Sodobni vojaški izzivi

Contemporary Military Challenges

Znanstveno-strokovna publikacija Slovenske vojske

REPUBLIKA SLOVENIJA
MINISTRSTVO ZA OBRAMBO
GENERALŠTAB SLOVENSKE VOJSKE

Sodobni vojaški izzivi

Contemporary Military Challenges

Znanstveno-strokovna publikacija Slovenske vojske

REPUBLIKA SLOVENIJA
MINISTRSTVO ZA OBRAMBO
GENERALŠTAB SLOVENSKE VOJSKE

EU IN NATO:
VARNOSTNA RAZMERJA

»Če si ne zagotovite zaveznikov in pomočnikov, ostanete sami in šibki«.

Sun Tzu, Umetnost vojne

EU AND NATO:
SECURITY RELATIONS

»If you do not seak out allies and helpers, then you will be isolated and weak.«

Sun Tzu, The Art of War

VSEBINA
CONTENTS

Liliana Brožič

UVODNIK

EU IN NATO: VARNOSTNA RAZMERJA

V tokratni številki Sodobnih vojaških izzivov smo se posvetili odnosom med Evropsko unijo in Natom na varnostnem področju. 1. junija 2021 so se v Bruslju sestali zunanji ministri držav članic zavezništva, da bi se dogovorili o podrobnostih vrha Nata 14. junija 2021 v Bruslju v Belgiji, torej prav v času izida naše tematske številke. Dvajset zunanjih ministrov je predstavljalo države članice Nata, ki so obenem tudi članice EU, zaradi česar je dogodek, kot je vrh Nata, še toliko pomembnejši za prihodnost evropske varnosti. Na ministrialu so bile omenjene številne teme, kot na primer Afganistan, Belorusija, Rusija in Kitajska. V splošnem pa je bilo poudarjeno, da se mora Nato prilagajati novim varnostnim izzivom v zelo tekmovalnem okolju. Kot je omenil generalni sekretar Nata Jens Stoltenberg, se spoprijemamo s številnimi varnostnimi izzivi, ki jih moramo reševati skupaj, kajti nobena država ali celina se z njimi ne more spoprijeti sama. Navedeno vključuje krepitev sedanjih partnerstev pa tudi vzpostavljanje novih, vključno z azijsko-pacifiškimi, afriškimi in latinskomeriškimi državami. Beseda je tekla tudi o pospeševanju usposabljanja in krepitvi zmogljivosti za partnerje ter o prizadevanjih za reševanje vplivov podnebnih sprememb na varnost. Ministri so se strinjali, da morajo začeti delati po prihodnjem Natovem strateškem konceptu, saj se je varnostno okolje po letu 2010 pomembno spremenilo. Generalni sekretar je poudaril, da bo Natova prihodnja prilagoditev od članic zahtevala nadaljevanje vlaganj v obrambo in več skupnih vlaganj za dosego povečanja moči ter močnega sporočila o skupni enotnosti in odločnosti.

V času, ko je Združenim državam Amerike predsedoval Donald Trump, so v političnih razpravah pogosto preučevali dejstvo, da Evropska unija oziroma njene države članice namenjajo premalo pozornosti in virov za svojo obrambo.

Leta 2016, torej že leto pred začetkom mandata ameriškega predsednika Trumpa, je Evropska unija sprejela Globalno strategijo EU, v kateri je predvidela nekaj možnosti, s katerimi želi okrepiti področje Skupne varnostne in obrambne politike, o

čemer bomo več pisali v naslednji številki Sodobnih varnostnih izzivov. V strategiji so predvideli, da bodo Evropski obrambi sklad, Stalno strukturno sodelovanje, Usklajeni letni pregled obrambe in drugi mehanizmi delovali tako, da se dejavnosti, viri ter zmogljivosti ne bodo podvajali z Natovimi, temveč se bodo med seboj dopolnjevali. Res je, da je Evropska unija v okviru Skupne varnostne in obrambne politike na svojih srečanjih in v sprejetih dokumentih predvidela že veliko dejavnosti v smislu krepitve te politike, vendar jih pozneje ni toliko udejanjila. Se je na tem področju v zadnjih štirih letih kaj spremenilo ali pa se mogoče še bo med konferenco o prihodnosti Evrope? Tako kot zavezništvo načrtuje nov strateški koncept, tudi Evropska unija napoveduje Strateški kompas, ki bo dal nove usmeritve za prihodnje sodelovanje tudi na področju varnosti.

Kako to sodelovanje med Evropsko unijo in Natom poteka leta 2021 na nekaterih področjih varnosti, nam predstavljajo avtorji v tokratni številki.

Prispevek z naslovom *Sodelovanje EU-Nato in slovensko predsedovanje Svetu evropske unije* avtorja **Marka Mahniča** predstavlja zanimivo tezo o tem, ali so ovire za skladno delovanje Evropske unije in Organizacije severnoatlantske pogodbe na področju skupne varnosti in obrambe le tehnične narave ali pa gre morda za razlike v politiki, dvostranskih odnosih in nacionalnih ambicijah nekaterih držav.

O tem, kakšno je *Partnerstvo med EU in Natom pri zagotavljanju informacijske oziroma kibernetske varnosti: teorija in praksa*, piše **Damjan Štrucl**. Kot pravi, so razvoj informacijsko-komunikacijske tehnologije in novi izzivi sodobnega varnostnega okolja povzročili podpis Skupne izjave o poglobljenem strateškem partnerstvu med organizacijama leta 2016. V prispevku avtor analizira strateško partnerstvo med EU in Natom pri zagotavljanju varnosti in obrambe v sodobnem varnostnem okolju.

Obrambne pobude za krepitev varnosti Evropske unije so k pisanju prispevka spodbudile **Gregorja Garba**, ki predstavlja, kaj vse je Globalna strategija Evropske unije leta 2016 prispevala za njeno strateško obrambno avtonomijo, sprva sicer v teoretičnem smislu po petih letih in tudi v praktičnem smislu. Vse seveda ob dejstvu, da bo Evropska unija tudi v prihodnosti ohranjala močne stike in trdno sodelovanje s Severnoatlantskim zavezništvom.

David Humar in **Nina Raduha** predstavljata proces nastajanja Vojaške strategije Republike Slovenije v Slovenski vojski. Spremembe v mednarodnem okolju so k strateškim premislekom na varnostnem področju spodbudile Nato in Evropsko unijo. Slovenija kot država članica v obeh organizacijah prav tako potrebuje strateški premislek na vojaškem in varnostnem področju. Več o procesu v prispevku *Oblikovanje vojaške strategije Republike Slovenije*.

Reševanje nezakonitih migracij v Evropi je tema, ki se ji je posvetil **Miklós Böröcz**. Vse od leta 2015 so takrat množične nezakonite migracije pomenile veliko težavo za

Evropo in Evropsko unijo. Množična begunska kriza se je postopoma preoblikovala v nezakonite migracije posameznikov in manjših skupin, ki so ohranile in okrepile stik z vsemi, ki pri tem sodelujejo ter skrbijo, da migracijski tok z nezakonitim predznakom ne pojenja. Avtor predlaga nekaj rešitev za to problematiko.

Liliana Brožič

EDITORIAL

EU AND NATO: SECURITY RELATIONS

In this issue of the Contemporary Military Challenges, we focus on the relations between the European Union and NATO in the field of security. On 1 June 2021, NATO Foreign Ministers met in Brussels to discuss the details of the NATO Summit to be held on 14 June 2021 in Brussels, Belgium; the period, which coincides with the publication of this thematic issue. Twenty foreign ministers represented NATO member states, which are also EU members, making an event such as the NATO summit all the more important for the future of European security. Many topics were mentioned at the ministerial, such as Afghanistan, Belarus, Russia and China. In general, however, the emphasis was put on the fact that NATO should adapt to new challenges, security settings in a highly competitive environment. As mentioned by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, we are presented with a number of challenges to our security that we need to tackle together, because no country and no continent can deal with them alone. This includes strengthening the existing partnerships and building new ones, including in the Asia-Pacific, Africa, and Latin America. The participants also discussed the stepping up of training and capability building for partners, as well as work to address the security impact of climate change. In the conclusion, the ministers broadly agreed that it was important to start work on NATO's next Strategic Concept, because our strategic environment has significantly changed since 2010. Secretary General underlined that NATO's future adaptation would require Allies to continue investing in defence, and to invest more together, as a force multiplier and a strong message of unity and resolve.

During Donald Trump's mandate as President of the United States, the fact that the European Union or its Member States pay too little attention and thus resources for their own defence has often been a hot topic of political debate.

In 2016, a year before the US President Trump took office, the European Union adopted a Global Strategy which envisaged several options to strengthen the Common

Security and Defence Policy, which we will discuss in further detail in the next issue of the Contemporary Security Challenges. The Global Strategy provided that the European Defence Fund, the Permanent Structured Cooperation, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, and other existing and new mechanisms would operate in such a way that activities, resources and capabilities would not duplicate with NATO's, but would complement each other. True enough that, within the Common Security and Defence Policy, the European Union has already foreseen many activities at its meetings and in the adopted documents in terms of strengthening this policy, but later implemented little. Has anything changed in this area in the past four years, or will perhaps something change at the time of the Conference on the future of Europe? Just as the Alliance is planning a new strategic concept, the European Union is announcing a Strategic Compass, which will set new directions for future cooperation, also in the field of security.

In this issue, the authors present how the cooperation between the European Union and NATO is taking place in 2021 in some areas of security.

The article titled *EU-NATO cooperation and the Slovenian presidency of the Council of the European Union* by **Marko Mahnič** presents an interesting thesis on whether obstacles to the coherent functioning of the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the field of common security and defence are of a purely technical nature, or are there maybe differences in the policies, bilateral relations and national ambitions of certain countries.

Damjan Štrucl writes about the *EU-NATO partnership and ensuring information security and cybersecurity: theory and practice*. According to him, the development of information and communication technology and new challenges of the modern security environment have led to the signing of the Joint Declaration on deepening the strategic partnership between both organizations in 2016. The author provides an analysis of the EU-NATO strategic partnership in ensuring security and defence in the modern security environment.

Defence initiatives to strengthen the security of the European Union motivated **Gregor Garb** to write an article presenting what the 2016 European Union Global Strategy contributed to the EU's strategic defence autonomy. Initially, in a theoretical sense, and after five years in a practical sense. All of course, given the fact that the European Union will continue to maintain strong relations and cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance.

David Humar and **Nina Raduha** present the process of creating the Military Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia in the Slovenian Armed Forces. Changes in the international environment have initiated security-related strategic considerations of NATO and the European Union. Slovenia as a member of both organizations also needs a strategic consideration in both military and security fields. Their article

provides more details about the *The process of devising the Military Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia*.

Tackling irregular migration in Europe is a topic addressed by **Miklós Böröcz**. Ever since 2015, the then mass illegal migration has posed a major problem for Europe and the European Union. The mass refugee crisis has gradually transformed into illegal migration of individuals and small groups, who have maintained and strengthened contact with everybody along the way, who take part in this and ensure that the migration flow with of illegal character does not subside. The author provides some solutions to this problem.

Marko Mahnič

SODELOVANJE EU-NATO IN SLOVENSKO PREDSEDOVANJE SVETU EVROPSKE UNIJE

EU-NATO COOPERATION AND THE SLOVENIAN PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Povzetek   Namen članka je spodbuditi razmislek o tem, ali so ovire za skladno delovanje Evropske unije in Organizacije severnoatlantske pogodbe na področju skupne varnosti in obrambe le tehnične narave ali gre za razlike na nekaterih drugih ravneh v politiki, dvostranskih odnosih in nacionalnih ambicijah nekaterih držav, ki so članice ene ali druge organizacije. V obeh primerih se postavlja vprašanje, ali lahko Slovenija kot država, ki 1. julija 2021 prevzame predsedovanje Svetu Evropske unije, v šestih mesecih predsedovanja prispeva k premostitvi katere izmed teh ovir.

Ključne besede   *EU, Nato, Slovenija, predsedovanje Svetu EU.*

Abstract   The aim of this article is to entice the reader to consider whether the obstacles in the way of cohesion between the European Union's common security and defence efforts and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Organization are truly of a technical nature, or whether there are differences on other levels, in the politics, bilateral relations and national ambitions of certain members of the same organization? Whatever the case may be, the question before us is whether Slovenia can contribute to surmounting any of these obstacles during its six-month presidency of the Council of the European Union, starting on 1st July.

Key words   *EU, NATO, Slovenia, Presidency of the Council of the EU.*

1.

Introduction The year 2020 will go down in history as a year of unexpected events, challenges and outcomes which have affected the lives of people all around the world. A new European Commission led by Ursula Von Der Leyen, the former German Minister of Defence, started its work at the beginning of the year. Due to complications with the appointment of Commissioners, the Commission formally took up its posts with one month's delay, on 1 December 2019. It was immediately clear that this is a kind of relaunch of the Union, with a more ambitious approach and concrete ideas for the future of Europe. The Commission soon presented the new Green Deal, signed the agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) and announced, inter alia, a more geopolitical agenda with implications in the field of security and defence. Shortly afterwards the global Covid-19 pandemic broke out and it seemed as if the world stopped for a moment. This was followed by a period of intense competition; first in the purchasing of protective equipment, then in developing a vaccine, and finally, towards the end of the year, we were able to witness an intriguing presidential election in the United States. With the victory of Joe Biden, or rather the departure of Donald Trump, Europe was flooded by a wave of optimism and the hope of rekindling or strengthening the transatlantic relations.

Throughout this period, the NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, consistently repeated the same message: "NATO-EU cooperation has reached unprecedented levels [1]"(Stoltenberg, 2020). At first glance, such a statement is not surprising, as 21 out of the 27 Member States of the EU are also NATO allies. However, the value and effectiveness of such a relationship has often been questioned in recent years. Also, for countries like Slovenia, the concept of a single set of forces[2] (Lampret, Grilj, 2019, p 79) and the principle of non-duplication are of the utmost importance in this respect, as the resources available annually for the equipment, training and capability development of the Slovenian Armed Forces are very limited. A Joint Declaration was signed in the margins of the NATO Warsaw Summit in 2016, followed by an implementation plan of 42 proposals (Council of the EU, 2017) for EU-NATO common actions, and a second Joint Declaration in Brussels in 2018 with a further 32 proposals. The basic idea behind these proposals was to highlight those areas where countries would not have to choose on the basis of the "either/or" principle, but could rather focus on synergies, or the "not only, but also" approach.

The purpose of this article is to encourage reflection on whether the obstacles to coherent actions of the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the area of common security and defence are of a purely technical nature or whether there are differences at certain other levels, in politics, in bilateral relations and in the national ambitions of certain countries, members of either organization. In both cases, the

---

[1] *Secretary General Stoltenberg used the phrase on various occasions throughout the year.*

[2] *The concept implies that countries do not have multiple military or defence capability development budgets and cannot invest in their own armed forces and additionally into NATO or EU capabilities. It is therefore necessary to find solutions with a "single set of forces" to operate successfully across all frameworks.*

question arises as to whether Slovenia[3], as a small country taking over the Presidency of the Council of the EU on 1st July 2021, can in some way contribute to overcoming any of these obstacles during the six months of its Presidency.

1   A JOURNEY OF FIVE KILOMETRES BEGINS WITH A SINGLE STEP[4]

The signing of the two Joint Declarations resulted in a common set of 74 proposals for activities, focusing on 7 priority areas: countering hybrid threats; operational cooperation (including maritime operations); cyber security and defence; defence capability development; defence industry and research; exercises; and defence and security capacity-building (Council of the EU, 2016). The second Joint Declaration (Council of the EU, 2018) further emphasized the focus on military mobility, the fight against terrorism, resilience related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear related risks, and the promotion of the role of women in security and peace[5]. The final aspect, monitored by both organizations since 2016, is the level of political dialogue. Although the signature of the first Joint Declaration undoubtedly represented an important step forward, we cannot really say that EU-NATO cooperation has only been going on for the past five years. On the contrary, it could be argued that it has been happening from the very beginning or, in other words, since the creation of the EU and NATO. Opinions are divided, but in Slovenia we often refer to the signature of the "Berlin Plus" agreement in 2002[6] as the start of operational cooperation. Some would argue that the first steps date back to the beginning of the 1990s (Culetto, Himelrajh, 2018, p 15), from the signing of the Maastricht Treaty[7] by the western European countries which were already NATO allies at the time.

Regardless of when this first step took place, it is quite clear that it is already a long-lasting process. Rather than seeking to make major changes through this cooperation, it is important to reach agreements, tangible results and solutions on a regular basis. The ever-changing security environment led to the signing of the Joint Declarations, which means that both NATO and the EU must constantly adapt to new challenges and threats. When these challenges are such that no country, the EU nor NATO can tackle them alone, then cooperation is the only solution. Today's security threats are characterized by the emergence of new means and areas of application, new actors, or completely new threats developing before they are effectively identified or countered. In reality we are seeking a kind of partnership between two organizations

---

[3]   Together with Germany and Portugal, Slovenia forms the so-called trio of countries, who prepare their own 18-month programme together, while at the same time ensuring that the Council of the EU continues to work on a common, inherited agenda.

[4]   Reference to the Chinese proverb "A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step"

[5]   Point 6 of the second Joint Declaration, signed by the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk; the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker; and the Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, on 10 July 2018.

[6]   16 December 2002 – the signature of the Berlin Plus arrangement allowed the EU to use NATO structures, mechanisms and assets in the conduct of its missions.

[7]   The Maastricht Treaty was signed in February 1992 and entered into force in November 1993. It was the launch of Europe's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the cornerstone of a political union.

which both have different tools, advantages and disadvantages. When we talk about EU-NATO cooperation, we must therefore have synergies in mind, or try to achieve a result greater than the simple sum of the contributions from the two sides in this equation. If we stay on mathematical concepts for a moment, a subset of 20 countries[8], to which Slovenia also belongs, stands out from the wider array of countries which are either members of the EU or NATO allies; these are countries that actively participate in both allied and EU defence initiatives. For this reason, it is important to avoid both duplication and the principle of "either/ or" already mentioned in the introduction. The aerial distance from the headquarters of the EU to the NATO headquarters in Brussels may only be five kilometres, but it is clear that the route towards coordinated joint action is extremely demanding and full of obstacles.

1.1 74 small steps

Although most discussions on EU-NATO cooperation inevitably revolve around the signed Joint Declarations and the implementation plan of the 74 proposals for common actions, this is just one side of the story. These are, for the most part, proposals for measures, which can be implemented at the level of officials employed as staff of the two organizations. For example, as many as 20 proposals out of the 74 deal with countering hybrid threats. The first proposal concerns the creation of a European Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats, the second the provision of technical means to exchange information on hybrid threats, and so on (Council of the EU, 2017). The Centre was established in Helsinki, Finland, in 2017. Slovenia officially joined it in 2019 (European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, 2019).

The EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, which is part of the Single Intelligence Analysis Capability (SIAC) of the European External Action Service (EEAS), and the NATO Hybrid Operations Analysis Unit have been using BICES since 2018 (Council of the EU, 2018). This is a system for the exchange of classified intelligence information which was originally developed to retrieve data from battlefields in NATO ally or partner countries. Without going into details about the other priority areas here, the review of the annual progress reports could suggest that the list of 74 proposals has been almost exhausted; most of the joint activities have already been completed or are at least ongoing. After all, a large number of the activities in the implementation plan were planned for 2017, and if no progress had been made up to now, then the level of relations between the two organizations could indeed be questioned. So why is this progress not visible externally? Where are the obstacles and the real problems of the cooperation, if the proposed measures are being implemented so well? The fact is that the implementation of these proposals mainly addresses the administrative, bureaucratic or technical challenges faced by the staff of the two organizations in Brussels. Each small step can be of great importance to their daily

---

[8] *Denmark is an ally and a member of the EU, but does not participate in the EU's defence initiatives.*

work, but the measures will not solve some of the major issues that regularly arise when EU-NATO cooperation is mentioned.

1.2   36 countries and many problems

The first steps taken by Joe Biden as President of the United States of America hinted that the biggest problem for successful EU-NATO cooperation had been solved by the result of the US elections. Under Donald Trump the US withdrew from international agreements, cut its own budgets and threatened to reduce contributions or withdraw armed forces from certain areas of strategic importance. The perception that NATO equals the US led to a serious lack of confidence in transatlantic relations over the four years of the Trump administration. This in turn led, among other things, to a rather surprising statement by the French President Emanuel Macron. During an interview for the renowned magazine The Economist, he announced that we are witnessing NATO's 'brain death' (The Economist, 9.11.2019, p 9). Taken out of the context in which it was used, the statement raised a lot of eyebrows and spread rapidly through global and online media. Many perceived it as France acting on its own or, at the very least, as a reckless move by its President.

In reality, Macron was speaking about European solidarity, which must emerge before the US turns its back on us. He also mentioned the unexpected withdrawal of US forces from Syria, which allowed renewed clashes between members of the Turkish Armed Forces and the Kurds. As a result, the relationship between Turkey and the European allies, who advocated a longer-lasting ceasefire, also deteriorated. It was Macron's response to Trump's constant complaints about the costs incurred by the US for NATO (Trump, 2018) and his statements about NATO being outdated. If transatlantic relations were to deteriorate any further, Europe would be left to itself, sooner or later. In a somewhat inappropriate manner, Emanuel Macron merely stressed what was already stated in the Global Strategy[9] for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy: »European security and defence efforts should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contributing to and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO. A more credible European defence is essential also for the sake of a healthy transatlantic« partnership with the United States« (Global strategy, 2016). In other words, the strengthening of the EU in the field of defence also strengthens NATO. If we can now add better, enhanced transatlantic relations with the new President of the US in office, then EU-NATO cooperation should also gain further momentum.

Unfortunately, the EU now faces a new challenge concerning its relationship with the UK, which has now officially left the EU[10]. While the British remain NATO allies, defence initiatives in the EU can no longer count on their assets, capabilities

---

[9]   *On 14 November 2016 the Council of the EU adopted conclusions on the implementation of the EU Global Strategy in the area of security and defence, setting out the level of ambition and concrete actions. The strategy was prepared by the European Commission of that time, led by Jean-Claude Juncker and Federica Mogherini.*

[10]   *The so-called 'BREXIT' was the result of a referendum in the United Kingdom in which, on 23 June 2016, just under 2 % more voters voted to leave the European Union.*

or the presence of members of the British Armed Forces in missions and operations. Depending on their own interests, they are likely to engage in certain initiatives as a third country over time, but until then EU-NATO cooperation remains a key element, and offers opportunities to continue the dialogue with the UK on specific defence topics, such as military mobility. It is very likely that the UK will always be welcomed by the EU with open arms in any type of cooperation.

The opposite is true for Turkey, which would sooner be described by certain EU Member States as a threat rather than as an ally or partner third country. The negative impact of this on EU-NATO cooperation is perhaps most evident in the failure to exchange any sensitive or classified information. This is not so much a technical problem of how to share that information safely, but rather a question of trust, or lack thereof. Cyprus or Greece are unlikely to talk about their defence capabilities and plans in the presence of Turkey. On the other hand, even when negotiating with the EU as a whole, Turkey reiterates its refusal to recognize Cyprus as an independent state. As long as it still owns at least a part of the territory of Cyprus, Turkey is also claiming an additional part of the Mediterranean Sea. However, from the point of view of maritime security, this is a problem for another EU Member State – Greece.

