ETHICS IN ISLAM: AN OVERVIEW OF THEOLOGICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL AND MYSTICAL APPROACHES

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ABSTRACT

*The paper aims at outlining some of the most important ethical concepts in the Islamic tradition, particularly in rational theology (*kalām*), classical philosophy (*falsafa*), and Sufi mysticism (*taṣawwuf*). It attempts thereby to highlight their theoretical and methodological differences as well as their common characteristics in dealing with fundamental ethical questions. For this purpose the article begins with the explanation of a number of basic terms, and continues with a brief account on some important ethical aspects of the primary scriptural sources, the Quran and the Sunna, which serve as a foundation for ethical theories in all three mentioned currants of Islam.*

Keywords: Islamic ethos, moral, ethics, dialectical theology, classical Islamic philosophy, Sufism

L'ETICA DELL'ISLAM: UNO SGUARDO SUGLI APROCCI TEOLOGICI, FILOSOFICI E MISTICI

SINTESI

*L'articolo cerca di riassumere alcuni concetti di etica fondamentali della tradizione islamica, sopratutto nella teologia razionale (*kalām*), nella filosofia classica (*falsafa*) e nella mistica sufi (*taṣawwuf*). Il testo cerca di mettere in evidenza le loro divergenze teoretiche e metodologiche, come pure le loro caratteristiche comuni, di fronte alle questioni etiche fondamentali. Con questo scopo l'articolo spiega dapprima i concetti primari, mostrando in seguito alcuni importanti principi di etica nelle due fonti primarie, il Corano e la sunna profetica, che sono la base delle teorie etiche nelle tre correnti dell'islam menzionate.*

Parole chiave: l'etos islamico, morale, etica, teologia dialettica, filosofia islamica classica, sufismo

INTRODUCTION

One of the most important dimensions of religion is its ethical dimension. Religious ethics covers various rules, commandments and laws that enable believers to lead a good, righteous and virtuous life. The cultivation of ethos or ethical dimension also prevents the emergence of religious radicalism, based on ignorance, exclusiveness, intolerance and even violence. Religious radicalism as a result of an individual or collective *crisis* (which is ultimately a *crisis of consciousness*) thus goes hand in hand with the loss of *ethos* and *spirituality*.

It could be observed that Islam is currently in a deep cultural, epistemic and spiritual crisis. Increasing sectarian fights, political conflicts and ideological instrumentalization of religion may be the main factors of this crisis, whose very consequences are religious fundamentalism, extremism and radicalism. However, what needed is in this context, is not so much a „reform of Islam", but rather an *ethical and spiritual revolution*, which is primarily the „revolution of meaning", as the French philosopher and Islamic scholar Éric Geoffroy, appropriately assesses (Geoffroy, 2009, 85). For it is never the religion *as such*, that is in crisis, but its agents. Having that in mind, the great Muslim scholar, theologian and mystic from 12th century, Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī (d. 1111),[1] entitled his Magnum Opus *Iḥyaʾ ʿulūm ad-dīn* (see e.g. al-Ghazālī, 1998.) i.e. „The Revival of the **Science** of Religion" – not the „revival of religion".[2] What Muslims today need, generally speaking, is the „Ghazzālīan project" of revivification of true knowledge and the revitalization of one's own consciousness – an ethical and spiritual „revolution", which can be gained only through holistic and integral education grounded in its own theological, philosophical and mystical tradition. For this purpose the exposition and the „re-actualization" of *Islamic ethos*, manifested in doctrines and teachings of Islamic rational theology (*kalām*), classical philosophy (*falsafa*) and Sufism (*taṣawwuf*),[3] seem to be inevitable.

TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS

Ethics[4] is a philosophical discipline, which deals with the question of human virtues, moral principles and right conduct. Although ethics and morality are closely related, there is a subtle distinction between those two terms. While morality basically refers to good human character, behavior or conduct, ethics represents a philosophical examination of principles, standards and rules that prescribe what an individual ought to do. The first addresses the proper behavior of man, while the later addresses why such actions are proper (Hashi, 2011, 123), and examines their conditions. Morality is therefore a subject of ethics; ethics is in turn the *philosophy of morality*. This relationship between ethics and morals (or morality) is also reflected in the corresponding Arabic terminology. The general term used for „morals" in an Islamic context is *akhlāq* (sing. *khuluq*), which also means „good character".[5] Because the word *akhlāq* is etymologically connected with the word *khāliq* (the Creator) and *makhlūq* (the creature), it assumes a good relationship between the human being and God as well as among human beings (Rahim, 2013, 508). Whereas Islamic ethics as a science dealing with ways to gain and maintain virtues, noble character and right conduct, is called ʿ*ilm al-akhlāq*, i.e. the „science of good character". Ethics can therefore generally be understood also as „theory of virtue" or „moral science".[6]

Ethics in Islam is however not a delimited domain, but rather a subfield, with different emphases and epistemic results, depending on the theoretical or practical context of a particular field (see Al-Daghistani, 2016a, 129). Islamic ethics is therefore not an exclusive subject of Islamic philosophy, but also a matter of jurists, religious scholars, theologians and Sufis. Since the Prophet Muhammad did not leave any systematic theory of mandatory moral principles, Muslims have to interpret the provisions of divine Revelation again and again in different discourses (Hegemann, 2006, 170). Ethical questions have thus been discussed not only in philoso-

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1   More for his life, work and teaching see e.g. al-Ghazālī, 1967; 2010; 2014.

2   The underlining idea behind this statement is that the metaphysical and theological fundaments of religion (in this case of Islam) are transcendent and unchangeable dimensions of the Revelation, whereas human *knowledge of religion* and his interpretative ability must be continuously examined, cultivated and perfected. In the Islamic tradition is also widespread the idea of *mujaddid ad-dīn*, i.e. a „great scholar" who will appear at the beginning of each century to „renew" or „revive" the Islamic religion. But since the „religious law" (the *sharia*) cannot be changed, the „religious renewal" or „revival" is actually concerning religious knowledge and faith of Muslims, not the religion *as such*. Religious „renewal" or „revival" means therefore in this context the „renewal" or „revival" of human understanding of and dealing with a matter of religion.

3   For the closer analysis of the term „Sufism" and its metaphysical-spiritual framework see: Al-Daghistani, 2013, 119–154; 2016, 209–224; Al-Ghazālī, 2014.

