 2011. The latter had a heavy impact on production in Thailand and on the global supply chain. Climate change also remains a serious problem for the country. The consequences of climate change further increase the risk of extreme weather conditions, natural disasters, droughts and rising sea-levels (United Nations Thailand 2008). Although the Thai government initiated some counter-measures, there are still many open challenges that could persuade foreigners to invest in other countries instead.

Legal

[62] Although Thailand has well-defined investment policies that are focused on liberalization and encouraging free trade, there are some restrictions for foreigners in certain business activities. Foreign enterprises are regulated by the 'Foreign Business Act 1999, BE 2542' (FBA). The activities in which foreign participation are limited, are divided into three groups: List 1 principally concerns land-dealing and agricultural activities; List 2 includes businesses related to national security or safety, or involving culture and art, tradition, folk handicraft, or environment and natural resources; and List 3 contains most other services, including legal and accounting.

While the activities under List 2 and List 3 may be pursued if the foreigner obtains a foreign business license, foreigners cannot engage at all in List 1 activities.

Government promotes especially foreign investments that contribute to the development of technology, skills, and innovation. In order to attract FDI, Thailand established the Board of Investment (BOI). BOI is a government agency that provides incentives for stimulating investment in Thailand. It is empowered to grant a wide range of fiscal and non-fiscal incentives and guarantees to qualified investment projects. In order to help revitalize Thailand's economy, to support the expansion of existing investment and encourage the attraction of new investment into Thailand, the BOI developed several measures to foster investment. These measures were implemented in the form of deregulation, such as foreign majority ownership in industries under the Foreign Business Act, incentives such as tax holidays, and facilitation such as expedited processing of visas and work permits.

While foreign businesses in the manufacturing sector are entitled to 100 percent ownership, market entry is restricted to several industries, and in non BOI-promoted areas foreign equity participation is limited (WTO 2011) in such a way that foreign ownership must not exceed 49 percent. In several industries, market access is further restricted by the application of tariff quotas, import fees and import permits (Shark 2011).

Other government organizations, such as the Department of Ex-



port Promotion and the International Chamber of Commerce, are also available to provide support to foreign investors.

Knowing that FDI has an impact on many areas of the host country, the following chapter presents main economic and ecological variables on which FDI could have an impact.

[63]

SIMILARITIES WITH EURO-MED REGION

If we compare elements of PESTEL analysis of Thailand with Euro-Med states' conditions, we can expose that some elements are very similar. Especially Southern Euro-Med states' faced numerous political crises in the past. Corruption, government instability, and inefficient government bureaucracy are characteristic also for Southern Euro-Med states and have a negative influence on the international capital flows.

Southern Euro-Med states also lack adoption of the latest technologies and the capacity of innovation. As the level of technology, as measured by most relevant indices, remains relatively low in the Southern Euro-Med states, the transfer and diffusion of technology can present a potentially important function of FDI in these countries.

On the other hand there are also some elements in the PESTEL analysis that are valid not just for the Southern Euro-Med but for the whole Euro-Med region. These are especially the threat of terrorism and environmental challenges. Both present a major common challenge in the whole Euro-Med region. The threat of terrorism has been increasing during the last few years and countries tried to protect themselves with numerous preventive actions. Also regarding environmental challenges, there have been many environmental policies adopted by all Euro-Med countries in the last few years. Although examples of good practices are available in the region, environmental degradation still remains a relevant regional risk. Both, in Thailand and also in Euro-Med region pollution increased dramatically in the recent decades, and the responses to it are still insufficient despite national efforts.

TABLE 3 Linear Regression Summary

R	R square	Adj. R square	Std. error of the estimate
0.814	0.662	0.652	63357.24461

NOTES Predictors: Constant, FDI inflow. Dependent Variable: GDP.

[64]

EFFECTS OF FDI IN THAILAND

The following findings are based on a theory that FDI flows influence the fluctuation of selected economic variables (economic growth (GDP), employment, export values, and pollution). The statistical data is from UNCTAD.

Research was built upon the study of five major economic variables gathered for Thailand. The main independent variable is FDI. The starting point for all variables was 1980. SPSS statistical software has been used to run regressions and conduct correlation analyses.

The relationship between FDI and selected economic variables will be analysed using linear regression models. These models will also show the extent to which FDI can have impact on the specified variables. However, prior to modelling we tested whether or not the relationship between the variables is linear and whether or not linear regression might be useful during the analysis. The linearity assumption was checked using a graphical method by constructing a scatter graph. All graphs showed that there is a linear relationship between all variables. With the linear regression model we estimated the strength and statistical significance of the impact of FDI on economic and ecological variables.

The first model presented in tables 3–5 shows the regression output for the economic growth and FDI. The correlation coefficient value (R) 0.814 points to the relation of variable FDI inflow with endogenous variable GDP. Adjusted determination coefficient is 0.652, meaning that 65.5 % of variance of endogenous variable can be explained by independent variable. Using the Anova test, we demonstrate the acceptance of the model according to the statistical criteria in table 4.

The Anova test (table 4) proves the existence of a linear depen-



Foreign Direct Investment as a Driver of Economic Development

TABLE 4 ANOVA F-test

Item	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sig.
Regression	251899969777.504	1	251899969777.504	62.753	0.000
Residual	128452494238.718	32	4014140444.960		
Total	380352464016.222	33			

[65]

NOTES Predictors: Constant, FDI inflow. Dependent variable: GDP.

TABLE 5 Coefficients

	Unstandardized coeff.		Std. c.	t	Sig.	95,0% conf. inter. for B	
	B	Std. err.	β			Lower	Upper
(a)	57168.380	16343.404		3.498	0.001	23877.955	90458.806
(b)	23.715	2.994	0.814	7.922	0.000	17.617	29.812

NOTES Row headings are as follows: (a) constant, (b) FDI inflow. Dependent variable: GDP. Collinearity statistics: tolerance 1.000, VIF 1.000.

dence between variables, enabling us to use the linear form of equation in the case concerned.

In table 5 the model is presented along with the *VIF test*. Beta coefficients from table 5 express the relative importance of the independent variable in a standardized form. We found that FDI is the significant predictor and that it has a high impact on the GDP. A multicollinearity test for our model is also presented in table 5. As the tolerance should be > 0.1 (or for VIF statistics it should be < 10) for all included variables, this requirement was fulfilled with the achieved VIF value 1.00. It was hypothesized that FDI increases economic growth. The results show that the hypothesis is supported by an evidence from the estimated coefficient, which is positive. If we compare results with other studies, we find a lot of papers that prove strong contribution of FDI to the economic growth (some of the Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee 1995; Agarwal 2000; Pain 2001; 2006; Neuhaus 2006).

With the next model we tested the linear regression with FDI and employment in Thailand. The results are presented in tables 6–8. The correlation coefficient value (R) 0,844 demonstrates the relation of variable FDI with endogenous variable employment. The adjusted determination coefficient is 0,703, meaning that 70.03 % of variance

TABLE 6 Linear Regression Summary

R	R square	Adj. R square	Std. error of the estimate
0.844	0.712	0.703	2628.80741

NOTES Predictors: Constant, FDI inflow. Dependent Variable: Employment.

[66]

TABLE 7 ANOVA F-test

Item	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sig.
Regression	547279355.295	1	547279355.295	79.194	.000
Residual	221140108.536	32	6910628.392		
Total	768419463.831	33			

NOTES Predictors: Constant, FDI inflow. Dependent variable: Employment.

of endogenous variable can be explained by independent variables.

Using the Anova test in table 7 we demonstrate the acceptance of the model according to the statistical criteria.

The Anova test proves the existence of linear dependence between variables, enabling us to use the linear form of the equation in the case concerned. In table 8 the model is presented. Again beta coefficients from table 8 express the relative importance of the independent variable in standardized form. The results show that FDI reflected country employment. It is shown that the greater is the FDI that flows into Thailand, the higher employment is in the country. The statistical significance of the model and the high value of R Square support our hypothesis that FDI effects higher employment. The findings are the same with findings from Yabuchhi (1999), Balcerzak and Żurek (2011), Shaari, Hussain, and Halim (2012), and Habib and Sarwar (2013) which also proved positive correlation between employment and FDI inflows. With the third model we tested the relationship between FDI and export in Thailand.

Data in the model summary (table 9) show high correlation of FDI to export. With the independent variable 70.6 % of variance can be explained.

With the Anova test we proved the existence of linear dependence between variables (table 10).

Results in table 11 show that greater FDI flows into Thailand re-



Foreign Direct Investment as a Driver of Economic Development

TABLE 8 Coefficients

	Unstandardized coeff.		Std. c.	t	Sig.	95,0% conf. inter. for B	
	B	Std. err.	β			Lower	Upper
(a)	28874.443	678.118		42.580	0.000	27493.163	30255.724
(b)	1.105	0.124	0.844	8.899	0.000	0.852	1.358

[67]

NOTES Row headings are as follows: (a) constant, (b) FDI inflow. Dependent variable: Employment. Collinearity statistics: tolerance 1.000, VIF 1.000.