Twenty-one ministers, leaders or representatives of EU Member States must listen to their colleagues from Cyprus, Malta, Ireland, Sweden, Finland and Austria, each with their own problems and interests within the Union. The very next day those same 21 representatives can be present at a NATO meeting, where Turkey expresses its gratitude to the US for the withdrawal of armed forces from Syria. At another time, at a meeting of the Council of the EU or the European Parliament, they might confirm the budget assigned to the European Defence Fund (EDF), and immediately hear US criticism about how EU defence initiatives, such as PESCO[11] and the EDF, are nothing more than duplication and decoupling from NATO. The same US, which in the morning requests from its European allies to increase their defence spending and to bear their share of the burden within NATO, is offended in the afternoon (Cooper, 2019), when those same European countries actually decide to spend billions of euros on defence. Even when we are not talking about any financial aspects, the US should really support all efforts and defence projects undertaken jointly by European countries. The fact is, if certain Member States cannot agree on something within the EU, they will certainly not agree to it within NATO. However, if a consensus is reached within the EU, the job is already half-done for NATO. Therefore, in order for all of the 36 countries which form this colourful mix of NATO allies and members of the EU to completely agree, something truly exceptional must happen. A major disaster, a complex crisis, a threat must appear that no one can face alone.

_____
[11] *"Permanent Structured Cooperation"*

2   AND THEN 2020 HAPPENED

It could be said that only a few days after Croatia took over the Presidency of the Council of the EU all the EU's pre-established priorities were swept off the table by the Covid-19 pandemic. Following the first case of infection recorded in France on 24 January 2020, the virus spread rapidly across Europe, severely hit Italy and triggered the closure of borders between Member States. Meetings in Brussels moved from secure rooms and large halls to online platforms. As a result, in particular on security and defence issues, any exchange of intelligence reports or classified information was automatically excluded from the agenda of all meetings. Given the changed way of working in both the EU and NATO, exchanges between the two organizations in the same way as before were no longer feasible. The pandemic has highlighted many areas which have proved to be ineffective and problematic in the context of a complex crisis, such as a global pandemic of a highly contagious virus. One area from the context of operational military action is, for example, the evacuation of personnel from missions and operations abroad. Despite the existence of protocols and solutions for MEDEVAC and STRATEVAC on paper, Slovenia had to find a solution forthe evacuation of an infected member of the armed forces from EUTM[12] Mali alone (Kremžar Kovač, 2020, p 50). We eventually received assistance from a civil company, the French commercial airline VallJet (Ministry of Defence, 2020). On the other hand, members of the armed forces soon became part of national plans to limit the spread of infections, and assisted the civilian services in managing the crisis. They were involved in the transport of protective equipment, the transport of infected people and other logistical activities; in some cases they took over the protection of certain buildings or deployed temporary medical facilities (Kremžar Kovač, 2020, p 45). It has therefore become clear that one of the modern challenges posed by such global crises is achieving effective cooperation between the military and civilian services.

3   BLURRED LINES BETWEEN CIVIL AND MILITARY

A comparison between the engagement of members of the armed forces with civil society in times of crisis and the cooperation between NATO and the EU may now seem logical. Even looking at the areas addressed by the proposed set of actions in the context of the two Joint Declarations, it could be concluded that civil-military cooperation is the silver lining linking these two organizations together. Unfortunately, the case is not so simple. NATO is often seen as a military organization; however, its most prominent representatives, the Secretary-General, ambassadors, Foreign Affairs Ministers, and Heads of State meeting in the North Atlantic Council are, as a rule, all civilian officials. Prior to being in charge of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg was the Norwegian Prime Minister. The second, more widely known Secretary-General, Javier Solana, acted as a Minister for Culture, Education and Science and Minister

---

[12] *"EU Training Mission", a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces.*

of Foreign Affairs in Spain. After four years as head of NATO, he became the first High Representative for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. NATO is therefore also a political organization (Stoltenberg, 2020), and this is the role that should be strengthened through the NATO 2030 reflection process and integrated in the preparation of a new strategic concept.

On the other side of the coin lies the EU, a political organization and an economic union of 27 countries which share the single European market through a common legal system. Given that not all EU Member States are also allies in NATO, the EU has long been working on issues and shortcomings affecting its own security and defence. Following the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001, the application of[13] Article 5 of the NATO Washington Treaty and the resulting 'war on terror' (Matyók, Zajc, 2020, p 38), in 2003 the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy[14] for a "Safe Europe in a Better World" (European Council, 2003). While some of the ideas presented at that time for a holistic approach and for Europe's common external action are still very much valid, after a decade the underlying idea of this strategy has proved to be somewhat naïve. Humanitarian aid to neighbouring and partner countries, a form of promotion of European values in remote regions, where very different beliefs, traditions and religions often prevail, has not proven to be a solution to the threats that Europe wanted to avoid at that time. Terrorist attacks in Madrid and Paris took place, relations in the Western Balkans worsened with Kosovo's declaration of independence[15], and a civil war in Syria began. The final wake-up call was the Russian so-called 'annexation' of the Ukrainian Crimea peninsula, where neighbouring countries were only able to observe the surgical precision (Tomšič, 2018) of the hybrid actions carried out by Russia in virtually all areas of society, ending with the arrival of armed soldiers wearing uniforms without markings, without flags and without demonstrating membership of a particular country[16].

This was an event which, in some ways, challenged the theory that European countries could leave their security and defence entirely up to the Alliance. Even if NATO capabilities would be ready to respond quickly to the arrival of such unmarked forces in the territory of one of the allies, the Ukrainian case showed that such a response would in fact be too late. Countering hybrid threats and hybrid warfare is nothing new; countries can be prepared, build resilience, or be able to sustain a potential attack, adapt and quickly recover from it. However, this is not an acceptable solution for the EU, which needs a way to detect, prevent or deter hybrid action even below the level

---

[13] *Article of the NATO founding treaty, which states that in the event of an armed attack on one ally country the allies will respond as if they had all been attacked.*

[14] *The "European Security Strategy" was prepared under the leadership of Javier Solana in 2003. The document was endorsed by the European Council in December 2003.*

[15] *Despite Serbia's opposition, Kosovo declared its independence on 17 February 2008. Kosovo is still not recognised by Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain, which makes the possibility of full EU membership even more questionable for Kosovo.*

[16] *These unidentified units have been labelled as 'Little Green Men', describing their green military uniforms without any special marking or flag indicating their affiliation.*

of armed conflict. It is not that the military is weak in dealing with present and future threats; rather, the threats are too complex for command directed responses, and the military alone cannot provide appropriate, holistic responses. What is required is a coordinated interaction between militaries, civil stakeholders, government agencies. To be resilient, nations, states, and the whole of society must be smart in adapting to the 'reality on the ground', since reality does not easily adjust itself to our theories (Matyók, Zajc, 2020, p 29).

This reality was deepened by the migrant crisis[17] in 2015, which called into question the humanitarian actions and solidarity of the EU and the utility of its alliance with NATO (Matyók, Zajc, 2020, p 34). As a result, in 2016 the European Commission presented the aforementioned new Global Strategy[18] for Foreign and Security Policy for a "Stronger Europe". It includes initiatives in the areas of defence, capability planning and development, and cross-border research cooperation, among others. Acronyms such as CARD[19], PESCO, EDF[20] and EPF[21] have become part of our vocabulary, and Member States have embarked on projects and plans to turn this strategy into actions, outputs, and externally visible results. However, given that it is only for the past few years that the EU has been working together on defence within the Union, and no longer only on external action, these efforts appear to be too scattered and uncoordinated, and therefore quite ineffective for the time being.

4   STRATEGIC COMPASS AND NATO 2030

It could perhaps be said that the EU has got lost in its own defence initiatives and therefore needs a Strategic Compass[22] to set the direction of all these initiatives and bring them together as a meaningful whole. The political dialogue currently taking place between EU Member States aims to ensure that all countries contribute to shaping the content of the Strategic Compass in relation to its four pillars, the four focus areas of crisis management, resilience, capability development and partnerships. A document is expected to be drafted under the Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the EU, and finally adopted by March 2022 at the latest (Kolenc, 2020, p 12). It is intended to link the strategic level the EU has been actively discussing since 2016

---

[17]   More than one million migrants from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and various African countries attempted to enter Europe in 2015. Individuals from Kosovo, Albania and other countries joined them on this route towards the west, some fleeing war, and others just looking for a better life in the European Union.

[18]   The title of the document is »Shared Vision, Common Action. A Stronger Europe: a Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy.''

[19]   Coordinated Annual Review on Defence – CARD

[20]   'European Defence Fund' – part of a common budget dedicated to promoting defence industrial research and cooperation and capability development between EU Member States.

[21]   European Peace Facility – Peace Facility, an extra-budgetary financial mechanism for missions, operations and support measures

[22]   The process began in 2020 under the German Presidency of the Council of the EU and will conclude after the Slovenian Presidency, possibly with the adoption of the Strategy Paper in March 2022, under the French Presidency.

with practical, operational guidelines to achieve the level of ambition and a "strong Europe".

Although the themes of the four pillars are intertwined and have an impact on each other, it is clear that in the context of partnerships EU-NATO cooperation will be at the forefront. As a basis for the Strategic Compass, a joint analysis of threats and challenges, based on inputs from intelligence services, was prepared in the second half of 2020. It is a confidential document without any additional validation or adaptation of the text, which serves as a factual overview of all the challenges faced by the Member States of the EU. A similar review was carried out for NATO by a panel of independent experts and published as the "NATO 2030" report[23] however, this one is publicly accessible. Given the confidential nature of the EU's analysis its content will not be discussed in this article, but it is important to note that there are clear parallels between the two documents. Whether an EU Member State or NATO ally, no single country can defend itself against the effects of Russia, China, hybrid actors, cyber-attacks, climate change, the development of disruptive technologies, and so on. NATO cannot set the strategy (Biscop, 2020), legislation, policy or action of civil society in a particular country. On the other hand, the EU alone cannot respond effectively to possible military attacks, should they occur. Only when we realize that we all face the same threats, which go beyond our own capabilities, does it become clear that the key to security and effective defence lies in cooperation. During the very short period of the Croatian Presidency of the Council of the EU before the outbreak of the pandemic in early 2020, Slovenia co-signed, with Germany, Portugal and with the support of Croatia, a food-for-thought paper[24] on EU-NATO cooperation. In the text we advocated building trust and closer links between the two organizations. We proposed improvements to the exchange of information, including through more institutionalized solutions, such as the establishment of a joint working group on military mobility. We supported continued cooperation on topics including cybersecurity, hybrid threats and parallel and coordinated exercises[25]. However, we also highlighted the need for joint, coordinated action in new areas such as the impact of climate change on defence. All of these proposals are still valid, with both the pandemic and the two strategic processes now showing that we were already thinking in the right direction at that time.

5 COOPERATE WHEREVER POSSIBLE; ACT WHENEVER NECESSARY

The EU is founded on a common market, on the free movement of people and resources, and on cooperation between the Member States. It continues to work in an integrated, partnership-based way externally, trying to cooperate wherever

---

[23] *Practically in parallel with the Strategic Compass, the "NATO 2030" process is underway and is expected to result in a new strategic concept for NATO, which will be politically active, forward-looking and better prepared for the challenges posed by outer space, technology development, and climate change.*

[24] *"Towards a Common Space of Trust – Priorities for EU-NATO Cooperation" a food for thought non-paper, not published publicly.*

[25] *PACE Exercise Concept – "Parallel and Coordinated Exercise" to be continued in 2022.*

possible. It should also, alone or in cooperation with NATO, take action whenever necessary. Whether it is a covert operation below the threshold of armed conflict, or a direct threat requiring a military response, synergies between the two organizations allow Member States to act in virtually all domains. A major step in the EU-NATO cooperation framework would be to change the current way of solving controversial situations by finding the lowest common denominator[26]. Moving away from this "unanimity" decision-making model would mean that the interests of a single state can no longer prevail over the common objectives of the EU or of NATO. At the moment, Turkey seems to be the main culprit. Both the EU and NATO act in a way that protects and respects human rights according to United Nations conventions[27]. Ironically, Turkey has recently announced its withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention[28] on preventing violence against women and domestic violence. Previously, Turkey had already gambled away the trust of many European countries through extortion or the "weaponization" (Jennequin, 2020) of migration – using migrants as bargaining leverage against the EU. Similarly, the purchase of Russian S-400 rocket systems[29] was not in line with its role as an ally in NATO. In addition to enhanced transatlantic ties, new strategic guidelines and additional areas for seeking synergies and mutual cooperation, sooner or later both the EU and NATO will have to act, as productive cooperation with Turkey seems less and less possible. Not only NATO, but also the EU is repeatedly cornered by Turkey's actions, hampering the progress in cooperation between the two organizations along the way. Over the past year, so many things have been brought to our attention, from our shared shortcomings to threats and major challenges, bringing us to a point where we can no longer afford to limit 35 countries to administrative cooperation at the staff to staff level only because one country refuses to cooperate. Unfortunately, it is too early to guess whether the new NATO Strategic Concept or the EU's Strategic Compass will bring about any solutions to this problem. We just have to wait and see.

6   WHAT CAN SLOVENIA DO IN THE MEANTIME?

During its six-month Presidency of the Council of the EU, the Republic of Slovenia will certainly stress the importance of EU-NATO cooperation as the best tool, the most integrated approach, and a way to involve the whole of society, both civil and military, in security and defence issues. We also need to highlight the Western Balkans region[30], which has historically served as the scene for EU-NATO cooperation on

---

[26] *Where countries do not agree on a particular point, the most basic, broadest possible definition is sought in order to reach a compromise that can be supported by all. It also loses the potential for concrete actions, the way forward, and the more visible results of the initiatives that face this obstacle.*

[27] *For example, the mutual defence clause, 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union, applies in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. The same applies to NATO Article 5.*

[28] *The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence was presented for signature on 11.5.2011 in Istanbul, Turkey.*

[29] *Russia's ground-to-air rocket system with a range of up to 400 km and the ability to operate against both large planes and targets as small as drones.*

[30] *The Western Balkans region consists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, the Republic of North Macedonia and Albania.*

the ground. It is still an area heavily influenced by various foreign actors, hybrid activities, historical tensions and unresolved conflicts. In the area of capability development, the two organizations are increasingly highlighting innovation and disruptive technologies. Whereas NATO has a well-established defence planning process and fora to stimulate allied industrial relations, the EU's toolbox includes legislation, a political framework called PESCO, a coordinated annual review (CARD), and the European Defence Fund (EDF), which will support defence research and capability development (Fiott, 2019). The EDF, in particular, aims to stimulate the cross-border participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in consortia and co-funded projects. Slovenian SMEs are very active, innovative and sometimes world leaders in their field of work. The involvement of Norway, Canada and the US in the PESCO military mobility project is another important milestone in the area of military mobility, often considered as one of the most successful products of EU-NATO cooperation. Slovenia is also developing specific innovations in mobility and energy efficiency. The Directorate for Logistics at the Ministry of Defence is leading the RES-HUB project[31], developing renewable energy harvesting and hydrogen energy storage capabilities (Šipec, 2021) aimed at facilitating cross-Europe military mobility with lower CO_2 emissions, and contributing to energy sustainability in the EU's defence and security sectors. So, not only are we aware of the importance of climate change for the defence system, but we are already actively working on, exploring and developing solutions. All of these topics can be placed on the agendas of Council meetings and formal and informal events which will take place between 1 July and 31 December 2021.

Conclusion

As a NATO ally and an EU Member State, we will be actively involved in the drafting of both the new NATO Strategic Concept and the EU Strategic Compass in the months to come. But it is also important to give visibility to issues related to resilience, security and defence during our Presidency of the Council of the EU. Slovenia can certainly do that, even if the main role of the Presidency is mediating and brokering compromises between the EU Member States and EU institutions such as the Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament. To do this, the Presidency must act as an honest and neutral broker (General Secretariat of the Council, 2021). At the same time, it must respect the 18-month plan of the trio, which, in the case of Germany, Portugal and Slovenia, includes strengthening EU-NATO cooperation as one of its priorities.

Effective solutions in the area of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy and synergies with NATO are of the utmost importance for countries such as Slovenia. According to Article 37 of the Defence Act[32], one of the functions of the Slovenian Armed Forces is to carry out obligations assumed by the state in international organizations and through international treaties. We do this mainly

---

[31] *The project "Defence Resilience Hub Network in Europe" aims to create a network of energy self-sufficient hubs in Slovenia and the European Union.*

[32] *Defence Act published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, #82/1994*

through our participation in missions and operations of the EU, NATO, the UN and other organizations. Currently, we have soldiers deployed in 12 different missions and operations (Ministry of Defence, 2021) around the world, representing around 5% of our armed forces. This percentage means that the primary functions of the Slovenian Armed Forces are those which it performs on domestic soil. Another way of fulfilling commitments towards international organizations, often publicly criticized in the media, would be by raising our defence spending up to or above 2% of the annual gross domestic product (Defence White Paper of the Republic of Slovenia, 2020, page 11). This does not mean that we should pay someone for protection, or buy a membership in one of the organizations, as is often mistakenly believed, mainly by sceptics or those who oppose any kind of investment in military capabilities on principle. In practice, we should just invest more in our own army, their preparedness, capacities and the tasks that 95% of them carry out every day in Slovenia (since only 5% are deployed abroad). By doing this, we would not only make good on our commitments to NATO, but also to the EU and our PESCO partners (Culetto, Himelrajh, 2018, p 19), while at the same time improving the resilience of our own country. There is therefore no need to choose whether we will invest in capabilities suitable for operating either in Slovenia, or in NATO, or even in EU's defence initiatives. In most cases, we can make progress in all of the above through a single solution. This is why it is important that we are present, involved and actively participating in these organizations, their strategies and plans for the future. In reality, duplication occurs only rarely, but even then, as a Member State and as an ally, we have the opportunity to draw attention to this issue and propose different solutions together with other countries at the table. Our voice is heard, our vote counts and our point of view matters. Not only that, for the next six months we are the ones writing the agendas of the EU's meetings and organizing its events. And since, for the time being at least, there is no compass to show the way for the EU's Member States, they will rely on our Presidency to steer them in the right direction.

Bibliography

1. Biscop, S., 2020. *The future of the Transatlantic Alliance: not without the European Union. Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations. https://www.egmontinstitute. be/the-future-of-the-transatlantic-alliance-not-without-the-european-union.*

2. Cooper, C., 2019. *https://2017-2021.state.gov/press-briefing-with-assistant-secretary-clarke-cooper-bureau-of-political-military-affairs/index.html.*

3. Culetto, P., Himelrajh, J., 2018. *PESCO – On the way to a European security and defence union or another dead end? Sodobni vojaški izzivi. Znanstveno-strokovna publikacija SV, 2018(3), p 13.*

4. Defence Act of the Republic of Slovenia, adopted on 20. 12. 1994. *http://pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=ZAKO532.*

5. EU Global Strategy in the area of security and defence, presented on 28. 6. 2016. *https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf.*

6. EU-NATO Common Set of Proposals, 2016. *https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/12/06/eu-nato-joint-declaration/.*

7. *EU-NATO Joint Declaration signed at the NATO summit, Warsaw, Poland, 8. 7. 2016. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/sl/press/press-releases/2016/07/08/eu-nato-joint-declaration.*

8. *EU-NATO Joint Declaration signed in Brussels, 10. 7. 2018. https://www.consilium. europa.eu/sl/press/press-releases/2018/07/10/eu-nato-joint-declaration.*

9. *European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, 2019. https://www. hybridcoe.fi/establishment/.*

10. *European Security Strategy –A Secure Europe In A Better World, adopted on 12. 12. 2003. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30823/qc7809568enc.pdf.*

11. *Fiott, D., Lindstrom, G., Tardy, T., et al., 2019. The EU And NATO –The Essential Partners. European Union Institute for Security Studies. https://www.iss.europa.eu/ content/eu-and-nato.*

12. *The French president Emmanuel Macron's interview with The Economist. https://www. economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-in-his-own-words-english.*

13. *General Secretariat of the Council, 2021. The Presidency of the Council of the EU. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/presidency-council-eu/.*

14. *Jennequin, A.,2020. Turkey And the Weaponization Of Syrian Refugees. Brussels International Centre. https://www.bic-rhr.com/research/turkey-and-weaponization-syrian-refugees.*

15. *Kolenc, M., 2020. Strateški kompas za varnost in obrambo. Revija Slovenska vojska, 2020(10), p 12.*

16. *Lampret, U., Grilj, B., 2019. 15 years of Slovenian NATO membership through the lens of the changing global security and geopolitical environment. Sodobni vojaški izzivi. Znanstveno-strokovna publikacija SV, 2019(3), p 65.*

17. *Matyók, T., Zajc, S., 2020. Joint civil-military interaction as a tool in responding to hybrid threats. Sodobni vojaški izzivi. Znanstveno-strokovna publikacija SV, 2020(3), p 27.*

18. *Ministry of Defence, 2020. Defence White Paper of the Republic of Slovenia. https://www. gov.si/assets/ministrstva/MO/Dokumenti/WP2020.pdf.*

19. *Ministry of Defence, 2020. Slovenska vojska iz Malija uspešno evakuirala svojega pripadnika. https://www.gov.si/novice/2020-04-12-slovenska-vojska-iz-malija-uspesno-evakuirala-svojega-pripadnika/.*

20. *Ministry of Defence, 2021. S skupino za spremljanje in povezavo bo Slovenska vojska okrepila prispevek k mirovnim prizadevanjem mednarodne skupnosti … https://www.gov. si/assets/organi-v-sestavi/GSSV/Slovenska-vojska/Dogodki/2021/februar/20210219_LOT_HISA_BiH_gradivo.pdf.*

21. *NATO 2030 – United for a New Era. Reflection group report, 25. 11. 2020. https://www. nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf.*

22. *Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common Set of EU-NATO Proposals, 2017. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/19/eu-nato-cooperation/.*

23. *Stoltenberg, J., 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_172820. htm?selectedLocale=en and https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_180092.htm.*

24. *Šipec, R., 2021. Defence Resilience Hub Network in Europe – RESHUB. https://www.gov. si/assets/ministrstva/MO/Dogodki/2021/marec/Novinarska-29MAR21_RESHUB.pdf.*

25. *Third Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common Set of EU-NATO Proposals, 2018. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35578/third-report-ue-nato-layout-en.pdf.*

26. *Tomšič, B., 2019. Hybrid warfare as a method of implementing the national strategy – the case of Crimea. Sodobni vojaški izzivi. Znanstveno-strokovna publikacija SV, 2019(4), p 129.*

27. *Trump, D. J., 2018. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-conference-nato-summit-brussels-belgium/.*

Damjan Štrucl

PARTNERSTVO MED EU IN NATOM PRI ZAGOTAVLJANJU INFORMACIJSKE OZIROMA KIBERNETSKE VARNOSTI: TEORIJA IN PRAKSA

THE EU-NATO PARTNERSHIP AND ENSURING INFORMATION SECURITY AND CYBERSECURITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Povzetek   Evropska unija in Nato sta pomembni politični, gospodarski in varnostni organizaciji v globalnem okolju. Razvoj informacijsko-komunikacijske tehnologije in novi izzivi sodobnega varnostnega okolja so povzročili podpis Skupne izjave o poglobljenem strateškem partnerstvu med organizacijama. Obe organizaciji se zavedata svoje vloge in tudi pomembnosti sodelovanja pri zagotavljanju varnosti, še posebej, ker so varnostni izzivi, tveganja in grožnje prepleteni z virtualnim in fizičnim prostorom. S tem prispevkom želimo analizirati strateško partnerstvo med EU in Natom pri zagotavljanju varnosti in obrambe v sodobnem varnostnem okolju, ki temelji na skupni izjavi iz leta 2016.

