

HONOR AMONG THE *PHILOSOPHES*: THE HUME-ROUSSEAU AFFAIR REVISITED*

John MARTIN

Trinity University, Dept. of History, USA-San Antonio, TX 78212-7200

ABSTRACT

*This essay looks to the famous Hume-Rousseau dispute of 1766 as a case study in the history of honor. Scholars have often seen the late eighteenth-century as the period in which the early modern notion of honor as a matter of one's external reputation gave way to a modern notion of honor as an internal virtue. To the contrary, Martin argues that Rousseau's efforts to displace the concern with reputation (famously developed in his novel *Julie*) were undermined by Rousseau's own continuing preoccupation with his standing in the Republic of Letters. Rousseau's strategy in the dispute leaves us with a paradoxical legacy: we moderns crave honor, even as we recognize that it is insincere to do so.*

Key words: honour, ethical values, Hume, sincerity, Rousseau, 18th century

Questa lettera dunque ti troverà a Londra...io sto aspettando che la malinconia del clima e il fondo feroce degli abitanti ti disgustino non meno che la spesa, che bisogna fare per ogni minima cosa. Da te sapremo qualche nuova di Rousseau, di cui hai sentito parlare tanto a traverso in Parigi; sappi che Beccaria comincia a ritirarsi un passo dal giudizio datone e sappi che quanti di noi hanno letto le cose ultimamente stampate sono decisamente per Rousseau e risguardiamo il signor Hume come uomo, che fa sospettare del suo carattere e sicuramente dimostra di non avere la delicatezza e sensibilità, che merita di trovare in un amico il signor Gian Giacomo.

- Pietro Verri to Alessandro Verri, 15 December 1766 [CCR, no. 5621]

* I presented an earlier version of this paper at the conference "Honour. Identity and Ambiguity in Informal Legal Practice," at Koper, Slovenia, November 11-13, 1999. I am most appreciative to the organizers of that conference as well as to Trinity University for the financial support that made my participation possible. The current paper constitutes a fragment of a work in progress on the history of sincerity in early modern Europe.

In January 1766 the French *philosophe* Jean-Jacques Rousseau, persecuted in both France and Switzerland for his writings, arrived in London in the company of the Scottish philosopher David Hume. Working through a series of friends and contacts, Hume, who had voluntarily assumed the role of Rousseau's patron and protector, spirited Rousseau out of France, found temporary lodging for him in London, introduced him to English society, and then arranged for him to live in the English countryside, at Wootton in Derbyshire.

At first things went smoothly between the two men who, earlier, had known each other only by reputation. For a short time, it even seemed that a deep friendship might develop. But all this changed in early April when a letter spoofing Rousseau was published in the *St. James' Chronicle*. The letter (allegedly written by Frederick, King of Prussia, to Rousseau himself) took aim above all at Jean-Jacques's eccentricities. "You can find a quiet haven within my States. I wish you well and shall treat you kindly," it read, adding the promise to "provide you with such misfortunes as you wish; and, unlike your enemies whose attitude is very different, I shall cease persecuting you when you stop taking pride in being persecuted." (Pottle, 1967, 259)

Predictably Rousseau took this letter as an attack upon his honor. He wrote the editor of the *Chronicle* and demanded an apology. But Rousseau also suspected that Hume, his apparent friend, had played a collaborative role in the writing of the letter that Rousseau believed to be the work of his enemy, the French philosophe Jean Le Rond d'Alembert. And as Rousseau thought back over his association with Hume, he began to discern a number of "signs" that only led him further to suspect the machinations of the Scottish philosopher. Rousseau must have stewed about this matter for some time, for in late June he made his suspicions known to Hume. "Vous vous êtes mal caché," Rousseau wrote to his one-time friend. "Vous m'amenez en Angleterre, en apparence pour m'y procurer un azile, et en effet pour m'y deshonoré." (CCR, no. 5242)

