Vloga podjetnika v tržnem gospodarstvu: The Role of the "Developer" in a free market Economy Author(s): Richard ANDREWS Source: Urbani Izziv, No. 11 (april 1990), pp. 39-42 Published by: Urbanistični inštitut Republike Slovenije Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/44179901 Accessed: 31-08-2018 08:45 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms This article is licensed under a Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. Urbanistični inštitut Republike Slovenije is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Urbani Izziv This content downloaded from 194.249.154.2 on Fri, 31 Aug 2018 08:45:29 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms URBANI IZZIV SVÌ99?BB Richard ANDREWS VI oga podj etnika v tržném gospodarstvu The Role of the "Developer" in a free market Economy Na pobudo Urbanističnega institūta je Richard Andrews kriticno orisal vlogo in delovanje invest itorjev oz. podjetnikov ( developer - jev) v sistēmu planiranja prostora v Veliki Britaniji V prispevku govorio značilnostih dveh osnovnih tipov podjetnikov: - podjetnikov, ki delujejo s ciljem multiplicirati vrednost kapitała z nakupom in preprodajo zemljisč ali pasēsti, in - podjetnikov, ki investirajo kapital (najbolj pogosto lastnega) zato, da bi ustvarjali povračilo v obliki rente ali profita. Delovanje prvih, ki je zelo kratkoročno, in delovanje drugih, ki pomeni zavarovanje dolgoročne vrednosti naložbe, je hkrati pod nadzorom lokalnih upravnih služb, ki imajo - razen kontrole in ugotavljanja skladnosti s płońskimi cilji visjega nivoja - možnost vplivati predvsem na usklajevanje interesov podjetnikov z interesi lokalne skupnosti. Mag . Richard Andrews predava na Šoli za arhitekturo na Birmin- gham Polytechnic ter je konzultant za prostorsko planiranje. In this short essay, I will attempt to identify the main aspects of the func- tions and activities of the developer within the British system of develop- ment and planning control: the Development Process. It is important to identify first the functions of the State in the promo- tion and control of development under the present British system. In this sense the State is comprised of three major components: 1. Central Government (elected) - House of Lords - House of Commons 2. Government Agencies - Direct (ie Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Education etc), these are depart- ments of Central Government; -Indirect, ie QUANGOS (QUasi Autonomous Non-Government Or- ganisation), these are non-clected (such as New Town Development Corporations, Urban Development Corporations, and until very recent- ly the Central Electricity Generating Board, the regional water authorities etc) 3. Local Government (a "two-tier" elected system) - County Councils, responsible for education, police, transport, minerals - Local or District Councils - respon- sible for most other local functions. Briefly the roles of these three com- ponents can be summarized below: 1. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, responsible for setting up and modifying the controlling legislation that governs the Town and Country Planning system, including forward planning (Development Plans) and Development Control. (It should be noted that, since 1947, all development rights to privately owned land, have been taken over by the State - therefore, while it is nor- mal to have private ownership of 39 This content downloaded from 194.249.154.2 on Fri, 31 Aug 2018 08:45:29 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms št. 11 /1990 land at all levels, from individual houses to giant industrial corpora- tions, these owners do not have the right to develop their own land, and are required to obtain planning premission from the State, via the District or Local Council, for all forms of development (there are certain exceptions to this rule). "Development" is defined as all forms of building construction or a Change of Land Use.) Central Government, through the Department of the Environment also controls the appeal system - see below. 2Š GOVERNMENT AGENCIES may very often carry out develop- ment without going through the nor- mal procedure for obtaining planning permission, and in effect, operate much as a similar agency would in Yugoslavia - they usually draw up their own plans, and carry out development directly, or provide funding for development in accord- ance with those plans. In this sense they act as direct development agen- cies. 3. LOCAL GOVERNMENT ad- ministers the Planning System, es- tablished by Central Government, under powers contained within the Town and Country Planning Legis- lation i.e. the Counties draw up the "Structure Plans" (the upper tier of the two tier forward planning sys- tem) which are basically policy documents (not plans in the geographic sense): the Districts draw up Local Plans (the lower tier) which are geographically based plans, relating to Land Use, and which form the basis of the Develop- ment Control system, also ad- ministered by the District Councils, in accordance with the Structure Plans. Development