4   The term „ethics" (Gr. *ethica*) as a science, which deals with human habits, customs and morals (*ēthos*) was established by Aristoteles. For more see Kenny, 1978.

5   For the additional explanation of this term see for example al-Jurjānī, 2012, 166; see also Wehr, 2013, 361. The word *khuluq* appears twice in the Quran, in chapter 26, verse 137, and in chapter 68, verse 4. See Hashi, 2011, 123.

6   Another Arabic word, which is often used as a synonym for *akhlāq* is *adab*, which covers not only „moral", „morality" or „good character" but also a range of meanings, such as „good manner", „proper behavior", „noble attitude", „etiquette" and even „belles-lettres". For detailed and critical examination of various historical and contextual formulations of *adab* see Chiabotti, 2016. While ʿ*ilm al-akhlāq* „*addresses the theoretical background of human conducts*", *adab* (or, in this case, *akhlāq*) „signifies the actual practice" of ethics, i.e. ethical actions and manners (Hashi, 2011, 123).

phy, but also especially in Islamic jurisprudence, Sufi-literature, theological treatises, political theories and even in medical compendiums. Majid Fakhry[7] divides ethical theories in Islam in four major fields: (1) *scriptural morality*, (2) *theological theories*, (3) *philosophical theories*, and (4) *religious theories* (Fakhry, 1994, 6–7). Although this classification may not be sufficiently differentiated, it at least points out the difficulty of defining Islamic ethics as one single and independent domain.[8] There are nonetheless some fundamental ethical themes and common features, issued in all main Islamic disciplines, especially in Islamic dialectical theology (*kalām*), classical Islamic Philosophy (*falsafa*) and Islamic mysticism or Sufism (*taṣawwuf*), to which the present article is referring to.

PRIMARY SOURCES OF ISLAMIC ETHICS

The primary sources of Islamic ethics in all of the above mentioned discourses are – explicitly or implicitly – the Quran and the Prophetic Sunnah. The Islamic philosophers represent an exception, drawing the inspiration for their ethical conceptualization predominantly from the ancient Greek tradition, especially from Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (see Groff and Leaman, 2007a, 36). But even though they primarily referred to ethical views promoted by Greek philosophers, they did not ignore the authority of the Quran or disavow the Prophetic Tradition (Fakhry, 1994, 2). The text of the revelation is often the subject matter in classical Islamic philosophy, or, as Seyyed Hossein Nasr puts it, „*the source of philosophical meditation*" (Leaman, 2007a, 496). In fact, the classical philosophers of Islam, the *falāsifa*, usually used ethical theories advocated by ancient philosophers to exemplify the Islamic *ethos*, embodied in the Quran and Sunnah.

Both the Quran as a divine Revelation and the Sunnah as the way of the Prophet Muhammad, transmitted through his sayings and teachings in the so-called *hadiths*,[9] can be categorized as „scriptural morality" (see Fakhry, 1994, 6; Rahim, 2013, 508). Although neither the Quran nor the Sunnah offer a systematic and uniform ethical theory, they set the framework

and the context for an intellectual examination of the fundamental ethical questions upon which the Islamic philosophers and religious scholars have reflected and meditated over the centuries. While the Quran in general lays the foundation of ethical rules, standards and values, the Sunnah contains the actual practices of such rules and provisions (Hashi, 2011, 124). Various Quranic verses (Q.) (see e.g. Q. 3:134, 3:161, 4:36, 4:85, 4:125, 7:56, 11:36, 12:113, 33:70–71, 41:33) and Prophetic sayings tackle issues which can considered to be fundamental topics of ethics, such as the nature of human behavior, moral values, religious duties, right and wrong deeds, the role of intention, acts of transgression, virtue, freedom and responsibility, social relationships, moral reasoning and choice, as well as divine justice, mercy and power (see e.g. Hashi, 2011, 124; Fakhry, 2013, 11).[10] There are many Quranic verses, encouraging believers to improve their relationship with each other, to purify their souls (see e.g. Q., 3:164 26:88-89, 87:14–15, 91:9–10), to reflect and to strive for knowledge (see e.g. Q., 2:26, 3:164, 3:190, 20:114, 30:56, 39:9, 85:11), to have faith and to perform good deeds (see e.g. Q., 2:25, 2:82, 3:57, 4:57, 5:9, 7:56, 10:9, 18:107, 22:14, 31:8, 35:7,47:2, 64:9, 95:6), to take care of those in need (see e.g. Q., 51:19, 70:24), to be aware of the sacredness of whole of creation (see Q., 17:44), to respect all creatures (see Q., 6:38, 7:32), and to be patient, thankful, generous, truthful, just, and righteous. From Surah *al-Ḥujurāt* (the „Dwellings") alone it is possible to deduce some „golden advices" addressing every believer. These moral advices, which include commandments as well as prohibitions, prompt believers for example not to harm people in ignorance (Q., 49:6), not to scoff at other people nor to insult one another (Q., 49:11), not to spy, neither to backbite (Q., 49:12), to be equitable, to make peace between disputed groups (Q., 49:9), and to be constantly aware of the Divine presence (Q., 49:1, 10, 12). Pious and righteous acts,[11] which are in accordance with the primordial nature of man, *fiṭra*,[12] are normally referred to as *ṣāliḥāt* (proper deeds), whereas sinful and immoral acts, which are in disharmony with human nature, are classified as *sayyiʾāt* (improper deeds) (Fakhry, 1994, 12). The

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7   Majid Fakhry is a professor emeritus of philosophy at the American University of Beirut and a Senior Fellow at the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at the Georgetown University. He has written extensively in the fields of Islamic philosophy, Islamic theology, Quran studies, ethical theories in Islam and history of Islamic thought.

8   An attempt to unify and determinate Islamic ethics as a separate discipline, is challenging because of its numerous and comprehensive scope, concerning various areas, from religious matters and spiritual realization to social relationships and ecological questions.

9   Arabic term *ḥadīṯ* (pl. *āḥadīṯ*), literary „saying", generally designates the Prophetic tradition, which can be seen as a kind of supplement to the Quran.

10   The verse which perhaps most clearly reflects the universal ethical message of the Quran, placing the virtue of righteousness/piety (al-birr) in the center of moral-religious concern, is the verse 177 of chapter 2.

11   Different schools of Islamic jurisprudence classify human action into five ethical-legal categories: (1) *fard* (obligatory or required), (2) *sunna* (recommended), (3) *mubāḥ* (neutral or morally indifferent), (4) *makrūh* (reprehensible or discouraged), and (5) *ḥarām* (forbidden or prohibited) (see e.g. Nanji, 2016, 37).

12   The Quranic term *fiṭra* is the genuine Islamic concept and denotes the primordial spiritual nature of man. It designates „*the immutable natural predisposition to the good, innate in every human being from birth, or even from the pre-existent state in which, as Islamic doctrine teaches, the human soul enters into a covenant with God* […]" (Kahteran, 2007, 211).

revelatory text of the Quran constitutes the genuine core of Islamic *ethos*, which can be ultimately summarized in the tree fundamental themes: (1) the nature of right and wrong, (2) divine justice and power, and (3) moral freedom and responsibility (Fakhry, 1994, 11).

Human freedom and responsibility are from the Quranic point of view inseparably connected with two further notions, which have a profound ethical dimension: *taqwa* and *khalīfa*. *Taqwa*,[13] which is contrasted with wrongdoing, protects oneself from sliding into evil and guards oneself against the displeasure of God (Leaman, 2007b, 643). The second term, *khalīfa*,[14] is essential for the Quranic understanding of human condition and his *special* position in the Universe. The status, which raises man above all other creatures, is according to the Quranic narration founded on the notion that God has empowered man with the cognitive faculty, free will and transcendent guidance through divine Revelation. God placed man on earth as a „vicegerent" (Q., 2:30), taught him „all the names" (Q., 2:31) and entrusted him with the duty and responsibility to guard human life and natural resources (Hashi, 2011, 126). It is this very task to improve life and to make earth an inhabitable and save place, which underlies the notion of man as a „divine successor".[15]

The philosophy of *perennial wisdom*, which teaches that to change the world, one must first change oneself, is also a constitutive feature of the Islamic spiritual tradition. To properly fulfill the „project" of *khalīfa*, i.e. to constantly upgrade the quality of life and to contribute to the wellbeing of humanity, one must first of all improve one's own inner condition, overcome egoistic tendencies and transcend bad qualities – one must, in a word, transform his or her own character.[16] The Prophet Muhammad, whose mission aim was ultimately nothing but to complete human character,[17] serves Muslims as an example of the realization of precisely those qualities, values and virtues, which the Quran consistently emphasizes, such as goodness, God-awareness, righteousness, justice, truthfulness, piety, humility, patience,[18] compassion and nobleness. In accordance with the Quranic *ethos*, the Prophet taught his companions to transform their personal qualities, refine their character and maintain a moral conduct. He emphasized, that the „greatest struggle" (*aj-jihād al-akbar*) is the „inner struggle" (*jihād an-nafs*),[19] which consists in purifying one's own soul from passions, lust, ignorance and vices. The best among people are therefore those who perfected their character and acquired the best morality.[20] From the Prophet's numerous ethical counsels and maxims[21] it becomes clear that individual piety and devotion to God is measured by moral, altruistic and noble behavior towards others. The mutual ethical relationship between people is the core of Islamic religious ethos. Having a sound relationship with others is a necessary condition for a sound relationship with God. According to Muhammad's teachings, God therefore „*forgives those who forgive others*" and „*pardons those who pardon others*" and supports those who support each other (Al-Quḍāʿī, 2016, 2.4, 2.5, 2.103).

The Quranic corpus and the Prophetic tradition provide the foundation of an Islamic ethos, which have been acting as a crucial point of reference in various classical Islamic discourses on ethics. Based on the ethical framework set by the Quran and Sunnah, Muslim theologians, philosophers and mystics developed their own understanding of fundamental ethical problems, as well as specific methods and concepts to deal with them. In the following chapters we will therefore attempt to briefly outline some of the most profound ethical teachings and theories of three important Islamic currents – rational theology (*kalām*), classical philosophy (*falsafa*) and Sufi

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13 This term, which can be interpreted as „awareness of God", „reverence" or „God-fearing", represents one of the highest human features in an Islamic religious context, and serves as a kind of safeguard mechanism from moral peril and indecent acts (see e.g. Q., 2:197, 22:35–37, 47:17, 91:8).

14 For the additional explanations regarding the term *khalīfa* see for example Bowker, 1997, 543; Dozy, 1968, 397; al-Jurjānī, 2012, 170; Wehr, 2013, 359.

15 The true, deeper meaning of *khalīfa*, whose degree of realization depends on faith and righteous deeds, is therefore not – as too often (mis)understood –, merely political, but rather existential, ethical and spiritual. Quran states that God „*has promised those of you who have believed and done the righteous deeds that He will surely make them successors* […]" (Q., 24:55).

16 Yasien Mohamed notices correctly that „*character refers more to the inward condition of the human soul, and should therefore be distinguished from personality, which refers more to the outward qualities of human behaviour.*" He continues that character thus „*pertains rather to the innate motivation and virtues of the soul and is a guide to moral conduct*" (Mohamed, 2007, 139). Against this background it is also easier to understand, why the „pure intention" represents the most important moral principle in Islam. The prophet Muhammad stated for example that „acts are only worth the intentions that accompany them" (Al-Quḍāʿī, 2016, 1.1).

17 Malik reported, that the Prophet Muhammad said: „I have only been sent to perfect good character" (Musnad Ahmad 8595; also *al-Muwaṭṭa* 1614).

18 Quran refers to patience in various relations and contexts ninety nine times, among others in chapters 3:125, 3:146, 8:46, 32:24, 42:43. See also Mohamed, 2007, 143.

19 Reported by Imam Khatib al-Baghdadi in *Tarikh Baghdad* (13:493), and in *Faydh al-Qadir*, (Vol 4, p. 511).

20 Reported in *Saḥīḥ al-Bukharī* 6035; *Sunan al-Tirmidhī* 1162.

21 A great number of sayings, *hadiths*, which Prophet Muhammad bequeathed to his community, contain various moral instructions and ethical teachings, with universal humanitarian lessons. He was advising that a man should deal with people without oppression, speak without lying, keep his pledges, and perform virtuous deeds (Al-Quḍāʿī, 2016, §2.135, §4.85). He preached about refinement of behavior, virtuous actions and repentance of sin, advocating that „*the loveliest beauty is beauty of character*" (Al-Quḍāʿī, 2016, §7.17), and that the generosity to people „*is the deed most rewarded*" (Al-Quḍāʿī, 2016, §9.41).

mysticism (*taṣawwuf*) –, whereby the main differences as well as overlapping aspects will be highlighted.