Now it was no small matter in early modern Europe, even in the Republic of Letters, to accuse a gentleman, as Rousseau did Hume, of lying, of intentionally and deliberately deceiving another. "To give the lie" - to make such an accusation - was a challenge to another's honor. Rousseau may have felt dishonored by the "King of Prussia" letter in the *Saint James' Chronicle*, but Hume was now dishonored by Jean-Jacques. In a carefully crafted response, Hume both defended his honor and offered Rousseau a way to save face. "I shall charitably suppose that some infamous Calumniator has belyed me to you: But in that case, it is your Duty, and I am persuaded in it will be your Inclination, to give me an Opportunity of detecting him and of justifying myself... You owe this to me, you owe it to Yourself, you owe it to Truth and Honour and Justice." (CCR, no. 5246) But Rousseau did not take up the offer for a graceful reconciliation. Hume had, in fact, misunderstood Jean-Jacques, whose letter was, at heart, a plea for reassurance, an invitation to Hume to reassert

his friendship. When this invitation (which was, after all, veiled) was declined, Rousseau had no choice but to push his charges further (Starobinski, 1957, 163-168). In a long letter written in early July, Rousseau laid his charges before his former friend (CCR, nos. 5274, 5274bis, 5274ter).

Given both the rhetorical power and the nearly legalistic tone of Rousseau's letter, Hume now feared that Rousseau was on the verge of publicizing the charges against him. Accordingly, over the next few months Hume engaged in a steady effort to shore up his reputation. He wrote friends justifying his own actions in an attempt to inoculate himself against Rousseau's potential attack. On 15 July - the day he received the letter from Rousseau - Hume wrote long, defensive letters to d'Alembert, to the comtesse de Boufflers-Rouverel, to Richard Davenport, and to Hugh Blair (CCR, nos. 5281, 5282, 5283, 5284). He solicited a letter from Horace Walpole, the author of the letter mocking Rousseau, in order to exonerate himself (CCR, no. 5318). Eventually word reached Jean-Jacques that Hume was considering publishing, as a kind of pre-emptive strike, his correspondence with the French philosophe. When Rousseau learned of these intentions, he stated, "s'il l'ose faire, à moins d'énormes falsifications, je prédis hardement que, malgré son extrême adresse et celle de ses amis, sans même que je m'en mêle, M. Hume est un homme démasqué." (CCR, 5332).

But how would Hume defend his honor? Even in the seventeenth century when dueling was nearly epidemic in England, scholars had rarely resorted to violence to protect their reputations; and in the eighteenth century, after the Church and crown had largely eradicated dueling from English society, such a reaction would have been even more unlikely. Yet Hume could not ignore Rousseau's insult, not only because he was a gentleman, but also because he was a radical philosopher, working at the cutting edge of English empiricism. Hume's credibility was dependent on his reputation for veracity. Indeed, he prided himself on this. To allow another philosopher to attack him and not respond would have meant risking having his own credibility undermined.

Urged on by his friends in France, especially d'Alembert and Julie de Lespinasse, Hume decided to get the facts on the table - to give his own account and document it the best he could (CCR, no. 5300). Thus, Hume rose to the challenge by writing a defense and then publishing the correspondence between himself and Jean-Jacques in a work entitled *Exposé succinct de la contestation qui s'est élevée entre M. Hume et M. Rousseau* (1766; English trans. 1766; Italian trans. 1767). Throughout Europe the public looked on with great interest. Commenting on the interest it attracted, Friedrich Melchior Grimm noted in a letter to the Comtesse de Boufflers that "a declaration of war between two great European powers could not have caused a greater stir." (Goodman, 1991-92, 188-189). Hume and his allies fully expected to win the case and be victorious in the court of public opinion. In the end, however, it was Rousseau who carried the day.

Rousseau's triumph derived, as we shall see, from his explicit appeal to sincerity - an ideal that proved to have far greater currency in the court of public opinion than did Hume's appeal to Reason. Moreover, to a large degree the outcome of this dispute appears to fit in neatly with what many historians believe to have been a fundamental shift in the code of honor in the later half of the eighteenth century. In this period, they believe, the traditional medieval and early modern codes of honor (in which honor was conceived as reputation or an external quality) gave way to modern notions (which view honor as an internal or intrinsic personal quality) (Stewart, 1994, 39-41). Certainly, the history of eighteenth-century political thought seems to support this view. While Montesquieu had argued for the preeminence of honor as the dominant political value in the early eighteenth century, later philosophes - most notably Voltaire and Rousseau - had challenged this ideal, making the case for personal virtue as the well-spring of political life (Pappas, 1982; Blum, 1986).