TABLE 9 Linear Regression Summary

R	R square	Adj. R square	Std. error of the estimate
0.846a	0.715	0.706	45403.79944

NOTES Predictors: Constant, FDI inflow. Dependent Variable: Export.

sult in raising exports. This supports the findings of Harding and Javorcig (2011) who also proved a positive correlation between FDI and export.

The last model tested the relationship between FDI and air pollution. Here, Carbon Dioxide emissions were chosen as a proxy for air pollution in general. It was expected that an increase of FDI would give a rise to a corresponding increase in CO₂ emissions.

As it can be seen in table 12, the correlation coefficient value (R) 0,861 demonstrates the relation of variable FDI with endogenous variable air pollution. Adjusted determination coefficient is 0,733, meaning that 73.3 % of variance of endogenous variable can be explained by the independent variable. With Anova test in table 13 we proved the acceptance of the model according to the statistical criteria.

The results presented in table 14 show that FDI had impact on

TABLE 10 ANOVA F-test

Item	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sig.
Regression	165411210246.094	1	165411210246.094	80.238	0.000
Residual	65968160123.746	32	2061505003.867		
Total	231379370369.839	33			

NOTES Predictors: Constant, FDI inflow. Dependent variable: Export.

TABLE 11 Coefficients

	Unstandardized coeff.		Std. c.	t	Sig.	95,0% conf. inter. for B	
	B	Std. err.	β			Lower	Upper
(a)	10754.291	11712.199		0.918	0.365	- 34611.259	13102.678
(b)	19.217	2.145	0.846	8.958	0.000	14.847	23.587

[68]

NOTES Row headings are as follows: (a) constant, (b) FDI inflow. Dependent variable: GDP. Collinearity statistics: tolerance 1.000, VIF 1.000.

TABLE 12 Linear Regression Summary

R	R square	Adj. R square	Std. error of the estimate
0.861	0.742	0.733	0.64053

NOTES Predictors: Constant, FDI inflow. Dependent Variable: Emissions.

pollution in Thailand.

The more FDI flows into a country, the higher is the risk of pollution. The same was concluded also by Grimes and Kento (2003), Liu, Pan, and Chen (2006), and Wu (2006), who proved that FDI is worsening the environment. As FDI generates more output it can also generate more pollution, but many studies show that technological spill over effects from FDI and crowding out less efficient firms because of FDI could improve overall energy efficiency (Eskeland and Harrison 2002). Economic policy in Thailand should therefore take actions in the direction that FDI will be beneficial also to the environment.

Regarding the fact that Euro-Med states face the same environmental challenges as Thailand, we can conclude that also Euro-Med countries should take actions that will protect environment when it comes to the inward FDI. Positive correlation between FDI and

TABLE 13 ANOVA F-test

Item	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	F	Sig.
Regression	34.207	1	34.207	83.374	0.000
Residual	11.898	29	0.410		
Total	46.105	30			

NOTES Predictors: Constant, FDI inflow. Dependent variable: Emissions.



TABLE 14 Coefficients

	Unstandardized coeff.		Std. coeff.	<i>t</i>	Sig.
	<i>B</i>	Std. err.	β		
(a)	1.289	0.173		7.458	0.000
(b)	0.000	0.000	0.861	9.131	0.000

[69]

NOTES Row headings are as follows: (a) constant, (b) FDI inflow. Dependent variable: Emissions.

GDP growth could encourage Southern Euro-Med states for attracting more FDI. Positive influence of FDI on economic growth was shown already in many other studies, therefore one of the important factors for strengthening economic position of the Euro-Med region could also be international capital flows.

CONCLUSION

According to our PESTEL analysis Thailand has well-defined investment policies with focus on encouraging free trade and liberalization. Especially foreign investments that contribute to the development of technology, skills and innovation, are actively promoted by the government. Despite some negative characteristics such as political instability and high level of corruption, Thailand is among the most attractive investment locations according to international surveys.

The Thai government established resources for supporting and assisting foreign investors. Through the Board of Investment (BOI), the government offers a range of support services, tax incentives and import duty concessions to an extensive list of businesses that are regarded as priority or promoted industries. In addition, companies promoted by the BOI, receive permission to bring in foreign workers, own land and take or remit foreign currency abroad. In addition, foreign businesses in the manufacturing sector are entitled to 100 percent ownership.

Thailand is characterized by a large pool of cost-effective labour that can make products competitive in the global marketplace. With its strategic location, modern transport facilities, good infrastructure for foreign investors and upgraded communications and IT net-

[70] work Thailand ensures optimum business and living conditions for investors. But on the other side, in terms of technological progress, Thailand lacks adoption of the latest technologies and the capacity of innovation. Furthermore, the quality of R&D is also rather poor. One of the most important barriers to foreign investment is the protection of several local industries and the local workforce, as well as weak protection of intellectual property (IP). Counterfeited products are sold across the nation and IP rights are enforced ineffectively. Furthermore, on-going climate change and pollution also threaten the environmental business environment in Thailand. If overcoming the mentioned challenges, the main goals of the Thai government in the next years, Thailand will become even more attractive for FDI.

Regarding the analysis of selected economic and environmental effects of FDI, the influence of FDI on economic growth, employment and export in Thailand was found to be significant. Findings are consistent with economic theory and the original hypothesis. As all estimated coefficients were statistically significant, we can conclude that economic policy, FDI inflows and other elements seem to worked in synergetic relationship in Thailand in the past. According to the PESTEL analysis, the finding that FDI increases the pollution was also expected. Thailand has a lot of environmental challenges to overcome and as FDI can be beneficial also to the environment, the Thai government should take actions that will support such investments.

As there are similarities within environmental, political and technological conditions between Thailand and Euro-Med states, some similar conclusions can be suggested also for Euro-Med states. In order to attract more FDI that will bring positive effects to the host economy, Euro-Med states should improve their political conditions (more efficient government bureaucracy, government stability etc.) and offer appropriate conditions for FDI to improve technology and innovation. Regarding the fact that a lot of FDI has negative effect on the environment, Euro-Med states also have to pay attention to the fact that the attracted FDI is environmentally friendly.



AUTHORS' CONTRIBUTIONS

Authors researched the economy of Thailand and analysed possibilities for foreign direct investments in Thailand. For analysing determinants of FDI in Thailand PESTEL analysis was used. Another added value of the article presents the definition of some similarities between Thailand and Euro-Med states.

[71]

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The Mediterranean Region as a Phenomenon and an Object of Analysis in the Field of International Relations

ANA BOJINOVIĆ FENKO
University of Ljubljana, Slovenia

This article offers an understanding of the Mediterranean region as a rare phenomenon in the international relations and consequently the non-uniform ways in which it is analysed within the science of International Relations. Three prevailing interpretations of international relations in the Mediterranean region are shown, namely the definition of the Med as an EU foreign policy object, as an inter-regional space based on diverse sub-regions and as an area of autonomous regionalisation process. Furthermore, scientific approaches analysing the three aspects are presented. A critical analysis and evaluations of both, the phenomenological and scientific domains of the region, leads to a conclusion where the author indicates the already notable and potential future implications of the research results for both, the political practice of international relations and the development of the science of IR.

Key Words: The Mediterranean region, political phenomenon, science of IR

The Mediterranean is not an institutionalised region in the form of a regional governmental organisation (RGO). However, it is one of the oldest regions in-the-making. Long before the institution of sovereignty was introduced, international relations were performed by other-than-state entities and the Mediterranean was perceived and lived as a unit, be it during the Ottoman Empire, Italian city-state merchant influence, the *Pax Romana* (3000 b.c.–565 a.d.), or the Arab hegemony from the 8th–13th Century (Calleya 1997). Various states have had an interest in the region since the 17th Century when domestic and foreign authorities fought for the access to the sea and tried to balance their power in this strategic trade area, deemed as the centre of the world (Amin 1989; Braudel 1990). If

[76] one looks only at the last century of its regional processes, the first formal governmental regional organisation of a strictly functional nature of co-operation was founded already in 1910, but ever since, only one other all-Mediterranean RGO, two sub-regional and one inter-regional have been founded, all having extremely low profile and non-political mandate (Bojinović Fenko 2009a).¹ A lot of initialled ideas of Mediterranean states for regional cooperation have been presented after the Cold War, but quite some have failed (Bojinović Fenko 2009a) and it is the EU that has since 1995 represented the most influential, even hegemonic regional actor in the Mediterranean (Pace 2006), namely by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), complemented by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Currently, the institutionalized but rather non-treaty based governmental co-operation in the field of regional politics is framed within the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). The latter represents an upgrade of the previous EU-sponsored regional frameworks for cooperation with the southern Mediterranean partners. However, several factors such as the global financial crisis, persisting economic imbalance, ongoing territorial disputes, new security threats (such as terrorism, piracy), cultural disputes such as the 'Cartoon Crisis' and increasing ethnic intolerance in Europe contributed to weaken, and even block region-building processes (Panebianco 2010, 153). Cooperation in the Mediterranean region further failed to gain importance after the uprisings in the Arab Mediterranean in the beginning of the second decade of the 21st Century.² The provisions of the UfM's founding document – the Paris Declaration ('Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean' 2008) for tightening the institutional framework and diversifying cooperation into political and more functional fields (concrete economic, energy, education, development and environmental projects), have now resulted in practicing only those regional activities of the minimum common denominator; that is reflected in the 6 so-called priority regional projects, which are of primarily apolitical and exclusively functional nature. The latter are performed in the fields of De-Pollution of the Mediterranean, Maritime and Land Highways, Civil Protection, Alternative Energies, Higher Education and



