



td69

Since 1960


treatises and
documents

Journal of Ethnic Studies

razprave in
gradivo

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja

December 2012



Treatises and Documents, Journal of Ethnic Studies is an interdisciplinary Journal. It was established in 1960. Its original aim was to publish longer, in-depth papers (Treatises) on ethnic and minority issues, and documents related to those issues.

Nowadays the Journal publishes a wide range of scholarly articles on ethnic and minority issues, with special emphasis on topics relevant for the so-called Alpine-Adriatic-Pannonian geographical area.

Razprave in gradivo, Revija za narodnostna vprašanja je bila leta 1960 ustanovljena z namenom objavljanja daljših razprav o etničnih in manjšinskih vprašanjih in pomembnih dokumentov.

Danes v reviji objavljamo širok nabor znanstvenih prispevkov s področja etničnih in manjšinskih študij, posebno pozornost pa posvečamo pomembnim temam iz t. i. alpsko-jadransko-panonskega prostora.

69

treatises and documents

Journal of Ethnic Studies

razprave in gradivo

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja

December 2012

Treatises and Documents, Journal of Ethnic Studies

Razprave in gradivo, Revija za narodnostna vprašanja

UDC-UDK 323.15.342.4 (058)

ISSN 0354-0286 (Print / Tiskana izdaja)

ISSN 1854-5181 (On-line edition / Elektronska izdaja)

Editor-in-Chief / Odgovorni urednik

Janez Pirc (Institute for Ethnic Studies, Slovenia / *Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Slovenija*)

Editors / Urednici

Barbara Kežar (Institute for Ethnic Studies, Slovenia / *Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Slovenija*)

Emma Lantschner (University of Graz, Austria, and European Academy Bozen, Italy / *Univerza v Gradcu, Avstrija, in Evropska Akademija v Boznu, Italija*)

Technical Board / Tehnični odbor

Romana Bešter, Mojca Medvešek (on-line edition / e-izdaja), **Sonja Kurinčič Mikuž** (indexing and sales / *indeksiranje in prodaja*), **Janez Stergar**

Editorial Board

Benjamin Barber (Rutgers University, N.Y., USA), **Sara Brezigar** (Institute for Ethnic Studies, Slovenia), **Milan Bufon** (Slovenian Research Institute, Italy, and University of Primorska, Slovenia), **Sean Byrne** (University of Manitoba, Canada), **Jadranka Čačić-Kumpes** (University of Zadar, Croatia), **Fernand de Varennes** (University of Beijing, China), **Vojin Dimitrijević** (Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, Serbia), **Rainer Hofmann** (University of Frankfurt, Germany), **Boris Jesih** (Institute for Ethnic Studies, Slovenia), **William Kymlicka** (Queen's University, Canada), **Avguštin Malle** (Slovenian Scientific Institute, Austria), **Joseph Marko** (University of Graz, Austria, and European Academy Bozen, Italy), **Francesco Palermo** (University of Verona and European Academy Bozen, Italy), **Srdja Pavlović** (University of Alberta, Canada), **Tom Priestly** (University of Alberta, Canada), **Albert Reiterer** (University of Vienna, Austria), **Petra Roter** (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia), **Sherrill Stroschein** (University College London, U.K.), **Patrick Thornberry** (Keele University and Oxford University, U.K.), **Vladimir Wakounig** (University of Klagenfurt, Austria), **Colin Williams** (Cardiff University, U.K.), **Jernej Zupančič** (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia), **Mitja Žagar** (Institute for Ethnic Studies, Slovenia).

Uredniški odbor

Benjamin Barber (Univerza Rutgers, N.Y., ZDA), **Sara Brezigar** (Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Slovenija), **Milan Bufon** (Slovenski raziskovalni inštitut, Italija, in Univerza na Primorskem, Slovenija), **Sean Byrne** (Univerza v Manitobi, Kanada), **Jadranka Čačić-Kumpes** (Univerza v Zadru, Hrvatska), **Fernand de Varennes** (Univerza v Pekingu, Kitajska), **Vojin Dimitrijević** (Beograjski center za človekove pravice, Srbija), **Rainer Hofmann** (Univerza v Frankfurtu, Nemčija), **Boris Jesih** (Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Slovenija), **William Kymlicka** (Univerza Queen's, Kanada), **Avguštin Malle** (Slovenski znanstveni inštitut, Avstrija), **Joseph Marko** (Univerza v Gradcu, Avstrija, in Evropska akademija v Boznu, Italija), **Francesco Palermo** (Univerza v Veroni in Evropska akademija v Boznu, Italija), **Srdja Pavlović** (Univerza v Alberti, Kanada), **Tom Priestly** (Univerza v Alberti, Kanada), **Albert Reiterer** (Univerza na Dunaju, Avstrija), **Petra Roter** (Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija), **Sherrill Stroschein** (Univerza v Londonu, Združeno kraljestvo), **Patrick Thornberry** (Univerza v Keeleju in Univerza v Oxfordu, Združeno kraljestvo), **Vladimir Wakounig** (Univerza v Celovcu, Avstrija), **Colin Williams** (Univerza v Cardifu, Združeno kraljestvo), **Jernej Zupančič** (Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija), **Mitja Žagar** (Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Slovenija).

Published by / Založil in izdal

Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja / *Institute for Ethnic Studies*

SI, 1000 Ljubljana, Erjavčeva 26, tel.: +386 (0)1 20 01 87 0, fax +386 (0)1 25 10 964, <http://www.inv.si>, e-mail: inv@inv.si

Legal representative / Predstavniki: **Sonja Novak-Lukanovič**

Co-financed by The Public Agency for Books of the Republic of Slovenia / *Revijo sofinancira Javna agencija za knjigo Republike Slovenije*

Abstracting and indexing services / Vključitev v baze podatkov

The journal is currently noted in the following / *Revija je vključena v:*

CSA Sociological Abstracts, CSA Worldwide Political Science Abstract, International Political Science Abstracts (IPSA), FRANCIS, IBZ, IBSS.

Contacts / Kontakti

Editorial correspondence should be addressed to / *Pošto za uredništvo revije naslovite na:*

Janez Pirc, Institute for Ethnic Studies / *Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja*, Erjavčeva 26, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia,

e-mail: editordt@guest.arnes.si

Ordering information / *Naročila*: **Sonja Kurinčič Mikuž**, Institute for Ethnic Studies / *Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja*, Erjavčeva 26, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, e-mail: sonja.kurincic@guest.arnes.si

Disclaimer / Pojasnilo

The published articles express authors' viewpoints. / *Objavljeni prispevki izražajo stališča avtorjev.*

The Journal was published as follows / *Revijo smo izdajali:*

1960-1986: Razprave in gradivo (Treatises and Documents) ISSN 0034-0251;

1987-1989: Revija za narodnostna vprašanja – Razprave in gradivo (Journal of Ethnic Studies - Treatises and Documents) ISSN 0353-2720;

1990-2010: Razprave in gradivo: Revija za narodnostna vprašanja (Treatises and Documents: Journal of Ethnic Studies) ISSN 0354-0286.

Institute for Ethnic Studies © Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja (Ljubljana), <http://www.inv.si>

Annual Subscription / *Letna naročnina:*

institutions 48 €, individuals 36 €, students 24 €. Price of single issue 18 €, students 9 €.

za ustanove 48 €, za individualne naročnike 36 €, za študente 24 €. Cena posamezne številke 18 €, za študente 9 €.

treatises and documents

Journal of Ethnic Studies

razprave in gradivo

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja

December 2012

Table of Contents

8	Kawser Ahmed / Sean Byrne / Peter Karari / Olga Skarlato Meeting Rising Expectations of Hopes for Peace in Post Peace Accord Northern Ireland: The Role of the Good Friday Agreement and the Implication for External Economic Aid
36	Marija Jurić Pahor Transculturation and Cultural Hybridity: Two Key Notions of Postcolonial Studies as a Challenge for the Study of National and Ethnic Identities
66	Marianna Kosic Identity Matters: Strategies for Coping with Ethnic Identity Threats among Slovene Minority Adolescents in Italy
90	Mitja Žagar In Memory of Vojin Dimitrijević (1932 - 2012)
92	About the Contributors
95	Reviewers in 2012
97	Guidelines for Contributors

Kazalo

- 8** **Kawser Ahmed / Sean Byrne / Peter Karari / Olga Skarlato**
Razmišljanja o naraščajočem upanju na mir na Severnem Irskem po
mirovnem sporazumu: vloga Velikonočnega mirovnega sporazuma in
njegove posledice za zunanjo ekonomsko pomoč
- 36** **Marija Jurić Pahor**
Transkulturacija in kulturna hibridnost: dva ključna pojma postkolonialnih
študijev kot izziv za proučevanje nacionalnih in etničnih identitet
- 66** **Marianna Kosic**
Identitetni pomeni: strategije obvladovanja groženj etnični identiteti med
adolescenti slovenske manjšine v Italiji
- 90** **Mitja Žagar**
V spomin Vojinu Dimitrijeviću (1932 - 2012)
- 92** **O avtorjih**
- 95** **Recenzenti prispevkov v letu 2012**
- 97** **Navodila avtorjem**

KAWSER AHMED / SEAN BYRNE /
PETER KARARI / OLGA SKARLATO

Meeting Rising Expectations of Hopes for Peace in Post Peace Accord Northern Ireland: The Role of the Good Friday Agreement and the Implication for External Economic Aid

The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) formally brought about the cessation of open political violence and a semblance of normalcy returned to Northern Ireland. Over the years varied peacebuilding efforts were undertaken both by external and internal actors in Northern Ireland and the Border Area to support the peace process. This study explores the impact of peacebuilding and reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties based on interviews with funding agency community development officers, and NGO civil society leaders engaged in the overall peace process. The participants' narratives indicate how the GFA has contributed towards de-escalating violence, reducing sectarianism, fostering cooperation between macro political level efforts and micro grassroots level peacebuilding initiatives by creating an institutional framework for cross-community cooperation.

Keywords: Northern Ireland, Good Friday Agreement, peacebuilding, economic aid

Razmišljanja o naraščajočem upanju na mir na Severnem Irskem po mirovnem sporazumu: vloga Velikonočnega mirovnega sporazuma in njegove posledice za zunanjo ekonomsko pomoč

Velikonočni mirovni sporazum je formalno prinesel konec odprtega političnega nasilja in Severno Irsko vrnil v navidezno normalne razmere. Pretekla leta so zaznamovala različna mirovna prizadevanja v podporo mirovnemu procesu s strani notranjih in zunanjih akterjev na Severnem Irskem in v obmejnem območju Republike Irske. Raziskava obravnava vpliv izgrajevanja miru in sprave na Severnem Irskem in v obmejnih pokrajinah Republike Irske, temelji pa na razgovorih z uradniki agencij za financiranje lokalnih skupnosti in vodji civilnodruženih nevladnih organizacij, udeleženih v vsesplošnem mirovnem procesu. Pričevanja intervjuvancev nakazujejo, kako je Velikonočni mirovni sporazum z oblikovanjem institucionalnega okvira za medskupnostno sodelovanje prispeval k popuščanju nasilja in sektaštva, kot tudi k spodbujanju sodelovanja med prizadevanji na makro politični ravni in mirovnimi pobudami na lokalni ravni.

Ključne besede: Severna Irska, Velikonočni sporazum, izgrajevanje miru, ekonomska pomoč

Correspondence address for all authors: Arthur V. Mauro Centre for Peace and Justice, St. Paul's College, 70 Dysart Road, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB R3T 2N2, Canada.
E-mails: kawserahmed@yahoo.com, sean.byrne@ad.umanitoba.ca, karari_mp@yahoo.com, olyaskar@yahoo.com

1. Introduction

Ethnicity has long been used by elites to gain power by fomenting conflict between rival ethnic groups (Brubaker & Laitin 1998; Carter et al. 2009). The Northern Ireland conflict is a long standing ethnic conflict where the hostility of Protestant Unionists and Catholic Nationalists created extreme political polarization between both communities (Byrne & Irvin 2002). Consequently, the ongoing political violence from 1968 to 1998 commonly termed “The Troubles” destroyed many lives, property, and the hopes and dreams of the people of Northern Ireland and generated intense intergroup animosities (Byrne et al. 2010; Skarlato et al. 2010). Rival political leaders used ethnic myths that were transmitted transgenerationally to entrench hatred within both groups (Byrne et al. 2008). These leaders perpetuated the conflict by manipulating micro-nationalistic sentiments to promote each group’s ethno-political identities and to sustain group cohesion (Byrne et al. 2010). Thus, Unionists and Nationalists adopted certain identities that mostly reflected their denominational ethnic group affiliations rather than social-economic class (Dixon 2007). The island was partitioned by the 1920 Government of Ireland Act and the 1921 Anglo-Irish treaty resulted in Northern Unionists opting out of the Irish Free State (Byrne et al. 2009). Partition reinforced territorial demands expressed through nationalistic feelings as unequal power relations set within an imperial British context divided Unionists from Nationalists (O’Dowd & McCall 2008). Consequently, the vital national question regarding territoriality and sovereignty became a deep-rooted concern for both the Unionist and Nationalist communities coupled with inequalities at the economic and social level especially economic deprivation within the Nationalist community (Ryan 2007). As a result, Northern Ireland’s Troubles was characterized by violent ethno-political strife between the Unionist and Nationalist communities (Paul & Gillespie 1999).

The transformation of violent ethno-political conflict necessitates an understanding of the root causes of the conflict. Therefore, any transformational intervention process must address the core underlying causes of ethno-political violence, such as poverty, inequality, social-political exclusion and systemic injustices (Solimano 2005). Further, income inequality, unemployment and poverty fosters violence and have obstructed reconciliation efforts in Northern Ireland (O’Hearn 2000). Thus, “external economic aid, properly administered” under well-articulated socioeconomic policies must empower disenfranchised groups by distributing resources equitably and as part of a multi-track post accord intervention approach (Byrne & Irvin 2002, 78). Economic aid is considered by the international community as an authentic intervention tool within the ambit

10 of liberal peacebuilding efforts in the aftermath of peace agreements as evidenced in the cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina and in many Latin American and African countries (Byrne et al. 2010). The liberal peacebuilding view is that external economic aid can address economic deprivation to redress structural inequality by providing deprived communities with resources to infuse self-confidence and encourage the grassroots to engage in a milieu of mutual interdependence (Byrne et al. 2008). Thus, economic aid can be used in humanitarian relief efforts, cross-border conflicts, natural disasters, as well as initiatives that focus on demining, the reintegration of combatants into their communities and the establishment of effective judicial systems and democratic infrastructures so that “economic growth will spill over into peace” (Byrne & Irvin 2001, 426).

While economic aid cannot redress the centuries old conflict that is deeply ingrained in the minds of both communities, it can start to address structural problems as an integral part of an overall multi-pronged intervention effort so that the war-to-peace transition can take place (del Castillo 2008). Moreover, if the aid is targeted correctly it can reduce structural inequalities and reduce competition for scarce economic resources thus reducing violence and by providing a social platform for interaction by connecting former foes to a common goal (Byrne et al. 2009). The International Fund for Ireland (IFI) and the European Union (EU) Peace and Reconciliation (I, and II) Funds provided economic assistance to local community projects in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties (Byrne et al. 2009). Under Peace III both Funders are providing resources to various peacebuilding and community capacity building activities undertaken by local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to address the root causes of the conflict. Moreover, the Peace III Fund has earmarked “those areas that experience the debilitating cycle of social exclusion and poverty that, in part, has been fed by violence and conflict” (SEUPB 2007, Parag. 1.4). Both funders have targeted five key objectives namely: economic regeneration, social bridging, local development, regional development and across border partnership (Byrne et al. 2009, 635). Although external aid is a critical component of post-peace accord peacebuilding it should be used in conjunction with other peacebuilding intervention tools to ensure sustainable peace (Racioppi & O'Sullivan See 2007). However, economic aid is not an external panacea to resolve protracted ethnopolitical conflicts; local people must own their peace (Mac Ginty 2008, Ryan 2007).

Peacebuilding in post peace accord societies is envisaged as a holistic process whereby the recurrence of violence is reduced with creative intervention peacebuilding methods (Byrne et al. 2008). Peacebuilding should be understood

as a dynamic process aimed at building and reorienting various creative activities to “reduce the risk of a relapse into conflict” culminating into creating an environment ripe for “reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery” (Pantev 2004, 122). The success of the peacebuilding process depends on timing, a mixing of multifaceted approaches, waging diplomatic, political and economic means and the process must be adequately financed (ibid.). Thus, the Multi-Track Diplomacy framework suggests that peacebuilders must identify and coordinate approaches within a multidimensional peacebuilding intervention model (Diamond & McDonald 1996; Byrne & Keashly 2000). In the case of Northern Ireland the multi-track initiative should include governmental, NGO and private citizen involvement through a mix of advocacy and civil society actors’ undertaking various indigenous peacebuilding approaches (McCall & O’Dowd 2008). In this regard Paffenholz and Spurk (2010) contend that voluntary NGOs can undertake peacebuilding initiatives because they are independent from the state, while they also interact closely with the state and the political sphere.

Within this broad array of civil society actors Lederach (1997, 2005) argues that an integrated framework of peacebuilding is important where the middle-range leadership of civil society actors can effectively connect to the top-level leadership (or government elites) and the local grassroots level leadership. Consequently, a wide network of local non-profit voluntary organizations can work together to facilitate conflict transformation (Lederach 1997; Jeong 2005). These civil society NGOs can positively influence peace processes by stabilizing the political milieu in many post-peace accord societies (Lederach 1997, 2005). NGOs enhance a society’s wellbeing by expanding its “social space” making it accessible to all conflict parties (Boulding 1990: xvii). Moreover, civil society functions to enlarge civic engagement, and promote non-violent conflict resolution methods (Ahmed & Potter 2006, Ahmed 2011, Scholms 2003). In Northern Ireland these NGOs are often termed Peace and Conflict Resolution Organizations “have taken a leading role in denouncing violence, supporting the peace process” and in transforming conflict (Cochrane 2006, 265). Moreover, transformational peacebuilding integrates the personal, relational, structural and cultural dimensions of peacebuilding efforts (Lederach 1997, Jeong 2005). Thus, a first step towards materializing a lasting and comprehensive peace in Northern Ireland witnessed the historic signing of the GFA on April 10, 1998. The Irish and British Governments and various political parties within Northern Ireland signed it.

The signing of the GFA was a turning point in Northern Ireland’s turbulent and complex history. The British and Irish governments and Northern Ireland’s political parties not only signed a political accord but they also started their

12 journey forward on the path of peace (Cochrane 2002; Hennessey 2001). For example, Dr. Mo Mowlam, Northern Ireland's former Secretary of State described the significance of the GFA in the following way:

The agreement reached on Good Friday could be a significant turning point in the history of Northern Ireland. It could herald in a new era of peaceful co-existence and constructive co-operation. But let's have no illusions. It will take a long time to repair the physical and emotional damage of the past and bring about a sense of reconciliation and partnership (Knox & Quirke 2000, 3).

British sovereignty claims to Ireland and Irish national self-determination claims are at the core of the conflict (Knox & Quirk 2000). Past political efforts to negotiate this difficult political terrain (for example, the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement) ended in failure (Byrne & Irvin 2001, Byrne 2001). In contrast the GFA emerged out of multi-party talks and was approved by referenda that was formulated by "Peace Polls" and covered a total of eight polls in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (Irwin 2001).

The GFA recognises the legitimacy of Northern Ireland's union with Britain as long as the majority of its population desires it (Byrne et al. 2009). The Irish government also changed the Irish constitution by referendum laying claim to the national territory of the island (Hennessey 2001). Thus, the GFA significantly influenced grassroots level peacebuilding in two ways. First, in Strand One — Democratic institutions in Northern Ireland, "a consultative Civic Forum will be established. It will comprise representatives of the business, trade union and voluntary sectors, and such other sectors". Second, the provision was created of "the right to equal opportunity in all social and economic activity, regardless of class, creed, disability, gender or ethnicity" (The Agreement 1998). Both of the strands are instrumental in ensuring macro political and micro grassroots level coordination for peacebuilding (Ruane & Todd 2003). The GFA also established a Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission to promote awareness of human rights, to review existing laws and practices, and to advise the Northern Ireland government on matters related to human rights (The Agreement 1998, Chpt. 6). For example, Christine Bell concludes that "human rights measures can be useful to a peace process, not just because they address root causes of violence but because they can assist parties in finding agreement on issues such as political accommodation by reducing the zero-sum dimension to intercommunal power tussles" (Bell 2006, 367). Despite slow progress on the macro political process the GFA has improved conditions on the ground creating a milieu to channel external economic aid to grow the local economy to reduce security concerns, and to promote public optimism and tolerance (Aughey 2005). Although there was an occasional political impasse, the principal militant Loyalist and

Republican paramilitary groups kept the ceasefire diminishing the prospect of a resumption of widespread political violence (Mac Ginty et al. 2007).

13

2. Methodology

This study analyzes the narratives and stories of 120 respondents to distil their perceptions, images and life experiences of the effects of the GFA on the peace process and the various interrelated and complementary initiatives undertaken by multitrack peacebuilding. The respondents from Londonderry/Derry and the Border Area were asked about what aspects of the GFA supported the peace process, and what were the contradictions/ambiguities in the GFA that tended to hinder the overall peace process and the reconciliation process in Northern Ireland and the Border Area. The respondents' are funding agency community development officers and leaders of peacebuilding projects supported by either the European Union (EU) Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland (Peace III) or/and the IFI. Key themes were identified based on the respondents' narratives.

Thus the article maps the perceptions and images of 120 civil society NGO community group leaders, and funding agency development officers in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties about the GFA's effect on the peace process, and the effectiveness of external aid in building the peace dividend. A qualitative research methodology was used in this study using in-depth interviews that generated data rich from the participants' stories of conflict and conflict transformation. The in-depth interviews elicited the interviewees' perceptions of the peacebuilding process, and the GFAs contribution to the Northern Ireland peace process.

The lead researcher used in-depth semi-structured interviews during the summer of 2010 to explore the perceptions of 120 respondents directly involved in implementing peacebuilding projects in Derry/Londonderry and the Border Area that includes Counties on both sides of the Irish Border, namely Counties Armagh, Cavan, Derry, Donegal, Fermanagh, Leitrim, Monaghan and Tyrone. A semi-structured interviewing strategy (Bogdan & Biklen 2007, Charmaz 2006, Druckman 2005) was used since it allowed the lead interviewer to further develop and expand upon particularly interesting and intriguing responses (Bernard 2002). The 120 key people interviewed included those from a plethora of local NGOs, working to implement peacebuilding programs. The participants were first identified and then contacted in advance of the lead researcher traveling to

Northern Ireland through emails, telephone calls and letters. The interviews were conducted over a period of ten weeks with each person interviewed for roughly between 80 to 120 minutes. The participants in the sample do not represent a cross-section of the entire civil society of Northern Ireland. However, they do represent a cross-section of local NGOs who are directly involved in sustainable economic development, capacity building and peace and reconciliation funded cross community projects. The interviewees responded to eleven carefully designed open-ended questions to express their images and perceptions about the effectiveness of the funding in the peace process and how the GFA supports the overall peace process in Northern Ireland. In this study, all of the interviews were tape-recorded and the participant's stories were transcribed verbatim. The respondents' quotations are presented in their original words and their identity is not exposed to maintain anonymity. The data set is unique and has not been previously published. Data analysis was done inductively in a grounded theory approach (Hitchcock & Hughes 1995, Druckman 2005). It is important to note that we cannot generalize the findings from this qualitative study to a broader global context.

The participants' perceptions of the peace process and its connection to the GFA highlighted the following: (1) how the GFA supported the peace process and (2) why did the GFA not support peace process.

3. Positive Influences of the GFA in the Northern Ireland Peace Process

Many respondents argued that a positive synergistic function existed between micro grassroots level peacebuilding initiatives and macro political level efforts, which are made possible by the GFA. For example, a community group leader in Derry expressed how one of the provisions in the GFA outlined creating a Civic Consultative Body to empower grassroots community leaders to be heard:

ROGER: There is room for some optimism, in terms of the gradual adoption of responsibility for our own matters. I do think that a civic voice has a chance to maybe be somewhat amplified ... so basically that the channels of upward communication are worked on, if people are able to use those channels that capture the civic voice and have confidence in them then it wouldn't be just peace and reconciliation, which would be back in the centre where we are. There is something that needs to feature in this conversation and it does exist in this town and it is the perception of the peace and reconciliation industry.

In a similar vein, another community group leader from Derry expressed how the people of Northern Ireland have transformed politically into active citizens in the following manner:

MICHAEL: I think there was a tremendous achievement it gave all of us each and everyone of us a fillip a very necessary fillip, and it helped to reenergise. I also think it does this tremendous thing particularly for people from a Republican Nationalist Catholic background, and it says well here's an opportunity now for years we have been very reluctant subjects and now here is an option to become active citizens and build a new society together. Now that is a big leap from reluctant subject to active citizen. I think many, many people within the Catholic Nationalist Republican community have made that leap.

Another community group leader from Derry also highlighted how macro political level efforts are being synchronized at the micro level to maintain a sustainable peacebuilding process:

LYNNE: I think when we started out in this process going back even 30 years ago the theory that everybody put forward was the chain reaction theory that if everybody did a wee bit eventually it would be built up to a chain reaction and the whole thing would take off, and I think that has been part of the peace process that everybody doing small bits has gradually added to it. It is very important at the other end, the political end of it that they are seen to work together.

Another community group leader in the Border Area also noticed the presence of a level of coordination between micro and macro level actors as facilitated by the GFA:

MARGE: There is a lot of coordination going on at both the macro level and the micro level because a lot of our projects are developed in partnership with our local cross Border partners, they go through the approval process of the Special EU Programmes Body... I think there is a certain degree of cooperation that's taking place along all those different tiers. So again I would agree that I think it is working as far as Donegal is concerned ... well we're hoping it's a bottom up approach to planning as opposed to top down.

Moreover, another community group leader in Derry identified the shift in some of the young people's political attitudes and how they differ from the sectarian politics of the old guard politicians:

ROBERT: There are some politicians still to this day, who would be reluctant to interact and who would still be in their minds fighting an old battle and I think now young people have moved forward in the sense that we would find groups now, for instance the group that is currently on the Wider Horizon preparation they talk about their music, they talk about their football teams, they talk about their different issues, they don't talk about the Troubles anymore, because they have nearly put it behind them.

16 Another EU Peace III community development officer in Derry felt that the provisions mentioned in the GFA need to be supported wholeheartedly to bring home the peace dividend:

MOIRE: I think that we have got to work the provisions of the Agreement because it is the only thing that is going to bring about a level playing field for communities like ours... The provisions under the Good Friday Agreement aren't perfect but they do represent an historic compromise of sorts that can get us started on the work that we need to do, and I think it needs to be supported.

However, a community group leader in the Border Area explained that the GFA should be viewed as a work in progress:

WILLIAM: But the Good Friday Agreement is a working document, so people viewed it as a settlement, it isn't. It's an agreement. It's an agreement to work on, and I suppose for this community it's a work in progress in the big macro sort of politics of a United Ireland and that is what Republicans want but it is also a work in progress of building the structures in a society that is fair for everyone.

A EU Peace III officer in Derry also underlined that the GFA has created powersharing between Unionists and Nationalists changing the dynamics of the conflict:

CYRIL: Well clearly we wouldn't be where we are now without the Good Friday Agreement, from the Good Friday Agreement certain things flowed, chief one which was probably that Unionists finally accepted that they had to share power, and once they accepted that everything else flowed from that. It took some people longer than others. The Democratic Unionist Party took time to get there and so on, but it clearly changed the dynamic of the conflict in a fairly dramatic way.

