

## RACIONALIZACIJA OBVEŠČEVALNO- VARNOSTNIH STRUKTUR V NATU IN EVROPSKI UNIJI

## STREAMLINING THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY STRUCTURES IN NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

**Povzetek** Kot vsaka organizacija se tudi zveza Nato in EU bolj ali manj stalno spreminjata ter organizacijsko prilagajata novim izzivom in posledično novim prednostim ter nalogam. Obveščevalno-varnostni deli obeh organizacij niso izjema in čeprav radikalne oziroma večje organizacijske spremembe, predvsem zaradi konsenzualnega načina delovanja, niso zelo pogoste ter zahtevajo več časa, se manjše spremembe nenehno dogajajo. V zadnjem času se sicer na obveščevalno-varnostnem področju v obeh organizacijah niso zgodile večje organizacijske spremembe, kljub temu pa se je predvsem znotraj Nata struktura na obveščevalnem področju pomembno kvalitativno dopolnila. Dopolnitev se je zgodila zato, da se k bolj aktivni vlogi pri izmenjavi obveščevalnih podatkov z zavezništvom (še močneje kot v preteklosti) vključijo poleg vojaških oziroma obrambnih tudi civilne obveščevalno-varnostne strukture držav članic. Podoben, čeprav manj očiten, trend je potekal tudi v okviru obveščevalno-varnostnih struktur EU. Vzporedno z zaključevanjem operacij v Afganistanu, s počasnim stabiliziranjem razmer na Zahodnem Balkanu, predvsem pa kot posledica novih/starih izzivov, ki jih povzročajo razmere v povezavi z Ukrajino, postane jasno, da se bo obveščevalno-varnostna struktura v obeh organizacijah, zlasti pa v Natu, v naslednjih letih dodatno spreminjala in izpopolnjevala. Cilj prispevka je poleg prikaza trenutne organiziranosti obveščevalno-varnostne strukture v obeh organizacijah napovedati prihodnje usmeritve na obveščevalno-varnostnem področju.

**Ključne besede** *Nato, EU, obveščevalno-varnostna dejavnost, Center za fuzijo obveščevalnih podatkov, Civilni obveščevalni odbor, Vojaški obveščevalni odbor, obveščevalni analitični center EU.*

**Abstract** Just like every other organisation, NATO and the EU are more or less constantly changing and organisationally adapting to new challenges and related new priorities and tasks. The intelligence and security structures of both organisations are no exception and although radical or major organisational changes, mainly due to the consensus mode, are not very frequent and require more time, minor changes and adjustments occur constantly. In recent years, the field of intelligence and security in both organisations has not witnessed any major organisational changes. Nevertheless, especially within NATO, the intelligence structure has significantly increased in quality due to the extra effort to include, in addition to military and defence, civil intelligence and security structures of Member States to play a more active role in the exchange of intelligence with the Alliance. Similarly, although less obviously, a similar trend took place in the context of the intelligence and security structures within the EU. In parallel with the termination of operations in Afghanistan, with a slow stabilisation of the situation in the Western Balkans, and mainly as a result of the new/old challenges posed by the situation in relation to Ukraine, there is no doubt that the intelligence and security structures of both organisations, especially NATO, will be further modified and upgraded over the coming years. The aim of this paper is thus, in addition to outlining the current organisation of the intelligence and security structures in both organisations, to indicate the future trends in the field of intelligence and security.

**Key words** *NATO, EU, intelligence, security, Intelligence Fusion Centre, Civilian Intelligence Committee, Military Intelligence Committee, EU Intelligence Analytical Centre.*

**Introduction** The aim of this paper is to analyze the current intelligence and security structures in NATO and the EU, and highlight the importance of cooperation between the intelligence and security organisations of member states in the field of intelligence and security. The analysis is derived from key quality methods, while additional added value to the study is brought by the method of direct participant observation. To a certain extent, the paper also addresses the role of Slovenia's intelligence and security structures vis-à-vis NATO and the EU.

