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Discussing Medieval Dialogue between the Soul and the Body and Question of Dualism[1]

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Introduction

Within the dialogue poetry, a literary genre that thrived also in the Middle Ages, the most numerous thematic group is the body and soul debates, and the contribution discusses their most popular example: the *Dialogus inter corpus et animam*, usually referred to as the *Visio Philiberti*.[2] The text was written in the thirteenth century, its reputed author is Walter Map (1140 – c. 1208-1210), and therefore its origin is most likely England, from where it circulated across Europe, as evidenced by 188 (Baker, Cartlidge, 2014, 196) preserved manuscripts that include this text.[3] I would like to turn attention to six currently known illustrated versions of the *Visio Philiberti*. They are preserved in Budapest, Erlangen, London, München, Wien,[4] and Brno[5].[6]

1 This contribution is based on the presentation, titled *Dialogue between the Soul and the body: Dualism?*, discussed at the conference "Iconology Old and New. Transregional Conference on the Move. Croatia and Hungary, 2013. Part Three: European Iconology East & West 5: Cultural Imageries of Body and Soul – Intermedial Representations of the Corporeal, the Psychic and the Spiritual" at the University of Szeged in 2013.

2 Several versions of this poem are known; the original and most common one (Inc.: Noctis sub silentio tempore brumali), the extended one (Inc.: Vir quidam extiterat dudum heremita), and the short one (Inc.: Juxta corpus spiritus stetit et ploravit).

3 Although widespread and influential, the *Visio Philiberti* was seldom studied in detail recently; Palmer, 1999, 412-418, Cartlidge, 2006, 24-46, Golob, 2011, 151-162, Baker, Cartlidge, 2014, 196-201. Besides, the *Visio Philiberti* was included in a wider iconographic research (at least) four times; Osmond 1990, Brent, 2001, 1-18, Philipowski, 2006, 299-319, Raskolnikov, 2009.

4 The Vienna manuscript lacks depiction of the dialogue, therefore it will not be considered further.

5 The Brno manuscript remained inaccessible during the preparation of the contribution.

6 Országos Széchényi Könyvtár, Budapest, Cod. lat. 242, 10r – 23r, Universitätsbibliothek Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, Cod. 542, 291v – 299v, Wellcome Library, London, MS.49, 51r – 51v, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek München, Cgm 3974, 60r – 65v, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Wien, Cod. 2880, 119r – 128v, Městský archiv, Brno, Cod. 105, 1r – 13r.

The text is about a dream vision of the other world that stages a quarrel of a soul with its body over the question of who among the two of them is guilty of sin, or thematizes the relationship between the body and the nobler soul (which is also the main medieval theological issue). The contribution that is interested in medieval anthropology, intends to specify the interpretation of the relationship between the two basic component parts of man in order to find the individual. This noun is applied here in its modern quality as "a single human being as distinct from a group".[7] The individual asserts through the issue of personal responsibility, this is valid especially from the twelfth century onward when the concept of sin was reformed, and consequently the self-examination was stressed.[8] Namely, the conflict of the soul and the body is an illustrative example of the then pervasive perception of man or sinner, disintegrated into the inner and the outer man, but in the *Visio Philiberti* conflict (over culpability), it turns out to be the likeness, and not the difference between the opponents. This means the individual as *individuus*, indivisible is not treated destructively or divided, on the contrary, it is doubled or represented as the individual image, thus the end of the contribution touches upon the art-historical problem of medieval portrait.

Medieval Concept of the Divided Self

According to the general medieval definition, man is the union of two conflicting elements, the soul and the body (Le Goff, 1990, 8). The question is whether the emphasis was on "union" or on "conflicting", since the Platonic idea of the immortal soul, which dictates the differentiation between the spiritual soul and the material body, gained great importance in Christianity (Wéber, 2000, 1369).

Theory: Theology and the Indivisible *Persona*

In general, medieval theologians understood man as the unity of the soul and the body. As Walker Bynum argues, they used the word *persona* (that does not mean the individual (Gurevich, 1995, 89-99)) to specify not the soul (which alone is the person in Platonism), but the indivisible psychosomatic entity (1995, 318), for the etymology of the word *persona* is *per se una*, united on its own. Still, the individual natures of the two components are preserved to some extent (King, 2007, 202). As an inseparable union, the relationship between the soul and the body was commonly compared to marriage (Mark 10, 6-9), because although being contrary, they make a match,[9] due to the power of love which ties as strongly as to unify them into a new whole.

7 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/individual [8. 2. 2014].

8 On the connection between responsibility and dialogue see Reed, 1990, 65-88.

9 This is supported by the opposite genders of Latin words for the soul, *animus*, *animī* (m) and the body, *caro, carnis* (f).

Notwithstanding, the marriage metaphor makes it clear that duality was harmonized, and yet not eliminated. Moreover, in the thirteenth century, such somewhat dualistic position appeared insufficient to express the unit (Walker Bynum, 1995, 256), since some theologians like Thomas Aquinas (Thomae de Aquino (1225-1274)) reinterpreted Aristotle's hylomorphism or defined the soul as the single form of body, and the body as its expression in matter, to unify them completely.

Practice: Reception of Greek Dualism in Christianity and Moral Conflict within Man

Despite the official theological standpoint, the Middle Ages stressed the concept of man as a sinner, that is, after the Fall which broke the union between the soul and the body (Le Goff, 1990, 4). The disobedient soul was punished with rebellion of its body, therefore their harmonious relationship turned into discord, so their different natures enforced, hence duality was deepened to division. This conflict between the soul and the body (Galatians 5, 16-17) was a common medieval metaphor for man's moral condition (Canuteson, 1975, 62). But how could the conflict gain such popularity if the unity of the soul and the body is based on the resurrection of the body, an essential Christian doctrine? On the one hand, this doctrine differentiates monistic Christianity from Platonism (the latter attributes the immortality only to the soul, while the body is mortal and death is the opposite of life) or, generally speaking, from the dualism, "all religious doctrine that posits as independent and antagonistic the principle of all good and the principle of all evil" (Brenon, 2000, 451). While on the other hand, the doctrine of the resurrection had no practical role in the Middle Ages, as estimated by Dinzelbacher (1999, 54). Furthermore, according to Le Goff, medieval society orientated itself by binary oppositions: though the doctrinal Manichaeism was rejected, it was nevertheless practiced (1990, 10). Contrasting the benevolent and the malevolent – briefly moral dualism – suited medieval didactic or moralizing tendency to save man's soul, since in dualism the body was not accepted as the soul's partner but as its enemy, attached to prohibited worldly pleasures. There is even Christian version of moral dualism which juxtaposes the superior and the inferior, because God is only one or has no equal, therefore He will defeat evil. For example, when trying to explain human inclination to sin, Augustine (Aurelius Augustinus (354-430)) rejected the Manichean idea of two souls, the good and the bad, however, he still failed to avoid the dualism that is useful for isolating the origin of evil from God. In order to prove the oneness of soul, Augustine divided the will instead, into two morally conflicting aspects, "the inner man" (the soul) and "the outer man" (the body), and encouraged to dissuade from the outer or to focus on the inner man. In other words, even though Augustine acknowledged the man as the union of the soul and the body, he

singled out the soul at the expense of the body: "…there is in me both a body and a soul; the one without, the other within. In which of these should I have sought my God…? …the inner part is the better part…"[10]