A community group leader in the Border Area also mentioned how the present political situation made it possible to create institutions and norms that exerted pressures from the bottom grassroots level up to the political elites so that they were aware of their responsibilities to deliver the peace:

GRAINNE: Communities do know that we won't go back to those days. I feel that communities want the politicians to get on with it, they almost say look if we can do it here in communities why are you not able to do it up there and get on with it. So I think it is a double-edged sword. It is great that we are here but why aren't we further on and let the politicians get it sorted.

A community group leader from the Border Area also highlighted that the GFA created a political milieu where political initiatives at the macro level are synergistically connected to the micro levels of peacebuilding:

RACHEL: I think that the political process couldn't happen without some move on the ground ... So I think there is a very, very important connection between them, and in fact like right through all those levels if you really want to have peace, you have to get from top to bottom, you've got to kind of keep building those bridges, and I think at the level of politics, at the level of community and on a personal level, I think that is happening and I think the reason the peace process is a result of it.

A community group leader in Derry perceived how the changed political landscape had opened up opportunities for grassroots NGOs to dialogue with politicians on restorative justice issues:

FRANK: I think there is a lot for the politicians to hear and learn. [We] have had a series last year of meetings with the politicians to say look this is devolution how do you feel about crime and punishment, you know what you think is important, what do you think about prisons and how we deal with offenders. So we have been trying to do that and at least get our view in there on some of that. Yeah, so that's the conversation I think that's happening, or needs to happen, or is happening, or should continue to happen between the communities and the voluntaries, and the politicians I think.

A community group leader in Derry mentioned how the new political terrain has nurtured creative measures like the arts and music to be used as peacebuilding tools in the following way:

AOIFE: I'll give you a quote from somebody else Professor Goodwin, and he was saying that there are changes that society are bound to go through whether they like it or not both are evolving and that artists are the antenna they pick up these changes from wherever you think they come from and disseminate them through their work. I think we were doing that, blindly and intuitively and naively and stupidly and that is what we were doing saying here's another way, you know here's the two communities coming together and creating something new. I remember at one point Mo Mowlam called us the music of the future, you know we use it in our website now, a good quote for us you know that she saw a potential future of the two communities working together.

In contrast, a community group leader from the Border Area highlights how the funding helped his NGO to undertake creative peacebuilding initiatives in the arts that are not politically motivated:

NIALL: I think politics in general is a difficult thing because it tends to put people off and I think the reason we see the arts as playing such an important role in peace building is because it is something that isn't political. You may see some political influences in terms of artistic endeavour but as I say it's not political ... if you can change particularly with younger people if you can change their perceptions at a younger age, if people's perceptions are changed through integration at a younger age is that maybe if they do go on to politics they'll take that with them into politics.

In addition, another community group leader from Derry explained how the storytelling process helps to heal past trauma in the following manner:

LISA: For groups like ourselves what we find is that we are dealing with a lot of the issues that are not really dealt with in the Good Friday Agreement, the chief one which is dealing with the past, and that has not been dealt with, it is still being dealt with in a haphazard way. Part of the problem is the people I think there is still a large element of sectarianism in how people deal with the past and what they think about. I mean I honestly believe that there are many people in the Unionist community who dismiss Bloody Sunday partly because there were Catholics getting killed and they felt they deserved it.

Consequently, civic bodies or forums enhance sustainable peacebuilding and can support peacebuilding activities of grassroots level NGOs by promoting “active citizenship” – a concept that underpins citizens obligations to render their services for social good (Bell 2004, 566; Kearns 1992, 20). For Northern Ireland, the peace process was not restricted only to the formal Track 1 (i.e. elite level) initiative as many key local groups “within civil society” (i.e. the Civic Forum) played dominant roles in the grassroots level process (Bell 2004, 566; Cochrane 2006, 253). In this regard, the Civic Forum outlined in the GFA provisions emerged as a new critical space where the voluntary and community sector can act together to become a dominant actor in the peacebuilding process (Birrell & Williamson 2001). Although, the Civic Forum could act as a key bridge builder between “the Executive and the Assembly” through facilitating “formal dialogue” regarding matters relating to grassroots level development this hasn’t been achieved due to the recalcitrance of both Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) who are fearful of grassroots empowerment (McCall & Williamson 2001 cited in *ibid*, 214–215). Many of the NGOs represented at the Civic Forum have also acted to promote democracy and people’s inclusion during the “anxiety and expectation” generated by the passing and implementation of the GFA (Aughey 2005, 2). Nevertheless, the GFA introduced a new model of “institutionalization of the ideal of deliberative democracy,” as a critical space to give voice to Northern Ireland’s women as well as facilitating a peacebuilding process through a “bottom-up, civil society approach” (*Ibid*, 93). Moreover, both funds empowered citizens to become active at the community level that solidified existing social connections (Birrell & Williamson, 2001, 5). For example, the EU funded “the Leader and Leader II, that reinvigorated rural voluntary groups to promote community based employment, and INTERREG which has assisted community groups in economic development activities” (McCall & Williamson 2001 cited in Birrell & Williamson 2001, 6). However, tension continues to prevail between those who advocate for the Civic Forum’s grassroots actions and mainstream political leaders who “are expected to deliver and the consequence of trying to deliver will continue to be communal tension, mistrust and low-

level violence” (Aughey 2005, 105). Many of our participants observed that the actions of grassroots activism and the Civic Forum are disconnected with the political machinations taking place at the devolved Belfast Assembly in Stormont. The people’s distrust of politicians has a legacy that goes back to the late 1960s when the Unionist government established a Community Relations Commission that never functioned properly due to the suspicion of Protestants and Catholics (Griffiths 1972, 128), which perhaps carried on to stifle the work of present Civic Forum. In this regard, Sinn Fein and the DUP termed the Civic Forum as “an unnecessary and costly layer of bureaucracy” (Bell 2004, 568).

Macro political level and micro grassroots level synchronization of developmental efforts are important in implementing a sustainable peacebuilding process in Northern Ireland. The root causes of the conflict in Northern Ireland cannot be adequately handled solely at the macro political level (Birrell & Williamson 2001). Macro political level actors get maximum media attention to remain visible in the public domain yet the smaller community organizations work daily to resolve local level conflict (Knox & Quirk 2000, 50). In Northern Ireland, many NGO community-based organizations are working towards peacebuilding by creating a common ground for both the Catholic Nationalist and Protestant Unionists communities (Buchanan 2008). However, many of our respondents argued that coordination among both the funders and the government need to be further improved. Others expressed that the lack of synergy between government and NGO community based organizations impedes the overall peace progress. They also highlighted the duplication of efforts in terms of projects working in the same sector to obtain identical goals. Further, they pointed out that the political actors are sometimes fearful of losing ground and influence that is vital to securing their votes in local constituencies. This kind of negative environment breeds mistrust and ultimately harms the sustainability of the peace process and the critical grassroots work of community organizations.

Young people are the future of Northern Ireland and they need more long term economic, political, social and psychological support (Senehi & Byrne 2006). The Office for National Statistics of Northern Ireland mentioned that “today Northern Ireland has the fastest-growing and youngest population of all UK countries” as a result of lower death rates (Northern Ireland also has the lowest all age mortality rate within the UK) (Office for National Statistics 2009, 13). However, many of today’s young people living in Northern Ireland did not witness the violence of the Troubles. They were born in the early 1990s when the violence started to recede finally culminating in the historic GFA. In contrast, a study of 15–16 year-old Belfast youth found that exposure to violence led to three-quarters of the sample having psychological health issues in the

transgenerational transmission of the trauma of the Troubles (McAloney et al 2009). This phenomenon has manifested itself in higher levels of depression, psychotic symptoms, substance misuse and a tendency toward suicide (Thiessen et al. 2010). Thus, many respondents opined that young people are frustrated and are feeling hopeless regarding employment opportunities. The peace projects are not able to deliver a sense of security to them while many young working class people feel cheated out of a proper education. Their sense of frustration not only hurts them individually; it also motivates them to join various dissident paramilitary groups to find a sense of community as well as to seek thrills.

The 1998 GFA provided a framework for a devolved assembly with full executive and legislative authority, and underwent approval via referenda in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (McAloney et al. 2009a, Irwin 2001). Between April 1996 and May 2000 eight public opinion surveys were conducted to garner people's feedback and support of the peace process (Irwin 2001) and to ensure the inclusion of peoples opinion (Knox 2011). In our study, many respondents equivocally expressed their vision about the macro political level and the micro grassroots level working in unison. They argued that the GFA is not just a piece of paper signed by political parties rather its provisions must be implemented as part of the overall peacebuilding objectives. For example, the devolution of power posed a challenge to both the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Féin as Unionists realized that they had to share power with Nationalists. The powersharing executive at Stormont brought together two former enemies onto the same political platform who now have to cooperate with each other politically. Some of our respondents also noted that the political leaders came down to the local level to seek support for the GFA while others argued that they were out-of-step with local issues. The GFA will take a far longer time to implement than initially envisaged, yet change is a foot in Northern Irish politics.

A bottom grassroots level up peacebuilding approach is crucial to build sustainable peace in Northern Ireland. After the end of Cold War while undertaking post accord reconstruction the UN engaged in comprehensive peacebuilding by adopting a liberal market economy model (Mac Ginty 2008). A comprehensive peacebuilding strategy utilizes existing infrastructures and involves local citizens in choosing the methods to mitigate violence (Lederach 1997) that includes local grassroots people in praxis and policymaking (Campbell 2011). However, while local community groups and the Northern Ireland government are closely involved in all peacebuilding efforts their expectations may not follow the same direction. Sometimes, a government may coopt community groups to further its goals (Chopra 2000, Paris 2002). Many of our respondents discussed this

dilemma agreeing that grassroots up peacebuilding is more sustainable in the long run. Many aspired not to return to the sectarian past and to pressure their politicians to make sure this never happens. They also opined that Stormont politicians travel to their local constituencies to dialogue with local people while local residents travel to Hillsborough to express their political demands. Such a process would not have been possible under direct rule. In this way, the people at the local level are exerting pressure on the policymakers to listen to their political demands. For example, community based restorative justice projects run by political ex-prisoners and former combatants are addressing everyday crime in local communities (Eriksson 2009). This kind of restorative justice approach facilitates the reconciliation process and builds trust both for individuals within the community and between communities and the state in a conflict transformation process to resolve societal conflict peacefully (Campbell 2011).

Dialogue is an effective peacebuilding tool to be used in the peaceful resolution of local conflicts (Eriksson 2009). There are various underlying deep-rooted tangible and intangible causes that have perpetuated the Northern Ireland conflict as people continue to suffer from the trauma of the past. Dialogue and storytelling processes open up opportunities for people to tell their stories and to contribute to healing by providing psychological release from the past (Senehi 2002) in order to deal constructively with conflicts (Eriksson 2009; Senehi 2009). Dialogue allows people to grasp a greater understanding of diverse ideas aiding in the deescalation of conflict through minimizing the demonization of the other (Ropers 2004). Many respondents expressed the point that the funding has created the space for numerous socioeconomic platforms to emerge whereby Nationalists and Unionists can come together and engage in dialogue. Many of our community group leaders considered dialogue, based on an interfaith platform, a useful tool to build trust and confidence among the dissident paramilitary groups (Smock 2002). They also argued that dialogue assists in removing psychological barriers behind which both communities hide their differences and wage conflict. Once Unionists and Nationalists are engaged in dialogue, they can understand each other's needs, hopes and fears. In addition, they considered that dialogue between micro level and macro level actors to be important in building the civic culture. For example, the Northern Ireland Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (NIACRO 2009) has organized a series of meetings with Unionist and Nationalist politicians to understand the broader aspects of crime and punishment, using mediation services to work with offenders in the prison system.

Innovative peacebuilding methods such as music, storytelling and the arts can be used to construct a positive self-image and to heal from past trauma (Senehi

2009). Creative processes such as music, storytelling and the arts can be effective catalysts for peacebuilding in divided societies (Senehi 2002). Some of our respondents argued that using a strategic soft approach incorporating the arts, storytelling and music into peacebuilding work creates a common space where people can come together freely to express their hopes and fears that acts as a healing mechanism and a reconciliation tool to remove stereotyping (Shank & Schirch 2008; Senehi & Byrne 2006). For example, in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, hip-hop music is used to discuss social and political issues. In Sri Lanka, children and adults participate in music, painting, theatre, yoga, and sculpture in the Butterfly Peace Garden. In Israel, the Peres Center for Peace brings together young Palestinians and Israelis to “promote peacebuilding between Israel and its Arab neighbours and in particular between Israelis and Palestinians... [it] conducts dozens of projects, involving thousands of Israelis and Palestinians, fostering socio-economic cooperation and people-to-people interaction” (Peres Centre for Peace 2012). In Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada each year the Winnipeg International Storytelling Festival brings together schoolchildren and storytellers-peacebuilders to discuss complex issues (WISF 2012). Hence, a community based approach in the aftermath of violent conflict can also act as an effective tool for bringing segregated groups together to share their common cultural backgrounds to become aware of their roles in past conflict (Senehi 2009). Northern Ireland has a classic history of maintaining and referring to past historical and cultural traditions that contributed to the conflict and entrenched group identities (Cairns & Mercer 1984). For example, since the start of the Troubles in 1969, the parading season from Easter to September has annually created tensions and necessitates an extensive amount of law enforcement presence to prevent violence (Zelizer 2003). The marching season foments inter-group conflict and separates young people hindering integration and acting as an obstacle to coexistence and creating a shared society as envisioned in the GFA (Byrne 2009). Many of the respondents in our study opined that incorporating the arts, storytelling and music into peacebuilding work in an apolitical way can build new friendships and bring young people together under a fresh peacebuilding approach.

4. Negative Effects of the GFA in the Northern Ireland Peace Process

In this section we have highlighted the respondents’ images and perceptions about the negative effects of the GFA in the overall Northern Ireland peace process. They expressed their frustration and despair with the GFA mostly

grounded in the fact that the promised delivery of the peace dividend by the GFA has not yet materialized. For example, a community group leader in Derry expressed how the Civic Forum has not really worked:

SIAM: There has been sort of civic bodies, which have tried, and they haven't worked. You know there was under the Good Friday Agreement a civic forum where it was going to be community representatives and business men and so on would have actually sat on influential bodies that would try and steer the politicians you know that would make thing better in communities and in a business sense but they just didn't really work.

Another community group leader from Derry mentioned how young people are frustrated with the lack of economic opportunities caused by the worldwide recession and the failure of the GFA to deliver jobs:

CAROLINE: You know the sense of hopelessness and despair which is again rising in working class areas for reasons that has got very little to do with Irish politics and everything to do with economic developments and the economic crisis across Europe and indeed across the world. I mean the main reason you have got younger people in larger numbers than ever officially admitted to support dissident Republicanism, it doesn't really have to do with these young people thinking to fight for a United Ireland or not to recognise British authority, it is a fact that they are very angry at the situation that they find themselves that they can see no hope and at least the Real IRA is having a go at least it is still fighting, so that's the reason for this.

In addition, another community group leader in Derry explained that the GFA and the peace process has failed to create any significant major investment into Northern Ireland:

MARTY: I would say that the peace process hasn't actually driven economically at all; by itself it didn't generate any investment... I don't think the process could have led to any significant major investment and I say that for two reasons a) I don't see it on the ground and b) I don't believe that business people internationally put their money where there has been a peace process because there has been a peace process, business men are in there basically because they see it as the best natural turn.

Another community group leader from Derry opined that the absence of adroit political leadership at the macro level was in stark contrast to the positive influence of the voluntary community sector:

CHLOE: The community and voluntary sector in Derry in particular grew up with a lack of political leadership and the growth of the community sector during the Troubles it was largely church based within itself ...that power is something that our Councillors and politicians find very, very frightening... I think overall we lack leadership on all parts of life, I think our difficulty is we have very few leaders and in terms of the Catholic community it had the church but the church has lost so much creditability and there's

an act of mistrust on the church's involvement in the communities. I think a lot of our community organisations are middle management for government agencies and that they service the needs of the government rather than the people.

In addition, a community group leader from Derry mentioned how the politicians were acting as gatekeepers and blocking various grassroots initiatives. This is what he had to say on the issue:

KEITH: I suppose is a bit of work that the community development can play, but what there are the gatekeepers... It's a dangerous thing, and again that's where back to the peace process and back to the Peace and Reconciliation Funds that it's all been superficial, nobody engages in the serious issues when you put up the serious issues for discussion the gatekeepers shut the door, they don't let you in.

A community group leader in Derry argued that sectarian politics continues to frustrate the unfulfilled promise of the peace accord in the following manner:

OONAGH: People want to see action, people have ten and eleven year old kids who you know want to go in terms of they don't know what's happening they don't know what it is, they see factories closing they're just sick of the orange and green arguments and they want to see policy... but I suppose alongside that as well is that ordinary politics at times now are dreary and drudgery and people are probably switching off and particularly at a time when jobs are under pressure and there are economic restraints and all the rest it's not as easy for people.

Similarly, a community group leader from the Border Area articulated the disconnection between promises and the delivery of the peace dividend in the following manner:

GEAROID: It's about delivery because government is about delivering to the people who you represent so there would be a fit between all those and sometimes there can be a disconnect... so it is not a single fix you know that they are totally gelled, they are running parallel, or they are separate, it's a combination and a mixture of them all.

In addition a community group leader from the Border Area echoed the same frustration in the following way:

RAYMOND: So the Good Friday Agreement, alright it was fantastic but what happened, it took a lot of time to do it and understand that there was a lot of other people involved ... a lot of the very top people are not singing from the same hymn sheet. There are a lot of people who are dragging their heels and really just wanted to just drag as much as possible. The Bloody Sunday enquiry is a perfect example why did that take so long to come out the truth.

As envisioned in the GFA, astute political leadership at the macro level is a

precondition to build a peaceful society in Northern Ireland. The GFA provided institutional provisions of devolved government where political powers are decentralized so that the citizens can directly participate in the decisionmaking process, and in envisioning a peaceful Northern Ireland society (Tonge 2000). Effective peacebuilding strategies should encompass three essential elements “the local sources of hostility, the local capacity of change, and the (net) specific degree of international commitment available to assist sustainable peace” (Doyle & Sambanis 2000, 781). Again these elements function within a political space that must foster the capacity building of actors and institutions working for peacebuilding (ibid.). For example, as part of its Management of Diversity Issues, the International Conflict Research Institute initiated a project in 2004 entitled ‘Politicians and Community Relations’ (Ibid.). The research sought to determine the “potential role of politicians in contributing to the improvement of community relations, while also taking into account the perception that in some cases politicians foment division between communities rather than assist in peacebuilding” (Doyle & Sambanis 2000, 794). The research discovered several intriguing findings regarding politicians’ perceptions of community relations and what the politicians think about community-based peacebuilding organizations. In responding to the question, “What Community Relations means for a politician?” a large majority of politicians agreed that a ‘shared future’ should be the key concern of government policy (ibid., 781). The politicians were also divided over “sharing-oriented policy reforms” in education, housing and public service indicating that efforts to foster a more shared society should not compromise personal or cultural values (ibid., 783).

In our study, many respondents indicated that astute leadership is absent as some politicians act as gatekeepers to obstruct the peacebuilding process by polarising and fragmenting community groups using them in their drive to win sectarian votes during elections. Some respondents also explained how Unionist DUP and Official Unionist Party politicians play the orange card within working class Loyalist communities by attempting to influence funding bodies to favour certain groups over others. Similarly, Sinn Fein has taken over the community development industry in local Catholic communities as it cements its electoral power base. Thus, the narrow vision of Unionist and Nationalist politicians is detrimental to the overall peace process.

The international economic recession has also impacted the macro level economic environment of Northern Ireland stalling the peacebuilding momentum. Thus, creating a resilient micro level sustainable economic infrastructure is necessary to endure the adverse effects of external economic turmoil. Due to the worldwide economic recession, Northern Ireland’s economy

is also suffering. Although both external funds generated lots of employment through various peacebuilding projects the necessary capital investments in industrial sectors to generate more jobs did not take place as desired (Cohen & Solomon 2007). Northern Ireland's economy will have to survive in the face of stiff competition with other low-wage countries of Asia and Europe (Kerr 2003). Many of our respondents averred that youth capacity building has to be built up gradually and be continuously supported by both external funds as young people living in despair are either joining dissident spoiler groups or are committing suicide. However, the infrastructure created by both funds offers a solid platform to be harnessed and now all that is required is for the Stormont powersharing government to draw in Foreign Direct Investment to Northern Ireland and meld it with local entrepreneurship. Hence, the adoption of "social business" within the grassroots can build a sustainable economy with much needed resilience in the face of the current recession period (Robinson & Foley 2004). According to our respondents, the effects of a poor economy results in the joblessness of young people who continue to be the hardest hit with almost one in five, 18 to 24-year-olds in Northern Ireland unable to find work (BBC News 2011). In addition, some young males are joining dissident paramilitary groups while others commit suicide (Largey et al. 2009, 19).

Meeting people's rising expectations of hope in the aftermath of signing a peace agreement is often a difficult commitment to fulfill by the government. Ethnopolitical violence destroyed the infrastructure needed to build the economy in Northern Ireland. Consequently, political promises made in a peace agreement that are not delivered as expected results in grassroots frustration. Many scholars contend that while formal peace agreements bring an end to overt hostility they often fall short of establishing genuine peaceful relations as they merely manage conflict rather than bringing deep reconciliation to former adversaries (Senehi 2002; Mac Ginty 2008). In Northern Ireland many of our respondents indicated that although the signing of the GFA formerly ended the conflict, the peace dividend aspired to by the people has not yet been delivered. The people's frustration has occurred on both the sociopolitical and the economic spheres. People need to see the speedy implementation of the peace agreement on the ground. In Northern Ireland breaking down sectarian barriers, building a sustainable economic infrastructure, reconstructing people's mindsets, and devolving power peacefully so that politicians of all shades of political colour can work together has yet to be achieved as both communities remain embroiled in conflict. These issues are further complexified when the peace negotiators at the macro political level fall short of providing the constructive leadership to implement a long-term vision to create a peaceful society.

5. Conclusion

27

In conclusion, the GFA has laid out an institutional framework and played a crucial role in reducing some of the sectarian violence in Northern Ireland. Moreover, it facilitated the creation of a stable economic environment where external aid from the IFI and EU Peace III Fund could be injected into grassroots community peacebuilding projects to improve the socio-economic condition and repair damaged relationships. However, these localized peacebuilding efforts need to be continuously supplemented by actions at the macro level. The peacebuilding work of grassroots level NGOs are important in building trust between both the Protestant and Catholic communities so that they can move towards acknowledging the past and reconciling their differences so that they can cohabit and coexist in a peaceful society. However, the political work undertaken by political leaders must be synergistic with the work of grassroots level voluntary community organizations to deliver the peace dividend as promised in the GFA. Our respondents expressed both the positive and negative effects of the GFA. They also unequivocally pointed out that a future peaceful Northern Ireland depends on how the political condition of the Stormont powersharing government evolves and how it delivers the promises made in the GFA to all of the people of Northern Ireland. External funders must constantly critically review and gauge the success of their current peace methodologies and standard operating procedures in the formulation of policies for the constructive implementation of their aid programs.

6. Acknowledgements:

We would like to thank Tom Boudreau, Jessica Senehi and Hamdesa Tusso and the reviewers from *Treaties and Documents, Journal of Ethnic Studies* for their constructive feedback on several drafts of this article. This research is funded by a three-year Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada grant number 103564.

28 References

The Agreement [The Agreement: Agreement reached in the multi-party negotiations], 1998 (10 April 1998), <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/agreement.htm> (22 March 2012).

Ahmed, S., 2011. The Impact of NGOs on International Organizations: Complexities and Considerations. *Brooklyn Journal of International Law*, 36, 817–1183.

Ahmed, S. & Potter, D. M., 2006. NGOs in *International Politics*. Kumarian Press, Sterling.

Aughey, A., 2005. *The Politics of Northern Ireland: Beyond the Belfast Agreement*. Routledge, Abingdon & New York.

BBC News, 2011. Young Hardest Hit as Unemployment Rises Again, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-15755994> (21 March 2012).

Bell, C., 2006. Human Rights, Peace Agreements, and Conflict Resolution: Negotiating Justice in Northern Ireland. In J. Mertus & J. Helsing (eds.) *Human Rights and Conflict: Exploring the Links between Rights, Law, and Peacebuilding*. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 345–374.

Bell, V., 2004. In Pursuit of Civic Participation: The Early Experiences of the Northern Ireland Civic Forum, 2000–2002. *Political Studies* 52(3), 565–584.

Bernard, H. R., 2002. *Research Methods in Anthropology*. Altamira, Oxford.

Birrell, D. & Williamson, A., 2001. The Voluntary Community Sector and Political Development in Northern Ireland Since 1972. *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 12(3), 205–220.

Bogdan, R. & Biklen, S. K., 2007. *Qualitative Research for Education: An Introduction to Theory and Methods*. Pearson Education Inc, Toronto.

Boulding, E., 1990. *Building A Global Civic Culture: Education for an Interdependent World*. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse.

Brubaker, R. & Laitin, D., 1998. *Ethnic and Nationalist Violence. Annual Review of Sociology* 24, 423–452.

Buchanan, S., 2008. Transforming Conflict in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties: Some Lessons from the Peace Programmes on Valuing Participative Democracy. *Irish Political Studies* 23(3), 387–409.

Byrne, S., 2001. Consociational and Civic Society Approaches to Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. *Journal of Peace Research* 38(3), 327–352.

Byrne, S., 2009. The Politics of Peace and War in Northern Ireland. In J. Carter, G. Irani & V. Volkan (eds.) *Regional and Ethnic Conflicts: Perspectives from the Front Lines*. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, 207–226.

Byrne, S., Arnold, J., Fissuh, E., Standish, K., Irvin, C. & Tennent, P., 2009. The EU Peace II Fund and the International Fund for Ireland: Nurturing Cross-Community Contact and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland. *Geopolitics* 14(4), 630–652.

Byrne, S., Fissuh, E., Thiessen, C., Irvin, C. & Tennent, P., 2010. The Role of the International Fund for Ireland and the European Union Peace II Fund in Reducing Violence and Sectarianism in Northern Ireland. *International Politics* 47(2), 229–250.

Byrne, S. & Irvin, C., 2001. Economic Aid and Policy Making: Building the Peace Dividend in Northern Ireland. *Policy and Politics* 29(4), 413–429.

Byrne, S. & Irvin, C., 2002. A Shared Common Sense: Perceptions of the Material Effects and Impacts of Economic Growth in Northern Ireland. *Civil wars* 5(1), 55–86.

Byrne, S. & Keashly, L., 2000. Working with Ethno Political Conflict: A Multi Modal Approach. *International peacekeeping* 7(1), 97–120.

Byrne, S., Thiessen, C., Fissuh, E., Irvin, C. & Hawranik, M., 2008. Economic Assistance, Development and Peacebuilding: The Role of the IFI and EU Peace II Fund in Northern Ireland. *Civil wars* 10(2), 106–124.

Cairns, E. & Mercer, G., 1984. Social Identity in Northern Ireland. *Human Relations* 37(12), 1095.

Campbell, S., 2011. Construcing Top-Down as Bottom-Up: The Governmental Co-option of Peacebuilding 'From Below'. *Explorations in Anthropology* 11(1), 39–56.

Carter, J., Irani, G. & Volkan, V. D. (eds.), 2009. *Regional and Ethnic Conflicts: Perspectives from the Front Lines*. Prentice Hall, New York.

Charmaz, K., 2006. *Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis*. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks.

Chopra, J., 2000. The UN's Kingdom of East Timor. *Survival* 42(3), 27–40.

