

The 24th ISCP Conference  
第 24 届 ISCP 国际中国哲学大会  
第24屆ISCP國際中國哲學大會

## Addressing Global Crises and Reimagining Solutions through Chinese Philosophy

透过中国哲学应对全球危机并重新构想解决方案  
透過中國哲學應對全球危機並重新構想解決方案

OPENING SPEECH  
AND  
BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

开幕致辞及论文摘要集  
開幕致辭及論文摘要集

Edited by: Maja M. Kosec



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**Addressing Global Crises and Reimagining Solutions through Chinese Philosophy**  
**Opening speech and Book of abstract**  
**The 24th ISCP Conference, Ljubljana 2025**

Editor: *Maja M. Kosec*

Design and layout: *Nana Martinčič*

Published by: Založba Univerze v Ljubljani (University of Ljubljana Press)

Issued by: Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani  
(University of Ljubljana Press, Faculty of Arts)

For the publisher: Gregor Majdič, rector of the University of Ljubljana

For the issuer: Mojca Schlamberger Brezar, Dean of the Faculty of Arts,  
University of Ljubljana

Printed by: Birografika Bori d. o. o.  
Ljubljana, 2025

First Edition

Number of copies printed: 200

Publication is free of charge.

First e-edition. Digital copy of the book is available on: <https://ebooks.uni-lj.si/zalozbaul/>  
DOI: 10.4312/9789612975999

Katalogna zapisa o publikaciji (CIP) pripravili v  
Narodni in univerzitetni knjižnici v Ljubljani

Tiskana knjiga  
COBISS.SI-ID=238453251  
ISBN 978-961-297-601-9

E-knjiga  
COBISS.SI-ID 238071299  
ISBN 978-961-297-599-9 (PDF)

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**OPENING SPEECH**

**开幕致辞**

**OTVORITVENI GOVOR**



## **Dear friends, esteemed colleagues, and dear companions,**

It is a great honor and joy for me to welcome you to this anniversary conference of the International Society for Chinese Philosophy, through which we will commemorate the 50th anniversary of this society, founded in 1975 by Professor Cheng Chung-ying. Since then, over the course of half a century, the society has proven to be one of the most important bridges between Western and Chinese philosophy, as well as a significant platform for transcultural philosophical dialogues—dialogues that are more necessary today than ever before. With this historic gathering, we wish to demonstrate that society will continue to thrive and develop in a positive direction, with respect for diversity and inclusion. It is by no means a coincidence that these values also rank among the most important characteristics of the Chinese philosophical tradition, belonging to the core principles that guide its mission.

And since we have already mentioned the spirit of inclusivity, I would like to ask for a bit of patience at the very beginning of our gathering, as I have delivered this opening part of my keynote speech in three languages that are important for this conference and therefore must be part of it. The first is Slovenian, as the language of the country and culture hosting this conference; the second is English, as the *lingua franca* of the contemporary academic world; and the third is Chinese, as a global language in which the philosophy we will be discussing during this event is written—and from which we will undoubtedly learn many new things once again.

However, since philosophy must not be dogmatic, and because I do not wish to go on at length or continue testing your patience, I will—despite my forthcoming critique of the reduction of thought to a *lingua franca*—deliver the remaining and longest part of my address in English only. You can follow the Slovenian and Chinese translations of the text on the slides accompanying my speech.

This trilingual introduction naturally carries symbolic significance, and it is perhaps we, as scholars in the field of philosophy, who best understand the weight that symbolic forms of language can bear—forms which, in their performative function, do not merely convey meaning but simultaneously co-create relations of power, identity, and the very possibilities of thought.

The spirit of inclusion is especially important when we speak of philosophies, languages, and cultures that do not belong to the hegemonic dominance of the contemporary

structures of power shaping today's globalized world. Of course, we have all long become accustomed to English being the *lingua franca* of modern academic interaction. On the one hand, this greatly facilitates direct communication among researchers and theorists from all parts of the world. On the other hand, English is not a neutral, artificially constructed global language like Esperanto, which embodies an egalitarian ideal. Rather, it is a language spoken and thought in by those who were born into it, socialized in it, and feel most comfortable using it—precisely the segment of the global population that has dominated the world and shaped the fate of much of the planet since the era of colonization. The dominance of English is thus, on one level, a convenient means of communication, but on another, it deepens the marginalization and discrimination of all cultures, traditions, and languages that do not belong to the Anglophone linguistic and intellectual heritage.

This discrimination and marginalization do not harm only the members of languages and cultures that are left voiceless but ultimately affect all of us as members of humanity. Why? Let me illustrate this with an example from ecology. As we all know, the modern ecological crisis is a constitutive part of the most pressing global crises. When discussing this crisis, we often refer to the problem of extinction affecting numerous animal and plant species and other forms of organic life. Each species that disappears in the explosive whirlpool of ecological destruction takes with it an unrepeatable configuration of life—a unique mode of being and relation to the world that cannot be replaced. At the same time, such loss destabilizes the fragile ecological balance, the collapse of which threatens human existence itself.

The situation is similar with the extinction of numerous small, seemingly insignificant languages, which we witness daily in the modern world. Approximately nine languages go extinct each year in today's world, which means that one language disappears every 40 days. This rate of extinction has increased over the past decades; about ten years ago, the average time between extinctions was one language every 90 days. According to the ELCAT project (Endangered Languages Catalogue), about four languages go extinct each year, meaning that one disappears every three months.

According to UNESCO estimates, of the 6,000 to 7,000 languages spoken in the world today, nearly half are endangered, with between 50% and 90% of these languages expected to become extinct by the end of the century. The main reasons for language extinction include globalization, migration, the dominance of major languages in education and media, and reduced intergenerational language transmission.

And we must understand that the loss of each language is not merely the loss of a unique cultural heritage, knowledge, and the identity of a community. It also means



the loss of a specific, singular, and unrepeatable worldview—of a way of understanding and expressing the reality we live in and that forms part of ourselves. It represents an impoverishment of our shared potential for thought, which we possess as humanity. And it is precisely we, as philosophers, who best understand that it is the diversity of perspectives and worldviews that most effectively unveil the veils covering the many dimensions of truth.

As philosophers engaged with Chinese philosophy and its potential to enter the realm of contemporary global philosophy, we also serve as bridges striving to connect mutually distant cultures and the very different views of reality that these cultures generate and question. In this role, we perhaps best understand that the task of philosophy is by no means to convey a single universally valid truth—that is the role and mission of religion. The task of philosophy, by contrast, lies in opening ever new questions about the true nature of reality and the world in which it is rooted, doing so in a variety of ways and from a multitude of different perspectives.

The theme of this year's ISCP conference is highly ambitious and far-reaching. It almost sounds as if we intend to save the world through Chinese philosophy. Of course, the world cannot be saved by Chinese philosophy—just as Yang Zhu already observed, it cannot be saved even by sacrificing a single hair from one's head. Nevertheless, it remains important to reflect on the problems of today's world through the lens of philosophy and philosophical dialogues that connect the Chinese and Western traditions and their contemporary contexts.

But philosophy is problematic and has its issues. Today, it may even be on the verge of survival. My students often ask me whether classical philosophical questions are still relevant at all. They wonder whether ancient concepts can even be meaningfully connected to modern ways of thinking. They suggest that we should not limit our discussions to abstract theory but instead try to bring them closer to contemporary people by applying their content in practical contexts. In this way, they would become easier to understand, and people would more readily grasp why they are important.

Such questions clearly show that many people perceive „purely philosophical“ discussions as something superfluous, something alienated from real life and therefore entirely irrelevant. I cannot agree with such a view of the world and philosophy. Philosophy is not merely a form of intellectual play or a self-indulgent engagement with one's own thoughts; it is not a game of sophisms or a pursuit of intellectual self-gratification.

On the contrary: philosophy is the foundation of all critical thinking. The modern world, including science, law, politics, and ethics, has taken shape through centuries

of philosophical debate. Without theoretical reflection, we would not even know how to ask the right questions, let alone understand the answers. Without theoretical reflection on reality, we would still be living in the Stone Age, lacking the intellectual groundwork necessary for the development of technology and empirical sciences.

Of course, it is true that practical applications make it easier to understand ideas. And it is equally true that our creation of ideas and our reflection on them—our critical engagement with reality—ultimately leads to our fundamental goal, which is expressed in the desire to reshape and improve the world we live in. At first glance, then, it seems that only such an understanding of reality, one based on a clear insight into the benefits of directly applying ideas, offers the fastest and most effective path toward meaningful and significant change.

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But we must understand that the most important discoveries in science, which have time and again led to revolutionary breakthroughs in the development of technology and material goods, were merely by-products of theoretical constructions of reality. The search for the most effective applications through the lens of instrumental rationality, which dominates the modern world doomed to collapse, has never been the primary impulse or driving force behind theory. Theory, in fact, is grounded in the value of usefulness, as presented in the essays of Zhuangzi, and in the aesthetics of pure structures, as explained by Ji Kang.

The simplification of reality and its reduction to the utilitarianism of short-term benefits is therefore not the central task of philosophy, which belongs to the core theoretical disciplines in the humanities. The task of philosophy is a thorough and radical reflection on the complexity of reality, which often resists simple explanations.

In other words: humanities—and philosophy as their foundation—are grounded in theoretical thinking and in a qualitative insight into the nature of reality, not merely in empirical data about actualities. The contributions of theory to practice are crucial, as they shape the frameworks within which we can meaningfully interpret data, understand social and cultural phenomena, and formulate meaningful responses to the challenges we face. Such thinking is often demanding and does not always yield immediate results or clear meanings. And yet, it is essential for preserving the significance of human existence and for the advancement of humanity.

The complex crises we face today—such as wars, environmental catastrophes, unequal distribution of resources, viral pandemics, and others—belong to global problems that cannot be fully addressed within the narrow frameworks of individual nation-states. They must also be approached within the broader context of global cooperation and


solidarity. Such strategies require the development of genuine intercultural dialogue, that is, a dialogue that goes beyond currently fashionable slogans and can lead to truly equitable transcultural exchange of knowledge and ideas. In this effort, our conference will focus on traditional and contemporary Chinese philosophy.

As we will see over the course of the conference, many contributions clearly highlight the fact that Chinese philosophy can offer insights into a wide range of perspectives and principles that may potentially contribute to the development of innovative reflections on new solutions to global crises.

These solutions will certainly not remain confined to addressing globalization based solely on economic and political criteria of continuous accumulation of material profit and power; rather, they will also point toward alternative approaches aligned with the idea of planetarity as articulated by Gayatri Spivak. For we all wish to live in a world that is balanced, non-violent, unpolluted, and in which we are not all the same—but equal in worth.

In this spirit and on this foundation, I am pleased and honored to officially declare the opening of this conference, which offers us new opportunities for fruitful exchange of ideas and knowledge. I hope it will bring us a wealth of new insights, new opportunities, and above all, new friendships.

Professor Jana S. Rošker  
President, International Society for Chinese Philosophy (ISCP)  
Ljubljana, June 20, 2025

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Jana S. Rošker', written in a cursive style.

## 亲爱的朋友们，尊敬的嘉宾们，同仁们：

我怀着无比荣幸与喜悦的心情，欢迎大家参加本次国际中国哲学学会的周年纪念会议。本学会由成中英教授于1975年创立，通过本次会议，我们会共同纪念学会成立五十周年。自学会创立起，在半个世纪的发展过程中，本学会已被公认为连接中西哲学最重要的桥梁之一，同时也是推动跨文化哲学对话的重要平台——而这样的对话，在当今这个时代，比以往任何时候都更加不可缺少。通过这次具有历史意义的聚会，我们希望本学会将在尊重多样性与包容性的基础上，继续蓬勃发展、迈向积极的未来。值得强调的是，这些价值观也正是中国哲学传统中最为重要的特质之一，是引领其使命的核心原则。

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既然提到了包容的精神，我也想在这次聚会的一开始请求大家给予一些耐心，因为我将把本次主题演讲的开场部分用三种语言呈现出来。这三种语言对本次会议都具有重要意义，因此它们理应成为其中的一部分。第一是斯洛文尼亚语，作为本次会议主办国的语言；第二是英语，作为当代学术界的通用语；第三是中文，作为我们将在此次会议中探讨哲学的语言之一——而这门语言，也将再次带领我们学习到许多新的思想与知识。

然而，因为哲学绝不应当是教条主义的，也因为我不愿占用太多时间或继续考验各位的耐心，尽管我稍后将会批判将思想简化为单一通用语言的倾向，但我接下来的主要发言部分——也是最长的部分——将仅以英语进行。大家可以在我演讲所配的幻灯片上看到斯洛文尼亚语与中文的译文。

这一三语引言自然而然地承载着象征性的意义。或许我们这些哲学领域的学者是最能理解语言的象征形式所能承载的分量的——这些形式在其施为性功能中，不仅传达了意义，同时共同建构了权力关系、身份认同，乃至思考的本能本身。

当我们谈论那些不属于当代全球化世界权力结构主导范围内的哲学、语言与文化时，包容精神显得尤为重要。当然，我们早已习惯以英语作为现代学术交流的通用语。从一方面来说，这极大地便利了来自世界各地的研究者与理论家的直接沟通。但从另一方面看，英语并不是一种中立的、如世界语那样人工构建、体现平等理想的全球语言。它是一种由母语者使用和思考的语言——这些人自出生起便在其中接受社会化，并熟练地运用它，恰恰是这部分全球人口，自殖民时代以来主导了世界并塑造了大部分地区的命运。因此，英语的主导地位一方面便捷了沟通，但

在另一方面，也加深了所有不属于英语语言与思想传统的文化、传统与语言的边缘化与歧视。

这种歧视与边缘化不仅伤害了那些被剥夺了话语权的语言与文化成员，最终也影响到我们作为人类共同体的每一个人。为什么？让我用一个生态学的例子来说明。众所周知，当代生态危机是当前最紧迫的全球性危机之一。在讨论这一危机时，我们常常提到灭绝问题——它正影响着无数动植物以及其他有机生命形式。每一个在生态毁灭的剧烈漩涡中消失的物种，都会带走一种不可重复的生命配置——一种独特的存在方式与其和世界的关系，这些都是无法替代的。与此同时，这种损失也会破坏本就脆弱的生态平衡，而这种平衡一旦崩溃，将直接威胁到人类自身的生存。

类似的情况也发生在众多小型、看似无关紧要的语言的消亡上，而这一过程在当今世界每天都在上演。如今，全球大约每年有九种语言灭绝，也就是说平均每四十天就有一种语言消失。过去几十年来，这一灭绝速度在不断加快；大约十年前，语言灭绝的平均周期为每九十天一种。根据濒危语言目录（ELCAT）项目的数据，目前大约每年有四种语言灭绝，也就是每三个月就会有一种语言从世界上消失。

根据联合国教科文组织的估计，当今世界上使用的语言约有六千至七千种，其中近一半正处于濒危状态。预计到本世纪末，这些语言中将有50%至90%面临灭绝。语言灭绝的主要原因包括全球化、人口迁移、主流语言在教育与媒体中的主导地位，以及代际语言传承的减弱。

我们必须明白，每一种语言的消失不仅意味着一个独特文化遗产、知识体系与社群身份的丧失，它同时也意味着一种独特而不可重复的世界观的消逝——一种理解并表达我们所处现实、并构成我们自身一部分的方式。这是一种对人类共同思维潜能的削弱。而正是我们这些哲学工作者，最能理解：正是多样的视角与世界观，才能最有效地揭示遮蔽真理诸多维度的重重面纱。

作为致力于中国哲学及其进入当代全球哲学领域的哲学家，我们也充当着桥梁的角色，努力连接彼此遥远的文化以及不断反思由这些文化所生成的对现实的认识。也就是因为我们作为这样的一个桥梁，我们也许最能理解：哲学的任务绝不是传达某种普遍有效的单一真理——那是宗教的使命。哲学的任务是在于不断开启关于现实本质及其所处世界的新问题，并从多种方式和不同视角对其进行探讨。

今年国际中国哲学学会年会的主题雄心勃勃，影响深远，听起来几乎像是我们打算通过中国哲学来拯救世界。当然，世界并不能只靠中国哲学来拯救——正如杨朱早就指出的，拔一毛而利天下，不为也？。然而，通过哲

学以及连接中西传统与当代语境的哲学对话，来反思当今世界的问题，仍然具有重要意义。

但哲学本身也是有问题的，她面临着自身的困境。如今，她甚至可能处于存亡的边缘。我的学生们常常问我，古典哲学的问题如今是否还有意义；他们怀疑，古代的概念是否还能与现代的思维方式建立有意义的联系。他们认为，我们的讨论不应仅限于抽象的理论，而应尝试将其内容应用于现实语境之中，使之更贴近当代人的生活。这样一来，哲学便更容易被理解，人们也能更清楚地认识到她的重要性。

这些问题清楚地表明，许多人认为“纯粹的哲学”讨论是多余的，是脱离现实生活的，因此也是完全无关紧要的。我无法认同这种对世界和哲学的看法。哲学并不仅仅是一种智力游戏，或是自我沉醉于思维之中的活动；她不是耍弄诡辩的把戏，也不是一种沉溺于自我思辨的满足。

恰恰相反，哲学是一切批判性思维的基础。现代世界——包括科学、法律、政治和伦理——都是在历经数百年的哲学论辩中逐渐形成的。没有理论性的反思，我们甚至无法提出正确的问题，更别说给出答案了。如果我们缺乏对现实的理论反思的本能，我们至今仍将停留在石器时代，无法建立起科技与经验科学发展所必需的思维基础。

当然，实践性的应用确实有助于理解观念。这同样也说明，我们对于观念的创造与反思——即我们对现实的深度思考与批判性参与——最终指向一个根本目标，那就是改善和重塑我们所处的世界。

从表面上看，似乎只有这种实用性的对现实的理解，即一种建立在对观念直接应用之效益有清晰认知的基础上的理解，才能提供一条通往深刻而有意义变革的最快且最有效的路径。

但我们必须明白，科学中那些一次又一次引发技术和物质发展革命性突破的最重要的发现，只不过是关于现实的理论建构的副产品。以功利理性为视角追求最有效的应用，这种主导人类对于现代世界的态度注定会导致其崩溃。这种极为实用性的态度从来都不是理论的基本驱动力。理论实际上植根于“无用之用”的价值，如《庄子》诸篇所示，以及纯粹结构的美学，如嵇康所阐述的那样。

对现实的简化及其向短期功利主义的还原，并不是哲学的核心任务，而哲学本身属于人文学科中的核心理论。哲学的任务，是对现实的繁复性进行深入而彻底的反思，而这种繁复性往往抗拒简单的解释。

换句话说，人文学科——以及作为其理论基础的哲学——植根于理论思维与对现实本质的本质性洞察，而不仅仅是关于现实状况的经验数据。理论



对实践的贡献至关重要，因为它塑造了我们理解数据、认识社会与文化现象、并对所面临挑战作出有意义回应的框架。这种思维常常是艰难的，未必能带来立竿见影的结果或明确的意义，然而，它对于维护人类存在的意义以及人类的进步而言是不可或缺的。


当今我们所面临的各种复杂危机——如战争、环境灾难、资源分配不均、病毒大流行等——属于全球性问题，无法在单一民族国家的狭隘框架内得到全面解决。这些问题必须在全球合作与团结的更广阔背景下加以应对。这种策略要求我们发展真正的跨文化对话，即超越当前流行口号的对话，从而实现真正平等的知识与思想的跨文化交流。在这一努力中，本次会议将聚焦于中国传统与当代哲学。

正如我们将在本次会议中看到的，许多报告清楚地指出，中国哲学能够为多种视角和原则提供洞见，这些洞见可能有助于发展对全球危机新解决方案的创新性思考。

这些解决方案显然不会局限于仅从经济和政治上不断积累物质利益与权力的全球化标准出发；相反，它们还将指向与盖亚特里·斯皮瓦克所阐述的“行星性”理念相契合的替代路径。因为我们都希望生活在一个平衡、非暴力、无污染的世界中。生活于这样的行星世界中，我们每个人虽各不相同，但作为人，我们都拥有同等的价值与尊严。

本着这一精神，并以此为基础，我喜悦与荣幸地正式宣布本次会议开幕。本次会议为我们提供了思想与知识交流的新契机。我希望它能为我们带来丰富的新见解、新机会，最重要的是，新友谊。

罗亚娜  
中国哲学国际学会会长  
卢布尔雅那，2025年6月20日



## Dragi prijatelji in ljube prijateljice, spoštovane kolegice, cenjeni kolegi!

V veliko čast in veselje mi je, da vas lahko pozdravim na tej jubilejni konferenci Mednarodnega združenja za kitajsko filozofijo, s katero bomo med drugim zaznamovali 50. obletnico tega združenja, ki ga je leta 1975 ustanovil profesor Cheng Chung-ying. Vse odtlej se je to združenje v polovici stoletja svojega obstoja izkazalo kot eden najpomembnejših mostov med zahodno in kitajsko filozofijo ter kot pomembna platforma za transkulturne filozofske dialoge, ki so dandanes bolj potrebni kot kadarkoli doslej. S tem zgodovinskim srečanjem želimo pokazati, da se bo to združenje uspešno razvijalo še naprej in sicer na zelo pozitiven način, saj sodita spoštovanje do raznolikosti in vključevanja, ki sta tudi med najpomembnejšimi značilnostmi kitajske filozofske tradicije, med temeljne vrednote, ki opredeljujejo njegovo delovanje.

In ko smo že omenili duh vključevanja, bi vas že na samem začetku našega srečanja želela prositi za nekoliko potrpljenja, ker sem tale uvodni del svojega otvoritvenega govora povedala v treh jezikih, ki so pomembni za to konferenco in torej morajo biti njen del. Prvi je slovenščina kot jezik države in kulture, ki to konferenco gosti, drugi je angleščina kot *lingua franca* sodobnega akademskega sveta, tretji pa kitajščina kot tisti svetovni jezik, v katerem je zapisana filozofija, o kateri bomo v okviru tega srečanja diskutirali in od katere se bomo zagotovo spet naučili marsikaj novega.

Ker pa filozofija ne sme biti dogmatična, in ker nočem več dolgoveziti ter še naprej postavljati vašega potrpljenja na preizkušnjo, bom kljub svoji kritiki redukcije mišljenja na *linguo franco*, ki bo sledila, v preostalem, najdaljšem delu svojega nagovora govorila samo še v angleščini. Slovenski in kitajski prevod nadaljnega besedila pa lahko zasledujete na prosojnicah, ki spremljajo moj nagovor.

Ta trojezični uvod ima seveda simbolno vrednost, in ravno nam kot teoretikom in teoretičarkam s področja filozofije je morda še najbolj jasno, kakšno težo imajo lahko simbolne forme jezika, ki v svoji performativni funkciji ne izražajo zgolj pomena, temveč hkrati soustvarjajo razmerja moči, identitet in možnosti mišljenja.

Duh vključevanja je pri tem izjemno pomemben, predvsem kadar govorimo o filozofijah, jezikih in kulturah, ki niso del hegemonistične dominacije sodobnih struktur moči, ki opredeljujejo sodobni globalizirani svet. Seveda smo se vsi že zdavnaj navadili, da je angleški jezik *Lingua franca* sodobnih akademskih interakcij. To nam po eni strani zelo olajšuje neposredno komuniciranje med raziskovalci, raziskovalkami, teoretiki



in teoretičarkami iz najrazličnejših delov sveta. Po drugi strani pa angleščina ni zgolj nek umetni, v ta namen skonstruirani globalni jezik, kakršen se zrcali v egalitarni ideji esperanta, temveč je jezik, ki ga govori in v katerem razmišlja, v katerega je bil rojen in v katerem je bil socializiran in se zato v njem najudobneje počuti prav tisti del svetovne populacije, ki je nadvladoval svet in krojil usodo velike večine drugih delov našega planeta, vse od kolonializacije naprej. Dominacija angleščine je torej po eni strani udobno sredstvo sporazumevanja, po drugi pa pogloblja marginalizacijo in diskriminacijo vseh kultur, izročil in jezikov, ki niso del anglofonske idejne tradicije.

Ta diskriminacija in marginalizacija ni zgolj v škodo pripadnikom in pripadnicam jezikov in kultur, ki ostajajo pri tem brez lastnega glasu, temveč je v škodo vsem nam kot pripadnikom in pripadnicam človeštva. Zakaj? Naj vam poskusim to predočiti s primerom iz ekologije. Kot vsi vemo, je sodobna ekološka kriza konstitutivni del vseh najbolj perečih globalnih kriz. Ko govorimo o tej krizi, pogosto omenjamo problem ekstinkcije številnih živalskih in rastlinskih vrst in drugih oblik organskega življenja. Vsaka vrsta, ki izgine v eksplozivnem vrtincu ekološkega uničenja, s sabo odnese neponovljivo konfiguracijo življenja, način bivanja in odnosa do sveta, ki ga ni mogoče nadomestiti, obenem pa ruši krhko ekološko ravnovesje, katerega razpad ogroža tudi obstoj človeka.

Podobno je z ekstinkcijo številnih majhnih, na videz nepomembnih jezikov, ki smo ji vsakodnevno priča v sodobnem svetu. V sodobnem svetu izumre približno 9 jezikov na leto, kar pomeni, da vsakih 40 dni izgine en jezik. Ta stopnja izumiranja se je v zadnjih desetletjih povečala; pred približno desetimi leti je bil povprečni čas med izumrtji en jezik na vsakih 90 dni. Po podatkih projekta ELCAT (Katalog ogroženih jezikov) pa vsako leto izumrejo približno štirje jeziki, kar pomeni, da vsake 3 mesece izgine en jezik.

Po ocenah UNESCOa je med 6.000 in 7.000 jeziki, ki se danes govorijo po svetu, skoraj polovica ogroženih, pri čemer naj bi do konca stoletja izumrlo med 50 % in 90 % teh jezikov. Glavni razlogi za izumiranje jezikov vključujejo globalizacijo, migracije, prevlado večjih jezikov v izobraževanju in medijih ter zmanjšano medgeneracijsko prenašanje jezika.

A vedeti moramo, da izguba vsakega jezika ne pomeni zgolj izgube edinstvene kulturne dediščine, znanja in identitete skupnosti. Pomeni tudi izgubo specifičnega, enkratnega in neponovljivega pogleda na svet, razumevanja in izražanja resničnosti, v kateri živimo in ki je del nas samih. Pomeni osiromašenje našega skupnega potenciala mišljenja, s katerim razpolagamo kot človeštvo. In ravno kot filozofi in filozofinje seveda najbolje vemo, da so prav različne perspektive, različni pogledi na svet in stvarnost tiste, ki nam najboljše razkrivajo tančice, ki prekrivajo obličja mnogoterih razsežnosti resnice.

Kot filozofi in filozofinje, ki se ukvarjamo s kitajsko filozofijo in možnostmi njenega prodora v svet sodobne globalne filozofije, pa smo hkrati tudi mostovi, ki poskušajo povezati vzajemno oddaljene kulture in zelo različne poglede na resničnost, ki jih te kulture rojevajo in prevprašujejo. Kot taki morda najbolje vemo, da naloga filozofije nikakor ni v tem, da bi nam posredovala eno obče veljavno resnico. To je naloga in poslanstvo religij. Naloga filozofije pa je, prav nasprotno, prej v tem, da razpira vedno nova vprašanja o resnici, o naravi resničnosti in sveta, v katerem je zakoreninjena in to na najrazličnejše načine in iz mnogoterih različnih perspektiv.

Tema letošnje konference ISCP je zelo ambiciozna in velikopotezna. Sliši se nekako tako, kot da bi želeli s pomočjo kitajske filozofije rešiti svet. Sveta seveda ni možno rešiti s kitajsko filozofijo, podobno kot je ugotovil že Yang Zhu, ki je poudaril, da ga ni možno rešiti s tem, da zanj žrtvujemo las iz svoje glave. Kljub temu pa je pomembno, da o problemih današnjega sveta razpravljamo skozi optiko filozofije in filozofskih dialogov, ki povezujejo kitajsko in zahodno tradicijo in sodobnost.

A filozofija je problematična in ima probleme. Morda je dandanes celo na robu preživetja. Moji študenti in študentke me pogosto sprašujejo, ali so klasična filozofska vprašanja danes sploh še pomembna. Sprašujejo se, ali je antične pojme sploh mogoče smiselno povezati s sodobnim načinom razmišljanja. Predlagajo, naj svojih razprav ne omejujemo na abstraktno teorijo, temveč jih raje poskušamo približati sodobnemu človeku prek uporabe njihovih vsebin v praktičnih kontekstih. Na ta način naj bi postale lažje razumljive in ljudje bi lažje dojeli, zakaj so pomembne.

Takšna vprašanja jasno kažejo na to, da veliko ljudi »čisto filozofske« razprave dojema kot nekaj odvečnega, nekaj, kar je odtujeno od resničnega življenja in s tem povsem nepomembno. S takšnim pogledom na svet in filozofijo se nikakor ne morem strinjati. Filozofija ni zgolj oblika intelektualnega poigravanja ali samovšečnega ukvarjanja z lastno mislijo; ni igra sofizmov ali iskanje intelektualne samozadovoljitve.

Nasprotno: filozofija je temelj vsega kritičnega mišljenja. Sodobni svet — vključno z znanostjo, pravom, politiko in etiko — se je oblikoval skozi stoletja filozofskih razprav. Brez teoretske refleksije sploh ne bi vedeli, kako si zastaviti prava vprašanja, kaj šele kako razumeti odgovore. Brez teoretske refleksije resničnosti bi še vedno živeli v kameni dobi brez intelektualne podlage, potrebne za razvoj tehnologije in empiričnih znanosti.

Seveda je res, da praktične aplikacije olajšajo razumevanje idej. In prav tako je res, da naše ustvarjanje idej in naš razmislek o njih, torej naše kritično ukvarjanje z resničnostjo konec koncev vodi k našemu osnovnemu cilju, ki se kaže v želji po možnostih

preoblikovanja in izboljšanja sveta, v katerem živimo. Na prvi pogled se torej zdi, da šele takšno razumevanje stvarnosti, ki temelji na jasnem uvidu v korist neposredne aplikacije idej ponuja najhitrejšo in najučinkovitejšo pot do smiselnih in pomenljivih sprememb.

A vedeti moramo, da so bili najpomembnejši izsledki znanosti, ki so vselej znova privedli do revolucionarnih preobratov v razvoju tehnologije in materialnih dobrin, zgolj stranski produkti teoretskega konstruiranja resničnosti. Iskanje najbolj učinkovitih aplikacij skozi optiko inštrumentalne racionalnosti, kakršna prevladuje v sodobnem, na propad obsojenem svetu, nikoli ni predstavljalo osnovnega zagona in pogonske sile teorije. Ta namreč v resnici temelji na koristi nekoristnosti, kakršno nam je svojih esejih predočil že Zhuangzi, in na estetiki čistih struktur, kakršno nam je razložil že Ji Kang.

Poenostavljanje stvarnosti in njena redukcija na utilitarizem kratkoročnih koristi zato tudi ni osrednja naloga filozofije, ki sodi k temeljnim teoretskim vedam na področju humanistike. Naloga filozofije je temeljit in radikalen premislek njene kompleksnosti, ki se pogosto upira enostavnim razlagam.

Z drugimi besedami: Humanistika — in filozofija kot njena osnova — temeljita na teoretskem mišljenju in na kvalitativnem uvidu v naravo resničnosti, ne zgolj na empiričnih podatkih o dejanskosti. Prispevki teorije k praksi so ključni, saj oblikujejo okvire, znotraj katerih lahko smiselno in pomenljivo interpretiramo podatke, razumemo družbene in kulturne pojave ter oblikujemo smiselne odzive na izzive, s katerimi se soočamo. Takšno mišljenje je pogosto zahtevno in ne prinese vedno takojšnjih rezultatov ali jasnih pomenov. Pa vendar je ključno za ohranitev pomena človeškega bivanja in za napredek človeštva.


Kompleksne krize, s katerimi smo soočeni v današnjem trenutku, kot so vojne, okolijske katastrofe, neenakomerna porazdelitev virov, virusne pandemije itd., sodijo h globalnim problemom, ki jih ni mogoče v celoti reševati znotraj ozkih okvirov posameznih nacionalnih držav. Obravnavati jih je treba tudi v širšem okviru globalnega sodelovanja in solidarnosti. Tovrstne strategije zahtevajo razvoj pristnega medkulturnega dialoga, tj. dialoga, ki presega trenutno modne slogane in lahko vodi k resnično enakopravni transkulturni izmenjavi znanja in idej. V tem prizadevanju se bo naša konferenca osredotočila na tradicionalno in sodobno kitajsko filozofijo.

Kot bomo videli v teku konference, številni prispevki jasno izpostavljajo dejstvo, da nam kitajska filozofija lahko ponudi uvide v najrazličnejše perspektive in principe, ki lahko potencialno prispevajo k oblikovanju inovativnih razmislekov o novih rešitvah za globalne krize.

Le-ti pa prav gotovo ne bodo ostali omejeni na reševanje globalizacije, ki temelji na zgolj ekonomskih in političnih kriterijih nenehne akumulacije materialnega profita in oblasti, temveč bodo nakazali tudi alternativne rešitve, ki so blizu planetarizmu v smislu, v kakršnem ga je zastavila Gayatri Spivak. Zakaj vsi si želimo živeti v svetu, ki je uravnotežen, nenasilen, neonesnažen, in v katerem nikakor nismo vsi enaki, temveč enakovredni.