Influence of Christian Dualism on the Medieval Valuation of the Individual

This division is supposed to mark medieval attitude to the individual fundamentally; according to Biernoff, for instance: "The Augustinian formula of an 'inner' and 'outer' man was widely used throughout the Middle Ages to evoke a sense of the self, fractured and polarized by sin." (2002, 23). In theocentric medieval world, man did not have autonomous identity or existed in relation to God, and the soul was important as a bearer of this essential connection which is likeness. The image of God is stamped on the inner man, and since the seal as image models the individuality (Bedos-Rezak, 2006, 55), man must transform into the image of Christ (2 Corinthians 3, 18) to arrive at his own identity (Destro, Pesce, 1998, 184-197). To conclude, in the Christian Middle Ages, self-realization was not the uniqueness but sameness. Moreover, the outer man belongs to earth, an area of *dissimilitudinis*, unlikeness to God (Le Goff, 2009, 241), and signifies living according to man or human self-sufficiency. Therefore the body has to undergo an improvement (that results in the resurrected body), wherein some of its individual characteristics will be eliminated (Walker Bynum, 1995, 256). Linking the individuality with fault is close to Platonic concept of the individual which is a consequence of the soul's divergence from the One or of its fall into multiplicity, then an imperfect embodiment of a common human form. For, in Platonism, the matter is negative, and as the principle of the individuation it shows the individual in unfavourable light. By this paradigm for the self-expression, the medieval self was neglected in search of perfection or the simplicity of God, and presented as heterogeneous, that is, as dissoluble and concurrently dissolute. This is why the individuality could not become a value, and this paper aims to treat such conclusion as a problem by questioning Christian dualism instead of the medieval individual.

Relationship between the Soul and the Body: Disconnection

Division of the Soul and the Body or Dualistic Anatomy of Man

Divided due to the fall of Adam, the man literally falls apart in death which is the punishment for original sin and breaks the nexus between the soul and the body.

10 Aurelius Augustinus, *Confessiones*, X, 6, 9, Patrologia Latina 32, col. 783. Translated by Albert C. Outler, http://www.ling.upenn.edu/courses/hum100/augustin10.pdf [13. 5. 2015].

For example, when the monk Barontus had a near-death experience, written down at the end of the seventh century and is known as the *Visio Baronti*, his soul or the enlivening principle was plucked out of his body, and he felt he was splitting. Similarly, in the death scene from the *Ars moriendi*,[11] the soul as the last breath just left the body of a dying, therefore it is depicted separately, and represents the antithesis of the motionless corpse (Camille, 1994, 70). An important structural feature of the macabre image is being split (Binski, 1996, 134), and as such it reveals the dual or ambivalent nature of man.

Opposition of the Soul and the Body or Horizontal Dualism

The *Visio Philiberti* also refers to death, because the soul gets into conversation with the (fresh) corpse, waiting for burial, moreover, the split is sharpened by the corresponding dualistic structure of the dialogue which displays the dichotomy of man or his separation into the two opposed elements. The soul and the body become two entities, namely the personificated soul gains its own body that enables it speaking, and the personificated dead body can act or think. Apart from gaining independency, they are involved in verbal clash or made antagonists. In these two respects, the disputation between the soul and the body is a microcosmic version of the *Psychomachia*, the battle between virtues and vices. The double structure of the dialogue confronts two different points of view to show the contrast, like its visual correspondent, the two-piece structure of the diptych, encompasses the earthly and the other world to separate them. For example, illustrations of the Three Living and the Three Dead from English manuscripts (see Greer Fein, 2002, 69-94) place each trinity on its own page, and juxtapose the living with the decomposing dead which as the future doubles of the living imitate, but do not reflect them.

Moral Contrast of the Soul and the Body or Vertical Christian Dualism

The antonymic pair from Greco-Roman antiquity was altered in the Middle Ages, when the contrast was interpreted in accordance with the vertical orientation of Christian system of values: Christians separated up and down instead of left and right (Le Goff, 2009, 9, 10), meaning that the spiritual soul was considered superior to the body. In the body-and-soul debates the moral contrast of the co-speakers appears to be present: the body is mostly corrupt, and the soul accuses it of sins. Likewise, in the beginning of the *Visio Philiberti* the soul stresses its likeness to God, thus presents itself as nobler than the body. The soul's nakedness in the illustrations means being

11 Meaning two texts on the good death from the first half of the fifteenth century. The original version from 1415 is known as *Speculum artis bene moriendi* (Inc.: Cum de presentis exilii), and the short version, ca. 1450, is *Bilder-Ars* (Inc.: Quamvis secundum philosophum).



Figure 1: Dialogue between the Soul and the Body, mid-15th century, Országos Széchényi Könyvtár, Budapest, Cod. lat. 242, 13r).

stripped of sin, while the body is wrapped in a shroud or clothed. Furthermore, the use of contrasting colors reflects the black-and-white comparison. On Budapest example (OSK, Cod. lat. 242), transparent grey denotes the soul's aerial body, and brownish marks the terrestial body made of clay (see Figure 1). In all other examples the contrast is clearly moral, since in comparison to the soul's rosy complexion, deathly pallor of the body delineates its weakness – to temptation (Camille, 1994, 83). In short, the

structure of the *Visio Philiberti* is dualistic, nevertheless, the opposition between the soul and the body is echoed only.