Cochrane, F., 2002. People Power?: The Role of The Voluntary and Community Sector in The Northern Ireland Conflict. In F. Cochrane & S. Dunn (eds.) *Peace People: A Profile of the P/CRO Activist*. Cork University Press, Cork.

Cochrane, F., 2006. Two Cheers for the NGOs: Building Peace from Below in Northern Ireland. In M. Cox, A. Guelke & F. Stephen (eds.) *A Farewell to Arms?: Beyond the Good Friday Agreement*. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 253–268.

Cohen, R. & Solomon, H. 2007. *Economics in Peacemaking: Lessons from Northern Ireland*. Portland Trust, London. www.portlandtrust.org (30 January 2009).

Del Castillo, G., 2008. Economic Reconstruction of War-Torn Countries: The Role of International Financial Institutions. *Seton Hall Law Review* 38, 1265–1295.

Diamond, L. & McDonald, J. W., 1996. *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace*. Kumarian Press, Sterling.

Dixon, P., 2007. *The Northern Ireland Peace Process: Choreography and Theatrical Politics*. Routledge, Abingdon & New York.

Doyle, M. W. & Sambanis, N., 2000. *International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis*. *American Political Science Review* 94(4), 779–801.

Druckman, D., 2005. *Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict Analysis*. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks.

Eriksson, A., 2009. A Bottom-Up Approach to Transformative Justice in Northern Ireland. *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 3(3), 301–320.

Griffiths, H. (1972). The Northern Ireland Community Relations Commission. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 1(2), 128–132.

Hennessey, T., 2001. *The Northern Ireland Peace Process: Ending the Troubles?* Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Hitchcock, G. & Hughes, D., 1995. *Research and the Teacher: A Qualitative Introduction to School-Based Research*. Burns & Oates, London.

Irwin, C., 2001. How Public Opinion Polls Were Used in Support of The Northern Ireland Peace Process *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, 1, 62–73.

Jeong, H. W., 2005. *Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies: Strategy and Process*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder.

Kearns, A. J., 1992. Active Citizenship and Urban Governance. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 17(1), 20–34.

Kerr, J., 2003. Northern Ireland's Economic Future Fragile. BBC News, 17 September, 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/3115538.stm (22 March 2012).

Knox, C., 2011. Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland: A Role for Civil Society. *Social Policy and Society* 10(1), 13–28.

Knox, C. & Quirk, P., 2000. *Peace Building in Northern Ireland, Israel and South Africa: Transition, Transformation and Reconciliation*. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Largey, M., Kelly, C. B. & Stevenson, M., 2009. A Study of Suicide Rates in Northern Ireland 1984–2002. *The Ulster Medical Journal* 78(1), 16–20.

Lederach, J. P., 1997. *Building peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC.

Lederach, J. P., 2005. *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Mac Ginty, R., 2008. *No War, No Peace: The Rejuvenation of Stalled Peace Processes and Peace Accords*. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Mac Ginty, R., Muldoon, O. T. & Ferguson, N., 2007. No War, No Peace: Northern Ireland After the Agreement. *Political psychology* 28(1), 1–11.

McAloney, K., McCrystal, P., Percy, A. & McCartan, C. 2009. Damaged Youth: Prevalence of Community Violence Exposure and Implications for Adolescent Wellbeing in Postconflict Northern Ireland. *Journal of Community Psychology* 37(5), 635–648.

McCall, C. & O'Dowd, L., 2008. Hanging Flower Baskets, Blowing in the Wind? Third-Sector Groups, Cross-Border Partnerships, and the EU Peace Programs in Ireland. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 14(1), 29–54.

NIACRO [Northern Ireland Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders] 2009. Management of Women Offenders in Northern Ireland, <http://www.niacro.co.uk/current-issues/45/management-of-women-offenders-in-northern-ireland/> (22 March 2012).

O'Dowd, L. & McCall, C., 2008. Escaping the Cage of Ethno-National Conflict in Northern Ireland? The Importance of Transnational Networks. *Ethnopolitics* 7(1), 81–99.

Office for National Statistics, 2009. Report: A Demographic Portrait of Northern Ireland. Population Trends 135. The Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, http://www.nisra.gov.uk/archive/demography/publications/Pop_Trends_NI_Article.pdf (15 January 2012).

O'Hearn, D., 2000. Peace Dividend, Foreign Investment, and Economic Regeneration: The Northern Irish Case. *Social Problems* 47, 180.

Paffenholz, T. & Spurk, C., 2010. A Comprehensive Analytical Framework. In T. Paffenholz (ed.) *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment*. Lynne Rienner Publications, Boulder, 65–91.

Pantev, P., 2004. Euro-Atlantic Solidarity on Post Conflict Rehabilitation: Adjusting the Strategic Approaches. *Connections: The Quarterly Journal* 3(2), 121–125.

Paris, R., 2002. International Peacebuilding and the 'Mission Civilisatrice'.

Review of International Studies 28(4), 637–656.

Paul, B. & Gillespie, G., 1999. Northern Ireland: A Chronology of the Troubles 1968-1999. Gill & Macmillan, Dublin.

Peres Centre for Peace, 2012. Developing Tomorrow's Peace. Tel Aviv-Jaffa, Israel, <http://www.peres-center.org/> (31 November 2012).

Racioppi, L. & O'Sullivan See, K., 2007. Grassroots Peace Building and Third Party Intervention: The European Union's Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland. *Peace and Change* 32(3), 361–390.

Robinson, G. & Foley, F., 2004. *Politicians and Community Relations in Northern Ireland*. Magee College, University of Ulster, Derry, INCORE Report, 1–83.

Ropers, N., 2004. *From Resolution to Transformation: The Role of Dialogue Projects*. In B. Austin, M. Fischer & H. Giessmann (eds.) *Berghof Handbook of Conflict Transformation*. Berghof Cojnflct Research, Tübingen, www.berghof-handbook.net/all/# (31 November 2012).

Ruane, J. & Todd, J., 2003. A Changed Irish Nationalism? The Significance of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. In J. Ruane, J. Todd & A. Mandeville (eds.) *Europe's Old States in the New World Order*. University College Dublin Press, Dublin, 121–145.

Ryan, S., 2007. *The Transformation of Violent Intercommunal Conflict*. Ashgate Publishing, Farnham.

Scholms, M., 2003. *Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs*. Frank Cass, Portland.

Senehi, J., 2002. Constructive Storytelling: A Peace Process. *Peace and Conflict Studies* 9, 41–63.

Senehi, J., 2009. Building Peace: Storytelling to Transform Conflicts Constructively. In Sandole, D., Byrne, S., I. Sandole-Staroste & Senehi, J. (eds.) *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution*, Routledge, Abingdon and New York, 201–214.

Senehi, J. & Byrne, S., 2006. From Violence Toward Peace: The Role of Storytelling for Youth Healing and Political Empowerment After Conflict. In S. McEvoy-Levy (ed.) *Troublemakers or peacemakers*. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 235–258.

Shank, M. & Schirch, L., 2008. Strategic Arts Based Peacebuilding. *Peace & Change* 33(2), 217–242.

Skarlato, O., Byrne, S. & Thiessen, C., 2010. The EU Peace II Fund and the International Fund for Ireland: Transforming Conflict and Building Peace in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties. *Razprave in gradivo, Revija za narodnostna vprašanja / Treatises and Documents, Journal of Ethnic Studies* 62, 92–124.

Smock, D. R., 2002. *Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding*. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC.

Solimano, A., 2005. Political Crises, Social Conflict and Economic Development: The Political Economy of the Andean Region. Edward Elgar Publication, Cheltenham & Northampton.

SEUPB [Special EU Programmes Body], 2007. Peace III EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation 2007 – 2013, *Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland Operational Programme*, Official Report by the Special EU Programmes Body. Special EU Programmes Body, Belfast, Omagh & Monaghan, <http://eustructuralfunds.gov.ie/files/Documents/Peace%20III%20EU%20Programme%20for%20Peace%20and%20Reconciliation.pdf> (15 January 2012).

Thiessen, C., Byrne, S., Skarlato, O. & Tennent, P., 2010. Civil Society Leaders and Northern Ireland's Peace Process: Hopes and Fears for the Future. *Humanity and Society* 34, 39–63.

Tonge, J., 2000. From Sunningdale to the Good Friday Agreement: Creating Devolved Government in Northern Ireland. *Contemporary British History* 14(3), 39–60.

WISF, 2012. Winnipeg International Storytelling Festival. Arthur Mauro Centre for Peace and Justice, St. Paul's College, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, http://umanitoba.ca/colleges/st_pauls/mauro_centre/outreach/storytelling/index.html (3 December 2012).

Zelizer, C., 2003. The Role of Artistic Processes in Peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina. *Peace and Conflict Studies* 10(2), 62–75.

MARIJA JURIC PAHOR

Transculturation and Cultural Hybridity: Two Key Notions of Postcolonial Studies as a Challenge for the Study of National and Ethnic Identities

Following a short presentation of postcolonial studies, the author deals with their two key concepts, also considered typically postmodern notions: transculturation or “transculturality” and cultural hybridity. She thereby points out that postcolonial studies essentially contributed to the deconstruction of binary divisions and to the fact that national or ethnic purism gradually turned into unbearable cultural strategy. Transculturation is described as a phenomenon of contact area, where diverse cultural codes are meeting, clashing and intertwining in often asymmetrical relations of supremacy and subordination. Although the notion of transculturation basically coincides with the concept of cultural hybridity, the two are not identical. The notion of transculturality aims above all at the kind of culture, marked by transformation, mixture and intertwinement, while the notion of cultural hybridity is focused on the image of “third space” (H. K. Bhabha) as a place of negotiating and translating, implying subversion of demarcations and call for dialogue despite frequently extremely violent and traumatic past.

Keywords: postcolonial studies, transculturation, transculturality, cultural hybridity

Transkulturacion in kulturna hibridnost: dva ključna pojma postkolonialnih študijev kot izziv za proučevanje nacionalnih in etničnih identitet

Po krajši predstavitvi postkolonialnih študijev, avtorica obravnava dva njihova ključna koncepta, ki ju prištevajo tudi med značilno postmoderne pojme: transkulturacijo oziroma »transkulturnost« in kulturno hibridnost. Pri tem izpostavi, da so postkolonialni študiji bistveno prispevali k dekonstrukciji binarnih delitev ter k temu, da je nacionalni oz. etnični purizem postopoma postal nevzdržna kulturna strategija. Transkulturacijo opiše kot pojav kontaktnega območja, kjer se v pogosto asimetričnih odnosih nadvlade in podrejenosti srečujejo, spopadajo in prepletajo različni kulturni kodi. Čeprav pojem transkulturacije v temeljnih potezah sovпада s pojmom kulturne hibridnosti, ju ne smemo enačiti. Pojem transkulturacije meri zlasti na takšno zgradbo kulture, ki jo označujejo preobrazba, mešanica in preplet, medtem ko je pojem kulturne hibridnosti fokusiran na predstavo »tretjega prostora« (H. K. Bhabha) kot 'kraja pogajanja' in prevajanja, ki implicira subvertiranje razmejitev ter klic k dialoški kljub nemalokrat skrajno nasilni in travmatiki preteklosti.

Ključne besede: postkolonialni študiji, transkulturacija, transkulturnost, kulturna hibridnost

Correspondence address: Marija Juric Pahor, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Erjavčeva 26, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, e-mail: juric.pahor@alice.it

1. Uvod

Ker se pričujoči prispevek navezuje na postkolonialne študije, moramo za poglobljeno razumevanje tematike najprej na kratko orisati pomen pojma »postkolonialno«. Izraz se v znanstveni literaturi običajno nanaša na procese razkrajanja kolonialnih svetov, ki so jih vzpostavile evropske sile, ter na posledično učinkovanje imperialne dediščine v novo nastalih neodvisnih nacionalnih državah. Zato termina »postkolonialno« ne moremo uporabljati, kakor da označuje stanje, ki avtomatično in za zmeraj predpostavlja, da je nekdanj formalni kolonialni status stvar preteklosti; in prav tako ne more biti samoumevno, da sprememba formalnega statusa avtomatično pomeni, da se lahko kakor kačjo kožo odvrže psihične, ekonomske in kulturne posledice kolonialnega statusa. Kot pravi Gyan Prakash (1992, 8): »Postkolonialno obstaja kot učinek, kot potem – potem, ki ga je proizvedel kolonializem.«

Termin »postkolonialno« pa ima tudi povratne učinke nekdanjih kolonij na nekdanje imperialne centre predvsem z množičnim priseljevanjem prebivalstva (večinoma iz tako imenovanega tretjega sveta), ki dajejo Evropi, čeprav ne nujno v zaznavi same sebe, pa vendar v družbeni realnosti, vse bolj multikulturni značaj. Postkolonialni študiji obsegajo teoretsko preučevanje zgoraj navedenih pojavov ter precej intenzivno soočanje z vprašanji kulturnih stikov ter iz njih izhajajočih (pogosto konfliktnih) družbenih procesov transkulturacije, ki spodkopavajo tradicionalne vrednote in prepričanja o edinstvenih in homogenih nacionalnih in etničnih identitetah. Dajejo pa tudi vedeti, da te identitete postajajo vse bolj hibridne, kraji, ki evocirajo difrakcijo in zbujajo nemir ob raznolikosti. Te kraje/identitete ni mogoče misliti atavistično, to je, povezano s »statusom identitete enega samega izvora«, temveč »rizomsko«,¹ kjer se izvor prepleta s srečanjem z drugimi (Glissant 1990, 31).

Postkolonialni študiji dekonstruirajo težnje in mite, ki predpostavljajo genezo ene same, linearno in monokavzalno začrtane identitete, ki se zdi nespremenljiva in definirana po ideji o naravnem in izvornem ter zaščitenem pred živahnimi stiki in strahom pred okužbo. Stuart Hall (1996, 246–247) pravi: »[K]ar se tiče želje po brezpogojni vrnitvi k čistemu in nepotvorjenemu izvoru, so se dolgoročni učinki 'transkulturalizacije', ki so bili značilni za kolonizacijski proces, izkazali za ireverzibilne.« Kolonizacija je po njegovem poskrbela za to, da je postal etnični purizem postopoma nevzdržna kulturna strategija. Edward Said (1997, 57) poudarja pomen tistih intelektualcev – eksilantov, »katerih prisotnost naredi *dozdevno homogenost* novih družb [S. govori o Angliji in Franciji], v katerih živijo, bolj zapleteno.« Homi K. Bhabha (1997a, 119) govori o »delokaliziranih

in diasporičnih ljudstvih«, ki vnašajo svoje izkušnje in poglede iz kolonialnih in postkolonialnih časov »v centre« in »postimperialni zahod nenehno spominjajo na hibridnost njegove materinščine in heterogenost njegovega nacionalnega prostora.«

2. Stuart Hall in Homi K. Bhabha

Postkolonialni študiji se začnejo z vstopom prvih intelektualcev iz »tretjega sveta« oziroma 'globalnega juga' (*Global South*) v zahodni znanstveni diskurz. Gre večinoma za teoretike in raziskovalce, ki so imigranti, nemalokrat pa tudi pripadniki etničnih, verskih in drugih manjšin, delujejo pa zlasti v anglofonskem jezikovnem prostoru. Proučevalci postkolonialnih teorij in literatur so si bolj ali manj enotni v tem, da je *Orientalizem* Edwarda Saida, ki je izšel leta 1978, »utemeljitveni dokument« postkolonialnih študijev. Svojevrstna avantgarda sta še Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in Homi K. Bhabha (gl. Castro Varela & Dhawan 2005; Jeffs 2007, 468–469). Po Robertu Youngu (1995, 163) so omenjeni trije intelektualci 'sveta trojica' (*Holy Trinity*) postkolonialne teorije. Bistveno so prispevali k rekonceptualizaciji odnosa med nacijo, kulturo in etničnostjo, kar velja še zlasti za Homija K. Bhabho – vsekakor pa tudi za Stuarta Halla, ki je v pičlem pol stoletju postal sinonim britanskih kulturnih študij – projekta, ki je močno vplival na postkolonialne študije, tako da se teoretsko in vsebinsko pogosto z njimi prekriva (Williams & Chrisman 1994). Ni naključje, da v novejši literaturi pogosto tudi Stuarta Halla prištevajo k merodajnim postkolonialnim mislecem (gl. ibid., 349–342; Supik 2005, 29; Babka & Posselt 2012, 7).

Ker bomo naš raziskovalni predmet večkrat predočili s pomočjo teoretskih predpostavk Halla in Bhabhe, naj na kratko predstavimo njuno biografsko ozadje, o katerem sta oba večkrat dejala, da odmeva tudi v tem, kar mislita in ubesedujeta.

Stuart Hall se je rodil leta 1932 v Kingstonu, glavnem mestu Jamajke v Karibih, ki je bila med letoma 1509 in 1655 španska, med letoma 1655 in 1962 britanska kolonija, nato pa neodvisna država Skupnosti narodov (izvirno angl. *Commonwealth of Nations*; od leta 1964 samo *Commonwealth*). Prebivalci Jamajke, Jamajčani, so večinoma potomci afriških sužnjev ter mešanci afriških in anglo-irskih prebivalcev z vplivom španske in staroselske »indijanske« Taino kulture. Hall je imel kot najmlajši od treh otrok najtemnejšo kožo, kar je bil povod za družinske šale, potisnjen pa je bil tudi v identiteto »outsiderja« in »manjšinca« v smislu, da so bili temnejši odtenki kože v primerjavi s svetlejšimi pojmovani za nekaj »manj« – to je »manj« na socialni lestvici (Chen 1996, 486–487).

O družini po očetovi liniji Hall pravi, »da je bila etnično zelo mešana«, to je afriškega, vzhodnoindijskega, portugalskega in judovskega porekla, medtem ko je bila družina njegove matere »skorajda bela«; obe družinski frakciji, še zlasti pa »materina«, sta se istovetili z »angleškostjo« in s kolonizatorji (ibid., 486, 488). Predstava, da ima identiteta opraviti z ljudmi, ki izgledajo vsi enako, ki čutijo na isti način in se imajo za enake, je Hallu tuja. Označuje jo za »nesmisel« (Hall 1994, 74). Prav tako tuja mu je misel, da je identiteto mogoče razumeti v obliki dveh različnih zgodb, ene, ki je evropska, in druge, ki je kolonialna oziroma postkolonialna, in naj bi bila umeščena zunaj Evrope oziroma evropskih nacionalnih držav. Da tovrstna (od)cepitev, ki predpostavlja uzrtje historično in kulturno čistih »nacionalnih teles« in izključitev vsega, kar naj ne bi spadalo vanj, Hall lepo ponazori s prispodobno iz lastne biografije, ki ga je kot mladega imigranta pripeljala z Jamajke v Anglijo:

»Ljudje kot jaz,« razlaga Stuart Hall (1994, 74), »ki so prišli v petdesetih letih v Anglijo, so bili – simbolno rečeno – že več stoletij tu. Prišel sem domov. Sem sladkor na dnu angleške skodelice čaja. Sem sladki zob, plantaža sladkornega trsa,² ki je generaciji angleških otrok pokvarila zobe. Ob meni je tisoče drugih, ki so čaj v skodelici sami. Tega, kot veste, ni mogoče pridelovati v Lancashireju. V Združenem kraljestvu ni ene same plantaže čaja. Toda čaj je simbol angleške identitete. Kaj pa ljudje povsod po svetu vejo o Angležih, razen da dneva ne morejo prestati brez skodelice čaja? Toda od kod prihaja? S Cejlona – Šrilanke, Indije. To je zunanja zgodba, ki je v notranjosti Anglije. Ni angleške zgodovine brez te druge zgodovine.«

Tudi Homi K. Bhabha, ki se je rodil leta 1949 v Mumbaju (tedaj še Bombaj) v Indiji, poučuje pa na univerzi Harvard v ZDA, izhaja iz zavračanja binarnih delitev, ki stojijo v temelju kolonialističnega pogleda na svet in so inherentne tudi vsakršni nacionalni identiteti. Svet ni ločen na dva dela in razdeljen na dva nasprotujoča si tabora (center proti periferiji, prvi svet proti tretjemu, nacionalne večine proti etničnim in drugim manjšinam) (gl. Bhabha 1994). Eno med razlagami, da Bhabha sveta ne vidi v luči binarnih delitev in da zavrača teorije totalnosti in homogenosti identitet, nakazuje že dejstvo, da je odrasčal v družini, ki je pripadala in pripada razmeroma majhni etnično-religiozni skupnosti Parsov, zavezani zaratustrskemu ali zoroastrskemu nauku (Mitchell & Bhabha 2009 [1995], 105–107). Parsi, iz perz. *pars*, 'Perzijec', ki so se v 7. stoletju zaradi padca Sasanidskega cesarstva in islamizacije Perzije večinoma umaknili v Indijo, so sredi 19. stoletja – torej v obdobju angleškega kolonializma, ki je trajalo od leta 1756 do leta 1947 – veliko prispevali k urbanizaciji Indije. Bili so avantgarda pri razvoju trgovskih vezi in moderne infrastrukture indijskih metropol, še zlasti Bombaja. Odigrali pa so tudi pomembno vlogo posredovalcev med raznolikimi indijskimi skupnostmi in kolonizatorjem in pri tem izkazovali tudi »dokajšnjo spretnost pri pogajanju kulturnih identitet« (Castro Varela & Dhawan 2005,

83). V nekem intervjuju Bhabha pripominja, da so bili Parsi sicer bogati, da pa v Indiji nikdar niso imeli resničnega političnega vpliva, zaradi česar zavzemajo – in to vse do danes – mejno družbeno pozicijo. Prav zgodnje izkušnje, ki jih je Bhabha imel kot pripadnik Parsijev, so bile vzgib, da se je pozneje veliko ukvarjal s pojavi mejnosti, ambivalence, hibridnosti ter 'vmesnih' (*in-between*) ali »tretjih prostorov« (Bhabha 1997b, 244–246).

Tako kot Hall tudi Bhabha meni, da se identitete znotraj posebnih zgodovinskih situacij in na institucionalnih prizoriščih konstruirajo s pomočjo diskurzivnih praks in strategij. Če se posamezniku zdi, da ima poenoteno identiteto od rojstva do smrti, je tako zato, ker je konstruiral zajetno »zalogo« naracije o sebi, saj je popolna, varna in koherentna identiteta fantazija (Hall 1992, 277). Oba razbirata identiteto kot hibridno, v tem smislu, da se vedno vzpostavlja *vmes*, na križišču družbenih (diskurzivnih) kategorij nacionalnosti, etničnosti, spola, verskega in svetovnega nazora, razreda. Identiteta je torej že v zasnovi dialoška, je "pogajanje" med različnimi kategorizacijami, ki se lahko med seboj dopolnjujejo ali pa so tudi v protislovju (Bhabha 2000, 2): gre za prav bahtinovsko večglasje ali trk diskurzov v enem samem subjektu, v katerem se odigravajo družbene napetosti, bodisi med vladajočimi ali potlačenimi diskurzi, pa tudi med pripadnostmi, ki se aktivirajo in kombinirajo na nove načine, ne da bi se mogli »zaključiti« v kakršni koli enoviti sintezi (Zakrajšek 2007, 25). Tudi obstoj tradicije ali sheme deloma zavestne in deloma nezavedne kolektivne memorije, ki jo zaznamujejo travmatični dogodki, je pomešana v samo zgodovino institucij, kultur in subjektov in jo občasno reaktivirajo zgodovinski dogodki, ki evocirajo njeno dolgotrajno navzočnost.

3. Pojem in zgodovina pojma transkulturacije

Pojem transkulturacije, ki ga lahko uokvirimo v naraščajoče zanimanje za poskuse oblikovanja novih odnosov med državo in družbo, vložene v refleksivne konceptualizacije preobrazbe kolektivnih identitet ter nacionalne javne kulture (napori naj bi obrodili sadove tudi v odnosu do tujosti, drugosti in drugačnosti ter manjšinskih ali »subalternih« skupin), je središčni sestavni del tistega pojmovnega omrežja, ki se razširja v sklopu postkolonialnih študijev. Angleški pojem *transculturation* na primer najdemo v slovarju Billa Ashcrofta, Gareth Griffiths in Helen Tiffin (2007 [1998], 213–214), ki predstavlja in razlaga ključne pojme *Post-colonial Studies*. Prav v tej knjigi pa je kot ključni pojem naveden tudi izraz *hybridity* (ibid., 108–111), ki je z omenjenim pojmom, kot bomo še videli, v številnih potezah zelo soroden, pa čeprav ju ne gre enačiti.

Pojem 'transkulturacije' (*transculturación*) je že v štiridesetih letih 20. stoletja v svoji knjigi *Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y el azúcar*, ki je prevedena tudi v nemški jezik (1987), uvedel kubanski antropolog Fernando Ortiz. Ortiz je z ozirom na kubansko gospodarstvo s tradicionalno proizvodnjo tobaka in z novejšo pridelavo sladkornega trsa opisal, kako je v povezavi z različnimi skupinami prebivalstva – z afriškimi sužnji, s španskimi kolonizatorji, z azijskimi pogodbenimi delavci – prihajalo do oblikovanja novih socialnih in kulturnih formacij. Vendar, tako Ortiz, pri tem ni mogoče govoriti o »akulturaciji« v smislu koncepta, ki ga je zagovarjal tedanji *mainstream* ameriške antropologije: stare, družbeno nedominantne kulture so prisiljene, da se vraščajo v novo, dominantno kulturo oziroma da jih ta prilagodi sebi in asimilira. V resnici je tako, da gre vselej za izmenjavo med kulturami, ki preobrazi vse vpletene strani. Transkulturacija označuje pri Ortizu torej proces transformacije, v katerem se oblikujejo kulturni vzorci, ki niso zgolj aglomeracije ali mozaiki elementov izhodiščnih kultur, temveč izkazujejo genuine nove poteze. Do tega procesa prihaja tudi pri povsem neenakomerni porazdelitvi oblasti in moči, torej tako pri vladajočih kot vladanih (kulturah).

Ashcroft, Griffiths in Tiffin (2007 [1998], 213) izpostavljajo, da se je pojem transkulturacije definitivno uveljavil šele v osemdesetih letih 20. stoletja. Transkulturacijo opišejo kot »pojav 'kontaktnega območja' [*contact cone*] [...], kjer se srečujejo, spoprijemajo in med seboj bojujejo različne kulture, pogosto v zelo asimetričnih odnosih nadvlade in podrejenosti« (ibid.). Podobna je tudi definicija Jeana Lamoreja (1987, 19), ki se naslanja prav na opredelitev F. Ortiza. Transkulturacija je po njegovem ime za nenehen, kreativen ter ireverzibilen proces preobrazbe, ki se nikoli ne konča.. Je proces izmenjave, »v katerem se vedno nekaj da v zameno za to, kar je bilo prejeto: obe soudeleženi strani se vzajemno spreminjata. Pojavi se nova realnost, ki ni mozaik znakov, temveč nov, izviren pojav.«

Po Stuartu Hallu (1996, 247) pojem transkulturacije omogoča novo branje družbenih razmer v kolonijah ter v postkolonialnem in globaliziranem svetu, saj ta pojem ne dopušča redukcije na absolutno binarnost nasprotujočih si etničnosti in kultur. Nasproti vsem binarnim miselnim shemam postavlja Hall mnogotero, heterogeno *razliko*. Hall (ibid., gl. tudi Hall 2002, 36) se pri tem navezuje na derridajevski³ izraz *différance*, ki je napisan s črko »a«, da se razlikuje – v zapisu, ne pa v govoru – od francoske besede za razliko *différence*.⁴ Ta izraz, izpeljan iz de Saussurejeve semiologije, prevajamo kot 'razliko' in hkrati kot 'odlog'. »*Différance* z »a« potemtakem povzema dejanje razlikovanja in odlaganja, je dejavnost, ki proizvaja razlike in odloge (Grilc 2001, 16). Iz arbitrarnega odnosa med znakom in označenim sledi, da je pomen posameznega znaka mogoče dojeti le preko

ovinka odlaganja na druge znake, ne pa z neposrednim nanašanjem na predmet, torej na označeno samo, ki je prisotno le v svoji odsotnosti – kot *sled*. Pomenov in s tem tudi razlikovanja ni mogoče dokončno določiti, saj vsebujejo vedno neko v *ad infinitum* postavljeno igro odloga.