THEOLOGICAL ETHICS

Scholastic Muslim theologians (*mutakallimūn*),[22] who have been involved in the interpretation of the Islamic scriptural tradition, with the aim of working out a Quranic and Prophetic ethos, relied not only on their own religious textual evidence, but also on Greek logic and Christian theology (Fakhry, 1994, 2). Regarding the discussion of theological theories of ethics, we must however distinguish (at least) between two major currents: (1) the so-called Muʿtazilites, which represent the rationalist theological movement in Islam, and (2) the Ashʿarītes,[23] semi-rationalist and more scripturally orientated scholastic scholars (Fakhry, 1994, 3). Although both currents ultimately ground their ethical theories in the Quran and the Prophetic tradition, the first formulates a rationalistic ethical system, „with basic deontological presuppositions", while the latter stands for a more „rigorous voluntarist system" (Fakhry, 1994, 6).

Especially the Muʿtazilites,[24] who were the first original ethical thinkers of Islam, attempt to bring the Quranic ethical principles into harmony with the rational postulates of human intellect (Fakhry, 1994, 67). In their teaching they thereby underline the rationality of God's will, as well as the profound relationship between human freedom and human responsibility. They assert that man is inherently free and capable to act through reason, and that he has – by the very means of his cognitive capacity – the power to distinguish between right and wrong, and, in consequence, to choose what is right and avoid the wrong. They state that with the exception of some religious-spiritual acts like prayer, fasting and „obligatory charity" (*zakāt*), which are determined as being good through Revelation, other moral goods can be recognized and determined through pure reason, such as truthfulness, righteousness, justice and generosity (Ansari, 1989, 86). Because these features are inherently good, there is no necessity of Revelation to *reveal* their moral value. For the Muʿtazilites, moral obligation is rational,

whereby rationality is the binding principle not only for man but also for divine justice. This means that God's reward for the righteous acts and His punishment for the sinful acts is not just rationally justified but also rationally grounded – which in turn means that God *must* reward the righteous and punish the sinful (Ansari, 1989, 86).

While the Muʿtazilites advertise human intellectual faculty and power of reason as an autonomous instance of ethical knowledge, emphasizing thereby the ontological autonomy of free will, the Ashʿarītes – who tend to lean more against authority of scripture than against the results of rational proofs – defend a middle position between absolute determinism and self-sufficiency of human will (Ansari, 1989, 86). Hereto they developed the so called theory of *kasb* or „acquisition", which asserts that although God is the ultimate ontological cause of all human acts, they are however „activated" or „acquired" specifically by human will and his free choice to act (or to refrain from a certain action).[25] Further, the Ashʿarītes state that divine Revelation is the only true source to know the good and the right, whereby human reason can only come to know what is pleasant and unpleasant, useful and harmful (Ansari, 1989, 87). This means that reason is not the basis of moral obligation: obligatory is eventually only that which Revelation commands (Ansari, 1989, 87).[26]

Despite differences of opinion on certain theological doctrines among Muslim theologians, there are some fundamental questions which can be considered as common theoretical problems of theological ethics in Islam. Those questions include first and foremost the problem of Divine justice and the reality of His judgement in the hereafter; free will of man and the power of choice; nature of good and evil; the role of human reason; and man's relationship with God (Fakhry, 1994, 3; see also Al-Daghistani, 2016a, 130.). It is evident from my earlier remarks that in the context of Islamic theological ethics, revelatory text plays an essential role in determining what is good, and as such serves Muslim theologians as a firm basis for their intellectual examinations of what a human being can and should do to reject evil and realize the good in the world.

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22 For a comprehensive scientific research of Islamic theology see e.g. Schmidtke, 2016; Winter, 2014; Renard, 2014; Watt, 1973; van Ess, 1992; Nagel, 1994; Karimi, 2015.

23 This current was named after its founder, the famous Muslim religious scholar and theologian Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 935). Some of the principal representatives of the Ashʿarīte school are Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 1013), Abū Manṣūr al-Baghdādī (d. 1037), and al-Juwaynī (d. 1064), known as „imam of the two holy cities" (i.e. Mecca and Medina). His most famous disciple was Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), who also belong to Ashʿarīte school of theology. For more see e.g. Fakhry, 1994, 4.

24 Some of the principal representatives of the Muʿtazilite school are Bishr Ibn al-Muʿtamir (d. 825), Muʿammar ibn ʿAbbād (d. 830), Abū Isḥāq al-Naẓẓām (d. 845) and ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 1025). See e.g. Fakhry, 1994, 3–4. The five core principals of Muʿtazilite theological creed are: (1) Divine unity, (2) Divine justice, (3), Divine warning and promise, (4) the notion of intermediate position of the sinner, and (5) the principle of commanding the good and prohibiting evil. For further reading see e.g. Martin, 1997, 90–110.

25 For many Sunni theologians – like Ibn Hammām (d. 1475) and Ibn Taymīyah (d. 1327) – the way the Ashʿarīte formulated their doctrine appeared thus to be a kind of „qualified determinism" (Ansari, 1989, 87).

26 The Māturīdīs, who represent the third major current of systematic theology in Islam, agree partly with the Muʿtazilites, acknowledging that the faculty of pure reason does reveal the ethical values of things, although there are things and obligations, known to be good only through revelatory text (Ansari, 1989, 87). They were also of the opinion that to justify human responsibility on the one hand and Divine justice (manifesting in the ultimate award or punishment for man`s deeds) on the other, one must necessarily acknowledge the efficacy of human will, without however compromising Divine omnipotence (Ansari, 1989, 87).

PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS

Islamic philosophical ethics can be defined as a sub-discourse of classical Islamic philosophy, *falsafa*,[27] designating the philosophy, written principally in Arabic language and pre-eminently by Muslim thinkers in the period from the 8th to the 12th century.[28] Islamic philosophical ethics represent primarily a systematical examination of ethical theories of ancient Greek ethics, with implicit or explicit reference to the religious worldview of Islam. Classical Islamic Philosophers thereby not only gave „*Greek ethical concepts a new meaning based on the Quran*" (Mohamed, 2007, 415), but also, *vice versa*, penetrated into the deeper meaning of scripture, particularly due to the rational enquiries and concepts founded by Greek philosophers. Among the most discussed ethical subjects of *falsafa* are: the realization of right conduct, the refinement of human character, the way of achieving happiness, and the question of human nature and its relationship with the socio-political order (further, see Al-Daghistani, 2016a, 130–131). Greek ethics, which is essentially an „ethics of good", profoundly shaped the ethical discourse of Muslim philosophers, whose central investigation remained focused on the *highest good* and related question of the true happiness of man (Ansari, 1989, 84). However, although classical Islamic philosophers generally agree on the ultimate goal of man, they differed to some extent regarding the way in which this final objective may be achieved. For this purpose, each of them developed their own ethical vision, emphasizing thereby a particular philosophical method and human virtue. Nonetheless some overlapping characteristics and common tendencies in their theories can be easily detected.

Abū Yaʿqūb al-Kindī (d. ca. 870) (for further reading see e.g. Flügel, 1857; Adamson, 2007), the pioneer of philosophical writing in Islam, is generally regarded to be the first among Arabic authors, who produced a comprehensive and systematical philosophical book in Arabic, *Al-falsafa al-ūlā* („The Fist Philosophy") (see Al-Kindī, 1974). In this book, al-Kindī defines philosophy (*falsafa*) in accordance with the Greek ideal, as „*knowledge of the true nature of things*", and classifies it as the „*highest in degree and most noble in rank*" (al-Kindī, 1974, 55). The aim of the philosopher is for al-Kindī however not merely to „attain the truth", but also to „act truthfully" (al-Kindī, 1974, 55). Yet al-Kindi's elaborations on the nature of virtuous conduct are found especially in his most influential ethical treatise *On Dispelling Sorrow*, in which he praises moral attitude and an ascetic way of life, as advocated by Socrates. After diagnosing sorrow as „*a disease of the soul resulting from the loss of what is cherished, or the failure to attain what is sought after*" (Fakhry, 1994, 68), al-Kindī

suggest that man should not focus so much on sensual objects and material things, which are impermanent, but rather on knowledge and virtue, which eventually lead to inner fulfillment and happiness. According to al-Kindī, human beings should thus learn to cultivate the „habit of contentment" (Fakhry, 1994, 68) and to value the intelligible-spiritual world (Adamson, 2016b, 94). The attainment of true happiness, which is for the *falāsifa* the *causa finalis* of human existential searching, lies therefore for al-Kindī in the *modus vivendi*, guided by the principles of reason and by the virtues.

A similar line of argument was defended by another champion of Islamic philosophy, Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī (d. 925), the author of an important ethical work on *Spiritual Medicine* (see al-Rāzī 1950; Adamson, 2016a, 63–83), which reflects on the ancient idea of moral perfection as a way to heal the soul. In the process of moral-spiritual self-improvement, the human intellect (*ʿaql*), which ar-Rāzī considers as „God's greatest blessing" (ar-Rāzī, 1950, 20), plays a decisive role. For ar-Rāzī the intellect is not only the cognitive faculty, which enables man to understand the world around him, but also the ruling principle of the soul, which helps him to overcome lusts and transform the character (Fakhry, 1994, 71). Man should thus not allow his passions to dominate over his reason, „*clouding it and diverting it from its proper path and right purpose*" (ar-Rāzī, 1950, 21). Quite the opposite: for an ethical way of life it is necessary that we train our self to abstain from bodily pleasures and engage in the contemplation of the intelligible world (see also Al-Daghistani, 2016a, 133–134). Ar-Rāzī`s „spiritual therapy", whose goal is the transformation of the soul`s character (ar-Rāzī, 1950, 22), consists therefor above all in rejecting hedonism, restraining the passions and searching for Truth, „*embodied either in the sound religious law (al-sharīʿah)* […], *or in a 'law of reason'*" (Fakhry, 1994, 76).

If al-Kindī and ar-Rāzī were concerned primarily with the problem of moral refinement, purification of the soul, and the individual pursuit of happiness, Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. ca. 950) (for more see e.g. Fakhry, 2002; Netton, 1992; Mahdi, 2001), the great Muslim logician and founder of Neo-Platonism (Fakhry, 1994, 78), had also dealt with the problem of establishing the best political society. The attainment of happiness (*saʿāda*) as the ultimate goal of our moral endeavor is for al-Fārābī possible only in the active political life on the one hand, and in the acquisition of rational knowledge on the other. In his book on *Classification of science* (*Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm*) (see e.g. al-Fārābī, 1996), he defines „political science" (*al-ʿilm al-madanī*) as a discipline which investigates moral predispositions and voluntary acts, as well as states of character and types of habits, from which these actions arise (al-Fārābī, 2006, 187–189; see also Al-Farabi, 2001). Politics, which for al-Fārābī are fundamentally ethical and belong to

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27   The term *falsafa* is an Arabic loan word for Greek φιλοσοφία (*philosophia*).

28   For the systematic or historical introduction in the classical Islamic philosophy see e.g. Sharif, 1963; Nasr, 2006; Fakhry, 2015; Adamson, 2016; Rudolph, 2013; Al-Daghistani, 2016.

practical philosophy, also deal with motives, goals and ways in which moral acts ought to be carried out and virtuous regimes ought to be led. In this context al-Fārābī highlights two abilities, which in his opinion define a moral and politically active *citizen*, whose attitude and action can contribute to shape an „ideal society" or „ideal city" (*al-madīnat al-fāḍila*) (see al-Fārābī, 1985):[29] the *cognitive ability* of rational realization of general rules of moral conduct, and the *existential ability* to act according to this realization (al-Fārābī, 2006, 193). Al-Fārābī further also refers to two virtues, which are for him essential for a morally and politically stable society: friendship and justice. People of the „ideal" or „virtuous city", characterized by goodness and righteousness, are hence „*expected to construct communal cooperation among themselves to achieve happiness (sa'ada)*" (Yavuz, 2006a, 129). In this way al-Fārābī's reflection on man's virtue and the excellent community combines Islamic, Platonic and Aristotelian elements.