In general, I accept the view that eighteenth-century thinkers came to view honor increasingly as a function of internal or intrinsic motivations. Indeed, Rousseau himself played a significant role in fashioning just such notions of internal virtue in the modern definition of honor. Thus honor - or so Rousseau publicly claimed - was a matter of integrity (an index of the internal state of one's soul) rather than a matter of social reputation as it was for Hume. As Julie expressed it to her lover St.-Preux in Rousseau's best-selling novel *Julie, ou la nouvelle Héloïse*, first published in 1761, "*L'honneur d'un homme... n'est point au pouvoir d'un autre; il est en lui-même et non dans l'opinion du peuple; il ne se défend ni par l'épée ni par les boucliers, mais par une vie intègre et irréprochable.*" (Rousseau, 1964, 158). Rousseau, in short, played a pivotal role in the shift in the European understanding of honor as a code of conduct shaped by a predominantly military and aristocratic ethos to honor understood as personal virtue. Reputation had given way - or so it seemed - to the ideal of the "*vie intègre*," to sincerity of intention. It was precisely this discourse that shifted the notion of honor from its status as an external quality to its status as an internal virtue.

But the emphasis on this shift formulated in these terms (external vs. internal, social vs. psychological, other-directed vs. inner-directed, and so on) masks, I believe, a fundamental characteristic of honor: namely, that it is primarily a matter of cultural capital and that it changes much less than do the cultural forms on which it draws. Honor, in short, is a function of the social values and customs of particular societies and even of specific settings in specific societies, with the result that a social analysis of the place of honor is a prerequisite to an understanding of this term (Bourdieu, 1977, 171-183; Pitt-Rivers, 1966). It is from within this framework that I wish to explore the Hume-Rousseau affair. In particular, it is my goal to demonstrate that, despite the apparent discrepancies in their strategies, both Hume and Rousseau were profoundly concerned with reputation. Each was perennially anxious about his

standing in the Republic of Letters. Their differences stemmed, therefore, not so much from a different perception of honor *per se* as from their differing views of identity and selfhood - views that had been shaped by profoundly different experiences as well as by social and cultural locations within eighteenth-century Europe.

To the gentlemanly Hume, as we shall see, the movement to reassert his honor was largely a direct appeal to external guarantees (from friends and from documents) that he had behaved in a respectable fashion. By contrast, Rousseau's strategy moved in precisely the opposite direction. A brilliant man shut out of the higher circles of European society both by background and by temperament, Rousseau downplayed his concern with reputation and stressed, instead, that it was one's heart, one's feelings, one's motives that ultimately mattered. Paradoxically, however, Rousseau's appeal was in fact to a great public - one he had in a sense helped fashion - of men and women who, like him, had grown frustrated by the emphasis placed on such external or conditional markers of honor as noble birth.

Historians have explored the Hume-Rousseau dispute - *cette affaire infernale* - from a number of angles. As we might expect, biographers, with no little partisanship, have devoted considerable attention to the dispute, and they have made much of the differing temperaments of the two men (Ritchie, 1807; Burton, 1846; Greig, 1931; Mossner, 1980; Guéhenno, 1966; Cranston, 1997). Several scholars have also focused on the dispute itself. The historian Dena Goodman, in her excellent study of the case, has argued that Rousseau and Hume not only clashed over the facts of the dispute. They also operated out of two "opposing conceptions of truth." (Goodman, 1991-1992, 188; Peoples, 1927-1928; Guillemin, 1942; Linares, 1991). "Rousseau," she notes, capitalized on the intimacy of the letter form, while Hume...emphasized the documentary aspect of the annotated correspondence." (Goodman, 1991-1992, 183). And indeed Hume's instructions concerning the publication of the *Exposé succinct* as well as its English translation go to great lengths to stress the factuality of his claims. In an especially impressive documentary move, Hume offered to deposit the originals of the letters in the British Museum. By contrast, Rousseau's letters appealed to sentiment, to emotion, and to the heart. Thus, in Goodman's view, this affair revealed a fundamental tension in European culture between the Enlightenment commitment to reason, veracity, and documentation, and the new, emerging ethic of sincerity and feeling that Rousseau himself had done so much to popularize.