Ključne besede   *Sodelovanje med EU in Natom, varnostno okolje, informacijsko okolje, kibernetska varnost, kibernetski prostor.*

Abstract   The EU and NATO are important political and security organizations in a global environment. The development of ICT and the new challenges of the contemporary security environment have led to the signing of a joint EU-NATO declaration. Both organizations are aware of their roles, and of the importance of working together to ensure security, especially as security challenges, risks, and threats are intertwined with both virtual and physical space. With this paper, we wish to analyze the EU-NATO strategic partnership in ensuring security and defence in the contemporary security environment, based on a joint statement from 2016.

Key words   *NATO-EU cooperation, security environment, information environment, cybersecurity, cyberspace.*

Introduction   Today, we can no longer imagine the functioning of a global community, states, critical infrastructure or the economy without information and communication technology (ICT). The development of the internet, ICT, the information environment and cyberspace has made society more connected and interdependent, but also more vulnerable. These facts have led to changes in the security environment, resulting in the need for a comprehensive approach to addressing security issues. National borders have become blurred, as the information environment and cyberspace know no physical borders. It is also extremely difficult to identify adversaries or violators of national and/or international law with an adequate level of certainty.

The fact is that today's security environment is complex, as states and the international community concurrently confront the security issues of intertwined virtual and physical space and the consequences of threats that are always transferred from the virtual to the physical space, where the damage occurs. Unlike the physical dimensions of space, virtual space is not regulated; there is no sovereign exercise of power and no established international legal norms (Mačák, in Pissanidis et al., 2016, pp 131-132), the attribution of illegal acts (actors) is almost impossible (Ibid., p 30; Ibid., p 124), it is extremely difficult to manage and control, and the consequences can be global. Thus, in a contemporary security environment, modern society confronts new forms of threats, risks, and challenges which require national and international organizations to take a comprehensive and coordinated approach to ensure all forms of security.

Individual approaches to national security in the information environment and cyberspace alone are insufficient and ineffective (Ibid., p 128). Today we experience cyber incidents and information activities in various forms (especially social engineering and fake news) daily, just at the national level alone, which cannot be limited or prevented. Mogherini (in Rehrl, 2018, p 6) advocates that cooperation between countries is particularly important to achieve resilience to such threats. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that information security, and thus cyber security, is primarily the responsibility of the state. In this manner the state primarily protects its own security, and indirectly international security, as cyber incidents can otherwise be spread uncontrollably beyond national borders (Pernik, 2014, p 7; Mogherini, in Rehrl, 2018, p 6).

Cooperation between countries and organizations is also crucial in ensuring information or cyber security. The European Union (EU) and NATO both advocate a holistic and common approach from the international community in addressing contemporary security issues and the need to share information, design common standards, build trust, and so on, at the political-strategic, operational, and technical (tactical) levels (Relations with the European Union, NATO, 2020, e-source). For this reason, the two organizations signed a Joint Declaration on a strategic partnership, with which they want to achieve a unified approach to their response to contemporary security threats.

In this paper, we will test the hypothesis that effective Euro-Atlantic security requires a unified approach to addressing the security challenges and threats of a contemporary security environment based on transparency and trust. We will achieve this through an analytical approach and the use of deduction, as well as descriptive methods that represent an EU-NATO partnership in cooperation in providing information/cyber security (and defence), or jointly responding to contemporary threats.

1 THE EVOLUTION OF THE EU-NATO STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: RESPONDING TO CONTEMPORARY SECURITY THREATS

The EU and NATO are important political and military international organizations, directly and indirectly integrated into all three systems of contemporary security: cooperative security, collective security and defence. Both organizations directly ensure their members have collective security and defence[1], and at the same time enable the implementation of the concept of global security (Cohen, 2008, pp 6-7). The EU and NATO share common values[2] and strategic interests, and confront and tackle the same threats and challenges (Lisbon Summit Declaration, NATO, 2010, e-source). Therefore, the organizations are key partners for one another across issues of common interest, crisis management, capability development, and policy consultations on the contemporary security environment (Grissom, 2018, p 1; UL EU C 202/1).

1.1 Historical milestones of EU-NATO cooperation in ensuring information/ cyber security

The EU and NATO have long ceased to be the organizations they once were. The changed political environment, globalization, and the development of ICT have shaped global values, sources of threat, and challenges, while at the same time some security issues have become global (Svete, 2005, p 80). Global security issues can include hybrid threats, the information environment, cyberspace, and critical infrastructure, among others. It is precisely these global security issues that are the common denominator of their interconnection and cooperation, as the Member States of the organizations confront the same vectors of threat (both state and non-state actors) that threaten political, economic, and military, as well as civilian, security (Lété in Pernik, 2017, p 1)

The two organizations constantly face serious challenges and threats from the contemporary security environment. The information revolution has led to the need for information assurance, information and cyber security, and the identification of

---

[1] *Based on the 42 (7) Article of the EU Treaty (Lisbon Treaty), EU Member States shall provide assistance and support to an attacked state by all means available (UL EU, C 202/38, 7. 6. 2016). This provision is complemented by Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which stipulates a solidarity clause on joint action by the EU Member States in the event of a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or manmade disaster (UL EU, C 202/1).*

[2] *According to the North Atlantic Treaty and the EU Treaty, these common values are the protection of the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedoms, democracy, and a common heritage (UL EU, C 202/1).*

new critical sectors of society. Herrmann named these sectors critical infrastructure systems[3] and categorized them as follows: 1. Telecommunications systems; 2. Banking/financial systems; 3. The water supply system; 4. The gas and oil supply and storage system; 5. Power plants and the electricity supply; 6. The transport system; 7. Emergency services; and 8. Government services (2001, pp 1-10). This type of identification of critical infrastructure systems has led to other forms of security, such as operational security, industrial security, technical security, information security, communication and computer security, cybersecurity, network and information security, and so on (ACO Security Directive, AD 70-1, 2012; ENISA overview of cybersecurity and related terminology, ENISA, 2017, p 6).

Although both organizations had identified cyber threats and challenges as early as 2002 (NATO) and 2003 (EU), informal political-strategic cooperation on cyberspace was only established in 2010 and 2011 at the EU-NATO level in response to computer incidents[4]. Their formal cooperation only began in 2016, with the signing of a Technical Agreement on cyber defence between NATO's Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) and the EU Computer Incident Response Team (CERT-EU) (EU and NATO increase information sharing on cyber incidents, EEAS, 2016, e-source).

In the same year, the signing of the Technical Agreement was followed by the signing of the Joint Declaration in Warsaw on the renewed EU-NATO Strategic Partnership. The two organizations agreed that only together could they successfully counter today's global threats, including combating hybrid threats, cyber defence, and enhancing the stability of their partners and neighbours as their security is interconnected (Joint Declaration, EU, 2016, e-source). In 2016 and 2017, Annexes to this Joint Declaration were also adopted, setting out concrete measures to counter hybrid threats, operational cooperation (including maritime issues), cyber defence capabilities, the defence industry and research, exercises, capacity-building, and strengthening political dialogue (Council Conclusions on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration, EU, 2016, 2017, e-source).

The renewed Joint Declaration on the EU-NATO Strategic Partnership was adopted in 2018, reaffirming the implementation of the agreed objectives and goals from 2016. Since both organizations were facing multiple and evolving security challenges, a new commitment to deepening cooperation within the existing common proposals was agreed, including in responding to hybrid and cyber threats. In addition, a new Joint Declaration highlighted the promotion of a fair sharing of the burden, the

---

[3] Today, these systems are called critical infrastructure, and they must be separated from information infrastructure. The concept of critical infrastructure is much broader and includes critical sectors, while the concept of information infrastructure is linked to the operation of critical infrastructure services (Svete, 2007, p 160). The critical infrastructure of the Republic of Slovenia involves: transport, energy supply and drinking water, finance, healthcare, food, environmental protection and communication information networks and systems (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No 75/17).

[4] The computer incident response team can be CERT or CSIRT and is generally dedicated to responding to cyber incidents. (Defining Computer Security Incident Response Teams, US-CERT, e-source)

benefits and responsibilities of the Allies, and the EU's commitment to prioritizing security and defence in future discussions on the next long-term EU budget (Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation by the President of the European Council, NATO, 2018, e-source).

Figure 1:
Formal EU-NATO cooperation (Source: extracted from NATO and EU documents)

2 AREAS OF EU-NATO COOPERATION

A series of events have shown the true dimensions of the challenges to the information environment and cyberspace, including the cyber-attack on Estonia in 2007, the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, the hybrid war in Ukraine, and the 2016 US presidential election (Latici, 2020, p 4). In addition to the common values, all these mentioned events have at least one more shared feature: they have implications for the 21 countries that are members of both the EU and NATO. Of course, we should not ignore the fact that there are other, even more specific political-strategic reasons: 1. The EU needs NATO to ensure military security (NATO's policy of deterrence); 2. NATO needs an EU contribution to the development of European defence capabilities (Europe can become a more relevant transatlantic partner, which makes NATO stronger); 3. The two organizations need each other to confront hybrid threats (the EU has broader competencies); 4. Both organizations are needed to stabilize peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area (the EU has "soft power" tools to support NATO's »hard power«); and 5. Both organizations need the cooperation of Non-Member States (states who are not members of both organizations) to ensure security in the region. (Latici, 2020, p 4; Raik in Järvenpää, 2017, pp 1-2)

In 2016, the organizations took a key step towards formalizing enhanced cooperation by signing a Joint Declaration, at the same time reaffirming their awareness of common challenges (Latici, 2020, p 4; Raik in Järvenpää, 2017, p 1). The enhanced strategic partnership sets out seven strategic objectives in the areas of operational cooperation, hybrid threats, cybersecurity, defence capabilities, defence capacity building, the defence industry and development, and exercises (Joint Declaration,

EU, 2016, e-source). The Joint Declaration was followed by two Annexes with a total of 74 concrete measures to achieve the strategic goals, emphasizing that NATO remains the transatlantic framework for a strong collective defence and an essential security forum among the Allies. In any case, the strategic partnership is also important for the EU, as it enables more efficient development of the EU's defence capabilities and thus also strengthens NATO (Statement on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration, NATO, 2016, e-source).

Political-strategic cooperation

Political and diplomatic cooperation is the basis for the development of international relations and their formalization. This is also confirmed by the joint statement adopted in 2016, in which the organizations stressed the need to protect their common values and interests, which can be achieved through regular formal and informal meetings between the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NAC) and by enhanced cross-sectoral meetings of relevant committees and councils. (Statement on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration, NATO, 2016, e-source). Additionally, the need to fully involve non-EU Allies in political and diplomatic cooperation was also accepted, which is an important element in developing an international »comprehensive approach« to crisis management and operations. To this end, a decision has been taken to hold regular meetings on issues of common interest at the level of Foreign Ministers, Ambassadors, Military Representatives, and Defence Advisers. For more effective cooperation and coordination, cooperation mechanisms have also been established at all levels between NATO's International Military Staff and the EU institutions (European External Action Service (EEAS), European Defence Agency (EDA)[5], the European Commission and the European Parliament) (NATO-EU Relations Fact Sheet, NATO, 2016, e-source; NATO-EU Relations Fact Sheet, NATO, 2019, e-source).

Operational cooperation

The two organizations established operational cooperation as early as 2005 and 2006, when they set up liaison teams at the EU military staff and NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). The adoption of the Joint Declaration strengthened operational cooperation, as it agreed to establish mechanisms for permanent cooperation at all operational levels across all domains of warfare (land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace). In this way the cooperation will include all seven common objectives of the Joint Declaration[6], both in the planning of joint actions

---

[5] *The EDA is responsible for the area of research and technology, and for cyber defence development. In addition, it provides support to the Member States in developing a skilled military cyber defence workforce, ensures the availability of proactive and reactive cyber defence technology, develops various courses, and raises awareness of CDSP operations (NATO Cyber Defence, EDA, 2020). For education, training, exercises, and evaluation (ETEE), a cybersecurity platform has been established, run by the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) (Cyber platform for Education, Training, Evaluation and Exercise (ETEE), EDA, 2018).*

[6] *Operational cooperation, hybrid, cybersecurity, defence capabilities, defence capacity building, defence industry, development and exercises (Joint Declaration, EU, 2016, e-source).*

and operations and in their implementation (Statement on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration, NATO, 2016, e-source).

Figure 2: EU-NATO Agenda (Source: Latici, 2020, p 5)

Countering hybrid threats

Awareness of the dangers of hybrid threats and the importance of joint cooperation in countering them is one of the most important areas of both joint statements. Cooperation is based on the implementation and operationalization[7] of parallel procedures and manuals in the areas of web security, strategic communication (Stratcom[8]), crisis response, situational awareness, and building resilience. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) and the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom CoE) have been identified as key actors in assisting Member States and the two organizations in responding to hybrid threats. In addition, the Hybrid CoE and the StratCom CoE, in cooperation with both military personnel, support Member States and both organizations in strengthening resilience to hybrid threats. In this regard, the following measures have been taken:

– Situational awareness and strategic communications encompass all five domains of space, including the information environment (social media), and cover the systematic exchange of information, analysis, and enhanced cooperation between

---

[7] *Operationalization: to make something useful and effective in the process; to make operational*

[8] *Stratcom – strategic communications are a coordination function at the strategic level, intended for the analysis and coordination of the communication and information capabilities of the adversary and the complex operational environment (LePafe, 2014, p 6).*

the StratCom CoE and the EEAS Stratcom, and between the newly formed EU Fusion Cell and the relevant NATO entity;

– Crisis response is based on the synchronization of the EU crisis response processes, including the EU's Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements and the NATO Crisis Response System;

– Strengthening resilience includes regular awareness and cross-reporting on resilience and defining criteria and guidelines for greater coherence between the EU Capability Development Plan (CDP) and the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) (Statement on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration, NATO, 2016, e-source).

Cybersecurity and defence

Cyberspace, or the information environment, is a medium for the creation and implementation of hybrid, information, and cyber operations. The organizations agreed to strengthen cooperation in cybersecurity in the area of training and education, including participation in cyber exercises[9]. As an additional measure of cooperation, the exchange of cyber defence concepts was also defined, to promote the interoperability of cyber defence requirements and standards between the two organizations. Another important joint action is cooperation in research and technological innovation of cyber defence, which also enables the interoperability of standards, and is rational in terms of resource consumption (Statement on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration, NATO, 2016, e-source).

Defence capabilities

In a joint statement, the organizations adopted the principles of non-duplication and the complementary nature of capabilities. This can only be achieved by ensuring consistency of results between the NDPP and the CDP. The organizations also took additional measures related to complementing multinational projects/programmes developed within NATO Smart Defence and EU Pooling & Sharing, in areas of common interest (satellite communications, cyber defence, remote-controlled aviation systems, etc.) and in the field of standardization (Statement on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration, NATO, 2016, e-source). Through these measures, the two organizations have enabled the unified development of the defence capabilities of the Member States based on the same standards, which is particularly important in responding to modern security threats.

Education, training, and exercises

Education, training, and exercises are among the most important areas for strengthening a unified approach to confronting challenges in the modern security environment, concurrently leading to the rationalization of resources. The EU and NATO have agreed to conduct joint education and training in hybrid threats and cybersecurity, as well as to exchange exercise reports and lessons learned. Among

---

9   *For example, the »Cyber Coalition« and »Cyber Europe« exercises.*

the measures taken is the cooperation of the two organizations in exercises which include elements of hybrid and cyber threats, based on the principle of parallel and coordinated exercises (PACE), such as crisis response exercises (CMX) and »Cyber Coalition« (Statement on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration, NATO, 2016, e-source).

Defence capacity building, the defence industry, and research

This area of cooperation is based on both political-strategic cooperation measures and measures of a non-political nature. Political-strategic measures are aimed at enhanced formal and informal PSC-NCS cooperation and the strengthening of political dialogue, which are the basis for measures of a non-political nature at the operational level. The following were identified as concrete measures of a non-political nature: 1. The identification of possible cooperation projects; 2. Exchange of knowledge between Centres of Excellence and professional staff; 3. Enhanced EU-NATO cooperation in research and technology; and 4. The use of existing forums to develop a dialogue between EU-NATO personnel in the defence industry (Statement on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration, NATO, 2016, e-source).

Political-strategic measures are thus aimed at enhanced formal and informal cooperation between the PSC-NCS and the strengthening of political dialogue, which are the basis for the implementation of non-political nature.

2.1 From theory to practice

Monitoring the implementation of the adopted documents is only possible if the implementation of the enclosed provisions/agreements themselves is monitored, which both organizations are aware of. However, just because something is written, does not mean it is done. The actual implementation of the measures demonstrates how seriously the two organizations have taken the agreement, and how credible a partner they are to each other and the Member States. This is also demonstrated by the fact that despite an agreement to produce reports on an annual basis, the organizations produced the first three reports at half-yearly intervals (June 2017, November 2017, May 2018) and only the last two at annual intervals (June 2019, June 2020) as agreed. In writing this, the author would like to emphasize that the discussion is limited to those essential measures that are related to the information environment and cyberspace.

Political-strategic cooperation

None of the five reports contain concrete actions taken in this area, but set out general findings of progress, such as strengthening the EU-NATO strategic partnership, common values and interests, burden-sharing, common challenges and threats, strengthening the ESDP, and complementarity between the two organizations (1 - 5 Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common Set of Proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016/2017, NATO/EU). This is considered normal, as the political-strategic level provides guidelines to be implemented

at the operational level. The policy-strategic guidelines thus assist planning for mutual cooperation at the operational level. This is confirmed by the second and third reports, which state that the PSC-NAC's regular bilateral dialogue on issues of common interest has become the norm, resulting in clear political commitment and increased transparency in developing the capacity of multinational projects and programmes (Ibid.). This shows that political-strategic cooperation is also crucial in building trust and ensuring mutual transparency.

Countering hybrid threats

Both organizations focused their first activities on actively involving the EU in the planning of CMX 17, which aimed to test the sustainability of jointly agreed measures on hybrid threats. The Hybrid CoE, the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, and the NATO Hybrid Analysis cell have now been established. The newly formed entities represent the first step towards a better overview of the joint situational picture, especially since cooperation between Stratcom groups was also established at the same time. The organizations paid special attention to active communication between the two military staffs in the Stratcom area, especially in the areas of media and disinformation, exchange of analyses, and capacity development (1 - 5 Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common Set of Proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016/2017, NATO/EU).

At the end of 2017 the Hybrid CoE reached operational capacity, which in turn led to active cooperation between the Hybrid CoE, the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, and the newly formed NATO Hybrid Analysis cell, as well as between the EU's Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity and NATO's Joint Intelligence and Security Division. The Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES)[10] network has also been set up between the EU and NATO. As a result of this cooperation, the first parallel and coordinated report was produced, and is still being produced in the same way today. The need for active cooperation between the two organizations in this field was also confirmed, as this ensures that the implication of hybrid threats is coherently addressed in the CDP and the NDPP (Ibid.).

Following the active participation of these entities, a review of cooperation in the areas of early warning and situational awareness, Stratcom and communication, crisis response, cyber defence, energy security, resilience and deterrence was carried out. The first step in the fight against terrorism was also taken, when NATO was invited to participate in Europol meetings (Ibid.).

Nevertheless, in the author's view, the NATO Cyber Operations Centre is currently lacking in the fight against hybrid threats. Cyberspace can be used as a key tool to achieve an adversary's goal, whether political, economic, or military, and hybrid threats can be carried out in or through cyberspace.

---

[10] *BICES is a multinational intelligence system that provides intelligence to NATO and its Member States (Tolga, B., I.; Faith-Ell, G., 2020, p 30).*

Cybersecurity and defence

In the area of cybersecurity and defence, the following measures were taken: the implementation of the NCIRC/CERT-EU technical agreement; cooperation in the exchange of concepts, threat indicators, ad hoc exchange of threat warnings, and threat assessments; closer cooperation between response groups; and cross-cutting meetings focused on crisis management, cyber diplomacy, the EU cyber diplomacy toolbox, and NATO's cyber defence efforts. A EU-NATO consultation meeting was also held to discuss the NATO Cyber Defence Pledge, the EU Joint Report on Resilience, Deterrence and Defence, and the presentation of key EU cyber defence capability development projects. The main objectives of these measures were to avoid duplication of defence capacity, and it was also agreed that the Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) would become an operational tool for the two organizations to exchange information on cyber incidents (1 - 5 Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common Set of Proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016/2017, NATO/EU).

Defence capabilities

In this area, the two military staffs conducted a review on the CPD and the NDPP to ensure coherence between the two plans and to avoid duplication of defence capabilities. It has been highlighted that the Member States have only one set of their own (national) military forces, and military staff should strive to ensure coherence between the two planning processes, so the military staff agreed that regular contacts and information exchange should become the norm to avoid duplication of existing capabilities (Ibid.). This approach confirms the stated objective of the complementarity of defence capabilities and the rationalization of resources set out in the Joint Declaration.

Education, training, and exercises

The organizations have also made progress in the area of education, training, and exercises. Education and training was mainly focused on strengthening complementarity and exchanging best practice, with the NATO Hybrid CoE and CCDCOE being the most involved. Education took place mainly in the form of workshops, while training took place mainly in the form of exercises. The CMX exercise, which successfully completed the PACE concept, stands out, as it has proved to be a key element of EU-NATO cooperation in strengthening resilience to and combating hybrid threats. Specifically, the purpose of this concept and exercise was to achieve cooperation in four areas: early warning/situational awareness, Stratcom, cyber defence, and crisis prevention and response (1 - 5 Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common Set of Proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016/2017, NATO/EU).

Cooperation in cybersecurity and defence exercises has also been strengthened. The EU has joined the NATO Trident Juncture; Trident Jaguar; the Cyber Coalition, and the Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exercise, and NATO took part in the

MILEX exercise (Ibid.). These exercises do not only serve as training, but also for the exchange of experience and practical knowledge. They are a priceless source of practical knowledge and experience, and at the same time the best way to test tools and documents in place.

Defence capacity building, the defence industry, and research

In the area of the defence industry and research, the EU and NATO have set up a mechanism to develop a dialogue on industrial aspects, focusing on specific areas of common interest such as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Recent dialogue in this area has intensified, especially on supply chain and innovation issues, with a focus on ICT. This enhanced dialogue led to the presentation of the EU Cyber Security and Defence Package within the European Defence Fund, and NATO introduced the MISP (1 - 5 Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common Set of Proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016/2017, NATO/EU).