The significance of justice, friendship and mutual affection as constitutive dimensions of the moral way of life, leading to personal fulfillment and social harmony, is also explicated by the chief representative of philosophical ethics in Islam, Ibn Miskawayh (d. 1030) (for his ethical philosophy see e.g. Abdul, 1964). In his most important ethical treatise, *Refinement of Character* (see Miskawayh, 1968), Miskawayh attempts to systematically examine „*those moral traits that render the performance of virtuous actions congenial or spontaneous*" (Fakhry, 2004, 192–193). In doing so, he first determines the principles of ethics and investigates the nature and function of the human soul (Miskawayh, 1968, 3). Miskawayh establishes thereby that the excellence of the soul consists in the pursuit of knowledge, and that man differs from other animals specifically by his capacity for voluntary and moral action resulting from reflection. Justice, as the cardinal virtue, can be realized only as a result of the conjunction of wisdom, courage and temperance, whereby human friendship, affection and love represent essential components of the good and moral life.[30] Since Miskawayh also refers to al-Kindī's concept of the cultivation of the soul in his ethical treatise and quotes various Quranic verses, he attempts to combine Neo-Platonic, Aristotelian and Islamic-philosophical elements (Leaman, 2003, 256).

If the majority of Islamic philosophers attempted to synchronize ancient Greek philosophy with Islamic religious thought, it was the famous scholar Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī (d. 1111),[31] who synthesized philosophical, religious and mystical currents in Islam. This synthesis manifests itself in the most articulated way in his ethical theory, contained particularly in his magnum opus *Iḥyā' 'ulūm ad-din* („The Revival of Religious Sciences") and *Mīzān al-'Amal* („The Criteria of Action"). Al-Ghazzālī`s principal thesis is that true happiness (*sa'ā-da*) as the ultimate objective of human existence can be attained only through religious-metaphysical knowledge (*'ilm*) and moral-devotional action (*'amal*) together. This emphasis on the mutual relationship between knowledge and actions runs like a golden thread through his whole ethical-spiritual oeuvre. With his *Criteria of action* and *The Revival of Religious Sciences,* al-Ghazzālī aims at establishing a religious ethics, which not only contains comprehensive theoretical knowledge but also delivers practical guidance for achieving spiritual purity, moral conduct and consequently a state of true fulfillment and happiness.[32] He namely states that the virtue of action consists in abolishing what *ought not to be*, whereas the virtue of knowledge lies in obtaining what *ought to be* (al-Ghazālī, 2006, 108). Thereby gradually achieving a state of happiness represents not merely a psychological feeling, but rather an ontic expression of inner self-realization, based on spiritual purification and metaphysical cognition. Fully in line with the Islamic tradition al-Ghazzālī thus states on numerous occasions that in order to know God, one most first know oneself, i.e. one's own soul, its vices and its virtues (al-Ghazālī, 2006, 110). Here, virtue again plays a crucial role, whereby the Aristotelian understanding of virtue as a mean between two extremes is reinforced by the important Quranic concept of *wasaṭiyyah*, the „middle way" (see Q., 2:143). Al-Ghazzālī therewith establishes moderation as a basic Islamic concept and shows that the criteria of the right balance is the human intellect and the religious law (al-Ghazālī, 2006, 146). According to al-Ghazzālī „*faith, knowledge and action are the fundamentals of religion*", whereby „*his exposition of religious principles is only an aspect of his ethical system*" ('Umaruddīn, 1996, 308). Al-Ghazzālī – who is regarded as one of the chief representatives of the Sunni orthodoxy and at the same

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29 In contrast with the „virtuous city", al-Fārābī drafts four different kinds of corrupt „city": the „ignorant city" (*al-madina al-jahiliyya*), the „transgressing city" (*al-madina al-fasiqa*), the „renegade city" (*al-madina al-mubaddala*), and the „errant city" (*al-madina al-dalla*) (Yavuz, 2006a, 129).

30 For his concept on friendship and love see Miskawayh, 1968, 121–155. Besides rationality, a social component plays an important role in Miskawayh's vision of moral perfection: „*For love of others, and affection towards them, can play a part in the progress and upward movement of all people; that is because these are a sphere for fulfilling the different virtues.* […] *The human being can only fulfill his perfection if it is affirmed that he is a social being, as well as being rational*" (al-Dīn, 1994, 133).

31 Because of his various and profound writings, al-Ghazzālī can be equally considered as Theologian, Philosophers and Sufi.

32 In this way al-Ghazzālī approves in general what most of the Islamic philosophers taught, whereby he additionally highlights the Sufi perspective of inner purification and other initiatical devotional practices, analyzing their value not only regarding individual „salvation", but also regarding social relationships with other people. Against this background, al-Ghazzālī is trying to make the ortho-praxis of the Islamic faith the foundation for a spiritual dimension which enables the individual to achieve higher levels on the devotional initiatical path of Sufism (Yavuz, 2006, 159).

time as one of the most vocal critics of blind imitation of religious tradition – skillfully intertwines philosophical reasoning, Aristotelian ethics, Quranic principles, theological doctrines and Sufi teachings.

SUFI ETHICS

Sufism or Islamic mysticism[33] as an „initiatic way" (Geoffroy, 2009, 26) and „spiritual science" (see al-Kalābādhī, 2000, 59; 2001, 74; as-Sarrāj, 1990, 39–41, 61–62, 173; al-Makkī, 1992, 418–425, 446–449). Is far away from naïve altruism, unreflecting sentimentalism or superficial esoterism. Quite the opposite: it combines *via activa* and *via contemplativa*, theory and practice, knowledge and action, love and discipline, experience and thought – and it has been manifested throughout the history as an effective force for individual self-transformation, as well as social reformation.

