Sodobni vojaški izzivi

Contemporary Military Challenges

Znanstveno-strokovna publikacija Slovenske vojske

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MIGRACIJE IN VARNOST NA STARI CELINI

»Konec hladne vojne ni končal konflikta, ampak je sprožil nove identitete, ki koreninijo v kulturi, in nove vzorce konfliktov med skupinami iz različnih kultur.«

Samuel P. Huntington, Spopad civilizacij, str. 161

MIGRATIONS AND SECURITY ON THE OLD CONTINENT

»The end of the Cold War has not ended conflict but has rather given rise to new identities rooted in culture and to new patterns of conflict among groups from different cultures.«

Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, p. 161

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Liliana Brožič

UVODNIK

MIGRACIJE IN VARNOST NA STARI CELINI

Dve leti mineva od evropske migrantske krize. Jeseni 2015 je Evropo preplavil begunski val, kakršnega nismo pričakovali in si ga nismo znali predstavljati. Presenetil nas je v vseh pogledih. Sodobna tehnologija, ugledne ustanove in vodilni svetovni strokovnjaki z različnih področij niso predvideli tega, kar se je zgodilo. Evropski pravni red, človekove pravice, schengenski režim in ideje Zahoda, ki so se hitro razblinile, nam pa je ostala samo gola realnost.

Kje so begunci zdaj, koliko jih je in kako se počutijo? Kako je begunska kriza vplivala na nacionalnovarnostni sistem, na skupno evropsko obrambno in varnostno politiko? Mediji o tem dve leti pozneje le redko poročajo. Veliko pa se govori o terorističnih napadih po evropskih mestih, o izstopu Velike Britanije iz Evropske unije, o ameriškem predsedniku Donaldu Trumpu in korejskih raketah, ki burkajo Japonsko morje.

Samuel P. Huntington je pred leti napisal knjigo Spopad civilizacij. V Sloveniji je izšla leta 2005. Izhajal je iz predpostavke, da bosta glavna razloga za spopade narodov v prihodnosti njihova kulturna in religiozna identiteta. Napovedal je, da bo največjo grožnjo predstavljal ekstremni terorizem. Različne ideologije bodo zamenjali individualno usmerjeni posamezniki, ki jim ne bo več mar za skupno dobro, temveč bodo osredotočeni nase in svoje koristi. Odsotnost ideologij bo nadomestilo vračanje k starodavnim tradicijam. Odzivi na Huntingtonovo delo so bili zelo različni. Nekateri so bili navdušeni, drugi skeptični. Lahko pa ugotovimo, da se je njegova teorija, ki jo je prvič predstavil leta 1992, potrdila na primeru vojne, ki se je zgodila na Zahodnem Balkanu. Ko se je ideologija nekdanje Jugoslavije razblinila, so se narodi in narodnosti vrnili k svojim koreninam in zgodila se je vojna, ki je zahtevala veliko življenj.

O dejstvu, da je Zahodni Balkan prelomnica različnih kultur, je pisal tudi Robert D. Kaplan v svojih delih. Najbolj znano med njimi je Balkanski duh, v katerem podrobno preučuje zgodovinsko in kulturno turbulenco v neposredni soseščini zibelke zahodne civilizacije, ki je bila zadnjih več kot dva tisoč let gonilo razvoja Zahoda.

Zato nas v tokratni številki Sodobnih vojaških izzivov zanima, kaj je novega na stari celini, s poudarkom na varnostnem, obrambnem in vojaškem področju.

V članku *Geostrateški premiki v sodobni Evropi* **Uroš Tovornik** preučuje geostrateški pomen odnosov med Francijo, Nemčijo in Veliko Britanijo kot držav, ki so v preteklosti krojile usodo Evrope. Z odločitvijo Velike Britanije o izstopu iz Evropske unije se prej klasični geostrateški trikotnik lahko spremeni v druge odločilne geostrateške povezave, ki staro celino lahko zelo spremenijo.

József Kis-Benedek piše o posledicah dogajanja v severni Afriki in na Bližnjem vzhodu. Nekateri avtorji so se v bližnji preteklosti spraševali, ali bo po arabski pomladi nastopila arabska zima, sledila pa sta evropska migrantska kriza ter povečanje terorističnih napadov v Evropi. V članku *Izzivi iraške, sirske in libijske krize za Evropsko unijo* se avtor posveča vprašanju udeležbe borcev na kriznih območjih, ki prihajajo na pomoč iz Evrope.

Gospodarska obveščevalna dejavnost: neizogibna izbira je naslov članka, ki ga je napisal **Laris Gaiser**. V njem poudarja nujnost večje pozornosti, ki jo mora Slovenija nameniti temu področju, da bo zagotavljala večjo dobrobit svojim državljanom. Po letu 1991 je Slovenija dosegla veliko, toda sodobne varnostne smernice določajo, da je poleg klasičnih nalog na obveščevalno-varnostnem področju pomembna tudi gospodarska obveščevalna dejavnost. Kako je s tem v Sloveniji in kaj bi še morali storiti?

Slovenska vojska že nekaj let sodeluje v mednarodni operaciji in na misiji v Bosni in Hercegovini. Tam ni edina, saj poleg nje za red in mir skrbijo še **številne** druge države članice Evropske unije. Kako dolgo bo še tako in kako uspešne so mednarodne varnostne sile na tem območju? Na to in nekatera druga vprašanja poskušajo odgovoriti avtorji **Ivana Boštjančič Pulko, Johanna Suhonen** in **Kari Sainio** v članku *Ocenjevanje načrtovanja in izvajanja misij ter operacij EU: študija primera EUFOR Althea v Bosni in Hercegovini*.

Kibernetika, kibernetski prostor in kibernetski napadi so splošno znani pojmi, o katerih zadnje čase veliko slišimo in beremo. Ali te pojme res dobro poznamo? Kako je s pravnimi podlagami na nacionalni ravni in kako je to področje urejeno v mednarodnem okolju? To je izziv, na katerega je treba najti strateške in povsem konkretne odgovore. Enega izmed mogočih lahko najdemo v članku *Zakonitost nizkointenzivnih kibernetskih operacij po mednarodnem pravu* avtorice **Pike Šarf.**

Vojaško letalstvo je sestavni del sodobnih oboroženih sil. Slovensko je razmeroma mlado in je v svoji kratki zgodovini doživelo več razvojnih faz tako na področju letalske stroke kot tudi v organizacijskem vojaškem smislu. Kakovostno sodelovanje slovenskih vojaških pilotov v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah ter mednarodnih vojaških vajah priča o tem, da smo na pravi poti. Toda kako naprej? Avtor **Mitja Lipovšek** se v članku *Slovensko vojaško letalstvo danes in čez 20 let* sklicuje na misel, da je zgodovina razprava preteklosti s sedanjostjo za prihodnost.

Obilo zanimivega branja vam želimo in vas vabimo k sodelovanju tudi kot avtorje člankov.

EDITORIAL

MIGRATIONS AND SECURITY
ON THE OLD CONTINENT

It has been two years since the European migrant crisis. In autumn 2015, Europe was flooded by a refugee wave that people neither expected nor imagined. It was a surprise in every way. Modern technology, reputable institutions, and leading global experts from different fields did not anticipate what happened. The European legal order, human rights, the Schengen regime, and the ideas of the West dissolved quickly and left people faced with a naked reality.

Where are the refugees now, how many are there, and how do they feel? How did the refugee crisis affect the national security system and the common European defence and security policy? The media rarely reports on this now, two years later. Instead, there is much talk of terrorist attacks in European cities, the UK's exit from the European Union, the US President, Donald Trump, and the Korean rockets that ruffle the Japanese sea.

Years ago, Samuel P. Huntington wrote a book The Clash of Civilizations. It was published in Slovenia in 2005. His assumption was that the main reason for the clash of nations in the future would be their cultural and religious identity. He predicted that the greatest threat would be extreme terrorism. Different ideologies would be replaced by self-oriented individuals, who would no longer be concerned about the common good, but focused on themselves and their benefits. The absence of ideologies would be replaced by a return to ancient traditions. Responses to Huntington's work were very different; some were enthusiastic, others sceptical. We can, however, conclude that his theory, first presented in 1992, was confirmed in the case of the war in the Western Balkans. When the ideology of former Yugoslavia died, the nations and nationalities returned to their roots, which resulted in a war that claimed the lives of many people.

Robert D. Kaplan also wrote about the fact that the Western Balkans is a crossroads of different cultures. The most famous of his works is Balkan Ghosts, in which Kaplan examines in detail the historical and cultural turbulence in the immediate neighbourhood of the cradle of Western civilization, which has been the driving force behind the development of the West for the past two thousand years.

This issue of Contemporary Military Challenges is therefore interested in what is new on the Old Continent, emphasizing security, defence and the military.

In his article *Geostrategic Shifts in Contemporary Europe*, **Uroš Tovornik** examines the geostrategic significance of the relationships between France, Germany and the United Kingdom, the countries that shaped the fate of Europe in the past. With the UK's decision to leave the European Union, the former classic geostrategic triangle can now turn into other decisive geostrategic links which could greatly change the Old Continent.

József Kis Benedek writes about the consequences of events in North Africa and the Middle East. In the recent past, some authors have wondered whether the Arab Spring would be followed by Arab Winter; however, what followed was the European migrant crisis and the escalation of terrorist attacks in Europe. In his article *Challenges Posed to the European Union by the Iraqi, Syrian and Libyan Crises*, the author focuses on the participation of foreign fighters in crisis areas, coming from Europe to aid.

Economic Intelligence: an Inevitable Choice is the title of an article written by **Laris Gaiser**. It stresses the urgent need for Slovenia to devote greater attention to this area in order to ensure greater benefits for its citizens. Slovenia has come a long way since 1991, but modern security guidelines stipulate that, besides classic tasks in the intelligence and security field, economic intelligence is also important. What is the situation in Slovenia and what else should we do?

For several years, the Slovenian Armed Forces have been involved in the international operation and mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Slovenia is accompanied by many other European Union member states, ensuring peace and order in the country. How long will this go on, and how successful are the international security forces in the area? It is this and some other questions that the authors **Ivana Boštjančič Pulko, Johanna Suhonen** and **Kari Sainio** try to answer in the article *Assessing the Planning and Implementation of the EU Missions and Operations: Case Study of EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina.*

Cybernetics, cyberspace and cyber attacks are commonly known terms of which much has been heard and read about recently. How well do we really know these terms? Is there a legal basis at the national level and how is this field regulated in the international environment? This is a challenge requiring strategic and concrete answers. One of the possible answers can be found in the article *Legality of Low-Intensity Cyber Operations under International Law* by **Pika Šarf**.

Military aviation is an integral part of the modern armed forces. Slovenian military aviation is relatively young and has, in its short history, experienced several development phases, both in the field of aeronautics and in the organizational military sense. The quality of cooperation of Slovenian military pilots in international operations, missions, and international military exercises testifies that we are on the right track. But how to proceed? In his article, *Characteristics of the Slovenian Armed Forces Air Force: Now and 20 Years in the future*, the author **Mitja Lipovšek** refers to the idea that history is a debate of the past with the present for the future.

We wish you an interesting read, and invite you to also participate as authors of articles.

Uroš Tovornik

GEOSTRATEŠKI PREMIKI V SODOBNI EVROPI

GEOSTRATEGIC SHIFTS IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE

Povzetek   Članek analizira geostrateške spremembe v današnji Evropi in svetu, ki smo jim priča od konca hladne vojne in predvsem od leta 2014 naprej. Klasična geopolitična dinamika se je vrnila in geopolitične teorije, kot sta osrčje in obrobje, so ponovno aktualne. Posledično se na svetovni oder vračajo tudi klasični geostrateški igralci. Članek analizira premike v treh evropskih državah in hkrati članicah Evropske unije, ki so v preteklih stoletjih krojile usodo Evrope, in sicer Francije, Nemčije in Združenega kraljestva. Geostrateške igre v Evropi so zmeraj imele globalne posledice, zato je bila v članku posebna pozornost namenjena tudi ZDA in Rusiji, njunim geopolitičnim interesom in geostrateškemu repozicioniranju. Sčasoma postaja jasno, da smo v tranziciji in na poti k oblikovanju nove evropske in svetovne strateške arhitekture. V tem smislu članek prepoznava nove porajajoče se geostrateške vektorje v Evropi. Ti lahko po eni strani opredeljujejo novo prihajajoče ravnotežje sil, po drugi strani pa možnost kolizije teh vektorjev. Pri slednjem smo lahko priče nepredvidljivim varnostnim posledicam tako za Evropo kakor tudi za ves svet.

Ključne besede   *Geopolitika, geostrategija, Francija, Nemčija, Združeno kraljestvo, ZDA, Rusija.*

Abstract   This article shows how Europe and the world we are living in have changed drastically since the end of the Cold War, and especially since 2014. Classical geopolitical dynamics have resurfaced; theories, such as Heartland and Rimland, apply time and again. Consequently, classical players on the Europe and world stages are back in the game. The article analyses shifts in the following three traditional European powers and members of the European Union which have shaped the destiny of Europe during the last centuries: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. As strategic games in Europe have always had global dimensions, the United States and Russia's influence and their geostrategic repositioning in Europe is also duly considered. The trend of a transition towards a new strategic architecture in Europe and in the world is ever

more evident; the article thus also indicates the new emerging geostrategic vectors in Europe. On the one hand, they may indicate that a new balance is emerging, and on the other hand, that these vectors might collide. In case of the latter, we may face unprecedented security ramifications for Europe as well as for the entire world.

Key words *Geopolitics, geostrategy, France, Germany, United Kingdom, United States, Russia.*

Introduction Since early 2014, the overall geostrategic situation in Europe has drastically changed. The post Second World War order, which resisted and prospered well beyond the Cold War, has come to a crossroads where peace and security in Europe cannot be taken for granted any longer. The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the war in Ukraine, the mass migration wave in 2015, and the decision taken by the United Kingdom (UK) in a referendum in 2016 to leave the European Union (EU), have unveiled the shaky grounds of Europe's unity and stability.

Under the pressure of these events, the EU, a political and economic framework which has reflected the success of the continental geopolitical reconciliation project, has struggled to find appropriate solutions to revert a trend of renationalization in the integration process. As a consequence, EU member states today find themselves in a changed geopolitical environment constantly trying to adapt to a new strategic context. With the UK leaving, the EU will depend on the Franco-German axis. Yet, the EU is geopolitically part of the wider European continent, and its security is also potentially influenced by two global players, the United States (US) and the Russian Federation (Russia). Any change in Europe must be looked at carefully through the geostrategic lenses of these five countries and the relations between them.

This article will analyse geostrategic changes in France, Germany, the UK, the US and Russia, and will consider several indicators and trends in strategic shifts in Europe. In developing the argument, the geopolitical theories of Harold Mackinder and of Nicholas Spykman will be taken as a foundation. We will present how the two theories are re-applied and how Europe, in particular France, Germany and the UK, have found themselves yet again part of a greater game between the US and Russia, in which the US plays by the rules of the old Truman doctrine based on containment, while Russia tries to penetrate through it. This game has shaped new vectors in Europe which indicate that new alliances are about to be formed or evolved in and around Europe, directly affecting the EU. To conclude, the article will show which emerging geostrategic vectors the author sees as potentially colliding and thus with a potential impact on Europe's security.

1 THE GEOSTRATEGIC SITUATION IN EUROPE

While we were marking the centenary of the First World War, which so profoundly changed the pace of Europe's geopolitical landscape, Europe found itself yet again at a crossroads similar to those witnessed at the beginning of the 20th century. For a

short time in our post-Cold War history there was an impression in Europe that we could, with Euro-Atlantic integrations on the one hand, and a (oil and gas) business oriented Russia on the other, overcome geostrategic axioms. Hence, for the first time in the history of Europe, we could live in peace and prosperity. However, geostrategic algorithms, as so many times in history, have proved it false and utopic.

It seems that the geopolitical theories of the Heartland and Rimland, developed by Mackinder[1] and Spykman[2] in the first half of the last century, have re-emerged on the surface of Europe's geostrategic realities. A century ago Mackinder stated that "who rules Eastern Europe commands the Heartland, who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island, who rules the World-Island commands the World" (Mackinder in Kaplan, 2013, 74). A while later Spykman claimed that "the Rimland of the Eurasian land mass must be viewed as an intermediate region, situated as it is between the Heartland and the marginal seas"[3] and that the "Rimland functions as a vast buffer zone of conflict between sea power and land power" (Spykman, 1944, p. 41). "Who controls Rimland rules Eurasia, who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world" (Spykman, 1944, pp. 41 & 43).

Whereas Mackinder's work points to a struggle of Heartland-dominated land power against sea power, placing the Heartland-based land power in the better position, Spykman held that the "Rimland was the key to world power, as the maritime-oriented Rimland was central to contact with the outside world" (Kaplan, 2013, p. 96). Spykman's theory heavily influenced the US Cold War Containment strategy towards the Soviet Union, which practically controlled the whole of Mackinder's Heartland. This strategy was implemented through the Truman doctrine in 1947, which became the foundation of American foreign policy. It led, in 1949, to the setting up of NATO and to various security agreements in East Asia, such as those with Japan and with South Korea after the Korean War (1950-53). Based on the Containment strategy, the Marshall plan (or the European Recovery Programme) was launched to help recover the economies of the Western European nations and to stimulate them to foster economic cooperation. Even though the European Union does not derive from the Marshall Plan, the latter inspired the European integration process which started in 1951 with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community.

Based on that we are going to present three traditional European powers, France, Germany and the UK, whose relationships are decisive for the future of European integration. These relationships represent the fundamentals of the current order in Europe. These three countries do not exist and act in isolation, but in a complex

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[1] *Harold Mackinder was a British geographer, known for his famous Heartland Theory, which represents a basis of modern geopolitics.*

[2] *Nicholas Spykman was an American political scientist who developed the Rimland theory, which is based on a positive critique of Mackinder's Heartland theory.*

[3] *The European coastline, the Arabian Middle Eastern Desert land (including the Persian coastline), and the Asiatic Monsoon land (including India and the East-Asian coastline).*

strategic context influenced primarily by two additional powers upon which peace and security in Europe and the world depend: the US and Russia. Let us present them one by one.

1.1 France

France is one of the five permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council and a nuclear power. Even though France has been a world power which controlled many of the world's trading routes, it was predominantly continental[4] and less of a maritime power. From the early 19th century up to the Second World War, France had been heavily present in the Western Mediterranean, the gate to the African continent, and controlled much of Western Africa. After the end of the Second World War, though, it lost most of its colonies. In the years following the First World War the German geostrategist Karl Haushofer underlined that despite its remarkable overseas empire, "France's history shows curious changes from continental to oceanic tendencies and back again" (Haushofer in Parker, 1985, Location No. 1649), but that "France, like Germany, did not really understand the importance of the sea and that continental considerations had invariably taken over the oceanic ones". (Parker, 1985, Location No. 1649). According to Pascal Gauchon, French president Charles De Gaulle saw France's rapprochement with Germany after the Second World War as natural, as both countries were continental powers, as opposed to the UK-US axis which represented the two maritime powers (Gauchon, 2012, p. 37). For Olivier Kempf, France's predominantly continental character since the end of the Second World War is due as much to US supremacy on the world seas as to its orientation towards EU integration (Kempf in Billard, 2013). Nevertheless, France's strategic interests today are, in good part, still focused on the Mediterranean, Africa, the Pacific and the Antilles.

According to the French geopolitician Pierre Verluise, the world economic crisis in 2008 was a geopolitical turning point for France. It shifted the central strategic role France had held since the end of the Second World War in favour of Germany. This was evident in 2009, when France sacrificed the traditional strategic and military autonomy it had enjoyed since 1960, when de Gaulle withdrew from the NATO Command Structure, by rejoining the Alliance at the NATO Summit in Strasbourg and Kehl (Verluise, 2012). It was an important strategic shift; as Verluise stresses, since 2008 France had started to balance between an economically dominant Germany and the UK (Verluise, 2012). The military and strategic rapprochement could be seen in regard to nuclear capabilities, as codified in the 2010 French-UK Strategic Treaty (France-UK Treaty, 2010). It was further manifested in 2011, when France, together with the UK and with the support of the US, toppled the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi (Verluise, 2012). This intervention, followed by another, less noticeable one

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[4] *Spykman saw France as a continental power (Spykman, 1944, p. 4).*

in Mali in 2012[5], provided the French military with the opportunity to reassert the country's position in the world and, at the same time, increase French influence in North Africa.

However, since the Crimea crisis in 2014, it seems that France has become more attentive to Russia and closer to Germany. It is interesting that after the terrorist attack on 13 November 2015 in Paris, which turned France's attention even more to the South, France did not invoke NATO's famous Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, but went to the EU for support, based on Article 42, Paragraph 7, of the Lisbon Treaty. Moreover, the French president at the time, Francois Hollande, talked to the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, on how the two countries might cooperate in the fight against terrorism, which Hollande explicitly stated at the NATO Summit in Warsaw (Le Monde, 2016).

It seems that France does not perceive a major threat to its strategic interests emanating from Russia, but rather from the South and South-East, which geographically coincide with its traditional areas of interest: Levant (Syria, Lebanon), the Western Mediterranean and North Africa. At the same time, France must be able to rely on a politically and financially strong EU as its geopolitical platform, which it influences substantially. However, to continue to do so, it must carry out structural changes in its economy, as was the case with Germany, otherwise it could face significant financial difficulties which would leave France in a slightly more junior position towards an economically stable Germany (Verluise, 2012). With the UK leaving the EU, France is being drawn even closer to a financially stable Germany, as their common strategic interest is to politically sustain the ever-weaker EU and the Eurozone.

1.2   Germany

Germany does not have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, but has recently adopted an official position expressing its wish to acquire one in the future (White Paper on Defence, 2016, p. 63). It is predominately a continental power, traditionally oriented towards Central and Eastern Europe and partially towards Anatolia and the Middle East. According to Mackinder, "Germany occupies the central strategic position in Europe" (Mackinder, 1904, p. 436). Lying on the North European plain, its East-West openness puts it in the vulnerable strategic position of potentially being overrun from two sides. Avoiding two fronts at the same time was the permanent aim of Bismarck's[6] strategic thinking. To do so, it needed a strong army and a skilled diplomacy. This was well reflected in Bismarck's statement that "Prussia (and later Germany) was an armed camp in the middle of the plains and its only effective frontiers were its armies" (Parker, 1985, Location No. 1026). Today's Germany draws its strategic thinking from the times of Bismarck, from the

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[5]   *In January 2012, a rebellion against Mali's central government began, which was later taken over by islamists. Based on an official request from the Malian interim government, a French military operation was launched in Mali.*

[6]   *Otto von Bismarck was Germany's first Chancellor, from 1871 to 1890.*

Weimar Republic, and from its reestablishment as West Germany in 1949. Since its reunification with the former East Germany in 1990 and the end of the Cold War it has again become a major European power; today, according to World Bank data from 2015, it is the fifth economy in the World[7] and is by far the largest economy in Europe (The World Bank, 2017). As a country with few natural resources and at the same time gigantic exports due to its industrial production, it is in Germany's interest to have good political relationships with both Russia and the US while preserving its strategic axis with France and thus with the EU, especially as the EU represents its most important market. According to Friedman, "Germany's strategy is still locked in the EU paradigm. However, if the EU paradigm becomes unsupportable, then other strategies will have to be found" (Friedman, 2012, para 27). Friedman does not exclude even a possible future German alliance with Russia (Friedman, 2012, para 27).

Germany has faced various challenges in the last decade, which it did not anticipate and which were neither beneficial for the geostrategic environment it belongs to, nor for its prospects for further industrial and economic development.

The first was the intervention in Libya in 2011 in which Germany, unlike France, deliberately did not participate. That was very different from the French-German unity over the Iraqi war in 2003, when neither of the two countries participated.

The second event was the Crimea crisis and Ukraine conflict starting in 2014, when Germany's reactions were quite reserved; it displayed a rather moderate stance with regard to Russia when compared to its neighbours and Allies in the region, such as Poland, the Baltic States or Romania. Even though Germany aligned itself fully with the US with regard to the Ukraine crisis, it has always toned down those voices who advocated a stronger stance against Russia. The German White paper on Defence summed it up by emphasising that Germany will "promote in NATO a dual approach to Russia, consisting of credible deterrence and defence capability as well as a willingness to engage in dialogue and attempts at cooperative security" (White Paper on Defence, 2016, p. 69).

At the same time, Germany's Eastern neighbourhood, Poland, the Baltic States and Romania, found themselves between the two major players of continental Europe, Germany and Russia. These are the same countries which, at the time of the Second Iraqi war in 2003, lent their support to the US-led coalition in invading Iraq and which Donald Rumsfeld[8] called the "New Europe" (Baker, 2003, para 1). It became evident that the New Europe has become a kind of a buffer zone which separated Germany from Russia and which, at the same time, counted heavily on the support of Washington (and London) rather than on that of Berlin or Paris (Friedman, 2015). But Rumsfeld's term "New Europe" has deeper geopolitical roots emanating from the

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[7] *Russia being the 6th, France 9th, the UK 10th. The US is ahead of Germany, being the 2nd, while China is the 1st.*

[8] *US Defence Secretary between 2001 and 2006.*

Polish President Marshal Jozef Pilsudski's geostrategic concept of the Intermarium[9] and its geopolitical project of Prometheism[10]. "The geopolitical strategies of Prometheism and Intermarium were developed in Poland at the beginning of the 20th century as a counterweight to Russian political aspirations" (**Črnčec**, 2010, p. 37). During the interbellum period, and especially after the end of the Polish-Soviet War in 1921, Pilsudski's plan of Intermarium came to a halt. What remained of it was partly reflected in the Polish-Romanian alliance which lasted until the fall of Poland in 1939. It was not until the end of the Cold War that the idea re-emerged in the shape of the Višegrad Group countries[11]. The latest initiative even encompasses the countries between the Baltic, Black and Adriatic seas, also known as the "Three Seas Initiative"[12]. It may have the potential to evolve into a new geostrategic reality between Germany and Russia. Taking into account the current security situation in Europe, both initiatives, the Višegrad Group and the Three Seas Initiative, fit well into traditional UK geostrategic thinking, based on Mackinder.

The next major event occurred in 2015; the massive influx of Muslim migrants to Germany prompted by the ongoing war in Syria. The security ramifications were immediately visible, beginning with the incidents in Cologne on the Eve of the 2016 New Year, and continuing with attacks across the country during the following few months. Most of those attacks were reported as religiously oriented, and the perpetrators labelled as Muslim radicals. The spillover effect of such events could, however, be far-reaching, as it could carry the seeds of change into German and European political life, leading to the radicalization of the internal political spectrum.