V tem smislu in na tej osnovi sem vesela in počaščena, da lahko uradno razglasim otvoritev te konference, ki nam nudi nove možnosti plodne izmenjave idej in znanja. Upam, da nam bo prinesla obilico novih uvidov, novih priložnosti in predvsem novih prijateljev.

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Ljubljana, 20. junij 2025



**KEYNOTE SPEECHES**  
**ABSTRACTS**



*AMES Roger T.*

## **The Confucian Philosophy of Family Feeling**

The seismic sea change in the geopolitical order of the world that has accelerated over the first two decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century requires nothing less than the reformulation of the world's geopolitical order. The international anarchy of the zero-sum Westphalian model of a modern state system with sovereign and equal nation states each playing to win has proven woefully inadequate to resolving the complex human predicament of our time. The perceived isomorphism among family, state, and world in Confucian philosophy gives rise to an alternative conception of the political in which governance is firmly rooted in personal cultivation within the institution of family. In looking to Confucian philosophy as a possible resource for a new geopolitical order, I begin by joining Michael Walzer in common cause in his search for a universal minimalist morality that can provide a basis for a limited but important solidarity and for mutual critique among the world's peoples and cultures.

## Global Philosophy as Criticism in Search of Allies

Does Chinese philosophy offer solutions to the global crises we are facing today? This is certainly a legitimate question, as we must mobilize all available resources, including philosophy, to combat the imminent collapse not only of the biosphere, but also of the political and social order. It is another matter how promising it is to look at philosophy and Chinese philosophy in particular in this context. Its voice is weak. Historically, it may have proven incapable of preventing the developments that threaten catastrophe today. Moreover, what we find in philosophy might not only be part of a solution, but also prove to be part of the problem.

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Be that as it may, we are obliged to be optimistic. In any case, if Chinese philosophy is to contribute to successfully addressing global issues, it will have to understand itself as part of global philosophy. But what is global philosophy? It would be quite irrelevant if it consisted of a panopticon of different worldviews that remain within their own horizons, as is often the case under that title today. In order to be relevant, global philosophy would rather mean engaging in a collaborative work on a shared problematic history, and joining forces with others to do so.

Such alliances, even if they did not last long, have been made several times by the West, namely after experiences of crisis in which its tradition became uncertain of itself, prompting it to look beyond its boundaries. However, philosophy itself was born out of an experience of crisis, and it is this what predestines it for global thinking. Ancient China was no exception. Though this has often been underexposed, here, too, philosophy emerged as a criticism of the existing culture the collapse of which had made the world problematic forever. If philosophy wants to say anything meaningful today that takes the global nature of the crisis seriously and does not amount to a confirmation of the given, this will hardly be possible without reviving its culture-critical, culture-transcending core and joining hands with its likes.



*WANG Robin*

## **Zhuangzi's 解心 (Untangling the Heart/Mind) and The Wisdom of Biomimicry: Innovating Humanity, Nature, and Technology in the 21st Century**

Zhuangzi employs the term 解 (untangling, dissecting, releasing, unraveling) in both 解心 (untangling the heart/mind) and 解牛 (dissecting the ox). In 解心, this 解 represents the process of „untangling“ mental knots through a state of critique, releasing, forgetting and flow—similar to the precision and observation involved in dissecting the ox by grasping its natural structure. This concept embodies Zhuangzi's philosophy of achieving clarity and understanding by aligning with the natural order rather than resisting it. This philosophical position resonates with the wisdom of biomimicry, which draws on nature's time-tested systems as models for addressing human challenges. Both Zhuangzi's 解心 and biomimicry involve observing and emulating natural forms, processes, and patterns to innovate human activity in attune with nature's living forces. This approach advocates integrating the natural world into human practices—not exploiting it—treating nature (even animals) as a teacher and guide rather than merely a resource. Such perspectives and practices offer a pathway toward sustainable technological innovation, ecological balance, and synchronized coexistence in the 21st century.



# **PRESENTATIONS IN ENGLISH**



## The Promise of Wuwei Confucianism

In recent years there is a pronounced awareness that Confucianism is a rich source of insights applicable to contemporary ethical, social, and planetary issues. Classical Confucian texts such as the *Lunyu* 論語 (or *Analects of Confucius*) and the Mengzi 孟子 (or *Mencius*) are widely interrogated for their perspectives on how to deal with anything from personal setbacks and family squabbles to community-specific conflicts and major global challenges. Taking the teachings in these texts seriously is therefore often tied to the promise of pre-conceived positive results or to assurances that such results are achievable. I argue that interpreting the Confucian proposal as solely promise giving and future-oriented is counter-productive for appreciating not only what distinguishes Confucianism from many consequentialist projects, but also what makes Confucianism a valuable resource for addressing calamitous global attitudes today. I propose *Wuwei* 無為 Confucianism as a planetary ethos that is more present- and process-oriented, capable of achieving personal and social benefits (or *li* 利) through decoupling the work towards a better self and a better world from fixations on controllable and measurable outcomes. The promise of *Wuwei* Confucianism is a shift of the planetary focus: from deliverable-based “think big” planning that precedes and outshines human efforts, to the modest, often clumsy work of “broadening of the Way” (*hong dao* 弘道) individually and collectively in the present moment.

## Are plants *wuxin* 無心 and *wuming* 無命? The current philosophy of plants in dialogue with Zhuangzi and Wang Fuzhi

In the last decade, within environmental studies, a strand has emerged relating to the philosophy of plants as part of the more general discourse relating to the non-human. The plant neurophysiologist Stefano Mancuso has produced a complex reflection on the intelligence, memory and agentivity of plants that raises many philosophical questions that have the potential to revolutionise philosophical reflection as a whole. Notoriously, in Western philosophical culture, especially of Aristotelian descent, the vegetative faculty is the most basic, presiding over the sole maintenance of the living organism. Plants have neither sensory nor intellectual faculties. Within the argument about *qi* 氣, Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 produces an analysis that in some ways may seem similar to the Aristotelian one. He argues that plants are *wuxin* 無心 and *wuming* 無命. On the one hand, we will try to contextualise this statement by Wang and understand its facets, and on the other hand, we will attempt a comparison with Zhuangzi's view on this specific issue that may open up for contemporary reflection.

*ANGLE Stephen C.*

## **Confucian Global Citizenship and Ecological Values**

The challenges that liberal societies, with their emphases on protecting individuals' private choices and correspondingly thin sense of public values, have in motivating action toward solving global crises like climate change are well known. Less attention has been paid to the fact that despite seeming to assign intrinsic value to our environment (through doctrines like „forming one body with all things“), the Confucian tradition has so far failed — historically and today — to motivate environmental activism. This paper explores the reasons why Confucians have cared for the environment without becoming environmentalists, and then shows how a modern, progressive Confucian development of the tradition can remedy this disconnection. Modern Confucians should deny that citizenship rests on a foundational private-public dichotomy, instead seeing citizenship as encompassing all aspects of our outer behavior. The scope of citizenship both includes activities at the personal end of the personal-to-public continuum and extends beyond the formal politics of nation-states to include all manner of involvement with the world's environment. At the same time, Confucian philosophical debates offer multiple directions for a contemporary elaboration of the tradition's centering of “life-giving generativity”; the paper assess the comparative textual grounding and philosophical plausibility of pragmatist and enactivist variations of ecological value. Finally, it addresses the question of how a Confucian vision of global, ecologically informed citizenship can contribute in a world in which shared worries about climate catastrophes coexist with plural conceptions of a good human life and a flourishing cosmos.

## Re-acting, Modesty, and Gentleness: Cheng Xuanying's Proposition for Effective Government and Harmonious Coexistence

Cheng Xuanying, an important representative of early Tang dynasty Daoist twofold mystery teaching (*chongxuanxue*), integrated many Buddhist concepts into his writings without losing sight of such Daoist preoccupations as longevity, overcoming death, and bringing Great Peace to the world. His commentary to the *Daodejing* promotes a Buddhist-inspired concept of mental cultivation that focusses on elimination of the self-other (subject-object) distinction in cognitive processes, leading to a state of *wuxin* (no-mind). By applying the rules for selfcultivation to politics and government, Cheng Xuanying is able to emphasize the virtues of gentleness and modesty while showing how they will lead to the harmonious coexistence of beings and the kingdoms in which they live.



## Reinterpreting Zhu Xi's Doctrine of Gewu (格物, Investigation of Things) from the Perspective of Relational Autonomy

Zhu Xi is one of the most prominent scholars of Chinese Neo-Confucianism. This study will examine two criticisms of Zhu Xi's moral philosophy and suggest that these criticisms can be addressed by reinterpreting his ideas through the lens of relational autonomy.

The first criticism is that Zhu Xi's stance is overly authoritative and places excessive confidence in the legitimacy of external social order. This aspect makes his ethics less appealing to contemporary audiences. The second criticism is that his ethical perspective does not reflect that of a truly autonomous agent but is instead subordinate to external norms. These criticisms often arise from Zhu Xi's doctrine of *gewu* (格物), or the investigation of things. Through this doctrine, Zhu Xi argues that in order to become moral, humans must begin by learning external and objective moral knowledge and continue to engage in this learning process. This approach sets him apart from other thinkers of his time, as many Neo-Confucianists focused more on discovering the inner strength and potential needed to become moral individuals.

The two criticisms of Zhu Xi, mentioned above, focus on how his emphasis on knowledge is seen as overly restrictive of human inner autonomy and natural potential. In contrast, this study explores the possibility of a different interpretation of Zhu Xi's doctrine of *gewu* by considering it from the perspective of relational autonomy.

Proponents of relational autonomy argue that while autonomy is central to human ethical and practical life, it is relational rather than absolute or purely individual. The Confucian tradition, including Neo-Confucianism, integrates both aspects—autonomy and relationality—as key elements. The central argument of this study is that Zhu Xi's doctrine of *gewu* can be reinterpreted as a way to embrace respect for otherness, acknowledge the essential need for mutual dialogue and exchange, and cultivate a sense of morality suited to such interactions.

## **Mencius and Decoloniality: Rightness (義) against Orientalism**

It is difficult to reject that most of the values that dominate contemporary society originate from the modern Western worldview, particularly going back to the Enlightenment and the age of imperialism. As Frantz Fanon pointed out, the modern world places whiteness in a hierarchically dominant position against blackness, and as Edward Said has pointed out, this process of totalization includes the othering of everything non-Western, thereby defining the West against the Orient. For both Fanon and Said, the process is totalizing, in which one is completely subjected to, defining and imposing onto one their values, identity, and worldview, transforming one into a subject of the societal order. However, within the philosophy of Mencius, we can find elements that provide potential for resistance against such a process. In this paper, I contend that his idea of the human disposition, particularly *yi* (義), can provide a stable ground for decolonizing ourselves and the world. Because Mencius places the origin of *yi* within the human heart and not in the external world, it empowers each person to be authentic and not be defined by any external worldview or identity. Furthermore, I will show that because of the relational nature of *yi*, in which it functions as a basis for the powerless to resist domination in the unequal power relationship as exemplified in the ruler-subject relationship, *yi* can help us overcome the problems created by the modern Eurocentric worldview, including imperialism and racism. Finally, I will discuss some potential concerns and explore how those concerns may be addressed. By doing so, I will conclude that the *yi* can help us not only in decolonization but also help us imagine and strive toward building a world where we are genuinely free through its emphasis on human autonomy and dignity.

## Greek and Chinese Perspectives on Communal Synchronization as a Basis for Normative Engagement

This paper explores how classical Chinese thought and Aristotelian philosophy offer a shared foundation for creating enduring frameworks of modern normative engagement through the concept of communal synchronization. In Chinese thought, the concept of ‘knowing the tune’, *zhiyin* (知音) of another person serves as a powerful metaphor and recurring motif for interpersonal and communal harmony in proximity. The concept of *zhiyin* is often linked to the story of Yu Boya (俞伯牙) and Zhong Ziqi (鍾子期) from the Warring States period, which is recorded in several Classical Chinese texts. This concept extends beyond personal relationships, serving as a metaphor in key Confucian and Daoist texts, where music symbolizes the spontaneous harmony essential to both relationships and governance, with the latter being reinforced by ritual, which formalizes this unity. Aristotle, on the other hand, argues that humans have a natural instinct for rhythm and melody, and that this, combined with *mimesis* or mimetic action, underpins all human creative endeavors. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle introduces the concept of political synchronization, where communal consciousness develops through consistent human interaction, laying the foundation for enduring partnerships. He identifies a shared space as being essential for fostering concord (*omonoia*), the ‘primitive’ form of friendship characterized by alignment in practical concerns and values. Both traditions support the idea that sharing normative space and time is critical for achieving positive mutual feelings, higher coordination and improving the quality of institutions. Can such a space be integrated into today’s political frameworks? Both philosophies would argue not only that it can, but that it is absolutely necessary because norms, much like music, are a collective human endeavor that arises from gradually coordinated, bottom-up communal practices aimed at shared goals.

## Conceptualizing Objects in the Daodejing

My presentation assumes a mereological perspective to conceptualize objecthood in Daoist metaphysics, as presented in the *Daodejing* (道德經). I begin with distinguishing between two types of objects that constitute the two regions of the Daoist metaphysical universe—*dao* (道) and *you* (有). Next, I demonstrate that *dao*, which is sometimes interpreted as non-existent, contrarily to being an ontological nothingness or an impossible object, is characterized by the undifferentiation that can be accommodated by mereological universalism, according to which any distinct entities can form an object made from them. Next, I will proceed to “things” (*wu* 物)—concrete entities, which constitute the metaphysical region of *you*. These entities will be analyzed in terms of their structuring. I will show that this aspect of object’s constitution can be accommodated by restricted composition, according to which what is an object is determined by composition rules (arrangements of parts). Next, I will show that operating with these two concepts of objecthood remains compliant with the fundamental Daoist characteristics, which center around ontological dependence. My final part of presentation discusses how the ontological standing of objects in *you* can be referred to their “objecthood limitations” determined by part arrangement, spatial location, and the status of being complex wholes (objects made from more than one part).

## Mencius's 'True King' and the Rising American Monarchy

The current Vice President of the United States, J.D. Vance, recently commented that he was influenced by a fringe political theorist named Curtis Yarvin. For years, Yarvin published under the pen-name “Mencius Moldbug,” an explicit reference to the Chinese philosopher, Mencius. Yarvin is not a serious scholar. Rather, he is a former Silicon Valley code-writer turned political blogger. We are now, unfortunately, living in a world in which such obscure figures exercise an out-sized influence on the future of geo-politics. In this case, such influence extends to the political philosophy of the sitting Vice President of the United States.

In this paper, I will explore how “Vance’s Mencius” dabbles in ancient theories of Chinese monarchy and writes admiringly of the authoritarian rule of China’s current President, Xi Jinping. Yarvin notes in his writings that Chinese theories of “kingly rule” were based on empathy (“whatever that is,” he muses). I do not intend to go down rabbit holes with any pseudo-intellectual blogger, but rather to take this opportunity to re-clarify what “empathy” (*ren*) means in Chinese political philosophy, and to remind us how it functions in Chinese theories of monarchical rule. This will provide an opportunity to contrast Chinese “kingly virtue” with how the current Trump administration envisions its own consolidation of power—a consolidation which, like it or not, signals a turning point in the power of the American Presidency.

## **Daoism as Anti-Imperialism**

When looking at the Daoist philosophical tradition (in particular, what has been named “Lao-Zhuang Daoism”) it is apparent that they were critical of both their Confucian and Mohist philosophical counterparts. Relatedly, the Daoists were also highly critical of certain institutions of the state and of the frequent wars of their time. This paper analyzes the Daoist philosophical texts and endeavors to show how the Daoist’s critique of their philosophical and political counterparts can be best understood as presenting us with a philosophical critique of imperialism. Although it is explicitly the Confucians and Mohists that the Daoist most often critiques, we can get the better sense of what the Daoist is critical of by looking at the imperialist project outlined and endorsed by the Legalist political thinker, Shang Yang. By juxtaposing Shang Yang’s legalism with the Daoist critique of “action”, “knowledge”, and “desire”, it will be shown that what the Daoist is critical of is how the state can be organized such that the imperial project is encouraged and perpetuated. The Confucians and Mohists can be understood as (at times) helping to enable this imperial project, but it is ultimately the Legalists that are, from the Daoist perspective, the ones most culpable in normalizing and encouraging war-like and imperial behavior. The Daoist anti-imperialist philosophy is thus one that recognizes how the institutions of the state can be organized such that the war-like, imperial project is normalized.

## **The Immensity of the Breath as the Atmosphere of Subjectivity, Intersubjectivity and Political Community: From the Intersubjective Respiratory Community to Political Community**

In this presentation, I will examine how the experience of the immensity of breath and air give us an access to the vast atmosphere where we can rethink, re-examine and re-experience the relations between subjectivity, intersubjectivity and political community as questions of respiratory philosophy. My respiratory interrogation of these relations takes place in dialogue with Gaston Bachelard, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Luce Irigaray.

Following Irigaray, one could say that there is a respiratory difference between “the forgetting of breathing” and “the cultivation of breathing”. If one wishes to think within respiratory philosophy the relations between subjectivity, intersubjectivity, political community and democracy, one needs to return to all of these phenomena into the experiential atmosphere of breathing. In my presentation, the respiratory return to subjectivity is the point of departure to examine the network of subjectivity, intersubjectivity and political community. The return to the subject can take place within the atmosphere of the forgetting of breathing as is the case, for example, with René Descartes in his *Metaphysical Meditations* or Edmund Husserl in his *Cartesian Meditations*. On the other hand, Bachelard’s *Air and Dreams* and *The Poetics of Space*, Merleau-Ponty’s *Phenomenology of Perception* and Irigaray’s *Between East and West: From Singularity to Community* give us a chance to rethink and re-experience the return to the subject as a phenomenon of cultivation of breathing. In *Air and Dreams*, Shelley’s joyful subject of air is understood in its essential relation to the immense and joyful aerial world. In *The Poetics of Space*, Baudelaire’s subjectivity is vast as for Baudelaire, the return to the true subjectivity is a return to the self as an immense being. The word “vast” is a word of breath. In *Phenomenology of Perception*, when the body-subject falls asleep it returns to the respiratory communication with “some immense exterior lung”. This respiratory communication creates a certain respiratory rhythm that becomes, according to Merleau-Ponty, “my very being”. In *Between East and West*, “the quest of the Buddha” is to become “the subject as breath” who is in “continuous communication or communion” “with the breathing of the entire living universe.” In these examples from Bachelard

(Shelley and Baudelaire), Merleau-Ponty and Irigaray (the Buddha), the respiratory and aerial subjectivity is intertwined or penetrated by the immense or vast respiratory and aerial world. According to Bachelard, the communication between the immense subjects and the immense world opens for us a new phenomenology that he calls “a phenomenology of immense”.

In my presentation, I wish to examine what kind of political community could reveal itself to us, if we would understand in the context of a phenomenology of immense 1) what could it mean that the immense respiratory subjects communicate perpetually with each other and with the intersubjective common immense respiratory and aerial world and 2) how the formation of a respiratory community is a condition of possibility for the formation of any kind of political community.



*BRUNOZZI Philippe*

## **Current Debates on Economic Justice in China**

In his 2011 article 分配正义：从弱势群体的观点看, Yao Dazhi 姚大志 defended an egalitarian position according to which, for unequalities to be just, they must be accepted by the least advantaged. However, Yao acknowledges that this principle cannot be applied in all circumstances. Under conditions of severe inequality, the author argues that the wealth concentration must first be limited, which may involve massive redistribution. I will first briefly outline Yao Dazhi's position and situate it within current Chinese debates on social justice. Since his position seems to meet limitarianism halfway, I will relate his position to current limitarian accounts.

## The Siamization of the *Daodejing* 道德經: Reflecting on Gadamer's "Text-Tradition" Theory

Translating the *Daodejing* into any foreign language then requires interpreting the ideas in the source text. Likewise, the Thai translation of the *Daodejing* is not simply translated as a source which can be perfectly replicated into the Thai language. Rather, the Thai interpretation of the *Daodejing* is shaped through Thai pre-conceptions. This paper studies the Siamization of the *Daodejing*, considering the Thai translation of the text by Pojjana Chantarasanti. This paper finds that Chantarasanti uses Pali-Buddhist terms to translate some unfamiliar Daoist notions. The Thai interpretation then raises questions about hermeneutics because its meaning is reachable through a Thai hermeneutic which is greatly shaped by language and concepts borrowed from Pali-Buddhist-text sources. I will also contrast the Thai translation with some prominent English translations. These prominent English translations employ multiple interpretative strategies for translating the Wang Bi *DDJ*, such as providing a sinological perspective; outlining the interpretative history of the text; establishing new ways to interpret the text and treating the text as a philosophical text. This retranslation dynamic will be used to reflect on Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics by focusing on his "text-tradition" theory, proposing a view of the ways in which interpreters understand the world depending upon their pre-existing engagements. Doing this could offer us some potentially fruitful philosophical tools to think with the Thai interpretation of the *Daodejing* and about the nature of interpretation more broadly. As Gadamer proposes, a translation/interpretation is never an objective retelling of old and foreign ideas into the present, but simply a "fusion of horizons." To what extent then is the Siamization of the *Daodejing* successful in facilitating the process of such a fusion? Finally, the Siamization of the *Daodejing* enables Daoist thought to obtain new form of expression, which, in turn, manifests both creativeness and the openness of Daoist philosophy.

## Xin as a Technomoral Virtue

Social media, encompassing social networking sites or services, is one of the digital technologies that has profoundly influenced and continues to affect numerous facets of our lives. It has transformed how we connect and communicate with others, as well as how we disseminate and gather various forms of information. The cherished and familiar concept of friendship has also been adapted to this medium, giving rise to the term “social media friendships (or friends),” prompting scholars to explore its implications.<sup>1</sup> In one of her recent works, Shannon Vallor emphasized the importance of virtues—specifically what she termed *technomoral virtues*—“to foster human capacities for flourishing with new technologies.” In this paper, I aim to contribute to the discussion of social media friendships by identifying a *technomoral* virtue that can guide users in navigating this technology. I emphasize the Confucian virtue of *xin* (信; trust, trustworthiness, integrity, fidelity, or faithfulness), which forms the foundation of friendship and is at the core of the discussion of this relationship in early Confucian texts. My overarching argument is that *xin* is an important *technomoral* virtue because it can promote ethical and responsible use of social media. In my discussion, I focus on the critical aspects of *xin*. Being critical is essential for ensuring trustworthiness, which means that one’s words and actions are consistent and aligned. It is also important when evaluating others, particularly in carefully choosing friends. These critical aspects of *xin* are relevant in the context of social media. On one hand, when we share information, express our thoughts, or present ourselves in our social media profiles, it is vital to ensure that we do not use these platforms to mislead others. On the other hand, we should carefully evaluate and choose the individuals we follow, connect with, and regard as friends in the realm of social media, recognizing that they will invariably influence us in some capacity.

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1 Elsewhere, I argued that social media friendships can be morally valuable, drawing support from early Confucian texts, particularly the concept of distant or historical friendship described in *Mengzi* 5B8.

## Philosophizing with Swords and Hammers: Nanquan and Nietzsche

In the contemporary literature, Chan (禪, JP: Zen) Buddhism has been criticized for a variety of ethical shortcomings. From the well-documented support of Imperial Japan by Zen Buddhist leaders (the Japanese historical and ideological counterparts to Chan) to the claim that Chan has no independent, robust ethics of its own, criticisms of Chan ethics question not only sporadic historical misappropriation or misuse, but potentially the very foundations of Chan ethics when considered as philosophy. In this paper, I examine a Chan gōng'ān (公案, JP: koan) which, on its face, clearly exemplifies one such ethical shortcoming. Specifically, I focus on Case 14 of *The Gateless Gate* or *Wúmén-guān* (無門關, JP: Mumonkan), Nanquan Cuts the Cat in Two. I then provide an interpretation of the gōng'ān which a sympathizer of Linji (臨濟宗, JP: Rinzai) Chan could use to respond to such charges. To support this interpretation, I compare what I take to be the primary message of the gōng'ān with an interpretation of Nietzsche's overarching philosophical project. Through this comparison, I clarify the meaning of Nanquan Cuts the Cat in Two, provide historical precedent to this meaning, and lay out a philosophically plausible pathway towards defending it. Central to its meaning is the possibility of being deceived or ignorant of one's true nature or state of being. Furthermore, the pathway out of such ignorance, when viewed from *within* that ignorant state, may appear both rhetorically violent and lacking systematic structure.

## **Liang Qichao's Buddhist Interpretation of Kant's Epistemology and Its Relevance for Moral Agency**

Liang Qichao (1873-1929) has been regarded as the first Chinese author to systematically introduce Kant's philosophy in the Chinese context and for a Chinese audience. His work on Kant, and particularly his epistemological remarks, have frequently been discarded as scholarly shallow and philosophically irrelevant. On the contrary, Liang Qichao's contribution is relevant not only as already foreshadowing tropes, criticisms and re-elaborations of Kant's epistemology in the Chinese context, but also as shedding a new, philosophically interesting light on the notion of thing in itself and on the possibility of opening a path for its knowability. This is done based on a re-interpretation and re-elaboration of Kantian concepts such as Copernican revolution, phenomenon, and noumenon according to Yogacara epistemology.

This re-interpretation is fundamental not only in epistemological terms, but also, and most importantly, in ethical terms: the opening of a knowability path for things in themselves, in fact, allows for the possibility of an ethics centered on the idea of true self. The idea of a true self possessing moral autonomy, and whose moral responsibility derives from freedom, resonates with Kant's concept of noumenal agent, but it allows Liang to escape the epistemological contradiction Kant runs into when assigning a causal role to the free self as moral agent.

## **Alienation and Chinese Philosophy: Zhuangzi and Confucius, identification and estrangement, ancient wisdom and alienating modernity**

The category of alienation was among the most powerful elaborated by Critical Theory and the most influential in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. Recently revived in a monograph by Rahel Jaeggi, who defined it as a “relation of relationless”, it represents a salient trait of modernity and a source of social pathologies, whose main symptom is, in MacIntyre’s words, “feeling a stranger in a world that one himself has made”.

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The present paper focuses on the debate between Zhuangzism and Confucian philosophy, showing how these schools addressed the alienating effect of social structures and linguistic constraints, particularly in relation to the problems and risks inherent to identification with social roles and conventions.

From a hermeneutic perspective, this paper aims at building a bridge between ancient Chinese philosophy and philosophy of alienation, with a double effect. On the one hand, arguing for the cross-cultural, trans-historical relevance of the category of alienation. On the other hand, showing how the timeless wisdom of ancient Chinese philosophy can help interpreting, and perhaps surviving, our alienating postmodernity.

CARLEO III Robert A.

## Let's Be Rational, but Really: Liang Shuming's Theory of Reason of, for, and by the People

Liang Shuming's explication of Confucian tradition gives "reason," *lixing* 理性, a central role. As Liang tells it, Confucius's distinctive innovation was revaluing the traditional ethical order "on the basis of reason" and his key achievements include "arousing people's reason"—indeed, "the sum total of the spirit of the Chinese people is bringing this reason into play." Liang explicates this unique traditional form of reason to advocate it in modern philosophy. Yet, he has been characterized as instead proposing an "irrational" form of "intuitivism." These labels are understandable: Liang reconceptualizes "reason" as a primarily affective rather than intellectual or speculative capacity. It consists in "sensitive intuitions" which affectively move the agent and emotionally connect with others. Since reason is commonly contrasted with intuition and emotion, Liang's theory strikes some as irrational. This paper disagrees, and aims to indicate the promise of this way of deliberating what is right. It first outlines and then defends Liang's description of Confucian reason, highlighting its value as a rational approach to ethical thinking based in the Confucian virtue of humaneness as empathic care. This manner of moral adjudication has substantial strengths over the abstract and speculative approaches that dominate modern "rationalist" discourse. In seeking reason and rightness from within our particular, situated, and sensible connections to others, Liang highlights the primary importance of others' actual needs, interests, and feelings in our moral evaluation. What is really rational and right is made of, for, and by humans ourselves. As he sees it, calling on us to value people in this way was Confucius's central contribution to humanity. It redirects our decision-making toward caring for others' suffering and flourishing.

*CHAI David*

## **Consoling Oneself with Daoism in Times of Social-Political Uncertainty**

One of the unique attributes of Daoist philosophy is its ability to console those who feel despondent about their personal circumstances. Early examples of this usage can be found in the poetic works of the Han dynasty, with Jia Yi's "Rhapsody on the Owl" being an exemplary case. Having been banished from the capital to Changsha, Jia Yi's melancholy was compounded by the arrival of an owl at his residence. To counter the ominous symbolism of the owl and the downward spiral of his fate, Jia Yi turned to Daoism and its theory of change to decouple fate from the vicissitudes of good and bad fortune. Doing so not only allowed Jia Yi to elucidate the limitless potential of following the Dao but the spiritual freedom one acquires in the process.



## Decoupling Reproduction and Filial Piety: A New Reading of Mencius IV

Overpopulation, and the consequent scarce resources, have often been blamed for everything from famines and wars to environmental disasters. The traditional obligation to produce an heir to the family, in particular, clashed with the one-child policy in mainland China and resulted in significant sex disparity among newborns. In spite of the prevalence of this tradition, the only pre-Han Confucian reference that links breeding to filial piety – one of the most important Confucian virtues – is the saying ‘*bu xiao you san, wu hou wei da* 不孝有三，無後為大’, customarily translated as ‘there are three things which are unfilial, and to have no posterity is the greatest of them’ (*Mencius* IV, A: 26). This reading, based on exegeses by Zhao Qi 趙岐 (died 201), is however not without dispute. Later in the book, Mencius proclaims that ‘there are five things which are pronounced in the common usage of the age to be unfilial’ (*Mencius* IV, B: 30), but none of the five has anything to do with posterity. Many attempts have been made throughout the millennia to reconcile this inconsistency, yet none, including that of Zhao, works without adding to Mencius’s word. Based on an etymological and structural reanalysis of the passages concerned, the present paper argues that Zhao’s reading is mistaken. This calls into question the ethical basis of encouraging reproduction at all costs. While the urge to maintain family lineage could have a long history, it was not an ideology supported by Confucian sages.

## Relationship Roles: Norms and Particularity

One distinctive contribution Confucianism makes to ethics is the idea of relationship-roles. Relationship roles help to define what relationships should be like. They involve norms and prescribe duties and prerogatives. Norms associated with each specific relationship role are the concrete expressions of and guides to follow the particular configuration of a relationship. In this sense, relationships are not entirely particularistic, fluid, and dependent solely on the preferences of the parties involved. Norms will give structure and guides to our relationships, and help to set up expectations and draw boundaries. In this way, they contribute to the stability and the smooth operation of relationships.

On the other hand, emphasizing role may make us lose sight of the fact that the person that we relate to and interact with within a relationship is a concrete, distinct individual and not a mere role occupant. We need to recognize her individuality. The elements of norms in role-ethics may also stifle the spontaneity of a relationship and restrict the expressiveness and the individuality of the parties in living out and defining their particularistic relationships. After all, each relationship is a unique good that has immense personal meaning and values that are exclusively shared only among the participants in the relationships. And this particularistic element needs to be cherished and protected.

In my presentation, I hope to examine the conflicts between the elements of norms and particularity in relationship roles. I shall look at some Confucian texts, especially the *Analects*, *Mencius*, *Xunzi*, and *Liji* to find the answers and insights Confucianism has on this issue.

## Moye 鑢 and the inauspicious metal: the role of a myth in Zhuangzian environmental philosophy

This paper wishes to provide an in-depth analysis of the use of the mythical figure of the Moye 鑢, a legendary sword, and of the Great Founder (daye 大冶) in the “*Da-zongshi* 〈大宗師〉” chapter of the *Zhuangzi* 《莊子》 anthology. Their mention in a conversation about transformation (*hua* 化) between Master Lai 子來 and Master Li 子犁 helps us to understand what a Zhuangzian environmental philosophy entails. This paper proposes three main axes that require examination: (i) the Zhuangzian stance on environmental protection, (ii) the text’s approach to teaching in the context of environmental education, and (iii) the *Zhuangzi*’s ways of coping with situations we have no control over. To do so, this paper will present the Moye passage in its context before introducing the way myths are used in the *Zhuangzi*. First, the myth-making to be found in the text pertains to the kind of “indirect” teaching it proposes, which is especially salient for the issue of environmental education. Indeed, myths are particularly suited to this task, since their ever-transforming shape matches the ever-transforming nature of the *wanwu* 萬物 (“ten-thousand things”). Second, the text emphasises that being fixated on a specific set of valuations (*e.g.*, utilitarian, economic, etc) can only lead to a less adaptable and less adept behaviour. The mention of the Moye sword gives us an insight into this critique and its link to the general operation of the *wanwu*: constant transformation. Through the use of myth and myth-making, the text’s points about fixed *shifei* 是非 or *bici* 彼此 distinctions become more poignant, but also more palatable. Through this critique, a properly Zhuangzian environmental philosophy can be articulated, and the aforementioned three axes can be developed.