[O]značeni pojem ni nikoli prisoten sam na sebi, v zadostni prisotnosti, ki bi napotovala le sama nase. Vsak pojem je *de iure* in bistveno vpisan v neko verigo ali sistem, znotraj katerega s sistematično igro razlik napotuje na drugega, na druge pojme. Taka igra, razlika, tako ni več preprosto neki pojem, temveč možnost pojmovnosti, pojmovnega procesa in pojmovnega sistema nasploh (Derrida 1994, 11).

Verigo različnih konotacij znaka, ki jih *différance* sproža, lahko označimo kot polisemičnost znaka, kot odprtost za različne in večrazsežnostne interpretacije. Pomenljivo je, da se teoretski instrumentarij dekonstrukcije, katere utemeljitelj je Derrida in ki so mu zavezani skoraj vsi postkolonialni misleci, pri tem osredotoča zlasti na tista mesta v »tekstu« (tekst označuje po Derridaju [2004, 18] vsakega potencialnega nosilca pomenov, torej ne le besedila, ampak npr. tudi govor, film, ples, kulturo, identiteto itd.), kjer se pomeni prelivajo, izključujejo, so dvoumni, protislovni ali pa razpršeni in neizrečeni. Dekonstrukcija razkriva, da »tekst« nikakor ni enoznačen in vnaprej jasen, ampak pogosto sam v sebi razcepljen, hibridiziran in fragmentiran v svoje kulturne sestavine. S tem ko Derrida na široko razgrinja polje označevanja – tekstualnost – spodkopava in odpravlja zamejenost tistega, čemur Hall (2002, 36) v navezavi nanj ter na Ernesta Laclaua pravi »čista logika difference«. Ta logika, ki nima nič skupnega s pojmom transkulturacije, je po Hallu lahko le podlaga za separatizem in apartheid; »čista logika difference [je] možna strategija le tam, kjer ena identiteta od druge identitete nič noče in z njo ni v nikakršnem konstitutivnem razmerju« (ibid.).

Senzibilizacija za razlike ob hkratni naraščajoči skepsi nasproti binarnemu modelu razlike kot nečesa zaprtega ali ujetega med dva nasprotna pola zamegljuje pogled na tisto, kar se takšni togi strukturiranosti izmika. Sem lahko prištejemo vse, kar je v zvezi s pojmom transkulturacija: odpiranje prostorov do-mišljanju (kolonialne, nacionalne, evropske, druge) zgodovine in dediščine v smeri pluralnih, mnogoterih in heterogenih preteklosti in prihodnosti, vprašanja, ki se nanašajo na fluidnost, multiplost in fragmentiranost kulturne izkušnje, procese pogajanja za identiteto in pripadanje, iskanje novih identitetnih scenarijev, ki z opuščanjem starih, ne več primernih, omogočajo nove, času primerne politike zamišljanja kolektivnih subjektov.

Če zasledujemo zgodovino pojma transkulturacije, ugotovimo, da se je, izhajajoč s Karibov, najprej zasedal v Latinski Ameriki (gl. Spitta 1995, 1–28), nato

v Severni Ameriki, medtem ko je bil v Evropi deležen le majhne pozornosti. Wolfgang Welsch (1997, 67–90, zlasti op. 16 in 38), eden najpomembnejših nemško govorečih filozofov in teoretikov postmodernizma,⁵ je v svoji razpravi o »transkulturnosti« zapisal, da je ob začetku devetdesetih let 20. stoletja, ko se je zaradi močno spremenjene konstitucije današnjih kultur začel soočati z novo konceptualizacijo kulture, imel pojem transkulturnosti za nekaj novega. V Evropi slej ko prej najbolj pogosto uporabljajo pojem interkulturnosti, s katerim poimenujejo vstopanje v dialog z drugimi kulturami (gl. npr. Mikolič & Kozak 2008), ki pa v nasprotju s transkulturnostjo izhaja iz vase zaprtih kultur: udeleženci dialoga so postavljeni v vnaprej določene »čiste« identitarne pozicije. Že citirani martiniški pisatelj in filozof Édouard Glissant (1995, 13–14) jo je v svoji razpravi *Introduction à une Poétique du Divers* Karibe označil kot »odprto morje, morje, ki defraktira«, kot večstoletni kraj srečevanja in prehajanja, in posledično – še bolj kot ZDA – kot naravno zibelko kreolizanih družb in najbrž tudi novih kulturnih teorij. Temu postavi nasproti Sredozemsko morje, »morje, ki se osredotoča«, in v katerega vplivnem krogu so nastajale velike monoteistične religije in usmerjale »človeško misel k mišljenju Enege in k enotnosti.« Ne da bi se spuščali v zgodovinske in kulturnopolitične implikacije te predpostavke, je mogoče reči, da se je Evropa v diskusijo o spremenjenih kulturnih konceptih bolj opazno vključila šele v devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja, torej v času intenzifikacije globalizacijskih in migracijskih procesov, ki ustvarjajo »transnacionalne vezi in prostore, povečujejo vrednost lokalnih kultur in postavljajo v ospredje tretje kulture« (Beck 2003, 26).

Seveda pri tem ne gre spregledati pomena britanskih kulturnih študij, ki so se na pobudo Fernanda Ferrare že od leta 1972 začeli razvijati tudi v Italiji, in sicer zlasti v sklopu anglistike neapeljskega Orientalnega univerzitetnega inštituta (*Istituto Universitario Orientale*, danes *Università degli Studi di Napoli "L'Orientale"*), pa tudi na univerzi v Palermu. Tam so se velika imena iz zgodnjega obdobja kulturnih študij, kot so Raymond Williams, Richard Hoggart in Richard Johnson, redno srečevala z "neapeljsko šolo", v kateri so ob Ferrari izstopali še njegovi učenci Lidia Curti, Marina Vitali in Laura di Michele (Cometa 2007, 66). Šele s preselitvijo Iaina Chambersa, predstavnika britanskih kulturnih študij, v Neapelj (leta 1976), je bila zagotovljena trajna in sistematična recepcija širokega kulturološkega polja, tako da je »neapeljska šola« vse do danes »pomembna povezovalna točka kulturnih študij v Italiji, še zlasti z ozirom na postkolonialno vprašanje« (ibid., 67). K temu razvoju je nedvomno pripomogla formiranost britanskih intelektualcev v specifično britanski gramscijevski smeri ter dejstvo, da so univerzo v Neaplju obiskovali in obiskujejo tudi študenti iz nekdanih italijanskih čezmorskih (afriških) kolonij.

Kljub zgodnji recepciji kulturnih in postkolonialnih študijev v Italiji, je mogoče reči, da se je konceptualni premik pojmovanja kultur in identitet v smeri transkulturacije tako kot drugod po Evropi tudi v tej državi polagoma uveljavil šele v devetdesetih letih. Tako med drugim tudi v Italiji prihaja do postopnega nadomeščanja pojmov »multikulturalnost« in »interkulturalnost« s pojmom »transkulturacija« ali »transkulturalnost«. Hkrati je ta pojem uporabljen v knjigi *The Post-colonial question*, ki jo je Iain Chambers izdal skupaj z Lidio Curti (Chambers & Curti 1996); šele leta 2011 je Lidia Curti izraz »transcultural« izrecno navedla v naslovu prispevka, ki obravnava literaturo migrantk v Italiji. Simptomatičen za prehod k pojmu »transkulturacija« je na primer prispevek Antonine Ardito (2007) o Paulu Freireju, ki je s svojo pedagoško teorijo in prakso bistveno navdihnil postkolonialno izobraževanje: predstavlja ga kot »interkulturalnega pedagoga«, Brazilijo, kjer se je rodil in iz katere je pri svojem raziskovalnem delu izhajal, pa kot »emblematični kraj intertranskulturalnosti« (ibid. 2; poudarek MJP). Tovrstnih »prehodnih« antinomij je v evropski razpravi o konceptih transkulturacije ali »hibridnih kultur« precej. Naj omenimo še odmevno razpravo nemške kulturologinje in literarne teoretičarke Doris Bachmann-Medick (1996) o novih konceptih svetovne književnosti, v kateri se v prid interakcijske odprtosti »kulturnih razlik« ograjuje od pojma multikulturalnosti, vendar še naprej uporablja termine, kot so »interkulturalno napetostno polje«, »interkulturalno razumevanje« ipd., ki jih razlaga v smislu postkolonialnega pojma transkulturacije, ne da bi se na ta pojem kakor koli nanašala. Tudi znamenita knjiga Homija K. Bhabhe *The Location of Culture* je v nemškem prevodu izšla pod simptomatičnim založniškim geslom »Studien zur Inter- und Multikultur / Studies in Inter- and Multiculture« (gl. Bhabha 2000, platnica). Nakazano pojmovno zagato sugerira tudi razprava slovenske sociologinje Mateje Sedmak *Izzivi medkulturalnosti* (2009), ki se konča s poglavjem Kako (multi/inter/trans)kulturalna je prihodnost? Ne glede na pojmovne disonance pa je mogoče reči, da postaja znanstvena analiza, ki se v tej ali drugi obliki navezuje na pojem transkulturacije, tudi v Evropi deležna vse večje pozornosti, kar hkrati sovпада z naraščajočim zanimanjem za postkolonialne študije – vsem zadržkom navkljub.⁶

V določenem smislu je mogoče reči, da ima postkolonializem »globalizirajočo« funkcijo. Predpona »post« v »postkolonial« v tem smislu ne pomeni neki preprosti »potem« v smislu linearne, kronološke progresije – saj bi razprava v tem primeru dejansko zadevala le neposredne učinke kolonialnega gospodstva – temveč pomeni rekonfiguracijo celotnega polja, v katerega se kolonialni diskurz steka (Hall 1996, 247). Šele v tej rekonfiguraciji postane debata o transkulturaciji zanimiva v širšem pomenu besede, saj lahko vključuje tudi fenomene, ki v temeljih spreminjajo sodobni pozni moderni svet. Naj omenimo masovne

mednarodne migracije, še zlasti imigracije v bogate dežele Evrope in severne poloble, globalno cirkulacijo kapitala, blaga, storitev, znakov in informacij, ki vodijo do tega, da postajajo državne meje vse prepustnejše, multiplost etničnih in kulturnih raznolikosti pa vse bolj prisotna, očitna in občutena, kar velja še zlasti za Evropo.

3.1 Wolfgang Welsch: Kaj je pravzaprav transkulturnost?

Ko je nemški filozof Wolfgang Welsch pred več kot dvajsetimi leti začel razvijati koncept transkulturnosti, ki ga je nato izdal še v več razširjenih in tematsko prirojenih različicah ter prevodih (gl. npr. 1992a, 1992b, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2010, 2011), ga je pri tem pogojeval vtis, da tradicionalno pojmovanje kulture ne odgovarja več radikalno spreminjajoči se družbeni realnosti. Zdelo se mu je, da imajo sodobne kulture drugo obliko od tiste, ki jo še vedno zagovarjajo ali sugerirajo utečeni pojmi kulture. »Zato je veljalo izdelati novo koncepcijo 'kulture'. 'Transkulturnost' hoče ustrezati današnjim kulturnim razmeram« (Welsch 2011, 295). Takšen postopek je bil vnaprej postavljen pred zahtevo, da prejšnje pomene kulture prevaja v današnje razumevanje. Začel se je torej kot re-definicija nereflektiranega prenašanja terminologije, ki jo je proti koncu 18. stoletja konceptualiziral Johann Gottfried Herder in se je nato trdno zasedla v nacionalnih imaginarijih srednjeevropskih držav, tako trdno, da mnogi z njo še vedno soglašajo. Herder, tako Welsch (1997, 68; gl. tudi Welsch 2011, 297), predpostavlja kulturo kot pojav z izrazito tendenco k unifikaciji (kultura homogenizira življenje nacije, oblikuje jo v individualno enoto), etnični konsolidaciji (kultura je vedno kultura nacije [= naroda] v pomenu ljudstva; temelji na ideji o »*Volksgeistu*«) ter separaciji (kultura nacije je organizirana na podlagi samonikle razločevalne pozicije, kar zagotavlja razmejitve od drugih kultur in nacij).

Herder si je kulturo zamišljal kot vase zaprto kroglo, ki ostaja zaokrožena tudi s teritorialno in z jezikovno razširitvijo nekega naroda (Welsch 1997, 68). Čeprav so v Franciji zasnovali model nacije v ograditvi od tistega, ki ga običajno povezujemo z nemškim, s herderjanskim ali z etničnim, se je tudi tam oblikovalo razumevanje kulture, tesno vezano na predstavo posebne človeške skupine, ki ima skupni geografski teritorij, skupno določeno zgodovino, jezik in tradicijo. Doris Bachmann-Medick (1996, 263, 270–271) govori temu ustrezno o trdovratnem ohranjanju »evrocentričnih 'zemljevidov'«, v katerih kulture slej ko prej odgovarjajo med seboj razmejenim nacijam oziroma *nacionalnim* državam, pa čeprav je družbena stvarnost že zdavnaj »post-nacionalna«.

Wolfgang Welsch večkrat opozarja, da je treba iz tovrstnih diagnoz izpeljati

nujne pojmovne in normativne konsekvence: »Naše kulture *de facto* že zdavnaj nimajo več oblike homogenosti in separacije. Nasprotno, privzele so novo obliko, ki jo označujem za *transkulturno*, ker gre kot samoumevno *skozi* tradicionalne kulturne meje« (Welsch 1997, 71). Ta preobrazba se za Welscha izpričuje kot »nov tip množstva: množstva različnih kultur in življenjskih oblik, od katerih vsaka izhaja iz transkulturnih kombinacij«. Tako znova nastane visoka stopnja kulturne raznolikosti,

[...] le da razlike zdaj ne nastajajo več skozi sobivanje jasno zamejenih kultur (kot pri mozaiku),⁷ temveč se oblikujejo med kulturnimi mrežami, ki imajo nekaj elementov skupnih, a se v drugih razlikujejo, tako da obstajajo med njimi tako sovpadanja kot razlike (ibid., 78).

Te transkulturne mreže dajejo vedeti, da so današnje kulture med seboj tesno povezane in prepletene. »Življenjske oblike se ne končajo na mejah nekdanih posamičnih kultur (dozdevnih nacionalnih kultur), temveč jih presegajo in so prav tako v drugih kulturah« (Welsch 2010, 43).

Welsch v svojih poznejših razpravah opominja tudi na določene paralele med njegovim pojmovanjem transkulturnosti v primerjavi s tistim, ki ga je leta 1940 vpeljal Fernando Ortiz (naj spomnimo, da Welsch ob vpeljavi pojma transkulturnost v nemški, če ne kar evropski znanstveni diskurz, pojma transkulturnosti še ni poznal). In to z namenom, da bi predočil, da je predpostavka o uniformiranju kultur, ki naj bi ga povzročil proces globalizacije, »kvečjemu površna diagnoza« (Welsch 2010, 59–60). Drugače od Ortizovega koncepta transkulturnosti je poudarek Welschovega koncepta transkulturnosti fokusiran bolj na mikroraven posameznika kot na družbeno makroraven. To ni naključje, saj sta transkulturnost oziroma transkulturnost podvrženi radikalni zgodovinski, kar pomeni, da sta stalno v spreminjanju in transformaciji (končnica »-acija« to dinamičnost nedvomno bolje ponazarja kot pa statična končnica »-nost«). Razprave o transkulturnosti moramo zato umestiti v zgodovinsko specifične procese in prakse. Danes so to predvsem procesi globalizacije ter procesi pospešenih migracij, ki so postali globalni pojav t. i. postkolonialnega sveta in sodoločajo pozno moderno. Ti procesi spodbujajo prepletanje različnih pokolenj, zgodovin in kultur v eni osebi, tako da so ljudje, čeprav navadno nevede, prisiljeni dnevno nihati, posredovati oziroma »prevajati« med posameznimi kulturnimi tradicijami. Posamezniki, ki združujejo v sebi takšne plurivalence, se torej hkrati gibajo v več kulturah; niso usmerjeni zgolj k eni kulturi, ampak znajo posredovati med različnimi kulturami ter na nepričakovan način med seboj prepletati različne kulturne kode.

»Smo kulturni mešanci,« pravi Wolfgang Welsch (2010, 46), in nadaljuje: »[k]ulturna identiteta današnjih posameznikov je 'skrpana/sestavljena' [*patchwork*] identiteta.« Elisabeth Bronfen in Benjamin Marius (1997, 14) pripominjata: »Hibridno je vse, kar nastane iz mešanja tradicijskih linij ali označevalcev, kar zveže različne diskurze in tehnologije, kar se iz-oblikuje iz tehnik kolaža, semplanja in brklarije. V tako hibridiziranih kulturah je nacionalna identiteta lahko le ena od mnogih.« Podobno razmišlja tudi Stuart Hall (1999, 435): »Ljudje, ki pripadajo [...] *kulturam hibridnosti*, so se morali odpovedati sanjam oziroma ambiciji, da bi znova odkrili nekakšno 'izgubljeno' kulturno čistost, etnični absolutizem.« Gre za ugotovitev, o kateri na primer nazorno govorijo študije, ki se s transkulturne perspektive nanašajo na obmejna in druga območja alpsko-jadranskega prostora, ki jih že več stoletij določa raznoterost narodov, jezikov in kultur, ter na transkulturno naravnost njegovih prebivalcev in osebnosti, ki so v njem delovale oziroma v njem še delujejo (gl. npr. Strutz 1993; Borsò & Brohm 2007; Juric Pahor 2008a, 2008b, 2011; Kondric Horvat 2008, 2011; Vavti 2009; Sedmak 2009, 2011; Wintersteiner, Gombos & Gronold, 2010; Milharčič Hladnik 2011; Lunzer 2012).

Čeprav Welsch poudarja, da je v času globalizacije transkulturnost dosegla novo kakovost, ki je v svetovnem merilu močnejša kot kdaj koli prej, vendarle priznava, da zgodovinsko »ni povsem nova«, še več, da je bila tudi v preteklosti »dosti prej pravilo« kot izjema (Welsch 2010, 50; 1997, 74). Naj v tem kontekstu omenimo francoskega renesančnega humanista, pisatelja in filozofa Michela de Montaigna (1533–1592), ki se je družil z različnimi ljudmi in je ob srečevanju z njimi ter drugimi kulturami že zgodaj dobil občutek različnosti sveta – da je vsak posameznik drugačen in da obstaja veliko različnih pogledov na svet. Leta 1580 je v svojih *Esejih* zapisal:

Svoji duši dajem zdaj ta, zdaj oni obraz, pač glede na to, na katero stran se obrnem. Če raznoliko govorim o sebi, potem zato, ker se vidim raznolikoga. V sebi najdem vsa protislovja v taki obliki, kot izhajajo iz okoliščin ... Nič takega, kar bi držalo kot pribito, nič enoznačnega in trdnega ne morem izreči o sebi, nič takega, kar bi lahko izrazil brez 'če in potem' ... Vsi obstajamo le iz barvitih krp, ki tako rahlo in ohlapno ležijo druga na drugi, da vsak hip katera od njih zafrfota, tako kot se ji zazdi; zato je med nami in v nas prav toliko razlik kot med nami in drugimi (Montaigne, cit. v Nastran Ule 2000, 35).

Tudi pisatelj, lingvist, novinar, politični utopist in vidna osebnost italijanskega risorgimenta, Niccolò Tommaseo, ki se je rodil leta 1802 v Šibeniku, umrl pa je leta 1874 v Firencah, izstopa po svoji hibridni identiteti, ki je sad različnih življenjskih izkušenj in transkulturnih kombinacij. Renate Lunzer ga opredeljuje kot Italohrvata z mnogoplastnimi »vmesnimi eksistencami«, ki pa je – še zlasti v svojih mlajših letih – sledil simbolni interpelaciji italijanske kulture, in sicer

tako, da se je »discipliniral in uravnaval v Italijana, pa čeprav je ostal ironični ostanek: *almost the same, but not quite*«⁸ (ibid., 185). Tej monokavzalni in omejevalni drži se je Tommaseo v svojem poznejšem življenju zavestno odrekel. Ta preobrat so spodbudili očitki vesti ob smrti njegove matere Caterine Kevesić, katere (slovanski in dozdevno manjvredni) jezik je zatajil (ibid., 189). Kmalu nato ji je posvetil elegijo v dalmatinski ikavski različici, ki so ji sledile Iskrice, 33 kratkih liričnih proznih tekstov, v katerih odstira pogled v kontroveržno človekovo notranjost in se ogreva za »bratstvo narodov« brez nacionalnega in etnično-socialnega zatiranja. Kot politik risorgimenta v nenehnem eksilu (Francija, Korzika, kjer je prišel v stik s poljskimi eksilanti, različni kraji v Italiji, ki so se tedaj od pokrajine do pokrajine precej razlikovali) je Tommaseo polagoma razvil izostren čut za pojav *peregrinatio* v povezavi s transkulturnostjo, ki »meri na kulture s sposobnostjo povezovanja in prehajanja ob hkratnem izogibanju nevarnosti homogenizacije in uniformizacije. Kulturna raznolikost se pojavi na nov način, bolj kot transkulturna mešanica kakor pa kot sopostavljanje jasno zamejenih kultur« (Welsch 2001, 59). To se kaže tudi v tem, da se je Tommaseo imel za izobčenca iz lastne domovine (opiše jo kot deželo, v kateri so živeli ljudje različnih ver in različnih običajev), toda prav zato za nekoga, ki je lahko postal sopripadnik več nacij⁹ (Lunzer 2012, 195).

Večstoletno tradicijo transkulturnosti zagovorniki tradicionalnega kulturnega koncepta kaj radi spregledajo, da bi namesto tega kot obvezno razglasili fikcijo homogenih nacionalnih kultur, ki se je začela uveljavljati šele v 19. stoletju (Welsch 2010, 50; 1997, 74). Gre za pomembno ugotovitev, ki pa jo – vsaj tako kaže – kljub pomislekom »spregleda« sam Welsch, in sicer tedaj, ko se ozira v nacionalno preteklost in na tedanji odnos do (nacionalne) kulture. Koncept transkulturnosti, bi lahko odgovorili, ni samo opis novih ali »ne povsem novih« kulturnih pojavov, temveč – bolj načelno – nov, sodoben pogled na »kulturo«, ki bi ga morali dosledno uporabiti tudi takrat, ko se nanašamo na čas naciotvornosti ali na diskurz nacionalizma.

Stuart Hall (1999, 414–424) je oblikovanje nacionalnih kulturnih identitet prepričljivo zaobjel kot proces hibridizacije, v katerem so bili heterogeni etnični, kulturni, jezikovni in regionalni elementi nasilno združeni v neko naključno, arbitrarno in disonančno enoto; pozaba teh nasilnih izvorov nacije je bila, tako Hall v navezavi na Ernesta Renana, ključni dejavnik nastajanja nacije in razširitve »nacionalne zavesti« med široke plasti prebivalstva. Implicitno pa je nasilje vključeno v samo nastajanje in perpetuiranje nacije, ki je pri Stuartu Hallu – kot tudi pri Homiju K. Bhabhi (1990a, 2007a [1994]) – lahko le imaginativna in posredovana preko naracije ali diskurza.¹⁰ Temelji na monološkem principu, ki totalizira ljudstvo in dela nacionalno voljo enotno, ali z drugimi besedami: *enemu*

označevalcu je pripisana funkcija reprezentiranja subjekta (mesta vpisa) za vse preostale (ki tako postanejo »vsi«, tj. totalizirani). Hall in Bhabha vztrajata, da nacije oziroma nacionalne kulture ne bi smeli misliti kot nekaj enotnega ali totaliziranega, temveč jih razkrinkati kot diskurzivni konstrukt, ujet v zaporedje zgodovinskih trenutkov. Cilj teorije diskurza v smislu prej že prikazane Derridajeve dekonstrukcije nadalje je, da subvertira predstavo »polarnosti vnaprej zamišljene samoporajajoče se nacije 'po sebi' in zunanjih drugih nacij« (Bhabha 2007a, 260), kar pa velja tudi za idejo o nacionalnem ali kulturnem stiku, v katerem naj bi vse v dialog vpletene strani ohranjale svojo jasno prepoznavno identiteto. Bhabha (1995, 207) pravi: »Kulture niso bile nikdar enotne same v sebi, niti preprosto dualistične v razmerju sebstva do drugega.« Raziskovalno zanimanje Bhabhe velja razlikam, ki obstajajo znotraj vsake nacije/kulture. Če temu ustrezno govori o 'kulturni razliki' (*cultural differences*), potem meni »notranjo razliko«, ki je imanentna vsakemu kulturnemu izreku (Bronfen & Marius 1997, 12). Bhabha prenese idejo »cepitve subjekta«, torej neizbežne konfrontacije subjekta s svojo lastno notranjo diferenco, na nacijo in kulturo.

'Zaprečeno sebstvo nacije' [*the barred nation It/Self*], odtujeno od svojega večnega samoporajanja, postane liminalni prostor označevanja, ki je navznoter označen z manjšinskimi diskurzi, s heterogenimi zgodovinami nasprotujočih si ljudstev, z antagonističnimi avtoritetami in napetimi območji kulturnih razlik (Bhabha 2007a, 260).

Pomenljivo je, da kulturno hibridnost tudi drugi teoretiki ne razumejo več kot posebne značilnosti neke specifične kulture, temveč kot temeljno karakteristiko vsake kulture, torej tudi nacionalne kulture. Stuart Hall (1999, 422) poudarja, da so »[v]se moderne nacije kulturno hibridne«. Bernd Schulte (1997, 245) govori o »normalnosti hibridnih kultur [...], ki so jim v zgodovini vselej stale nasproti le navidezno homogene in stabilne kulture kot konstruirana izjemna stanja«. Tudi Bernhard Waldenfels (1997, 157) pravi: »Drugi govorijo vedno že iz mene, ko govorim drugim. Na začetku je mešanica, ne čistost. Prepostavka o genuini čistosti rase ali kulture izvira iz blodne ideje čistosti.« Wolfgang Welsch se v eni od svojih najnovejših razprav o transkulturnosti takole navezuje na Edwarda Saida: »Edward Said ima prav, ko pravi: 'Vse kulture so hibridne; nobena ni čista; nobena ni identična z nekim 'čistim' ljudstvom; nobena ne sestoji iz homogenega tkiva'« (Said cit. v Welsch 2010, 51).

Če se je Welschu še pred nedavnim očitalo, da v svoj teoretski model transkulturnosti ne vključuje vidika oblasti in neenake porazdelitve moči v različnih transkulturnih strukturah, velja opozoriti, da je Welsch do te kritike medtem zavzel jasno stališče. Transkulturnost se po njegovem ne odigrava v brezoblastnem prostoru (gl. Welsch 2010, 53–54). Nasprotno, gonilne sile, ki

na makroravni povzročajo transkulturacijo, so po njegovem predvsem procesi moči. Welsch omenja v prvi vrsti kapitalistično ekonomijo s svojim globalnim kopičenjem materialnih in humanih resursov, prerazporeditvijo razmerja med bogatimi in revnimi ter s krepitevijo migracijskih gibanj.