Hume and Rousseau were both radical critics of traditional epistemologies. Both staked their reputations on extremely strong claims about the discernment of truth, but truth was also, as Steven Shapin has eloquently argued in his *Social History of Truth*, a construction (Shapin, 1994). Truth in the abstract, that is, is a fiction. Truth is always embedded in social relations. What renders the Hume-Rousseau debate so significant is that for both protagonists their reputations were implicated in their truth

claims, while their honor depended largely on their ability to persuade the public of their individual views of the truth.

Hume's task was especially delicate. Having made the rejection of all metaphysical notions of the transcendental self or ego - whether the self was conceived as the Cartesian *res cogitans* or as the Christian soul - he was not able to appeal to either his sincerity, his intentions, or his conscience to validate his honor. The proof of his claims required empirical documentation or evidence. Thus, the traditional view of truthfulness in early modern England that "the word of a gentleman was not only a matter of public reputation but was also construed as flowing from an individual's inner nature" was not available to Hume; nor were any claims of authentic gentility (Shapin, 1994, 68). To the contrary, Hume's defense of himself, was tied to a far more fragile notion of the self. To Hume, the self, was, after all, nothing but a "fiction." It was, in his words, "a kind of theatre," a sphere in which "perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away." Thus, Hume continued, each of us is "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions." (Hume, 1978, 253; see also Pike, 1967; Penelhum, 1975). Hume's validation of his truth, therefore, required documentation, empiricism, impartiality. But in the fluid world of early modern publishing, such documentary transparency was virtually impossible.

From the very beginning, Hume's efforts to defend himself and his reputation were vexed. The publication of the *Exposé succinct*, after all, was to a large degree the initiative of d'Alembert. In a letter dated 15 July 1765, shortly after reading Rousseau's accusatory epistle, Hume wrote to d'Alembert to defend himself from Rousseau's insinuations. And in this letter, Hume offered to send along copies of "quelques lettres que nous (i.e. Hume and Rousseau) nous sommes écrits." (CCR, no. 5281). Shortly afterwards, d'Alembert responded, stating that he and several of his Parisian friends were convinced that Hume must publish his defense: "vous devez," d'Alembert wrote to his Scottish friend, "donner cette histoire au public avec toutes ces circonstances." (CCR, no. 5300). Hume then sent the transcripts over to d'Alembert in Paris. At this point, the work left Hume's hands, only to be doctored by his Parisian friends. In October 1766 d'Alembert's circle working closely with Jean-Baptiste-Antoine Suard published the *Exposé succinct*. Hume, however, needed or believed he still needed an English translation. But he now faced a dilemma. His French allies - who were also, we must remember, Rousseau's enemies - had taken certain liberties with the original documents (Meyer, 1952). Should he publish an English translation that would follow the original correspondence exactly - or should he publish an English version that would follow the *Exposé succinct*? In his letter to William Strahan, his London publisher, Hume makes his own desires clear:

"I shall immediately send you up a Copy of the original Manuscript, which is partly English, partly French; but more of the latter Language, which must be

translated.... *The Method the Translator must proceed is this.... Let him compare exactly the French narration with my English: Where they agree, let him insert my English: Where they differ, let him follow the French and translate it: The Reason of this is, that I allowed my Friends at Paris to make what alterations they thought proper; and I am desirous of following exactly the Paris Edition. All my letters must be printed verbatim, conformable to the Manuscript I send you*" (CCR, no. 5485).

To be sure, there was to be no alteration of Rousseau's letters here, but there was of Hume's. Moreover, Strahan was an awkward choice. First he was the editor of the *Saint James' Chronicle*, where the "King of Prussia" letter had originally appeared. Moreover, he showed no inclination to follow Hume's instructions on the matter of the English translation. And against Hume's explicit wishes, he had revealed the identities of two prominent French noblewomen whose names had been suppressed in the French version (CCR, no. 5576bis). Nor could Hume control the way the publicity of the affair would develop, once it had become public. Voltaire joined the fray with his own epistolary contribution (Voltaire, 1766). Furthermore, along the way, Hume also managed to alienate his former English publisher David Millar and also the literary cad Horace Walpole, whose spoof of Rousseau had ignited the entire struggle (CCR, nos. 5511, 5522). In short, the publication process had begun to undercut rather than reinforce Hume's credibility. Having severed all claims that the truth was an expression of the internal self, Hume had to rely exclusively on the claim that truth could be socially constructed in a philosophic enterprise of publication that would reclaim his reputation. But the publication process was vexed by the appearance and the reality of the animus of the d'Alembert circle against Rousseau, by the missteps of publishers and translators on both sides of the Channel, by pirated and doctored editions, and even by the curious decision of the trustees of the British Museum not to accept the manuscripts of the Hume-Rousseau correspondence (Mossner, 1980, 530; Johns, 1998). In the end a purely external notion of honor - one that appealed to discrete facts alone, without any reference to intentions or the conscience - proved fragile indeed.