Relationship between the Soul and the Body: Connection

Interpretation of the Body as Positive or Deviation from Dualism

The negativity of the body, suggested by the soul's initial speech, is repeated in the end of the poem, with the threat of the sinner's metamorphosis into the devil. Straining of the physiognomy to the demonic deformity, which signifies the sinfulness, highlights the body as Paulinian flesh that presents man in his difference from God. Such dualistic interpretation of the body encourages repression of its sinful passions or corresponds to the didactic purpose of the visions of the other world which center the conversion from the outer to the inner man, as confirms previously sinful nobleman Philibert who enters the monastery. In the *Visio Philiberti*, the dream vision, however, frames the dialogue between the soul and the body that belongs to an essentially different literary genre. Unlike the visions which present the soul's destiny after death with focus on its punishment in the purgatory, the debate poems do not have a distinct tendency to moralize. The body and soul dialogues are among those placed on the border between religious and secular poetry (Raby, 1957, 300); they do not thematize only the soul but the whole man, and can be expanded into philosophical discussion without easy answer or moral conclusion (see Reed, 1990). The dialogue of the *Visio Philiberti* is also not a didactic one, wherein the reasonable soul would guide and scold the foolish body. Rather, composed under the influence of school exercises in rhetoric and the formal debate held in universities (Ackerman, 1962, 554, 555), this is a scholastic dialogue, meaning – despite of compromising the moral message – both views on the subject of debate are presented. In this way, the body is enabled to defend against the soul's accusations of being sinful. Moreover, the dialogue discussed is the most scholastic in tone, for its arguments are outstandingly sophisticated (Osmond, 1990, 63), hence the body as skilled rhetorician is the soul's equal. In the illustrations, the corpse is animated with lively rhetorical gestures, after having initially its arms crossed on chest, which is a common pose for cadaver (Ariès, 2009, 8); thus the above mentioned moral inequality or imbalance between the soul and the body, suggested by the contrasting colors, gets evened out.

This interpretation of the body can be properly understood in the context of "the body and soul legend", especially through comparison with the forerunner of the dialogue between the soul and the body, the address of the soul to the body, where the

corpse does not reply to the soul, since it lies dead or cannot react. That is, the body's frailty, intensified into mortality, is emphasized, therefore the speaking or immortal soul is its antithesis. Hence, the address that represents traditional Christian dualism, interprets the body as corrupted by nature or inferior to the soul, while the *Visio Philiberti* understands it entirely differently, and obviously deviates from Christian (or vertical) dualism. Because the corpse acts or speaks reasonably independently of the soul which is the animating and rational principle, it is not subordinated. This is why the dialogue discussed seems closer to the horizontal (or unchristian) dualism where the opponents are equal or the body is the opposite force of evil. Furthermore, according to Le Goff, in the Middle Ages the flesh was demonized (1974, 144-146); the fleshiness generally meant sinful impulse, and in this respect the body was not passive. And although the spirit separated, the corpse was not considered to be truly dead until the flesh decomposes entirely (Camille, 1994, 83-87). Regarding the *Visio Philiberti*, Ackerman interprets the personificated body as an active principle of evil (1962, 551).[12] But the corpse (acts or) speaks to plead not guilty, and thus not in accordance with the horizontal dualism either. To sum up, the body's answer is a reasonable argument that proves the innocence: "*Esne meus spiritus, qui sic loquebaris? / non sunt vera penitus omnia quae faris; / jam probabo plenius argumentis claris / quod in parte vera sunt, in parte nugaris…*"[13] This means the body is neither inferior nor evil, and as such excludes both versions of the dualism. With occurrence of the reply after 1100, the address was developed into the debate, where the soul can share the guilt with the body or is even to blame, and this change coincided with the renewed, positive attitude towards the body which, as Biernoff points out, confounded medieval dualism (2002, 23-26). In this regard, a special influence is attributed to contemporary Latinization of Arabic thought and Aristotelian philosophy[14] that superseded moralizing and emphasized the functional aspect of the body which was not a prison but an instrument, and therefore beneficial to the soul (Osmond, 1990, 6, 7).[15] In short, the *Visio Philiberti* reflects the break with moralizing tradition or with dualistic rejection of the body, which I find crucial, since the body is the carrier of the individuality.

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12 Also Cartlidge compares the animation of the dead body to Frankenstein (Cartlidge, 2006, 30).

13 "Is that you, my Spirit, speaking in this way? All the things you're saying are not completely true. Now, let me fully prove with clear arguments how they are partly true and partly nonsense…" Walter Map?, *Visio Philiberti* (Inc.: Noctis sub silentio tempore brumali), lines 97-100. Edited by Thomas Wright, *The Latin Poems Commonly Attributed to Walter Mapes*, London 1841, pp. 95-106. For the translation see Bossy, 1976, 149.

14 Translations of Avicenna's *De anima* and Aristotle's *De anima* were available since the late eleventh century.

15 For example, William of Saint Thierry (c. 1075-1085 – 1148) suggests that the soul needs the sensing body; Guillaume de Saint Thierry, *De natura corporis et animae*, II, Patrologia Latina 180.

Similitudo, Resemblance of the Soul and the Body

According to the standard definition of the relationship between the soul and the body from the widely read pseudo-Augustinian *De spiritu et anima* from the twelfth century, the soul as the rational principle rules over the body.[16] However, in the dialogue discussed, the corpse questions the soul's moral superiority exactly with transferring the responsibility for sin on the authority. Moreover, this argument is irrefutable, which means the soul is not an innocent victim of the corrupted flesh, but rather the one to blame. Because the soul cannot deny its involvement, it accuses the body of seducing, so lastly, they share the responsibility. The body's reply breaks down the dualistic opposition of soul and body (Brent, 2001, 18); the soul loses its moral superiority, and the body is not automatically immoral, hence the moral difference between the antagonists is blurred. They also look and behave alike. The soul is neither invisible nor abstract but three-dimensional, even muscular, and along with a human body, it gains human nature, while the corpse as fresh keeps the human form, and thus human dignity, considering that the decomposition indicates feebleness or foolishness. In addition, the horizontally laid body which raises its head reminds of words of Bonaventure (Bonaventura (1221-1274)), who compares the body to the soul to emphasize their similarity or the body's excellence, namely its upright posture.[17] The body speaks up sensibly, whereas the soul's speech seems more emotional than wise. That is, the soul and the body are not presented as contrasting components, quite the contrary, as estimates Cartlidge, *similitudo*, resemblance is one of the key motifs of the *Visio Philiberti* (2006, 26).