Bilateral consultations have also been held between NATO Allies and EU members, and between NATO partners and EU partners, and the adoption of common standards has been agreed, for which the Material Standardization Harmonization Team is responsible. Maintaining regular contacts between the military headquarters has prevented unnecessary duplication of international projects and initiatives, resulting in the coordination of 38 of 47 PESCO[11] projects with NATO (Ibid.).

Some measures have also been implemented in the field of innovation, especially in energy and artificial intelligence. Data exchange has been established between the EDA and the NATO Innovation Hub, and between the NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO), the European Commission, and the EDA (Ibid.).

3   CHALLENGES OF THE EU-NATO PARTNERSHIP: COMMON TERMINOLOGIES

Although both organizations emphasize the importance of a common and unified approach in responding to contemporary security threats, we note that the organizations do not use uniform terminology. The importance of terminology in the contemporary security environment was pointed out by Futter et al., who argue that there are no uniform definitions and understanding, especially with regard to security in cyberspace (2018, p 201; Schatz, D et al., 2017, pp 53-54). Noor took the same view, pointing out that even if we all speak the same language, we do not all

---

[11]   *PESCO - Permanent Structured Cooperation. Under PESCO, two of the 17 flagship projects related to cybersecurity are: 1. the EU Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) and 2. the EU Cyber Rapid Reaction Team (CRRT) (EEAS, ESDC/Cyber Platform: Inauguration Ceremony, EEAS, 2018). The first CRRT was prepared under the lead of the Netherlands in 2019. In March 2020, six Lithuanian-led countries signed a memorandum on the CRRT, by which Lithuania, Estonia, Croatia, Poland, the Netherlands, and Romania agreed on mechanisms of operation, legal status, role, and procedures (Cyber Rapid Response Team established by six EU countries, the Lithuania Tribune, 2020).*

understand terminology equally (Noor, 2021, Tallinn Winter School in Diplomacy, e-source).

At the same time, there are also language barriers, where the meaning and understanding of a term may be lost in translation. In addition to the already known international legal gaps (e.g. the application of international law, norms, measures, etc.), therefore, the common understanding of terminology presents an additional challenge to a common and unified approach to facing the global challenges of the two organizations.

In reviewing EU and NATO documents from the cyber defence perspective, we analyzed the Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations (AJP-3.20. Conduct of Operations - AJP-3, edition C, version 1) and the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) documents, as the main organization of EU cybersecurity. In the comparisons, we focused only on the essential terms that form the basis for a unified approach in the contemporary security environment.

Information environment

The information environment is not defined in EU documents, although this term is mentioned in some of them. Although the EDA commissioned the implementation of the EU Capability Development Analysis Plan until 2035, highlighting the importance

Figure 3: Information environment and forms of operation (Source: Adapted from Orye, E and Maennel, M O, 2019, p 106[12])

---

[12] *Until November 2012, the term Computer Network Operations was used instead of the term cyber operation. The following terms were also changed: Computer Network Attack, Computer Network Defence and Computer Network Exploit (Glossary, NIST, 2021, e-source).*

of understanding the information environment (Kepe et al., 2018, p 22), the definition itself could not be found. Within NATO documents this term is identified in AJP-3: "*A composite of the information itself, the individuals, organizations and systems that receive, process and convey the information, and the cognitive, virtual and physical space in which this occurs,*" (AJP-3, p LEX-6).

This raises the question of how the EU understands the information environment, which in general terms represents the interaction between social networks and cyberspace. This issue is very important from the point of view of combating hybrid threats, as by sharing a common understanding of the information environment, organizations can develop more effective resilience to hybrid threats.

Cyberspace

Understanding cyberspace is as important as understanding the information environment, especially in terms of international law and the exercise of sovereign power by states. For comparison, we looked at the definition of ISO 27023, which defines cyberspace "*as a complex environment resulting from the interaction of people, software and services on the Internet, supported by worldwide distributed physical information and ICT devices and connected networks*" (ISO/IEC 27032, 2018, p VI).

ENISA defines cyberspace somewhat differently. Its definition encompasses all three layers of cyberspace: "*the time-dependent set of tangible and intangible assets which store and/or transfer electronic information*" (ENISA overview of cybersecurity and related terminology, ENISA, 2017, p 6).

NATO defines cyberspace similarly to most experts and the International Telecommunication Union (Probert, 2019, p 69), and has identified two definitions:

– Cyberspace is "*the global domain consisting of all interconnected communication, information technology and other electronic systems, networks and their data, including those which are separated or independent, which process, store or transmit data*" (NATO, AJP-3.20, p 4).
– "*Cyberspace is the virtual, non-physical domain formed by all information technology systems interconnected on a global scale*" (NATO, AJP-3, p C-3).

Thus, we are again faced with the same problem in defining the information environment, specifically in how organizations understand cyberspace. Different understanding of cyberspace influences the formulation of other definitions concerning the cyber domain, and thus the building of resistance to cyber threats, or cyber operations.

Information Security

The NATO definition of information security is not covered in any of the aforementioned documents, but is covered by the NATO Security Directive of the Joint Operations Command and in the Security document within NATO. Instead of the term "information security", NATO uses the abbreviation "INFOSEC" and the term Information Assurance, which means the protection of all information inside/outside[1] information systems and networks, including other forms of security: physical, documentary, communication, computer, industrial, physical and security of operations (ACO Security Directive, 2012; Security within NATO, NATO, 2020). The EU´s information security is defined in different way, as ENISA states that information security is a classic information security model that defines three objectives: confidentiality, integrity and availability (ENISA overview of cybersecurity and related terminology, p 6). NATO has a similar definition, but instead of information security the term CIS (Communication and Information System) security is used, which is "*the application of security measures for the protection of communication, information and other electronic systems, and the information that is stored, processed or transmitted in these systems concerning confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication and non-repudiation*" (Security within the NATO, NATO, 2020); this follows the ISO 27000 definition of a standard (ISO/IEC 27000, 2018, p 12). This type of definition is also defended by Longley et al. (1992, p 268), from which we can logically conclude that cybersecurity is a subset of information security. However, ENISA has taken a different definition, namely that information security and network and information systems are subsets of cybersecurity and related terminology (ENISA, 2017, p 6).

Cybersecurity

The definitions of the two organizations also differ in defining cybersecurity. ENISA uses two definitions of cybersecurity in one document:

1. "Comprises all activities necessary to protect cyberspace, its users, and impacted persons from cyber threats";
2. "Covers all aspects of prevention, forecasting; tolerance; detection; mitigation, removal, analysis and investigation of cyber incidents".

Considering the different types of cyberspace components, cybersecurity should therefore cover the following attributes: "availability, reliability, safety, confidentiality, integrity, maintainability (for tangible systems, information and networks), robustness, survivability, resilience (to support the dynamicity of the cyberspace), accountability, authenticity and non-repudiation (to support information security)" (ENISA Overview of Cybersecurity and Related Terminology, 2017, p 6).

---

[1] *Includes physical and digital information.*

NATO defines cybersecurity in a much simpler way, namely as "the application for the protection of communication, information, and other electronic systems, and the information that is stored, processed or transmitted in these systems with respect to confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication and non-repudiation" (NATO, AJP-3.20, p 4). However, the NATO definition does not include all layers of cyberspace, as a social (human) layer is not included.

Conclusion   Over the past two decades, digital technology has become the backbone of modern society while society, in kind, has become simultaneously very vulnerable and resilient to modern security challenges. The information environment and cyberspace have created new security challenges and threats that cannot be tackled individually, with consequences spreading globally. These consequences may be completely non-kinetic or kinetic in nature, but may also be a combination of both, depending on the level of resistance achieved against modern threats.

The EU and NATO are aware of the contemporary security environment, which consists of all the domains of warfare, and whose hazard vectors are the same for both organizations. This awareness has been steadily strengthened for a long time, which has led to the signing of a joint declaration on a deepened strategic partnership. Both organizations have agreed that only joint efforts can lead to greater resilience to hybrid and cyber threats to the two organizations and their Member States, considering all the domains of warfare.

Both adopted agreements set clear objectives and goals for the EU-NATO Strategic Partnership, and 74 adopted measures made these goals concrete. The analysis showed that both organizations undertook the agreement with the utmost seriousness in all areas of common interest: political-strategic, operational and hybrid cooperation, cooperation in cybersecurity, development and capacity building, and industry and innovation. The pace of cooperation was found to have accelerated, with the greatest progress being made in implementing joint measures to combat hybrid threats, cybersecurity and defence, and capacity building, as the aim was not to duplicate but to complement capabilities. However, such efforts are also key to a fair sharing of the burden and the benefits and responsibilities between the organizations, or between the Member States of both organizations.

Despite a large number of implemented measures, some open questions remain, primarily concerning definitions and terminology. Terminological differences are present in all areas. The most worrying is the diametric nature of the understanding of information or cybersecurity. Such discrepancies can lead to different resilience and capacity building, both in the Member States and in organizations, and make it impossible to implement the principle of non-duplication and complementarity. Another open issue is the application of Article 5 and non-Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, or Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty on the EU and Article 222 of the Treaties on the Functioning of the EU. The latter issue is of an international legal nature, but the organization could also act in this area, which would provide insight

into how the Member States understand the application of international law in the case of hybrid and cyber threats.

Bibliography

1. *ACO SECURITY DIRECTIVE, AD 70-1 (2012). Belgium: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.*

2. *Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations – AJP-3.20, 2020, NATO. NSO.*

3. *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations – AJP-3, Edition C, Version 1., 2019. NATO. NATO Standardization Office.*

4. *Cohen, R., 2008. Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order. Garmisch-Partenkirchen: George C. Marshall Center.*

5. *Council Conclusions on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. EU, 2016. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15283-2016-INIT/en/pdf, 23. 12. 2020.*

6. *Council Conclusions on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration, 2017. EU. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31947/st14802en17.pdf, 18. 12. 2020.*

7. *Cyber Defence, 2020. EDA. https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/cyber-defence, 23. 12. 2020.*

8. *Cyber Rapid Response Team established by six EU countries, 2020. The Lithuania Tribune. https://lithuaniatribune.com/cyber-rapid-response-team/, 19. 12. 2020.*

9. *Defining Computer Security Incident Response Teams. US-CERT. https://www.us-cert.gov/bsi/articles/best-practices/incident-management/defining-computer-security-incident-response-teams, 22. 2. 2021.*

10. *EEAS, ESDC: Cyber platform for education, training, evaluation and exercise (ETEE), 2018. https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2018/11/20/cyber-education-training-exercise-and-evaluation-(etee)-platform-launched, 19. 12. 2020.*

11. *ENISA overview of cybersecurity and related terminology. European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, 2017. https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-position-papers-and-opinions/enisa-overview-of-cybersecurity-and-related-terminology, 13. 2. 2021.*

12. *EU and NATO increase information sharing on cyber incidents, 2016. EEAS. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5254_en, 23. 12. 2020.*

13. *Fourth Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common Set of Proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, 2019. NATO https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_06/190617-4th-Joint-progress-report-EU-NATO-eng.pdf, 18. 12. 2020.*

14. *Fifth Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common Set of Proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, 2020. EU. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/44445/200616-progress-report-nr5-eu-nato-eng.pdf, 18. 12. 2020.*

15. *Futter, A., 2018. Journal of Cyber Policy: 'Cyber' semantics: why we should retire the latest buzzword in security studies, Vol. 3, No.2. Taylor & Francis Group, pp 201–206.*

16. *Kepe, M., Black, J., Melling, J., Plumridge, J., 2018. Exploring Europe's capability requirements for 2035 and beyond: insights from the 2018 update of the long-term strand of the Capability Development Plan. Brussels: EDA.*

17. *Glossary, NIST, https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/computer_network_operations, 21. 1. 2021.*

18. *Herrmann, S., D., 2001. A Practical Guide to Security Engineering and Information Assurance. New York: Auerbach Publications.*

19. *International Standard ISO/IEC27000, 2018. Geneva: ISO.*

20. *International Standard ISO/IEC27032, 2018. Geneva: ISO.*

21. *Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation, 2016. EU. https://www.consilium.europa. eu/media/24293/signed-copy-nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en.pdf, 23. 12. 2020.*

22. *Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation, 2018. NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/ natohq/official_texts_156626.htm, 23. 12. 2020.*

23. *LePage, R., 2014. Understanding NATO Strategic Communications. Sofia: Crisis Management and Disaster Response Centre of Excellence.*

24. *Lété, B., Pernik, P., 2017. EU-NATO Cybersecurity and Defense Cooperation: From Common Threats to Common Solutions. Policy Brief, No. 38. Washington DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States.*

25. *Latici, T., 2020. Understanding EU-NATO cooperation: theory and practice. Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service.*

26. *Lisbon Summit Declaration. NATO, 2010. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_ texts_68828.htm, 21. 12. 2020.*

27. *Longley, D., Shain, M., Caelli, W., 1992. Information Security: Dictionary of Concepts, Standards and Terms. New York: Stockton Press.*

28. *Mogherini, Rehrl, 2018. Handbook on Cybersecurity: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, p 6. Vienna: Federal Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Austria.*

29. *Noor, E., Tallinn Winter School of Cyber Diplomacy, 2021. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bxWGc4Db7Z4, 10. 2. 2021.*

30. *Orye, E., Maennel, M. O., 2019. Recommendations for Enhancing the Results of Cyber Effects, 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle NATO Cooperative Cyber Centre of Excellence, Tallinn: CCDCOE.*

31. *Pernik, P., 2014. Improving Cyber Security: NATO and the EU. Tallinn: International Centre for Defence Studies.*

32. *Pissanidis, N., Rõigas, H., Veenendaal, M., 2016. 8th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Cyber Power. Tallinn: NATO CCD COE Publication.*

33. *Pogodba o Evropski uniji, Evropska unija, UL C 202/38, 7. 6. 2016.*

34. *Pogodba o delovanju Evropske unije, Evropska unija, UL C 202/1, 7. 6. 2016.*

35. *Probert, E. D., 2019. Organisational Structures & Incident Management for Cybersecurity in the America. ITU: SlideShare.*

36. *Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common Set of Proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016, 2017. NATO. https://www.nato.int/ nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_06/20170619_170614-Joint-progress-report-EU-NATO-EN.pdf, 18. 12. 2020.*

37. *Raik, K., Järvenpää, P., 2017. A New Era of EU-NATO Cooperation: How to Make the Best of a Marriage of Necessity. Tallinn: International Centre for Defence and Security.*

38. *Relations with the European Union, 2020. NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ topics_49217.htm, 18. 12. 2020.*

39. *Schatz, D., Bashroush, R., Wall, J., 2017. Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law: Towards a More Representative Definition of Cyber Security, Volume 12, No. 2, Florida: Embry-Riddle Aeronautic University, pp 53−74.*

40. *Second Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common Set of Proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016, 2017. NATO. https://www.nato.int/ nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_11/171129-2nd-Joint-progress-report-EU-NATO-eng.pdf, 18. 12. 2020.*

41. *Security within NATO, C-M(2002)49-REV1, 2020. NATO.*

42. *Svete, U., 2005. Varnost v informacijski družbi. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za uporabne družbene študije.*

43. *Svete, U., 2007. Varnostne implikacije uporabe informacijsko-komunikacijske tehnologije. V: Elektronsko upravljanje in poslovanje v službi uporabnika / Pintarič, U. (ur.). Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, pp 160–161.*

44. *Statement on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration signed by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2016. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ official_texts_138829.htm, 18. 12. 2020.*

45. *Third Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common Set of Proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, 2018. EU. https:// www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35578/third-report-ue-nato-layout-en.pdf, 18. 12. 2020.*

46. *Tolga, B., I., Faith-Ell, G., 2020. Information Sharing Framework for Penetration Testing. Tallinn: CCDCOE.*

47. *The Brussels Treaty. NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17072.htm, 19. 12. 2020.*

48. *Zakon o kritični infrastrukturi (ZKI). (Critical Infrastructure Act) Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No 75/17 of 22 December 2017.*

Gregor Garb

OBRAMBNE POBUDE ZA KREPITEV VARNOSTI EVROPSKE UNIJE

DEFENCE INITIATIVES TO STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Povzetek   Izhajajoč iz poslanstva Globalne strategije za zunanjo in varnostno politiko EU iz leta 2016 in s ciljem doseganja strateške obrambne avtonomije so države članice EU soglasno sprejele in uvedle pobude za krepitev razvoja zmogljivosti EU, kot so CARD, PESCO in EDF. Z doseganjem strateške obrambne avtonomije kot prednostne naloge bo EU postala ugledna svetovna sila in ne bo več tista, ki bo za doseganje svoje ravni ambicij odvisna le od velikih sil. Z izpolnjevanjem tega cilja bo EU krepila svojo že tradicionalno mehko moč pri zaščiti strateških interesov. Kljub temu bo sodelovanje med EU in Natom še naprej nujno za evropsko in svetovno varnost.

Ključne besede   *EUGS, obrambne pobude, CARD, PESCO, EDF, sodelovanje med EU in Natom.*

Abstract   Following the mission of the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS), and with the aim of achieving strategic defence autonomy, the EU Member States unanimously adopted and implemented various initiatives to strengthen the development of the EU's capabilities: CARD, PESCO and the EDF. By achieving strategic defence autonomy as a priority, the EU will become a respectable global power and, as such, it will no longer be one that depends solely on great powers to provide for its level of ambition. In this way, the EU will also harden its traditional soft power to protect its strategic interests. Nevertheless, cooperation between the EU and NATO will remain essential and is crucial for European and global security.

Key words   *EUGS, defence initiatives, CARD, PESCO, EDF, EU-NATO cooperation.*

Introduction The European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) is the updated doctrine of the EU to improve the effectiveness of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), including the defence and security of the Member States, the protection of civilians, cooperation between the Member States' armed forces, management of immigration and crises, and so on. Adopted on 28 June 2016, it replaced the European Security Strategy of 2003. The EUGS is complemented by a document entitled "Implementation Plan on Security and Defence".

EUGS sets out the interests, principles and priorities of the European Union in a more connected, competed and complex world. Over the past five years, these global trends have not only been confirmed, they have deepened and become more intertwined. Competition and complexity play a key role in the strategic, economic and political spheres. They occur at both the global and regional levels, particularly in areas which are already experiencing fragilities, conflicts and rivalries.

The security of the EU was presented as the first priority of the EUGS; in 2016, great importance was already attached to it by Member States and EU institutions. The ongoing deterioration of the strategic context, and Member States' and EU institutions' growing political determination to address this together, resulted in a new level of ambition with three overarching objectives: crisis management, building the security and defence capacities of our partners, and protecting the EU itself (EUGS, 2019, p 10). This aims to improve the protection of the EU and its citizens, to help governments jointly build defence capacity, and to develop a better response to crises.

Further actions to step up EU security include three key separate but interlinked defence initiatives which propose and enable various types of suggestion and support, including a financial one for more efficient capability development and joint procurement for Member States, and steps to put into effect the EU-NATO Joint Declaration. In this context, EU-NATO cooperation represents an integral pillar of the EU's work aimed at strengthening the EU's first priority – the security of the Union.

The purpose of this article is to make an overview of defence initiatives which have originated in the EUGS and how they actually contribute to improving the EU's security and further cooperation with NATO.

1 DEFENCE INITIATIVES FOR CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT IN THE EU FRAMEWORK

In the wake of the EUGS, the EU has launched major defence initiatives to encourage European defence cooperation and support the EU level of ambition in security and defence agreed by Member States in November 2016. Although distinct, these initiatives contribute to the same goal: delivering more capabilities through deepening European cooperation and, in doing so, strengthening the Union's ability

to take more responsibility as a security provider and enhance its strategic autonomy and freedom of action (EPP, 2021).

The newly established end-to-end planning framework at EU level (see Figure 1) ranges from common priority setting among Member States, through the Capability Development Plan and a regular defence review by CARD (Coordinated Annual Review on Defence), to common planning and project implementation, based on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and incentivized by the European Defence Fund (EDF).

Figure 1: A coherent approach from priorities to impact (Source: EPP, 2021)

The basis for ensuring an overall coherence in this new approach is common priority setting, geared towards building a more consistent, interoperable, deployable and sustainable set of European capabilities and forces. Prioritization begins with the Capability Development Plan, which provides the baseline and general orientation for the coherent development of the European capability landscape, while the Overarching Strategic Research Agenda identifies common research priorities in

defence; both serve as key references for the EU's defence initiatives such as CARD, PESCO and the EDF.

1.1 Capability Development Plan

Efficient collaborative EU defence cooperation requires participating countries to select the priorities they want to dedicate their efforts and limited resources to. The European Defence Agency[1] (EDA) works on priority setting in the areas of capability development; defence research; skills, technologies and industrial manufacturing capabilities (Priority Setting, 2021).

This important priority setting is achieved through the Capability Development Plan (CDP), a list of capability areas in which European shortfalls have been identified and where multinational collaboration could help fill the gaps. Initially set up in 2008, the CDP was revised in 2011, 2014 and 2018 under the auspices of the EDA, which is the CDP 'architect', in close cooperation with the Member States and with the active contributions of the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS).

The CDP provides a full capability picture that supports decision-making processes at EU and national level with regard to military capability development, thus contributing to increased coherence between Member States' defence planning. It addresses security and defence challenges from the perspective of European capability development, looks at the future operational environment, and defines EU Capability Development Priorities agreed by Member States (EPP, 2021).

"Since 2016, the European defence project has picked up speed. Based on the 2016 EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy, several initiatives have been launched to reinforce defence cooperation: the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, the Permanent Structured Cooperation, and the European Defence Fund. Today's adopted EU Capability Development Priorities serve as their benchmark to ensure that their combined outcome will be a more coherent set of deployable, interoperable, sustainable capabilities and forces," said Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency (CDP, 2018).

---

[1] *Stimulating and supporting cooperative defence development among the Member States lies at the heart of all EDA activities. The EDA serves as the enabler of EU defence cooperation, and as a platform where Member States that are willing to join forces to develop new defence equipment can do so, with the Agency's help and expertise. Cooperation in the EDA is entirely voluntary; common projects are either initiated by the Agency itself or brought to it by one or several Member States. Projects and programmes are inclusive, meaning that additional Member States can join at any time. Know-how, new technologies and final equipment and capabilities developed at the EDA are owned by the participating countries, which also finance the projects they are involved in. Multinational capability development at the EDA covers the whole life-cycle of a project, from research and development and definition of common standards and requirements to design planning, industrial development and procurement of new defence equipment. All capability domains are covered: land, air, sea, cyber and space (EDA Factsheet, 2021).*

The last CDP[2] revision, in June 2018, has led to the definition of eleven European Capability Development Priorities, which address the entire capability spectrum in support of the EU's level of ambition and are designed to help guide Member States' efforts in capability development. They were the result of an in-depth assessment made on the basis of contributions provided by Member States, the EUMC and the EUMS on short-term[3], mid-term[4] and long-term[5] trends: capability shortfalls analyses and lessons learned from recent CSDP operations; planned capabilities and the potential for future European cooperation in each of the capability domains; and a study into the long-term capability-related and technological trends and needs (2035 and beyond) (Priority Setting, 2021).