Rousseau sensed this. Rousseau had always been critical of philosophical reasoning as the governing criterion of truth. In his *Profession de foi du Vicaire savoyard*, published originally in Book IV of *Emile*, Rousseau equated philosophy with vanity. Indeed, this critique of reason would play a significant role as we shall see in Rousseau's argument for sincerity (Melzer, 1996). In a famous passage, Rousseau writes: "Quand les philosophes seroient en état de découvrir la vérité, qui d'entre eux prendroit intérêt à elle? Chacun sait bien que son système n'est pas mieux fondé que les autres." (Rousseau, 1964, 569). It is vanity, therefore, that leads to philosophical argument, not love of truth, not reason. Rousseau, therefore, turns within himself to discover the foundations of what is true: "*Portant donc en moi l'amour de la vérité pour toute philosophie, et pour toute méthode une règle facile et simple qui*

me dispense de la vaine subtilité des argumens, je reprends sur cette règle l'examen des connoissances qui m'intéressent, résolu d'admettre pour évidentes toutes celles auxquelles dans la sincérité de mon coeur je ne pourrai refuser mon consentement." (Rousseau, 1964, 570).

It is precisely this strategy he uses in his dispute with Hume. "Je ne sais que ce que je sens," Rousseau wrote Hume in his own defense, adding, "le premier soin de ceux qui trament des noirceurs est de se mettre à couvert des preuves juridiques; il ne feroit pas bon leur intenter des procès. La conviction intérieure admet un autre genre de preuves qui régulent les sentiments d'un honnête homme." (CCR, no. 5274). From the very beginning of his long July letter, therefore, Rousseau struck a rhetorical posture that he knew would unsettle Hume. The strategy was both complex and compelling. Basing his argument on a "conviction intérieure," he moved on, at various points in the letter, to equate this conviction with his heart, his feelings, his soul. At the same time, he claimed a perfect sincerity. He described himself as a man of "open" character, who would be frank and sincere. As was so often the case with Rousseau, it was a sincerity that would transcend language. Thus Rousseau recalled his arrival in England: "En débarquant à Douvre, transporté de toucher enfin cette terre de liberté et d'y être amené par cet homme illustre, je lui saute au cou, je l'embrasse étroitement sans rien dire, mais en couvrant son visage de baisers et de larmes qui parloient assez." (CCR, no. 5274). Jean-Jacques's tears, that is, were pledges of sincerity - expressions that spoke a pure language of the heart. But there is another dimension to Rousseau's rhetoric. Having grounded the self in his feelings and in his heart, his reputation and honor were now safe from external opinion. He left Switzerland, he tells Hume, with his person endangered, but with his honor secure. And he concludes his letter with a similar contrast between the self and the body: "mon corps est affoibli, mais jamais mon âme ne fut plus ferme." Thus, in this carefully crafted letter as in so many of his writings - especially *Julie* and the *Confessions* - Rousseau had crafted a rhetoric of selfhood that was extremely powerful.

Its power, however, was not entirely of Rousseau's own making. In fact, his language struck a favorable chord with the public largely because it drew on conventions of truth-telling that were widespread both in England and on the continent in the early modern period - notions that had begun to develop in the Renaissance and Reformation and which were widely diffused by the mid-seventeenth century (Martin, 1997). Indeed, the appeal of Rousseau's notion of sincerity - despite his claims of originality - derived from its resonance with many quite traditional currents in both Protestant and Catholic culture, particularly Calvinism, Pietism, and Jansenism, each of which had placed great emphasis on the heart as the center of individual identity. Rousseau's ideas also derived from strong currents of anti-courtier literature that had been central to the development of the novel in both France and

England throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Rousseau imagined the self as a highly individuated entity in which the heart - the individual's feelings, passions, affections - defined who one is. Selfhood in Rousseau, therefore, was anything but a fiction. It was a robust reality (Hundert, 1997). In particular Rousseau would have objected to Hume's view that the self is nothing but a theater - an institution against which he had railed famously in his *Lettre à d'Alembert sur les spectacles*. He insisted that the self inside each of us is potentially authentic or genuine, at least if we can achieve sufficient solitude to escape societal pressures to deceive ourselves and others. In short, Rousseau - in radical contrast to Hume - assumed the existence of a true self within.