Bond of the Soul and the Body

Due to the moral equality between the co-speakers, the responsibility issue remains unsolved. Nevertheless, this dialogue is not a never-ending recrimination of equal opponents, typical of the dualism. Since the soul and the body share the responsibility, the *Visio Philiberti* is rather close to the explanation of the body-soul relationship offered by the parable of the blind man and the lame, known from the *Talmud* (Osmond, 1990, 61, 62): they differ in functions, but complement one another, and act together, therefore they are both responsible. According to Cullmann, the Christian idea of the resurrection relates to the Jewish notion of the resurrection of a person, and not to the Greek concept of immortality of the soul (Walker Bynum, 1995, 5), therefore the soul and the body will attend judgement as one. In the thirteenth century, Albert the Great (Albertus Magnus (c. 1200-1280)), Aquinas, or Giles of

16 Pseudo-Augustinus, *De spiritu et anima*, Patrologia Latina 40.

17 Bonaventura, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*, S. Bonaventurae Opera omnia, 4, Florenze 1889.

Rome i. e. Aegidius Romanus (c. 1243-1316) based this unity of soul and body on the excerpts from Aristotle who claims that the soul can function only with the body, and thus ties them together. Likewise in the dialogue discussed, the connection is emphasized instead of division or difference, because the body's argument for rejecting full responsibility is to be the soul's instrument, which is Aristotelian (Osmond, 1990, 64, 65). At the same time, Bonaventure similarly established the unification of soul and body through the explanation of acting or sinning that involves both, to which the relationship of the soul and the body from the poem discussed corresponds as well: "As soul and body are one being, the soul must, then lead the body, or be dragged along by it."[18] Hence, the *Visio Philiberti* suggests that the guilt is mutual or disables the clear-cut moral distinction between the soul and the body, and consequently points to the link between them.

Unit of the Soul and the Body or the Individual, *In-dividuus*

Despite their division, the bond between the soul and the body obviously remains, therefore it is inseparable, which makes the duality (of man) ostensible. Put differently, the relationship of binary pair that is not interpreted as contrast but as similarity, as is the case with the *Visio Philiberti*, reveals the peculiarity of Christian dualism – the inconsistency. This means that in monotheistic Christianity binary thinking is not the fundamental but an alien way of thinking, also when it comes to think of the individual. Inadequacy of dualism within medieval Christianity can be illustrated with Gelasian schema, the separation of the two social functions, of the pope and of the king, wherein the religious power was supreme, as enunciated by the pope Gelasius I (492-496). Duby pointed out that although this schema is dualistic, it implies division among three parts or three orders of society. Firstly, the clerks and the soldiers fight for supremacy, therefore they are both active, and secondly, the clerks as *oratores*, those who pray, are closer to God or situated above the soldiers, so these two orders are in hierarchical relationship, which means they are not equal. Hence, the third order is required to balance the schema, concretely, the laymen got divided into the soldiers and the people that are passive (1985, 94-99). I project Gelasian schema onto man as microcosm, where the soul as striving to God or ascending to heaven corresponds to the clerks, and the figure of the corpse to the worldly laymen, furthermore, they are hierarchically related or unequal. Moreover, a crucial feature of the *Visio Philiberti* is that the soul and the body clash verbally, thus they are both active or equated. Besides, the corpse is addressed either as *caro*, flesh, or as *corpus*, body;[19] because the incorporation of

18 Bonaventura, *Breviloquium*, S. Bonaventurae Opera omnia, 5, Florenze 1891, pp. 124-125. Translated by José de Vinck; see Canuteson, 1975, 37, 58.

19 On the difference between both expressions, and their use within the body and soul debates see Raskolnikov, 2009, 61-66.

Platonic dualism into the monistic system distinguishes bodiliness from weakness to stress the latter, the interchangeability of morally opposite notions[20] is telling and reveals the dual nature of the corpse. That is, like the laymen, the corpse is divided too, hence, within two co-speakers there is ternariness hidden. In other words, similar to Gelasian schema, equalizing demands the third part, namely the body can be the soul's equal co-speaker only if it is better than the passive flesh which is therefore also implied as a background (and such attendance of the flesh is not dualistic).[21] For this reason the body is not bad and consequently not the soul's opposite or the outer man.

The body as morally neutral[22] meets "medium good and bad", the third category within medieval classification of sinners which surpassed moral dualism (Le Goff, 2009, 333-340). This category reflects the second stage of the feudal revolution when *mediocres*, the middle class asserted itself (while at the first stage the people were acknowledged as the third order, see above) (Le Goff, 2009, 340-343). Furthermore, in connection to then developing surgery, the secular value of the body was promoted (see Pouchelle, 1983), regardful of the micro level. That is, the body from the *Visio Philiberti* is in the intermediate position between the soul and the flesh, also affirmed by the corpse itself, who says to be their intermediary, which means it is neither the outer nor the inner man but their connection. Considering that the morally neutral category is, as labeled by Le Goff, ideologically bold unification of the irreconcilable oppositions (2009, 336), the body unites the soul and the flesh. This is why the body stands for the whole, as confirms the legal[23] term *habeas corpus*, "a writ requiring a *person* (my emphasis) under arrest to be brought before a judge or into court".[24] At that time an offender began to be considered as an individual case, because the focus was put on the personal motive (Le Goff, 2009, 321-329), so this whole is the self. In short, the body means the individual.

What is crucial for the individuality issue is that the self is not fractured or heterogeneous union of the two opposite elements but their homogeneous blending, since it is realized with the body which is a separate intermediate part. For, due to the substitution of binary with tripartite schema, the body enforces instead of the flesh and the intermediateness instead of the dividing line, hence the unity of the soul and the body, that defines the individual, emerges from their conflict. This is supported by Bossy: "Deliberately, I think, the debate finally presents itself less as a disputation between separate speakers than as a dialogue-in-monologue. The warring verbal constructs

20 *Caro*, *carnis* (f) had pejorative meaning.

21 This is why I identify the speaking corpse with the body despite its dual nature.

22 Which corresponds to the gender of the Latin word *corpus*, *corporis* (n).

23 On the connection of theology and canon law see Le Goff, 2009, 316-321.

24 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/habeas-corpus?q=habeas+corpus [6. 8. 2014].

become joined by one underlying discourse." (1976, 150) Otherwise stated, because of the shift in emphasis, the dialogue discussed is not face-to-face confrontation, rather, it reminds of the two faced Janus (see Brumble, 2013) in the middle, who was then commonly known as the Roman god of doorways which mediates the link between the opposites. From the twelfth century onwards even Janus with three faces appeared (Golob, 1985, 40), for example, on the illustration of month January (where Janus is often included) from the Ruskin Hours (The J. Paul Getty Museum, Los Angeles, Ms. Ludwig IX 3), or from the manuscript from Besançon (Bibliothèque municipale, ms. 0140), to name only two of many, two profiles blend in one, frontal face, and thus explicitly show unifying of duality into the unit.