Among the Sufis were however also thinkers who had a more theoretical approach to Sufism, and who were attempting to systematically establish it as a „spiritual science", by explaining states, stations and techniques of the mystical way. Abū Bakr al-Kalābādhī (d. 990) –author of the famous Sufi manual *Kitāb at-taʿarruf li-madhhab ahl at-taṣawwuf*, („The Doctrine of the Sufis"), which is deemed one of the most valuable treatises on Islamic mysticism (Arberry, 1977, xiii) – defines Sufism as a *science of the spiritual states* (ʿilm al-aḥwāl) (al-Kalābādhī, 2001, 59; al-Kalābādhī, 2000, 74).[34] Though since the states are the consequences of acts, they „*are only experienced by those whose acts have been right*" (al-Kalābādhī, 2001, 59; al-Kalābādhī, 2000, 74). In this manner al-Kalābādhī continues, that for someone who tries to transform his inner self, refine his character and improve his actions, „*it is first of all necessary, then, that he should know the vices of the soul, […] the wiles of the Enemy, and the temptations of this world […]*" (al-Kalābādhī, 2001, 59; al-Kalābādhī, 2000, 75). Only „*when the soul is properly addressed, and its habits amended, when it is schooled in the divine manners […]*" (al-Kalābādhī, 2001, 59; al-Kalābādhī, 2000, 75), a man is able to overcome his passion, watch over his

thoughts (*murāqaba al-khawāṭir*), and purify his heart. Abū al-Qāsim al-Junayd from Bagdad (d. 910), often referred to as the „Sultan of Mystics" (Glasse, 2000, 211), states that the most important components of Sufism as a whole are self-purification, self-conquest, knowledge and care for the community (al-Kalābādhī, 2001, 16; al-Kalābādhī, 2000, 10).[35] The fundamental dimensions of Sufism were outlined more than a century later in a similar way by al-Ghazzālī. In his philosophical-spiritual autobiography *Munqīdh min aḍ-ḍalāl* he ascertained that the complete way of the Sufis includes knowledge and action, belief and practice. That which is the most distinctive of mysticism cannot be gained merely by reading and studying, but only by (1) „mystical taste" of reality (*ḏauq*), (2) spiritual state (*ḥāl*) and (3) transformation of personal qualities (*tabaddul aṣ-ṣifāt*) (al-Ghazālī, 1967, 55). Immediate inner experience, spiritual states and transformation of character are actually those issues of Sufism, which are, despite the difference in opinions, discussed essentially in all important Sufi works.[36]

Against this background Sufism can be understood as a *holistic ethical project* whose aim is an increasing awareness of God, purification of the soul, mystical realization and virtuous conduct. With the aid of initiatic teachings and techniques of Sufi spirituality – such as *murāqaba* („mindfulness"), *muḥāsaba* („self-examination") (Al-Daghistani, 2016b), *tafakkur* („contemplation"), *tadhakkur* („invocation") and *futuwwah* („spiritual chivalry") – a believer can fundamentally transform his character and improve his behavior (see for example al-Qushayrī, 2007, 232; al-Anṣārī, 2011, 84-85; Badri, 2000, 29; al-Kalābādhī, 2000, 95). Continuous practice and performance of these activities enable a believer to develop a more critical consciousness toward one's self, and at the same time a more inclusivistic, open-minded, humble and compassionate attitude towards others.

At the core of this *initiatic science* of Sufism lies the knowledge and practice of *futuwwah*, a kind of Sufi moral code, which leads man to a deeper awareness of the Divine and generosity toward others. The way of *futuwwah* associates right actions with spiritual virtues and reveals the true meaning of compassion, self-denial,

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33 For a systematic or historical introduction in the Islamic mysticism see e.g. Nicholson, 1914; Hafizović, 1999; Knysh, 2000; Molè, 2003; Geoffroy, 2003; Schimmel, 2014.

34 An introductive explanation of the meaning of the *state* and *station* can already be found in Abū Naṣr as-Sarrāj's (d. 988) magnum opus *Kitāb al-lumaʿ fī-t-taṣawwuf*, which is considered to be the oldest preserved classical manual on Sufism (Gramlich, 1990, 15). Relying on al-Junayd, as-Sarrāj asserts that, unlike the inner *states*, spiritual *stations* are gained by means of ascetic practices and acts of devotion (as-Sarrāj, 1914, 13). According to al-Qushayrī – who in his remarks also refers to other (named or unnamed) Sufi-Masters of the past – the *states* are something that descends upon the heart of the meditator, without asking and endeavor (al-Qushayrī, 2007, 57; al-Qushayrī, 2007, 78). *States* are considered basically as something that emerges spontaneously, whereas *stations* are acquired by one's own inner struggle. *Stations* are therefore firm and last longer, whereas *states* are constantly changing (al-Qushayrī, 2007, 57; al-Qushayrī, 2007, 78).

35 According to Al-Junayd Sufism „*is a purification of the heart from the associating with created beings, separation from natural characteristics, suppression of human qualities, avoiding the temptations of the carnal soul, taking up the qualities of the spirit, attachment to the science of reality, using what is more proper to the eternal, counselling all the community, being truly faithful to God, and following the Prophet according to the Law*" (al-Kalābādhī, 2001, 16; al-Kalābādhī, 2000, 10).

36 See for example: as-Sarrāj, *Kitāb al-Lumaʿ fī-t-taṣawwuf*, al-Makkī, *Qūt al-qulūb*, al-Kalābāḏī, *At-Taʿrruf al-maḏhad ahli-t-taṣawwuf*, al-Hujwīrī, *Kashf al-maḥjūb*, al-Munāwī, *Al-Kawākib ad-durrīyya*, as-Sulamī *Ṭabaqāt aṣ-ṣūfīya*, al-Qushayrī, *Risāla Al-Qushayriyya fī ʿilm at-taṣawwuf*, al-Ansāri, *Manāzil as-sāʾirīn* and also al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm ad-dīn*.

hospitality, generosity, patience, renunciation, gratitude, kindness, repentance, friendship and love (al-Jerrahi, 1991, 6). *Futuwwah*, which can be translated as „spiritual chivalry" is considered as a realization of noble character and virtuous way of life, guided by the Divine, by example of the prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h.), and his companions. The Sufi aim is *„to abandon all improper behavior and to acquire and exercise, always and under all circumstances, the best behavior proper to human beings […]"* (al-Jerrahi, 1991, 6). *Futuwwa* is thus *„a code of honorable conduct that follows the example of the prophets, saints, sages"*, and the intimate friends of God (al-Jerrahi, 1991, 6). Sufism, driven by the spirit and norm of spiritual chivalry, is about *„constantly recognizing the status of humanity and acting correctly"* (Shihab, 2011, 190). In this sense, Muhammad ibn ʿAli al-Qassab stresses that *„Sufism means a noble moral character trait that a noble person shows in a noble moment in time (waqt) in the presence of a noble company"* (al-Qushayrī, 2007, 289–290).[37] *Futuwwah* is thus not only a *bon ton* or etiquette, but a state of mind, based on spiritual virtues and noble qualities, arising from inner spiritual struggle and self-overcoming. „It means placing other people above oneself. It is being generous and altruistic. It is self-denial, immunity to disappointment, indulgence toward other people`s shortcomings. It is a fearless struggle against tyranny; love of God, love of His creation, love of Love" (al-Jerrahi, 1991, 13). Despite the diversity of viewpoints on *futuwwah*, all Sufis focus on one central element of „heroic generosity" (al-Qushayrī, 2007, 237) or *effective altruism*:[38] giving preference to other people over one's own self (Knysh, 2000, 98).[39]

It is obvious from the above, that the cultivation of *futuwwa*, which leads to an altruistic and inclusivistic attitude towards others can undoubtedly be considered as an active ethical constituent of Sufi spiritual education in fighting against religious radicalism on the one hand, and in increasing tolerance, acceptance and altruism on the other. Against this background Sufism as an *authentic* Islamic spiritual education can be regarded as an important component for building peace and stability in the context of inner-religious as well as inter-religious tensions and conflicts.