Research, and The Mediterranean Business Development Initiative ('Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean' 2008, Annex). However, even agreeing on projects of technical cooperation is hampered by politicization.³ In sum, Bicchi's assessment (2012, 13) of the UfM's institutional logic intersecting politicization in nature of policy and bilateralism as types of instruments applied as well as Gillespie's (2012, 217) estimation of the UfM's project activity being 'technical' rather than politically-focused in character, have proven to be correct. [77]

In addition to the described non-treaty based mode of the UfM, the informality of the Mediterranean region has always been strengthening by non-governmental co-operation even during, but especially after the end of the Cold War (Šabič and Bojinović 2007). The UfM umbrella itself provides a special attention to civil society-based regional cooperation by placing The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly and The Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures as integral institutions of the Euro-Mediterranean relations ('Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean' 2008, points 17–18). Bojinović Fenko (2012) identified various types of non-governmental actors in the region, namely transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with Mediterranean offices, Mediterranean NGOs and multi-actor coalitions active in various fields of functional cooperation, such as environmental protection, sustainable development, water-related issues etc. (Ibid.). Especially EU-supported NGOs in the field of human rights and inter-cultural dialogue have spurred from the EU's support for development of the third basket in the EMP, namely the Socio-Cultural Cooperation on the basis of exchange and strengthening civil society, leading to assumptions of a new Euro-Mediterranean cultural identity (Panebianco 2003). Nevertheless, the three dimensions of Euro-Med cooperation, political, economic and identity dimension, have not been developing in parallel with equal speed nor results. Furthermore, the non-homogeneity of state and non-state actors in the Mediterranean region in terms of defining the needs and outcomes with respect to these three regional dimensions prevent the region to perform as a

[78] common project of and for the Mediterranean society. For this reason, from the perspective of prevailing cases of world regions, this is an unusual case of a region, on the one hand performing centuries of long non-state regionalisation process from within and at the same time struggling with regionalism as internal states' project for the last 70 years with strong pushes also from outside of the region.

Within the above defined problem, this article offers an understanding of the Mediterranean region as a rare phenomenon in the field of international relations and consequently the non-uniform ways in which it is analysed in the science of International Relations (IR). The method pursued in this research article is first, a thick description of the ontology of the Mediterranean region and second, a conceptual analysis of theoretical approaches in the field of IR explaining and understanding this phenomenon. Within the two parts of the article, a critical analysis and evaluations is performed of both. Conclusion indicates the already notable and potential future implications of the research results for the practice of international relations and the development of the science of IR.

THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION AS A PHENOMENON IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Its boundaries are not drawn either by space or time. One does not even know how to determine them and on what basis. They are not economic not historical, not state- nor nation-based: they are similar to a chalk-drawn circle which permanently appears and is being erased, a circle which is being widened and narrowed by winds and waves, works and inspirations.

Matvejević (2000, 16)

Since the Mediterranean lacks a presence in the form of an RGO, reference to it is sporadic and uninform. Especially in non-scientific contexts, politicians, experts and journalists mainly expose it in terms of well-known historical references, such as *mare nostrum*, oblivious of the fact that this notion already denotes the 'ownership' of the region to its northern societies; the Med being a natural



extension of Europe. These definitions appeared at the time of important regional political events, led by the EU, such as the signature of the Barcelona declaration in 1995 or the Paris declaration on the UfM in 2008 (e.g. *The Economist* 2008). A second notion in a rather more critical understanding of the Mediterranean is a reference to a 'sphere of influence', either in the historical cadre of colonisation and Cold-War power game of the two blocks or in terms of a more recent understanding of outside influence and presence in the region; not only by states but also by international universal and regional governmental organizations and global NGOs. According to this perspective, the Mediterranean is not defined only by Europe (as above) but by a *pleiade* of influential external actors. In brief, it is defined from the outside (Ismael and Ismael 1999; Leontidou 2004; Walters 2004; Moulakis 2005). The latter is highly representative by a discursive reference to the region, defined according to political pragmatism and the use for the external actors; the EU defines the region as Euro-Mediterranean, sometimes also Southern Mediterranean, or Southern Mediterranean Partners, when referring to security issues and unresolved conflicts the terms used are Maghreb, Mashreq and Middle East. When the post-Yugoslav space was treated as a post-conflict area, it was not defined as part of the Mediterranean by the EU, whereas Slovenia (since 2004 as the EU member state) and states of the stabilized Western Balkans region (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Albania) have been included in the UfM only since 2008, when the EU updated and thus reconceptualised its relations with the region. Calleya (2005, 42) estimates that this is a consequence of permanent changes in patterns and types of relations within the region. The USA, for example, as another influential actor, refers only to the Middle East or to the MENA region (Middle-East North Africa) (Craig 2004). [79]

After the Cold War, the perspective of understanding the Mediterranean changed from outside-in into a more inside-outward orientation. The latter was a result of various factors; the European Union enlargements and the strengthened interest in the southern neighbourhood (launch of the EMP), the breakup of Socialist Yugoslavia and the shift of Balkan Mediterranean states' interest from the Med

[80] to the South-Eastern Europe (partly France and largely Turkey and Greece), a renewed rise of Islamism and a new impetus for Israeli-Palestinian conflict solution (Aliboni 1996, 53–60). Despite this new centripetal trend, the region remained strongly penetrated by global international politics, as seen by the Gulf crisis and debates on democratization, fight against terrorism and so called ‘clash of civilisations’ in terms of variety of cultures. The notion that it is the diversity rather than commonalities that make up the essence of the Mediterranean region,⁴ is taken by Xenakis (1999, 257): ‘Mediterranean can be also seen as a network of diversities and dividing lines of co-operation between different socio-economic systems, political cultures and regimes, languages, forms of expression, and religions.’ Divergence is also taken into consideration when defining the Mediterranean in terms of conditions for and results of international development. Moisseron (2005, 25–38) refers to this phenomenon through a concept of ‘imbalanced actors’ in terms of the level of economic development and a strong trade and economic dependency of states in the Southern Mediterranean on Europe and from the perspective of the imbalanced demographical trends.⁵ Additionally, developing states and especially Arab critiques estimate liberalism as an unattractive plan of social and economic life because its fearless accentuation of individuality and competition weakens the community (Adler and Crawford 2006, 28–9).

Since 2011 political perspectives on the Med have resonated predominantly in linking the region as a space of transnational flows to sources of radicalism, international terrorism and religious fundamentalism (e.g. Drakos and Kutan 2003; Looney 2005; Fini 2006), and so have the critics of such one-dimensional framing of social deviation sources (Volpi 2006) and a political strategy of securitization by the EU in response to such definition of security threats (Bicchi and Martin 2006; Pace 2010). One of the recently highly exposed sources of instability and threat deriving from or through the Mediterranean is (illegal) migration, but this is far from a novel phenomenon; King (1998) has referred to the Med as Europe’s Rio Grande almost 20 years ago. Next to these transnational flows not liable to state-control, nowadays two main state-level obstacles pre-



vent closer regional cooperation in the Mediterranean, namely the unfinished process of state-building (Ayoob 1999, 251–52; Bill and Springborg 1999, Chapter 2) and (also partly in this context) a continuation of unresolved disputes and conflicts, especially Israeli-Palestinian (Adler and Crawford 2006, 29–30).

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On the basis of the above outlined various interpretations of international relations in the Mediterranean region, I can summarize that the latter is understood through three prevailing definitions: (a) as a neighbouring area and thus a foreign policy object of Europe, (b) as an inter-regional space, where diversity derives from different sub-regional units and (c) as an area of autonomous regionalisation process. In this framework, the area is also taken into consideration in the prevailing scientific literature on IR, which I will discuss in the following part.

THE MEDITERRANEAN AS AN OBJECT OF ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The Mediterranean question has existed for less than three centuries. In classical and medieval times a Mediterranean problem was not possible due to a simple reason that there existed nothing but the Mediterranean. [...] The Mediterranean problem started with the British occupation of Gibraltar on 4 August 1704.