Control is the process of assessing the planning ap- plications for development sub- mitted by other Local Government Departments or, by far the greater number, by private sector agencies, which may range from individuals wishing to extend their own houses, through to giant industries develop- ing new factories, or commercial or office premises. It is at this point that we should ex- plain the concept of the developer. The Developer is primarily con- cerned with initiating development in some manner, for a financial return, either for himself or, more often, for some third party who may not wish to be involved in the process, and who is therefore prepared to pay a premium for the initiating work to be done for him. Thus the Developer can be of two different types: A. The developer who operates to multiply the value of Capital by buying and selling land or property capable of development. His "Profit" is generated by: - having identified the development potential of a property or site; - purchasing the site or property before the increase in value that this development potential would generate, has been attached to the site or even recognised by other agencies or the Local Planning Authority (LP A) - enhancing the value by obtaining the necessary permissions from the LPA to be able to develop the site or property; - reselling the site or property with the permissions attached (it is nor- mally the case that Planning Per- misión runs with the land, not just the owner or applicant at the time that the permission is granted). This form of Developer often uses borrowed capital to initiate his schemes. It is apparent that this form of developer has little or no interest in the longterm effect of the proposed development, in terms of the wider costs to the community of any such given development, such as in- frastructure costs, community or en- vironmental effects, or other negative effects. (I will come back to this point at the end.) B. The Developer who wishes to in- vest capital (often his own) in order to generate a "return" or "yield" in the form of rents or profit on a trade or function carried out from the premises to be developed. This form 40 This content downloaded from 194.249.154.2 on Fri, 31 Aug 2018 08:45:29 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms URBANI IZZIV St. 11 / 1990 of developer will be maintaining a long-term interest in the develop- ment, and is therefore far more con- cerned to cover, and avoid the prospect of, longterm costs generated by his development, be they financial (infrastructure costs or environmental damage) or qualitative (inappropriate develop- ment generating activity or traffic for which the site is unsuitable in the longterm and which may therefore "blight" the site in future). In both cases, but particularly A, the Developer is normally interested in obtaining maximum development potential from a site, and it is there- fore the role of the Local Planning Authority to cxcercise their powers of Development Control to ensure that wider negative effects are not allowed to ocćur. This will in part have been anticipated at a policy level, by the Structure Plan policies, but it is also at the Local Plan level that Development Control must seriously anticipate the pressures for development, together with the problems that particular typeš of development may generate. It has to be remembered, however, that while the Town and Country Planning Sys- tem is designed to protect against bad development, it does not have any really effective positive powers in order to implement development. Thus the Planning System must remain a rearguard action against bad development, with little or no power to promote good develop- ment except indirectly through ad- visory documents like Planning Briefs. This aspect is an important point because as long as there is no guidance to say what can be developed on a particular site, there will always be pressure from private sector developers to "overdevelop" given sites, to improve their trading position or investment; and the "potential" for development on a particular site is the primary deter- minant of its valuation. If a site is therefore "overvalued", the purchas- ing developer may well "push" the Development Control System to the limit, on the justification that he "needs" a particular scale for development to "service" or generate sufficient return for his investment. In the case of there being no Plan- ning Brief for a site, the Local Plan- nig Authority (the District Council) will have to waste valuable man- power resources "fighting" a par- ticular case of unsuitable development, by a developer who may well be prepared to spend con- siderable sums of money (often a small percentage of the eventual in- crease in value of the site) in such a fight. This is where the Appeal system be- comes important: in the event of a Local Planning Authority refusing Planning Permission, the applicant can appeal to the Secretary of State for the Environment (the Minister), to override the L.P.A. While the S.o.S. (or his Inspector) has to pay