CONCLUSION

In the light of the current geo-political situation in some countries of the Middle East, as well as recent tragic events in Europe, one may easily get the impression that the religion of Islam is more than any other religious system receptive to political manipulation, ideologization and even militarization. To analyze the (internal as well external) factors which contributed this currently seemingly dominating image of Islam, would exceed the scope of this paper. It should however be underlined that – besides the fact that the simple blaming of a religion for such a complex phenomenon as for example terrorist attacks is neither right nor constructive – the religion of Islam bears, as we were able to see above, a rich and long tradition of ethical discourses.

It is therefore of great importance for today's intercultural and interreligious context to rediscover and to rethink *Islamic ethos*, manifested in various discourses, which were outlined in the present paper. The rich heritage of diverse Islamic ethical traditions, whose common concern is the way of perfecting human character and achieving a state of self-realization should not be considered as a utopian (or nostalgic) vision or an abstract phenomenon, but rather as a serious alternative means in dealing with some of the existential challenges of our time. The theoretical and practical framework of Islamic ethics thus *can* and *should* (again) provide the basis for a higher moral quality of life of the individual as well as of society as a whole.

The paper has aimed at outlining some of the most important ethical concepts in the Islamic tradition, particularly in rational theology (*kalām*), classical philosophy (*falsafa*), and Sufi mysticism (*taṣawwuf*). It attempted thereby to highlight their theoretical and methodological differences as well as their common characteristics in dealing with fundamental ethical questions. For this purpose the paper explained a number of basic terms and gave a brief account on some important ethical aspects of the primary scriptural sources, which serve as a foundation for ethical theories in all three mentioned currants of Islam. If we indeed consider the ethical principles in the Quran; numerous moral instructions of the Prophet Muhammad; dynamic debates on fundamental ethical questions among Muslim theologians; efforts of Muslim legal scholars for achieving the best moral solutions for different ethical issues; various philosophical ethical theories, combining Greek thought with an Islamic worldview; and finally, the profoundly ethical spirituality of Sufism – then we can in fact conclude together with ʿUmaruddīn that Islam is an inherently ethical religion, whose *„laws and injunctions are based on the most equitable and solid moral foundation"* (ʿUmaruddīn, 1996, 307).

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37 On the same spiritual and epistemic basis ʿAmr ibn Uthmān al-Makkī also explicates that *futuwwa* ultimately means having good moral character (al-Qushayrī, 2007, 238). For many Sufis the doctrine of chivalry represents a hallmark of Sufism (Knysh, 2000, 12). The Sufis see *futuwwah* as an integral act of devotion, for it illuminates the way to a state of total consciousness of Truth (al-Jerrahi, 1991, 15).

38 An Arabic term for altruism is *īthār*. It is one of the most important measures taught by the Sufi masters, and it *„means to place the other in front, to give precedence to the other"* as well as *„to refrain from passing judgment on one`s fellow men"* (Sviri, 2002, 169).

39 Al-Muḥāsibī for example ascertains that spiritual chivalry means acting justly, *„while not demanding justice for your own self"* (al-Qushayrī, 2007, 238). Self-overcoming as well as social responsibilities is an essential part of *futuwwah*. In his Epistle, al-Qushayrī concludes, that *„the foundation of chivalry is that the servant of God always exerts himself in the service of others"* (al-Qushayrī, 2007, 237).

ETIKA V ISLAMU: PREGLED TEOLOŠKIH, FILOZOFSKIH IN MISTIČNIH PRISTOPOV

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POVZETEK

*Islamska intelektualno-duhovna zgodovina razpolaga z raznoliko in bogato etično tradicijo. V luči aktualnih družbeno-političnih dogodkov, naraščajočega ekstremizma in religijskega radikalizma, so obuditev, revitalizacija in kritična umestitev te tradicije v sodobni kontekst izrednega pomena. Najpomembnejše etične koncepte in teorije najdemo predvsem v racionalni islamski teologiji (*kalām*), klasični arabsko-islamski filozofiji (*falsafa*) in sufijski mistiki (*taṣawwuf*). Kljub njihovim teoretskim in metodološkim razlikam je vendarle mogoče izpostaviti pomembne skupne značilnosti v odnosu do nekaterih glavnih etičnih vprašanj, kot so prizadevanje za dobrim in moralna samoizpopol- nitev človeka. V ta namen članek najprej pojasni osnovne pojme, kot sta „etika" in „morala" (ter njuni ustreznici v islamski intelektualni tradiciji), nato pa nadaljuje s prikazom in osvetlitvijo nekaterih ključnih etičnih vidikov v primarnima viroma islamske religije, Koranu in preroški suni, ki služita za podlago etičnim teorijam v vseh treh zgoraj omenjenih tokovih znotraj Islama. Na podlagi temeljnih etičnih principov v Koranu, številnih moralnih nasvetov preroka Mohameda, dinamičnimi debatami med muslimanskimi teologi, etično-filozofskimi modeli klasičnih musli- manskih filozofov in duhovno-etičnimi nauki sufijskih mistikov, je mogoče upravičeno zaključiti, da je islam načelno etična religija. Ponovna oživitev in refleksija o islamskem etosu bi lahko zagotovo ne le prispevala k boljšemu razu- mevanju islamske religije, temveč omogočila tudi trdno podlago za konstruktiven boj proti religijskemu radikalizmu in esktremizmu.*

Ključne besede: islamski etos, morala, etika, dialektična teologija, klasična islamska filozofija, sufizem

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