Federzoni (1936, 387, 389)

The influence of the EU on the Mediterranean is analysed within the literature of IR and European Studies. Predominantly, the reference is on the analysis of EU external action though the concept of actorness or foreign policy. Second to that is the placement of Euro-Mediterranean area into studies of inter-regionalism and finally, a handful of authors focus on the Mediterranean area from the perspective of regionalism and studies of regionalisation process. The focus of researchers on EU policies towards the Mediterranean has twofold implications; the enquiries of such studies mainly aim to assess the effects of EU foreign policy on the EU members states

or the EU as a whole and only a small number of publications primarily assess the effects of the EMP, ENP or UfM for the Southern Mediterranean partners (e.g. El-Sayed 1999; Youngs 2002; Darbouche and Gillespie 2006; Pace 2006; Volpi 2006; Adler et al. 2006; [82] Demmelhuber 2007; Bicchi and Gillespie 2012) what else the entire Mediterranean (e.g. Bin 1997; Stavridis 2002; Attinà 2003; Bojinović Fenko 2009b). EU foreign policy-focused studies assert a hegemonic position of the EU. All types of power in IR are conceptualized in this context, namely the EU's material power (security studies and realism) (Blank 1999; Biscop 2003; Balfour 2004), the EU's structural power (liberalism and political economy) (Kourtelis 2015; Lovéc 2015), the EU's discursive power defining the EU's Self though the Mediterranean as the Other (Pace 2006; Bicchi and Martin 2006) and EU's normative power (Tovias 2005; Bicchi 2006; Adler and Crawford 2006). The latter two approaches are strongly informed by social constructivism, imported from general philosophy of social science. Hegemonic influence of the EU on the Med is also conceptualised by referring to EU's strategy of 'buffering logic' (del Sarto and Schumacher 2005, 26), which as an effect reproduces 'peripheral dependency' rather than open regionalism (Joffé 2007).

Analysing the Euro-Mediterranean area within the studies of inter-regionalism is rather an alternative theoretical approach to the above described EU foreign policy focus. In this context, the Mediterranean is initially placed as an equal region to the EU despite the fact of its under-institutionalisation and inexistence in a framework of a formal region (RGO); thus rather common regional norms, values and practices of state and non-state actors are the focus of understanding – again strong elements of social constructivism (Bojinović Fenko 2009b). The above mentioned diversity of Mediterranean states' political systems, economic development, dispersed security and culture, and a partly visible but politically irrelevant idea of Mediterranean solidarity make Aliboni (2000) refer to the region as having a 'quintessential interregional nature'. A similar finding is noted also by Calleya (1997, 230); since pan-Mediterranean initiatives do not stand the ravages of time, states do not manage to develop such stability and intensity of relations



that a foreign policy of one of them would steer also the foreign policy of its neighbour. Within this approach, some researchers do not recognize the inter-regional nature of the Mediterranean due to its nascent nature but rather refer to a more static view of the area in terms of its sub-regions (Maghreb, Mashreq, Southern Europe, Balkans) (Aliboni 2004). Finally, some kind of inter-regional nature of the Mediterranean is researched within individual regional analyses of RGOS, in which individual sub-regions or states of the Mediterranean take part. However, there are very few cases of literature identifying overlapping political agendas of different regional spaces (EU, NATO, OSCE, Arab League, African Union and the UfM) (see Bojinović Fenko 2012). [83]

The third and the newest (still developing) approach to analysing the Mediterranean as a region is a presupposition of the area developing through a regionalisation process. This approach is conceptualized within the social constructivism-based New Regionalism Approach and presupposes a formation of an international region by all relevant actors (state-market-civil society), as a bottom-up spontaneous process – a response to globalization. Regionalisation is the actual process of increasing exchange, contact and co-ordination and may be caused by regionalism, but it may also emerge regardless of whether there is a regionalist project and ideology or not (Hveem 2003, 83). As in the Mediterranean, there are numerous non-state regional actors, such as NGOs, municipalities and cities as micro-regions, subnational regions, epistemic communities, research centres and businesses, this approach seems most applicable. In his historical analysis Calleya (1997, 67–8) refers to this nature of regional connections in the Med since the 11th Century as to ‘transnational area’. Some authors analysing individual regionalizing actors in this context are Jünemann (2002; 2003) and Feliu (2005), analysing the development of Mediterranean regional NGOs, and Youngs (2002), who assess that these actors have been empowered by the EU’s democracy promotion projects. However, as a consequence these bottom-up societal developments are understood as endangering the paper democratic regimes in some of the southern Mediterranean states. To gain legitimacy with the regimes, NGOs have ini-

[84] tiated so-called multi-actor coalitions (Šabič and Bojinović 2007, 330–1). These refer to cooperation between various types of regionalising actors at various levels of regionalism (states, NGOs, RGOS, subregions, inter-parliamentary) based in the region and external in different fields of regional cooperation, such as: environmental protection, sustainable development, economy and business, social development, human rights, culture, science and research, higher education and local governance (Bojinović Fenko 2012). Application of the New Regionalism Approach to the Mediterranean is performed by an analysis of levels of regionness, where the Mediterranean displays dynamic development of elements of regional society and regional community by various actors (Bojinović Fenko 2009b).

In this context, the historian Morris (2003, 43–5) refers to a so-called process of Mediterraneanization, defined as a process of connection. He criticizes the prevailing historians' views of the Mediterraneanism in terms of a long *durée* (Braudel 1990), defined as connectivity, mobility and decentring (Horden and Purcell 2002), as too static and focused only on the analysis of short-term changes extrapolating them through time. This type of analysis presents the region as already integrated, fixed, or rather as if these elements were its permanent features (Morris 2003, 46–7). Mediterraneanization seems very complementary to the above presented features of understanding the Mediterranean through a regionalisation process in IR; looking at the area as a dynamic place, changeable in space and time, enabling a more complex awareness of this process' outcomes for individual actors. Namely, some social groups and/or political actors prosper as winners and some regress as losers, thus the Mediterranean in some places and for some actors is more and for others less.

CONCLUSION

In this article I focused on developing an understanding of the Mediterranean as a phenomenon in the field of international relations and on presenting the approaches through which it is analysed in the science of IR. I have shown three prevailing interpretations of international relations in the Mediterranean region, namely the



definition of the Med as an EU foreign policy object, as an inter-regional space based on diverse sub-regions and as an area of autonomous regionalisation process. While the first and the second interpretations by referring to Euro-Mediterranean, Middle East, MENA, Southern Med Partners, Maghreb, Mashrek, Southern Europe or Balkans, blur not only the notion but the very existence of the Mediterranean region, the regionalization enables the understanding of the Mediterraneanization in space and time. The implications of the findings for political actors, especially for the EU, point to a need for a highly responsible use of definitions and references to the Mediterranean region in political discourse as for example discursive reference to 'partnership' or 'friendship' raises aspirations whereas 'common norms and values' may raise concern and ambiguity with the addressees. Additionally, what is also evident, is that various ideas on regional cooperation may also be contested at various levels and by different types of actors, which calls for an open dialogue among parties and action *in bona fides*. Finally, as the regionalisation process performs with different outcomes for different regional actors, the notion of power as the central focus of political science remains pertinent also for IR analysis. In this context however, the circumstance of Mediterranean states never having developed a clear and operational autonomous regionalism project and the fact that the main framework for governmental cooperation in the Mediterranean region, namely the UfM, currently remains un-operational due to several regional and domestic political and external factors renders a classical IR analysis of interstate RGO activities unfit. IR thus gets informed by a social science theory, which is sensitive to understanding social processes and non-state actors and groups, such as social constructivism and even performs complementary to a novel history approach.

[85]

NOTES

- 1 Commission internationale pour l'exploration scientifique de la Mer Méditerranée, founded in 1910 (23 member states), Le Centre International de Hautes Etudes Agronomiques Méditerranéennes (CIEHAM) founded in 1962 (13 member states), European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization (EMPPO) founded in 1951 (47 member states), Middle

- East Mediterranean Travel and Tourism Association (MEMTTA), founded in 1995 – not operational, and l'Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA), founded in 1989 (5 member states) (Bojinović Fenko 2009a).
- 2 Additional factors impeding inter-state cooperation in the region are: individual internal states' hegemonic or incompatible pretensions in the region (e.g. French, Spanish, Italian, Israeli), conflicting agendas of external states (e.g. USA, Russia); the big constituency of UfM participating states (44) and its unclear institutional structure; unresolved Middle East Peace Process, overlapping political agendas of different regional spaces (e.g. EU, NATO, OSCE, Arab League, African Union and the UfM), and political instability and the challenge of regime change in the Mediterranean (see Bicchi and Gillespie 2012).
 - 3 For example, a sectoral meeting on fresh water in April 2010, where 'the participants agreed on all the technical aspects of cooperation on water, but the agreement fell on the concrete wording in terms of referring to the Palestinian occupied territories' (Johansson-Nogués 2012, 30).
 - 4 The most illustrative in this sense is the title of an influential scientific edited book *Convergence of Civilizations: Constructing a Mediterranean Region* (Adler et al. 2006).
 - 5 The author notes that in the year 1950, the ratio of the number of inhabitants between the North and the South of the Mediterranean was 2 : 1 (140 million: 70 milion) whereas the estimation for 2025 is a complete turn of this ratio into 1 : 2 (Moisseron 2005, 35).