Oblikovanje identitet posameznikov se torej dogaja v prostoru, ki ga označujejo številne disparitete in omejitve, pa tudi prisila, stiska in revščina. Nikakor ni tako, da bi posamezniki elemente svoje identitetne pahljače tako rekoč svobodno izbirali in sestavljali. Nasprotno, podvrženi so številnim omejitvam in zunanjim pritiskom (ibid.).

4. Kulturna hibridnost in vstop v »tretji prostor«

Topika (kulturne) hibridnosti je v diskurzu današnje humanistike in družboslovja vseprisotna, kar opozarja, da gre za temo, ki jo občutimo kot relevantno. Tako kot pojem transkulturnosti velja tudi pojem hibridnosti za enega med ključnimi termini postkolonialnih študijev (Ashcroft idr. 2007 [1998], 108–111). Oba pojma sta tesno med seboj povezana in v marsičem neločljivo spojena, tako da se ju včasih uporablja sinonimno. Pomenljivo je, da se je tudi pojem hibridnosti najprej uveljavil v latinskoameriškem diskurzu. V navezavi na pojem *transculturación* (Fernando Ortiz, pozneje Ángel Rama) ga je od srede osemdesetih let razvijal Néstor García Canclini (1995). Prodornost njegovih misli o *culturas híbridas* se kaže na primer v priobčenju enega med njegovimi prispevki (García Canclini 2000) v zborniku *Without Guarantees*, ki so ga Paul Gilroy idr. (2000) izdali v čast Stuartu Hallu. To pa hkrati pomeni, da se je latinskoameriški znanstvenik s svojimi – v Latinski Ameriki zelo cenjenimi in nagrajenimi – prispevki o hibridnosti povzpел tudi v pomembnega referenčnega avtorja britanskih kulturnih študij. Pojem *hibridación* označuje po Garcíi Cancliniju odprte, procesualne strukture, ki so inherentne kulturam in transkulturnim odnosom, ki presegajo geografske, religiozne, etnične, jezikovne, nacionalne in državne meje. Ihab Hassan, ameriški literarni teoretik, rojen v Egiptu, je hibridnost razglasil za razpoznavni znak postmodernizma in postmoderne (Juvan 2006, 11). Hibridnost sodi tako med značilno postkolonialne in značilno postmoderne pojme, »s katerimi je, v nasprotju z binarno logiko in metafizičnim esencializmom, mogoče misliti sobivanje različnih entitet v eni sami, *relacijsko* gibljivi, spremenljivi pojmovni enoti« (ibid.).

Zelo pomembno vlogo za oblikovanje pojma hibridnost ima Bahtinov koncept o jeziku kot hibridni konstrukciji, pri čemer avtor hibridnost deli v dva med seboj ločena dela: v organsko in intencionalno hibridnost. Po tem konceptu

lahko že ena sama jezikovna izjava sestoji iz več »jezikov« (sociolektov), ki prehajajo iz enega v drugega in izrekajo različne resnice. Ta proces poteka pri organski hibridnosti nezavedno ali samodejno in ne vodi do zavestnega soočanja med razlikami in kontrasti znotraj »jezikov«. V nasprotju z organsko hibridnostjo gre pri intencionalni hibridnosti za zavestni preplet »jezikov«, za večglasje ali polifonijo, ki se izpričuje kot dejanje dialoga (gl. Bachtin 1979, 218, 244–255). Paradigmatsko se po Bahtinu intencionalna hibridnost pojavlja v literarnih besedilih, še zlasti romanu, o katerem Bahtin pravi, da je dialoški, ne pa monološki. V nasprotju z monološko stvaritvijo dialoški roman ne dopušča dominantnega ali unitarnega glasu, ki utiša druge glasove, obratno, tendira k polifoniji in subverzivni moči karnevalizma; v narativnem okviru reflektira demokratične in anti-hierarhične vrednote (gl. Bahtin 1982).

Ob Stuartu Hallu, Paulu Gilroyu in Iainu Chambersu se na Bahtinov koncept hibridnosti navezuje tudi García Canclini in Homi K. Bhabha (gl. npr. Bhabha 1994, 142–143, 188–192), ki v svoje analize vključuje tudi Lacanovo psihoanalizo. Prav Bhabha je pojem hibridnost merodajno preoblikoval v transkulturno miselno figuro, tako da velja za tistega teoretika, s katerim je pojem hibridnost zaslovel. Hibridnost za Bhabho ne označuje preprosto nekega procesa ali stanja prepletanja in mešanja, saj se zasnove v »tretjem prostoru«, v katerem hiat med identiteto in »drugstvom« (alteriteto) ali drugačnostjo ni več zasnovan kot multikulturno ali medkulturno so-bivanje v pojmovanju kulture kot omejene, homogene sfere, prav tako ne kot dialektično posredovanje nasprotujočih si sil/strani, katerega rezultat je sinteza, temveč kot nerešljivo medsebojno prepletanje med »enim« in »drugim«: med središčem in obrobjem, zatiralci in zatiranimi, pripadniki večine in pripadniki manjšin, zavestnim in nezavednim. Onkraj čvrste makrostrukturne, skupinske ali posameznikove dominacije nad drugim/i se preko diskontinuiranih pogajanj in prevajanj oblikujejo »hibridne« tvorbe, ki implicirajo priložnost za dekonstruiranje hegemonih pogledov.

»Hibridnost je 'tretji prostor', ki nastajanje drug/ačn/ih pozicij šele omogoča,« pravi Homi K. Bhabha (1990b, 211). S tem daje vedeti, da je hibridnost s »tretjim prostorom« če že ne spojena, pa vsekakor tesno povezana, a tudi, da je ta prostor že v svoji zasnovi dialoški prostor, ki – če bomo Bhabho pozorno – združuje prvenstveno vrednote in glasove pregnanih, razseljenih, marginaliziranih, izkoriščanih, izpostavljenih kolonializmu, rasizmu in nacionalizmu. Bhabha razume »tretji prostor« kot apel proti sovraštvu in klic k »etiki in politiki proksimitete [bližine]«, ki jo Bhabha (2007b, 34) asociira z »odnosom do sosedu«, in sicer v smislu Lévinasove antropološke misli srečanja z drugim (kar pomeni, da smo kot etični subjekti priklicani v bivanje šele preko odgovora, preko prevzemanja odgovornosti [klicu obličja drugega], ki predhodi subjektivnosti).

Temu ustrezno je ta prostor lahko izziv za vnašanje kreativne zadrege, ki omogoča kritiko ali potencialno subverzijo rigidnih hierarhičnih identitetnih konstrukcij in hierarhičnih oblastnih razmer.

Bhabha s Foucaultom predpostavlja, da oblast izhaja iz multiplih, med seboj povezanih oblastnih centrov, ki prečijo vse družbene odnose – družbeno telo in telo posameznika ali posameznice – jih diskurzivno konstituirajo in hkrati nadzirajo. Po Bhabhi se nahajajo »subjekti [...] prek simbolnega razsrediščenja multiplih oblastnih relacij, ki fungirajo tako kot sidrišča kot tudi kot tarče ali kontrahenti, vedno v disproporcionalni bližini poziciji opozicije in oblasti« (Bhabha 1994, 72). Tretji prostor razvije Bhabha s pomočjo različnih metafor in jezikovnih figuracij, kot na primer »liminalni prostor med določanjem identitet« (ibid., 5) ali »stopnišče«, v katerem se zabrišejo binarne kategorizacije, premeščajo polarizacije in vzpostavljajo možnosti hibridne identifikacije (ibid., 7). Bhabov interes se usmerja na procese prevajanja, izpogajanja in povezovanja razlik preko hibridizacije. Rezultat tega so spremenjene vizije in perspektive za vse udeležene. Bhabha govori tudi o 'vmesnih' (*in-between*) prostorih, tranzitnih prostorih, v katerih subjekti živijo svoje svoje dvojne ali večkratne »mejne eksistence« v obliki neke »med«-resničnosti in »med«-časovnosti. V tem prostoru govorijo ljudje »v različnih jezikih iz enega prostora, ki se nahaja 'med' njimi in ki je skupnostni prostor« (Bhabha 1994, 17). Ti vmesni prostori po Bhabhi zakoličijo teren, iz katerega je mogoče izdelati strategije – individualnih ali kolektivnih – identitet, ki pri aktivnem procesu definirati idejo družbe same vodijo k inovativnim krajem sodelovanja in kolizije. »V nastajanju takšnih vmesnih prostorov – preko prekrivanja in 'premikanja' (*displacement*) področij diferenciacije – pride do pogajanja intersubjektivnih in kolektivnih izkušenj 'nacionalne biti' (*nationness*), skupnostnega interesa in kulturnih vrednot« (ibid., 1–2). In to kaj lahko tudi v dramatični inscenaciji.

V intervjuju z Lukasom Wieselbergom, ki ga je Bhabha (2007c) ob svojem obisku na Dunaju in tamkajšnji univerzi dal za avstrijsko radio-televizijo ORF-Science-Chanell, je avtor na zelo nazoren način razložil pojem hibridnosti oziroma hibridizacije:

Moja ideja je bila: Celotna kultura je konstituirana okrog pogajanj in konfliktov. V vseh kulturnih praksah obstaja – včasih dober, včasih slab – poskus etabliranja avtoritete. Celo pri klasični umetnini, kot denimo Brueghelovi slikarji ali Beethovnovi skladbi, gre za etabliranje avtoritete.

Zdaj se postavi vprašanje: Kako deluje človek kot akter, če je lastna možnost delovanja omejena, na primer zaradi tega, ker je izključen in zatiran? Mislim, da obstajajo celo v tej poziciji *underdoga* možnosti obrata naloženih kulturnih avtoritet, da se nekaj od tega

sprejme, drugo zavrne.

S tem postanejo simboli avtoritete hibridizirani in iz tega nastane nekaj samosvojega. Hibridizacija zame ne pomeni preprostega mešanja, temveč strateško in selektivno prisvajanje pomenov, ustvarjanje prostora za akterje, katerih svoboda in enakost sta ogroženi.

Za Bhabho za dokazovanje hibridnosti ni dovolj reči, da je neka oseba »deloma hindujka, deloma kristjanka, deloma pripadnica Parsijev, deloma Avstrijka, deloma Slovenka« (Bhabha 2012, 65–66) – to zanj ni hibridnost. Bhabhi gre prvenstveno za to, kako ti deli stopajo med seboj in z zunanjimi skupnost-tvornimi silami v pogajanje, kako se te interakcije dogajajo (ibid., 66). Hibridizacija je zanj potemtakem proces, gibanje, ki se ne suče okrog multiplih identitet, temveč okrog tega, kako ljudje, ki pripadajo *kulturam hibridnosti* (Hall 1999, 435), nihajo, posredujejo ali prevajajo med raznolikimi kolektivnimi interpelacijami in kulturnimi kodi.

Nedvomno sodijo k tej kategoriji ljudi tudi pripadniki slovenskih manjšin, ki živijo zunaj meja Slovenije, denimo Slovenci v Avstriji ali Slovenci v Italiji. Zanimiva v tem kontekstu je razprava Suzane Pertot (2007), ki se nanaša na transgeneracijski prenos jezika in identitete med tržaškimi Slovenci, pri čemer se navezuje prav na koncept »tretjega prostora« oziroma identitetnih pogajanj, kakor ga je razvil Bhabha. V tej razpravi se avtorica med drugim nanaša tudi na razpad Jugoslavije leta 1991 – države, ki so jo tržaški (in primorski) Slovenci zaradi več kot dve desetletji trajajočega fašističnega in naci-fašističnega preganjanja povezovali z nekakšnim občutjem varnega pristana, ki jim ga je dajalo tudi množično vključevanje v narodnoosvobodilni boj (NOB), po vojni pa upanje, da jim bo življenje v tedanji Sloveniji oziroma Jugoslaviji omogočalo nadaljnjo kontinuiteto, če ne kar nekakšno »odrešitev«. Avtorica to prelomno zgodovinsko situacijo, ki je sovpadala z novo ideološko usmeritvijo,¹¹ ponazori z intervjujskimi izvlečki. Iz njih izhaja, da akt prevajanja »na meji kulture« (Bhabha 1994, 7) – kakor bi lahko tudi opredelili »tretji prostor« – »zahteva srečevanje z 'novostjo', ki ne sodi v kontinuum preteklosti in sedanjosti« (Bhabha 1994, 7). Takšen akt, povezan z občutjem preloma – v našem primeru: ni bilo samo konca Jugoslavije, zmanjkala je tudi pomembna identitetna opcija, ki jo je »zrušila« družbeno realnost – je v številnih primorskih Slovencih evociral zavedanje simbolne produkcije novega dejanja prevajanja. To dejanje po Bhabhi (ibid.) ni omejeno na priklic preteklosti kot družbenega vzroka, ampak preteklost prenavlja. Relacija »preteklost–sedanjost« tako po njegovem postane nujni, ne pa nostalgični del življenja. Intervjujski izvlečki v razpravi Suzane Pertot (2007, 260–261) to opažanje potrjujejo. Opredeljuje jih zaznavna družbenotransformativna zavest, ki ohranja v sebi vzgib, da preteklosti Jugoslavije,

ki je v danem primeru asociirana z NOB, ne gre zanikati ali iz nje odstraniti vsake senčice idealov in želja, ki so bili z njo povezani.

D.: »Jaz sem Slovenec, ni dvoma ... Kar se tiče državljanstva, sem lahko Italijan, ampak sem človek, ki pripada manjšini, slovenski in ... nič družga. [...] Slovinc iz matične domovine, ne ... Ne čutim tega ... in nimam razloga za bit povezan z ... današnjo Slovenijo ... Mislim, da naše korenine so tukaj, so vedno ble in bojo. [...] Z Jugoslavijo bi blo drugače ... je blo drugače, so bili določeni ideali, ki potem po ... enaindevetdesetem letu ... so se spremenili. Mislim, da kot je zame, je tudi za druge, recimo moje letnike al pa še starejše. Mi smo, mislim, še zadnja generacija, ki to občuti« (Pertot 2007, 260).

Z.: »Slovenija gre z velikimi koraki naprej [...] gre po zelo dobri poti naprej.«

Intervjuvarka vpraša g. Z.: »Je žalovanje za bivšo Jugoslavijo mimo?«

Z.: »Svet gre naprej, kot sem rekel poprej, nimaš kaj jokati nazaj ... Ampak, dej, ... tisto ki me moti kakšen krat, ki pozabljajo na svojo zgodovino. To je zelo grdo, bi rekel, to je nespametno, nesmiselno, zato ker če ne bi bla Jugoslavija, ne bi bla, ma je bla. ... je bla« (Pertot 2007, 261).

5. Namesto zaključka

Izkušnje fašizma, nacionalsocializma, genocidov ter povojnih pobojev so prispevale k temu, da si zamišljamo svet, še zlasti pa Srednjo Evropo in kraje, kjer živijo nacionalne in etnične manjšine, prej kot prizorišče totalitarizmov in bojov za meje kakor pa kot kraj srečevanj in preseganj meja. Gre za bistveno spoznanje postkolonialnosti kot diskurza, ki ga opredeljuje težnja po de-totalizaciji in »iskanju prostora dialoškosti, ki obstoja kot potencial« (Alfonso Toro, cit. v Rössner 2003, 105). Poudariti velja, da ta prostor ne meri na konsenzualistično sporazumevanje ali harmonizacijo stališč, temveč na posebno konfiguracijo umskega in čutnega, ki ni preprosto polarizirana ali regulirana, temveč heterogena, konfliktna in nezacelljivo neskladna. Čeprav se dogaja vedno znotraj diskurza, ne vodi v varne vode inteligibilnosti. Bhabhova ideja »tretjega prostora« je, da se v njem nekaj odpira – nekaj še-ne-realiziranega ali še-ne-obstoječega, nekaj, kar omogoča zgraditi dialoško bližino ter »*moment of recognition*« ('moment pripoznanja in prepoznanja') kljub nemalokrat skrajno nasilni in travmatski preteklosti. Verjetno med postkolonialnimi teoretiki ni misleca, ki bi tako vztrajno in pronicljivo kot H. K. Bhabha svojo analitsko energijo usmerjal prav v odkrivanje teh težko razumljivih območij na 'mejni točki' (*liminal point*) človeških eksistenc, da bi z njihovo pomočjo zajel interpersonalne položaje 'vmesnosti' (*in-between*) in »mejnosti« ter raznolike figure multiplih,

razcepljenih in razseljenih identitet. Bhabha se zaveda, da sistemska rešitev teh pojavov ni mogoča, zato je potreben vzajemen dialog posameznikov in skupin. Tako zanj kot tudi za teoretika postkolonializma in postmodernizma (v prispevku je izpostavljena teorija transkulturnosti Wolfganga Welscha) je značilno, da je treba preseči vse »tiranije soglasij«. Sem šteje tudi prizadevanje za radikalno redefiniranje pojmovanja o edinstvenih, homogenih nacionalnih in etničnih identitetah v smislu spoznanj iz teorij o transkulturaciji (transkulturnosti) in hibridizaciji (hibridnosti).

56 Notes

¹ Édouard Glissant si je koncept rizoma sposodil v polju misli, ki sta jo opredelila Gilles Deleuze in Félix Guattari.

² Kolonializem na Jamajki je tesno povezan s trpljenjem sužnjev na obsežnih plantažah sladkornega trsa.

³ Jacques Derrida se je rodil leta 1930 v judovski družini v alžirskem El-Biaru. Že v mladih letih je imel slabe izkušnje z antisemitizmom in bil v konfliktu s kolonialno Francijo.

⁴ Izčrpna razlaga, kako in zakaj je Derrida po slovnični poti 'prišel do pojma *differance*, ki ga slovenimo z 'razlika (s strešico na i), je v knjigi Uroša Grilca (2001, 14–18).

⁵ Izraz »postmodernizem«, ki mu ne moremo odrekati določenega sozvočja s postkolonialno teorijo, opredeljuje, grobo rečeno, intelektualni tok, ki zavrača totalnost univerzalne vednosti, velike zgodovinske pripovedi, trden temelj človeškega obstoja in možnost objektivnega znanja. Postmodernizem dvomi o resnici, enotnosti in razvoju ter nasprotuje tistemu, kar razume kot elitizem v kulturi. Nagiba se h kulturnemu pluralizmu, diskontinuiteti in heterogenosti.

⁶ Zelo očitni in trdovratni so zadržki proti postkolonialnim študijem zlasti v Italiji in v nemškem govornem prostoru. Temu botrujeta predvsem dva razloga: omalovaževanje in skoraj »potlačitev« lastne kolonialne preteklosti ter nepripravljenost, da bi se z njo soočili (Lombardi-Diop & Romeo 2012, Lützel 1998, 22–23). Čeprav se dozdeva, da Italija ni imela znatne kolonialne preteklosti in/ali da je imela kolonizacijo s »človeškim obrazom«, je v resnici tako, da je tudi italijanska država v afriških kolonijah in končno v Italiji sami in nekaterih evropskih državah (zlasti pod okupacijo sil osi) izvajala najhujše zločine (gl. Del Boca 2007). Habsburška monarhija sicer ni bila kolonialna sila v pravnem pomenu besede – vendar so tudi v njej izvajali »notranjo kolonizacijo« (Feichtinger, Prutsch & Csáky 2003), ki je med drugim prizadela vsa območja nekdanje Jugoslavije (ibid.; gl. tudi Jeffs 2007, 485). Podobno kot Italija je tudi Nemško cesarstvo izvajalo genocidne zločine v svojih kolonijah v Afriki (Eckert & Wirz 2002, 373). Njegova politika »*Drang nach Osten*«, ki je v močni meri prizadela zlasti teritorije s slovanskim prebivalstvom, je bila ideološka podlaga za poznejšo nacistično osvajalno in genocidno politiko, ki jo je deloma vodila skupaj s fašistično Italijo. »Je mogoče« – se v navezavi na Hannah Arendt sprašuje Daniel Romuald Bitouh (2012, 169) – »odmišljati postkolonialne teorije v prostoru, ki je trpel in še trpi pod travmami [ne zgolj nacističnih, ampak tudi fašističnih, op. MJP] totalizmov?« V tem sklopu velja tudi opomniti, kar se danes rado pozablja, da se je kolonialne in imperialistične pohode opravičevalo z rasističnimi politikami, manifestirali pa so se v skrajno zatiralskih suženjskih praksah na *okupiranih* ozemljih; v praksah, ki jih lahko označimo za fašistoidne. Prav zato je martiniški pesnik Aimé Césaire »cilje in metode fašizma označil kot prav kolonializem, ki se je vrnil v Evropo« (cit. v Jeffs 2007, 486).

⁷ Prisodobna o mozaiku daje misliti na termin multikulturalnosti, o katerem Welsch (2010, 49–50) meni, da temelji na pojmovanju jasno zamejenih kultur; enako naj bi po Welschu (ibid.) veljalo tudi za pojem interkulturalnosti, saj ta pojem kulture ne razume kot prepleta.

⁸ Rek »*almost the same, but not quite*« je citat Homija K. Bhabhe.

⁹ Mišljene so nacije, ki so se v zgodovini razvijale v sistemu držav, pa tudi nacije, ki so kot potencialne nacionalne države nastajale v sklopu večnacionalnih imperije.

¹⁰ »Nacionalne kulture konstruirajo identitete, s tem da vzpostavljajo pomene 'nacije', s katerimi se lahko identificiramo; vsebovane so v zgodbah, pripovedovanih o naciji, spominih, ki povezujejo

sedanjost s preteklostjo ter predstavah, preko katerih je [nacija] konstruirana« (Hall 1999, 416). V teh »nacionalnih pripovedih« so še posebej poudarjeni izvori (utemeljitveni miti), kontinuiteta, tradicija in brezčasnost (nespremenljivost) (ibid., 416–420).

¹¹ S postkolonialne perspektive je zanimivo, da je bil prelom v času razpada Jugoslavije ter procesov demokratizacije in neodvisnosti Slovenije zaznati tudi v spremembi podobe Afrike, ki je bila deležna posebne raziskovalne pozornosti (gl. Jeffs 2000; Pirc 2010), in držav »tretjega sveta« (gl. Medvešek & Bešter 2010) v slovenskih medijih, učbenikih, pa tudi v širši slovenski javnosti. Jugoslavija vključno s Slovenijo je vse do svojega padca podpirala dekolonizacijska prizadevanja držav (večinoma članic gibanja neuvrščenih, v katerem je Jugoslavija igrala vodilno vlogo), kjer je imela tudi svoje gospodarske interese ter zelo razvejano dopisniško omrežje, ki je omogočalo pozitivno in diferencirano upodabljanje ljudi in teritorijev »tretjega sveta«. Nikolai Jeffs (2000) ugotavlja, da je ta medijska podoba z umikom novinarske prisotnosti v času razpada Jugoslavije in nacionalne osamosvojitve Slovenije dobila izrazito negativen in rasističen predznak.

58 Literatura

Ardito, A., 2007. Paulo Freire educatore interculturale. *Ricerche di Pedagogia e Didattica* 2 (2007), <http://rpd.unibo.it/article/view/1502/878> (12. avgust 2012).

Ashcroft, B., Griffiths, G. & Tiffin, H. (ur.), 2007 [1998]. *Key Concepts in Post-colonial Studies* (2. izdaja). Routledge, London & New York.

Babka, A. & Posselt, G., 2012. Vorwort. V H. K. Bhabha, *Über kulturelle Hybridität: Tradition und Übersetzung* (ur. A. Babka & G. Posselt). Turia + Kant, Wien, 7–16.

Bachmann-Medick, D., 1996. Multikultur oder kulturelle Differenzen? Neue Konzepte von Weltliteratur und Übersetzung in postkolonialer Perspektive. V D. Bachmann-Medick (ur.) *Kultur als Text: Die anthropologische Wende in der Literaturwissenschaft*. Fischer, Frankfurt a. M., 262–290.

Bachtin, M., 1979. *Die Ästhetik des Wortes*. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M.

Bahtin, M., 1982. *Teorija romana*. Cankarjeva založba, Ljubljana.

Beck, U., 2003. *Kaj je globalizacija? Zmote globalizma – odgovori na globalizacijo*. Krtina, Ljubljana.

Bhabha, H. K., 1990a. Narrating the Nation. V H. K. Bhabha (ur.) *Nation and Narration*, Routledge, London & New York, 1–7.

Bhabha, H. K., 1990b. The Third Space. Interview with Homi Bhabha. V J. Rutherford (ur.) *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference*. Lawrence and Wishart, London, 207–221.

Bhabha, H. K., 1994. *The Location of Culture*. Routledge, London, New York.

Bhabha, H. K., 1996. Culture's In-Between. V S. Hall & P. du Gay (ur.) *Questions of Cultural Identity*. Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 53–60.

Bhabha, H. K., 1995. The Commitment to Theory. V B. Ashcroft, G. Griffiths & H. Tiffin (ur.) *The Postcolonial Studies Reader*. Routledge, London & New

York, 206–209.

Bhabha, H. K., 1997a. Die Frage der Identität. V E. Bronfen, B. Marius & T. Steffen (ur.) *Hybride Kulturen: Beiträge zur anglo- amerikanischen Multikulturalismusdebatte*. Stauffenburg, Tübingen, 97–122.

Bhabha, H. K., 1997b. The Postcolonial Critic. Intervju z Davidom Bennetom in Terry Collits. V P. C. Hogan & L. Pandit (ur.) *Literary India: Comparative Studies in Aesthetics, Colonialism and Culture*. Rawat, New Delhi, 237–254.

Bhabha, H. K., 2000. *Die Verortung von Kultur*. Stauffenburg Verlag, Tübingen.

Bhabha, H. K., 2007a [1994]. DisemiNacija: Čas, naracija in robovi moderne nacije. V N. Jeffs Kje, kdaj, zakaj postkolonialne študije. V N. Jeffs (ur.) *Zbornik postkolonialnih študij*. Krtina, Ljubljana, 249–290.

Bhabha, H. K., 2007b. Grenzen, Differenzen, Übergänge. V A. Günsenheimer (ur.) *Grenzen, Differenzen, Übergänge. Spannungsfelder inter- und transkultureller Kommunikation*. Transcript, Bielefeld, 29–48.

Bhabha, H. K., 2007c. Migration führt zu “hybrider” Gesellschaft. Homi K. Bhabha v intervjuju z Lukasom Wieselbergom, ORF-Science, <http://sciencev1.orf.at/science/news/149988.html> (2. september 2012).

Bhabha, H. K., 2012. *Über kulturelle Hybridität: Tradition und Übersetzung* (ur. A. Babka & G. Posselt). Turia + Kant, Wien.

Bitouh, D. R., 2012. Liminalität, Hybridität und Identität: Zu Joseph Roths Inszenierung der Grenze als Subversion der Metaphysik von Identität. V A. Babka, J. Malle & M. Schmidt (ur.) *Dritte Räume: Homi K. Bhabhas Kulturtheorie: Kritik, Anwendung, Reflexion*. Verlag Turia + Kant, Wien, Berlin, 167–182.

Borsò, V. & Brohm, H. (ur.), 2007. *Transkulturation: Literarische. und mediale Grenzräume im deutsch-italienischen Kulturkontakt*. Transcript, Bielefeld.

Bronfen, E. & Marius, B., 1997. Hybride Kulturen: Einleitung zur anglo-amerikanischen Multikulturalismusdebatte. V E. Bronfen, B. Marius & T. Steffen (ur.) *Hybride Kulturen: Beiträge zur anglo-amerikanischen Multikulturalismusdebatte*. Stauffenburg, Tübingen, 1–29.

Bronfen, E., Marius, B. & Steffen, T. (ur.), 1997. *Hybride Kulturen: Beiträge zur anglo-amerikanischen Multikulturalismusdebatte*. Stauffenburg, Tübingen

Castro Varela, M. D. & M., Dhawan, N., 2005. *Postkoloniale Theorie: Eine kritische Einführung*. Transcript, Bielefeld.