But a paradox is at work here. Rousseau was every bit as concerned with the public recognition of his claims as Hume was of his. What was new was Rousseau's audience. Hume had labored to protect his reputation as though the only group that mattered was the coterie his fellow philosophers - a relatively well-defined collection of intellectuals who could vouch for his reputation and who, Hume believed, could impress their verdict upon a larger public. Rousseau, by contrast, turned to this growing public - a public that, to a large degree, had been constructed by its shared interest in novels and other new forms of popular literature. It is not that the two groups (the philosophes and the readers of novels) did not overlap, but it is indeed the case that this second, larger group had begun to conceptualize selfhood and the individual in new ways. Rousseau himself had played a large role in this transformation. His novel *Julie ou la nouvelle Héloïse* was the century's bestseller, with over seventy editions published by 1800. As one recent student of the Enlightenment and its readers has observed, "ordinary readers from all ranks of society were swept off their feet. They wept, they suffocated, they raved, they looked deep into their lives and resolved to live better, then they poured their hearts out in more tears." (Darnton, 1984, 242; see also Kelly, 1999). It was these readers who could now understand and empathize with the sufferings of poor Jean-Jacques as he opened up his own heart to them. Thus, turning to them, Rousseau could indeed protect his reputation even while publicly maintaining that the views others had of him simply did not matter. Rejected by Hume, Rousseau could be embraced by his own novel-reading public. He raced to preserve his own honor in a new idiom even as he attacked the aristocratic code of honor of the Old Regime. He craved the esteem of public opinion even as he denounced a concern with reputation as one of the most debilitating vices of the age.

The Hume-Rousseau affair, therefore, brings to the surface several aspects of honor that, in my view, deserve emphasis. The first is that the term "honor" does not refer to a thing in itself. Its meaning, in fact, becomes clearest when it is attributed to a particular social group, as, for instance, when we speak of the honor of aristocrats, of women, or of academics. We might best conceptualize honor therefore as a kind

of credit (or social capital) borrowed against by individuals in a specific social setting. In the ancien régime, aristocrats were often forced to uphold their honor through dueling (despite the well-acknowledged irrationality of the custom), but we must not forget that there were other, equally complex codes of honor in the early modern world, among ordinary women and men, whose vernacular of honor and shame drew on quite different values. (Farr, 1987; Farr 1988; Ruggiero, 1993). In the late eighteenth century, by contrast, a new idiom appears to have emerged, largely through the influence of Rousseau - again, perhaps best summarized by Julie, the central female protagonist of *La nouvelle Héloïse*, when she draws a distinction between "l'honneur réel et l'honneur apparent:" "Qu'y a-t-il de commun entre la gloire d'égorger un homme," she asks rhetorically, "et le témoignage d'une âme droite, et quelle prise peut avoir la vaine opinion d'autrui sur l'honneur véritable dont toutes les racines sont au fond du cœur?" (Rousseau, 1964, 153-154). The new idiom, that is, was one that placed great emphasis on internal convictions - convictions rooted in the heart. Once again, however, this new, dominant idiom undoubtedly continued to coexist with a wide variety of other forms of honor in this same period, whether these codes were explicit, as they were among the military elites of modern Europe, or implicit, as they were in a variety of other social and cultural contexts in the same period.

From this perspective, it was not so much honor itself that had changed as it was the broader cultural framework (what Rousseau would have called the *moeurs*) within which individual men and women sought to reaffirm their reputations. We must speak of the shift from an external to an internal notion of honor, therefore, with caution. What was really involved was a broader cultural shift towards individualism in which honor would take on a new set of meanings. It may seem a subtle distinction, but it is a crucial one if we are to understand the powerful afterlife of honor over the last two hundred years. Not only has honor, after all, continued to exist as a formal code among military elites, civil servants, and academics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Honor, in this same period, has also continued to function as a kind of "invisible code" that colors the difficult choices of ordinary men and women as they seek to preserve their self-esteem and their reputations within the competitive framework of modern bureaucratic and capitalist institutions (Reddy, 1997). Rousseau, therefore, not only laid the foundation for the modern self, he also left a legacy of conflicted views about honor. We crave reputation, but we recognize that such cravings are, as Rousseau himself demonstrates, insincere.