All these challenges have made Germany think about its future position in a geostrategic context that has suddenly become fragile. Germany's strategy still views the EU geostrategic platform, together with NATO, as its cornerstone, and that has been clearly reflected in the latest White Paper on Defence, issued in July 2016. In that paper Germany reiterated that its ''security is based on a strong and resolute North Atlantic Alliance'' and that Germany is "working towards strengthening NATO's European pillar to increase the capacity for action of NATO and the EU." (White Paper, 2016, p. 138). It is explicitly stated that "the long-term goal of German security policy is to create a European Security and Defence Union" (White Paper,

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[9] *Intermarium was a plan pursued after World War I by Polish President Jozef Pilsudski, which would include the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland), Ukraine, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.*

[10] *Prometheism was a political project of Josef Pilsudski, the aim of which was to weaken the Soviet Union by supporting nationalist independence movements among the major non-Russian peoples that lived within the borders of Russia and the Soviet Union.*

[11] *The Višegrad Group (or V4), established in 1991 in the Hungarian town of Višegrad, currently consists of four European Union member states: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. The V4 is a political alliance within the EU with the aim of advancing military, economic and energy cooperation between these countries.*

[12] *Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia agreed in Dubrovnik, Croatia in 2016 to establish the Three Seas Initiative (the countries between the Baltic, Black and Adriatic seas), which geographically also resembles Pilsudski's Intermarium project.*

2016, p. 179). Notably though, the White Paper also states that the country is ready "not only to assume responsibility in international security policy but also to play a substantial and leading role" (White Paper, 2016, p. 139). This signals a shift for Germany, which "has tread softly in global and military affairs since World War II" (Johnson, 2016, para 4). Moreover, with the UK leaving the EU, Germany may focus more on the EU to increase the visibility of the Common Security and Defence Policy to better balance its strategic interests within NATO and vis-à-vis Russia.

1.3   The United Kingdom

The UK is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a nuclear power. It is predominantly a maritime power and, as such, oriented towards the sea. Although it used to control the world's seas, traditionally it has primarily focused on the Atlantic (West) and the North Sea (North); its security, though, has always been interlinked with developments in continental Europe. The UK's security was best explained by Mackinder a century ago; according to him, its security is "dependent on the preservation of a power equilibrium between the maritime and continental states of the world island (Eurasia). If either of the two gained the ascendency, the whole continent would be dominated and the pivot area controlled by the single power. It was therefore the task of British foreign policy to prevent any integration of power on the continent of Europe and, particularly, to see that nothing would lead to an effective military alliance between Germany and Russia," (Mackinder in Spykman, 1944, pp. 36-37).

The strategic situation evolved with the First and Second World Wars. The UK was on the winning side of both Wars, but gradually lost its empire and world influence, mainly to the US. To compensate for this loss, the UK has retained special relations with the US. With European integration becoming more and more attractive, the UK decided to join the then European Economic Community in 1973, immediately followed by its strategic entourage, Ireland and Denmark. Ever since, the UK has provided a permanent transatlantic link and has represented a (strategic) bridge between the EU and the US.

The UK has, throughout its EU membership, objected to the idea of an ever-closer political union, and has never joined the Eurozone or the Schengen area, even though the Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair played with the idea. In 2009, the EU Lisbon Treaty entered into force, including for the very first time in EU history the possibility for a member state to withdraw. With the 2008 financial crisis and its severe ramifications leading to an economic recession across the EU, including in the UK (Van Reenen, 2016), the political atmosphere, especially on the right side of the political spectrum, became ever more Eurosceptic. This prompted the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, to make a political pledge in 2013 to hold a referendum on his country's EU membership (The Economist, 2016). In June 2016, a majority of voters decided to leave the EU (Brexit).

It is difficult to predict the repercussions of Brexit for the EU integration project, but it certainly represents a game-changer at the strategic level. Most probably the UK will define a special relationship with the EU, as it is too big to be strategically and economically overlooked. Nevertheless, in the long run, the UK could slowly start to distance itself from continental Europe. In this respect, it could start searching for new strategic partnerships around the globe, and view the EU as an entity towards which it could apply Mackinder's old strategic paradigm, the balance of powers.

1.4   The United States

The US entered the 21st century as the sole remaining superpower in the world, after the Soviet Union had collapsed ten years earlier. This was a triumphant and unique geostrategic position, which could hardly have been predicted at the beginning of the 20th century. A permanent member of the UN Security Council and a nuclear power, the US expanded its political and economic influence across the globe, which was mirrored in its boosted economy and consistent economic growth throughout the '90s. Spykman characterised the US geopolitical position as being "surrounded geographically by the Eurasian land mass plus the continents of Africa and Australia" (Spykman, 1944, p. 33). Based on that, Spykman claimed that it was in the US's interest to exercise control of the two oceans which divide it from both shores of that land mass and adjacent territories (in particular, the European peninsula and East Asia-Pacific). For this reason, US is in its essence primarily a maritime power, similar to the UK.

Since the end of the Cold War four key events have steered US strategic thinking. At the turn of the century, the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York shifted US strategy towards the War on Terror and interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. The Arab Spring revolutions in North Africa in 2010-2012 resulted in intervention in Libya in 2011 and in the same year sparked a civil war in Syria. The appearance of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014 contributed to an overall deterioration of the situation in a region strategically important for all players, including the US, due to its rich oil and gas reserves.

The global economic crisis, which began with the collapse of Lehman Brothers at the New York stock exchange in 2008, represents the second key event that has had economic as well as geopolitical consequences for the US and worldwide. The evolution of this crisis, with global ramifications, has been well captured by George Friedman: "The financial crisis became an economic malaise. The economic malaise created a social crisis. The social crisis generated a global political crisis. The class that had absorbed the existential blow of 2008 turned on the elite and their values. The elite, focused obsessively on their interests and ideology, failed to notice the revolt" (Friedman, 2016, para 11). This revolt was "manifested in the election of Donald Trump in the US, Brexit in the UK and the rise of numerous radical political parties across Europe" (Friedman, 2016, para 11).

In 2012, the US Strategic Guidance was issued, where the US declared it wanted to rebalance its strategic focus from Europe to East Asia and the Pacific (US Strategic Guidance, 2012, page 2). The US has deepened its military engagement and cooperation in the region, especially with Japan and South Korea. In 2014, the Crimea crisis and the war in Ukraine forced the US to acknowledge that rebalancing in East Asia and the Pacific could not be done without leaving Europe unprotected, especially in times when both shores of Spykman's Eurasian land mass had once again become unstable.

Today, the US is trying to contain Russia in Eastern Europe and limit its influence in the Middle East, while at the same time trying to contain China in the South China Sea, and to manage the unfolding security situation in the Middle East and North Africa. This was clearly recognized in the latest US National Military Strategy (Military Strategy, 2015), which also calls for an overhaul of the nuclear arsenal, in response to Russia's nuclear sabre-rattling (Davidson, 2015). And yet, Spykman's Rimland theory as a basis for Truman's doctrine is still relevant to contemporary US strategy, which aims to contain the Eurasian heartland through various alliances which the US is trying to reinvigorate, mainly by strengthening its forces in the eastern parts of NATO in Europe and by deepening military cooperation with its allies in East Asia and the Pacific. This was clearly underlined in the new US National Security Strategy of 2015, where it is stated that the US will further "advance its rebalance to Asia and the Pacific" and at the same time "strengthen its enduring alliance with Europe" (US National Security Strategy, 2015, pp. 24-25).

1.5 Russia

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia was recognized as its legal successor, and thus became a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a nuclear power. Mackinder stated that the Heartland and the pivot area of the world's island lies in Russia, and thus "in the world at large Russia occupies the central strategic position held by Germany in Europe. She can strike on all sides and be struck from all sides, save the north" (Mackinder, 1904, p. 436). Russia, therefore, represents a true land power to both Mackinder and Spykman.

In the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia went through a difficult political and economic period, where military and strategic issues were not given priority status. In 1999, though, three events changed the geopolitical, and consequently the geostrategic, course of Russia. The first was the NATO bombardment of Serbia (then Yugoslavia), which showed that Russia was not capable of protecting its historical ally Serbia. This was followed by the Second Chechnya War, where Russia symbolically halted the trend of fragmentation. The third event, late that year, was the appointment of Vladimir Putin, by then President Boris Yeltsin, as Acting President of the federation, which proved to be a grand strategic change in the geopolitical stance of the country.

The change was not apparent until the war in Georgia broke out in 2008. It became a fact with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war in Ukraine. With its entry into the war in Syria in 2015, Russia showed the West its ability to actively project power not only to its near neighbours, but also to the Middle East and the Mediterranean; that is well beyond the Heartland, into Spykman's Rimland. From the Russian viewpoint, this change could be a consequence of Ukraine leaving its neutral status and moving towards the EU (and possibly NATO)[13] which, in a potential conflict with the West (NATO), would represent a loss of strategic depth for Russia. This strategic depth lies, according to Friedmann, west of the "line from St. Petersburg to Rostov-on-Don" (Friedman, 2016, para 4). He also states that "it should be no surprise then that Russia's national strategy is to move its frontier as far west as possible. The first tier of countries on the European Peninsula's eastern edge, the Baltics, Belarus, and Ukraine, provide depth from which Russia can protect itself, and also provide additional economic opportunities. In the south, the focus is on the Caucasus." (Friedman, 2016, para 19).

After the 2014 events in Crimea, Russia was reported to be in violation of its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987 (NATO, 2014). At the same time, though, Russian officials openly declared that the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty of 1989 was dead, and Russia "continued a large-scale comprehensive defence build-up in areas ranging from space and counter-space to submarine and ground forces as well as nuclear forces" (Blank, 2015, para 1).

At the end of 2015, Russia announced its new National Security Strategy, where a comprehensive view of how Russia sees the world around it and its strategic position is well described, and where one might notice elements of Mackinder's and Spykman's schools of thought. In this document, Russia perceives itself as a main unifier of Eurasia. In this respect, it sees "the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union as a new stage of integration in the Eurasian space" (Russian Security Strategy, para 91). The idea of Russia being an Eurasian power comes from "the most stable geopolitical school in Russia, the Eurasian school, founded by brothers George and Evgeny Trubetskoi at the beginning of the 20th century. Its basic idea is that Russia is neither Europe nor Asia, but Eurasia. The contemporary leader of this school is Aleksandr Dugin" (**Črnčec**, 2010, p. 37), an influential scholar, whose ideas are respected by the current Russian president, Vladimir Putin.

According to the new Security Strategy, new threats to Russian national security emanate through "the policy of containing Russia" (Russian Security Strategy, para 12) by the US and its allies. In this context "further expansion of NATO, and the location of its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders are creating a threat to its national security" (Russian Security Strategy, para 15). Therefore, one of the

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[13] *Russia expressed its reservations in 2004, when former Warsaw pact countries entered NATO, and especially the Baltic States, which were, till 1991, part of the Soviet Union.*

key long-term strategic goals is "consolidating Russia's status as a leading world power" (Russian Security Strategy, para 30) through a "process of shaping a new polycentric model of the world order" (Russian Security Strategy, para 13) coupled with an "all-embracing partnership and strategic cooperation with China" (Russian Security Strategy, para 93). With regard to Europe and the EU, Russia will seek to "consolidate a mutually beneficial cooperation and the formation in the Euro-Atlantic region of an open system of collective security" (Russian Security Strategy, para 13).

Another crucial moment which changed the strategic situation in favour of Russia was the failed attempted military coup in July 2016 in Turkey. Turkish President Erdoğan publicly accused the US government of backing the coup attempt, and started to strategically approach Russia. A first step in this rapprochement had already been made in 2013, when Erdoğan, frustrated with the slow-moving and demanding EU accession process, appealed to Putin to allow Turkey into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Erdemir & Zilberman, 2016). This process turned Russia into a major player in the strategically important Black Sea region, and helped it spread its geopolitical influence into the heart of the Middle-East and thus Spykman's Rimland.

2 STRATEGIC SHIFTS IN EUROPE

It seemed that, up to the world financial crisis in 2008, the EU and the whole European continent, including its Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods, were stable regions. Yet, with the Greek debt crisis and NATO's Bucharest Summit, Europe's Pandora's box had opened again, as it has done so many times throughout history. The former sparked the lack of trust in European institutions, while the latter is linked to NATO's decision that ''Georgia and Ukraine will become members of NATO'' (NATO Summit Declaration, 2008, para 23), which could be interpreted as a possible ''causus beli'' for the War in Georgia in 2008, by which Russia indicated its opposition to any further enlargement of NATO.

Developments in Ukraine since 2014 could be seen as a Russian geostrategic reaction, a push-back against the EU and NATO, enabled by the EU's internal weakness, including the divergent views on Russia among the EU Member States, but also among the European Allies of NATO. The reasons lay partly in the new geopolitical economy or geo-economics, based on Russian oil and gas pipeline projects, and partly in the re-emergence of classical geopolitics, based on the Heartland and Rimland theories, which had been frozen since the end of the Cold War.

Germany clearly sees itself as a new great power, officially expressed in the new White Book on defence. Relations with Russia have been always high on its agenda. The Nord-Stream gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea, which connected the two countries, directly increased their mutual economic interdependence and tied the bonds between the two. Germany's relations with France have been strategically important since the end of the Second World War, so great attention has been given

to the EU, a mutual platform for stability, trust and economic cooperation for both countries. At the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine, the similar positions of Germany and France towards Russia could be seen.

France is traditionally focused on the Mediterranean and North Africa, as the War in Libya in 2011 and the intervention of French forces in Mali have clearly shown. It is also a core EU Member State and, for the time being, its bond with Germany is strong. It seems that France's main preoccupation is preserving its internal security against the radicalization of its Muslim population, and it does not perceive a major threat coming from Russia. However, it also seems that France's position could shift towards closer ties with London, if Germany becomes too strong within the EU.

For the UK, Eastern Europe is a crucial territory which should serve as a buffer zone to prevent strong Russian links with Germany, and here Pilsudski's Intermarium comes into contemporary geostrategic play. Only an economically and militarily strong Central Europe, based on the Višegrad countries (mainly Poland) plus Romania could physically and geostrategically cut direct links between Moscow and Berlin. But these countries cannot act alone, without a strong strategic back-up from the US and the UK. As to the UK's strategic alliance with the US, it is long-established, as both are traditionally maritime powers. Another factor that might influence the UK is its future strategic stance outside the EU. Based on Mackinder, it is possible that the UK might endorse its traditional geostrategic principle, the balance of powers.

A common goal for all five countries is to fight Islamic terrorism. A stronghold of Islamists is currently ISIS. However, due to strategic moves by the big players, ISIS has gained enough manoeuvring space to start influencing the strategic game itself. The clearest example was the migrant crisis and ability of jihadi fighters to infiltrate the migrants and, together with domestic European jihadi cells, carry out several attacks in 2015 and 2016 (France, Belgium and Germany). These attacks have contributed to a growing radicalization of Europe's political spectrum, which might, in the long run, threaten the current predominant centrist political powers in Europe. All this, coupled with Europe's dependence on Turkey's willingness to stop the migrants in 2015, showed that the EU is clearly having difficulties handling problems of such magnitude. It has become evident that various countries (such as Turkey or Russia) can politically intimidate the EU and thus France and Germany. The feeling of a politically as well as economically fragile union was successfully used during the Brexit referendum campaign in June 2016. With the UK decision to leave the EU comes a fear that the UK, as a future non-EU member state, might find itself in a similar position to two important EU neighbours, Russia and Turkey, when it comes to its power to influence EU decision-making. It cannot be excluded that, in the future, the UK could find itself on a different strategic footing with regard to key political and security questions in Europe.

Conclusion This article has sought to show that the world we are living in has changed drastically since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the 2014 Crimea crisis. History has reminded us, time and again, that classical geopolitical dynamics repeat. Today we are living in times of an accelerated geopolitical transition from the post-Cold War unipolar system towards a new strategic architecture in the making. Based on this assumption, the author sees the following geostrategic vectors which are appearing in Europe.

The first is the US-UK or the "Atlantic" vector, with the two (maritime) powers in the lead, encompassing the Scandinavian and Central and Eastern European countries between the Baltic and the Back Seas, in particular the three Baltic States, Poland and Romania. The countries between the Baltic and Black Seas (and possibly the Adriatic Sea), also known as the Intermarium, serve as a counterbalance towards potential Russian expansion towards the West and, at the same time, as a geostrategic corridor towards the Black and Caspian Seas, areas of special US strategic interest. They also represent the new core of NATO and have raised their defence budgets, fearing a resurgent Russia. The countries of the Intermarium might be seen in the future as an autonomous power axis within Europe, but for the foreseeable future, the author sees them as a bastion of the "Atlantic" axis, whose key mission is exercising containment towards Russia as well as against Russian potential future links to Germany.

The second vector is the "EU" vector, based on the France-Germany (continental) axis, which represents the core of the EU. Italy, and possibly the Benelux countries, could be associated with this vector, as they could serve as a regulator in a permanent process of searching for a fine balance between Paris and Berlin. Regardless of the rest of the EU member states, the fate of the EU depends solely on France and Germany and their willingness to retain and deepen the Union. Having said that, the EU will exist as long as French and German geopolitical interests coincide. One should not forget that those interests also depend on the geostrategic and geoeconomic environment, two interlinked variables whose dynamics are difficult to predict but will certainly shape the future strategic landscape of Europe.

The third vector is the "Eurasian (continental) vector", based on the Russia-China axis, where Russia is geostrategically focused on the European and Middle East regions, and China on Asia, East-Asia and the Pacific regions. In Mackinder's and Spykman's language we could say that this vector represents the Heartland trying to penetrate the Rimland through various points, Europe, the Middle East (Turkey and Syria) and East-Asia and the Pacific (South China Sea), in order to obtain a hegemony over Eurasia and to challenge US supremacy on both shores of the two oceans.

An additional fourth vector cannot be ruled out, that is, a combination of the EU and Eurasian vectors resulting in a "Trans-Eurasian" vector. In this case, the Franco-German axis would be extended to Russia and possibly even to China. This scenario

of the united continental powers of Eurasia would, following Mackinder's theory, be a true existential threat to the UK as well as to the "Atlantic" vector, which the US and the UK would most probably try to prevent. The collision points between the "Trans-Eurasian" and "Atlantic" vectors would be the countries between the Baltic and Black Seas (the Intermarium region), most probably Poland and/or Romania.

A crucial strategic point, where the interests of all these vectors could collide, is the Middle East, including Turkey. The wider Middle East region, extended to Iran and the Central Asian countries, rich in natural gas and oil, represents a crucial territory which the "Atlantic" and the "Eurasian" oriented vectors will try to control. It is, therefore, a potential geostrategic collision point, and a direct security challenge for the EU and, hence, for France and Germany.

The EU has found itself today amid these strategic shifts, internally divided, and sensitive to external influences. Its core changed in 2016, from the Paris-Berlin-London triangle being reduced to the Paris-Berlin axis as a new core "EU" vector. The very existence of the EU and the "EU vector" might depend on this axis being preserved. This will depend, however, on what will be the economic and consequently the political balance within the axis itself. Should Germany become too powerful and France run into a financial and economic downturn, their mutual relations would be greatly challenged by a critical impact on the future of the common European integration project.

The direction of the strategic shifts presented in this article is still unclear; yet it is evident that the trend of a transition towards a new strategic architecture in Europe and in the World is underway. Peace and stability in Europe is no longer something we can take for granted. The next decade will be crucial for Europeans to show how much they have learned from past experience, as all kinds of conflicts from within and without will shape the future of the continent we are living in.

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IZZIVI IRAŠKE, SIRSKE IN LIBIJSKE KRIZE ZA EVROPSKO UNIJO

CHALLENGES POSED BY THE IRAQI, SYRIAN AND LIBYAN CRISIS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

Povzetek   Leta 2016 in predvsem 2017 so se na kriznih območjih Bližnjega vzhoda in Severne Afrike pojavile nekatere pozitivne spremembe. Spodbuden dogodek je bila uspešna akcija iraških in pešmerskih sil, ki jih podpira zahodna koalicija, proti tako imenovani Islamski državi, katere rezultat je bila izguba ozemlja ekstremističnih organizacij. Avtor analizira vidike kriznih območij, in sicer Iraka, Sirije in Libije, ki se nanašajo na posledice nerešenega vprašanja migrantov. Poleg kriznih območij predstavlja tudi situacijo tujih borcev in varnostna tveganja, ki jih povzroča njihova vrnitev v domovino. Navaja ukrepe, ki so jih sprejele EU in njene države članice, da bi preprečile in obvladale grožnjo, ki jo predstavlja vračanje tujih borcev.

Ključne besede   *Bližnji vzhod, Evropska unija, migracije, Sirija, Libija, tuji borci.*

Abstract   In 2016, but mainly in 2017 some positive changes happened in the crisis areas of the Middle East and North Africa. Encouraging event was the successful actions of Iraqi and Peshmerga forces supported by the western coalition against the so called Islamic State, the result is the loss of territory of the extremist organizations. The author analyzes the perspectives of the crisis areas, namely Iraq, Syria and Libya, referring to the effects of the unresolved migrant issue. Besides the two crisis zones, he also presents the situation of foreign fighters and the security risks posed by their return. He specifies the measures taken by the EU and its member states to avert and handle the threat represented by returning foreign fighters.

Key words   *Middle-East, European Union, migration, Syria, Libya, foreign fighters.*

Introduction The Middle East and North Africa have undergone significant changes since 2011. These changes occurred in political, economical, social and demographic aspects, accompanied by system-changes, civil wars and other violent conflicts. In consequence, the relative regional stability has ceased to exist or at least has been severely shaken. New "fault lines" emerged, alongside which the global and regional powers are making efforts to assert their own interests, while the new changes affect also the countries outside the region. I do not use the expression of "Arab spring" because this is far away from spring; anyway this remark is not used in the Middle East at all. I am convinced that the expression Arab changes can better characterize the situation in general terms, but the phenomenon is different and each country treats it in a different way. The Arab changes have caused several failed states. Syria has been destroyed, Yemen is in a civil war, Iran strives for regional hegemony, Iraq and Libya are far away from stability, and Lebanon is in existential dilemma. Turkey is on the way of Islamization and the ambitions of president Erdoğan have polarized its population. World powers try to dominate the region through investments and military forces.

On those territories where the leading political and military roles have been taken over not by state actors, ethnical, tribal and sectarian dividedness has appeared, disrupting national unity. The so created security vacuum has been filled by jihadist groups, threatening the whole region and even the outside world. The three largest regional crises zones affecting Europe are Iraq, Syria and Libya. The armed conflicts evolved in these zones have huge human, social and economic impacts. According to UN data, the number of victims in Syria is over 400,000, the unemployment rate is 52%; approximately 45% of inhabitants left their home, the number of IDPs (internally displaced people) amounts to 6.4 million. (SCPR 2016) About 4.5 million people escaped to Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan, which has imposed a great burden on the social and economic situation of these countries. The refugees have reached also Europe, bringing about the greatest refugee wave since the Second World War, testing the solidarity of the Europeans.

The fall of Qaddafi regime resulted in tearing apart some Libyan territories and causing the setting up of hostile groups and tribes, entailing several-intensity conflicts. A violent combat began for the power, natural resources, further destabilizing the Libyan situation. Also here, ISIS tried filling the created vacuum. Its intention is quite evident: strengthening its presence in Libya, destabilizing the country, obtaining strong economic positions, primarily in the oil industry. Its presence is dangerous also for Europe for several reasons. It is deployed close to Europe, fuels the refugee wave flooding towards Europe, and last but not least, after its weakening process taking place in Iraq and Syria, it seeks to find another territory for its redeployment. The migration crisis and the terrorist attacks in Europe forced the European authorities to devote greater attention to the migrants, the jihadist threat, and especially to the radicalization.

Despite the similarities, the Syrian and the Libyan conflicts are different in many respects; therefore it is essential for us to determine their specific features. In Syria,

the great and medium-sized powers have sometimes conflicting interests; and there are several armed groups that confront each other. In addition, the present and the future of the Kurds are still very uncertain. By contrast, in Libya there is some willingness for reconciliation and dialogue, although the illegal arms and man-trade, the jihadist propaganda, the dissatisfaction of the youth and the increasing presence of ISIS cannot be ignored.

We need a clear understanding concerning refugees, asylum-seekers, migrants, illegal migrants and foreign terrorist fighters. Many people leave their country in search for a better life, to have a better job. These are migrants. Refugees and asylum-seekers are those who are forced to flee because of wars, human rights violations, and persecutions. Asylum seeking is a basic human right. The expression illegal migrant is not accepted in many countries because people cannot be illegal. Instead of this some countries use the idiom undocumented immigrants or unauthorized immigrants. In my paper I do not deal with migration only with foreign fighters. The phenomenon of foreign fighters is neither new nor uniquely Islamic. I deal actually with the return of foreign fighters to Europe from the Iraqi and Syrian war. They went there for ideological or religious reasons, gained war experiences. Those who come back to Europe represent a serious security risk because they can organize terror attacks, radicalize people or help in finding would be terrorists.

1   THE IRAQI AND SYRIAN SITUATION

Since 2013, the frontlines have been more or less stabilized in both countries. In Iraq the liberation of Mosul will be crucial in 2017. It is an important task for the coalition forces to prevent the fleeing of the ISIS terrorists to Syria. In Iraq three main ethnic groups are engaged in the conflict: Sunni Arabs, who have been in control for decades and do not accept the change in the authority, the Shias who want to enforce the changes and the Kurds who do not regard themselves as Iraqis. The question of the future is how these people could be able to live together in one country in peace.

Situation is far more worst in Syria. The country can be divided in four parts: territories ruled by the regime, decreasing ISIS areas, territories controlled by the Kurds, and several areas being in the hands of several opposition forces. It is necessary to note that Syria – before the civil war – could be historically divided in two parts. One extended west of the Damascus-Aleppo axis and the other was in the east. The difference between the two can be contributed to their development level in favor of western territories. In order to really understand the Syrian power relations, it is necessary for us to point out that the country has always been ruled by a strong central power. Syria has been interwoven by many state institutions providing basic social and public services, and building the necessary infrastructures. In the less developed areas, the government ensured also working places, in the absence of a viable private sector. However, from 2005, under Assad's rule, this situation changed, the role of government diminished, the regime failed to make appropriate investments, and gave over the responsibility to the private sector to provide the population with basic

necessities. Developments slowed down dangerously, and when the government recognized it was already too late. Nevertheless, it tried to remedy the situation. In 2011, some weeks after the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, Bashar el Assad – with a three-decade delay – started the works of 3 million USD to divert the Tigris River, which would have made it possible for the peasants to irrigate arable lands, giving job for several thousand citizens. However, by 2016, according to Syrian sources, the war losses reached 255 billion USD, the Syrian GDP fell to the half of that in 2010, the proportion of unemployed citizens exceeded the half of active population, the poverty rate amounted to 85%. (Narbone, L. – Favier. A. 2016)

A very serious consequence of the war was the drastic split of the country, which will certainly determine Syria's future. The torn-apart territories are characterized by the following features:

– The areas controlled by the regime include the richer part of Syria. Alongside the Damascus-Aleppo axis (on the western territories), there is a relatively decent life, encompassing the coastline as well. There are some settlements out of state control, but the biggest problem after the reoccupation is the rebuilding of towns. In Aleppo (the largest Syrian city) it was not accidental that there were conducted violent combats for ruling the whole town. The situation has become more complicated by the fact that also the al Nusra Front occupied a small area in the eastern part of the city.[1] This area has been less damaged during the war and is of high importance from political, economic and cultural standpoint owing to the fact that it is much more developed compared to other areas. Aleppo suffered a significant loss of people, buildings and services. This has a serious impact on the return of refugees and IDPs. The Syrian government actually has no refugee policy.