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Interview with Prof. Dr. Maja Makovec Brenčič, Slovene Minister of Education, Science, and Sports

ANA BOJINOVIĆ FENKO
University of Ljubljana, Slovenia

A new National strategy for the internationalization of higher education of the Republic of Slovenia for the period 2015-2020 is under preparation. What are the key new features in relation to the existing system?

The national strategy of higher education follows the direction of the National program of higher education in order to enhance the quality of higher education through openness to the international environment. Internationalization is recognized as an integral part of an evolving higher education environment that ensures quality and sustainable development of teaching and scientific research as well as the development of any other segments that form the higher education area. An active participation in the international academic environment also promotes cultural, political and economic cooperation with other cultures and societies relevant for Slovenia, wherewith it is possible to circumvent the negative effects that may jeopardize smaller societies. Internationalization is currently an important topic as we are faced with a migrant flow, and it is through a true understanding of internationality that multiculturalism, adoption of diversity and respect of cultures can be strengthened. This is also one of the challenges of the strategy.

At this moment, an analysis of the achieved progress in the field of internationalization is being carried out both through the National program of higher education and as a reflection on the future development of openness of the universities as well as other knowledge institutions in the field of higher education. It deals with other strategic documents as well, such as Smart Specialization Strategy, Slovenia's Development Strategy 2014-2020, Research and Innova-

[92] tion Strategy of Slovenia 2011–2020, strategic international orientation of Slovenia in the field of foreign and economic policy and development cooperation, and other previously adopted internationalization strategies for the Slovenian higher education institutions.

The central objective of the emerging strategy is to make the Slovenian higher education system more appealing to foreign students, teachers, researchers and professional staff (a new feature, for example, is a visual identity and e-study in Slovenia, which is already used for the joint promotion of Slovenian higher education institutions at higher education fairs abroad), as well as to emphasise the omnidirectivity of internationalization, i.e. the domestic internationalization. Much of this is already underway, aimed at all students and higher education teachers and associates, i.e. those that are generally not physically mobile and therefore without any direct international experience.

Domestic internationalization draws on e-mobility and virtual mobility, it involves intercultural and global abilities and the development of soft skills based on high-quality, structured, integrated and systematically organized academic experience, which is embedded into the curriculum/programme that is internationalized to a greatest extent possible, a variety of extracurricular activities, the teaching process itself (e.g. visiting teachers, teachers from practice with international experience, problem-based learning etc.) and so on. Studies, especially those conducted among employers, show that graduates with international experience, which can be acquired in various ways – either at home or abroad, are more employable. Therefore, a diversity of ways for acquiring such experience should be made possible in knowledge institutions.

With the strategy, we want to change the majority opinion that mobility is in fact the most common form of internationalization. It is indeed one of the best achievements of the Bologna system due to its contribution to greater openness and interconnectivity of the higher education system in Europe and beyond. However, it is with the new strategy that we want to emphasize omnidirectivity as well as the diversity of promotion of various forms and processes of in-



ternationalization in higher education, including those that may be quite peculiar to individual knowledge institutions.

How does the Republic of Slovenia understand the role of Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI) in the internationalization of higher education and science in Slovenia?

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We see the role of EMUNI in the internationalization of higher education especially as a network organization, as a facilitator and integrator of interculturalism in the field of higher education and beyond. This means it is not only an individual higher education institution with its study programmes, but a focal and connection point for the Mediterranean countries, which could assist Slovenian higher education institutions in the establishment and implementation of cooperation at various levels, reaching from the programme, development and research level to the strengthening of intercultural behaviours and competencies.

The draft of the abovementioned strategy targets priority regions, including the Euro-Mediterranean region among others. What concrete measures are planned for achieving this objective? Will this measure, for example, include the allocation of bilateral scholarships, which are allocated in 2014/15 to only a few European Mediterranean countries and Israel, and none to the Arab Mediterranean countries?

Slovenia can offer its knowledge and development potential both, for the development of higher education and research area in its narrower and wider region, and as a facilitator connecting education and science with the economy. The Mediterranean region is also emphasized as an important region in the EU and receives a great deal of attention, in addition to the Balkans and Asia, in the framework of the international dimension of higher education in Erasmus+ programme, as well as allocated funds in the form of scholarships for the exchange of students and higher education teachers. Some countries, such as Egypt, Tunisia and Bahrain, have already expressed a considerable interest in deepening their cooperation with Slovenia; if the interests deepen and become more concrete in various forms of cooperation, we will, of course, also consider bilateral scholarships or other forms of cooperation.

[94] *In 2013, CMEPIUS conducted and published a study on the evaluation of the impacts of the Erasmus programme on higher education in Slovenia, and pointed out, among other things, that the state (universities, faculties) is not collecting data on students who took part in the academic exchange, which could help identify good and bad practices established at foreign universities. At the same time, the possibilities of addressing domestic students and diplomats are not explored as much, foreign students are not systematically informed about Slovenian history, culture and society, and Slovenia fails to maintain contact with them after the exchange. Do you plan to address these unexploited opportunities in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?*

The residents of the European Union have a right to study, live and work in another Member State of the European Union and around the world, which allows them to have direct experience and contacts with people of other nations and cultures. The systematic upgrade of the experiences gained in a foreign country, with high-quality access to intercultural and international competencies and their development, enables greater competitiveness for individuals in the international and global labour market and the labour market in general. This is confirmed by the studies on employment, especially of young people. For this reason, one of the proposals in the Strategy for the internationalization is the promotion of learning the Slovenian language and about the Slovenian culture among foreign students in Slovenia.

The strategy also emphasizes the importance of preserving the Slovenian language as a language of the professional sphere; it should remain the dominant language of teaching and research, despite the inclusion of intercultural and international dimensions to study programmes. In fact, a language can always be learned through cultural familiarization of the environment in which we live or where we place ourselves; this was actually a topic of discussion among the Ministers at the Education, Youth, Culture and Sports Council of the EU. And each of us has stressed how important it is to preserve the independence through history and learning the broader as well as the current context of a language, and also the im-



portance of learning foreign languages and teaching children about the diversity of cultures in their early years.

The field of Slovenian higher education and science is relatively legally rigid when it comes to conditions of international cooperation. One of the most pressing issues is, for example the fact that the tender for foreign students is published in May for the following academic year, which is more than six months later than the standard date in countries with highly internationalized education. National legislation significantly restricts the accreditation of university programmes in foreign languages, the accreditation of joint programs with foreign partners is extremely difficult and time-consuming, and foreign scientists must overcome numerous administrative obstacles, which fall under the jurisdiction of different ministries, if they want to carry out their research in Slovenia. Does the ministry recognize these issues and are measures for their improvement being prepared?

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The internationalization of higher education is a topic that the Ministry will address together with a working group of stakeholders in the noveltion of the Slovenian Higher Education Act. We are also tackling the transition from the programme to institutional accreditation. Our aim is to thus open or at least slightly limit the 'rigidity' which you mentioned, and to transfer the autonomy of the programme development to knowledge institutions. This, of course, also means a transfer of the responsibility for the quality, openness, development, improving the knowledge of Slovenian professional, academic language, as well as strengthening of intercultural competencies. We also want to support the development of transnational cooperation, as this is what provides and connects the transfer of new knowledge, new strategic partnerships, joint programs, diplomas. At the same time, knowledge institutions need to actively open their doors and build this culture of openness. Some of them are very active in this area, while some of them are still getting familiarized with the issue.

How do you assess the issue of brain drain in Slovenia and what plans does the Ministry have in respect to the related measures, such as brain circulation? Did the Ministry establish a mechanism for maintaining re-

lations with Slovenian scientists-emigrants?

[96]

As history shows, brain drain was always part of global development and transfer of knowledge, and we can observe this today as well. Even our first academics, scientists, researchers broadened their knowledge abroad. However, it is important that such knowledge returns to its home creative, research and development environment, which must be interesting enough to attract it back. With this in mind, the Ministry is preparing measures with a focus on researchers at the start of their career to be brought closer to the economy. A lot is expected from the implementation of smart specialization strategies connecting the economy with science and research. It is in this area that I see opportunities for cooperation between young people and top-level scientists who wish to return to their homeland. Also, after years of decline, we are increasing funding in 2016 and 2017 for the field of science and higher education, thereby adding a dash of optimism to all those who believe in Slovenian scientific and research excellence and the quality of its higher education. We also strive to obtain funds via ERA-NET, HORIZON 2020 and other instruments that support science and research in the EU. Data shows that we were quite successful in this area, also when in comparison to other countries. In the strategy for the internationalization, we will ensure a place for Slovenian scientists around the world, and many of these activities are already in place at the universities and other knowledge institutions.

Science became highly internationalized, especially in terms of scientific production, which could be described as industrial. We are seeing significant anomalies in the Slovenian scientific field that contradict common sense when assessing the relationship between the quality and scope of publications of scientific research (academic dishonesty, scientific publications with foreign publishers, cooperation of science and economy, scoring the scientific achievements). Does the Ministry address these issues and are you planning any measures in this area?