Chambers, I. & Curti, L. (ur.), 1996. *The Post-Colonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons*. Routledge, London.

Chen, K. H., 1996. The Formation of a Diasporic Intellectual: An interview with Stuart Hall. V D. Morley & Chen, K. H. (ur.) *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*. Routledge, London & New York, 486–505.

Cometa, M., 2007. Kulturwissenschaften in Italien: Ein Paradigma. V V. Borsò & H. Brohm (ur.) *Transkulturation: Literarische und mediale Grensräume im deutsch-italienischen Kulturkontakt*. Transcript, Bielefeld, 65–86.

Curti, L., 2011. Transcultural itineraries in women's literature of migration in Italy. *Feminist Review Conference Proceedings* (e79–e92), <http://www.palgrave-journals.com/fr/conf-proceedings/n1s/pdf/fr201126a.pdf> (6. avgust 2012).

Del Boca, A., 2007. *Italijani dobri ljudje?* Mladinska knjiga, Ljubljana.

Derrida, J., 1994. Izbrani spisi. Študentska organizacija Univerze (Knjižna zbirka Krt; 91), Ljubljana.

Eckert, A. & Wirz, A., 2002. Wir nicht, die Anderen auch. Deutschland und der Kolonialismus. V S. Conrad & S. Randeria (ur.) *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus: Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften*. Campus, Frankfurt am Main, 372–392.

Feichtinger, J., Prutsch, U. & Csaky M. (ur.), 2003. *Habsburg Postcolonial: Machtstrukturen und kollektives Gedächtnis*. Studienverlag, Innsbruck.

García Canclini, N., 1995. *Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity*. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

García Canclini, N., 2000. The State of War and the State of Hybridization. V P. Gilroy, L. Grossberg & A. McRobbie (ur.) *Without Guarantees: In Honour of Stuart Hall*. Verso, London & New York, 38–52.

Gilroy, P., Grossberg, L. & McRobbie, A. (ur.), 2000. *Without Guarantees: In Honour of Stuart Hall*. Verso, London & New York.

Glissant, É., 1990. *Poétique de la relation*. Gallimard, Paris.

Glissant, É., 1995. *Introduction à une poétique du diverse*. Gallimard, Paris.

Grilc, U., 2001. *O filozofiji pisave: Na poti k Derridaju*. Društvo za teoretsko psihoanalizo, Ljubljana.

Hall, S., 1992. The Question of Cultural Identity. V S. Hall, D. Held & A. McGrew (ur.) *Modernity and its Futures*. Polity Press, Cambridge, 273–325.

Hall, S., 1994. *Rassismus und kulturelle Identität* (Ausgewählte Schriften 2). Argument-Verlag, Hamburg.

Hall, S., 1996. When was 'the post-colonial'? Thinking at the Limit. V I. Chambers & L. Curti (ur.) *The Post-Colonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons*. Routledge, London, 242–260.

Hall, S., 1999. Kulturelle Identität und Globalisierung. V K. H. Hörning & R. Winter (ur.) *Widerspenstige Kulturen. Cultural Studies als Herausforderung*. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M., 339–441.

Hall, S., 2002. Demokratie, Globalisierung und Differenz. V O. Enwezor, C. Basualdo, U. M. Bauer, S. Ghez, S. Maharaj, M. Nash & O. Zaya *Demokratie als unvollendeter Prozess*. Documenta_11 Plattform 1. Hatje Cantz, Kassel, 21–40.

Jeffs, N., 2000. Podoba Afrike v slovenskih medijih. *Medijska preža* 09, <http://mediawatch.mirovni-institut.si/bilten/seznam/09/mediawatch/> (8. september 2012).

Jeffs, N., 2007. Kje, kdaj, zakaj postkolonialne študije. V N. Jeffs (ur.) *Zbornik postkolonialnih študij*. Krtina, Ljubljana, 461–503.

Jurić Pahor, M., 2008a. Transkulturation und Hybridität im Spiegel der Migration: Das Beispiel Triest. V G. Vorderobermeier & M. Wolf (ur.): »*Meine Sprache grenzt mich ab ...*«: *Transkulturalität und kulturelle Übersetzung im Kontext von Migration*. LIT Verlag, Wien, Münster 2008, 127–146.

Jurić Pahor, M., 2008b. Transkulturnost kot možna raziskovalna paradigma za rekonstrukcijo (več)kulturne podobe panonskega prostora. V *Panonski prostor in ljudje ob dveh tromejah: Zbornik referatov na znanstvenem posvetu v Murski soboti, 9.–11. novembra, 2007*. Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana, 163–173.

Jurić Pahor, M., 2011. Grenzen, Schwellen, Übergänge: Überlegungen zum Alpen-Adria-Raum. V E. Tschernokoshewa & I. Keller (ur.) *Dialogische Begegnungen: Minderheiten–Mehrheiten aus hybridologischer Sicht* (Hybride Welten, 5). Waxmann, Münster, 318–337.

Juvan, M., 2006. Dialogi med »mišljenjem« in »pesništvom« in teoretsko-literarni hibridi = Dialogues between »thinking« and »poetry« and theoretical-literary hybrids. V M. Juvan & J. Kernev-Štrajn (ur.) *Teoretsko-literarni hibridi: O dialogu literature in teorije* (Primerjalna književnost letnik 29, posebna št./special issue). Slovensko društvo za primerjalno književnost, Ljubljana, 9–26, 189–209.

Kondrič Horvat, V., 2008. Transkulturalität der »Schweizer« Autorin Ilma Rakusa. *Acta neophilologica* 41(1–2), 57–64.

Kondrič Horvat, V., 2011. Avstrijski pisatelj Vladimir Vertlib v transkulturnem kontekstu oziroma kako avstrijska je književnost. *Glasnik Slovenske matice* 33, 128–132.

Lamore, J., 1987. Transculturation; Naissance d'un mot. *Vice Versa* 21, 18–19.

Lombardi-Diop, C. & Romeo, C. (ur.), 2012. *Postcolonial Italy: The Colonial Past in Contemporary Culture*. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Lunzer, R., 2012. »Exilant im eigenen Haus, aber Mitbürger mehrerer Nationen«: Der Italokroate Niccolò Tommaseo. V A. Babka, J. Malle & M. Schmidt (ur.) *Dritte Räume: Homi K. Bhabhas Kulturtheorie. Kritik. Anwendung. Reflexion*. Verlag Turia + Kant, Wien, Berlin, 183–196.

Lützel, P. M. (ur.), 1998. *Schriftsteller und »Dritte Welt«: Studien zum postkolonialen Blick*. Stauffenburg Verlag, Tübingen.

Medvešek, M. & Bešter, R. (ur.), 2010. *Državljeni tretjih držav ali tretjerazredni državljani?: Integracija državljanov tretjih držav v Sloveniji*. Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana.

Mikolič, V. & Kozak, K. J., 2008. *Medkulturni dialog kot temeljna vrednota EU / Intercultural dialogue as the fundamental value of the EU*. Založba Annales, Koper.

Milharčič Hladnik, M., 2011: IN – IN: *Življenjske zgodbe o sestavljenih identitetah*. Založba ZRC SAZU, Ljubljana.

Mitchell, W. J. T. & Bhabha, H. K., 2009. »Prevedeni prevodilac« (intervju s Homi Bhabhom vođen marta 1995). *Zeničke sveske: Časopis za društvenu fenomenologiju i kulturnu dijalogiku* 10, 103–128.

Nastran Ule, M., 2000. *Sodobne identitete v vrtincu diskurzov*. Znanstveno in publicistično središče, Ljubljana.

Ortiz, F., 1987 [1940]. *Tabak und Zucker: Ein kubanischer Disput*. Insel, Frankfurt am Main.

Pertot, S., 2007. V imenu očeta: Medgeneracijski prenos slovenskega jezika in identitete po moški liniji. V M. Košuta (ur.) *Živeti mejo*. Slavistično društvo, Trst, 255–266.

Pirc, J., 2010. Misrepresentations of Africa in Contemporary Slovene School Textbooks. *Razprave in gradivo, Revija za narodnostna vprašanja / Treatises and Documents, Journal of Ethnic Studies* 63, 124–149.

Prakash, G., 1992. Post-colonial Criticism and Indian Historiography. *Social Text* 31/32, 8–19.

Rössner, M., 2003. Mestizaje und hybride Kulturen, Lateinamerika und die Habsburger-Monarchie in der Perspektive der Postcolonial Studies. V J. Feichtinger, U. Prutsch & M. Csaky (ur.). *Habsburg Postcolonial: Machtstrukturen und kollektives Gedächtnis*. Studienverlag, Innsbruck, 97–109.

Said, E. W., 1997. Intellektuelles Exil: Vertriebene und Grenzgänger. V E. Said *Götter, die keine sind. Der Ort des Intellektuellen*. Berlin Verlag, Berlin.

Schulte, B., 1997. Kulturelle Hybridität: Kulturanthropologische Anmerkungen zu einem "Normalzustand". I. Schneider & C. W. Thomsen (ur.) *Hybridkultur: Medien, Netze, Künste*. Wienand Verlag, Köln, 245–263.

Sedmak, M., 2009. Izzivi medkulturnosti. V M. Sedmak (ur.) *Podobe obmejnosti*. Založba Annales, Koper, 13–35.

Sedmak, M., 2011. Kultura mešanosti. Družbeno in politično prepoznavanje socialne kategorije mešanih ljudi. *Annales. Series historia et sociologia* 21(2), 261–274.

Spitta, S., 1995. *Between Two Waters: Narratives of Transculturation in Latin America*. Rice University Press, Houston.

Strutz, J., 1993. Istrska polifonija – večjezičnost in literatura. *Annales. Series historia et sociologia* 8(1), 187–197.

Supik, L., 2005. *Dezentrierte Positionierung: Stuart Halls Konzept der Identitätspolitik*. Transcript, Bielefeld.

Vavti, S., 2009. »Wir haben alles in uns ...«: Identifikationen in der Sprachenvielfalt – Beispiele aus Südkärnten (Österreich) und dem Kanaltal (Italien). Peter Lang, Frankfurt a. M., Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford & Wien.

Waldenfels, B., 1997. *Topographie des Fremden*. Surkamp, Frankfurt a. M.

Welsch, W., 1992a. Transkulturalität – Lebensformen nach der Auflösung von Kulturen. *Information Philosophie* zv. 2, 5–20.

Welsch, W., 1992b. Transculturalità: Forme di vita dopo la dissoluzione delle culture. *Paradigmi. Rivista di critica filosofica* (posebna izdaja: Dialogo interculturale ed eurocentrismo) X(30), 665–689.

Welsch, W., 1997. Transkulturalität: Zur veränderten Verfassung heutiger Kulturen. V I. Schneider und Ch. W. Thomsen (ur.) *Hybridkultur: Medien. Netze. Künste*. Wienand Verlag, Köln, 67–90.

Welsch, W., 1999. Transculturality – the Puzzling Form of Cultures Today. V U. M. Featherstone & S. Lash (ur.) *Spaces of Culture: City, Nation, World*. Sage, London, 194–213, <http://www2.uni-jena.de/welsch/Papers/transcultSociety.html> (15. avgust 2012).

Welsch, W., 2001. Transculturality: The Changing Forms of Cultures Today. *Filozofski Vestnik* XXII(2), 59–86.

Welsch, W., 2010. Was ist eigentlich Transkulturalität? V L. Darowska & C. Machold (ur.) *Hochschule als transkultureller Raum? Beiträge zu Kultur, Bildung und Differenz*. Transcript, Bielefeld, 39–66.

Welsch, W., 2011. Transkulturalität – neue und alte Gemeinsamkeiten. V W. Welsch *Immer nur der Mensch? Entwürfe zu einer anderen Anthropologie*. Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 294–322.

Williams, P. & Chrisman, L., 1994. *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader*. Columbia University Press, New York.

Wintersteiner, W., Gombos, G. & Gronold, D. (ur.), 2010. *Grenzverkehr/ungen. Mehrsprachigkeit, Transkulturalität und Bildung im Alpen-Adria-Raum*. Wieser Verlag, Klagenfurt/Celovec.

Young, R., 1995. *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race*. Routledge, London & New York.

Zakrajšek, K., 2007. Postkolonialni dialogi. *Primerjalna književnost* 35(227), 19–35.

MARIANNA KOSIC

Identity Matters: Strategies for Coping with Ethnic Identity Threats among Slovene Minority Adolescents in Italy

The article explores how Slovene minority adolescents in Italy experience and respond to ethnic identity threats, focusing on their coping strategies. These include the active construction of self-image through plural complex identity, seeking and maintaining distinctiveness, blending in and identity enhancement. Qualitative thematic analysis was performed on 35 written narratives, studied through the interpretative lens of social identity perspectives and identity process theory. Results are consistent with the theoretical framework. In the conclusions the author reflects on some practical implications of her findings.

Keywords: identity motives, ethnic identity threats, coping strategies, Slovene minority adolescents in Italy

Identitetni pomeni: strategije obvladovanja groženj etnični identiteti med adolescenti slovenske manjšine v Italiji

Članek preučuje, kako mladostniki slovenske manjšine v Italiji doživljajo in se odzivajo na grožnje etnični identiteti, s poudarkom na njihovih strategijah spoprijemanja z le temi, na aktivni gradnji samopodobe preko večplastne pluralne identitete, na iskanje in ohranjanje posebnosti, mešanje in poudarjanje pozitivnih plati identitete. Kvalitativna tematska analiza je bila opravljena na 35 pisnih pripovedih v interpretativni luči perspektiv družbene identitete in teorije o procesu identitete. Rezultati so v skladu s teoretičnim okvirom. Avtorica v zaključkih posreduje razmišljanja o nekaterih praktičnih pomenih izsledkov.

Ključne besede: identitetni motivi, grožnje etnični identiteti, strategije spoprijemanja, mladostniki slovenske manjšine v Italiji

Correspondence address: Marianna Kosc, SLORI – Slovene Research Institute / Slovenski raziskovalni inštitut / Istituto di ricerche sloveno, Ul. / Via Beccaria 6, 34133 Trst / Trieste, Italia, e-mail: marianna.kosc@gmail.com

1. Introduction

The autonomous region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia in the North-Eastern part of Italy bordering on Slovenia is the context of the research presented in this paper. It is a territory that hosts a multitude of ethno-linguistic groups: Italians, Slovenes, Friulians, Germans and many other communities, including new ethnic minorities, e.g. Serbs, Croats, Albanians, Romanians, Chinese, Bengali, etc. The wide diversity in the population that this area offers implies that some inhabitants are more or less easily identifiable as different from the majority group because of their physical appearance, language, religious belief, cultural practices or other features that might or might not be visible and easily identifiable markers of their identities. In the focus of this study, specifically, is the Slovene minority group, an autochthonous national minority group that was historically present on the territory and is as such recognized by the Italian state by the law n. 482/1999.

Despite formal legal protection of minority rights, it has been largely documented in social psychology research that being a minority group member makes it more likely to be the target of discrimination and rejection. Belonging to a minority group can, therefore, represent a threat to a positive social identity, especially in young people, and push them to adopt several coping strategies to counteract their devalued social identity, i.e., the identity with attributes that are perceived to be not fully accepted in the societal context where they live.

There is increasing concern for knowledge about, and an understanding of the depth and breadth of, the above mentioned issues. The formation of a healthy ethnic identity is in fact an important developmental life task during adolescence, and is more salient and complex for adolescents belonging to ethnic minority groups (Phinney 1989, 1990; Phinney & Alipuria 1990; Crocetti et al. 2008a, 2009b). How identities are constructed, kept alive and negotiated matters, since identity construction shapes our experiences in everyday life and is significantly linked to the ways in which we internalize practices, knowledge, beliefs and feelings about the world and about ourselves, and how we interact and behave with others in the societal context.

Given these premises, the article aims to present and discuss some of the coping strategies reported by Slovene minority adolescents in response to a perceived ethnic identity threat, qualitatively analyzing selected written narratives through the lens of social identity perspective combined with inspirations from identity process theory.

68 2. Theoretical Framework

Social identity perspective (e.g., Tajfel & Turner 1979, 1986; Hogg 2003, 2005; Hogg et al. 2007), also termed social identity theory and self-categorization theory, describes why and how individuals identify with particular social groups, as well as the various ways in which social identities influence behaviour and perceptions. In recent years identity process theory (e.g. Breakwell 1983, 1986, 1988; Vignoles et al. 2000, 2002, 2006; Vignoles 2011) has further explained how identity stems from psychological processes and manifests itself through thought, action and affect in relation to the representations and attributions in a particular social context as well. Following these lines of research, scholars have identified several important identity motives that shape identity construction, including pressures for self-esteem, distinctiveness, continuity, meaning, efficacy, and belonging (e.g., Vignoles et al. 2006; Vignoles 2011). These identity principles guide identity processes of assimilation and accommodation in defining desirable states for the structure of identity (Breakwell 2010, 6.4).

In brief: social categorization is a fundamental cognitive adaptive process that enables us to organize and categorize our daily experiences in the world, accentuating the similarities within and differences between categories (Hogg & Abrams 1988, cited in Stets & Burke 2000, 225–226). Any trait that is meaningful to a person or a group can become the foundation of a social identity, defined as the knowledge that one belongs to a social group or category. The process of social categorization at the basis of identity formation is generally evaluative in nature: it goes hand in hand with intergroup bias, that is, with in-group favoritism and intergroup discrimination. In social identity theory it is argued that in order to have good self-esteem, once we identify with a certain social category, we tend to highlight the positive attributes of the in-group, the one that we are members of, and differentiate ourselves from others, members of the out-group, who do not share these characteristics (Turner et al. 1987; Hogg & Abrams 1988, cited in Stets & Burke 2000, 232; Hewstone et al. 2002, 579–580). According to Tajfel (1978, 74–75), these comparative processes, and particularly the negative evaluations that result from them, can become problematic, precisely because people generally need and strive to obtain a positive self-image in their interactions with others.

Like all other forms of social identities, ethnic identity is self-identification derived from group membership (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel & Turner 1979). Rotherham and Phinney (1987, 13) define ethnic identity as a “sense of belonging to an ethnic group, and the part of one's thinking, perceptions, feelings and behaviour that is due to ethnic group membership”. It develops as individuals categorize and compare

themselves to others within an environment and negotiate their identification through communication (Yep 2002, cited in Albert et al. 2005, 109).

Generally, compared to dominant group members, minority group members are more likely to experience identity threats in the form of prejudice, discrimination, racism, stigma, institutional barriers or negative attitudes of the mainstream society towards them.

Identification with a group and an ethnic category ideally imbues the person with “psychological security, a feeling of belonging” (Aydingün 2002, 191), but the subjective perception of possessing an ethnic identity with characteristics that are negatively evaluated in one’s context or that are not recognized as we would wish by others, is experienced as a threat by the individual and can have negative effects, “challenging continuity, distinctiveness or self-esteem” (Breakwell 1986, 51); these lead, inter alia, to defensiveness, passivity, in-group hostility, and identification with the oppressor (Allport 1954; Jaspal & Cinnirella 2012). Identity process theory outlines both the conditions in which identity processes are successful and situations when an identity is threatened and coping strategies are consequently enacted, i.e., any activity or thought that can, consciously or not, remove or ameliorate a threat (Breakwell 1986, 79) which occurs “when the processes of assimilation-accommodation are unable, for some reason, to comply with the principles of continuity, distinctiveness, self-efficacy, and self-esteem” (Breakwell 2010, 6.5).

As Jaspal and Cinnirella noted (2012, 504), ethnic identity is acknowledged as an important dimension of the self as it has significant implications for a wide range of phenomena, including psychological and physical well-being (Phinney et al. 2001), but also linguistic behavior (Jaspal & Coyle 2009, 2010) and intergroup relations (Verkuyten 2005). It is therefore important to research these issues in the young minority population.

3. Method

3.1 Participants: Slovene Minority Adolescents in Italy

The study used a convenience sample of 35 secondary school students, self-identified as Slovene minority members, attending years 4 and 5 in two Slovene lyceums in Trieste and Gorizia, two border cities in the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region in the North-Eastern part of Italy. They were 16–19 years old, except three

who were older. Participants constitute a homogeneous sample, a definite group for whom the research question is significant: they were therefore deliberately selected for sharing the experience of a particular condition and considered able to offer insights and a meaningful perspective from their shared experiences.

3.2 Procedure and Methodology: Qualitative Thematic Analysis

Participation in the research was voluntary. In cooperation with teachers of Italian and Slovene language, participants were invited to write, as a school assignment, a text on their ethnic identity and/or perceived intergroup relations on the Italian-Slovene borderland in everyday life situations. In order to elicit a sharing of experiences, understandings, stories, opinions and feelings from participants, subsidiary cues and prompts were used (e.g., a list of associated words and possible themes for discussion). The written narratives were given to the researcher in an anonymous format. Excerpts were originally written in Italian or Slovene. The author translated them into English for the purpose of this paper.

The data set consists of all instances across the entire data corpus that had some relevance to ethnic identity threat and related coping strategies. The data were analyzed using qualitative, mostly theoretically driven or “top-down” thematic analysis following the approach outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006, 88), but inspired by interpretative phenomenological analysis as well (Smith et al. 1999; Smith & Osborn 2003, Smith et al. 2009). The choice of this qualitative methodology serves the research aims of understanding in depth and representing young people’s everyday subjective experience of reality and related actions as they live through particular situations (Elliott et al. 1999, 216), and at the same time validates some recent theories in the field of social psychology.

After collecting the data, the author familiarized herself with all aspects of the content by actively and repeatedly reading the texts, searching for meanings and patterns. Coding was done manually, writing notes on the margins, using highlighters of different colours and a set of “post-it” notes to group segments of similar data and to combine them in a broader theme. During each reading emerging themes were noted and coded in the left margin, organizing the data into meaningful groups. In a subsequent phase, the right margin was used to capture superordinate themes, and to identify possible patterns and preliminary interpretations. Conflicts between different concepts within the same texts and between different texts were also examined.

The discussion that follows is essentially “top-down”, derived from the theoretical perspectives examined and seeded with verbatim extracts from the data that present a “grounding in examples”.

3.3 Methodological Limitations of the Study

The findings of this study should be considered with an awareness of some methodological limitations. First, the reflections expressed in the narratives of adolescents are bound by the limits of their ability to verbalize and articulate in words their experiences. Secondly, the students' willingness to share their thoughts with the researcher might have been affected by the procedure selected for collecting qualitative data. Perceived threats to one's ethnic identity and the strategies adopted to counteract them are sensitive issues. Given the fact that students were asked to pen their feelings and experiences as a school homework assignment, and considering that the texts were collected by their professors, the researcher is aware that some participants might have not felt free enough to express themselves authentically, without fear of being judged or evaluated for the ideas exposed. Nevertheless, even though the students were also given the possibility to submit their texts anonymously on-line via an internet platform, almost all opted to hand the texts to their teachers. We can therefore assume that discomfort was minimal or even non-existent. Perception of the researcher's neutrality and the ethnic similarity between the researcher and the participants may have been crucial to ensure trust, and consequently, the validity of the data. Thirdly, generalizations from this sample to the wider population should be made with caution. The sample is very probably not representative of all Slovene minority adolescents. Despite this, the complementary qualitative study conducted permits us to deepen our understanding of the way coping strategies may be used in response to ethnic identity threats in a minority group.

4. Results: Coping with Ethnic Identity Threats

In this section we present a selection of data extracts that capture the recurring themes that emerged in this study, i.e., those coping strategies used to deal with perceived or potential ethnic identity threats, and specifically those that were the most prevalent in the group sample across the individual narratives. Four main superordinate themes are reported, all correlated one with another and not mutually exclusive, namely: 1) “active construction of self-image through complex identity”, 2) “maintaining distinctiveness”, 3) “blending in”, and 4) “self-enhancement”. The verbatim texts in the original Slovene or Italian language are in the notes.

72 4.1 Active Construction of Self-Image through Complex Identity

Individuals and groups actively construct and maintain their images of themselves. As Breakwell (2010, 6.5) stated, “the person has agency in creating identity.”

I am a son of this land, a Goričan [inhabitant of Gorizia]. Half Slovene, half Friulian, but I cannot say I am not Italian either. A human being is and has the right to be what s/he feels, based on national values that s/he received in the cradle or that were discovered later in life.¹

In this extract the difficulty of choosing a single label for self-categorization and identification is evident: the adoption of a single label or a reductive category would not fit the subjective sense of belonging, which is, rather, a multiple one, comprising a mixture of different degrees of ethnic, national and local territorial dimensions. The territorial dimension appears to be the one that grounds the identity. It is expressed in more affective terms, “*I am a son of this land*”, emphasizing the ties to the land, denoting a familial relationship with it as a child with qualities similar to the “motherland/fatherland”, or more rationally seeing oneself as its by-product, logically relating to the intrinsic linguistic diversity of the territory that is considered home and that by its own nature makes it more likely for its inhabitants to develop (by choice, influenced by socialization and exploration processes) and to express a more (structurally and contentively) complex, and/or a hybrid, identity rather than a simple one.

Ethnic identity is an identity that develops from within the person actively engaged in its construction, instead of being an image that is imposed only by stereotypes from the outside. Yet, at times self-categorisation is a difficult task to negotiate with others, because, as one student explains,

... there are also others who categorise you ... it is not only that you self-define.²

Identities are socially constructed and constantly contested facts. They are the result of discursive processes and assigning and accepting meaning by political actors (Risse 2004, 267).

We ‘Zamejski Slovenci’ [Slovenes living on the Italian side of the border] are not regarded as Slovenes in Slovenia, but as Italians.³

In our sample the perception of mismatch between the category assignment by others and one's own self-image results in mixed feelings, sometimes positive, often negative, often with a sense of uniqueness and being something special. Frequently surprise, disappointment, annoyance, frustration, concern, fear and worry would be apparent, especially when negative stereotypes and prototypical features are attributed to the categories.

But something really disappointed me. When a few years ago I was in Kranjska Gora for sport training sessions, we and some other girls talked with some peers from Slovenia and they were looking at us in surprise when we told them that we were members of the Slovene minority in Italy, as they did not know that we 'existed'.⁴

In a moment I felt, getting closer to me, wide-open eyes staring at me. 'Are you a Russian?', 'No, I am not a Russian, I am a Slovene!', 'Ah, so you are Slav...', 'And why are you in Italy?' ... The word "Slav" still bothers me a lot even today. I am fed up with answering the same questions all the time, fed up with those surprised and confused looks, fed up with being a stranger. But that's exactly how I felt when I went for a 2-week vacation across Italy. Every time I had to list again the reasons why I can speak such a strange language, why I do not live in Slovenia, why I attend Slovene schools. I felt like an unusual, new animal species in the zoo, that everyone looks at with interest, analyses and compares. That was me, a special case. Finally I have come back home. I have returned to a place of different, Slovenes, one who are treated in a special way.⁵

In Ivana's narrative as set out above, category misconceptions of the Italian majority group members she referred to are due to lack of previous contact with and a scarce knowledge of the national minority group. It is clear that in some contexts lacking the knowledge and ability to function competently and successfully in interpersonal and intergroup encounters, not being able to assign identities to others in harmony with one's self-image, can hinder future relations and interactions with the person due to the establishment of mutual negative impressions and related interpretations, even more so if these are associated with traumatic experiences of the past that can revolve around personal experiences of discrimination, or with social memories of Fascism and Italianization.