– The war has not ruined the territories alongside the coastline (Tartus and Lattakia and their vicinity), therefore many IDPs moved there, upsetting this territory's ethnical balance, so the Alevite population can get easily into minority. Thanks to its relative richness, this region can become in the future a starting point for a re-building process, after the war.

– The most fertile territories, alongside the Euphrates River and the roads leading to Iraq, belong presently to ISIS. There are situated the oil-rich Deir ez Zor and Rakka, the capital of ISIS, and the scene of fierce fights, after the occupation of Mosul. The expected loss in 2017 of Rakka will represent (also ideologically) a very heavy loss for the terrorist organization.

– The third territory consists of the eastern part of Syria and a strip situated west of Aleppo, under the rule of the Kurdish PKK wing, the Democratic Union Party. Here, the majority of inhabitants are Kurds, and in some other peripheral areas, they represent the largest minority. It is necessary to note that the Kurds do not live only in this region, but several thousand of them have residence also in Damascus and Aleppo.

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[1] *The al Nusra Front changed its name in summer of 2017. Its new name: Fatah as-Sam. According to its declaration, it has broken with al-Qaida, but we cannot prove this.*

– The fourth part is occupied by several opposition groups, among them also the al-Qaida-associated al Nusra Front as well. While the first three territories are directly connected and relatively continuous, that is not the case with the areas ruled by opposition groups.

In the last three years, the three above territories have practically broken away from the regime-ruled areas, and they established new administrative system and governance. The traditional economic communities have disappeared, the investors left the region, the trade and transport networks are in ruins. New institutions have come into existence, composed primarily of locals, who earlier had fought against the central leadership. The new institutions are at issue both with each other and the government, for example they have introduced at least four types of teaching and curriculum at the schools, as well as three types of currency. The Kurds have initiated numerous projects and framed many new laws in the areas under their rule. ISIS is levying taxes, carrying out investments and operates a strong police. Opposition groups have established on their territories several organs (councils) and administrative bodies, which deal with distributing foods and aids, as well as operating hospitals.[2]

It worth examining the type of relations existed between local administrative bodies and armed groups. In this regard, there are two opposite tendencies: cooperation and confrontation. At the beginning of the conflict, local armed groups supported the establishment of councils. The cause of this basically was that local armed groups were organized first of all from locals, who liberated the given territory. They had similar endeavors and relied on the local social system. The members of Free Army had no intention to take over the power from the local councils. However, later, as the conflict extended, the armed groups needed more and more arms and equipment, therefore they made efforts to build up their own governing structure. They even aimed at taking over the local administration and the distribution of several aids and foods, which elicited the population's sympathy. Simultaneously, several new phenomena appeared also inside the opposition: corruption, dilettantism and heavy internal debates.

All these clearly indicate the challenges the Syrians have to face after the war. One of the biggest challenges is the decentralization, mainly the Kurdish situation or "isolation". A great amount of mistrust has accumulated between certain regions and settlements. The desire for local autonomy has emerged not only among the Kurds, and not only in one or two regions, but throughout the country. It is exactly the desire for autonomy that prevents the opposition groups from uniting their forces. There is also another serious problem connected with decentralization, and that is the distribution of resources. It is not only a Syrian "specialty" that sometimes the territories which are rich in resources are at the same time the poorest regions.

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[2] The number of local councils has doubled since 2012, we heard about 800 such councils in 2015. Their functioning is dependent upon foreign supporters.

It is unlikely that these territories will accept the rule of Damascus. For example, the development of Kurdish territories can be speeded up by making use of the oil resources. The locals – even before the appearance of ISIS – accused Damascus of stealing their oil in Deir ez-Zor. However, it would be a naivety to think that Damascus will give up the oil wells in favor of the regions. The situation has become more complicated also due to the fact that the minorities are afraid of Islamism; the Kurds of the Arabs; the Christians of the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs. It would be very difficult to forecast how a future government will be able to handle these contradictions.

2   LIBYA

The Libyan situation has been characterized by the dynamics of continuous religious fights, by the wars for oil and conflicts among the tribes, nationalist endeavors, as well as by the mutual effects of all these factors. (Varvelli, A. 2016)

Despite the repeated attempts and the international mediation and support, the Libyans have been unable to set up a functioning government, which has certainly exercised a negative impact not only on the region, but also on Europe, primarily through the migration crisis originating from Libya. The General National Congress convened in 2012 and the new parliament elected in 2014 has failed to produce success. There are two parliaments and two governments (in Tripoli and al Bayda) competing with each other for their acceptance and recognition. In order to put an end to this institutional crisis, the UN established in 2014 its Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). Its objectives included the establishment of a unity government, the conclusion of an agreement among the rival fractions, the introduction of confidence building measures, and naturally, the elaboration and implementation of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement. (UNSMIL 2015)

In my assessment, it was a big mistake that the participants have not involved the influential armed (militant) groups in the settlement process, by saying that they were elaborating only a political agreement. The omission of opposition representatives has resulted in an inability to implement the objectives. Immediately after the beginning of the settlement process, local forces tried to take over the lead. In the wake of the 2014 elections, the new House of Representatives made attempt at eliminating the dividedness. It set up in Tobruk the "internationally recognized" parliament and a new government. However, 20 members of the re-elected House of Representatives were not willing to occupy their seats in the parliament. Also in Tripoli, the parliament nominated a new government, thus the dividedness intensified. In the meantime, also the military tensions intensified, and new fights began among the warriors supporting the different institutions. These fights have led to a humanitarian crisis and caused several thousand citizens to leave their home. According to UN assessment, "the Libyan situation has been characterized by the lack of rule of law, continuous combats among rival armed groups, daily attempts, tortures and kidnappings". Since 2014, there have been continuous fights for obtaining natural resources and

local infrastructures. These fights have claimed the life of several thousand people, including civilians. About 435,000 locals escaped, the basic infrastructure has been ruined, the essential services have stopped functioning and the living standards have drastically deteriorated. (UNHCR 2015) This situation relates mainly to 2014. Since then, the struggle is continued in some special, but strategically important fields. It is the local fighters that take part in the combat, the participation of foreign fighters is not significant, except those who are deployed in the southern areas to fight for the possession of raw material resources. The rival armed groups erected many checkpoints, which is making the travelling very difficult.

As regards the Libyan settlement process, experts are of the opinion that there is an urgent need for local or regional mediation by such actors that have not been involved in the Libyan war. It was in this spirit that a conference took place in the Tunisian Djerba in 2015, organized by the German ministry of foreign affairs, with the support of the Peace Research Institute Oslo, with the participation of UNSMIL as observer.

From the prospective of European security, the strict control of the Tunisian and the Libyan borders are extremely important to avoid terrorism support, smuggling and organized criminal acts (including human smuggling). Before the Arab changes, these borders had been relatively safe, even if the black marked flourished there. In the wake of the fall of Ben Ali and Qaddafi, the frontiers were not protected and violence became an everyday event. State control over the militias came to an end. Instead the state, non-state actors took over the lead. After 2014, a violence spiral raged, and the security vacuum was quickly filled by ISIS, particularly in Sirte and Sabrata that is close to the Tunisian border. (Meddeb, H. 2016) The ISIS members made their best to assist the jihadists arriving from Tunisia, especially after 2013, when the Ennahda government prohibited the activity of the az Ansar al Sharia Tunisian, Salafist, jihadist organization. ISIS plays an active role also in smuggling drugs, arms and alcohol. For lack of appropriate control, the border zone has become a good "hunting field" for the rivaling militias.

The Tunisian authorities – with special regard to the 2015 Sousse terrorist attack – have significantly strengthened the border, nearly making it a fortress. However, we have to emphasize in this respect that before the Arab Spring, the authorities had practically neglected the protection of this border section, as the Libyan side had been strictly controlled by the Qaddafi militia. Currently, the Tunisian side is relatively well-protected. However, this is not the case at all on the Libyan side, and we cannot expect any improvement in this regard, before the settlement of the internal Libyan crisis. All this has undoubtedly a detrimental effect on European security, since Libya is the most important route for the African refugees.

From a military point of view it is worthy of attention that the United States has opened a new front in August 2016 in Libya, codenamed as Odyssey Lightning against ISIS, with the purpose to assist the internationally recognized government in its fight against the terrorist organization. The commanders coordinate their operations with

all of the efforts made by several organizations to fight against the Afghan Taliban, the local and the Iraqi ISIS. The United States provided the Libyan government with intelligence data and conducted air strikes on ISIS positions. (Pomerleau, M. 2016) It supports the operation also from Tunisia. To that end, in virtue of an agreement, it deployed American soldiers to Tunisia, where the cooperation is focused mainly on exchanging intelligence information.

3 PROBLEMS WITH THE FOREIGN FIGHTERS

The Middle East crisis zones have – among others – two negative impacts on Europe: they flood Europe with migrants and "send" foreign fighters to Europe, whose number is likely to increase after the war. For these problems to be properly handled, it would be necessary – in my opinion – for EU states to pay greater attention to the following persons and events:
– Persons who travel to the crisis zones and combat as foreign fighters;
– Those who go to the crisis areas get military training and combat experiences and return to the EU member states;
– Connections between foreign fighters and terrorist attacks;
– Persons who wanted to go to the crisis zones, but were prevented from doing so, but are willing to commit terrorist attempts. In this regard, we have to deal with the risk that the returned fighters can help also the lone wolfs by their experiences and can assist in activating sleeping cells. This possibility has been emphasized also in the Europol 2015 TE-SAT report. (EU TE-SAT 2015)

The problems of foreign fighters came up first in 2012, after many fighters had travelled first to Syria, then to Iraq to combat against Assad or participate in the Iraqi combats. Between September 2014 and September 2015, 30,000 persons travelled to the crisis areas from 104 countries. (Carlin, J. P. 2015) Their travel and terrorist activities directly affected some European countries. They organized or executed terrorist attacks there, or used some countries in Europe as transit country for the fighters who were the citizens of another European country and planned to departure to the operational areas. In 2014, among their motivations had a significant role their desire to help establishing the Islam Caliphates and the "adoration" of the utopist Islamist propaganda pursued to that end. We have to mention also the other motivations such as the thirst for adventure, the possibility to participate in combats, and the religious fervor. If we analyze the radicalized persons, we can note that the anti-West feelings had also a role. Other individual motivations were the fear of being punished for some criminal act, marginalization and the desire for belonging to a terrorist organization.

A Serbian expert colleague told me that from his country also gypsies went to Syria, and the jihadist recruiters are active also in the Serbian gypsy communities. He also mentioned that he learned from some Dutch reports that the foreign fighters, who are in the operational areas, try to pursue recruiting activity inside their circle of acquaintances.

Foreign fighters use primarily their own identification documents, but also false papers. Several countries, among others Czech Republic indicated that some Bosnian citizens bound for Germany used false identification cards. It happens – although sporadically – that they use the documents of dead people. The foreign fighters first enter generally Turkey. However, according to Polish authorities, when they return from Syria, they sometimes choose the Istanbul-Belgrade-Madrid-Warsaw route. I am of the opinion that they will follow the above practice also in the future.

Foreign fighters began appearing in Syria in 2012, still before the setting up of ISIS. Between September 2014 and September 2015, their number drastically increased and reached 30,000 persons. They arrived from 104 countries. Experts warned at that time that this phenomenon will pose a real threat to Europe and also to other regions. (Van Ginkel, B. – Entenmann, E. 2016) From among the EU member states, the main originating countries are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain and Great Britain. The Europol 2016 TE-SAT report assesses the number of fighters coming from the EU as 5,000 persons. (EU TE-SAT 2016) The data (as in general) cannot be considered as really precise and authentic, even if they are confirmed by several sources. The reason for this is that member states determine differently the definition of foreign fighters. It has happened e. g. that they confused the foreign fighters with the terrorists, neglecting the fact that not every foreign fighter is at the same time a terrorist. Sometimes, the authorities have no precise data, or do not make distinction among those fighters who are in operational areas, who have already returned or are dead. Two countries, Greece and Hungary don't provide data, thus these are missing from the joint EU database. Most foreign fighters come from Belgium, France, Germany and Great Britain. If we count them in proportion to the population, most of them are from Belgium. (In the examined period, 2,838 persons derive from the above four countries.) From among the all foreign fighters 30% returned to their home; and 14% of them died. Most fighters (near 100%) are from great cities or from the surrounding areas. The proportion of women fighters is 17%. About 6-24% of foreign fighters converted to Muslim religion. We have no information about whether some of them are or not citizens of more than one country. However, we have information about their very quick radicalization, which is confirmed by the Europol 2016 TE-SAT report as well. (EU TE-SAT 2016) At the beginning, ISIS tried to entice the radicals by an intensive propaganda campaign and deterred the foreign fighters from returning to their home country. (If somebody did so, he was severely punished.) ISIS allows the women fighters to travel alone, which is in stark contrast to the al-Qaida's "order", according to which they can travel only with a companion. However, when the women enter ISIS territory, they have to obey this order. Many women go out to join their husband, but some of them would like to get married abroad. ISIS rigorously expects the women to obey their husband and educate their children according to ISIS ideology. They have to proudly tolerate the hardships in the operational area, and also the eventual death of their husband. They can receive armed trainings, and are expected to make service as nurses to treat the wounded fighters. Foreign fighters can have – besides their wife – woman slaves and can "use" them sexually as well. These slaves are not Muslims, demonstrating

to the Muslim wives that they occupy a higher rank in the community. Women have important role in radicalization, recruitment and implementation of auxiliary (e. g. financial) tasks. As I mentioned, they got military training, but in general, they do not participate in combats.

There are foreign fighters not only in ISIS, but also in the ranks of the Jabhat al Nusra Front. Authorities have revealed such fighters in Netherlands, Finland, and Great Britain. Their favorite terrorist method was to deploy VBIED (vehicle borne improvised explosive device).

From the second half of 2016, less and less foreign fighters travelled to the crisis zones. This can be contributed to the intensification of coalition attacks, the severe counter-terrorist measures and last but not least to the ISIS's weakening, especially in 2016. In 2015, about five fighters returned every month to Netherlands. Spain has also submitted reports to Europol on the diminishing number of foreign fighters. As regards Italy, there was not any change to this effect.

However, foreign fighters travel not only to Iraq and Syria, but also to Afghanistan, Chechnya, Libya, Mali, Somalia and Yemen; and their number is not diminishing. (At least this was the case in 2015; I had no data on 2016 at my disposal when I prepared this study.)

It has turned out that the attempts committed in Paris and Brussels have been carried out on the basis of foreign experiences. This can be proved also by the fact that also the al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula participated in preparing the perpetrators for the attempt against Charlie Hebdo.

3.1 EU initiatives to meet the challenges posed by foreign fighters

The EU counter-terrorism strategy covers also this problem in such a way that it takes into consideration the special features of this issue. The essence of this strategy is: prevent, protect, pursue and respond. Although it was adopted in 2005, it has been applied to foreign fighters only from 2014. It was the meeting of EU interior and justice ministers where a decision was taken on applying the new strategy also to foreign fighters. The main elements of this decision were the following: preventing radicalization and extremism, pursuing effective information exchange (also with third countries), revealing the preparation of extremists for going abroad to become foreign fighters. As regards the information exchange, it was an important step the establishment of the European Counter-terrorism Center in the Hague, in the framework of Europol, in January 2016. The EU improved also its cooperation with third countries, particularly with the countries bordering Syria and Iraq. Still in 2013, it improved also the Schengen Information System, in such a way to make it possible for the border guards and security forces to quickly obtain update information on suspected foreign fighters. In 2015, the EU interior and justice ministers adopted a directive on punishing more severely the extremists who received terrorist training, and those who participate in financing

terrorism. All these measures have – without doubt – enhanced, to a great extent, the efficiency of the joint efforts against foreign fighters.

In sum, the EU has taken the following measures to avert the threat posed by foreign fighters. (Van Ginkel, B. – Entenmann, E. 2016)

Time	Event
2005	Nominating an EU counter-terrorist coordinator
2005 Nov.	Adopting EU counter-terrorism strategy
2011 Sep.	Establishing EU network for monitoring radicalization
2013 Jul.	22-point proposal by EU interior and justice ministers for keeping an eye on foreign fighters
2014 Aug.	Decision of EU interior and justice ministers on suppressing the activity of foreign fighters; preventing the acts of extremist persons; pursuing information exchange with third countries; disclosing and preventing suspicious travels, and taking procedures against foreign fighters
2015 Jan.	Riga meeting of the above EU ministers aimed at elaborating a counter-terrorism strategy concerning Syria and Iraq, with special attention to foreign fighters
2015 Feb.	Declaration of EU Council on the fight against terrorism. Its main elements: protecting citizens and EU values, preventing radicalization, cooperating with foreign partners
2015 Jun.	Adopting EU internal security strategy: 2015–2020
2015 Jul.	Setting up the EU Referral Unit (EU IRU). (It is fully operational from 01 Jul 2016.)
2015 Oct.	Taking a binding resolution by the European Parliament on the importance of a joint EU strategy on preventing extremists from being radicalized and recruited to become foreign fighters
2015 Nov.	Elaborating proposals by EU institutions on preventing radicalization and extremist activities leading to terrorism
2015 Dec.	Approving a proposal by EU interior ministers on preparing air passenger lists, which has been later adopted by the European Parliament
2016 Jan.	Opening the European Counter-terrorism Center in the Hague

3.2   Measures taken on national level

In the wake of EU measures, also such nations took preventive steps that were less affected by the activities of foreign fighters and eventual terrorists, but found it important to prevent radicalization and terrorist acts. They have taken even such serious measures that entailed expatriation as well. Under the effect of the Paris attempts, several countries – in the spirit of combating transnational crimes – have strengthened their security and intelligence organizations. They have increased the severity of border guarding and introduced a new record system and a new investigation procedure. 22 states qualified the participation in terrorist groups as a criminal act; 23 member states labeled the propagation of terrorist attacks as a punishable activity, and 20 of them punish also the recruitment of terrorists. The participation in terrorist training is considered to be a criminal act in 23 member states. At the same time, the travelling abroad to become foreign fighter constitutes a crime only in nine member states, but they are going to punish also this activity.

I am firmly convinced that, besides the general national measures, it would be necessary for each nation to elaborate a concrete comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, since the threat level is different in each country, especially in terms of radicalism and extremism. Also the prevention can be realized primarily at national level. Even the counter-terrorist training, the treatment of extremists released from prisons and the handling of returned foreign fighters can be efficiently carried out only at national level.

Conclusion The two large crisis zones in the Middle East (Syria and Libya) have been exercising a significant negative impact on the whole region and Europe as well. There are three essential factors that are certainly connected with each other: the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts, the refugee wave and the intensification of terrorist acts in Europe. The loss of territory if the so called Islamic State contributed to the growing number of terrorist attack in Europe in 2017. The year of 2016 was characterized mainly by military rather than diplomatic initiatives, which has not brought nearer a real solution to the conflicts. Disagreements between the great powers have only increased rather than diminished. The NATO-member Turkey has been making consultation rather with Russia and not with the United States, probably owing to the Kurd issue. It would be an interesting event if Turkey were to begin negotiations on joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; in the case it could not pursue its talks with the EU.

The greatest challenge in Europe is represented by the refugee wave, which is likely to continue for a long time, if Europe does not take really effective counter-measures to prevent illegal migration. However, migration itself can be attributed to too many factors, thus, it is nearly impossible to put an end quickly to this phenomenon.

Besides the Syrian and Iraqi crisis, also the Libyan internal chaos severely influences the European migration situation. Unfortunately, there is no any sign in Libya of some real reconciliation among the confronting parties. Therefore, also the EU is incapable to have substantial talks with Libya.

In 2016 the international coalition has taken effective measures against ISIS, and as a consequence, the size of territories occupied by the terrorist organization has been significantly reduced. This process will certainly continue also in 2017, and we hope that the radical forces will be pushed into background in the region.

Simultaneously with the weakening of radical militant forces in the Middle East, an opposite process can begin in Europe, where the activity of returning foreign fighters and European extremists may become much more intensive. If this comes really true, the number of terrorist attempts committed in Europe will probably increase. A bad news is that the majority of terrorist attack in Europe is committed by people born in Europe, some of them having European citizenship.

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Laris Gaiser

GOSPODARSKA OBVEŠČEVALNA DEJAVNOST: NEIZOGIBNA IZBIRA

ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE: AN INEVITABLE CHOICE

Povzetek   Od padca berlinskega zidu se je mednarodno okolje močno spremenilo. Globaliziran trg, v katerem so politična zavezništva vedno bolj krhka, je države prisilil v stalno gospodarsko vojno, v kateri pa prevladujejo le tiste, ki so v zadnjih letih oblikovale primeren sistem za izmenjavo informacij med javnim in zasebnim sektorjem. Gospodarska obveščevalna dejavnost je najbolj napredna teorija državnega upravljanja in predstavlja najprimernejši okvir za zasebno-javno sodelovanje v gospodarstvu. Namen članka je definirati pojem gospodarske obveščevalne dejavnosti in z analizo nekaterih tujih primerov dokazati, da so lahko države konkurenčne in varne le, če sprejmejo primerno gospodarsko-obveščevalno strategijo. Znotraj takšnega scenarija – čeprav predvideva zaščito gospodarskih interesov v Zakonu o Slovenski obveščevalno-varnostni agenciji – Slovenija nima celovite strategije za obrambo oziroma razvoj lastnih gospodarskih interesov prek strukturiranega sistema gospodarske obveščevalne dejavnosti. Oblikovalci politike bodo morali v prihodnosti upoštevati potrebo po reformi, ki bi zagotovila učinkovito in varno prihodnost slovenskemu gospodarstvu ter stabilnost državnega sistema.

Ključne besede   *Gospodarska obveščevalna dejavnost, tajne službe, varnost, razvoj.*

Abstract   In a post-Cold War environment countries live in a state of permanent economic warfare. Political alliances are more and more fragile, and while countries have compete every day on the global market in order to survive, only those with a structured system can prevail. Economic intelligence is the most advanced political and economic theory of state management, which also offers the framework for private-public cooperation. In defining economic intelligence and analyzing some examples of structured foreign systems, this article aims to show that in a globalized world countries can be competitive and safe only by adopting an economic

intelligence strategy. Within such a scenario Slovenia, despite contemplating the defence of national economic interests through the Law on Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency, has no comprehensive strategy to defend or promote its economic interests by a structured economic intelligence system. Policy makers must take into consideration reforms that could guarantee the country's future economic efficiency and security.

Key words   *Economic intelligence, secret services, security, development.*

Introduction   The period following WWII was one of geopolitical stability and clear military alliances, with countries having rather limited margins of political and economic freedom. Today, we are facing a situation of a new type of anarchy. The victory scored by the United States in the Cold War has cut off the political relations and trade linked to the period before the fall of the Berlin Wall, and has led to a different type of confrontation: a geo-economic one. The fluidity of international relationships has forced countries to tackle global competition in such a way as to achieve the best possible outcome in terms of profit, development and wealth. In these new economic clashes, the stability of the old political alliances has been undermined and, because of the geo-economic war, governments are required to become guarantors of social stability. This role needs to be based on a strategic vision which fosters economic growth and development.

Within such a framework, countries which for years have been at the centre of criticism, and whose operation, under the load of liberal philosophy, has been reduced to a minimum, return to take on a role of primary importance (Gaiser, 2015). They return to being active co-protagonists of the economy, destined to catalyse and implement strategies of reform that allow the country-systems to remain competitive. The policymakers' goal today is to find the right means of collaboration between state and entrepreneurial systems, as well as implementing the right policies of support of national production – a necessity which develops from the fact that information today has become the most valuable resource (Črnčec, 2009). The research and strategic management of information is an economically relevant and complicated art, which is why companies are forced to implement their own structures of business intelligence; the efficiency of this could be increased by an appropriate national cooperative system, in which, as much defensively as offensively, companies of national security must play a decisive role.

Within the environment of a globalized market the State has become the service provider on which a company can base its success. The State, instead of existing for itself, is forced to transform the machinery of its bureaucracy into an efficient market support system, in order to offer to private and public owned companies the most competitive services (Treverton, 2001). The international success of an enterprise is the success of the hosting country. A country that is not able to be competitive is destined to succumb to others or become non-influential on the world

scene. International competition has increased remarkably. For this reason, country-systems need a more sophisticated, precise and organized means to remain credible, attractive to investments, structurally stable and able to make sound economic choices. We are living in a period that is aware of the fact that territorial conquests and direct control of parts of the globe are, in addition to being politically difficult to accept on the part of democratic public opinions, economically expensive (Luttwak, 1993).

To be in possession of a good "machine of economic war", both in its active form (penetration of other markets and competitive advantages), and passive form (defence of one's own national interest), sustained by a credible state structure, is an absolute priority. The continual intensification of international exchanges, together with growing technological independence and the continual flux of information, heavily influences international relations as well as economic systems.

Within this international environment during the last twenty years, a more sophisticated method of economic warfare has been developed: economic intelligence. It dictates the need for cooperation between the public and private sectors, a need which may have been felt in the past, but whose implementation has been only on a comparatively minor scale.

This research demonstrates that the most important countries in the world have already shaped their own system of active collaboration and information- sharing with market-based companies in order to achieve higher levels of competition on the globalized market, while Slovenia is still passive and may miss the window of opportunity to reshape its country-system.

1 ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE

1.1 Definition

During the 1990s, Edward Luttwak launched the idea that military wars would soon become a memory of the past, substituted by economic wars. In one of his main works, The Endangered American Dream (1993), he highlights the fact that, with the pacification of international exchanges, military threats and alliances have lost their importance. Economic priorities are no longer concealed, and move into the foreground. In the future it will be fear of economic consequences that will regulate commercial contestations, and certainly political interventions will be motivated by strategic purposes (Halby, 2003).