## Beyond Good and Evil: Deconstructing Human Nature in Mengzi

There are various and complex reasons for current global crises today, besides political, economic, ministerial, ethnic, cultural, and religious conflicts. Is there anything related to human nature? This paper seeks to clarify this question by examining the different ideas of human nature that appeared in Mengzi, and according to the theory of Meta-One promoted in the recently published book *Reconstructing the Metaphorical Metaphysics in Traditional Chinese Philosophy: Meta-One and Harmony*<sup>1</sup>, and employing the methodologies in that book to deconstruct human nature, claiming that inborn nature exists only in the biological dimension. Still, there is no inborn nature in the ethical, political, and social dimensions. Particularly, the paper applies the dynamic analytic method to analyze the dynamic process of humans as ethnic, moral, political, and social living beings from the following three periods of growing up and development of human personalities: first, the paper discusses the potentialities and the inborn human nature at the biological dimension in the period of Meta-One, and then explores the multiplicities of being a human and the solo necessity in the period of the Multi-One, and finally deconstructs the human natures suggested by ancient philosophers, and assumes that Good and Evil as moral, political, and social categories do not apply to human nature, and the human nature should not be responsible for the crises that happened in the past, today, and future. This paper argues for the claim from the following three sections:

- I        Meta-One: Potentialities vs. Inborn Nature
- II       Multi-One: Multiplicities vs. Solo Necessity
- III      Utter-One: Human Nature: Beyond Good and Evil

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1        Derong Chen, *Reconstructing the Metaphorical Metaphysics in Traditional Chinese Philosophy: Meta-One and Harmony*. Maryland: Lexington Books, November 15, 2023.

## Limitations of Edification in Zhu Xi's thought and Obscurantism

In contemporary Europe, democratic values are increasingly undermined by a resurgent obscurantism, fueled by advancements in science, technology, and governance. Tech oligarchs promote “technology transforming human life,” often ignoring public consent, while elected governments prioritize think tanks and technocrats over popular opinion, eroding democratic legitimacy. In China, obscurantism is commonly linked to Legalism, but Confucian thought, notably Confucius’ statement, “The people may be made to follow a path of action, but they may not be made to understand it,” and Zhu Xi 朱熹’s interpretations, reveals a Confucian strain. Scholars today argue Confucius recognized public ignorance without intent to deceive, yet this distinction’s ability to deflect accusations of obscurantism is debatable. For example, Frederick II’s discussion with d’Alembert on deceiving the masses—endorsing it due to their inherent ignorance—contrasts with d’Alembert’s view that early rational education could counter superstition. Zhu Xi’s complex exegesis both mitigates and risks obscurantism. He differentiates “the common people, acting daily according to it, yet have no knowledge of it” (Books of Changes) from “not be made to understand it,” framing the latter as a reflection of the sage’s limited capacity rather than public folly. However, he cautions that enlightening the masses might awaken their utilitarian cunning, a perspective aligning with Wang Anshi 王安石’s “fooling the people” stance, which Zhu Xi critiqued. This tension is evident in Zhu Xi’s followers, like Zhen Dexiu 真德秀, who endorsed the non-Confucian *The Treatise of The Illustrious Sage on Response and Retribution* (太上感應篇) to exploit popular belief in karmic retribution for social control. Acknowledging the masses’ limited rationality while claiming exceptional insight—whether in ancient Confucianism or modern techno-utopianism—creates a slippery slope toward obscurantism. This enduring risk, evident across cultural and temporal contexts, necessitates constant vigilance to safeguard democratic and rational principles.

CHENG Chung-yi

## On Zhuangzian Forgiveness

Forgiveness is widely considered a virtue that targets reconciliation between the victim and the wrongdoer and can resolve conflict by restoring a peaceful interpersonal relationship. Although it was not thematized in ancient Chinese philosophy, this paper aims to argue for a Zhuangzian conceptualization of forgiveness for the following two reasons. First, according to the emotional account of forgiveness, forgiveness is fundamentally a matter of the victim overcoming and eliminating their resentment and hatred emotions toward the wrongdoer. Zhuangzi does have a proposal for self-control of emotions that could entail the concept of forgiveness. Second, and more importantly, in those cases where it may not be easy to distinguish the victim from the wrongdoer, as both sides claim they have been wronged, forgiveness seems not viable. Still, Zhuangzi's idea of "forgetfulness" (*wang* 忘) and "mutual forgetfulness" (*xiangwang* 相忘) could be an elevated conception of forgiveness. This paper will also focus on Zhuangzi's discussions on the agent effort, in other words, the proper process of achieving forgiveness.

## **Perspectives within the Multi-layered Structure: Zhu Xi's unified theory of Li**

Theme: Theory of Perception: Exploring Chinese philosophical perspectives on perception offers alternative and new insights into understanding consciousness and the nature of reality.

In this paper, I explore how Zhu Xi perceives reality using conceptual schemes of different levels of detail. Specifically, I argue that Zhu Xi navigates the world through a multi-layered structure Li, constituted by conceptual schemes of Li with different levels of details. Here, I also seek to show that a full picture of Zhu Xi's unified theory of Li requires a better appreciation of the structural unity of Li.

To illustrate the multi-layered structure of Li, I explore three motivating premises: 1) the nature of Zhu Xi's metaphysical project, 2) Different conceptual schemes of different levels of diversification, and 3) perspectivism within this multi-layered structure. I first set the grounds by going through his discussions on that which is above and below form to describe the nature of Zhu Xi's metaphysical project. Then, I show that Zhu Xi's multi-layered structure of Li takes the form of "1>2>5>myriad" which serves as a useful conceptual framework to contextualise his claims on the one and many Li. To illustrate, I apply this structure to his discussions on humaneness, where he explains the meaning of humaneness at increasing levels of detail. Lastly, I use the unified structure of Li to understand how Zhu Xi understands the complex fabric of reality. Specifically, he parses the complex reality with different levels of detail, where each level of detail is a perspective from which we view reality. By combining and contrasting these different levels of details help reach a holistic understanding of the subject matter.

## Primitivists view of knowledge and the method of restoring nature

It is well noted that the primitivists in the *Zhuangzi* denounce so-called “sages” because they invent cultural products and social norms that induce people’s eagerness for knowledge and damage people’s innate nature. In primitivists’ view, knowledge as acquaintance of cultural products and social norms is not a mark of clarity but a mark of arousal. Its pervasiveness means that people are not following their nature, and that society becomes a source of stress. Based on this view, one may have an impression that primitivists only regard knowledge as something negative and condemnable. However, I argue that this is not the case. The primitivists allow a form of knowledge that is basic, limited in scope and non-reflective. In their ideal society there are some activities that are not innate and involve knowledge to a certain extent. Furthermore, if we consider a post-sage era in which there is already a plethora of cultural products and social norms and people’s nature has been already damaged, it remains a question whether nature can be restored. If it can, then the method of restoration should also be regarded as a form of knowledge. I argue that one method of restoration involves reflecting on the knowledge one acquires and its negative effect on one’s physiological and psychological health. One then knows how not to desire many things. This knowledge is reflective, therapeutic and contained within the boundary of nature. Based on these concerns, even if one accepts primitivists’ emphasis on nature, certain forms of knowledge still seem inevitable, especially in a post-sage era.



## Self-hate and Self-love: Confucian Approaches and Solutions

Hatred on a global scale has deep-rooted origins that can be traced through various dimensions of human society. The sources of this animosity are not confined to contemporary issues; throughout history, humanity has struggled with manifestations of violence, intolerance, and division. Whether it be racial and gender violence, persecution based on religious beliefs, hate crimes, or the stark divisions present in political ideologies, these elements converge to foster an environment ripe for conflict. Ancient Chinese philosophers offered valuable insights into the foundations of social conflict. They suggested that, on a societal scale, hatred might stem from ineffective social systems or the insatiable desires of imperial ambitions that prioritize power over people. These frameworks illustrated that societal structures have a considerable impact on how individuals perceive and treat one another. At a more personal level, they noted that hatred often arises from self-indulgence and a failure to show compassion to others. Selfishness, in this context, can blind individuals to the suffering of those around them. An often overlooked yet crucial aspect of this discourse relates to self-hatred or a profound lack of self-love, which is subtly woven into Confucian thought. This internal struggle can manifest in various forms, such as the feeling of giving up on oneself, known in Chinese as 自暴自棄 (*zì bào zì qì*). In this paper, I will delve into these concepts further, exploring the different types of self-hatred and the implications they have on interpersonal relationships. More importantly, I will discuss the transformative power of restoring self-love (自愛, *zì ài*), which serves as a foundational step toward creating a more compassionate world. By fostering self-love, individuals can extend that sentiment to others, ultimately working towards reducing hatred and mitigating conflict in society.

## **Dao in Transition: Comparative Reflections on Laozi's Italian Translations in the Interwar Period**

The history of Daoism in Italy is closely tied to the reception and circulation of its Classics. While Italian Christian missionaries were among the first Westerners to write about Daoism, it wasn't until the 20th century that a substantial production and dissemination of Daoist works began to take shape. The first half of the century saw the publication of six translations of the Laozi, three partial translations of the Zhuangzi, and several general works on Daoism. The growing interest in Daoism within the Italian intellectual scene can be attributed to two key developments of the 19th century. First, the establishment of sinology as an academic discipline in France, which fostered and promoted scholarly interest in Chinese culture throughout Europe. Second, the spread of international esoteric groups and occult movements, which were strongly influenced by Eastern philosophies and religions.

In this paper, I aim to introduce and compare two significant Italian translations of the Laozi produced during the interwar period, each reflecting these two influences: Evola's controversial translation, published in 1923, and Castellani's translation from 1927. These two paradigmatic examples not only illustrate how Daoism and Daoist ideas were introduced and promoted in the Italian cultural scene during the early 20th century, but also reveal the distinct contexts in which these ideas were received. Additionally, the differing approaches to the text by these translators were shaped not only by their personal backgrounds but also by their unique objectives.

*DAI Yuanfang*

## **Transcultural Feminism: Questioning the Paradigm of Transnational Feminism and Advocating Transcultural Feminist Solidarity**

This paper criticizes the different kinds of feminism originating in the U.S. academia and circulating worldwide. It points out ways in which many transnational feminist methodologies participate in or contribute to the very things they purport to criticize even as it enacts transnational feminism as a critique. The focus of my criticism is against the backdrop of Chinese feminist philosophy that may or may not participate in the problematic internationalization or exportation of U.S.-centric feminism. The rise of transnational feminism resists neoliberal global capitalism and challenges global feminism and international feminism promoted by globalization and global capitalism. Transnational feminism is progressive compared to global feminism and international feminism, but it is also limited by its paradoxical nationalization of U.S. transnational feminism.

I use a transcultural approach while building on the transdisciplinary work of transnational feminist rhetoric. I advocate a transcultural approach to correct the shortcomings of the nationalization of transnational feminism. Although a U.S.-centric transnational perspective could institutionalize and discipline the production and dissemination of feminist knowledge, it can potentially contribute to genuine collaboration with women “elsewhere.” A transcultural approach sets a reflective distance between oppressed women and the culture in which they are located but also makes it possible for them to be sensitive to the situatedness and difference of women’s experiences. I make connections between transnational feminism and transcultural feminism, demonstrating there is a broader framework involved by reviewing the development of and debates around the internationalization of U.S.-centric feminism by scholars in the United States and its impact on Chinese feminism. I propose a transcultural approach to not only find an effective way to address women’s experiences across cultural differences but also address feminist solidarity as necessary and possible across cultural differences.

## Technocratism, Algorithmic Regulation, and Han Feizi's Political Philosophy

Han Fei is one of the few pre-Qin political philosophers who can provide theoretical support and reflections on the current topics of technocratism and algorithmic regulation. Technocratism advocates rational and systematized institutional solutions, and algorithmic regulation promises greater efficiency and effectiveness in governance. All of these elements find illuminating echoes in Han Fei's philosophy of governance by impartial standards, especially the concepts of „performance-title“ (*xingming* 刑名) and „checking evidence.“ (*canyan* 参验) Since the latter emphasizes the role of data, evidence, and authenticity in the political process, we can even envision Han Fei's theory as being able to admit an artificially-intelligent „*xingming-canyan*“ model. Meanwhile, the ultimate target of technocracy's defeat is the dysfunctional and corrupt bureaucracy, which is also in line with Han Fei's vision of „ruling the bureaucracy by law.“ (*yifazhiguan* 以法治官) Han Fei proposed a structural approach to address the defects of bureaucratic administration: having a ruler who could cooperate closely with the impartial standards and was stronger in disciplining officials than the „mediocre ruler“ (*zhongzhu* 中主) to protect the „meritocrats“ of the *fa* tradition and optimize the taming of bureaucrats, which is the theory of „techniques“ (*shu* 术) and „authority.“ (*shi* 势) Despite highlighting the importance of technocrats, a technocracy needs a Han Feizian ruler who empowers the technocrats and endorses with their decisions. Such a „selfless“ ruler would ideally be an „AI ruler“. However, people in liberal democracies are skeptical about the drawbacks of technocracy and algorithmic regulation, such as algorithmic black boxes and digital Leviathan. That may also constitute an external critique of Han Fei's proposal, but what Han Fei reveals seems to be precisely the unavoidable nature of power relations. This suggests that we should not overlook the relevance of Han Fei's political philosophy to modern political problems.

## De-Orwellizing Western Perspectives on China as one of the key Preconditions of Solving various Global Crises

There seem to dominate currently two extreme positions in discussions about China in the West. One, which also prevails in Western mainstream media, denounces China *per se*. Even China's most obvious and indisputable achievements, whether in the economy, science, sports, or social development, are questioned, marginalized, and often include some unflattering information when mentioned. The other position is associated with uncritical admiration of China, not unlike that expressed by some parts of the population in Eastern Europe, which recall, with nostalgia and often naïve idealization, the way of life prior to 1989. While respect for China is well deserved in many regards, the impression that I have gained from various discussions is that its economic achievements in particular constitute for many (also for a part of Western conservatives) an essential component of the legitimizing narrative for the CCP government. Not unproblematically, functionalist arguments such as "the system works in China because of the strong, expertise-driven authoritarian rule" are brought back into play, with debates often very quickly reduced to instances such as Chinese high-speed trains or the Shanghai skyline. Notwithstanding all the problems that exist in the "West," it is questionable whether these achievements, as the epitome of China's success story, which are often extrapolated to other areas of life, suffice to make an argument for authoritarian rule as an attractive alternative to (social-)liberal democracy while the internal dangers, conflicts, contradictions, or pathologies that accompany it are simultaneously ignored. On the other hand, however, and this is the main ambition of my talk, I do not wish to defend ahistorical, categorical, and often biased criticisms, which are habitually present also in a (significant) part of scholarly debate about China, and which makes it impossible to have a reasonable debate on global challenges.

Thus, in my talk I will at first present some metatheoretical considerations regarding the perception of China in the West and how important it is to change it, in order to overcome various global crises. In the second and third part of my talk I will discuss the issue of social harmony and conflict resolution – focusing at first on the discussion about social justice and social state and then on the questions of global order, commenting especially on the recent works of Tongdong Bai and Zhao Tinyang.

## **Do some Chinese philosophers overlook the European social model on purpose?**

An important objection to the most prominent defenders of various versions of a „Chinese model” – e.g. Daniel Bell, Jiang Qing, and Tongdong Bai – is that their critique of Western democracy is primarily a critique of the democratic shortcomings of the USA. Indeed, the merits of their respective views and occasional remarks regarding “European exceptionalism” notwithstanding, they fail to seriously account for the progressive aspects of the European social model, not to mention its social-integrating possibilities. In Europe, this social-progressive model of the state is not just an economic category, but also a way of life. However, the model as such is in a crisis by virtue of being exposed to a variety of threats in the ‘era of globalization’ – especially from neoliberalism – and, as a result, its future remains uncertain. Several Western authors who study Chinese philosophy see in Confucianism the potential to provide a kind of “corrective influence” on liberalism and its excessive focus on individuality. This, in turn, brings them into proximity with communitarian criticisms of liberalism – and with the theoretical and practical problems associated with it. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to further develop such a perspective. For example, with the continuing atomization prevalent in Western societies, it would be beneficial to look at some “integrating aspects” of philosophical Confucianism. This is because of an apparent historical paradox viz. that the welfare state has been heavily involved in the preparation of its own crisis by supporting the rapid development of individualization – by guaranteeing the social preconditions of freedom – which paradoxically tends to destroy the recognition for the commons and the overall framework in which freedom is actualized. Moreover, as Axel Honneth emphasizes, we are confronted with the “paradox of individualization,” in which the loosening of social bonds does not lead to freedom, but rather to disorientation. However, I argue that a fruitful discussion about the potential solutions to the crisis of (socio-liberal) democracy and social state as such, as well as various problems related to the Chinese economic success, i.e. the unprecedented increase of inequality in China, might come rather from Chino-European than Chino-North American philosophical, political and especially cultural exchange.

## Goodness Without Criteria: Wang Yangming on Liangzhi

In this paper, I present *liangzhi* 良知, the centerpiece of Wang Yangming 王陽明's philosophy, as goodness without criteria. For Wang, *liangzhi* is an always existing inherent reality of the heart-mind (心之本體), and it will be known by the heart-mind spontaneously (心自然會知) and must not be looked for outside of oneself (不假外求). At first glance, Wang seems surprisingly confident in the efficacy of *liangzhi*, while having surprisingly little to say about what it consists in or how it is to be achieved. In a dialogue with his student Xue Kan 薛侃, Wang is asked for a criterion to distinguish between right and wrong. Yet, instead of coming up with any principle, virtue or prudential reasoning, for Wang, the matter at hand must be decided by one's own realization (須汝心自體當). If *liangzhi* is not learned (不學), intuitive (不慮) and realized through oneself (自得), then how to address the Wittgensteinian challenge that if "whatever is going to seem right to me is right [then] that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'"? In this paper, I elucidate how the absence of any criterion in Wang's notion of *liangzhi* can be upheld as a feature instead of a bug. For Wang, we must comprehend ourselves as in touch with the good in the first place, and this comprehension cannot be arrived at by any chain of steps, by any process of knowledge acquisition or by any fulfillment of conditions.

## **Ideological Subsumption and the Possibility of Comparative Philosophy: A Methodological Reflection on the Limits of Chinese Philosophy and its Contemporary Political Usages**

Comparative philosophy involves inquiry into the convergences and divergences among temporally, geographically, and linguistically distinct speculative traditions. While the status of “philosophy” of traditions lying outside the cultural and historical milieu of the “West” is still an object of debate in modern historiography, it is nonetheless a matter of institutional fact that said traditions have gained significant footing over the past few decades within Anglophone philosophy departments. In particular, premodern Chinese philosophy has drawn substantial attention among comparativists, partly due to its historical, linguistic, and cultural distance vis-à-vis canonical (European and Anglophone) philosophical corpora, partly due to its increasing significance in twenty-first century geopolitics.

Notwithstanding the disruptive and decentering effect that comparative—especially Western-Chinese—philosophy has proved to yield, there are methodological issues that require examination and which—to my understanding—jeopardize the very possibility of retrieving Chinese philosophical resources to “address global crises” and “reimagine solutions” to pressing social, political, and economic issues, as the present congress invites scholars to do. In this presentation, I will identify two methodological problems that are fundamentally rooted in the very question of *ideological subsumption*—that is, *whether* and to *what extent* the very study and contemporary fascination for Chinese philosophy is inscribed and indeed stems from dominant Western systems of thought—and which points towards the possibility of transcending the hegemonic political discourse (and indeed institutional matrix) of Western societies, namely, *Liberalism*. My methodological reflection will retrieve critical elements from recent developments in Marxist ideological critique and the work of Jana Rošker, Steven Angle, and François Jullien. It will ultimately claim that the contemporary usage of Chinese philosophy is still—and perhaps unavoidably—driven by Western Liberal values. My intervention will, in this regard, invite scholars conducting research on Chinese philosophy to examine the methodological—epistemological and, to a certain degree, ontological—foundations of their research, in order to assess the possibility of addressing and conceiving meaningful responses to ongoing crises and urgent political issues.



## Mohism and the Extinction Crisis

Over the past 500 million years, at least five great mass extinctions have occurred. We are now living in what has been termed the “sixth extinction” (see Elizabeth Kolbert, *The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History*). Uniquely, the current extinction crisis has been almost entirely caused by humans. Worldwide, humans have wiped out 60 percent of all mammals, birds, insects, and reptiles since 1970. About 25 percent of all mammals and 33% of all amphibians are classified as threatened species. According to a recent landmark U.N. report, about a million species are at risk of extinction over the next few decades (“Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecological Services”).

This presentation develops a Mohist framework for addressing the current extinction crisis. This framework foregrounds the Mohists’ emphasis on not causing harm (*hai* 害) and doctrines of impartial caring (*jian ai* 兼愛) and moderation of expenditure (*jie yong* 節用).

In so doing, this project builds upon influential and recent scholarship in Mohism. For example: According to Lai, as “men of uninhibited passion, of action as well as of words,” the Mohists were “easily moved to strike (in defense of the weak).” (Whalen Lai, “The Public Good that Does the Public Good,” 1993). According to Virág, for the Mohists, “all the calamities of the world—violence, warfare, famine, misery, and poverty—could be boiled down to a structural problem in the workings of human inclinations—namely, a basic tendency toward partiality (*bie* 別)” (Curie Virág, *The Emotions in Early Chinese Philosophy*, 2017). According to Ip, the Mohists were significant nonviolent activists, comparable to the world’s renowned exponents of nonviolence (Hung-yop Ip, *Grassroots Activism of Ancient China*, 2022).

Concluding remarks include suggestions of implications of this study for interpretive scholarship on the ethical and social philosophy of Mohism.

## **Logic in Action: Later Mohist logic in the light of cosmological texts, and its ethical implications for the 21<sup>st</sup> century**

The presentation seeks to reformulate the main tenets of later Mohist logic against the background of early Chinese cosmological texts, and to explore their ethical implications. Mohist pragmatic approach to truth—rooted in ethical and societal utility—evolved into a semantic framework, wherein names gained meaning through systematic classification and usage, similar to Western logic’s treatment of reference. On the other hand, in the light of proto-Daoist cosmological accounts, later Mohist logic can be seen as representing a cosmological worldview that makes a direct link between the logical (‘how things are’) and ethical (‘how things should be’) realms. By analysing the logical chapters of the Mozi and the Mohist Canons, the presentation examines how their practical orientation on correct distinctions (shi 是/fei 非) makes sense within a cosmology where establishing such primary distinction represents an act of cosmic creation. The Mohists’ use of hierarchical definitions and parallel inference can thus be understood as an effort to establish coherent and replicable rules for structuring the shared world in a manner that best corresponds to the general ‘cosmo-logic’. However, their emphasis on argumentation and truth as ethical correctness parallels Western philosophical concerns with propositional truth. By contrasting these approaches with modern theories of reference and meaning, this presentation contributes to understanding the intersection between early Chinese and Western logic, highlighting both the limitations and innovations of Mohist thought in global logical traditions.

GARRISON James

## A Gu That's Not a Gu: The End of Art in China?

"A *gu* that is not a *gu*! A *gu*, indeed! A *gu*, indeed!" – Confucius (Analects §6.25)

When is a *Gu* not a *Gu*? Well, simply put when this ritual drinking vessel is not used in drinking rituals (perhaps because it's behind glass in a museum). A related question arises: When is music not music? Confucianism traditionally maintains that music ceases being music proper when it is lewd and creates social chaos instead of social harmony. In working out this idea, Confucian philosophy offers considerable resources for addressing a major issue in contemporary philosophy of art—indiscernibility.

Photography, mechanical reproduction, found art, and the like have all led to a crisis of "indiscernibles" in the artworld, whereby *anything* might be art, thereby ending the narrative of art's quest to define itself, per Arthur Danto's influential "end of art" thesis. However, careful consideration of cultural expression in Confucian East Asia indicates that there might be more to the story.

Consider the Confucian connection between ritual, music, and the so-called rectification of names. Within this framework, which is a major fundament of East Asian culture, there is a deep-seated prohibition on *anything* being art, such that art is continually defined through and/or against unfolding political definitions of symbolic life.

Hence, where indiscernibles might be a concern in a Confucian context, the primary issue is not the artwork, but with the ethical implications and political fallout of having a person lay claim to a title which they have not earned in practice and where the concern for rectifying names, ritual, art, and symbolic existence is about preventing negative outcomes on the ethical/political level. It will therefore be shown that the kind of "indifference" and "complete anaesthesia" of which Danto speaks is a conceptual non-starter in the context of East Asian (specifically Chinese) art.

## Alternatives in Applying Chinese Insights

Concepts seem stubbornly lodged within their frameworks, dependent on a whole constellation of other concepts for their meaning. Even if a Chinese text wanted to say something of value concerning contemporary global challenges, it is unclear how any idea could escape its native paradigm to play any role within any other. Encountering the declaration by Master Lie 列子 on his ancient journey from Zheng 鄭 to Wei 衛 that “you have never died and have never lived 未嘗死未嘗生,” for example, the modern reader may sense a role for Daoism in modern conversations about life and death yet lack any clue how to overcome this barrier. This paper assesses five alternatives: selection, conversion, revolution, addition, and revision.

Although simply selecting desirable elements from Chinese philosophy and incorporating them into one’s own framework seems the most expedient option, this presents challenges in both extraction and insertion. A second alternative, converting to Daoism, is also a non-starter for most. Clearing one’s conceptual slate and freely incorporating diverse ideas into a custom-made paradigm, the third choice, would also seem implausible. The fourth option, addition, potentially holds more promise. Since humans routinely apply a variety of interpretive frameworks as required by the occasion, adding a Daoist scheme would seem feasible. Finally, it merits consideration whether concepts currently in operation can be slightly modified to better conform with foreign insights, whether Daoist, Confucian, or whatever. Such revision is certainly the most conservative choice. Drawing upon texts concerning Master Lie, this paper weighs the options.

## Japanese Interpretation of the Phrase “Confucius wished to live among the nine tribes”: Reception of 17th Century Ming Loyalists who fled Japan

This paper explores the Japanese interpretation of the phrase “Confucius wished to live among the nine tribes 子欲居九夷” from *Analects* 論語. In China, the phrase is traditionally understood to mean Confucius is expressing a desire to move to a distant eastern region. However, in Japan, an alternative interpretation emerges, where it is identified as the “gentlemen’s country 君子國 (Japan)” where Confucius wished to relocate. This interpretation, dating back to the Heian period and extending through to the Edo period, reflects a form of Japanese Sinocentrism that redefines the traditional Sinocentric Hua-Yi 華夷 (civilized/barbarian) worldview.

In the seventeenth century, following the fall of the Ming dynasty to the Manchu-led Qing dynasty, some Ming loyalists, discontent with the new Manchu rule, fled to Japan. Upon arriving in Japan, these Ming loyalists engaged with Japanese Confucian scholars and encountered this phrase’s unique interpretation. This interaction prompted a reevaluation of traditional Hua-Yi ideology, particularly the question of whether the Japanese, like the Manchus, were considered “barbarians.” The Japanese interpretation posited that since Japan had long absorbed Chinese culture, was more civilized than Manchu-ruled China. This intellectual exchange provided the Ming loyalists with a theoretical justification for their migration to Japan.

This paper examines the historical interpretation of the term “Yi夷(barbarian)” in *Analects*, as understood in Japan, and how this interpretation was received by Ming loyalists who fled to Japan during the rise of the Qing dynasty. This study examines the Ming loyalists’ interactions with Japanese Confucian scholars, highlighting similarities and differences in their respective understandings. Furthermore, it provides broader implications for migration, cultural identity, and the impetus to seek a new homeland during times of political upheaval, demonstrating how Confucian principles may provide valuable solutions to contemporary global challenges.

## Shù and Pacifism in Mengzi's Political Philosophy

In today's world, conflicts and crises are widespread. Although global peace is largely maintained, it remains fragile, and the shadow of war persists. The reasons for this situation are manifold, but one significant factor is that many political entities still hold the belief that war is an effective means to achieve political goals. As a result, military violence is often employed to pursue these aims, even at the expense of innocent civilians and, in many cases, the aggressors themselves.

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Early in the Warring States period, Mengzi systematically criticised this belief. He argued that it is impossible for rulers to achieve the dominion under Heaven through warfare, as war only accelerates their downfall. In contrast, a ruler who can unify the states under Heaven must possess benevolent virtue and be capable of implementing benevolent governance. Ultimately, such a ruler gains the recognition of the people, not through violent conquest, but through the practice of virtues, thereby becoming the Son of Heaven. In this sense, Mengzi's political philosophy is a form of pacifism.

This paper explores the pacifism in Mengzi's theory of benevolent governance and investigates its value in today's world. It argues that „shù<sup>恕</sup>“ (reciprocity) is the logical foundation of Mengzi's pacifism. The paper is structured into four sections: The first section outlines the historical context of Mengzi's political philosophy and highlights the uniqueness of his claim of benevolent governance in that context. The second section reconstructs and evaluates Mengzi's arguments on anti-war. The third section analyses Mengzi's theory of benevolent governance from the perspectives of legitimacy, effectiveness, and feasibility and reveals the pacifism within. The fourth section examines the foundational role of „shù“ in Mengzi's arguments and critically reflects on the value of pacifism based on „shù“ in today's world.

## What can trees do for us? Daoist tree-cultivation and the planetary: lessons from early Chinese philosophy and poetry

Largely missing from the textual tradition prior to the eleventh century, in China the tree-grower becomes a figure of importance only from the Song onwards. A notable forerunner, however, may be found in the Tang essayist Liu Zongyuan's 柳宗元 (773–819 CE) allegorical biographical sketch of the tree-grower Guo Tuotuo 郭橐駝 ('Guo the Camel Back'). Signalling the Zhuangzian trope of physical deformities as signs of inner virtue and wisdom, the tree grower's art of cultivating trees becomes an allegory for the arts of governance. The human desire for control of the more-than-human world must yield to the natural rhythms of things. The tree-grower in the *Zhuangzi* appears as a figure who knows what it might mean to be properly alive and free. This association echoes down the tradition as later literati such as Ji Kang, Cao Zhi, Xie An, Xie Lingyun and Tao Qian all incorporate trees into their dynamic representations of landscape, inflecting their understanding of the good life with Daoist equivalencies between cultivating natural entities and cultivating the self. Set against the values of utility, service and violent subjugation of the natural world, these representations of encounters with trees, I suggest, transcend the values of Confucian orthodoxy to question the limits of the political in human life. If the discourse of tree cultivation presents a millennia-long elite conversation about value and meaning-making beyond the dictates of society, what might these depictions teach us as creatures of modernity? How might an arboreal lens reanimate our latent longing for more natural forms of self-cultivation?

## From Gewu 格物 (Investigate Things) to Ping Tianxia 平天下 (Harmonizing and Pacifying the World)— Examining Confucian aesthetic experience through the Daxue 大學 (Great Learning)

This paper aims to explore some of the characteristics of Confucian aesthetic experience through examining the *Daxue* concept *gewu*.

The author will first discuss the unique characteristics of Confucian aesthetic experience:

1. Concrete ordinary life experience itself is promoted and valued. The unique characteristic of this type of aesthetics experience is its *ethical-value-based* nature--searching meaning in ordinary and trivial daily life overshadows the typical expectation of visual or taste based aesthetic experience.
2. Strong sense of history. The Confucian aesthetic experience always intertwines individual, community, national, international and universe aspects. The focus of this type of aesthetic experience frequently circles around questions such as how collective consciousness shapes individual (aesthetic) existence and memory and how individual memory in turn contributes to collective existence and history, and how aesthetic expression conveys (or rejects) historical, geographical, (inter-) cultural and (inter-) national narratives. The aesthetic ideal is demonstrated in its subtle multifaceted reflective nature.
3. The angle of totality. The angle of totality of the Confucian aesthetic experience embodies in its strong sense of intervening in reality, targeting on current geographical, social-political, ethical and cultural issues and problems.

The author then will explore how these unique characteristics of the Confucian aesthetic experience are demonstrated in the Confucian world-making project in the *Great Learning*. One of the arguments the author develops is that the concept of *yi* 義 (appropriateness) as a distinctive component of Confucian aesthetic experience is in the center of understanding the meaning and content of *gewu* (格物).



## Breath-change and Democratization: Daoist Reflections

This paper supposes that the democratization of subjectivity is pivotal for reflections on democracy. The reason for this is that subjectivity is in itself, within its very structure and dynamics, political. I try to explore the democratization of subjectivity by relating the askesis of heart-fasting (*xīn zhāi de gōngfū*/心齋的工夫), alluded to in chapter four of the *Zhuāngzǐ*, to the Daoist emphasis on “self-transformation” or “self-change” (*zìhuà*/自化). The motif of self-change can be helpful in rethinking democracy from the perspective of an inner cultivation (*nèixiū*/內修) that connects subjectivity and breath-change (*qìhuà*/氣化) within the concept of a breath-changing subject (*qìhuà zhǔtǐ*/氣化主體) or transformative subjectivity. My reflections connect the Daoist understanding of inner cultivation as democratization of the human self-relation to an outer cultivation (*wàixiū*/外修) that I preliminarily would like to call autometamorphic democracy (自化民主). I will try to explain the relation between transformative subjectivity and autometamorphic democracy by connecting it to two important concept in modern Chinese political philosophy, “inner holiness” and “outer kingliness” (*nèishèng wàiwáng*/內聖外王).

Inner holiness and outer kingliness mentioned in chapter 33 of the *Zhuāngzǐ* have long become important terms for rethinking the relation between subjectivity and politics. In the context of contemporary Neo-Confucianism, it is common to think about the relation between the “heart-character-subject” (*xīnxìng zhǔtǐ*/心性主體) or “moral subject” (*dàodé zhǔtǐ*/道德主體) which is regarded as “inner holiness” and democratic politics which are thought in terms of a “new outer kingliness” (*xīn wàiwáng*/新外王). However, the question that arises from this discussion is whether contemporary Neo-Confucianism has succeeded in democratizing “subjectivity” (the so called “inner holiness”). The discussion is complex, but the point of this paper is to assume that the answer to this question is largely negative. On this basis, I want to pose the following question: What kind of “subjectivity” or “new inner holiness” (*xīn nèishèng*/新內聖) corresponds to a vision of “democracy” or “new outer kingliness” that goes beyond the political imagination of contemporary Neo-Confucian philosophy that has been largely limited by naively accepting a rather conventional modern Western discourse on democracy? My discussion takes “self-change” as starting point to rethink the democratization of “subjectivity” (inner holiness). In contrast to contemporary Neo-Confucian scholars, I don’t take the “heart” (*xīn*/心) as philosophical bridge to connect subjectivity and politics, but “breath” (*qì*/氣) and its changes (*qìhuà*/氣化).