In an article on the same topic published in this publication five years ago<sup>1</sup>, the author emphasised that, with the NATO and EU membership, several new doors opened for Slovenia in the intelligence and security structures of both organisations, as Slovenia, as was the case in other areas, joined its partners around the same table. Through the years, Slovenia has developed into a respectful partner and progressed to a country that does not just receive intelligence and intelligence expertise, but is also the provider of intelligence and a country that offers experiences, i.e. it exchanges them through various forms of cooperation within NATO and the EU.

<sup>1</sup> Damir Črnčec: *Izmenjava obveščevalno-varnostnih izkušenj z Evropsko unijo in Natom / Exchange of experiences in intelligence and security with the European Union and NATO, Bilten Slovenske vojske, 2009, pp. 83 – 104.*

Since 11 September 2001 (9/11), the environment has been marked by a global and transnational character of threats. A more intensified cooperation between all institutions facing these threats has, therefore, become necessary. NATO and the EU, however, do not have respective intelligence and security organisations of their own, as do their member states. They both lack their own robust organic collection assets and, especially with regard to raw intelligence data, they both strongly rely on the intelligence and security support from their respective member states. Nevertheless, both NATO and the EU have quite a robust internal intelligence structure and many internal bodies, including analytical, whose mission is to provide intelligence and security information to support decision-makers on all levels. Support ranges from the highest, grand strategic and political level to commanders and decision-makers at the operational and tactical levels in the ongoing operations. In addition to the raw intelligence data and final intelligence products, both organisations also strongly rely on their member states to source or provide the civilian and military personnel who fill the majority of intelligence and security posts in both organisations. As a result, both organisations can only be as good in the intelligence and security field as is the support they both receive from their member states regarding intelligence data, finished intelligence products and personnel. Both organisations in the past faced and likely still face many challenges with regard to the intelligence and support they receive from nations. Furthermore, they also face challenges in their respective internal intelligence and security field. Some examples from the last decades, when both organisations were unable to predict crucial events, include the collapse of the Soviet Union, wars in the territory of former Yugoslavia, the 9/11 attacks, the Russia-Georgia crisis, the Arab Spring and, very recently, the crisis in Ukraine. The "surprise" of these events (which could even be called intelligence failures<sup>2</sup>) leads to a conclusion that the intelligence and security support in both organisations has been lacking and was, in the past (and likely still is to a certain extent), negatively impacted by intelligence gaps both in analysis and resources. Furthermore, several statements by the highest NATO and EU decision-makers saying that reorganisations in the intelligence and security field were to result in the improvement of intelligence support at all levels as well as in better intelligence and warning, in a way confirm that intelligence support to decision-makers has been lacking.

Slovenia has fully participated in NATO and EU intelligence and security structures since becoming a full member of both organisations. Since then, Slovenia has slowly strengthened its cooperation in the intelligence and security field with these two organisations. The responsibility to provide intelligence to both became one of the main principles that Slovenia has followed in its approach. Moreover, despite the obvious constraints and limitations, Slovenia has begun to fill intelligence and security posts within both NATO and the EU with professionals at strategic, operational and tactical levels, and has become well connected with the intelligence and security structures of both organisations.

<sup>2</sup> *More on the limits of intelligence and intelligence failures in Peter Gill and Mark Phythian: Intelligence in an Insecure World (2007), pp. 103–124 and in Mark Lowenthal: Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (2006), pp. 99, 113 and 114.*

## 1 STREAMLINING THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY EFFORTS IN NATO

NATO has a robust structure that consists of several bodies tasked to provide intelligence and security support. These bodies exist at various levels inside and outside NATO's chain of command<sup>3</sup>. All these bodies rely heavily on inputs from the intelligence and security organisations of their member states.

The highest NATO decision-making body is the North Atlantic Council (NAC)<sup>4</sup>. Other major entities at NATO Headquarters (NATO HQ) are the International Staff (IS) and the International Military Staff (IMS)<sup>5</sup>. Intelligence and security structures in support of the highest political and military decision-makers in NATO, providing warning and supporting planning, are embedded in both the IS and the IMS staffs. However, the intelligence analytical capability has historically been less robust and less structured in the IS than in the IMS; the reason for this was primarily the nature of threats the Alliance had to face in the past.