Interpretation of the Body in Illustrations of the *Visio Philiberti*

So far my opened question, if the body in the *Visio Philiberti* means the self, is also confirmed by the illustrations. Since moral corruption in the Middle Ages was commonly expressed in visual terms or seen on the body as an imperfection,[25] the corpse from the illustrations discussed is clearly interpreted as morally neutral, because it always remains without visible signs of putrefaction (although the illustrations are not of the same origin) (see Figure 2). This fact provides a lot of information if we consider the late medieval trend of depicting the decomposition of the corpse which reflects general contemplation on the transience of the material body. Between the fourteenth and sixteenth century when the illustrations discussed were made, the *transi*, realistic representation of the decaying dead body, dominated especially the illustrations in popular devotional books (Ariès, 1981, 110-123). Abhorrence to putrefaction is commonplace in the body and soul debates as well (Ackerman, 1962, 562, 563), and the present dialogue too contains *memento mori*, "remember to die" elements, such as the body's compliant on the worms, biting its side. The depicted corpse is, however, not yet eaten away, which is in accordance with aforementioned separation of the body from the corruptible flesh. Hence, the fresh corpse does not stand for the perishable outer man (that would be signified by the *transi*), it is rather the representation of the individual, for, in the moment of death, a body becomes an image which is the essentially a different quality (Belting, 2004, 156-202).

Dialogue as a Mirror or Likeness of the Soul and the Body

Even though in the Middle Ages only extremes were expressed (Huizinga, 2011, 247), or though medieval images were organized according to dualistic system of total distinction (for example, contemporary depictions of the Last Judgement separate the good and the bad) (Binski, 1996, 166-199), in the *Visio Philiberti*, the split structure

25 For instance, the decayed cadaver was also among Hildegard von Bingen's images of sin.

Figure 2: Dialogue between the Soul and the Body, c. 1420, *Wellcome Apocalypse*, London, MS.49, 51v). Wellcome Library, London. By permission of the Wellcome Library, London.

frames the likeness instead of the (moral) contrast. Therefore, the dialogue is rather a sort of mirror than a conflict. It encourages self-analysis which, in the words of Guibert de Nogent (c. 1055-1124), places oneself, like in a portrait, in front of his own eyes.[26] And, as Golob establishes regarding the Budapest illustrations, the experience of self-mirroring is depicted although it is not quoted by the writer (2011, 157, 158).

Intermediate Area or the Soul and the Body United

This is not a material mirror, which was in the Middle Ages usually labeled as Narcissistic. The material mirror shows only the external appearance or the outer man (whereas the essence or the inner man remains invisible to the bodily eye), and cannot provide true self-knowledge or even leads away from it since the outer man is disconnected from the inner man. The division between the material and the other world is emphasized or revealed in the mirror of mortality, with the decomposing mirror double that literally vanishes. On the other side, in the *Visio Philiberti* the dividing line between visible and invisible world is unclasped into an intermediate area where the self-observation is located. Because the vision discussed is a dream vision, this area is dream,[27] in the Middle Ages known for its middle character (Kruger, 1994, 118-122), meaning that it is linked to earth and heaven simultaneously, so it can encompass the dual nature of man (and actually often staged the revelation of a real identity).[28] For, according to the Augustine's dream theory,[29] influential throughout the Middle Ages, the dream is an object of *visio spiritualis*, spiritual vision, the intermediate sort of seeing, which (already with Augustine) surpasses binary, the outer-inner opposition, or bridges the antithesis between falsehood and truth, that is, it abolishes the borderline between visible and invisible. Let us remind ourselves again of Janus in the doorway, with one of his faces looking outward, and the other inward, and thus joining exterior and interior vision. Hence, the soul and the body are united on the same visual field.

Visio spiritualis or Blending of the Soul and the Body

The dream is a neutral field of mixed nature (Hahn, 2006, 45, 46). A characteristic of *visio spiritualis* is the absence of the body, therefore the corpse seen loses its substantial body to become immaterial dream image invisible to the bodily eye. This

26 Guibert de Nogent, *Quo ordine sermo fieri debeat*, Patrologia Latina 156, coll. 27 B, 28 C. On the self-knowledge in the Middle Ages see Morris, 1972, 64-95.

27 And not the purgatory. Besides, the supposed author of the text, Walter Map, was not acquainted with this concept; Le Goff, 2009, 325.

28 The medieval association between dreams and mirror as an instrument of self-examination was widespead. See Kruger, 1994, 130-140.

29 Aurelius Augustinus, *De Genesi ad litteram*, Patrologia Latina 34.

means the corpse is distinguished from the flesh or corrupted matter whose visibility refers to the sinfulness, considering the visual subtext of the original sin, namely Eve's desiring gaze or attractive look of the apple, exposed in the twelfth and thirteenth century (Biernoff, 2002, 42-46). Another characteristic of *visio spiritualis* is the sensuousness of the idea because all dreams appear in corporeal similitudes, thus the soul (although in death it loses its body, and consequently its only image) gains a body to be visible to the inner eye. Furthermore, this body is somatomorphic, and as such obscures theological separation of the spirit and the matter (Zaleski, 1991, 67, 68). Hence, in the *Visio Philiberti*, the dualistic line or difference between the invisible soul and the bodily appearance is blurred.

Confluence of the Soul and the Body or the Homogeneous Self

An explanation for blurriness can be found within Aristotle's definition of *mixtum*, mixture. Being different from an aggregate where two substances are situated side by side without loss of separate identity, the mixture is "a true blending of the ingredients into a homogeneous compound in which the original natures disappear" and "are replaced by a new nature that permeates the compound down to its smallest parts" (Lindberg, 2007, 288, 289). Hence, the blurriness points to the common entity of different elements, wherein the body and the soul from the *Visio Philiberti* correspond to this definition in two regards. Firstly, the attributes of the contrasting components are neglected (in favor of the characteristics of the individual). Namely, the body loses its carnality (which would turn it into no-body, that is, into the opposite of somebody, a person), and the soul loses its simplicity (in a sense of Platonistic Oneness which is formless) or takes a concrete (individual) form. And secondly, the body is distinguished from the flesh instead from the soul, to be related to the soul, since the corpse is not rotting, but animated. Moreover, the soul's aerial body resembles its material body, which is in accordance with the biblical tradition (Luke 16, 19), as well as with the visions of the other world, where the identity of a person preserves in spite of the (temporary) separation of the soul from the body. To elaborate on this, the soul is not depicted in the usual manner, as child or an antithesis, because it has the same height or figure as the body, therefore the soul is the heavenly double. Nevertheless, such interpretation of the soul is not to be confused with the Platonic concept of the self-sufficient soul that alone, without the body, is the person. For, all the souls are three-dimensionally shaped, even athletic, so their bodiliness is tangible, which means they have or need bodies. The Budapest illustrations (OSK, Cod. lat. 242) most clearly show that the soul's aerial body reflects the earthly body as the features of the soul and the body match entirely, or in the words of Golob, the soul looks like the twin brother (2011, 157). The exception are the Munich illustrations (BSB, Cgm. 3974) where the soul is not a double of the body – it is smaller (see Figure 3). However, the soul is not represented as a child either, but its