## **EN-EACP Introduction**

The Educational Network of the European Association for Chinese Philosophy (EN-EACP) is a platform dedicated to the study and teaching of Chinese philosophy, with a special focus on Europe and the Chinese-speaking world. Founded in 2014, the European Association for Chinese Philosophy (EACP) is developing this “educational network” to facilitate access to Chinese philosophy for European students and to deepen the exchange between European scholars with experience in teaching Chinese philosophy. This panel will address the experiences and perspectives of European scholars in teaching Chinese philosophy. In particular, it aims to discuss proposals for curricula related to different areas of Chinese philosophy, as well as for summer schools and graduate courses, which the EN-EACP will help to organize and promote.

## **Weighty Words Feigning Truth: The Diverse Images of Sages and the Fictional Genealogies and Histories in the Zhuangzi**

The Zhuangzi points out three modes of language employed by Zhuangzi: goblet words (卮言), weighty words (重言), and lodged words (寓言). Among these, weighty words are described as „being treated as truth.“ However, weighty words, as a form of discourse that appeals to authority and historicity, may appear to convey truth but are, in fact, clever and extravagant „pretended serious words.“ This mode of writing serves as a key, deliberate rhetorical strategy in the Zhuangzi, reflecting the Zhuangzian approach to the dialectical relationship between rhetoric (the role of language itself), the Dao, thought, and truth.

This paper investigates two key aspects: first, the diverse and multifaceted representations of sages such as Confucius, Laozi, the Yellow Emperor, Yao, and Shun in both the Inner and Miscellaneous Chapters of the Zhuangzi; second, the reconstruction of genealogies of ancient emperors and masters, as well as the fabrication of historical events through „utmost virtue (de) „ and the Dao. Finally, from the perspective of the genealogies of „hearing the Dao“ and „the doubt of beginning“, the process of „hearing the Dao“ emerges from a non-historical interpretation of history that transcends textual and verbal expression, leading to the doubt of a beginning that is not having a beginning.

The writing of weighty words fundamentally opposes the authority and normative traditions of Confucian moral order, critiquing and deconstructing the narrative power of sage-kings in the Confucian historical tradition, while simultaneously reflecting intellectual dialogue between Confucianism and the Huang-Lao thought. Weighty words are often intertwined with lodged words (yuyan), and are, in essence, a form of goblet words (zhiyan), fluidly unfolding across multiple perspectives, representing a unique philosophical language of transformation that belongs to the realm of thought which does not present itself directly one-sidedly.

## Reimagining Social Order through Xunzi's Moralistic 乱 luan - 治 zhi Dichotomy

The influential secular-liberal view of political order is that peace is maintained through amoral legal restraints. The Classical Confucian thinker Xunzi understood that order (治 *zhi*) partially depended on legal institutions but deemed this insufficient. For Xunzi, social order requires both the correction of chaotic (乱 *luan*) human nature through legal institutions of law and punishments (刑罚 *xingfa*) and social institutions of rituals and duties (礼义 *liyi*). Out of the two, Xunzi thinks moral cultivation is more important than laws and argues that social order lives and dies on the moral behaviour of its participants. Institutional decay has become a global problem, and impersonal laws seem unable to reverse this decay. Political vitriol spills into political violence in nations with highly sophisticated laws and robust liberal-democratic institutions.

This gives us reasons to take Xunzi's claim seriously, how much does an individual participant's moral behaviour contribute to the decay of order? Contrary to the common belief that institutional checks and balances make political order indifferent to individual virtues, could bad moral behaviour cause political chaos? To be clear, I am not proposing Xunzi's arguments as the straightforward answer as a 'moralistic order' is not necessarily benevolent. Civic duties may include unwanted moralistic regulation, leading to an oppressive community with no regard for freedoms. Nevertheless, a comparative study of Xunzi's 'order' may reveal that amoral laws are insufficient for social order and provide cursory solutions to our problems today. For instance, we may question the Liberal idea that institutions are truly 'safety nets' that prevent the worst chaos from occurring and compel us to reflect deeply on the effects of individual moral behaviour on political communities.

*JACOBY Marcin*

## **The situation in Poland**

Polish HEIs run almost twenty different BA and MA programmes in Chinese Studies across the country. Over the last twenty years the number of such programmes has gradually increased but the focus has shifted from traditional Linguistic, Literature, Philosophy and History Studies to curricula based in Cultural Studies, and centered around contemporary issues. Preserving robust, traditional Sinology curricula at least for a small number of students is vital for future research. Introducing Chinese Philosophy courses also in other curricula, such as Philosophy, History, Art History and others, is necessary for future, less European-centered education. The challenge is how to navigate these needs in times of decreasing numbers of students and ever-more vocational-centered education.

## **The Relational Self and Parental Love**

In recent decades, blaming parents for adult children's problems and even cutting off parents have not only become more common than a few decades ago in the U.S. but also have started in China where filial piety has been regarded as a core virtue for over two thousand years. The parent-blaming culture is partially based on an extremely individualistic understanding of the self and an absolute separation between the child's well-being and parent's happiness. Many devoted parents are blamed for regarding their children as their extension and taking the success of their children as part of their own happiness and therefore accused of being selfish and even narcissistic. This way of thinking has been taught by some popular psychology and promoted by many psychological therapists in the U.S. However, if one understands the self as relational as Confucians do and sees parental love as something that intrinsically connects parents' deep affection for their children and parents' great self-fulfillment from children's well-being, one will realize that parents' satisfaction from children's success doesn't have to be the result of selfishness but a natural by-product of parental love. Certainly, children's happiness that parents perceive doesn't always match up with what children believe about their happiness. When loving parents are mistaken about what makes their children happy and over interfere with their children's decision-making, they can actually cause great pain to their children. However, this doesn't mean that the motivation of these parents in parenting is totally selfish without parental love but only shows that parental love doesn't necessarily bring happiness to children and parents need to respect their children and listen to their children more. This paper will argue about the consistency between unselfish motivation and self-satisfaction in parental love in terms of the relational self and reveal the misconception of parental love in contemporary parent-blame culture based on popular psychology.

JUNG Jongmo

## The ethics of communication: Ito Jinsai and Ruan Yuan's interpretations of *kejifuli*

My presentation explores the possibility of interpreting the concept of *kejifuli*, found in Confucius' *Analects*, from a contemporary perspective. Specifically, it analyzes how East Asian scholars' interpretation of the term "*kejifuli*" shifted during the 17<sup>th</sup>–19<sup>th</sup> centuries, aligning with scholarly perspectives during the Song–Ming dynasties. They criticized the metaphysical and essentialist aspects of Neo-Confucianism, instead emphasizing human relationships, thereby opening up new horizons for Confucian studies. Further, it explores the significance of this shift in meaning from the perspective of interpersonal communication—i.e., our relationship with the *others*. To achieve this, the present study analyzes scholarly perspectives on benevolence and the interpretation of *kejifuli* by two scholars: Ito Jinsai (伊藤仁齋, from the Edo period in Japan) and Ruan Yuan (阮元, from the Qing dynasty in China). Although these two scholars are separated by time and space, they held similar views regarding their interpretation of benevolence and *kejifuli*. Specifically, both understood Confucius' concept of benevolence (仁) as pertaining to human relationships and emphasizing mutuality—a view they incorporated into their interpretations of *kejifuli*. In my view, their interpretations imply an understanding of ethics based on otherness and plurality, with an orientation towards the possibility and inevitability of communication and interconnection among moral agents or personalities.

My presentation corresponds to the entire theme of the conference, "Addressing Global Crises and Reimagining Solutions through Chinese Philosophy," and it will be a timely discussion in that it secures the meaning of Chinese philosophy in modern society.

## **Global Conflicts and Malicious Comments: Would Confucius AI Help?**

The rise of malicious comments and hate speech in digital spaces has not only worsened personal and societal conflicts but has also contributed to global tensions. This presentation explores the potential of Confucius AI as a conceptual solution to mitigate such conflicts. Rather than pursuing the actual development of an AI system, this project uses Confucius AI as an imaginative framework to explore how Chinese philosophy, specifically Confucian ethics, might address global challenges in the digital age. Confucius AI, rooted in Confucian principles, is envisioned as a system that transforms negative discourse into constructive and respectful dialogue through an ethical moderation process.

The core approach of Confucius AI is based on the Confucian principles of ren (仁) (benevolence) and li (禮) (propriety), which emphasize respect for others and harmonious social relationships. This conceptual AI intervenes in online conversations by identifying harmful language and adjusting it to meet these ethical standards. The presentation focuses on whether this intervention can reduce hostility in digital interactions and foster a culture of mutual respect in an increasingly interconnected world.

In addition, the presentation examines the imagined effectiveness and limitations of Confucius AI, including the broader implications for reducing global conflicts. Potential ethical issues are also explored, such as the risk of overreach and censorship, and the challenge of applying Confucian values universally while respecting cultural diversity. Ultimately, this presentation aims to offer a philosophical reflection on how Confucian ethics might contribute to resolving global conflicts exacerbated by digital communication.



## **Can a Sage Feel Hatred? The Problem of Anger and Morality in Neo-Confucianism**

Can a morally virtuous person feel anger and hatred towards others? Can someone who harbours hatred and anger, which are traditionally considered negative traits, be considered a sage? According to the Book of Documents (Shujing), King Shun expressed great anger at the Four Evildoers (sixiang) who were terrorising the people, and had them executed. Later, Neo-Confucian scholars discussed Shun's anger within the framework of the theory of the Four Beginnings and the Seven Emotions, seeking to justify these moral emotions not only ethically but also metaphysically. The theory of the Four Beginnings and Seven Emotions is a key theme in Neo-Confucianism in Joseon Korea, aiming to explain emotions from a moral perspective and to clarify how emotions underpin moral practice.

This presentation will explore how the paradox of a sage's anger and hatred is justified in Confucian thought and propose a Confucian explanation of righteous anger. I delve into the possibility of a philosophical elucidation of righteous anger by exploring the relationship between the negative emotion of anger and morality. Specifically, it will examine the following questions: Can righteous anger be justified in a neo-Confucian context? What are the definition and limits of righteous anger? How does the question of anger and morality in Confucianism differ from debates on anger in Western ethics and political theory, and what alternative perspectives might Confucian thought offer?

*KING Richard A. H.*

## **Remarks on Confucian role ethics as viable contemporary ethics**

Confucian roles ethics appear to have excellent credentials for solving the crises of estrangement and alienation among individuals in contemporary societies. For offering roles as a fundamental orientation for lifelong conduct may be thought to minimize both of these pitfalls. Roger Ames has argued in several works (esp. 2011, 2021) that ancient Confucian role ethics is a viable system of ethics for humans living now. After a brief interpretation of Ames' thesis, concentrating a) on the concept of person and b) on the concept of role, I argue that in his theory "person" is the bearer of roles and question how his use of "person" relates to the ancient legal and moral use of the term. As to "role", a functional reading of this current term is attractive, whereas ancient roles are most obviously ritual. While it may be argued that rites in ancient China were functional, thus making roles encoded and acted out in them also functional, this is disputable. Furthermore, roles are plural and therefore supervenes on one another: No one is only mother, but also citizen; yet being a mother may supervene on being a citizen: both roles combine in the one person. This is the foundation for role conflict. While Ames concentrates on roles in the family, other areas of roles (the state, professions) must be considered within the highly differentiated societies we live in, and it is questionable how they can be grounded or justified using the family. I close with methodological reflections on the use of ancient materials in relation to current crises, referring to the climate crisis and the widespread academic use of early Chinese texts for solutions (Suzuki, Torres 2025).

KOSEC Maja M.

## From Anxiety to Subjectality: Xu Fuguan and Li Zehou

Xu Fuguan's concept of *concerned consciousness* (*youhuan yishi* 忧患意识) and Li Zehou's *culture of joy* (*legan wenhua* 乐感文化) are pivotal to their respective theories on the origins of Chinese culture. My presentation explores the dynamic interplay between these two concepts through a comparative approach that draws on Martin Heidegger's concepts of *Dasein* and *Angst*. It emphasises the focus on the collective presence of the feeling of anxiety in Xu Fuguan's work and Martin Heidegger's interest in the anxiety of the individual. Reassessing the philosophical foundations of these concepts, I argue that Li Zehou's concept of the *culture of joy* builds on both and should be understood as an extension of the concept of *concerned consciousness* rather than its antithesis. Finally, I highlight Li's understanding of *subjectality* as a possible bridge between the issues raised by the two aforementioned authors.

KWEK Dorothy

## Sense and sensibility in the *Zhuangzi*

The difficulty of deriving positive normative propositions from the *Zhuangzi* often has it characterized as engaging in a variety of scepticism. This paper grapples with the difficulty of pinning down *what* the *Zhuangzi* is trying to say by exploring *how* the *Zhuangzi* says – or refuses to say – things. I examine the literary and aesthetic dimensions of the text, which tend to be given short shrift in contemporary philosophical readings, through a cross-cultural comparison of the expectations surrounding the experience and work of ‘art.’ The paper explores the possibility that over and above the instruction of any precept or principle, the *Zhuangzi* seeks to induce certain ethico-political *sensibilities*, and that the evasiveness of the text is inseparable from the kinds of sensibilities it seeks to elicit.

## **“The Course can not keep away from things”: Zhuangzi open the gate of literature descriptions and ethics of difference**

Zhuangzi consciously undergoes a plan to deconstruct the giant Totality-Metaphysics; nevertheless, what he conceives would unnecessarily stride

toward the termination of Metaphysics, which on the other hand propels the ultimately superior Course to integrate once again into subtle and various physical beings that call for more exquisite observation as well as sharp feelings.

Though Metaphysics temporarily collapses in regard to “Worseness”, a means of deconstruction and restoration, visible creatures and beings, like ant (insect), panic grass (plant), earthenware tile (mineral) and excrement (human wastes), entirely extricate individual auras. The so-called “The Course can not keep away from things” righteously illustrates transformative manifestations upon the diversity of beings, “One finger embrace the whole world, One horse embrace the all beings” while the logics of Metaphysics falls apart.

From now on, the metaphysical embodiment of “The Course identify with all beings” lies in: Humans constantly are touched by marvelous things to reckon transcendental humanity of “Inspiring from things” whether they are capable of observing the subtle existence of beings and even in the encounter of fragile creatures. With the “Things-Addicted” and “Subtle-Observed” interpretation, we may realize the reason why in Zhuangzi interwoven with various subtle existence of living beings, inferior objects as well as disgraceful and worthless things.

Abundant in peculiarity of triviality, inferiority, The Zhuangzi also reflects a vivid feeling of willingness to perceive the essence of existence among different things in addition to specific and exquisite observations on humans and nature.

Confronted with those paradoxical conditions, we sometimes feel vulnerable but touched perpetually by their vitality; therefore, we may exhibit adorable affection and pay tribute toward universally changeable beings.

Therefore, Zhuangzi open the gate to the differences of ethics and the literature descriptions to all beings. Literature descriptions can insight into the subtleness of trivial

things to develop writings on “Things”, which approves differential and marvelous congruity of nature through specific and exquisite observations. Hence, Zhuangzi eventually manifests in numerous “expressing ways” that contain floating words, citations from weighty ancient authorities, and fables, so that literature becomes an instrumental approach to “The Way that can be told is not an unvarying way.” To this matter, the more Zhuangzi utters, the more Zhuangzi composes. And then, Zhuangzi’s loving capacity become more and more until endless.

## Fasting of the Heart, Mirror Poetry, Cure for the State

The first dialogue in chapter four of the *Zhuangzi* / *Chuangtzu* (4/1-34) is best remembered for its notion of “heart/mind-fasting,” which the master-character “Zhongni (Confucius)” introduced to the pupil-character “Yan Hui,” who had revealed the plan to bring cure to a catastrophically governed state. This paper explicates how Yan Hui, as a result of the “fasting,” would be better equipped for the dangers and challenges that Zhongni associated with this political intervention, including the challenge of transforming (*huà*) the willful ruler. It contributes mainly in four ways. First, it makes a more compelling interpretive case that, although Zhongni supposed the result of heart/mind-fasting to be an “empty (*xū*)” mode of agency in which Yan Hui would act while not fishing for the world’s tallying with his heart/mind or for opportunities to apply his own models, he did not want this pupil to cease caring about the people or abort his attempt of political intervention. Second, it surveys the scholarship for an interpretation to reconcile Zhongni’s two expectations, concluding on a version of mirror-like virtuoso responsiveness from which Yan Hui, *despite* his values and projects, would act while not fishing for the world’s tallying with his heart/mind or for opportunities to apply his own models. Third, it points out two puzzles about this reconciliation: When he responded to his situation with utterances, how would these verbal responses make sense to himself, if he did not appear to himself to be seeking any particular outcome or an opportunity to implement models? And why could being empty or mirror-like in this sense make him better at *transforming others* (e.g. a willful or jealous ruler)? Fourth, through some imaginative storytelling, it suggests a solution to the two puzzles, which is modeled after a *poet’s* intelligence that spontaneously reflects the salient aspects of reality.

## Artificial Intelligence: Ethical Insights from Confucianism

The prevalence of generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) technologies is a rapidly developing global crisis. GenAIs are increasingly relied on in professional and educational contexts—including for ethical, legal, and political decision-making. I argue against the use of AI tools in ethical decision-making and education by drawing on insights from Classical Confucian theories of moral psychology and development. Classical Confucians emphasized that social roles and rituals (*li* 禮) importantly constitute the moral self; that moral decision-making and obligations depend on the demands of our relationships to particular others and our broader society; and that the virtuous moral agent has properly cultivated emotional and affective attitudes. Rituals help practitioners develop the proper affective attitudes and to display them in socially recognized, contextually responsive ways (*Analects* 2.3, 3.4, 8.2, 9.3, 17.21, 19.14). Rituals shape or express natural features of human nature such as our inclination to grieve loved ones or respect our parents; at the same time, they are responsive to changing contexts and circumstances. Moreover, this means of moral cultivation requires the guidance, education, examples, or correction of others. GenAI tools lack the ability to morally reason as a member of a community, to embody and practice rituals that help shape our character and affect, or to respond to and cultivate ethically salient emotions. These technologies therefore cannot develop or replace the sage's ethical wisdom, character, and morally appropriate emotional responses, nor can they appreciate the nuance and interconnectedness of ethical demands and decisions. Classical Confucian understandings of roles, relationality, and moral psychology offer a fruitful ethical framework for evaluating the efficacy and ethicality of emerging GenAI technologies. From this Confucian perspective we must be wary of overreliance on these tools at the expense of developing our moral characters as situationally embedded, embodied, relational, and emotional agents.



LEE Janghee

## Xunzi's Shendu (慎獨)

My presentation does not aim to thoroughly explore the concept of 'shendu' (慎獨) in early Confucianism. It, rather, takes notice of the fact that 'shendu' appear in the *Xunzi*. In fact, 'shendu' has long been known as the 'shendu' of the *Great Learning* or the *Doctrine of the Mean*. It seems natural that 'shendu' has attracted such a keen attention in the Confucian tradition, given the fact that 'shendu' appears in the *Great Learning* and the *Doctrine of the Mean*, both of which are so-called "the Four Books." Interestingly, while we cannot find 'shendu' in the *Analects* and the *Mencius*, it is found in the *Xunzi*. Furthermore, if the *Wuxing* (五行) is regarded as the work of so-called "Si-Meng (史孟)" genealogy, the *Xunzi* is awkwardly positioned together with the works considered close to Mencius' ideas via the concept of *shendu*.

In order to understand Xunzi's concept of *shendu*, I will first explore whether the concept of *shendu* in pre-Qin Confucianism is limited to the meaning of 'careful when alone.' Examining 'shendu' in the *Great Learning*, the *Doctrine of the Mean*, the *Wuxing* and the *Xunzi* respectively, we find that *shendu* may be a concept related to the "truth of inner self". If *shendu* can be understood as a concept centered on inner authenticity, it becomes more curious about what it means in the case of Xunzi. This is because 'inner integrity' is often regarded as being characteristic of Mencius's thought whereas Xunzi is understood to represent the opposite. I will suggest my own interpretation of *shendu* in Xunzi's philosophy in the conclusion.

LEE Lilith W.

## Meeting the Coloniser's Gaze: 19th Century Straits Chinese Visions of Philosophy in Crises

The Straits Settlements, where Mainland and Maritime Southeast Asia overlapped, was of significant political and economic interest for both *fin-de-siècle* Imperial Britain and China. The intelligentsia of the British colony's Straits Chinese majority sought to establish themselves as both British *and* Chinese, attempting to hybridise the respective intellectual traditions of both empires in their development of an Anglo-Chinese consciousness at imperial peripheries. In this paper, I present the hybridisations effected by two such Straits Chinese philosophers as being of significant interest for those of us concerned with the possibility of a 'planetary,' 'global,' 'cosmopolitan,' or 'post-comparative' philosophy, given the legacies of coloniality in world philosophies today.

I reconstruct the critiques of philosophy at the turn of the 20th century by the only two non-European members of the Straits Philosophical Society in Singapore: Dr LIM Boon Keng and TAN Teck Soon. They drew heavily on Chinese philosophy and history to ameliorate the image of the Chinese 'race' in the eyes of their fellow Society members, but both philosophers also saw philosophy as a whole in crisis: not only as expressed in European colonial projects, but also in the decline of the Qing imperium. In response, LIM and TAN developed alternative visions of a new *Straits Chinese* philosophy for the world, problematising the otherwise self-frustrating global aspirations of 'Western' and Chinese philosophical traditions. I situate LIM and TAN's Confucian and Daoist approach to the crises of philosophy within their sweeping engagements with ideas in Scottish Medicine, Late-Qing Confucianism, Rabindranath Tagore, British Idealists, and South Asian Buddhism—thereby illuminating their divergent conceptions of the possibility of a philosophy for the world.

## The Implication of Care in the Political Thinking of Zhuangzi

This paper will use the care ethics as a framework to analyze the dimension of „care“ within the political thought of the Zhuangzi. According to Zhuangzi, the root cause of chaos in the world lies in the various schools of thought clinging to their perspectives, which leads to mutual exclusion and a lack of communication, much like „耳目鼻口，皆有所明，不能相通.“ In other words, only through „Tong 通“ can the world move toward harmony. In the Zhuangzi’s „Qiwulun“ chapter, it is stated that „道通為一“. This „Yi 一“ can be seen as a concept of community, yet it allows for the coexistence of diversity. How to achieve „Tong“ as „Yi“ is the essence of Zhuangzi’s notion of care.

The care ethics emphasizes that normative ethics upholds „justice“ as the highest value, but „care“ must be prioritized before justice can truly be realized. Therefore, care should be the core of ethical thinking. From Zhuangzi’s perspective, care is to be achieved through the method of „Tong.“ When translated into contemporary political language, this „Yi“ should be interpreted as „publicness.“ However, this publicness cannot be established through the imposition of norms but must unfold with the critical power that resists reduction and discipline, symbolized by the metaphor of „Chaos 渾沌.“ This critical force in Zhuangzi’s political thought must be recognized and preserved. Only by safeguarding this force can politics, in its public form, preserve differences, thereby achieving true „Tong“ and „Harmony 和“ without falling into the violence of uniformity.

Zhuangzi uses the concept of „Xiang Wang 相忘“ as the best embodiment of the value of publicness. Paradoxically, through mutual forgetting and each finding comfort in their own ways, life can be lived in accordance with its natural course. This represents the profound expression of Zhuangzi’s politics of care.

## The Difference Between Gewu 格物 and Gyeokmul 格物 —— Neo-Confucian View on “Investigation of Things” in China and Korea

In Confucian Classic *Great Learning*, the first step of the *Eight Steps*, the term 格物 (*gewu* in Chinese, *gyeokmul* in Korean) was established as an epistemological theory of Confucian thought by the Southern Song philosopher Zhu Xi, who interpreted it as “approaching to things and investigating their principles” (即物窮理, *jiwugiongli*). Zhu Xi’s interpretation of 格物, which emphasized the investigation of objects, had the potential to be understood as a scientific methodology. Consequently, 格物 gained attention in modern East Asian intellectual history as a translation for concepts such as “philosophy” or “science.”

In the intellectual history of China, Zhu Xi’s view on 格物 was seen as something to be overcome. Zhu Xi’s theoretical approach to 格物 faced criticism from Confucian thinkers like Wang Yangming and Qing Dynasty evidential scholars. On the other hand, in the Korean Confucian tradition, which fully embraced Zhu Xi’s thought, his concept of *gewu* was regarded not so much as something to be overcome but rather as a rich source of intellectual resources. This was because the process of translating the Chinese term 格物 into Korean revealed various possibilities for interpretation. The diverse interpretations of the term were freely developed both within and beyond the scope of Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucianism.

## **Philosophy in Action: Rethinking the Role of the State Apparatus in Social Welfare in Southern Song Local Administration**

The paper argues that a group of intellectuals in Southern Song China (1127-1276), rejecting both the totalitarian and the laissez-faire economic philosophies, devised a middle-path model that relied on local officials to implement active yet moderate fiscal management measures to promote social welfare. This search for new models was driven by the gap between ideals and reality: the old Confucian ideal of a benevolent government contrasted with the reality of a revenue-hungry fiscal state; the newly emerged non-government initiatives promoted by the Neo-Confucian movement struggled to fight local corruption. Drawing on their first-hand experiences in local administration about famine relief, land reclamation projects, and revenue collection, the various intellectuals came to agree on the significance of a responsible local government in balancing the interests of different parties. The new model was constructed around three levels of argumentation. First, through their reinterpretations of the Classics, the intellectuals established that such fiscal management techniques as government price controls had canonical foundations. Second, they engaged with more nuanced analyses of risks and benefits, moving beyond moralistic arguments. They demonstrated, for instance, that tax reduction was not always conducive to peasant welfare. Lastly, some of the intellectuals in the movement took the further step to investigate the historical development of government institutions for practical wisdom, which developed into an alternative curriculum of Confucian learning that prioritized practical governance to ethical principles. My study aims to provide a new understanding of the ever-evolving Confucian statecraft beyond the binary of state control versus moral cultivation. I hope that not only the intellectual model itself but also the way in which a philosophy renovated itself to encompass social changes will shed light on our modern crises, which also demand adaptable and non-binary thinking.

## Resisting Technology Addiction through Mencian Ethics

As AI has rapidly advanced in recent years, it is crucial to also consider the profound impact of the attention economy, which, unlike AI, is already exerting long-lasting effects on the global population. In the attention economy, technology companies derive their primary profits not from direct content consumption but from advertising revenue generated by capturing users' attention. This relentless pursuit of attention has led to widespread issues of addiction to social media, pornography, and video games across the world, along with related secondary problems. Unlike substance addiction, technology addiction cannot be resolved through complete abstention, as modern life and work are deeply intertwined with digital technologies. Moreover, this problem cannot be addressed by individual willpower alone, as advanced technologies and design techniques—rooted in cutting-edge psychology and neuroscience—are deliberately crafted to exploit human psychology and foster addictive behaviours. To address this issue, we must move away from both rugged individualism and oppressive patriarchy. Mencian ethics, particularly his principle of “don't forget, don't force 勿忘勿助,” offers a valuable model. According to this approach, we should focus on collectively creating environments that foster healthy digital habits, rather than placing the burden solely on individuals or resorting to forceful behaviour modification. One fundamental environment is the family. A healthy family environment benefits not only teenagers but also adults, who are particularly susceptible to social media addiction. This environment must be nurtured by all family members. Beyond the family, we must also work to cultivate a healthy digital culture in society at large. This includes, above all, imposing restrictions on irresponsible, addictive design practices by technology companies and providing education on the healthy use of digital technologies. By applying “don't forget, don't force,” we can collectively create environments that better equip people around the world to resist technology addiction.

## **Pitfall of Appropriate Personal Style ---- Why Zigong Fails to Foster Trust in Others**

A distinctive aspect of Confucius's virtue ethics is his emphasis not only on ensuring that the right actions are done but also on how they are done. The manner or the way to do things often referred to as 'styles'. Joel Kupperman (2002) and Amy Olberding (2007, 2009) argue that cultivating an appropriate style is morally significant in Confucian ethics. Ideally, an appropriate style can foster trust in our interactions with others, leading to mutual acknowledgment and creating a harmony community. However, as Olberding notes, there are instances when even well-cultivated and refined styles can inadvertently generate distrust. This point is more effectively illustrated by Zigong's case. Zigong demonstrates a polished style in his words and demeanor. But he often falls short in providing tailored responses to others. As a result, Zigong struggles to foster trust and even generate distrust.

My focus is on the problem: why does an apparently well-cultivated style fail to foster trust? The existing literature offers two primary explanations. The first view is a cynical one, positing that Zigong's intentions are selfish, suggesting that his practice of rituals serves only his own purposes. In contrast, Amy Olberding (2009) offers a more generous interpretation, arguing that Zigong is genuinely motivated to cultivate virtue but overly focuses on strict adherence to ritual forms. I argue that that Zigong's failure arises from the way his manner reveals weaknesses in his character, reflecting his disposition of self-complacency. Specifically, I argue that developing a personal style should serve an intrapersonal function, namely honing our virtuous expressions and promoting empathy. This intrapersonal function is closely linked to interpersonal functions, like building trust. Thus, Zigong not only directs his efforts in the wrong direction but also lacks the motivation to develop his characters.

## The Ethical Reflection on the Paradox of Practice in the Zhuangzi

The so-called paradox of practice refers to the situation or result that is contrary to the value direction in the course of value or moral practice or action. The formation of an opposite result implies that value or moral practice itself contains or connects elements that violate the direction of values. This results in a situation where value or moral practice has both positive and negative implications; in other words, practice is both virtuous and sinful at the same time. For example, actions stemming from good motives or purposes may lead to negative or evil outcomes, causing the action to have both good and evil aspects. In Zhuangzi's ethical reflections, the phenomenon of the paradox of practice is mentioned multiple times, and special attention is given to reflecting on this phenomenon.

For *Zhuangzi*, the most difficult-to-detect or self-awared yet highly influential evil or negative outcome of behavior often arises from a context of goodness or positivity. *Zhuangzi* believes that within a good or kind context, whether stemming from good intentions or from a belief that one is performing good or appropriate actions, the actor is prone to overlooking or being unaware of the factors within that could potentially lead to evil. In *Zhuangzi*'s view, this aspect of evil is especially important because, on one hand, when we try to prevent evil, we tend to focus on exploring the possible causes of evil from the perspective of evil itself—such as negative emotions, desires, bad motives, ignorance, prejudice, etc.—and attempt to eliminate these factors. However, this focus can easily cause us to neglect the factors and links within a kind or good context that could lead to the formation of evil. Once the evil within a kind or good context is overlooked, evil continues to proliferate. Moreover, people always wish to affirm good intentions or expect themselves to be in a kind or good context. But if the evil hidden within that context goes unnoticed or unacknowledged, then as the passion and expectation of practicing good increase, so too does the evil that grows alongside it. Thus, one may fall into the paradox of the more one practices good, the more evil is formed. This article will delve into *Zhuangzi*'s reflection on the paradox of practice and how he proposes a fundamental solution to it.



## **Transforming Normative Models of Perception: Insights from Late Ming to Early Qing Chinese Philosophy**

This paper investigates the potentials and mechanisms for transforming the normative model of perception and cognition—defined by the subject-object dichotomy and three-dimensional spatiality—as reflected in late Ming to early Qing Chinese philosophical sources. By exploring alternative cognitive models presented in these texts, I aim to elucidate the understandings of consciousness and approaches to the nature of reality developed during this period, which reflect an epistemic transformation. These perspectives offer reimagined modes of thinking that can contribute to addressing current global challenges. The study begins by examining the prevailing perception paradigm, which posits a mind-independent world of discrete objects in three-dimensional space, directly perceivable by a fixed subject. This object-centered, spatially based cognitive model is critiqued in the sources, where its inherent contradictions are exposed, and mechanisms for its transformation are developed. Through analysis of the works of Wang Fuzhi (王夫之), Fang Yizhi (方以智), and Hanshan Deqing (憨山德清), the paper identifies a trend among thinkers of this era to transition from object-centered cognition to alternative models that transcend spatial constraints and the subject-object dichotomy. These models challenge core assumptions of substance ontology and the subject-object paradigm, more aligning with what we now would call process-oriented or relational ontologies. By exploring these transformative potentials and mechanisms of epistemic shifts, the paper provides insights into alternative approaches to reality and experience. The results are not only useful for comparative investigations in the history of knowledge and theories of mind—addressing questions of universals versus culturally conditioned traits in how people perceive, conceptualize, and represent their understanding of the world—but also relevant for addressing the ethical and cognitive challenges of the present. By expanding the field of possibilities regarding how we can think and approach the world, these insights contribute to reimagining solutions to crises.