Another issue mentioned by the participants, one that arouses in them more concern and discomfort, was in fact the negative attitude from the dominant group, illustrated by an extract from Katarina's report:

History can be seen nowadays too. Since I was a child I have been victim of verbal violence. Italians call us "sciavi" (slaves), which is very offensive. Quite often you get to know that they have written something on our monuments or in public places. From personal experience I know that Italians do not like Slovenes, though exceptions do exist. / ... / In some sports meetings there were insults and sometimes even beatings.⁶

Similar shared reports confirm that in the cities where Slovene minority members live the tendency towards a negative view of diversity is still occasionally conveyed by discourses and practices of exclusion against minorities and their rights by right-wing Italian groups; and further, that these remain deeply and long lastingly present in adolescents' awareness, at least until, as we will see later, they have the opportunity to have a positive experience. Miklavcic (2006) in her fieldwork observed that the graffito *Basta sciavi* ["Enough of the Slavs/slaves"] is one such example. "Sciavi is a derogatory term used to define Slovenes and other Slavs in general" and "it is directed against both the Slovene minority and immigrants from former Yugoslavia."

As Velikonja (2002) puts it, in the political, cultural and media discourse terms like "Yugoslavia" and "the Balkans" were commonly associated with communism and socialism and therefore had negative connotations of backwardness, disorder, wildness, poverty, etc. On the contrary, Europe was seen as synonym for the developed world, prosperity, democracy, freedom, etc. That is one of the reasons why Slovene minority members strive to safeguard themselves from being seen as from former "Yugoslavia" or as "Slavs".

Individuals can more or less actively reject categorisations made by others. Adolescents activate different cognitive and behavioural defensive mechanisms in order to restore consistency with their self-view or to avoid any "categorization threat" (Ellemers 2012, 850), a threat evoked when a person is seen as a member of a certain group but the person does not see this as desirable or appropriate to their own self-identification, and when the threat is accompanied by fear and feelings that their preferred self-identification is not accepted and respected by significant others.

A way to cope with the stress derived from non-matching or negatively evaluated categorizations is to switch among identities according to situations or to present only selected aspects of one's identity.

I always introduce myself as a Slovene and explain that I am from Trieste. In fact you must adapt the description depending on the person you talk to, but only in the sense that I stress one thing [rather than something else] ...⁷

I define myself as a Slovene. Self-designation of course can change according to situations, often under different types of pressures, hardly ever consciously and completely freely.⁸

Ethnic identity can change across contexts. Individuals may have different ways of perceiving themselves and these can get activated depending on situations.

Different circumstances will trigger different identifications and lead to a corresponding set of behaviours (including language choice) and attitudes.

In their explanations, very often informants maintain that their multiple identities are stable and that they are self-confident, but also admit that their self-presentations do change depending on the situation, their interlocutors and their own ethnic identity strength.

I have a high degree of self-confidence and a stable identity: I am a Slovene and a Friulian. / ... / I present myself differently in different situations. For instance, if I introduce myself to an Italian, I tell him/her that I am a Slovene and a Friulian and of course an Italian citizen, while if I introduce myself to a foreigner, I first of all say that I come from Italy and that I have Italian citizenship, afterwards I explain my identity to him/her.⁹

As we can see from the above, in both cases, when introducing himself to an Italian or to someone of another nationality, the person feels the need to stress his Italian citizenship as a common identification element or as a national-territorial identity marker. Afterwards, he endeavours to explain the special features of his sense of belonging as a Slovene and as a Friulian, representing the enriched complex and multifaceted identity that integrates a variety of historical and cultural roots which would not be otherwise reflected in a single general label.

4.2 Maintaining Distinctiveness

As explained in Chapter 2 above, identity creation is guided by motivational principles that are similar to needs and tendencies towards certain identity states and away from others (e.g. Breakwell 1986; Brewer 1991; Vignoles et al. 2006, 309; Hogg 2007). It is argued that individuals seek to establish and preserve a positive self-view by enhancing their sense of belonging to the ethnic group and maintaining the distinctiveness of this identity, that is, a sense of moderate differentiation and separateness from others on both individual and group levels of identity (Vignoles et al. 2000, 337–338).

Having a distinctive sense of identity is especially important for reducing subjective uncertainty. Participants typically show both heightened in-group identification and intergroup discrimination under conditions of subjective uncertainty (Hogg 2000; Hogg et al. 2007). Optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer 1991, 2003) proposes that identification with a social group or category is stronger when the optimal level of distinctiveness and inclusiveness is found, i.e., an adequate balance between the conflicting drives for differentiation of the self and for assimilation with others.

76 The motive of distinctiveness is exemplified in the following observations that Slovene minority members tend to use to stress the difference between themselves and Slovenes from Slovenia [here, Slovenian Slovenes] or Italians, who are both considered simultaneously potential relatives and belonging both to the in-group and the out-group:

I do not feel much belongingness to the 'mother' homeland [i.e., to Slovenia]. Of course we do have the same roots and a lot of common history, but there are also many differences. To me 'zamejska' and 'primorska' cultures [the former that of the Slovenes in Italy, the latter the coastal regional culture] mean a lot. My homeland is the Goriška region [i.e., the region of Gorizia] and partly also the Tržaška region [the region of Trieste].¹⁰

...to be 'zamejski Slovenec' [a Slovene from the Italian side of the border] doesn't mean to be a 'slovenski Slovenec' [Slovenian Slovene]. We are different, even though we have the same roots.¹¹

When distinctiveness needs are threatened, people adopt cognitive coping strategies to restore a sense of adequate distinction between the categories "us" and "them". The distinction is likely to reflect a self-protecting mechanism, even though not always a conscious one, making it possible, through particularization and specifications, to enhance a sense of belonging, acceptance by, inclusion and closeness to the group, and to emphasize one's in-group positive attributes that will increase self-esteem (Vignoles et al. 2006, 310).

A satisfaction of both motives – the one of exclusiveness and the other of inclusiveness – is, therefore, possible at the same time, even though they appear to be opposed (Vignoles et al. 2006, 328).

Some people ask me if I feel more Slovene or Italian and I answer that I feel Slovene through language and culture, but at the same time Italian, because there are some aspects in me that are, precisely, part of the Italian culture. So how do I define myself? 'Confinante/Zamejka' [see below]

As it is shown in these examples, the adoption of new identity labels is very often highlighted and has priority in the narratives. Differences and similarities with both in-groups/out-groups, i.e. Slovenes and Italians, are recognized in the discourse, as speaking the same language, sharing the same culture and nationality or citizenship, but as having different lifestyles, varieties of language, living in different life contexts, etc.

The acknowledgment of having common roots with "Slovenian Slovenes" enables, inter alia, individuals to perceive the historical connection with their

ancestors and with the population of the broader territory that shares the same ethnicity. "Continuity across time and situation" (Breakwell 1986, 24) is, in fact, another important psychological motive of identity.

77

The Slovene label adopted for self-categorization, "zamejci" (expressed as "confinante" in Italian in the last excerpt above, meaning "those living on the other side of the border"), being sufficiently discriminating, particular and inclusive at the same time, allows Slovene minority members to

describe themselves with an optimal level of distinctiveness (Brewer, 1991) with flexible, malleable and dynamic boundaries: feeling varying degrees of "closeness" and "distance" in perceived (dis)similarity and identification with Slovenes in the "mother nation" and the Italian majority, sometimes defensively finding ways to demonstrate that they are from there, where they live (Kosic 2011, 160).

4.3 Blending in

In our previous quantitative research based on structured questionnaires on ethnic identification in a larger population of Slovene minority adolescents, we found no significant evidence of rejection of their own group and culture, despite the fact that this can be quite a common characteristic of minority members (Kosic & Caudek, 2005; Kosic 2010).

Nevertheless, perceived discrimination and the stereotypes that our broader society places on ethnic groups can greatly affect adolescents' sense of pride in, or shame about, their own ethnicity. They can perceive a problem leading to assimilation due to fear of rejection (Berry 2004: 176–179).

Language is one of the most important symbolic markers of ethnic identity in Slovene minority adolescents (Kosic 2010). Consequently, language-related situations can induce perceptions of identity threat. Hiding or abandoning an identity, in this case the linguistic one, is one possible strategy to overcome ethnic identity threat (Breakwell 1986). In the words of our participants we discovered that this strategy is adopted at least temporarily in some situations:

We youngsters use more and more Italian or English words. In public also, with friends, we prefer to speak Italian rather than Slovene. And why this? Because we fear what people are saying about us, about the Slovene minority. We fear that people may not accept us, if they hear a language that is not Italian, we fear what they think of us. For this reason we youngsters often prefer to speak Italian rather than Slovene. /.../ In Trieste and Gorizia there are schools with Slovene as teaching language. These schools, especially high schools, are often damaged by people that enjoy writing insults or drawing swastikas

on the walls of the school building. This is another reason why we youngsters are often ashamed to speak Slovene in public.¹²

Language is an important marker for moving from “them” to “us” and vice versa. Therefore, language switching can also indicate a weakening ethnic (minority) identity and the desire to switch from one group to another by acquiring competence in the dominant group language and losing the minority language. In most of the cases examined in this sample, however, it appears that the preferred strategy is one of blending in. Blending in is manifested as an attempt to be socially accepted and included by others of the in-group or by the dominant group that has a perceived higher status, without calling attention to ethnic heritage or to other specific traits, even though the latter are not necessarily denied as aspects pertaining to the self. This strategy may include not speaking Slovene language in some contexts.

Segatti’s research (2008, 87), in fact, documented that about a quarter of 1122 Italian respondents showed negative reactions, expressing feelings of anger or annoyance, when hearing a conversation in Slovene in public spaces, i.e., in a bus, at a post office or at the municipality in Trieste or Gorizia. Positive feelings of pride and satisfaction accounted for 12 per cent of Italophones.

It goes without saying that to express one’s true self in all its completeness in some situations can be difficult and may require courage. According to social identity theory, if one group membership cannot provide a positive social identity, the person may try to leave the group and join the other, which is seen as having a better position (i.e., enabling social mobility), even though the cost of this strategy may result in condemnation from one’s peers or other group members and loss of authenticity at a personal level.

To get lost in the majority is neither a good nor a bad thing in my opinion. It is not bad because it is the easiest exit from potential torture done by the majority, because this way you become equal to all others, you are not different but just one of the crowd / ... / I do not judge these people, but I do not congratulate them either. It is understandable that they only seek peace in their lives, that they do not want to feel that they are outsiders. But there are also those people that are ashamed of being part of the minority and decide to renounce it. This is a very bad thing, and is to be condemned, even though every opinion has to be taken in consideration. This is not correct, because I think that it is a kind of refusal of one’s self and a falsehood about who you really are.¹³

4.4 Self-Enhancement

A socially more accepted strategy is to seek new ways of intergroup comparison

that would favour one's own group (i.e., a kind of social creativity). When and if being a minority group member is considered to be a threat to a positive social identity, common responses to this threat are the accentuation of positively-valued qualities that differentiate minority group from out-groups, and stronger in-group identification. A multicultural perspective of accepting diversity is frequently adopted by Slovene minority members (Kosic & Caudek 2005) and it provides the ideological justification for affirming one's ethnic minority identity and enhancing the value of ethnic differentiation (Verkuyten 2005).

This may be illustrated with some excerpts from the texts written by the students:

To be a minority is not that bad, it brings its benefits that we should all be aware of. I've read somewhere that it is scientifically proven that "zamejci" [Slovenes living on the Italian side of the border] are more open to foreign languages, more tolerant of diversity, more altruistic and empathetic. In my opinion this is true, as it would be logical that "zamejci" and those who are regularly in contact with reality along the borderland, would understand diversity more easily and understand what it means to be oppressed by a majority group.¹⁴

We members of the minority have in my opinion the advantage of knowing a language more, but also have more cultural baggage. Since we are ourselves a mixture of different cultures we respect and accept people that are different from ourselves more easily. / ... / To tell the truth, it often happens that being a minority we do isolate ourselves. Maybe this is a way to protect ourselves that allows us to avoid feeling discomfort.¹⁵

A positive aspect of being a minority is, first and foremost, knowing two languages. Because of this we are more mentally flexible and we adapt better to different situations.¹⁶

Individuals are willing to identify with a positive stereotype or to compare their in-group with out-groups on dimensions which demonstrate the superiority of their in-group: the more one identifies with groups that are valued, the more one can maintain a positive feeling about the self, a sense of pride and self-respect. It is, in fact, a typical characteristic of in-group bias to ascribe more positive features to oneself and one's own group in order to evaluate belonging to it as more valuable. A sense of pride and admiration of one's own group for possessing qualities such as early bilingualism, an aptitude to learning languages and mastering them with proficiency, respect and openness to diversity, mental flexibility, empathy, etc., were noticeable across the entire data set.

Even though I do not know many Italians, as a Slovene I have never felt discriminated or downgraded among them. This year I am a volunteer, I work with elderly people, and that in a completely Italian environment. I was positively surprised by the fact that as soon as my colleagues and also the elderly people with whom I work go to know that I was a

Slovene, they started to ask me with interest to translate something for them, or they asked me if they pronounced certain Slovene words correctly. The interest that they had towards my language gave me the impression that knowing Slovene in the Italian environment is an enrichment, and not a reason for discrimination.¹⁷

The contact hypothesis (Allport 1954; Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) posits that greater contact with an out-group is generally associated with less prejudice. More frequent opportunities of intergroup contact in the right conditions, together with the promotion of studies of ethnicity, may help the larger society to be aware and better understand the situations and feelings of ethnic minorities, encourage respect of diversity, empower ethnic minority group members to value the positive aspects of their ethnic identities and make them feel more self-confident.

5. Conclusions and Directions for Further Research

This study provides empirical evidence that is in accordance with the theoretical frameworks of social identity perspectives and identity process theory, namely that Slovene minority adolescents in Italy adopt a range of strategies for coping with the perceived ethnic identity threat that they experience in their everyday life.

The qualitative thematic analysis of students' written narratives summarizes and reconstructs experiences, opinions, feelings and behaviours of individuals belonging to this particular ethnic group. Particular emphasis was given to the active construction of self-image through plural complex identity, the seeking and maintaining of distinctiveness, the blending in and the identity enhancement practices as coping strategies in response to perceived ethnic identity threats. The interpretations of the data are consistent with the theoretical framework adopted, and confirm the finding of the few similar studies conducted on ethnic identity issues in (post)adolescents at the Italian-Austrian borderland (Merkač 1983; Vavti 2009) or in the territory analyzed here (Juric Pahor 2000; Mendarič 2009).

"People can be understood by others in particular ways, and people act toward one another depending on such understandings and positionings" (McCarthy & Birr Moje 2002, 228–229). Given the data discussed in this paper, two main directions may be envisaged. The first is the promotion of studies of ethnicity for majority groups. Given that it has been demonstrated that a strong ethnic

identity may act as a buffer against multiple stressors, the second is the promotion of ethnic identity exploration and ethnic identity achievement among young people, paying attention to (un)conscious identity motives; this may help to equip minority adolescents with skills that would allow them to have higher levels of mastery over stressful situations and to indirectly address other related issues, improving, e.g., their academic careers, intergroup relations, linguistic behaviour, physical health and psychological well-being (Jaspal and Cinnirella 2012, 504).

Crocetti et al. (2008, 994) suggest that people from ethnic minority groups should be a priority target for interventions aimed at promoting a healthy adolescent development. We would further suggest that people from both ethnic majority and minority groups should be a priority target for interventions aimed at promoting a healthy ethnic identification and a mature positive intergroup relational attitude, with a view to their feeling empowered and free to represent their ethnic identities in the most constructive and creative way, facilitating and promoting the construction and perception of multiple complex identities composed of different characteristics.

Regarding further directions for research, we believe it is important to develop a better understanding of the impact of ethnic identity threat on self-identification of different age groups, including younger adolescents and young adults.

82 Notes

¹ "Sem sin domače zemlje, Goričan. Pol Slovenec, pol Furlan, pa tudi ne morem reči, da sploh nisem Italijan. Človek je in ima pravico biti to, kar se čuti, na podlagi narodnih vrednot, ki jih je dobil v zibelki ali ki jih je kasneje odkril."

² "... so tudi ostali, ki te kategorizirajo. Ni samo, da se ti sam opredeliš..."

³ "Zamejski Slovenci nismo v Sloveniji upoštevani kot Slovenci, temveč kot Italijani."

⁴ "Nekaj pa me je zelo razočaralo. Ko sem bila pred leti v Kranjski Gori zaradi športnih priprav, smo se z drugimi puncami pogovarjale s sovrstniki iz Slovenije in začudeno so nas gledali, ko smo jim rekly, da smo pripadniki slovenske manjšine v Italiji; oni sploh niso vedeli, da mi "obstajamo".

⁵ "V hipu sem začutila vse bližnje, popolnoma razprte oči, ki bulijo vame. "Ma sei russa?", "No, non sono Russa, sono Slovena!", "Ah, sei Slava quindi ...", "E perché sei in Italia?"... Beseda "Slava" me še dandanes moti. Naveličana sem odgovarjati na vedno ena in ista vprašanja, naveličana sem tistih presenečenih in zbeganih pogledov, naveličana sem biti tujka. A prav tako sem se počutila, ko sem pred leti odhajala na dvotedenske počitnice po Italiji. Vsakič sem morala ponovno navesti razloge, zaradi katerih poznam tako čudaški jezik, zakaj ne živim v Sloveniji, zakaj obiskujem slovenske šole. Počutila sem se kot nenavadna, nova živalska vrsta v zoološkem parku, katero si vsi z zanimanjem ogledujejo, analizirajo ter primerjajo. To sem bila jaz, poseben primer. Končno sem se ponovno vrnila domov. Vrnila sem se v prostor drugačnih, posebno obravnavanih Slovencev."

⁶ "Zgodovina se kaže še v današnjih dneh. Že od malega sem žrtev besednega nasilja. Italijani nas imenujejo "sciavi", kar je zelo žaljivo. Večkrat se izve, da je prišlo do popisa spomenikov in drugih javnih krajev. Iz lastnih izkušenj vem, da Italijani ne marajo Slovencev, obstajajo pa tudi izjeme. /.../ Med kakimi športnimi srečanji je prišlo do uporabe žalitev, včasih pa je prišlo tudi do pretepov."

⁷ "Vedno se predstavim kot Slovenec in pojasnim, da sem s Trsta. Predstavitev sicer moraš menjat odvisno s kom govoriš, a le v smislu, da poudarim nekaj..."

⁸ "Opredeljujem se kot Slovenka. Samoopredelitev posameznika se seveda lahko spremeni glede na okoliščine, običajno pod različnimi tipi pritiska, težje zavestno in popolnoma svobodno."

⁹ "Imam visoko samozavest in ustaljeno identiteto: sem Slovenec in Furlan. Skušam postajati čim bolj odprt do ostalih, toda mislim, da bom vedno ostal to, kar sem. Okolje ne bo spremenilo moje etnične-nacionalne identitete, čeprav se v različnih okoliščinah različno predstavim. Na primer... če se predstavim Italijanu, mu bom povedal, da sem Slovenec in Furlan in seveda italijanski državljan, če pa se predstavim tujcu, mu bom najprej povedal, da prihajam iz Italije in da imam italijansko državljanstvo, potem pa mu bom pojasnil svojo identiteto."

¹⁰ "Ne čutim velike pripadnosti 'matični' domovini (Sloveniji). Seveda imamo iste korenine in precej skupne zgodovine, toda veliko je tudi razlik. Veliko mi pomeni 'zamejska' oz. 'primorska' kultura. Moja domovina je Goriška in delno tudi Tržaška."

¹¹ "...biti zamejski Slovenec ne pomeni biti slovenski Slovenec. Smo drugačni, čeprav imamo iste korenine."

¹² "Noi giovani usiamo sempre di più parole italiane o inglesi. Ma anche in pubblico, con gli amici, preferiamo parlare l'italiano che lo sloveno. E questo perché? Perché abbiamo paura di cosa

dice la gente di noi, della minoranza slovena. Abbiamo paura che la gente non ci accetti, perché sente parlare una lingua che non è l'italiano, abbiamo paura di cosa pensa di noi. Per questo noi giovani molte volte preferiamo parlare l'italiano che lo sloveno. / ... / A Trieste e a Gorizia ci sono scuole con insegnamento in lingua slovena. Molte volte queste scuole, specialmente le superiori, vengono danneggiate da persone che si divertono a scrivere insulti ed a disegnare svastiche sui muri dell'edificio scolastico. Ecco un altro motivo per cui molte volte noi giovani ci vergogniamo a parlare lo sloveno in pubblico.”

¹³ “Izgubiti se v večini je, po mojem mnenju, stvar, ki ni ne slaba ne dobra. Slaba ni zato, ker je najlažji izhod iz morebitnega trpinčenja s strani večine, ker tako postaneš enak vsem ostalim, nisi drugačen in si le eden v množici. / ... / Teh ljudi ne obsojam, niti jim ne čestitam. Razumljivo je, da iščejo v svojem življenju le mir, da se ne želijo počutiti kot outsiderji. So pa tudi tisti ljudje, ki se manjšini odrečejo in se sramujejo tega, da so del nje. To je izredno grdo, je obsojajoče, ampak vsako mnenje je treba upoštevati. / ... / To ni prav, ker mislim, da je to neko zavračanje samega sebe in laganje o tem, kdo v resnici si.”

¹⁴ “Biti manjšina ni slabo, prinaša svoje prednosti in teh bi se morali zavedati vsi. Nekje sem bral, da je znanstveno dokazano, da so zamejci bolj odprti za tuje jezike, da so bolj strpni do drugačnosti in da so bolj altruistični in sočutni. Po mojem mnenju to drži, kajti logično bi bilo, da zamejci oziroma ljudje, ki se z zamejstvom srečujejo, lažje razumejo drugačnost in razumejo to, kako je biti zatiran s strani neke drugega večinskega naroda.”

¹⁵ “Noi appartenenti alla minoranza siamo secondo me avvantaggiati non solo perché conosciamo un lingua in più, ma anche perché abbiamo già in partenza un bagaglio culturale più ampio. Essendo noi stessi un mix di culture diverse siamo più predisposti al rispetto e all'accettazione della gente diversa da noi. / ... / A dir la verità, spesso succede che noi stessi, facendo parte della minoranza ci isoliamo dagli altri. Forse questo è solo un modo di proteggerci che ci evita di stare a disagio.”

¹⁶ “Pozitivna plat manjšinske stvarnosti je predvsem poznavanje dveh jezikov. Zaradi tega smo miselno bolj prožni in se lažje znajdemo v različnih situacijah.”

¹⁷ “Čeprav ne poznam mnogo Italijanov, se med njimi kot Slovenka nikoli nisem počutila diskriminirana ali manjvredna. Letos delam prostovoljno delo, se ukvarjam z ostarelimi ljudmi, in to v totalno italijanskem okolju. Pozitivno presenetilo me je to, da ko so moji sodelavci in tudi starejši, s katerimi delam, izvedeli, da sem Slovenka, so začeli z zanimanjem spraševati, naj jim kaj prevedem, ali so me spraševali, če pravilno izgovarjajo nekaj slovenskih besed. Zanimanje, ki so ga imeli do mojega jezika, mi je dalo vtis, da je poznanje slovenščine v italijanskem okolju obogatitev, nikakor pa razlog diskriminacije.”

84 References

- Allport, G. W., 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Addison-Wesley, Reading.
- Albert, R., Schneeweis A. & Knobbe, I., 2005. Strengthening, Hiding or Relinquishing Ethnic Identity in Response to Threat: Implications for Intercultural Relations, *Intercultural Communication Studies* XIV(1), 107–118.
- Aydingün, A., 2002. Creating, Recreating and Redefining Ethnic Identity: Ahiska/Meskhetian Turks in Soviet and Post-Soviet Contexts. *Central Asian Survey* 21 (2), 185–197.
- Berry, W., 2004. Fundamental psychological Processes in Intercultural Relations. In D. Landis, J. M. Bennett & M. J. Bennett (eds.) *Handbook of Intercultural Training*. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 166–184.
- Braun, V. & Clarke, V., 2006. Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology* 3 (2), 77–101.
- Breakwell, G. (ed.), 1983. *Threatened Identities*. Wiley, Chichester.
- Breakwell, G. M., 1986. *Coping with Threatened Identities*. Methuen, London.
- Breakwell, G. M., 1988. Strategies Adopted when Identity is Threatened. *Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale* 1, 189–204.
- Breakwell, G. M., 2010. Resisting Representations and Identity Processes. *Papers on Social Representations* 19, 6.1–6.11.
- Brewer, M. B., 1991. The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 17, 475–482.
- Brewer, M.B., 2003. Optimal Distinctiveness, Social Identity, and the Self. In M. Leary & J. Tangney (eds.) *Handbook of Self and Identity*, 480–491.
- Brown, R., & Hewstone, H., 2005. An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Contact. In M. Zanna (ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 37, 255–343. Academic Press, San Diego.
- Crocetti, E., Rubini, M., Luyckx, K. & Meeus, W., 2008a. Identity Formation

in Early and Middle Adolescents from Various Ethnic Groups: From Three Dimensions to Five Statuses. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence* 37, 983–996.

Crocetti, E., Rubini, M. & Meeus, W., 2008b. Capturing the Dynamics of Identity Formation in Various Ethnic Groups: Development and Validation of a Three-Dimensional Model. *Journal of Adolescence* 31 (2), 207–222.

Ellemers, N., 2012. The Group Self. *Science* 336, 848–852.

Elliott, R., Fischer, C. & Rennie, D., 1999. Evolving Guidelines for Publication of Qualitative Research Studies in Psychology and Related Fields. *British Journal of Clinical Psychology* 38(3), 215–229.

Hewstone, M., Rubin, M. & Willis, H., 2002. Intergroup Bias. *Annual Review of Psychology* 53, 575–604.

Hogg, M. A., 2000. Subjective Uncertainty Reduction through Self-Categorization: A Motivational Theory of Social Identity Processes. *European Review of Social Psychology* 11, 223–255.

Hogg, M. A., 2003. Social identity. In M. R. Leary & J. P. Tangney (eds.) *Handbook of Self and Identity*. Guilford, New York, 462–479.

Hogg, M. A., 2005. The Social Identity Perspective. In S. A. Wheelan (ed.) *The Handbook of Group Research and Practice*. Thousand Oaks, Sage, 133–157.

Hogg, M. A., 2007. "Uncertainty-Identity Theory". *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 39, 69–126.

Hogg, M. A., Sherman, D. K., Dierselhuis, J., Maitner, A. T. & Moffitt, G., 2007. Uncertainty, Entitativity, and Group Identification. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 43, 135–142.

Jaspal, R. & Cinnirella, M., 2012. The Construction of Ethnic Identity: Insights from Identity Process Theory. *Ethnicities* 12(5), 503–530.

Jaspal, R. & Coyle, A., 2009. Language and Perceptions of Identity Threat. *Psychology and Society* 2(2), 150–167.

Jaspal, R. & Coyle, A., 2010. 'My Language, My People': Language and Ethnic Identity among British-Born South Asians. *South Asian Diaspora* 2(2), 201–218.

Jurić Pahor, M., 2000. *Narod, Identiteta, Spol*. Knjižna zbirka Smeri. ZZT EST, Trst.

Kosic, M., 2010. *Patterns of Ingroup Identification and Outgroup Attitudes on the Italo-Slovene Borderland*. Doctoral dissertation, IUIES, Trieste.

Kosic, M., 2011. So Near and so Far: Cherished Diversity, Feared Otherness. In S. M. Değirmencioğlu (ed.) *Some Still More Equal than Others? Or Equal Opportunities for All?* Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg Cedex, 155–167.

Kosic, M. & Caudek, C., 2005. Ethnic Identification and Outgroup Attitudes in Minority and Majority Groups, *Review of Psychology* 12(2), 103–113.

McCarthy, S. J. & Birr Moje, E., 2002. Identity Matters. *Reading Research Quarterly* 37(2), 228–238.

Mendarič, Z., 2009. Etnične manjšine in diskriminacija: Primer slovenske manjšine v Italiji in italijanske manjšine v Sloveniji. *Annales. Series Historia et Sociologia* 19(1), 173–184.