We recently intensified, together with the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SAZU) and other stakeholders, the discussion on ethics in science and on the establishment of an honorary panel in



2016. These discussions will certainly contribute to raising awareness and transferring good practices from the international environment, pursuing the values of science and strengthening its value and importance within the broader society. The Government already adopted the Strategy on open access to scientific data and publications; discussions on open science are becoming increasingly more relevant as well. ARRS (Slovenian Research Agency) recently began preparing the amendments on the scoring of scientific achievements within the framework of the steering group. At the same time, many measures aimed at bringing together views and common objectives through dialogue and knowledge transfer between industry and science have been prepared in the recent years. Even the strategy S4 has and will continue to encourage a more active dialogue and search for synergy effects between science, research and the economy sector, as well as non-economy sectors, i.e. in the field of social sciences. Some of these topics and the open dialogue will be promoted by a new act on research and development activities, which is currently being prepared at the Ministry. One of the aims of the new act is to respond, together with stakeholders, to the challenges that are facing modern science.

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Résumés

Effets du coopération territoriale européenne sur la promotion de l'énergie renouvelable et l'efficacité énergétique dans des pays IPA : expériences du programme MED

JAVIER GOMEZ PRIETO ET YORGOS J. STEPHANEDES

Cet article adresse le développement territorial par des pratiques de coopération entre les états membres de l'Union Européenne et pays candidats. La coopération territoriale européenne (CTE) est un but de la politique de cohésion de l'Union Européenne (UE) et constitue un moteur clé pour réduire des disparités sur le territoire Européen. L'instrument CTE intègre la participation des pays Thiers, soit nommé ceux qui sont inclus dans des catégories : l'instrument d'aide de préadhésion (IAP) et l'instrument européen de voisinage et de partenariat. Le programme transnational du CTE pour la région Méditerranéens (Programme MED) inclue dix pays membre de l'Union Européenne et trois pays qui appartiennent à l'instrument IAP : Bosnie et Herzégovine, Albanie et Monténégro. En 2013, le Programme MED a confirmé huit projets transnationaux qui intègrent des partenaires de l'IAP et adressent l'usage et la promotion des ressources de l'énergie renouvelables (RER) et l'efficacité de l'énergie (EE). Selon la période transitoire actuelle, qui entraîne un cycle conclu 2007–2013 et le cycle curant 2014–2020, des aspects d'évaluation du CTE, appliqués sur des domaines spécifiques, sont essentielles pour la réalisation mieux des stratégies futures et l'éducation des leçons précédentes. Dans ce contexte, le but de cet article est d'analyser des effets du CTE sur la promotion de RER et EE dans des pays de l'IAP, en considérant des expériences du Programme MED. L'approche méthodologique inclue : (1) le processus de collecte des données (2) recherche documentaire et analyse des résultats et (3) la validation des résultats obtenus. La valeur ajoutée de ce recherche représente la contribution supplémentaire de l'évaluation, reliée à l'intervention du CTE dans des états non membre de l'UE dans le cadre spécifique du RER et EE.

Mots clés : politique de cohésion, coopération territoriale européenne, pays IPA, région Méditerranéens, l'énergie renouvelable et l'efficacité énergétique

IJEMS 8 (1): 5–24

Moment Méditerranéen en Israël : des frontières nationales aux zones géopolitiques

DAVID OHANA

[100]

Dans l'article suivant, je vais analyser la montée du soutien pour une idée Méditerranéenne en Israël. Je vais explorer et interpréter un débat sur l'identité émergente d'Israël-Méditerranéenne par des interviews avec des personnes publiques et poètes, et par des rapports de média. L'idée d'une identité Méditerranéenne n'est pas une notion étrangère ou imaginée, mais plus une expression authentique des gens qui vivent dans la région Méditerranéenne. En Israël, l'idée était née dialectalement de la situation politique des gens Israéliens d'un côté à cause du conflit au voisinage Arabo-Palestinien et de l'autre, d'une reconnaissance croissante de l'importance de l'identité régionale.

Mots clés : Moment Méditerranéen, Israël, zones géopolitiques

IJEMS 8 (1): 25-48

Investissement étranger direct comme moteur du développement économique à Thaïlande

ANITA MAČEK, VITO BOBEK ET TINA VUKASOVIĆ

Cet article adresse quelques impacts les plus importants des investissements étrangers directs (IED) sur l'économie émergente, avec un focus sur Thaïlande. Particulièrement dans des économies émergentes, des IED sont un élément important pour le processus de développement. Avec l'aide des méthodes de recherches choisies, l'article proposé fait preuve de faits stylisés concernant des IED en Thaïlande. En utilisant l'analyse PESTEL, les auteurs ont analysé l'environnement macro des IED en Thaïlande et avec des modèles de corrélations, la corrélation entre IED et variables économiques choisies a été analysée. Les résultats des analyses statistiques ont rempli des prévisions. Le Thaïlande est une destination attractive pour des IED, qui a un effet positif sur la croissance économique, l'emploi et l'export. Cependant, les résultats ont aussi montré que des IED sont positivement corrélés avec la pollution de l'air en Thaïlande, donc la politique économique devra faire plus d'attention sur la protection environnementale quand attirant des IED. Si on compare des éléments d'analyse PESTEL de Thaïlande avec ceux des pays Euro-Med, nous pouvons exposer leurs similarités. Particulièrement des pays Euro-Med du sud ont été confrontés par nombreuses crises politiques dans le passé.



Corruption, instabilité gouvernementale et l'inefficacité de la bureaucratie gouvernementale sont aussi caractéristiques des pays Euro-Med du sud et influencent négativement sur le flux de capitale internationale. De l'autre côté, il y a aussi des éléments dans l'analyse PESTEL qui ne sont valables seulement pour des pays Euro-Med du sud, mais pour toute la région Euro-Med. Ce sont particulièrement le menace du terrorisme et défis environnementales. Tous les deux présentent un défi commun majeur dans toute la région Euro-Méditerranéenne.

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Mots clés : Investissement étranger direct, développement économique, Thaïlande, effets des IED, analyse PESTEL

IJEMS 8 (1): 49–74

La région Euro-Méditerranéenne comme un phénomène politique et un objet d'analyse sur le domaine des relations internationales

ANA BOJINOVIĆ FENKO

Cet article offre une compréhension de la région Méditerranéenne comme un phénomène rare dans le domaine des relations internationales et par conséquent comme des façons non-uniformes, dans lesquelles il est analysé dans le cadre de la science des relations internationales. Il y a trois interprétations dominantes des relations internationales dans la région Méditerranéenne présentes, c'est-à-dire la définition du Med comme un objet de la politique extérieure de l'UE, comme un espace inter-régionale qui base sur la diversification des sous-régions et comme une zone de procès autonome de la régionalisation. En outre, approches scientifiques, analysant les trois aspects, sont présentes. Analyse critique et évaluation de tous les deux, les domaines phénoménologique et scientifique de la région, mènent vers la conclusion où l'auteur indique des implications futures des résultats déjà notables et potentiels de la recherche pour la pratique politique des relations internationales et le développement des sciences des relations internationale.

Mots clés : région Euro-Méditerranéenne, phénomène politique, science des relations internationales

IJEMS 8 (1): 75–90



Povzetki

Učinki evropskega transnacionalnega sodelovanja pri spodbujanju obnovljive energije in energetske učinkovitosti v državah IPA: izkušnja s programom MED

JAVIER GOMEZ PRIETO IN YORGOS J. STEPHANEDES

Prispevek se ukvarja s teritorialnim razvojem in praksami sodelovanja med državami članicami Evropske unije in državami kandidatkami. Evropsko teritorialno sodelovanje (ETS) je cilj kohezijske politike Evropske unije (EU) in predstavlja ključni dejavnik pri zmanjševanju razlik na ozemlju Unije. Instrument ETS zajema sodelovanje tretjih držav, torej tistih, ki so vključene v naslednje kategorije: instrument za predpristopno pomoč (IPA) in evropski instrument sosedstva in partnerstva (ENPI). Transnacionalni program ETS za Sredozemlje (program MED) vključuje deset držav članic iz Evropske unije in tri države iz okvira instrumenta IPA: Bosna in Hercegovina, Albanija in Črna Gora. V letu 2013 je bilo v okviru programa MED oddobrenih osem transnacionalnih projektov, ki povezujejo partnerje IPA in se ukvarjajo z uporabo in spodbujanjem obnovljivih virov energije (OVE) in energetske učinkovitosti. V skladu s trenutnim prehodnim obdobjem, ki vključuje zaključen cikel 2007–2013 in začnajoči se cikel 2014–2020, so vidiki evalvacije ETS, uporabljeni na specifičnih tematskih področjih, nujni za boljše izvajanje prihodnjih strategij in učenje iz preteklih izkušenj. V tem kontekstu je namen tega članka analizirati učinke ETS na spodbujanje obnovljivih virov energije in energetske učinkovitosti v državah IPA, ob upoštevanju izkušenj iz programa MED. Metodološki pristop vključuje: (1) proces zbiranja podatkov, (2) teoretične raziskave in analize rezultatov in (3) preverjanje pridobljenih rezultatov. Dodano vrednost te raziskave predstavlja dodatni evalvacijski input, povezan z intervencijo ETS v državah nečlanicah v okviru specifičnih kontekstov obnovljivih virov energije in energetske učinkovitosti.