attention to the established Planning Criteria (in the relevant Structure Plan, and Local Plans), he can still override the decision of the LP A, if it can be shown that the Determina- tion of the application by the LPA was incorrect on Planning Grounds. As these are often a matter of professional opinion, rather than fact, it is often the Developer who can afford an expensive case presen- tation, who will win the day. This may not be in the best interests of the community, or the longterm condi- tion of the site in question, but, un- less considerable resources are spent by the LPA to prepare Plan- ning Briefs and general design and planning guidance notes (such as the Essex Design Guide) it may well prove impossible to withstand the pressure from private developers when a situation of high demand (such as for private housing in South- East England) exists. From an opposite viewpoint, Developers themselves may be under pressure to increase develop- ment potential on any site above that indicated by the LPA, given that they are subject to outside forces from third parties (such as a client "end- consumer" who hąs specific design criteria or limitations by the nature of his business; or the raising of in- terest rates on money borrowed) 41 This content downloaded from 194.249.154.2 on Fri, 31 Aug 2018 08:45:29 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms št. 11 /1990 and it may prove cheaper in the medium term to fight the negative décision of the LPA through the Ap- peal System, rather than to concede to the demands of planning or design criteria set out by the LPA, which would have enabled a positive décision to be obtained from the LPA. As already explained, the Appeal system is the method whereby an ag- grieved Applicant (subject to a refusal of Plannig Permission) may take his case to the Secretary of State through the "Planning Inspectorate". In this event, the S.O.S (or his ap- pointed Inspector) may overrule the Decision of the LPA. In this way, the Central Government of the day can, in fact, use the Appeal system as a means of rapidly modifying estab- lished Central or Local Government policy. For example, "Green Belt" policy is well established throughout the Planning System, as a means of protecting the Countryside around large cities. However, there is con- stant pressure for the relaxation of Green Belt restrictions, and such relaxation can be implemented piece-meal by Central Government, without consulting the relevant Local Authority, simply by allowing a few appeals to succeed against the LP As, to indicate the shift in policy. It is in this manner that the number of appeals granted to private developers recently, has risen quite dramatically. At the present time, many developers are piaying heavily on this situation, to the detriment of the Planning System, and often to the disadvantage of Local Communities. In order to overcome some of the obvious disadvantages and problems created by the Inde- pendent Developer who operates entirely for his own interest, there has been, for a number of years, a process of development whereby the private developer enters partner- ship with the Local Authority, the former motivating the development and often providing financial resour- ces from the private sector, while the latter facilitates the development by using its Compulsory Purchase Powers to assemble large sites (where before there were multiple ownerships) and its statutory powers to provide infrastructure etc. In this way, the Community may well benefit from the development in two ways: - in the provision of facilities funded by the Private Sector eg. shops, of- fices, etc; - the provision of public facilities and improvements to infrastructure provision through finance or con- struction made avalilable as part of the private development scheme. In this way, often callcd Partnership Schemes, the private sector developer gains a development that would otherwise be refused; while the Local Authority retains consid- erably more direct control of the development, together with often achieving community facilities at no expense to public finance - this last aspect is called "Planning Gain". It can be seen, therefore, that there are major problems and pit- falls within the development process, whereby developers can (and do) take advantage of the weaknesses in the control system, to make profit at the expense of the community in general - however there is equally the opportunity, through careful monitoring and anticipation of problems, for the passive planning system of Local Government to har- ness the "drive" provided by the private sector Developer, in a man- ner that will be of longterm benefit to the community either through the free provision of facilities for public use, or by partnership with the private sector to generate finance and income for both sides: the Developer and the Community. Richard Andrews, B. Arch. (Hons) M.Sc.(T.&GP.) M.R.T.P.I. 42 This content downloaded from 194.249.154.2 on Fri, 31 Aug 2018 08:45:29 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms