DRUŽBOSLOVNE RAZPRAVE

Social Science Forum

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Uredniška politika: Družboslovne razprave so revija, ki objavlja kolegialno recenzirane znanstvene članke in recenzije knjig. V recenzijski postopke sprejema članke v slovenščini in angleščini s področja sociologije, komunikologije, politologije in kulturologije ter tem raziskovalnim področjem bližnjih družboslovnih disciplin. Pri izboru člankov za objavo se upošteva njihova raziskovalna inovativnost ter aktualnost glede na trende v znanstveni skupnosti, v kateri je revija zasidrana. V teoretskem in metodološkem pogledu je revija pluralistično naravnana, posebno skrb pa posveča utrjevanju slovenske družboslovne terminologije.

Editorial policy: Družboslovne razprave is a peer reviewed journal which publishes papers and book reviews. Contributions are invited in fields of sociology, media studies, political science, cultural studies and other studies which are close to these fields. The published contributions should display high level of research originality and address the themes which seem relevant to the scientific communities in which the journal is grounded. Both in theoretical and methodological respects the journal stands for pluralism.

KAZALO
TABLE OF CONTENTS

RECENZIJE KNJIG
BOOK REVIEWS

UVOD

INTRODUCTION

Uvodnik k aprilski številki DR/SSF

Letošnjo prvo izdajo revije Družboslovne razprave začenjamo rahlo spremenjeni – na platnicah je namreč drugačna barvna shema kot v letu 2021, kar smo ob konstituciji sedanje uredniške ekipe že napovedali. Prav tako smo med gradivi na spletnih straneh revije posodobili Navodila avtorjem in avtoricam. V sodelovanju z Arhivom družboslovnih podatkov Fakultete za družbene vede smo namreč oblikovali konkretne smernice o hrambi, rokovanju in dostopu do empiričnih podatkov, na katere se prispevki sklicujejo.

Uredništvo tako avtorje in avtorice a) *spodbuja*, da zagotovijo odprti dostop do raziskovalnih podatkov, ki so plod njihovih raziskav in so jih uporabili v prispevkih, objavljenih v Družboslovnih razpravah; b) *priporoča*, da svoje raziskovalne podatke objavljajo v podatkovnih repozitorijih, središčih ali arhivih, skladno z relevantno zakonodajo in strokovnimi etičnimi merili; c) *svetuje*, da za objavo svojih raziskovalnih podatkov izberejo zaupanja vreden področni repozitorij, ki omogoča različne režime dostopa za različno (ne)občutljive podatke; in d) *priporoča*, da so podatki urednikom in recenzentom na voljo ob oddaji članka v recenzijo, vsem pa najkasneje ob izdaji revije. V uredništvu se popolnoma zavedamo specifičnih situacij, ko ideja odprtega dostopa časovno ne sovpada z delom in procesom pridobivanja podatkov, sploh v primeru daljših raziskovalnih projektov. Zato je, ne glede na odločitve posameznih avtorjev in avtoric, zapisano smiselno brati zgolj kot priporočila, ki nikakor niso obvezujoča. Več o zapisanem je dostopno na povezavi https://www.sociolosko-drustvo.si/navodila-avtorjem/.

Sicer pa prvo letošnjo številko uvajamo s petimi samostojnimi prispevki v dveh jezikih – slovenščini in angleščini – tako domačih kot tudi tujih avtorjev/ic. Številko otvarja prispevek v angleškem jeziku Berta Šalaja in Marijane Grbeša s Fakultete političnih ved Univerze v Zagrebu z naslovom *What is celebrity populism? The case of a Croatian singer Miroslav Škoro*. Prispevek, ki povsem po naključju sovpada z aktualno volilno kampanjo ob slovenskih volitvah v državni zbor, nudi konceptualen premislek o razumevanju populizma v kontekstu *celebrity* kulture in na študiji primera Miroslava Škora analizira ključne populistične prvine njegove volilne kampanje v času hrvaških predsedniških volitev tako s kvantitativnim kot kvalitativnim metodološkim aparatom. Sledi prispevek v slovenščini *Konzervirani nasmeh: Interpasivnost v sodobnem komuniciranju* Tadeja Praprotnika s Fakultete za humanistične študije Univerze na Primorskem, ki širitev interpasivnosti v komuniciranju med drugim razume kot posledico procesov družbenega pospeševanja, ki so ga intenzivirale digitalne tehnologije in imperativi omrežnih medijev ter neoliberalne retorike izbire in odgovornosti. Ideje pospeševanja delno, a konceptualno na povsem drugačen način dopolnjuje še en prispevek v slovenščini z naslovom *Banalnost družbene škode: primer hitre mode*, v katerem sodelavka Inštituta za kriminologijo pri Pravni fakulteti Univerze v Ljubljani Katja Simončič idejo banalnosti zla Hannah Arendt konceptualno aplicira na primer hitre mode. S pojmom nemišljenja avtorica namreč problematizira vzpon hitre mode in nekritične potrošnje v času globalne kapitalistične ekonomije. Da se neoliberalnim zakonitostim trga težko upirajo tudi raziskovalne organizacije, problematizira prispevek v angleškem jeziku z naslovom *Structural positions, hierarhcies, and perceptions of gender equality* sodelavk Znanstvenoraziskovalnega centra SAZU Jovane Mihajlović Trbovc, Majde Černič Istenič, Tanje Petrovič in sodelavca Andreasa Andreaua. Članek vzpostavljene režime neenakosti po spolu prikazuje znotraj različnih kategorij zaposlenih in med drugim opozori na intersekcionalnost razmerij, kjer v različna dojemanja enakosti spolov trčijo strukturni položaji, starost in prekarnost zaposlitvenega statusa. Številko zaključuje pregledni članek v angleščini Marka Hočevarja s Fakultete za družbene vede, ki – kot govori že sam naslov *A Literature review of the selected political economy issues of the COVID-19 crisis* – tematizira nekatere družbeno-ekonomske spremembe, predvsem na področju dela, v času epidemološke krize in obenem opozarja na spremljajoč vzpon družbenih neenakosti.

Tokratni uvodnik pa zaključujemo s posebnim pozivom Uredništva recenzij knjig, ki bralce in bralke revije prijazno vabi k pripravi tematskih recenzij knjig z namenom, da bi z vpogledom v znanstveno publicistiko s področja epidemije in družbe bogatile nadaljnje številke Družboslovnih razprav. Podrobneje spodaj.

Vabljeni k branju in sodelovanju.

Urednici DR/SSF: Tanja Oblak Črnič in Natalija Majsova

Editorial Issue the April issue of DR/SSF

This issue of Social Science Forum comes with a slightly modified cover, which means that it is time for a new volume. As the editorial team promised at the start of its mandate, every volume of the journal has its own, special combination of colours. Moreover, the Journal's webpage features an updated version of the Instructions for Authors, which now include guidelines on data storage, handling, and access to scientific data used in the articles. Intended to encourage open access to the empirical data used in SSF publications, these guidelines were developed together with the Social Science Data Archive of the Faculty of Social Sciences.

Namely, the SSF Editorial Board: a) encourages authors to provide open access to empirical data arising from their research and used in papers published in Social Science Forum; while in addition, the editorial board: b) *recommends* that authors publish their research data in data repositories, centres or archives according to relevant legislation and professional ethical criteria; c) *suggests* that they choose a trusted discipline-specific repository for publishing their research data; the repository should offer varying access regimes for different types of (non-)sensitive data; and d) *recommends* they make the data they refer to available to editors and reviewers while submitting an article for review, and to the public upon publication of their article in Social Science Forum. The Editorial Board is naturally aware that in certain situations the idea of open access does not coincide with the work and process of data acquisition, especially with longer research projects. Therefore, the guidelines above may be seen as non-binding recommendations. More information is available at: https://www.sociolosko-drustvo.si/navodila-avtorjem/.

In terms of content, this year's first issue comprises five diverse contributions in two languages (Slovenian and English) produced by a broad range of international authors. The issue begins with a contribution in English by Bert Šalaj and Marijana Grbeša from the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, entitled – *What is Celebrity Populism? The Case of the Croatian Singer Miroslav Škoro* – The article, which happens to have coincided with the electoral campaigns preceding the recent elections to the Slovenian National Assembly, offers a conceptual reflection on populism in the context of celebrity culture. The authors analyse the key populist elements of Miroslav Škoro's election campaign for the Croatian presidential elections, unpacking this case study using both quantitative and qualitative methodological approaches. In the following contribution written in Slovenian and entitled – *Canned Smile: Interpassivity in Contemporary*

Communication – Tadej Praprotnik from the Faculty of Humanities, University of Primorska, analyses the expansion of interpassivity in communication as, among others, an outcome of the processes of social acceleration intensified by digital technologies and the imperatives of networked media and the neoliberal rhetoric of choice and responsibility. These reflections of acceleration are partly – albeit from a very different conceptual perspective – complemented by the next article also in Slovenian – *The Banality of Social Harm: The Case of Fast Fashion* – Here, Katja Simončič, a research associate at the Institute of Criminology at the Faculty of Law of the University of Ljubljana, applies Hannah Arendt's notion of the banality of evil to the case of fast fashion. Relying on the concept of unthinking, the author problematises the rise of fast fashion and uncritical consumption in the global capitalist economy. The problem of neoliberal market laws as a challenge for research organisations is addressed in the following contribution written in English entitled – *Structural Positions, Hierarchies, and Perceptions of Gender Equality: Insights from a Slovenian Research Organisation* – by associates of the ZRC-SAZU Scientific Research Centre Jovana Mihajlović Trbovc, Majda Černič Istenič and Tanja Petrovič and co-author Andreas Andreau. This article shows how established regimes of gender inequality affect various categories of employees. Among others, it underscores the intersectionality of work relationships, showing that structural positions, age and precarious status are entangled with different perceptions of gender equality. The issue concludes with a review article again in English by Marko Hočevar from the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. As suggested by the title – *A Literature Review of Selected Political Economy Issues of the COVID-19 Crisis* – this contribution focuses on certain socio-economic changes, particularly in the field of labour, that took place during the pandemic crisis, while also drawing attention to the accompanying rise of social inequalities.

We wish to conclude this editorial with a special call from the Book Reviews Editor, who warmly invites readers to submit a book review for an upcoming special issue, which aims to enrich Social Science Forum with an overview and discussion of various aspects of scholarship about the COVID-19 pandemic.

More details may be found below.

DR/SSF Editors Tanja Oblak Črnič and Natalija Majsova

Poziv: recenzije monografij na temo epidemija in družba

Akademska skupnost in njena teoretska produkcija vznikata, se konstituirata in tudi razvijata prek različnih oblik dialoga. Prvi je dialog same s sabo v okviru argumentirane izmenjave pogledov in tez, ki šele prek kolektivnega presojanja lahko pridobijo teoretski status, predvsem pa svojo uporabno vrednost. Celo več, brez dialoga ni akademske skupnosti in brez nje ne more biti teoretske produkcije. Ostaja ji le nepreizkušen in neovrednoten nabor izjav, vatli presojanja pa postanejo zunajakademska merila znanstvene odličnosti. Druga oblika dialoga je odnos med akademsko skupnostjo in svetom. To ne pomeni le empiričnega preverjanja tez, ampak predvsem ohranjanje nenehnega dialoga z objektom svojega preučevanja – družbo. Brez tega je teoretska produkcija izolirana in prazna, hkrati pa tudi ni zmožna proizvajati vednosti, kajti ta vznika ravno v stiku med akademsko skupnostjo in družbeno dinamiko. Kot je v *Sociološki imaginaciji* opozarjal že Mills: akademska skupnost brez stika z družbeno dinamiko postane ali dvorna veda, se pravi tehnoznanost, ali pa »neroden primer nerelevantne dolgoveznosti« (str. 58).

Ravno zaradi teh »pogojev možnosti« obstoja akademske skupnosti se recenzije knjig kažejo ko pomembno orodje ohranjanja dialoške narave produkcije vednosti. Recenzije so oblika premišljenega, kritičnega, a tudi spoštljivega soočenja z avtorskim delom, s čimer ponazarjajo, da se pisanje monografije ne zaključi z njenim tiskom, ampak da je to le ena stopnja v procesu skupne teoretske produkcije. Recenzija tako ni zgolj odziv na delo ali njegov ponovni premislek, kot bi lahko sklepali iz etimologije besede, ampak gre za svojstven prispevek k razvoju vednosti. Zaradi svoje krajše, zgoščene oblike in dostopnega sloga pisanja pa so recenzije tudi pomembno orodje pri komuniciranju znanosti širšemu občinstvu ter krepitvi povezave med družbo in akademsko skupnostjo. Recenzije nimajo zgolj predstavitvene funkcije, ki je vse prepogosto zreducirana na predstavljanje znanstvenih dosežkov nerazsvetljeni javnosti, ampak morajo biti zamišljene in delovati kot orodje dialoga z različnimi občinstvi.

Da je postopek recenziranja knjig vse bolj odrinjen na stranski tir, akt njihovega pisanja vse bolj razvrednoten, delo na njih pa prekarizirano, je zgolj odraz razgradnje akademske skupnosti v razmerah prisilne hiperprodukcije znanstvenih objav. Hiperprodukcija, ki je vpeta tako v logiko kvantificiranja znanstvene produkcije kot tudi način kariernega napredovanja v akademiji, je vodila v atomizacijo tako proizvajalcev kot tudi vednosti same. Prvi so atomizirani zaradi eksistencialne nujnosti po zasledovanju osebnih dosežkov, druga pa zaradi razpada akademskega polja na kup ločenih in izoliranih poddisciplin z lastnim sistemom hiperprodukcije revij in objav. Dodaten dejavnik je tudi nekritična globalizacija znanosti, ki na periferiji globalnega sistema le redko vodi v odpiranje in bogatenje domače produkcije, veliko pogosteje pa v razkroj lokalne akademske skupnosti. Znanstvena skupnost tako razpade na izolirane, v lastno hiperprodukcijo ujete monade, ki zaradi časovne stiske in eksistencialne nuje opuščajo dialoška načela produkcije vednosti. Recenziranje knjig, ki so jih kvantificirana znanstvena merila v precejšnji meri razvrednotila, zato vse pogosteje postaja pozabljena in zanemarjena praksa, ki je prepuščena tistim na začetku akademske poti.

Zato se v uredništvu zavzemamo za povrnitev pomena in vrednosti recenzentskemu delu in procesu. Skozi urednikovanje revije nenehno iščemo načine za okrepitev položaja recenzij ter za krepitev njihovega dialoškega formata in funkcije. Recenzij ne vidimo kot prežitek preteklosti ali kot zapostavljen dodatek k »izvirnemu« teoretskemu doprinosu v obliki člankov, ampak kot osrednji del revije in tudi kot ključno prakso snovanja akademske skupnosti. Politike spodbujanja pisanja recenzij s strani še neuveljavljenih raziskovalcev in raziskovalk ne dojemamo kot procesa razvrednotenja, ampak – ravno obratno – kot obliko širjenja polja dialoga in omogočanja vstopa novih glasov ter s tem bogatenje znanstvene razprave. Ravno tako odločitve za omejevanje recenzij na pisce in piske v slovenskem jeziku ne razumemo kot zamejevanje produkcije vednosti, ampak kot obliko krepitve lokalnega dialoga, ki ima v drugih pisnih forumih omejene priložnosti za razvoj. Družboslovne razprave želijo tako na svoj način prispevati k razvoju močne lokalne akademske skupnosti.

Z namenom spodbujanja izmenjave pogledov in krepitve dialoga med različnimi glasovi smo se odločili za preizkušanje novih pristopov k postopku produkcije recenzij. Običajno prakso recenziranja izbranih del z zelo raznolikimi tematikami bomo v decembrski številki nadomestili z osredotočenostjo na družboslovno produkcijo na temo epidemije covida-19. Epidemija kot travmatičen in prelomen dogodek je sprožila množico različnih odzivov. In znanstvena produkcija od te hiperprodukcije nikakor ni bila izolirana. Ta produkcija, ki je občasno tudi oportuna ali terapevtska, ravno zaradi svoje množičnosti in raznolikosti kliče po bolj celostni obravnavi na enem mestu. S posebnim blokom recenzij monografij na temo covida-19 želimo različnim javnostim ponuditi delen vpogled v znanstveno produkcijo na tem področju, predvsem pa želimo spodbuditi dialog med različnimi avtorji in avtoricami ter njihovimi deli.

Zato vabimo vse, da nam predloge monografij, ki bi jih recenzirali, posredujete do **1. julija 2022** na elektronski naslov ***BookRevDR_SSF@sociolosko-drustvo.si.*** Pri izboru del si lahko pomagate s seznamom del, ki smo ga pripravili v uredništvu in je dostopen na naslovu https://www.sociolosko-drustvo.si/pozivi/.

Urednik recenzij knjig: Klemen Ploštajner

Seznam knjig, ki so predlagane za recenziranje

Bambra, Clare, Lynch, Julia, in Smith, Katherine E. (2021): The Unequal Pandemic: COVID-19 and Health Inequalities. Bristol: Brisol University Press. 198 pages. https://policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/the-unequal-pandemic

Davis, Mike (2020): The Monster Enter: COVID-19, Avian Flu and the Plagues of Capitalism. London: Verso. 224 pages. https://www.versobooks.com/books/3947-the-monster-enters

Fatsis, Lambros, in Lamb, Melayna (2021): Policing the Pandemic: How Public Health Becomes Public Order. Bristol: Policy Press. 148 pages. https://policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/policing-the-pandemic

Gerbaud, Paolo (2021): Politics after Populism and Pandemic. London: Verso. 288 pages. https://www.versobooks.com/books/3774-the-great-recoil

Lupton, Deborah (2022): COVID Societies Theorising the Coronavirus Crisis. New York: Routledge. 166 pages. https://www.routledge.com/COVID-Societies-Theorising-the-Coronavirus-Crisis/Lupton/p/book/9781032060569

Maçães, Bruno (2021): Geopolitics for the End Time: From the Pandemic to the Climate Crisis. London: Hurst Publishers. 240 pages. https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/geopolitics-for-the-end-time/

Mavelli, Luca (2022): Neoliberal Citizenship Sacred Markets, Sacrificial Lives. Oxford: Oxford University PRess. 304 pages. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/neoliberal-citizenship-9780192857583?q=covid&lang=en&cc=us

Mitropoulos, Angela (2020): Pandemonium Proliferating Borders of Capital and the Pandemic Swerve. London: Pluto Press. 144 pages. https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745343303/pandemonium/

Tooze, Adam (2021): Shutdown: How Covid Shook the World's Economy. New York: Viking. 368 pages. https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/669575/shutdown-by-adam-tooze/

Wallace, Rob (2020): Dead Epidemiologists: On the Origins of COVID-19. New York: Monthly Review. 260 pages. https://monthlyreview.org/product/dead-epidemiologists-on-the-origins-of-covid-19/

Slovenske

Podjed, Dan (2020): Antropologija med štirimi stenami: Spoznavanje družbe in sebe med pandemijo. Ljubljana: Založba ZRC. 152 strani. https://isn2.zrc-sazu.si/sl/publikacije/antropologija-med-stirimi-stenami

Žerdin, Ali (2021): MMXX: Leto nevarne bližine: Kaj je šlo v Sloveniji narobe med epidemijo covida-19. Ljubljana: UMco. 304 strani. https://www.bukla.si/umco/mmxx-leto-nevarne-blizine.html

Call for Contributions: Monographs Dealing with the Topic of the Pandemic and Society

The academic community and its theoretical production emerge and are constituted and developed through various forms of dialogue. The first is the dialogue of the academic community with itself, which occurs within the framework that allows for the exchange of substantiated views and theses, which can only gain theoretical status and, most importantly, applied value through joint assessment. Moreover, without dialogue there is no academic community, and without an academic community there can be development of theory. What simply remains is a set of statements that are neither proven nor evaluated, while extra-academic criteria of scientific excellence serve as a gauge for assessment. Another form of dialogue is the relationship between the academic community and the world. This not only implies the empirical validation of hypotheses, but also, and above all, the effort to maintain a continuous dialogue with the subject of study: society. Without this, the development of theory is not just isolated and empty, but unable to produce knowledge arising from the contact between the academic community and social dynamics. As Mills notes in *The Sociological Imagination*: without having contact with social dynamics, the academic community becomes either a courtly science, i.e. technoscience, or a "clumsy piece of irrelevant ponderosity" (p. 26).

It is these "conditions of possibility" determining the academic community's existence that make book reviews an important tool for preserving the dialogical nature of knowledge production. Reviews are a form of thoughtful, critical, yet also respectful confrontation with another's work; this demonstrates that the writing of a monograph does not end when it is published, which is only a stage in the process of joint theoretical production. Namely, a review is not merely a response to a particular work or its reconsideration as the etymology of the word might suggest, but a unique contribution to the development of knowledge. Their shorter, concise form and accessible writing style mean that reviews are also an important way of communicating science to a wider audience and strengthening the connection between society and the academic community. Accordingly, reviews not only have a presentational function, which is all too often reduced to presenting scientific achievements to an unenlightened public, but must be conceived of and act as a tool for ensuring dialogue with a range of audiences. The process of reviewing books is being increasingly pushed out to the side lines, the act of writing a review is ever more devalued, while working on reviews has become precarious; all of this simply reflects the academic community's disintegration in conditions that dictate the forced hyperproduction of scientific publications. The hyperproduction, embedded in the logic of quantifying scientific production and ingrained as part of career advancement in academia, has led to the atomisation of both producers and knowledge. The former are atomised by their existential need to pursue personal achievements, and the latter due to the academic field's fragmentation into a number of separate and isolated subdisciplines, which in turn have their own systems leading to the hyperproduction of journals and publications. Another factor is the uncritical globalisation of science, which on the periphery of the global system rarely results in the opening of domestic production and enriching it, but more often causes the disintegration of the local academic community. The scientific community thus dissolves into isolated monads trapped in their own hyperproduction, which abandon the dialogical principles of knowledge production under both time and existential pressures. Book reviewing, which has been significantly devalued by quantified scientific criteria, is hence becoming an increasingly forgotten and neglected practice, one that is left to those at the beginning of their academic career.

For this reason, our editorial board is committed to restoring the importance and value of the work and process of book reviewing. While editing the journal, we are constantly looking for ways to strengthen the position of reviews and to enhance their dialogical format and function. We do not regard reviews as a relic of the past or a neglected addition to the 'original' theoretical contribution in the form of articles, but as both a central part of the journal and as a key practice for building the academic community. We do not view the policy of encouraging the writing of reviews by not yet established researchers as a tendency towards their devaluation, but on the contrary as a form of expanding the field of dialogue and enabling the appearance of new voices, thereby enriching the scientific debate. Likewise, the decision to restrict the submission of reviews by authors writing in Slovenian is not considered a factor confining the production of knowledge, but as a form for strengthening local dialogue that in other written forums sees limited opportunities for development. Such sociological discussions are thus aimed to contribute in their own way to the development of a strong local academic community.

To encourage the exchange of views and strengthen the dialogue among different voices, we have decided to experiment with new approaches to producing reviews. The usual practice of reviewing selected works covering a wide variety of topics will be replaced in the December issue, which will focus on social science production relevant to the topic of the COVID-19 pandemic. The traumatic and far-reaching event of the pandemic has triggered a multitude of diverse responses, and scientific production has clearly not been isolated from this hyperproduction. It is because of the multitude and diversity of these works that this production, which is occasionally also opportune or therapeutic, calls for a more comprehensive approach that enables the topic to be dealt with in a single place. With a special block of reviews focused on monographs dealing with COVID-19, we wish to offer different audiences partial insights into scientific production in this field, and in particular to promote dialogue between different authors and their works.

We therefore invite anyone to send us proposals for the review of monographs by **1 July 2022** to this e-mail address ***BookRevDR_SSF@sociolosko-drustvo.si***. To select works, authors may use the list prepared by the editorial board available at https://www.sociolosko-drustvo.si/pozivi/.

Reviews Editor: Klemen Ploštajner

List of Books Proposed for Review

Bambra, Clare, Lynch, Julia, and Smith, Katherine E. (2021): The Unequal Pandemic: COVID-19 and Health Inequalities. Bristol: Brisol University Press. 198 pages. https://policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/the-unequal-pandemic

Davis, Mike (2020): The Monster Enter: COVID-19, Avian Flu and the Plagues of Capitalism. London: Verso. 224 pages. https://www.versobooks.com/books/3947--the-monster-enters

Fatsis, Lambros, and Lamb, Melayna (2021): Policing the Pandemic: How Public Health Becomes Public Order. Bristol: Policy Press. 148 pages. https://policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/policing-the-pandemic

Gerbaud, Paolo (2021): Politics after Populism and Pandemic. London: Verso. 288 pages. https://www.versobooks.com/books/3774-the-great-recoil

Lupton, Deborah (2022): COVID Societies Theorising the Coronavirus Crisis. New York: Routledge. 166 pages. https://www.routledge.com/COVID-Societies-Theorising--the-Coronavirus-Crisis/Lupton/p/book/9781032060569

Maçães, Bruno (2021): Geopolitics for the End Time: From the Pandemic to the Climate Crisis. London: Hurst Publishers. 240 pages. https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/geopolitics-for-the-end-time/

Mavelli, Luca (2022): Neoliberal Citizenship Sacred Markets, Sacrificial Lives. Oxford: Oxford University PRess. 304 pages. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/neoliberal-citizenship-9780192857583?q=covid&lang=en&cc=us

Mitropoulos, Angela (2020): Pandemonium Proliferating Borders of Capital and the Pandemic Swerve. London: Pluto Press. 144 pages. https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745343303/pandemonium/

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Wallace, Rob (2020): Dead Epidemiologists: On the Origins of COVID-19. New York: Monthly Review. 260 pages. https://monthlyreview.org/product/dead-epidemiologists-on-the-origins-of-covid-19/

Slovenian

Podjed, Dan (2020): Antropologija med štirimi stenami: Spoznavanje družbe in sebe med pandemijo. Ljubljana: Založba ZRC. 152 strani. https://isn2.zrc-sazu.si/sl/publikacije/antropologija-med-stirimi-stenami

Žerdin, Ali (2021): MMXX: Leto nevarne bližine: Kaj je šlo v Sloveniji narobe med epidemijo covida-19. Ljubljana: UMco. 304 strani. https://www.bukla.si/umco/mmxx-leto-nevarne-blizine.html

ČLANKI

ARTICLES

Original Scientific Article UDK 316.74:929-028.41

Berto Šalaj, Marijana Grbeša

WHAT IS CELEBRITY POPULISM? THE CASE OF THE CROATIAN SINGER MIROSLAV ŠKORO

ABSTRACT

The goal of this paper is to expound on the concept of celebrity populism, a phenomenon gaining strength across the world but still lacking a credible conceptual underpinning. We rely on two well-established concepts, populism and celebrity politics, to develop a definition of celebrity populism as a powerful formula that combines the attractiveness of populist messages with the awe of celebrity culture. Unlike other conceptualisations of celebrity politics, we differentiate between populist and mainstream (pluralist) politics and suggest that we should evaluate celebrity populism on its own merits, rather than subjugate it to a generic concept of "celebrity politics". We distinguish three categories of populist celebrity politicians: populist celebrities, celebrity populists, and super celebrity populists. Finally, we test our categorisation on the case of the popular Croatian singer and politician Miroslav Škoro.

KEY WORDS: populism, celebrity politics, celebrity populism, Croatia, Miroslav Škoro

Kaj je zvezdniški populizem? Primer hrvaškega pevca Miroslava Škora

IZVLEČEK

Cilj tega prispevka je razložiti koncept zvezdniškega populizma, pojava, ki se krepi po vsem svetu, a še vedno nima verodostojne konceptualne podlage. Zanašamo se na dva dobro uveljavljena koncepta, populizem in zvezdniško politiko, da bi razvili definicijo zvezdniškega populizma kot močne formule, ki združuje privlačnost populističnih sporočil s poveličevanjem zvezdniške kulture.

Za razliko od drugih konceptualizacij zvezdniške politike ločimo med populistično in mainstream (pluralistično) politiko ter predlagamo, da bi morali zvezdniški populizem ovrednotiti v skladu z njegovo lastno vrednostjo, namesto da bi ga podredili generičnemu konceptu »zvezdniške politike«. Razlikujemo med tremi kategorijami populističnih zvezdnikov: populistični zvezdniki, slavni populisti in super slavni populisti. Na koncu svojo kategorizacijo preizkusimo na primeru priljubljenega hrvaškega pevca in politika Miroslava Škora.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: populizem, zvezdniška politika, zvezdniški populizem, Hrvaška, Miroslav Škoro

1 Introduction[1]

In June 2019 Miroslav Škoro, one of the most famous Croatian singers and entertainers, released a pompous YouTube video in which he announced his candidacy for the 2019–2020 presidential election. On that occasion, he pointed out that he intended to be a tool of the people in the fight against established Croatian political elites who had become alienated from the people and who cared only about their particular, partisan interests (Škoro 2019a).

At about the same time, the biggest global political news was the victory of the famous comedian Volodymyr Zelensky in the Ukrainian presidential election. Zelensky ran with his party *Servant of the People* (*Sluha narodu*), named after the homonymous Netflix series in which Zelensky played a kind-hearted teacher who runs for president. When he announced his candidacy for President of Ukraine on YouTube and other social networks, Zelensky asserted that he would hold the presidency as a "servant of the people" in the fight against the corrupt Ukrainian political elite. In April 2019, Zelensky defeated the then President Petro Poroshenko in the second round of the presidential election, winning 73 percent of the vote. His newly established party *Servant of the People* garnered 43 percent of the vote in the June parliamentary election, or 254 out of a total of 450 seats, thus securing also a clear parliamentary majority.[2]

Miroslav Škoro and Volodymyr Zelensky differ in a number of features, as do the Ukrainian and Croatian political systems, yet they also share many similarities. First, both Škoro and Zelensky had made enviable careers in the world of enter-

1. The article is part of the project "Textual analysis of the populist discourse in the 2020 parliamentary election in Croatia" funded by the University of Zagreb.

2. Election Guide – Democracy Asisstance&Elections News. Available from https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/3163/ and https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/3256/ (Accessed 20. 11. 2021).

tainment and show business before they engaged in politics. Therefore, both of them can be classified as *celebrities*. Second, both Škoro and Zelensky decided to enter the political arena with messages that divinise the people and demonise the mainstream political elites, which puts them into the category of populist politicians. Third, both Škoro and Zelensky gained considerable support of the citizens soon after entering political arena. This is, of course, truer for Zelensky, who used this support to win the presidential and then the parliamentary election and who, eventually, became a key figure in Ukrainian politics. Škoro, on the other hand, won 24.5 percent of the vote and came in third in the first round of the presidential election in Croatia in December 2019.[3] After the presidential election, Škoro, like Zelensky, founded a party – *Domovinski pokret Miroslava Škore* (*Miroslav Škoro Homeland Movement*), which won 16 seats in the July 2020 parliamentary election, thus becoming the third strongest party in the Croatian parliament.[4]

Considering these similarities, it is justified to ask to which category of politicians Škoro and Zelensky belong? This question is relevant because it seems that standard political-ideological categorisations and classifications do not provide a satisfactory answer.

In this paper, we argue that they are both illustrative cases of *celebrity populism*, a phenomenon that has been gaining strength across the world but still lacks solid conceptual underpinning (Grbeša in Šalaj 2023). The main goal of this paper is to provide an explicit account of the concept of *celebrity populism*, i.e., to identify and explain the basic features of this breed of politicians. We develop the idea of celebrity populism from two well-established concepts - *populism* (Grbeša and Šalaj 2018; Hawkins et al. 2019; Mudde 2004) and *celebrity politics* (Marsh et al. 2010; Street 2004; Wheeler 2013).

In the first part of the paper, we provide a brief overview of contemporary research on populism and present our understanding of this phenomenon. The second part of the paper presents key accounts on *celebrity politics* and describes the typology of celebrity politicians that is relevant to our conceptualisation. In the third part, we connect these two key theoretical concepts, elaborate our understanding of *celebrity populism*, and propose our categorisation of celebrity politicians. In the fourth part of the paper, we apply our conceptualisation to the analysis of Miroslav Škoro's political profile. We focus on the period of the 2019–2020 presidential campaign in Croatia. Using quantitative and qualitative content analysis, we attempt to determine to which extent Miroslav Škoro's political profile can be explained by the concept of *celebrity populism*.

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3. https://www.izbori.hr/pre2019/rezultati/1/index.html (Accessed 5. 11. 2021).
4. https://www.izbori.hr/sabor2020/rezultati/1/ (Accessed 5. 11. 2021).

2 Populism as Meta-Ideology

An overview of contemporary literature dealing with *populism* (e.g., Grbeša and Šalaj 2018; Hawkins et al. 2019) suggests that there are at least five approaches to this phenomenon, three of which have emerged as dominant. According to the first of the two approaches, *populism* is regarded as a specific form of organising political parties. Taggart thus defines *populism* as a specific type of political party organisation, characterised by a high level of centralisation, where a charismatic leader plays the key role in the party (Taggart 1995: 41). Within the second approach, *populism* is understood as a strategy of political mobilisation characterized by "the mobilization of ordinarily marginalized social sectors into publicly visible and contentious political action, while articulating an anti-elite, nationalist rhetoric that valorizes ordinary people" (Jansen 2011: 82). These two approaches seem to be the least represented in contemporary populism studies.

The third approach sees populism as a political-communication style. Proponents of this approach (e.g., Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Moffitt and Tormey 2014) believe that the only common feature of different populist actors is a rhetoric based on appeal to the people. According to Jagers and Walgrave (2007: 332), the political actors who use this particular style of communication can be politicians and political parties, but also leaders of social movements, interest group representatives, and journalists. Advocates of this approach believe that populist actors do not have a sufficient number of common features for populism to be considered a political ideology.

Similar to this approach is the fourth conceptualisation of the phenomenon which sees populism as a particular "discursive frame". In the words of the most distinguished proponent of this approach, Paris Aslanidis, populist discourse should be perceived as "the systematic dissemination of a frame that diagnoses reality as problematic because 'corrupt elites' have unjustly usurped the sovereign authority of the 'noble People' and maintains that the solution to the problem resides in the righteous political mobilization if the latter in order to regain power" (Aslanidis 2016: 99).

Contrary to conceptualizations that regard populism primarily as a "style" or a "discourse", a fifth approach has developed, which understands populism as a political ideology. At the core of this approach is the assumption that all populists understand politics as a conflict between two homogeneous and mutually antagonistic groups – the honest people and the corrupt political elite.

Proponents of this "ideational approach", which has prevailed in the scholarly research in the last two decades (see Hawkins et al. 2019), believe that populism expresses certain ideas about how modern politics should look like, which is why it is reasonable to treat it as a political ideology.

Ideational understanding of populism has been inscribed in probably the most influential modern definition of populism offered by Cas Mudde. He argues that populism is an "ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonte generale (general will) of the people" (Mudde 2004: 543).

Acknowledging the relevance of all five approaches, in this paper we rely on *ideational approach* and we argue that populism may be understood as a specific *political meta-ideology* (Grbeša and Šalaj 2018). *Political meta-ideologies* can be understood as a superior gender notion (genus) to the notion of political ideologies. In other words, meta-ideologies include ideologies that, on the one hand, share some common characteristics, while on the other hand, they differ in many other features. At the same time, political meta-ideologies differ from each other in how they understand politics, political processes and the organisation of political life. Building on recent research insights into contemporary political ideologies (Freeden 2013; Freeden et al. 2013; Vincent 2010), we believe that there are three dominant political meta-ideologies: *monism*, *pluralism,* and *populism* (Grbeša and Šalaj 2018). *Monism* as a meta-ideology encompasses ideologies that differ one from another in a whole range of features, but at the same time share one common characteristic – that there is only one, absolute political truth and only one correct way of organising political life. Furthermore, another principle common to all monistic ideologies, is that any kind of attempt to bring this political monopoly into question is not allowed and is therefore punishable, regardless of whether the monopoly is based on class, race or religion. According to this logic, monistic meta-ideology encompasses fascism, communism, and religious fundamentalism. Another meta-ideology, *pluralism*, is the genus of all those political ideologies that accept a pluralist view of politics and a pluralist structure of the political community. This includes a spectrum of highly diverse ideologies, from conservatism to social democracy. Despite their differences, these ideologies can be placed in a common category because they all consider legitimate the existence of different, heterogeneous social groups, ideas, interests, attitudes and values that coexist in a society and compete with each other for the opportunity to temporarily govern that society.

Therefore, in this paper, populism is understood as a political meta-ideology, parallel to monism and pluralism and characterized by the co-occurrence of two features: positive evaluation of the people and general diffuse political anti-elitism. This construction of systemic conflict between the people and elites is coupled with the "crisis talk" (Homolar and Scholz 2019) and, sometimes, with the rage against the "dangerous others" who are, along with elites, responsible for "the crises". The identity of the "dangerous others" depends on the ideological leaning of the populist actors - right populists usually target migrants and minorities (e.g., Pajnik et al. 2020) while left populists commonly criticise financial institutions (Mouffe 2018).

In sum, populism can be distinguished from monistic meta-ideology, which claims that there is only one political truth and one correct way of political organisation, and from pluralism, which, in the sense of meta-ideology, considers societies to be very heterogeneous and that there are many differences among citizens and political elites. Although differentiation between pluralism and populism is not clear-cut, conceptualising populism as an ideology in its own right is essential to ideational approach to populism (Hawkins et al. 2019).

3 Celebrity Politics

Another phenomenon and theoretical concept we rely on in this study is *celebrity politics*. Drake and Higgins (2006) point out that the issue of influence of celebrities on politics and on the political process is not a new one. They refer to Wright Mills's famous 1956 book *The Power Elite* which claims that the growing popularity and influence of celebrities turns them into a new power elite that can be compared to a political elite. Nevertheless, most research on the relationship between the political and celebrity spheres focuses on the period from the second half of the 20th century, and it has been inspired by two processes. On the one hand, traditional politicians are increasingly trying to connect with celebrities and resort to patterns of behaviour typical of celebrities. On the other hand, celebrities from the realms of show business or sports are increasingly entering the space of formal politics.

Corner and Pels argue that the "celebrity power is progressively being translated from the popular entertainment industries towards more 'serious' fields such as business, politics, art and science" and that "the only future for political personality is that of celebrity" (Corner and Pels 2003: 8). Similarly, Driessens argues that "[c]elebrity has become a defining feature of our mediatized societies" (Driessens 2013: 641). He suggests that we have been witnessing "diversification of celebrity", which means that celebrities are no longer confined to the world of entertainment or sports, but that other social fields, including politics, may also produce celebrities (ibid.: 644). He differentiates between processes of *celebritisation* and *celebrification*, whereby *celebritisation* refers to all-embracing "societal and cultural changes implied by celebrity", while *celebrification*, in contrast, "comprises the changes at the individual level" which transform ordinary people or public figures into celebrities (ibid.: 643).

In his seminal work on the power of celebrities, David Marshall defines celebrities as those people who "enjoy a greater presence and wider scope of activity and agency than those who make up the rest of the population. They are allowed to move on the public stage while the rest of us watch" (1997: ix). Marshall (ibid.) argues that contemporary social scientists have realised that contemporary political processes can be better understood if they incorporate irrationality and emotions into their models. This can largely be found in the world of entertainment, where celebrities often try to express the feelings of the audience. Marshall believes that something similar occurs in the political sphere, where political leaders seek to express the attitudes and feelings of citizens. Therefore, the increasingly frequent connection of politicians with the world of entertainment and celebrities can be understood as an attempt of these politicians to connect more firmly with citizens by borrowing "from the relationship of trust and admiration that is associated with figures in popular culture" (Street 2001: 191). This celebrification of politicians may include a wide range of activities, from celebrity endorsement and posing with celebrities, to imitating behaviour of the stars and adopting "mannerisms, gestures and styles of popular culture" (ibid.: 191).