Intelligence and security elements for the direct support of operations, operational planning and intelligence training are mainly embedded in both NATO strategic commands, namely the Allied Command Operations (ACO) and the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and their respective sub-commands<sup>6</sup>. The IS includes a special office responsible for the coordination and implementation of the Alliance security standards. The key structure in the security field is the Allied Command Counter Intelligence (ACCI) as the sole organic unit of NATO, designated for security. The command is located at SHAPE. Its staff also provides security intelligence support to commanders of crisis response operations. The command is tasked with the detection, deterrence and neutralisation of terrorist threats, espionage, sabotage and subversive operations directed against NATO personnel. It provides security intelligence support to all NATO units, commands and personnel of the Alliance and member states.

In the last two decades, NATO has undergone significant organisational changes throughout its structure. Several changes have also occurred in the intelligence and security field. Some of the most recent changes were triggered by the new Strategic concept adopted at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, which determined the vision and goals

<sup>3</sup> *On NATO Committees, including in the field of intelligence and security, see: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49174.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49174.htm).*


<sup>4</sup> *The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the principal political decision-making body within NATO. It brings together high-level representatives of each member country to discuss policy or operational questions requiring collective decisions. In sum, it provides a forum for wide-ranging consultation between members on all issues affecting their peace and security ([www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49763.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49763.htm)).*

<sup>5</sup> *The International Military Staff (IMS) is the executive body of the Military Committee, NATO's senior military authority. It is responsible for preparing assessments, evaluations and reports on all NATO military matters, which form the basis of discussion and decisions in the Military Committee (MC) ([www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_64557.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_64557.htm)).*

<sup>6</sup> [www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_52091.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52091.htm).

for the Alliance for the next decade<sup>7</sup>. Among other objectives, the new Strategic concept includes the necessity for NATO to have the capacities to successfully perform its task of collective defence and crisis management. The concept calls for the Alliance to be able to defend its members against the full range of threats and to be capable to managing even the most challenging crisis. The Chicago Summit in 2012 further reinforced and refined this objective<sup>8</sup>. But even the most obvious changes in such a robust and bureaucratic organisation have proven to be very time consuming and occur only at a very gradual pace. As a result, changes are often only slight adjustments and streamlining, despite the need for more substantial changes.

**Figure 1:**  
Strategic  
Intelligence  
and Security  
Architecture  
within the  
NATO Civilian  
and Military  
Structures  
Source:  
NATO and  
author's own  
research



<sup>7</sup> Lisbon Summit Declaration; issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon; Press Release (2010) 155, issued on 20 Nov. 2010 ([www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease)).

<sup>8</sup> Chicago Summit Declaration; issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012 ([www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease)).

In fact, in the last two decades, the NATO intelligence structure at all levels has, to some degree, faced constant reorganisation. It can be argued that the first big challenge for NATO after the Cold War was to adapt itself to the new reality and to find a new *raison d'être* for its existence. Confusion about the new reality was evident and intelligence was not immune to this confusion. The traditional Cold War threats became less realistic and more unlikely, but a new main challenge arose: the need to adequately tackle transnational threats, especially terrorism. It was obvious that new post-Cold War challenges demanded a completely new approach in the intelligence field, as the traditional and conventional military threat receded with the fall of the Soviet Union. The old NATO intelligence structures were organised to efficiently counter Cold War military threats, mainly the Soviet conventional and nuclear threats. In practice this meant that the intelligence structures were organised under NATO's Military Structure, under the NATO Military Committee. But the new post-Cold War reality was that the challenges for the Alliance were less and less military in nature. It was no longer just about counting opposing soldiers, tanks, planes, ships, but also tackling new and much more complex and difficult emerging threats and challenges. Old Cold War era intelligence analysts often remember the past with much nostalgia and fondness, when the threat was much clearer, and with a classic enemy whose resources, capabilities and intentions were much easier to identify and analyse. The intelligence within NATO at that time consisted mainly of comparing the quantitative data and updating the enemy's order of battle. As a result, the support that these structures could provide to decision-makers was much more concrete and factual.

New threats demanded a different intelligence approach in NATO since these new, transnational threats in many NATO nations were often the domain of civilian intelligence, security and law enforcement structures and not of military/defence intelligence structures. In order to successfully counter these new threats, the military/defence structures had to reach out to their counterparts in the civilian structures. These processes, however, required time even at national levels, and it is not surprising that even more time was needed within NATO.

The new approach to threats and how to counter them demanded a more holistic approach; this means cooperation not just between civilian and military intelligence structures but also a more tense cooperation between the intelligence and law enforcement agencies, the judiciary etc. At the national level, some NATO countries' intelligence, security and CI structures successfully underwent the required reorganisations and built bridges between the civilian and military intelligence and security organisations in order to more effectively counter the new threats. However, the intelligence reform and similar changes in NATO require much more time and are much more difficult, mainly due to the fact that NATO, through the decades, has become a very bureaucratic organisation and also due to the consensual nature of adopting decisions. Furthermore, there was even a certain reluctance in some nations for really substantial changes and several legal issues in some member states. As a result, the changes are not always the best, but only the best possible, since

all member states must agree on them. Consequently, sometimes even very logical solutions are not easy to reach and are burdened with national agendas and old, traditional divisions between the civilian and military intelligence structures.

Nevertheless, in recent years NATO has taken some important steps to take its intelligence capability to the next level. Probably the most important step was the decision of member states on the need to bring on board national civilian intelligence structures. Until quite recently, NATO did not have a common forum with civilian intelligence organisations. It had the AC46 body<sup>9</sup>, but this body consisted of mostly national security and counterintelligence (CI) services/agencies, and its primary task was dealing with security and CI issues and not with the provision of intelligence warning or intelligence analysis in support of planning and decision-making. Thus, an important addition to intelligence analysis at the NATO HQ was the establishment of a new body, namely the Civilian Intelligence Committee (CIC)<sup>10</sup>, which consists of national civilian intelligence, security and CI services of member states. This body essentially replaced the previous AC46 with the task to handle the civilian intelligence issues in NATO. It reports directly to the NAC and advises it on matters of espionage and threats which may affect NATO. Each NATO member state is represented in the CIC by its security and intelligence services. Furthermore, building on successful lessons learned from the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU) as a body in which civilian and military structures came together to commonly deal with the threat of terrorism, the concept developed even further and the TTIU transformed into the Intelligence Unit (IU)<sup>11</sup>. The IU is an analytical body with the task of providing intelligence support to the highest decision-making bodies in the NATO HQ on strategic issues of concern with intelligence-based analyses. The IU also supports senior civilian and military decision-makers in NATO (primarily the NAC and the MC, although reports of assessed intelligence may also be provided to other intelligence users at the NATO HQ) with intelligence-based analyses addressing terrorism, instability, proliferation and other regional and transnational issues of concern to the Alliance. It is a group of professional and skilled intelligence analysts from the NATO nations' civilian and military/defence intelligence structures. They still rely heavily on inputs from nations, but they produce non-agreed intelligence products<sup>12</sup> in close cooperation with the IMS Intelligence Division. The IU liaises on a regular basis with and obtains inputs from NATO member countries' security and

<sup>9</sup> *NATO's Special Committee (AC46) was the body representing chiefs of national counterintelligence services; it was created in 1952 to combat intelligence threats to the Alliance. It had begun exchanging information on international terrorism as early as 1970. The plan to revise and broaden its mandate was going on for years... (Eric Terzuolo, NATO and Weapons of Mass Destruction; Regional alliance, global threats (2006), Routledge, p. 23).*

<sup>10</sup> [www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_69278.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69278.htm).

<sup>11</sup> [www.qual.fr/permlinks\\_job\\_analyst-intelligence-unit-iu-brussels-nato-international\\_2754.html](http://www.qual.fr/permlinks_job_analyst-intelligence-unit-iu-brussels-nato-international_2754.html).

<sup>12</sup> *With regard to the level of the final agreement on the threats and risks to the Alliance among the NATO member states, different intelligence and security bodies in NATO produce the so-called NATO Agreed Intelligence (NAI) and/or NATO non-agreed intelligence. NAI usually covers a 10-year timeframe and is updated annually with the main objective to support NATO Defence Planners. It is called NAI because the final assessments are the result of the consensus reached among all NATO member states ([www.nato.int/docu/comm/2008/0803-science/pdf/tohmas\\_brevick.pdf](http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2008/0803-science/pdf/tohmas_brevick.pdf)). On the other hand, NATO non-agreed intelligence production is the intelligence that is not agreed among all the NATO member states.*

intelligence services, including through the existing mechanisms of the NATO CIC and the Military Intelligence Committee (MIC)<sup>13</sup>, in order to maintain and develop the flow of intelligence reporting to and within the Alliance. In addition, it liaises with the intelligence services of the Partnership for Peace/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (PfP/EAPC) and the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) nations.

Under the NATO Military Committee, the IMS Intelligence Division did not face significant changes or a major reorganization. Nevertheless, it re-aligned to be the integral part of the wider intelligence and security architecture at the NATO HQ. It continues to provide intelligence support for the MC and the NAC at the strategic level by providing Intelligence and Warning (I&W) and analytical assessments. For coordination of intelligence support at the NATO HQ level, between the CIC and the MIC, a new coordination body was established, called the NATO Intelligence Steering Group. It consists of the key heads of intelligence bodies and key NATO decision-makers and its task is to coordinate activities in order to prevent the duplication of efforts between NATO's civilian and military intelligence structures. It is chaired by the NATO Deputy Secretary General.

Intelligence in the NATO command structure, including its Allied Command for Operations (ACO) and Allied Command for Transformation (ACT) and their subordinate commands, also underwent a quite substantial streamlining in the last few years. At the Lisbon Summit in 2010, the Heads of States and Governments decided that the changing global environment required NATO to enhance its contribution to a comprehensive approach to crisis management, as part of the international community's effort, and to improve NATO's ability to deliver stabilisation and reconstruction effects<sup>14</sup>. Among other things, the Summit called for changes in intelligence structures inside SHAPE J2 and in its subordinate Joint Force Commands (JFCs). As a consequence of the difficulties the ACO was facing in providing timely and robust intelligence support to NATO operations, especially the ISAF mission in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent the KFOR mission in Kosovo, and due to the difficulties in reaching an agreement on how to quickly reorganise and improve NATO intelligence structures and intelligence support, the majority of NATO nations supported the establishment of a new organisation, the Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC), which was later renamed the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC)<sup>15</sup>. The NIFC was created to facilitate the sharing and fusion of intelligence, to contribute to filling intelligence gaps within the ACO, and to support the planning and execution of current operations. It is directed by the MC to significantly contribute to, but not replace, the NATO ACO key intelligence activities. It remains outside the formal NATO chain of command and NATO's permanent and crisis manning structures,

<sup>13</sup> *Military Intelligence Committee (MIC) comprises of the heads of military intelligence services of NATO member countries. It meets regularly in the format of the heads of intelligence services, heads of NATO military intelligence structures and heads of operational commands ([www.mod.gov.al/arkiv/eng/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=2216:meeting-of-the-nato-military-intelligence-committee-held-in-tirana&catid=329&Item=673](http://www.mod.gov.al/arkiv/eng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2216:meeting-of-the-nato-military-intelligence-committee-held-in-tirana&catid=329&Item=673)).*

<sup>14</sup> [www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease).

<sup>15</sup> *More about the NIFC, its mission and vision, role and history at [web.ifc.bices.org/about.htm](http://web.ifc.bices.org/about.htm).*

but it falls under the operational command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The NIFC supports the SACEUR and the ACO by providing intelligence to warn of potential crises and to support the planning and execution of NATO operations, including direct intelligence support to NATO Special Operations Forces. With all-source intelligence fusion, the NIFC mission is to deliver timely, relevant products to enhance NATO's situational awareness and operational effectiveness. The NIFC is a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) organisation located in the United Kingdom with the United States being a framework nation. It became fully operational in December 2007. It comprises over 200 military and civilian intelligence and support professionals from 26 of 28 NATO nations and one NAC-approved non-NATO nation. Whether forward deployed or providing reach-back for deployed NATO forces, the task of the NIFC analysts is to collaborate with a wide range of partners to produce intelligence assessments to enhance NATO's situational awareness. The NIFC is manned 24 hours per day, seven days a week and supports NATO operations across three continents. Many NIFC assessments have also been made available to military planners in the EU. The NIFC uses both classified and open-source information to give NATO forces the most accurate and timely intelligence support available. Each of NATO's current operations is commanded by a designated Joint Task Force headquarters, and the NIFC is tasked to provide intelligence support to each of them. In practice, the NIFC provides daily support to ISAF and routine support to the KFOR mission. Furthermore, the NIFC support has been the key contributor to Operation Ocean Shield through close cooperation with the NATO Maritime Command at Northwood, UK. It also provides support to Operation Active Endeavour and its mission to conduct maritime operations in the Mediterranean Sea to demonstrate NATO's resolve to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorism etc. One of the newest NIFC tasks is to support NATO Special Operations Forces. In this regard, the NIFC is responsible for providing direct intelligence support to NATO Special Operations Forces under the direction of the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ). The NIFC has supported NATO Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan with intelligence and deployed intelligence professionals. Slovenia has been an active participant in the NIFC since its establishment, where it currently fills two posts.

NATO has recently streamlined its command structure in order to make it more affordable, while protecting its levels of operational capability and capacity. These reforms have reduced the overall number of staff from 13,000 to 8,800 posts NATO-wide, but have also created a more deployable and streamlined command configuration, including in the intelligence field<sup>16</sup>. In the centre of the new streamlined NATO command structure and of special importance to the improved intelligence support is the Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre (CCOMC)<sup>17</sup>, with the task to monitor emerging challenges in a more comprehensive and effective way.

<sup>16</sup> *More about the NATO Command Structure Review: [www.jfcnaples.nato.int/page352335714.aspx](http://www.jfcnaples.nato.int/page352335714.aspx) and [www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_52091.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52091.htm).*

<sup>17</sup> *[www.aco.nato.int/natos-military-committee-visits-the-ccomc-at-shape.aspx](http://www.aco.nato.int/natos-military-committee-visits-the-ccomc-at-shape.aspx); [www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_86912.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_86912.htm?selectedLocale=en); [theleadersclub.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/LEADER-CLUBamended.ppt](http://theleadersclub.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/LEADER-CLUBamended.ppt).*

The CCOMC was established in 2012 and is the new integrated NATO centre tasked to support the Alliance with an improved approach to emerging security challenges and crises, while helping deliver a more flexible and agile responses to crises. The CCOMC is divided into five task groups focusing on Crisis Identification, Current Operations, Estimations and Options, Response Direction and Crisis Review. The CCOMC's main tasks are to provide command and control to NATO operations at the strategic level, situational awareness, strategic estimation of potential crises, management of multiple crises simultaneously, evaluation of the strategic risk to ongoing NATO operations and contribution to all SACEUR missions and tasks in peace, crisis and conflict. It fulfils its role by performing active and comprehensive situational awareness of the security environment and by producing fused assessments and crisis evaluations. The Centre collaborates and cooperates in an integrated manner, bringing together military and civilian expertise. In comparison to intelligence and security structures at the level of the NATO HQ and partially the strategic level in the ACO, the intelligence at the level of subordinate commands, this is at the JFCs level, did not undergo the required changes, at least not so far. Nevertheless, several significant changes at the JFCs level would be needed in order to improve the intelligence process and support to the operations and prevent the unnecessary duplications.

## 2 INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY EFFORTS IN THE EU

In comparison to NATO, the intelligence and security structure in the EU is much less robust and consists of only a few bodies. At the top of the structure is the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN)<sup>18</sup> which operates as part of the European External Action Service (EEAS). It was formed in March 2012 and has only around 70 employees. The INTCEN's mission is to provide intelligence analysis, early warning and situational awareness to the EU High Representative and the EEAS, to various EU decision-making bodies in the fields of Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and Counter-Terrorism, as well as to the EU Member States<sup>19</sup>. The INTCEN does this by monitoring and assessing international events, focusing particularly on sensitive geographical areas, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other global threats. The INTCEN has its roots in the European Security and Defence Policy of 1999, which put a group of analysts working on open-source intelligence in the organisation called the Joint Situation Centre. The organisation slowly grew and developed and started to produce classified products. It relies completely on inputs received from the EU Member States, military intelligence, non-military intelligence and diplomatic reporting<sup>20</sup>. It is divided into two divisions. The first is Analysis Division, responsible for providing strategic analysis based on

<sup>18</sup> [www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-223-eu-intcen.pdf](http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-223-eu-intcen.pdf).

<sup>19</sup> [www.mfa.bg/uploads/files/1384440855EEAS-2013-AD-33.pdf](http://www.mfa.bg/uploads/files/1384440855EEAS-2013-AD-33.pdf).

<sup>20</sup> *The INTCEN does not have a collection capability, it doesn't deal with personal data and does not carry out clandestine operations; the operational level of intelligence is the EU member states' responsibility. INTCEN only deal with strategic analysis (more in the interview with Ilkka Salmi, Director INTCEN: [www.mo.be/node/37891](http://www.mo.be/node/37891)).*



The only EU organic intelligence asset and its only real collection capacity is the EU Satellite Centre (EU SATCEN)<sup>22</sup> which provides satellite imagery and analysis. Furthermore, it assures technical development activities in direct support of its operational activities and specialised training for the imagery analysts from Member States. The SATCEN is located in Torrejón de Ardoz near Madrid, Spain, and consists of imagery analysts, geospatial specialists and supporting personnel from the EU Member States. It was established in 1992 and incorporated as an agency into the EU on 1 January 2002. The SATCEN's areas of priority reflect the key security concerns as defined by the European Security Strategy, such as the monitoring of regional conflicts, state failure, organised crime, terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Centre, for example, provides support to EU deployed operations (such as the EU NAVFOR - Operation Atalanta) and humanitarian aid missions. The Centre is also an important early warning tool, facilitating information for early detection and possible prevention of armed conflicts and humanitarian crises. Slovenia actively participates in both main EU intelligence and analytical bodies, the INTCEN and EUMS Intelligence Directorate, while, on several occasions in the past, it also actively participated in the work of the SATCEN.

## Conclusion

With the Ukraine crisis and consequently the ongoing political discussions about the need to reconsider Russia as a partner in the Euro-Atlantic integrations, there is a realistic possibility we will again see at least some streamlining, but possibly even some more substantial changes with regard to the intelligence and security structures, especially in NATO, but also, although to a lesser extent, in the EU. This streamlining/changes would be introduced with the aim to reflect the new emerging geopolitical reality and to meet the new needs of decision-makers and defence planners.

The current financial constraints must not prevent Slovenia from continuing its active participation within the intelligence and security structures of both NATO and the EU. An active approach, consisting of even more intelligence sharing and filling intelligence and security posts within both NATO and the EU with highly motivated professionals at the strategic, operational and tactical level, must remain one of the priorities for our decision-makers, especially among those shaping our foreign, national security and defence policy. It is not just about being part of the process, showing the flag or maintaining credibility within both organisations as a good and responsible partner. It is, in fact, all this but also much more - it is to remain capable of providing the best possible intelligence and security support to our troops deployed on missions abroad, regardless of whether they serve under the NATO or EU flag, and to be able to provide adequate support to decision-makers at the national level with regard to the ongoing and future missions, and even about national security. Moreover, Slovenia should go even further and should dare to fill more leadership intelligence posts and posts with more responsibilities and more internal as well as external visibility. This should certainly be our way forward, with a higher level of ambition when filling the international intelligence positions. In

<sup>22</sup> More at [www.eusc.eu](http://www.eusc.eu).

difficult times, when rationalisation and reductions at all levels of the public sector are inevitable, decision-makers should really think twice when making decisions about cutting the already limited and scarce resources for intelligence and security, especially since Slovenia's participation in international missions abroad will, in one way or another, likely keep decreasing in the future. Providing effective and capable intelligence at the highest levels means better strategic decisions and better strategic planning. At the operational level it means better operational planning and better operational decisions, while at the tactical level it provides a safer execution of a concrete mission for the soldiers and literally saves the soldiers' lives. To be well-placed inside the intelligence and security system in international organisations is of paramount importance.

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