Merkač, F., 1983. Zavest slovenskih mladostnikov o svetu, v katerem živijo in identiteti narodne skupnosti. *Mladje* 50, 84–92.

Miklavcic, A., 2006. Diverse Minorities in the Italo-Slovene Borderland: “Historical” and “New” Minorities Meet at the Market. At Memory and Narrative Symposium, “Diversity” in an International Context, Berkeley, November 2006.

Pettigrew, T. F. & Tropp, L. R., 2006. A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 90, 751–783.

Phinney, J. S., 1989. Stages of Ethnic Identity in Minority Group Adolescents. *Journal of Early Adolescence* 9, 34–49.

Phinney, J., 1990. Ethnic Identity in Adolescents and Adults: A Review of Research. *Psychological Bulletin* 108, 499–514.

Phinney, J. S. & Alipuria, L. L., 1990. Ethnic Identity in College Students from Four Ethnic Groups. *Journal of Adolescence* 13, 171–183.

Phinney, J. S., Horenczyk, G., Liebkind, K. & Vedder, P., 2001. Ethnic Identity, Immigration and Well-being: An Interactional Perspective. *Journal of Social Issues* 57(3), 493–510.

Risse, T., 2004. European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have We Learned?' In R. K. Herrmann, T. Risse & M. B. Brewer (eds.) *Transnational Identities. Becoming European in the EU*. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 247–271.

Rotherham, M. J. & Phinney, J. S., 1987. Introduction: Definitions and Perspectives in the Study of Children's Ethnic Socialization. In J. S. Phinney & M. J. Rotherham (eds.), *Children's Ethnic Socialization: Pluralism and Development*. Sage, Newbury Park, 10–28.

Segatti, P. (ed.) 2008. *Lingua e identità in una regione plurale. Il punto di vista di friulani, Giuliani e sloveni*. Libreria Editrice Goriziana, Gorizia.

Smith, J. A. & Osborn, M., 2003. Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. In J. A. Smith (ed.) *Qualitative Psychology: A Practical Guide to Methods*. Sage, London.

Smith, J. A., Flowers, P. & Larkin, M., 2009. *Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis: Theory, Method, and Research*. Sage, London.

Smith, J. A., Jarman, M. & Osborn, M., 1999. Doing Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. In K. Chamberlain & M. Murray (eds.), *Qualitative Health Psychology: Theories and Methods*. Sage, London.

Stets, J. E. & Burke, P. J., 2000. Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory. *Social Psychology Quarterly* 63(3), 224–237.

Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C., 1979. An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (eds.) *Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Brooks/Cole, Monterey, 33–48.

Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C., 1986. The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior. In S. Worchel & W. Austin (eds.) *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Behavior*. Nelson-Hall, Chicago, 7–24.

Tajfel, H. (ed.), 1978. *Differentiation between Social Groups*. Academic Press, London.

Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D. & Wetherell, M. S., 1987. *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory*. Blackwell, Oxford.

Vavti, Š., 2009. "Nisem 0815 Korošec..." – Primeri etnične identifikacije pri slovensko govorečih (post) adolescentih na dvojezičnem avstrijskem Koroškem.

Treatises and Documents, Journal of Ethnic Studies / Razprave in Gradivo, Revija za narodnostna vprašanja 60, 40–61.

Velikonja, M., 2002. Ex-Home: “Balkan Culture” in Slovenia after 1991. In B. Tornquist-Plewa & S. Resic (eds.) *The Balkan in Focus – Cultural Boundaries in Europe*. Nordic Academic Press, Lund, 189–207.

Verkuyten, M., 2005. Ethnic Group Identification and Group Evaluation among Minority and Majority Groups: Testing the Multiculturalism Hypothesis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 88, 121–138.

Vignoles, V. L., 2011. Identity Motives, In S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx & V. L. Vignoles (eds.) *Handbook of Identity Theory and Research*. Springer, New York, 403–432.

Vignoles, V. L., Chryssochoou, X. & Breakwell, G. M., 2000. The Distinctiveness Principle: Identity, Meaning, and the Bounds of Cultural Relativity. *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 4, 337–354.

Vignoles, V. L., Chryssochoou, X. & Breakwell, G. M., 2002. Sources of Distinctiveness: Position, Difference and Separateness in the Identities of Anglican Parish Priests. *European Journal of Social Psychology* 32(6), 761–780.

Vignoles, V. L., Regalia C., Manzi C., Gollledge J. & Scabini E., 2006. Beyond Self-Esteem: Influence of Multiple Motives on Identity Construction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 90(2), 308–334.

MITJA ŽAGAR

In Memory of Vojin Dimitrijević (1932 - 2012)

At first I could not believe the sad news that October 5 brought an end to the life of professor Vojin Dimitrijević, worldwide known intellectual, enthusiastic activist for human rights, founder of the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, key institution for human rights in Serbia and surrounding region, one of the leading European experts in the fields of international law, international relations and democratization, holder of the French Legion of Honour, etc. Irreplaceable loss although everyone is replaceable, they say. I am most hurt by the loss of a friend I first met in the Yugoslav movement for United Nations while still a teenager; although already an established university professor, he accepted me as an equal partner, which speaks for itself. When we last met a few months ago, he was still full of energy, vigorously commenting global crisis and the situation in Serbia in the time of elections, although we mostly discussed future plans for cooperation. Despite his age I did not find him old. In fact I was quite certain that we were bound for many productive years as friends and partners. And then it happened ... in the midst of work with students which he enjoyed so much. His work is too extensive to be embraced in such a short text, and we are probably not yet fully aware of the true significance and results of his contribution to all the fields he had been dealing with. No doubt we will greatly miss his sparkling comments at conferences and friendly get togethers; his enthusiasm, expertise and advice regarding the education and training for human rights will be sadly lacking, along with his participation in important textbooks, monographs, research reports and projects, and, last but not least, our journal will miss him as a valuable member of the editorial board. As for myself, I will especially miss our friendly talks and our – often polemic – debates.

V spomin Vojinu Dimitrijeviću (1932 - 2012)

Najprej nisem verjel žalostni vesti, da se je 5. oktobra končala življenjska pot profesorja Vojina Dimitrijevića, intelektualca svetovnega formata, zagnanega aktivista za človekove pravice, ustanovitelja Beograjskega centra za človekove pravice, ključne institucije za človekove pravice v Srbiji in širši regiji, enega vodilnih evropskih strokovnjakov na področjih mednarodnega prava, mednarodnih odnosov in demokratizacije, nosilca francoske legije časti... Nenadomestljiva izguba, čeprav pravijo, da je vsak nadomestljiv. Najbolj boli izguba prijatelja, ki sem ga kot najstnik spoznal v jugoslovanskem gibanju za Združene narode in me je kot uveljavljen univerzitetni profesor sprejel kot enakopravnega partnerja, kar veliko pove o njem. Ko sva se zadnjič srečala pred nekaj meseci, je bil poln energije, ko je zavzeto komentiral situacijo v Srbiji v času volitev in globalno krizo, največ pa sva se pogovarjala o načrtih za prihodnost in možnostih za sodelovanje. Kljub njegovim letom, se mi ni zdel star in sem bil prepričan, da bova skupaj – kot partnerja in prijatelja – doživela še veliko produktivnih let. Potem se je zgodilo... sredi dela in v stiku s študenti, ki ga je imel tako rad. Njegovo delo je preobsežno, da bi ga lahko zaobjel v tem kratkem besedilu, prave razsežnosti ter pomena in rezultatov njegovega dela na vseh področjih, s katerimi se je ukvarjal, pa se verjetno niti še ne zavedamo. Zagotovo bomo pogrešali njegove iskrive komentarje na konferencah, posvetih in prijateljskih srečanjih. Manjkali nam bodo njegovo navdušenje, prispevki in nasveti pri izobraževanju ter usposabljanju za človekove pravice, pri nastajanju pomembnih učbenikov, monografij in raziskovalnih poročil, manjkal nam bo pri raziskovalnih in drugih projektih, v naši reviji ga bomo pogrešali kot dragocenega člana uredniškega odbora. Jaz pa bom zlasti pogrešal najina druženja ter prijateljske pogovore in najine – pogosto tudi polemične – razprave.

About the Contributors / O avtorjih

Marianna Koscic

Marianna Koscic, Ph.D., holds a degree in Social Psychology (University of Trieste) and a Ph.D. in Transborder Policies for Daily Life (International University Institute for European Studies). She currently cooperates with the Slovene Research Institute in Trieste and studies patterns of in-group identification and out-group attitudes among minorities and majorities on the Italo-Slovene borderland. Her research interests include implicit measures of prejudice, multiple discrimination, social inclusion, complex social identity. As a trainer specialized in ethnic and national minorities she is active in the promotion of human rights education in formal and non-formal educational settings.

Dr. Marianna Koscic je diplomirala iz socialne psihologije (Univerza v Trstu) in ima doktorat iz čezmejnih politik v vsakdanjem življenju (Mednarodni univerzitetni inštitut za evropske študije). Trenutno sodeluje s Slovenskim raziskovalnim inštitutom iz Trsta ter proučuje vzorce identifikacije znotraj skupin ter medskupinske odnose med pripadniki manjšin in večin v italijansko-slovenskem obmejnem prostoru. Njeni raziskovalni interesi vključujejo merjenje predsodkov, proučevanje večplastne diskriminacije, socialne vključenosti ter kompleksne socialne identitete. Aktivna je kot trenerka učenja človekovih pravic v formalnih in neformalnih okvirih, specializirana pa je na področje etničnih oziroma nacionalnih manjšin.

Kawsar Ahmad

Kawser Ahmad is a Ph.D. student in Peace and Conflict Studies, Arthur Mauro Centre for Peace and Justice at St. Paul's College, the University of Manitoba. He is a retired Lt. Coronel in the Bangladeshi army who spent time as a peacekeeper in Cyprus, and the Western Sahara. He has coauthored articles in the Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies, and the International Journal of Development and Conflict.

Kawser Ahmad je doktorski študent na Peace and Conflict Studies, Arthur Mauro Centre for Peace and Justice na St. Paul's College, University of Manitoba. Je upokojeni podpolkovnik bangladeške vojske, ki je služboval v mirovnih silah na Cipru in v Zahodni Sahari. Je soavtor člankov v Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies in International Journal of Development and Conflict.

Sean Byrne

93

Sean Byrne is a professor, cofounder and director of the Ph.D. and M.A. Programs in Peace and Conflict Studies, and founding executive director of the Arthur V. Mauro Centre for Peace and Justice, St. Paul's College, University of Manitoba. He has published extensively in the area of ethnic conflict analysis and resolution. He is a coeditor of the Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution (Routledge 2009), and Critical Issues in Peace and Conflict Studies: Implications for Theory, Practice, and Pedagogy (Rowman & Littlefield 2011).

Sean Byrne je profesor, soustanovitelj in direktor doktorskih in magistrskih programov na Peace and Conflict Studies, ter ustanovni direktor Arthur Mauro Centre for Peace and Justice na St. Paul's College, University of Manitoba. Izdal je številne članke s področja analize in reševanja etničnih konfliktov. Poleg tega je sourednik knjig Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution (Routledge 2009) in Critical Issues in Peace and Conflict Studies: Implications for Theory, Practice, and Pedagogy (Rowman & Littlefield 2011).

Peter Karari

Peter Karari is a Ph.D. candidate in Peace and Conflict Studies, Arthur Mauro Centre for Peace and Justice at St. Paul's College, the University of Manitoba. He earned an M.A. in Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Magdeburg in Germany, and a B.Sc. in Social Work from the University of Nairobi. He has co-authored articles in the International Journal of Development and Conflict, and the Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies.

Peter Karari je doktorski kandidat na Peace and Conflict Studies v Arthur Mauro Centre for Peace and Justice na St. Paul's College, University of Manitoba. Magisterij je dosegel iz Friedens- und Konfliktforschung na Univerzi v Magdeburgu, diplomo pa na področju socialnega dela na Univerzi v Nairobiju. Je soavtor člankov v International Journal of Development and Conflict in v Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies.

Olga Skarlato

Olga Skarlato is a Ph.D. candidate in Peace and Conflict Studies, Arthur Mauro Centre for Peace and Justice at St. Paul's College, the University of Manitoba. She earned a B.A. and an M.A. degree in North American Studies from the

School of International Relations, St. Petersburg State University, Russia. She also studied and worked in Germany, the USA, and Canada doing research on the topics of environmental conflict prevention and resolution, human security and international economic development. She has coauthored articles in *Geopolitics*, *Irish Journal of Political Studies*, *Treatises and Documents - the Journal of Ethnic Studies*, and the *Journal of Human Security*.

Olga Skarlato je doktorska kandidatka na Peace and Conflict Studies v Arthur Mauro Centre for Peace and Justice na St. Paul's College, University of Manitoba. Diplomsko magisterij je dosegla na področju severnoameriških študij na School of International Relations na Univerzi v Sankt Peterburgu. Študirala in delala je v Nemčiji, ZDA in v Kanadi, njeno raziskovalno delo pa je posvečeno preprečevanju in reševanju okoljskih konfliktov, človeški varnosti ter mednarodnemu ekonomskemu razvoju. Je soavtorica člankov v znanstvenih revijah: Geopolitics, Irish Journal of Political Studies, Razprave in gradivo – Revija za narodnostna vprašanja in Journal of Human Security.

Marija Jurić Pahor

Maria Jurić Pahor, Ph.D., is a researcher (scientific counselor) at the Institute for Ethnic Studies in Ljubljana. Her fields of research include: minorities (especially Slovenes in Carinthia Austria and in Italy), national and ethnic identities, transculturation, fascism, national socialism and transgenerational transmission of the traumas from the concentration camps, memory and remembrance. She led or co-led several national (Austrian, Slovene) and one international research project. Lastly (2008–2011), she led the project “The Constitution of New National and Ethnic Identities in the Alps-Adriatic Region with Special Regard to Border Areas and the City of Trieste, and to the ‘Community-building’ Aspects of the Contemporary Media”, financed by the Slovenian Research Agency. She is the author or coauthor of several scientific publications and monographs.

Marija Jurić Pahor, dr., je znanstvena svetnica na Inštitutu za narodnostna vprašanja v Ljubljani. Njena raziskovalna področja so: manjšine (zlasti Slovenci na Koroškem in v Italiji), nacionalne in etnične identitete, transkulturalnost, fašizem, nacionalsocializem in transgeneracijski prenos taboriščnih travm, memorija, spomin. Bila je nosilka in sonosilka več nacionalnih (avstrijskih, slovenskih) in enega mednarodnega raziskovalnega projekta. Nazadnje (2008–2011) je vodila projekt “Konstitucija novih nacionalnih in etničnih identitet v prostoru Alpe-Jadran s posebnim ozirom na obmejna območja in mesto Trst ter na ‘skupnost-tvorne’ vidike sodobnih medijev”, ki ga je financirala Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije. Je avtorica oziroma soavtorica več znanstvenih publikacij in monografij.

Reviewers in 2012

Recenzenti prispevkov v letu 2012

We highly appreciate the help of all the experts, who reviewed the articles submitted for publication in Treatises and Documents, Journal of Ethnic Studies, in 2012.

Zahvaljujemo se strokovnjakom, ki so v letu 2012 recenzirali prispevke za revijo Razprave in gradivo, Revija za narodnostna vprašanja.

Dr. Marinko Banjac, asistent, Katedra za analitsko politologijo, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani.

Dr. Romana Bešter, znanstvena sodelavka, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana.

Doc. dr. Sara Brezigar, znanstvena sodelavka, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana.

Dr. Danijel Grafenauer, znanstveni sodelavec, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana.

Izr. prof. dr. Mirjam Hladnik Milharčič, Inštitut za slovensko izseljenstvo in migracije, Znanstvenoraziskovalni center Slovenske akademije znanosti in umetnosti.

Doc. dr. Andrej Hozjan, Filozofska fakulteta, Univerza v Mariboru.

Doc. dr. Boris Jesih, višji znanstveni sodelavec, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana.

Damjana Kern, Center za slovenščino kot drugi/tuji jezik, Filozofska fakulteta, Univerza v Ljubljani.

Dr. Vera Klopčič, višja znanstvena sodelavka, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana.

Doc. dr. Attila Kovacs, znanstveni sodelavec, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana.

Dr. Samo Kristen, višji znanstveni sodelavec, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana.

Ass. Prof. Dr. Emma Lantschner, Zentrum für Südosteuropastudien, Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz.

Marko Lovec, asistent, Center za proučevanje mednarodnih odnosov, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani.

Doc. dr. Damjan Mandeljc, Katedra za občo sociologijo, Oddelek za sociologijo, Filozofska fakulteta, Univerza v Ljubljani.

Doc. dr. Karmen Medica, znanstvena sodelavka, Inštitut za sredozemske humanistične in družboslovne študije, Fakulteta za humanistične študije, Univerza na Primorskem.

Dr. Mojca Medvešek, višja znanstvena sodelavka, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana.

Dr. Janez Pirc, asistent z doktoratom, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana.

Izr. prof. dr. Mateja Sedmak, znanstvena svetnica, Inštitut za sredozemske humanistične in družboslovne študije, Fakulteta za humanistične študije, Univerza na Primorskem.

Janez Stergar, prof. zgod., strokovni svetnik, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana.

Dr. Štefka Vavti, znanstvena sodelavka, Slovenski znanstveni inštitut v Celovcu.

Zaira Vidali, razvojni sodelavec, Slovenski raziskovalni inštitut, Trst.

Doc. dr. Simona Zavratnik, znanstvena sodelavka, Katedra za analitsko sociologijo, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani.

Doc. dr. Nives Zudič Antonič, Fakulteta za humanistične študije, Univerza na Primorskem.

Izr. prof. dr. Jernej Zupančič, Oddelek za geografijo, Filozofska fakulteta, Univerza v Ljubljani.

Red. prof. dr. Mitja Žagar, znanstveni svetnik, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana.

Guidelines for Contributors

General

The editorial board of **Treatises and Documents, The Journal of Ethnic Studies** welcomes the submission of scholarly articles in the field of ethnic and minority studies, especially on racial and ethnic relations, ethnic identity, nationalism, xenophobia, the protection of (ethnic, national, linguistic, religious, and other) minorities, migration, multiculturalism and related subjects. The journal is particularly interested in discussions regarding ethnic and minority issues in the so-called Alpine-Adriatic-Pannonian area and all comparative studies, which include – only partially or as a whole - this geographic area. This area comprises the Alpine arc, the hinterland of the eastern Adriatic and Pannonian Basin. More technically, this area includes the following countries: Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Italy, Germany (especially the southern part), Hungary, Kosovo, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. Also Macedonia and Bulgaria may be interesting cases.

Three issues of the journal are published every year, usually in April, September and December.

Articles that are submitted must be original, unpublished material and should not be simultaneously under consideration - either in whole or in part - for publication elsewhere.

The journal encourages the submission of articles in English, since this enables authors to present their ideas and work to a broader public. However, articles in other languages – with a special emphasis on the Slovenian language – are also welcome. The abstracts of the articles are always published in the language of the article and in English.

Authors who do not have native or equivalent proficiency in English must prior to submission have the article read by someone with this proficiency. This step ensures that the academic content of your paper is fully understood by journal editors and reviewers. Articles which do not meet these requirements will most likely not be considered for publication.

Manuscripts should be submitted in electronic form and must include:

- ♦ the submitted article, with the title in the language of the article and in English;
- ♦ an abstract of the article in the language of the article and in English; this should

include a brief presentation of the issues discussed, the methodology used, the main findings and the conclusions;

- ♦ 3 – 7 key words the language of the article and in English.

The length of the title, the abstract and the key words in one language should not exceed 1,300 characters (including spaces). More detailed information about the form of submitted manuscripts is presented in the prescribed template, available at the journal's website (<http://www.inv.si>).

In a separate document please submit: the title of the article, the author(s) name and a brief biographical note on each author with full contact information (for publication in the journal). Please refer to the template (at the journal's website) for further detailed information.

All submitted manuscripts are subjected to peer-review procedure by at least two reviewers. The review procedure is double blind. Authors may be asked to revise their articles bearing in mind suggestions made by the editors or reviewers. The final decision on publication rests with the editorial board.

Manuscripts should be sent by e-mail, in Word (.doc), to editor-in-chief: editorTD@guest.arnes.si.

Format and Style

The preferred **length for articles** is between 30,000 and 45,000 characters, including spaces (between approx. 4,500 and 6,500 words). Longer articles may be accepted at the discretion of the editorial board. A limited number of endnotes are permitted, if they are used for explanatory purposes only. They should be indicated serially within the article.

Authors should take into careful consideration also the **style and format requirements** of the journal, which are presented in the template (available at <http://www.inv.si>) in more detail. Particular attention should be paid to the formatting of references, single spacing throughout and the inclusion of keywords and abstracts. Articles that do not meet these requirements will be returned for modification before being read and reviewed.

Referencing Style

99

The **Harvard author-date system** of referencing must be used for bibliographical references in the text and in the alphabetical list of references at the end of the article. Authors should ensure that all and only those references cited in the text appear in the list of references. General bibliographies should not be provided. Authors must also follow the requirements regarding referencing style and format as presented in the table of examples, available at the journal's website (<http://www.inv.si>).

Ethnicity, the book series on ethnicity and nationalism, published by the Institute for Ethnic Studies (IES), presents its Volume No. 7:



A shared vision Intercultural dialogue – a global paradigm to promote linguistic and cultural diversity.

Edited by: Sonja Novak Lukanovič

Published by: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja/
Institute for Ethnic Studies and Slovenian
National Commission for UNESCO, 2010,
234 pp.

From the content:

- ♦ *Tamara Borgoyakova:* Minority Languages in Multicultural Setting: the Case of Khakassia
- ♦ *Terrence G. Wiley and Gerda de Klerk:* Common Myths and Stereotypes regarding Literacy and Language Diversity in the Multilingual United States
- ♦ *Sonja Novak Lukanovič:* Language Diversity in Slovenia
- ♦ *Marija Jurić Pahor:* The Alps-Adriatic Region: An Exploration of Ethnic-National Diversity and Cross-Border Dialogue
- ♦ *Teresa L. McCarty:* Conserving and Promoting Ethnolinguistic Diversity – Lessons from Native American Education
- ♦ *Perry Gilmore:* Cultural Diversity in Higher Education: Insights from an Alaskan Case Study


Ordering information:

Inštitut za narodnostna
vprašanja / Institute for
Ethnic Studies, Erjavčeva
26, 1000 Ljubljana,
Slovenia.

Contact person:

Janez Stergar,
janez.stergar@guest.arnes.si

Price: 14 €



Dr. Vanek Šiftar - slovenski romolog. Ob devetdesetletnici rojstva in desetletnici smrti (1919 - 1999 - 2009)

Uredil / Edited by: Mladen Tancer

Izdal / Published by: Ljubljana: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja / Institute for Ethnic Studies; Petanjci: Ustanova dr. Šiftarjeva fundacija / dr. Šiftar Foundation; Murska Sobota: Svet romske skupnosti Republike Slovenije / The Council of the Roma Community of the Republic Slovenia, 2011, 263 str. / pp.

Ordering information:

Inštitut za narodnostna
vprašanja / Institut for
Ethnic Studies, Erjavčeva
26, 1000 Ljubljana,
Slovenia

Contact person:


Vera Klopčič,
vera.klopacic@inv.si

Iz vsebine / From the content:

V pričujoči monografiji o Vaneku Šiftarju, slovenskemu romologu so objavljeni prispevki Vaneka Šiftarja, v izvirni obliki. Dr. Šiftar je v svojih delih in strokovnem udejstvovanju v slovenskem prostoru prvi obravnaval širše razsežnosti položaja Romov in s svojim zavzeanjem odločilno prispeval k razvoju romologije kot posebne interdisciplinarne vede.

**FORMAL AND INFORMAL
EDUCATION FOR ROMA**
Different Models and Experience

Edited by
Romana Bešter, Vera Klopčič, Mojca Medvešek



Izšel na avtorjevih stroških
Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja

Formal and Informal Education for Roma: Different Models and Experience

Uredile / Edited by: Romana Bešter, Vera Klopčič & Mojca Medvešek

Izdal / Published by: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja / Institute for Ethnic Studies, 2012, 129 pp.

From the content:

- ♦ *Romana Bešter & Mojca Medvešek:* Romani Educational Incubators – An Aid for Students in the Learning Process
- ♦ *Marco Brazzaduro:* Romani Schooling: Light and Shadow
- ♦ *István Horváth:* Two Decades of Educational Policies for the Roma: Lessons and Dilemmas from Romania
- ♦ *Hedina Tahirović Sijerčić:* Migration and Its Implications for the Educational System: The Case of the Roma in Bosnia, Germany and Canada
- ♦ *Zoran Slavnić:* From Anti-Roma Racism to Romani Rights in Sweden
- ♦ *Dragutin Babić:* The Education of the Roma in Croatia: Statistical and Empirical Insights
- ♦ *Dragoljub B. Đorđević:* Policy and Practice of Romani Inclusion in the Educational System of the Republic of Serbia
- ♦ *Ljatif Demir:* Romani Cultural After-School Activities as an Instrument for the Better and Easier Inclusion of Romani Children and Youth in the Formal Educational Process

Ordering information:

Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja / Institute for Ethnic Studies, Erjavčeva 26, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia.

Contact person:

Romana Bešter,
romana.bester@guest.arnes.si



Srbi v Beli krajini: *Vrlini, Radojčić i Kordić su bili prvi naseljenci 1593*

Avtorji / Authors: Miran Komac, Romana Bešter, Felicita Medved, Mojca Medvešek, Janez Pirc, Petra Roter & Natalija Vrečer

Izdal / Published by: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja / Institute for Ethnic Studies, 2012, 109 pp.

Ordering information:

Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja / Institute for Ethnic Studies, Erjavčeva 26, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia.

Contact person:

Mojca Medvešek,
mojca.medvesek@guest.arnes.si

Iz vsebine / From the content:

Pričujoča monografija prinaša vpogled na edinstveno in hkrati v našem prostoru dokaj malo poznano mešanico kulturnih, jezikovnih, etničnih in drugih družbenih posebnosti, ki so prisotne med prebivalci štirih vasi na skrajnem jugu Bele krajine. Ta obmejni prostor se zaradi uskoškega izvora prvotnih prebivalcev v omenjenih ozirih razlikuje od okoliške regije že stoletja, a seveda položaj ne ostaja statičen. Monografija skuša odgovoriti predvsem na vprašanja, ali je mogoče prebivalstvo teh vasi obravnavati kot artikulirano narodnomanjšinsko skupnost z vsemi značilnostmi, ki so v mednarodni praksi običajno obravnavane kot potreben pogoj za priznanje statusa narodne manjšine, ali si omenjena populacija sploh želi statusa narodne manjšine in ali poseduje ustrezno socialno vitalnost, ki bi ji v primeru priznanja statusa omogočala uresničevanje manjšinskih pravic.

td



treatises and documents

Journal of Ethnic Studies

razprave in gradivo

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja

Content / Vsebina

Meeting Rising Expectations of Hopes for Peace
in Post Peace Accord Northern Ireland: The
Role of the Good Friday Agreement and the
Implication for External Economic Aid

K. Ahmed / S. Byrne / P. Karari / O. Skarlato

Transculturation and Cultural Hybridity:
Two Key Notions of Postcolonial Studies as a
Challenge for the Study of National and Ethnic
Identities

Marija Jurić Pahor

Identity Matters: Strategies for Coping with
Ethnic Identity Threats among Slovene Minority
Adolescents in Italy

Marianna Kosic



INŠTITUT ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA
INSTITUTE FOR ETHNIC STUDIES