*MICHAEL Thomas*

## **If the Dao is a Thing, What Kind of Thing is it and What Does it Do? A Brief Inquiry into Yan Zun's Laozi Zhigui**

In the Laozi Zhigui, Yan Zun wrote: 夫道之為物, “The Dao is a thing.” However, we might ask, What kind of thing is the Dao and what does it do? Yan Zun, together with many of those who have studied the Daoist Dao, say that the Dao is formless and shapeless, and many even have gone on to say that that Dao is a no-thing, prompting some modern scholars to argue that the Dao is just an empty word. Often, the Dao is recognized as the ultimate source of the world and the cause of its continuance, but few have actually discussed what it is that the Dao actually does. In this presentation, I look at the many passages of the Laozi zhigui that specify many different sorts of actions that the Dao performs in the empirical world, and it turns out that the Dao those actions are seminal to the on-going processes of the world: the Dao is not simply an ultimate source and it is much more than a vague flow that somehow blows throughout the world. This paper also looks at the ways in which Yan Zun says that by following these actions of the Dao in the here and now, we can trace them backwards in such a way as to come into the recognition of the cosmic Dao in our very life, which is not only an important mark of the Daoist Sage, but also explains the natural philosophy by which the world continues to function in its phenomenal fullness.

## **Can the Confucian Relational Conception of the Self Provide an Alternative to Excessive Individualism?**

It has become commonplace to regard excessive individualism in the modern West as a major enabling factor regarding current and pressing global crises, such as social capital decline, inequality and climate change. In this paper, I will argue that constructively examining the relational idea of the self that is found in Classical Confucianism can aid in the task of imagining solutions to excessive individualism. Firstly, I will use Gauthier (1977), Taylor (1989) and Rošker (2021) to argue that individualism assumes the place of a pre-reflective default in modern Western referential frameworks. This means that, despite the fact the West has many who argue against individualism (such as the communitarians) and many practices that could be seen as relational (such as weekly church services) individualism remains an ideology Westerners continually return to in their thoughts and actions to enough of an extent that it contributes towards global crises. Secondly, I will explore how the Confucian relational conception of self could provide an alternative to individualist models. To illuminate the Confucian idea of the relational self I will analyse in depth the debate between commentators regarding its precise nature. For example, there are those who believe the Confucian relational conception of the self begins with a biological organism that grows into a relational self through socialisation, for example, Wong (2013), and those who want to define the Confucian relational self as beginning *in media res* from birth, such as Ames (2018, 2021) and Rosemont (2015, 2018). I argue that under all interpretations, we are defined by our social roles and dependent on others, a greater appreciation of which could stymie excessive individualism and hence contribute to resolving many current global crises.

## **The Role of Ordinary People: Confucian Contributions to Environmental Issues**

Today we live in a time dominated by serious environmental risks such as population, industrialization, urbanization, technological manipulation or military intervention, that threaten not only the life of the planet, but also of part of its population. In this context, people feel that they can do little to solve the serious problems and trust that the solution lies exclusively with global organizations and committed governments. However, we cannot leave the power and responsibility for solving these issues to international institutions. By contrast, it is necessary to promote alternatives from the different areas that address the problems of each region and create solutions that contribute to the development of a harmonic relationship between the different parts of the planet.

This presentation aims to rethink the way ordinary people can contribute to addressing current environmental issues through Confucianism. Confucian humanist does not seek universal principles or theories, but a way of action that promotes a harmonious existence; and this kind of approach is not restricted to a limited group of people, but it is promoted among all population. First, I consider the importance of the creativity in Confucian humanism. According to this school of thought, human beings are continually realizing oneself as a person, and this kind of realization is fundamentally creative. Second, I explore the contributions of this creative approach to Confucianism through a reinterpretation of the notion of junzi. Therefore, I will argue that Confucianism deserves further attention because it offers new ways of rethinking our role as citizen of Earth and the duty that every human being is called upon to fulfill.

O'NEILL Rory

## Interdependent Independence: Navigating Context Collapse through “Being Circumspect towards the Self” (*shen du* 慎獨)

This article presents the notion of “being circumspect towards the self” (*shen du* 慎獨), drawn from the *Daxue* 大學 and the *Zhongyong* 中庸, as an ethical guide to internet use. There has long been interest in the relationship between Confucianism and technological development, from the Jesuit missionaries of the 16th and 17th centuries through Max Weber and Joseph Needham in the 20th century. Since the beginning of the 21st century, some scholars have argued that the Confucian relational self is incompatible with the values prevalent in social media interactions, particularly given the collapsed contexts and invisible audiences that accompany these platforms. This article contends that instead of viewing Confucianism and technology as essentially opposed, a pluralistic and pragmatic approach is more fitting with Confucianism as a lived philosophical tradition. To this end, “being circumspect towards the self” provides a framework for moral cultivation that can guide navigation of social situations where anonymity and the ambiguity between solitude and company are at play. It does so while remaining consistent with the Confucian notion of the self as relationally constituted. Beyond discussions of social media, *shen du* also provides a lens for considering ethical approaches to generative AI, where interactions occur with an invisible and context-deprived mass of contributors to an AI bot. “Being circumspect towards the self” offers a means to remain morally and socially aware even when we lose sight of distinct social contexts.

*OTT Margus*

## **Complex adaptive systems and topics from the Chinese Philosophy**

This talk tries to bridge the complex adaptive systems (CAD) and Chinese philosophy. From the first I take such notions and models as dynamism, heterogeneity, non-linearity, feedback, emergence, path dependency, phase space, phase portrait. From the second, such concepts as articulations (理), above-the-forms (形而上), subtle (微、妙), spiritual (神), incipient (幾、發), energy (氣), actualized juxtaposing forms (形). CAD-s would gain intuitive grasp and the Chinese concepts additional modern relevance.

PANG-WHITE Ann A.

## Public Responsibility and Human Rights Issues: Learning from Confucian Classics

In this paper, I will explore the difference between the Confucian and the Western liberal approach to rights. The liberal approach to human rights emphasizes the right to non-interference by other individuals and the State. In contrast, the Confucian approach to human rights focuses on the State's public responsibility to care for the populace and to ensure that all citizens have "a secure livelihood" (in modern vocabulary, "a right to sustenance") and "a secure mind" ("a right to development") (see, for example, the *Mengzi* 1A:7 and 3A:3). These two divergent approaches to human rights explain their conflicting viewpoints on: (a) what human rights imply, (b) what these rights require, and (c) what the boundary of the State's involvement is.

To further understand the Confucian approach, I will explore what the Confucian virtue of humaneness (*ren* 仁) is, its implication on government, and what a humane government should look like. Key concepts such as *renzheng* 仁政, *weimin fumu* 為民父母, *minweigui shejicizhi* 民為貴社稷次之, and *datong* 大同, will be examined. I will rely on the *Analects*, the *Mencius*, the *Great Learning*, and the *Liyun* chapter from the *Book of Rites* as my textual resources. Considering the limitation of liberalism widely perceived by the public and the scholarly circle, I present a modern interpretation of Confucian classics followed by a reflection on what we can learn from Confucian classics and political philosophy in today's market-driven global and politics.

*PARK Jihyun*

## **How Is Hate Justified: Various Perspectives from Ancient China**

The various thinkers who emerged in ancient East Asia—commonly known as the Hundred Schools of Thought (百家諸子)—justified hate in different ways. Confucianism, represented by Confucius, expressed hatred toward political violence, while Xunzi, who clearly recognized that language makes humans political beings, pinpointed hatred toward deceitful political rhetoric.

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Confucianism held that the hierarchy between civilization and barbarism, and between humans and non-human beings, must be clear. It believed that political violence could be mitigated and ultimately eliminated through the benevolent welfare dispensed by the sage-king, from the lowest forms of life, such as animals and plants, to inanimate objects.

In contrast, Daoism defined the civilization pursued by Confucianism as an artificial construct created by humans. It argued that hatred of artificiality could be resolved through an integrated order of the natural world and human existence (Non-action and Naturalness, 無為自然). Legalism viewed the Confucian notion of the sage-king's benevolent welfare as fictitious and asserted that reliance should be placed entirely on the function of the law itself, not on humans. This position was founded on a hatred of instinctively selfish human beings. Mohism identified human actions that create inequality and undervalue labor as objects of hatred.

Each of these thinkers perceived hate differently—whether toward ,force' (Confucianism), ,artificiality' (Daoism), ,humans' (Legalism), or ,inequality' (Mohism). Therefore, this paper seeks to reveal how the political philosophies of these ancient thinkers developed while justifying such varying forms of hatred.



PERKINS Franklin

## Early Chinese Approaches to Diversity and Disagreement

In this talk, I will discuss how early Chinese philosophers reflected on diversity and disagreement. I will argue that successfully understanding and dealing with disagreement requires us to, in Hegel's terms, move beyond the "abstract opposition between Truth and Error." When early Chinese philosophers began to reflect on philosophical diversity, they explained these disagreements not through the opposition between truth and error but rather in terms of partiality and completeness. That is, each philosophy gets something right, but also leaves something out. Variations of this approach appear in the "Jiebi" chapter of the *Xunzi*, the "Tianxia chapter" of the *Zhuangzi*, the "Essentials of the Six Schools" chapter of the *Shiji*, and in various parts of the *Huainanzi*. I will provide a survey of these approaches, considering two primary questions: is this diversity seen as a problem or an advantage, and, can this diversity be overcome? The *Xunzi* and the *Shiji* both believe that one school (Confucianism or Daoism, respectively) combines the strengths of all the others, so that the others are no longer needed on their own. The "Tianxia" chapter of the *Zhuangzi* claims that the ancients had a comprehensive philosophy but that it has now been lost, leaving only various partial approaches. The last part of the talk will concentrate on the views found in the *Huainanzi*, which contains the most positive view of diversity. In the conclusion, I will assess of the value and weaknesses of the *Huainanzi*'s approach for the relationship between different cultures and philosophies in the contemporary world.

## **Confucian Dignity and Work-conditionality**

Work-conditionality is the governmental practice of making receipt of a welfare resource contingent on performing work-related activity. For example, assistance with access to healthcare is work-conditional if it is provided only to those who are actively working or seeking employment. While Confucian ideas historically have been invoked by state institutions to defend a variety of work-conditional policies, to my knowledge, there is no extant scholarship that systematically develops a conception of what forms of work-conditionality are morally justifiable from a Confucian perspective. This paper offers a preliminary attempt at doing so.

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I draw on the Confucian conception of human dignity to develop a Confucian-inspired account of the ethics of work-conditionality. The account has two central claims. First, work conditionality is morally justifiable—and sometimes morally ought to be implemented—only if it facilitates developing a society that enables its citizens to effectively pursue moral virtuosity, because human dignity is grounded in our potential to develop moral virtues. Consequently, it is morally impermissible to impose work-conditionality upon individuals whose work opportunities are limited to vice-instilling ones. Second, even when work-conditionality is morally justifiable, it must always (resources permitting) be paired with a system of unconditional universal entitlements that reflect Confucian optimism about the potential for moral virtuosity being shared across all of humanity. These universal entitlements would protect people from experiencing the forms of precarity that are most likely to encourage unvirtuous lifestyles. Thus, in a Confucian welfare system, work-conditionality would only ever be implemented for kinds of welfare assistance that elevate people above the level of security from descent into morally benighted lifestyles provided by unconditional welfare programs.

To illustrate the ecumenical attractiveness of the account, I also argue that it is congenial to both camps in the contemporary debate between Confucian democrats and Confucian meritocrats.

## Filial Enhancement? Confucian Stance on the Ethical Limits of Genome Modification

Without a biologically restricted notion of human nature and arguments against “playing God,” Confucianism is open for the benefits of genetic enhancement [Nuyen 2007]. Moreover, it seems to be free from material-origin essentialism that stands behind “person affecting” and “identity affecting” interventions in individual lives [cf. Żuradzki, Dranseika 2022]. Hence, Confucianism has a relatively open attitude towards using prenatal testing and preimplantation genetic diagnosis as a means to select “healthier” babies, allowing for certain moral ambiguity [Zhao 2021: 81]. However, Fan Ruiping [2010] states that genetic modifications are admissible as long as they contribute to the Confucian values of moral development and fidelity to ancestors. A Confucian would not object to upgrading her child’s IQ; she should oppose, however, as Fan states, genome modification of children’s hair or skin colour as a disrespect toward the ancestors, particularly when the new colour of skin or hair is seen as more beautiful than their gift. Other Confucians [Li, Zhang 2019: 8] believe Fan’s restriction goes too far, as these modifications do not harm the family’s integrity and their good. It may be added that while the *Classic of Filial Piety* (*Xiaojing*) declares that the body (“every hair and bit of skin”) received from the parents must not be injured, it does not say it cannot be modified if that improves their gift. Following these concerns, the paper further explores the possible bioethical limits of the Confucian stance on genome modification and enhancement.

## **Classic Chinese Philosophical Insights into Large Language Models**

This paper, „Classic Chinese Philosophical Insights into Large Language Models,“ investigates how Early Confucian philosophy, particularly the principle of the Rectification of Names, can enhance the development and ethical management of Large Language Models (LLMs). The paper argues that these ancient philosophical insights can provide valuable frameworks for addressing the semantic, ethical, and operational challenges faced by modern AI systems.

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Large Language Models (LLMs) represent a significant leap in Artificial Intelligence, capable of understanding and generating human-like text through advanced neural network architectures. Despite their potential, LLMs are fraught with challenges related to accuracy, bias, ethical concerns, and interpretability. This paper suggests that Confucian philosophy, especially the Rectification of Names, offers a valuable perspective for addressing these issues. The Rectification of Names posits that societal harmony depends on the precise use of names and roles, ensuring that individuals' actions align with their titles and responsibilities.

LLMs, like GPT (Generative Pre-trained Transformer), are built on transformer architectures that leverage attention mechanisms to process and generate coherent text. These models undergo extensive pre-training on diverse datasets, followed by fine-tuning for specific tasks, enabling them to perform a wide range of applications from chatbots to content creation. However, they require significant computational resources and energy, limiting accessibility and raising concerns about their environmental impact.

Despite their capabilities, LLMs face notable challenges. They often struggle with semantic ambiguities, such as polysemy, where words have multiple meanings based on context. Additionally, LLMs can perpetuate biases present in their training data, leading to unfair or harmful outputs. Their complex neural networks operate as black boxes, making it difficult to understand their decision-making processes. Furthermore, LLMs need to adapt continuously to the evolving nature of language and societal changes.

The Rectification of Names (正名 zhèngmíng) is a cornerstone of Confucian philosophy, emphasizing the importance of precise language use to maintain social harmony. Confucius asserted that societal stability hinges on the correct use of names, ensuring that titles accurately reflect the roles and responsibilities of individuals. This alignment fosters clear communication and trust within society, as roles and actions are consistent with their names.

Confucian philosophy posits that names do more than identify; they prescribe behavior and define relationships within the social hierarchy. Misalignment between names and roles leads to confusion, ethical misconduct, and social disorder. Education is vital in this context, teaching individuals about their roles and moral responsibilities to ensure societal harmony. The dynamic nature of language requires continuous adaptation and education to maintain the alignment of names with societal roles.

The Confucian concept of the Rectification of Names has intriguing parallels with the challenges faced by LLMs. One key aspect is semantic alignment and model accuracy. Just as the Rectification of Names emphasizes the alignment of roles and responsibilities, LLMs must accurately align words with their meanings and contexts. Misalignment can lead to misinterpretation and ineffective communication, similar to the societal chaos described by Confucius when roles and titles are misaligned.

Ethical implications and bias are also significant concerns. In Confucian terms, ensuring that titles and roles are correctly assigned involves moral correctness. Similarly, LLMs must generate text ethically, addressing biases in their training data to avoid perpetuating harmful stereotypes. Developers must implement safeguards and refine training data to ensure ethical outputs, aligning with the ethical guidelines governing AI development.

Interpretability and transparency are further areas where the Rectification of Names provides insight. The concept involves clarity and transparency about roles and duties, paralleling the need for interpretability in LLMs. Understanding how these models generate outputs enhances trust and accountability. Efforts to make AI decisions interpretable align with the broader goal of rectifying names by clarifying the role each part of the model plays in generating output.

Responsibility and accountability are crucial principles in Confucian philosophy, translating into the responsibility of developers and operators to ensure AI systems are used responsibly. This involves adhering to ethical AI practices and continuously monitoring and updating systems to prevent misuse and ensure adherence to intended purposes.

Moreover, the dynamic nature of language and its evolving context require continuous learning and adaptation for LLMs. Regular updates and fine-tuning help LLMs stay current with linguistic and societal shifts, maintaining their effectiveness and reliability.

Further research areas include deepening semantic alignment to refine LLMs' contextual understanding, developing ethical frameworks to mitigate biases, and enhancing interpretability to improve trust and reliability in AI applications. By integrating Confucian principles, the paper proposes a framework for the responsible and beneficial use of LLMs, fostering more harmonious and ethical interactions between AI and society.

## **Wang Yangming's Concept of the Unity of all Things and Support for the Environment**

There is a profound cosmological theme in Yangming's philosophy: That all things are united. The theme is accompanied by his claim that humans can experience this state by maximizing their intuitive evaluating. In becoming aware of their unity with other life forms, even non-life forms, humans can better understand the benefits and harm experienced by them. This strengthens their motivation and capacity to support the environment.

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Chen Lisheng describes four major ways by which humans participate in the unity of all things in Yangming's thinking: 1) through the common material force (氣) that permeates the universe; 2) humans attribute significance to other things; 3) humans embody ancestral relationships; and 4) humans have the responsibility to govern human affairs. Yangming's perspective leads one to look beyond human benefit to consider the welfare of the greater ecosystem. A person's fulfilment of their moral nature, which includes realizing their concern for the environment, is a process of realizing their unity with all things. It also leads to realization that humans are integrally and necessarily linked to the material world, and so too is the significance or justification of their existence. For these reasons, humans should support the environment.

SELLMANN *James D.*

## Confucian depth ecology as a response to climate change

Aside from a few passages addressing animals or the environment, Confucian philosophy appears to lack an environmental ethics perspective. LI Zhehou's (李澤厚) contemporary work in Confucian philosophy continues this lacuna by limiting his understanding of community to the human realm. Using the common liberal humanism that limits moral actions to the interpersonal human realm misses the importance of inclusive moralities such as animal rights and environmental ethics. I propose that if we return to the original shared common cultural roots of Confucian and Daoist philosophy that a Confucian understanding of the natural world can embrace the non-human environment within the scope of Confucian morality. Extricating and elucidating ideas from the *Yijing*, the *Shijing*, Xunzi, Dong Zhongshu, Wang Chong, and later scholars, the concept of the mutual resonance and response (*ganying* 感應) between the natural world and humans developed into the unity of heaven and humanity (*tianren heyi* 天人合一). An inclusive Confucian depth ecology opens new ways of thinking that can be deployed to envision deeper dimensions for understanding the self's inner life, its connections to the outer life of the self-other relationship, and its extension to kin relationship with the environment. This paper explores how these old and new ways of thinking can change our behavior and change our moral interactions with others including the environment and thereby enhancing freedom as an achievement concept derived from graceful moral action.

## **Transhumanism and Ziran: Daoist philosophy of holistic universe in action – Daniel Lee’s *Manimals* and Xu Bing’s forest project**

Presentation examines the theme of transhumanism and the integration of human beings with nature in philosophical and artistic representations of Chinese culture. The problem of the relationship between humans and other living beings and nature has been treated extensively in the Chinese philosophical tradition. Confucius, for example, already spoke of the need for a humane treatment of animals. However, the complexity of this issue was discussed in depth in Daoist philosophy, especially in the work of Zhuangzi. In the first part of my presentation, therefore, I will deal with the problem of anthropocentrism as treated in Zhuangzi’s philosophical parables on the subject of the relationship between humans and animals. In the second part of the presentation, I will present the idea of transhumanism and the problem of anthropocentrism and environmental degradation in the works of two artists: Daniel Lee and Xu Bing. Lee’s works titled *Manimals* directly addresses the problem of anthropocentrism by creating new creatures, that represent a physical fusion of humans and animals. These new creatures, however, evoke a deeper epistemological and axiological reflection on the understanding of the relationship between humans and animals. Xu Bing’s *Forest Project* on the other hand, embodies the Daoist philosophical principle of 一生二, 二生三, 三生萬物 (“one gives birth to two, two gives birth to three, three gives birth to all things”) and reflects the interconnectedness and generative nature of life, resonating deeply with the project’s focus on reforestation and ecological balance. Through the act of planting trees inspired by artistic calligraphy, the project illustrates how small, thoughtful actions can proliferate into broader ecological restoration, mirroring the Daoist idea of how life unfolds and multiplies from simplicity to complexity. By integrating this philosophy, Xu Bing not only emphasizes the harmony between human creativity and nature but also inspires a holistic approach to addressing environmental crises, highlighting humanity’s role within the vast, interdependent web of life.



## **When English Trees Hide a Chinese forest: Teaching Chinese Philosophy in Lithuania Through English**

Lithuanian, as a small language with a still only emerging tradition of Asian studies, faces unique challenges in teaching and researching Chinese philosophy. Since Lithuania's independence over 35 years ago, efforts to establish a robust academic foundation in Asian studies have gradually emerged, but significant obstacles remain. Among these is the lack of direct translations of Chinese philosophical classics into Lithuanian, which also means that there is a lack of an agreed-upon vocabulary for Chinese philosophical terminology. Consequently, educators rely heavily on English translations to teach Chinese philosophy, a practice that introduces its own complexities and interpretative biases.

The talk will analyze several problematic aspects of this dynamic, including the limitations of existing English translations, the difficulty of adapting philosophical concepts into a linguistic framework unfamiliar with Chinese thought, and the broader challenges for cross-cultural philosophical discourse in Lithuania.

## Reexamining the Notion of De Through the Excavated Laozi Editions and the Han dynasty Interpretation of Yan Zun's Laozi Zhigui

While this panel focuses on Yan Zun and his Han dynasty commentary of which the seven *juan* of commentary on the *Dejing* are those that survived history, I ask to reconsider Han silk and bamboo editions and Han commentaries, through a reexamination of De and its meanings and implications from Guodian Laozi editions which do not demarcate dao and de as separate categories. The Guodian editions further intertwine contents from both “jings,” and serve as three coherent and complete manuscripts organized thematically. The current transmitted editions are based on the Han dynasty textual culture, archeological findings from the period show that the *Laozi* either begins with a *Daojing* or a *Dejing* (or a *Shangjing* and a *Xiajing*), depending on the source of influence and their ideological textual purpose. I ask to trace the development of the meaning of De within the *Laozi* tradition beginning with the study of the notion in pre-Qin textual remains of the *Laozi* and the fuller manuscripts dating to the Western Han. To conclude and enlarge the discussion, I ask to return to the panel's focus on Yan Zun and ask to reexamine Yan Zun's interpretation of *Dao* and *De* in its practical and ethical applications.

## Daoist Philosophical Practice for a Better Life

The aim of this paper is to examine how Daoist philosophical practice can contribute to overall well-being. It centers around the hypothesis that life in general would be better when Daoist philosophy is practiced. The paper examines aspects of Daoist philosophy suitable for philosophical practice, focusing on ideas from the *Laozi* and the *Zhuangzi*, such as the concepts of the natural flow of things (*ziran*), non-action (*wuwei*), the inevitability of events, and the views on disputation and argument. The ideas of *ziran* and *wuwei* suggest that we can try to adjust the flow of events in ways we hope they will develop without, as it were, interfering too much, because if we do, we might disrupt them and come to the opposite outcome of what we hoped for. Accepting the idea of the inevitability of events helps us deal with burdens about the outcomes of events that we did not expect or hope to happen. The Daoist view on disputation and argument teaches us that it is hardly unlikely that we may tell who is right and who is wrong in daily conversations, thus inferring that arguments and debates are often futile. At the end, the paper discusses the idea of inner peace, which is crucial when implementing the above said Daoist concepts in philosophical practice. The paper concludes that Daoist philosophy may help individuals reach a better understanding of themselves and their role and position in society and the world. Hence, applying Daoism in philosophical practice may offer a significant contribution to helping individuals develop personal wisdom in dealing with burdens and hardships in everyday life, as well as overcoming societal or mental crises. This inherited improvement on individual level is believed to ultimately contribute not just to a better life but overall well-being as well.

## **Waking up the tradition: navigating the two faces of ritual in search of a Confucian civil society**

In his recent book on Confucian constitutionalism, Sungmoon Kim (2023) argues that the Confucian concept of ritual (*li* 禮) is central to the formation of Confucian civil society. Building upon ritual as a subjunctive space, which has the „power both to constrain private and sectarian interests and to cultivate civil dispositions“ (13), Kim suggests that shared ritual practices enable communication and mutual respect, which results in establishing a „civil tongue.“ Such a „civil tongue“ lays the foundation for further public deliberation and public decision-making.

However, Loubna El Amine (2024) contends that placing ritual at the root of the Confucian civil society does not resolve the tension between Confucianism and pluralism. Some citizens might refuse to participate in ritual practices, undermining the potential for ritual to accommodate group differences.

In response, I argue that while specific ritual forms can be questioned or rejected, ritual as a social practice constitutes the very fabric of social connectedness. Being part of society entails some form of ritual practice, and disagreement over rituals „is often disagreement about what kind of communities and relationships are worth having“ (Farneth, 2023:43). In fact, turning away from ritual means turning away from what is public and civic.

Yet, as Michael Nylan (2001) points out, rituals are two-faced: they can either impede or encourage change, contest or help maintain the status quo (171). Therefore, the main challenge in centering Confucian civil society around ritual and resolving the tension between Confucianism and pluralism is not disagreement over rituals. Instead, it is the inherent potential of ritual to shift from multivocal and flexible to reductive and ossified.

## Ecstasy of Breath(s): From Subjectivity to Community

The air is full of meaning. But there is a lacuna in every breath we take – the rhythm of inspiration and expiration is invisibly and almost imperceptibly broken and a pause is induced. A pause in the breathing rhythm, almost like a cessation/caesura, erupting from within the immanence and subjectivity of life. A possibility of an interval of love but also of stopping, or even terminating of breathing. A possibility of evil. Every breathe we take is enveloped both by the grace and danger of this moment – *a death*. In this talk, we will meditate on the ontological logic of this invisible caesura, marking a secret reminder – *remembrance of the departed and liminal breaths* within the life of community, *a democracy*. Our aim will be to show that with this breathturn, philosophy could argue for the possibility for another genealogy of future democracy in a new respiratory sense and against the violent modes and machinations of breathless power within politics. In order to be alive, one must breathe incessantly; but to live ethically, one needs to adjust her/his respiratory rhythm of the ethics of life and reserve of breath. This talk will therefore inquire into the ecstasy of breath as a possibility of transformed subjectivity within the future peaceful culture of democracy.

## Epistemic Resistance in the Zhuangzi

This work calls into question the idea that Daoism, more specifically the Zhuangzi, is a philosophy of non-resistance. More precisely, I use the epistemological ideas found in the Zhuangzi to make the argument for what I call epistemic resistance.

In order to make this argument, I point to a tradition of legitimating epistemic norms in Confucian philosophy which the Zhuangzi often criticizes, that is, the veneration of past sages and moral exemplars, as well as their sayings. I then point to the problems Zhuangzi raises regarding such a culture of legitimation, which is that epistemological systems are always contingent, and sometimes even manipulated by dominant power structures. Finally, I use stories from the Zhuangzi, traditionally referred to as “skill” or “knack” stories, arguing that they are political in nature, to propose an alternative which I call “epistemic resistance.” Here, I argue for the value of *undermining* existing epistemological frameworks that reproduce itself as a step towards making way for appropriate responses according to appropriate needs.

*TANG Siufu*

## **Intercultural Convergence of Value Judgement: A Confucian Perspective**

Near the end of the first quarter of the twenty-first century, the world witnesses intensified conflicts and crises. Human beings around the world more than ever insist on their own respective version of value judgement and yet there seems to be little hope of reaching consensus between different cultures, communities, or groups. Finding objective foundation for universal value judgement seems to be an insurmountable task. But what options do we have other than resorting to relative value judgement and the likely consequent conflicts? This paper attempts a Confucian solution to intercultural value conflicts. Through a reconstruction of some key ideas of early Confucianism, this paper argues that intercultural coexistence and cooperation can be based on the very idea of harmonious community without relying on realistic value foundation. The paper first articulates the Confucian idea of community (qun 群) and argues that a global community is a practical necessity of human beings of the twenty-first century and community building should not be limited to within a nation state. The paper then suggests that a global community building effort should be based on the idea of harmony of diversity (he 和) and guided by virtues of intercultural communication such as civility (wen 文), respect (jing 敬), ritual propriety (li 禮), and common concern for all (gong 公). This paper argues that intercultural consensus is possible with the common goal of harmonious communal living, and there is no need for agreement in thick conceptions of values.

## Shuwu's Tragedy: Rethinking Mencius' Arguments on "Right of Rebellion"

Justin Tiwald's reinterpretation of Mencius' "right of rebellion" as a moral framework critical of tyrannical forms of rule instead of an "open mechanism" for bottom-up revolts has been agreed upon and supported by a range of scholars' recent reflections; however, this new perspective still awaits further clarifications and proof of evidence due to the scarcity of empirical examples in pre-Qin history. This article studies a unique case named "Shuwu's Tragedy" from *Zuozhuan* and *Gongyangzhuan* with a rich corpus of Neo-Confucian commentaries and debates on a minister's right to denounce the monarch for brutality. Shuwu was a virtuous prince of the state of Wey who temporarily assumed the monarchical duties of his fleeing elder brother, Duke Cheng of Wey, and he successfully resolved a military conflict with the state of Jin in 632 BCE. However, Duke Cheng murdered Shuwu when Shuwu planned to return the throne to him. Wey's minister, Yuan Xuan, thus escaped from Wey and accused Duke Cheng in front of the hegemon, Duke Wen of Jin, which eventually triggered further bloody killings and chaos in Wey's court and family. After reviewing the Neo-Confucian commentaries, this article argues that Shuwu's case strongly supports Tiwald's new thesis on Mencius' "right of rebellion"; furthermore, it discusses an ultimate question in Mencius' political ethics: which takes priority, chastening the tyrant or restoring order?



TSENG Roy

## Civilizational Difference, the Nation State, and Common Humanity: Revisiting Carsun Zhang's Theory of Tianxia

When discussing the concept of “*Tianxia*” (天下), Zhao Tingyang (趙汀陽) has become a central figure. However, an important yet often overlooked aspect of contemporary “*Tianxia*” discourse is that the leading New Confucians in Taiwan and Hong Kong also place significant emphasis on the idea of world-ness. In this essay, I argue that “*Tianxia*” in the political theory of Carsun Zhang (張君勱), for example, can help illuminate the Confucian tradition of advocating for “peacefulness under Heaven” (*tianxia taiping* 天下太平) and “universal harmony in the world” (*shijie datong* 世界大同) in relation to the critical political issues confronting modern China. More specifically, I aim to make four main points. First, Zhang’s theory of *Tianxia* can be seen as a proposal for a modern form of “Confucian cosmopolitanism,” asserting that all human beings, regardless of their social or political affiliations, are members of a common community. Second, as a result, Zhang’s Confucian cosmopolitanism emphasizes an appreciation and acknowledgment of common humanity, which “translates ethically into an idea of shared or common moral duties toward others by virtue of this shared humanity.” Third, Zhang’s appeal to the “common heart-mind” (*xin zhi suo tong* 心之所同) as the core of Confucian cosmopolitanism parallels, to a significant degree, Kantian respect for human dignity, personal moral worth, and equal moral status. Finally, it is largely through a Kantian-inspired reinterpretation of Confucianism that Zhang redefines the civilizational spirit of China in response to Western imperialism and reshapes the traditional political framework of “family-state-*Tianxia*.” Consequently, his political theory seeks to mediate the tensions between patriotism, nationalism, and cosmopolitanism through universal human nature.

## Toward a Confucian Theory of Social Reconstruction

This paper argues for a Confucian theory of social reconstruction. It draws on the philosophies of John Dewey, Michel Foucault, critical theory and the philosophy of technology to establish an interpretive framework for understanding social conditions as underdetermined articulations of technological arrangements. Confucian philosophy maintains our socio-political conditions are products of indeterminate arrangements of ritual technology and that the primary concern is the maintenance and reform of these ritual arrangements to keep them consistent with contemporary values and necessities. This paper addresses the issue of technology in Confucian thought, showing how reality is a dynamic whole that integrates history, technology, and culture characterized by ritual. This ritual reality has consequences for the Confucian self as constitutive through ritual roles and relations because it is these, and therefore each “self,” that embody the ritual reality. An analysis of the self, body, and subjectivity shows that the Confucian self is a social product that emerges through its involvement in ritually defined contexts. Through self-discipline, these ritual contexts are incorporated into one’s person whereby self and other become existentially intertwined and mutually reproductive. This entails that self-discipline must be extended to the cultivation of the ritual relations that constitute one’s person and thereby lead to the reformulation, renegotiation, and reconstruction of various articulations of ritual technologies and the reality they embody. This process of self-discipline becoming focused on the ritual conditions of society implies the coincidence of “learning” (*xue* 學) and “teaching” (*jiao* 教) since it is through the self as locus of ritual productivity that the ritual reality is transformed and transmitted in a progressive manner.

## Keeping the Tally: Daoist magics and the cultivation of anti-imperial subjectivities

As read through the traditional lens of the Lao-Zhuang philosophical tradition, Daoism has rightfully been read as presenting some form of anti-imperial - if not outright anti-statist - political philosophy. And while we find this articulation of the texts convincing, there seems to be a friction between the theory of Daoism as excavated from the texts and the historical, lived reality of Daoist practitioners. If we commit ourselves to the idea that anti-imperialist positions are any combination of presupposed by, argued for, or implicit in, the ideological “core” of Daoism, then we must also wrestle with Daoism’s sustained interaction with Chinese empire(s), which often redounded to the Daoists’ benefit. Furthermore, the question must be addressed in a way that neither dismisses later Daoists ideology and practice as inauthentic or mistaken, nor that appeals to the hackneyed, colonial distinction between 家 *jia* and 教 *jiao*.