The EU Capability Development Priorities reflect, in equal terms, existing capability shortfalls in the CSDP context, lessons learned from recent operations, planned capabilities, and the potential for future cooperation according to national plans, as well as technological trends and industrial developments impacting future capabilities. On the one hand, they address the main capability shortfalls for deployed operations (land, maritime and air capabilities, as well as logistic and medical support) with a reinforced focus on high-end warfare. On the other hand, they also cover other focus areas of Member States, such as the adaptation of military capabilities required for territorial defence and security or cyber defence, as required by the EUGS in 2016 (CDP Factsheet, 2018).

Each of the EU Capability Development Priorities are further detailed in modules of relevant sub-priorities (see Figure 2).

The 2018 EU Capability Development Priorities cover the following lines of action:

– Enabling capabilities for cyber-responsive operations
– Space-based information and communication services
– Information superiority
– Ground combat capabilities
– Enhanced logistic and medical support capabilities
– Naval manoeuvrability
– Underwater control contributing to resilience at sea
– Air superiority

---

[2] One of the novelties of the 2018 CDP is that it considers evolution in the broader European security and defence environment, taking into account the necessity of countering hybrid threats and adaptation to the new EU level of ambition agreed by the Member States. The 2018 Plan also looks at the entire spectrum of capability development and underpins the identification of cooperative activities that can be implemented by Member States in the cooperation framework of their choice.

[3] his includes a capability shortfalls analysis from the CSDP perspective, as well as lessons learned from recent operations.

[4] The mid-term dimension assesses the potential for cooperation for each capability.

[5] The CDP finally offers an assessment of future trends (2035 and beyond) and needs for each capability by linking long-term technology trends to future capability requirements and related R&T needs, as well as industrial perspectives.

– Air mobility
– Integration of military air capabilities in a changing aviation sector
– Cross-domain capabilities contributing to achieve the EU's level of ambition (CDP Factsheet, 2018)

These modules are further refined through 'Strategic Context Cases', which map the European capability landscape and propose activities or 'Avenues of Approach' (see Figure 3), to be taken forward by Member States in a cooperative manner. The Strategic Context Cases are living documents and are developed by Member States within the EDA, in close coordination with the EUMC and EUMS. They allow the identification of the actions and steps that must be taken in cooperation in the short, mid- and long-term to achieve a more coherent set of deployable, interoperable and sustainable capabilities, for use in CSDP missions and operations, or within other national or multinational frameworks such as the UN or NATO, considering that Member States have a single set of forces.

Figure 2: "Avenues of Approach" (Source: EPP, 2021)

The Strategic Context Cases provide an integrated view of what can be done on the basis of cooperation in each of the capability domains, informing national defence planning and the implementation of EU initiatives such as CARD, PESCO, and the EDF. They therefore include references to Research and Technology priorities more specifically identified in the Overarching Strategic Research Agenda. They also refer to the Key Strategic Activities: skills and industrial manufacturing capacities considered important for the implementation of the priorities and underpinning of the notion of EU strategic autonomy.

1.1.1 Overarching Strategic Research Agenda

The Overarching Strategic Research Agenda (OSRA) was initiated by the EDA with the aim of providing a harmonized view of relevant European defence research priorities and the possible paths to achieve them, taking into account the different funding mechanisms available, such as the newly established European Defence Fund. For this purpose, OSRA aligns the Strategic Research Agendas (SRAs) of the EDA's various Capability Technology Groups (CapTechs) with military tasks and long-term capability needs agreed by Member States in the CDP. CapTechs[6] are run by the EDA and bring together experts from the government, industry, small and medium enterprises (SME), and academia. The OSRA methodology complements the bottom-up approach of the SRAs (which are a result of the CapTechs identifying new research developments and emerging technologies that have an impact on future capabilities) with a top-down approach that takes into account the military capability needs defined by Member States (OSRA factsheet, 2019).

OSRA defines 136 Technology Building Blocks (TBBs) and associated TBB roadmaps. OSRA and its TBBs are defined in a cooperative effort between participant Member States at European level, bringing an added value to support the development of future defence capabilities. Each TBB roadmap provides an assessment on existing technology gaps in a specific area, its relevance to defence capability development, the Technology Readiness Level (TRL), and concrete collaborative project ideas including an indicative timeline up to 2027. They serve as a basis for launching cooperative R&T projects and informing funding decisions taken in the context of the EDF. Where applicable, the roadmaps show links to related TBBs and considered projects within and outside the EDA framework (EPP, 2021).

1.1.2 Key Strategic Activities

The EU Global Strategy specifies that Member States need the technological and industrial means to acquire and sustain those capabilities which underpin their ability to act autonomously. In this context, the objective of the Key Strategic Activities (KSA) is to analyze defence industry and technological capacities within the EU, and to identify crucial areas with a view to strengthening the EU's strategic autonomy. This approach is also in line with the broader aspiration of the EU to address and mitigate dependencies from external markets, and to reinforce the security of the European supply chains. The "New Industrial Strategy for Europe", published by the European Commission in March 2020, reflects this industrial policy in support of the EU's industrial and technological sovereignty, including in the space and defence sectors.

The ambition of the KSA is to raise awareness and promote a common understanding in Member States, EU institutions and defence industry actors of industrial and

---

[6] *Currently, the EDA hosts 12 such CapTechs and two Working Groups. Building on CapTech's SRAs and Member States' capability development needs, OSRA defines common research and technology (R&T) priorities in the form of Technology Building Blocks.*

technological areas, as well as skills and competencies where dependency on non-EU players could put the EU's freedom of action in the domain of defence at risk. It is suggested that the identified KSA become specific targets for national and EU funding schemes, including the EDF, hence contributing to the development of a more competitive and autonomous European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). The KSA process also intends to promote collaboration between Member States in agreed capability and research priority areas, while focusing on the industrial aspects (KSA, 2021).

As we can conclude, the CDP has particular strategic significance and provides the reference and general orientation for a more coherent development of the European capability landscape. It will notably serve as a key reference for ongoing and future activities related to capability development in the EU framework, and for the implementation of major European defence initiatives, such as CARD, PESCO and the EDF, launched following the 2016 EU Global Strategy.

1.2 Coordinated Annual Review on Defence

EUGS (2019, p 36) proposed that "An annual coordinated review process at EU level to discuss Member States' military spending plans could instil greater coherence in defence planning and capability development". To fulfil this expectation, Member States decided to take up the idea to set up a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD, 2021)[7].

CARD's objective is to provide Member States and the EU with a picture of the existing defence capability landscape in Europe, and to identify potential areas of cooperation. The idea is that over time this will lead to a gradual synchronization and mutual adaptation of national defence planning cycles and capability development practices. This, in turn, will ensure a more optimal use and coherence of national defence spending plans. CARD is a 'pathfinder' for collaborative capability development projects while, of course, avoiding duplication of work with NATO (CARD 2, 2021).

"The CARD will provide the necessary overview and indications to help bind together national planning, multinational PESCO projects and the European Defence Fund, all the while remaining complementary to NATO's defence planning targets," said Jorge Domecq[8]. "If it works as we intend, the CARD will provide the overview of the entire European capability landscape, and thus function as a pathfinder to support related political decision-making" (CARD2, 2021).

---

[7]   *Based on a concept developed by the EDA, CARD was finally approved by the EU Council in May 2017. Since then, the EDA, together with the EU Military Staff (EUMS), has acted as the CARD Secretariat.*

[8]   *EDA's Chief Executive.*

After a first trial run in 2017/2018, the first full CARD cycle was launched in autumn 2019 and completed in November 2020 with a final report submitted to the Defence Ministers meeting in the EDA's Steering Board.

It identifies a total of 55 collaborative opportunities across the whole capability spectrum, considered to be the most promising, the most needed or the most pressing ones, including in terms of operational value. Based on this catalogue of identified opportunities, it is are recommended that Member States concentrate their efforts on the following six particular focus areas, which are not only covered by the EU Capability Development Priorities agreed in 2018, but are also where the prospects for cooperation look particularly good, namely (CARD, 2021):

– Main Battle Tanks (MBT)
– Soldier Systems
– Patrol Class Surface Ships
– Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (Counter-UAS)
– Defence Applications in Space
– Military Mobility

In addition to this, 56 options for cooperation in Research & Technology have also been identified. The focus is on areas such as Artificial Intelligence and cyber defence, new sensor technologies, emerging materials, energy efficient propulsion systems, unmanned systems and robotics.

CARD also reveals that conditions for multinational cooperation in all six capability focus areas are advantageous, including from a time planning perspective. For this reason, a broad participation of Member States can be expected in collaborative projects related to these areas, at system and subsystem levels, including through linkage from such new collaborative projects to already existing programmes[9].

For the efficiency and effectiveness of CARD it is crucial to provide real added value. To achieve this goal, it must be supported by full information on the defence plans (including spending plans) of Member States, as well as the implementation of the EU Capability Development Priorities resulting from the Capability Development Plan.

Responsibility for the collection of all this information lies with the EDA, which also worked on compiling all the available information for the test run and 2020 CARD cycle. It follows a prescribed methodology that consists of different elements and procedural steps[10] (CARD, 2021).

---

[9] *The final CARD report also urges Member States to make full use of all identified collaborative opportunities, and stresses that collaborative development of capabilities in these six focus areas requires industrial cooperation for prime contractors, mid-caps and small and medium-sized enterprises, with positive effects on the competitiveness of the European Defence Technology and Industrial Base (EDTIB).*

[10] *Such as: Initial Information, Bilateral Dialogues, CARD Analysis and CARD Report.*

1.3 Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defence

In the light of the changing security environment, the EUGS has commenced a process of closer cooperation in security and defence. EU Member States have agreed to step up the European Union's work in this area and acknowledged the need for enhanced coordination, increased investment, and more cooperation in developing defence capabilities. This is the main aim of the Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence (PESCO), as outlined in Articles 42(6)[11] and 46, as well as in Protocol 10[12] of the Treaty on European Union. Through PESCO, Member States increase their effectiveness in addressing security challenges and in advancing towards further integration and strengthening of defence cooperation within the EU framework (PESCO Factsheet, 2020).

PESCO[13] is a Treaty-based framework and process to deepen defence cooperation between EU Member States who are capable and willing to do so. The aim is to jointly develop defence capabilities and make them available for EU military operations. This will enhance the EU's capacity as an international security actor, contribute to the protection of EU citizens, and maximize the effectiveness of defence spending. The difference between PESCO and other forms of cooperation is the legally binding nature of the commitments undertaken by the participating Member States. The decision to participate was made voluntarily by each participating Member State, and decision-making will remain in the hands of the participating Member States in the Council. This decision-making is without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain EU Member States (PESCO, 2021).

On 22-23 June 2017 the European Council agreed the need to launch an inclusive and ambitious Permanent Structured Cooperation to strengthen Europe's security and defence, and to help reach the level of ambition of the EU expressed in the EU Global Strategy published in 2016.

On 13 November 2017, as the first formal step towards setting up PESCO, Ministers signed a common notification on PESCO and handed it over to the High Representative and the Council. The notification set out a list of 20 more binding common commitments in the areas of defence investment, capability development and operational readiness. It also contained proposals on the governance of PESCO and its principles. Based on this notification, on 11 December 2017, the Council took

---

[11] Which provides that "those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework".

[12] Stipulates that PESCO is open to any Member State which has higher capacities and undertakes to intensively develop defence capabilities through the development of national contributions and their participation in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes and in the activities of the EDA in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments.

[13] In November 2020 Joseph Borrell stated: "PESCO is a decisive contribution for the development of Europe's capacity to act autonomously. It is key for the development of strong and integrated defence capabilities available to the EU, which will allow us to react effectively to the most demanding circumstances". Borrell is a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the EU Commission.

the historic step of adopting a decision establishing PESCO and its list of participants; a total of 25 Member States[14] decided to participate. The participating Member States' aim is to collaboratively develop a coherent full-spectrum force package and make the capabilities available to the Member States for national and multinational (EU CSDP, NATO, UN, etc.) missions and operations (PESCO2, 2021).

While membership of PESCO is only for those Member States that have undertaken the more binding commitments, third States may exceptionally be invited to participate in PESCO projects upon certain conditions. These general conditions and related procedures were adopted on 5 November 2020 in the form of a Council Decision, which encompasses a set of political, substantial and legal requirements in line with the nature and goals of PESCO, while acknowledging the added-value that partners can bring to PESCO projects[15] (CBP, 2021).

PESCO's two-layer structure, the Council[16] and Projects[17], aims to offer new opportunities to put in place a viable and sustainable EU Defence cooperation, with concrete projects and legally binding decisions by the Council. The PESCO secretariat[18] fights for "developing a culture of compliance (which) will be crucial" (Biscop, 2018) to the cohesive achievement of the different projects.

On 6 March 2018, the Council adopted a Recommendation setting out a roadmap for the implementation of PESCO, and formally adopted the first set of 17 different projects in three different domains and the project members for each of them. A second set of 17 projects was adopted by the Council on 20 November 2018. A third set of 13 projects followed on 12 November 2019, bringing the total number of projects to 47. The Council decided not to launch any new projects in 2020. In

---

[14] *On the basis of the Council decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 the participating Member States are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden.*

[15] *Although broadly supportive of the initiative, the United Kingdom (UK) did not sign up to PESCO. As a third country now outside the EU, the UK Government favours a flexible, ad hoc approach to future defence cooperation with the EU. Adopting this stance lends itself to participation in specific PESCO projects, on a case-by-case basis. However, the Government will have to find all of the EU's terms and conditions on third state participation acceptable, particularly with respect to the general conditions related to the strengthening of the CSDP and control over intellectual property. Any determination on future UK participation in PESCO may therefore depend on how important the Government calculates a specific project to be for the UK's national interest.*

[16] *Responsible for overall policy direction and decision-making, including the assessment of whether participating Member States are fulfilling their commitments. Legal acts are adopted by unanimity (except decisions concerning the suspension of membership and entry of new members, which are taken by a qualified majority). Only PESCO members can take part in the vote.*

[17] *PESCO's output will also be measured by the projects it will develop. Each project will be managed by those Member States that take part in it, under the oversight of the Council. To structure the work, a decision on general governance rules for the projects was adopted by the Council on 25 June 2018.*

[18] *The EDA and the EEAS, including the EU Military Staff, jointly provide secretariat functions for all PESCO matters and a single point of contact for the participating Member States and institutions.*

addition, one of the 47 projects was terminated in February 2020, bringing the list of projects currently developed to 46[19].

This list demonstrates the EU Member States' willingness to increase efficient exchanges and cooperation with regard to defence issues for over three years. Divided into seven different categories, the projects cover multiple fields of action, such as: "Training, Facilities"; "Land, Formations, Systems"; "Maritime"; "Air, Systems"; "Cyber, C4ISR"; "Enabling, Joint" or "Space" (FINABEL, 2019).

They include projects in the areas of capability development and in the operational dimension, such as: the establishment of a European Medical Command, an EU Training Mission Competence Centre, Cyber Rapid Response Teams, Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security, Military Disaster Relief, Maritime Surveillance, the creation of a European Military Space Surveillance Awareness Network, a joint EU Intelligence School, and specialized Helicopter Training, as well as co-basing, which would allow the joint use of national and overseas bases.

Every two years, a process is launched to generate new projects. The list of projects and their participants is updated by the Council each year in November. Assessment criteria have been developed by the PESCO secretariat to inform the evaluation of the project proposals by the participating Member States. The Council adopts PESCO projects, following a recommendation by the High Representative. The Council recommendation of May 2019 on progress made on PESCO foresaw that, after 2019, the next call for PESCO projects would take place in 2021.

With the aim of assessing the fulfilment of the more binding commitments, each participating Member State is required to communicate a National Implementation Plan (NIP) each year, informing the other participating Member States about the progress made on the binding commitments it has undertaken. The NIP forms the basis of the assessment process, as described in the Council Decision establishing PESCO. Each year, the High Representative presents an annual report on PESCO to the Council, based on an assessment made by the PESCO secretariat. On this basis, the Council reviews annually whether the participating Member States are continuing to fulfil the more binding commitments. The first of these assessments was adopted by the Council in May 2019 (PESCO Factsheet, 2020).

The first PESCO Strategic Review was conducted in 2020 and on 20 November the Council validated the guidance for the next PESCO phase (2021-2025) in terms of overall aims, key policy goals, processes, and incentives to improve the fulfilment of the more binding commitments.

---

[19] *Thirty-eight of these projects are aligned with NATO priorities. PESCO Member States are also expected to meet 20 specific defence policy commitments, including meeting agreed defence spending targets, the harmonization of requirements, and greater collaboration.*

1.4   European Defence Fund

EUGS (2019, p 35) proposed that "EU Funding for defence research and technology, reflected first in the mid-term review of the Multiannual Financial Framework and then in a fully-fledged programme in the next budget, will help develop the defence capabilities Europe needs".

In 2017, the European Commission began to work on the European Defence Fund (EDF), consisting of 'dimensions' for defence research and capability development. The EDF will provide a key contribution to Europe's strategic autonomy, protecting and defending its citizens. It will provide financial incentives to promote cross-border cooperation between Member States and between companies[20] to enhance innovation from research to the development phase of capabilities, including prototypes, through co-financing from the EU budget. This, in turn, will lead to cost savings for EU countries. The fund will coordinate, supplement and increase national investments in defence (EDF, 2021).

The EDF is not meant to buy military kit for the EU, but to stimulate Member States to jointly procure the same equipment while strengthening the EDTIB through common defence research and innovation. It offers financial incentives connected to conditions for cooperating in multinational consortiums of technology institutes and defence industries. In other words, by using the Fund, participants are forced to establish cross-border cooperation formats, consisting of at least three different entities in three different Member States. The EDF offers additional funds[21] for the inclusion of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs), and for projects launched under PESCO (Clingendael, 2021, 2).

In order to test the EDF the Commission launched two pilot programmes, together worth €590 million: the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR, 2017-2019) with a €90 million budget, and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP, 2019-2020) with a €500 million budget. After the successful results, the pilot phase had served its purpose.

The final decision on the setting up of the EDF was taken by the Council and the European Parliament in 2019-2020. The Fund began to function on 1 January 2021 with a total agreed budget of €7.953 billion for the 2021-2027 period[22]. Roughly one third will finance competitive and collaborative defence research projects, in particular through grants, and two-thirds will complement Member States' investment

---

[20] *Including enterprises, research centres, national administrations, international organizations and universities.*

[21] *The percentage of financing can vary from 100% for feasibility studies to 20% in the case of the development of demonstrators. In essence, the financing percentage is lowered when a project leaves the drawing board and enters the factory floor. Co-financing by Member States and/or industry is essential to carry a project forward from the development phase into full-scale production.*

[22] *This represents 0.74% of the total EU Multi-Annual Financial Framework 2021-2027 budget of €1.074 trillion. In 2019 the EU Member States spent €41.4 billion on defence equipment procurement, including R&D (Clingendael, 2021, p 3).*

by co-financing the costs of defence capabilities development following the research stage (EDF, 2021).

2   DEEPENING EU-NATO COOPERATION

Since 2016, cooperation between the EU and NATO has gained momentum. The changed security environment has been the driving factor in recasting the outdated cooperation model, based on the Berlin-Plus arrangement of 2003, into a new strategic partnership for addressing challenges and threats to European security, coming from the east and south in particular, together (Zandee, 2019, p 21.)

As stated in EUGS (2019, p 37) the EU will deepen cooperation with the Alliance in complementarity and full respect for the institutional framework, inclusiveness and decision-making autonomy of the two. A further result of the new enhanced partnership was a first Joint Declaration signed in Warsaw in July 2016, with an outcome of identified seven concrete areas (see Figure 4) to enhance EU-NATO cooperation: 1. Countering hybrid threats; 2. Operational cooperation, including at sea and on migration; 3. Cyber security and defence; 4. Defence capabilities; 5. Defence industry and research; 6. Exercises; 7. Supporting Eastern And Southern partners' capacity-building efforts (EU-NATO Factsheet, 2020).

On the basis of the mandate by the Joint Declaration, common sets of proposals were endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils in December 2016[23] and 2017[24] (EU-NATO Cooperation, 2020). Altogether 74 concrete actions are under implementation, grouped in the agreed seven areas. In July 2018, in Brussels, the EU and NATO signed another, second, Joint Declaration, this time to confirm their commitment to implementing the ambitions of the first declaration, and also to recognize the efforts of the EU to enhance European security and defence, not least through PESCO and the EDF.

---

[23] *In December 2016, NATO foreign ministers endorsed 42 measures to advance how NATO and the EU work together, including:*
  - *Measures to bolster resilience to hybrid threats, ranging from disinformation campaigns to acute crises;*
  - *Cooperation between NATO's Operation Sea Guardian and the EUNAVFOR Operation Sophia in the Mediterranean;*
  - *Exchange of information on cyber threats and the sharing of best practices on cyber security;*
  - *Ensuring the coherence and complementarity of each other's defence planning processes;*
  - *Parallel and coordinated exercises;*
  - *Efforts to support the local capacities of partner countries in the sectors of security and defence.*

[24] *In December 2017, further steps were taken to enhance EU-NATO cooperation through the addition of 32 new measures including in three new areas:*
  - *Military mobility to ensure that forces and equipment can move quickly across Europe if necessary, which requires procedures for rapid border crossing, sufficient transport assets and robust infrastructure (roads, railways, ports and airports);*
  - *Information-sharing in the fight against terrorism and strengthening coordination of counter-terrorism support for partner countries;*
  - *Promoting women's role in peace and security.*

So far, five progress reports have been submitted, highlighting the key achievements and added value of EU-NATO cooperation in all areas of interaction. Cooperation between the EU and NATO is now the established norm and daily practice, and continues to take place on the basis of the key guiding principles: openness, transparency, inclusiveness and reciprocity, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy and procedures of the two organizations, without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any Member State (Understanding EU-NATO Cooperation, 2020).

By signing joint declarations, the EU and NATO have committed themselves to stepping up their cooperation and strengthening their role in supporting international peace and security. The Allies are determined to make their contribution to creating more favourable circumstances through which they will:

– Fully strengthen the strategic partnership with NATO, in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of the two organizations;
– Enhance practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field;
– Broaden political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to share assessments and perspectives;
– Cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimize duplication and maximise cost effectiveness (Relations with the EU, 2021).

Enormous change has taken place in the EU-NATO relationship in recent years. It seems that already, in a such short period, more has been implemented than in the previous decade and a half under Berlin-Plus. Now is the moment to further explore the scope for EU-NATO synchronization of the defence planning systems of the organizations – to the benefit of the EU and transatlantic security (Zandee, 2019, p 31)

Conclusion With the aim of achieving strategic defence autonomy, the Member States unanimously adopted and implemented various initiatives to strengthen the development of the EU's defence capabilities. This will strengthen the EU's strategic autonomy, but the real boost in its political (strategic), operational (capabilities) and industrial (equipment) dimensions will depend on the further level of commitment and follow-through required by the PESCO governance model.

The importance of adopted defence initiatives can be viewed from at least three different but interrelated aspects: as a political aspect in terms of closer integration and strengthening ties between the Member States and within the EU; as a defence aspect in terms of supporting the development and building of key defence capabilities identified by the Member States; and as an economic aspect in terms of the development and progress of the defence industry and technological science.