Ključne besede: evropska kohezijska politika, Evropski instrument sosedstva in partnerstva, instrument za predpristopno pomoč, Sredozemlje, obnovljivi viri energije in učinkovita raba energije

IJEMS 8 (1): 5–24

Sredozemski trenutek v Izraelu: od nacionalnih meja do geopolitičnih območij

DAVID OHANA

[104]

V pričujočem članku bom analiziral vzpon podpore sredozemski ideji v Izraelu. Pregledal in interpretiral bom razpravo o porajajoči se izraelsko-sredozemski identiteti skozi razgovore z javnimi osebami in pisatelji, ter preko medijskih poročil. Zamisel o sredozemski identiteti ni tuj, zamišljen pojem, temveč pristen izraz ljudi, ki živijo v sredozemski regiji. V Izraelu je zamisel vzniknila dialektično iz utrujenosti Izraelcev zaradi politične dimenzije konflikta z njihovimi arabskimi in palestinskimi sosedi na eni strani, ter iz vse večjega prepoznavanja pomembnosti regionalne identitete.

Gljučne besede: sredozemski trenutek, Izrael, geopolitična območja
IJEMS 8 (1): 25–48

Neposredne tuje investicije kot gonilo gospodarskega razvoja na Tajskem

ANITA MAČEK, VITO BOBEK IN TINA VUKASOVIĆ

Članek se ukvarja z nekaterimi najpomembnejšimi vplivi neposrednih tujih investicij (NTI) na hitro rastoča gospodarstva, s poudarkom na Tajski. Zlasti v hitro rastočih gospodarstvih so NTI pomemben element razvojnega procesa. S pomočjo izbranih raziskovalnih metod ta članek dokazuje stilizirana dejstva v zvezi z NTI na Tajskem. Z uporabo PESTEL analize so avtorji analizirali makro okolje za NTI na Tajskem in s korelacijskimi modeli analizirali korelacije med NTI in izbranimi gospodarskimi spremenljivkami. Rezultati statističnih analiz so izpolnili pričakovanja. Tajska je za NTI privlačna destinacija, kar ima pozitiven učinek na gospodarsko rast, zaposlitev in izvoz. Rezultati pa so pokazali tudi, da so NTI pozitivno povezane z onesnažnjem zraka na Tajskem, zato bo morala biti gospodarska politika pri privabljanju NTI bolj pozorna na okoljsko zaščito. Ob primerjavi analize (analiza PESTEL) za Tajsko in tiste za evrosredozemske države lahko ugotovimo, da so nekateri elementi zelo podobni. Zlasti južne evro-sredozemske države so se v preteklosti soočale s številnimi političnimi krizami. Korupcija, vladna nestabilnost in neučinkovita vladna birokracija so značilne tudi za južne evro-sredozemske države in negativno vplivajo na mednarodni pretok kapitala. Po drugi strani pa so v PESTEL analizi tudi nekateri elementi, ki veljajo ne le za



južne evro-sredozemske države, pač pa za celotno evro-sredozemsko regijo, med njimi zlasti grožnja terorizma in okoljski izzivi. Ti predstavljajo velik skupni izziv v celotni evro-sredozemski regiji.

Ključne besede: neposredne tuje investicije, gospodarski razvoj, Tajska, učinki NTI, analiza PESTEL

IJEMS 8 (1): 49–74

[105]

Sredozemska regija kot pojav in predmet analize na področju mednarodnih odnosov

ANA BOJINOVIĆ FENKO

Članek prinaša razumevanje sredozemske regije kot redkega pojava v mednarodnih odnosih in posledično neenotnih načinov analize regije v okviru znanosti mednarodnih odnosov. Prikazani so trije prevladujoči načini interpretacije mednarodnih odnosov v sredozemski regiji, in sicer definicija Sredozemlja kot predmeta zunanje politike EU, kot medregionalnega prostora, ki temelji na raznolikih podregijah, in kot območja avtonomnega procesa regionalizacije. Predstavljeni so tudi znanstveni pristopi k analizi omenjenih treh vidikov. Kritična analiza in ocena obeh, tako fenomenološke kot znanstvene domene v regiji, pripelje do zaključka, v katerem avtorica pokaže na že opazne in mogoče prihodnje posledice rezultatov raziskave za politično prakso mednarodnih odnosov in za razvoj znanosti mednarodnih odnosov.

Ključne besede: Sredozemska regija, politični fenomen, znanost mednarodnih odnosov

IJEMS 8 (1): 75–90



ملخصات

دور الضغط التنظيمي على رأس مال البنوك وقرارات المخاطرة أليساندرا تاندا

يمثل نظام رأس المال جوهر النظام الإحتراسي المصرفي. بالرغم من أن هدف المنظمين هو الحصول على صناعة مصرفية أكثر أماناً وقوة، فإن تأثيرات نظام رأس المال على رأس مال البنوك وقرارات المخاطر يعتبر غامضاً. يحلل البحث العلاقة بين رأس المال وتغيرات المخاطر وأثر الضغط التنظيمي على عينة من البنوك الأوروبية خلال الفترة 2006-2010 والتي تشتمل على بداية الأزمة المالية الأخيرة. تبرز النتائج إلى أن البنوك تتجه إلى تبني سلوك مختلف بناء على نسبة رأس المال المفترض، يدعم النظرية المزعومة " مضاربة الإحياء ". يدعم الدليل إعادة النظر في الهيكل التنظيمي وخاصة بالإستناد إلى متطلبات رأس مال أعلى وصارمة.

الكلمات الدالة: بنك، رأس مال، مخاطرة، تنظيم، المستوى الأول
النص بالكامل 8 (1) ص 5-23

هل يختلف العملاء العرب الذين ينتمون لأسواق متشابهة في تقييم جودة الخدمة البنكية؟ مصطفى و. نورالله

الهدف الرئيسي لهذا البحث هو دراسة تقييم عملاء من ثلاثة أسواق متشابهة مستهدفاً إكتشاف إختلافات ذات أهمية بين ثلاث أنواع من الإجابات. لقد تم قياس جودة الخدمة بإستخدام منهج قائم من الأدب، وبالتالي تم إختيار منهج قياس جودة الخدمة (SERVPERF) لتقييم ثلاثة أنواع من الإجابات. يأتي عملاء هذه الدراسة من ثلاثة أسواق متشابهة وهم: المملكة العربية السعودية، الإمارات العربية المتحدة والكويت. لقد استخدم برنامج الحزمة الإحصائية للعلوم الاجتماعية (إس.بي.إس.إس) لتحليل المعلومات وتشغيل نموذج التباين من أجل تحليل المعلومات بطريقة وحيدة الاتجاه لفحص الإختلافات بين المجموعات. ولقد أظهرت المعطيات أن هناك إختلافات مميزة بين الثلاث مجموعات. كما أن النتائج تشير إلى أنه فيما عدا التعاطف فإن كافة الأبعاد الأربعة الأخرى أظهرت إختلافات جزئية.

الكلمات الدالة: جودة الخدمة، جودة الخدمة البنكية، العالم العربي، حضارة
النص بالكامل 8 (1) ص 25-41

إمكانيات تعليم متعدد الثقافات في المجتمع الأوروبي بورت ميكويتس

[108]

يقدم هذا البحث تحليل لأفكار نظرية ونماذج والتي يمكن أن تستخدم كأساس للتعليم المتعدد الثقافات في المجتمع الأوروبي الحالي. مبدئياً فإنها تقدم أهمية التعدد الثقافي للتعليم القائم على بيانات البحث من سلوفينيا. يعد التعدد الثقافي أحد أهم المبادرات التعليمية التي تتعامل مع مشكلة عدم المساواة في التعليم. لاحقاً في النص وفي غياب الأساس النظري للتعليم المتعدد الثقافات، تم تحليل وتوصيف أربعة نماذج نظرية محتملة: نموذج الأخلاق العالمية القائم على مشروع هانس كونج للأخلاق العالمية، يُعد النموذج الآخر القائم على بحث سلافوج زيزيك للعنف، نموذج الولاء الدستوري القائم على نظرية جورجن هابرماس ونموذج الإعراف القائمة على نظرية الإعراف.