According to Luttwak's geo-economic thought, the time of wars waged for conquest of territories and diplomatic influence has passed. The central objective must be to increase highly qualified work in the leading industries and in services of high added value, with the goal of conquering or preserving an envied position at the heart of the world economy. The invested capital of a country is equivalent to firepower;

subsidies for the development of products correspond to progressions in artillery, while the penetration of markets with the help of the state substitutes the bases and military garrisons displayed abroad and even diplomatic influence. Without a doubt, as Halby writes, the approach developed by Luttwak incontestably produces a useful advancement in the comprehension of the new international architecture and of the game of its constitutive actors. In particular, the appearance of geo-economics as a concept is essential, since it bears witness to its entry in the definition of world geo-politics in accordance with the economic and commercial questions (Halby, 2003).

When the state intervenes and directs, influences or promotes economic choices, we find ourselves in the field of geo-economics. All of this is not a new phenomenon unknown to past generations. Throughout the development of history, international subjects have always played an active role in the economy. The tangible difference in comparison to today's world is that of the intensity or means of determining action. Before, it was the economy which was at service to political power, where now the roles have been reversed. Nowadays, a period in which military conflicts are really becoming l'ultima ratio regum, the terrain of international competition is moving increasingly towards the economic sector, and the contemporary world of economics cannot be analyzed only from the point of view of classic market theories. The classic economic theories on international exchanges do not reflect all the aspects of economic international relations, where one can often find the echo of the tactics and strategies of Sun Tzu and Macchiavelli in decision-making, and such decisions often depend in an important way on factors not of the market (Csurgai, 2011, p. 23). It should be pointed out that certain of these factors are strategies of information: a state's influence, indirect state support of the private sector, control of hidden currency and forms of protectionism. In order to survive, the country sees itself as constrained to compete in a highly sophisticated environment and because of this transforms itself, according to the definition of Gyula Csurgai, into a strategic state, whose task it is to persevere or increase its own privileged position in the economic and international political world through the creation of a geo-economic framework of success (Csurgai, 2009).

The strategic state is one of the keys to contemporary economics and has the vital task of adequately developing the concept of economic intelligence so as to maximize the capacities of every actor to acquire market shares. In turn, the development of the strategic state will always be necessarily influenced by the culture, history and anthropological perceptions of the various actors – public and private – involved in the decisional geo-economic processes, that is, in the development and security of the economy. We must highlight, like Jean and Savona, that unlike military intelligence, which has only one user and predefined referent geographical areas, objectives and risks, economic intelligence acts in a more complex context where the plurality of sources, users and goals often triggers the necessity to confront the coordination paradox: everybody asks for coordination, but nobody wants to be coordinated by somebody else (Jean, Savona, 2011, p. 76). The task of economic intelligence is to strategically manage information that allows the country to control, anticipate,

and manage the evolution of various markets, giving life to political choices, both offensive and defensive. The more the interests of a country are extended, the more the strategy must have a global breadth. This means that the apparatus of intelligence must be designed in such a way as to cover every possible sector of interest and – most importantly – to have the capacity to synthesize and process in order to allow the political actors complex and multilevel choices (e.g. judicial, financial, media, scientific, technological, etc.). Such organizations have the increasingly greater task of 'synthesis of reality'. To the consolidated typical activities of the past – military and political espionage – can be firmly added the need to cover the economic sector.

Economic intelligence consists of gathering and processing information relevant to the economic sector with the intention of making operational choices. Its activities are aimed towards obtaining information, surveillance of competitors, protection of strategic information, and capitalizing on this knowledge in order to influence, determine and control the global economic environment. Economic intelligence is a power tool for countries, in which the private and public spheres are intertwined and communicating.

The historical development of geo-economic relations requires such a high level of specialization of national systems that it is not possible to exclude the secret services, as commonly defined, from the support apparatus of the economy. The economic challenge decreases the spaces available to military war, but the end goal, that of accumulating power and wellbeing, remains unchanged. Information, the highest good, is useful in both understanding situations and sketching out future choices, and is so important that it requires composite strategies that can defend and use it. According to Jean and Savona, economic intelligence is a discipline which, by studying the cycle of information necessary for companies and countries to carry out correct development choices, improves the cognitive and decisive abilities applied to the complexity of the competitive global context. Economic intelligence is at once a system and a methodology of work elevated to be an instrument of collaboration between state and enterprise (Jean, Savona 2011). Its structures are nothing other than the means by which the public and private sectors can collaborate efficiently for the common wellbeing, during a historical period in which, separate, they would be destined to perish. In this way, the entrepreneurial sector maintains its vitality while the state rediscovers a new legitimizing mission. Economic intelligence is a blend of various disciplines and fields of knowledge whose aim it is to increase the competitiveness of businesses and states at an international scale. The methods available to both businesses and the state comprise competitive intelligence, business intelligence, industrial espionage and, in the case of the state, economic counter-intelligence. Data (white, grey or black) is gathered and used in order to increase or at least preserve one's own freedom, to concentrate efforts and to spare energy.

1.2 Examples of countries with implemented economic intelligence systems

The fluidity of international relations requires nations to be capable of facing global competition by organizing themselves in such a way as to guarantee the best results for themselves in terms of earnings, development and wellbeing. The gathering and strategic management of information is a complex art with economic relevance. Because of this, companies are forced to establish their own business intelligence units. The efficiency of such units can be improved by appropriate cooperation at the state level, where national security agencies must adopt a decisive role in terms of both protecting and gathering information. The requirements of the purely public intelligence services have become more refined over time and thus have increased in complexity. Intelligence has evolved beyond analyzing military developments and 'simple' industrial spying to serving increasing geo-economic needs. Foreign policy has been increasingly busy establishing international relations in line with the requirements of the economy and in offering support to national businesses. Growth strategies and an efficient exchange of information between the public and private sectors have led to a better management of the economy. Market imperfections and a hypercompetitive international environment force states to actively intervene in the economy in order to optimize the use of the human capital, technological developments and resources of a country. In this way, a state achieves three vitally important objectives: it increases the nation's growth and wealth, achieves stability by having legitimized itself, and accrues power.

Leaving aside those countries that have an economic intelligence system based on a longstanding tradition of informal information sharing between economic, political and intelligence bodies, such as, for example, Germany and Japan, and taking into account only those countries which have officially developed a legal framework for private-public collaboration, we can briefly examine the cases of the USA, France, the United Kingdom and Russia. Their importance lies in the fact that they have been designed since the beginning in a structured way, respecting national specificities, and being today well-established, they present unavoidable benchmarks.

1.2.1 The United States of America

According to Duclos (2002), the USA, having the desire to take the place of the European colonial empires, has in the past few decades given life to a strategy of commercial conquest that led them to a geo-political supremacy consisting of a relationship between federal authority and multi-national society and the control of information and technology, as well as cultural domination through soft power, education, and economic and management standards. To this, one must add that the unquestioned American supremacy in the global economy is extrinsic not only by the systems of influence of the market, such as rating, consulting and financial management companies, but also by the preponderant presence of personnel and international organizations, through their financial coverage and control of positions of responsibility (e.g. NATO, OCSE, FMI, the World Bank). The USA is therefore

an international actor which possesses a global approach to its own strategy of power and of economic supremacy. They have a policy of information that is both offensive and defensive, and a HUMINT in the economic sector, effectively based on the synergy between the public and private sectors. The national interest is pursued in every direction.

After the defeat of communism, Bill Clinton was the first politician to demand that state bodies actively cooperate in offering support to the nation's economic system. From then on, the planetary balances – formerly based on political and military clout – began to be shaped by countries' economic results, i.e. by the capacity of their economies to create wealth by exploiting markets that had already become global.

In 1993, the National Economic Council (NEC) was established, which is the heart of economic politics and chaired by the President of the USA himself. This organization was proposed in order to coordinate and control the implementation of presidential directives, and represented the point of conjunction with companies' business intelligence units. It represented the beginning of a new USA global approach summarized a year later in the new National Security Strategy, which ordered the intelligence community to follow political, economic, social and military developments in all parts of the world, in all sectors in which American interests are involved, and where the information from open sources was not sufficient (The White House, 1994). Economic intelligence would play an increasingly important role in helping political decision-makers to understand economic changes, in supporting US negotiators, and in helping to identify possible economic threats to American companies on the part of foreign intelligence or incorrect commercial practices.

Together with the NEC, the National Security Council (NSC) analyzes issues related to economic and industrial counter-espionage by also taking advantage of their collaboration with the National Counter-Intelligence Centre, an organization instituted by the FBI, the CIA and the Department of Defence to cooperate with corporations in such a way as to anticipate or hinder any type of economic espionage on the part of foreign companies. In the same year, the Advocacy Centre, a department within the Department of Commerce, was formed with the task of following and supporting the expansion of US companies around the world. The Advocacy Centre has to constantly hold the development of every type of project in the world, in which any American company has interests, under control. Thanks to continual monitoring of the markets, the active support of American delegations committed abroad, and to the tight collaboration installed with the intelligence community, this represented the principal junction between it and the corporations, for which the information is nevertheless supplied in a discreet way. The DCI (Director of Central Intelligence) is the one who decides if and when to supply information to the private sector. If more companies demonstrate interest, then in the same call for competition everyone must receive the same help and information (Gaiser, 2016).

1.2.2 The United Kingdom

In the UK a full-scale law on the secret services, the British Intelligence Services Act, was only produced in 1994, despite the longstanding national intelligence tradition. With legislative text that takes into consideration as much the internal service, the Security Service (known also as MI5), as the external one, the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), as well as defence (DI – Defence Intelligence Staff) and systems of communications (GCHQ – Government Communications Headquarters), the birth of economic intelligence was made official. According to the official wording, the activities of the Secret Intelligence Service and GCHQ had the goal of preserving the interests of economic wellbeing in the United Kingdom (Article 1). Economic intelligence, or rather economic wellbeing, became an official priority, defined by the law. The services guarantee their support to companies' needs, and the success of the British Intelligence Community is defined every year on the basis of the results obtained in favour of the national economy. MI5 depends on the Home Office, and MI6 and GCHQ on the Foreign Office, to receive directives on the priorities and objectives of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), formed by the undersecretaries of the interested departments and presided over by an undersecretary whose specific role it is to coordinate intelligence and security, responding directly to the Prime Minister. The JIC has the task of defining the goals of the activities, that is, of drafting the 'shopping list', as well as forwarding information to interested companies (Gaiser, 2016). According to the most accurate estimates, at least 60% of the funds of MI6 were already committed to that sector by the end of the 1990s (Marcon, Moinet, 1999, p. 7). In analyzing the United Kingdom, however, one must not forget that the strategy of economic intelligence is not based only on the sensible use of services, but also on the ensemble of institutions responsible for the support of their exports, that is, of investments in and from the country. In this sense, the UKIT – UK Trade and Investment – embedded in the frame of the Foreign Office, represents the standard means by which the government desires to systematically coordinate the approach towards importing and exporting companies as bringers of economic potential. The UKIT is officially a department of the government and is present in more than 100 countries around the world. Supplying professional assistance to companies that desire internationalization, and trying to propose the United Kingdom to companies overseas as partners of global yield, it also acts as a platform of support and a facilitator in favour of the sector of defence and security. The critical infrastructures of the United Kingdom are in turn constantly monitored by the Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure that works in close contact or in coordination with all the involved Ministries and the private economic world.

1.2.3 France

In 1994 a report of the Commissariat général du Plan, edited by Henri Martre, came to light, and over time became the milestone for the reform of economic intelligence in France (Gagliano, 2014). According to report outputs in 1995, a 'functional subject' in contact with all the entrepreneurial sectors and state administrations was defined and named: CCSE – Comité pour la Comptétivité et la Sécurité Economique.

It was given tasks comparable to those of the American National Economic Council. Chaired by the Prime Minister, it is made up of seven appointed members, with a mandate of two years as representatives of enterprise managers, Ministries, unions and the academic world. This composition guarantees cooperation and continuous coordination between the public and private sectors.

The General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN), the institution coordinating the government's security policies, which incorporates the Inter-ministerial Intelligence Committee (the CIR, Comité Interministériel du Renseignement), offered the CCSE logistic and administrative support. The SGDSN acts as a perfect information sharing platform. It allows the CCSE to be promptly supplied with important data, thanks to the CIR presence. While the DGSE – Direction Général de Securité Extérieur – continued, through its Service 7, to bring forward the typical initiatives of espionage in the economic field, over the years the French state has given itself a well-structured setting for economic intelligence by also reducing its activities to regional levels. In 2002, a decree by the Ministry of Economics and Finance of a 'continual mission – mainly defensive – in the sector of economic intelligence' transferred the mission to the Prefects. In 2005 a Ministry of the Interior decree informed regions and other local bodies about the economic intelligence approach the Republic intended to implement. In the end, the whole picture was upgraded in May 2013 by the nomination by the government of an Inter-ministerial Delegate for Economic Intelligence, with the task of coordinating the various branches of public administration towards shared goals.

1.2.4 Russia

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the KGB was restructured by Boris Yeltsin into two branches: the SVR – Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki – was entrusted with external security, while internal security was delegated to the FSB – Federal'naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti. Both these services make reference directly to the head of state and to the Security Council of the Russian Federation.

A decree on 11 August 2003 was promulgated by Vladimir Putin to supply the FSB with powers to maintain the unity of the state, combat terrorism and overcome any attempt at destabilization. An earlier decree of 10 January 1996 had given the SVR powers to protect Russian personnel and institutions abroad and to conduct activities of electronic surveillance, but most importantly to bring forward economic, scientific, strategic and technological espionage. It was clear that not even in the most difficult of transitional periods would scientific and technological intelligence ever stop working. In fact, thanks to the growth in scientific exchange and contract opportunities between the East and West, as well as the formation of new joint ventures between Russian and foreign enterprises, the activities of industrial espionage services in the economic sector even increased. During the Cold War priorities were essentially oriented towards the military field and strategic technologies, but now all aspects of the industrial sectors and commercial productions are considered important. It was the same Yeltsin who in 1996 imparted the order 'to give priority to the acquisition

of economic and industrial information'. He also insisted, however, on the fact that efficient coordination between intelligence and its users was lacking, and complained that the Russian industry only used a minimum of the gathered information (Jean, Savona 2011, p. 88). The gap between economic intelligence and its users was much higher than that which existed in the military field, because of the tight symbiosis that existed between the GRU and the arms industry. It was during that period that the political elite began to talk about the constitution in the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Commerce of an office destined to formulate the needs of economic and industrial intelligence and to spread the results to the users.

2   SLOVENIA AND ITS LACK OF A STRUCTURED ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

Slovenia can be cited as a typical example of a country which, even though it has limited territorial dimensions, still has a good consular and diplomatic network and noteworthy intelligence – both military and civil – services, even within the limits of its dimensions, with deep historical traditions and an economic structure that could easily benefit from a coordinated and systematic action of economic intelligence. This action, however, would be difficult to achieve in a coordinated manner.

Rightly considered in the 1990s as the most westernized of the ex-Yugoslavia countries, with its high-level industrial structure, Slovenia reached the objectives that were set by its foreign policy in 1999 within a few years: it became a member of all of the international organizations – especially of NATO and of the European Union in 2004 – and joined the Eurozone in 2007. The country was able to achieve all this during a period in which its economy was sky-rocketing, so much so that it became a member of the exclusive OECD club in 2010. This positive cycle of growth was based not only on big structural investments, but also on the continuation of industrial and commercial strategies designated by the governments of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, which ended due to an inability to anticipate proactively the immediate consequences of the international financial crisis which erupted in 2007 (Gaiser, 2015).

Immediately after its independence Slovenia could claim a rich web of commercial and political contacts in the world, thanks to the capillary presence of Slovenijales, a company which, even if specializing in the production of lumber derivatives and engineering, could be compared during the Yugoslavian era to the Japanese JETRO in terms of function and importance. The inevitable economic restructuring, and the departure of the state from the corporation, resulted in its downsizing to only Slovenia's internal market, and the country had to wait for the constitution of the Javna Agencija za Podjetnistvo in Tuje Investicije (Public Agency for the Republic of Slovenia for Entrepreneurship and Foreign Investments), which occurred in 2005, to regain a presence in the world that was parallel to that of the diplomatic and consular headquarters. The agency, transformed in 2013 into SPIRIT Slovenia following a very critical audit revision of its efficiency carried out by the Slovenian Court of Audit

(RS-RS, 2013), had the goals of supporting the internationalization of Slovenian companies and attracting foreign investments into the country. Currently, SPIRIT Slovenia is framed within the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology. As a state-run agency it collaborates actively with all governmental departments in the promotion of the country abroad, by maintaining a special relationship with the Department of Commercial Diplomacy (part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), with which it prepares delegations during visits abroad.

Nevertheless, the Slovenian Court of Audit has highlighted multiple times that the Ministry of Economics, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Agency do not collaborate sufficiently for the internationalization of national enterprises, and that their annual work programmes do not sufficiently specify the minimum set goals. According to the Court, the results that have been obtained thus far have not justified the financial investment guaranteed by the state budget (RS-RS, 2009).

Today Slovenia is in an economic identity crisis, with a public deficit that has increased by 130% in the five year period from 2008-2013 and an unemployment rate higher than the European average (OECD, 2015). It cannot easily carry out choices of revitalization or repositioning on the international markets, despite the excellence that it possesses in niche sectors such as medicine, pharmaceuticals, energy and lumber.

After having struggled with the negative legacy of the Communist intelligence heritage, Slovenia developed a small, new, modern intelligence system, coordinated by the National Security Council (Prezelj, 2016). The Security Information Service (Varnostno-Informativna Služba), working within the Ministry of the Interior, became an independent governmental agency named SOVA in 1993. This transition strengthened the Prime Minister and the government's role. According to Brejc, the intention of the political leadership of SOVA was to have a small, effective, and trained professional intelligence agency which would be able to collect intelligence information abroad. Transplanting any of the European intelligence models (e.g. the Austrian, German, British, Hungarian, etc.) to the case of Slovenia was not considered at the time due to the persuasion that Slovenia, as a small State, could not afford a large intelligence agency with global goals (Brejc, p. 171). The Law of 1999, amended in 2006, which delineated the competences of the national intelligence agency SOVA, foresaw in Article 2 that it must carry out its own activities, both offensive and defensive, in support of the economic interests of the country. Nevertheless, the Agency is currently required to supply its information only to the Prime Minister and possibly to competent Ministers. An effective connection between the entrepreneurial system and the use of economic interests is lacking. In fact, Slovenia possesses the structures suitable for economic intelligence of good quality, but up to now has not known how to bring them together into a single system.

Conclusion Economic intelligence is a collective and offensive measure, formed by the coordinated actions of research, treatment, diffusion and protection of information, obtained legally or through 'legalized' systems of state activities, in as much as access to secret information becomes lawful at the moment in which it is authorized. All of this presupposes an organization of networks and specific instruments to preserve or increase the geo-economic power of a state and its sphere of influence. The logic of the balance of power holds the world economy. The national systems must guarantee an environment suitable for the success of their own enterprises – both public and private – and the goal of the state's economic intelligence is also to change the rules of the game of world competition, adapting the markets to their own needs and creating the conditions for their success even in inferior circumstances.

This coordination occurs in different forms for different countries, and moulds itself on the basis of the local culture of intelligence.

The study of various management systems provides an opportunity to recognize the single historical, cultural and economic pattern-driven particularities of each nation. Without the careful acknowledgement of the underlying anthropological differences there is a high risk of misunderstanding and irrationally implementing strategic information that is unsuitable to the referring environment. Just as a constantly applicable pre-defined solution of economic intelligence does not exist, there also exists no vision of economics that can be precisely defined as neutral.

Slovenia is a market-based economy with still a strong state presence, especially in banking and the industrial system. It is by Constitution (Article 2) a social state. This means that public sector activities will be always oriented towards maximising general wellbeing. Within this scenario it is the decision-makers' duty to restructure the country's economic framework and to propose a new development strategy in the near future.

Furthermore, following the examples of the most qualified countries, the Slovenian government should find a workable solution for coordinating the intelligence services with the needs of the economic system. Its economic interests are geographically limited. This means that SOVA's activities abroad overlap the country's economic network, and that bilateral relations based on information sharing could be a win-win solution. Moreover, it means that, lacking a political willingness to shape a new strategy, it could be SOVA that highlights the need to develop a comprehensive economic intelligence system and forces the political elites to transform the country to a strategic state as defined by Csurgai.

Economic politics could find greater opportunities if it was decided to establish a full-scale strategy of economic intelligence. The government should give life to a specific institutional framework in which it could conflate, in an official way, information obtained by the Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency (SOVA) with that obtained by the economic and banking system and by the SID Bank,

responsible for the financing and insuring exports. The very first step could be made by conceiving a special configuration of the National Security Council (Svet za Nacionalno Varnost) to be called on specific economic issues. Today, it is composed of the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Finance and the Director of SOVA; its composition presupposes a standard, old-fashioned, security approach to intelligence. Opening it also to the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology, and to representatives of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and other specific economic sectors, could transform it into an economic intelligence coordinating body having targets comparable with those entrusted to the American NEC, the French CCSE and the British JIC.

In the absence of other means, the provision of Article 2 of the Law on Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency could be used as a starting point for positive change. The more social bodies feel that they have a common objective, the more willing they will be to accept organizations and methods aimed at increasing their overall competitiveness. In this sense, it is of the utmost importance that universities and companies study the issue and promote the training of specialized management figures while continuing to spread the knowledge and awareness of intelligence issues among the wider population. Shared security at the service of a nation's general wealth does not only require appropriate organizations, but – first and foremost – qualified people who are able to understand the basics of economic warfare.

It could be said that in any state around the world only the willingness of the public and private sectors is needed in order to understand the advantages derived from reciprocal collaboration and to give life to a strategic vision of their country-systems.

Economic warfare has given countries more options then waging armed conflicts. This has, to some extent, loosened the interdependence between the economy and war. This diverges from the 20th century, where the former was at the service of the latter. As these borders expand over time, the more all countries need to put in place their own economic intelligence units because this will be the tool they are forced to resort to if they are to play on the new chessboard.

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OCENJEVANJE NAČRTOVANJA IN IZVAJANJA MISIJ IN OPERACIJ EU: ŠTUDIJA PRIMERA EUFOR ALTHEA V BOSNI IN HERCEGOVINI

ASSESSING THE PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS: CASE STUDY OF EUFOR ALTHEA IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Povzetek   Evropska unija je vzpostavila tesne povezave z državami Zahodnega Balkana v zadnjih tridesetih letih, predvsem zato, da bi zagotovila stabilno, uspešno in dobro delujočo demokratično družbo pri vključitvi v Evropsko unijo. Tudi takratna Evropska varnostna in obrambna politika (EVOP), pozneje preimenovana v Skupno varnostno in obrambno politiko (SVOP), je bila umeščena visoko v političnem programu agende Evropske unije. Nato je predal operacijo Sfor v Bosni in Hercegovini, katere naloga je ohranjanje varnosti v regiji, in Evropska unija je 2. decembra 2004, devet let po koncu vojne, začela operacijo Althea. Eufor Althea je najdaljša vojaška operacija Skupne varnostne in obrambne politike v zgodovini do zdaj. V prispevku so opisani pridobljene izkušnje in vidiki ter posledice zmogljivosti načrtovanja operacije. Temelji na intervjujih, izvedenih v BiH, pri čemer se upoštevata tako Evropska unija kot zunanji vidik glede tematike. Na začetku naj bi bil okvir SVOP predviden kot kratkoročni instrument. Avtorica sklene, da mora Evropska unija, če želi učinkovito načrtovati in izvajati zapletene dolgoročne civilne in vojaške misije ter operacije, ustrezno prilagoditi mandate in svoj splošni pristop. Eufor Althea naj bi kljub dolgotrajni prisotnosti na terenu in brez znakov umika v bližnji prihodnosti dosegla uspeh, in sicer predvsem pri ohranjanju varnega okolja, spodbujanju človekovih pravic in enakosti spolov ter krepitvi zmogljivosti oboroženih sil Bosne in Hercegovine, prav tako naj bi k omenjenim dosežkom prispevala tudi zmogljivost načrtovanja.

Ključne besede   *Evropska unija, Bosna in Hercegovina, SVOP, Eufor Althea, načrtovanje, učinkovitost.*

Abstract   The European Union has established close links with the countries of the Western Balkans over the past thirty years, primarily with the aim of ensuring a stable, successful and well-functioning democratic society when joining the EU. The

former European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), later renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), was placed high on the political agenda of the EU. NATO handed over the SFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose task was maintaining security in the region, and on 2 December 2004, nine years after the end of the war, the EU began its Operation Althea. EUFOR Althea is now the longest CSDP military operation in history. The article describes the acquired experience and the aspects and implications of the operation's planning capacity. It is derived from interviews conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and takes into account both the EU and external aspects of the topic. At the outset, the CSDP framework was envisaged as a short-term instrument. The article concludes that, in order to effectively plan and implement complex long-term civilian and military missions and operations, the EU must adapt its mandates and general approach. The article claims that EUFOR Althea, despite its long-term presence on the ground and without any signs of withdrawal in the near future, has achieved a certain success, especially in maintaining a secure environment, promoting human rights and gender equality, and strengthening the capabilities of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, it claims that it was the planning capacity that contributed to these achievements.

Key words   *European Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina, CSDP, EUFOR Althea, planning, efficiency.*

Introduction   One of the six constituent republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), entered a period of war in March 1992 which lasted until December 1995. The violence led to the deaths of 100,000-200,000 people and left almost half the population displaced (New World Encyclopaedia, 2016). The war ended in 1995 with the assistance of the international community under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), after negotiations in Dayton between leaders from Belgrade, Sarajevo and Zagreb, and with the official signing of the Dayton Accords[1] in Paris on 14 December 1995. This commenced a long and turbulent path towards restoring peace and security. NATO's first operation, Implementation Force (IFOR), with over 60,000 troops, became operational in December 1995. A year later, the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) took over IFOR's mandate. NATO's presence in BiH for almost nine years ensured the successful implementation of the Dayton Accords in all entities of BiH, encompassing the de-escalation of the conflict and the disarmament and demilitarization of the armed forces and the civilian population, as well as the repatriation of displaced people. NATO expressed its intention to retreat its forces at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004 (Knezović, 2005).

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[1]   *United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council S/1995/999 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina.*

The European Union (EU) intended to take over the operation from NATO. The EU's approach to the Western Balkans was based on strategic objectives aiming at the eventual accession of these countries to the EU, and guaranteed European commitment in BiH (Council of the EU, 2004 b). On 9 July 2004, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) welcomed the intention of the EU to provide for the new operation in BiH with UNSC Resolution 1551[2], and authorized the EU operation to proceed in November 2004 with UNSC Resolution 1575[3].