Figure 3: Dialogue between the Soul and the Body, 1460-1466, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek München, Cgm 3974, 62r).

appearance is differentiated. It has the same round face with full cheeks and short curly hair like the body, meaning the soul is the miniature of the body or Aristotelian form of a body (Camille, 1994, 70) (and the body its repetition in a sense of realization in larger format). Because the soul as the heavenly double encompasses the body, and because the soul as the miniature of the body is encompassed in the body, *similitudo* or likeness implies their inseparable connection. Most of the medieval thinkers understand the soul in agreement with Aristotle as the form of the body (Lagerlund, 2007, 4, 5), therefore the body is defined as the soul's expression (in sense of the outer appearance that shows the inner spirit) (Walker Bynum, 1995, 255-257), which means that, unlike with the symbol which signifies something else, there is no gap between the signifier and the signified. As Zaleski estimates, differently than the bird or the spark, etc. that were metaphors for the soul, the homunculus was understood literally (1991, 68). According to the contemporary classification of signs by Roger Bacon,[30] due to their similitude, the body is the natural sign of the soul.[31]

Since the soul and the body become each other, as expressed by Walker Bynum (1995, 333), they are two sides of one coin, therefore each of them stands for their fusion which meets the Aristotelian notion of person as a psychosomatic entity (also, at that time, Aristotelian technical definition of man substituted the Platonic one (1995, 135)). In other words, emphasizing connection or continuity between the two worlds is concern with preservation of the earthly form (which would ensure recognisability in all spheres), then the interest in the identity that appeared in the thirteenth century. For, considering the soul is the form of the body and the body is the expression of this form, their common denominator is the form which was in conformity with what Aristotle understood as the identity. This is the theory of formal identity, represented by (above mentioned) Aquinas, Albert the Great, and Giles of Rome (Walker Bynum, 1995, 256-271). To sum up, *similitudo* or inseparable connection further means the identity (in sense of close similarity).

Furthermore, as stated by Aquinas (who was one of the first thinkers that started to distinguish individuality from numerical difference (Walker Bynum, 1995, 255)), this inseparable connection is a basis for the individuality which is mutual denotement, namely the soul is the single form that makes the body individual, and is differentiated from other souls in reverse (Sweeney, 1996, 182-186). Hence, *similitudo*, which also refers to the individual mirror image, ties the soul and the body into the mirror relationship: this is particularly evident in the Budapest (OSK, Cod. lat. 242) and Munich illustrations (BSB, Cgm. 3974). What we actually see are two similar bodies that each stands for the blending of the soul and the body into the self, which as

30 Bacon (c. 1214 – c. 1292-1294?) contributed one of the most important medieval treatise on signs.

31 Roger Bacon, *De signis*, Opus maius, 3, 2.

homogeneous cannot be fractured, it is rather doubled by the mirror for the purpose of the self-observation.

Similitudo, the Individual Image

Similitudo, likeness that denotes the relationship between the soul and the body, is a contemporary term for the image, meaning the self which is the individual form demands the image that would express this form; such close connection between the individual and the image is also confirmed by Pliny who explains the origin of the painting with contouring a man's shadow (Stoichita, 1999, 11). Among the soul and the body, the image can be recognized in the latter, for the corpse is "the likeness *par excellence*", and was a medieval site of self-inscription (Camille, 1996, 51-56). In accordance with the fact that the individuality is not superficial (Aquinas locates it in the middle ground between the soul and the body (Sweeney, 1996, 184)), the corpse discussed is intermediate spiritual image (because the *Visio Philiberti* is a dream vision). As such it is comparable to the ghost of Beaucaire who labels himself as "an image of a body that is not a body" (Schmitt, 1998, 198). In other words, the corpse as immaterial, although visible, is a suitable expression of the individual which is neither material body, nor invisible soul, but their common form. Hence, the corpse as the visible form represents the identity like the spirits in general that often carried distinctive features (Schmitt, 1998, 195, 196).

Image and Dualism

The revaluation of the body, which is the visible component of man, implies the revaluation of the image or surpassing the dichotomy between the appearance and the essence. As a fact, the corpse is distinguished from the outer man not only because of the reply, but also because the spiritual image was emancipated from the material body. Therefore the corpse is not the appearance that misleads, but rather the incorporeal or mental image to think with, and as such it leads to the truth, concretely, to self-knowledge.

Augustine supports the dichotomy *scientia* (knowledge from the external world) – *sapientia* (wisdom from God), namely he acknowledges the inner truth, while sense data deteriorate the soul (Canuteson, 1975, 5-16). And *imago Dei*, likeness to God who is invisible, and whose shapeless gleam is put in man's soul (Ackerman, 1962, 550, 551) which is accordingly theomorphic, can be recovered only by turning away from the visible world, therefore Augustine strives for surpassing the image. On the other hand, he already differentiates the spiritual image from the corporeal, for it is used, not enjoyed (Hahn, 2006, 46). However, pseudo-Augustine's *De spiritu et anima* defines the apparitions