Although distinct, these initiatives contribute to the same goal: delivering more capabilities through deepening European cooperation, and, in doing so, strengthening the EU's ability to take more responsibility as a security provider and to enhance its strategic autonomy and freedom of action. The development of autonomous capabilities must also be seen in terms of the protection of the EU's strategic interests, where it is increasingly becoming clear that traditional soft power is no longer enough, and that it needs to be hardened more and more often.

Today, within the first priority of EUGS – the Security of the Union – important changes are taking place; CARD, PESCO and the EDF are three key separate but interlinked defence initiatives aimed at EU capability development. CARD provides an overview of the existing capabilities within the EU, evaluates the Member States' efforts in addressing the CDP-based capability priorities, and identifies opportunities for cooperation. PESCO defines commitments and offers the context and scope for projects related to capability development. The EDF provides EU funding to support the implementation of agreed projects for research and technology, as well as for industrial development.

By joining the initiatives, Member States have lost part of their defence capabilities for guaranteeing their own individual sovereignty and state autonomy, but on the other hand they have compensated for this by controlling the collective decision-making process and maintaining the last word on the use of force. Progress and improvement in a more coherent set of deployable, interoperable, and sustainable capabilities, for use in CSDP missions and operations, or within other national or multinational frameworks such as the UN or NATO, given that the Member States have a single set of forces, will be achieved only through the consistent implementation of the resulting requirements from the initiatives described above. On the contrary, this will be another of the so-called dead letters on paper and another proof of more disagreement on the political carpet between the Member States.

The fact is that the implementation of defence initiatives followed by EU defence autonomy does not represent the separation of the EU from NATO or the building of the EU's own armed forces, but is rather means and instrument by which the Member States will develop and achieve defence capabilities that they could not do alone or at low cost.

In the current increasingly volatile and unstable strategic geopolitical environment, cooperation between EU and NATO remains essential. Close cooperation and partnership between them enhances the transatlantic bond, while EU defence initiatives contribute to common burden-sharing. Mutually enhancing, they can mobilize a broad range of tools and make the most efficient use of resources to address challenges and enhance the security of EU citizens.

Only by taking full account of all commitments and obligations arising from the initiatives will the EU achieve a level of strategic defence autonomy and become a

respected global power that does not depend solely on superpowers to provide for its level of ambition.

Bibliography

1. Biscop, S. *European Defence: Give PESCO a Chance. Survival 60(3), UK, pp 161–180. http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2018/06/European-defence-give-PESCO-a-change-SvenBiscop-June18-1.pdf).*

2. *CARD, 2021. https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/EU-defence-initiatives/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-(card), 20. 2. 2021.*

3. *CARD 2. Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, 2021. https://eda.europa.eu/webzine/issue18/cover-story/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-(card), 7. 4. 2021.*

4. *CBP. UK Research Briefings. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9058/, 4. 4. 2021.*

5. *2018 CDP. EU Capability Development Priorities Approved, 2018. https://eda.europa.eu/news-and-events/news/2018/06/28/new-2018-eu-capability-development-priorities-approved, 4. 4. 2021.*

6. *CDP. Capability Development Plan Factsheet, 2018. https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2018-06-28-factsheet_cdpb020b03fa4d264cfa776ff000087ef0f, 6. 4. 2021.*

7. *Clingendael Alert. European Defence Fund, 2021. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/Alert_European_Defence_Fund_February_2021.pdf, 1. 4. 2021.*

8. *EDA Factsheet, 2018. https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2018-06-28-factsheet_cdpb020b03fa4d264cfa776ff000087ef0f, 28. 3. 2021.*

9. *EDF. European Defence Fund, 2021. https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/EU-defence-initiatives/european-defence-fund-(edf), 20. 3. 2021.*

10. *EPP, 2021. EDA Prioritisation Platform. https://prioritisation.eda.europa.eu/, 2. 4. 2021.*

11. *EUGS. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, 2016. https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf, 28. 3. 2021.*

12. *EUGS. The European Union's Global Strategy Three Years On, Looking Forward, 2019. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu_global_strategy_2019.pdf, 1. 4. 2021.*

13. *EU-NATO Cooperation, 2020. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/28286/eu-nato-cooperation-factsheet_en, 1. 4. 2021.*

14. *EU-NATO Factsheet, 2020. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu_nato_factshee_november-2020-v2.pdf, 21. 3. 2021.*

15. *FINABEL, 2019. https://finabel.org/another-17-pesco-projects-approved-2/, 4. 4. 2021.*

16. *KSA. Key Strategic Activities, 2021. https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/EU-defence-initiatives/priority-setting/key-strategic-activities, 1. 4. 2021.*

17. *OSRA Factsheet, 2019. https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2019-03-25-factsheet-osra, 22. 3. 2021.*

18. *PESCO, 2021. https://pesco.europa.eu/about/, 25. 3. 2021.*

19. *PESCO2, 2021. https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/EU-defence-initiatives/permanent-structured-cooperation-(PESCO), 25. 3. 2021.*

20. *PESCO Factsheet, 2020. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/pesco_factsheet_2020-11-9-version-20-nov.pdf, 24. 3. 2021.*

21. *Priority Setting, 2021. https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/EU-defence-initiatives/priority-setting, 22. 3. 2021.*

22. *Relations with the European Union, 2021. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm, 1. 4. 2021.*

23. *Understanding EU-NATO Cooperation, 2020. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ etudes/BRIE/2020/659269/EPRS_BRI(2020)659269_EN.pdf, 28. 3. 2021.*

24. *Zandee, D., 2019. EU and NATO Capability Development: Separate or Together?, pp 21-31. In Brustlein, C. (Ed.) Mutual Reinforcement: CSDP and NATO in the Face of Rising Challenges, Focus Strategique, No. 93, IFRI, France.*

David Humar
Nina Raduha

OBLIKOVANJE VOJAŠKE STRATEGIJE REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE

THE PROCESS OF DEVISING THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA

Povzetek
V članku je predstavljen potek priprave predloga Vojaške strategije Republike Slovenije znotraj Slovenske vojske z namenom oblikovanja zgodovinskega spomina in krepitve prepričanja, da sta obramba in varnost stalen proces, ki ne more biti odvisen od vsakodnevnega političnega razpoloženja, temveč mora biti dobro načrtovan, nivojsko in resorno usklajen proces, ki je na koncu zapisan v strategijah. Nato in EU intenzivno sprejemata nove strategije na obrambnem in vojaškem področju. Sledi jima Republika Slovenija z oblikovanjem prvega predloga Vojaške strategije Republike Slovenije. Bistveno vlogo pri oblikovanju predloga strategije do zdaj je imel proces, ki je zagotovil krepitev in sistematizacijo vojaške misli, poenotenje razumevanj znotraj Slovenske vojske in usklajenost z obrambno-vojaškimi dokumenti.

Ključne besede
Vojaška strategija, potek priprave vojaške strategije, Vojaška strategija Republike Slovenije.

Abstract
The article presents the process of developing the Military Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia within the Slovenian Armed Forces, with the aim of building historical memory, and in the strengthening belief that defence and security are a continual process that cannot be subjected to everyday political mood, but must be a well-planned process, departmentally coordinated at all levels, which is finally written into a strategy. NATO and the EU are intensively adopting new defence and military strategies, followed by the Republic of Slovenia with its first proposal of a Military Strategy. A key role in writing the proposed strategy was played by the process within the Slovenian Armed Forces, which ensured the strengthening and systematization of military thought, the synchronization of its understanding, and harmonization with defence-military documents.

Key words
Military strategy, process of drafting military strategy, Military Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia.

Introduction The significantly changed security environment, the changed strategic balance of forces, the emergence of new and complex threats after 2014, the information technology revolution, and modern security challenges require and deserve our attention, and dictate a faster adaptation of national and international security and military structures in order to be as effective as possible in ensuring peace and security.

Security is not a self-evident good, as is shown by an overview of major crises and conflicts, hybrid action[1], terrorist attacks, natural and technical disasters, famines, infectious diseases, migration, environmental problems, economic crises and so on, which can escalate towards the conventional use of military power (Conflict trends, 2020; HIIK, 2019; ReSNV-2). In such a reality, no-one is absolutely resilient and safe, a fact confirmed by a number of experts (Ramirez et al., 2018; Furlan, 2020; Malešič, 2016; Žabkar, 2003). Strategic shocks warn us that security trends are not linear; they can lead to even greater discontinuity. Changes are a trend we must follow. NATO and the European Union (EU) are aware of these trends, and since 2014 they have been in a phase of adapting to the changed security environment, and transforming and adopting new strategies. NATO is already implementing its new military strategy and vision for NATO 2030, and is announcing a new strategic concept. The EU has decided to develop a »Strategic Compass« by 2022, which will be a policy document for the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (NATO, 2021; Garmone, 2020; NATO ACT, 2020; NATO 2030, 2021; Rynning, 2020, Vergun, 2019; Broeks, 2020; EU Parliament, 2019; and EU Council, 2019).

The Republic of Slovenia (RS) follows these trends with the ambition to participate in ensuring effective national defence and regional and global peace in accordance with its interests, political decisions and obligations to the homeland, alliances and partnerships, but primarily with regard to its obligations to its citizens. In 2019, the RS adopted a new Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia (ReSNV-2). It has also begun to increase its defence budget and raise awareness of the importance of a credible and effective military organization to protect national interests and goals. Currently, based on the defence policy's ambitions, the Ministry of Defence and the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) are revising key development planning documents: a Resolution on the General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the Slovenian Armed Forces (ReSDPRO SV), and the Medium-Term Defence Programme (SOPr 2021/2026). With these two documents and the renewal of other relevant normative acts, the state should determine the scope and timeline of providing human, financial and material resources and a normative framework for the development of the SAF and its capabilities.

---

[1] *Hybrid warfare combines actions from irregular and conventional warfare, extensively using new technologies and StratCom. For more see https://www.hybridcoe.fi/coi-strategy-and-defence/.*

In accordance with the Vision of the SAF Chief of the General Staff (Vision, 2019), the consent of the Minister of Defence[2], NATO and EU documents and concepts, defence and military development trends, and on the basis of in-depth military-professional analyses and assessments of international security trends, risks and threats, the SAF has launched a systematic approach to the development of the proposal of the Military Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia (MS RS) for the first time. It will be followed by the review and revision of doctrinal documents, concepts and guidelines for the engagement of the SAF and its operational plans for different scenarios. After thirty years of the existence, development, growth and of the RS and its defence forces, the SAF, following the necessary military strategic considerations, has produced an MS RS proposal. The purpose of this document is to define the Ends and Ways of SAF strategic engagement, and the directions in which the SAF should develop according to national directions and aspirations[3]. The drafting of the document was approached systematically, on the basis and with the use of contemporary knowledge and experience. A guided process with extended discussions was put in place, using cooperation with other defence structures in the RS.

The main research topic of this article is the process of developing the MS RS proposal within the SAF. The goal is to systematically record the process of strategic thinking and development of the strategy and to emphasise the need for the MS RS. In addition to this, the aim is to expand military strategic knowledge and its importance for effective military engagement both in the RS and beyond. The record of the development of the MS RS has a dual purpose; the basic intention is to record and inventory the process executed by the SAF as one that enabled the strengthening and unification of military strategic thought, the final product of which is the proposal of the most senior military document in the RS. The second purpose of this article is to produce a tool[4] that will facilitate an easier and more systematic approach to the production of security, defence and military related strategic documents. For the theoretical background of the article the method of analysis of primary and secondary sources was mainly used. The main research method is a case study by observation during participation (the first author of the article was in the lead of the MS RS process, while the second was a member of the red group and the expert-support group), through exercises and surveys conducted among the participants in the process of formulating the strategy text.

The main research questions of the article derive from the statement that the RS and the SAF need the MS RS, which should be adopted at the level of the Government of the RS, and which will arise as a result of a process of military strategic thought synchronized with defence and national security thought, ambitions, goals

---

[2]   In Slovenia, the Secretary of Defence is called the Minister of Defence.

[3]   The Means will be defined and planned in ReSDPRO SV and SOPr.

[4]   The article leans on the theory described by Furlan (2020, 2021) and Vuk (2020), Lykke (2001), Yarger (2006), and Rumelt (2017).

and resources. In this context, we will seek answers to questions about strategic consideration, whether there were any peculiarities in the production of the MS RS with respect to the theory, why the RS and the SAF need a military strategy at this time, and why we did not have one before. Additionally, we are interested in the dilemmas faced in the process of the development of the MS RS, and whether the MS RS as a document can contribute to the desired SAF positioning in the state's and society's structure, i.e. for the SAF to be recognized as a credible part of the instrument of national power both at home and abroad, while enjoying a high reputation in Slovenian society.

1 THE NEED FOR MILITARY STRATEGIES

Military strategy is the art and science of the engagement of the armed forces to achieve the national goals, especially in the field of national security, by using military force or threat. Based on the defined national security interests and threat assessment, the essence of such a strategy is to determine strategic military objectives, necessary resources, risks, and, consequently, military ways to achieve the set national security objectives. A military strategy is based on the national security strategy and the defence strategy[5], and must express the connection of the armed forces with the other elements of the national security system. The strategy must also reflect the country's commitments to the international community, which in Slovenia's case must pursue national interests within international organizations and partnerships, especially NATO and the EU.

There are several reasons why the need to formulate a military strategy of the Republic of Slovenia has emerged. We can combine them into external and internal reasons, as described below.

External reasons include changes in the international security environment, and an increase in military threats on the periphery of the Euro-Atlantic area, which has been intensifying since 2014 with the use of military force, more intensive and complex hybrid actions, and military operation conflicts below the threshold of war. As a result, NATO and the EU are embarking on new strategies to strengthen their military capabilities, introduce innovations in military operations, and raise their level of preparedness. After 50 years, NATO developed its new Military Strategy (NMS)[6], which was issued in May 2019. It is of crucial importance from a military point of view, because it was founded on a Capabilities-Based and Threat-Informed

---

[5]   *In the case of the RS, it must also be based on the Defence Act of the Republic of Slovenia (ZObr 1994), in which, due to the lack of strategic documents at the time of its creation, certain elements that usually belong to strategies and doctrines were also defined.*

[6]   *Relevant public source about the NMS: NATO (2019), Vergun (2019), and Broeks (2020).*

Approach[7]. In 2016, the EU adopted the EU Global Strategy »Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe« (EU Global Strategy – EUGS), which guides EU foreign and security policy, including military development and action[8]. The Republic of Slovenia also joined these processes in 2019, when it adopted a new Resolution on the National Security Strategy (ReSNV-2).

Internal factors begin with the need for clearly defined military strategic thought. Despite the fact that the SAF has most of its operational capabilities at the tactical level, it needs a strategy for SAF engagements as a whole in national defence and in NATO and EU activities, especially in collective and common defence. In its 30 years of independence, the RS has not yet developed a comprehensive military strategy[9], a written and unified military strategic thought, which would improve and unify strategic knowledge, development and operation, and thus contribute to other national and international strategic documents and activities. The internal reasons include the fact that, despite its predominantly tactical capabilities, the SAF, as a national armed force, must ensure its involvement in providing security at a strategic national and international level, which can, in its core military essence, only be defined by a military strategy. A military strategy is required due to the processes initiated by ReSNV-2 and the growing awareness that ignorance and misunderstanding of security risks and threats can pose a critical risk to national security. Internal factors also include the fulfilment of the obligations of the RS to international allies and partners, which anticipate the strengthening of military capabilities and the strengthening of the deterrence and defence posture. Thus, the MS RS provides a conceptual connection with national, NATO and EU documents, as well as with the documents of allies and partners.

Consequently, and in accordance with the vision and intention of the Chief of the General Staff, in 2020 the SAF began the process of drafting the MS RS proposal (Vision of the Chief of the General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces, 2020), which is to be prepared and submitted to the competent authority by summer 2021.

---

[7] *With a coherent top-down approach, the NMS provides directives and guidelines to the military structure for the continuous and effective development and use of Allied military instruments of power over a 10-year period. Its implementation is based on two documents: Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area Concept (DDA), issued in June 2020, and NATO's Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC) issued in 2021. The contents of the documents are mostly confidential, but publicly available summaries of the documents used in the article are the following: NATO, 2021; Garmone, 2020; NATO ACT, 2020; NATO 2030, 2021; Rynning, 2020, Vergun, 2019; Broeks, 2020.*

   In 2019, NATO issued new Political Guidance (PG19) for NATO adaptation in an unpredictable security environment, focusing on strengthening deterrence and defence, projecting stability and the fight against terrorism, investing in defence, and modernization, focused on military capabilities.

[8] *The EU has begun to influence the strengthening, building and integration of military capabilities in EU countries. Initiatives have been devised, such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDIP). Open sources on the topic can be found at: EU Parliament (2019) and EU Council (2019).*

[9] *The Strategy of the Military Defence of the Republic of Slovenia was issued in 1998 (Grizold, 2004), but focuses mainly on the military part of national defence, which is the most important part of military activities and strategy, yet only one of them.*

The SAF General Staff is the highest military expert body of the RS and is, as such, responsible for the development of military strategic thought, which supports the realization of national interests and goals, and guides the achievement of a proper state of preparedness and the efficient engagement of the SAF forces. As such, it has initiated and led the process of drafting the strategy proposal. The initiated process, however, must ensure the systematic development of military strategic thought from which the MS RS emerges, which offers a solid and modern starting point for the SAF's functioning. Vuk (in Furlan, 2020) argues that strategic (military) thought in the SAF is relatively weakly present. Therefore, it is important to take into consideration how its military experts will perceive, unify and implement this process.

2 THE PROCESS OF FORMING A MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA

Different scholars from strategy science like Žabkar, Vuk, Furlan agree that defence, especially its military part[10], and the security of the RS are constant processes that cannot vary according to daily mood and spirit, but must be well planned and clearly defined in the strategy. A military strategy must be synchronized with other strategic documents. A good strategy systematically reduces the impact of uncertainty in decision-making and action processes. It examine, develop and anticipate the strategic environment to the extent that we can respond to a variety of security challenges effectively and in a timely manner. A military strategy substantiates the basis for military concepts, doctrines and plans, as well as basic military and defence planning documents. The strategy is the most important military document, since it defines why we have a military instrument of power, what goals it wants to achieve, and in what way. An important role in the formation of strategies is played by the process of creating, designing and writing them, which their content, feasibility, effectiveness and efficiency largely depend upon (Žabkar, 2003; Vuk, 2016; Furlan, 2020).

2.1 Principles of devising the Military Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia

In the process of drafting the MS RS, the SAF followed a theoretical framework developed by Furlan (2020). It is also important to highlight Prochazaka's all twelve guiding principles of strategy formulation shown below were taken into account in the implementation of the strategy-making process.

1. The problem was identified – the changed security environment, the escalation of threats and security challenges, the need for adaptation and for systematization of thought, knowledge, experience and strategic solutions.
2. Transparency has been ensured – a process implementation team has been appointed; strategic communications have been included in the process from the very beginning, and a time limit and references have been defined.

---

[10] *In accordance with the Defence Act of the Republic of Slovenia, the defence of the Republic of Slovenia is an indivisible whole consisting of the military and civil defence.*

3. Attempts were made to ensure the principle of interdisciplinarity – both officers and non-commissioned officers from various working levels and specialties have been appointed to the working group. In the future second phase of the strategy development process (after internal harmonization), external experts in the field of national security will be present.

4. Objectivity was ensured – an analytical group was formed, and exercises were conducted to find and test the proposed solutions.

5. The process was project-led – despite their regular work commitments, the planned number of key officers and non-commissioned officers took part in the strategy formulation process.

6. Coherence was achieved gradually – the MS RS was placed in the hierarchy of documents, but at the beginning some decision-makers of the defence system had concerns with the importance of the military strategy.

7. An alternative approach was enabled by the assessment of different solutions, especially in the context of decision-making exercises (Table Top Exercise (TTX)).

8. The cost assessment has been made – through the provision of resources for the SAF defined in reference documents.

9. MS RS objectives have been set – publicity; development; strengthening; unification and systematization of military strategic thought; building knowledge and experience; contribution to other documents; creating a starting point for the revision of other military documents, doctrines, plans; etc.

10. An implementation framework has been established – the main implementation elements have been determined and the identified resource-related modalities have been linked to resources and objectives.

11. Indirectly, lessons learned have been taken into account – lessons learned from devising other strategic-level documents were indirectly taken into consideration. During the process, the analytical team accurately recorded the lessons learned.

12. Best practice – to a large extent theoretical and international strategy-making practice has been taken into account (Prochazaka, 2019 in Furlan, 2020).

Strategic communications

Strategic communications is a sub-process within the MS RS formation process, which in terms of content complemented the aspect of the cognitive and non-kinetic dimensions of SAF activities. At the same time (more relevant to this article), the aim of integrating strategic communications into the entire process of the development of the MS RS was to uniformly achieve the desired communication effects with regard to the content and the MS RS devising process on the perception and behaviour of the selected target public. For the purposes of drafting the strategy strategic communications guidelines were developed, which sought to form a unified understanding of the need for the formation of the MS RS and why the RS needs it. Strategic communications provide a framework for the commonly accepted presentation of the strategy's content and its effects to the internal and external environment, and help to balance the expectations of the national and strategic operating environment.

2.2 The basis of the Military Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia

Initial guidelines

The Chief of the General Staff's intent, which was written in the development vision, is clear. He wrote that the activities and efforts of all SAF members should focus on the development of a military strategy, which will be based on the ReSNV and the Defence Strategy of the RS. It must take into account other strategic documents in the area of national security and the newly adopted NATO and EU documents – the NATO military strategy, EU concepts, plans and guidelines, and a strategic analysis of the security environment and contemporary threats.

By order of the Chief of the General Staff, an Interim Group for the preparation of a draft MS RS was established in the SAF. The group consisted of more than 60 different military, defence and security experts who were tasked with preparing a Draft Military Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia in a transparent manner and in a professionally planned and managed process, by 30 June 2021.

> **IDENTITY CARD OF MS RS**
>
> Proposer of the strategy: SAF
>
> Approver: Minister of Defence
>
> Holder of the MS RS: SAF General Staff
>
> Signatory: Government of the RS
>
> Time frame: 24 September 2020 – 31 July 2021
>
> Participants: Administrative part of the MoD
>
> Coordination: Interdepartmental
>
> Type: Operational military strategy with development elements
>
> Accessibility: Public text

Placement of the military strategy in the hierarchy of strategic documents

As already mentioned, the strategy must be in line with national and international strategic documents in the field of defence and the military. The SAF is based on the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia; the Defence Act (ZObr); the Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the RS (ResNV-2); the Defence strategy; and other strategic level documents[11] affecting the functioning of the SAF. Based on the tasks from the ZObr and other guidance documents, the military strategy, which is the

---

[11] *The study Hierarchy of Documents in the Field of National Security in the Republic of Slovenia from 1999 and the decisions of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia from 1999 and 2000, among other documents, define the strategy of military defence. In accordance with the ZObr and the ReSNV, the SAF, in addition to the key function of national military defence, also has other functions and thus a broader mission. This all together is the comprehensive matter of the MS RS. However, the military strategy must be complementary to the ReSDPRO SV, which is defined in the Rules on Planning in the MoD of the RS, as a guiding and planning document in the area of SAF development.*

skill and science of balancing military objectives, means, ways and methods of use, defines the achievement of the set objectives. The MS RS also takes into account the adopted NATO Military Strategy (and the documents implementing it), the NATO Joint Doctrine (AJP-01), and the emerging EU Strategic Compass.