Through a survey of major Daoist soteriological technologies, this paper will argue that later Daoist practice retains the anti-imperialist spirit, even under Imperial patronage. We will examine how three esoteric technologies - 符籙 *fulu*, 外丹 *waidain*, and 內丹 *neidan* - each aim at manipulating or producing power that lie wholly beyond the capacity of Imperial machinations to affect, thereby presenting avenues for practitioners to cultivate, within themselves, the very sense of unfettered freedom that serves as the hallmark of traditional Lao-Zhuang Daoism.

## **A Speech that Follows Things Ways of Speaking in the Zhuangzi 莊子 and the Question of Chinese Philosophy**

Among ancient Chinese philosophical texts, the Zhuangzi 莊子 is characterised by a unique, playful, and whimsical use of language. Its peculiar ways of speaking indubitably serve the Zhuangzi's profound philosophical insights. Scholars have argued that the Zhuangzi's use of language both manifest and pertain to some of its core ideas. Some have argued that the Zhuangzi's idiom goes together with its claim about the fluidity and transformative nature of all reality (Dirk Meyer, Stéphane Feuillas). Others stressed its effort to establish a language that respond to such fluidity (Wim De Reu, Chiu Waiwai). Still others have emphasised the transformative power of the Zhuangzi's mode of communication (Lee H. Yarley, Youru Wang). Expanding on this scholarship, this paper further investigates the Zhuangzi's philosophy of language. First, I shall focus on theoretical statements that relate the Zhuangzi's views on language to a radical ontology of change. The Zhuangzi indeed asserts that there is no reality, whether material or immaterial, that is ever unchanging. Consequently, any discourse that aims at saying something about reality must be as fluid and changing than reality itself. Second, I shall suggest that the Zhuangzi's deliberate and self-reflexive creation of a particular literary style is unique among ancient Chinese texts. In that regard, the Zhuangzi can be regarded as an unprecedented attempt to establish, theorize, and practice a distinctive kind of discourse. On this basis, it may be possible to draw a comparison between the Zhuangzi and the way ancient Greek philosophers, especially Plato, undertook to redefine the meaning of the word "philosophia" in order to name what was then a new intellectual practice.

*VAN ELS Paul*

## **Practicing what Laozi Preaches: The Refined Philosophy and Harmonious Rhetoric of the *Wenzi***

The *Laozi* presents us with a way of living in harmony with our natural and social environment. The text also offers categorical assurances that “weapons are ill-omened instruments” and “wherever armies encamped, thorns and thistles will grow.” Providing vivid imagery of the horrors of war, statements such as these do not inspire thoughtful discussion of military conflict. The *Wenzi*, although agreeing with Laozi’s quietist philosophy, offers a more refined stance and a more inclusive rhetoric when it comes to matters of conflict and warfare. Within the text we find a comprehensive system of values in which humaneness, rightness, and other concepts have their place but when facing the complexities of the world and getting along with others, nothing is more important than living in harmony with our environment.

## Reading Descola's on human and non-human interactions through a Confucian lens

In recent years, Philippe Descola has questioned the modern understanding of nature, particularly as framed by Descartes' philosophy, which he argues has contributed to fostering a "mentality of plundering the planet." Descola's critique emerges from his anthropological work, specifically his study of the Achuar, who perceive plants and animals as beings with whom analogical communication is possible, rather than as mere objects "to be used" or "to be analyzed." Building on these observations, Descola developed a systematic framework categorizing various ways human civilizations relate to nature.

Among the critiques directed at Descola's work, one questions his interpretation of the Western tradition (after all, Kant was still capable of experiencing "the starry sky above his head"), while another points out a lack of engagement with Chinese philosophical traditions. In Confucianism, for instance, humans and animals share a common existence within the universe. This perspective stems from the concept of the "Unity of Heaven and Earth" as presented in the *Zhongyong* (中庸), which positions humans as living entities among others, called to cooperate with both Heaven and Earth. Other Confucian texts, such as the *Mencius* (孟子), emphasize a fundamental continuity between humanity and animals, though with variations in degree. The commentarial tradition surrounding *Mencius* encourages what Pierre Hadot describes as "the Orphic path towards nature"—an approach that engages the senses, allowing perceptions of nature to foster a larger sense of responsibility.

This presentation will first introduce Descola's framework of four ontologies, before taking a Confucian detour in harmony with Pierre Hadot's understanding of philosophy as a transformative experience, which includes what Hadot refers to as an "oceanic experience".

## The Positive Absence and Kun Way-making -- A Feminist Criticism in Neo-Confucian Ethics

There is an positive absence (*kongque* 空闕) in the gendered construction of the virtues of *qian* 乾 and *kun* 坤 relegated to men and women, corresponding to *tian* 天 and the earth, in Neo-Confucian ethical theory, represented by Zhu Xi's cultivation of the virtues. The positive absence exists as a place of nothingness between *kun* way-making (*kundao* 坤道) and *qian* way-making (*qiandao* 乾道). In *kun* way-making, the virtue of *kun* (*kunde* 坤德) constituted by the optimal appropriateness (*yi* 義) and wisdom (*zhi* 智) are oriented towards investigating events (*gewu* 格物) and knowing principles (*zhizhi* 致知); both the virtues of *kun* and *qian* are to be symbolized in *qian* way-making, while the symbolization is renegotiated in *kun* way-making. Between the two types of way-making, the place of nothingness is usually represented as a "lack" in a female subject. However, both virtues are founded on the spontaneity of her calculation (*quan* 權) in the place of nothingness or a positive absence. It is in a possibility to renegotiate both the virtues of *kun* and *qian* in a woman's experience of the positive absence that a potential feminist criticism to the dichotomous construction in Neo-Confucian ethics can be revealed.

## On Zhu Xi's „Before Arousal“ and Its Corresponding Self-Cultivation Theories

In the discussion about the human mind by Southern Song philosopher Zhu Xi (朱熹), the special concept of „before arousal and after arousal“ (*weifa yifa* 未发已发) plays a crucial role. „Before arousal“ (*weifa* 未发) refers to a unique psychological stage where no specific thoughts, emotions or any other contents are aroused within the mind, yet perception itself remains awake, and the essence of innate virtue (*Mingde* 明德) also latently exists. Under such special conditions where both wakefulness and „quietness and inactivity“ (*jiran budong* 寂然不动) exist together, Zhu Xi developed a self-cultivation theory centered on „the nurture through the maintaining of seriousness“ (*zhu-jing hanyang* 主敬涵养). Steps such as constant alertness (*chang xingxing* 常惺惺), restraint (*shoulian* 收敛), and caution (*jinwei* 谨畏) aim to keep learners in a state where thoughts and emotions remain well untriggered while perception remains undimmed. Thus, the „middle“ (*zhong* 中) is reached during the „before arousal“ phase, which allows learners to further achieve „harmony“ (*he* 和) when interacting with external things during the „after arousal“ phase. Zhu Xi's reflections on the „before arousal“ phase and its corresponding self-cultivation theories typically represent a meticulous observation of the mind and perception in Chinese philosophy. Such reflections always have the purpose to help learners gain a better understanding of their own mental mechanisms, thus enabling them to better purify the mind and elevate their spiritual realm.



## Between Harmony and Equality: On the Quest of the Divine and Ultimate Concerns in Life as Inherent in the Twelve-tone Temperament in Ancient Chinese Music

The mathematical structure behind ancient Chinese Music held a divine pursuit in Zhou dynasty and was regarded as a harbinger of the cosmic order. In the “Zhouyu xia” 周語下 section of the *Guoyu* 國語, it is documented that King Jing of Zhou 周景王 (r. 544–520 BCE) had ordered the casting of a set of large bronze bells in the pitch of *wuyi* 無射, leading to opposition from royal officials grounded in the musical principles of *he* 和 “harmony” and *ping* 平 “equality.” The court musician Lingzhou Jiu 伶州鳩 advocated the belief that “music emanates from harmony, and harmony springs from equality.” Here, “harmony” signifies the perfect balance between the five (or seven) tones and the sounds of eight categories of musical instrument 八音 perceptible to human ears, while “equality” denotes the relatively but not absolutely equal temperament ratio and balanced structure of the twelve-tone scale used in ancient China called *shi'er lü* 十二律. While staying true to his duties as a court official, Lingzhou Jiu recognized harmony as the central notion behind the twelve-tone temperament originally generated by the so-called *sanfen sunyi* 三分損益 method, and saw harmoniousness as an expression of Heaven. This takes the 3:2 ratio between the musical pitches as sacred law that defies changes no matter how the king wills it. He believed that only by adhering to the twelve-tone that one could reap the practical benefits of music, such as the universal care of individual differences, cultivation of the body and heart-mind, changing of the social mores for the better, enhancement of human well-being, and ultimately elevating human beings to the level of Heaven.

While the notions of harmony and equality in music also appear in the *Shijing* 詩經 (Book of odes), Lingzhou Jiu’s discourse on chromatic scale elucidates how these two principles permeate the intangible numerical law and audible musical sounds, transitioning from cosmic order to the mystic regime of the soul, and ultimately converging back to the quest of the divine and infinite.

## Incomplete Humanism: A Confucian Alternative to The Liberal-Capitalist Subject

This paper argues that the liberal-capitalist account of human nature presents us with an “incomplete” form of humanism in that it assumes that the unrestrained pursuit of human desires automatically coheres into harmonious, larger whole or telos. Under these assumptions, human beings on an individual level and as a species, as a matter of theodicy, already coherently relate to the human collective and to nature as a whole.

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From both the Confucian and Daoist perspectives these assumptions fundamentally mischaracterize the nature of the human. Human nature and its concomitant desires are socio-cultural and therefore, not subject to the limiting conditions of nature. This means that unlike the rest of biological life, human nature and desire are not predetermined, merely reflexive, constant, or universal. Human desires are not automatically in a sustainable equilibrium with its environment both social and physical. Both Confucianism and Daoism recognize the agential role that humans have in shaping their desires and “natures.” These Chinese philosophers present us with a more *complete humanism*.

Contrary to the previous Christian tradition that saw such unrestrained pursuit of one’s desires as a recipe for social chaos, the modern discourse of desire posits that there is a theodicean structure to the world (an “invisible hand”) such that, like the laws of physics or biology, this structure will ensure metaphysical harmony. The reason why the liberal-capitalist conception of the human being represents an incomplete transition to humanism is that it did not recognize that human beings, unlike the rest of the natural world, are not constituted by their biology alone. Both Confucianism and Daoism assumed the socio-cultural nature of the human and constructed their philosophical projects on the basis of this assumption.

XU Rongshao

## Crisis and History: On the Emergence of Modern Historical Time in Liang Qichao's Philosophy of History

As a influential scholar in modern Chinese intellectual history, Liang Qichao was specifically renowned in his academic achievements in History and Philosophy. His series of famous works, such as *New Historiography* (*Xin shixue* 新史學) and *Introduction to Chinese History* (*Zhongguoshi xulun* 中國史叙論) has sparked a revolution in Chinese Historiography not only because it was an academic reaction towards the systematic crisis which the Chinese Empire confronted in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, but more importantly, it also provided a new reflexion upon the Philosophy of History, which was exemplified in Liang's advocacy of reforming the historical view in modern Chinese Historiography. Therefore, this paper seeks to explore the philosophical foundations underlying Liang Qichao's concept of *New Historiography*, offering a comprehensive analysis of how his work redefined historical time within the context of modern Chinese thought. In doing so, this study aims to contribute to the broader discourse on the intersection of historiography and philosophy in early modern China. Drawing upon the theories of „historical time“ as articulated by scholars such as Reinhart Koselleck and David Carr, we first aim to elucidate several core theoretical constructs that are crucial for understanding the shift in historical paradigms during this period. By applying these conceptual frameworks, this paper investigates the ways in which the political crises of the late Qing Dynasty—marked by both internal decay and external pressures—catalyzed changes in the narrative structures and epistemological foundations of Chinese historical writing. Subsequently, this analysis will delve into Liang's texts to provide a philosophical explanation on the importance of his innovation on historical time in modern Chinese history of Philosophy based on a transcultural and interdisciplinary perspective.

*YANG Huayanni*

## **How Not to Be a Daoist Dogmatist: Reflections on Language in the Guan Yin Zi**

The *Guan Yin Zi* (關尹子) is a Tang dynasty apocryphal text found in the Daoist Canon *Daozang*. It fuses Daoist thought with Buddhist philosophy, resulting in nine chapters of aphorisms, whose terse insights and unusual charm have provoked multiple commentaries spanning Song and Ming dynasties. No English translation of the text is available at the moment, and very little attention has been given to it.

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This paper is an effort to bring the *Guan Yin Zi* into the horizon of a wider scholarly community. In 9.20, it warns all students of the Dao: “When encountering subtle and exquisite sayings, or mysterious and wonderful deeds, be careful not to seize them with eagerness or adhere to them as truths. Once you do, it becomes the direst disease possible, with no medicine to cure.” Contrary to the majority of Daoist texts that espouse the Dao, habitually quoting from the *Daodejing* as uncontested wisdom, the *Guan Yin Zi* maintains a rare sobriety with all verbal formulations and ancient teachings. I shall trace out the text’s attitude toward language with a close analysis of chapter nine, observing the Daoist absorption of Buddhist imageries and its critique of attachment. Yet the Buddhist approach is also transformed when expressed in the Chinese language. This paper offers new points of reference on the early interaction between Daoism and Buddhism.

## Daoli 道理 and Logos: Towards a Plurality of Truths

The Western concept of “*logos*” is commonly translated into Chinese as “*Dao* 道”. While they overlap in many aspects, “*logos*” carries a sense of rationality that “*Dao*” lacks. A more fitting translation for “*logos*” might be “*daoli* 道理”. The *Dao* is inherently ineffable, whereas *daoli* is expected to be articulated, as suggested by the Chinese phrase “*jiang daoli* 講道理” (to articulate a *daoli*). In contrast to the cold and rigid rationality conveyed by the concept of *logos*, *daoli* aligns more closely with what Li Zehou 李澤厚 describes as “pragmatic reason” (*shiyong lixing* 實用理性), which is embedded in a network of relationships. Although both *Dao* and *logos* point to the transcendental Oneness, this notion is ultimately a linguistic construct. Thus, in interpreting Confucius’ doctrine of “*yi yi guan zhi* 一以貫之” (literally meaning “to keep the Oneness throughout”), I do not place emphasis on the “Oneness” but rather on the “throughout”. This suggests a process of transitioning from one *daoli* to another, ultimately establishing the connectedness among various *daolis*. An effective articulation of *daoli* necessitates a balanced separation between “*Dao*” and “*li*”. An excessive emphasis on “*Dao*” at the expense of “*li*” can undermine the foundation for communicating *daoli*, resulting in what is pejoratively referred to in Chinese as “*jiang da daoli* 講大道理” (empty sermonizing). When “*Dao*” overshadows “*li*”, it leads to “*Dao*-centrism”, which is essentially a variant of “*logos*-centrism”. Therefore, when communicating a *daoli*, it is advisable to avoid adopting a top-down approach that proceeds from the superior metaphysical ground of the *Dao*.

YU Peng

## The Zhuangzi, Anarchy, and the Political Ethics of Failure

Previous approaches to Daoism and anarchism tend to underscore nonacting rulers or non-coercive rule. In this paper, I propose a different approach. In rereading the *Zhuangzi* and anarchy, I argue that while absence of coercive ruler is important, the *Zhuangzi's* anarchist thinking does not necessitate the state and rulership. Instead, it embraces the interior dispositions of all things in living, acting, and transforming one another in defying the moralist-instrumentalist political hierarchy. Acting out of *ziran* (self-so, self-ordering), these dispositions give rise to horizontal inclinations and orientations beyond anthropocentrism that oppose the hierarchy of human politics. By foregrounding localities of evasion, noncompliance, nonparticipation, and disruption, they configure and reconfigure relations that fail to sustain the hierarchical operation of power. Of particular interest is the way in which such political failure is revealed as a form of freedom-in—characterized by the capacity to navigate freely within complex power relations (*xiaoyao*) as opposed to standing completely outside of it. The result is an embedded autonomy that does not break free from the extant power structure but is instead situated in the liminal relations from within. Such self-rule is part and parcel of the anarchy in the *Zhuangzi*. Conceived as freedom-in rather than freedom-from or freedom-to, the Zhuangzian anarchy contains elements of (re)orienting toward—political, aesthetic, ethical, bodily, and spiritual—that provide myriad possibilities for making relations anew. In unaccomplishing and unachieving—failing to accomplish and achieve linguistically, morally, aesthetically, and politically—one avoids being seized and totalized by following their intrinsic dispositions to grow and thrive in a world of interconnections. What the *Zhuangzi's* anarchism amounts to, I argue, is a politics of proximity that understands anarchism as involving (re)creating postures and moods of intimacy whereby one finds herself at home.

ZHANG Lili

## Zhouyi and Feminism: Margaret Pearson's Interpretation of the Book of Changes

The *Zhouyi* has attracted widespread attention from feminist scholars in contemporary times. This paper attempts to examine a feminist interpretation of the *Zhouyi* produced by Margaret Pearson, an American sinologist who published *The Original I Ching: An Authentic Translation of the Book of Changes*. She argues that the formation process of the *Zhouyi* should have been influenced by the matriarchal culture in the pre-qin era, and hence this book should not be translated without feminist perspectives. To elaborate, the first section will present three main points of Pearson's theory of the *Book of Changes*: (1) she treats *Zhouyi* as a "lived book" that maintains its effectiveness and usefulness in any situation and believes that this principle ought to be applicable to women; (2) she displays a different scenario of interpreting and translating the *Zhouyi* with traits of "worship *yin*" and takes the hexagram Gou 姤 as a typical example to show women's greatness; and (3) she proposes a "context dependence" principle in translation to get rid of the androcentrism annotative tradition. Then, the second section explores the background and reasons for Pearson's *new* interpretation. She notices that most previous sinologists have taken a male-centered narrative approach when translating the *Zhouyi*, where *Junzi* 君子 is translated as a disputed sexist term of "gentleman or superior man" and women face some degrading situations. For instance, the virtue of "straight" (*zhi* 直) means great when it encounters men but means "lascivious" when meets women. Such sexist translations are obstacles for people to perceive the real meaning of the *Book of Changes*, as Pearson has argued the existence of matriarchal elements in this book. Thus, the third section will take *yin-yang* relation as a vivid example to support her argument. Through carefully examining different versions of the *Book of Changes* and other relevant canons in the pre-qin era, I agree with Pearson's theory that the original *Book of Changes* should have fragments or metaphors that worship women or *yin*. Thus, the hidden fluid *yin-yang* relation is uncovered by Pearson, and hence her interpretation of the *Zhouyi* will bring herself and the book into the construction of postmodern feminism. The conclusion section carries out Pearson's contributions to the contemporary research on the *Zhouyi*, as well as some of her misunderstandings of this book.

## **Addressing Anthropocene Environmental Crises through Chinese Philosophy: Nonhuman, Dark Ecology, and Sustainable Development**

In light of the escalating global environmental crises, such as climate change and biodiversity loss, it is imperative to reimagine sustainability frameworks that transcend anthropocentric paradigms. This paper contends that Chinese philosophical traditions, notably Daoism and Confucianism, offer profound insights for addressing the challenges of the Anthropocene by emphasizing the intrinsic interconnectedness between humanity and the natural world. The Daoist thought of Laozi and Zhuangzi advocates for an ontological harmony between humans and non-human entities, proposing a vision of nature as an interdependent whole. Meanwhile, Confucian philosophers like Mengzi (Mencius) underscore the ethical responsibility humans bear toward nature, grounded in moral cultivation and the concept of *ren* (仁), or humaneness. Drawing on these classical philosophical frameworks, the paper engages with Timothy Morton's concept of "dark ecology," which critiques the limitations of anthropocentric environmentalism by promoting an awareness of ecological entanglements, and Donna Haraway's multispecies ethics, which calls for an inclusive approach to human and non-human relationships. By synthesizing these contemporary ecological perspectives with Chinese philosophical principles, this paper advocates for a relational, non-anthropocentric model of environmental ethics that can serve as a foundation for global sustainability policies. This interdisciplinary approach not only highlights the relevance of Chinese philosophy in reframing human-nature relations but also underscores its potential to contribute novel theoretical foundations for tackling the environmental crises of the Anthropocene. The paper demonstrates that Chinese thought, with its emphasis on balance, ethical responsibility, and relationality, offers vital pathways toward sustainable development and environmental resilience.



## Philosophy of Perceptual Consciousness in Su Shi and the Cheng Brothers

How does perception occur? Does perceptual consciousness have a location? Northern Song dynasty thinker Su Shi (蘇軾) adopts the Buddhist model of codependent origination to understand audial experience. This model is different from modern science. Visual experience, for example, is regarded by scientists as a process in which an external stimulus impacts the retina of the eyes that triggers nerve impulses and pass to the brain which forms an image. On the contrary, Cheng Hao (程顥, 1032-1085) and Cheng Yi (程頤, 1033-1107) maintain that the activation of perception is not from the external (感非自外). Cheng Hao thinks that perceptual consciousness has no location. In his “Letter on Calming Nature,” he famously claims that nature does not have “inner” and “outer” (性無內外). In this article, I interpret this “nature” as perceptual consciousness and explain that it does not lie in the objects, the sense organs, or the brain. We should not confound the “location” of perceptual consciousness itself with the locations of its causal factors. This observation reminds us of Leibniz’s “mill argument,” namely, if perception could occur in the composite or in the machine as huge as a mill, when we enter the mill, we can only find one part pushing another, but we cannot find anything like a “perception.”

## **Human nature, ritual and ‘proportional allocation’ – Investigating Xunzi’s social project and its contemporary relevance**

This paper re-examines the long-disregarded social project based on a very different basic premise from the one at the bottom of the dominant exposition of Confucian thought. It takes on three main facets of Xunzi’s thought: *xing*, *li*, and *fen* as the framework for establishing a sustainable, harmonious society. First, it demonstrates how Xunzi’s theory of human nature is a necessary starting point for a working social project. Second, it investigates the ritualised social etiquette (*li*) and its role as a set of tools for creating the psycho-moral environment, allowing the application of a social model based on the ‘proportional allocation’ of goods (*fen*). This paper’s focal point is to scrutinise the notion of *fen*, which emphasises the necessity of a ‘proportional’ allocation of goods based on the social position of the recipient and the necessity of the situation and utility. It is argued that as much as Xunzi’s project recognises social hierarchy, it is not a blind apology for social inequality and steams out of a rational assessment of the socio-biological reality of humankind. Despite what his critics claim, regulatory measures in Xunzi’s project are not a display of distrust in humanity but result from recognising human psycho-moral reality and the significance of human agency in the society-building process. As such, Xunzi’s vision provides a comprehensive recipe for creating a sustainable, harmonious society. In the final section, this paper will attempt to elaborate on the relevance of Xunzi’s approach in the context of a ‘globally harmonious society’.

# 中文演讲



## “命之”或“成之”？——论王夫之人的尊严之来源

人的普遍尊严作为人权的合法性的重要奠基，被赋予了神圣的、不可褫夺的先天固有性，以及没有等级区分的普遍平等性。因此，使得人的普遍尊严往往会被不加以思考和考察地接受以及应用于人权理论的阐发和实践之中，这就导致人的尊严来源模糊不清。而人的尊严所谓的先天固有性、普遍性、平等性究竟是建立在什么基础之上，则需要进一步探究和澄清。同样，人的尊严的来源也需深入的挖掘与剖析。西方对人的尊严之来源从上帝赋予论到康德的“理性尊严论”皆属于天赋“命之”的范畴，把尊严设定为一种人与生俱来的、天赋的固有价值。儒家虽没有严格意义上的现代“尊严”概念，但有深刻的关于尊严的思想和见解。儒家通常被认为是持有“德性尊严论”，人因其德性而具备尊严，可见儒家的尊严观包含天“命之”与人“成之”双重属性。明清大儒王夫之在穷究天人关系并考察人禽之别的基础上建构起了丰富而深刻的人的尊严理论。王夫之人的尊严理论以人性尊严为始基，以人道尊严为重点，以人格尊严为旨归，强调“存人道以配天地，保天心以立人极”，在尊重天道自然的同时凸显出“依人建极”的人本主义色彩，并对人的身心形神予以人文性的关照，形成一种价值整合与价值导向辩证统一的尊严理论。总的来说，王夫之的尊严论把人的尊严更看作是人之成就，而非简单的天之馈赠，在保障人之先天基本尊严的同时，赋予了后天道德人格之极高价值。

## 王船山与中国哲学的时间意识

中国哲学具有浓厚的时间意识，并在王船山那里得到了最深刻而系统的表达。船山把时间的存在追溯到主体的时间意识结构中，过去、现在与未来分别对应着主体的识、思、虑。识、思、虑分别代表主体意识中的保存、呈现与预期（包括筹划）的功能。按照船山的理解，人所居住于其中的世界，就是人的“识”“思”“虑”所及的世界，人的世界经验正是通过过去、现在和未来而得以构成。对王船山而言，时间的流逝不仅具有线性行程的特点，还具有境域性的特征，过去、现在与未来彼此之间并不是相互隔绝，而是过去延伸到现在，现在也不断地涌向过去和未来，未来和过去和现在是一个相互交往的整体，从而时间的三个维度都超出自身而进入其他维度。时间的本质归根到底是一种关系，它意味着存在的持续敞开，它展开为隐显（可见与不可见）之间的交互作用。时间总是与存在，特别是人这种存在联系在一起。有时间性的存在者，就是能够在“现在”承担过去、关怀未来的存在者，就是能够去敞开存在、敞开自我的存在者。时间就是存在的敞开形式和存在形式，因此不能脱离时间来构想存在。对于时间的体验就是存在的体验。因此，承担时间也就是在每一个当下承担他自身以及整个世界的存在。此外，王船山还深切地意识到，存在的显现总是要借助于空间的因素。作为存在之显现的“现在”总是意味着占有空间而不断扩展。因此，空间的参与是时间自身的要求，也是时间得以具体化的方式之一。

## 王陽明的「萬物一體」與全球化下的群己關係

近年的全球化議題中，逐漸出現了本土主義的聲音，提出本土利益優先，甚至質疑全球化的必要性。兩者之所以造成張力，在於當代社會並沒有安頓好群己關係一個人主義與集體主義的論爭。當代以個人主義為主流，只要群體與個人構成利益衝突，被放棄的總是群體，甚至拒絕接受群體的規範。至於全球與本土之間的張力，乃這種想法的延伸。當代雖然有著以儒學資源回應個人主義的研究，但尚未關注宋明理學的思想資源。本文以王陽明的「萬物一體」為例，指出儒家沒有偏向個人與群體的其中一方，而是調和兩者。因為兩者在個人轉化的過程中有著相輔相成的關係。這點能體現於：一、個人與天地萬物乃「原是一體」的存有事實，是互為關連、「一氣流通」的整體。二、個人在實踐上的圓滿不能離開群體的圓滿，反之亦然。兩者在個人轉化的歷程中有著不能割裂的關係。三、個人和群體並不是一種化約和奠基的認知關係，而是能夠通過「存天理去人欲」的實踐消解當中的張力。關鍵在於能否對治私欲而體認個人與萬物為一體的事實。四、在全球化和本土主義的議題中，儒家基於一體的道理不會放棄全球化的一面，但同時基於「理一分殊」亦承認親疏厚薄之區別，只是承認親疏厚薄並不意味著擁護本土主義，反對全球化。

CHIEN Chen-cho 簡丞佐

## 和之天倪以齊物——論莊子處理衝突與差異之態度

易經有云：「方以類聚，物以群分，吉凶生焉」意指當世間萬物因彼此差異而有所分別後，認知、目標、利害也隨之有所分別，在有限資源的現象世界中，爭名奪利、爭權奪勢亦應運而起，故而「吉凶生焉」。而處於戰國亂世的莊子，相較積極入世的儒家墨者，追求完善制度的法家等，他選擇自外於政治事務，而以探索自然之道為世人提供一種處世哲學。

本文將自人類社會價值衝突之探討與因應之道開展討論，概略比較東西方思想對於多元文化與普世價值之討論，繼而從莊子齊物思想解析其看待「是非」、「成毀」、「有無」、「死生」等等之態度，藉由對戰國時期其他學說的省思與批判，探究齊物思想如何引導世人省思現象世界中的紛擾與爭執，理解「彼亦一是非，此亦一是非」、「是亦一無窮，非亦一無窮」之道理。唯莊子齊物思想亦曾受到傳統主流思想之質疑，筆者亦試圖將就此探究莊子本義以釐明爭議。

基於前述齊物思想之探究與解析，本文冀能據以檢視當代社會價值衝突議題，並思考在更複雜的社會分工、多元文化，以及瞬息萬變的國際關係中，如何以莊子齊物思想為基礎，輔以西方倫理學概念進行齊物論之當代詮釋。



DU Jingyi 杜靜漪

## 「五音療疾」與「大音希聲」：中國哲學中的音樂感知與宇宙秩序

本研究透過分析道家與中國傳統醫學中的音樂感知理論，構建出一個跨越物質與形而上感知的哲學框架。中國古代哲學中的「五音療疾」理論指出，五音（宮、商、角、徵、羽）與人體五臟相對應，音樂不僅能夠調節情緒，還具有治癒疾病的功能，展現了中國哲學對音樂感知在身體層面的深刻洞見。另一方面，道家的「大音希聲」概念揭示了音樂感知與宇宙和諧之間的形而上關聯，認為音樂的至高境界在於透過無聲的感知達到與「道」的合一。本文以這兩個核心概念為切入點，探討中國哲學中音樂感知的雙重維度：一是音樂在具體生理與情感調節中的作用，二是音樂作為超越物質、接近宇宙本質的感知體驗。文章將系統性梳理中國哲學中的知覺理論與音樂體驗的關係，特別是音樂如何作為感知的媒介，幫助理解現實與意識的聯繫。同時，本文將嘗試開展跨文化的知覺理論比較，特別是中國哲學與西方現象學的對話，結合梅洛-龐蒂（Maurice Merleau-Ponty）與彼得·桑迪（Peter Szendy）等西方學者的知覺理論與音樂哲學討論。此外，還將與西方音樂哲學中「天體音樂」（Music of the Spheres）等音樂與宇宙秩序的關係展開比較分析。在後疫情時代，全球心理健康危機愈發嚴峻，聲音作為人與外部世界溝通的媒介已發生本質變化。透過分析中國哲學中的音樂感知理論，本文旨在為全球範圍內的音樂療法應用、心理健康恢復及人類與自然和諧的議題提供新的哲學解讀。結合中國哲學中的感知與宇宙秩序觀，音樂不僅能夠作為個體自我療癒的工具，還為人類重新建立與自然的長期和諧關係提供了具整體性與可持續性的文化解決方案。

DUAN Chongyang 段重阳

## 时空与物之秩序：方以智“宙轮于宇”探赜

方以智提出的“宙轮于宇，则宇中有宙，宙中有宇”对物之秩序与时间和空间的关系作了阐发。时空作为物能够呈现自身的条件有着不同的侧重，时间性与物之存在的规定性相关，空间与物之秩序的规定性相关。物之存在关涉一物自身，物之秩序则关涉不同之物，故而空间的呈现与差异相关，这就是“大二”的出现，所谓“天地之数，止有一二而毕矣”。“天地”作为根本性的空间秩序，已经是“二”，来源于无差别之“一”，即太虚之天，“地”乃天之“余”，“天”亦用于其中。天地作为万物的本原—根据，以时空的统一性为依据，故而有“一在二中”，有别于抛弃空间性而以永恒之时间性为追索本原的西学，同时，本原—根据也能够在差异之物中显现，故而有“合二而一”和“统冒”之说。作为其方法的，就是“摄用之体”和“摄体之用”的统一。空间性的当下而非时间性的永存是工夫论的目的，“以推移之宙消贪心”凭借的是物自身的时间性存在，“以规矩之宇辨物则”依据的是基于空间性的物之性理。空间性的“规矩”若要实现“时中”，离不开心的时间性，“宙轮于宇”一方面强调“物则”独立于物的时间性，不能被执于变化之物，但“时位”之“当”却依然需要心的时间性。物之秩序的成立基于心的时空性，二者的根本关联既是形而上学对根据的追问必然走向“心”的依据。

FENG Li 冯莉

## 圣人与制礼作乐 ——从《礼记·乐记》看早期儒家对普遍秩序的建构

近年来，学者们广泛探讨了《礼记·乐记》中的心性论、宇宙论、感通论和政治教化等哲学议题。然而，除了这些方面，《礼记·乐记》其实还着重探讨了一个主题：圣人制礼作乐。不过，许多对于早期礼乐思想的研究却常常忽略这一议题。本文围绕这一主题展开讨论，旨在揭示早期儒家如何将礼乐建构为一种普遍秩序。本文认为，圣人制礼作乐主要包含三个层次：一是圣人制礼作乐的依据，即天地和人情，这同时也是一个将两者礼乐化的过程；二是圣人制礼作乐的原则，即化无形、无序为有形有序，将天地和人情都表现为人的感官知觉可感知的有形之内容，并确定这些形现事物（即天地与人情）之间的适当边界，从而呈现出一个具体的、经验的、有形的、且和谐有序的世界；三是为什么圣人能制礼作乐：圣人作为礼乐秩序的制作人，通过其理性和智慧确保这一形见秩序的合理性和有效性，保障天地与人情之间的平衡与和谐。这一研究将为当下建构和谐秩序提供宝贵视角。

GAO Hui 高辉

## 中国哲学中的“自我”概念重构——试论自我意识的循环问题

我如何能够确认，那个我以为所碰到的自身就确实是属于我的？德国当代哲学家迪特亨里希重新将自我意识的困境置于当下哲学的论域中，称之为意识的循环问题。换言之，自我意识不预先设定自身，则无法获得对于自身的认识，自我意识的奠基问题在西方哲学的话语中始终难以摆脱循环论证。而本文的问题是，这种西方哲学的困境能否借助一种他者的视角而得以重新审视并寻求解决。自我概念在中国哲学传统中也有过形而上学层面的讨论，从词源意义上来说，“我”一词包含了“武器”的含义，蕴含了一种明确的边界感的含义。而庄子对于自我意识的确定性也提出过与西方哲学相似的质疑，最有名的一段论述就是庄周梦蝶的故事，通过寓言的形式来提出了关于自我意识的奠基问题。庄子关于自我的核心命题“今者吾丧我”，分别用“吾”与“我”来指代两种不同的自我，即作为主体性的自我与作为客体的自我。本文将根据庄子的文本，运用先验的方法，展开对于自我概念在中国传统哲学背景下的分析与重构，从而试图对于西方哲学的困境提出另外一种解决思路。

## 《庄子》中光明意象的权力-认知涵义

《庄子》中与“光”“明”等概念相关的文段难免出现争议。认知领域中，对“以明”的解释也有“用明”和“止明”两情感色彩相反的解释角度<sup>1</sup>；政治领域上，“十日并出”章有赞颂圣人贤德一解，也有讽刺君王影响力太甚一解<sup>2</sup>。尽管这种相反的情感色彩解读贯穿了涉及光明意象的两个领域，目前学界较少将认知、政治两者联系讨论。本文通过讨论“照”“光”“明”“耀”等多种表达“光明”义的字词，探究《庄子》中光明意象的涵义。

“明”的初始含义“被光照”、“处在明亮位置”意味着被看见或知晓，因此“明”既可以表征认知过程，也可以在此基础上形容人的认知能力或境界。而后一种用法意味着圣人也成为“明”的化身，自身的言论像太阳等发光物一样能够影响他人。光明意象不仅用来形容圣人在认知上的影响力，也被用来形容政治上掌权者的影响力。太阳通过阳光影响万物，掌权者通过权力影响百姓。由此，阳光勾连太阳与光明，如同影响力勾连权力与认知，“光照”因此具有认知-权力的双重含义。知识不再只是某种中立的事实表达，而在表达行动主张时成为了影响他人的权力，“明王”等称呼意味着圣人认知境界高的同时保持较弱的政治控制力。对光明意象二重性的揭示，有助于解释“光明”与“晦暗”并重的文本，也能在太阳喻的意义上构成与柏拉图“哲人王”相互参照的中国方案。

1 参见吴根友.庄子《齐物论》“莫若以明”合解[J].哲学研究,2013(05):41-49+127.