as only semblances of bodily things (Schmitt, 1998, 28), so the inner image cannot be distinguished from the external appearance or the outer man, thus the dichotomy is maintained – until the thirteenth century, when the cognitive function of the image was stressed (instead of its ontological relation to reality) (Lewis, 1995, 8). Differently, visions of the other world, importantly marked by folklore that does not comply with the theological distinction between material and spiritual, establish a continuity of earthly world beyond or project images of bodies to the invisible. And due to the Incarnation, God is anthropomorphic and justifies the image; the invisible God which could not be pictured had taken human form and became visible in Christ, and from this perspective He must be imaged (Soskice, 1996, 34). Moreover, from the thirteenth century onwards, images of Christ that emphasize His human nature to enable *imitatio Christi*, following the example of Jesus, were widely spread. The image became of central importance in the late medieval devotion, besides, the use of realism to represent Christ's bodily torment legalized likeness to oneself that was problematic; originality or idiosyncrasy were close to heresy (Gurevich, 1995, 199). The reason for acknowledgement of the functionality of the image lies in the change in attitudes towards corporeal imagery of that time; speculation or meditative promotion to the inwards and finally to God endeavours to bridge the gap between the outer and the inner world (which is the distance from God) with the very image (Hamburger, 1998, 146, 147). That is, the image, previously comprehended as a barrier to God, was afterwards privileged as mediating between the worlds or supposed to be leading from the sensual to the abstract (Melion, 2007, 2). An example is Dante: even though he abides the dualistic antithesis between the essence and the appearance when separating the shadow (or image) from its body, he does not restrict the appearance to the external world or to the outer man. Rather, the shadow, since liberated from its mortal body, passes into the beyond which is inhabited by living shadows or souls (Belting, 2004, 208-217), meaning the image of the body is transferred to the soul which is thus somatomorphic. Visuality was characteristic of the Late Middle Ages when the nature of human knowledge was labeled as somatic, for everything was thought in images, hence the dichotomy between the appearance and the essence was abolished (Camille, 2000, 197-212). Or in the words of Hamburger: "This turn towards the world implies a fundamental continuity between man, nature, and Creator altogether different from the 'bifurcation or separation of man from nature' characteristic of the Platonic tradition." (2000, 374)

Similitudo as Connection between the Visible Body and the Invisible Soul

In short, Augustine separates the inner and the outer man, therefore the visible body conceals the true identity – with God, whereas speculation conjoins the inner and the outer vision (Hamburger, 2000, 396), which means the external appearance

directs to the internal truth. In the *Visio Philiberti* too, the body does not represent the outer man that leads away from God, it is rather a creation which steers towards the Creator, because it is interpreted positively, namely the body is related to the soul as its image. For, *similitudo*, likeness is the thirteenth-century concept of the image that, in between the soul and the body, establishes spiritual similarity. Furthermore, the Neoplatonistic boundary between the essence and the appearance, implicit in this concept, is exceeded, since in the Late Middle Ages the meaning was drawn from the image (and no longer read into it) (see Smith, 1981, 568-589). That is, *similitudo* reveals deep connection between the soul and the body instead of their ontological difference. The speaking corpse is "live image" where the life or the soul as the principle of animation is implied (Freedberg, 1989, 285), thus the soul is not divided from the visible world, but incorporated in the body; for instance, Socrates claims that the invisible soul is expressed by the physiognomy, and can consequently be depicted by imitating the appearance (Nash, 2006, 193).

To Extract or Abstract the Soul from the Body

However, in the Middle Ages, this is was not as self-evident as with Socrates. At first the deep connection between the signifier and the signified was in verbal domain. For example, according to Raoul de Houdenc[32] (or his *Roman des eles*, written around 1210), close resemblance is the relationship between the concept and its name. He denotes this relationship with the verb *portraire*, to portray, therefore the word *portret*, represents the thought. Nevertheless, when the image as decipherable was equated to the visible word (Lewis, 1995, 9), the essential resemblance got expanded to the more superficial visual level, and abstract concepts such as the soul were represented by human figures, also *portraiture*, portraits (Perkinson, 2004, 16-18). Hence, to portray meant to reveal the soul in the bodily appearance in a sense of the abstraction of the mental image of the body from the individual flesh, for the term *portraiture* derives from the Latin verb *protrahere*, to extract. Accordingly, Villard de Honnecourt[33] emphasizes that portraying is the opposite of *contrefaire*, imitation of the outward appearance which results only in the similarity on the surface, and therefore cannot capture the essence: "… (cest livre) si trouverés le force de le portraiture, les trais, ensi come li ars de jometri le commande et ensaigne."[34] This explains his generic figures that differ much from the ulterior practice of portraiture – the representation of physiognomic details.

32 A French poet (c. 1165 – c. 1230), then comparable to Chrétien de Troyes.

33 A thirteenth century artist (c. 1225 – c. 1250), known through his portfolio that dates from about 1220-1240.

34 Villard de Honnecourt, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris, MS Fr 19093, 1v. See also Hahnloser, 1972.

To Imitate the Body as the Expression of the Soul

However, the corpse in the illustrations is not only similar to the soul but also different from it. In comparison with the more idealistic or general soul (which always appears as a youth with muscular body and bright curly hair), the body is represented in a realistic manner, with specific features. Schmitt ordered variants of depicting ghosts in six distinct modes and in this rage the corpse corresponds to "the living dead" that does not differ from the living person (1998, 206). Anyway, the corpse does not represent the outer man, because the social status of the deceased is not definite (except maybe in the Munich illustrations (BSB, Cgm. 3974) where the body is clothed), which means the corpse is defined only with the physiognomy. Nonetheless, the illustrations do not depart from the concept of image given by the text, for grasping the soul actually justifies the focus on the bodily appearance, since all, the nominalists, as well as the mystics, start from observation of the visible world (Belting, 1991, 38-40). Moreover, already Villard's pictures were *contrefais al vif*, counterfeited from life, that is, he observed the living models or the looks of the particulars (Perkinson, 2004, 15-23), so the only difference between Villard's final products and the corpse from the illustrations of the *Visio Philiberti* is that the latter is not refined from particularities. The reason for the difference between the concept of the image as laid into the text discussed (contemporary and therefore comparable to Villard's work), and its actualization in the illustrations which all date later than the text itself – after the thirteenth century, is thus time discrepancy only. In the Late Middle Ages the connection between the appearance and the essence was developed fully, in other words, the surface displayed (and no longer just led to) the depth, because the hierarchy of vision[35] was evened out, meaning the soul got visible to the bodily eye. For example, according to Georges Chastellain,[36] the inwardly is identical with the outwardly or *semblant*, outward appearance is the mirror of the soul,[37] and from this point of view, there is no need for its reduction. The particularities were no longer disregarded, on the contrary, they became important (Braunstein, 1987, 556-593), furthermore, and this is crucial, through the tendency to unveil the soul, the self, which can be found in the details of the body, was expressed.