الكلمات الدالة: التعليم، متعدد الثقافات، تعدد الثقافات، التعددية الثقافية
النص بالكامل 8 (1) ص 61-43

التعاون الأورو-متوسطي في العلوم والإبداع: 20 سنة لإجراء برشلونة عبد الحميد الزهيري

يشكل إعلان برشلونة وإتفاقيات الشراكة بين الإتحاد الأوروبي ودول جنوب البحر المتوسط معاً مع الإتحاد المتوسطي "إعلان باريس"، إطاراً لسياسة التعاون التنموي بين الإتحاد الأوروبي ودول جنوب البحر المتوسط. يسعى هذا البحث إلى أن يشير إلى معالم هذا التعاون في العلوم والإبتكار، مراجعة الأدوات والبرامج الموجودة، تقييم التحديات والفرص وإقتراح معايير للأعمال المستقبلية. في الختام فإن الكاتب يشير إلى أهمية تنمية حس التعاون المشترك، تقديم إصلاح هيكلي ومؤسسي وبناء قدرة الشباب في دول جنوب البحر المتوسط والإستفادة من القيمة المضافة لتداول الأفكار. لقد تم توضيح مبادرتين للتعاون محددتين، الشراكة للبحث والإبتكار في محيط البحر المتوسط (بريما) والأجندة المعتمدة للإبتكار الأورو-متوسطي.

الكلمات الدالة: التعاون الأورو-متوسطي، شراكة البحث والإبتكار، أدوات وبرامج، بريما
النص بالكامل 8 (1) ص 76-63

Current and Future Events in the Euro-Mediterranean Area

☒ *Doctoral conference*

Organiser: Graduate School of Government and European Studies

Type of event: International conference

Date: May, 2016 *Venue:* Ljubljana, Slovenia

Web page: <http://www.fds.si/index.php>

☒ *Short Course on Ultrasound in Infectious Diseases and Tropical Medicine*

Organiser: University of Pavia

Type of event: International Course

Date: 2–6 February, 2016 *Venue:* Pavia, Italy

Web page: <http://www.tropicalultrasound.org>

☒ *Focused Assessment with Sonography of Cystic Echinococcosis (FASE)*

Organiser: University of Pavia

Type of event: Winter School

Date: 8–12 March, 2016 *Venue:* Pavia, Italy

Web page: n.a.

☒ *Environmental Communication Project ‘Skyros 2015’*

Organiser: University of the Aegean

Type of event: Environmental Communication Training
in real life conditions

Date: May 2015–November 2016 *Venue:* Skyros Island, Greece

Web page: <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10206624745839684&set=oa.875981922459515&type=1&theater>

☒ *Ex Oriente Lux II – Aegyptiaka Symposium: Religion, Politics and Culture in the Mediterranean from the 8th to 6th c. B.C.*

Organiser: University of the Aegean

Type of event: International conference

Date: April, 2016 *Venue:* Rhodes Island, Greece

Web page: <http://www.aegyptiaka.gr/index.php/en/symposium-2016>

Current and Future Events

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- ☒ *9th Conference in Actuarial Science & Finance on Samos*
Organiser: University of the Aegean
Type of event: Conference
Date: 18–22 May, 2016 *Venue:* Samos Island, Greece
Web page: www.aegean.gr

- ☒ *18th IEEE Mediterranean Electrotechnical Conference (MELECON 2016)*
Organiser: University of Cyprus
Type of event: International Conference
Date: 18–20 April, 2016 *Venue:* Limassol, Cyprus
Web page: <http://melecon2016.org/>

- ☒ *Enhancement of Synergies within the MedUnNET, with the Educators of MEDIES, the NGO's of MIO-ECSDE, the Parliamentarians of COMPSUD and the Journalists of COMJESD*
Organiser: UNESCO Chair on Sustainable Development Management and Education in the Mediterranean/University of Athens, MIO-ECSDE/MEDIES Secretariat
Type of event: Academic and research coordination of the network
Date: September 2015–June 2016 *Venue:* Athens (Greece)
Web page: www.medies.net, www.mio-ecsde.org

- ☒ *Mediterranean Youth Responses towards Sustainable Development and Current Crisis*
Organiser: UNESCO Chair on Sustainable Development Management and Education in the Mediterranean/University of Athens, MIO-ECSDE/MEDIES Secretariat, under the political guidance of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)
Type of event: Survey
Date: April 2015–June 2016 *Venue:* Mediterranean
Web page: www.medies.net, www.mio-ecsde.org

- ☒ *Integrated Sustainable Waste and Resource Management and the Pollutant Release and Transfer Register*
Organiser: UNESCO Chair on Sustainable Development Management and Education in the Mediterranean/University of Athens, MIO-ECSDE
Type of event: Distance Learning Modules



Date: from January 2015 (open resource) *Venue:* TBD
Web page: <http://www.envirolearning.net/h2o2o/index.php>

☒ *Mediterranean Food & Diet*

Organiser: UNESCO Chair on Sustainable Development Management and Education in the Mediterranean, University of Athens & MEDIES Secretariat

Type of event: Distance Learning Modules

Date: to be announced soon *Venue:* TBD

Web page: <http://elearn.elke.uoa.gr>

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☒ *Partnership and e-Learning course on Education for Sustainable Development in Designated Areas (PeLESDA)*

Organiser: University of Athens

Type of event: Summer School

Date: July, 2016 *Venue:* Amfissa city (Greece)

Web page: to be published soon

☒ *Finalization of the Action Plan on ESD*

Organiser: UNESCO Chair on Sustainable Development Management and Education in the Mediterranean/University of Athens, MIO-ECSDE/MEDIES Secretariat, under the political guidance of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)

Type of event: Advocacy

Date: September 2015–July 2016 *Venue:* TBD

Web page: www.medies.net

☒ *Master Program in Cooperation and Development*

Organiser: University of Pavia

Type of event: Post graduate course in Cooperation and Development (Master)

Date: October 2015–January 2017 *Venue:* Pavia, Italy

Web page: www.cdnpavia.net

☒ *Two Nations and Three Religions in Israel and Palestine*

Organiser: Galilee Institute in Israel

Type of event: Programme for graduate students and faculty members

Date: 29 December 2015–10 January 2016

Venue: Galilee Institute, Israel

Current and Future Events

Web page: <http://www.galilcol.ac.il/middle-east/sessions/course.asp?sessionId=2&courseId=2>

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- ☒ *Management of Higher Education Institutions*
Organiser: Galilee Institute in Israel
Type of event: Course
Date: 21 January–1 February, 2016 *Venue:* Galilee Institute, Israel
Web page: http://www.galilcol.ac.il/courses/course/34/Higher_Education.html

- ☒ *UFP Research Days*
Organiser: University Fernando Pessoa
Type of event: International conference
Date: 9–11 March, 2016 *Venue:* Porto, Portugal
Web page: <http://gadi.ufp.pt/dias-da-investigacao-na-ufp/?lang=en>

- ☒ *Aggiornamento professionale Pesca Sicilia*
Organiser: Accademia Eraclitea
Type of event: Bando di attuazione della misura 1.5 tipologie 1 e 2 Sviluppo sostenibile delle zone di pesca
Date: 15 March–15 June, 2016 *Venue:* Trapani, Italia
Web page: <http://www.gac2014.eraclitea.com/>

- ☒ *Pediatric Chest Diseases Congress*
Organiser: Hacettepe Üniversitesi
Type of event: Congress
Date: 15–16 January, 2016 *Venue:* Hacettepe University
Web page: www.hacettepe.edu.tr

- ☒ *'Nursing Week' events*
Organiser: Hacettepe Üniversitesi
Type of event: Event week
Date: 12 May, 2016 *Venue:* Hacettepe University
Web page: www.hacettepe.edu.tr

- ☒ *'Youth Week' events*
Organiser: Hacettepe Üniversitesi
Type of event: Event week
Date: 15–22 May, 2016 *Venue:* Hacettepe University
Web page: www.hacettepe.edu.tr



☒ *Student Mobility – International Semester*

Organiser: International School for Social Business Studies

Type of event: Student mobility

Date: January 2016 – July 2016 *Venue:* Celje, Slovenia

Web page: <http://mfdps.si/>

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☒ *International Week for Guest Higher Education Teachers and Staff*

Organiser: International School for Social Business Studies

Type of event: International Week

Date: 18–22 April, 2016 *Venue:* Celje, Slovenia

Web page: <http://mfdps.si/>

☒ *International Scientific Conference on Management of Knowledge and Learning MakeLearn 2016*

Organiser: International School for Social Business Studies in cooperation with: Politehnica University Timisoara, Romania, Kasetsart University, Bangkok, Thailand, Maria Curie Skłodowska University, Lublin, Poland

Type of event: International Scientific Conference

Date: 25–28 May, 2016 *Venue:* Timisoara, Romania

Web page: <http://makelearn.mfdps.si/>

☒ *Doctoral Students' Workshop on Academic Writing for Publishing Scientific Papers in International Journals*

Organiser: International School for Social Business Studies in cooperation with: Politehnica University Timisoara, Romania, Kasetsart University, Bangkok, Thailand, Maria Curie Skłodowska University, Lublin, Poland

Type of event: Doctoral Students' Workshop

Date: 27–28 May, 2016 *Venue:* Timisoara, Romania

Web page: <http://makelearn.mfdps.si/>

☒ *Mediterranean Summer School Innovation in Business Entrepreneurship*

Organiser: International School for Social Business Studies

Type of event: Summer School

Date: 27 June 2016–8 July 2016 *Venue:* Portorož, Slovenia

Web page: <http://summerschool.issbs.si/>



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