2 如有学者指出,“历代解庄者对该章(以下简称“十日并出”章)文义的理解颇为歧杂,对“十日并出,万物皆照”的释读更是疑谏难定。”(王玉彬.《庄子·齐物论》“十日并出”章辨正[J].中国哲学史,2015(04):16-20.)

## 人类基本价值系统的建立、式微与重建——从轴心时代到新轴心时代

正如雅斯贝斯所说，轴心时代是一个“精神过程”，笔者进而认为，轴心时代更根本性的特质和最大的贡献是发现价值，并形成人类基本价值系统。人类基本价值系统建构的主要途径有二，一是宗教，二是哲学。各个轴心文明运用这两种途径的方式有所不同，由此造成了各自鲜明的个性。各种宗教和哲学的价值学说都包含两个层面，一是价值实践论，二是价值本原论；前者是后者的体现，后者是前者的根基。近代以来，人文主义的兴起、理性的弘扬和科学的发展，都对传统哲学尤其宗教产生了极大冲击，而人类基本价值系统也随之式微。

人类向何处去？在雅斯贝斯看来，人类将进入第二个轴心时代。目前学术界主流的看法是，新轴心时代的特质就是现代性，因而我们已经身处新轴心时代。然而，根据雅斯贝斯的阐述，新轴心时代的实质仍然是一个“精神过程”，它远没有到来。新轴心时代的根本任务是重建人类基本价值系统，当然这离不开现有的价值系统。由于中国哲学本身就是一种价值性哲学，而西方哲学是一种知识性哲学，因此由中国哲学奠定的中华价值系统将开辟通往新轴心时代的道路。

近代以来人类基本价值系统式微的根源在于价值本原论的崩溃，因而当今人类基本价值系统重建的关键，是重建价值本原论，但康德、叔本华、牟宗三等中西哲学家重的努力并不成功。道哲学认为作为物质和生命本原的易与作为价值和意义本原的藏本来是两个相互独立的世界，灵魂则是沟通二者的桥梁。这样一来，易界、藏界和灵界共同构成了道，而藏界才是真正的价值本原。

HSU Chiayu 許家瑜

## 逍遙游於天下：從莊子的化哲學思考移民、邊界、身份認同的流動

在當今全球化的世界中，移民及其相關問題日益突出。遷移不僅僅是由戰爭或壓迫性的生活條件驅動，越來越多的人正在跨越邊界，無論國際體系是否支持這種流動，遷移的時間長度和地區各不相同。國家、區域和國際層面的全球政治、經濟和文化政策的制定都與身份和邊界密切相關。看似是意識形態或不同文明之間的衝突，實際上是身份的衝突。在當今世界，承認和肯定身份已成為許多全球政治事件中的關鍵概念，也是迫切需要解決的問題。除了當代政治哲學家如福山和亨廷頓的觀點外，戰國時期莊子的「化」哲學也為當今超越文化或地理邊界的身份問題提供了思想資源。本文分為四個部分。首先，分析了莊子的「化」、邊界與流動的哲學，認為邊界是流動的，並處於不斷轉化之中。身份和文化沒有固定的本質。文明在根本上是平等的，文化是混合的。其次，討論移民者如何面對自己的遷移，莊子指出人的存在超越了國家的存亡，身份的本質在於其流動的連續性。第三，探討如何面對他者的遷移。莊子倡導相互尊重和不作評判，讓每個人按照自己的方式進行自我轉化。最後，本文探討莊子理想的政治共同體體制，其超越以人為中心的治理，包容萬物的多樣性與流動性，體現出萬物一體與萬物不傷的天下政治理想，為當今全球身份與遷移問題提供了新的哲學視角。

HU Haiyang 胡海洋

## 安之者必将道也——荀子“人道”视域下的军事思想及安全观念论析

荀学论“道”以“人道”为要，对“人”主体性地位的关注是其讨论秩序建构的重要理论起点。作为诞生于战国末期“大变局”时代的荀子思想，广泛涉及到对军事与安全等相关议题的讨论，其中不仅包括了基于人性本质与文明起点而立论的建军思想，“禁暴”与“壹民”的军事战略，以“礼”为中心的治军、用兵之术，而且也从“道”的高度对国家安全问题进行系统思考，并针对现实治理的诸多方面予以“总体”阐释。《荀子》的军事思想与安全观念在坚持“民本”、反对“唯利”、“权出于一”“安之以道”等诸多方面有着开创性的理论突破，是对先秦儒家政治思想的重要探索与丰富，同时也与新时代“总体国家安全观”存在着相当程度的理论契合。



## 王阳明哲学之生态观研究

王阳明哲学中蕴含着丰富且深远的生态智慧，其核心在于“心外无理”、“心外无物”的理念，这不仅强调了“身心”的和谐统一，还巧妙地将这一理念扩展到人与自然的系统中，倡导人与自然的和谐共生。进而他提出的“万物一体”哲学观念，将人类的道德关怀扩展至天地万物，将自然纳入道德考量的范畴，认为人与自然共同构成了一个有机联系的生态整体，这一整体深刻体现了天地的“生生”之仁性。这一思想打破了传统观念中人与自然的界限，将人类与自然视为不可分割的整体，共同承载着宇宙的生命力和创造力。“知行合一”、“致良知”的观念则体现了其生态观上的实践层面，真正的良知是与天地万物相通的，它作为指导我们正确行动的内在力量，通过“知行合一”，我们可以将内心的良知转化为关爱自然、保护环境的实际行动，而“致良知”则要求我们在日常生活中不断修炼内心，提升道德境界，以更加负责任的态度对待自然。与西方环境伦理学相比，王阳明的生态思想更多地源于对自然的敬畏和爱护，这种爱根植于天地的仁性之中，而非单纯以改善人类生存环境为出发点。王阳明哲学中的生态思想不仅具有深刻的理论内涵，更具有重要的实践价值，它为我们提供了一种全新的视角来审视人与自然的系统，为现代环境保护提供了有益的借鉴和深刻的启示。

## 张载哲学中的时间与空间

张载以气为本，发展了儒家的形而上学，并以此为基础提出了他对时间与空间的思考。“太虚即气”是张载哲学的根本命题。太虚与气不是两种异质的存在，而实质上是同一存在的两种不同存在形式。太虚是气的本源的、原初的存在形态（“气之本体”）；而经验世界的一切具体存在者，作为气的特殊存在形式，都是一种暂时性的存在（“客形”），与此相对，作为气的原初存在形态的太虚的存在则具有永恒性（“至实而无动摇”）。在时间意义上对经验事物的暂时性的理解，导向了在存在意义上对人与万物的有限性的理解。从而人的存在的自我筹划则进一步指向了对“死而不亡”的终极价值的追寻，超越个体的时间性生存而实现其存在意义的不朽。在空间意义上，“太虚即气”的提出，针对的是佛教、道教将太虚或虚空理解为一种“空的空间”的空间的观念。“空的空间”一方面意味着空间与存在的分离，空间成为一种纯形式；另一方面，宇宙也被理解为有边界、有界限的。而作为“气之本体”的太虚，实质上是空间与物质的合一。通天地一气，气弥漫于整个宇宙，因此宇宙是没有边界或界限的。

JIN Shengliang 金生亮

## 论墨家的“劳动伦理”

以往对墨家伦理的讨论或是集中于“兼爱”这一主张，又或是集中于后果论还是义务论的性质辨析，而忽略了墨家伦理的特殊之处——“劳动伦理”。该伦理的内涵即“强从事”——要求每个个体将所有“力”都用于完成其所承载的社会分工（“分事”）。“强从事”的伦理特征表现在墨家将“从事”作为“为义”的一部分以及将“强从事”作为“天志”的内在要求。因此，“强从事”乃是墨家“义”伦理中的重要内容。从思想起源来看：“劳动伦理”并非仅是战国时代的一种临时规范，也不是墨子个人极端精神的理论表现，而是深植于当时的历史现实。伴随着血缘关系的破灭，分工成为人与人之间建构联系的主要中介。墨家将社会理解为由不同职业群体分工而组成的一个整体，分工的持续化是社会这个整体得以维系的关键。就思想关系而言：从墨家“劳动伦理”作为“贤”的内在要求之一可以发现其所指向的是个人与群体之间的关系，而非个人与他者的关系。因此，“劳动伦理”与“兼爱”在性质上存在较大的差异。但实际上“劳动伦理”的提出正是为了“兼爱”的实现。当“劳动伦理”被生产阶层所实践时，生活必需品将丰富而有余；当“劳动伦理”被管理阶层所实践时，道德观念则能得到维护。由此，“兼爱”理想得以实现。

## 圣人执一：从“一”看《韩非子》思想与黄老道家思想联系

对“一”的诠释，构成了先秦哲学史的一条重要脉络。这一脉络可以追溯至《老子》。《老子》将“一”视为“道”的诸多特性之一，进而代指“道”，并在这一意义上指出“一”是万物存在的根源。《老子》又提出“抱一”、“得一”、“圣人执一”等主张，将“一”视为善治之根基，而《黄帝四经》在此基础上进一步阐发了“一”与“万物”的关系，形成一种圣人“握一以知多”、执一以御万物的政治观念。《韩非子》论“一”则整合了各方面的资源，并将“一”对万物的权威引向尊君的政治立场。“一”为君主所垄断，对于臣民而言不可测知，而由“一”所形成、具有自发性的“名”与“法”则将君主对“一”的体察转化为现实的统治力量。“一”与“万物”的关系，不但展开为名与法之生成，亦被具象化为君与臣民上下悬隔、不容僭越的单向关系。《韩非子》中除了《解老》、《喻老》两篇明显与道家思想相关外，《扬权》、《主道》等内容也与道家思想有紧密关联。从《韩非子》对道家思想的吸收，实际上中间经由了黄老道家的洗礼，从中继承了执一以御万物的政治观念，并由此构建完全以君主为核心的政治立场。

LEE Dongkai 李东凯

## 从成中英的本体诠释学谈东西哲学的融合发展及其对世界诸多问题的积极影响

几十年来，欧洲的分析哲学脱离客观存在而陷入概念逻辑的空谈，美国的实用主义哲学脱离本体而只谈片面的实效，对于当今主流西方哲学的这些问题，美国夏威夷大学的成中英教授看的很清楚。成中英教授的本体诠释学是把西方的认识论为主的分析哲学和中国的道、理、易经等本体论哲学结合起来的更新的哲学认识体系，不仅解决了西方分析哲学脱离实际、脱离本体的问题，也通过更加清晰的分析方法诠释了玄妙晦涩但大道至简的中国哲学，这种融汇东西方哲学各自优点的哲学研究不仅可以解决东西方哲学各自的一些问题，也会为人们看待和解决当今世界的各种问题提供更新的方法论和本体论根据。多年来，我与成中英教授有过多次的学术交流，在微信上，随便某个哲学话题都可以随时引发我俩的沟通，印象最为深刻的，其中之一就是成中英教授对于在原理性、系统性、整体性、发展性上怎样更好的融汇东西方哲学各自的优点，从而产生更新的哲学观点，为当今世界各国的各种问题提供更新的理论根据。这一点也颇为符合成中英教授在1975年创立的国际中国哲学大会的第24届会议的主题《透过中国哲学应对全球危机并重新构想解决方案》。为此，我从我的新书《太极本体论》的某些章节摘取了论述成中英教授的本体诠释学的一部分内容来撰写出这篇论文，希望这篇论文能够参与到本次大会，一方面以此来纪念和发扬成中英教授的本体诠释学，另一方面，我也想以此机会来谈一下东西方哲学的融汇对于世界各方面的积极影响，在世界历史上，我们已经有这个方面很好的实践经验来借鉴！主要的，一个是在12、13世纪，阿拉伯的哲学、科学、技术等传入欧洲给当时的基督教世界带来神学、哲学、科学、技术等各方面的解放和复兴，另一个，那就是在17-18世纪，中国的哲学、政治等传入欧洲后给欧洲的宗教、哲学、政治等方面都带来了天翻地覆的变革。以史为鉴，现在，在深刻剖析古今中外各种哲学的是非对错之后，把东西方哲学的各自优点再次融合交汇起来，必能产生出更新的哲学，为世界各地理性的解决各种现实问题提供可靠的哲学根据。成中英教授的本体诠释学在这个方面已经给世界提供了非常重要的参考，我的新书《太极本体论》也是这个方面的一个尝试，供大家参考。

LEE Hsien-Chung 李賢中

## 墨學視野下的環境倫理思想探究

墨家反對儒家的等差親疏之愛，而強調一種平等、普遍、超越時空的「兼愛」思想，並以「興天下之利，除天下之害」為仁人君子所應努力的目標。墨家所謂的「天下之利」雖然是以「天下人的福祉」為主，其中也包含了對於「自然之物」、「人為之物」以及人與自然環境和諧關係的看法。為謀求人類整體的幸福，必須正視人類所賴以生存的自然環境以及其中的各種動植物。今日世界在資訊、科技、工業、經濟上有快速的發展，但是對於環境的破壞也日益嚴重。

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本文將以墨家的「兼愛」思想、論「物」觀點、知-行關係、「權求」考量，從價值根源到道德覺知，從倫理思維情境到道德實踐，經由一系列的理論體系，包括思維方法的：倫理情境類推、價值原則類推、實踐方式類推等推論方式，構成墨學的現代視野，應用於環保問題的處理、提供制定環境政策的參考，以期解決氣候變遷、土地汙染、水資源浪費、生物多樣性喪失等環境倫理問題，進而促進人類社會與自然環境的永續發展。

LEE Yen-Yi 李彥儀

## 由荀子「化性而起偽」思索科技時代中人的圖像的形塑之道

我們身處科技時代，已在各方面和科技發展設備密不可分，從而，也開始改變我們對人的本質、認同乃至圖像的理解。其中，尤其是人工智慧（artificial Intelligence）的出現與蓬勃發展，更迫使我們深入檢視人與科技或機器之間的差異以及人面對科技時的適切態度。

筆者認為，若以荀子「化性而起偽」來考慮我們人類和人工智慧為基礎的科技之間的關係，我們至少可以提出三個思考方向：首先，當代以人工智慧為主導的科技可以作為我們人類「轉化人性」或發展人性的諸多依憑或輔助之一，我們甚至可以因著發揮各種功能或向度的人工智慧科技而重新考慮我們人類自身的圖像的種種可能性。其次，若將人工智慧被輸入大量資料或寫入程式的過程放在荀子「化性而起偽」的視野中理解，則這個過程是一「偽」或「人為」的歷程。若再關聯著荀子之將「偽」界定在禮義、師法等關係乃至社會群體範圍之中，則這寫入或輸入的過程就相當於一種人類將其群體的價值觀或世界觀輸入其中的過程。最後，就我們人類之將自身價值觀或世界觀輸入人工智慧而使其有「生命」或仿若有意識的發展而說，這反映了一種我們人類和人工智慧在「互動」中彼此成長的創新動態且的「化性而起偽」的歷程，而人工智慧會如何和我們相處，更多時候恐怕得取決於我們人類之如何理解自身。

## 从关怀伦理学视角检视孔子的关系性自我及其对于当代社会的价值

儒家伦理学常被认为重视个人的道德义务或美德，尤其儒家是一种美德伦理学的观点受到较多学者的支持。然而，儒家的孔子虽重视个人主体价值的建立，但他提出“毋意，毋必，毋固，毋我”（《论语·子罕》），个人道德的完成建立在与他人交往互动的基础之上，是对于只强调个人价值的消解，而采取关系性自我的思维。关怀伦理学（care ethics）是一种关系主义的立场，提出以关心者（carer or one-caring）与被关心者（cared-for）的关心关系共同构成道德行为，道德的完成并非个人的道德行为，也不只是个人美德的实现。关怀伦理学认为在关系之中，关心者对于被关心者会产生“关心”（care）这种自然情感，是一种无道德意识、不计算功利后果的情感。孔子出于对他人、社会、国家的关心而付诸实践，与关怀伦理学的关心之情十分相似。以关怀伦理学的关系视角检视孔子的自我观，不仅可以解释出儒家思想的新意，使儒家的自我不再是原子式的个人，而是人我关系的呈现；也可以透过儒家与关怀伦理的结合，为儒家如何回应当代伦理问题，例如人际关系的疏离、道德冷漠等，提供更为有效的解决观点。



## 「出世／入世」的辨證——論莊子「何無有之鄉」的「去知」型態之生活境域

〈逍遙遊〉篇末惠施藉大樹喻莊子之言論大而無用，莊子回應「何不樹之於無何有之鄉」，可以於其下徜徉，於其側逍遙。莊子意指惠施以「無用」界定大樹，已自我限制於「用」的標準，而以是否有用論斷生命的價值，是造成人我對立的根本原因。莊子反省這樣的認知方式，提出「離形去知」的「坐忘」方法，捨棄以感官認識世界，在無心的無我狀態，方能達到與萬物通而為一。道通為一的理想，莊子具體化為「無何有之鄉」，是一個消解「用」的劃分之所在，而且「大樹」是重要的象徵，直指一般人困於「用」之所見。然而歷代注家對於「無何有」，多解釋為什麼都沒有，如唐代成玄英疏解「無何有」為「無有」，刪去「何」字，而成「無人之處」，陸德明也釋之為「寂絕無為之地」，是個空寂之處，這些解釋都有待商榷。莊子創造「無何有」一詞，而不直言「無有」，此「何」字或有深意，「何有」亦可為反詰之語，蓋莊子並非無視世界萬物，也不是在世界之外建立一個無人之所，而是消解人類自我設限的認知方式，破除人與世界的隔閡，還給萬物「無何有」的原本面貌。在「入世」之中，方能有「出世」之所。當今世界因為認知差異造成緊張衝突，莊子的「無何有之鄉」，或許能對如何消解紛爭有所啟發。

## 《维摩诘经》中的空间观——以吉藏的理解为中心

《维摩诘经》“不思议品”中，须弥灯王佛遣三万二千狮子座入于维摩诘室中。狮子座高广，维摩诘室小，以大物入于小屋，显现出《维摩诘经》中不可思议的空间观。吉藏是中国佛教三论宗的集大成者，其以独特的中观思想对《维摩诘经》中的空间观作出了解读。吉藏认为，高广之座入方丈小室，方丈小室容高广之座，座室大小无有增减，而容入宛然，因此是不思议。为何会有此不思议的容入现象？吉藏以三论宗独有的“初章”理论对其进行了解释。吉藏认为，普通人执着“大小”“容入”等现象拥有自性，因此“大小”“容入”皆为决定相，大决定是大，小决定是小，小决定不容大，大决定不入小；佛教的大乘证悟者与此不同，其了达“大小”“容入”等现象都是因缘，因此“大小”“容入”无有决定相，大可以是小，小可以是大小，大可以入于小，小可以容于大。通过对“初章”四句的解读，吉藏对《维摩诘经》中不可思议的空间容入现象进行了理论化的解释，这种解释同时也可以运用到佛经中的其他相似论述中，如将须弥山纳入芥子之中等等。《维摩诘经》中的论述和吉藏的解释体现出了中国佛教哲学所具有的独特空间观。

## 《莊子》的「和之以是非」與當代世界衝突的因應 目

《莊子·齊物論》中提及：「聖人和之以是非，而休乎天鈞」，其中「和之以是非」是指優先地從對方關於是、非判斷的脈絡中，來面對是、非衝突的問題。具體來說，就是當雙方發生衝突時，包含觀點、信念、信仰上的衝突時，因應衝突的關鍵，不是在於理性地說服對方，而是在於能理解及進入對方立論及信念成立的脈絡，特別是蘊含在其中的情感脈絡；進而從其脈絡回過來反思自身論點的限制，而後再進一步去理解對方。而衝突或對立的雙方，一方面透過理解對方看似與自身對立的論點或立場，其實與自身一樣，都有其支持的理由及脈絡，以及背後的情感因素；同時又能藉由對方來反思自身時，則對立的雙方將發現彼此的論點並非絕對的對立關係；而是各有其不同的立論及生命脈絡，且可以共存，卻又都需要調整關係。若雙方都能優先理解同理對方的認知脈絡及情感特質，並從中反思自身的限制，則衝突關係將轉變為相互理解與反思、調整的關係，這即是所謂「和之以是非」；而彼此相互進入對方認知或情感脈絡，並回過來反思自身的動態環轉關係，便是「休乎天鈞」。本人將進一步論證，基於《莊子》「和之以是非，而休乎天鈞」的方法，當代世界的許多衝突，包含文化、宗教、信仰、價值觀、國家利益等，皆有機會獲得轉化或調節。

LIN Xinyi 林欣儀

## 論《太玄》之「三」：一個數的世界模型

西漢揚雄作《太玄》，稱「玄」為最高法則，此法則以三分為萬物變化模式。後人對此褒貶不一，無論褒貶，皆將《太玄》與《易》相比。褒者稱《太玄》「贊《易》」或「準《易》」，貶者批其為《易》的劣質模仿，三分只為強合曆數。本文以此爭論為起點。首先，透過歷史文獻呈現雙方觀點，梳理其原因與影響。其次探討《太玄》之三分的運作模式及其如何解釋現象。最後探討在以《易》為主流的儒家思想下，揚雄與其他學者對《太玄》的定位，及此定位對《太玄》的影響。本文結論認為：《太玄》的價值應重估，原因有二：其一，在運作模式上，有別於《易》的陰陽二點的線性反復，《太玄》之「三」給出變化契機點，將宇宙運作置於圓周的螺旋循環，跳脫了傳統思惟框架，是更客觀地解釋世界的嘗試。其次，《太玄》以「數」來設想最終法則，有別於《易》的陰陽物性理解，是為純理性的宇宙觀，這種不指涉任何經驗的純理性思維方式，是微觀科學的根本。

LIU Puchun 刘朴淳

## 塑造圣神：三一教庆赞仪式研究

三一教作为福建地区特有的民间宗教，具有独特的宗教思想与仪式实践。本研究在深入把握前人研究成果与三一教仪式发展的历史进程之基础上，通过田野调查和文献梳理，首次全面揭示了三一教庆赞仪式的完整构成和流程，并对其中的仪式元素、内涵、功能以及塑造林兆恩神圣形象的因素进行了深入剖析。通过对仪式要素和流程的细致分析，本文认为：首先，庆赞仪式具备完整的仪式结构，其结构特征符合“分离—阈限（近阈限）—融合”或“点燃—宴会—再次点燃”的模式。其次，庆赞仪式的动态变化充分反映了三一教仪式传统与社会变革之间的紧密关联。三一教的仪式传统在社会变迁中不断调整，融入国家元素，并从封闭走向开放，从而维系教主的神圣形象。再次，庆赞仪式具备重塑共同体、增强道德感及传承文化记忆的社会功能。通过仪式中展现的信仰一致性，庆赞仪式促进了群体认同，为共同体的重塑提供了可能；同时，它通过对神圣形象的崇拜，深化了信仰者的社会责任感与道德观念，对信仰者的日常行为起到了引导作用；作为文化记忆的载体，庆赞仪式传递了三一教的历史传统与道德规范，增强了信仰者的归属感和认同感，进而促进了三一教信仰的传承与教主形象神圣性的延续。最后，本文深入探讨了庆赞仪式如何对林兆恩神圣形象进行塑造。三一教仪式的产生源于其宗教化需求与宗教思想，而明初的礼俗改革与明中后期乡里教化制度的瓦解为其发展奠定了基础。三一教在塑造其仪式时，积极借鉴儒家礼仪与官方祭祀体系，同时，近世以来的济度宗教运动也对仪式的建构产生了深远影响。在庆赞仪式中，这些因素均得到了充分体现，共同塑造了林兆恩“教祖”与“神”的双重形象，进而实现了其神圣化的过程。

LIU Rong 刘荣

## 王夫之人禽之辨发微

王夫之的人禽之辨思想是对孟子及其以后儒家学说的鲜明继承和现实发展。王夫之扩大了人禽之辨命题的意涵，人禽之辨实是人与非人（禽狄）之辨。他从人性及其所自出之人道论人之所以为人而在本质上异于禽狄者。一则，人秉天命之整全德性，玉成道德人格；然人性日生日成，禽兽只有初命之性，则人禽之别非一成不变；二则，人率德性行焉得为人道，人道为人之独有，是人之殊于禽狄之基本原则。王夫之的人禽之辨不仅旨在说明人与动物的本质不同，而且为了责骂异族，更是为着维系华夏族群、存续儒学正统，守先待后，以争剥复；其理论逻辑还被延伸应用到了政治实践中。

## 以「愛-反-仁」的德行培養方式看孟子的養善觀

德行的意義不應停留在理由形式的規範性證成而已，而是應該思考：人的原初德行是什麼？該德行是如何可能的？唯有切身的原初德行才是最能先行培養的德行；而且，儒家重視通過實踐來界定領域，也就是，較常以「如何可能」（how）來解決「是什麼」（what）的命題。這使得德行的意義得以回到實踐層面來進行反思和驗證。準此，在黃百銳（David Wong）研究孟子道德心理的基礎上，亦即「情感—反思—理性」（Feeling-Reflection-Reasoning），可以進一步申論孟子的「反思」不僅是習察反問的「思慮」而已，還包括「思」的接受（思則得之，思曰容）。換言之，培養德行需包含雙重性機制，一個是通過「思慮」來調整狀態，另一個則是孟子最為重視的，意即，以善意來接受人的原初狀態，並且依順人的已然之跡來進行正向的培養，此即孟子的養善觀。本文以為，孟子首倡孩提之童即已有的「愛」作為人的原初德行，這不僅有助於我們知道該如何具體地培養出一個抽象之理的「仁」，也有助於反思如何得以在多元價值衝突的時代下進行整合。在孟子的愛敬生命原則之下，「敬」（duty）所重視的是對價值體系的恪守，是以價值來成就人；而「愛」（love）所重視的是以整全的人觀來成就價值，通過廣大的人倫世界牽合他人、並將之納入我們的價值體系內去關懷，也因此，以「愛」為始的人觀不僅可以養善，亦可整合人倫價值的衝突。

## 佛家幸福論：以《妙法蓮華經·方便品》中的「實相心」論悟「空」

過去兩千六百年佛陀誕生與現今的社會環境來對比，最大的分別就是現代科技發展迅速，雖然方便了人類許多物質方面的需求，然而對人類的身心靈健康和社會等問題並沒有因為科學醫療技術的進步而減緩。本文以佛學的角度厘清人因為認知體系而產生煩惱、痛苦而致生病、憂鬱、犯罪孽生等可能性脈絡；依據大乘佛教唯識學的意識思維特性，與人類利用五個感官（五根）來感知外在人事物後而經由大腦（第六根）的神經系統傳達訊息到腦部而使我們有所分析、演繹等獲得理性和感性的認識，對應李開濟著《般若波羅蜜多心經研究》上的色、聲、香、味、觸、法六塵（物）而形成眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意六識；此六根六塵六識十八界，加上第七識（末那識），第八識（阿賴耶識），第九識（清淨識），形成一套完備的認知體系。這些認知體系是由心對現前的對象的感受、思考判斷作用，甚至對過去、現在、未來的作用，若執著於某個作用可能會導致一個人生病、憂鬱或犯罪孽生等社會問題。

因此，本文依鳩摩羅什譯《妙法蓮華經·方便品》中觀一切法如「實相」的義理，透過感恩、臣服、和參的方法，舉例說明此方法如何將此轉念的力量去破除五蘊（色、受、想、行、識）十八界中形成的我執、貪嗔癡三毒的意識心，將外在所認知的物質實相（主客體）視為一個整體來理解「空」，悟「空」後再起修內觀禪定而逐漸轉依九識清淨識，入安樂自在圓滿幸福的境地，以佛學角度提供幸福可及的參考。



## 想像力與創造力之辨：從莊子之「樂」探索AI生成圖像

AI生成圖像是否已經取代了人的創造力？Michel Serres曾提到，現代科技透過雲端貯存、影像生成與演算法取代了過去認定人之為人的重要特徵：記憶力、想像力與推論能力。當AI滿足上述條件，甚至展現超越人類之執行力時，人與AI的差異幾希？除了成為餵養AI學習的養分罐，人還剩下什麼標誌自身存在的特異性？創造力，Serres毫無懸念地回答。Serres區辨想像力與創造力，讓我們重回Immanuel Kant的界定。對Kant而言，想像是構作的 (poétique)而非創造的 (créatrice)，因為想像力奠基在感知結果上，進行再現式的生產。由此看來，AI生成比較接近想像力而非創造力的展示。這衍生了兩個問題，第一，想像力與創造力的區別何在？第二，一旦釐清創造力的來源與效用，是否有助於推進AI研究新一階段之發展？Henri Bergson反對把創造力理解為計劃性重新排列元素的製造，反之，創造與物共感 (sympathie)而生。與物共感從西方科學的角度來理解十分困難，取徑東方思想則可望開闢另一種體會。徐復觀在《中國藝術精神》提到，藝術精神離不開樂。《國語·周語》「樂從和」，《禮記·樂記》「大樂與天地同和」，可見，樂根源自和諧的產生，和諧既指向與天地萬物也同時是與自身本性的統一。對莊子來說，和化異為同，同使人忘己，放棄私慾達到精神自由/游。精神自由指向透過中止分析與知識性的判斷，讓心回到純粹感性的知覺專一化，使知覺世界蛻變為不斷催生某種新意味新事物誕生的創造性世界。此想法類似於Bergson認為創造力乃於時間中的持續創造。倘若知覺與和諧乃創造的關鍵之鑰，如何讓AI長出感性器官並且透過與物和諧地遊戲而啟動其創造性，便是本文持續探索的方向。

REN Milin 任蜜林

## 中国“和平”观念的哲学内涵及现代意义

“和平”观念作为中华文明的突出特性和重要内容，对于中国政治、社会、文化的发展产生了深远的影响。“和平”观念之所以能够产生这样深远的影响，就在于其有一套独特的哲学原理结构。对于这一哲学原理结构的揭示，有助于我们更加深入地了解“和平性”的思想内涵和哲学特征。“和平”虽然由“和”“平”组成，但二者的地位和作用是不同的，他们体现的实际是一种“和体平用”的结构。也就是说，“和”是本体，“平”是功用。只有有了“和”这个本体，“平”才能得以实现。概括地说，“和平”的原理结构就是以“和”为体，以“平”为用。具体包含“保合太和”的本体论、“和实生物”的生成论、“和而不同”的实践原则、“天下太平”的理想宗旨。这种“和”的思想总体上来看是建立道德秩序之上的，到了宋明时期，儒家又把这种道德秩序推到宇宙本体方面，中华文明所建立起来的天人合一、群己合一的世界都与此有着密切关系。中华文明的和平性不但在中国历史上发挥了非常重要的作用，其对于新中国的政治、经济、文化、外交等方面也产生了重要的影响。

ROŠKER *Jana S.* 羅亞娜

## 用揚棄法詮釋儒家關係主義：邁向新的星球倫理

當今我們處於全球化的時代，同時面臨全球性危機，這些危機的解決方案必須透過全球性的合作來實現，因為其解決方式已無法再依賴局限於單一國家狹隘邊界內的政策。如今，全球範圍內의思想和知識交流比以往任何時候都更加必要，且這種交流不應僅限於經濟和政治議題，還應涵蓋不同文化傳統中衍生的倫理考量。本演講將介紹儒家關係倫理，旨在將其融入新的全球倫理框架中，以更有效地應對全球化世界中緊迫的問題。通過提出將儒家關係主義納入普遍適用倫理框架的新方法——跨文化揚棄，本次報告旨在促進對全球倫理的更深刻和細緻的理解。

## 佛教平等观的理论义涵与现代价值——一个概念史的考察

佛教作为一种自我标榜平等的思想文化传统，其在中国的发展被质疑未能展现出推进社会平等的实际效用，这一理论与现实间的断裂需要从佛教平等观的独特义涵加以理解。平等是佛教的哲学思维方式和价值观念，是一种观察和理解世界的方法。佛教中对于事物的差别与无差别的认识，关于相即不二、圆融无碍的理论等，都是这种思维方式的体现，这是佛教平等观最有特色的部分。形上的思维落实到宗教信仰和修行层面，才转变为修行位阶和方法的平等，以及更具体的政治、性别、阶层、经济等方面的平等。

对中国佛教在历史上是否真正倡导了平等的问题，涉及诸多史实和概念理解问题。但更值得讨论的是佛教平等观区别于西方平等理论以及中国文化传统中平等观的独特性，可以为当代社会公平问题的解决提供何种借鉴。佛教的平等，超越人类中心主义，倾向从自由意志和行为的果报承受角度谈平等，认为众生同具感受痛苦的能力、强调感知伤害的能力相同，重视未来和潜能的平等而不拘泥于当下和现状。由此，佛教提倡了一种更大格局的平等观，对于当前的生态、环保等问题均有借鉴意义。佛教主张“向上看齐”的平等，而不是“向下拉平”的平等。面对社会资源的有限性和分配原则的差异，佛教不是在“因”的过程中一味寻求资源获取的平等。从人的心理角度言，佛教平等观提供了一种破除嫉妒心理的可能，可调解西方论者所提出的平等与欲念之间的矛盾。

佛教平等理念或许在中国历史上没有促进社会平权的运动，但在塑造中国人的思维方式上有独到价值，其特有的平等观对于解决当代西方平等思想中的困局也有诸多启发意义。

SU Tzu-Ying 蘇子嫻

## 以熊十力《體用論》反思科技發展中去物質化、去實體化的「實體」定義

因為covid19的影響，加速了人類數位化速度，並在有之外更企求好，故僅僅視訊連線是不夠的，人類努力於「遠距臨場感」而致力，我們的世界正在努力地去物質化、去實體化，譬如：電影後製不再需要真的有恐龍、海嘯，只需要有建模數據。在這愈來愈去物質化、去實體化的科技發展過程中，人類似乎透過科技在重建知覺對於「實體」的定義，我們對於物質的依賴是變強還是變弱？亦或是轉化？

在此，中國哲學對於「實體」的概念從來都不是封閉的，在熊十力先生《體用論》中以「實體非常非斷，生滅滅生」來打破對於實體固型的理解（恆轉），理解到心物雖有別但不二，實體與本體同；這實體與本體同的概念筆者認為可透過到吳光明（Kuang-ming Wu）於1997年提出的「身體思維」進一步被闡釋，吳光明在「思維」的論析上，認為「我」（I）是一個隱而不顯的具體指稱；當我們在描述一件「那個」（that）與「這個」（this）的連結時，「我」雖然沒被書寫或表達出來，但「我」是在其中。於此，筆者認為是可以回扣到熊十力本體與實體的觀點，換句話說，儒家關於物質的把握，可以透過以「本體」（我）所含具的「感·知」來消融與物質實體的邊界，進而使物質實體呈現出可侵入性。

故本文試圖以熊十力先生的《體用論》來提供面對科技發展越來越去物質化、去實體化的狀態，打破實體固型的儒家實體觀。

TANG Yuansong 汤元宋

## 女子可以成圣吗？——儒家是否为角色伦理学的另一种观察

儒学是否为角色伦理学的讨论，近年来吸引了海内外颇多学者的关注。本文尝试提供另一种观察的视角。八百年来，作为新儒学的理学思想深刻影响了东亚社会，但理学思想因其保守性色彩也曾备受批评。相比于其他宗教、思想流派历史中的女性思想家，中国理学史却罕能列举出哪怕一名女性理学名家。理学虽然主张人人皆可成圣，但在具体的伦理实践中，则又要求女性恪守妇道。以为读书非女子事，甚至认为女子是男性成圣道路上阻碍的观点在理学家中并不少见。理学家族中的女性，无论是中国出身理学家族、嫁予状元姚勉的梅庄夫人，亦或嫁予名儒重臣阮元的孔子第七十三代长女孙孔璐华，还是日本出身儒学世家、并与儒学名家婚配的贝原东轩、赖梅颯、山井道子等，她们的生活中都难免被压抑性情才华，而罕有希圣希贤的主张与实践。在东亚社会中，只有朝鲜出现些许不同的特例，比如金浩然斋、任允摯堂和姜静一堂。在理学影响下的东亚社会，这些理学家族中女性的不同命运，可以揭示出理学作为一种思潮，产生的不同变体。从而促使我们再次检讨理学以及广义的儒家，究竟是否是一种能够突破关系伦理束缚的角色伦理，从而实现一种更深刻的对于人的真正平等的觉醒。

WANG Hong 王虹

## 《周易》“井”文化的呈现——祥瑞与危机

“井”自古以来被认为是重要的生活资源，不仅代表着资源分配的实用价值，还被赋予了精神价值。《周易》中“井卦”对“井”赋予了很多文化隐喻，有托物言志、烘托渲染、起兴寄托、状物移情等作用，主要表现为“井”的象征意义，如个人品德、国家的安定与繁荣等息息相关，达到“以井喻家”“以井喻人”“以井祈福”的目的。这些文化内涵也渗透到了中国古代的绘画艺术中并得到了丰富和深刻地体现。笔者通过文献与古画做“图文互证”研究，“井”的精神与文化影响着儒者的思想，这些思想既有对个人精神品质的影响还有对国家命运的感慨。“井”有“井德”教育、社会教化、君子修身等方面的作用，如“君子修德”“审时度势、趋利避害”等。本文希望中国人对“井”的探索，其透过绘画展现出的祥瑞与危机可以为全球贡献出生生不息的精神力量，在强调世界人民之间的相互理解和团结实践的同时，也可抱持正确的心态，在文化共生理念下，笔者希望借助“井”的这些文化寓意与优势，面对当前的环境危机以及人们的情感焦虑等社会问题，都能带来一些思考。在思考“井”资源的安全以及井文化的精神寓意的同时，在面对世界危机时，需要全世界人民戮力同心。“井”精神可以促进各国间相互的合作和世界和谐的凝聚力。

## 以莊子之「知」與「心齋」思考變動世界中「對話」的意義

隨著科技、通訊的快速發展，人與人之間的交流，似乎更加的快速和便利。可是快速與便利的溝通方式，似乎沒有促成全球和諧共處的願景。由此，促使筆者思考《莊子》中，許多對於學習、知識和語言的論述與反思，尤其是莊子特別喜歡以「對話」的方式，來呈現他的觀點。而「對話」為語言表現的一種形式，卻具有其特殊性；因為，「對話」多數伴隨著情境，以對話者之間的互動呈現內容。由此，本文將通過「知」與「心齋」，來探討《莊子》中關於「對話」的現代意義。因為，首先莊子從不迴避人存在於人世間的事實，亦同意人具有「能知」（天府），即認識世界萬物的能力；再者，莊子經常強調人之「知」的侷限性，很容易形成「成心」、「師心」，因此需要「心齋」。最後，在《莊子》多數的「對話」情境裡，莊子總是喜歡借「對話」中的他人之口，來表達思想；如「心齋」的出處〈人間世〉，莊子藉由「顏回與仲尼」、「葉公子高與仲尼」、「顏闔與蘧伯玉」等對話，以第三者，或近似旁觀者的視角，來呈現他對於人間情勢的批判與分析。在當前的動盪不安的情勢中，《莊子》關於「知」與「心齋」的討論，以及「對話」的呈現，有助於我們重新思考「對話」的意義與價值。



XUN Zijie 荀子杰

## 从“感应之气”到“致良知”学说：阳明主体间模式基于列维纳斯“affection”概念的重新阐释

思想家对“主体间模式”的关注与转向是中西方哲学演进过程中共同经历的过程。在从思维出发把握与他者之关系的认识论径路走到尽头之后，双方都不约而同地将主体间性的可能性奠基于人类本源性的同情共感。王阳明对此同情共感的具体描述是“气”以及它们彼此之间的“感应”关系，从中又可进一步区分出先天层面的天赋能力，先验层面的无意识积淀以及经验层面的工夫活动三个递进的维度。然而，由于阳明文本中缺乏对“感应之气”功能的进一步哲学阐释，有必要引荐法国现象学家列维纳斯的“affection”概念作为理解阳明“感应”的他山之石。列氏从元素出发，将主体阶段的“己”刻画为母性与易受伤害性，进而认为主体的诞生源自他者对主体的“hétéro-affection”（异质-感发）。以此为参照，阳明将“万物一体之仁”视为主体诞生的条件，以“形体之气”与“天地之气”的感应交汇为“心性”萌发生长的端始。由于人先天的感应共通之能，每当伦理处境来临，本源性的道德情感就会觉醒，将主体从私欲、气习的遮蔽中唤出，这即是伦理关系的自身显现。另一方面，不同于列维纳斯“affection”于存在论层面止步，王阳明独有的洞见在于他进一步将“感应”所意谓的主体间交互推进到工夫论维度，揭示出普通人如何在生活世界中运用自身本有的道德情感能力，存养良知，克制私欲，最终成为一个道德的人。

YIN Tingting 殷亭亭

## 方以智“生命关怀观念”的内容与精神——以《药地炮庄》为中心的考察

方以智身处时代裂变之中感慨颇多，后期以儒解庄、以禅说庄而作《药地炮庄》一书，书中彰显出的生命关怀是方氏基于本人的现实思考、会通儒释道而形成自己哲学特质的过程。方以智在书中凸显的生命关怀精神体现在其对心物关系的考察、安时处顺的处事态度以及对生死问题的重新审视上。他在心物关系的解读中，于“齐物”之外提出“公因公用”思考进路，目的在于使天道性命的内涵于己心全副展开，经验的现象世界便成为“真知”的基础；而安时而处顺的态度随着“真知”的呈现，在面对世事中也便有了超越的思想境界。但此处的“安时而处顺”并非消极义，因为方以智主张在“生生死死”中体会“出生死”的意涵，他侧重于对生之积极义的肯定，体现他直面现实的清醒和积极的精神。

## 哲学主体性与互鉴性关系探析——以“仁爱”为中心

主体性与互鉴性（开放性）关系是多元哲学对话的前提性问题。主体性是互鉴性得以可能的基础，互鉴性既扩展主体性的视野，又促进主体性的进一步深化。如何理性、平和地处理好哲学主体性与互鉴性的关系问题，是当代多样文明交流互鉴的前提。作为中国哲学最为重要的概念之一，“仁爱”内蕴哲学主体性与互鉴性的意涵和启示。“仁爱”向来被置于儒家价值体系和道德体系的首位，是情感认同、道德理性、价值选择、行为规范的综合。“仁爱”指向不同主体的交往互鉴，其内涵包括亲亲、仁民、爱物已经成为共识。亲亲强调以孝悌为本，即具备血缘关系的主体之间对这一血缘关系的维系；仁民强调人与人之间的相互尊重，承认不同主体具有独立人格的同时，具有沟通交往的可能性；爱物强调以自然为伴，指向人在宇宙中对主体性的恰当而非夸大的认识，以及对自身责任的自觉担当。此外，“仁爱”还有“自爱”的意思，“知者自知，仁者自爱”（《荀子·子道》）。对“仁爱”的“自爱”内涵的挖掘，一方面，承认不同主体之间之所以能够交往互鉴，在于主体性的确认；另一方面，在交往互鉴的同时，能够对于自身主体性有更为深入的认识。在这一意义上，“仁爱”既承认中国哲学的独特性、包容性、和平性，又强调不同哲学形态之间可以秉持主体性和互鉴性并重的态度进行平等交流，通过对话交往、相互借鉴，更好地促进哲学主体性的坚信。哲学主体性不是拒绝沟通，哲学互鉴性也不是盲从他人。在今天，以“仁爱”为代表的中国哲学追求的是充分尊重多样文明的主体性，同时谋求解决人类共同面临问题的可行方案，重新寻求人与自身、人与他人、人与世界，以及哲学形态自身、哲学形态之间、人类思想智慧的和谐相处。

ZHANG Qianqian 张谦谦

## 自恋人格的儒家治疗方案

自恋是现代生活中一种高发的精神疾病，也是常见的心理障碍。西方心理学界围绕自恋的形成与发展形成了多种学说，包括以弗洛伊德为代表的精神分析学派“本能根源”的看法，认为婴儿基于对哺育者的需要而形成了“原始自恋”，并进一步可能导致“继发性自恋”。与弗洛伊德意见相反的人际关系障碍说认为自恋源于童年时期的精神官能症，是对自尊缺失的一种补偿机制。阿德勒提出并强调的是文化环境对自恋形成的关键影响。然这些思路都不足以从根本上解决自恋的问题。从儒学立场看，“良知主体”的觉醒是疗愈自恋的基础和贯穿自恋治疗的“大药”。考察儒学当中对治心疾的资源，将有助于儒学和现代心理学的资源交相为用，疗愈自恋。

ZHOU Jinyao 周衿瑶

## 紧绷与共生：明清之际友伦观念的革新与实践

古希腊的友伦观念以契约精神为核心，强调平等与互利；儒家友伦则是五伦中兄弟一伦的变体，与仁爱、君师紧密相连。明清之际诸多思想家对友伦重提，革新了其内涵。通过剖析何心隐、李贽、傅山、王夫之、方以智等人的友伦观点，展现明季友伦与天人、君臣、兄弟三伦的共生关系。明季士人通过反思友伦与其他三伦的异同，试图缓解君臣关系、人际关系的紧绷，将友伦作为一种伦理实践，以寻求更和谐的人际关系和社会秩序。明代士大夫群体意识的强化，以及活跃的党社和讲学活动，促进了“朋友”一伦意义的提升。然而，明末政治环境的凶险对“友”之一伦提出了特殊而苛刻的要求，使得士人对“友伦”的言说变得复杂丰富。明季士人提倡友伦的原因主要有两个方面：首先，是对明末君臣关系紧张的一种补充。例如何心隐认为朋友关系能够成为聚天下英才、推行仁政的重要纽带。这种思想反映了士大夫对传统君臣关系的重审和对朋友关系的重视。其次，社稷存亡的危难促使党社出现，乱世友伦的作用凸显。江山易代过程中，士人面临着政治上的孤立和危险，他们通过党社和讲学活动来寻求精神上的慰藉和支持。独学无友，则孤陋而难成，友伦在关系伦理中起着桥梁作用，它不仅连接个体，促进个人成长，还有助于维护社会和谐与正义。

## 论“中国美学”的学科特质

既有的“中国美学”概念，包括了广义的中国美学和狭义的中国美学。狭义的“中国美学”是指中国古代美学思想和审美意识及其在当代的研究和继承发展，主要是对西方美学学科进入中国之前中国古代美学思想的追溯，也包括当代中国在古代美学思想和审美意识研究中对它的继承和发展。审美意识是中国美学思想的源头活水。历代中国人的审美情趣，是古人长期审美实践的累积，凝定在器物和文学艺术等历史遗存中，并形成了悠久的传统，值得我们当代出发对它们进行理论概括和总结。中国古人在对自然山水的欣赏中突显主体的审美意识，在赏会中呈现个体的会心体验，从中呈现了对生命的体认，达到畅神的境界，彰显了生命的价值和意义。中国美学思想有重视感悟和连类无穷的诗性表达特点，体现了一种生命意识。中国美学中重视有机整体性，体现了中国文化中尚象的传统和重视表意的传统，形成了以意象为核心的美学思想，有自己潜在的范畴体系。中国美学具有多民族融合和借鉴外来文化的兼容并包的特点，需要在继承传统、借鉴西方、面向当下审美实际的基础上，运用丰富的美学资源建构一个知识系统。中国古代独特的美学概念，包括术语、范畴和命题，彰显其独特价值。中国美学研究不仅需要扎实的中国古代文献基础，而且需要西方美学的修养和全球化的视野。西方美学的方法和学术规范影响着中国美学学科建设。中国美学与西方美学有所见略同的地方，但也有一定的差异。中西美学也有矛盾冲突，需要对话和交融。西方美学在学科范式和研究方法方面，为整理中国美学思想提供了范式。中国古代的美学思想需要基于中国古代的历史语境，又要超越于历史语境，在当代发挥作用。中国古代美学思想资源，需要在参证西方的跨文化交流中发展，结合当下的审美实践加以印证，激活其中有价值、有生命力的内容。学习和借鉴西方，实现中西美学的融合对话，是中国美学走向现代，走向世界的重要方面。我们建立现代意义上的中国美学学科，把中国美学作为多元一体的世界美学的有机组成部分，既是中国美学融入世界美学的需要，也是我们珍视中国美学思想作为人类宝贵精神财富的一种神圣的义务。

**DESCRIPTIONS  
OF BOOK  
LAUNCHES**





*ALLINSON Robert E.*

**Zhuangzi for Spiritual Transformation:  
An Analysis of the Inner Chapters  
(State University of New York Press, 1989)**

ALLINSON Robert Elliott, Soka University

AMBROGIO Selusi, University of Macerata

ROGACZ Dawid, Adam Mickiewicz University

CHAI David, The Chinese University of Hong Kong

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This book offers a fundamentally new interpretation of the philosophy of the *Zhuangzi*. It is the first full length work of its kind that argues a deep level cognitive structure exists beneath an otherwise seemingly random collection of literary anecdotes, cryptic sayings, and dark allusions. The author carefully analyzes the differences between myths, legends, monstrous characters, paradoxes, parables and linguistic puzzles as strategically placed techniques for systematically tapping and channeling the cognitive and spiritual dimensions of the mind.

Professor Allinson takes issues with commentators who have treated the *Zhuangzi* as a minor foray into relativism. Chapter title are re-translated, textual fragments are re-located, and, significantly, inauthentic outer and miscellaneous chapters are carefully separated from the authentic, inner chapters. Each of the inner chapters is demonstrated to be a building block to the next so that they can only be understood as forming a developmental sequence. In the end, the reader is presented with a clear, consistent, and coherent view of the *Zhuangzi* that is more in accord with its stature as a major philosophical work.

*AMBROGIO Selusi, ROGACZ Dawid (ed.)*

## **Chinese Philosophy and Its Thinkers (Bloomsbury, 2024)**

AMBROGIO Selusi, University of Macerata

ROGACZ Dawid, Adam Mickiewicz University

VALMISA Mercedes, Gettysburg College

ROSENLEE Li-Hsiang Lisa, University of Hawaii – West Oahu

CHAI David, Chinese University of Hong Kong

MICHAEL Tom, Beijing Normal University

PERKINS Franklin, University of Hawai'i at Mānoa

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This is a round-table devoted to a debated presentation and discussion of the theoretical reasons, historiographical paradigms, and topics of the multi-authored three-volume set *Chinese Philosophy and Its Thinkers* (Bloomsbury 2024), the most extended history of Chinese Philosophy in the English language edited by Selusi Ambrogio and Dawid Rogacz. Across a set of three volumes spanning more than three thousand years, this is a survey of thinkers central to the development of philosophical thought in China. From the origins of Chinese thought in the Zhou dynasty to the contemporary Chinese environmental philosophy and bioethics.

The present three-volume set addresses these academic and social concerns by offering a new comprehensive history of Chinese philosophy and its thinkers. As a collective work of more than seventy researchers, it fills numerous gaps in the existing scholarship and examines many misconceptions surrounding its impactful narratives. By uncovering the philosophical debates held throughout more than two millennia of the development of Chinese thought, its ultimate ambition is to foster global philosophical engagement with the views of Chinese thinkers and to extend the range of problems that can be tackled in current philosophical discussions.

CARLEO III Robert A.

## **Humane Liberality: A Confucian Proposal (Rowman & Littlefield, 2024)**

CARLEO III Robert A., East China Normal University

LI Huanyou, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich

LIANG Yuhan, Wuhan University

PERKINS Franklin, University of Hawaii at Manoa

LEBKUECHER Gina, Wuhan University

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Robert Carleo's recent book, *Humane Liberality: A Confucian Proposal* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2024), draws on the philosophy of Classical Confucian philosopher Mencius (Mengzi), as well as the work of later Chinese philosophers—Qing Confucian Dai Zhen (1724–1777) and modern philosopher Li Zehou (1930–2021)—to argue for 'humane liberality'. Professor Carleo's book presents a concrete humanist proposal for endorsing rights and liberties via Mencian humaneness, which provides a uniquely Confucian framework for assessing rights, wrongs, liberties, and equality that are rooted in concrete considerations of actual persons' well-being. Carleo's Mengzian 'humane liberality' serves as a promising foundation for promoting government policies that serve equality, flourishing, freedom, and justice while avoiding liberalism's problematically circular, abstract, and nonempirical notions of freedom and equality. In this way, *Humane Liberality* provides a novel and constructive outline for understanding and practicing Confucian values and liberal principles in a contemporary and global context, and explores the promise and potential of reconciling these two valuable moral and political outlooks.

This panel offers an opportunity to engage with Professor Carleo in a conversation about the themes, arguments, and insights explored in his book. The event will include a brief précis of the book's content presented by the author, followed by comments from the panelists to which Professor Carleo will have an opportunity to respond. The session will then conclude with a Q&A session with the audience.

KING Richard A. H.

## **The Lord a Lord, the Minister a Minister, the Father a Father, the Son a Son: Roles and virtues in Plato, Aristotle, the Mencius and the Xunzi (Meiner, 2025)**

KING Richard. A. H., Bern University

AMES Roger, Peking University

CHAN Sin Yee, University of Vermont

CONNOLLY Tim, East Stroudsburg University

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The connection between roles and virtues is complex and informs the ways of thinking about the good life investigated in this study. Whether roles are distinguished by rites – as in early China– or as functions, as in ancient Greece, it is their good performance that makes living within the domain or city good. This is what this monograph is about: an innovative contribution to the understanding of virtue in the context of ancient ethico-political thought.

One prominent feature of early Chinese politico-ethics is that there are apparently virtues attached to roles. Thus early followers of Confucius discuss filiality (*xiao* 孝) and fraternity (*ti* 悌). The title of this volume: “The Lord a Lord, the Minister a Minister, the Father a Father, the Son a Son.” comes from the collection known as the *Analects* of Confucius: without naming the virtues, it prescribes the proper role fulfilment as necessary for government. While in ancient Greece we do not have such named role virtues, this monograph argues that in Aristotle and Plato the very notion of virtue, *arête* binds it to performing some particular role, *ergon*, “function”. In contrast, in the early Chinese texts (4<sup>th</sup>-3<sup>rd</sup> century BCE) *Mencius* and *Xunzi*, there are indeed filiality and fraternity, but roles, and hence virtues, are determined not by function but by rites (*li* 禮), above all using filiality as a paradigm for ordering conduct, also in government. By showing the importance of role ethics in Plato and Aristotle, this study allows us to see Confucian politico-ethics as much closer to classical Greek theories than heretofore. Furthermore, by demonstrating that virtue and roles may go hand in hand, we can move forward the current debate in early Chinese thought which posits the two notions as alternatives and not complementary to one another.

ROSENLEE Li-Hsiang Lisa

***Confucian Feminism: A Practical Ethic for Life*  
(Bloomsbury 2024)**

ROSENLEE Li-Hsiang Lisa, University of Hawaii – West Oahu

FOUST Mathew, Appalachian State University

DAI Yuanfang, Michigan State University

XIANG Shuchen, Xidian University

ZHANG LILI, Chinese Academy of Social Science

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As a sequel to her 1st monograph *Confucianism and Women: A Philosophical Interpretation* (2006), Rosenlee's *Confucian Feminism: A Practical Ethic for Life* (Bloomsbury, September 2024) is the only book publication available to date using distinctive Confucian terms, methods and concerns to construct a hybridized feminist theory, interrogating the root of gender oppression and envisioning a liberating future for all transnationally and transculturally. Building on previously published anthologies on the intersection between Confucianism and feminist philosophy such as *The Sage and the Second Sex* (2000), *Asian and Feminist Philosophies in Dialogue: Liberating Traditions* (2014), and *Feminist Encounters with Confucius* (2016), this book offers a family- and care-based feminist theory applicable to a wide-range of issues including elder care, spousal relationship, democratic institutions, and common good, in addition to some implications for the LGBTQAI+ community.

This book panel will feature three readers with diverse academic training, ranging from social sciences, rhetoric, to comparative philosophies. Their critical insights will help advance both of the fields of comparative philosophy and feminist philosophy. Each reader will have 20 minutes to present their comments and the author will deliver a 20-minute response, followed by a 30-40 minute Q-A session.

## Confucian Feminism, Ritual and the Obligations of the State

My comment will focus on the latter parts of Prof. Rosenlee's *Confucian Feminism: A Practical Ethic for Life*. Rosenlee's book is ambitious in that it, through an interpretation of Confucian ethics via the framework of care-ethics, she seeks to rethink the responsibilities of the state itself. Given that the contemporary "liberal" orthodox conception of the state rests on autonomous, unencumbered and thus "masculine" conception of personhood, a relational, care-ethic-feminist redefinition of personhood implies an attendant rethinking of the nature of the state itself. Rosenlee argues that the traditional conception of *Datong* better captures a care-ethics-feminist attitude of our relationships towards each other in a civic community. A nuanced understanding of the place of ritual is central to this political conception of civic community. My paper will focus on Rosenlee's analysis of the difference between ritual and law and how the divergence between them can be insightfully and simultaneously understood in a gendered way and with attendant political implications for our thinking about the nature of political organization.

If there is time, then I will also briefly speak about another issue that Rosenlee's book draws upon: liberal feminism's problematic complicity with entrenching colonial and racial hierarchies. How Confucian feminism might avoid this pitfall and the related problems of identity politics in which a certain race of women are elevated to serve a regressive political status quo would also be an interesting topic of discussion.

*ZHANG Lili*

## **The Legitimacy of Confucian Feminism**

Scholars have pointed out the incompatibility between Confucianism and feminism, as some well-known sexist proverbs have deep roots in Confucian canons (e.g., men are superior and women are inferior 男尊女卑). With the efforts of some scholars, there is a consensus that Confucianism should abandon those gender bias theories to keep pace with a women-friendly society. Rosenlee's new book *Confucian Feminism A Practical Ethic for Life* is one of them, which deserves our attention. The first part of this paper will give a summary of her book and will raise a question of how to integrate Confucianism and feminism. I agree with Rosenlee and argue that her attempt at constructing the concept of "Confucian feminism" is academically legitimate. Thus, the second part of this paper will give textual evidence to show some traditional materials in Confucianism can be re-read as gender-friendly and some famous sexist concepts (e.g., chastity 贞) are gender-neutral in their original context. Then, I will borrow words from Chenyang Li, Sor hoon Tan, Ann Pang-White, and Susan Mann to show the necessity of reshaping Confucianism to generate a modern Confucian feminist theory. I will conclude this paper with the argumentation of the legitimacy of Confucian feminism and will present the value of Rosenlee's contribution to such an academic change in the present.

*DAI Yuanfang*

## **Confucian Feminism in Transcultural Context**

In my comments on Rosenlee's book, I focus on the politics of feminism in the context of Confucian philosophy and how the idea of "Confucian feminism" can be used as a practical ethic for life. I tend to think solely concentrating on textual interpretations of Confucian classics is insufficient to reveal the relation between Confucianism and gender equality. Comparative scholars' position at the intersection of Western feminism and Chinese philosophy results from the opportunity to gain a transcultural perspective enabled by globalization. The implications of Confucianism for Chinese women's status cannot be appropriately addressed without examining its social context. Chinese cultural heritage must be a part of the mix of feminist practices reinforcing transcultural practices. In such transcultural practices, Chinese traditions connect to Western feminism and deeply affect how Chinese feminism is formed. In other words, the rise of feminist scholarship of Confucianism results from scholars' transcultural experiences. Their academic practice is transcultural in that they reinterpret Confucian texts in a feminist way and compare thoughts from different cultural and intellectual contexts and traditions. Rosenlee's new book is one of the examples of this kind of transcultural experience in academia.



*ROŠKER Jana S.*

**Chinese Philosophy in Transcultural Contexts:  
Comparative Approaches and the Method of Sublation.  
London (Bloomsbury, 2024)**

ROŠKER Jana S., University of Ljubljana

ZIPORYN Brook, University of Chicago

CARLEO III Robert A., East China Normal University

PANG-WHITE Ann A., The University of Scranton

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The book presents a novel dialectical method to our comprehension of diverse philosophical ideas. Analyzing philosophical discourses that have emerged in China and the Sinophone region, Rošker applies the method to examples from across the history of thought. From Ancient Chinese logicians to 20th-century intellectuals, she connects thinkers and offers fresh insights into key aspects of philosophy. The result is a series of vibrant dialogues among different intellectual traditions, providing new understandings of transcultural philosophical interactions.

SELLMANN James, JACOBY Marcin (ed.)

## **Dao Companion to the Philosophy of the Lüshi chunqiu (Springer, 2025)**

SELLMANN James, University of Guam

JACOBY Marcin, SWPS University

CHAI David, Chinese University of Hong Kong

COOK Scott, Yale-NUS College

MICHAEL Thomas, Beijing Normal University

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The *Dao Companion to the Philosophy of the Lüshi chunqiu* is a new volume to be published by Springer in late 2025. It will be the first comprehensive, multi-authored study of the *Lüshi Chunqiu* in English, and one of very few studies of this scope in any language, including Chinese. The book consists of 24 chapters by leading scholars from North America, Europe, Australia, and East Asia tackling the work's literary form, rhetorical strategies, metaphysics, leadership theory, and reception in imperial, and modern China. The main focus of the volume is a robust analysis of how different philosophical and political concepts and influences were melted and welded together by the work's authors to create a coherent philosophy of ideal, moral rulership of All Under Heaven. The volume aims at showing *Lüshi Chunqiu* as a highly original and coherent piece of political discourse, counter to its previous label as a "miscellaneous" or "eclectic" work of secondary importance in China.

*STAMATOV Aleksandar (ed.)*

## **Dialogues with Classical Chinese Philosophy (Routledge, 2025)**

STAMATOV Aleksandar, Ming Chuan University

OGRIZEK Marko, University of Ljubljana

PETERNELL Tara, University of Ljubljana

This book is an edited collection of essays that engage classical Chinese philosophy into dialogue conducted through a threefold methodological approach: Chinese philosophy compared with Western philosophy, Chinese philosophy and contemporary issues, and Chinese philosophy in the context of world philosophy. The essays delve into essential pre-Qin philosophical texts, examining them in light of their potential connections to themes aligned with these approaches.

The three methodological approaches are essentially interrelated in a way that the discussions on comparisons between Chinese and Western philosophies, and Chinese philosophy and contemporary issues, pave the way towards world philosophy. In the comparative approach, we seek parallels between two different traditions; in this case Chinese and Western. World philosophy emerges from this comparison, but it is not a philosophy that belongs to any of the traditions; it is a philosophy of its own tradition. By joining, so to speak, similar concepts and ideas from different traditions, we come to concepts and ideas that transcend the boundaries of these traditions, but are still acceptable and understandable within their framework of thinking. They come to belong to a new tradition which is called world philosophy. Furthermore, the contemporary issues are universal and global. Even though it may seem that the initial discussions about them come from a specific tradition, they concern most, if not all, of the world. By discussing these issues through the lens of any tradition of philosophy, in this book Chinese philosophy, we are also coming closer to world philosophy.

*VALMISA Mercedes*

## **All Things Act (Oxford University Press, 2025)**

VALMISA Mercedes, Gettysburg College

CONNOLLY Tim, East Stroudsburg University

SILIUS Vytis, Vilnius University

ZIPORYN Brook, University of Chicago

This book explores the collective character of action to expand the ways in which we think about agency. I develop two main claims throughout the book. First, that there's no such thing as an individual action. All actions, including those that appear to be individual, intentional, and volitional, are collectively constituted and performed by an assembly of actors, human and nonhuman. Second, that agency is not an abstract capacity owned by individual entities, such as humans, which would underlie the exercise of concrete actions. Rather, the term agency is a label referring not to an inner faculty but to the concrete socio-material processes that emerge from the collaborative efforts of multiple entities acting together. In other words, all of our actions are co-acted along with others; and what we view as our own unique and distinctive form of human agency, which includes intending, conceiving, planning, and executing actions, as well as anticipating, explaining, rationalizing, justifying, and experiencing the effects of actions, is constituted at every layer by a colorful variety of nonhumans and can't be entirely separated nor understood without them.

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