35 The classification of *visio corporealis, visio spiritualis,* and *visio intelectualis.*

36 The official court chronicler of Philip the Good and also a poet (c. 1405-1415 – 1475).

37 Georges Chastellain, *Oeuvres*, 1-8 (ed. de Lettenhove, K.), Bruxelles 1863-1868. See also Belting, 1994, 44-45.

To Portray the Individual

Hence, the body from the *Visio Philiberti* does not represent the soul alone, because bodiliness is integrated,[38] and because the physicality is the expression of the individual (Walker Bynum, 1995, 291-305); the corpse is thus "locus of self-expression" (1995, 333). In the Budapest illustrations (OSK, Cod. lat. 242), the face, that has always been the seat of personal identity (Vermeule, 1981, 43-45), is framed with the shroud, which means that instead of the attributes of a particular social function which make the medieval individual a type, the physiognomy gets centered.[39] Moreover, in the Munich illustrations (BSB, Cgm. 3974), the physiognomy is already defined: we see round cheeks, small round eyes, heart-shaped lips, and fine curly hair. In the London illustrations (Wellcome Library, MS. 49), the prominent nose reminds of the early portraits in profile. And in the Erlangen illustrations (UB, Cod. 542) especially, features are depicted in realistic detail: dark lively eyes, sunken cheeks, distinctive beard and hairdo, and complexion, which is important for medieval perception of personal identity (Braunstein, 1987, 582-586), is specified (see Figure 4).



Figure 4: Dialogue between the Soul and the Body, c.1440, Universitätsbibliothek Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, Cod. 542, 294v).

38 For example, popular comparison of the body to the garment that make the body no more than the garment of the soul which has to be dropped, got infrequent in time.

39 And this fact is contrary to Gurevich's findings on the medieval individual that "cannot be reduced to a psychological entity, merely to a soul-body combination: it includes the individual's social function". (Gurevich, 1995, 171) In my opinion, the individual is, on the contrary, an universal phenomenon which cannot be reduced to social construction.

In short, the corpse that is both, similar and at the same time different from the soul, represents neither the outer man nor the soul, but their combination which is unique.[40]

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Obravnava srednjeveškega dialoga med dušo in telesom ter vprašanje dualizma[41]

Ključne besede: telo, duša, odnos med dušo in telesom, konflikt, kontrast, dualizem, podobnost, identiteta, individuum, podoba

Prispevek temelji na negaciji srednjeveškega dualizma oziroma na razlikovanju telesa od mesa, kot predlaga Suzannah Biernoff (2002). Ta razlika ustreza interpretaciji telesa, pravzaprav trupla, v nekaterih dialogih duše in telesa, med katerimi je tudi priljubljena *Visio Philiberti*. Telo namreč ni grešno meso, temveč je predstavljeno moralno nevtralno oziroma realistično (ne groteskno), saj je tematizirana osebnost in ne ideologija. To pomeni, da obravnavani dialog telesnost loči od problematične šibkosti, oziroma da je telesnost izraz individuuma. V nasprotju s *transi*, kjer je individuum minljiv in izginja z razkrajajočim se mesom (ter nazadnje postane anonimen skelet), individualnost v *Visio Philiberti* ni fiksirana na nestalno snov ali meso. Nosilec individualnosti je nesnovno telo ali duhovna podoba, ki je avtonomna, ker se je odcepila od materialne podlage, torej individualnost ni površinska. Razliko med telesom in mesom upoštevajo tudi ilustracije obravnavanega dialoga, čeprav je ilustracija sama po sebi fizična podoba; pergament kaže podobo individuuma, kakor jo kaže koža. Pergament se namreč od kože hkrati bistveno razlikuje, in sicer koža postane pergament, ko meso postrgajo z nje. Ali, kot se slikovito izrazi Aegidius Romanus, »tekočina se zliva v kožo in izliva iz nje, a koža ostane«[42], kar pomeni, da je v skladu s Pavlom (1 Kor 15, 49) individualnost pojmovana kot individualna oblika, neodvisna od materiala – je vrednota, ki se mora ohraniti. Če povzamem, *Visio Philiberti* dokazuje, da je individualnost v srednjem veku pomembna in izražena s podobo.

41 Članek je zasnovan na prispevku z naslovom *Dialogue between the Soul and the Body: Dualism?*, ki je bil predstavljen na konferenci »Iconology Old and New. Transregional Conference on the Move. Croatia and Hungary, 2013. Part Three: European Iconology East & West 5: Cultural Imageries of Body and Soul & Intermedial Representations of the Corporeal, the Psychic and the Spiritual« na Univerzi v Szegedu leta 2013.

42 Aegidius Romanus, *Quaestiones de resurrectione mortuorum* (ur. Nolan, K.), Roma 1967, q. 3, str. 110, vrstice 184–197. Izraz »koža« se nanaša na kozjo kožo, ki so jo uporabljali kot zbiralnik za vodo.

Barbara Peklar

Discussing Medieval Dialogue between the Soul and the Body and Question of Dualism[43]

Keywords: body, soul, relationship of, conflict, contrast, dualism, likeness, identity, individual, image

This contribution is based on the rejection of medieval dualism or on distinguishing the body from the flesh, as suggested by Suzannah Biernoff (2002). This differentiation corresponds to an interpretation of the body, actually corpse, within some of the body and soul debates including the popular *Visio Philiberti*. Here the body is not sinful flesh, but is presented neutrally or realistically (not grotesquely), because the personality is thematized instead of the ideology. Thus in this debate, physicality is distinct from problematic weakness, and expresses the individual. This means that, unlike in the *transi* where the individual is transient or perishes with the decaying flesh (and finally becomes an anonymous skeleton), individuality is not fixed to the flesh or inconstant matter. Rather, it is carried by the incorporeal body or spiritual image which is autonomous or distinct from its material grounding, and so individuality is not superficial. The difference between the body and the flesh is also maintained in illustrations, although they are corporeal images, since the parchment displays the image of the individual just as skin does, however, in the preparation of parchment, the flesh was removed from the skin. Or, in the picturesque words of Giles of Rome, "liquid is taken into and poured out of a waterskin but the skin remains",[44] meaning, in accordance with Paul (1 Corinthians 15, 49), individuality is the individual form, independent of material, and therefore worth preserving. In short, not only the individuality is important, but it also has to be expressed by the image.

43 This contribution is based on the presentation, titled *Dialogue between the Soul and the body: Dualism?*, discussed at the conference "Iconology Old and New. Transregional Conference on the Move. Croatia and Hungary, 2013. Part Three: European Iconology East & West 5: Cultural Imageries of Body and Soul – Intermedial Representations of the Corporeal, the Psychic and the Spiritual" at the University of Szeged in 2013.

44 Aegidius Romanus, *Quaestiones de resurrectione mortuorum* (ed. Nolan, K.), Roma 1967, q. 3, p. 110, lines 184-197. For the translation see Walker Bynum, 1995, 238, 239.