The increasing celebritization of politics has encouraged scholars to conceptualize relationship between political and celebrity spheres and to categorise celebrity politicians accordingly. The pioneering conceptualisations developed by West and Orman (2003), Street (2004) and the later works of 't Hart and Tindall (2009) and Marsh, 't Hart and Tindall (2010) have been particularly influential in this regard. West and Orman (2003: 2-4) differentiate among *political newsworthies*, who rely on their performance to engage with the public; *legacies*, who were born into a well-known family; *famed nonpoliticos (elected officials)*, who were well-known before being elected; *famed nonpoliticos (lobbyists and spokespersons)*, who are, basically, celebrities who endorse or advocate certain causes; and finally, *event celebrities*, who become famous because of a scandal, tragedy or similar.

Street's (2004) relatively simple, yet influential, classification is based on the relationship between politics and popular culture. He argues that the convergence between politics and popular culture translates into two types of celebrity politicians. The first type, CP1, is a celebrity originating from the world of show business or sports who becomes an elected politician, such as Arnold Schwarzenegger, who became the Governor of California. The second variant of CP1 is a traditional, elected politician who engages with celebrity techniques that typically belong to the world of pop culture in order to gain sympathies and attract voters. The second type, CP2, includes celebrities who engage for a common cause and use their celebrity power to influence political decisions, such as Bono Vox, Angelina Jolie etc. CP2s also go by the name *celebrity diplomats* or *celebrity activists* (Cooper 2008; Tsaliki et al. 2011).

In this paper, we rely on the classification proposed by David Marsh, Paul t'Hart and Karen Tindall whose typology is based on two criteria: the sphere of origin and the nature of the relationship with the other sphere (2010: 327). They differentiate between five categories of celebrity politicians. *The celebrity advocate* is a non-political actor who wishes to influence the public agenda or advocate for a certain policy; *the celebrity endorser* is a non-political celebrity who endorses a candidate or a party; *the politician who uses others' celebrity* is an elected politician who relies on someone else's celebrity or fame. In our paper, we rely on the remaining two categories, *celebrity politicians* and *politician celebrities*. *Celebrity politicians* are celebrities from non-political spheres who become elected politicians (also Street's CP1, subtype 1). *Politician celebrities* are those actors whose sphere of origin is politics; however, their public behaviour, personal life or connections to celebrities change their public appeal to the extent that they no longer exclusively belong to the political sphere but also to the celebrity sphere (also Street's CP1, subtype 2).

4 Celebrity Populism

The connection between celebrity politics and populism has often been regarded as inherent or intuitive, since performance and style are central to both (e.g., Moffitt 2016; Pels 2003; Street 2004; 2018). Street even suggests that "[T]he rise of populism, and how this is understood, draws the celebrity politician within its ambit, as does discussion of the mediatisation and personalisation of politics more generally" (2018: 9). However, studies that explicitly address the relationship between populism and celebrity politics are still rather modest (for exceptions see Alomes and Mascitelli 2012; Bartoszewicz 2019; Enli 2017; Giglioli and Baldini 2019; Grbeša and Šalaj 2023; Schneiker 2019; Street 2018; Wood at al. 2016). In the following paragraphs, we elaborate the connection between populism and celebrity politics as we believe that the concept of *celebrity populism* and its derivatives can be useful in describing, explaining and evaluating contemporary political processes in democratic societies.

Populists, like celebrity politicians, have the power to energize and mobilise otherwise apathetic publics (Marsh et al. 2010). Moreover, emotions and distrust with mainstream political elites are central to both celebrities and populists.

Wirz points out that "populist communication is inherently more emotion-eliciting than nonpopulist communication and therefore especially persuasive" (Wirz 2018: 1131), while Street (2018: 9) argues that populists tend to elicit adoration that resembles behaviour of fans. Such attempts to understand behaviour of contemporary citizens and voters through the lens of fans were present well before the recent surge of populist politics across the world. In this respect, the work of Liesbet Van Zoonen (2005) is particularly important. She argues that fans and political citizens have several things in common: they emerge as the results of performance of artists and politicians, they follow their objects closely, they promote them, they discuss them among themselves and "come to informed judgements and propose alternatives" (Van Zoonen 2005: 16). The difference between them may be, as Van Zoonen suggests, "in the type of psychological relationship that fans have with artists and citizens with politicians: affective and emotional versus cognitive and rational" (ibid.). However, she challenges this constricting "dualism" between ratio and emotions and argues that "we can accept the mechanisms of fandom as a basis for rethinking engagement with politics" (ibid.). *Fandom*, maintains Van Zoonen, "is built on psychological mechanisms that are relevant to political involvement" and these are "fantasy and imagination on the one hand, and emotional processes on the other" (ibid.). It is plausible to assume that this type of emotional investment in politics, typical of fandom, has been most intensively displayed by populists.

Celebrity politicians, like populists, often play the card of "political outsiders" who are not part of the resented establishment: "they are new, they are exciting, they are unpredictable" (Marsh et al. 2010: 324). t'Hart and Tindall (2009) indicate that the more dissatisfied the publics are with traditional politics, the greater the opportunities for celebrities to successfully run for office. The same goes for populists (Grbeša and Šalaj 2018).

Although the connection between celebrity politics and populism may seem apparent, a demanding mission to combine them into a solid concept that would identify specific features of the celebrity-populist blend, as opposed to celebrityhood of traditional non-populist politicians, has only just begun. Building on Marsh, 't Hart and Tindall's (2010) distinction between celebrity politicians and politician celebrities, Grbeša and Šalaj (2023) proposed a definition of *celebrity populists* vs. *populist celebrities*. In their view, "the *celebrity populist* is a celebrity who acquires populist rhetoric to run for elected office and in some cases, maintains this rhetoric while holding elected office" while "*populist celebrity* is a populist politician who engages with different celebrity techniques to mobilize supporters and celebritize his/her image". They claim that both types of celebrity populism represent "a powerful communication mix that combines attractiveness of populist messages with the awe of celebrity culture" (ibid.). The contribution of such conceptualisation is that, unlike other conceptualisations of celebrity politics, it differentiates between populist and mainstream (pluralist) politics. Figure 1 demonstrates how the sphere of mainstream politics, populist politics and the celebrity sphere merge into different types of celebrity politics and celebrity populism.

Figure 1: Celebrity politics and celebrity populism.



Source: Grbeša and Šalaj 2023.

Grbeša and Šalaj (2023) conceptualisation distinguishes between: 1) *political celebrities*, mainstream politicians who resort to celebrity discourse to construct their celebrity persona; 2) *celebrity politicians*, celebrities who come from the celebrity sphere (usually entertainment or sports) and run for elected office using mainstream, non-populist discourse; 3) *populist celebrities*, populist politicians who adopt elements of celebrity discourse to acquire and/or retain public support; and 4) *celebrity populists*, celebrities who come from the celebrity sphere and rely on populist discourse (rhetoric of anti-elitism and people-centredness) to win an election and/or maintain public support.

In this paper we upgrade this conceptualisation acknowledging that the use of celebrity techniques by celebrity politicians may vary, regardless of their meta-ideology (pluralism or populism) and the sphere of origin. For instance, a singer who uses populist narrative to become an elected politician is, according to Grbeša and Šalaj's (2023) definition, a *celebrity populist*. However, such conceptualisation tells us nothing about his/her use of celebrity techniques in his/her campaign communication or in office if elected. Therefore, we base our upgraded conceptualisation on three dimensions: *sphere of origin* (celebrity sphere or politics), *meta-ideology* (populist politics or mainstream (pluralist) politics) and *the use of celebrity techniques* for political purposes.

In the first dimension, we use the term *sphere of origin* as defined by Marsh, t'Hart and Tindall (2010) which refers to the original location of an actor's profession. Therefore, we differentiate between two categories - *professional politicians* and *celebrities*. With regard to the second dimension, we identify all politicians either as *populists* or as *mainstream (pluralist) politicians*. In this respect, in democratic systems, all those actors who advocate one of the pluralist meta-ideologies, such as Christian Democracy, liberalism, social democracy, conservatism, greens, etc., can be classified as *mainstream politicians*. Our third dimension is related to the adoption of techniques and communication styles that are otherwise characteristic of the celebrity sphere. These techniques include association with celebrities (through endorsement, photo opportunities and similar), adopting styles and behaviours typical of show biz celebrities, using cues from pop culture to associate with voters and introducing elements from private life to gain public sympathy (Street 2001, 2004; van Zoonen 2006). Within this dimension, we distinguish between two categories of politicians - *those who rely on celebrity techniques in their political behaviour* and *those who do not*.

By combining these three dimensions, we obtain a classification with eight possible categories of political actors demonstrated in Table 1.

Table 1: Celebrity politics and celebrity populism: a three-dimensional model.

	Sphere of origin				
	Meta-ideology		Celebrity sphere	Use of celebrity techniques	
	Populist politics	Mainstrem (pluralist) politics			
1	-	+	-	-	Mainstream (pluralist) politician
2	+	-	-	-	Populist politician
3	-	+	+	-	Celebrity politician
4	+	-	+	-	Celebrity populist
5	-	+	-	+	Political celebrity
6	+	-	-	+	Populist celebrity
7	-	+	+	+	Super celebrity politician
8	+	-	+	+	Super celebrity populist

Category 1 includes *mainstream pluralist politicians* who have built their political careers from the very beginning through the political sphere, advocating some of the pluralist political ideologies and relying rarely, or not at all, on celebrity techniques. Category 2 includes *populist politicians* whose sphere of origin is populist politics and who in principle do not use celebrity techniques.

Categories 3 and 4 include actors who enter the world of politics from the celebrity sphere, but, once they enter politics, they choose not to rely on celebrity techniques, i.e., they attempt to profile themselves as 'serious' politicians, accepting communication strategies and techniques that correspond to the traditional political sphere. Category 3 refers to *celebrity politicians* who advocate one of the pluralist ideologies while category 4 refers to politicians who advocate populist ideology, which is why we brand them *celebrity populists*. Although it seems unlikely that celebrities who resort to populist rhetoric will not capitalize their celebrity background, our initial impression is that Miroslav Škoro represents such a case, which we attempt to test in the analytical section of the paper.

Categories 5 and 6 encompass actors who come from the realm of politics but frequently use various celebrity techniques. Category 5 includes politicians who promote pluralist ideology, and we call them *political celebrities*, while category 6 includes politicians who advocate populist political ideology and whom we call *populist celebrities*.

The last two categories, 7 and 8, include actors who enter politics from the celebrity sphere, and who abundantly use *celebrity* techniques in their political activities. Given their double connection with the celebrity sphere, these actors are denoted by the adjective *super*. Depending on their ideological position, we differentiate between *super celebrity politicians* (category 7), and *super celebrity populists* (category 8). Conditionally, the examples in the category 8 include the former US President Donald Trump, Italian politician and the former leader of *Movimento 5 Stelle* (*Five Star Movement*) Beppe Grillo, former Reykjavik mayor Jon Gnarr, Polish politician, singer and actor Pawel Kukiz and Bulgarian politician and singer Slavi Trifonov. These examples are only illustrative, and their conclusive classification as *super celebrity populists* would require a comprehensive analysis.

It is important to emphasise that proposed categories represent ideal types, as all categorizations do, and that in real life they may overlap. For instance, it is common for mainstream politicians to resort to populist rhetoric, especially during election campaigns. Nevertheless, this still doesn't make them "true populists" but rather "populists in style", as suggested by Grbeša and Šalaj (2019). Also, categories presented here are dynamic, which means that certain actors in different periods of their political activity may cut across different categories.

Figure 2 presents Grbeša and Šalaj's (2023) conceptualisation, upgraded with the dimension *use of celebrity techniques*, which generates two additional categories of celebrity politicians – a *super celebrity politician* and a *super celebrity populist.*

Figure 2: Celebrity politics and celebrity populism: a three-dimensional model.



The category of *super celebrity populists* is the quintessence of connecting populism and celebrity politics. These politicians enter the political arena with the capital of their celebrity identity, adopt the emotionality and drama of populist discourse, and continue to communicate with their supporters using the conventions of fandom (see Street 2018; Wood et al. 2016). Therefore, it is plausible to assume that *celebrity populists in general* and *super celebrity populists* in particular, in different ways and to a different extent, personify the idea of Van Zoonen's "political fandom" (2005). In the next section, we preliminarily test our categorisation on the case of the Croatian singer, entrepreneur and politician Miroslav Škoro.

5 Celebrity Populism of Miroslav Škoro

Ever since Croatia gained independence in the 1990s, the country has been interchangeably governed by two major parties – the Croatian Democratic Union (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica*, HDZ) and the Social Democratic Party (*Socijaldemokratska partija*, SDP). However, in the last couple of years, the supremacy of the HDZ and the SDP has been challenged by a number of populist options. The advent of populism in Croatia has been inspired by resentment towards the established political elites (Grbeša and Šalaj 2018) and one of the lowest levels of trust in institutions within the EU (Eurobarometer 2020; Henjak 2017).

A total of eleven candidates ran in the 2019-2020 presidential election. The HDZ's incumbent Kolinda Grabar Kitarović and the SDP's Zoran Milanović, who eventually won the election, went to the second round as the frontrunners. Miroslav Škoro, a political outsider, won 24.45% of votes and finished the race third. Škoro is best known for his singing career and his numerous patriotic hits. He also has a doctorate degree in economics and has been a successful entrepreneur. Since 2015 he has been engaged in viticulture and winemaking. From 1995 to 1997, he served as Consul General of the Republic of Croatia in Hungary. In the 2007 parliamentary election, he was elected an MP on HDZ's list and was the party's (unsuccessful) candidate for Mayor of Osijek in the 2008 local election. He left the parliament after only eight months, disappointed with politics and arguing that politics had nothing to do with real life.[5]

Škoro made his original career in the field of music. This secured him a celebrity status, which is why Škoro, in terms of his sphere of origin, can be regarded as a *celebrity politician*.

In order to be able to define Škoro's political profile with respect to the remaining two dimensions - populist or pluralist political ideology and the use of celebrity techniques - we analysed his communication during the 2019–2020 presidential election campaign in Croatia. We combined quantitative and qualitative content analysis to examine if and how his populist narrative merged with celebrity cues into *celebrity populism*.

5.1 Research Design

Using quantitative content analysis, we analysed a total of 69 posts published on Škoro's official Facebook page during the period of official election campaign, from 9 to 22 December 2019 (Škoro 2019b). The focus of the analysis was on Facebook communication because digital media are confirmed to be well-suited for the promotion of both populist and celebrity discourses (e.g., Manning et al. 2016; Enli 2017). In addition, according to *The Reuters Institute Digital News Report* (2020), social media is the main source of news for 55% of citizens in Croatia, with Facebook being convincingly the most popular social media platform (for 74% of citizens).

5. Available from https://www.rtl.hr/vijesti-hr/novosti/hrvatska/predsjednicki-izbori2019/3612387/biografija-predsjednickog-kandidata-tko-je-miroslav-skoro/ (Accessed 5. 11. 2021).

We supplemented the analysis of Facebook posts with a qualitative analysis of two video announcements released on Škoro's official YouTube channel – the opening (2019a) and the closing (2019c) video. The first is the already mentioned announcement of the presidential candidacy of 22 June 2019, while the second is the video that Škoro released on 30 December 2019, before the runoff of the presidential election between Zoran Milanović and Kolinda Grabar Kitarović held on 5 January 2020.

As a part of the quantitative analysis, we first examined the presence and valence of populist cues in Škoro's Facebook posts, including: 1) presence and valence of references to the people; 2) presence and valence of references to political elites; and 3) presence of references to "dangerous others" other than political elites. We used binary codes, "yes" or "no", to detect presence and "positive", "negative" or "neutral" codes to establish valence. We then coded posts for the presence of various elements of celebrity politics: 1) references to the candidate's personal life, including elements of humanization and 2) references to popular culture or show business. In defining indicators of celebrity politics, we relied on van Zoonen's (2006) conceptualisation of celebrity politics as a phenomenon constituted by popularization and personalization. Both celebrity categories were coded with binary codes, "yes" or "no". Although posts contained elements other than texts, such as photos (26), videos (22) and links to news articles (4), we decided to code only textual parts of the posts and to use additional content to qualitatively substantiate the findings.

The agreement between coders was strong across all categories. It ranged from Cohen's kappa = 0.87 to 1.00.

5.2 Results

Miroslav Škoro referred to the people in 28 posts (positively in 20 and neutrally in eight posts). Škoro sees the people as his allies and as a source of strength in his crusade against corrupt elites: "This is unstoppable! The people have decided, and God is helping us!" (2019b, 13 December). Škoro insisted that he was "responsible solely to his people" (ibid., 9 December), and as president, he would ensure that people play a greater role in decision making through referenda.

The central place of the "people" in his campaign is visible in his slogan "Let's give Croatia back to the people", while Škoro's connection with the people permeates selected YouTube announcements. Škoro begins his presidential video announcement by quoting exactly the part of the constitution, which says that power comes from the people and belongs to the people.

He claims that this constitutional provision was constantly on his mind when he decided to run. "The only representative in the political system who represents the whole nation and the only one who is still directly elected by the people is the President of the Republic," says Škoro (2019a). He asserts that he wants to be the people's president, that is, the president who will be "a tool of the people in the fight for a decisive turnaround" (ibid.). In the closing video, Škoro says:

> *As one of you, I can honestly say what I will do as a voter. I will definitely go to the polls and I will not allow them to manipulate my ballot. At the polling station, I will take my ballot and circle one of the numbers. HOWEVER, it will be neither number one nor number two. I will write and circle number three - you, my Croatian people! (...) You gave me your vote in the first round, and I will give it to you in the second, until we sweep away this oligarchy together in the parliamentary election and give Croatia back to the people* (2019c).

The entire political discourse of Miroslav Škoro during the election campaign was imbued with positive references to the people. Moreover, a positive reference to the people was often accompanied, as the previous quote suggests, by a pronounced identification with the people.

Another dimension of populism, anti-elitism, appears in the eight Facebook posts, with all posts being markedly negative. Additional eleven posts contain attacks on mainstream politicians, mostly on frontrunners Milanović and Kitarović, who are commonly regarded as a proxy for political establishment.

Harsh criticism of Croatian political elites permeates Škoro's YouTube videos. In his announcement video, Škoro states that Croatia is ruled by a controlled party system in which the two strongest parties alternate in power with their trading partners and that these political elites are completely alienated from the people (2019a). In a statement published before the second round of the election, Škoro told his voters that he was "guilty" because he "dared to run against the oligarchic duopoly" and that it really did not matter who would be elected between the two remaining candidates because Croatia would still be ruled by an opportunistic clique "which evokes Croatian sacrosanct principles until it gets votes, and then the government turns its head away from its own people and ignores their protests and referendum initiatives" (2019c).

The assumption that Miroslav Škoro can be classified as a *populist* rather than a *mainstream pluralist politician* is confirmed by the presence of positive references to the people and negative references to the political elites, which were detected both in his Facebook messages and video announcements.

The third dimension of populism, which can help determine the type of Škoro's populism, is the presence of "dangerous others". The analysis of Facebook posts shows that he mentioned "dangerous others" in a total of six posts. Although

Škoro identifies a whole range of enemies, from the polling agencies to the media and powerful financial interests, it is not possible to identify a group that he invariably defines as "dangerous others". However, in Škoro's case, one can still speak of a right-wing populism, which is suggested in his YouTube posts in which Škoro continuously addresses the people as "Croats", which implies that he understands the concept of the people predominantly in its ethnic sense. Also, in his announcements, Škoro often calls for God's help, so, for example, he states that the people and he will "together change and, with God's help, awaken Croatia" (2019a).

As for the analysis of the elements of celebrity politics, in only four posts we detected links to the sphere of popular culture or show business, and in none of the posts did Škoro refer to his personal life. The only reference to his singing career was when he posted a link that was announcing his television interview, featuring a glamourous photo of himself holding a microphone (2019b, 16 December). The remaining references to pop culture were used to promote his slogan and his number on the list (11). For instance, he posted a link to Elvis Presley's *It's Now or Never* and wrote "Jacques Houdek [a fellow singer] sent me one great song this morning. I listen to it for the 11th time in a row" (ibid., 22 December).

Although Škoro entered the political arena as an extremely popular singer, he was reluctant to use his celebrity capital to appeal to the people on his main communication platforms - on his Facebook page and in his YouTube videos. Although the analysis did not encompass all campaign channels, it is plausible to assume that communication on his most prominent campaign vehicles would indicate the strategic course of the campaign.

It seems that Škoro tried to distance himself from his celebrity background. Moreover, he seemed insulted when political opponents and media mentioned his singing career. In the closing video he protests:

> *But, from that historic 22 December, I progressed from a deserter, war profiteer, singer and Serbian son-in-law to a gentleman and a co-candidate (...) Nothing has essentially changed, only the fact that they need us now. Don't worry, on the feast day of Epiphany, when the outcome of the election is known, we will be referred to as "the tamburitza player and his outsiders" again* (2019c).

The analysis thus showed that the candidate coming from the celebrity sphere heavily relied on populist rhetoric on his main campaign platforms, while ignoring celebrity techniques. We can only speculate about the reasons behind this decision, but our assumption is that this was a strategic choice based on the assessment that emphasizing Škoro's career of an entertainer would make him appear less credible.

How should we, then, classify Miroslav Škoro? If we look at the conceptualisation shown in Table 1 and Figure 2, we can conclude that Škoro is a *celebrity populist*. We base this categorisation on the fact that Škoro made his original career in the sphere of celebrities, and after entering the political arena, he advocated, at least when it comes to the presidential election campaign, a populist ideology. However, unlike some other politicians with a similar combination of sphere of origin and populist ideology, such as Donald Trump, Beppe Grillo or Volodymyr Zelensky, Škoro rarely used celebrity techniques. Škoro led a very conventional campaign in which he tried to distance himself from his identity as a popular singer and pushed his entrepreneurial and scientific achievements to the fore. We hypothesise that this strategy was the result of a fear that frequent use of celebrity techniques would make him come across as frivolous and reduce his electoral chances. Therefore, we believe that Miroslav Škoro is a rare example of a celebrity populist who, unlike *super celebrity populists*, comes from the celebrity sphere, but after entering the political arena, is reluctant to use celebrity techniques.

6 Conclusion

In the last thirty years, two phenomena have particularly marked the field of political communication - populism and celebrity politics. However, there are surprisingly few studies that explicitly connect these two concepts and seek to understand how their marriage changes the space of contemporary politics. This paper seeks to make a step forward in this respect and encourage systematic research into the phenomenon we refer to as *celebrity populism*.

Building on the assumption that the appeal of celebrity politics and populism rests on some common features, such as performativity, the central role of personality and emotions, and distrust of mainstream political elites, we develop a definition of celebrity populism. In contrast to the established definitions of celebrity politics and the corresponding categorisations of celebrity politicians, in our conceptualisation we emphasize the importance of explicitly distinguishing political meta-ideologies that are combined with celebrity discourse. The seductive power of the populist-celebrity marriage suggests that we should evaluate celebrity populism on its own merits, rather than to subjugate it under a generic concept of "celebrity politics". Such approach enables us to consider potentially explosive implications of this emerging phenomena and to analyze the anatomy of specific cases, in terms of their celebrityhood and the type of populism they invoke.

Building on previous conceptualisations of *celebrity politics* (Marsh et al. 2010) and *celebrity populism* (Grbeša and Šalaj 2023), we develop our classification by combining three dimensions: *sphere of origin* (politics or celebrity sphere), *meta-ideology* (mainstream (pluralist) politics or populism) and *the use of celebrity techniques*. Thus we come to a total of eight categories of political actors: 1) *mainstream* and 2) *populist politicians* whose sphere of origin is mainstream or populist politics and who commonly avoid celebrification of their political personae; 3) *political celebrities*, mainstream politicians who resort to celebrity discourse to construct their celebrity personae; 4) *celebrity politicians*, celebrities who come from the celebrity sphere and run for elected office using mainstream, non-populist discourse but don't rely extensively on celebrity component of their persona; 5) *populist celebrities*, populist politicians who acquire elements of celebrity discourse to win over the voters or public sympathy; 6) *celebrity populists*, celebrities who come from the celebrity sphere and rely on populist discourse (rhetoric of people-centeredness and anti-elitism) to win an election and/or maintain public support but are reluctant to campaign on their celebrity background; 7) *super celebrity politicians*, celebrities who come from the celebrity sphere and use mainstream, non-populist discourse in their communication but rely abundantly on their celebrity capital and celebrity techniques and 8) *super celebrity populists*, celebrities who acquire populist rhetoric and rely heavily on celebrity techniques to communicate with the publics. The last category, *super celebrity populists,* represent the essence of the celebrity populism phenomenon. In a celebritized world characterized by massive distrust with mainstream political elites, super celebrity populists emerge as a new, attractive breed of politicians whose point of appeal surpasses traditional politics. Their psychological relationship with voters, based on affectionate and emotional factors rather than rational ones, resembles the relationship of fans with their idols.

In the analytical part of the paper, we used the case of the Croatian singer and politician Miroslav Škoro to test our categorisation. The analysis of his communication during the 2019-2020 presidential election showed that Škoro can be classified as a *celebrity populist*. If the sphere of origin is taken as the criterion, Škoro is a true celebrity, whereas, according to the discourse used in the campaign, he is a true populist. However, Škoro's reluctance to use his popularity of a singer in the campaign and to rely on his career of an entertainer, in virtue of which he entered politics as a famous person, makes it impossible to classify him as a *super celebrity populist*. It was precisely this possibility of celebrity politicians or celebrity populists to step out of their celebrity shoes when they enter politics that prompted us to introduce a dimension of using celebrity techniques, which proved to be justified. Finally, methodology presented in this paper provides a replicable tool for capturing and categorizing various cases of celebrity populism. It also serves as an incentive to further develop this concept and to improve its measuring categories.

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Tadej Praprotnik

KONZERVIRANI NASMEH: INTERPASIVNOST V SODOBNEM KOMUNICIRANJU

IZVLEČEK

Interpasivnost je uveljavljen kulturni pojav delegiranja občutkov od posameznika na predmete. Širjenje interpasivnih praks je v sodobnem času odraz procesov družbenega pospeševanja, zahtev po posameznikovi opolnomočenosti in izpolnjevanju lastnih zahtev po »dogajanju« ter neoliberalne retorike izbire in odgovornosti. Z analizo in interpretacijo primarnih in sekundarnih virov besedilo predstavlja in pojasnjuje strategije interpasivnosti, ki se odražajo v rabi posameznih digitalnih tehnologij. Rabe tehnologije odražajo družbene prioritete, v rabi tehnologije kot infrastrukturi družbenosti se posledično odražajo tudi strategije interpasivnosti. Besedilo v razvejanih praksah sodobnega komuniciranja izpostavlja situacijsko pogojeno dvojnost komunikacijskega delovanja: vsako družbeno delovanje predpostavlja specifično družbeno regulirano in konvencionalizirano prakseološko semiotiko, s katero sporočamo svoje delovanje, to isto semiotiko pa lahko uporabimo tudi za doseganje nasprotnih ciljev: da se izognemo delovanju in ga delegiramo na element materialne kulture.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: interpasivnost, komunikacija, digitalne tehnologije, družbeno pospeševanje, materialna kultura, praksa, individualizem

Canned Smile: Interpassivity in Contemporary Communication

ABSTRACT

Interpassivity is an established cultural phenomenon of delegating an individual's emotional experience to objects. The spread of such interpassive practices in *contemporary times is a reflection of social acceleration, the demand for individual empowerment, of fulfilling independent demands for "action", and the neoliberal rhetoric of choice and responsibility. By analysing and interpreting primary and secondary sources, the text explains the interpassive strategies seen in the use of individual digital technologies. The use of technology indicates social priorities, while the use of technology as an infrastructure of sociability also indicates strategies of interpassivity. Diverse practices of contemporary communication and the situational duality of communication itself are further highlighted: any social activity presupposes a specific socially regulated and conventionalised practice of semiotics, which is used to communicate our activities, although the same semiotics can be used to achieve the opposite: to avoid any action and delegating it to another element of material culture.*

KEY WORDS: interpassivity, communication, digital technologies, social acceleration, material culture, practice, individualism

1 Uvod: Kako gledati in kaj videti v sodobnih komunikacijskih praksah

Sodobne digitalne tehnologije in platforme družbenih medijev so omogočile nove komunikacijske prakse, ki jih v daljši zgodovinski perspektivi lahko vidimo tudi kot specifične ekstenzije obstoječih kulturnih pojavov. Tehnologije kot družbeno-tehnični sistemi nazorno reflektirajo prakseologijo vsakdanjega življenja in »obsedenosti« partikularne družbe.

Članek problematizira komunikacijske prakse uprizarjanja in delegiranja aktivnosti, ko posamezniki uporabijo konvencionalno podobo, ki uprizarja aktivnost, sami pa lahko ohranijo stanje nedelovanja. Aktivnost »tukaj in zdaj« preložijo na fotografijo, ki je zabeležila dogajanje. Komunikacijska transparentnost, fluidnost, diverziteta in kompleksnost izpostavljajo vprašanje komunikacijske učinkovitosti uporabnikov, skratka: kako zagotoviti avtentičnost in legitimnost komunikacijskih dejanj. K posameznikom usmerjena arhitektura družbenih medijev načeloma omogoča optimizacijo podob posameznikovih interakcij in participacij, ki pa jih ti niso vselej zmožni udejanjiti. V procesu upodabljanja participacije, delovanja in »dogajanja« posamezniki pogosto »mobilizirajo partikularne nize lingvističnih in drugih semiotičnih resursov, s katerimi kreirajo in transformirajo dejanje potrjevanja avtentičnosti« (Leppänen in drugi 2015: 1). Avtentičnost oziroma verifikacija je za posameznike še vedno predpogoj za uspešno družbeno participacijo ali bivanje v skupnosti, spremenile oziroma razširile pa so se strategije verifikacije, torej »kateri tipi jezikovnih rab, semiotičnih praks in oblik participacije štejejo kot ‚veljavni' in ‚legitimni' za določen namen« (Leppänen in drugi 2015: 2).

Namen članka je tematizacija sodobnih strategij, s katerimi posamezniki utemeljujejo v družbi močno propagirane prakse participacije, interaktivnosti, čustvene komunikacije. Neoliberalno propagiranje opolnomočenosti sokreira okoliščine, v katerih posamezniki vse težje izpričajo svojo opolnomočenost. Obremenjeni in posledično utrujeni od lastnih zahtev po dokazovanju opolnomočenosti slednjo nemalokrat delegirajo na situacijsko kodirano in konvencionalizirano podobo, ki šteje kot praksa opolnomočenosti. Prispevek predstavi specifične strategije, ki se opirajo na teorijo interpasivnosti.

Teza članka je, da so interpasivne prakse v dobi neoliberalnega individualizma in družbenega pospeševanja izdatno navzoče, tehnološko vse bolj izpopolnjene in personalizirane digitalne tehnologije in družbeno preferenčni stili komuniciranja (samorazkrivanje, ohranjanje stika, empatičnost, mreženje) pa so te prakse naredili razmeroma »nevidne«. Zahteve po nenehni transparentnosti posameznika kreirajo stalno posodabljajoč bazen družbeno konvencionaliziranih in posledično komunikacijsko uspešnih primerov uprizarjanja tipične prakse, ki hkrati kreira vzporeden proces širjenja komunikacijskega delovanja, v katerem se posameznik v veliki meri odreče dejanskemu delovanju. Z besedami Hannah Arendt lahko situacijo zgostimo in zapišemo, da je »obnašanje nadomestilo delovanje« (Arendt 1996: 43), konvencionalno prepoznane prakse (aktivnosti) posamezniki uporabljajo, da se izognejo delovanju. Drugače rečeno: multimodalni in semiotično raznovrstni komunikacijski kanali dopolnjujejo in nadomeščajo govorna dejanja (Austin 1990), vizualno eksplicitne in transparentne podobe situacijsko specifično izvajajo inverzna govorna dejanja. Klasično formulo performativa reči = storiti nadomešča interpasivna strategija storiti = reči, ki zaradi vizualne transparentnosti navidezno natančneje opisuje vršilca govornega dejanja. V tej preoblikovani formuli lahko najdemo analogije z Lacanovo distinkcijo »med vami in tem, kar jaz rečem« (Lacan 2008: 13), pri čemer Lacan v svojem slogu na naslednji strani še enkrat poudari, da to, kar jaz rečem, ne govori o tem, da jaz sem (Lacan 2008: 14). Interpasivni učinek, ki mu sledijo nekateri posamezniki, pa bi se glasil: tisto, kar posameznik stori, ne govori nujno o tem, da on to je.

Vizualni material uporabniško generiranih vsebin prakso potrjuje, v številnih primerih pa prakso (dogajanja, uživanja, empatične komunikacije) nadomešča. Drugače rečeno: »/F/otografija pove več kot tisoč besed.« In celo več: na Instagramu objavljena fotografija zabave izpričuje oziroma potrjuje prakso zabave, hkrati objavljena fotografija nadomešča dejansko prakso zabave.

Članek predstavi teorijo interpasivnosti in širše družbene okoliščine kot neposredne pospeševalce in oblikovalce aktualnih verzij interpasivnosti, nato pa eksplicira oziroma tipizira specifične strategije interpasivnosti skozi sodobne digitalne tehnologije: v specifičnih aktivnostih besedilo prepoznava prakse delegiranja oziroma prelaganje delovanja na specifični nosilec informacije (fotografija, čustvenček, algoritem).

Izbrane komunikacijske prakse oziroma »govorna dejanja« pojasnjujemo skozi teoretski okvir interpasivnosti, teoretski okvir hkrati zožuje – če nekoliko parafraziramo Brymana (2008: 24) – kako vidimo prakse in kaj bomo v praksah sploh zagledali. Besedilo se skuša izogniti pastem (tehnološkega) prezentizma, namreč v aktualnih komunikacijskih kanalih in prevladujočih praksah videti obrise radikalno novega. Predstavljene komunikacijske prakse razumemo kot neposredne manifestacije kulturnih prioritet preteklega in obstoječega družbenega okolja (družbeno pospeševanje, individualizem, opolnomočenost). Besedilo skozi primere predstavi spregledana in premalo raziskovalno uporabljena razsežja interpasivnosti ter skuša – rečeno z besedami Susan Herring – »identificirati in opisati online fenomene v kulturno smiselnih terminih« (Herring 2004: 338).

2 Interpasivnost kot teoretsko-tematizacijski raziskovalni okvir

Teorija interpasivnosti se je pojavila konec prejšnjega stoletja, zlasti kot odziv na prevladujoč diskurz interaktivnosti, ki je poudarjal, naj posamezniki prevzamejo odgovornost za svoje konzumentske prakse (van Oenen 2018: 105). Različne vsakdanje prakse so pričeli interpretirati na nov način, kako se namreč »'pasivnost' (konzumiranje) s konzumirajočih premesti na proizvod« (Pfaller 2019: 22); govorimo o procesih, ko »najbolj intimna verjetja, celo najbolj intimne emocije, kot so sočutje, jok, solze, smeh, lahko prenesemo, delegiramo na druge, ne da bi pri tem izgubili njihovo iskrenost« (Žižek 1989: 32). Izhodišče teorije so Lacanove opombe o funkciji Zbora v grški tragediji, ko gledalec svoja občutja lahko preloži na Zbor, sam pa se prepusti vsakdanjim profanostim oziroma nadaljuje z njimi:

> *Ko ste namreč zvečer v gledališču, mislite na svoje opravke, na nalivno pero, ki ste ga čez dan izgubili, na ček, ki ga boste morali podpisati naslednji dan. Gledalcem potemtakem ne smemo preveč zaupati; za vaša čustva mora poskrbeti neka razumna scenska ureditev. To je naloga Zbora. Čustveni komentar je podan. Prav to tvori najboljšo možnost preživetja antične tragedije. Komentar je sicer bedast, ni pa brez trdnosti, celo človeški je. Potemtakem ste osvobojeni vseh skrbi – čeravno ničesar ne občutite, bo Zbor čutil namesto vas. In konec koncev, zakaj si ne bi mogli zamisliti, da je predstava dosegla svoj učinek na vas – pravo mero, malo dozo učinka – četudi niste ne vem kako drhteli. Po pravici povedano, nisem prepričan, da gledalca udeležba pri spektaklu spravi v takšno drhtenje* (Lacan 1988: 251).

Na podlagi tega izhodiščnega uvida v zabaven in pomenljiv kulturni fenomen so kmalu zgradili splošneje zastavljeno teorijo interpasivnosti (Žižek 1989); najbolj razdelano verzijo teorije je predstavil avstrijski filozof Robert Pfaller (2019). Med klasične primere interpasivnosti uvrščamo primer najetih žalovalk, ki na pogrebih jokajo namesto svojcev (tako se zadosti dolžnostim predpisanega žalovanja, dejansko žalujoči pa se lahko med obredom posvetijo drugim opravilom), tudi primere na področju religioznih praks (ko oseba v cerkvi prižge svečo, se posveti kontemplaciji in molitvi, a kmalu zapusti cerkev, sveča pa namesto osebe opravlja religiozna opravila; primer so tudi tibetanski molilni mlinčki, ko oseba na papir zapisano molitev vtakne v mlinček, ta pa nato moli namesto nje; Žižek 1989: 31–32). Poznamo primer konzerviranega smeha (angl. *canned laughter*), znan iz britanskih situacijskih komedij (angl. *sitcom*), ko se televizija »smeje namesto nas«. Ob komičnih in zabavnih situacijah namreč lahko slišimo smeh in aplavdiranje občinstva. Žižek se vpraša, čemu ta smeh. Prvi možni odgovor – da konzervirani smeh služi temu, da nas opomni, kdaj naj se zasmejimo – je zanimiv zato, ker implicira paradoks, da je smejanje določena dolžnost, ne pa spontano občutje. Žižek sklepa, da ta odgovor ne zadošča, saj se običajno ne smejimo. Edini ustrezni odgovor je potem v tem, da nas Drugi – utelešen v televiziji – osvobaja dolžnosti, da se smejemo, in se smeje namesto nas. Če po napornem delavniku ves večer zgolj odsotno zremo v televizijski ekran, lahko vsemu navkljub na koncu rečemo, da smo se skozi medij Drugega pravzaprav zelo dobro imeli (Žižek 1989: 33). Podobno je z Zborom v gledališču, ki čuti obžalovanje, obiskovalci gledališča čutijo zahtevana občutja skozi medij Zbora. Zopet smo razbremenjeni vseh skrbi; tudi če ničesar ne čutimo, bo Zbor to opravil namesto nas (Žižek 1989: 32). Novejša interpretacija konzerviranega smeha izpostavlja, da občinstvu ni moč povsem zaupati, da bo v celoti prepoznalo in razumelo smešne izjave in trenutke. V teh primerih so izjave ali situacije sicer lahko smešne, toda ne dovolj smešne, da bi privedle do smeha. Prevedeno v interpasivni okvir slednje pomeni, da konzervirani smeh signalizira prepoznan manko uživanja ali razumevanja, ki ga nadomešča interpasivni smeh, torej smejoči glas, ki pa nima neposredne povezave z vsebino (čemu se smejimo) (Grimshaw 2018: 52).

2.1 Družbene okoliščine kot dejavniki sooblikovanja interpasivnih praks

Prelaganje užitka, torej pasivnosti, je ključni fokus teorije interpasivnosti:

> *Interpasivne osebe svojim namestnikom ne prepuščajo svojih dejavnosti, temveč ravno to, kar rade počnejo – kar počnejo iz lastnega zadovoljstva, za sproščanje, iz strasti ali prepričanja. Drugim torej ne puščajo delati,*

temveč jim puščajo uživati namesto sebe ali, povedano drugače, na druge ne delegirajo aktivnosti (kot se to dogaja v primerih interaktivnosti), temveč, nasprotno, pasivnost (Pfaller 2019: 69).

Z drugimi besedami: »Uživanje v nečem se deloma ali v celoti preda, prepusti drugi osebi ali stroju« (Pfaller 2019: 21).