ČAST MED FILOZOFI: NOV POGLED NA AFERO HUME-ROUSSEAU

John MARTIN

Trinity University, Dept. of History, USA-San Antonio, TX 78212-7200

POVZETEK

Avtor v članku raziskuje sloviti spor med Humeom in Rousseaujem iz leta 1766 kot poseben primer v zgodovini časti. Pri analizi Humeovih in Rousseaujevih naporov, da bi ohranila svoj ugled, se naslanja na Rousseaujevo *Correspondence complète*. Analiza v obeh primerih poudarja določene nedoslednosti med nameni obeh protagonistov in dejanskimi načini, kako sta se pehala za svojimi cilji. Humeova prva skrb je bila resnica, ki jo je poskušal dokumentirati na vse mogoče načine, toda vsi njegovi naporji so se izkazali za bolj ali manj jalove zaradi sovraštva d'Alembertovega kroga do Rousseauja in kapric novoveškega založništva. Zdi se, da prav zaradi tega ni mogel izkoristiti Razuma tako učinkovito, kot je upal, ko je poskušal ohraniti svoj ugled. Rousseau je po drugi hlinil brezbrzičnost do ugledu, vendar so bila njegova dejanja vedno preračunana tako, da bi potrdil svoj status kot ene pglavilnih osebnosti in hkrati poudaril svojo nedolžnost v očeh široke javnosti. Toda po tej analizi je mogoče malce podvomiti o tradicionalnem prikazovanju zgodovine časti v poznem 18. stoletju. Namesto da v tem obdobju presojava o premiku od skrbi z javnim ugledom k skrbi z individualno skrbjo, Martin vztraja, da je na to obdobje bolje gledati tako, kot ga definira rastoči poudarek na idealu posameznika, ob paradoksu, da se takšno osredotočenje ni končalo s pristnim izražanjem individualne kreposti toliko kot z željo, da ugled človeka potrdijo njemu sorodni sodobniki. Avtor ob koncu članka poudarja pomen razvijanja definicije časti, kar bi nam omogočilo razumeti njeno vztrajanje kot vladajoče, pa čeprav morda "skrite" vrednote v novem veku po propadu starega režima.

Ključne besede: čast, etične vrednote, iskrenost, Hume, Rousseau, 18. stoletje

SOURCES

Letters

CCR = *Correspondence complète de Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, ed. R. A. Leigh, 44 vols. Geneva: Institut et musée Voltaire, 1965-1985. [my references are to the number of the letter cited; I preserve the original spellings and accents.]

Exposé succinct de la contestation qui s'est élevée entre M. Hume et M. Rousseau, avec les pièces justificatives. "London:" no publisher indicated, 1766.

A Concise and Genuine Account of the Dispute between Mr. Hume and Mr. Rousseau. London: T. Becket and P. A. de Hondt, 1766.

Esposizione della contestazione insorta fra il signor Davide Hume e il signor Gian Jacopo Russo: con le scritture loro giusticative ed una dichiarazione agli editori del Signor d'Alambert (sic). Venice: Luigi Pardini, 1767.

Treatises

- Hume, D. (1978): *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Oxford, Clarendon Press; originally published, 1739-40.
- Rousseau, J.-J. (1995): *A Monsieur d'Alembert sur son article "Genève" et particulièrement sur le projet d'établir un théâtre de comédie en cette Ville in Rousseau, Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond, V: 1-125. Paris, Gaillimard; originally published, 1758.
- Rousseau, J.-J. (1959): *Confessions*, *ibid.*, I: 1-656; originally published, 1782-1789.
- Rousseau, J.-J. (1969): *Emile*, *ibid.*, IV: 239-86; originally published, 1762.
- Rousseau, J.-J. (1964): *Julie ou la nouvelle Héloïse*, *ibid.*, II: 1-793; originally published, 1761.
- Voltaire, (1766): *Le docteur pansophe, ou lettres de Monsieur de Voltaire*. London, no publisher indicated.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Blum, C. (1986): *Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue: The Language of Politics in the French Revolution*. Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1977): *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Burton, J. H. (1846): *Life and Correspondence of David Hume*. Edinburgh, W. Tait.
- Cranston, M. (1997): *The Solitary Self: Jean-Jacques Rousseau in Exile and Adversity*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Darnton, R. (1984): *Readers Respond to Rousseau: The Fabrication of Romantic Sensitivity*. In: Darnton, R: *The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History*. New York, Basic Books.
- Farr, J. R. (1987): *Crimine nel vicinato: ingiurie, matrimonio e onore nella Digione del XVI e XVII secolo*. Quaderni storici, 66: 839-854.
- Farr, J. R. (1988): *Hands of Honor: Artisans and their World in Dijon, 1550-1650*. Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press.
- Goodman, D. (1991-1992): *The Hume-Rousseau Affair: From Private Querelle to Public Procès*. *Eighteenth-Century Studies*, 25: 171-201.
- Goodman, D. (1994): *The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment*. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- Greig, J. Y. T. (1931): *David Hume*. London, J. Cape.

- Guéhenno, J. (1966):** Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Translated by John and Doreen Weightman. 2 vols. New York, Columbia University Press.
- Guillemin, H. (1942):** "Cette Affaire infernale," l'affaire J.-J. Rousseau-Hume. Paris, Plon.
- Hullung, M. (1994):** The Autocritique of Enlightenment: Rousseau and the Philosophes. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.
- Hundert, E. J. (1997):** The European Enlightenment and the History of the Self. In: Porter, R. (ed.): *Rewriting the Self: Histories from the Renaissance to the Present*. London and New York, Routledge, 72-83.
- Johns, A. (1998):** The Nature of the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press.
- Kelly, C. (1999):** Taking Readers as They Are: Rousseau's Turn from Discourse to Novels. *Eighteenth-Century Studies*, 33: 85-101.
- Linares, F. (1991):** Jean-Jacques Rousseaus Bruch mit David Hume. Hildesheim, Georg Olm.
- Martin, J. (1997):** Inventing Sincerity, Refashioning Prudence: The Discovery of the Individual in Renaissance Europe. *American Historical Review*, 102: 1309-1342.
- Melzer, A. M. (1996):** The Origin of the Counter-Enlightenment: Rousseau and the New Religion of Sincerity. *American Political Science Review*, 90: 344-360.
- Meyer, P. H. (1952):** The Manuscript of Hume's Account of his Dispute with Rousseau. *Comparative Literature*, 4: 341-150.
- Mossner, E. C. (1980):** The Life of David Hume. Oxford, Clarendon.
- Nye, R. A. (1993):** Masculinity and Honor Codes in Modern France. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Pappas, J. (1982):** La campagne des philosophes contre l'honneur. In: *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century*, 205. Oxford, At the Taylor Institution.
- Penelhum, T. (1975):** Hume's Theory of the Self Revisited. *Canadian Philosophical Review*, 14: 389-409.
- Peoples, M. H. (1927-1928):** La Querelle Rousseau-Hume. *Annales de la Société Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, 18.
- Pike, N. (1967):** Hume's Bundle Theory of the Self: A Limited Defense. *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 4: 159-165.
- Pitt-Rivers, J. (1966):** Honour and Social Status. In: Peristiany, J. G.: *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Pottle, F. A. (1967):** The Part Played by Horace Walpole and James Boswell in the Quarrel Between Rousseau and Hume: A Reconsideration. In: Huntington Smith, W. (ed.): *Horace Walpole: Writer, Politician, and Connoisseur*. New Haven and London, Yale University Press.

- Reddy, W. M. (1997):** *The Invisible Code: Honor and Sentiment in Postrevolutionary France, 1814-1848.* Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Ritchie, T. E. (1807):** *Account of the Life and Writings of David Hume* (London, 1807).
- Ruggiero, G. (1993):** 'More Dear to Me Than Life Itself:' Marriage, Honor, and a Woman's Reputation in the Renaissance. In: Ruggiero, G.: *Binding Passions: Tales of Magic, Marriage, and Power at the End of the Renaissance.* Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Shapin, S. (1994):** *The Social History of Truth.* Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press.
- Starobinski, J. (1957):** *Jean-Jacques Rousseau: La transparence et l'obstacle.* Paris, Plon.
- Stewart, F. H. (1994):** *Honor.* Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press.