It was decided by the MoD that the process of drafting the MS RS must take place simultaneously and in coordination with the drafting of the Resolution on the General Long-Term Programme of the Development and Equipping of the SAF (ReSDPRO) and the Medium-Term Defence Programme of the RS (SOPR), and must reflect the direction of the NATO and EU strategies. All this will enable the renewal and development of the operation plans of the SAF and provide adequate resources for strengthening and building the SAF's capabilities.

Process of devising the Military Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia and organization of work

The course of the individual phases of strategy formulation was defined while preparing the starting points for the MS RS, and registered in the Order for the Implementation of the Proposal Process of the MS RS (Order, 007-203/2020-1). Within the process of the formation and adoption of the MS RS, three phases were defined:[12]

1. Phase 1: Strategic consideration (September to December 2020).
2. Phase 2: Development of strategic thought (January to May 2021).
3. Phase 3: Formulation of the Military Strategy proposal (May to July 2021).

The phase of creating starting points was not defined in the Order, so in this article we consider it a pre-phase. Phases 1 and 2 were conducted in a strictly confidential environment; however, the third phase, the harmonization and drafting of the MS RS, was unclassified, as the MS RS will be a public document. The completion of each phase is reported to the Chief of the General Staff to provide him with an overview of the situation. According to the report, the Chief of Defence (CHOD) provides guidelines and instructions for the further work of the MS RS preparation group. In practice, the development of strategic thought and the drafting of the MS RS already began in Phase 1, so in reality the phases overlapped.

The work was organized within five groups, each with its own specific content-related task. The groups adjusted their methods and micro-timing according to the content, availability of personnel and expectations:

---

[12] *It should be noted that the process of creating a MS RS was underway when the Covid-19 epidemic was declared. All consultations, meetings, presentations and exercises were therefore carried out in compliance with the prescribed measures for the prevention of SARS-CoV-2 Covid-19 virus infection. This additionally impeded the work of the organizational team; however none of the participants caught the infection during the MS RS-related activities related.*

1. The expert-coordinating group was tasked with the decision-making process and the presentation of the strategy to the internal professional public at the Ministry of Defence and later to the external public and the media. It consisted of the most senior SAF representatives, who were able to use their strategic-level competencies to formally and professionally design and direct the process of military strategic reflection and knowledge development.

2. The Blue Group consisted of strategic experts and decision-makers who, with their competencies in specific subject-matter areas, ensure a military professional, meaningful and coordinated search for the definition of solutions and the formulation of the emerging strategy and its systematic record. Their basic task was to unify military strategic thought, thus providing a solid basis for a clear military strategy. The group provided the necessary transfer and management of information and synchronized the work of the other groups.

3. The Yellow Group consisted of operational and strategic-level experts. They were tasked with ensuring the synchronization of strategic thought with the operational requirements, examining the security situation and the strategic environment, providing threat assessment, and identifying security risks and threats.

4. The Green Group consisted of representatives of the operational and tactical levels, whose competencies ensured the synchronization of strategic thought with the tactical requirements, and whose task is to define the strategic military objectives and their connection to the tactical level, and to approach the search for ways to operate and engage the SAF.

5. The Red Group consisted of representatives who used their knowledge, connections and careful planning skills to provide the necessary connections to the environment and various publics within and outside the SAF. They were in charge of implementing the strategic communications processes from the beginning of the strategy development process until the MS RS adoption and its further implementation. The group was tasked with ensuring the comprehensibility of the text and the message related to the content of the MS RS, as well as the processes of its implementation.

Individual members of these groups also participated in the expert-coordinating and expert-support groups. They were tasked with preparing substantive material for study and discussion, and exercises, discussions and seminars. The preparations were organizational, logistical and mostly contextual. They defined the main objectives, issues and dilemmas of the discussions. After seminars and exercises, which they organized and provided the substantive materials for (scenarios, vignettes, solutions and contents), conclusions and tasks for further work were designed and approved by the expert-coordinating group. The key task, and most demanding one, was to write down the solutions from the discussions that were the basis for drafting the proposed chapters. The chapter proposals were discussed by all the groups, and they

could send written suggestions on the proposals. The consolidated proposal of the full text was discussed three times in the Blue Group before the final approval[13].

Aim and purpose of the strategy

The purpose of the consideration and development of the MS RS is to define the concept, principles and idea of the SAF's engagement as a defence force and as a key part of the military instrument of power, and to consolidate its military strategic thought and moral foundations.

Military professionals define and understand the SAF as an instrument of national power. Therefore, the purpose of the MS RS is to define the military strategic goals and the ways of achieving them with the military instrument of national power, thus contributing to the renewal and preparation of other strategic documents of the RS.

The aim of the MS RS is to determine the ways in which the SAF is engaged and used in pursuing the interests and goals of national (defence) security and in responding to sources of risks and threats to national security. As part of the introductory section of the formation of the MS RS, the desired final state was defined, which can be achieved by recording a realistic and feasible MS RS: the SAF is a credible military instrument of high reputation in Slovenian society's domestic and international environment.

Designing the MS RS contents outline

The MS RS contents outline followed the theory of the process of creating and formulating strategies. The created content sets served as the basis for the work of the groups and their content engagement, and later became an index of the strategy. The assessment and selection of the framework were carried out by the strategic decision-makers and by groups to which an individual thematic set of the contents was assigned. In addition to the foreword, introduction and conclusion, the proposal of the MS RS consists of six content sets: (1) Strategic Framework; (2) Military Security Environment: Threats and Risks; (3) Strategic Military Objectives; (4) Military Instrument of Power of the RS; (5) Deterrence and Military Defence Methods of the RS, and engagement of the SAF; (6) Imperatives of the development and engagement of the SAF.

2.3   Phase one – strategic consideration, assessment

The process of extended discussions and deliberations began on 24 September 2020 at the Kadetnica military facility in Maribor, with two-day consultation of the

---

[13] *The blue group organized 10 consultations, while the other groups had even more. Additionally, two exercises by SAF strategic decision-makers and three mini-exercises and one extensive seminar of experts from the defence structures of the Republic of Slovenia were organized. More than 80 military, defence and national security experts participated in the strategy process. A small group in charge of writing spent more than 10,000 hours in refining and formatting the text. Several presentations of the process and content of the MS RS have been given for various interested groups.*

SAF's key personnel. In the first phase, a series of discussions, consultations and workshops were held, as well as a process of military-strategic reflection, focusing on defining the strategic and military environment, political and military ambitions, and the military instrument of power in both the narrower and broader sense.

The first two content sets of the index served as a framework for the MS RS and were carried out through discussions within the Blue Group on the basis of materials prepared by individuals[14] and the Yellow and Green groups. This part of the process was classified as "secret". The discussion of the selected topic at the level of the Blue group was followed by discussions at the level of the Yellow and Green groups. The Red group continuously monitored the flow of the discussions, informed the internal public about it, and organized presentations and meetings with stakeholders in the defence system. The first phase was followed by an analysis of the situation, where the military-strategic consideration was assessed. The formulated content and the set postulates were written down as a unified foundation for the continuation of the production of the MS RS.

Following the guidelines of the Blue Group, the Green Group examined the strategic environment and threats, as well as the documents defining the SAF's goals and functions. In connection with this, the group defined the goals, sub-goals and activities that the military power should provide for the implementation of the basic tasks from the Constitution and the Defence Act.

The first phase of the process of drafting the MS RS was completed by recording the strategic military goals. The content was coordinated and approved at a meeting of SAF strategic leaders. The confirmed content of the first three sections was then presented to the working bodies and internal organizational units of the Ministry of Defence[15]. In principle, the strategy development process was accepted and supported. All undefined, uncoordinated topics were identified, such as protection of critical infrastructure, increase in defence forces, strategic logistics, and so on. The fact that the SAF and the administrative part of the MoD had difficulties in agreeing on the MS RS signing authority is of key importance for understanding the process of the MS RS formation. All the identified topics, perceived deviations in understanding, and open questions concerning the content and process of the strategy were recorded with the aim of them being resolved and coordinated in the second phase of the formation of the MS RS.

---

[14] *Experts from the SAF, specializing in strategy science, including Vuk (2020).*

[15] *During the completion of the first phase the first findings, the contents of the first three sections and the process of drafting the MS RS were presented to: the Defence Policy Directorate, the Defence Affairs Directorate, the Logistics Directorate, the Intelligence and Security Service, the Secretariat of the Secretary-General, the Administration of the Republic of Slovenia for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief, the Defence Inspectorate of the Republic of Slovenia and, outside the MOD, to the Slovene Intelligence and Security Agency.*

2.4 Second phase – development of military strategic thought

In the second phase the process continued, based on the situation analysis and the first three content sets, with the first exercise testing the already defined content to find solutions for bridging the gaps between the environment, ends, means and exploring possible working methods. The process focused on defining the use of the military instrument of power; conducting military activities in peacetime, crisis and war, including the cooperation and support of other departments; the support of and integration of the SAF into the national security system (including participation in the decision-making process); and identifying important strategic imperatives of the SAF's development and warfare. The discussion of these topics was carried out sequentially, bottom up, in accordance with the set outline and the already defined goals, with the initial discussion at the level of the Green Group, followed by discussions at the level of the Yellow and Blue Groups[16].

In the search for solutions through discussion, the key working method in this phase were the table-top exercises (TTX); one TTX at the beginning and one at the end of this phase. During the exercises, other stakeholders in the defence and security system were also included in the process of creating the MS RS. In addition, a full-day expert seminar with participants from the MoD and the SAF took place. Considering the needs of the process and the guidelines provided by the Chief of the General Staff, this phase included at least two consultations of each individual group. During these consultations, the groups focused on the substantive and procedural challenges in the formation of the MS RS.

A test of the risks and benefits of the MS RS content was carried out in the TTX, through discussions at working meetings of different strategy-making groups, and in numerous correspondence reflections of selected experts. The risks and benefits were sought by monitoring discussions and exercises, and were integrated into the organization of further work.

Table top exercises – Kresnik

As part of the process of military strategic reflection and the formation of the MS RS, two TTXs were carried out, based on the Kresnik 2020 scenario[17]. The purpose of the

---

[16] *The connecting element of writing the strategy in this and the next phase was a group of individuals, who provided the draft text of the strategy. The group refined each chapter, which had been written on the basis of discussions, findings and compromises, in terms of terminology, content and form. By doing this, they enabled a review of the text in the reverse hierarchy of the MS RS creation.*

[17] *The Kresnik 2020 scenarios, which were used to enact exercises TTX 1 and 2, were created on the basis of knowledge of the strategic framework of the RS and its geographical strategic position, analysis and identification of threats to national and international security, and the way the opponents operate. The scenario was formed on the basis of realistic assumptions and taking into account the technological development and information environment of the SAF operation. The scenarios were complemented by various vignettes (the term vignette denotes an imaginary event that in a fictional situation requires some action and response and is a consequence of the development of the scenario). The participants responded to the vignettes in the form of discussions and expressions of opinion through pre-prepared questions asked by the exercise managers. These questions were a reflection of dilemmas or open questions in writing down the content of the strategy and its concepts.*

TTXs was to conduct an effective discussion and exchange the views and opinions of key SAF leaders in an effective way, with different views within the framework of strategic reflection based on the scenario.

The first exercise, in December 2020, was attended by 60 people from the Blue Group for the preparation of the MS RS, and invited individuals from the administrative part of the MoD and the SAF members supporting the exercise. In this way, an attempt was made to identify the gaps between the means and the goals, define the possible ways in which our defence forces should operate, and systematically write them down in the military strategy. The Exercise Director was the Chief of the General Staff of the SAF. His basic guidance was that the MS RS was to provide an answer to how the SAF will carry out its basic mission in the future, and to reflect the fact that the SAF is a military instrument of power.

During the exercises, working meetings and consultations of the formed groups were organised to prepare the contents. All the participants were aware of the importance of the process of creating a strategy, not only from a substantive point of view, but also from an educational point of view. In this context, and based on TTX-1, three additional mini TTX exercises were carried out. The participants in these TTXs were members of the Yellow and Green Groups, the Senior Officer Staff Course candidates, and the writers of the content part of the strategy. These three exercises enabled the testing of the comprehensibility of the defined solutions, the expansion of strategic thought within the SAF, and the identification of gaps in the solutions, as well as unifying the understanding of exposed strategic dilemmas between the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Additionally, it facilitated the expansion of knowledge of the reasons and need for developing a military strategy.

The final part of the second phase of strategy formulation was the implementation of TTX 2, carried out in March 2021. This exercise included all the groups involved in the strategy formulation process, thus enabling a two-level discussion, identification of solutions, decision-making, and detailed replay, as well as the testing of certain solutions. The operational and tactical parts were divided into ten project groups, which, according to the projects, presented solutions or responses to the vignettes from the scenario. Their starting points and suggestions were used by the strategic (Blue) group in their decision-making. The purpose of the exercise was to encourage discussion on the possible ways and methods under which the SAF could operate in order to achieve the set military strategic goals in a complex, hybrid, information environment in which we are already facing modern security challenges and threats. Experts from the Ministry of Defence also took part in the exercise, which enabled mutual discussion and a coordinated search for solutions within the overall response to ensure the defence of the Republic of Slovenia and the use of the SAF. The findings of the discussion served as a good basis for the quality continuation of the formation of military strategic thought, and the preparation of a proposal of the SAF's contributions to the Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the SAF.

The analysis of the findings, the results of the discussions, the highlighted topics and the accepted facts were monitored by the analytical and observatory groups, which had the exclusive task of recording during the exercises.

Strategic seminar as part of the project of preparing the MS RS proposal

Based on the experience of the MS RS formation process and the implementation of the first TTX, areas were identified which would require in-depth knowledge and the appropriate exchange of information and procedures with other stakeholders in the national security system. A strategic seminar, in cooperation with representatives of various MoD bodies and the SAF, was therefore held. The topics discussed in more depth and coordinated between all the stakeholders at the seminar were the following: the national command and control system in crisis and war; the national command and control system immediately prior to and during collective defence; system and crisis response measures; threat assessment; the development of the SAF's capabilities; growth in military and defence capabilities; the National Defence Plan; host nation support; protection of critical infrastructure and facilities of special importance; and the response to hybrid threats.

Each individual topic was presented by the administrative part of the MoD, which covered mainly the legal-formal aspect of the topic, and by the user (the SAF), which presented the topic from the user's perspective and the perspective of practical experience. The topics were presented in sets, between which it was possible to initiate discussion and coordinate opinions. The remaining dilemmas and open questions were postponed until the gaming and discussion during TTX-2. The findings, compromises and provided solutions represented the basis for the definition of the second part of the MS RS content proposal. In this phase, the risks of feasibility and the substantive inadequacy of the MS RS were identified.

2.5   Phase three: design of the text proposal of the MS RS

In the third phase, on the basis of the substantive material prepared in the previous phases, the writing and drafting of the proposal of the MS RS continued. The preparation of the proposal was carried out by an expert support group, which carried out the process through the coordination of the strategy proposal at all three levels. The individuals responsible for particular sections and content were designated, as well as a subgroup which was to compile the first drafts of the complete text. These drafts went through at least three coordination meetings in the Blue group, with the support of the other groups.

In cooperation with Slovene language specialists and terminologists, the group harmonized the terminology and arranged proofreading. An English translation of the text was provided by the translators. Additionally, two attachments to the MS RS were prepared: an explanation of terms, and a terminology glossary of the basic resources used in the MS RS. The MS RS draft in its current version represents the proposal draft for the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia.

According to the plans, the final proposal of the strategy can, at this stage, also be presented to the wider professional and other public. However, in accordance with the guidelines of the MoD, it was necessary to take this phase slower in order to harmonize the MS RS timetable and content with ReSDPRO.

3   LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE PROCESS OF DEVISING THE MS RS

The evaluation of the performance, usefulness and content acceptability of the MS RS was a regular, continual process in the formation of the strategy. The process of creating the strategy was monitored by the analytical group in the strategic decision-making exercises. Feedback and (dis)satisfaction with the process and new proposals were sought by conducting surveys of the TTX participants. Minutes of the group's findings and conclusions were also written at all the consultations of the Blue group.

3.1   Evaluation of the performance, usefulness and content

Findings of the survey analysis

During the process of developing the MS RS, three surveys were conducted with approximately 40 respondents who participated in the TTX or strategic seminar[18]. The key findings are described below:

The process of strategy drafting, the exercises and the discussion at the TTX were identified by the respondents as very useful, because they enabled a unique process of learning the development of military thought and military decision-making. A large proportion of the respondents believed that the process contributed to personal professional development in terms of broader military strategic thinking and decision-making.

It was considered to be an excellent opportunity for an exchange of expert opinions on the topic of military strategic thought, since all the participants had the option to participate in the discussion, and all were encouraged to contribute. They found that the exercises provided important guidelines and starting points for further work on the strategy; enabled the verification of the SAF's methods of operation and use; indicated gaps, especially capability-related ones; and revealed gaps between the actual and the recorded existing situation, and the relevant solutions. The exercises provided a very good starting point for further work and decision-making. The integration of the civilian and military perspectives was recognized as important in the exercises and consultations, because only in this way can a suitable environment for a comprehensive approach be created. The vast majority of participants identified the exercises and the process as a cost-effective and useful form of training. The discussion helped to confirm the strategic goals and unify the understanding of the participants of the exercise. Very quickly, it hinted at the gaps in our system. Most of all, it showed the different perceptions of the strategic environment, decision-makers

---

[18] *All surveys are archived in the SAF HQ.*

and, above all, strategic considerations, and at the same time put them over a common denominator.

Instead of a conclusion, a quote from one of the surveys: »In the given circumstances, the chosen way of working certainly means a quantum leap in the approach to long-term planning in the SAF«.

Weaknesses identified in the surveys and the given suggestions

The discussion did not take sufficient account of new technology and the development of new systems. Solutions were sought mainly in the increasing numbers in the SAF and their capabilities, not in the prioritization of tasks or new technologies. Too much emphasis was placed on the modes of operation that support the SAF's non-priority tasks. It is necessary to continue with exercises for the leaders to unify and game through the worst-case scenarios.

There was a gap between the highlights of the strategic seminar and the differences in the perception of the future between the administrative part of the MoD and the SAF, and the ways of operation defined by the MS RS. In the future, it will be necessary to ensure the presence of other stakeholders in the national security system and other government departments responsible for national security in discussions and exercises. There was also a critical remark that the exercises were somewhat one-sidedly focused on the land part of military operations.

There should be more interaction between individual exercise groups. The TTXs should include fewer vignettes and provide more time for discussion. Even though the exercises were well set out, it was not possible to clearly conclude from the discussion what the ways of operation were supposed to be. The debaters opened up too many dilemmas and provided too few focused solutions. A TTX is especially useful when looking for answers to the question of "how"; of course, it will also be necessary to find the answer to the question "with what".

Findings of the analytical group[19]

The key task of the analytical group was to extract the content important for the writing of the MS RS, in terms of content elements, dilemmas, and offered solutions, from the exercise and the discussions. The analytical group set up an analytical model for the assessment and findings of the discussion in the frame of the exercise scenario. They monitored the given responses to the vignettes in accordance with military strategic objectives, ways of operation and other categories listed as objectives of the TTX. The content of the work of the analytical group is reflected in the content of the MS RS. In this respect, it is worth highlighting five facts: (1) In addition to the development of the MS RS, it is necessary to prepare a glossary of terms with definitions in order to ensure uniform understanding and terminological consistency;

---

[19] All data, monitoring matrix and findings are archived in the SAF HQ.

(2) The topics that were most discussed within the framework of the scenario and vignettes of the exercise were the following: increased strength of forces; scope and structure; the importance of strategic communications and its capabilities, and threat assessment; (3) The discussions during the exercise clearly showed that the exercise participants were aware of the challenges in achieving the defined military strategic objectives; (4) The idea of a defence staff was identified and supported; (5) It would be sensible to carry out exercises and processes of a similar type in the SAF in the future, and to plan them in a complementary manner with regard to other SAF exercises, training events and activities, as they represent an extremely suitable tool for an exchange of views and opinions between leaders.

The purpose of both the exercises and the process of formation of the MS RS was achieved, as it effectively illuminated strategic dilemmas from various perspectives within military strategic consideration, enabled an exchange of views and solutions, and thus strengthened group awareness of key challenges.

Innovations and highlights introduced by the MS RS and the challenges arising from it

The MS RS introduces important innovations that redefine the SAF's main effort. Among other things, the MS RS emphasizes that the SAF is the main authority in charge of combat activities in the RS in all combat domains and dimensions. It defines the SAF as the main part of the military instrument of power[20]. It defines the deterrence posture as the SAF's priority, both in independent activities and within NATO and the EU. It identifies the ways of deterrence and military defence of the RS, and the engagement of the SAF. It connects the resources and goals of the RS in the field of defence with the methods of implementing it. Part of this is also the concept of increasing military forces in case of need. This is an upgrade of the current concept of a military strategic reserve.

The MS RS also highlights other important, often under-emphasized concepts and ideas. It makes it clear that the RS and its people are the centre of military defence, and that individuals and their perception are key to ensuring security. It states that in today's security environment, military threats are mostly related to or are even an integral part of other threats and will be carried out below the threshold of war, which can upset the balance and directly threaten peace, security and stability in Europe. It puts a special emphasis on hybrid warfare and highlights the importance of non-physical factors and the impact of technology development in ensuring security in a modern security environment. Military action is extended to all domains

---

[20] *The DIME methodology was developed by U.S. Department of Defence academics and experts in 2005 as an acronym for describing the various powers of the state (DoD, 2005). The traditional instruments of national power of the state externally are: Diplomacy, Information, Army, Economy (DIME - Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economy). Morgenthau (1995: 220) argues that military power gives the other instruments of national power real significance for the overall power of the state. Furlan makes similar claims in his textbook on strategy (Furlan, 2020, 2021). Total national strength is the product of the strength of individual instruments. DIME is also defined in NATO AJP-01.*

and dimensions, within the framework of a comprehensive and integrated approach, with the participation of all instruments of power of the state and its citizens in responding to modern security challenges. It emphasizes that the RS manages its military posture together with NATO and within the EU. In extreme situations, the RS will also defend itself independently and, if necessary, unconventionally. The RS will play an active role in NATO and the EU and will responsibly assume its obligations in these two organizations.

The introduction of these innovations and the emphasis on the neglected ideas of the MS RS could, in the event of inconsistencies at the level of the national security system, lead to certain disagreements. At the same time, these facts and the introduced innovations confirm the thesis that the RS needs a national military strategy if it wants the SAF to continue to perform its legally determined tasks successfully and efficiently. Failure to achieve its military strategic goals will also increase the risks involved in preserving the fundamental values of Slovenian society and our way of life, as well as protecting and defending our national interests and goals.

There are risks associated with personnel, sustainable financing, and challenges within the SAF and between the SAF and the MoD. The SAF has the ambition to minimize these risks. Although in accordance with the Constitution and the Defence Act the SAF is a defence force of the RS, it does not represent the entire military instrument of power of the RS. Even generally, warfare is the responsibility of the state, with all its instruments of power, not just the military. The SAF, as the competent body responsible for combat and thus the carrier of combat in warfare and a key part of warfare, will propose the draft MS RS. With regard to the fact that warfare and combat are the basic forms of the SAF's activities, the SAF will also take into account other aspects of engagement, such as international military operations and missions in peacetime, ensuring readiness, and support to other state bodies and the protection and rescue system.