1   METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

This article[4] introduces the findings of the research conducted in the framework of the project *Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention* (IECEU).[5] A large portion of the IECEU research was dedicated to examining the effectiveness of ten Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions based on case study research of **six key capabilities** – planning capacity, operational capacity, interoperability, competencies, comprehensiveness and technologies. This paper seeks a deeper understanding of the first – **planning capacity** – and argues that EUFOR Althea has achieved a satisfactory level in this, despite the fact that room for improvement still remains. Each of the capabilities can be analysed from an EU and a non-EU perspective. The two perspectives overlap and thus provide a good overview of different opinions and viewpoints (Mekri, 2015, p. 25).

The applied research method was a qualitative analysis of interviews and focus group discussions. The interviews were conducted in the period between November 2015 and March 2016. Due to the sensitivities of the issues discussed, the names of the interviewees are not disclosed.[6] All preliminary research findings were afterwards 'tested' at a round table in Slovenia.[7] Analysis of primary and secondary sources served as a supportive research method.

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[2] *Security Council Resolution S/RES/1551 (2004), adopted 9 July 2004.*

[3] *Security Council Resolution S/RES/1575 (2004), adopted 22 November 2004.*

[4] *This article is based on deliverable D2.3 of the IECEU Project (http://www.ieceu-project.com/), which received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 653371. The responsibility for the content of the article lies solely with the authors and the opinions expressed therein do not reflect the official position of the European Union. The deliverable is based on data collection and interviews conducted by J. Suhonen, K. Sainio, E. Norvanto, J. Salonen, I. Boštjančič Pulko, M. Muherina and B. Udovič, as well as on Deliverable 2.3 of the IECEU project.*

[5] *This project received funding from the EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation HORIZON 2020. For more info check: http://www.ieceu-project.com/ (08 June 2017).*

[6] *The interview data and details are in the possession of the authors; the interviews were conducted with former and current personnel of EUFOR Althea, local and international regional experts, representatives of the governmental actors of various EU member states, European External Action Service (EEAS) representatives as well as other EU, non-EU and civil society representatives, NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and others.*

[7] *Video from the round table with statements of the representatives taking part is available here: http://www.ieceu-project.com/?p=536.*

Planning capacity is assessed from the perspective of EUFOR Althea's initial mandate, namely the operational planning and capacity-building and training (CBT) of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) and support to the BiH authorities in maintaining a safe and secure environment (SASE)[8]. Additionally, EUFOR Althea's engagement in Security Sector Reform (SSR) and defence reform is covered, due to its linkage with CBT. Research on EUFOR Althea's planning capacity strived to encompass strategic and operational planning and its implications for the management and implementation of the operation, the lessons learned and the operation's situational awareness (Mekri 2015, pp. 102-104).

2 PLANNING OF EUFOR ALTHEA

EUFOR Althea was established in December 2004 by the decision of the Council of the European Union[9]. It is the longest-running military intervention launched in the framework of the CSDP as one of the EU's crisis management instruments. It was deployed under the Berlin Plus Agreement[10], enabling the EU to utilize NATO's assets and capabilities in the operation (Council of EU Secretariat, 2015).

The history leading up to the launching of the operation began with the Maastricht Treaty, which was the first to identify the EU's objectives regarding external and foreign relations, as the EU realized it had no power over conflict in its immediate neighbourhood.[11] This fact had a direct impact on the EU's borders, as the member states began developing the two key levels of common crisis management capabilities: the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), focusing on strategic foreign policy objectives, and, a couple of years later, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which aimed at operational execution of crisis management.

The St. Malo declaration[12] and the Treaty of Amsterdam[13] expressed the need for operational capabilities, the latter integrating crisis management into the CFSP. In 1999, the European Council approved the Action Plan for Non-Military Crisis Management and the development of institutional structures for its implementation (Gourlay and others, 2006). The ESDP, established at the 1999 European Council

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[8]   As stressed at the general presentation at HQ EUFOR Althea, 2 March 2015: the CBT of the AFBiH and support to the BiH authorities in maintaining a SASE represent COM EUFOR's Main Effort within Op ALTHEA.

[9]   Council of the European Union Decision 2004/803/CFSP of 25 November 2004 on the launching of the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

[10] The Berlin Plus agreement is a comprehensive package of arrangements finalized in 2003 between the EU and NATO, which enables the EU to make use of NATO's assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations (European External Action Service, 2016a).

[11] European Union, Treaty on European Union, Treaty of Maastricht, signed 7 February 1992 in Maastricht, in force from 1 November 1993.

[12] Saint-Malo Declaration, signed on 4 December 1998 in Saint-Malo.

[13] European Union, Treaty of Amsterdam, amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities, and certain related acts, as signed on 2 October 1997 in Amsterdam, in force from 1 May 1999.

meeting in Cologne (renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) after the Lisbon Treaty[14]) became operational in 2003, with the launch of the first CSDP missions.

EUFOR Althea was launched in a context where the future of BiH mattered not only for maintaining peace and security in the EU's neighbourhood but also for the EU's self-perception as a foreign policy and security actor. BiH has been referred to as a 'testing ground' for the CSDP many times (Council of the EU, 2004 b). It contributed to the EU's development from a civilian power to a more multifaceted one, resorting to military instruments with an aim of promoting its own values and goals. EUFOR Althea has allowed the EU to experiment with its military capabilities in a relatively safe multi-actor environment, and the operation has been explicitly framed as an element of a broader and comprehensive EU policy towards the region (Juncos, 2015).

EUFOR Althea's launch aimed at ensuring the continued implementation of and compliance with the Dayton Agreement, to contribute to a safe and secure environment and to support the Euro-Atlantic integration of BiH.[15] The EU initially deployed 7,000 troops (Kim, 2006). The mandate has evolved and been reconfigured four times, most recently in September 2012. The operation continues to function in line with its peace enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The most recent mandate of the operation encompasses three main objectives: providing CBT for the AF BiH, which is the non-executive part of the operation; supporting the BiH authorities in maintaining SASE[16] in BiH; and providing support to the overall EU comprehensive strategy for BiH. The non-executive part aims at BiH becoming a security provider rather than a security consumer in the long term (Council of EU Secretariat, 2015).

With the reconfiguration in 2012, EUFOR Althea's troop level dropped to approximately 600, which remains its current strength. The reconstruction of the operation was driven primarily by lack of political will and by withdrawals of the participating nations (Interview no. 21).

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[14] *European Union, Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, 2007/C 306/01*

[15] *EUFOR Althea's current mandate is twofold: its mission is based on the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) joint action, which has an executive component derived from the UNSC resolution (to support the BiH authorities in maintaining a SASE) and a non-executive component (to provide capacity-building and training for the AFBiH) (Interview no. 39).*

[16] *SASE consists of the following tasks: countermines activities, military and civilian movement control of weapons, ammunition and explosive substances, and management of weapons and ammunition storage sites (Council of EU Secretariat, 2015).*

3 PLANNING CAPACITY OF EUFOR ALTHEA

Resolution UNSCR 1575 mandated EUFOR to exclusively inherit the role of SFOR. A robust force of 7,000 troops from 22 EU member states and 11 other countries was deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to ensure continued implementation of and compliance with Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Dayton Agreement, and to contribute to a SASE. Large number of SFOR troops remained in BiH and were only transferred under the command of EUFOR Althea, which was assessed as operationally smooth and relatively simple, particularly because of the use of 'Berlin Plus' arrangements and the existing SFOR operation plans which formed the basis of EUFOR Althea's strategic and operational planning (Interviews no. 21, no. 23, no. 32, no. 33 and no. 44).[17] The NATO common assets and capabilities as defined in the Specific Agreement for EUFOR Althea comprise mainly Command and Control (C2) items such as Operation Headquarters (OHQ) at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the EU Command Element (EUCE) at Joint Forces Command (JFC) Naples, and Communication and Information Systems (CIS) and access to NATO's classified networks, specifically intelligence systems and intelligence databases, as well as infrastructure (Interviews no. 21, no. 23, no. 32, no. 33 and no. 44).

EUFOR Althea is conducted under the authority of the European Council. Its political control and strategic direction is exercised by the Political and Security Committee (PSC).The EU Military Committee (EUMC) monitors the appropriateness of its execution, and the EUMC's chairman acts as the primary point of contact for the operation commander (OpCdr), who is also a Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) in the NATO structure. In his role as OpCdr, the DSACEUR is supported by the EU OHQ, which is the whole of SHAPE amplified by the European Union Staff Group (EUSG) as the core of EU expertise. To ensure synergy and prevent unnecessary duplication, the EUSG is closely interconnected with the SHAPE Comprehensive Crisis and Operation Management Centre (CCOMC), which facilitates access to all SHAPE Directorate entities. The OpCdr reports to the PSC through the chairman of the EUMC on all issues of strategic value for the operation. He also attends EUMC and PSC meetings and briefs them on the EUFOR Althea EUCE (Interviews no. 21 and no. 65 and EUSG, 2016).

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[17] *'About CSDP – the Berlin Plus agreement', from the EEAS, accessed on 26 May 2016, at http://eeas.europa. eu/csdp/about-csdp/berlin/index_en.htm. This agreement involves a comprehensive package of arrangements finalized in early 2003 between the EU and NATO that allows the EU to make use of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations.*

Figure 1:
Command
and control
structure and
responsibilities[18]

4 STRATEGIC LEVEL PLANNING

Strategic-level planning is conducted within the EUSG at OHQ.[19] EUSG also deals with force generation, manpower and organization review, the EUFOR Althea reporting system and financial issues, and provides updated information from the operation itself. The EUSG maintains situational awareness within BiH. Theoretically, a clear military command structure, a solid reporting system, and the availability of NATO assets provide a very good basis for real-time situational awareness. However, the reduced number of troops and, especially, the current low number of liaison and observation teams (LOTs)[20] in the field compromise the ability to react and respond in a timely manner to a potential deterioration of the SASE (Interviews no. 34, no. 24 and no. 40).

OHQ will update the operational plans as required in coordination with the NATO Strategic Operational Planning Group. In addition to co-ordinating all operational matters, monitoring current operations, and advising on all operational issues,

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[18] Interview no. 47; EUSG basic brief of 7 January 2016.

[19] 'European Union Staff Group: Operation ALTHEA OHQ in Shape', accessed on 23 May 2016, at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/100608%20Shape%20-%20EUFOR%20Althea%20OHQ%20-%20how%20it%20works.pdf. The European Union Staff Group at EU Operation Headquarters at SHAPE. It supports the DSACEUR in his role as Operation Commander, the individual who plans and directs the operation at the military strategic level of command.

[20] 'Liaison and observation teams in EUFOR', accessed on 22 May 2016, at http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php/eufor-elements/liaison-and-observation-teams.

OHQ participates in operational planning and the process of development for current operations. OHQ is responsible for the reserves concept; co-operating with troop-contributing nations (TCNs) and the EUCE with respect to intelligence and reconnaissance assets; and collaborating with the EU Military Staff (EUMS) in connection with possible EU Battlegroups intervention. In addition, it liaises with NATO on the Balkans Operational Reserve Forces and Strategic Reserve Forces. The role of the OpCdr as the NATO-EU strategic co-ordinator, and his well-functioning interaction with the EUFOR commander (COM EUFOR), was seen as a critical factor for operational success (Interviews no. 34, no. 24 and no. 40 and EUSG 2016).

From a military point of view, the C2 structure of EUFOR Althea is quite complicated due to the several 'layers' of political and military actors. The political-strategic level sometimes provides no coordination or planning guidance directed to the operational level. The EU as a whole should have a common understanding on the preferred strategic development of the country, since political realities limit strategic/operational planning (Interviews no. 25 and no. 34). The operation clearly suffers from lack of a clear end state (Interviews no. 21, no. 28, no. 40, no. 39 and no. 36). The mission staff often lack understanding of what is going on at the HQ level in Brussels, but the same is also true vice versa (Interview no. 21).

Member states' approvals of the mission's extension or its adjustment are crucial and sometimes a showstopper to the planning process and execution. Changes or adjustments of the OHQ-level operation plan (OPLAN) have to be approved by the member nations (Interviews no. 29 and no. 47). EUFOR Althea is quite low on the agenda of the member states, and nations do not usually send their best staff to the operation, since they perceive it as a training opportunity for individuals (Interview no. 28). NATO is the main counterpart for EUFOR in the planning process and is considered to be much better at planning and resource allocation. One EU official stressed that the operation is actually much more NATO-conducted than EU-conducted with a mandate being framed in member states' discussions, but the reality is given by DSACEUR, and sometimes NATO's input is significantly greater. This fact gives more freedom, more input and outcome, but in the end it shows that the EU is not able to provide more than basic instructions (Interviews no. 21 and no. 24).

Notwithstanding the multi-level and complex C2 structure, political realities, and sometimes lack of coordination between the political-strategic level and the operational-tactical level, the interviewees perceived the current planning system based on NATO assets as functional, and considered the planning process to take all the necessary factors into account. The EUSG at OHQ is seen as 'the core', liaising with all the SHAPE Directorate's branches, particularly through the Strategic Operations Centre, thereby enabling a complete interface in all areas. The EUSG maintains a close relationship with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and EUMS through recourse to SHAPE's assets at OHQ when needed, in accordance with the CSDP (Interviews no. 24 and no. 47). Strategic planning is perceived to be problematic, since at the outset of the operation there was a clear lack of discussion

regarding the end state, which should define what milestones should be reached for the operation to end and leave the country (Interview no. 67, 68). The so-called end state is listed very vaguely as "(…) to be based on progress in building efficient state level structures, in particular in the area of security and defence. This objective is primarily the responsibility of the BiH government assisted by EU civilian actors. Moreover, it will be important to avoid the creation of a culture of dependence upon EUFOR" (Council of EU 2004, 4). Some of the respondents perceive that the continuation of the operation mainly serves the EU's political purposes (IECEU, Round table discussion of experts, 2016).

5   OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND EXECUTION

When EUFOR Althea was deployed there were already OPLANs in place, prepared by SFOR HQs and troops, and work continued largely in line with the existing plans. SFOR OPLANs formed the basis for EUFOR Althea's strategic/operational planning (Interviews no. 21, no. 23, no, 32, no. 33 and no. 44).

EUFOR Althea uses a 'standard military' operations planning process (OPP) and follows NATO's Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD). OHQ at SHAPE will update or develop the operational plans as required in coordination with the NATO Strategic Operational Planning Group. The key element at OHQ is the EUSG, which supports the DSACEUR in his role as OpCdr and is responsible to him for the day-to-day running of the operation and operational planning. OHQ co-ordinates all operational matters, and advises on operational issues and participates in operational planning and the development process for current operations (Interviews no. 21, no. 23, no, 32, no. 33).

Planning is usually carried out in parallel with the EUCE at JFC in Naples and HQ EUFOR Althea in Sarajevo. Parallel planning entails the various individual levels sharing information and products with subordinate units as soon as these are ready to be used in the subordinate units' planning. Subordinate units keep the higher levels informed of their planning through back-briefing. This enables dialogue between the various levels from early in the planning phase, and the OPLANs at OHQ and EUFOR Althea level are co-ordinated. Finally, COM EUFOR is able to act, put the plan into action, and distribute the necessary orders/directives/guidance within the OPLAN framework.

The OpCdr pays regular visits to EUFOR Althea, enabling face-to-face contact between the commanders, supporting COM EUFOR Althea's leadership, and giving him direct strategic/operational level guidance (Interview no. 34). The OPLANs at both the strategic-operational level (OHQ) and operation level (Area of Operation in BiH) are reviewed in light of the security situation and the development of the operational environment in BiH. Since the beginning of the operation, the OpCdr's OHQ OPLAN has been revised four times, and COM EUFOR's OPLAN five times (Interviews no. 40, no. 41, no. 46 and no. 47).

The current planning process produces detailed and co-ordinated plans, and the decision-making process is functional and takes into account all the factors that need to be considered. However, the political guidance or member states' 'approval', linked to national interests/agendas related to extending or adjusting the mission, nominating reserves, or amending the operational plan, must be taken into consideration. The role of the EU member states/TCNs is crucial and sometimes slows down the planning process and execution (Interviews no. 29, no. 34, no. 35 and no. 47).[21]

6 TECHNOLOGIES AS PART OF PLANNING CAPABILITIES

The J6 (Communications) element of the EUSG at OHQ/SHAPE provides military strategic expertise to ensure the delivery of NATO information systems and communication support for EUFOR Althea. The EUSG/J6 maintains secure CIS systems across two environments (EU and NATO) which are technically different, and also operates secure communication links from EU OHQ at SHAPE through EUCE (Naples) to HQ EUFOR (in Sarajevo) (Interviews no. 46 and no. 47). The use of NATO CIS, NATO secure networks and intelligence systems, and the NATO intelligence database has provided an efficient and cost-effective mechanism for EUFOR Althea since the beginning of the operation. Similarly, one of the EUMC's major lessons, already identified in 2007, was that 'the use of NATO CIS assets was a pragmatic and cost-effective solution for the beginning of the EU operation and provided EUFOR with appropriate CIS support' (Council Document 2013). Although the communications established under the Berlin Plus agreement worked well, means of mobile communication were scarce and often unreliable, because of the use of often incompatible national systems in the Multinational Task Forces. This has also been a challenge in operations established since EUFOR Althea. Currently, NATO HQ Sarajevo supports the static CIS infrastructure at Camp Butmir (HQ EUFOR Althea) and deployable secure CIS systems are supported by EUFOR Althea personnel (EUSG 2016). In December 2010, a civilian contractor[22] was selected to provide full operation and maintenance support for the CIS on behalf of NATO HQ Sarajevo and HQ EUFOR Althea.

7 IMPLICATIONS OF PLANNING CAPACITY ON SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND DEFENCE REFORM

Originally, EUFOR Althea's engagement in Security Sector Reform (SSR) was connected to the European Union Police Mission's (EUPM) inefficiency in filling

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[21] *Any major changes or adjustments to the OHQ level OPLAN must be approved by the member nations. National caveats and national agendas were not seen as obstructing interoperability per se but were considered to be a phenomenon that presents challenges to operational planning. The issue of the strong national agendas of certain individual nations (e.g. Turkey and Austria) is not seen as significantly hampering interoperability in practice.*

[22] *'ATCO awarded NATO contract in Sarajevo', ATCO Structures & Logistics material, accessed on 31 May 2016, at http://www.atcosl.com/en-ca/Media-Room/News-2010/081210-NATO-Contract-Sarajevo.*

the law-enforcement void. Consequently, EUFOR became heavily involved in the fight against organized crime. The EUFOR involvement in fighting crime ran counter to accepted SSR norms and highlighted the continued weakness of Bosnian law enforcement. By the end of 2005 EUFOR had scaled down its contribution in this area, allowing the EUPM to become the primary international law enforcement agency in BiH (ISSAT, 2016).

EUPM's closure in 2012 marked an important transition for BiH's authorities, forcing them to take ownership of SSR. Today the EU still remains committed to strengthening the rule of law in BiH through other instruments, including the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) and the reinforced office of the EU Special Representative (EUSR). Military reform in BiH has been progressive while police reform has been slower. The police force continues to be ethnically divided despite the creation of state-level agencies. A general lack of coordination and cooperation between law-enforcement agencies hampers the ability of the police to deliver a full range of services (European Commission, 2015).

NATO still owns the strategic dimension of the reform process, working closely with BiH's Ministry of Defence (MOD). EUFOR, on the other hand, has an important role in the implementation of the technical and tactical aspects of the reform, and the organizations try to complement one another's efforts as much as possible. Currently, NATO and EUFOR seek to co-ordinate their efforts to foster defence reform, with NATO's objective being to support the development of the capacity of the defence sector in pursuit of NATO standards, thereby preparing BiH for possible future NATO membership. The EU aims to strengthen the country's security sector in order to ensure its consistent stability in connection with the EU integration process (Interview no. 39)[23].

Lack of a nationally owned strategy covering the defence sector has been a major barrier to a consistent reform process in BiH. The political framework in BiH makes the reform process challenging; a collective presidency directs the BiH Ministry of Defence and the country's armed forces, but BiH's three main ethnic groups differ in their views and vision for the development of the defence sector. In consequence, the government has so far been unable to produce a defence strategy (Interview no. 56). BiH's defence budget (€ 250,000,000) is very limited. To establish some sort of common baseline for the capacity-building and equipping process, EUFOR and NATO are jointly conducting an assessment with the aim of identifying the armed forces' current capabilities. They see this joint effort as potentially enabling them to focus their efforts on building appropriate defence capabilities and helping them co-ordinate and regulate third-country support. In addition, it should help to ensure

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[23] *As EU and NATO requirements are in line with one another, the joint reform efforts can help both organizations reach their long-term goals for the country. One interviewee described the cooperation between the two organizations, stating that no decision is taken on any aspect of SSR without the EUFOR and the NATO commanders first discussing it, before approaching any local authorities.*

that EUFOR Althea concentrates its capacity-building efforts on the right elements (Interviews no. 21, no. 34, no. 53 and no. 56).

8 IMPLICATIONS OF PLANNING CAPACITY ON INTEROPERABILITY

Civil-military synergies in BiH were unfortunately destined to be lost from the beginning. The two CSDP missions, EUPM and EUFOR Althea, were planned separately and there was no joint strategic planning or set of connecting structures (Interviews no. 22, no. 23, no. 31).

Moreover, the interviewees stated that cooperation with another EU actor, the European Union Monitoring Mission (until August 2007), was poor or non-existent. The presence of and cooperation with the UN during the initial stage was described as 'shallow'. Despite Berlin Plus, cooperation with NATO at the field-operations level was also considered poor; NATO directed its attention and activities toward the AF BiH, and CBT was not within Althea's mandate at that time. On account of the predominance of the OHR, the OSCE played only a minor role in terms of cooperation. The presence of NGOs in BiH was strong, and in fact, EUFOR Althea cooperated with them and aimed at information sharing, although this group of actors was described as the 'most difficult', both because of their unwillingness to share information and differences in working logic that sometimes even posed security risks for their personnel (Interviews no. 22, no. 23, no. 31, no. 32, no. 33, and no. 54).

9 IMPLICATIONS OF PLANNING CAPACITY ON CAPACITY-BUILDING AND TRAINING

Developing the CBT of the AF BiH in close coordination with NATO is currently one of the key tasks of EUFOR, but the comprehensive nature of BiH's defence reform only allows EUFOR's role to be minor when compared to that of other actors' (Interviews no. 28 and no. 34).[24] The aim is to support BiH's efforts to develop into a 'security provider' rather than being a 'security consumer', that is, to enhance local ownership by the BiH authorities and their autonomy. The current stage of the operation may lead to a major restructuring or might even be the first step towards the conclusion of the operation. The situation has stalled due to the political circumstances in BiH, which are currently not favourable. In general, the political design of BiH is not conducive to completing all tasks (Interviews no. 28 and no. 52).

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[24] *'About EUFOR', accessed on 23 May 2016, at http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php/about-eufor/ background. In 2012, the operation reconfigured and moved its focus to CBT for the AFBiH. It nevertheless retained its obligations to support the BiH authorities in maintaining a SASE; Council of the European Union press release '2992nd Council meeting – foreign affairs', Council document 5686/10 (Presse 10), Brussels, 25 January 2010.*

Interviewees stressed that the shift from the initial implementation of compliance with the Dayton Agreement and contributing to a SASE to providing CBT stems from the fact that the original mandate no longer matched the needs on the ground. EUFOR Althea's current focus on CBT actually derives from the member states' inability to decide 'where to go' and their unwillingness to contribute troops and resources to the operation.

EUFOR Althea is currently implementing a highly integrated and jointly co-ordinated training plan with the AFBiH, together with NATO and several bilateral partners. Within this joint framework, delivering effective CBT requires careful coordination of all the efforts by international actors. This is critical, as sometimes nations have been willing to provide training or donate equipment outside the agreed training plan. In consequence, the capacity and resources of EUFOR Althea and NATO HQ Sarajevo have become tied up for a long time in training the AFBiH in the use of particular equipment. Donations are sometimes politically linked to national interests. All this is reflected as a lack of sustainability of the capacity-building efforts (Interviews no. 36, no. 34, no. 39, and no. 24).

Several interviewees confirmed the existence of one major obstacle to effective CBT for the AF BiH; although the training is organized and planned very well and is currently also co-ordinated between EUFOR Althea, NATO and the AF BiH, financial support is a considerable challenge. EUFOR Althea conducts training mainly with its own equipment. When the training is completed, the trained AF BiH units should possess the skills and knowledge needed, but do not have the equipment and assets to execute what they are trained for. Certain budget allocations should therefore be made for purchasing equipment and basic assets for the AF BiH, since they have very limited resources to invest or procure practically any equipment. Currently, the Athena mechanism cannot be used to fund equipment or material for the AF BiH. One solution might be an 'Equip and Train' programme which is based on an assessment of the AF BiH's long-term needs. There has already been some progress in this regard, as the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) is working on the issue (Interviews no. 36, no. 34).

10 LESSONS LEARNED PROCESS

Several papers and reports addressing lessons identified within the operation have been issued by the EU institutions since 2004.[25] Sometimes these lessons have been implemented, while on other occasions old problems either re-emerged or were not sufficiently dealt with. Examples of these are the need for better coordination of EU instruments and for more efficient procurement procedures, which have been

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[25] *See, for example, the Council of the European Union and European External Action Service's 'Annual 2014 CSDP Lessons Report' (partially accessible to the public as of 26 May 2015, Annex C: EUMS contribution still limited), 6777/15, of 3 March 2015, and the Council of the European Union's 'Op Althea – Consolidated Report on "Historical Lessons Identified" from the execution of Operation Althea', Council document 14181/07, Brussels, of 11 March 2013.*

recognised as continuous problems by the Council (Interviews no. 28 and no. 30). The most significant progress has been made with a comprehensive approach, namely coordination and coherence between the individual actors in BiH. Further lessons have been learned about the Berlin Plus agreement, cost-sharing agreements, sharing of intelligence, and having clear delineation of tasks whenever NATO and EU military operations are in the same theatre (Emerson, Gross 2007; Leakey 2007).

The current lessons learned (LL) process in EUFOR Althea is based on a standard operating procedure (SOP) (HQ EUFOR 2011). Under this SOP, EUFOR Althea's J3 (Operations) branch is responsible for managing, directing, and staffing the LL process within EUFOR. Also, SOP states that each branch at HQ and at the unit HQs conducts its own process and designates LL analysts/points of contact tasked with dealing with J3. However, because of a range of factors, e.g. the temporary nature of HQ EUFOR, the frequent rotation of personnel or lack of trained personnel, this is not always achieved (Interviews no. 46 and no. 40, EUMS 2012).

Official public documents make no specific reference to a pre-planned and formal lessons learned process or products of best practices in EUFOR Althea (Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 2012).[26] According to the EUFOR OHQ operational documents, LL capability should prioritize EUFOR Althea's observations on the implementation of its key tasks, including elements such as capability requirements, concept development, and structures, along with the consequent reconfiguration of the operation. Also, the procedures for LL reporting should be integrated into the six-monthly review (SMR) process (Interview no. 46).

EUFOR Althea SMRs do not directly include observations, lessons identified or best practices. Most of the reviews nevertheless feature recommendations, which can be understood as observations/lessons identified or even best practices. (Interview no. 34). Most of the recommendations or best practices are related to national caveats and the restrictions to operational effectiveness; the importance of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) assets and Information Operation campaigns; the coordination between EUFOR and other EU/international actors (a very good 'best practice' has been the joint EUFOR Althea and NATO HQ Sarajevo coordination of the CBT for the AF BiH); the importance of a comprehensive approach at all levels; the inadequate training level and skills of staff officers; and the short tours (tour lengths should be 12 months for key posts and not less than six months for other posts at HQ) (Interview no. 46). The LL process has been implemented in all staff exercises and field-training exercises. The results and action bodies have been specified in final exercise reports, and these findings were presented in the OHQ LL report to the EUMS. The EUFOR Althea LO's report from 2015 dealt with AFBiH's lack of capabilities, along with procedures that have an impact on CBT planning and conducting of CBT activities, the reserve forces concept and reserves' activation process, CBT planning, assessment, and CBT cooperation with NATO HQ Sarajevo,

[26] There were approximately 30 lesson observations for EUFOR Althea in the ELMA database in February 2012.

as well as military-camp management in the light of in-sourcing vs. outsourcing camp management (Interviews no. 28, no. 30 and no. 47).

It seems that in very rare cases, the 'field-level' observations go through the EU Military LL Process (ELPRO) and that these observations eventually become official best practices. The key lessons and best practices listed in the EEAS Annual Reports are very general in nature and seem to be of little importance at the field level. It may take a very long time for an observation to be approved for learning and finally propagated as a best practice (Interview no. 28). Widespread use of informal best practices and mechanisms, such as information-sharing within personal networks, for learning and improving various phases is present in EUFOR. However, the informal mechanisms are highly dependent on personal relationships, leaving doubts about reliability and reach (Interviews no. 28, no. 30, no. 41, no. 34, no. 39, no. 37, no. 35 and no. 36).

Conclusion The CSDP missions and operations have been envisaged as a rather short-term response to a crisis. The current trends, however, indicate that they are used as relatively long-term post-conflict institution-building instruments. This fact highlights the importance of planning capacity, which has significant influence on the implementation of a given mission. The stabilization and reconstruction of a multicultural and multi-ethnic community in BiH became a litmus test for the Union's commitment to becoming a political and security actor that projects peace and stability across the entire continent. BiH's future therefore mattered not only to the citizens of the country, but also to the EU's perception of itself as a foreign-policy and security actor. In this sense, EUFOR Althea's deployment meant projecting its aspirations for the region in a relatively safe, risk-free environment, with low costs.

The timeframe of planning the mission in BiH was not a critical question in the case of BiH, since the military problem had largely ceased to exist by the time EUFOR Althea took over its tasks from SFOR. Notwithstanding the political divisions related to the CFSP, and in the face of institutional opposition from some quarters (initially the Council and the Commission) (Flessenkemper, Helly 2013, p. 9), EUFOR Althea was launched at a time of momentum for the ESDP. Following the events of the 1990s, particularly in BiH and Rwanda, several Member states developed a common understanding of the need to develop the EU's crisis management capabilities. No rapid deployment was deemed necessary and force generation did not present a challenge for the Union. Furthermore, the operation was not very demanding in terms of planning, since it was carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin Plus arrangements.

Access to NATO planning assets, structures and capabilities under the "Berlin Plus" arrangements, which contributed to a smooth and relatively simple transition from SFOR to EUFOR Althea, is clearly extremely beneficial and important for the functioning of the operation. The present planning system based on NATO assets takes all the necessary factors into account. The operation has a clear military command

structure and reporting system, and the availability of NATO assets provides a good basis for real-time situational awareness. There is also a well-integrated and jointly coordinated training plan with AF BiH together with NATO and several bilateral partners.

Despite the fact that deployment and initial planning were successful, the EU has failed to define and agree on an end state. The evaluation criteria for the operational tasks have been discussed and drafted at the OHQ level since 2005, but the CSDP operation still lacks official time-limited benchmarks. Lack of coordination or planning guidance exercised from the strategic/political level towards the operational level is a clear inadequacy. As for the CBT work, EUFOR Althea has only recently come to an understanding with NATO and the AF BiH on the coordination of efforts and resources aimed at building a specific set of capabilities of the AF BiH. A fully funded plan for the procurement of key assets and equipment and an agreement on the goals against which the development of the AF BiH could later be evaluated are still required.

Efficiency associated with the capabilities and their implementation is more difficult to assess. EUFOR Althea had good initial planning capacity, but certain gaps and weaknesses which manifest themselves in operational capacity were identified in the course of the research process. Lack of human intelligence (HUMINT) capability is a gap that hinders efficient and effective intelligence-gathering. It is also questionable to what extent the 17 LOTs can maintain and produce situational awareness, especially in the current context. Other problems with the LOTs lie in the personnel breakdown, especially in the low proportion of female officers and older personnel, as well as in the short rotation cycles, which hinder the development of relationships of trust with locals and follow-up on the implemented policies. Apart from these, the LOTs that are living among the local population across BiH seem to have been an excellent tool for gathering information, bringing visibility to the operation, and engaging with a wider audience. Another force element that the interviewees mentioned as having been an excellent asset in the first years of the operation was the IPUs.

There are still some challenges to be addressed. The operation suffers from a lack of a clearly defined end-state. The 'political realities' and the member states' role are crucial and often do not add positively to the planning process and execution of the operation. The reduced number of troops, and especially the current low number of LOTs, compromise the ability to react and respond in a timely manner to a potential worsening of the SASE in BiH. In EUFOR Althea's case national caveats have certainly been a challenge to operational planning.

The conflict in BiH ended 20 years ago and it is questionable whether the EU's 'hard power' is still required at this stage. Consequently, the question arises of whether BiH would be able to ensure a SASE at this stage. However, this question lies beyond the scope of the present article and the IECEU research project.

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Pika Šarf

ZAKONITOST NIZKOINTENZIVNIH KIBERNETSKIH OPERACIJ PO MEDNARODNEM PRAVU

LEGALITY OF LOW-INTENSITY CYBER OPERATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

Povzetek   Namen tega prispevka je obravnava mednarodnopravne ureditve nizkointenzivnih kibernetskih operacij. Čeprav mednarodna skupnost soglaša, da mednarodno pravo ureja ravnanje držav v kibernetskem prostoru, ni popolnoma jasno, kako se veljavna pravila mednarodnega prava uporabljajo v kibernetskem kontekstu. Večina pravnih strokovnjakov in strokovnjakov za nacionalno varnost ter vojaških strategov se je osredotočila na kibernetske operacije, ki dosegajo prag oboroženega spopada ali uporabe sile, vendar pa je le nekaj kibernetskih operacij v preteklosti ta prag tudi v resnici doseglo. Kibernetske operacije nižje intenzivnosti prevladujejo v kibernetskih odnosih med državami. Pri analizi skladnosti nizkointenzivnih kibernetskih napadov z veljavnimi pravili mednarodnega prava, zlasti z načelom ozemeljske suverenosti in načelom nevmešavanja, se članek opira na ugotovitve mednarodne skupine strokovnjakov, ki je pripravila t. i. Talinski priročnik uporabnega prava za področje kibernetskih operacij, in na mnenja drugih priznanih pravnih strokovnjakov.

Ključne   *Kibernetska operacija, mednarodno pravo, načelo ozemeljske suverenosti, načelo*
besede   *neintervencije.*

Abstract   The purpose of this article is to discuss the international law regulation of low-intensity cyber operations. Although the international community agrees that international law governs the conduct of states in cyberspace, it is not entirely clear how the existing norms of international law apply in the cyber context. The majority of legal scholars, as well as national security experts and military strategists, have focused on cyber operations that reach the threshold of either armed attack or use of force; however, few cyber operations in the past have actually risen to that level. Cyber operations of lower intensity prevail in state cyber interactions. While analyzing the accordance of low-intensity cyber operations with the existing norms of international law, in particular with the principle of state sovereignty and non-intervention, the article

leans on the findings of the International Group of Experts which developed the Tallinn Manual on International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, and writings of other recognized legal scholars.

Key words   *Cyber operation, international law, principle of territorial sovereignty, principle of non-intervention.*

Introduction   In the wake of the new millennium the prevailing assumption of the international community was that cyberspace presented a new threat, which would change not just the future of international conflicts but international relations in general. The world awaited an inevitable cyber-attack of apocalyptical dimensions that would cripple critical infrastructure and the economy. Cyber war was coming.

However, cyber war never happened. On the other hand, cyber operations of lower intensity are relatively common. The military employs a wide variety of cyber operations, both in the context of armed conflict and in times of peace, which serve various goals, from information gathering, deception and deterrence to disruption and destruction (Gill, 2016). The vast majority of military cyber operations do not meet the threshold of use of force or armed attack; however, this does not necessarily mean that they are legal under international law.

This article will examine how the focus of the international community and legal scholars has shifted from cyber war to low-intensity cyber operations. It will further provide an overview of the international law regime governing low-intensity cyber operations, arguing that although they fall below the threshold of use of force and armed attack, they may nevertheless violate other principles of international law, in particular principles of territorial sovereignty and non-intervention.[1] This article leans on the findings of the International Group of Experts that prepared the Tallinn Manual of International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, and writings of other recognized legal scholars.

Apart from normative uncertainty, the cyber-realm is also facing a terminological gap, since the international community has failed to define any cyber-related terms. In the absence of shared definitions, different states and institutions understand terms differently, which makes debate at the international level particularly difficult (NATO CCDCOE, Cyber Definitions). The term cyber operation itself is poorly understood. The Glossary of the Tallinn Manual states that a cyber operation is the employment of cyber capabilities with the primary purpose of achieving objectives in or through cyberspace (Schmitt, 2013, p. 258). In the present article the term low-intensity cyber operations will only refer to cyber operations falling below the threshold of use of

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[1]   *Low-intensity cyber operations may also violate other international law norms, for example, human rights (in particular the right to privacy and freedom of expression) or norms relating to diplomatic and consular relations, but, due to the spatial limitations, the present article will only concentrate on violations of the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention.*

force, although some authors also use this term for cyber operations amounting to the use of force below the threshold of armed attack.

1 FROM CYBER WAR TO LOW-INTENSITY CYBER OPERATIONS

In the late 1990s, cyber operations began to draw the attention of international legal scholars, as well as national security experts and military strategists. Arquilla and Ronfeldt wrote in their article, "Cyberwar is coming!", that "the information revolution will bring the next major shift in the nature of conflict and warfare" (1993, p. 143). In 2012, the Secretary of Defense of the United States and a former Director of the CIA, Leon E. Panetta, warned that "these kinds of attacks could be a cyber Pearl Harbor; an attack that would cause physical destruction and the loss of life" (Panetta, 2012). But he was far from being the only one to use such cyber doom rhetoric in the cyber security debate. Others have compared cyber attacks to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, major natural disasters or even nuclear weapons (Lawson, 2016). It is therefore not surprising that the entire legal community, fearing that states would in the near future engage in cyber warfare, focused their attention almost exclusively on cyber attacks amounting to either armed attack or use of force.

However, more than 25 years have passed since "cyber Pearl Harbor" was mentioned for the first time, but it still has not happened and it is highly unlikely that it will happen in the near future.[2] Regardless of all evidence that supports the opposite, some scholars are still asserting that the world is already in a state of cyber war.[3] Indeed, states and individuals alike are daily targeted by cyber attacks, but such attacks almost always fall within the categories of either cyber crime or cyber espionage. In fact in 2016, only 4.3% of all cyber attacks were conducted in relation to war or caused physical damage approaching the use of force. However, it must be noted that the number of such attacks almost doubled since 2015[4] (Passeri, 2016).

On the other hand, cyber operations of low intensity are quite common in state cyber interactions. Estonia gained the attention of global community in 2007, as it became the first country targeted by a series of low-intensity cyber attacks. Following the relocation of the Soviet memorial of the Bronze Soldier, the websites of the Estonian Parliament, Ministries, political parties, banks, news and broadcasters suffered

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[2] *A comprehensive list of cyber attacks perpetrated by different states, which includes information about the targeted state or institution within a state, the alleged source of the attack and a description of the event, is included in the Appendix in: Shakelford S. J., 2014. Managing Cyber Attacks in International Law, Business, and Relations: In Search of Cyber Peace. New York: Cambridge University Press.*

[3] *Dearden L., 2017. World Heading Towards 'Permanent Cyber War', France Warns. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/cyber-war-world-warning-france-criminals-extremists-russia-countries-guillaume-poupard-anssi-a7767886.html, 23 August 2017; Ferguson N., 2017. Cyber War I has Already Begun. https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/03/13/cyber-war-has-already-begun/dYE1vkpT1W3zKdhjxwH1QP/story.html, 23 August 2017.*

[4] *The share of cyber attacks falling within the category of "Cyber Warfare" was 2.4% in 2015.*

from various forms of distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS)[5] that prevented access to and defaced websites, as well as halting e-mail traffic. Considering the duration of the DDoS attack and Estonia's high reliance on information systems, the attack posed a significant threat; however, it resulted in mainly economic and communications disruptions (Czosseck, 2011; Watts, 2011). In 2008 Georgia was similarly attacked by a series of DDoS attacks, which coincided with the Russian military invasion and lasted for almost a month, much longer than the invasion and even postdating a ceasefire (Watts, 2011). Far less known is an attack on Azerbaijan in 2012 in which websites of government institutions and news agencies were hit by a politically motivated cyber attack by a group of hackers called "the Armenian Cyber Army" (UN Doc. A/66/897, 2012). These cyber incidents in Estonia, Georgia and Azerbaijan were undoubtedly wake-up calls for the international community on the new threats emerging from cyberspace.

Both state and non-state actors will in the future most likely engage in low-intensity cyber attacks, since they are tactically and strategically attractive for numerous reasons. A low-intensity cyber operation is unlikely to provoke a response from a target, especially because the target will not always be aware that an attack has happened at all. Even if the attack is detected, states employing low-intensity cyber operations spread the effects of the operation by attacking various targets over long periods of time, so the attacks appear random and unrelated. Watts therefore compares low-intensity cyber operations to death by a thousand cuts (Watts, 2011). Moreover, cyber operations are usually far cheaper than traditional military operations. The technology required is widely available and inexpensive, which also enables the cooperation of non-state actors, such as cyber militias, offering services for profit or political advantage (Ibid.). For all of these reasons low-intensity cyber operations are no longer used only by cyber criminals and cyber terrorists, but are becoming a powerful means for states to achieve a wide variety of political, military and economic goals and to project national power.

2   OVERVIEW OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE CYBER DOMAIN

The internet, one of the main components of cyberspace, was designed by the US Department of Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA, later known as DARPA) as a Cold War military project that would provide a decentralized communications system which would enable communication even if the Soviet Union successfully destroyed the telephone system. The result of this project was ARPANET, the first predecessor of the modern internet, which consisted of only four computers. In its first two decades it was primarily used in the academic environment as a tool to exchange ideas and knowledge. For security reasons the network split into two domains in 1983: ARPANET remained the network of academia and later

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[5]   *In a distributed denial of service attack, an attacker attempts to make an online service unavailable to its users by overwhelming it with traffic from different sources, which makes it impossible to stop the attack by simply blocking a single IP address.*

became the internet as we know it today,[6] and MILNET evolved into a network devoted entirely to military communications (Naughton, 2016).

For a very long time military engagement in the cyber domain was mostly seen through the prism of its involvement in the development of the internet, and cyberspace was considered as the military's new and safe communications system capable of surviving a devastating attack. However, in one very early case malicious code was used as a real cyber weapon, which is still considered probably the most damaging cyber operation to date, even though it was perpetrated by the CIA and not by the military. In 1982 CIA agents covertly provided the Soviet Union with infected SCADA software, which they desperately needed in order to operate their newly built Urengoy-Surgut-Chelyabinsk pipeline. The software infected the control systems, which resulted in a massive explosion, comparable to the blast of a small nuclear device (Rid, 2012). During the Kosovo crisis in 1999 it became clear that cyber operations would play an important part in international conflicts in the future. Just three days after NATO air strikes began, NATO websites, servers and the cyber infrastructure of NATO member states were the target of a coordinated cyber attack in order to disrupt NATO communications systems (Shackelford, 2014). According to US officials, the United States also resorted to cyber operations during the crisis, but refrained from launching a more aggressive attack that would destabilize the Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević, mostly because they were "worried about the legal implications of launching the world's first cyber war" (Borger, 1999; Ibid.).

However, cyberspace as such was still not seen as a war-fighting domain. It was not until during the international conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008, when cyber operations were launched alongside conventional kinetic operations, that the international community realised that cyberspace is a domain in which you can engage with and defend against an adversary (Ziolkowski, 2013). In 2011 the United States became the first country to officially recognise cyberspace as the fifth operational domain, along with land, sea, air and space (DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, 2011). More importantly, NATO recognized cyberspace as a domain of operations during the Warsaw Summit in 2016. Representatives of NATO states and other nations, including Montenegro, Ukraine, Georgia, and Russia, agreed, that "[they] recognize cyberspace as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at sea" (Warsaw Summer Communiqué, 2016).

In the last few years states have been urging the development of military capabilities in cyberspace, which could be compared to past cases of arms races (Craig, 2016). The militarization of cyberspace is evident from strategic documents and increasing investment in cyber military capabilities. Research conducted by the United Nations

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[6] *ARPANET was officially decommissioned in 1990, when the network became privatised with commercial companies called Internet Service Providers controlling and operating the network. The creation of the World Wide Web and a graphical browser that was easy to use were the final steps towards the internet as we know it today.*

Institute for Disarmament Research showed that, in 2012, 114 UN Member States had cyber security programmes, and 47 of these gave some role to the armed forces (UN Doc. UNIDIR/2013/3, 2013). While defence is the primary goal of the majority of cyber security programmes, there are a great number of states capable of launching an offensive cyber operation.[7] One of the main reasons the number is higher each year is that it is very hard to protect against vulnerabilities in cyberspace; meanwhile, detecting and exploiting them is considerably easier. General Michael Hayden, the former director of the NSA and the CIA, stated that "we have built the internet in such a way that it's very hard to defend it. It's built on openness. It's built on access. It's built on agility. None of those things help the defense" (Hayden, 2010).

3 LEGALITY OF LOW-INTENSITY CYBER OPERATIONS

Neither the international community nor legal scholars agree completely on how the existing rules of international law, including the principles of territorial sovereignty and non-intervention, apply to states' behaviour in cyberspace. In the absence of any cyber-specific customary or treaty law, the opinions of recognized international scholars are of the utmost importance.[8] Among dispersed academic debate, the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, and its follow-up project, the Tallinn Manual on International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (Tallinn Manual 2.0), which were written by an International Group of Experts on the initiative of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence, must be mentioned as the key contributions in clarifying the current state of international law as it applies to cyberspace.

The following section will briefly explain the international law principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention, and it will continue by addressing the question of when those principles are violated by state conduct in or by using cyberspace.

3.1 Low-intensity cyber operations and the principle of state sovereignty

The principle of state sovereignty and its correlate, the principle of non-intervention, are fundamental principles of international law. In its first judgment the International Court of Justice noted that "between independent states, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations" (Corfu Channel, 1949, p. 35).

The principle of territorial sovereignty gives a state the exclusive right to exercise its powers in the territory of a state, which includes land territory within state

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[7] *States believed to be in a possession of offensive cyber capabilities are the United States of America, Israel, Russia, China, Iran, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands.*

[8] *It must be noted, that according to Article 38 (1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which is universally recognized as the definitive statement of sources of international law, teachings of distinguished scholars, just like judicial decisions, are not regarded as a source of international law, but as a subsidiary means for the determination of international law (Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945).*

boundaries, internal waters, territorial sea, the air space above the territory, and the subsoil beneath it (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 1986, §212). Judge Max Huber noted in the Island of Palmas case that "sovereignty in the relations between states signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the functions of a state" (Island of Palmas, 1928, p. 838).

Before addressing the question of the legality of low-intensity cyber operations, we must understand that the international community and legal scholars have not always agreed whether existing rules of international law apply to states' behaviour in cyberspace. In the early days of the internet many scholars argued that the internet could not and should not be regulated, while others advocated self-regulation instead of state regulation. Later, legal scholars advocated that cyberspace is a common heritage of mankind or *res communis omnium*, much like the high seas or outer space, and is therefore an area outside the sovereignty of states subjected to a specific regime of regulation and exploitation (Segura Serano, 2006). Today the international community agrees that the norms of public international law, including the UN Charter, also apply to state conduct in cyberspace[9] (Schmitt, 2013; UN Doc. A/68/98, 2013; UN Doc. A/70/174, 2015). International law has the ability to address in a timely manner the challenges posed by new technologies, such as cyberspace, through the interpretation of the established international norms. Since the interpretation reflects the contemporary values of the international community, international law evolves as the values in the community change (Schmitt, 2013). Therefore, although the application of international law to cyberspace is undisputed, the interpretation of these norms in order to understand their exact scope will need some additional clarification.

Although cyberspace is a non-physical, virtual space, it is nevertheless a man-made environment that requires physical architecture to exist, and as such can be subject to state regulation (Buchan, 2016). Cyberspace can be described by using three interconnected layers[10]:

1. *A physical layer:* physical cyber infrastructure used to communicate and connect (hardware and other physical network components);
2. *A logical (virtual) layer:* software, data and protocols that allow the exchange of data across the physical layer across various geographical locations;
3. *A social layer:* individuals and groups as part of cyberspace (Gill, 2016; Schmitt, 2017).

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9   *Not all states agree that the whole body of public international law applies to cyberspace and therefore cyber operations. China and Russia, for example, oppose the applicability of international humanitarian law (Schmitt, 2014).*

10   *Sometimes this multi-layered system is also seen as consisting of five layers, with an additional cyber persona layer, which enables people to connect to the logical layer (e.g. e-mail addresses, social media accounts) and a geographical layer, which is the location of the physical layer (Gill, 2016).*

States may not claim sovereignty over cyberspace *per se*, but they enjoy sovereignty over cyber infrastructure located on their territory, as well as activities associated with that infrastructure (Schmitt, 2017; Von Heinegg, 2012). As a consequence, states have the right to enforce domestic legislation and to protect cyber infrastructure and safeguard cyber activities that are located in or take place in their territory, regardless of whether the cyber infrastructure belongs to the government, private entities or individuals, or the purposes it serves (Schmitt, 2017). On the other hand, states also bear an obligation to prevent their territory or cyber infrastructure under governmental control to be used to violate the rights of or produce detrimental effects on other states.[11] State regulatory power extends beyond the physical layer, which understandably falls under state sovereignty. Cyber activity of both legal and natural persons located in the territory of a state may also be regulated, and the state may prohibit or restrict certain online content in accordance with other applicable international law norms[12] (Ibid.).

As a result of states exercising territorial sovereignty over the physical layer of cyberspace located in their territory, some authors believe that any cyber attack on cyber infrastructure located in the territory of a foreign state violates its territorial sovereignty (Buchan, 2016; Ohlin, 2015). In support of that theory they argue that in the cyber context physical damage is irrelevant, since a cyber operation may have perceptible effects even though they are not physical in nature (Ziolkowski, 2013). The majority, however, do not agree with this wide interpretation of the rule. The International Group of Experts that prepared the Tallinn Manual 2.0 analyzed in detail which cyber operations constitute a violation of state sovereignty.

State sovereignty is violated in the event that a cyber operation results in physical damage or injury (Schmitt, 2017). The Stuxnet virus, which caused substantial damage to the centrifuges in the Iranian uranium enrichment facility at Natanz by changing the rotor speed, would therefore constitute a clear violation[13] (Buchan, 2012). A cyber operation that interferes with the functions of a foreign state which are inherently governmental in their nature also amounts to a violation of state sovereignty. On the other hand, a cyber operation that results in the loss of functionality of cyber infrastructure located in a foreign territory in some cases constitutes a violation of state sovereignty; however, in the absence of sufficient *opinio juris* it is not settled precisely when this threshold is reached (Schmitt, 2017).

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[11] *The duty of due diligence is a general principle of international law deriving from the principle of sovereignty of states, which has been confirmed in many cases of the International Court of Justice, most famously in the Corfu Chanel Case in which the Court stated that "every state has the obligation not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states" (Corfu Chanel, 1949, p. 22).*

[12] *Special attention should be paid to the freedom of expression enshrined in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which may be subject to restrictions only if certain conditions stipulated in Article 19(3) are fulfilled. Restrictions on the operation of websites, blogs or any other internet-based content must be content-specific and all generic bans are prohibited (UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, 2011).*

[13] *The question of whether the attack against Iran amounted to an unlawful use of force or armed attack is beyond the scope of this article. Solving this question is not only legally complicated, as the exact impact of the Stuxnet virus has never been entirely identified.*

The line between a low-intensity cyber operation that amounts to a violation of state sovereignty and one that does not is therefore very thin, and the legality of such an operation would depend on the circumstances of the particular case.

3.2   Low-intensity cyber operations and the principle of non-intervention

The principle of non-intervention prohibits states from arbitrarily interfering in affairs falling within the sole responsibility of another sovereign state. The prohibition of intervention "is a corollary of every state's right to sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence" (Jennings, 1992, p. 428). Its status as a rule of customary international law has been confirmed in numerous United Nations documents[14] and judgments of the International Court of Justice[15].

The Court noted that "the principle forbids all states or groups of states to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or external affairs of other states. A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each state is permitted, by the principle of state sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain free ones" (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 1986, §205). Determining whether an area lies solely in the responsibility of the domestic state is particularly difficult, but in general all matters that are not regulated by international law fall within the category of domestic affairs. In a globalized and interconnected world where cooperation between states is of key importance, few matters remain purely domestic (Kunig, 2008).

A line between friendly persuasion, which is a normal part of international relations, and political interference prohibited by international law is extremely difficult to draw. According to Oppenheim, "the interference must be forcible or dictatorial, or otherwise coercive, in effect depriving the state intervened against of control over the matter in question. Interference pure and simple is not intervention" (Jennings, 1992, p. 432). The element that distinguishes between interference and prohibited intervention is coercion. Only acts of a certain magnitude, which force a state to adopt a decision with regard to its policy that it would not otherwise adopt, qualify as coercive and violate the principle of non-intervention. The element of coercion is most obvious in cases of the unlawful use of force, which always constitutes a violation of the principle of non-intervention, but acts that do not involve direct physical coercion may also violate the principle (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 1986).

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[14] *Since 1957 the UN General Assembly has adopted more than 30 resolutions addressing the issue of a prohibition of intervention in the internal affairs of states. The most important is the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (UN Doc. A/RES/25/2625, 1970).*

[15] *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America); Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania); Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda).*

The International Group of Experts that prepared the Tallinn Manual 2.0 agreed that activities which merely involve influence by cyber means must be distinguished from prohibited interventions. A cyber attack launched by a state or a non-state actor, whose acts are attributable to a state and which is directed against cyber infrastructure located in the territory of another state and involves the element of coercion clearly amounts to prohibited intervention (Schmitt, 2013; Schmitt, 2017). The cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007 and on Azerbaijan in 2012 are examples of prohibited cyber interventions, since both attacks were politically motivated and aimed at changing policy in the attacked state, which clearly shows the presence of an element of coercion.

The Tallinn Manual provides some other examples of actions of a state that would constitute prohibited interventions:
– Using cyber operations to remotely alter electronic ballots and manipulate an election;
– Employing cyber means to alter electronic diplomatic communications between a state's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its negotiators during the course of fragile talks involving another state, in order to compel the abandonment of the talks;
– Launching disruptive DDoS operations against a state in an attempt to compel it to withdraw recognition of another state;
– Providing cyber weapons to a non-state actor engaged in an insurgency against the government of another state (Schmitt, 2017).

On the other hand, in the view of the International Group of Experts, certain acts do not qualify as wrongful interventions since they are lacking the coercive element. One of the most undisputed examples is cyber espionage, which does not amount to a prohibited intervention, even if it requires remote breaching of protective virtual barriers, e.g. breaching of firewalls or cracking of passwords. Another example is operations conducted by a state to protect its nationals who are in jeopardy abroad, if the territorial state is not offering adequate protection (Schmitt, 2017). The question of whether cyber operations in support of humanitarian intervention that was not consented to by the state or authorized by the UN Security Council would violate the prohibition of intervention remains unanswered, since the experts could not agree on the existence of an exception of humanitarian intervention in international law (Ibid.).

Conclusion   States are increasingly important actors in cyberspace and low-intensity cyber operations offer appealing opportunities to exploit the vulnerabilities of their adversaries, since they are highly effective, extremely affordable, especially compared to classic military operations, and also deniable, because of the difficulties with their attribution. Low-intensity cyber operations raise significant issues, even more so because almost the entire academic debate on state activities in cyberspace is focused on cyber operations which amount to the use of force or armed attack, and low-intensity cyber operations are often completely forgotten. In the last few years this situation has improved as more and more legal scholars recognize the

importance of determining the legality of low-intensity cyber operations. This was also reflected in the field of study of the International Group of Experts in the second edition of the Tallinn Manual, which no longer focuses on the international regime governing cyber warfare, but provides an extensive study of the legal regime for peacetime activities of the states in cyberspace.

Low-intensity cyber operations do not fall through a gap in international law, as some may argue. Although they do not rise to the level of use of force or armed attack, their legality may be assessed through the international law principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention. The key issue that still needs to be resolved is how these two fundamental principles of international law, which were adopted in an entirely different time and circumstances, should be interpreted in the cyber context. In this position of normative uncertainty, states need to be encouraged to articulate their positions on how current international law applies in cyberspace. Their silence leads to unpredictability, which could give rise to misinterpretations and miscalculations by other states and eventually escalate into international conflict. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that in the future states will show willingness to start negotiations in order to comprehensively codify the international law of cyberspace. In the meantime cyberspace will remain an environment haunted by uncertainty and ambiguity.

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SLOVENSKO VOJAŠKO LETALSTVO DANES IN ČEZ 20 LET

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES AIR FORCE: NOW AND 20 YEARS IN THE FUTURE

Povzetek   V članku Slovensko vojaško letalstvo danes in čez 20 let nas avtor skozi kratko zgodovino vojaškega letalstva v Sloveniji popelje do trenutnih karakteristik slovenskega vojaškega letalstva. V nadaljevanju avtor s pomočjo dejstev slovenske vojaške obrambne politike in fokusiranja Slovenske vojske (SV) na bataljonske bojne skupine predlaga karakteristike v razvoju slovenskega vojaškega letalstva, ki morajo poleg vloge podpore bojnim enotam SV temeljiti na združenih funkcijah, kot so poveljevanje in kontrola (PINK); ognjena podpora; premik in manever; zaščita in vzdržljivost združenega bojevanja. Najpomembnejše vprašanje pa je, kaj je treba narediti, da bodo te karakteristike oblikovane na temeljih združenih funkcij. Vsekakor ima slovenska obrambna politika, podprta z vojaškim načinom mišljenja, pomembno vlogo pri postavitvi teh značilnosti.

Ključne besede   *Slovensko vojaško letalstvo, karakteristike, zavezništvo, združene funkcije.*

Abstract   This article, 'The Characteristics of the Slovenian Armed Forces Air Force (SAFAF)[1]: now and 20 years in the future', will lead us through a brief history towards the characteristics of today's Slovenian Armed Forces Air Force. In addition, the article will, with the help of the Slovenian security policy through the Slovenian Armed Forces, whose focus is on Battalion Battle Groups, present the future characteristics of the Slovenian Armed Force Air Force, which, besides fulfilling a supporting role, should be built on a foundation of the joint functions – command and control (C2);

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[1] *In this article, we will use the English term 'Slovenian Armed Forces Air Force', instead of 'Slovenian Military Aviation', because so far the decision-making policy personnel have still not clearly defined which translation would be more appropriate for the Slovenian case. Furthermore, even the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) itself does not clearly define this riddle. This can be correlated with this article's underlying thesis of 'still searching for an identity'. Which definition is more appropriate, the Air Force or Military Aviation, could be also be a topic for a further article.*

intelligence; fire power movement and manoeuvres; protection; and sustainment – of joint warfare. However, the key question is: what decisions should be made and what action taken to get us from here to there? Slovenian security policy, supported by a military way of thinking, plays the key role, and is the enabler for building new future characteristics based on joint functions.

Key words   *Slovenian Armed Forces Air Force (SAFAF), characteristics, alliance, joint functions.*

Introduction   Everything which can be operationally related to the air domain of the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) is presently centralized in the 15th Wing of the SAF. The 15th Wing, in terms of combat forces, falls under the Combat Support Forces of the SAF. The 15th Wing is also the representative of the Slovenian Air Component in terms of the Combined Joint Task Forces concept (CJTF) (MoD, 2016).

The SAF is a very young force, which consequently means that the SAF Air Force (SAFAF) is still fighting a battle for its existence and seeking its identity within the SAF. Seeking an identity will be presented in the first part of the article, along with the other three characteristics present in the SAFAF today. In the second part, the article will focus on its future characteristics 20 years ahead, and the foundations on which we should base mid- and long-term plans. In the third part, the article will focus on proposals for what to do to reach these goals. This will lead us towards the article's thesis, which is that the future character of the SAFAF should be shaped towards our national needs adjusted for our allies' joint functions, because the present character of the SAFAF yearns for an identity which would enable its existence inside the SAF's organization. Furthermore, it is time for the civilian authorities to recognize their role in establishing a level of military effectiveness which will provide the required national security and fulfil Slovenia's obligations in an efficient NATO alliance.

In other words, since our war of independence, the Republic of Slovenia (RS) has been evolving throughout its 25 years of life, and consequently so has the SAF and especially the SAFAF. We do not have our own independent legacy, which has already evolved, matured, and been maintained in our core security principles, to drive our security policy. Focusing on the Air Force, this will be briefly presented from Edvard Rusjan's time, through two important dates for Slovenian military aviation, to the young independent country and the still evolving SAFAF and its search for an identity within the SAF.

Additionally, the world in which we are living is changing drastically. Ideologically-driven conflicts are spreading throughout Europe and there is no guarantee that they will bypass the RS. Consequently, the civilian authorities should take more serious steps towards our national policy and clearly define the role of the SAF – what they expect from it – and consequently lose their political interference and allow the

SAF and the SAFAF to develop their effectiveness through joint functions which are supported by military thinking –'It is better to be a warrior in a garden than a gardener in a war' (Japanese proverb) – proper financing, and long term personnel management.

1 HISTORY OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES AIR FORCE

Slovenian aviation history starts at the beginning of 20th century, when Slovenian aviation pioneer Edvard Rusjan, six years after the Wright brothers, designed, constructed, and flew the first motor-powered aircraft in central Europe (six different types). Unfortunately, because of his enthusiasm for flying, his life ended prematurely in January 1911 (Slovenia.si, 2003), but despite that his legacy has continued throughout recent history. Until 1991, Slovenian airmen were always a part of combined military aviation forces – the Austro-Hungarian Empire; the State/Kingdom of Slovenians, Croats, and Serbs; the Kingdom of Yugoslavia; and finally, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Between Rusjan's death and 1991, the first important date came just after World War I (WWI), when Slovenian nationals formerly serving in the Austro-Hungarian military created and organized two aviation squadrons to fight for the northern Slovenian border, under the command of General Maister. The Slovenian pilots Vilko Peternelj and Franc Zupancic conducted the first Slovenian reconnaissance and combat flights against Austrian military forces on January 12th, 1919, which after 1991 became the official Slovenian Military Aviation day. The second important date in Slovenia's military aviation history was June 28th, 1991, during the War of Independence, when a Slovenian pilot and a technician (Joze Kalan and Bogomir Sustar) escaped from the Yugoslav People's Army to the Slovenian Territorial Defence Forces with a Gazelle Yugoslavian military helicopter (Lipic, 2016). This enabled the young Slovenian military forces to establish the first officially-recognized Slovenian Military Aviation unit, named the 15th Brigade of Military Aviation (15th BRMA) on June 9th, 1992.

With the establishment of the 15th BRMA, the SAFAF was born. Unfortunately, as in all new organizations, the SAF and the SAFAF went through an unavoidable time of challenges and issues related to identity. During the 25 years of development, shaping and reshaping of the SAF, the SAFAF's story was like a lover's novel between the SAFAF and Slovenian military policy. In the first 'chapter', beginning in 1992, the SAFAF went through establishment, growth, and prosperity to its first major reorganization when it was disbanded in 2004. The second chapter began on November 4th, 2004, when the 15th BRMA was disassembled to make three units (the Air Force School, Helicopter Squadron, and Maintenance Squadron) under three different commands (Command for Doctrine, Development, Education, and Training; Force Command; and Logistics Command). The third chapter started in 2006, when political and military leaders realized the confusion which the previous transformation had created in the chain of command in relation to the sustainment of the SAFAF, and reunited the military aviation units, with additional air surveillance and air defence units, under one command, called the Brigade of Air Defence and

Aviation. The organization changed again, for the fourth time, in 2013, when the SAF relocated Ground Air Defence to ground units and established the 15th Wing of the SAF, which is combine from the 15th Wing Command, 151st Rotor-Wing Squadron, 152nd Fixed-Wing Squadron, 153rd Maintenance Squadron, Air Force School, 16th Air Surveillance Battalion, and 107th Logistical Battalion. In total, the 15th Wing is comprise of approximately 650 airmen with school type/general aviation type fixed-wing and rotor-wing aircraft, medium type Utility Helicopters (UH), Light Attack Aircraft (LAAs), Short-take off-landing Transport Aircraft, and Light Transport Aircraft (LTA), with additional 3D ground-stationed Long Range Radar and ground Mobile Short Range Radar, combined in a Constant Report Centre (CRC) capable of 24/7 surveillance of Slovenian Airspace under the command of the 16th Command and Reporting Center. The 15th Wing is also responsible for one renovated military airbase (Cer-klje AFB), whose renovation/construction is currently coming to an end, which is capable of host-nation support for multiple squadrons/NATO type forces.

2 THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF TODAY'S SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES AIR FORCE

What clearly distinguishes the SAFAF is that it has always been an all-volunteer force, from independence in 1992 to today, despite the fact that the SAF was a conscript force until 2004, when the Republic of Slovenia joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and changed to an all-volunteer force. This has enabled the SAFAF to continue its development, which began from sketches in 1991, when it had just one ex-Yugoslavian National Army helicopter (a Gazelle), despite the never-ending story of significant reorganizations (again, four times in 25 years) and significant reductions in the military budget from 2010 when the recession in Slovenia started. Presently the SAF operates with 0.91% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (in 2010, at its peak, it was 1.61%) which is currently allocated in the percentage ratio 82:16:2 (personnel: operations and maintenance of force: procurement and development) (MoD, 2016, pp54-56) instead of the standard ratio of 50:30:20 (MoD, 2011). In other words, in the past few years the SAF has been struggling for survival, which is especially recognized in the 15th Wing because expenses in aviation and the sustainment of its capabilities are normally two to three times higher than infantry units such as the SAF Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) (GŠSV, 2014).

The second characteristic can be found in the way in which the SAFAF Professional Military Education and Training (PME&T) systems are created and organized. The general education of SAF personnel is provided in civilian institutions – high school for Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and Universities for Officers. Once they successfully finish civilian education, all NCOs and Officers go through basic military training and afterwards proceed towards the specialized Professional Military Education and Training (PME&T) which is required to successfully conduct their work. This is where air force personnel PME&T is distinctively different from others, because airmen's basic PME&T is synchronized with civilian aviation

education and training according to the Civilian Aviation Authorities (CAA). The CAA's fundamentals come from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) – equivalent to the US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA). In other words, the SAFAF School is organized similarly to the civilian Aviation Training Organization (ATO). Consequently, all air personnel licensing is based on civilian licences/ratings and then upgraded to military requirements (licences/ratings) which are under the Military Aviation Authority (MAA).

This leads us to the third characteristic, the three levels of control established after the SAFAF joined the NATO alliance. The first level represents internal national inspection, the subject of military inspections and controls by the higher command, the Inspectorate of the Republic of Slovenia for Defence, (National Assembly, 2004) and the MAA (GŠSV, 2012). The second level represents external national inspection, the subject of civilian inspection and control by the Civilian Aviation Authority (National Assembly, 2010). The third level is international, the subject of military inspection and evaluation from the NATO organization (MZZRS, 2004) and members of the Joint Fire Support Executive Steering Committee (JFSESC) (Golden, 2015).

The bottom line is that despite starting from scratch in 1992, and enduring through turbulent times (reorganizations and fiscal constraints), the SAFAF has something worth showing. For example, SAFAF has conducted peacekeeping missions (SFOR & KFOR), (MoD, 2012), a successful NATO standardization evaluation (national CRC, (15. PVL, 2015), and a national Forward Air Controller (FAC) programme (NATO FAC ST, 2014); been an active part of the NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS or NATO IADS) and various national and international exercises (NATO and USA forces)(15. PVL, 2015); and is now an indispensable part of the national Civil Protection and Disaster Relief (search and rescue, medical evacuation/transportation, transplant, firefighting, etc) organization. (GŠSV, 2013) In addition to this, the 15th Wing is advancing towards short-term development which is currently underway, such as the NATO MEDEVAC tactical evaluation (TACEVAL) (GŠSV, 2015) or accreditation of national Air Ground Operation Support (AGOS) Schoolhouse according to the Joint Terminal Attack Controller Memorandum of Agreement (JTAC MOA), and the NATO Standardization Agreement 3797 (STANAG 3797) and Allied Tactical Publication 3.3.2.2 (ATP 3.3.2.2) (GŠSV, 2014).

3 FUTURE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES AIR FORCE

Unfortunately, according to the mid- and long-term plans, the SAF will not develop its potential in military aviation, as can be seen from the following quote: "Military capabilities exceeding national capacity or ambitions will be provided within the alliance or on the basis of bilateral and multilateral international agreements." (RS MoD, p. 32). This means that air superiority over Slovenian airspace will be provided by the NATO alliance. The second major factor related to the development of the

SAFAF's capabilities is that "the SAF will ensure dual-use capabilities to support the system of protection against natural and other disasters." (RS MoD, 2011, p32). The third major factor is that the primary combat units used to fulfil national needs will be Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). These will provide the battalion level units (BBGs) needed to fulfil Slovenia's obligations to NATO, such as quick reaction forces in time of crises (MORS, 2016). SAF airpower should be adjusted accordingly, primarily to support the SAF BCTs. This support should be focused on the development of capabilities which would enable interoperability within the SAF, interoperability between the national border or national security forces (the SAF, the national police force and the national Civil Protection and Disaster Relief organization), and interoperability between the different NATO forces. In other words, long-term plans should develop those characteristics of the SAFAF which would support joint functions based on interoperable capabilities, primarily to support BCTs and BBGs– an interoperable C4ISR network which is supported by intelligence air assets with movement and manoeuvres air assets supporting the sustainment, protection, and fire power power dedicated mainly to ground units.

Firstly, the SAFAF should focus on centralized command, distributed (flexible) control, and decentralized execution. The SAF and the SAFAF should therefore develop capabilities based on a digital network which would allow the active participation of ground forces during the processes of planning and execution of air tasks through their representatives. At the same time, these technological capabilities should provide an active connection to allied operational C4ISR networks, which would enable the active participation of SAFAF in the joint operational environment. In other words, it would facilitate the joint function of command.

Secondly, the SAFAF should focus on tactical air mobility, which would enable 24/7 air assault/drop/supply by utility helicopters with attack capabilities dedicated to company level units. These tactical air mobility capabilities should be used for national domestic interests as well as for international needs, according to allies' needs. At the same time, the SAFAF should enable mid-range air transport/supply with LTAs primarily dedicated to the units used in international security and peacekeeping missions. These capabilities would provide the SAF with national independence in functions of movement and manoeuvres in the international environment.

Thirdly, the SAFAF should develop Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities enabled by tactical level or hand-held Remote Pilot Aircraft (RPAs) and operational level RPAs with limited strike capabilities – a function of intelligence – which could, through the C4ISR active allied connection, enable joint functions of intelligence.

Fourthly, the SAFAF should focus on LAAs with strike capabilities in the permissive and contested environment (JFS ESC, 2016). Their primary role would be the support of BCTs/BBGs with fire power in relation to BCTs/BBGs movement and manoeuvres. At the same time, LAAs would be used in the process of PME&T

(receiving/maintaining the certification/qualification level of proficiency of JTACs and SAF AGOS Schoolhouse, Air Defence (AD) personnel, Weapon Control Officers (WCO), CRC unit etc.) and support of other units (from BCTs level exercises down to platoon level exercises, calibration of ground based radar, etc.).

These four characteristics would enable the SAFAF to support the overall SAF in their core mission and purpose, which originates in the long-term plans and national security policy. The next logical question is which actions should be taken in the next 20 years to reach the established goal? But before this paper continues towards the proposed path for the 2036 development goal, it must answer the question of why the SAF and the SAFAF are currently struggling for their existence.

4 WHY WE ARE WHERE WE ARE?

The main reason can be found in Brigadier General Branimir Furlan's article, "Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness: the Slovenian Case." His hypothesis is that "unresolved problems in the first-generation civil-military relations, as well as the deviation within the second, require from the military a constant reprisal of its performance, leading to a risk of reducing legitimacy, credibility, and the ability to execute its core mission" (Furlan, 2012). In his article, he starts with an exploration of the arguments, such as, what does it mean for control to be objective, and what does a form of subjective control mean? Then he proposes a definition of military effectiveness, which is not just to win wars, but to actually understand the military role and mission and be "capable of transforming political guidance into effective military actions and responses" (Furlan, 2012). In the third part, he determines the area of analysis between civilian authorities, provided for military effectiveness, and the armed forces, an established effective combat force (mission analysis, strategic guidance, personnel management, equipping [material acquisition], financing training and education, readiness, and operations). The bottom line is that in the Slovenian case military education is the only area where the SAF enjoys professional autonomy. Everywhere else, the subject of control is influenced by the civilian authorities (Furlan, 2012). The reason for this is the legacy of mistrust which was inherited from the previous system and the power which the Yugoslavian National Army (YNA) had in it.

5 DECISIONS AND ACTIONS NEEDED TO GET FROM TODAY'S SITUATION TO THE PROPOSED FUTURE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES AIR FORCE

This year Slovenia is marking 25 years of its existence and it is time to change our mentality away from fear of the executive branch of government and its restrictive national policy towards the police and the military. The government should realize that we have national military forces to serve our young independent nation. The next step towards acceptance of military culture within the civilian sector of government

is for politicians to realize their responsibilities towards maintaining the security environment, by providing security forces for the protection of their citizens. The times of the Cold War are long gone. We are living in a world where conventional deterrence has failed, a fact which has been clearly recognizable during the last decade in relation to activities in the Middle East and North Africa, which have subsequently brought consequences into the heart of Europe – Afghanistan and the Iraq war, and the Arab or Spring revolution in Arabic countries such as Libya and Syria being prime examples. On the other hand, the role of military leadership is to emphasize the government's responsibilities, which are carried by civilian leaders, and to stress the importance of government policy for strategic national security which is provided by military forces. Policy makers should recognize the dynamics related to the world security environment where states and non-state actors compete for world order and their influence on it. Despite the fact that the Republic of Slovenia will not directly influence its will and shape the world security environment, the RS should be prepared to defend its national interests and its sovereignty.

An immediate and current example of today's security challenges is the example of controlling the mass migrations from the Middle East into Europe, where the SAF has helped to provide national border protection (MORS, 2016). In the future, the SAFAF could provide sufficient ISR capabilities for border protection, as well as mobility and manoeuvres of the SAF forces and their sustainment. At the same time, if border security drastically worsens, the SAFAF could provide basic security for the SAF forces and citizens of the RS with its integrated national C4ISR network, supported by ISR air assets, air mobility assets and eventually air attack assets. In other words, Slovenia could more easily and quickly detect danger with military air assets which have mounted ISR observation/targeting pods or RPAs. For example, fixed-wing capabilities enable larger border coverage in the same amount of time with less manpower and at the same time, they provide greater coverage into the adversary's territory, beyond the range and capabilities of ground units. At the same time, SAFAF air assets could provide a greater concentration of SAF forces in the area of interest through their movement and manoeuvres function. Finally, the SAFAF could provide firepower from the air to secure our forces on the ground.

Secondly, if politicians recognized their role and responsibilities towards national security, and had a clear and realistic acceptance of the security environment in which we live, RS politicians would lose the argument for neglecting the financial support of the SAF. On the contrary, RS politicians would strive towards the NATO-recommended 2% of national GDP. The fact is that the military needs financial resources for its development. Military development requires 20% of the defence budget to be dedicated to the acquisition of and research into the military equipment which would enable the SAFAF to develop the characteristics proposed in the plan for 2036. Unfortunately, it is an illusion to expect a change next year, or even within the next few years. In the next three to five years, financial resources will be spent on the consequences of the negligence of the SAF's development. The government's plan is to slowly increase the military proportion of GDP to 1.03% by 2020. If we

transform these percentages into numbers, it means that the defence budget will increase by approximately 40 million euros each year until 2020 (RS MoD, 2016). The problem is that today the SAF already needs around 10 million per year just to sustain the current military equipment which is essential to maintaining minimum effectiveness (Planet Siol, 2016). According to the General Staff, the SAF needs around 50 million euros of extra funding this year to be able to function with minimal effectiveness. Additionally, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) recognizes that the SAF would need an additional 200 million euros in order to be able to function effectively according to expectations (Nova 24TV, 2016). Hopefully, the government will also recognize the seriousness of this issue and take appropriate steps and actions towards the most needed positive financial corrections.

Thirdly, the SAFAF should reshape and upgrade its civilian-based PME&T programmes with more military-based ones. This means that the military part of the PME&T must be taken to a higher level. At the moment, we could argue that the mind-set of military pilots is set for the civilian environment. They are more than proficient in civilian regulations and flying experience in civilian commercial airspace. On the other hand, as a result of young armed forces with limited military experience, the SAFAF's military potential is still under development for example, the SAFAF does not at the moment execute any night live firing training, but is entirely based on live simulations. The problem lies in the national civilian aviation and environmental regulations. At the same time, if the new generation of pilots were able to overcome the old philosophy, based on flying technique – how good are you at acrobatic flying – by a new philosophy which is oriented towards military procedures – how good are you at following the right TTPs according to the circumstances – then now is the time to turn the basic PME&T philosophy more towards the military one. For example, the philosophy of flight safety in civilian aviation is oriented towards cancelling the mission if circumstances indicate certain level of danger; in the military world, the philosophy is not oriented towards cancelling the mission but towards how to execute it in the safest way.

Fourthly, the SAF and the Slovenian government should take a different approach towards government human resources policy and personnel management in the SAF. The RS invests a lot in air personnel, compared to some other government and military personnel. For example, if a pilot has flown 1000 flying hours on a certain type of aircraft which costs approximately 2500 euros per operational flying hour, it means that the SAF has invested at least 2.5 million euros in him or her. Consequently, the SAF and the RS government should adjust the national human resources policy to secure its investments in air personnel, but unfortunately, this is not the case with the present national human resources management policy. At the very least, they could learn from previous examples. Between 2004 and 2008, the SAFAF lost around a third of all its flight personnel because military pilots, engineers, and technicians chose to leave the armed forces, preferring to work for civilian companies. The result was the loss of a generation; the generation which today should be taking over almost all command positions in the 15th Wing (Squadron

Commanders and Staff or Sector Commanders) and other high ranking positions in the SAF General Staff. Consequently, the flying units face an inability to sustain required and established capabilities. With a better national economic situation, when air companies will prosper again, this bad scenario for SAF or SAFAF could happen again. Additionally, the SAF and the Slovenian government must realize that creating new air personnel is not a task which can be achieved overnight. For example, to become a pilot, besides successfully completing a civilian degree, medical selection, flying selection, and basic military training, you must go through basic flight training, and professional flight training over a time period of between three and five years – it varies due to the lack of solid financial support, which is consequently shown in military weapons acquisitions or PME&T related to gaining/ maintaining pilot licensing and ratings. After this, they are still senior pilots, with limited experience in military TTPs, and the investment in the pilots is only just beginning to be recovered. To be experienced, you need time and the process cannot be skimped, because of life-dependent safety issues. Because of this, the SAF and the Slovenian government must devise some long-term personnel management policy which would enable the required capabilities to be sustained over time.

Conclusion   To sum up, the Slovenian government, together with the SAF and the SAFAF, currently faces some serious challenges which must be solved to open the path to the twenty-year development plan. These issues can be overcome, especially if they are taken seriously by politicians. The RS was able to establish and develop its own Air Force capabilities, which after 25 years possess certain characteristics which have developed, based on circumstances. If the RS was able to develop the SAFAF from nothing to a level where it is taking an active part in NATO peacekeeping operations, there is no doubt that the SAFAF could follow the path of development and shape its 2036 characteristics in a way that would actively support the national and international security challenges. In other words, the development of its 2036 characteristics is dependent on the will of politicians and the national government, because the civilian authorities in the Slovenian case have a big impact on the efficiency of the SAF, and in the end politicians have the 'scissors and paper' in their hands to provide the basic financing of the changes. The Slovenian government and the SAF's leaders must realize that the new security issues which have been created during the last couple of decades, in the majority of cases, are impossible to solve without capabilities/functions through the third dimension – air and space. The risk, and potential costs related to it is much higher than without them. If our security policy dictates that we seek air superiority – freedom from attack from the air and freedom to attack from the air – through alliance, it does not mean that we should neglect the possibilities which the third dimension enables in modern warfare The bottom line is that the future character of the SAFAF should be shaped towards the national needs, adjusted for allies' joint functions, because the present character of the SAFAF yearns for an identity which would enable the SAFAF's existence inside the SAF organization, and at the same time, it is finally the time for the civilian authorities to sober themselves and recognize their role in establishing the military effectiveness which will provide the required national security and fulfil Slovenia's

obligations towards the NATO alliance. The Dean of the Air Command and Staff College from USAF University, Dr. Forsyth, always proclaims that "history is a conversation the past has with the present about the future." Who knows, if the national economy blooms and the civilian authorities recognize their role, maybe even thoughts of the procurement of 5th generation military systems, which today are not even on a list to be discussed, could be possible.

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Avtorji

Authors

Uroš Tovornik

Mag. Uroš Tovornik je leta 2001 diplomiral, leta 2005 pa magistriral iz politologije, oboje na Univerzi v Ljubljani. Delovne izkušnje si je od leta 2001 nabiral v zasebnem in javnem sektorju, doma in v tujini. Od leta 2006 je uslužbenec Ministrstva za obrambo. V tem času je med drugim sodeloval v projektu predsedovanja Slovenije Svetu Evropske unije leta 2008, delo nadaljeval v Obrambnem oddelku Stalnega predstavništva RS pri Natu in v Mednarodnem sekretariatu Nata v Bruslju. Od sredine 2017 je sekondiran v Evropsko obrambno agencijo.

Uroš Tovornik, MSc, *holds Bachelor (2001) and Master's (2005) degrees in Political Science from the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. During his professional career, which started in 2001, he has worked in both the private and the public sectors, at national and international levels. In 2006 he joined the Ministry of Defence of Slovenia. Since then he has been a member of the Ministry's EU presidency team in 2008 and assistant defence advisor within the Slovenian Defence Section at NATO Headquarters. He has also worked for NATO International Staff in Brussels. As of mid-2017, he has been seconded to the European Defence Agency in Brussels.*

József Kis-Benedek

Polkovnik dr. József Kis-Benedek je častni profesor, ki je večino svoje kariere delal na področju vojaške obveščevalne dejavnosti. Doktoriral je iz vojaške znanosti. Njegova zadnja vojaška dolžnost je bila namestnik direktorja produkcije Vojaške obveščevalne pisarne. Kot obrambni ataše je služboval 10 let v tujini. Predava na različnih fakultetah na Madžarskem. Njegova raziskovalna področja so Bližnji vzhod, terorizem, obveščevalna dejavnost in krizni menedžment.

Col. József Kis-Benedek, PhD, is a honorary professor with a background in military intelligence. He possesses a PhD degree in Military Sciences. His last military position was deputy Director of Production at the Military Intelligence Office. He served abroad as a defence attaché for ten years. He currently gives lectures at many universities in Hungary. His areas of research are the Middle East, terrorism, intelligence and crisis management.

Laris Gaiser

Doc. dr. Laris Gaiser je doktoriral na univerzi Guglielmo Marconi v Rimu. Habilitiran je za področje varnostnih študij. Je član raziskovalne skupine in predavatelj na inštitutu za preučevanje globalnih vprašanj (GLOBIS), od leta 2008 predava mednarodne odnose na univerzi v Georgiji (ZDA), je gostujoči predavatelj na dunajski Diplomatski akademiji in predavatelj na univerzi v Firencah. Med letoma 2012 in 2014 je bil podpredsednik in vršilec dolžnosti predsednika Evro-sredozemske univerze – EMUNI v Portorožu in član strateškega sveta za zunanje zadeve.

Assist. Prof. Laris Gaiser, PhD, *finished his doctoral studies at Guglielmo Marconi University in Rome. He qualified as a university lecturer with a habilitation thesis in security studies. Professor Gaiser is member of a research group and a lecturer at the Centre for the Study of Global Issues (GLOBIS). Since 2008, he has lectured in international relations at the University of Georgia in the USA and is a host lecturer at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna and the University of Florence. Between 2012 and 2014 he acted as Vice-President and acting President of Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI) in Portorož and was a member of the Strategic Council at the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*

Ivana Boštjančič Pulko

Ivana Boštjančič Pulko je doktorska kandidatka. Diplomirala je iz mednarodnih odnosov na Fakulteti za družbene vede. Devet let dela kot projektni vodja in raziskovalka na Centru za evropsko prihodnost (CEP). Odgovorna je za projekte na področju reforme varnostnega sektorja na Zahodnem Balkanu v okviru razvoja pomoči Republike Slovenije. Skrbi za implementacijo mednarodnih raziskovalnih projektov na področju zagotavljanja miru, kriznega upravljanja in preprečevanja konfliktov (ENTRi, IECEU, Let4Cap) ter dela mednarodnih organizacij.

Ivana Boštjančič Pulko *is a PhD candidate. She graduated in International Relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences and worked for nine years as a project manager and researcher at the Centre for European Perspective (CEP). She is in charge of projects on security sector reform in the Western Balkans within the framework of Slovenian Development Assistance. She is responsible for the implementation of international research projects on peace building, crisis management and conflict prevention (ENTRi, IECEU, Let4Cap), and the work of international organizations.*

Johanna Suhonen

Mag. Johanna Suhonen je magistrirala iz političnih ved na Univerzi Turku na Finskem. Delovala je kot raziskovalka in svetovalka za Finsko obrambno raziskovalno agencijo, za Mednarodni center Finskih oboroženih sil (FINCENT) in za Finski center za krizno upravljanje (CMC Finland). Napotena je bila v dve Natovi vojaški operaciji, delala z nevladnimi organizacijami na razvojnem področju v Evropi in Južni Ameriki. Trenutno dela na posebni opazovalni misiji OVSE v Ukrajini.

Johanna Suhonen, MSc, *holds a Master's degree in Political Sciences from the University of Turku, Finland. She worked as a researcher and adviser to the Finnish Defence Research Agency, the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT), and the Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC Finland). She has been deployed to two NATO military operations, and worked with non-governmental organizations in the field of development in Europe and South America. She is currently working at the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine.*

Kari Sainio

Podpolkovnik Kari Sainio v pokoju je nekdanji pripadnik finske vojske z bogatimi izkušnjami iz kompleksnega vojaškega kriznega upravljanja. Deloval je na petih različnih misijah: 1987–1988 v UNDOF (Damask in Golanska planota), 1999–2000 kot poveljnik bataljona Kforja (Kosovo), 2005–2006 kot vodja za zvezo Euforja Althea (Sarajevo), 2010–2011 kot namestnik vodje koordinacije skupnih učinkov v Kforju in 2012–2013 kot mentor oziroma svetovalec v Isafu (Mazar-e Sharif, Afganistan). Trenutno je višji inštruktor na usposabljanjih Mednarodnega centra Finskih oboroženih sil (FINCENT) ter SWEDINT.

Lieutenant Colonel Kari Sainio *is a retired member of the Finnish Defence Forces with extensive experience in complex military crisis management. He served on five different missions: 1987-1988 in UNDOF (Damascus and the Golan Heights); 1999-2000 as Battalion Commander in KFOR (Kosovo); 2005-2006 as Chief Liaison Officer in EUFOR Althea (Sarajevo); 2010-2011 as Deputy Chief of Joint Effects Coordination in KFOR; and 2012-2013 as Mentor/Advisor in ISAF (Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan). He currently works as a senior training instructor for the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) and the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT).*

Mag. Pika Šarf je leta 2016 magistrirala na Pravni fakulteti v Ljubljani. Za magistrsko nalogo z naslovom Mednarodnopravni vidiki ekonomskega vohunjenja v kibernetskem prostoru je prejela nagrado Pravne fakultete. Oktobra 2017 je postala mlada raziskovalka na Inštitutu za kriminologijo pri Pravni fakulteti v Ljubljani. Ukvarja se s kriminologijo in tehnologijo.

Pika Šarf, MsC, *graduated from the Faculty of Law in Ljubljana in 2016. For her Master's thesis, entitled "International Law Perspectives on Economic Espionage in Cyberspace" she received the Faculty of Law Award for Outstanding Master's Thesis. In October 2017 she became a young researcher at the Institute of Criminology at the Faculty of Law in Ljubljana, where her field of research is criminology and technology.*

Pika Šarf

Major Mitja Lipovšek je v Slovenski vojski zaposlen od leta 1999. Opravljal je naloge poveljnika 1. oddelka Pilatus, častnika za varnost letenja v Vojaškem letalskem organu GŠSV in namestnika poveljnika 152. letalske eskadrilje. Leta 2006 je končal štabno šolanje na IOS/SOS v ZDA, leta 2016 pa višje štabno šolanje na ACSC USAF University Maxwell AFB v ZDA, kjer je pridobil naziv Master of Military Art and Science. Hkrati vseskozi opravlja naloge operativnega pilota inštruktorja v SV.

Major Mitja Lipovšek *has been employed in the Slovenian Armed Forces since 1999. He has been Commander of the 1st Pilatus Detachment, Flight Safety Officer at the Military Aviation Authority, and Deputy Commander of 152nd FW Squadron. In 2006, he completed his IOS/SOS in the USA, and in 2016 he finished an ACSC at the USAF University, Maxwell AFB in the USA, where he received the title Master of Military Art and Science. He remains an operational pilot instructor in the Slovenian Armed Forces.*

Mitja Lipovšek

Navodila avtorjem
za oblikovanje prispevkov

Instructions for the authors
of papers

NAVODILA AVTORJEM ZA OBLIKOVANJE PRISPEVKOV ZA SODOBNE VOJAŠKE IZZIVE IN VOJAŠKOŠOLSKI ZBORNIK

Vsebinska navodila

Splošno

Sodobni vojaški izzivi je interdisciplinarna znanstveno-strokovna publikacija, ki objavlja prispevke o aktualnih temah, raziskavah, znanstvenih in strokovnih razpravah, tehničnih ali družboslovnih analizah z varnostnega, obrambnega in vojaškega področja.

Vojaškošolski zbornik je vojaškostrokovna in informativna publikacija, namenjena izobraževanju in obveščanju o dosežkih ter izkušnjah na področju vojaškega izobraževanja, usposabljanja in izpopolnjevanja.

Kaj objavljamo?

Objavljamo prispevke v slovenskem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v angleški jezik, in po odločitvi uredniškega odbora prispevke v angleškem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v slovenski jezik.

Objavljamo prispevke, ki še niso bili objavljeni ali poslani v objavo drugi reviji. Pisec je odgovoren za vse morebitne kršitve avtorskih pravic. Če je bil prispevek že natisnjen drugje, poslan v objavo ali predstavljen na strokovni konferenci, naj to avtor sporočiti uredniku in pridobiti soglasje založnika (če je treba) ter navesti razloge za ponovno objavo.

Tehnična navodila

Omejitve dolžine prispevkov

Prispevki naj obsegajo 16 strani oziroma 30.000 znakov s presledki (avtorska pola), izjemoma najmanj 8 strani oziroma 15.000 znakov ali največ 24 strani oziroma 45.000 znakov.

Recenzije

Prispevki se recenzirajo. Recenzija je anonimna. Glede na oceno recenzentov uredniški odbor ali urednik prispevek sprejme, če je treba, zahteva popravke ali ga zavrne. Pripombe recenzentov avtor vnese v prispevek.

Zaradi anonimnega recenzentskega postopka je treba prvo stran in vsebino oblikovati tako, da identiteta avtorja ni prepoznavna.

Avtor ob naslovu prispevka napiše, v katero kategorijo po njegovem mnenju in glede na klasifikacijo v COBISS spada njegov prispevek. Klasifikacija je dostopna na spletni strani revije in pri odgovornem uredniku. Končno klasifikacijo določi uredniški odbor.

Lektoriranje Lektoriranje besedil zagotavlja OE, pristojna za založniško dejavnost. Lektorirana besedila se avtorizirajo.

Prevajanje Prevajanje besedil ali povzetkov zagotavlja OE, pristojna za prevajalsko dejavnost oziroma Šola za tuje jezike Centra vojaških šol.

Navajanje avtorjev prispevka Navajanje avtorjev je skrajno zgoraj, levo poravnano.
Primer:
Ime 1 Priimek 1,
Ime 2 Priimek 2
V opombi pod črto se za slovenske avtorje navede, iz katere ustanove prihajajo. Pri tujih avtorjih je treba navesti tudi ime države.

Naslov prispevka Navedbi avtorjev sledi naslov prispevka. Črke v naslovu so velike 16 pik, natisnjene krepko, besedilo naslova pa poravnano na sredini.

Povzetek Prispevku mora biti dodan povzetek, ki obsega največ 1200 znakov (20 vrstic). Povzetek naj na kratko opredeli temo prispevka, predvsem naj povzame rezultate in ugotovitve. Splošne ugotovitve in misli ne spadajo v povzetek, temveč v uvod.

Povzetek v angleščini Avtorji morajo oddati tudi prevod povzetka v angleščino. Tudi za prevod povzetka velja omejitev do 1200 znakov (20 vrstic).

Ključne besede Ključne besede (3-5, tudi v angleškem jeziku) naj bodo natisnjene krepko in z obojestransko poravnavo besedila.

Besedilo Avtorji naj oddajo svoje prispevke na papirju formata A4, s presledkom med vrsticami 1,5 in velikostjo črk 12 pik Arial. Na zgornjem in spodnjem robu naj bo do besedila približno 3 cm, levi rob naj bo širok 2 cm, desni pa 4 cm. Na vsaki strani je tako približno 30 vrstic s približno 62 znaki. Besedilo naj bo obojestransko poravnano, brez umikov na začetku odstavka.

Kratka predstavitev avtorjev Avtorji morajo pripraviti kratko predstavitev svojega strokovnega oziroma znanstvenega dela. Predstavitev naj ne presega 600 znakov (10 vrstic, 80 besed). Če je avtorjev več, se predstavi vsak posebej, čim bolj zgoščeno. Avtorji naj besedilo umestijo na konec prispevka po navedeni literaturi.

Struktu-riranje besedila

Posamezna poglavja v besedilu naj bodo ločena s samostojnimi podnaslovi in ustrezno oštevilčena (členitev največ na 4 ravni).
Primer:
1 Uvod
2 Naslov poglavja (1. raven)
2.1 Podnaslov (2. raven)
2.1.1 Podnaslov (3. raven)
2.1.1.1 Podnaslov (4. raven)

Oblikovanje seznama literature

V seznamu literature je treba po abecednem redu navesti le avtorje, na katere se sklicujete v prispevku, celotna oznaka vira pa mora biti skladna s harvard-skim načinom navajanja. Če je avtorjev več, navedemo vse, kot so navedeni na izvirnem delu.
Primeri:

a) knjiga:
Priimek, ime (lahko začetnica imena), letnica. *Naslov dela*. Kraj: Založba.
Na primer: Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

b) zbornik:
Samson, C., 1970. Problems of information studies in history. V S. Stone, ur. *Humanities information research*. Sheffield: CRUS, 1980, str./pp. 44–68. Pri po-sameznih člankih v zbornikih na koncu posameznega vira navedemo strani, na katerih je članek, na primer:

c) članek v reviji
Kolega, N., 2006. Slovenian coast sea flood risk. Acta geographica Slovenica. 46-2, str. 143–167.

Navajanje virov z interneta

Vse reference se začenjajo enako kot pri natisnjenih virih, le da običajnemu delu sledi še podatek o tem, kje na internetu je bil dokument dobljen in kdaj. Podatek o tem, kdaj je bil dokument dobljen, je pomemben zaradi pogostega spreminjanja www okolja.
Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, str. 45–100. http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213, 17. 10. 2008.
Pri navajanju zanimivih internetnih naslovov v besedilu (ne gre za navajanje posebnega dokumenta) zadošča navedba naslova (http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si). Posebna referenca na koncu besedila v tem primeru ni potrebna.

Sklicevanje na vire

Pri sklicevanju na vire med besedilom navedite le priimek prvega avtorja in letnico izdaje. *Primer:* … (Smith, 1997) …

Če dobesedno navajate del besedila, ga ustrezno označite z narekovaji, v oklepaju pa poleg avtorja in letnice navedite stran besedila, iz katerega ste navajali. *Primer*: … (Smith, 1997, str. 15) …

Pri povzemanju drugega avtorja napišemo besedilo brez narekovajev, v oklepaju pa napišemo, da gre za povzeto besedilo. *Primer*: (po Smith, 1997, str. 15). Če avtorja navajamo v besedilu, v oklepaju navedemo samo letnico izida in stran (1997, str. 15).

Slike, diagrami in tabele

Slike, diagrami in tabele v prispevku naj bodo v posebej pripravljenih datotekah, ki omogočajo lektorske popravke. V besedilu mora biti jasno označeno mesto, kamor je treba vnesti sliko. Skupna dolžina prispevka ne sme preseči dane omejitve.

Če avtor iz tehničnih razlogov grafičnih dodatkov ne more oddati v elektronski obliki, je izjemoma sprejemljivo, da slike priloži besedilu. Avtor mora v tem primeru na zadnjo stran slike napisati zaporedno številko in naslov, v besedilu pa pustiti dovolj prostora zanjo. Prav tako mora biti besedilo opremljeno z naslovom in številčenjem slike. Diagrami se štejejo kot slike. Vse slike in tabele se številčijo. Številčenje poteka enotno in ni povezano s številčenjem poglavij. Naslov slike je naveden pod sliko, naslov tabele pa nad tabelo. Navadno je v besedilu navedeno vsaj eno sklicevanje na sliko ali tabelo. Sklic na sliko ali tabelo je: … (slika 5) … (tabela 2) …

Primer slike: Primer tabele:

Tabela 2: Naslov tabele

Slika 5: Naslov slike

Opombe pod črto

Številčenje opomb pod črto je neodvisno od strukture besedila in se v vsakem prispevku začne s številko 1. Posebej opozarjamo avtorje, da so opombe pod črto namenjene pojasnjevanju misli, zapisanih v besedilu, in ne navajanju literature.

Kratice

Kratice naj bodo dodane v oklepaju, ko se okrajšana beseda prvič uporabi, zato posebnih seznamov kratic ne dodajamo. Za kratico ali izraz v angleškem jeziku napišemo najprej slovensko ustreznico, v oklepaju pa angleški izvirnik in morebitno angleško kratico.

Format zapisa prispevka

Uredniški odbor sprejema prispevke, napisane z urejevalnikom besedil MS Word, izjemoma tudi v besedilnem zapisu (text only).

Naslov avtorja	Prispevkom naj bosta dodana avtorjeva naslov in internetni naslov ali telefonska številka, na katerih bo dosegljiv uredniškemu odboru.
Kako poslati prispevek	Na naslov uredništva ali članov uredniškega odbora je treba poslati tiskano in elektronsko različico prispevka.
Potrjevanje sprejetja prispevka	Uredniški odbor avtorju pisno potrdi prejetje prispevka. Avtorjem, ki sporočijo tudi naslov svoje elektronske pošte, se potrditev pošlje po tej poti.
Korekture	Avtor opravi korekture svojega prispevka v treh dneh.
Naslov uredniškega odbora	Ministrstvo za obrambo Generalštab Slovenske vojske Sodobni vojaški izzivi Uredniški odbor Vojkova cesta 55 1000 Ljubljana Slovenija Elektronski naslov Odgovorna urednica: liliana.brozic@mors.si

Prispevkov, ki ne bodo urejeni skladno s tem navodilom, uredniški odbor ne bo sprejemal.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE AUTHORS OF PAPERS FOR THE CONTEMPORARY MILITARY CHALLENGES AND THE MILITARY EDUCATION JOURNAL

Content-related instructions

General

The Contemporary Military Challenges is an interdisciplinary scientific expert magazine, which publishes papers on current topics, researches, scientific and expert discussions, technical or social sciences analysis from the field of security, defence and the military..

The Military Education Journal is a military professional and informative publication intended for education and informing on achievements and experiences in the field of military education, training and improvement.

What do we publish?

We publish papers in Slovene with abstracts translated into English. If so decided by the Editorial Board, we also publish papers in English with abstracts translated into Slovene.

We publish papers, which have not been previously published or sent to another magazine for publication. The author is held responsible for all possible copyright violations. If the paper has already been printed elsewhere, sent for publication or presented at an expert conference, the author must notify the editor, obtain the publisher's consent (if necessary) and indicate the reasons for republishing.

Technical instructions

Limitations regarding the length of the papers

The papers should consist of 16 typewritten double-spaced pages or 30,000 characters. At a minimum they should have 8 pages or 15,000 characters and at a maximum 24 pages or 45,000 characters.

Reviews
All papers are reviewed. The review is anonymous. With regard to the reviewer's assessment, the Editorial Board or the editor accepts the paper, demands modifications, if necessary, or rejects it. Upon receiving the reviewers' remarks, the author inserts them into the paper.

Due to an anonymous review process, the first page must be designed in the way that the author's identity cannot be recognized.

Next to the title, the author should indicate the category the paper belongs to according to him and according to the classification in the COBISS[1]. The classification is available on the magazine's internet page and at the responsible editor. The Editorial Board determines the final classification.

Proofreading
The organizational unit responsible for publishing provides the proofreading of the papers. The proofread papers have to be approved.

Translating
The translation of the papers or abstracts is provided by the organizational unit competent for translation or the School of Foreign Languages, Military Schools Centre.

Indicating the authors of the paper
The authors' name should be written in the upper left corner, aligned left.
Example:
Name 1 Surname 1,
Name 2 Surname 2,
In the footnote, Slovenian authors should indicate the institution they come from. Foreign authors should also indicate the name of the state they come from.

Title of the paper
The title of the paper is written below the listed authors. The font in the title is bold, size 16 points. The text of the title is centrally aligned.

Abstract
The paper should have an abstract of a maximum 1,200 characters (20 lines). The abstract should include a short presentation of the topic, particularly the results and the findings. General findings and reflections do not belong in the abstract, but rather in the introduction.

Abstract in English
The authors must also submit the translation of the abstract into English. The translation of the abstract is likewise limited to a maximum of 1,200 characters (20 lines).

Key words
Key words (3-5 also in the English language) should be bold with a justified text alignment.

Text
The authors should submit their papers on an A4 paper format, with 1.5 line spacing, fontArial size 12 points. At the upper and the bottom edge, there should be approx. 3 cm of space; the left margin should be 2 cm wide and the right margin 4 cm. Each page consists of approx. 30 lines with 62 characters. The text should have a justified alignment, without indents at the beginning of the paragraphs.

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[1]   *Co-operative Online Bibliographic System and Services*

**A brief pre-
sentation of
the authors**

The authors should prepare a brief presentation of their expert or scientific work. The presentation should not exceed 600 characters (10 lines, 80 words). If there are several authors, each should be presented individually, as shortly and as comprehensively as possible. These texts should be placed at the end of the paper, after the cited literature.

**Text
structuring**

Individual chapters should be separated with independent subtitles and adequately numbered.
Example:
1 Introduction
2 Title of the chapter (1st level)
2.1 Subtitle (2nd level)
2.1.1 Subtitle (3rd level)
2.1.1.1 Subtitle (4th level)

Referencing

In the bibliography, only the authors of references one refers to in the paper should be listed, in the alphabetical order. The entire reference has to be in compliance with the Harvard citing style.

Example:
Surname, name (can also be the initial of the name), year. *Title of the work.* Place. Publishing House.

Example:
Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

With certain papers published in journals, the author should indicate, at the end of each reference, a page on which the paper can be found.

Example:
Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 45-100.

**Referencing
internet
sources**

All references start the same as the references for the printed sources, only that the usual part is followed by the information about the Internet page on which the document was found as well as the date on which it was found. The information about the time that the document was found on the Internet is important, because the WWW environment changes constantly.
Urlich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 45-100. http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213, 17 October 2008.
When referencing interesting WWW pages in the text (not citing an individual document) it is enough to state only the Internet address (http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si). A separate reference at the end of the text is therefore not necessary.

Citing

When citing sources in the text, indicate only the surname of the author and the year of publication. *Example:* ….. (Smith, 1997) …

When making a direct reference to a text, the cited part should be adequately marked with quotation marks and followed by the exact page of the text which the citing is taken from.

Example: …(Smith, 1997, p.15) …

Figures, diagrams, tables

Figures, diagrams and tables in the paper should be prepared in separate files which allow for proofreading corrections. The place in the text where the picture should be inserted must be clearly indicated. The total length of the paper must not surpass the given limitation.

Should the author not be able to submit the graphical supplements in the electronic form due to technical reasons, it is exceptionally acceptable to enclose the figures to the text. In this case the author must write a sequence number and a title on the back of each picture and leave enough space in the text to include it. The text must likewise contain the title and the sequence number of the figure. Diagrams are considered figures.

All figures and tables are numbered. The numbering is not uniform and not linked with the numbering of the chapters. The title of the figure is stated beneath it and the title of the table is stated above it.

As a rule, the paper should include at least one reference to a figure or a table.. Reference to a figure or a table is: … (Figure 5) ……… (Table 2) ………

Example of a figure:

Example of a table:

Table 2: Title of the table

Figure 5: Title of the figure

Footnotes

The numbering of the footnotes is not related to the structure of the text and starts with number 1 in each paper. We want to stress that the aim of the footnotes is to explain the thoughts written in the text and not to reference literature.

Abbreviations

When used for the first time, the abbreviations in the text must be explained in parenthesis; therefore no additional list of abbreviations is needed. If the abbreviations or terms are written in English, the appropriate Slovenian term should be written along with the English original and possibly the English abbreviation in the parenthesis.

Format type of the paper

The Editorial Board accepts only the texts written with a MS Word text editor and only exceptionally those in the 'text only' format.

Author's address Each paper should include the author's address, e-mail or a telephone number, so that the Editorial Board can reach him or her.

Sending the paper A print or an electronic version of the paper should be sent to the address of the Editorial Board or the members of the Editorial Board.

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