V tako zastavljeni konstelaciji nastopi vprašanje, zakaj užitek, torej pasivnost, prelagati na druge ljudi ali predmete ter kako razumemo pasivnost in aktivnost. Uveljavilo se je prepričanje, da si ljudje želijo aktivnosti in da si nenehno želijo uživati, krepi se podoba posameznika, ki ve, kaj hoče, ki zna, zmore in celo mora uživati. Toda možnost, da konzumiramo užitek in da se nam »dogaja«, ne pomeni nujno, da je to v konici naših prioritet. Hkrati obstaja prepričanje, da skušajo racionalni posamezniki karseda veliko užitka zadržati zase, na druge pa preložiti delo oziroma aktivnost:

Ta domneva se ujema tudi z osnovnimi značilnostmi tega, kar politična ekonomija razume z izrazom homo oeconomicus, ki ga vodi njegov lastni interes in ki stremi k maksimiranju koristi, pri čemer je lastni interes v tem, da nam je treba narediti, prispevati čim manj, korist pa v tem, da za to dobimo čim več konzumabilnega, se pravi tega, kar je mogoče konzumirati (Pfaller 2019: 70–71).

V besedilu predstavljeni primeri bodo skušali pokazati, da je posameznikom zahteva ali privilegij užitka določeno breme, ki ga s pomočjo digitalnih tehnologij učinkovito preložijo na kakšno uveljavljeno prakso. V družbi je namreč krepko navzoča vrednostna delitev na aktivnost/pasivnost, ki je deloma odraz rabe interaktivnih tehnologij in impliciranih »osvobajajočih« potencialov interaktivnosti.

Pasivnost kot drža ni videti posebno priljubljena. Ne slavijo je ravno kot ene od sedmih kreposti. Medtem ko se interaktivnost pojavlja kot eno izmed sodobnih udarnih gesel, kot iztočnica za hvalnico določenim oblikam sodobnih medijev in njihovim domnevnim prednostim, kot propaganda za nekatere oblike novih umetnostnih praks, pa interpasivnost komajda lahko upa na takšno popularnost (Dolar 1997: 9–10).

Pozivi k uživanju in interaktivnosti vendarle niso kakšen »blagor«, prej vzrok za nelagodje. Ljudje si nemalokrat prizadevajo izpolniti aktivnosti, ki jih bodo razbremenile skrbi po uživanju, saj uživati očitno ni nekaj, kar nam je »dano« in po čemer nenehno hlepimo.

Cindy Zeiher in Mike Grimshaw (2018: 1) poudarjata, da je za razumevanje interpasivnosti najprej treba ugotoviti, kaj konstituira izkušnjo uživanja, torej identificirati in zamejiti uživanje, ki ga posamezniki delegirajo, ter določiti temeljno namero delegiranja uživanja.

Poraja se vtis, da si posamezniki prizadevajo ohraniti manko objekta, ki ga lahko začasno zapolnijo z dokazi uživanja oziroma – rečeno z Lacanom: »/P/onavljanje temelji na vrnitvi užitka« (Lacan 2008: 49). Uživanje je v veliki meri kulturna obsesija, kapitalistično poantirana neoliberalna logika, ki se prek medijskih podob izdatno uokvirja kot specifična praksa. Nič osvobajajočega tudi ni v tem, če moraš biti stalno aktiven, prej nasprotno: »Gole aktivnosti torej ne smemo obravnavati kot dokaza svobode, saj obstaja tudi nesvobodna aktivnost« (Pfaller 2019: 72). Pri vprašanju, zakaj užitek prelagati na druge ljudi ali stroje oziroma ga delegirati, Mike Grimshaw udari neposredno: »/U/žitek delegiramo, ker lahko postane zadolžitev oziroma zahteva, potemtakem torej delo. Pravzaprav uživanje je delo, toda o uživanju raje ne razmišljamo kot delu, raje ohranjamo idejo uživanja, ker nam to omogoči, da jo izražamo in uživamo v njej« (Grimshaw 2018: 51). Ta pozicija predpostavlja idealistično vero v možno nevtralnost uživanja, naivno razume uživanje, kot da obstaja zunaj kapitalistične konstrukcije, toda v kapitalizmu vse in vsakdo obstaja kot strošek. Analogno je tudi uživanje določeno delo, čeprav se ga pogosto razume zunaj področja dela (Grimshaw 2018: 51).

Vzporedno lahko interpasivnost razumemo kot ritual, saj je delegiranje in zastopanje temeljna poteza ritualnih praks. Rituali izhajajo iz verjetij in jih hkrati krepijo, a hkrati so rituali tudi svojevrstno delo, vendar o njih ne razmišljamo kot o delu, temveč kot o užitku in jih posledično ločujemo od dela. Rituali se pojavljajo na podlagi verjetja v njihovo delovanje. Skupna točka ritualov in interpasivnih dejanj je tudi prepoznanje, da so interpasivna dejanja iluzije, v katere ni treba verjeti (Grimshaw 2018: 53). Mike Grimshaw sklepa, da je izvedba rituala vselej namenjena drugim udeležencem, da nam samim ni treba verjeti: gre za izvedbo »kot da sami verjamemo«, kajti če ne bi verjeli, zakaj bi potemtakem izvajali ritual? (Grimshaw 2018: 59). Tu bomo prek Lacanove fenomenologije transferja in uveljavljenega koncepta subjekta, za katerega se predpostavlja, da ve (Lacan 2010: 217), torej strukturnega kraja, ki je opora transferju v psihoanalitični situaciji, za potrebe dodatne interpretacije vpeljali še Močnikovo eksplikacijo verovanjskega ozadja, ki mu pripiše »instanco verjetja v 'izreke', ki ozadje tvorijo« (Močnik 1999: 52) in jo poimenuje subjekt, za katerega se predpostavlja, da verjame. Interpasivnost po tej shemi potemtakem pomeni dvojni akt delegiranja: gre za delegiranje užitka in celo za delegiranje verjetja na »naivne« druge (Krips 2018: 348), kjer denimo Pfaller navaja Mannonijevo idejo delegiranega verovanja (Pfaller 2019: 16). Posamezniki lahko delujejo na podlagi verjetja, v katerega sami ne verjamejo, delujejo na podlagi verjetja drugih. Ti naivni drugi, za katere posamezniki predpostavljajo, da verjamejo v neumnosti, so lahko povsem fiktivne osebe (Krips 2018: 348): »Lahko da je fikcija, a ta fikcija je strukturna, torej je tudi delujoča fikcija« (Močnik 1999: 52). Čeprav sledilci ali prijatelji na družbenih medijih niso fiktivne osebe, pa ti posamezniki sebe k ničemur ne »zavezujejo«, vera v hipotetičnega naivneža je vselej pripisana drugemu, hkrati pa je igra pripisovanja naivnega verjetja množična oziroma strukturna. Vsak posameznik je prav zaradi strukturne narave pravkar opisanega verjetja lahko prepričan, da mu bodo drugi vrnili »uslugo« in prevzeli vlogo – rečeno z Močnikom (1985: 21) – »hipotetičnega tepca«, skratka odigrali vlogo naivnega opazovalca.

Mike Grimshaw pa se sprašuje naslednje: v kolikšni meri interpasivnost sploh ne govori o preloženem delu ali užitku, temveč je nemara nadomestek za pričakovano delo ali užitek, ki ne doseže zahtevane ali pričakovane ravni? Ali nemara interpasivnost signalizira manko tistega, kar se je pričakovalo, toda ne zares doseglo in pojavilo (Grimshaw 2018: 52)?

Interpasivnost je civilizacijska stalnica, njena dejanska manifestacija pa je rezultanta družbeno-kulturnih okoliščin (družbenih prioritet) in specifičnih tehnoloških zmožnosti, ki določajo in omogočajo vidnost in konkretno variacijo interpasivnosti.

Če na platformi YouTube beremo komentarje pod videi, denimo na temo *Fitness Workout*, bomo vselej našli komentar v stilu: »Je še kdo tu, ki se prehranjuje, medtem ko gleda ta video?« (Kuldova 2018: 33).[1] Interpasivnost ni neposredna posledica izdatnejše uporabe digitalnih tehnologij (ki uživajo namesto nas). Tehnologije tudi sicer niso vzrok družbenih sprememb, aktualne rabe tehnologije v prvi vrsti povnanjajo neoliberalno izpostavljanje »opolnomočenega« posameznika, ki je (inter)aktiven in »sam svoje sreče kovač«. Eksplicitni in implicitni pozivi po aktivnem življenju so kot stranski produkt okrepili tudi prakse, ki uprizarjajo aktivno življenje. Pozivi k eksplicitnosti in transparentnosti krepijo širjenje interpasivnega delovanja, ko posamezniki dejansko delovanje nadomeščajo s konvencionalnimi podobami aktivnosti. Ideološko naturalizirana podoba platform, kjer se »dogajajo« navadni posamezniki, ponuja dodaten pospešek k širjenju interpasivnih praks.

Izpostavljanje interaktivnosti in odgovornosti je rezultat dveh precej nasprotujočih si političnih pristopov: neoliberalne ideologije, ki nagovarja posameznike, naj prevzamejo individualno odgovornost (kljub povsod prisotnim ekonomskim in družbenim prisilam), ter različnih diskurzov emancipacije, participacije, demokratizacije (van Oenen 2018: 105). V presečišču se soočimo z navideznim

1. Podobno logiko ima tudi komentar pod videoposnetkom z naslovom *15 Minute Fat Burning HIIT Workout | No Equipment | The Body Coach* (The Body Coach TV, 2017). Komentar se glasi: »Just watched you do it and didn't actually move myself. Still feel like I've done a workout though.«

paradoksom: mar ni uživanje nekaj, kar neoliberalizem nenehno implicira in promovira? Robert Pfaller v stilu teorije interpasivnosti problem obrne: kapitalizem in kulturna industrija posameznike frustrirata, jih omejujeta in jim krnita uživanje. Pfaller namreč uživanje enači s pasivnostjo; uživanje je okoliščina in sposobnost, ko na posameznika ne pritiskajo zahteve po aktiviranju ali pozivi, naj sam določa svoje življenje, ko so posamezniki razrešeni pričakovanj (sebe in drugih) po participaciji na ravni individualne ali kolektivne samorealizacije (van Oenen 2018: 107–108). Čeprav »normalna biografija postaja izbrana, refleksivna, narejena (self-made) biografija« (Ule 2002: 75), se tovrstna svoboda na ravni vsakdanjih praks lahko izkaže kot svojevrstna nesvoboda: »izbirnost biografije ni prostor svobode, temveč prej mesto družbeno narekovanih izbir« (Ule 2002: 75). Posamezniki so večinoma ubrali prakso izvajanja medijsko izpostavljenih življenjskih stilov in postajajo »tipični primeri« oziroma nosilci tipičnih praks:

> *Individualizacija je konec koncev prikrita prisila, ki nas spodbuja k produkciji, samooblikovanju, samoinsceniranju ne le svoje lastne biografije, temveč tudi svojih socialnih vezi in mrež v različnih fazah življenjskega poteka, ob trajnem dogovarjanju z drugimi in zahtevah trga dela, izobraževalnega sistema, tržne ponudbe* (Ule 2014: 314).

Sodobni »afirmativni« pozivi »bodi aktiven, sodeluj, sokreiraj« ali – še huje – »življenje je tvoje« in »bodi srečen« performativno vzpostavljajo specifično tesnobo nedelovanja, da se posamezniku »ne dogaja« in da bi se mu »moralo dogajati«. Posamezniki vse več življenjskih situacij razumejo skozi okvir izbire in odgovornosti, z besedami Renate Salecl: »Moje življenje, moja korporacija« (Salecl 2010: 24); postajajo fleksibilni, »odprti so za spremembe«, korporativne strategije prevajajo v zasebno življenje. Ne delajo le v službi, delajo tudi na sebi, po možnosti istočasno. Potrošnja oziroma uživanje postajata oblika dela; in obratno, delo postaja oblika uživanja (van Oenen 2018: 120); potrditve svojih naporov in distinktivnosti pa aktivno iščejo na strani drugih ljudi ali širših kolektivov (van Oenen 2018: 114–116). Zdi se, kot da je užitek konzumiran šele, ko se ga izdatno skomunicira in torej preloži na občinstvo. Z besedami Hannah Arendt: »Delovanje, ki ostane anonimno, dejanje, za katerega ne vemo, kdo ga je storil, je nesmiselno in pade v pozabo; nikogar ni, o katerem bi lahko pripovedovali zgodbe« (Arendt 1996: 187) oziroma: »/D/elovanje in govorjenje potrebujeta druge ljudi, na katere se obračata« (Arendt 1996: 197). Vzporedno izpostavljena individualnost, edinstvenost in pozivanje posameznika, naj vzame vajeti v svoje roke in »dela na sebi«, pogosto sproža »vrtanje po sebi« in ugibanje, »kako postati najboljša verzija sebe« (van Oenen 2018: 121). Ker »najboljša verzija« ne obstaja, taka »optimizacija« traja v nedogled.

2.2 Interpasivne prakse kot posameznikova preživetvena strategija po dohitevanju in izpolnjevanju podob opolnomočenosti

V prakse proizvajanja vtisa delovanja se zaradi splošnega družbenega pospeševanja (Rosa 2014) in potrebe po »dohitevanju trendov« vključuje veliko posameznikov. Kljub že omenjeni cinični distanci do tovrstnih dokazov »dogajanja« postaja igra resnična »za nazaj«, učinki vsesplošnega dogajanja pa slej ko prej zares realni. Ne trdimo sicer, da so na profilih družbenih medijev vsi nasmehi v resnici interpasivni, torej zaigrani in konzervirani, trdimo pa, da obstaja razširjena hipoteza – verovanjsko ozadje, da (tudi) drugi objavljajo konzervirane nasmehe. Hkrati obstaja tudi »pozitivni« scenarij: ker obstaja vera v to, da obstaja »nekdo, ki verjame v verodostojnost Instagram fotografij«, bodo številni posamezniki igrali drug za drugega »zares«.

Pasivnost namreč ni ravno cenjena vrlina: »Videti je, da je v pasivnosti nekaj sramotnega in poniževalnega« (Dolar 1997: 10), zato so interpasivne prakse postale »preživetvena strategija« v okolju, kjer za družbeno preferirano prakso velja (inter)aktivnost in participacija. Van Oenen pojasnjuje, da so prakse interpasivnosti posledica »uspešne emancipacije«, kompleksnost sodobnega, v skladu z lastnimi normami upravljanega življenja pa je »blagoslov emancipacije«. Privilegij, da živimo v skladu s svojimi željami, je postal obveza, posamezniki opolnomočeni status doživljajo vse bolj kot breme. Interpasivnost van Oenen interpretira kot obliko odpora na pritiske, da se nam mora dogajati. Privilegij samorealizacije implicira imperativ po samorealizaciji, interpasivnost tako pomeni prelaganje bremena delovanja na predmete materialne kulture ali inštitucije, s katerimi je posameznik povezan (van Oenen 2011: 10–11). S prelaganjem delovanja (pogovorno: outsorsanje; angl. *outsourcing*) se posameznik razbremeni lastnih visoko postavljenih norm in hkrati ohranja ambicije avtonomnega delovanja. Gre za umik in premik od interaktivnega posameznika k posamezniku, ki zaradi privilegijev in zahtev po udeleženosti, opolnomočenosti in hedonizmu lastne interaktivne prakse delegira na institucije ali predmete (Jagodzinski 2018: 279).

Prelaganje delovanja ne pomeni zavračanje aktivnosti in emancipacije, prej nasprotno: posamezniki so sprejeli ideale emancipacije, a pogosto se ne čutijo dovolj sposobne živeti v skladu z njimi. Ne (z)morejo se samouresničiti v vseh vidikih, ki so na voljo. Dodatna »porcija« svobode in interaktivnosti (tudi s kapitalističnim pospeškom po optimizaciji potrošnikov) povzroča potencialno nezmožnost delovanja v skladu z lastnimi podobami aktivnega delovanja. Vir nelagodja leži v neizvajanju aktivnosti, ki so jih posamezniki sami postavili za merilo (van Oenen 2011: 10–11). Pritisk delovati kot opolnomočeni subjekt se povečuje, privilegij opolnomočenosti se preobraža v obveznost. Odpoved privilegiju bi pomenila izdajo emancipatornih procesov in avtonomije, za katere so si sami prizadevali (van Oenen 2010: 294). Pozivi k več (transparentne) komunikacije izhajajo iz sodobnega razumevanja, po katerem »več komunikacije« pomeni boljšo družbo, interpasivne prakse tako pomenijo alternativno soočanje z zahtevami po interaktivnosti, opolnomočenosti, empatičnosti. Prakse posamezniki situacijsko in strateško aktivirajo (tj. proizvajajo), ko ne uživajo ali ne želijo uživati (oddajati), ko se ne želijo ali ne zmorejo zabavati, ko ne želijo ali ne zmorejo biti empatični. Situacijsko aktivirane (inscenirane) prakse (obnašanje) nadomeščajo zapovedano delovanje (interaktivnost, opolnomočenost, empatičnost) oziroma to delovanje delegirajo na proizveden semiotični material, s čimer ohranijo »integriteto« interaktivnosti.

2.3 Konvencionalizacija prakse kot vir manifestacije interpasivnosti

Digitalne tehnologije so infrastrukturne platforme potencialnih oblik komunikacijskega delovanja, gre za uprizarjanje specifičnih družbeno preferiranih praks. Družbena praksa predpostavlja upoštevanje specifičnih oblik vednosti. Vednost ne pomeni le »vedeti«, ampak vključuje specifičen »know-how«, specifične načine doživljanja v povezavi s prakso. Nosilec prakse ni avtor prakse; gre za rutiniziran in družbeno reguliran način reprodukcije kolektivne vednosti, kar Reckwitz ponazori na primeru prakse zaljubljanja. Zaljubljenost kot praksa ne »odseva« iz posameznika, ampak je sestavljena iz rutiniziranega telesnega obnašanja ter specifičnega razumevanja sebe in druge osebe, v katero se zaljubimo. Praksa vključuje tudi vidike emocionalnosti; gre za specifičen rutiniziran način intencionalnosti, kako si nekaj želeti. Kulturni kodi določajo prakse, prek poznavanja kulturnih kodov določeno obnašanje tudi šele zares postane nosilec določene prakse, zato je reguliranost ključni element prakse (Reckwitz 2002: 253–254). Analogno je reguliranost predpogoj za izvajanje interpasivne prakse. Poznamo konvencionalne podobe telesnih drž, mimike in širše scenerije, po katerih tudi prepoznamo, da je na fotografiji praksa »zabave«, ne pa praksa običajnega srečanja. Fotografije nasmejanih ljudi s kozarci v rokah so primer upodabljanja zabave. Po izvršenem fotografiranju nasmejanih ljudi si lahko ti spet nadenejo resen in naveličan »nasmeh«. Posamezniki naredijo nasmejane obraze in jih fotografirajo (vložijo delo), da se razrešijo zahteve po uživanju na zabavi. Fotografirani »konzervirani« nasmehi predpostavljenim konzumentom fotografije signalizirajo prakso zabave in aktualizirajo družbeno regulirano semiotiko zabave in uživanja, konzervirani nasmehi hkrati performativno ustvarjajo okoliščine, v katerih se posamezniki »smejijo« in pojasnjujejo, zakaj se »smejijo«. Učinki performativnega izreka in učinki konzerviranega nasmeha so vselej vnazajski: klasični perfomativi šele skozi lastno izrekanje ustvarjajo okoliščine in kreirajo realnost, o kateri govorijo, konzervirani nasmeh fotografiranega posameznika šele v vnazajski perspektivi prepoznamo za avtentični semiotični nosilec in izpričevalec zabave.

2.3.1 Interpasivnost 2.0? Platforme družbenih medijev in uporabniško generirana interpasivnost

Družbeni mediji kot druga generacija internetnih platform omogočajo nove tipe komunikacije (Hoffman 2017: 2), njihova participatorna, konvergenčna in produporabniška razsežnost je bila konstruirana kot »povsem nova« z njihovo komercialno uveljavitvijo leta 2005 (Fuchs 2017). Družbene medije kot digitalno posredovane in na internetu osnovane platforme posamezniki in kolektivi uporabljajo za (iz)menjavo in urejanje uporabniško generiranih tekstualnih in avdiovizualnih vsebin (Hoffman 2017: 4), kar pomeni preseganje stare produkcijske ločnice med »aktivnimi« avtorji in »pasivnimi« bralci ter rojstvo participativnih produporabnikov (angl. *produsers*). Participacija tehnološko in interakcijsko opolnomočenih uporabnikov je ključni cilj družbenih medijev (Hoffman 2017: 5), predstavljeni primeri pa pokažejo družbene vzroke kot temeljne pospeševalce njihove uporabe: tehnološke (z)možnosti omogočajo in določajo tipe interakcij, družbeno izpostavljanje opolnomočenosti pa oblikuje dejanski snop spodbujenih in zaželenih rab tehnologije. Izraz interpasivnost 2.0 ne aludira na tehnološke značilnosti družbenih medijev kot povzročiteljev interpasivnosti, temveč opozarja na infrastrukturne podlage za prakse interpasivnosti. Rečeno preprosteje: tehnologija anticipira rabe tehnologije, družbene okoliščine pa usmerjajo in oblikujejo dejanske rabe, uporabnikom dajo »dober razlog«, zakaj uporabljati tehnologijo. Digitalne tehnologije in komunikacijski kanali omogočajo *oddajanje* uporabniško generiranih vsebin (interaktivnost) ali pa *proizvajanje* uporabniško generiranih vsebin, na katere uporabniki delegirajo lastna »opolnomočena« delovanja (interpasivnost).

Uporabniki svoje statuse in identitete aktivno potrjujejo in redefinirajo skozi verigo komunikacijskih dejanj (objavljanje, všečkanje, mreženje), zato profilni statusi uporabnikov niso nikoli končani. Lahko jih primerjamo z identitetami, ki niso skrepenela dejstva, ampak prihajajoče, razvijajoče se manifestacije v interakciji: »Identiteto lahko vidimo kot šele razvijajoč produkt in ne kot predhodno že obstoječ vir jezikovnih ali drugih semiotičnih praks in potemtakem v temelju družbeni in kulturni fenomen« (Bucholtz in Hall 2005: 588). Če so starejši pristopi predpostavljali, da jezikovne prakse *odsevajo* identitete, pa sodobnejši pristopi pokažejo, da jezikovne prakse šele *konstituirajo* identitete (Bucholtz in Hall 2004: 376), zato je komunikacija temeljno mesto, kjer se identitete in podobe modernosti ter delovanja šele vzpostavljajo. Komunikacija v družbenih medijih vključuje jezikovne in druge semiotične vire (besedilo, podobe, zvoki), zato je jezik družbenih medijev sestavljen iz multiplih in povezanih semiotičnih materialov (Leppänen in drugi 2014: 113), kar omogoča širšo semiotično raznolikost variacij interpasivnosti. Besedilna sporočila, ki so bila v prvi fazi internetnega komuniciranja praktično edini nosilec informacije, pogojno razumemo kot posameznikovo variacijo v množičnih medijih uveljavljene »sintetične personalizacije« (Fairclough 1989), s katero uporabnik kreira videz vključenosti in solidarnosti z bralci bloga, Facebook prijatelji, Twitter sledilci. Uporabniško generirane vsebine (fotografija, selfi, film, sistemsko generirani všeček) simulirajo podobo opolnomočenega, čuječega, empatičnega posameznika. Uporabniško generirane vsebine kot nosilce prakse bodisi *oddajamo* in v njih uživamo bodisi vsebine *proizvajamo* in vizualizirane podobe delegiramo na semiotični material, ki uživa namesto nas.

Če kupimo športnega terenca zato, da se nam ni treba udejstvovati v adrenalinski gorski vožnji in nikoli ne zapustimo mestnih cestišč (Bown 2018: 324), pa lahko fotografija, objavljena na platformi Instagram, izpričuje »nasmejano dogajanje« in se fotografija »smeje namesto nas«. Proizvedemo »zabavno dogajanje«, zato da se nam ni treba imeti zabavno. Opravimo dodatno delo, da nam samim ni treba uživati.

Navajamo dva vsakdanja primera:

Primer 1: Na plesišče znanega ljubljanskega nočnega lokala pristopita ženski. Ena prične ob glasbeni spremljavi intenzivno plesati, druga ob robu plesišča beleži dogajanje s pametnim telefonom. Po minuti zapustita lokal.

Primer 2: Mlajši par v restavraciji praznuje rojstni dan. Pred in med razrezom slavnostne torte ter po njem fotografirata dogajanje in izbirata primerne fotografije. Ko se nepričakovano popackata s koščkom torte, je to razlog za smeh, ki ga nemudoma zabeležita.

Primera ponazarjata prakso, ko posamezniki vložijo dodaten napor (delo), da se lahko razrešijo kakršnekoli skrbi glede lastne pasivnosti (užitka), torej zabeležijo prakso za potrebe kasnejšega delegiranje užitka. Beleženje aktivnosti omogoča tudi kasnejšo optimizacijo lastne platformske vidnosti. Fotografirana praksa »zabave« ima hkrati »podaljšan rok delovanja« – zabeleženo prakso lahko posamezniki objavijo tudi kasneje in takrat izpričajo »zabavno življenje«. Ko torej na fotografiji »uživamo«, v resnici krepko »garamo«: »Da bi dejanje, beseda in misel postali del sveta, je vedno potrebna čisto drugačna dejavnost od tiste, ki jih je povzročila« (Arendt 1996: 97). Gre, paradoksalno, za popredmetenje domnevno že konzumiranega užitka: »Popredmetenje je cena, ki jo plača živo, da bi sploh smelo ostati na svetu; in ta cena je zelo visoka, kajti na mesto tistega, kar je bilo neki bežen trenutek zares 'živi duh', zmeraj stopi 'mrtva črka'« (Arendt 1996: 97).

Čeprav so naša človeška telesa vse bolj objekti preoblikovanja, pravkar predstavljena primera ponazarjata, kako smo sami sebe v dobi pospešene platformske transparentnosti dobesedno pregnali vanje. V dobi individualizma družbenih medijev postajajo telesa (spet) verodostojni komunikacijski kanali: »V tem smislu je telo pravi vzor vsake lastnine, saj ga pri najboljši volji ne moremo posedovati skupaj ali deliti z drugimi« (Arendt 1996: 113). Telesa postajajo izpričevalci pristnosti.

Vsekakor Hannah Arendt upravičeno opozarja, kako besede zakrivajo: »Kakor hitro poskušamo reči, kdo je nekdo, ga začnemo opisovati z lastnostmi, ki jih imajo tudi drugi in niso ravno edinstvene« (Arendt 1996: 188). Toda vizualna transparentnost posameznika ima zaradi neposrednosti lahko celo bistveno širši interpasivni potencial: vizualno transparentne podobe ničesar ne zakrivajo, prav nasprotno, vizualna transparentnost omogoča, da spregledamo konvencionalnost in proceduralnost, skratka praznost ali vnaprejšnjo »spodletelost«. Konvencionalna podoba prakse namreč vselej že obstaja, posameznikove fotografirane podobe uživaškega obnašanja prinesejo le živi sedanjik v vnaprej predvideno proceduro. Aktualnost in transparentnost vzpostavi inverzno performativno iluzijo, kot da se z objavljeno fotografijo zdaj res nekaj stori:

> *Govorni subjekt prinese iluzijo, da se je »zdaj« res nekaj zgodilo – a prav z namenom, da se ne bi nič zgodilo, nič, kar ne bi bilo že vnaprej vpisano v proceduro in v njen specifični čas. Iluzija je sicer iluzorična, a za proceduro bistvena* (Močnik 1985: 140).

Profile na družbenih medijih lahko posamezniki uporabljajo kot avatarje;[2] gre za prenos delovanja in čustev na objekt (avatar), ki se smeji, joče, pleše namesto uporabnika. Uporabnik vloži dodatno delo (fotografira ali posname smeh ali ples in aktivnost objavi), da se lahko njegov Facebook/Instagram avatar zabava namesto uporabnika. Uporabnik zabeleži in objavi prakso zabave, prijateljem tako sporoči, da se zabava in se mu ni treba (več) ukvarjati z zabavo, kaj šele uživati. Kajti imeti se zabavno je nemara tudi naporno. Kot že izpostavljeno, ne gre le za delegiranje užitka, temveč za delegiranje verjetja: konzumenti »nasmejanih« fotografij so vstavljeni v vlogo subjekta, za katerega se predpostavlja, da verjame v uživanje: sam sicer vem, da ne uživam, zato naj vsaj moji naivni FB-prijatelji in drugi naključni konzumenti mojih fotografij verjamejo, da

2. Pojem avatar na področju informacijsko-komunikacijskih tehnologij pomeni vizualno reprezentacijo participanta v digitalnem okolju, vizualno je predstavljen v obliki osebe, objekta ali živali, deluje kot posrednik za osebo (Lister in dr. 2003: 383).

uživam. Vera v tega naivca, ki verjame, je strukturna in zato tudi delujoča fikcija. Še več: čeprav neposredno naivno nihče ne verjame, čeprav dejansko nihče ni tisti predpostavljeni naivec, so učinki vseeno realni: »/Z/adosti je hipoteza o naivnežu – pa že vsakdo za drugega lahko v dejanskosti prevzame vlogo tega hipotetičnega tepca« (Močnik 1985: 21).

Interpasivne prakse, ko posamezniki z olajšanjem preložijo užitek in se razbremenijo potrebe, da uživajo, po Pfallerjevem mnenju ovrže domnevo teorije interaktivnosti, ki načeloma zagovarja stališče, da postajajo ljudje vse svobodnejši, še posebej v času interaktivnih tehnologij, ki »opolnomočijo« posameznike (Pfaller 2019: 71). Ideologija neoliberalnega kapitalizma je »osvobodila« posameznika, ta postaja vse bolj odgovoren in posledično »kriv« za svojo prihodnost, pa tudi za svoj užitek. Ideja interaktivnosti je dobila »pospešek« z uvajanjem interneta, ko so se napovedovali interaktivni potenciali novih oblik medosebnega in skupinskega komuniciranja (Boncardo 2018: 300). Ideja izvira z začetka 20. stoletja, s področja avantgardnih umetniških praks, ko se je uveljavilo prepričanje, da so »umetniška dela pomanjkljiva, če ne dopuščajo svojemu občinstvu, da ta participira v njihovi kreaciji« (Boncardo 2018: 300). Na področju umetnosti so različne interaktivne inštalacije predstavljali kot odraz interaktivnosti, golo gledanje umetniških del pa se je označevalo za pasivnost (Pfaller 2019: 70). Pfaller nasprotuje ideji interaktivnosti in opozarja, da:

> *[...] marsikatera umetniška dela, ki ne ponujajo možnosti sooblikovanja, od svojih gledalcev zahtevajo veliko več »aktivnosti«, denimo v obliki interpretacijskega vložka, kot marsikatera interaktivna instalacija, katere zahteve glede delovanja, občutenja in razmišljanja, ki jih postavlja gledalcu, so pogosto resnično precej skromne* (Pfaller 2019: 70).[3]

Umetniška dela, ki ohranjajo distinkcijo med performerjem in gledalcem, med prenašalcem in prejemnikom ali med odrom in občinstvom, po Pfallerju nikakor ne krnijo ali zmanjšujejo moči sooblikovanja, prej nasprotno: distinkcija omogoča možnosti, po drugi strani pa interaktivna umetnost znižuje obseg posameznikovih možnih delovanj (Boncardo 2018: 301).

3. Pfaller opozarja, da načelo prisotnosti bistveno bolj pripomore k prelaganju delovanja, kot primer pa navaja diskusije o načrtovanih spomenikih žrtvam nacionalsocialističnih množičnih pobojev, še zlasti v Berlinu in na Dunaju, kjer vznika vprašanje, »ali naj postavimo veliko, vidno znamenje, ki bo izražalo našo pripravljenost za soočenje s preteklostjo – ali pa, nasprotno, obstaja nevarnost, da bo takšen spomenik ravno s tem, ko bo delo spominjanja prikazal kot že opravljeno, vse nas razrešil naloge razmisleka o nacionalsocialističnih zločinih« (Pfaller 2019: 24).

Pri razumevanju internetne interaktivnosti so v maniri tehnološkega determinizma izhodiščne ideje interaktivnosti izhajale iz same tehnologije, dejansko pa interaktivnost ni zgolj tehnološka značilnost komunikacijskega kanala, ampak spremenljivka, ki meri procesnost komunikacijskega konteksta; predpostavljen izid interaktivnosti naj bi bila aktivna vključenost, v obdobju računalniško posredovane komunikacije pa so z njo skušali pojasnjevati skupinsko dinamiko in kako se računalniško vzpostavljene skupine lahko »držijo skupaj« (Rafaeli in Sudweeks 1997: 1–2). Na platformah posamezniki prek izmenjave vizualnega materiala in všečkov proizvajajo vtis interaktivnosti in medsebojne vključenosti. Prakso interaktivnosti torej pogosto delegirajo na tehnološko plat interaktivnosti.

Če klasično interpasivno prakso predstavlja situacija, ko DVD-zapisovalnik posname film, da ga kasneje posamezniku ni treba gledati (Pfaller 2019: 69), pa analogno prakso na platformah družbenih medijev predstavlja praksa deljenja vsebin, člankov in filmov, ki jih kasneje (skorajda) nihče ne prebere oz. si jih ne ogleda (Bown 2018: 322). Podobno profil Facebook ali aplikaciji WhatsApp in Viber pogosto razbremenjujeta posameznike sodobnega privilegija po »več komunikacije« in zahteve po »konzumaciji« medsebojne naklonjenosti. Posamezniki so z digitalnimi tehnologijami stalno »na zvezi« z družinskimi člani ali prijatelji, všečkajo njihove objave, posledično si prihranijo kar največ časa in pozornosti za svoja opravila.

Interaktivnost je tudi ideološki konstrukt industrije: s prodajanjem naprav so pričeli »prodajati« tudi interaktivnost, navzočo v napravah (Marshall 2004: 14–15), okrepilo se je prepričanje, da je interaktivnost splošno zaželeni »blagor« in »difuzionistično« prepričanje, da je posvajanje tehnologij norma, dostop do tehnologij pa vsesplošno zaželen. Posledično se uporaba tehnologij percipira kot samoumevna potreba, neuporaba tehnologij pa se vselej razume kot znak (ekonomske) deprivacije (Wyatt 2003: 77–79). Novejše raziskave potrjujejo, da stopnje interaktivnosti med uporabniki ne moremo ocenjevati na podlagi tehnološke infrastrukture, ki je sicer lahko nujni pogoj, nikakor pa ni zadostni pogoj za družbeno interakcijo med uporabniki (Landert 2017: 38). Uporaba tehnologij in interaktivnost sta zaradi samoumevne zaželenosti »nevidni«, posledica tega je, da sta hvaležen okvir za interpasivnost. Tehnologija je pogosto predstavljena kot enodimenzionalna receptura in »zdravilo«, da se ni treba ukvarjati s kompleksnimi družbenimi problemi.

Pozive k opolnomočenju spremljajo pozivi k »odpiranju«, ko se posameznike poziva, naj namesto družbeno reguliranih in »uradnih« verzij samih sebe povnanjijo resničnejšo, drznejšo identiteto, naj torej »odvržejo maske«, kjer se van Oenen naveže na Richarda Senneta, ki v zahtevi po odstiranju vsebine »izza maske« prepoznava problem (van Oenen 2018: 117–118). Izpostavljanje

»maske« namreč kreira vtis, da je »pod masko« nujno nekaj bolj »pristnega« in »avtentičnega«. Prihaja do zanimivega obrata: profili družbenih medijev kljub transparentnosti (oziroma prav zaradi nje?) niso ravno okolja poglobljenega odstiranja mask, pač pa so bila danes že precej »zaprašena« okolja anonimnih klepetalnic (denimo *Internet Relay Chat*) razmeroma varen komunikacijski kontekst, v katerem so posamezniki lahko preigravali določene tipe subjektivnih izkušenj, ki so lahko »zmotile« ali prekinile tradicionalne regulirane in uradne verzije posameznikov. Ko so posamezniki v anonimni komunikaciji na podlagi vzdevkov in modificiranih komunikacijskih stilov spreminjali identitete, so se lahko ovedli konstruiranosti in procesualnosti identitet. Sherry Turkle (1995) je anonimne klepetalnice razumela kot okolje potencialne emancipacije od vnaprej reguliranih identitet. »Neresnost« in anonimnost klepetalnic je omogočila, da so posamezniki lahko izpostavili neuradne verzije lastnih identitet, neresnost in anonimnost je lahko krepila transparentnost.

V dobi družbenih medijev so identitetna eksperimentiranja redkost, posamezniki svoje profile razumejo kot blagovno znamko; na platformi za izmenjavo videoposnetkov YouTube je pred leti pisalo »Oddajaj samega sebe« (angl. *Broadcast Yourself*). V profilu so integrirane posameznikove različne družbene vloge, profil je viden po družbenih relacijah zelo različnim ljudem (Fuchs 2017: 50). Okvir oddajanja je okrepil pomen (akumulirane) vidnosti posameznika, posledično je prišlo do obrata; na Facebooku ne obstaja »grožnja vidnosti«, ampak se prek algoritemske logike vzpostavlja »grožnja nevidnosti«, ki določa načine delovanja posameznikov. Resnično grozo predstavlja možnost, da ne bodo videni (kot dovolj zanimivi), zato posamezniki sledijo platformski logiki, ki je utelešena v arhitekturi Facebooka, svojo vidnost morajo optimizirati (Bucher 2012: 1171). Nekdanjo vertikalno komunikacijo tradicionalnih medijev s pasivnimi uporabniki je nadomestila horizontalna komunikacija (Landert 2017: 38), platforme so privzele status središčnosti, kjer posamezniki preverjajo, »kaj se dogaja« in »kaj je relevantno«; uveljavil se je »mit o vseh nas« (angl. *the myth of ‚us'*) in podoba družbenih medijev kot središčnega prostora, v katerem zgodbe zadevajo »nas« (Couldry 2014: 885–886). Uporabniki so se na ta »središčni« položaj platform odzvali (tudi) s praksami, s katerimi »dogajanje« zgolj inscenirajo in se tako izognejo dejanskemu delovanju. Objavljene fotografije lahko razumemo na dvoje načinov: kot prakso izpričevanja delovanja (oddajanje) ali kot interpasivno prakso upora do zahteve po delovanju in dogajanju (proizvajanje). Velja izpostaviti, da je tudi oddajanje dejansko izvršenih in z užitkom »konzumiranih« dogodkov pogosto obsojeno na to, da bo na strani prejemnikov »prebrano« na družbeno preferiran, torej »fatičen« način: »Včasih se mi zazdi, da bi si naredil Instagram, da bi lahko poslal kakšno sliko iz filmov ali snemanj prijateljem, ampak tako ali tako ne bi nihče pogledal. Vsi gledajo le sebe« (Zeitlinger in Štefančič 2021).

Lastnik Facebooka Mark Zuckerberg se v objavi 12. januarja 2018 sklicuje na raziskave, po katerih uporaba družbenih medijev za namene povezovanja z ljudmi ugodno vpliva na počutje in medsebojno povezanost, to pa korelira z dolgoročnimi kazalniki sreče in zdravja. Simptomatično izpostavlja, da »pasivno branje člankov ali gledanje videov naj ne bi bilo tako koristno«, in napoveduje spremembe: arhitektura Facebooka bo optimizirala iskanje pomenljivih in smiselnih družbenih interakcij, preživet čas na Facebooku pa bo tako kakovostneje uporabljen (Zuckerberg 2018). V ozadju namere je ohranjanje poslovnega modela lastnikov (de Vos 2018: 19–20), saj večurno branje besedil ali gledanje videov ne posreduje obsežnih digitalnih sledi uporabnikov, posledično Facebook ne more izvajati optimizacije »uporabniške izkušnje« in izdatnejše personalizacije vsebin. Če parafraziramo Shoshano Zuboff (2019): pasivno branje ne daje dovolj podatkov za avtomatizacijo in optimizacijo potrošnikov, napovedni procesi zahtevajo čim več vstopnih podatkov, na podlagi katerih oblikujejo naše prihodnje aktivnosti in naša »zadovoljstva«.

2.3.2 Več komunikacije, več interpasivnosti: Pokažimo čustva ali vsaj pritisnimo čustvenčka

Prizadevanja po »več komunikacije« kreirajo raznolike vzporedne procese. Uveljavila se je »interaktivna pedagogika« sodobne kulture, ki jo »zaznamujejo nenehni pozivi, kot so 'Pokličite nas!', 'Povejte nam svoje mnenje!', 'Sodelujte!' in podobno« (Pfaller 2019: 73). Tovrstno nagovarjanje posamezniku odvzema možnost premisleka, na katerih področjih bi se zares želel aktivirati:

> *Ni to, kar se je zmanjšalo, nekaj povsem drugega – namreč možnost, da se ne vpletamo, da zavzamemo distanco ali tudi da v javnosti obravnavamo vprašanja, ki so povsem drugačna od vprašanj, ob katerih nam običajno pred usta tiščijo mikrofone* (Pfaller 2019: 73)?

Pozivanje k aktivnosti krepi vtis avtonomije, češ, če so posamezniki »participativni«, odpade sum o morebitni manipulaciji: »Če bi bila oblast zgolj represivna, če ne bi nikoli počela ničesar drugega razen tega, da reče ne, mar zares mislite, da bi jo tedaj sploh kdo ubogal« (Foucault 2008: 121)? Manipulacija deluje tudi v situacijah posameznikovega (so)delovanja, posameznik se tudi hitreje (samo) zaslepi, da gre za prostovoljno aktivnost, zato »družbe aktiviranja učinkoviteje nadzirajo svoje subjekte kot represivne družbe, ki hromijo sleherno aktivnost ali jo preprečujejo s policijo« (Pfaller 2019: 72). Bolj ko so ljudje aktivirani, lažje jih po mnenju Pfallerja uspavamo z utvarami, ki si jih sami proizvajajo o svojih aktivnostih. Če posamezniki v preteklosti pogosto niso imeli dovolj informacij in tudi ne učinkovitih komunikacijskih sredstev, pa je danes drugače: »/D/anašnji sleherniki trpijo zaradi nasprotnega problema, ovira jih zlasti presežek informacij, komunikacij in izražanja« (Hardt in Negri 2012: 18):

> *Problem ni več v tem, da pripravimo ljudi, da se izrazijo, ampak da jim omogočimo in dopustimo male oaze samote in tišine, v kateri bi poiskali kakšno misel in jo izrekli. Represivne sile ne pritiskajo na ljudi, naj se ne izražajo, prav nasprotno, silijo jih k izražanju. Kakšno olajšanje, ko nimaš ničesar povedati, ko imaš pravico molčati, saj je šele v tišini možnost oblikovanja kakšne vse bolj redke smiselne ideje«* (Deleuze 1995: 129).

Hardt, Negri in Deleuze izpostavljajo problem (prevelike) pozornosti, a dejansko gre le za drugačno eksplikacijo teorije interpasivnosti, namreč zavračanje komunikacije, sodelovanja, uživanja. Interpasivnost, torej možnost molčanja in neodzivanja, pomeni za nekatere osebe specifično olajšanje in »privilegij«. Izpostavljanje lastnega mnenja je tudi odraz potrebe po »dohitevanju trendov«, skozi ponotranjeno ideologijo izbire (Salecl 2010) pa se posamezniki lažje samozaslepijo, da gre »resnično« za njihove teme.

Da obilno komuniciranje kreira šibkejše pogoje za (samo)refleksijo, je izpostavila tudi Sherry Turkle: »Težko je karkoli drugega početi s 3000 Facebook prijatelji, razen da si povezan« (Turkle 2012). Nenehna povezanost (angl. *always on*) zmanjšuje možnost, da bi se posamezniki naučili biti sami, toda ne osamljeni (Turkle 2012), stalna povezanost tudi ne zagotavlja vedno polne pozornosti (Turkle 2011: 280), prav slednje, torej biti »na zvezi«, pa je lahko hkrati načrtna preživetvena strategija, da posameznik lahko užije nekaj samote. Posamezniki s posredovanjem všečkov, dvignjenih prstov in čustvenčkov pogosto le kreirajo podobe pozornosti, take interpasivne strategije so odraz (in hkrati upor do) kulturne obsedenosti po nenehnem povezovanju, odpiranju in takojšnjosti. Diskrepanca med predvidenimi rabami tehnologije ter družbeno preferiranimi in realiziranimi rabami je odraz kulturnih prioritet. Judy Wajcman (2015: 16) je sodobno kulturno prioriteto, ki določa rabe tehnologije, zgostila v udaren stavek »Hitrost je seksi«. Sami dodajamo, da aktualne rabe odražajo tudi uveljavljeno prepričanje »Čustva so seksi«, posamezniki pa zaželeno komuniciranje čustev lahko prenesejo na konvencionalno dogovorjene znake. Ko denimo reagirajo na SMS-sporočilo s čustvenčkom (angl. *emoji*)[4] v obliki nasmejanega obraza, se čustveno odzovejo na prejeto sporočilo, če pa jim objektivne ali subjektivne

4. Leta 2015 je bil za Oxfordovo besedo leta izbran čustvenček »obraz s solzami smeha« (angl. *Face with Tears of Joy*), najpogosteje uporabljen čustvenček na vseh platformah, ki »najbolje odraža etiko, razpoloženje in preokupacije leta 2015« (OxfordLanguages 2015).

ovire in potrebe (ohranjanje prostora za nedelovanje) tega ne omogočajo, lahko komuniciranje čustev delegirajo na grafično ikono; delujejo interpasivno. Čustvenčki v kombinaciji z besedilom »mehčajo« pomen besedila ali zagotavljajo preferenčno razumevanje, samostojni čustvenčki pa zadostijo normativni potrebi po (čustvenem) odzivanju in ohranijo prostor nedelovanja. Ko posamezniki posredujejo »nasmejani« čustvenček, se namreč praviloma ne smejijo, empatičnost delegirajo in ohranijo podobo »odprtih« in senzibilnih posameznikov. Družbeno preferenčno prakso in fatično komuniciranje[5] preložijo na znak. Če konzervirani smeh situacijskih komedij pričara zabaven večer, pa čustvenčki pričarajo »odpiranje« in senzibilnost. Tako kot ni ravno »in« priznati, da uživamo v konzerviranem smehu, tudi ni ravno »in« priznanje, da sta nam »odpiranje« in izražanje empatičnosti do drugih ljudi naporni in sta nam nemara celo odveč. Zgodovinska geneza čustvenih grafičnih ikon nam ponuja posredno pojasnilo, kako se razvijajo strategije interpasivnosti.

Pričelo se je z ASCII-znaki v računalniško posredovani komunikaciji (emotikoni, angl. *emoticons*), ki so jih večinoma nadomestili vizualno bogatejši in eksplicitnejši čustvenčki (angl. *emoji*), zadnjo fazo pa predstavljajo večje, eksplicitnejše in izdatno animirane nalepke (angl. *sticker*). Vsaka faza prinaša bolj obsežno variacijo in kompleksnost (Konrad in dr. 2020: 217); ne gre za preprosto linearno nadomeščanje starejših verzij z novejšimi, saj so rabe in komunikacijske funkcije grafičnih ikon različne. Čustvenčke uporabljamo v različnih operacijskih sistemih in aplikacijah, bolj animirane in eksplicitne nalepke pa so vezane na določeno aplikacijo; nalepke morda ne bodo prevzele prvenstva in povsem izpodrinile čustvenčkov, dejanski razvoj bo rezultanta odločitev tehnoloških razvijalcev in oblikovalcev ter kulturnih dejavnikov (Konrad in dr. 2020: 231–232). Če čustvenčki mestoma dopolnjujejo besedilo, pa so nalepke samostojna »govorna dejanja«, portretirajo telesno govorico in obrazne ekspresije. Nalepke niso simbolne, ampak demonstrativne, so komunikacijsko neposrednejše, uporabnikom nudijo širši obseg načinov izražanja čustev, razpoloženj in dejanj (Konrad in dr. 2020: 222). Ob morebitnem nadaljnjem vztrajanju po »odpiranju« posameznikov se bo vzporedno krepila tudi komunikacijska optimizacija grafičnih ikon (tj. konvencionalizacija praks), torej nadaljnje razvijanje interpasivnih grafičnih ikon, ki razbremenjujejo uporabnike. Družbeno zapovedana »optimizacija čustev« se bo deloma prenesla na

5. Termin fatična komunikacija je uvedel antropolog Bronislaw Malinowski, z njim je opisal komunikacijske prakse, ki ne informirajo ali izmenjujejo kakšnih (novih) pomenljivih informacij, ampak izražajo socialnost in ohranjajo kanale komuniciranja »odprte« (Malinowski 1999: 303–304).

čustveno »optimizirano ikono«. Grafično eksplicitnejše ikone je hkrati mogoče interpretirati na manj ekspliciten način. Ob preobilici informacij, interakcij in dogajanja je namreč fatičnost skorajda obvezna preživetvena strategija, ki povratno »mehča« komunikacijsko eksplicitnost nalepk: marsikdaj se nalepke uporabljajo tudi zato, da se jih zares ne »prebere«. Povedna je izjava študentke, intervjuvanke v študiji (Tang in dr. 2021: 18), ki je raziskovala komunikacijske funkcije nalepk s perspektive uporabnika:

> *To je lepota nalepk! Ko nimaš ničesar za povedati, lahko uporabiš nalepke. Biti brez besed je nenavadno. Zdaj lahko brez truda zapolniš konverzacijsko vrzel z nalepko. Pri besednem izražanju moraš dobro premisliti, nihče pa te ne bo povprašal po natančnem pomenu nalepke* (ibid.).

Obstaja tudi znotrajskupinska in situacijska preferenčnost: nekatere posameznike razveseli, če zjutraj prek aplikacije WhatsApp ali Viber prejmejo »interpasivno« nalepko kave in lepih želja, druge razveseli šele fotografiran sončni vzhod z vrha Triglava, ki podobno kot »kava« sporoča »pomislil sem nate«. Prakse niso povsem regulirane, posledično v določeni praksi ne moremo samodejno prepoznati elementov interpasivnosti.

2.3.3 Algoritmi kot družbena dejstva: zakrita interpasivnost

Če smo do tu predstavili strategije, ko posameznik vloži dodatno delo, da se razbremeni uživanja, ob koncu izpostavljamo strategijo, pri kateri delo in intencionalnost posameznika načeloma umanjkata; gre za pogojno interpasivnost. Posamezniki namreč vse več odločitev in izbir delegirajo na algoritme, ki v obliki priporočil svetujejo ali odločajo, kako naj interpretiramo podatke, za kakšna dejanja naj se odločamo, predlagajo artikle ali optimalno potovalno pot (Mittelstadt in dr. 2016: 1). Interpasivnost se najčisteje izrazi v glagolu »googlati«, ki ne aludira le na korporacijo Google, temveč pomeni združevanje algoritemske storitve in same aktivnosti (Willson 2017: 139–140). Algoritmi kot tehnološka infrastruktura sooblikujejo naše razumevanje sveta, so performativni, ker povzročajo in usmerjajo potek dogodkov. Ne zmanjšujejo pristranosti, njihova vpisana vrednostna dimenzija celo krepi tradicionalne patologije in družbene neenakosti (Kitchin 2017: 18–19). Algoritmična kvantifikacija in upodatkovljenje posameznikovih digitalnih sledi na podlagi izračunavanja »za nazaj« kreira priporočila »za naprej«. Posameznike razvršča v statistične kategorije, ki signalizirajo kvantitativno zanesljivost, slednja odvrača posameznika od raziskovanja alternativnih rešitev. Algoritem *Google Autocomplete* zaključuje posameznikove iskalne poizvedbe, pomaga si na podlagi primerjave posameznikov z vsebino in posamezniki, ki jih statistično »vidi« kot podobne (Ananny 2016: 103). Kvantitativno izračunana relevantnost »zadetkov«, predlogov ali priporočil se navezuje na statistično pripadnost posameznika kategoriji. Algoritmična personalizacija se prek upodatkovljenja sicer »približa« posamezniku, toda kvantitativna logika računanja korelacij se osredotoča le na napovedovanje verjetnosti prihodnjih procesov in trendov. Korelacija ne pove, zakaj se nekaj dogaja, ampak le ugotavlja, da se nekaj dogaja (v populaciji) (Andrejevic 2014: 1679). Značilnosti in preference populacije se predstavljajo kot značilnosti in preference posameznika.

Čeprav gre za »tlačenje« posameznika v kategorijo, posamezniki algoritmična priporočila tudi cenijo. Algoritmi so »družbena dejstva« (Durkheim 1966), specifična prisila in omejitev, posamezniki pa v algoritmičnem kategoriziranju vendarle tudi »uživajo«, saj so razbremenjeni odločanja. Še več, ker so algoritmi kot družbena dejstva vsiljeni »od zunaj«, odpade potreba po posameznikovem proizvajanju vtisov delovanja. Artefaktna objektivnost algoritmov omogoča (samo) zaslepitev: ker algoritmi omejujejo posameznike, lahko posamezniki odgovornost za lastno nedelovanje pripišejo algoritmom. V algoritemskem omejevanju lahko uživajo, ker so razbremenjeni odgovornosti za lastno nedelovanje. V nedelovanje in v delegiranje odločitev so prisiljeni. Faze prelaganja/delegiranja sploh ni; moč odločanja in delovanja je »iztrgana« iz rok. Posamezniki lahko podaljšajo (samo)zaslepitev, da so nekoč uživali v opolnomočenosti odločanja. Artefaktnost in tehnološkost algoritmov kot »hladnih naprav« prispevata k »nevidnosti« interpasivnosti, ki je v primeru algoritmov toliko težje predmet posameznikove (samo)refleksije.

Prepričanje, po katerem se tehnologije kar zgodijo in nam vsilijo načine delovanja, lahko razumemo kot strategijo interpasivnosti. Posamezniki tehnologiji pripišejo ključno moč in so celo zainteresirano »slepi« za algoritme. Če se 61 % Norvežanov slabo ali sploh ne zaveda obstoja algoritmov (Gran in dr. :2020 13) in če je skorajda povsem neraziskano področje razumevanja algoritmov med svetovno populacijo (Hargittai in dr. 2020: 764–765), lahko ti podatki odražajo trenutno medijsko pismenost, a hkrati lahko kažejo tudi »strast do nevednosti« (Salecl 2020):

> *Različni mediji zdaj veliko pišejo o problemu nadzora, zato ne moremo govoriti, da ljudje s svojimi osebnimi podatki tako ravnajo zaradi pomanjkanja védenja, temveč z njimi tako ravnajo predvsem zaradi zanikanja tega védenja* (Salecl 2020: 176).

Govorimo lahko o razkoraku velikega podatkovja (angl. *big data divide*) med tistimi, ki »sortirajo«, in tistimi, ki »so sortirani« (Andrejevic 2014: 1683). »Biti sortiran« je sicer degradacija, toda »biti sortiran« je lahko za posameznike tudi specifičen »prihranek energije«, v čemer lahko celo uživajo.

Pastem tehnološkega determinizma (tj. kaj tehnologije počnejo z družbo) se potemtakem izognemo tako, da se usmerimo v (rabo) tehnologije kot refleksijo družbenih prioritet. Za potrebe kvalitativnega zgoščevanja v osrednjem besedilu (v poglavjih od 2.3.1 do vključno poglavja 2.3.3) predstavljenih in interpretiranih primerov na koncu predstavljamo shematiziran prikaz infrastrukture interpasivnosti. V tabeli izpostavljamo tipične strategije interpasivnosti, kot se večinsko udejanjajo v posameznih tehnološko oblikovanih okoljih. V zadnjih treh stolpcih so opredeljene ključne značilnosti posamezne strategije, kako se interpasivnost udejanja in razrešuje znotraj posamezne tehnološke infrastrukture.

Tabela: Infrastrukturne podlage interpasivnosti.

Komunikacijski kanal/infrastruktura	**Splet 1.0** • (elektronska pošta, blogi, klepetalnice) • emotikoni	**Splet 2.0** • (platforme družbenih medijev: Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, WhatsApp, Viber, YouTube) • čustvenčki/nalepke	**Algoritemski priporočilni sistemi** • (GoogleAutocomplete, PageRank, skupinsko filtriranje)
Dominantni nosilec informacije	Uporabniško generirano besedilo	Uporabniško generirana avdiovizualna vsebina	Digitalne sledi uporabnika
Prevladujoči tip odnosa uporabnika do delovanja	**Delovanje** • Uporabnik kot nosilec prakse • Refleksivnost prakse	**Delegiranje delovanja** • Uporabnik kot nosilec konvencionalizirane podobe prakse • Proizvajanje prakse • Performativnost prakse	**Odsotnost delovanja** • Upodatkovljenje uporabnika • Algoritmi kot družbeno-tehnična omejitev • Algoritmična personalizacija prakse
Prevladujoči tip razmerja do užitka	**Kreiranje videza užitka**	**Odsotnost užitka**	**Užitek odsotnosti**
Prevladujoča strategija interpasivnosti	Sintetična personalizacija	Uporabniško generirana interpasivnost	Algoritemska/ artefaktna interpasivnost
Prevladujoče ideološko prepričanje kot izhodišče interpasivnosti	Transparentnost uporabnika	Transparentnost prakse	Transparentnost podatkov/digitalnih sledi uporabnika

3 Zaključek: Interpasivnost kot kulturno-situacijski Plan B

Čeprav ne moremo »vtikati nos[u] v načine mišljenja drugih ljudi« (Geertz 1996: 94) in za vsako prakso enoznačno določiti temeljne komunikacijske namere, v prispevku vseeno izhajamo iz temeljne družbenosti in reguliranosti praks. Tako zožujemo horizont pogleda, torej kako gledamo na prakse in kaj vidimo v praksah. Skozi eksplikacijo sodobne kulture »močnega« posameznika smo interpasivne strategije poskusili *pojasnjevati* in hkrati v konkretnih primerih te iste prakse tudi *razumeti* kot specifično preživetveno strategijo posameznikov. Primere smo interpretirali kot brezšivno polje, v katerem objektivna prisila sodobne uživaške kulture in posameznikovo upravljanje s temi zahtevami koincidirata. Če Susanna Paasonen (2017) omreženo povezljivost (angl. *network connectivity*) razume kot infrastrukturo intimnosti, v omreženih povezavah pa vidi družbeno-tehnično možnost, ki modulira intimnost, smo sami v strategijah interpasivnosti videli družbenost tehnologije in tehnološkost (infrastrukturnost) prakseologije. Prakse opolnomočenosti in njene hrbtne, rezervne in situacijsko pogojene alternativne preživetvene strategije smo pojasnjevali in razumeli kot kulturno prakso, kot jo omogoča in določa tehnološka infrastruktura.

Tabelarno predstavljeni in posledično shematizirani primeri strategij interpasivnosti niso niti idealnotipski niti reprezentativni; ne gre za skrepenele strategije, ki jih lahko vnaprej pripišemo posameznikom. Namen članka je razširitev pogleda, skratka kaj kulturno pomenljivega še videti v rabi digitalnih tehnologij. Besedilo ni podprto s sistematičnimi empiričnimi evidencami in njegov namen ni kvantitativno statistično zgoščevanje, temveč kvalitativno poudarjanje in osvetljevanje praks; je poskus tipologizacije in interpretacije komunikacijskih praks skozi specifično teorijo, kjer prakse vidimo kot polje tehničnega in kulturnega, vstavljenega enega v drugega.

Čisto na koncu izpostavljamo še dvoje »pojasnil k uvodu«, za kateri sodimo, da ju je pri prihodnjem raziskovanju interpasivnosti treba upoštevati. Prvič, izpostavljamo individualni vidik: strategije interpasivnosti so namreč lahko izrazito vezane na posameznikovo upravljanje z vtisi. Velja izpostaviti, da se pri »dramatizaciji« lastnega dela »posamezniki pogosto soočijo z dilemo, ali naj se posvetijo izražanju ali delovanju. Ljudje, ki imajo čas in talent za dobro izvajanje neke naloge, zaradi tega morda nimajo časa ali talenta, da pokažejo, da to nalogo izvajajo dobro« (Goffman 2014: 44), zato se lahko v interpasivnost zatečejo prav z namenom, da se bodo še naprej lahko osredinjali na delovanje in torej še naprej – uživali. Na tej ravni so razlogi za interpasivnost torej drugačni. Drugič, pomembno je upoštevati kolektivno-generacijski vidik: percepcija interpasivnih praks je delno generacijsko pogojena. Če oseba v določeni praksi prepozna obrise interpasivnosti, to vselej več pove o njeni generacijski (družbeni) določenosti. Mlajše generacije v interaktivnih tehnologijah ne bodo nujno uzrle »skladišča« občasnih interpasivnih praks, saj so tudi njihova percepcija družbenosti ter razumevanje, prepoznavanje in kategorizacija praks drugačni. Družbena reguliranost prakse ni ahistorična, temveč se generacijsko in infrastrukturno (tehnološko) spreminja: semiotika »zabave« in »uživanja« je vselej specifična variacija, posledično so strategije interpasivnosti (kako se razbremeniti zabave in uživanja) generacijsko in situacijsko specifične. Predstavljeni primeri nisi enoznačni idealnotipski primeri, v katerih bi vselej lahko videli zametke interpasivnosti; ustrezneje jih je obravnavati kot potencialne, situacijske, »rezervne« scenarije.

SUMMARY

The article thematises and explains modern communication practices through the theoretical framework of interpassivity. Interpassivity is an established cultural phenomenon of delegating feelings from the individual to objects of material culture. The text problematises the communication practices of performing and delegating images of individual empowerment (enjoyment, participation, empathy) when individuals use a conventional image that performs and confirms their action, all while they could maintain a state of inactivity.

The text interprets modern interpassive strategies, which occasionally relieve individuals of heavily propagated practices of enjoyment, participation, interactivity, and empathetic communication. The neoliberal emphasis on individuals' choices and responsibilities for their own lives has created circumstances in which individuals find it increasingly difficult to attest to their empowerment, which is often delegated to a situationally coded and conventionalised image that counts as empowerment practice.

The postponement of action or the staging of images of enjoyment, empowerment and empathy does not mean a rejection of action and emancipation, but is largely a reflection of the individual's inability to always live and witness action and emancipation. Individuals are not always able to self-realise and act according to their images of empowerment. The privilege of being able to enjoy has evolved into a demand for enjoyment and, as a result, individuals put extra effort into portraying images of fulfilling that demand in order to relieve themselves of the burden that obligation intrinsically carries. Interpassive practices therefore mean an alternative confrontation with the demands of empowerment, enjoyment and empathy. Those become situationally and strategically activated by individuals when they are unable to enjoy or have fun, and when they do

not want or are unable to be empathic. Additional work is intentionally put in (producing user-generated content, which authenticates the images of social action) in order to absolve themselves of the demand for action. Individuals create conventional images of specific practices (enjoyment practice, entertainment practice) to rid themselves of the demands for enjoyment and entertainment. The semiotic material thus created indicates action practices, and individuals are able to maintain a state of inaction. Through interpassive strategies, individuals keep the integrity of self-realised individuals who live up to their own demands. The continual demand for the constant transparency of the individual creates a perpetually increasing pool of socially conventionalised and, consequently, communicatively successful examples of typical practice, which at the same time creates a parallel process of dispersing communication activities in which the individual can largely avoid taking any action.

The text initially outlines the theory of interpassivity and the wider social circumstances as direct accelerators of current versions of interpassivity and then sets out the strategies of interpassivity through modern digital technologies. By analysing and interpreting primary and secondary sources, the text thematises and defines interpassive strategies as reflected in the use of individual digital technologies. The use of technology indicates social priorities and values, namely, the use of technology as the infrastructure of sociability, also indicates strategies of interpassivity.

Empowerment practices are thus accompanied by their backup and situation-based alternative strategies of interpassivity. Specific strategies have been defined as manifestations and realisations of the cultural practice of interpassivity, as facilitated and determined by the existing technological infrastructure.

Interpassivity as a basic theoretical and thematic research framework enables the analysis and interpretation of dominant communication practices in individual types of digital technologies. In the presented examples of communication practices (social media platforms, mobile phones, algorithmic recommendation systems), we identify the interpassive strategies as the individual's strategy to satisfy the need to catch up and deliver images of empowerment. The starting point of interpassivity is the optimised transparency and visibility of individuals within digital technologies. The public display and resulting delegation are enabled by the semiotic conventionalisation of practices that reaffirm empowerment practices and allow individuals to maintain inactive. The architecture of digital technologies and the increasingly efficient possibilities of producing user-generated content create circumstances in which individuals do additional work (publication of photography) to relieve themselves of action and enjoyment. The social demands for communicating emotions found their proper echo in the interpassive strategies of delegating such emotions to graphic icons. The last (largely conditional and less visible) interpassive strategy is identified in the algorithmic recommendation systems. Algorithms as an artefact of socio-technical coercion and social fact are an objective limitation for individual action, the perception of algorithms as »cold devices« therefore allows for specific (self)deception: because algorithms limit individuals, they can attribute the responsibility for their inaction to these algorithms.

The presented strategies of interpassivity are distinctly situational, individual and also generationally conditioned, which means we cannot and should not always recognise the outlines of interpassivity.

Zahvala

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Katja Simončič

BANALNOST DRUŽBENE ŠKODE: PRIMER HITRE MODE

IZVLEČEK

Večina potrošnikov generacije Z navaja, da so jim etična in trajnostna vprašanja pri nakupovanju oblačil pomembna, vendar pa strma rast trga hitre mode kaže, da pri nakupu oblačil o njih v veliki meri še vedno ne razmišljajo. Prispevek se osredotoča na koncept banalnosti zla in pojem nemišljenja Hannah Arendt. Jedro prispevka je primerjalna analiza pogojev, ki so prispevali k nemišljenju običajnih Nemcev in njihovemu posledičnemu sodelovanju v nacističnih grozodejstvih, ter pogojev za nemišljenje potrošnikov hitre mode. Poleg boljšega razumevanja problematike nemišljenja pri potrošnikih je namen prispevka predvsem problematizacija pojava hitre mode. Analiza pokaže na škodljivost globalne kapitalistične ekonomije, ki nemišljenje spodbuja, ter na nujnost kritičnega mišljenja in posledičnega preizpraševanja normalnosti pojavov, kot je hitra moda.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: družbena škoda, hitra moda, banalnost zla, nemišljenje, Hannah Arendt

The Banality of Social Harm: The Case of Fast Fashion

ABSTRACT

While the majority of Generation Z consumers claim that ethical and sustainable issues are important to them, the rapid growth of the fast-fashion market shows that such issues are still largely neglected in practice. The paper focuses on Hannah Arendt's concepts of the banality of evil and the failure to think. A comparative analysis is conducted of the conditions that contributed to the non-thinking of ordinary Germans and their subsequent participation in the Nazi atrocities, and the conditions for the non-thinking of fast-fashion consumers. Aside from gaining *a better understanding of the non-thinking of fashion consumers, this paper's primary purpose is to problematise the phenomenon of fast fashion. The analysis points to the harmful nature of the global capitalist economy, which encourages non-thinking, and to the need for critical thinking and the consequent questioning of the normality of phenomena like fast fashion.*

KEY WORDS: social harm, fast fashion, banality of evil, non-thinking, Hannah Arendt

1 Uvod[1]

Pred približno 100.000 leti, ko so se ljudje začeli zakrivati z oblačili, pa vse do industrijske revolucije v 19. stoletju je imela večina ljudi v lasti le nekaj kosov trajnostno narejenih oblačil (Brooks 2015). Zaradi pojava hitre mode, za katero so značilni kratki časi proizvodnje in distribucije, poudarek pa je na modnosti oblačil (Cachon in Swinney 2011), se oblačila od devetdesetih let 20. stoletja naprej proizvajajo in kupujejo v večjem obsegu kot kdajkoli v zgodovini. Povprečen posameznik naj bi v zadnjih nekaj letih v ZDA kupil petkrat več oblačil kot leta 1980 (Cline 2014). Nizka cena oblačil znamk hitre mode in poceni materiali kupcu sporočajo, da gre za potrošno blago za nekajkratno uporabo, zato povprečen potrošnik kos oblačila zavrže, ko ga sedemkrat obleče (Remy in dr. 2016).

Množična proizvodnja oblačil je predvsem v državah globalnega juga (Martin 2013), v katerih zaradi boja za delovna mesta (Fashion United b. d.) ter vse večjih zahtev po produktivnosti (Laine 2015) delovni in okoljski standardi ostajajo nizki, vir izredne družbene škode.

Večji delež odgovornosti nedvomno nosijo velike modne znamke, ki ne poskrbijo za spoštovanje pravic delavcev v celotni dobavni verigi, ter vlade držav, ki izkoriščanje delavcev in prodajo izdelkov, nastalih na takšen način, dopuščajo. Ključno vlogo za družbeno škodo, ki nastaja v industriji hitre mode, pa nedvomno igra sama narava globalne kapitalistične ekonomije, ki vzpostavlja pogoje za povzročanje družbene škode v procesih proizvodnje in potrošnje.[2]

1. Prispevek je nastal v okviru dela na Inštitutu za kriminologijo pri Pravni fakulteti v Ljubljani v kontekstu projektov Preventivna (ne)pravičnost: Preventivno preprečevanje kriminalitete in družbene škode, Inštitut za kriminologijo pri Pravni fakulteti v Ljubljani za ARRS (2020-2023) in Trans-making: Umetnost/kultura/ekonomija za demokratizacijo družbe (Marie Sklodowska Curie Action, 2017–2021).

2. Haug in Busch (2016) na seznam odgovornih za nastanek škode v industriji hitre mode uvrščata tudi oblikovalce, oglaševalce, proizvajalce, dobavitelje in potrošnike.

Pričujoči prispevek se ob nenasprotovanju dejstvu, da so prav zgoraj navedeni akterji odgovorni za izkoriščanje in družbeno škodo zaradi hitre mode, osredotoča na potrošnika hitre mode. Danes devet izmed desetih pripadnikov generacije Z ob nakupu oblačil zagovarja stališče, da so modne znamke dolžne nagovarjati tako okoljska kot družbena vprašanja (Cone b. d.), dejstvo pa je, da trg hitre mode še vedno raste (Gilliland 2019). Znamke, kot sta na primer Asos in Boohoo, ki nimajo fizičnih trgovin, so tudi v času pandemije covida-19 beležile velike dobičke (Monroe 2021). Ob tem se odpira vprašanje, zakaj v praksi pri nakupovanju v trgovinah z oblačili potrošnik pogosto še vedno ne razmišlja o vprašanjih etike in trajnosti.

V zasledovanju boljšega razumevanja problematike nemišljenja potrošnikov se prispevek osredotoča na koncept banalnosti zla in pojem nemišljenja, kot ju je razvila Hannah Arendt (1964; 1971; 1978; 2007). Spremljanje sojenja vojnemu zločincu Ottu Adolfu Eichmannu v Jeruzalemu leta 1962 jo je pripeljalo do zaključka, da so mnogi nemški državljani v času nacizma implementirali politiko vodstvenih kadrov, brez izrecnega namena, da bi izvršili kazniva dejanja. Arendt je tedaj postavila tezo, da ljudje, ki so zagrešili zločine v tem totalitarnem sistemu, niso bili nujno pošasti ali fanatiki, temveč prej običajni ljudje, ki so zgolj opravljali svoje naloge v novovzpostavljenem birokratskem stroju. Vsak posameznik je prispeval le majhen delček k celotni operaciji, ki je postala del nove normalnosti, zaradi česar se je posameznikov občutek odgovornosti do posledic izgubil. Ko nov način delovanja države in birokratskega aparata postane običajen, tudi grozote postanejo običajne, utečeni normalnosti pa se je težko zoperstaviti.

V prispevku iščemo odgovor na raziskovalno vprašanje, katere vzporednice je moč potegniti med pogoji, ki so prispevali k nemišljenju običajnih Nemcev in njihovemu posledičnemu sodelovanju v nacističnih grozodejstvih v času nacizma, ter pogoji, ki k nemišljenju spodbujajo sodobne potrošnike hitre mode. Dalje nas je zanimalo, na kakšen način bi upor proti nemišljenju, pojavu, ki ga prispevek problematizira, pomagal pri zmanjšanju družbene škode zaradi hitre mode.

Razlog za primerjavo izbranih pojavov, ki na prvi pogled nimata mnogo skupnega, v veliki meri izvira tudi iz želje po problematizaciji družbeno škodljivih praks sodobne družbe. Medtem ko je holokavst upravičeno sprejet kot univerzalno zlo, pa potrošništvo, ki je vir izredne škode za delavce, okolje in nenazadnje tudi potrošnike same, v veliki meri sprejemamo kot normalno in nespremenljivo dejstvo sodobne družbe. Cilj te tako radikalne primerjave je torej tudi v opozarjanju na škodljivost potrošniških praks sodobne družbe, kot je hitra moda, katere številne brezimne žrtve so delavci, ki v suženjskih razmerah v potilnicah globalnega juga sebi in svojim bližnjim poskušajo zagotoviti preživetje. Mednarodna organizacija dela (International Labour Organization 2002) poroča, da vsako leto na globalni ravni zaradi posledic bolezni ali nesreč na delovnem mestu umre dva milijona delavcev, pri čemer jih večji del izvira iz držav globalnega juga. Te žrtve niso deležne enake pozornosti medijev in kriminologov ter posledično simpatije javnosti kot žrtve kaznivih dejanj, storjenih z naklepom, kot so umor, rop in posilstvo, četudi je njihova usoda pogosto grozovita. Pri teh žrtvah tudi ni mogoče s prstom pokazati na enega očitnega krivca, saj je odgovornost razpršena med številne akterje, ki opravljajo določene naloge v verigi hitre mode. Gre za širši problem v okviru kriminološke vede, ki osrednjo pozornost v veliki meri še vedno namenja ravnanjem, ki jih kot kazniva določa trenutna oblast (Hillyard in Tombs 2004), pojavom, kot so revščina, okoljska škoda in ekonomsko izkoriščanje, pa se posveča v manjši meri (Muncie 2000).

Metodološki pristop članka temelji na primerjalni analizi pogojev, ki so pripomogli k temu, da so običajni državljani prispevali k zlu v času holokavsta, in pogojev, ki prispevajo k temu, da sodobni potrošniki industrije hitre mode sodelujejo pri povzročanju škode, do katere prihaja zaradi hitre mode. Ključno raziskovalno orodje je torej primerjalna metoda (Collier 1993), ki se nanaša na metodološka vprašanja pri sistematični analizi manjšega števila primerov. Na tem mestu je nujna tudi opomba, da cilj prispevka ni vzporejanje škodljivosti ali človeškega trpljenja, ki nikakor ni primerljivo, temveč zgolj vzporejanje pogojev, ki običajnemu posamezniku omogočijo, da o posledicah svojih dejanj ne razmišlja.

Za primerjavo sta ključna koncept banalnosti zla, iz katerega je pri ravnanju potrošnikov mogoče izpeljati koncept »banalnosti« družbene škode in pojem nemišljenja, kot ju razume Hannah Arendt. Pri analizi se naslanjam na teoretična izhodišča avtorjev, ki se ukvarjajo s teorijami konformizma (Arendt 2007, 1951; Bauman 2013; Milgram 1963; Zimbardo 1995), pri čemer se osredotočam predvsem na iztočnice, ki jih poda Hannah Arendt v delih *Eichmann v Jeruzalemu* (2007), *Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951) in *The Life of the Mind* (1978), to pa povežem s kriminološkim pogledom na hitro modo (Simončič 2019b).

Uvodu (1) sledi predstavitev konceptov banalnosti zla in nemišljenja ter pojava hitre mode (2). V tretjem poglavju so analizirani dejavniki, ki prispevajo k nemišljenju potrošnikov hitre mode, pri čemer se opiram na pogoje, ki so v skladu s tezo Hannah Arendt prispevali k nemišljenju številnih običajnih Nemcev v nacistični Nemčiji (3). V sklepnem delu sledi kritični razmislek o napisanem. (4).

2 Banalnost zla in hitra moda

2.1 Banalnost zla

Poskus razumevanja holokavsta in nemške krivde so v svojih delih podajali številni avtorji, med drugim Levi (1986), Adorno (1950) in Jaspers (1947), poskus razumevanja razlogov za sodelovanje velikega števila Nemcev v nacističnih grozodejstvih pa tudi nekateri sodobnejši avtorji, kot sta Goldhagen (1997) in Kelman (2017). S tematiko se je poglobljeno ukvarjala Hannah Arendt, filozofinja in politična teoretičarka, ki se je osredotočila na problematiko nemišljenja številnih običajnih Nemcev, ki so v izvrševanju nacističnih zločinov sodelovali, ker so zaupali zakonom države in delovali v okviru sistema, ne da bi o njem kritično razmišljali. Zametke teze, ki jih Arendt postavi v zvezi s sojenjem Eichmannu (1962), je moč prepoznati tudi v delu *Origins of totalitarianism* (sl. *Izvori totalitarizma*) (1951), sorodne ideje pa tudi v njenih kasnejših delih, na primer v *Personal responsibility under dictatorship* (1964), *Thinking and moral considerations* (1971) in *The Life of the Mind* (1978).

V *Izvorih totalitarizma* Arendt ugotavlja, da so množična gibanja zgrajena na množici izoliranih »nevtralnih, politično neopredeljenih posameznikov, ki se nikoli ne pridružijo nobeni politični stranki in nikoli ne gredo na volitve« (1951: 68). Teh posameznikov ne motivira pridobitev materialnih dobrin, temveč prej pobeg iz realnosti. Dalje avtorica navaja, da totalitarizem povsod, kjer pridobi popoln nadzor, zamenja propagando z indoktrinacijo in z nasiljem uresničuje svoje ideološke doktrine. Med orodji doseganja popolne nadvlade v nacistični Nemčiji so bila koncentracijska taborišča, pri čemer je bil skupni cilj vseh taborišč obravnavanje množice zaprtih posameznikov, kot da ne obstajajo več (Arendt 1951).

Konstitutivni element koncepta banalnosti zla, ki ga je med sojenjem pri Eichmannu kot »predstavniku« nacistov in raziskovanjem drugih storilcev prepoznala Arendt, je odsotnost mišljenja. Banalnost zla je torej v tem, ugotavlja Arendt (1962), da do njega lahko pripelje nemišljenje (angl. *failure to think*). Množice so kot nerazmišljujoče označevali že številni veliki filozofi pred Hannah Arendt, med drugim Platon (1963), Kant (1963) in Nietzsche (1909). Vidik avtoričine teze, ki se je razlikoval od idej njenih predhodnikov, je vzročna povezava med množičnim nemišljenjem in nastankom zla (Formosa 2016). Arendt razlikuje med pojmoma vsakdanje (angl. *commonplace*) in banalno ter pojasni, da so zadeve lahko banalne, četudi niso pogoste. Banalnost zla torej nikakor ne pomeni, da je zlo trivialno in da se skriva v vsakem od nas, prav tako pa nemišljenja ne enači s pomanjkanjem inteligence (1978: 164). Arendt (1978: 164) poudarja, da je zlo površinsko, da nima globine, zato je o njem tako težko razmišljati, saj razmišljanje samo po sebi pomeni poglabljanje. To razmišljanje, ki je potrebno, če naj se izognemo zlu, naj bo kritično ter, kot navaja Arendt, usmerjeno v pomen in razumevanje, ne pa v iskanje preverljive resnice. Arendt sledi tudi sokratični misli, pri čemer poudarja predvsem pomen samega procesa razmišljanja in dialoga kot sredstva za preprečevanje zla (1978: 180).

S problematiko banalnosti zla so se ukvarjali tudi številni drugi avtorji. Milgram (1963) je znan predvsem po eksperimentu, v katerem je leta 1961 dokazal, da so običajni posamezniki, postavljeni v specifično situacijo, pripravljeni izpolnjevati naloge v nasprotju s svojo vestjo, kadar jim to veli avtoriteta. Zimbardo (1995), ki se je prav tako ukvarjal s situacionizmom (Hanson in Yosifon 2006), je po drugi strani zagovarjal tezo, da posamezniki že zgolj v situaciji, v kateri so jim predlagane začrtane poti ravnanja, tem slepo sledijo, ne da bi jim to velela avtoritativna figura. Bauman (2013) dalje ugotavlja, da sta bili v času vzpona nacizma v Nemčiji krepitev instrumentalne racionalnosti in birokratska organizacija delovanja države tista dejavnika, zaradi katerih se je oblikovala nadomestna morala dolžnosti in discipline ter zabrisala vzročna zveza med dejanji storilcev in trpljenjem žrtev, kar je omogočilo povzročanje zla.

Arendt (2007) navaja naslednje pogoje, ki privedejo do nemišljenja: (1) pravni red, ki zločin oziroma družbeno škodo dovoljuje, (2) zaupanje avtoriteti in podvrženost kontekstu, (3) običajni ljudje kot storilci in (4) posameznik kot kolesce v sistemu.

Prvi dejavnik (1), ki je botroval nemišljenju posameznikov v nacistični Nemčiji, je bila sprememba pravnega reda, ki je dovoljevala oziroma celo zahtevala, da posameznik ravna v nasprotju z dotlej ustaljenimi moralnimi maksimami običajnih ljudi (Arendt 2007: 177). Eichmann je na sojenju večkrat poskušal razložiti, da Hitlerjev ukaz ni potreboval pisne oblike, saj je že njegova izgovorjena beseda pomenila osnovni »zakon« države (Arendt 2007: 174). »Ne ubijaj!« je kar naenkrat postalo »Ubijaj!«. V organizacijski ideologiji je žrtvovanje lastnih interesov in identitete predstavljeno kot moralna vrlina (Bauman 2006), spoštovanje te moralne vrline pa kot »čast funkcionarja«, ki izvira iz njegove sposobnosti za vestno izvajanje ukaza nadrejenih, kot da bi bil ukaz v skladu z njegovim lastnim prepričanjem (Gerth in Mills 2014).

Naslednji element nemišljenja, ki ga izpostavi Arendt, je zaupanje avtoriteti bolj kot lastni presoji (2). Arendt opaža, da so bili zgolj redki posamezniki dovolj »arogantni», da so zaupali lastni presoji in niso klonili novim zakonom, ki so bili očitno v nasprotju z njihovimi prepričanji (Arendt 2007: 338). Eichmann se je zavedal, da bi nekatere moralno oporečne naloge lahko odklonil in da bi mu v tem primeru grozila zgolj disciplinska kazen, vendar pa je bilo zanj zoperstavljanje avtoriteti, ki ji je zaupal bolj kot samemu sebi, prav tako moralno oporečno. Četudi je imel zaradi njene nasilnosti in krvavosti o »dokončni rešitvi«[3] pomisleke, pa je po Wannseejski konferenci januarja 1942, na kateri so se državni podsekretarji sestali, da bi uskladili svoja prizadevanja »dokončni rešitvi«, vsa njegova negotovost izginila. »Tukaj, na tej konferenci so govorili najvidnejši ljudje, papeži tretjega rajha.« Eichmann je videl, da se celo »elita dobre stare javne uprave puli in bori za čast vodilnega položaja v teh ‚krvavih' zadevah«: »V tistem trenutku sem se sam sebi zdel kot kak Poncij Pilat, saj sem se čutil prostega vsake krivde« (Arendt 2007: 137).

Dalje (3) je v zvezi z idejo nemišljenja povezano ključno spoznanje Hannah Arendt, da Adolf Eichmann ni bil pošast z izdelanim morilskim načrtom, katerega bi se veselil udejanjiti, temveč zgolj – običajen človek (Arendt 2007: 71). Bil je »navaden«. Avtorica razloži:

> *Težava pri Eichmannu je bila prav v tem, da mu je bilo podobnih toliko ljudi in da ti niso bili niti perverzni niti sadistični, da so bili, in so še vedno, strašansko in zastrašujoče normalni. Z vidika naših pravnih institucij in meril presoje je bila takšna normalnost bolj grozljiva kot vsa grozodejstva skupaj, saj je pomenila /…/, da ta novi tip zločinca, ki je v bistvu hostis generis humani, svoje zločine opravi v okoliščinah, v katerih praktično ne more vedeti ali slutiti, da dela kaj narobe* (Arendt 2007: 318).

Na tem mestu je smiselna opomba, da številni avtorji (Allinson 2011; Lipstadt 2011; Stangneth 2015) zagovarjajo stališče, da je bila Arendt zavedena, saj jo je Eichmann uspel prepričati, da je zgolj običajen posameznik, ki so ga k izvrševanju grozot spodbudili dejavniki iz okolja. Allinson (2011: 296) navaja: »Zlo ni nikoli banalno. Hannah Arendt je prevzela predstava, ne pa resničnost. Eichmann je bil zloben genij, ne pa dolgočasen birokrat.« Ne glede na to, da resnična narava Eichmannovega značaja ostaja uganka, pa teza Arendt o tem, da do zla oziroma škodljivih posledic ne pripelje vedno zgolj naklepno ravnanje, temveč pogosto zgolj nemišljenje, kljub temu velja. Da so bili številni izvajalci genocida povečini normalni ljudje, ugotavlja tudi Bauman (2006: 233): »Vedli so se zelo podobno, kot se vedemo vsi. Imeli so žene, ki so jih ljubili, otroke, ki so jih razvajali, prijatelje, ki so jim pomagali in jih v stiski tolažili.« Kren in Rappoport (1994) dalje navajata, da bi po konvencionalnih kliničnih merilih zgolj 10 odstotkov esesovcev lahko uvrstili med »nenormalne«. Četudi je bil Eichman morda, v nasprotju s prepričanjem Hannah Arendt, »zločinec starega kova«, pa to zagotovo niso bili vsi drugi Nemci, ki so sodelovali v nacističnem morilskem stroju.

3. Dokončna rešitev judovskega vprašanja je bil evfemizem, ki so ga uporabljali nacisti za svoj načrt iztrebljanja Judov med drugo svetovno vojno (Holocaust Encyclopedia b. d.).

Zadnji (4) element nemišljenja predstavlja situacija, ko se posameznik počuti, kot da je zgolj kolesce v sistemu. Običajno namreč postane tudi delo, ki se ga človek navadi in ga opravlja znotraj institucij, ki jih država na novo vzpostavi kot legitimne in legalne – četudi so to totalitarne institucije, vzpostavljene za izvedbo genocida. Ne glede na grozovite posledice, do katerih je njegovo delo pripeljalo, so Eichmanna veliko bolj kot moralne dileme mučila logistična vprašanja, saj je njegov urad organiziral transportna sredstva v geta in koncentracijska taborišča. Arendt ugotavlja (2007: 180):

> */T/ežave pri usklajevanju odhodov in prihodov, neskončne skrbi glede pridobivanja zadostnega števila železniških kompozicij od železniške uprave in ministrstva za promet, glede določanja voznih redov in preusmerjanja vlakov v centre z zadostno »absorbcijsko« zmogljivostjo, glede zadostnega števila Judov, ki so bili pravočasno na voljo, tako da vlaki ne bi šli »v nič« /…/ – vse to je postalo rutina /…/.*

V zapletenem birokratskem sistemu posameznik ne razmišlja o končni posledici, temveč zgolj prida svoj prispevek, s čimer se razbremeni odgovornosti in obenem človeškosti (Arendt 2007: 319).

2.2 Hitra moda

Adorno in Horkheimer (2006) sta, izhajajoč iz Marxove teorije odtujenosti delavcev, v eseju Kulturna industrija: razsvetljenstvo kot množična prevara že leta 1944 zavzela stališče, da so zahteve delodajalcev po podrejenih delavcih ustvarile vzporedno potrebo po obvladanih, pasivnih potrošnikih. Avtorja sta kritična do sodobne kulturne industrije, tj. proizvodov in različnih oblik lahkotne zabave, narejenih za zadovoljevanje želja potrošnikov, ki deluje kot »kruha in iger« za množice ter dejansko disciplinira in nadzira posameznike (Horkheimer in Adorno 2006: 56). Marcuse (1991: 24) navaja uspešnost potrošniških družb, ki s pomočjo marketinga in medijev državljane prepričajo, da potrebujejo brezmejno količino potrošniških dobrin, zadovoljevanje teh umetno ustvarjenih potreb pa vodi v družbeno konformnost. Podobno ugotavlja Galbraith (1998), da prav proizvodnja ustvarja praznino, ki naj bi jo s svojimi produkti zapolnjevala.

Za sodobno potrošništvo je značilno vznikanje vedno novih želja, za katere se zdi, da niso nikoli potešene, čemur se posameznik privadi in je tako vedno nezadovoljen s tem, kar ima, in hrepeni po tem, česar nima (Campbell 1983: 282). Nakup cenenega kosa oblačila je reprezentativen primer lahkotne potrošniške zabave – številnim posameznikom, ki živijo in delajo v prekarnih razmerah, predstavlja obliko pobega in vsaj kratkotrajnega izboljšanja počutja. Količina proizvedenih oblačil in hitrost, s katero se na trgovskih policah pojavljajo novi modni kosi, se skladata z Viriliovo (2010) tezo o pospeševanju družbenih procesov (proizvodnje, potrošnje in komunikacije) v sodobni družbi, pri čemer avtor takojšnjost (angl. *instanteneity*), ki se jo zasleduje danes, označi za nečloveško.

Množična proizvodnja in potrošnja oblačil sta vir izredne družbene škode, ki se kaže predvsem kot okoljska škoda, škoda, ki jo občutijo delavci v oblačilni industriji (Hearson 2009) in potrošniki. Nizko plačilo za delo, zatiranje sindikalnega združevanja, diskriminacija žensk, dolgi delavniki in nevarne delovne razmere so del njihovega vsakdana (Nova 2012).[4] Nong, šivilja za znamko Victoria's secret, ena izmed 45–55 milijonov žensk, ki garajo v oblačilni industriji, je raziskovalcem Oxfama na primer zaupala, da si ne upa imeti otrok, saj jih ne bi mogla nahraniti (Raworth 2004). Modna industrija je tudi eden največjih industrijskih onesnaževalcev na globalni ravni (Pereira in dr. 2021), pri čemer škoda nastaja tako med proizvodnjo, predelavo in obdelavo vlaken, v procesu šivanja (Roos in dr. 2015: 16) kot tudi v fazi distribucije, maloprodaje in uporabe ter v fazi zavrženja oblačil (Muthu 2014: 111). Posledice potrošništva dejansko občutijo vsi Zemljani, ki jih oglaševalci na vsakem koraku spodbujajo k trošenju. Potrošništvo namreč deluje kot vzvod konformističnega vedenja (Kanduč 2003): posameznik namesto vloge državljana v prvi vrsti zavzame vlogo potrošnika, zaposlenega z zadovoljevanjem neskončnega vrelca vedno novih želja.

Med deset najopaznejših potrošniških trendov leta 2019 se uvršča tudi t. i. etični potrošnik, ki pri nakupovanju želi sprejemati odgovorne odločitve o tem, kakšne proizvode kupuje, obenem pa ga zanimajo rešitve za blaženje negativnih posledic potrošništva (Shaw in Tomolillo 2004). Ob tem je zaskrbljujoča informacija, da je bila med letoma 2016 in 2019 rast trga hitre mode kar 21-odstotna (Gilliland 2019), kar je razvidno tudi iz pojava novih znamk hitre mode, kot sta Misguided, ki na mesec ponudi 1000 novih kosov oblačil (Coresight Research 2017), in ASOS, v kateri lahko kupci vsak teden izbirajo med 7000 novimi kosi oblačil (Monroe 2021). Odpira se vprašanje razkoraka med tem, kaj potrošniki navajajo, da dojemajo kot pomembno, in njihovimi dejanskimi potrošniškimi navadami. Povprečni posameznik, ki danes kupuje več oblačil kot kdajkoli (Pierre-Louis 2019), v praksi namreč očitno ni pripravljen plačati več, da proces proizvodnje ne bi škodoval delavcem in okolju (Albouy in Adesida 2018).

4. Več o družbeno škodljivih posledicah hitre mode glej Simončič (2019b).

3 Analiza dejavnikov, ki prispevajo k nemišljenju potrošnikov

Koncept banalnosti zla razkrije problematiko hitre mode v novi luči. Razumevanje pogojev, ki so prispevali k temu, da so v času nacistične Nemčije številni običajni Nemci brez razmisleka o posledicah svojih dejanj sodelovali v nacističnih grozodejstvih, pomaga razumeti pogoje, ki prispevajo k temu, da se sodobni potrošnik nekritično udejstvuje v potrošniških praksah, ki imajo izredno škodljive posledice za delavce in okolje. V nadaljevanju so pogoji, ugodni za nastanek nemišljenja, tj. (1) pravni red, ki zločin oziroma družbeno škodo dovoljuje, (2) zaupanje avtoriteti in podvrženost kontekstu, (3) običajni ljudje kot storilci ter (4) posameznik kot kolesce v sistemu, ki jih navaja Arendt (2007: 330), izpeljani na primeru potrošnika hitre mode.

3.1 Pravni red, ki družbeno škodo dovoljuje

Med na novo vzpostavljenim pravnim redom nacistične Nemčije, ki je legaliziral prej prepovedano, ter pravnimi ureditvami v državah proizvodnje oblačil, ki delavcev ne zaščitijo v zadostni meri, in uradnimi organi teh držav, ki kršitev ne sankcionirajo, je moč potegniti vzporednico. V obeh primerih namreč država sprejema takšne zakone, ki povzročanje škode dopuščajo.

Proizvodnja oblačil je regulirana z zakoni nacionalne države, v kateri poteka, vendar pa so te določbe pogosto neupoštevane, države pa jih niso pripravljene ali zmožne uveljavljati (Hobbes b. d.). Vlade držav proizvajalk se bojijo, da bi vzpostavitev mehanizmov za zaščito delavcev in okolja pomenila preselitev proizvodnje modnih znamk v države, kjer nizke standarde ohranjajo. Dalje, pravice delavcev in nujnost zaščite okolja urejajo mednarodni instrumenti in gospodarski kodeksi ravnanja, vendar pa so tako prvi kot drugi nezavezujoči. Mednarodna organizacija dela (MOD), ki postavlja temelje mednarodnih delovnih standardov, je na primer sprejela osem temeljnih konvencij, ki zagotavljajo svobodo združevanja, se zavzemajo za odpravo otroškega dela, odpravo diskriminacije na delovnem mestu ipd., nima pa vzpostavljenega mehanizma, na podlagi katerega bi spoštovanje zavez od držav članic lahko tudi zahtevala (International Labour Office 2014). Kodekse ravnanja, ki so se pojavili v devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja in vsebujejo zaveze podjetja k družbeno odgovornemu ravnanju v celotni dobavni verigi, ima danes večina modnih znamk (Jenkins 2001). Problematična je njihova nezavezujoča narava, saj podjetjem omogoča, da se z njimi ponašajo in tako privabijo kupce, ki jim je etično poslovanje vse bolj pomembno (McPherson 2019), nihče pa nad njimi ne izvaja sistematičnega nadzora glede dejanskega uresničevanja teh zavez.

Zaradi zasledovanja načinov za izboljšanje konkurenčnosti, delovne učinkovitosti in odzivnosti na zahteve trga modnih znamk nastaja izredna škoda za delavce v državah globalnega juga in za okolje, v katerem živijo (Hung Lau in Zhang 2006). Vodstveni kadri v korporacijah, ki oblačila proizvajajo, se lahko docela legalno odločijo, da bodo oblačila proizvajali v državah, v katerih so delavci manj zaščiteni, delo pa preložili na »mega dobavitelje«, ki proizvodnjo porazdelijo med tisočimi tovarnami (Hobbes b. d.). Ko ti dobavitelji kršijo kodekse, ker se znajdejo pod hudimi pritiski, da pravočasno izpolnijo naročila (Hearson 2009), naročniki dvignejo roke in odgovornost prevalijo nanje.

Dejstvo, da je izkoriščanje neustreznih delovnih razmer v državah proizvodnje v sodobni družbi še vedno sprejeto kot del običajnega poslovanja, v očeh potrošnika legitimira obstoječi sistem delovanja hitre mode. Poslovnež, ki je sposoben delničarjem na tak ali drugačen način zagotoviti čim večji dobiček, bo v družbi sprejet kot spoštovanja vreden posameznik, ne pa kot delinkvent. Raziskave kažejo, da naj bi danes pri odločanju o naložbah več kot 80 % investitorjev pretehtalo tudi družbene in okoljske učinke posla, ki ga sklepajo (McPherson 2019), kar na prvi pogled kaže pozitiven korak k bolj družbeno odgovornemu poslovanju. V okviru hitre mode pa se je smiselno vprašati, kako iskrene so lahko etične namere znotraj modela poslovanja, utemeljenega na načrtni zastarelosti, ki posameznike neprestano spodbuja k novim nakupom (Ming Law in dr. 2004).

3.2 Zaupanje avtoriteti in podvrženost kontekstu

Vodstvene kadre v totalitarističnem sistemu je danes zamenjal »veliki Lastnik« (Mazzini 2016), tj. velika korporacija, ki z močjo kapitala preko zvitih marketinških strategij javno mnenje oblikuje sebi v prid. Ta avtoriteto črpa iz bogastva,[5] ki mu kupi zaveznike v politiki, s katerimi korporacije ob pomoči oglaševalcev ustvarjajo in prodajajo zgodbo sebi v prid, in sicer da je potrošnja kot eden izmed glavnih virov gospodarske rasti nujna in koristna v čim večji meri (Ross 2019).

Ob tem, da potrošnjo spodbujajo najmočnejši akterji na globalni ravni, so vzorniki mladih tudi zvezdniki, ki po eni strani nastopajo kot prepoznavni obraz kampanj pomoči nemočnim, se borijo za ohranitev čiste vode, pravic žensk in globalno pismenost, ob večerih pa se sprehajajo po rdeči preprogi, na kateri se vse vrti okoli mode. Še posebej velik vpliv na javnost imajo modni blogerji in

5. Modno podjetje Inditex (v okviru katerega delujejo znamke ZARA, Bershka, Resto, Pull&Bear, Massimo Dutti, Stradivarius, Oysho, Zara Home in Uterque) je na primer vredno več kot 106 milijard dolarjev, kar je celo več kot Facebook, ki je vreden 70,3 milijarde dolarjev (Swant 2020).

vplivneži, ki na družbenih omrežjih – v zameno za zajetne vsote – oglašujejo modne znamke. Ta posebno pretkani način oglaševanja, ki ne deluje kot klasično oglaševanje, doseže mlade na vseh družbenih omrežjih, pri tem pa kaže vedenje oseb, katerih lastnosti in sposobnosti mladi spoštujejo ter bi jih radi imeli tudi sami, zato se v skladu s teorijo socialnega učenja naučijo to vedenje posnemati (Bandura 1976). Na moč vplivnežev kaže podatek, da je podjetje Snapchat na borzi čez noč izgubilo 1,3 milijarde dolarjev, ko je mlada zvezdnica resničnostnih šovov Kylie Jenner tvitnila, da aplikacije Snapchat ne uporablja več (Yurieff 2018).

Na tem mestu velja omeniti tudi teorije o moči avtoritete Stanleyja Milgrama. Milgramov eksperiment (1963) je na primer pokazal, da so običajni posamezniki, ki so se znašli v neki specifični situaciji, pripravljeni delovati, kot jim veli avtoriteta, četudi so ukazi v nasprotju z njihovimi načeli. V Milgramovi raziskavi je večina sodelujočih drugim povzročila bolečino, ker jim je bilo tako naročeno, četudi v to niso bili prisiljeni in se to ni skladalo z njihovimi moralnimi prepričanji. Podobno se konformistično obnaša tudi povprečni potrošnik, ko brezglavo nakupuje, kot mu velijo korporacije s svojimi četami oglaševalcev, čeprav se najverjetneje strinja, da morajo biti vsi delavci pošteno plačani in da je treba okolje ščititi pred onesnaževanjem.

Philip Zimbardo, znan predvsem po stanfordskem eksperimentu (Zimbardo in dr. 1971), pa je zagovarjal tezo, da se posamezniki ne rodimo dobri ali zli, temveč da kontekst, v katerem se znajdemo, določa naše ravnanje, saj smo se v želji po preživetju sposobni prilagoditi še tako sovražnemu okolju (Haney in dr. 1973). Zimbardova teza se na tem mestu razlikuje od stališča Hannah Arendt, ki ni nikoli trdila, da se posamezniki obnašajo na določen način zgolj zato, ker so postavljeni v specifično situacijo, temveč je razlikovala med tistimi, ki kritično presojajo situacijo, v kateri so se znašli, in tistimi, ki tega ne počno (Lang 2014). Vzporednice med Zimbardovimi dognanji in izhodiščno tezo tega prispevku so na dlani, saj so potrošniki oblačilne industrije po eni strani postavljeni v situacijo, ki jih spodbuja, da nakupujejo proizvode hitre mode, obenem pa so skriti v množici potrošnikov in za svoje odločitve ne odgovarjajo nikomur. Potrošništvo je v sodobnih neoliberalnih kapitalističnih družbah sprejeto kot neproblematično; še več, države ga v zasledovanju gospodarske rasti celo spodbujajo (Quelch 2009), oglaševalci pa nas v potrošnjo silijo na vsakem koraku. Medtem ko naj bi bili prebivalci mest pred petdesetimi leti izpostavljeni približno 2000 oglasom na dan, je ta številka pred nekaj leti narasla na okoli 5000 (Story 2007). Raziskave kažejo, da zaradi spodbud iz okolja, ki aktivirajo potrošniška nagnjenja, kot so na primer reklame (Bauer in dr. 2012), posamezniki postanejo še bolj materialistični in tako še več trošijo. Za pripadnike generacije Z je, četudi so veliko bolj okoljsko zavedni od svojih predhodnikov, pobeg iz jeklenega korporativnega prijema težka naloga, saj so odrasli v času, v katerem je popolnoma normalno, da za majico ne plačajo več kot pet evrov in da so trgovine vsak dan polne novih modnih kosov (Nguyen 2021).

3.3 »Običajnost« potrošnikov

Tako kot naj bi bili »običajni« številni posamezniki, ki so sodelovali v nacističnih grozodejstvih, so »običajni« tudi potrošniki, ki s svojim povpraševanjem do neke mere poganjajo kolo hitre mode. Veliko večino obojih predstavljajo posamezniki brez sadističnih in drugih zlih nagnjenj. Pri etičnem potrošništvu ne moremo mimo vprašanja, kako pomembna so etična vprašanja v primerjavi z drugimi osnovnimi vprašanji (Devinney in dr. 2010: 9). Povprečen posameznik si nemišljenje dovoli, ker ima druge vsakdanje in nujnejše obveznosti, medtem ko mu za etična vprašanja ne ostane dovolj časa. Tako kot je Eichmanna zaposlovala skrb glede logističnih vprašanj transportacije Judov v koncentracijska taborišča, tako posameznik razmišlja o tem, da mora plačati račune, peljati otroka k zobozdravniku in skrbeti za telesno kondicijo. Zaradi velikega napora, ki ga vložimo v razmišljanje o vsakdanjih in urgentnih opravilih, si dovolimo nemišljenje pri temeljnih vprašanjih, ki po lastni oceni za nas ne bodo imela neposrednih posledic. Manjka kritično mišljenje, kot navaja Arendt (1961), v okviru katerega o problemu razmišljamo z različnih perspektiv. Predpostavka za sposobnost tovrstnega presojanja pa ni visoko razvita inteligenca, temveč »tihi dialog s samim sabo, ki ga od Sokrata in Platona naprej ponavadi razumemo pod pojmom mišljenje« (Arendt 1964: 45).

V kontekstu obravnave običajnega posameznika je smiselno poudariti tudi vprašanje empatije. Če naj bi bilo življenje vsakega posameznika neprecenljivo, lahko sklepamo, da se sočutje sorazmerno povečuje z naraščanjem števila posameznikov v krizni situaciji. Raziskave kažejo, da ni tako – medtem ko z enim samim posameznikom v stiski iskreno sočustvujemo, pa trpljenja stotih ali tisočih v množični krizi nismo sposobni čustveno dojeti (Slovic 2007). Razlog za to neskladje naj bi bil v posameznikovem predvidevanju, da bodo potrebe po sočutju tako velike skupine neobvladljive, zato regulira svoje čustvovanje in prepreči doživljanje preobremenjujočih čustev (Cameron in Payne 2011). Zmanjšano sočutje do trpljenja velikega števila žrtev, ki so fizično oddaljene, se jasno kaže tudi pri sodobnem potrošniku, ki ni zmožen sočustvovati z množico 60–75 milijonov delavcev, ki daleč stran, na drugi strani poloble, šivajo njegova oblačila (International Labour Organization b. d.). Kot sta ugotavljala že Horkheimer in Adorno (2006: 56–57), lahkotno zabavo skoraj vedno spremlja zatiskanje oči pred trpljenjem.

Nenazadnje je pri analizi ravnanja »običajnih« posameznikov nujno izpostaviti dejstvo, da neoliberalni kapitalistični sistem, v katerem živimo, povzdiguje produktivnost in individualno odgovornost posameznika za svoje življenje, države, v katerih je bilo povpraševanje za oblačili v zadnjih desetletjih največje, kot so ZDA, Avstralija in države Zahodne Evrope, pa so prav države, v katerih prevladuje ideologija individualizma (Carmichael 2015). Poleg individualizma so za postmoderno »likvidno« družbo značilne svobodne potrošniške odločitve (Bauman 2013), fluidnost, negotovost in samokritika posameznika (Bauman 2005), ki je primoran nenehno preverjati, kaj je v določenem obdobju v času kulturno zaželeno in sprejemljivo ter kaj mora storiti, da bo ostal zanimiv in privlačen (Eicher in Evenson 2014). Za razliko od etične in trajnostne potrošnje, pri kateri so v ospredju odgovornost, trajnost in dolgoročne koristi za zanamce, pa se poudarjeni individualizem sklada s hitro modo, ki posamezniku omogoča, da se s cenovno dostopnim kosom oblačila vedno znova na novo izrazi (Sudbury in Böltner 2011: 163).

Med običajne posameznike, ki sodelujejo pri nenaklepnem povzročanju škode v industriji hitre mode, lahko uvrstimo tudi oblikovalce, oglaševalce, lastnike tovarn in modnih znamk ter druge akterje, ki sodelujejo pri proizvodnji oblačil hitre mode. Očiten primer takšne škode iz malomarnosti je porušenje stavbe Rana Plaza v Bangladešu leta 2013, v kateri je na tisoče delavcev šivalo oblačila za priznane modne znamke. Nesreča, v kateri je umrlo 1134 ljudi, 2600 pa je bilo ranjenih, je nastala zaradi neurejenih požarnih izhodov in slabo vzdrževane stavbe ter nemoči delavcev, ki so neuslišano opozarjali na razpoke v stenah (War on Want 2014).

3.4 Posameznik kot kolesce v sistemu

Na področju hitre mode in hiperpotrošništva nasploh je velik problem dejstvo, da negativen prispevek vsakega posameznika k povzročeni škodi predstavlja le delček celotne slike, iz česar vodi logičen sklep, da bi bilo tudi etično ravnanje zgolj kaplja v morje. Sistem, v katerega je posameznik ujet, se zaradi svoje uveljavljenosti in moči zdi nespremenljiv, kompleksnost njegovega delovanja pa razprši odgovornost med številnimi »sostorilci« in posameznika razbremeni krivde. Pomaga pozabiti tisto, o čemer tudi sam ne želi razmišljati, obenem pa skrbi za to, da mu je ravno dovolj dobro in da je trpljenje delavcev na koncu dobavne verige ravno prav oddaljeno, zaradi česar se upor ne zdi nujen. Zaradi psihične in fizične razdalje med dejanjem in posledicami dejanja, v prostoru, v katerem se zvrsti množica neznatnih dejanj in nepomembnih akterjev – »posrednikov« (Lachs 1981), moralne dileme izginejo (Bauman 2006). Posameznik se v globalni kapitalistični ekonomiji počuti nemočnega in nezmožnega sprožiti sistemske spremembe. Allsop in dr. (2018) na primer ugotavljajo, da je za posameznike, ki živijo v političnem sistemu, oblikovanem v skladu z neoliberalno ideologijo, značilno povečanje individualizma ter upad zaupanja v lastne politične sposobnosti in odzivnost sistema.

Adorno je leta 1950 s sodelavci v delu Avtoritarna osebnost (1950) izoblikoval nabor meril, po katerih naj bi bilo mogoče oceniti, kako izrazite so pri posamezniku lastnosti, značilne za fašistoidno osebnost. Teorija je izzvala buren odziv, Adorno (1987 [1951]) pa je že leto po izdaji knjige spremenil svoje stališče in poudaril, da psihološke predispozicije same ne vodijo v fašizem, da pa obstaja psihološko polje posameznika, ki ga sile, delujoče v lastnem interesu, lahko bolj ali manj uspešno izkoristijo. Tudi Reich (1970) je za vzpon fašizma krivil množično zablodo množice, ne pa Hitlerja kot posebej fašistoidno osebnost. Gordon (2017) na primeru Donalda Trumpa sklene, da si je težko priznati neprijetno in vznemirjujoče dejstvo, da je Trump dejansko povsem povprečen lik in da trumpizma ni mogoče razlagati kot posledice njegovih specifičnih osebnostnih lastnosti, temveč kot rezultat nerazmišljanja (angl. *thoughtlessness*) celotne družbe. Za vzpon gibanj, ki povzročajo škodo, torej zlobni vodja ne zadostuje. Množična gibanja, ugotavlja Arendt (1951: 68), so zgrajena na množici izoliranih politično neopredeljenih posameznikov, ki hlepijo po pobegu iz realnosti. Podobno potrošniška kultura, ki je za nezadovoljne posameznike še posebej privlačna, ker daje iluzijo izbire, dejansko zgolj utrjuje ekonomski sistem, v katerem posameznik še zdaleč ni svoboden.

Dodatni razlog za pomanjkanje volje do upora tiči v človeški želji po pripadnosti in strahu pred izstopanjem, izločenostjo iz družbe. V skladu s teorijo konformizma (Hanson in Yosifon 2006) smo ljudje nagnjeni k homogenemu ravnanju s skupino zaradi strahu pred izgubo statusa, četudi se z ravnanjem ne strinjamo ali ga dojemamo kot moralno spornega (Bernheim 1994). Premišljen izbor modnih kosov je ena izmed strategij vključevanja v določene družbene skupine (Niinimäki 2010); moda je torej tudi sredstvo komunikacije (Barthes 2006) in tako zavzema pomembno mesto v naših življenjih. Etično proizvedena oblačila so v očeh večine še vedno pogosto (četudi zmotno) enačena s preprostimi kroji in hipijevskim videzom, kar služi kot dodatni razlog, da se jim večina raje izogne in ostane pri uveljavljenih znamkah, ki izžarevajo eleganco in stil ali vsaj ne izstopajo. Posamezniku, ki namreč zavrne »razvedrilno kulturo«, kot je na primer hitra moda, grozi oznaka asketskega ekscentrika in diskreditacija (Horkheimer in Adorno 2006: 56).

4 Zaključek

Namen prispevka je bil spodbuditi razpravo o tem, zakaj potrošnik pri nakupovanju v trgovinah z oblačili pogosto ne razmišlja o vprašanjih etike in trajnosti, ter o tem, da so nekatere družbeno škodljive prakse, kot je hitra moda, v sodobni družbi sprejete kot razmeroma normalne. Vzporednice med pogoji, ki so v času nacistične Nemčije pripomogli k nemišljenju številnih običajnih Nemcev in njihovemu sodelovanju v nacističnih grozodejstvih, ter pogoji, ki k nemišljenju spodbujajo sodobne potrošnike hitre mode, kažejo, da pravni red, avtoriteta in primeren kontekst – ne glede na prostor in čas – na številne običajne posameznike vplivajo tako, da se prepustijo nemišljenju in sodelujejo pri povzročanju družbene škode. Jalušič (2009) pronicljivo ugotavlja, da je totalitarizem dejansko predvsem specifičen primer uresničenja določenih pojavov, s katerimi imamo opravka tudi v običajnem, vsakdanjem življenju, tj. človeške nemoči in nemišljenja, in da danes ti pojavi posameznika ogrožajo veliko bolj kot pa možnost ponovitve grozot 20. stoletja.

Večanje števila etičnih potrošnikov, ki kritično razmišljajo o svojih potrošniških odločitvah (so pri nakupovanju preudarnejši, zmanjšujejo potrošnjo kosov hitre mode, uporabljajo alternativne potrošniške prakse, na primer nakup rabljenih oblačil, popravilo in zamenjava oblačil), je zelo dobrodošlo, vendar pa breme boja zoper hitro modo nikakor ne more biti zgolj na potrošniku in spremembi njegovih nakupovalnih navad. Potrošnik je zgolj en člen v proizvodni verigi; glavni del odgovornosti za svoj prispevek k okoljski škodi in škodi za delavce nosijo modne znamke, dobavitelji, oglaševalci, mediji, vplivneži, vlade držav proizvajalk, vlade držav potrošniških trgov in mednarodna skupnost (Simončič 2019b). Gre za nepregledno množico posameznikov, povečini »običajnih« ljudi, ki zgolj opravljajo svoje delo in poskušajo preživeti. V kompleksni družbi, v kateri živimo, smo prav vsi v določenih pogledih krivi nemišljenja: od direktorjev modnih znamk, lastnikov tovarn do tovarniškega delavca, ki si po napornem delovnem dnevu izboljša razpoloženje z nakupom poceni kosa oblačila. Podobno bi lahko analizirali nemišljenje izvršnega direktorja modne znamke, ki bi po kritičnem razmisleku morda deloval v smeri spremembe modela hitre mode ali državnega sekretarja, ki bi se boril za vzpostavitev pravnega okvirja, ki od podjetij zahteva, da prevzamejo odgovornost za kršitve pravic delavcev v celotni dobavni verigi (Simončič 2019b).[6]

6. Osredotočanje na potrošnika je nedvomna omejitev teksta, ki pa je vsaj delno korigirana z večkratnim poudarjanjem narave kapitalistične ekonomije in drugih akterjev ter njihove odgovornosti pri povzročanju škode v industriji hitre mode.

Ključna ugotovitev, izluščena iz analize pogojev, ki diktirajo odločitve potrošnikov in jih spodbujajo k hiperpotrošništvu, je predvsem problematičnost globalne kapitalistične ekonomije, v okviru katere posameznik deluje, ne pa individualna krivda posameznika. Ta namreč povzdiguje gospodarsko rast in konkurenčnost ter nujnosti odplačevanja dolgov držav globalnega juga ne postavlja pod vprašaj (Graeber 2011). Velik del svetovnega prebivalstva živi v kapitalističnih družbah, v katerih hiperpotrošništvo, ki prispeva h gospodarski rasti, ni zgolj normalizirana, temveč celo zaželena praksa, potrebe potrošnika pa imajo prednost pred zdravjem, varnostjo in dostojanstvom delavca (Taplin 2014).

Prav na tem mestu se kot nujno pokaže prakticiranje kritičnega mišljenja, kot ga razume Arendt (1964). Avtorica navaja, da so bili Nemci, ki niso sodelovali v nacističnih grozodejstvih, tisti posamezniki, ki so upali presojati sami; to so bili tisti, ki niso dovolili zavesti, da deluje avtomatizirano, temveč so se bili sposobni vprašati, do kolikšne mere bi bili zmožni živeti sami s sabo, če bi v tem nečloveškem režimu sodelovali.

Četudi je torej od potrošnika skoraj nemogoče zahtevati, da v sistemu, ki ga na vsakem koraku spodbuja k neetičnemu ravnanju, deluje povsem etično, je njegova osvoboditev iz spon neoliberalne kapitalistične ideologije ključna za uvajanje sprememb s strani korporacij, držav in mednarodne skupnosti v smeri pravičnejšega globalnega sistema proizvodnje. Prvi korak za dosego tega cilja je prav kritičen razmislek o resničnem izvoru škode, tj. o sistemu, ki nemišljenje spodbuja. Snovanje strategij, kako to razmišljanje spodbuditi, presega omejitve tega prispevka, a je nujno in vredno nadaljnjih socioloških raziskav. Neoliberalna kapitalistična družba, v kateri živimo, čisla rast, ki je neločljivo povezana z izkoriščanjem delavskega sloja (Heckt 2019), zato je za uvedbo resnično etične in trajnostne potrošnje treba prevprašati ekonomski sistem, ki ga jemljemo za samoumevnega. Prvi korak, ki ga lahko naredimo kot posamezniki, je, da si zastavljamo vprašanja. Vprašajmo se, zakaj se prepuščamo nemišljenju, kakšne so posledice za svet, v katerem živimo, in kdo nas k temu spodbuja. Le tako bomo prepoznali pravne rede, avtoritete in sisteme, ki imajo od našega nemišljenja korist, ter se jim postavili po robu.

SUMMARY

Ever since the 1990s individuals have been more frequently and in larger quantities shopping for low-priced clothes, and throwing them away faster than ever. The fast-fashion phenomenon, characterised by short production and distribution times and an emphasis on the fashionability of the clothing, is a source of great social harm. The mass production of clothing that largely takes place in the countries of the Global South is famous for the poor treatment of workers,

who receive inadequate pay, work overtime, suffer from health issues and are unable to make ends meet, despite working 12-hour workdays. The fast-fashion industry also exacts a heavy toll on the environment.

Aside from the structural conditions imposed by global neoliberal capitalism, fast-fashion brands, the countries of production and consumption, advertisers, suppliers and designers are among the biggest culprits responsible for the social harm occurring in the context of fast fashion. This article, however, focuses on the consumer. Research shows that while the majority of Generation Z consumers claim that ethical and sustainable issues are important to them when shopping for clothes, the continuous rapid growth of the fast-fashion market shows that these issues are still largely neglected in practice. When stepping into a clothing store, most fashion consumers do not think about the ethical and sustainability aspects of the clothes they might buy.

To analyse the fast-fashion consumer's failure to think (critically), Hannah Arendt's concept of the banality of evil and the associated idea of non-thinking are employed. From the concept of the banality of evil, developed as an explanation for the actions of ordinary Germans who participated in the Holocaust, we derive the concept of the banality of social harm caused by the fast-fashion industry is derived. Alongside attempting to understand the failure to think critically on the side of the consumer, this article aims to point to the harmfulness of fast fashion, a consumerist phenomenon accepted as normal in contemporary neoliberal capitalist society.

The conditions Arendt recognised as playing a crucial role in the occurrence of non-thinking are introduced and applied to the fast-fashion industry. These are, namely: (1) a legal order that allows crime or social harm to occur; (2) trusting authorities as well as susceptibility to the context; (3) the ordinariness of individuals participating in harm production; and (4) the individual as a cog in the machine. The analysis indicates that, indeed, the inadequate and unequal regulation of the global production of clothing as well as the glorification of the major fast-fashion brands, influencers and consumerism do play a role in normalising the social harm caused to the worker and the environment in the production of fast fashion. Moreover, consumers as ordinary people consumed by their own daily worries are those contributing to the harm. Finally, consumers operate within an established neoliberal capitalist system, which appears unshakeable and powerful beyond measure with the complexity of its operations dispersing responsibility among many 'accomplices'. For fear of being ostracised or losing their social status, many individuals further feel the urge to conform and act homogeneously with the crowd. Aside from Arendt's elements of the non-thinking concept, several other psychological factors impel us to buy clothes, such as the need to fit in, to stand out, feel good in our bodies, and so forth.

It appears that all four of the factors listed above, regardless of time and space, contribute to the normalisation of social harm and hence play a role in the non-thinking of individuals. While the focus in this article was on the fast-fashion consumer, it could very well be replaced with a focus on any number of other actors that play a role in the production of fast fashion, such as the fashion brand CEO, the fashion designer, the marketer or a state official.

The main conclusion of the article is that the source of the problem lies not in the ignorance and indifference of the ordinary individual but in the nature of the global capitalist economy that, via the conditions listed above, encourages non-thinking. It is at this point precisely that the practice of critical thinking, as understood by Arendt (1964), proves necessary. An individual's liberation from the shackles of neoliberal capitalist ideology is crucial if they are to demand changes to be made by states, corporations and the international community towards a fairer system of global production. The first step in achieving this liberation is to critically reflect on the true source of such social harm, i.e., the capitalist system that encourages non-thinking.

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STRUCTURAL POSITIONS, HIERARCHIES, AND PERCEPTIONS OF GENDER EQUALITY: INSIGHTS FROM A SLOVENIAN RESEARCH ORGANISATION

ABSTRACT

Based on a study of gender equality issues in a research organisation in an Eastern European post-socialist country, the paper argues that the increasing precariousness of academic employment and project-based work lead to workplace dynamics that must be considered in a specific setting. The results of a survey of employees at ZRC SAZU show how one's position within the academic hierarchy and structure, as well as the nature of the work regime, shape employees' opinions. The largest differences in opinion exist between junior female researchers and senior male ones, but there are also relevant differences in the views of women working as research and as administrative staff. The results indicate that an analysis that takes into account the forces of the neoliberal academic market has the potential to illuminate regimes of inequality that are gendered through the relationship between work and social reproduction rather than through identity categories as such.

KEYWORDS: gender equality; academic structure; intersectionality; precariousness; work-life balance.

Strukturni položaji, hierarhije in dojemanje enakosti spolov: spoznanja iz slovenske raziskovalne ustanove

IZVLEČEK

Na podlagi študije o enakosti spolov v raziskovalni organizaciji v vzhodnoevropski postsocialistični državi članek nakazuje, da vse večja prekarizacija akademskih *delovnih mest in projektno delo ustvarjata dinamiko na delovnem mestu, ki jo je treba vključiti v analizo v konkretnem okolju. Rezultati raziskave med zaposlenimi na ZRC SAZU, opravljeni na podlagi anketnega vprašalnika, kažejo, da položaj v akademski hierarhiji in strukturi ter vrsta delovnega režima oblikujejo mnenja zaposlenih. Najbolj izrazite razlike v mnenjih se kažejo med raziskovalkami na nižjih pozicijah, ki so najmanj zadovoljne s svojim položajem, in raziskovalci na višjih pozicijah, ki najmanj pogosto prepoznavajo spolne neenakosti. Raziskava je pokazala tudi pomembne razlike v pogledih med ženskami, ki delajo kot raziskovalke, in tistimi, ki delajo v administraciji. Rezultati kažejo, da analiza ki upošteva sile neoliberalnega akademskega trga, omogoča osvetlitev režimov neenakosti, ki se udejanjajo prek razmerja med delom in družbeno reprodukcijo, in ne prek identitetnih kategorij kot takih.*

KLJUČNE BESEDE: enakost spolov; akademska struktura; intersekcionalnost; prekarnost; usklajevanje poklicnega in zasebnega življenja.

1 Introduction[1]

Gendered inequalities among people working in academia have become a noted problem, a researched topic, and a target of public policies across Europe. Extensive evidence shows that gendered differences persist and are manifested in a lack of women holding the highest academic titles in certain disciplines (e.g. Holmes et al. 2015; Tiwari et al. 2019) and positions of leadership and decision-making (e.g. Bernard and Cooperdock 2018; Kuhlmann et al. 2017), in the gender pay gap in most countries, and in the division of labour and care work both at home and at work (Cukut Krilić et al. 2019), to name a few areas.

Several factors maintain and reproduce gender-based and structural inequalities in research and higher education institutions, as typical examples of "gendered organisations" (Acker 1990). The gendered division of labour in the private sphere, in which women still conduct a larger share of care and domestic work, remains an important factor, especially in times of crisis, as the 2008 economic crisis and Covid-19 pandemic have confirmed (Gabster et al. 2020; Flaherty 2020). While gender stereotypes and biases have decreased over time, rigid hierarchies in the academic world remain a fertile ground for flourishing practices of exclusion and exploitation, based not only on gender but also on

1. This paper is based on the research done in the framework of the Horizon 2020 project R&I PEERS (Pilot experiences for improving gender equality in research organisations, 2018-2022), funded by the European Commission (grant number 788171).

other overlapping identities and experiences (class, race, social background, ethnicity, migration, age, sexual orientation, etc.). The intersectional approach has thus become influential in the analysis of (and in policy interventions mitigating) gender inequalities and multiple discriminations in academia (Nichols and Stahl 2019) and is in general central to the study of inequality, identity, and power in the field of work and organisations (Rodriguez 2016; Acker 2012; Vallas and Cummins 2014).

1.1 An Intersectional Approach to Gender(ed) Inequalities

The economic and cultural, and indeed ideological, shift towards a neoliberal agenda and structural changes in the ways higher education and research are funded led to the sector being increasingly labelled "academic capitalism" (Slaughter and Rhoades 2009) or "the neo-liberal academy" (Ivancheva et al. 2019; Kinman 2014). The progressive decrease in the share of public investment has pushed research institutions into a search for external funding and has brought marketization, business-oriented management models, and a focus on productivity and excellence (and their measurement), all of which increase competition among and within organisations. These changes have increased the precariousness of research and academic jobs, especially for younger and junior staff, with generational and gendered consequences as well (cf. Murgia and Poggio 2019). However, these changes affect people differently, depending on their positions within the complex (and ever more diversifying) structure of the scientific sector, which determines the stability of their positions, their career progress options, their work-related requirements, and the interference in their private lives (Petrović 2021: 46). This structural conditioning interplays with gender and other dimensions of a person's identity.

While there is a consensus that gender inequality in academia should be examined (and tackled) in connection with other types of social inequalities, there are differences in both how the problem is conceptually grasped and how it is methodologically approached (Vallas and Cummins 2014: 239–240).

On a conceptual level stemming from the tradition of Western liberal feminism, the concept of "gender equality" (in academia) stands for a demand for equal opportunities for women and men to attain and progress in an academic profession (Ely and Meyerson 2000). Due to the increasing relevance of the intersectional approach, this demand has spread to ethnic, social, and other minorities and is based in the idea of social justice and equity (e.g. David 2004). Within this framework, analytic attention turns towards individuals and groups that are subject to mechanisms of inclusion in and exclusion from privileged academic positions.

The other camp of feminism (and indeed political theory), stemming from a Marxist analysis, approaches the concept of equality in relation to social reproduction (cf. Fraser 2016), examining how it influences the distribution of power in society. In the context of the academic field, Bourdieu (1984, 1993) has translated the notion of power as economic, social, cultural, and symbolic capital; and due to their uneven distribution, academic institutions are deeply hierarchical structures. Here, analytic attention turns towards modes of work and production in the academic field and how they keep power/capital from being equally available to and attainable for everybody.

This line of thought is less prominent in scholarship on issues relating to gender equality in academia (cf. Clavero and Galligan 2021) and policy interventions of "gender mainstreaming" (Çağlar 2013) within the European policy framework (Van Eerdewijk and Davis 2013). However, we argue that analysis that takes into account the modes of production, in particular in the academic setting, has the potential to illuminate regimes of inequality that are gendered through the relation between work and social reproduction, rather than through identity categories as such.

The majority of intersectional studies focus on subjectivities and explore how intersections of identity categories lead to inequalities experienced by individuals and groups (Rodriguez et al. 2016). The intersectional approach inherently navigates around the pitfall of taking identity categories as given and struggles to grasp how societal relations create and reproduce identity categories (Vallas and Cummins 2014). A comprehensive literature review in this field pointed out that intersectional research does not pay enough attention to how different subjectivities interplay with systemic processes and structures, institutional arrangements, and micro-level encounters (Rodriguez et al. 2016: 204; also Choo and Ferree 2010).

We support this invitation to shift the research focus towards a deeper understanding of how a particular structural and institutional context (that creates the working environment of a particular academic organisation) is conducive to creating inequality regimes (Acker 2006). Starting from a modest and pragmatic survey design aimed at detecting gendered inequalities in particular research organisation, we realised the limitations of our own study, which did not take into account the deeper structural and relational aspects of our case. Our study provides enough indication to suggest that the increasing precariousness of academic employment and project-based work is creating workplace dynamics and status hierarchies that are relevant to understanding what is fair and equal in academia and that these need to be taken into account within a specific setting. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to open avenues for further research that have been underexplored, especially in the setting of a post-socialist country.

In the following, we first present the methodology of the survey we conducted among the employees at the Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts (ZRC SAZU) and then outline our most important findings. First, we present results showing typical gender(ed) inequalities between senior male researchers and junior female ones. We then focus on how gender and academic seniority intersect to produce different views on career advancement issues. Finally, we discuss the different views of women researchers and administrators as a reflection of the different structural positions they find themselves in and the different relationships between work and social reproduction they experience. In conclusion, we outline promising avenues for further research.

2 Methodology of the Research

2.1 Study Setting

This study was executed as part of designing the gender equality plan (GEP) for the ZRC SAZU – one of Slovenia's largest research organisations active predominantly in the fields of humanities and social sciences – within the European Union's Horizon 2020 project "Pilot experiences for improving gender equality in research organisations" (R&I PEERS). The adoption and implementation of GEPs has been one of the ways to tackle gender asymmetries in academic organisations and is highly recommended by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE 2016), Athena SWAN (Scientific Women's Academic Network), the Charter for Women in Science in the United Kingdom (Ovseiko et al. 2017), and many gender equality experts (cf. Holzinger et al. 2018). The European Commission has supported the creation of gender equality plans for research organisations with targeted funding (cf. Kalpazidou Schmidt and Cacace 2017; Clavero and Galligan 2021) and by making GEP an eligibility criterion for funding under the framework programme Horizon Europe, starting with application calls made in 2022. This means that all public institutions applying for such funding need to have a gender equality plan (cf. Mihajlović Trbovc 2021). In Slovenia, as in many other Eastern European post-socialist countries, the practice of implementing GEPs is quite new; in February 2019, ZRC SAZU was the first academic organisation in the country to adopt it (Mihajlović Trbovc 2023).

Gender experts advise (cf. EIGE 2016) that, to create a gender equality plan, a research or higher education institution should first evaluate its present state of gender equality indicators (e.g. gender ratio among staff, in higher positions, and in decision-making bodies) and prevalent institutional culture patterns, locate problems, and recognise needs for change. One of the usual steps in this process is for the organisation in question to create a survey and distribute it among its employees, which should help detect their lived working experience and needs, thus providing input for creating adequate measures that fit the specificities of that particular institution. Following this logic, the team of the R&I PEERS project at the ZRC SAZU created such a survey for the needs of the R&I PEERS project, which was then translated and distributed also to seven piloting partner organisations. It was conducted with the aim of gathering employee opinions about the state of gender equality in these organisations and of evaluating which of the suggested mitigation measures would be adequate. Therefore, the survey covered perceptions of gender (in)equality in the organisation and specifically in decision-making processes, in career advancement, in practices of science outreach, and in employment practices, as well as opinions on work-life balance measures and the integration of the gender dimension in research and curricula. When devising the questionnaire and measurement scales, the project team modified and simplified questions from a much more comprehensive survey, the British Athena Survey of Science, Engineering and Technology (ASSET, c.f. Aldercotte 2017).

There are a growing number of studies that used surveys of small or large academic populations to examine the work experience and perceptions among academic staff and to compare them across gender and other demographic descriptors and scientific disciplines. Recurrent findings in many such surveys indicate that women experience academic working culture differently from men and usually feel (and are) disadvantaged in it (e.g. Aldercotte 2017; García-González et al. 2019; Drew and Marshall 2021; Ovseiko et al. 2019; Popp et al. 2019; Probert 2005; and in Slovenia: Jogan 1998; Mladenić 2006; Ule 2012, 2013; Flander et al. 2020). However, most of these surveys focus on academics and, with rare exceptions (e.g. Ovseiko et al. 2019), do not include administrative staff.

The novelty of the survey performed in the framework of the R&I PEERS project was that it was distributed to research staff and faculty, but also to administration and technical staff. By including this variable in the questionnaire, we were trying to find out which GEP measures would be suitable for which group of employees and wanted to design GEP strategies that will address the needs of as diverse a population of employees as possible. We were following the logic that informed interventions into academic structures require "differentiating between academics and other types of university employees whose terms and conditions differ fundamentally" (Kinman 2014: 232). In our survey, we also wanted to take into consideration the views of administrative staff, since their involvement is indispensable for implementing a gender equality plan. Such plans usually contain some changes in institutional procedures and practices, the collection of data, and the monitoring of indicators, all of which demands the involvement of the administrative staff. While gender equality plans predominantly aim at correcting gender asymmetries among researchers and/or teaching staff, they usually depend on the (additional) work of the administrative departments.

While our choice to include administrative staff in the survey had pragmatic reasons, this resulted in richer raw material that enabled us to correlate data on gender, seniority, and type of work. This data gave us a glimpse into how different modes of work create different relations between one's professional work and one's involvement in social reproduction. Our analysis showed that this relation is to a large extent conditioned by the structural setting (such as, different modes of labour, the stability of the work contract, the norms of career progress), almost as much as it is conditioned by hierarchical gender order (Connell 1987).

The study focusing on one academic organisation is informative for several reasons. As a research centre covering predominantly fields of the humanities and social sciences, ZRC SAZU is representative of the academic organisations in which women constitute the majority of the staff (57.4%, see Table 1).[2] Specificities of such a nominally "feminised" work environment are under-researched, while the predominant focus of the studies (that take gender equality in academia as their theme) is on the disciplines in which women are obviously underrepresented. Therefore, our case is a good place for a nuanced examination of relations between different aspects of work in an academic institution and the different structural positions (different) women are subjected to, in both private and professional life.

Furthermore, our study is situated in a context that is broadly representative of post-socialist countries in Eastern Europe. Existing since 1981, ZRC SAZU (as well as its employees) has experienced a significant shift from the stable public funding of research activities that characterised the socialist period to increased dependence on competitive and unstable funding schemes provided by the state, international and EU programmes, and the market. These structural changes, and their ramifications for the nature of academic work and the work environment, have been underresearched particularly in connection with gender(ed) inequalities in academia.

Finally, the categories of race and class (and their intersection with gender) function differently in this specific socio-historical setting than in the original setting

2. For comparison, on the national level, women constitute 62.5% of doctoral graduates in the social sciences, journalism, and information and 62.2% in the arts and humanities, both figures being somewhat higher (approximately 7 percentage points) than the EU average (European Commission 2021: 36), while the overall share of women researchers in Slovenia is around the EU average (32.3%, ibid: 97).

from which intersectionality theory emerged (Black feminism in the United States), and also differently than in the Western European countries where the intersectional approach is commonly used. Therefore, our study is an attempt to conduct an analysis with the intersectional approach in mind, without using identity categories as such.

2.2 Data Collection and Analysis

This article draws from two sets of data. First, we analysed the results of the survey conducted at ZRC SAZU in July 2018, discussing differences in opinions and perceptions among different groups of employees, dividing them by gender, whether they are research or administrative staff, and their level of seniority within the academic hierarchy. Second, we analysed the transcript of the workshop conducted in Ljubljana in October 2019 in the framework of the R&I PEERS project that brought together research and administrative staff from several research organisations, thus offering an additional and enriched perspective on the dynamics between research and administrative staff.

The survey data are representative of the whole organisation since the response rate was relatively high – 180 persons out of 340 employees (52.9%) completed the online form – and the sample of respondents largely reflects the distribution of the employees' groups in the overall population (see Table 1). Our division of the sample into groups of employees is based on the demographic data that respondents provided at the beginning of the questionnaire. The respondents self-defined as either research/teaching or administrative/support staff, junior [*začetniška/niža pozicija*] or senior [*uveljavljena/višja pozicija*], and by gender: female, male, or other [*drugo*]. Since only two individuals declared as "other", we did not include them in the survey analysis, so the analysed sample encompasses 178 persons. We opted for respondents to self-declare whether their position was junior or senior, rather than classifying them according to their academic or job title, because we believe that this is a matter of symbolic power rather than the title of a position per se.[3] Therefore, we cannot accurately establish the representativeness of the survey sample in regard to the seniority

3. The largest group in the academic staff at ZRC SAZU has the title Research Associate [*znanstveni sodelavec_ka*], which is in the middle of the academic hierarchy in the Slovene system of academic titles. It seems that some researchers classify this position as junior, while for others it is a senior position. We do not consider this to be a methodological flaw, but rather a reflection of the fact that the context of a particular working environment (e.g. institute/department) and the actual attainment of power define whether one would be (self-)perceived as a "senior" much more than an official academic title would.

of academic staff, but this group of employees had a higher response rate than administrative staff (see Table 1). Therefore, there is a margin of nonresponse bias, but it is low.

Table 1: Representativeness of the survey respondent sample at the ZRC SAZU.

Share of	ZRC SAZU		Survey respondent sample		Response rate
	number	percentage	number	percentage	
Female research staff	151	44.4%	86	48.3%	57%
Male research staff	112	32.9%	63	35.4%	56.3%
Female administrative staff	53	15.6%	19	10.7%	35.8%
Male administrative staff	24	7.1%	10	5.6%	41.7%
Overall	340	100%	178	100%	

Source: Černič Istenič et al. 2018.

The data were analysed using the SPSS software, version 25. We employed bivariate statistical analysis based on the assumption that there could be significant differences[4] in opinions among the six clusters of respondents: male senior research staff, male junior research staff, female senior research staff, female junior research staff, male administrative staff, and female administrative staff. In the statistical analysis, we divided administrative staff only by gender, not by seniority, because doing both did not produce groups that would be statistically significant. In other words, the group of men working in administration who participated in the survey was too small (n=10) for it to be meaningful to divide them into senior and junior groups and analyse them as such.

The survey comprised 34 closed-ended multiple-choice questions and five optional open-ended questions. Therefore, we supplement the statistical analysis of the survey results with a content analysis of the open-ended questions, which collected 189 substantial comments.[5] This means that an average of 21% of the respondents answered each of the open-ended questions, which is a high response rate for a non-obligatory question.

As this article focuses on differences in opinions between administrative and research staff, we supplemented the survey results with another set of data: transcripts of the focus group-like discussion that took place as part of the R&I PEERS

4. In statistical analysis, relevant discrepancies between the values are considered to be below 0.05, which assures that there is a statistically significant difference in opinions between the observed groups (Moore et al. 2013).
5. We excluded answers such as "I have nothing to add."

project workshop that was held on 16 October 2019, involving five administrative and seven academic/research staff from seven institutions from Slovenia and one from Serbia; the discussion was in English.[6] The workshop followed the methodology called Structured Democratic Dialogue Process (SDDP, c.f. Laouris and Michaelides 2018), which starts with a "triggering question" to which participants provided answers, i.e. ideas for a solution to the common problem. The triggering question for this particular workshop was: "What measures/actions (administrative, organisational culture-related, financial, legal…) should be taken to make Gender Equality Plan implementation beneficial for all employees in research organisations?" In the course of several rounds, participants expressed various opinions and formulated 29 ideas, which they then compared and correlated, guided by the workshop leader and with the use of the software specifically designed for SDDP (c.f. Laouris and Michaelides 2018). This workshop had some basic features of a focus-group method: selected participants, a specific question, and a moderated discussion in which each participant is invited to present an opinion. We did not apply a particular method of analysis for the transcript, but rather quote in this paper opinions that corresponded to open-ended questions in the survey.

3 Research Findings: How (Limited) Intersectionality and an Analysis of Structure Capture Social Reproduction

While the overall opinion of the employees on all topics covered by the survey is quite positive about the level of gender equality at the ZRC SAZU, women noted gender disparity and deprivation at a higher rate or they agreed less with statements claiming the existence of equality within the institution. When asked if one gender is more advantaged, a majority of all respondents claimed there were no significant differences between genders, but when differences were noted, they were more often to the advantage of men. This is in congruence with survey results from academic institutions abroad, where female employees in general perceive more gender bias than males do (García-González et al. 2019; Drew and Marshall 2021; Ovseiko et al. 2019; Popp et al. 2019; Probert 2005). Our study is also congruent with previous studies done in Slovenia. A survey of the PhD holders of both genders showed differences in the attainment of positions of power, influence, prestige, reputation, and decision-making – statistically more men

6. The workshop was led and moderated by one of the co-authors of this article, who does not speak local languages.

than women held all of these positions and reached them in a shorter time than their male peers (Ule 2012). The most recent survey of academic staff in Slovenia showed that male staff members are more satisfied with their employment, work, and academic environment than female staff is (Flander et al. 2020: 5).

Therefore, we expected and we did find a similar typical binary cleavage between men and women in perceptions relating to gender equality issues: in all but two questions (out of 34), gender was a statistically relevant variable. In addition, we noted significant differences in opinions between senior and junior research staff, as well. While gender is more relevant than seniority, the starkest differences in opinion are between senior male and junior female researchers, as we discuss further in detail. Finally, there is a relevant difference between the working experiences of women in research and women in administration, especially regarding certain aspects of balancing job-related demands and care work in private life.

3.1 Typical Gender(ed) Inequalities in Academia: Differences in Views Between Senior Male Researchers and Junior Female Ones

Our data shows that senior male researchers tend to be the most satisfied with the status quo and are the least prone to recognise that women are disadvantaged in achieving their career ambitions and potentials. As noted above, employees of the ZRC SAZU generally share positive opinions about the state of gender equality in their institution. The results of bivariate statistical analysis show that a large majority of the employees find that men and women are treated equally at their institute or department (79.2% agree or completely agree), that they are equally able to develop their potentials (75.5% agree or completely agree), and have equal access to and influence in decision-making bodies (71.9% agree or completely agree) and opportunities for career advancement (63.4% agree or completely agree). However, such opinions are significantly more prevalent among senior male research staff than among female staff members, especially those in junior positions. For instance, almost all (94.9%) senior male researchers agree (or completely agree) with the statement that "men and women are treated equally in the ZRC SAZU", while junior female researchers share that opinion at a significantly lower rate (73.2% agree or completely agree) (see Table 2). The largest difference in opinions is precisely between these two groups: while 64.1% of senior male researchers completely agree, only 19.5% of junior female researchers are of the same opinion.

Table 2: Agreement with the statement: "In general, men and women are treated equally in the ZRC SAZU, that is, in my department/institute."

		M adm. staff	F adm. staff	M res. senior	M res. junior	F res. senior	F res. junior	Over-all	Fisher's exact test	sig.
Completely disagree	f	0	1	1	0	0	2	4	34.815	0.003
	%	0	5.3	2.6	0	0	4.9	2.2		
Disagree	f	1	4	1	2	10	7	25		
	%	10	21.1	2.6	8.3	22.2	17.1	14		
No opinion	f	2	1	0	1	2	2	8		
	%	20	5.3	0	4.2	4.4	4.9	4.5		
Agree	f	3	10	12	10	19	22	76		
	%	30	52.6	30.8	41.7	42.2	53.7	42.7		
Completely agree	f	4	3	25	11	14	8	65		
	%	40	15.8	64.1	45.8	31.1	19.5	36.5		
n=	f	10	19	39	24	45	41	178		
	%	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		

Source: Černič Istenič et al. 2018.

Similarly, male researchers agree (or completely agree) with the statement that "women and men are equally able to develop their career potentials" at an extremely high rate (92.3% of seniors and 95.9% of juniors). On the other hand, female researchers agree with the same proposition at a significantly lower rate (66.7% of seniors and 61% of juniors).

These data seem to show a smaller gender gap than in some foreign surveys. For instance, the ASSET survey of individuals working in STEMM[7] academia conducted in the United Kingdom in 2016 found that three quarters of the women in the sample (75.7%) thought that it was easier for a man to get a senior post in their department, while almost half of the men (47.3%) found it to be the same for women and men (Aldercotte 2017: 24). This difference might be explained by the fact that the ASSET survey examined organisations in STEMM fields, while the ZRC SAZU is predominantly conducting research in the humanities and social sciences, which are in general more "feminised" disciplines.

To understand better what the statistical results of our survey mean, we turned to the open-ended questions. In the answers to the question "Describe other reasons you find relevant for the disadvantaged position of women in your institute/department", some of the survey respondents said that career breaks due to maternity leave women hindered in the current system of research evaluation

7. STEMM stands for Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics, and Medicine.

and career progress: "Maternity leave has a huge impact, as it puts women's careers on hold for more than a year, while our male colleagues continue their research and publishing and advance their careers. In reality, this frozen status for women is actually a regression in their careers" (221–FRS);[8] "Project-based work and financing, and consequently an uncertain future, do not go well with longer career breaks due to parental leaves. This is one of the biggest problems" (79–FRS). Some of the respondents point to "general social climate, stereotypes, and existing structures that still treat women as unequal to men, which inevitably also impacts relations within ZRC SAZU" (284–FRS). Others emphasize structural inequalities as more relevant than gender-based ones: "Disadvantages of young researchers are a serious problem, and the relationship of senior researchers to those at early career stages, be it men or women" (435–FRJ). Some respondents insist that "the system provides absolute equality in rights [*popolno enakopravnost*]" and explain that "there are fewer women in high positions because they restrict themselves in making career-related decisions [*ker se same prikrajšajo, ko sprejemajo odločitve o karieri*]" (308–FRS). Invariably, whether this statement is a stereotype-driven or self-fulfilling prophecy, it reveals ambiguities in understanding the very notion of equality.

We noted this gradual differentiation of opinions along the continuum – senior male – junior male – senior female – junior female – in answers to many questions in our survey (see also Table 2, Table 3, Table 5). Slightly more than a half of the responses (18 out of 34, that is 52.9%) in our survey showed this exact pattern. For instance, when respondents were asked whether women have influence and roles equal to that of their male peers in decision-making bodies, there is a tendency in the following direction: the higher the position of male researchers, the more they agree with this view; and the lower the position of women, the less they agree (see Table 3).

8. When quoting respondents, we refer to their serial numbers in the survey and demographic data. The meanings of the acronyms used throughout the text: FRS (female, researcher, senior); FRJ (female, researcher, junior); MRS (male, researcher, senior); MRJ (male researcher, junior); FAS (female, administrative, senior); FAJ (female, administrative, junior). The same acronyms (but without the serial number) are also used when quoting statements of the workshop participants.

Table 3: Agreement with the statement: "Women have an equal influence and role in decision-making bodies as their male peers."

		M adm. staff	F adm. staff	M res. senior	M res. junior	F res. senior	F res. junior	Over-all	Fisher's exact test	sig.
Completely disagree	f	0	1	1	0	3	0	5	40.111	0.001
	%	0	5.3	2.6	0	6.7	0	2.8		
Disagree	f	0	4	3	0	8	6	21		
	%	0	21.1	7.7	0	17.8	14.6	11.8		
No opinion	f	2	2	0	5	5	10	24		
	%	20	10.5	0	20.8	11.1	24.4	13.5		
Agree	f	2	10	14	9	16	18	69		
	%	20	52.6	35.9	37.5	35.6	43.9	38.8		
Completely agree	f	6	2	21	10	13	7	59		
	%	60	10.5	53.8	41.7	28.9	17.1	33.1		
n=	f	10	19	39	24	45	41	178		
	%	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		

Source: Černič Istenič et al. 2018.

3.2 Gender and Academic Seniority Intersect to Produce Different Views on the Issues Relating to Career Progress

The starkest contrast in opinions between senior male and junior female researchers was on the issue whether men and women have equal opportunities for career advancement at the ZRC SAZU. An exceptionally large majority (92.3%) of senior male researchers agree or completely agree that equal opportunities exist, while only 29.3% of junior female researchers would concur (see Table 4).

There was a similar finding in the study of the medical and social sciences staff at the University of Oxford in 2014: "the highest levels of gender disparity in the perceptions of the university culture... were on gender equity and self-efficacy in career advancement" (Ovseiko et al. 2019: 183), the latter meaning confidence in one's "ability to progress in career and overcome barriers to advancement" (ibid.: 170). For a comparison, a survey of junior female teaching staff working in two of the largest public universities in Slovenia in the mid-1990s found that the biggest obstacles to scientific advancement for female academics are family caring duties, which they carry out to a significantly greater extent than their male partners (Jogan 1998: 997–999).

Table 4: Agreement with the statement: "Men and women have equal opportunities for career advancement."

		M adm. staff	F adm. staff	M res. senior	M res. junior	F res. senior	F res. junior	Over-all	Fisher's exact test	sig.
Completely disagree	f	0	0	2	0	1	2	5	60,773	0.000
	%	0	0	5.1	0	2.2	4.9	2.8		
Disagree	f	1	5	1	2	15	16	40		
	%	10	26.3	2.6	8.3	33.3	39	22.5		
No opinion	f	1	1	0	5	2	11	20		
	%	10	5.3	0	20.8	4.4	26.8	11.2		
Agree	f	2	10	15	8	17	7	59		
	%	20	52.6	38.5	33.3	37.8	17.1	33.1		
Completely agree	f	6	3	21	9	10	5	54		
	%	60	15.8	53.8	37.5	22.2	12.2	30.3		
n=	f	10	19	39	24	45	41	178		
	%	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		

Source: Černič Istenič et al. 2018.

In the answers to the open-ended questions "Describe additional measures that could improve career prospects, particularly for women" and "Please suggest other changes that would improve employment practices at your department/ institute, particularly for women", it is notable that both junior and senior female researchers had more ideas for improvements than their male peers. They suggest necessary measures and changes such as flexible working hours and the availability of telework (66–FRS; 223–FRJ), reducing the influence of informal ties and support among male colleagues (76–FRJ, 106–FRJ), improving communication patterns at some institutes (156–FRS), systematic career counselling (431–FRJ), etc. Male researchers in senior positions, on the other hand, typically did not see any need for changes or additional measures. For example, one of them stated that "at our institute there is no need for any improvement, particularly not for women. At well-organised institutes there is no need to segregate according to gender, because it is taken for granted that employees will have special needs at some stage of their career because of their gender, and the rest of the institute has to accommodate to these changing needs" (73–MRS); another male researcher in a senior position (338–MRS) is against "special treatment of anyone based on her or his gender" and sees it as discrimination.

This data illustrates that not only gender, but also one's position within the academic hierarchy influences an individual's opinions and the way they experience the work environment. On the one hand, this might indicate a generational shift in opinions among male researchers – that is junior, and thus generally younger male researchers are more sensitive in recognizing gendered differences and disparities in their work environment. On the other hand, junior male researchers are more often than their senior peers in precarious work positions, which might make them more prone to recognise structural inequalities. This is also visible in the descriptive answers to open-ended questions, where male researchers in junior position support measures that would facilitate the reconciliation of work and private life for both genders (suggesting e.g. "additional vacation days for young parents", 188–MRJ), but also point to structural inequalities that make early-career researchers' positions precarious and difficult to maintain and advance, particularly if they have family duties: for example, one male researcher in a junior position argued that all researchers would profit from greater predictability of career paths and stabler employment, as this would improve their mental health and reduce the stress that is transferred from the workplace to private life (241–MRJ). In contrast to such views, male researchers in senior positions often neglect the inequalities based on gender, as described above, while some of them even "blame" female researchers for their own disadvantaged position by explaining it with "stupidity, incapability and low self-esteem of a female individual" (73–MRS) or with "an archaic belief that women must be recognized in academia regardless of their actual value" (100–MRS).

3.3 Structural Positions and Social Reproduction: Differences in Views Among Women Working as Research and as Administrative Staff

Among ZRC SAZU employees, there is a clear discrepancy in views among gender groups on many issues, and this is true for both research and administrative staff. Nevertheless, the survey shows that there are certain differences in perceptions among women working as research staff and those in administration, especially in relation to the challenges of balancing work and private life. When offered the proposition that the ZRC SAZU provides satisfactory services helping to balance professional work and private life, women working in administration agreed (or completely agreed) at a significantly higher rate (73.7%) than their female research colleagues (juniors and seniors combined: 58.1%) (see Table 5).

Table 5: Agreement with the statement: "In general, ZRC SAZU provides satisfactory services helping to balance professional work and private life."

		M adm. staff	F adm. staff	M res. senior	M res. junior	F res. senior	F res. junior	Over-all	Fisher's exact test	sig.
Completely disagree	f %	0 0	0 0	1 2.6	0 0	0 0	1 2.4	2 1.1	23.072	0.197
Disagree	f %	0 0	1 5.3	3 7.7	0 0	10 22.2	7 17.1	21 11.8		
No opinion	f %	3 30	4 21.1	4 10.3	5 20.8	6 13.3	12 29.3	34 19.1		
Agree	f %	5 50	11 57.9	24 61.5	13 54.2	23 51.1	14 34.1	90 50.6		
Completely agree	f %	2 20	3 15.8	7 17.9	6 25	6 13.3	7 17.1	31 17.4		
n=	f %	10 100	19 100	39 100	24 100	45 100	41 100	178 100		

Source: Černič Istenič et al. 2018.

Similarly, when asked whether private life and care work contribute to their (presumed) disadvantage in fulfilling their career ambitions/potentials, women working as researchers found this to be relevant (or somewhat relevant) at a significantly higher rate (67.5%) than women working as administrators (42.1%) (see Table 6). Asked about additional measures that could contribute to improving opportunities for career advancement, female administrative staff mainly provided rather general suggestions, such as the use of quotas (370–FA), obligatory use of part of paternal leave by the partners of employed women (115–FA), and in connection with the reconciliation of work and private life, acquiring certification as a family-friendly company, trainings for decision makers, etc. (268–FA). In contrast, answers from the female researchers gave insight into a variety of very concrete challenges faced by women trying to navigate academic career advancement and caring duties in private life: how to meet the criteria of academic evaluation when on maternity leave and how these criteria should be transformed to accommodate women (243–FRS; 242–FRJ; 290–FRS; 334–FRJ; 360–FRJ); the pros and cons of flexible working hours and working from home (66–FRS; 223–FRJ; 246–FRJ; 409–FRS); and the male image of a scientist who is dedicated solely to his work that cannot accommodate women (283–FRJ). Rather than giving straightforward recommendations, answers from female researchers of both generations revealed inner contradictions and entrapments of their professional position.

Table 6: Agreement with the answer "Private life and care work for their families" to the multiple-choice question "If women are disadvantaged in fulfilling their career ambitions/potentials, which of the following reasons are relevant contributing factors."

		M adm. staff	F adm. staff	M res. senior	M res. junior	F res. senior	F res. junior	Overall	Fisher's exact test	sig.
Not an issue in my department/ institute	f %	4 40	3 15.8	14 35.9	9 37.5	11 24.4	6 14.6	47 26.4	40.063	0.002
Irrelevant	f %	3 30	3 15.8	2 5.1	2 8.3	1 2.2	2 4.9	13 7.3		
Mostly irrelevant	f %	1 10	5 26.3	4 10.3	5 20.8	5 11.1	3 7.3	23 12.9		
Somewhat relevant	f %	2 20	2 10.5	14 35.9	7 29.2	11 24.4	14 34.1	50 28.1		
Relevant	f %	0 0.0	6 31.6	5 12.8	1 4.2	17 37.8	16 39.0	45 25.3		
n=	f %	10 100	19 100	39 100	24 100	45 100	41 100	178 100		

Source: Černič Istenič et al. 2018.

It is no wonder why work-life balance is a bigger challenge for women in research than for those in administration. Administrative work is mostly confined to the office and an eight-hour working day. While it is not flexible, the work shift generally ends in the office and the employee does not "take work home". On the other hand, research work is usually much more flexible, often allowing working from home, and is not confined to working hours, which turns out to be a double-edged sword: work never stops and the researcher's home becomes an office (Currie and Eveline 2011; Kinman 2014: 229; Petrović 2017). In addition, scholarly work is subject to constant periodical evaluations, and career progress depends on highly demanding results (peer-reviewed publications, project leadership, mentorship, etc.), including shorter and longer travels abroad. Answering open-ended questions, many female researchers pointed out how hard it is to fulfil the requirement of a one-month uninterrupted stay abroad as a requirement for attaining higher research positions, especially if one is a mother with young children (337–FRS; 345–FRJ). As one of them pointed out, "In theory it might be possible, in practice I do not know personally any woman who did that" (221–FRS). In comparison, a study found that 25% of female PhD holders in Slovenia were not able to go to postdoc abroad due to family duties, while only 8% of male peers shared the same experience (Ule 2012: 636).

This feature of academic work explains why financial support for family-related needs in case of longer stays abroad (e.g. schooling expense, financial support for the spouse) is significantly more important to female researchers (at a rate of 86.0%) than to female administrators (at rate of 68.4%), who also have no opinion about this at a higher rate (31.6%) (see Table 7). This is another of several questions for which gender difference was not crucial when clustering answers, meaning that whether the answer was given by administrative or research staff was more relevant than their gender.

Table 7: Agreement with the answer "Financial support for family-related needs in case of longer stays abroad (e.g. schooling expense, financial support for spouse)" to the multiple-choice question "In my opinion, career advancement opportunities could be improved with the following measures."

		M adm. staff	F adm. staff	M res. senior	M res. junior	F res. senior	F res. junior	Over-all	Fisher's exact test	sig.
Not an issue in my department/ institute	f %	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	19.221	0.143
Irrelevant	f %	1 10	0 0	2 5.1	1 4.2	2 4.4	2 4.9	8 4.5		
Mostly irrele-vant	f %	5 50	6 31.6	10 25.6	4 16.7	4 8.9	4 9.8	33 18.5		
Somewhat relevant	f %	1 10	7 36.8	9 23.1	7 29.2	16 35.6	10 24.4	50 28.1		
Relevant	f %	3 30	6 31.6	18 46.2	12 50.0	23 51.1	25 61	87 48.9		
n=	f %	10 100	19 100	39 100	24 100	45 100	41 100	178 100		

Source: Černič Istenič et al. 2018.

Bearing in mind the structural problems of scientific financing, which are leading to precariousness in academic and research jobs in Slovenia (Hofman 2017; Fakin Bajec and Sitar 2017) as well abroad (Ivancheva et al. 2019; Murgia and Poggio 2019), the stability and type of employment seem to influence individuals' perceptions of their work environment. Though administrative staff members are nominally part of the sector, their job positions are not directly subject to the rules of the neo-liberal research market, because they are usually not project-bound, but stable, thereby providing continuous income and a permanent employment contract. While in their open-ended questions both administrators and researchers mentioned a lack of stable funding as a structural problem, this problem clearly creates more practical difficulties for academics. So-called "project work" generates additional workload (administrative and management tasks) for researchers, while their research-related tasks still need to be done. As one of the female senior researchers pointed out in our survey, "The majority of researchers works on several projects at the same time, while each of these projects demands a lot of legwork with bureaucracy [*uradovanje*], reports, meetings. Since this amount of work exceeds an eight-hour working day, a lot of this work is done in 'spare time', meaning the time that should be dedicated to private life" (243–FRS). Moreover, scholarly work, organised predominantly in externally funded projects, often requires a scholar to "jump" from one research topic to the next, hindering meaningful continuity and development of the research process and one's research agenda, thus affecting the quality of academic output, all of which are relevant factors in academic career development.

Women working as research staff and those working in administration thus operate in profoundly different work regimes and face different sets of challenges in their working environments. This difference in experiencing what constitutes "work" may often diminish what is usually understood as "women's solidarity". This may also explain the dissonance in implementing gender equality measures at research and academic organisations that we have noted in our work: although the majority of the administrative staff that is supposed to implement these measures is female, they personally experience gendered inequalities to a lesser extent and would not directly profit from gender equality measures that usually target academics. In addition, in practice, the execution of a gender equality plan at an institution increases the workload for the administrative staff. Sharing views and experiences between research and administration staff is thus critically important for facilitating the implementation of gender equality measures in research organisations, but also for designing GEPs to respond to the needs of a diverse group of employees. Participants in the R&I PEERS project workshop in October 2019 also expressed this need. As one of them pointed out, "When we compare a researcher and an administrator, they should both have opportunities for personal development. [In order] to understand each other, maybe they should know more about each other's work, daily routines, and obligations; if we would understand each other better, we would respect each other more, and [the cooperation] would be much easier" (FAS); another similarly stressed, "I am in administration and I don't know what kind of work a researcher is doing, [I interact with them] only when he or she needs something or when there is a problem, only then I get to know about [their work]. So, if I as an administrator can see more of the work [done] by the researchers, maybe there would be more respect and fewer problems" (FAJ). A similar point was raised in the study of the staff of Oxford University working in medical and social sciences. Although the study did not analyse administrative staff members as a specific statistical group, their opinions came up in the qualitative analysis of the open-ended questions, where "many administrative... and support staff felt division between themselves and academics", and female administrative staff in particular "were more likely to report not feeling valued by academics" (Ovseiko et al. 2019: 180). Therefore, fostering meaningful communication and mutual respect between administrative and academic staff needs to be a first step in creating GEP, even when it primarily aims at transforming the work environment for academics of different genders.

4 Conclusion

Our research showed that academia has a persistent masculine habitus in which senior male researchers tend to be the most blind to gender inequalities, while junior female researchers see them most often. In early career stages, when work accomplishments are crucially important for securing academic progress and job stability, female academics are usually simultaneously bearing the demanding burden of care and family duties.

Furthermore, we found that work regimes, stability, and the type of employment also influence perceptions of gender (in)equalities. Junior researchers who more often occupy precarious work positions – short-term contracts and/or unstable employment that depends on project funding – are more prone to recognise structural inequalities than their senior colleagues are. Those who are more directly subjected to the rules of the neo-liberal academic market (e.g. continuous fundraising for salary) and to increasingly severe processes of academic evaluation experience harsher obstacles to balancing private and professional life, since many work-related tasks are being "outsourced" into the private sphere and the part of the day that is supposed to be dedicated to relaxation and leisure.

Our research indicates that the analysis of inequalities in the academic field could profit from taking into account specific modes of production in the particular setting (e.g. less-stable and project-based funding, and the precariousness of job positions) and how they relate to social reproduction. We recommend further research to explore the structural positions individuals take within a particular organisation and their engagement in social reproduction as a promising avenue for finding gendered inequalities, thus going beyond identity categories.

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LITERATURE REVIEW ON SELECTED POLITICAL ECONOMY ISSUES OF THE COVID-19 CRISIS

ABSTRACT

This article aims to explore the emerging literature concerned with the politico--economic impacts of the COVID-19 crisis and to present various insights and data about the ongoing processes. This literature review article: (i) provides an overview of various job retention schemes; (ii) reviews the literature on the transformation of work within the context of teleworking; and (iii) summarises the findings about the COVID-19 crisis' impact on income and gender (in)equality. While the presented literature provides well-arranged empirical insights into the COVID-19 crisis, it (mostly) fails to situate these changes in the longue durée of constant changes in the capitalist mode of production.

KEY WORDS: COVID-19 crisis, state, teleworking, inequalities, neoliberalism

Pregled literature izbranih problemov politične ekonomije krize COVID-19

IZVLEČEK

Namen članka je raziskati nastajajočo literaturo o politično-ekonomskih učinkih krize COVID-19 ter predstaviti različna spoznanja in podatke o tekočih procesih. Pregledni članek ponuja: (i) pregled različnih shem ohranjanja delovnih mest; (ii) pregled literature o preoblikovanju dela v kontekstu dela na daljavo; (iii) povzetek ugotovitev o vplivu krize COVID-19 na dohodkovno neenakost in neenakost spolov. Predstavljena literatura ponuja veliko empiričnih vpogledov glede krize COVID-19, vendar teh sprememb (praviloma) ne umesti v longue durée nenehnih sprememb kapitalističnega produkcijskega načina.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: kriza COVID-19, država, delo na daljavo, neenakosti, neoliberalizem

1 Introduction[1]

The past two years have been marked by the COVID-19 global pandemic. The COVID-19 crisis began as a medical and health crisis, which also triggered a deep economic recession at both the national and global levels. In 2020, the World Bank (WB) predicted that the global gross domestic product (GDP) would fall by around 5.2%; the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimated this contraction to about 6–8%, while the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided the least negative forecast – a 4.4% GDP fall (World Bank 2020; OECD 2020a; IMF 2020a). The WB even argued that COVID-19 could result in the deepest global recession in the last 150 years (World Bank 2020: 13). However, despite this initial shock, the pandemic did not result in such a negative sequence of events.

In its Global Economic Prospect for 2021, the WB forecasted that the global economy would experience 5.6% growth, which is a huge rise, although this would still be 2% lower compared to pre-COVID-19 projections (World Bank 2021). This rapid economic recovery and the specific response from the governments also prevented massive unemployment. This has been the result of never-before-seen fiscal and monetary policy measures implemented by states to prevent further and deeper recessions. However, these interventions by states have also had important political, economic and social consequences that range from labour market changes to changes in employment and work processes, while addressing and (re-)producing various types of inequalities.

The objective of this article is to synthesise the findings of the growing literature on the political, economic and social impacts of the COVID-19 crisis and to critically reflect on the research undertaken thus far while identifying certain limitations or blind spots of the presented literature. To achieve our objective, we researched the databases and publications of important international organisations (WB, IMF, International labour organisation-ILO, OECD, EU, the European Trade Union Institute-ETUI) that deal with the issue of public policies and their impact on employment, the rise of teleworking and different types of inequalities during the COVID-19 pandemic. We also used the two most widespread databases to select the most relevant articles: Web of Science and

1. The article was written as part of the project: *The changing role of the state: state and employment policy in the context of the COVID-19 crisis (Z5-3221)*, funded by the Slovenian Research Agency.

Scopus. In our search within these two databases, we adopted criteria such as subject area (social sciences, economy, business, arts and humanities, industrial relations, business and management, social sciences interdisciplinary), language (English) and time of publication (March 2020–February 2022). We searched for every section of this review using the following keywords: 1) COVID-19 and job retention schemes; 2) COVID-19 and teleworking (and impact); 3) COVID-19 and income inequality; and 4) COVID-19 and gender inequality. We briefly scanned the abstracts so that we could identify the relevance of the articles for our literature review and included the most relevant articles that dealt with different countries/regions. Moreover, as not much time has passed since the outbreak of the pandemic, we also used the snowball method to find additional important articles and newly published important books.

After the introduction, we review the importance of various job retention schemes in preventing mass unemployment amid the COVID-19 crisis. The third section reviews the literature focusing on teleworking and potentially permanent changes. In the fourth section, we review the literature on the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on income and gender inequality. The concluding section offers a critical reflection of the presented literature review from a Marxist theoretical position and points out certain limitations of the current state-of-the-art in explaining the consequences of the COVID-19 crisis.

2 Saving Jobs During the COVID-19 Pandemic

After the global financial and economic crisis of 2008, countries adopted different fiscal policies: the USA pursued a more neo-Keynesian economic policy, while the EU demanded strict austerity measures, spending cuts and the implementation of rigid fiscal rules. Moreover, although various policy instruments were adopted to save jobs during the 2008 crisis (Hijzen and Venn 2011; Hijzen and Martin 2013), the crucial idea was to save banks that were "too big to fail" and not to save jobs. This resulted in a further deregulated labour market after the 2008 crisis and the rise of non-standard types of employment (Streeck 2017; Tooze 2018). However, since the COVID-19 crisis was an exogenous shock, it also led different states to adopt similar job retention schemes (JRS).

At the beginning of March 2020, when the World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID-19 a global pandemic and when most states began implementing more or less radical lockdowns, a justified fear emerged that a deep recession would follow, which would also result in a specific "jobs crisis" (OECD 2020b). The OECD claims that after the initial shock, "the OECD unemployment rate saw an unprecedented 3 percentage point increase to reach 8.8% – the highest unemployment rate seen in a decade /…/"[2] (OECD 2021a). Similarly, in the second quarter of 2020, the employment rate in the EU decreased by 3% (Eurostat 2020a). However, in the third quarter, it increased by 1%, representing the "strongest increases observed since /…/ 1995" (Eurostat 2020b). Similar trends can also be observed in other parts of the world (OECD 2020c). This was all due to a rapid response from states that have implemented various JRS to mitigate the rise in unemployment and the consequent drop in demand. According to the data provided by the OECD, by May 2020, various JRSs "supported about 50 million jobs across the OECD, about ten times as many as during the global financial crisis" (OECD 2020c: 2).

In different countries, access to JRSs has been eased and the scale of support has grown to sustain the level of employment (for a more detailed overview, see Table 1). Drahokoupil and Müller have provided an extensive overview of various JRSs and their specificities that have been implemented by EU member states, Norway, the UK and Switzerland. They found that most states that did not have an already established JRS before the COVID-19 crisis "opted for a short-time work scheme. As a reaction to the crisis, short-time work was introduced in eleven EU countries and in the United Kingdom" (Drahokoupil and Müller 2021: 15). The framework of various JRSs in Europe has been different – the terms of subsidies, duration, eligibility, etc., vary from state to state (Szpejna and Kennedy 2020).

In the UK, the government introduced the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme. By March 2021, almost 34% of employees were furloughed (more than 11 million employees), while the number of those who claimed some of the unemployment benefits increased by almost 1.5 million since March 2020 (Wielgoszewska et al. 2021; Adams-Prassl et al. 2020a). Bishop and Day (2020) argue that from April to July 2020, the Australian Job Keeper Payment saved around 700,000 jobs. Cremers (2021) estimated that from March until the end of May 2020, more than 2.5 million people were included in the wage subsidy scheme in the Netherlands. Moreover, he has found that in 2020 businesses received EUR 15 billion through the wage subsidy scheme, which is almost 2% of the GDP. Osuna and García Pérez (2021) have explored the impact of the short-time work[3] (STW) schemes in Spain and found that without the STW mechanisms,

2. This was largely induced by developments in the USA and Canada. For example in the USA, in April 2020 the number of the unemployed increased by almost 16 million (OECD 2021a).
3. Short-time work is a state-funded programme that provides subsidies for workers during economic crises due to low revenues of companies where they are employed and because this results in shorter working hours.

the COVID-19 crisis would have led to a 42% unemployment rate, while with the implementation of these measures, the rise of unemployment was very moderate. In Ireland, they implemented a special programme – first, the Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme (TWSS) (Hick and Murphy 2021) until September 2020, and after September 2020, the Employment Wage Subsidy Scheme replaced the TWSS (Gibbons 2021). Both schemes proved to be effective in saving jobs. From April until December 2020, around 300,000 people, monthly, were included in the job retention scheme.

Christl et al. (2021) explored the influence of STW and other policy measures introduced to address the economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis in Germany and found that, without these measures, German households would have lost almost 5% of their market income in 2020. However, because of these specific measures, they lost only 0.8% of their market income. Ajyar and Chi Dao (2021) explored the impact of STW in Germany and found that the German model of *Kurzarbeit* was crucial in cushioning the rise of unemployment; without these schemes, unemployment would have risen by an additional 3 percentage points. South Korea revised its pre-existing Employment Retention Subsidy scheme (Oh 2020; Lee 2020), as well as Japan revised its Employment Adjustment Subsidy (Tsuruga 2020). Moreover, in South Korea, "the decision to increase the Employment Retention Subsidy from 63% to 75% was taken following a tripartite declaration on the COVID-19 crisis" (OECD 2021a). Crucially, both proved to be successful in preventing massive job losses.

The USA introduced a specific programme, which is actually not a JRS, but it had the same intention – to prevent massive job losses. In March 2020, the government adopted the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), which provided companies with no more than 500 employees with low-interest loans to be able to pay their employees, even if they did not actually work because of lockdowns. Between April and June 2020, the PPP provided companies with more than USD 500 billion (around 2.5% of the GDP). The second round of loans, from December 2021 until May 2021, was stricter and had additional criteria for eligibility – companies had to show a loss in revenue compared to 2019 by at least 25%, and the PPP was limited to companies with no more than 300 employees (Bartik et al. 2020; Hubbard and Strain 2020). Crucially, this loan was "converted into a subsidy if employment and compensation levels were maintained" (OECD 2021a). In the case of the USA, there are conflicting claims regarding the PPP; certain authors argue that it had an important impact in preserving jobs (Faulkender et al. 2021), while others claim that its impact was rather small (Bartik et al. 2020).

Table 1.: An overview of adopted job retention schemes in selected countries.

Country	Name of the JRS	Type	Author(s) / Organisation(s)
UK	Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme	Short-time work scheme	Adams-Prassl et al. (2020a); Wielgoszewska et al. (2021)
Australia	Jobkeeper Payment	Wage subsidy	Bishop and Day (2020)
Netherlands	Temporary Emergency Measure Bridging Employment	Wage subsidy	Cremers (2021)
Spain	Expediente de regulación temporal de empleo	Short-time work scheme	Osuna and García Pérez (2021)
Germany	Kurzarbeit	Short-time work scheme	Christl et al. (2021); Ajyar and Chi Dao (2021)
USA	Paycheck Protection Program	Loan/wage subsidy (special programme)	Bartik et al. (2020); Hubbard and Strain (2020); Faulkender et al. (2021)
South Korea	Employment retention subsidy	Short-time work scheme	Oh (2020); Lee (2020)
Japan	Employment Adjustment Subsidy	Short-time work scheme	Tsuruga (2020)
Latin America and the Caribbean	overview	/	ECLAC/ILO (2021)
Ireland	Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme; Employment Wage Subsidy Scheme	wage subsidy	Gibbons (2021); Hick and Murphy (2021)
OECD member states	overview of different JRSs of OECD member states	/	OECD (2021a)
EU, UK, Norway, Switzerland	overview of different JRSs	/	Drahokoupil and Müller (2021)

From the existing data and research, we can say that the most effective policies were those that already existed before the pandemic, and governments only adjusted them to new circumstances or those that were implemented quickly without hesitation in the early weeks of the pandemic (OECD 2021a). This quick and suitable response also saved more money in the long run; namely, if these policies had not been adopted, the massive unemployment and the money spent for different social protection programmes, if the recession got worse, would have caused much larger social, economic and fiscal problems for governments.

3 Teleworking During the COVID-19 Crisis

Another crucial aspect of the political economy of the COVID-19 crisis was radical was the radical disruption in the working process. The process of ICT development in the last 30 years has already transformed the individual and collective labour process. However, the new reality of social distancing amid lockdowns has led to the rise of teleworking as a new normality (Brynjolfsson et al. 2020). Sostero et al. claim that the broad use of teleworking during the COVID-19 pandemics "can be considered a large-scale natural experiment in work organisation; an improvised and ad-hoc response at the level of states and organisations to a rare circumstance" (Sostero et al. 2020: 53).

The Eurofound (2020: 31–34) study found that almost 40% of employees began working from home at the beginning of the pandemic, while only 20% were working from home prior. Moreover, those who regularly worked from home before the COVID-19 crisis represented almost half of those who were also currently working from home. In Finland, almost 60% of employees were working from home; in Belgium, more than 50% worked from home; and in Croatia, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary, there were around 20% (Eurofound 2020; ILO 2021a). An OECD (2021b) survey found that during 2020 in Australia, France and the UK 47% of all employees worked from home and that even in Japan, which did not implement a lockdown in the first wave of the pandemic, the share of employees that worked from home rose from 10% to 28% between December 2019 and the end of May 2020.

Belot et al. (2020) carried out a comparative cross-national survey in the USA, Japan, South Korea, the UK, Italy and China. They gathered data about teleworking during April 2020 and found that almost 40% of all employees had to telework amid the COVID-19 crisis. There was a significant rise in teleworking in all sectors. In China, the data is fascinating – namely, more than 60% of Chinese employees have reported teleworking, despite strong industrial and manufacturing sectors in the country.

Clear trends are showing that the share of teleworking is directly influenced by the degree of lockdowns and the public health situation in respective states (Eurofound 2020). In Slovenia, for example, the share of people working from home all the time or some of the days during a week was the highest in December 2020, when the lockdowns were very harsh, and the virus was spreading very quickly – almost 25% (SORS 2021). However, there was a clear change because many more people were going to work during the second wave than during the first (Breznik and Lužar 2021).

Belzunegui-Eraso and Erro-Garcés (2020) argue that in Spain, large companies (domestic or multinational) introduced teleworking more frequently than smaller ones. It was a sort of contingency for an external shock that required a radical reorganisation of the working process. Adams-Prassl et al. (2020b) examined teleworking potentials and realities in the UK and USA and found that there are important differences between and within sectors and occupations. The most significant rise in teleworking was present in those sectors and occupations where there had also been high numbers of employees working from home, even prior to the pandemic. Dingel and Neiman (2020) explored the share of jobs that could be done from home in the USA and found that around 37% of jobs in the USA could be done entirely from home, with important differences across cities and sectors.

Barrero et al. (2021: 30) have researched the impact of teleworking in the USA and they project that "American workers will supply about 20 percent of full workdays from home in the post-pandemic economy, four times the pre-COVID level". Moreover, they claimed that many workers would even prefer lower payments if they had the option to work from home. Similarly, Amankwah-Amoah et al. (2021) argued that the COVID-19 crisis has been the "great accelerator" regarding the use of technology and digitalisation. They also posit that the role of governments should be to promote "routine and long-term usage of home working and teleworking [that] may reduce traffic congestion and pollution, and make for more efficient working".

The increase in teleworking has also encouraged researchers to analyse the impact of teleworking on people's quality of life.[4] A study carried out in 16 cities in Europe, North America and the Middle East on more than 3 million people who were working from home found that the length of the working day incre-

4. Athanasiadou and Theriou (2021) provided a systematic literature review on the impacts of teleworking by analysing 40 articles in the period 2000-2020 and found that the prevalent conclusion was that teleworking was linked to higher work-life balance. However, the up to date research of teleworking during the COVID-19 crisis suggests the exact opposite.

ased by almost 50 minutes (DeFilippis et al. 2020). Gascoigne (2020) found that homework can lead to increased productivity through the intensification of work. Wang et al. (2021) conducted a study on the effectiveness of teleworking during the first months of the pandemic in China. They found that "working at home means more interruptions from family, which may negatively influence work effectiveness" (Wang et al. 2021: 28).

In the UK, Chung et al. concluded that the "blurred boundaries between work and home remain the most common negative outcome of home working /…/" (Chung et al. 2020: 15). Similar conclusions have been reached by different authors who have examined the impact of teleworking in different national contexts (see Tavares et al. 2020; Irawanto et al. 2021; Lonska et al. 2021; Tomohiro 2021; Wang et al. 2021). The second main finding seems to be that teleworking within the context of the pandemic also led to greater stress (Irawanto et al. 2021; Kapoor et al. 2021; Tomohiro 2021; Wang et al. 2021; Camacho and Barrios 2022).

In Table 2, we summarise the key findings of the reviewed literature.

Table 2.: A list of authors and their findings regarding the impact(s) of teleworking during the COVID-19 crisis.

Author(s)	Country/ region	Positive / Negative impact(s) of teleworking
Gascoigne (2020)	UK	Intensification of work
Chung et al. (2020)	UK	Blurred boundaries between work and private life
Tavares et al. (2020)	Portugal	Negative impact on work-life balance; a weaker sense of connectedness with other employees; problems with support infrastructure
Sostero et al. (2020)	overview (Europe)	Blurred boundaries between work and private life
Wang et al. (2021)	China	Blurred boundaries; ineffective communication, loneliness; higher job autonomy (flexibility of working time)
Lonska et al. (2021)	Latvia	Negative impact on work-life balance
Tomohiro (2021)	Japan	Blurred boundaries between work and private life
Irawanto et al. (2021)	Indonesia	Negative impact on work-life balance; negative effect on work stress because of work overload
Delfino and van der Kolk (2021)	Italy	More stress, important modifications in employee autonomy, weaker sense of connectedness with other employees
Kapoor et al. (2021)	India	More stress, blurred boundaries between work and private life; the negative impact of stress on well-being is partially mediated by teleworking
Camacho and Barrios (2022)	Colombia	Technostress due to too much work

Working from home was a specific answer to the pandemic lockdowns and was a tool to prevent job and earning losses. In this sense, teleworking proved to be very efficient and, together with different JRSs, prevented a deeper economic crisis and rise of unemployment, although important differences exist in teleworkability potentials between sectors. Moreover, important changes occurred in assessing the impacts of teleworking; as demonstrated before the crisis, it was associated mostly with a better work-life balance. However, due to the specific situation of the pandemic, teleworking is today, in different parts of the world, associated with blurred boundaries between work and private life. In this sense, state policies will have to address these problems, especially with the rising individualisation and alienation of workers when working from home.

4 COVID-19 and inequality

All these important changes due to the COVID-19 crisis and lockdowns – the various JRS and the radical transformation of the labour process through technology and working from home – have had an important impact on existing economic and social inequalities. In this review, we focus on two dimensions: income inequality and gender inequality.

4.1 Income inequality

Furceri et al. (2020), examining pandemics and epidemics in the last 20 years and their influence on inequality, found that they always led to increases in the Gini coefficient and to raising "income shares accruing to the higher deciles of the income distribution, and lowered the employment-to-population ratio for those with basic education compared to those with higher education". These scenarios have also been examined for the COVID-19 pandemic. Palomino, Rodriguez and Sebastian (2020) have examined various scenarios within the context of lockdowns (different length and scope) and have found that during the COVID-19 pandemic, inequality will rise as well: "Decomposing overall wage inequality in Europe, we find that lockdown and social distance measures produce a double process of divergence: both inequality within and between countries increase".

Darvas found that the difference between the job losses of the richer and better educated and the poorer low-educated workers correlates with the recession in 2020, which suggests that "the depth of the economic recession is related to the increase in within-country income inequity in 2020" (Darvas, 2021: 21). Oscar (2021) found that COVID-19 had an important impact on wage inequality, since the most affected sectors were low-wage and labour-intensive sectors. Therefore, COVID-19 has in certain countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania and Luxembourg) led to an increase in wage inequality. Christl et al. (2022) researched income distribution within Austria and found that "the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is regressive, affecting low-income households more significantly than high-income households" (Christl et al. 2022: 14).

Almeida et al. (2021) researched the impact of COVID-19 on income at the EU level and found that, throughout 2020, the disposable income of households "would fall by 9.3% due to the COVID-19 crisis without discretionary fiscal policy measures, and by 4.3% with policy intervention". Crucially, they claimed that the COVID-19 crisis would have a much larger impact on poorer households, thus reproducing income inequalities of the past (Almeida et al. 2021: 429).

Brewer and Tassova showed that "UK households, on average, sustained income losses in net income of 6.9%. Earned income fell by a substantial 12.6% of the baseline net income. But policies protected household incomes to a substantial degree" (Brewer and Tassova 2021: 456). Piyapromdee and Spittal (2020: 825) showed that in the first months of the pandemic in the UK, "[l]ower-income households experience the largest proportionate income reduction". Brewer and Gardiner (2020) explored the influence of COVID-19 on the income of households in the UK and found that certain important changes have taken place. Namely, new social and employment protection schemes managed to soften the blow, but pre-COVID-19 low-income families were much likelier to take on new debt or borrow money from families and friends: "This /.../ suggests that the crisis is having more marked negative effects on the living standards – considered broadly – of lower-income working-age families than of higher-income families" (Brewer and Gardiner 2020: 197).

Dasgupta et al. (2021: 339) argued that, in India, the effect of COVID-19 will be persistent, especially regarding poverty and income inequalities. Brum and de Rosa (2021) found that in Uruguay, the poverty rate grew from 8.5% to 11.8%. Qian and Fan (2020: 4) showed that, in China, those with better education lost less income than those with lower education levels. Those people with the lowest income had "more than twice as likely as those from the highest-income families to have a zero income /.../".

Although most of the articles found that there was an increase in income inequality, there are also authors who argue the exact opposite. One of the most interesting articles was published by Clark et al. (2021). They investigated the trends of income inequality during the COVID-19 pandemic in Germany, France, Italy and Spain between January 2020 and January 2021. They found that there was a fall in "relative inequality" in these countries. They concluded that "inequality mostly increased from January to May 2020 before dropping back below its pre-COVID level in September 2020" (Clark et al. 2021: 17). Similarly, Li et al. (2021: 19) claimed that "Australia experienced a rapid drop in income inequality, reducing the Gini coefficient /…/ income from 0.33 to 0.31". Moreover, similar conclusions were found in the case of South Africa (Chitiga--Mabugu et al. 2021: 92).

Regarding income inequality, as we can see, there are no conclusive findings. Certain authors and studies suggest that there was a decline in income inequality in specific cases, while most studies suggest the opposite. In this context, some of the implemented policies certainly helped reduce, or at least sustain, pre-pandemic levels of income inequality. More research will be needed in the future to better explain what really happened during the COVID-19 pandemic regarding income inequality.

4.2 Gender inequality

In its wage inequality report, the ILO states that, because of the "the disproportionate impacts of the COVID-19 crisis on women and the significant risks of further increasing existing inequalities to their detriment, wage policies are also an essential means of limiting the effects of the crisis on the gender pay gap" (ILO 2021b: 171). Within this context, one of the most researched areas regarding the socio-economic impact of COVID-19 is the field of gender inequality.

Alon et al. (2020) explain that in "normal" recessions, male employment is likelier to be affected and men are likelier to lose their jobs. However, the COVID-19 crisis had an impact on industries with a higher number of female employees. Moreover, because of the lockdowns closed schools and daycares, COVID-19 had a huge impact on employed mothers. Similar findings were presented in a review article by Brodeur et al. (2021). Kikuchi et al. analysed labour market changes in Japan within the context of the pandemic of COVID-19 and found that although "both males' and females' employment declined since February 2020, the decline is larger for females" (Kikuchi et al. 2021: 4). This was also the case in Austria (Christl et al. 2022), Israel (Kristal and Yaish 2020) and the USA (Tüzemen and Tran 2020). Dang and Nguyen (2021) carried out research that included South Korea, Japan, Italy, China, the UK and the four largest states in the USA (Texas, New York, Florida and California) and concluded that their results "suggest that women are more likely to permanently lose their job than men, and they expect their own labor income to fall more in the future than men do /…/" (Dang and Nguyen 2021: 6).

Štebe and Vovk (2021) found that the COVID-19 had an important impact on the well-being of women in Slovenia, especially due to more "precarious employment and the stronger demand for family care".

An empirical study of Germany, the USA and Singapore has demonstrated that COVID-19 has had a more substantial influence on female than male employment: women were likelier to work from home, work part-time or even become unemployed than men, mostly due to their more precarious position before the pandemic. Women were likelier to become unemployed in Germany or Singapore and in the USA, they were likelier to work from home or to work part-time. This study also found that gender roles have been changing due to the pandemic: in the case that women lost their jobs, they were trapped in a traditional gender attitude, while when men lost their jobs, this led to a redefinition of gender roles in relation to housework and childcare (Reichelt et al. 2021).

Adams-Prassl et al. (2020c) examined three cases – Germany, the UK and the USA – and found that in Germany employees were not affected by the crisis as much as in the USA and the UK because of the well-established short-time work scheme. The second important finding is that if one was able to perform their work from home, it also meant a higher probability that one would not lose their job, while those on temporary contracts, less educated and women were likelier to become unemployed. Fodor et al. (2021) analysed the hours spent on housework and childcare work of both men and women in Hungary and found that "men indeed claimed that they were doing 35% more childcare work than before the pandemic (just like women, in fact)". However, since women did much more childcare work before the pandemic, this also meant that "women devoted a significantly larger number of hours to children than before and much more compared to men" (Fodor et al. 2021: 105).

Deshpande analysed the situation in the first five months of the pandemic in India and found that "the gender gap in average hours spent on domestic work hours *decreased* in the first month of the lockdown" (Deshpande 2021: 77). Things changed by the end of 2020, when women spent much more time on housework than before the pandemic, while the level of men's housework decreased below the pre-pandemic level (Deshpande 2021). Costoya et al. (2021) analysed gender inequality and housework in Argentina in the first year of the pandemic and found that changes in hours of paid labour were crucial. Where men worked fewer hours, there "was an increase in the time spent in housework activities by men during lockdown relative to their partners, compared to the gap existing before the lockdown" (Costoya et al. 2021: 8). Conversely, as they pointed out, "a reduction in women's hours of paid work during the lockdown meant an increase in the within-couple gender gap" (Costoya et al. 2021: 8). However, Cuesta and Pico (2020) analysed the gender implications of poverty in Colombia during the COVID-19 pandemic and concluded that there were no special gender implications regarding women's employment and poverty (Cuesta and Pico 2020: 1580).

Moreover, Feng and Savani researched 286 full-time employees and dual--career parents in the USA who had to work from home since the beginning of the pandemic and asked them to self-evaluate their work productivity before and during the COVID-19 crisis. They found that there was a gender gap in self-perceived productivity and job satisfaction (Feng and Savani 2020). However, if men had to work from home, they were also involved in childcare and housework, much more than they had been before (Collins et al. 2020).

If, during the last few decades, reducing gender inequality has been among the top policy priorities in the world, during the pandemic, the traditional gender inequalities have been mostly reinforced (for an extensive overview of the key findings, see Table 3).

Table 3.: A list of authors and their findings regarding gender (in)equality during the COVID-19 crisis.

Author(s)	Country	Gender (in)equality and COVID-19
Alon et al. (2020)	USA	Women are more severely affected by job losses, while in addition the closure of day-cars also affected working mothers; fathers became included in childcare, which can lead to changes in housework and childcare
Adams-Prassl et al. (2020c)	Germany, UK, USA	Women have experienced a larger drop in employment in the USA, UK and Germany than men; less educated more likely to lose their jobs; the situation in Germany was somewhat better than in the USA and UK
Sevilla and Smith (2020)	UK	Women did more childcare than men during lockdown; also, women that had worked from home did more childcare than men who lost their job or were on furlough; however, it is evident, that a more equal allocation of childcare is present due to the COVID-19, especially in families where men lost their jobs or were on furlough
Cuesta and Pico (2020)	Colombia	No significant differences between men and women concerning the effect of the pandemic and state policy interventions on poverty
Kristal and Yaish (2020)	Israel	More women lost their jobs than men, which induced the income gap
Collins et al. (2020)	USA	Mothers with young children reduced their working hours much more than fathers; the gender gap in working hours grew from 20 to 50%
Feng and Savani (2020)	USA	Lower productivity and lower job satisfaction were reported by women due to the pandemic

Fodor et al. (2021)	Hungary	Men increased their share of childcare as much as women; however, since women were doing much more childcare work than men before the pandemic, women's contribution to childcare grew much more in absolute dimensions than men's; gender inequality increased the most among the most educated women
Deshpande (2021)	India	Lower gender gap regarding employment probability because of the lower probability of men being employed; after the first wave women did more housework than before the pandemics, while men spent less time on housework than before
Štebe and Vovk (2021)	Slovenia	Drop in employment and rise in absences from work for women that are larger than those for men; the negative impact of flexible employment was much more evenly shared between men and women
Costoya et al. (2021)	Argentina	The time spent for men and women on housework depended on the fact who worked less; women did much more childcare work and housework if they lost their job
Kikuchi et al. (2021)	Japan	Women's employment declined more than men's employment
Dang and Nguyen (2021)	South Korea, Japan, Italy, China, UK, Texas, New York, Florida, California	Women were more likely to become unemployed than men; women expect their income to decrease more than men do; one of the main reasons for this is the larger portion of women working in the service industry
Reichelt et al. (2021)	Germany, USA, Singapore	More likely that women would become unemployed than men in Germany and Singapore, in the USA women more likely to reduce working hours or to work from home; when women became unemployed and their partner remained employed it led to strengthening traditional gender roles; when men became unemployed it is associated with more egalitarian view on gender roles
Christl et al. (2022)	Austria	Bigger loss of income for women

The pandemic has clearly had a negative impact on gender equality. Women were likelier to lose their job or to work from home, while they also carried a much larger burden in childcare and housework. An analysis of different parts of the world suggests that this is a widespread phenomenon. The reviewed literature clearly points to the necessity of politically addressing long, persisting trends.

5 Critical Reflection of Presented Literature and Concluding Remarks

Because of various implemented policies aimed at mitigating the social and economic impacts of the COVID-19 crisis, we are seeing important changes in our everyday lives. The presented literature provides crucial empirical insights for understanding the broader changes in the existing modality of the capitalist mode of production. The temporal and spatial limitations of the article are apparent – the article does not and cannot exhaust the entire amount of literature that has been published regarding the political, economic and social impacts of the COVID-19 crisis. However, we can reflect on certain blind spots in the presented approaches.

First, it is clear that, in comparison to the crisis of 2008, the world has taken a different approach in addressing the economic and social aspects of the COVID-19 crisis. This is best represented by the widespread JRSs and their significant impact. The widespread use of JRS shows that a more Keynesian approach is being adopted. The goal of governments was to save jobs and not (exclusively) big companies. However, the data suggest that there are clear differences between different countries in their possibility of adopting larger programmes to stimulate their economies because of their different financial situations, the scale of public debt and the "confidence" of financial markets (Makin and Layton 2021). Therefore, the position of the country within the capitalist world system, the type of capitalism and welfare regime in the respective country and the level of economic development should be considered when explaining the exact institutional and financial possibilities and limitations when implementing specific JRS.

Moreover, since these JRSs were financed through deficit spending, certain authors claim that this could already mean a radical break with neoliberalism (Rodrik 2020; Tooze 2021). In this sense, the question that arises is: Was the implementation of JRSs a result of altered class power relations? If we examine union density as a proxy for the bargaining power of working classes, then we can see that in the OECD countries, the numbers are still going down (OECD 2022), meaning that organised labour is not becoming stronger. Hence, one must be careful when proclaiming such paradigmatic shifts, because problems might occur when the financial markets begin pushing for fiscal consolidation. In this sense, the neo-Keynesian answer would be to increase various taxes for the wealthiest to repay public debt. Will this happen, or will governments introduce fiscal austerity that will again – as after the crisis of 2008 – affect the poorest in our societies? Therefore, the question that arises is whether this will be a one-time neo-Keynesian answer within the broader history of the defeat of the working classes?

Second, regarding the introduction of teleworking, the literature correctly identifies important and even radical ruptures and transformations. We claim that teleworking should be understood within the context of the development of productive forces as well as of the transformation of relations of production that are inherent to capitalism. In this sense, COVID-19 was not the sole reason for and did not exclusively contribute to the rise of teleworking, but it was certainly a catalyst for the quick and massive rise of teleworking. As Mirowski (2013) noted, in capitalism, no crisis goes to waste.

Most of the articles reviewed clearly point out that this process of working from home leads to more stress and blurred boundaries between private and professional life. Manokha even argued that teleworking "contributes to /…/ to the development of a '24/7 employee' or a 'just-in-time employee', who is available, reachable and observable at any time" (Manokha 2020: 285). However, within the context of the capitalist mode of production, one important topic is missing. Capitalism is based on constant changes in the labour process, as well as technology, to reduce production costs and keep profit shares as high as possible. In this sense, working from home and using new information and communications technologies (ICTs) in the long run will change the business model of companies – teleworking will be much cheaper than having people working together at a shared place. Moreover, teleworking not only leads to greater stress and alienation but also can have an important effect on the inability of workers to organise – one becomes completely alienated from his/her colleagues and it becomes impossible to form any sort of class solidarity. However, it seems that the authors only consider these transformations within the scope of empirical findings or whether they are good or bad within moral categories without reflection of the context within which they are taking place. Hence, more attention should be given to the explanation of the new digital leap forward during the COVID-19 crisis within the framework of the constant development of productive forces in capitalism and within the framework of altered class power relations while certainly building on the existing empirical foundations that the presented literature provides.

Third, the question of income inequality is one of the most important ones in relation to the economic and social impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. The conclusions of different authors are not coherent; it seems that the predicted rise in income inequality was mitigated very much by the introduction of JRSs and other social programmes. Here again, one can see the possible strong role that the state can play in addressing these contradictions. Nevertheless, one must ask the question of whether these analyses are too narrow?

Namely, even in countries where there is relatively low income inequality, wealth inequality is much larger (see Roberts 2020). More importantly, Goodman (2022) showed that the wealth of billionaires rose only in 2020 by USD 3.9 trillion. The Oxfam report, named "Inequality Kills", states clearly that the "wealth of the 10 richest men has doubled, while the /…/ 99% of humanity are worse off, because of COVID-19" (Oxfam 2022: 17). Therefore, if we know that the wealthiest became much richer during the pandemic, it becomes clear that the research on income inequality should be combined with the research on wealth inequality to get a full picture of the ongoing changes.

Fourth, the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on gender inequality has been addressed by a variety of authors and they mostly agree that gender inequalities have been reproduced or even sharpened during the COVID-19 crisis. If we know that gender inequality and the exploitation of women in the workplace and at home are the cornerstones of capitalism (see Federici 2012; 2021), we should not be surprised that most of the analyses conclude that the pandemic has only worsened the position of women in our societies.

Throughout the long history of feminist struggles for equality, even though one of the main radical interventions of feminism was that 'the personal is political', too many times "the state has sought to redress inequalities between men and women, this has always been centred around formal equality initiatives in the workplace, which have left the private realm largely undisturbed. As a result, socially reproductive work remains unevenly distributed in the home, even where women are also engaged in paid work" (Gordon-Bouvier 2021: 216). Therefore, deeper analysis is needed of the specific ways in which the reproduction of gender inequalities are connected with the specific policy responses implemented in specific countries. More attention should be devoted to analysing specific age and occupational differences between women, while intersectionality (connecting the gender, class, race/nationality perspectives) should also be taken more into account when examining the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on gender inequality. If it is true that a new modality of capitalism is being established – although, as explained above, we must still wait to be able to make such conclusions – then it will be necessary to analyse the specific reproduction of gender inequalities within the new context of the capitalist regime of accumulation and mode of regulation.

Cotula (2021) argues that we should not disregard the structural changes that are evolving today because of attempts to limit the scope of the economic and social aspects of the crisis. Within this framework, the presented literature provides important empirical findings. However, it mostly fails to reflect on the power relations between classes and the transformed logic of the reproduction of capitalist accumulation. If it is true that in capitalism, "all that is solid melts into air" (Marx and Engels 2004), then it is crucial to examine the COVID-19 crisis within the context of the constant crisis tendencies and class-specific resolutions of those within the capitalist mode of production. This is where space opens up for further empirical as well as broader theoretical research on the political-economic changes and impacts of the COVID-19 crisis.

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RECENZIJE KNJIG

BOOK REVIEWS

Hana Hunjet

Angela Nagle: Ubijte vse normalneže: Internetne kulturne vojne od 4chana in Tumblrja do Trumpa in alternativne desnice. Ljubljana: Založba Analecta, 2020.
151 strani (ISBN 978-961-6376-92-1), 16 EUR

Knjiga Angele Nagle, ki je v ZDA izšla leta 2017, prvenstveno analizira trenutek, leto 2016, preživeto obdobje, ki je že nekaj let kasneje, recimo ko je bila knjiga prevedena v slovenski jezik, *passe*. Tudi avtorica v predgovoru k slovenski izdaji zapiše, da je delo »prej izsek iz časa kot enovita teorija« (str. 9), in ta poudarek je ključen tako za obravnavano branje kot za splošno razumevanje fenomena ameriških kulturnih vojn na spletu, ki so objekt analize recenziranega dela. Že hiter pregled naslovov poglavij, ki jih je sedem, knjiga pa ima poleg predgovora še uvod in zaključek, bralko opozori, da je za branje precej lažje biti nekdo, ki je vsaj leta 2016, če ne že prej, začel spremljati 4chan, Reddit ali Twitter, tudi YouTube. Vendar je knjiga, ko jo začnemo brati, dostopna tudi tujkam in tujcem spletnih forumov in družbenih omrežij, le da je zahtevnejša, predvsem pa nikakor ne omogoča vpogleda v dejansko vzdušje internetnih identitetnih peripetij in trolanja, lahko jih zgolj opisuje, pa čeprav to Nagle počne pravzaprav odlično. In nazadnje je delo zagotovo še najbolj tuje tistim in verjetno celo popolnoma nesmiselno za tiste, ki jim je (razmeroma) tuj že računalnik oziroma internetni prostor na splošno.

V knjigi se torej spoznamo z novimi političnimi trendi, ki so se začeli porajati skozi sicer apolitične YouTube vsebine in druge kanale. Spletna udeležba je za mnoge postala možnost politično nekorektnega obrekovanja, komentiranja in izjavljanja o najrazličnejših temah, v čemer so mnogi prepoznali transgresivni moment. V tem procesu in prostoru sta se – kot tudi v *dejanski* politični realnosti – oblikovali (alternativna) desnica in (občutljiva) levica. Nekoč progresivno in radikalno levico so zamenjali neusmiljeni in ekscesov polni desničarji, medtem ko se je levica identificirala z občutljivostjo in čustveno ranljivostjo tumblrjevske skupnosti, ki preveč omejuje javno izjavljanje, s tem ko nenehno opozarja na politično nekorektno izjavljanje in sovražni govor itd. Nagle uspe prikazati hektično vzdušje spleta s tem, ko sama drugega za drugim niza precizno izbrane primere rasizmov, seksizmov, homofobije ipd., četudi bralka zato mestoma zgreši še tiste redke teoretske zastavke, s katerimi poskuša knjigi dodati strokovno ali celo znanstveno dimenzijo. Tako problem levice dobro ponazori z njenim pretiranim ukvarjanjem s pripoznanjem spolov, kot so necrogender, anxigender, technogender, perigender, faegender, desnica pa se »ukvarja z inteligenčnim kvocientom, evropskim demografskim in civilizacijskim zatonom, kulturno dekadenco, kulturnim marksizmom, antiegalitarizmom in islamizacijo« (str. 25).

Nagle veliko prostora nameni – in to je indikativno – srhljivim ravnem mizoginije (str. 111), ki preveva spletne subkulturne odvode alternativne desnice, ki so izrazito antifeministični. Tematiki seksualno zafrustriranih moških posveti celo poglavje, imenovano Vstop v moškosfero. V njem opozori na naraščajočo skupnost *incelov* (*involuntary* *celibacy* oziroma neprostovoljni celibat, op. a.), ki je po njenem potencialno najnevarnejša frakcija krize moškosti, saj v svoji anonimnosti goji habitat, ki eksplicitno spodbuja femicid, medtem ko skupnost pod imenom Men Going Their Own Way (krajše MGTOW) zavrača vsakršne interakcije z ženskim spolom – gre za analogijo z radikalnim feminizmom oziroma reakcijo nanj – in *gre svojo pot*. Tretja skupina moških so tako imenovani prijazni fantje (ang. *Nice Guys*), ki prakticirajo umetnost osvajanja (ang. *pick-up artists*). Eden izmed bolj znanih je Roosh V, ki z mnogimi deli naslednje stališče: »Moje privzeto mnenje o katerikoli punci, ki jo srečam, je, da je ničvredna umazana kurba, dokler ni dokazano drugače« (str. 116–117). Kot pri vseh drugih temah, kakor ponazarja zgornji citat, konkretni primeri odlično funkcionirajo ter bralko soočijo s pogosto težko doumljivimi vrednotami in svetovnimi nazori. Pohvalno je tudi dejstvo, da je množici mizoginih izjav navkljub omenila primer videoigre na temo depresije, ki jo je ustvarila ženska in jo označila za »grozno igro z veliko značilnostmi feminizma, ki fetišizira krhkost in duševne bolezni« (str. 35), ter s tem nakazala, da je z enim očesom treba budno spremljati tudi tiste skupine, ki so prvenstveno deležne diskriminacije, saj lahko v odziv začnejo (re) producirati podobno pogubne ali vsaj dvomljive nazore. A navsezadnje je za avtorico, kot lahko razberemo iz njenih poudarkov, trojica univerzuma, ki na različnih ravneh goji zaničevalen odnos do ženskega spola, najbolj zaskrbljujoč trend pripadnikov alternativne desnice. Homofobni, ksenofobni in nacionalistični diskurzi ter razne teorije zarot so morda celo predvsem nekaj, *kar pride zraven*, a so prav tako enako brutalni in uničujoči, pri vsem skupaj pa gre za uveljavljanje patriarhalne dominacije belega zahodnega moškega, ki si želi podrediti vse Druge – te vedno definira kot odklonske, nenormativne, obrobne in manjvredne.

Prevajalka se je na škodo teksta in vsebine odločila mnogo uveljavljenih angleških terminov, kot so *normie, brocialist, basic bitch, gamer,* prevesti v slovenščino, s čimer je sicer besedilo mestoma začinila, saj so slovenske različice izpadle simpatično, a zanemarila dejstvo, da se tudi v slovenskem (spletnem) prostoru uporabljajo zgolj anglizmi. Normalnež in generičarka ne pomenita nič, medtem ko sta normie in basic bitch ključnika z milijoni povednih zadetkov. Nekatere termine je prevedla, angleško verzijo pa z obrazložitvijo zabeležila v opombo (mehkužni konservativec v internetnem alt-rightovskem diskurzu ne obstaja, medtem ko je *cuckservative* stalnica); zakaj ni bila dosledna in te možnosti ni izkoristila za vse prevode, ostaja nejasno. Knjigi manjka tudi spremna beseda, ki bi služila kot replika na napisano in bi lahko zagotovila bolj svežo umestitev avtoričinih ugotovitev, čeprav v predgovoru k slovenski izdaji to deloma opravi že sama; zdi se, da bi bila nujna tudi zato, ker – kot smo zapisale uvodoma – je nekaj let kasneje situacija drugačna, obenem pa so tovrstne spletne udeležbe in prakse prisotne tudi v slovenskem prostoru, zato bi bilo zanimivo vpeljati še tovrstno interakcijo.

V osnovi gre za zanimivo in pomembno delo, ki je spisano v lahko berljivem slogu, pri čemer je zaznati avtoričine tako akademske kot novinarske atribute, kar pozitivno vpliva na bralkino izkušnjo pri spoznavanju ali obnavljanju spletnih kulturnih vojn v letu 2016. Nadalje pa je smiselno opozoriti, da je Nagle sicer uspela narediti kakovostno, a navsezadnje vendarle zgolj sestavljanko, ki nekako tvori koherentno celoto, a ima tudi nekaj ključnih pomanjkljivosti, ki delo resnično naredijo za »izsek iz časa«, in ne za »enovito teorijo«. Nagle zgreši, da sta si tradicionalna in alternativna desnica bolj podobni, kot se zdi na prvi pogled, saj zapiše, da so alternativno desnico omogočili tudi tradicionalni, konservativni desničarji »zaradi njihove mehke krščanske pasivnosti in ker so svoje ženske/narod/raso metaforično spodbujali k odnosom z nebelim tujim osvajalcem« (str. 25–26). Izvzemši dejstvo, da se je alt-right vzpostavil v spletnem okolju in zaradi spleta (in to je izjemno pomembno), medtem ko za konservativno desnico to ne velja, se srečujeta prav v rasnem diskurzu; oba ženski spol umeščata v zasebno sfero, kjer naj skrbi za dom in reprodukcijo, ter napadata – eni bolj in drugi manj subtilno – npr. prejemnike_ce socialne pomoči, brezdomce_ke, nevladnike_ce, pri tem pa sta pogosto primerljivo nesočutna in ironična. Tej »napaki« navkljub je učinkovito identificirala, kako deluje sodobno preigravanje kulturnih vojn, spleta in radikalnih desničarskih politik, ter s paketom popisa intrigantnega materiala veliko prispevala k razpravam o pomenljivih prelomih in kontinuitetah omenjenih tem.

Igor Jurekovič

Aleš Črnič in Anja Pogačnik: Religija in šola. Poučevanje o religiji in njena simbolna prisotnost v javni šoli. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, 2021. *180 strani (ISBN: 978-961-235-990-4), 20 EUR*

Delo dr. Črniča in dr. Pogačnik je dobrodošel opomnik raziskovalcem religije, da je ta še kako konkreten družbeni pojav, ki je predmet nenehne družbene regulacije. Knjiga slovenskemu znanstvenemu prostoru prvenstveno prispeva kot aktualizacija znanstvene literature s področja vloge religije v javni šoli. Najpomembnejši dosežek avtorjev je, da sta na podlagi primerjalne analize aktualnih razmer na področju religije in šole oblikovala strokovne smernice za upravljanje z religijo v slovenski šoli. Opozarjata nas, da je reforma poučevanja in simbolne prisotnosti religije v slovenski šoli nujno potrebna za razvoj temeljne religijske pismenosti.

Ob predstavitvi dela je treba poudariti dvoje: prvič, knjiga predstavlja končno poročilo dvoletnega projekta »Izzivi religijsko pluralne družbe za javno šolo«, ki ga je Ministrstvo za šolstvo, znanost in šport leta 2018 razpisalo, da bi raziskovalci pripravili strokovno analizo področja s primerjalno analizo izbranih držav Evropske unije; in drugič, knjiga kot končno poročilo projekta teži k praktični aplikaciji dognanj v obliki različnih pravno-formalnih ukrepov. To avtorja poskušata doseči z oblikovanjem strokovnih priporočil za sistemsko urejanje področja v Sloveniji. Skratka, avtorja jasno opredelita specifičen namen dela. Hkrati pa v nadaljevanju odpirata vprašanja, o katerih bi bila dobrodošla tako nadaljnja znanstvena razprava kakor tudi strokovni posvet.

Delo obravnava povezani razsežnosti odnosa med religijo in javno šolo: obliko pouka religije in simbolno prisotnost religije. V prid preglednosti knjige avtorja razsežnosti ločita, čeprav ju sicer obravnavata skupaj. Prvi del knjige namenita analizi različnih tipov pouka religije, drugi del pa prikazu načinov ureditve simbolne pojavnosti religije v javni šoli. Najprej opredelita oblike religijskega pouka in povzameta bistvena evropska priporočila glede pouka religije. Nadaljujeta z izvrstno primerjalno analizo skrbno izbranih dvanajstih držav, pri katerih se sklicujeta na pomoč tujih kolegov in kolegic: Avstrija, Belgija, Češka, Danska, Francija, Hrvaška, Italija, Nemčija, Norveška, Poljska, Švedska ter Združeno kraljestvo Velike Britanije in Severne Irske. Na podlagi informativne analize nato izdelata tipologijo pouka religije. Opremljena s podatki iz tujine predstavita še stanje v Sloveniji na primeru osnovnošolskega obveznega izbirnega predmeta verstva in etika. Kritično ovrednotita kurikulum predmeta ter obenem navedeta natančne podatke o pogostosti izvajanj predmeta po šolah in številu otrok, ki so predmet obiskovali. Ocenjujeta, da je kurikulum predmeta »sodobno in razmeroma kakovostno zastavljen« (str. 81). Obenem vendarle ugotavljata, da je za pouk religije značilna »popolna izbirnost in neambicioznost« (str. 145) ter da se v nobeni od primerjanih držav – izvzemši Francijo – učenci v javnih šolah o religiji »ne učijo tako malo kot pri nas« (prav tam). Na podlagi ugotovitev oblikujeta smernice za revitalizacijo pouka.

Podobno ravnata tudi v primeru simbolne prisotnosti religije v javni šoli. Najprej predstavita oblike prisotnosti, nadaljujeta z mednarodnimi smernicami, nato pa predstavita primerjalno analizo dvanajstih držav. Na podlagi primerjave izdelata inovativno tipologijo, da bi shematično prikazala evropske prakse, nato pa razčlenita tudi stanje v Sloveniji. Ugotavljata, da je to področje formalno neregulirano razen zakonske prepovedi religijskih obredov, katere fokus je zagotavljanje nevtralnosti šolskega prostora. Instanca, ki o posameznih primerih odloča, so vodstva šol, celokupno pa je vpliv večinske religije minimalen (str. 136). Poglavje skleneta s strokovnimi smernicami.

Delo izpolni v uvodu zastavljena pričakovanja in hkrati odpira kopico dobrodošlih vprašanj – tako za raziskovalce kakor tudi za državne upravljavce religije v javni šoli. Zanimivo bi bilo npr. soočiti različne opredelitve simbolne prisotnosti religije v šoli in iz njih izhajajoče smernice. Te opredelitve temeljijo na prvotni konceptualizaciji laičnosti, zato se sprva pomudimo pri njej. Avtorja svojo opredelitev laičnosti temeljita na delu pedagoga dr. Zdenka Kodelje *Med pravico in prepovedjo* (2011). Laičnost definirata kot »neodvisnost družbenih sistemov [...] od neposrednih religijskih vplivov« (str. 19). Nadaljujeta, da se v laični državi osebna prepričanja enih ne smejo vsiljevati drugim, zaradi česar so vsi državljani svetovnonazorsko enaki. Da bi to načelno stališče lahko vzdržalo v praksi, mora biti država nevtralna v odnosu do religij in svetovnih nazorov. »Konfesionalna nevtralnost,« navajata, »je jamstvo nepristranskosti države in pogoj, da se vsakdo, ne glede na svoje versko ali filozofsko prepričanje, lahko v njej prepozna« (Kodelja 2011: 27). Konfesionalna nevtralnost države pomeni, da so v njej »religiozna ali filozofska prepričanja državljanov in drugih posameznikov obravnavana kot njihova *zasebna stvar*« (prav tam, poudarek dodan).

Vrnimo se k smernicam, ki jih avtorja priporočata glede nošnje religijskih simbolov v šoli. Pri oblikovanju predlogov pazljivo ločujeta med učenci in učitelji. Prvim naj bi bilo »smiselno dopuščati vidne znake in simbole religijske pripadnosti [...], pri čemer ti ne smejo bistveno ovirati izvajanja rednega šolskega programa in onemogočiti osebne identifikacije učencev« (str. 138). Pri učiteljih ubereta drugačen pristop, saj naj bi bil njihov vstop v javnošolski prostor prostovoljen. Prepričana sta, da morajo učitelji nevtralnost šole »izražati s svojim delovanjem, obnašanjem in tudi s svojim izgledom« (str. 139). Na podlagi uvodne opredelitve laičnosti trdita, da je učiteljem »smiselno in upravičeno omejiti nošnjo markantnih znakov/simbolov (in/ali obleke), ki bi zelo vidno naznanjali povezavo posameznega učitelja ali učiteljice s katero izmed religijskih tradicij« (str. 139).

Na začetku knjige izvemo, da če naj bo država konfesionalno nevtralna, mora religiozna prepričanja razumeti kot zasebno stvar posameznikov. To skupaj s smernicami odpira izjemno pomembna – in zapletena – vprašanja o verskih svobodah javnih uslužbencev na splošno: ali bi morali vsaj delno omejiti versko svobodo javnih uslužbencev na delovnem mestu? Oziroma ali gre tako postopati le v primeru učiteljev, saj ti na dnevni ravni poučujejo dovzetne otroke? Delo seveda obravnava specifičnost javne šole, zato ne gre pričakovati izdatne obravnave vprašanja religijskega izkazovanja javnih uslužbencev, a vseeno nudi dobre nastavke za nadaljnje razmisleke.

Avtorja se zavedata, da je koncept laičnosti zapleten, saj vključuje tako različne cilje kot tudi različne poti. V tej luči je zanimivo delo *Laičnost in svoboda vesti* (2020), v katerem se Jocelyn Maclure in Charles Taylor posvetita razčlembi načela laičnosti. Delo je podobno kot v našem primeru nastalo na podlagi poročila komisije, ki je želela urediti mesto religije v javni sferi Quebeca. Avtorja – podobno kot Črnič in Pogačnik – trdita, da laičnost počiva na načelih enakosti spoštovanja in svobodi vesti. Ločita med dvema idealnima tipoma laičnosti: republikanskim in liberalno-pluralističnim, ki ju razlikujeta glede na *smoter* laičnosti. Prvi vidi smoter v integraciji pripadnikov različnih kultur in religij v državljane, kar zahteva »distanciranje od religiozne pripadnosti in potlačitev teh pripadnosti v zasebno sfero« (prav tam, str. 39). Po drugi strani liberalno-pluralistični model vidi smisel v ravnovesju med spoštovanjem »moralne enakosti in spoštovanjem svobode vesti oseb« (prav tam). Torej, prvi umakne religioznost v zasebno sfero posameznika, drugi pa bi skupnost gradil na prepoznavanju in učenju o religioznih razlikah pluralne družbe. Avtorja v knjigi zagovarjata liberalno-pluralistični model, za katerega lahko rečemo, da mu želita slediti tudi Črnič in Pogačnik (čeprav se do omenjene kategorizacije ne opredeljujeta). Pri tem pa je zanimivo, da sta si deli v navzkrižju glede vprašanja simbolnega izkazovanja religijske pripadnosti učiteljev. Medtem ko Črnič in Pogačnik temu nasprotujeta, Maclure in Taylor pojavljanje religioznosti v državnih prostorih na splošno dopuščata in spodbujata. Sprašujeta se, ali je mar res, da je oseba, ki nosi prepoznavno religiozno znamenje, manj sposobna izkazovanja nepristranskosti, saj je »v prvi vrsti pomembno, da ti akterji [države] kažejo nepristranskost pri *izvajanju* svojih funkcij« (Maclure in Taylor 2020: 47). Po Maclure in Taylor lahko zahtevo po popolni religijski nevtralnosti javnih uslužbencev prej uvrstimo v republikanski kakor liberalno-pluralistični model. Zato vztrajata pri nevtralnosti *dejanj* javnih uslužbencev, medtem ko bi – z liberalno-pluralističnega stališča – nošenje religioznega znamenja omejevala tam, kjer omejujejo izpolnjevanje funkcij. S tem ubereta pristop, kateremu Črnič in Pogačnik sledita pri izkazovanju simbolov religijske pripadnosti učencev. Skratka, na podlagi podobnega izhodiščnega smotra laičnosti knjigi predlagata različna ukrepa.

Soočenje različnih smernic odpira izdatnejšo razpravo, ki je sicer ne smemo razumeti kot iskanje *pravilnega* odgovora. Recimo, da bi sledili smernicam Maclure in Taylor – mar ne zavračata moči religijskih simbolov, ko trdita, da so pomembna le *dejanja* učiteljev? A tudi stališča avtorjev *Religije in šole* morda ne gre zlahka sprejeti – zakaj pa bi predpostavljali, da je lahko učiteljica muslimanka bolj (ali manj) nevtralna, če nosi nikab? Skratka, gre za zapletana vprašanja, in zelo dobrodošlo je, da imamo v Sloveniji priložnost o njih razmišljati ob sodobnem knjižnem delu.

Delo *Religija in šola* je podatkovno bogato, izvrstno strokovno delo. Avtorja sta zadani cilj dosegla s pripravo odlične primerjalne študije ter oblikovanjem inovativnih tipologij pouka religije in upravljanja simbolne prisotnosti religij. Pri tem sta postopala v koraku z aktualnimi dognanji družboslovnega raziskovanja religije – še posebej hvalevredno je vztrajanje pri zavračanju zmotnega enačenja religije z verovanjem in pri kritiki koncepta svetovnih religij. To razumeta kot družboslovni dejstvi, ki ju moramo upoštevati tako pri oblikovanju učnega načrta predmeta verstva in etika kakor tudi pri premislekih o simbolni prisotnosti religije v javni šoli. Nenazadnje bi bilo v tej luči dobro premisliti tudi o samem imenu predmeta, v katerem bi besedo »verstva« veljalo zamenjati s pojmom, ki bi natančneje zajel pluralnost religijskih pojavov. Nadvse pomembno je, da delo kljub strokovnosti ostaja izjemno dostopno, prebere ga lahko vsakdo, ne da bi pri tem trpela njegova informativnost.

Glede na to, da delo predstavlja končno poročilo projekta, katerega namen je bila priprava natančnih strokovnih smernic, je njegova dostopnost izrednega pomena. Le želimo si lahko, da delo *Religija in šola* ne bi ostala zaprašena na knjižnih policah prostorov šolskega ministrstva, temveč da bi krojila težko pričakovano ureditev mesta religije v slovenskih javnih šolah.

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Lea Kuhar

Primož Krašovec: Tujost kapitala.
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Osnovna premisa knjige *Tujost kapitala* je, da nekaterih pojavov sodobnega kapitalističnega produkcijskega načina danes ni več mogoče teoretsko zapopasti. Po eni strani nemožnost njihovega teoretskega zapopadanja izhaja iz njih samih, torej iz tehnoloških procesov in pojavov, ki so se razvili s konstantno inovacijo produkcijskih sredstev. Avtor trdi, da je z razvojem kapitalističnega produkcijskega načina prišlo do nastanka nečesa popolnoma novega, nečesa, kar je nemogoče opisati s teoretskimi koncepti in za kar sam uporablja termina *tujost* in *osmi potnik*. Vendar pa nemožnost razumevanja nekaterih kapitalističnih pojavov ne izhaja zgolj iz tujosti teh pojavov samih, temveč hkrati označuje določeno zagato, v kateri se je znašla teorija. Po avtorjevem mnenju teoretsko pozicijo danes zaznamuje določena šibkost. Ta šibkost ni lastna zgolj tej ali oni vrsti teorije, temveč pripada teoriji kot taki. To poudari tudi avtor sam, ko zapiše: »Ne gre (le) za to, da nekatere teoretske sheme zastarijo, a jih je še mogoče posodobiti, da bi ustrezale spremembam svojega predmeta. Predmet sam se spreminja tako hitro in na način, ki je morda teoriji *kot taki* nedostopen« (str. 217).

Ker želi knjiga nasloviti tujost tehnoloških procesov, o katerih teorija sicer ne more govoriti, je avtor pred samim pisanjem sprejel odločitev, da iz teorije izstopi. Dana knjiga je torej neteoretsko delo, kar med drugim pomeni, da se ne podreja formi teoretskega pisanja, ki zapoveduje citiranje drugih teoretskih del, ter se ne obremenjuje s koherentno in konsistentno izpeljavo lastnega argumenta. Avtorjev izstop iz teorije je tudi razlog, zakaj je knjiga izšla v zbirki *Izhodi* Založbe Sophia. V opisu zbirke je zapisano, da vsebuje dela, ki zavračajo teoretsko pozicijo, ki se poslužuje odrejanja in presojanja politike ter kritično pozicijo, ki se gospodovalno ločuje od predmeta svoje raziskave. Izhod iz teorije opredeljuje tudi nekaj vnaprej določenih vsebinskih smernic. Kot zapiše Krašovec v zadnjem delu knjige, mora biti neteoretska forma opisovanja pojavov danes nujno naklonjena novim medijskim tehnologijam, biti mora občutljiva na spremembe v znanosti in predvsem ne sme biti antropocentrična in antroponarcisistična pri obravnavanju tehnoloških pojavov. To so med drugim tudi glavne teze dane knjige, ki se v različnih oblikah ponavljajo skozi vsa poglavja.

Kljub strogim načelnim zahtevam je treba opozoriti, da Krašovčev izstop iz teorije ni popoln. Na določenih mestih knjiga še vedno povzema obstoječe teorije, polemizira z nekaterimi teoretskimi razpravami in se naslanja na priznane teoretike, kljub temu da so takšne reference in polemike redke oz. niso izpeljane na dosleden znanstveni način. Tudi slog pisanja je veliko bolj poljuden kot pri znanstvenih delih. Posamezna poglavja se berejo bolj kot povzetki zgodovinskih, filozofskih in drugih teoretskih del. V začetnem poglavju se tako avtor s pomočjo različnih teorij ukvarja z zgodovinsko prelomnostjo kapitala in s prehodom iz *ancien régima* v meščansko državo, nato pa preide na teorijo realne subsumpcije delovne sile, denarja in kapitala, ki je privedla do finančnih derivatov, za katere trdi, da jih moramo razumeti kot »prvo povsem depolitizirano in ekonomsko obliko denarja« (str. 74). V nadaljevanju zagovarja tezo, da se je kapitalizem pričel znotraj ekonomskih procesov, ki jih bo sčasoma odvrgel, in da je v celoti postal »tehnoekonomski« (str. 88), kar pomeni, da bo tehnologija sčasoma v celoti nadomestila ekonomska razmerja in institucije. V zadnjih treh poglavjih avtor obravnava teorijo razrednega boja in procesa kulturne diferenciacije, ki danes poteka onkraj razrednih družbenih skupin (str. 97), ter se loti obravnave sodobnih ideoloških pojavov, ki jih razume kot večinoma »nediskurzivno« in »tehnološko določeno delovanje« (str. 131).

Na dobrih dvesto straneh tako knjiga odpira številne teme. Kljub zavračanju teoretske pozicije bi lahko rekli, da predstavlja relevantno branje za vsakogar, ki si želi pregledno branje terminov, ključnih za razumevanje sodobnega kapitalizma. Najbolj zanimiv del knjige je gotovo že omenjena epistemološka predpostavka, da se mora s spremembo predmeta preučevanja spremeniti tudi način njegovega zapopadanja. Tu torej pozdravljamo avtorjevo pobudo, da mora teorija iznajti nove miselne forme, s katerimi bo dojela tujost svojega predmeta, tudi če to pomeni izničenje nje same. A vendar je treba opozoriti, da z vstopom v nov način pisanja knjiga odpira tudi številna nova vprašanja in nove problemske sklope. Bolj kot kritika teorije tako knjiga na mnogih mestih deluje kot poveličevanje kapitalizma in tujosti tehnoloških oblik, do katerih je pripeljal njegov razvoj, pri čemer pa se ne spušča v vprašanje, zakaj naj bi bile te nove oblike sploh še kapitalistične. Poleg tega avtor na več mestih kritizira današnje levičarske pozicije, kljub temu da pri argumentaciji lastne kritike ne uporablja referenc na dela, o katerih govori, s čimer zastavlja vprašanje, zakaj je slednje sploh treba omenjati. Nenazadnje pa je nekoliko dvoumna tudi epistemološka predpostavka knjige, torej tista, ki naslavlja šibkost teorije in ki jo vidimo kot največjo prednost samega dela. Če dano dvoumnost strnemo v dve poanti:

Prvič, ni povsem jasno, s čim knjiga preseže teoretsko formo. Če zanemarimo tisto, kar o svojem delu pove avtor sam, in izhajamo zgolj iz vsebine posameznih poglavij, iz njih ni jasno razvidno, s čim naj bi knjiga proizvedla ali nakazala tisto nekaj drugega od teorije. Bolj kot njeno preseganje se zdi, da knjiga pade na pre-teoretsko raven pavšalnih sodb o družbenih pojavih in teoretskih stališč, ki jih avtor kritizira. Kljub temu da se v splošnem ne poslužuje teoretskih referenc, jih avtor uporabi ravno dovolj, da se zdi, da obtiči v nekakšni sivi coni med teorijo in neteorijo. Poleg tega ni jasno, kaj natanko je funkcija teoretskih preostankov, torej tistega, kar navsezadnje preostane od teorije. S tem imamo v mislih predvsem uporabo teorij drugih teoretikov in njihovih konceptov. Če delo ni teoretsko delo, potem termini, ki jih avtor uporablja, npr. *tujost*, *fetišizem*, *diskurz*, *afekti*, *ksenokultura*, ne morejo biti koncepti. Kaj potem so? In še pomembneje, če niso koncepti, ki predpostavljajo obstoječe teoretske okvire, kako naj potem razumemo njihov pomen?

Drugič, ravno tako ni povsem jasno, kaj naj bi bil predmet knjige. Iz dela izvemo, da je ta predmet nekaj tako tujega, da ga teorija ne more zapopasti. Izvemo tudi, da o njem nikakor ne smemo razmišljati na antropocentričen način. Vendar pa bralec ob branju ne dobi občutka, da tekst dejansko ima svoj neteoretski predmet oz. da knjiga dejansko zagrabi ali vsaj nakaže tisto nekaj več, kar neka druga teorija s svojim znanstvenim aparatom ne bi mogla opredeliti. Tu se ponovno odpirajo vprašanja, kot so ali knjiga sploh ima svoj predmet in ali – glede na svojo neteoretsko formo – svoj predmet sploh potrebuje? In nenazadnje je ključno predvsem vprašanje: če predmet knjige ne more biti teoretski predmet, knjiga pa ne teoretsko delo, zakaj potem vztraja v formi pisanja?

Matej Klarič

Ana Podvršič in Maja Breznik (ur.): Verige globalnega kapitalizma. Ljubljana: Sophia, 2019.
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Zbornik Verige globalnega kapitalizma je pri založbi Sophia izšel že leta 2019. Zaradi družbeno-političnega dogajanja in razprav o težavah zaradi prekinjenih dobavnih verig, ki so del globalnih vrednostnih verig (GVV), je znanstvena monografija danes še bolj aktualna kot v času izdaje. GVV lahko opišemo kot paleto povezanih in razpršenih mednarodnih aktivnosti (ne samo produkcije) s končnim namenom: prodajo blaga na trgu. Neoliberalna doktrina, ki je v zadnjih petdesetih letih postajala vedno bolj globalna in dominantna sila, je spodbujala ukinitev državno vodene industrializacije, svobodno trgovino, privatizacijo, liberalizacijo zunanje trgovine *in tuji kapital kot gonilo gospodarske rasti in družbenega razvoja. Razširitev GVV po svetu je posledica teh politik*.

Kriza kapitalizma leta 2008, pandemija in sedaj še vojna v Ukrajini so znamenja, da se pred našimi očmi ta globalni sistem ruši. Neoliberalni kapitalizem, ki ga lahko definiramo kot nevmešavanje države v imenu trga, je v zadnjem dobrem desetletju doživel že vsaj omenjene tri hude udarce. Krize, ki jim lahko dodamo še podnebno, so na laž postavile fukuyamovsko idejo konca zgodovine in velikih kriz kapitalizma. Empirija potrjuje, da lahko utemeljeno govorimo o tem, da so neoliberalni procesi svet pripeljali v današnje nezavidljivo stanje kriz(e). Težave z dobavnimi verigami so samo posledica krize neoliberalnega kapitalističnega sistema, ki je pospeševal medsebojno odvisnost in prepletenost sveta. Pandemija je po krizi leta 2008 še dodatno razkrila ranljivost sistema. Države se na krize vse bolj odzivajo s protekcionističnimi zapiranji gospodarstev, prekinjajo se ustaljene GVV, priča smo deglobalizaciji. Zaradi vojne v Ukrajini se sedaj veliko govori o prekinjenih dobavnih prehranskih poteh, sankcije proti Rusiji pa ogrožajo tudi energetske dobavne poti. Vse več je težav pri pridobivanju surovin itd. Neovirana svobodna trgovina vse bolj postaja stvar preteklosti. Številna podjetja že nekaj časa pesti pomanjkanje čipov, ki jih izdelujejo v oddaljenih državah. Februarja je zato EU predlagala zakon o čipih za digitalno suverenost EU. Gre za velik odmik od preteklih politik, ki so spodbujale prenos proizvodnje v gospodarsko manj razvite države in prepovedovale državne pomoči podjetjem. Toda vzpostavitev lastne proizvodnje znotraj EU bo zahtevala veliko časa. Zato bodo zgrešene neoliberalne politike EU tudi na tem področju v prihodnje terjale svoj davek. Gospodarski ministri držav EU so celo prisiljeni razmišljati o ukrepih za zmanjševanje odvisnosti od tretjih držav, dogajajo se zaplembe premoženj, tj. zasebne lastnine ruskih milijarderjev, kar je bilo še pred nedavnim povsem nezamisljivo.

Stefanie Hürtgen se v svojem besedilu dotakne prav strategij EU. Od sredine sedemdesetih let se je osnovna logika integracijskega procesa EU spremenila iz »makroekonomskega nazora v neoliberalno integracijo, ki se izmika harmonizaciji«. Ohranjanje različnih nacionalnih regulacij je po njenem v funkciji družbenopolitičnega režima konkurenčnosti. Kot pravi, so transnacionalna podjetja, frakcije finančnega kapitala in njihovi lobisti sistematično gnali projekt konkurenčne integracije, ki je vodil v iskanje držav z nizkimi mezdami ter nizkimi davčnimi, družbenimi in okoljskimi standardi za transnacionalno konkurenčno prestrukturiranje. Vse to na račun izkoriščanja delavk in delavcev v perifernih državah EU z minimiziranjem stroškov. Enakemu trendu lahko v istem časovnem obdobju sledimo tudi na globalni ravni. Tak pogled pa je povsem zanemarjen v še vedno prevladujočih neoklasičnih ekonomskih teorijah, ki služijo razredni apologiji. Zato je še kako dobrodošlo, da poskušajo avtorji namesto na razredni, kapitalu naklonjeni neoklasični ekonomiji, konceptu GVV podati drugačen pomen.

Že obstoječe študije koncepta, ki so se začele uveljavljati v sredini devetdesetih, so se do neke preusmerile v neoklasični ekonomiji alternativno, čeprav do sistema še vedno nekritično raziskovanje. Za razliko od washingtonskega konsenza namreč (bržkone na podlagi empiričnih podatkov, ki so na laž postavili prvotni optimizem) ne obljubljajo več, da bomo vsi zmagovalci, če bomo dosledno implementirali neoliberalne reforme. Kot pravi Podvršič, študije GVV sicer še vedno sporočajo, da so družbeni spopadi, razredni antagonizmi in razvojne razlike, ki so povzročale ciklične krize in družbene neenakosti svetovnega kapitalizma, stvar preteklosti. Postale naj bi del že omenjenega konca zgodovine in prav na tem mestu so se ujele v past in zmoto. Zadnji dogodki namreč potrjujejo, da neoklasična ekonomija in z njo povezane študije GVV nimajo pokritja v aktualnih družbenih procesih. Samo za časa pandemije so, kot ugotavljajo v Poročilu o svetovnih neenakostih iz decembra 2021 (Lucas 2021), neenakosti med najbogatejšimi in najrevnejšimi Zemljani zrasle najhitreje v zgodovini. Težko torej pritrdimo predpostavkam, da so rastoče družbene neenakosti stvar preteklosti ter da vključevanje domačih gospodarstev v GVV prispeva h kakovostnim delovnim mestom in regionalnemu razvoju.

Dodana vrednost zbornika je prav v tem, da konceptu GVV dodaja kritično noto, ga metodološko preoblikuje in, kot opisuje Podvršič, preučevanje pripelje nazaj na polje kritičnih razprav o zgodovinskih mehanizmih in družbenih neenakostih, ki med drugim določajo tudi neoliberalno financializacijo in globalizacijo proizvodnje. William Milberg je v svojem besedilu prav na tej točki kritičen, saj globalne vrednostne verige ne preučujejo pomena globalizirane produkcije za denarni tok oziroma financializacijo. Opozarja, da so si s pomočjo GVV glavne industrijske države zagotovile možnost, da ohranijo rast profitov v okvirih financializiranega sistema. Finančna liberalizacija in financializacija pa s seboj prinašata verjetnost za večje krize, za katere je neoklasična ekonomija do leta 2008 predpostavljala, da jih sploh ne bo več. Prav kritično, sistemsko in zgodovinsko raziskovanje vrača koncept GVV na izhodišče. Podlaga za njihov razvoj je bil namreč temu soroden koncept blagovnih vrednostnih verig. Razvila sta ga svetovno-sistemska analitika Terence H. Hopkins in Immanuel Wallerstein. Z njim sta definirala mreže dela in produkcijskih odnosov, ki imajo za končni rezultat blago. V središče sta postavila neenak razvoj, kjer vključevanje (pol)perifernih regij v svetovno trge in mednarodno trgovino slednje ujame v past strukturnih mehanizmov, ki reproducirajo regionalne neenakosti na račun profitov podjetij iz držav v centru sistema.

Višje profite si podjetja v okviru GVV zagotavljajo s selitvijo proizvodnje in posledičnim nižanjem mezd. Toda grožnja s selitvijo proizvodnje ne niža mezd samo v (pol) perifernih državah, obenem pomeni pritisk, da se v celotni produkcijski mreži (tudi v državah centra) omejuje njihova rast. Podjetja, vpeta v globalne vrednostne verige, so pod nenehno grožnjo zmanjševanja števila delavk in delavcev ter selitve tovarn. Kako vse skupaj poteka, si lahko pogledamo tudi na aktualnem primeru v Sloveniji. V enem izmed največjih slovenskih podjetij, novomeškem Revozu, so letos prešli na enoizmensko delo ter odpustili 450 delavk in delavcev. V zadnjem času smo priča procesom, ki GVV zaradi različnih dejavnikov vračajo v lokalno okolje in s tem krajšajo dolžino GVV. Tudi odpuščanja pri nas so (vsaj delno) posledica državno subvencioniranega vračanja proizvodnje v Francijo. Petr Pavlínek v članku preučuje avtomobilsko industrijo na primeru Slovaške in vpelje koncept integrirane periferije. Opredeli jo kot prostorsko-časovno rešitev, ki avtomobilskim podjetjem iz držav kapitalističnega centra omogoča ohranitev ali povečanje profitne mere, če širijo proizvodnjo na nizkocenovna področja, ki se geografsko stikajo z regijami proizvodnje in potrošnje iz centra sistema. Ker pa različna podjetja vlagajo v podobne ugodnejše lokacije, se sčasoma izčrpajo, zato morajo podjetja iskati nove, donosnejše lokacije. Integrirane periferije avtomobilskim podjetjem omogočajo, da pridejo do relativne presežne vrednosti z vzpostavitvijo proizvodnje na ugodnejših lokacijah. Pavlínek je na podlagi lastne študije skeptičen do optimističnih predpostavk, da naj bi povezovanje regij in držav v globalne vrednostne verige prineslo trajnostni regionalni razvoj.

Z vrnitvijo dela in kapitalizma v analizo GVV se v svojem besedilu ukvarja Ben Selwyn. Poudarja, da se kapitalizem kot profitna produkcija za svetovni trg širi že (vsaj) od 16. stoletja, z njim pa nastaja ena sama delitev dela, ki je razdeljena na množico političnih enot. Novost sodobnega globalnega kapitalizma vidi v tem, da so globalna podjetja zmožna upravljati globalne vrednostne verige kot del svojih konkurenčnih strategij. Obstoječim analizam očita, da pri pojasnjevanju inovacij preveliko pozornost namenjajo tehnologijam, menedžerskim strategijam in posredni naturalizaciji kapitalizma, ki zakrije družbene odnose in pogled na delo. Glede zanemarjanja dela je kritičen tudi do analiz svetovno-sistemske teorije. Opozarja, da ne smemo nasesti na osredotočenost na podjetja in kapital. Lokalni delavski boji namreč pomembno določajo način delovanja lokalnih ekonomij. Poudarja, da v prevladujočih študijah ostaja spregledan pomen organiziranega delavstva, ki je zmožno zvišati plače in izboljšati pogoje dela. To vzpostavi tudi drugačen distribucijski vzorec celotne regije v razvoju glede na tiste regije, v katerih delavstvo tega ni sposobno. Delavstvo vpliva tudi na podjetja, saj jih s svojimi uspehi sili, da konkurenčnost gradijo na drugih elementih kot na nizko plačanem delu.

Podobna je tudi kritika Maje Breznik, ki poudarja, da je črpanje ekstra profitov iz malih kapitalov odvisno od pretvorbe svobodnega mezdnega dela v nesvobodno delo, ki ga za tako označuje, ker morata delavka ali delavec posestno pravico prenesti na posrednika ali pa ne moreta prodati delovne sile drugemu kupcu, npr. zaradi zadolženosti. Izpostavlja, da v prevladujočih analizah GVV delavstvo nastopa kot pasivna žrtev kapitalskih strategij. Večino razprav v knjigi pa strne v gibanje med razbijanjem predstav vladajočih ideologij in preciziranjem znanstvenih konceptov. V času najvišjih družbenih neenakosti v zgodovini ter vse večjih in vse pogostejših (različnih) kriz v kapitalizmu je takšno kritično raziskovanje ne samo znanstveno bolj produktivno, temveč tudi nujno potrebno za oblikovanje alternativ vse bolj uničujočemu sistemu.

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