Conclusion   Do the RS and the SAF need the MS RS? The theoretical framework and research findings in the article can fully confirm the hypothesis from the beginning of the article – the RS and the SAF need the MS RS, which should be developed in the process of military strategic thought synchronized with defence and national security thought and adopted at the level of the Government of the RS.

The answers to individual research questions are offered by a case study and in the content of the MS RS sections. They are summarized below:

– There were no peculiarities in the production of the MS RS with respect to the theory. The process of the draft MS RS formation played a key role in its creation. This ensured the systematic development of military strategic thought and its harmonization with the basic documents in the field of defence. As such, it offers a sufficiently solid and modern starting point for the engagement and use of the SAF. The content is based on the expectations of the national security system, the

military profession, and Slovenian military thought. According to our analysis of the MS RS process we can see that strategic communications and coordination within the defence and national security system needed to be commenced earlier, even before a pre-phase.

– The development of the SAF and military defence in the 30 years of independence followed more development of the organizational point of view (from mandatory service and reserve to all volunteer professional forces), which did not develop the full range of military forces and the fulfilment of obligations in the RS defence system and to NATO and the EU. Such a mode of operation dictated the use of individual military forces and not the SAF as a whole, so there was no urgent need to develop ways of operating and using the SAF as a whole. The development of the SAF has brought us to the point where we are able to use the SAF as a whole, and the security situation also requires it, so the MS RS is very timely.

– In the process of drafting the MS RS proposal, the SAF strengthened and systematized military strategic thought. Thus, the SAF is now much better prepared to be involved in strategic processes at the national level and in NATO and the EU. Interdepartmental coordination of the MS RS is definitely needed. The question is whether it was necessary to start it at the time of the formation of the MS RS within the SAF. A further question is whether the process of drafting the proposal of the MS RS could have been better used for the creation of ReSDPRO SAF.

– The MS RS is one of the foundation documents of the SAF, on the basis of which it builds its character and ways of operation and engagement in the national security system and within the obligations accepted by the RS in NATO, the EU and other international alliances. The MS RS was designed taking into account the national strategic documents in the field of security and defence of the RS and allied strategies, concepts, plans, guidelines and strategic analyses of the security environment and modern threats. The MS RS therefore defines cooperation with and use of NATO and EU mechanisms for ensuring the military strategic goals of the RS, especially through NATO deterrence and collective defence and the EU CSDP.

– Finally the MS RS, as a document, can contribute to the desired SAF positioning in the state's and society's structure, i.e. for the SAF to be recognized as a credible part of the instrument of national power both at home and abroad, while enjoying a high reputation in Slovenian society.

The MS RS is the most senior national document in the field of the military. It defines the SAF as the most important part of the military instrument of state power, and makes its role and engagement concrete. The envisaged implementation of the MS RS is based on the basic principles of democratic civilian control over the armed forces, with decisions on the defence policy of the RS and the development and use of military forces being made by the Government of the RS.

The MS RS will serve as the basis for the development of a military instrument of power and its functioning, which must be prepared to implement a deterrence posture and national and collective defence within NATO and/or the EU, and to strengthen

the resilience of the society as a whole. This strategy will only be able to have its greatest impact if everyone agrees on its context and while providing the necessary resources, which must be sufficient, predictable, and stable in the long term. Time will tell whether the MS RS will work, but it is already obvious that in the process of drafting the military strategy, the strengthening of military strategic thought has been unified and systematized, and process was cost effective.

The fact remains that the General Staff of the SAF is the only competent body in the RS on the use of military force. The draft MS RS developed in the SAF military process described in this article offers a sufficiently solid and modern starting point for the operation and engagement of the SAF. Now the draft MS RS is ready for intergovernmental coordination, public presentation, and finally for approval by the Government of the RS.

Bibliography

1. *AJP-01, 2017. NATO Standard: Allied Joint Doctrine. Edition E, Version 1, 2/2017, NATO HQ.*
2. *Bebler, A.,1999. Hierarhija dokumentov na področju nacionalne varnosti v Republiki Sloveniji. Fakulteta za družbene vede, Inštitut za družbene vede, Obramboslovni raziskovalni center. Ljubljana.*
3. *Brodie, B., 1949. Strategy as a Science. World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp 467–488.*
4. *Broeks, J., 2020. The necessary adaptation of NATO's Military Instrument of Power. Militaire Spectator, 03/ 2020. https://www.militairespectator.nl/thema/international-veiligheidspolitiek/artikel/necessary-adaptation-nato's-military-instrument, 25. 5. 2021.*
5. *Cerami, J., Holcomb, J. F. (ed.), 2001. Guide to Strategy. U.S. Army War College, pp 179–185. https://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/01cerami.pdf, 25. 5. 2021.*
6. *Conflict Trends, 2020. Conflict Trends: A Global Overview, 1946–2019. PIRO Paper, Norway.*
7. *DoD-3000.05, 2005. Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (STTR) Operations. US Department of Defense, 28/11.*
8. *Ellehuus, R., 2019. Blueprint For A More Effective NATO. Breaking Defense. https://breakingdefense.com/2019/04/blueprint-for-a-more-effective-nato/, 25. 5. 2021.*
9. *EU Council, 2019. Sodelovanje EU na varnostnem in obrambnem področju. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/sl/policies/defence-security/, 22. 5. 2021.*
10. *EU Parlament, 2019. Obramba: Ali EU res ustvarja evropsko vojsko? https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/sl/headlines/security/20190612STO54310/obramba-ali-eu-res-ustvarja-evropsko-vojsko, 20. 5. 2021.*
11. *EUMC, 2020. Communication notice of meeting and provisional agenda. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/CM-2287-2020-INIT/en/pdf, 20. 5. 2021.*
12. *Furlan, B., 2020. Nacionalna (varnostna) strategija: teorija in praksa strategije. CVŠ, Ljubljana.*
13. *Furlan, B., 2021. Teorija in praksa strategije: vojaška strategija. Center vojaških šol, Ljubljana.*
14. *Garamone, J., 2020. NATO Military Committee gets Virtual Check on Alliance Missions. DOD News, 21. 9. 2020.*

15. Grizold, A., 2004. Izzivi v razvoju nacionalne obrambe Slovenije. Teorija in praksa let. 41, 1-2/2004.

16. Heuser, B., 2016. Theory and Practice, Art and Science in Warfare, An Etymological Note. War, Strategy and History.

17. HIIK, 2020. Heildelberg Institute for International Conflict Research: Conflict Barometer from 2001 to 2018. www.hiik.de (23. 2. 2020). https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/vergaderstukken/2021/02/11/food-for-thought-paper-nato-2030-a-transatlantic-agenda-for-the-future/food-for-thought-paper-nato-2030-a-transatlantic-agenda-for-the-future.pdf, 25. 5. 2021.

18. Liddell Hart, H. B., 1967. Strategy: The Classic Book on Military Strategy. Second Revised Edition. London: Faber&Faber Ltd.

19. Lykke, A., 2001. Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy. V J. Cerami.

20. Malešič, M. (ed.), 2016. Konvencionalna in hibridna varnost: vzorci (dis)kontinuitete. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede.

21. NATO 2030, 2021. A transatlantic agenda for the future. Food for Thought Paper.

22. NATO ACT, 2020. NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept Experiment Workshop. https://www.act.nato.int/articles/nato-warfighting-capstone-concept-experiment-workshop, 20. 5. 2021.

23. NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept Experiment Workshop, 2020. https://www.act.nato.int/articles/nato-warfighting-capstone-concept-experiment-workshop, 18. 5. 2021.

24. NATO, 2019. Chiefs of Defence discuss future Alliance adaptation. https:/www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_166244.htm, 20. 5. 2021.

25. NATO, 2021. Deterrence and defence. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_133127.htm, 22. 5. 2021.

26. Novay, N., 2020. The Strategic Compass, Charting a New Course for the EU's Security and Defence Policy. Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies.

27. Ramirez, J. M., Biziewski, J., 2020. Security and Defence in Europe. Springer, Schwitzerland.

28. ReSNV-2, 2019. Resolucija o strategiji nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije. Uradni list RS, št. 59/19.

29. Rumelt, R., 2017. Good Strategy – Bad Strategy: The Difference And Why It Matters. Profile Books, Great Britain, London.

30. Rynning, S., 2020. Deterrence Rediscovered: NATO and Russia. Springer 12/2020. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_3, 24. 5. 2021.

31. Simpson, E., 2018. War From The Ground Up. London: Hurst and Company.

32. Strategic Compass, 2020. Developing strategic principles. https:/www.eu2020.de/eu2020-en/news/article/eu-defense-strategic-compass-foreign-policy/2377030, 25. 5. 2021.

33. Strategos. https://www.etymonline.com/word/strategy, 2. 5. 2021.

34. Towards A Strategic Compass, 2021. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/towards-a-strategic-compass-2021-february.pdf, 2. 5. 2021.

35. Ukaz za izvedbo procesa izdelave predloga Vojaške strategije Republike Slovenije, GŠSV 007-203/2020-1, z dne 4. 9. 2020.

36. Vizija načelnika Generalštaba Slovenske vojske (2020). GŠSV 0100-24/2019-266, z dne 31. 8. 2020.

37. Vuk, P., 2016. Teoretični vidiki odnosa med strategijo in obrambnim planiranjem na varnostno-obrambnem in vojaškem področju. Sodobni vojaški izzivi, 18/1, pp 15–28.

38. Vuk, P., 2018. Definiranje konceptov na primeru vojaške strategije. Sodobni vojaški izzivi, 20/4, pp 47–69.

39. Vuk, P., 2020. Izzivi vojaške strategije v 21. stoletju. Sodobni vojaški izzivi. 22/1, pp 129–151.

40. Yarger, H.R., 2006. Toward a Theory of Strategy. Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, 2nd edition. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, pp 107–113.

41. Žabkar, A, 2003. Marsova dediščina: Temelji vojaških ved. 1. knjiga. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, Knjižna zbirka Varnostne študije.

Miklós Böröcz

REŠEVANJE NEZAKONITIH MIGRACIJ V EVROPI

TACLING IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN EUROPE

Povzetek   Nezakonite migracije pomenijo varnostno tveganje za Evropsko unijo, vendar se s tveganji zunaj Evrope ne moremo učinkovito spoprijeti brez vzpostavljanja zmogljivosti na mednarodni ravni, zato lahko to področje umestimo v okvir Skupne zunanje in varnostne politike. To stališče so potrdili tudi val nezakonitih priseljencev, ki je Evropo dosegel leta 2015, ter tveganja in posledice nepripravljenosti držav na ravni zagotavljanja nacionalne varnosti. V študiji predstavljamo tri glavne poti nezakonitih migracij, ki so prizadele Evropo. Predstavljeni so tudi države, ki so jih priseljenci prečkali, in ukrepi organov EU. V sklepu članka so predlagane morebitne rešitve za to stanje.

Ključne besede   *Nezakonite migracije, varnostno tveganje, vzhodnosredozemska pot migracij, osrednjesredozemska pot migracij, zahodnosredozemska pot migracij.*

Abstract   Irregular migration is a security risk for the EU. This risk from outside Europe cannot be dealt with effectively without capacity building at foreign interfaces, so it could be assessed as an area of the former CFSP. This position was supported by the influx of irregular migrants that reached Europe in 2015, and the risks and consequences of unpreparedness for national security. This study presents the three main routes for irregular migrants which affect Europe, the countries they pass through, and the actions of EU bodies. In addition to the discussion, later in the article potential solutions to the issue will be formulated.

Key words   *Irregular migration, security risk, Eastern Mediterranean migration route, Central Mediterranean migration route, Western Mediterranean migration route.*

The Global Trends 2019 Forced Displacement report of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) – published the day before World Refugee Day – estimated the number of forcibly displaced individuals to have reached 79.5 million worldwide in 2019 (70.8 million in 2018). This was the most drastic increase in the history of the organization, with 45.7 million (41 million in 2018) of the 79.5 million migrants settling within their own country's borders, and 4.2 million (3.5 million in 2018) asylum seekers currently living globally (UNHCR Global Trends, 2018, 2019).

In 2015 an unprecedented influx of migrants hit Europe, with an arrival of 1,822,180 individuals. The EU Member States were completely unprepared for the huge number of migrants who were able to travel uncontrollably to the countries of their choice, mostly in the areas of Northern and Western Europe (Idemudia and Boehnke, 2020).

Given that a significant improvement in the long-standing political instability of the North African region is not foreseeable in the near future, Europe remains the most attractive destination for migrants. The political uncertainty of the region continues to have a negative impact on public security, including border control. In the long term this security risk will be a major burden for both the EU institutions and the Member States (Schapendonk, 2015). In this article, we would like to explain the problem in more detail by presenting the three main routes of irregular migration affecting Europe.

We have analyzed and compared articles on the EU, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and irregular migration, with an emphasis on the main migrant routes, and brought together different approaches, views, and findings on the issue to ascertain how the EU can deal with irregular migrants. The article's main goal is to provide insight into how the EU institutions and the Member States can effectively tackle this phenomenon.

1 EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN/WESTERN BALKANS MIGRATION ROUTE

In 2015, huge crowds travelled from one Member State to another on foot along motorways and by public transport, all without registration. Migrants committed a number of common crimes against the population, breaking into houses, sneaking into courtyards, and stealing clothing and food. However, a significant number of crimes remained latent, given that migrants' violations against each other were not well reported to the authorities. Hungary reacted quickly and realized that the only effective way to tackle this new social phenomenon was to create a technical barrier at the external Schengen borders. At the same time, it introduced[1] and amended legislation,[2] as a result of which the Armed Forces were also able to participate in guarding the border.

---

[1] *E.g. Act CXL of 2015 on the Amendment of Certain Acts Relating to the Management of Mass Immigration law.*

[2] *E.g. the Constitution of Hungary.*

Thanks to a legal institution commonly referred to as a "legal barrier", people who entered illegally could be escorted back to the transit zones, initially to eight kilometres from the border, and then to the entire territory of Hungary. Although late in enacting this, Hungary was followed by several other Member States, adopting certain measures that led to the narrowing of the Western Balkans migration route. This also brought a significant change in terms of migratory pressures on Europe, with the number of migrants falling to 511,050 by 2016, 204,720 in 2017, and 150,100 in 2018. In 2019 and 2020 this pressure further decreased.

At the same time, and in spite of the measures introduced, criminal organizations emerged, whose main profile has become human trafficking (Besenyő, 2016). This activity has become much more rewarding, as they can serve a huge section of it, asking migrants for amounts between €1000-5000 per person per route. If the pass is not successful, they promise that they will retry at a later time. Those who run out of financial resources sell various activities, smuggle drugs or weapons, or become prostitutes, sometimes making one of their family members do so. In view of this, it can be said that irregular migration thus has a number of national security risks, which are a problem not at Member State level, but at the regional level (EU Commission, 2020).

Turkey's border protection activities and the asylum agreement of 18 March 2016, which allows the EU to return any migrants who have arrived illegally on a Greek island and not been granted refugee status to Turkey, have played an important role in reducing traffic on the route.[3] Compensating for Turkish readmission, the EU agreed to take in one Syrian refugee who arrived legally in Turkey for each illegal migrant returned. As a result of the emergency situation between the EU Member States and Turkey, on 15 March 2017 the Turkish Foreign Minister announced that Ankara would partially suspend the asylum agreement. Under this measure, Turkey would not readmit asylum seekers who had arrived and stayed illegally in the EU. If the situation deteriorated further, the head of the Turkish Foreign Ministry envisaged a unilateral denunciation of the entire convention. Of the EU Member States, Austria reacted most drastically to the move, which would have halted subsidies to Ankara and the country's EU accession talks. The Austrian political leadership additionally stated that circumstances made it necessary to strengthen the protection of the EU's external borders, especially in the Western Balkans. In response to the situation on the Turkish side, the Turkish Minister for EU Affairs called on EU leaders to provide financial assistance and an EU visa waiver. Tensions have eased since then, but the Turkish threat will persist for a long time to come, with the number of migrants in the country estimated at 6.1 million, according to IOM.[4]

The complete denunciation of the convention by the Turks will probably not take place, as this would also mean that the country would have played its only trump

---

[3] By the end of July 2019 this had reached as low as 21,000 people.

[4] Migration Data Portal.

card against the EU, so that it would no longer be able to impose conditions in order to obtain any concessions.

In 2019 the European Commission called for urgent intervention by Cyprus, as the level of migration had increased dramatically in the country over the previous two years. Unfortunately, this did not bring a lasting solution, so Cyprus still has the highest number of asylum applications per capita in the European Union, which is why Cypriots would like to see the relocation of about 5,000 migrants. To make the process easier, Nicosia reduced the time taken for applications from 75 days to 30 days (Asylum Information Database, 2020); however, Cyprus has also started to build a fence to cope more effectively with irregular migration (In-cyprus, *2021*).

Greece remains one of the most prominent conflict zones for migratory pressures on Europe. According to the UNHCR, in 2019 the number of migrants in the country was around 80,000, of which more than 70,000 were refugees on the islands.[5] In 2021 the number of migrants reduced to around 19,000 due to the Covid-19 pandemic. In Greece, those entitled to benefits receive a subsidy of €90-550 per person or per family per month, resulting in an expenditure of around €7 million. The European Union's Internal Security Fund has provided €50 million in aid to Greece to set up a new recognition system to monitor those entering the Aegean region by sea 24 hours a day. It is planned to set up 35 monitoring and two mobile stations at Aegean military bases. The station will provide continuous and up-to-date information to Athens, Brussels and FRONTEX. With this development, further serious steps can be taken in the fight against irregular migration (Ekathimerini, 2019).

North Macedonia also began to install a technical border barrier in 2015, which it had to strengthen in 2016 as it was broken through by migrants in February that year. In 2019, the number of registered migrants was close to 8,000. The country's border protection is supported by more than 100 foreign[6] police officers and border guards. In 2019, contrary to the global trend, the number of irregular migrants apprehended on the southern border of the country tripled compared to 2018. As a result of the pandemic, in 2020 the number of arrested irregular migrants on the southern border of the country decreased significantly. The country is facing domestic political difficulties in 2021, exacerbated by migration challenges (Spasov, 2016).

Albania is also affected by the Balkan migration route, but to a much lesser extent than North Macedonia. It was an important step in the life of the EU when, on 22 May 2019, FRONTEX launched its first non-EU mission in Albania, deploying 50 border guards, 16 vehicles and a moving thermal camera. The main task of the new mission has been identified as combating cross-border crime near the coast of Greece. The statement was issued just days before the EU parliamentary elections,

---

[5] *Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Leros, Kos, and the islands without hotspots: Tilos, Rhodes, Agathonisi, Farmakonisi, Crete, Methoni.*

[6] *Hungarian, Polish, Croatian, Austrian, Czech, Serbian, Slovenian and Slovak.*

leading to differing views and comments from political camps. However, Dimigris Avramopoulos, the Commissioner for Migration, described the new mission as a serious, historic step.

Bulgaria and Romania are less affected by the Balkan migration route, an important element of which is that, unlike the Serbian authorities, for example, the Bulgarian and Romanian authorities are cracking down on migrants and smugglers seeking to enter the country illegally. This strong, sometimes brutal, official attitude has proved effective, as evidenced by low headcount figures.

Most refugees continue to come to Serbia from North Macedonia, with no change in the routes through the country. In 2019 the number of migrants in Serbia was around 6,100, of which about 500 were without shelter,[7] while the remainder were waiting in migrant camps for the opportunity to move on. In 2020 the number of migrants in the country dropped to around 2,000. The Serbian police still do not take action against refugees; they only intervene if they detect a crime. Illegal migration from Serbia to the EU via Croatia is partly controlled by Afghan migrants, and business conflicts between gangs have been settled by showdowns on several occasions (Délhír, 2019). The refugees are organized into small groups and then sent on in a coordinated way, mostly to the Bosnian border. In its statements, Belgrade proposes joint European action to tackle migration successfully, but in its actions, due to the idleness of the authorities, it shows the opposite, as it sees the country as a transit country for irregular migration, so no action is taken against human traffickers or migrants (Umek et al. 2019).

Kosovo continues to be less affected by migration, as it is neither economically attractive nor a member of the EU. Montenegro is already playing an increasingly important role in the Balkan route, but is also a transit country for migration (FRONTEX: Western Balkans, Quarterly, Q4, 2019).

Bosnia and Herzegovina is also heavily burdened by migration in the Balkans, which in 2020 numbered 11,300 migrants (in 2019 the number was 18,000). One of the main reasons for this is the lack of border control in most parts of the country bordering Serbia. The worst situation is in the canton of Una-San, where, due to the dramatically deteriorating security situation, emergency measures have been introduced to restrict the movement of migrants outside the reception centre. Most migrants are accommodated in Bihács and Velika Kladusa, and many have moved to Vucjak, close to the Croatian border. Given that the quality of services provided to migrants in this country is below average, and that the number of available places is also underestimated, the situation between different ethnic groups has become tense, which has already led to mass fights, e.g. at the Miral Reception Centre. At a meeting of the three-member Bosnian presidency on 11 June 2019, the involvement of the army in dealing with the migrant situation on the Serbian-Montenegrin border

---

[7] *For example, in the Savamala area of Belgrade, which is commonly called the "Afghan Park".*

was also raised, but the proposal was rejected by the Serbian member of the Bosnian presidency, Milorad Dodik. He also vetoed the possibility of FRONTEX members protecting the border section from Croatia in the future. At the same time, Dodik prevented the establishment of uniformly distributed reception centres for migrants across the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would have helped the more vulnerable regions. He explained his decision by saying that areas mostly inhabited by Serbs should not be turned into a buffer zone. Despite the above, one way to relieve the burden of Bihács and Velika Kladusa was to transfer migrants staying in private houses and other accommodation to a temporary tent camp in Vucjak near the Croatian border (N1 Srbija, 2019).

In response to the actions taken by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia has begun the construction of a three-metre-high spiked metal fence at the Maljevac border crossing in north-western Bosnia near Velika Kladusa. There are plans to install a technical border lock at two more border crossings in the Gejkovac and Pasin Potok areas. According to statements, this can optimize the use of police forces, since in the event of a violent border crossing attempt, the fence may already be a sufficient deterrent until reinforcements arrive (N1, 2019). It is also a problem in Croatia that with the start of the tourist season, more police officers must be deployed to protect the places visited by guests, which can lead to a shortage of people and congestion in the summer. The actions of the Croatian authorities against migrants are described by international organizations as excessive, sometimes violent. The country has also finally, in 2021, introduced austerity measures in order to promote its accession to the Schengen area (Lučka and Čekrlija, 2020).

In Slovenia, it is also seen as desirable to strengthen border protection by continuing to build panel fences where the terrain so requires. In addition, the government increased the number of border guards in both the police and the army (Garb, 2018), and procured surveillance drones for technical developments (STA, 2020). For further reinforcement of the Slovenian-Croatian border section, camera surveillance systems have been installed. The fight against human traffickers has been stepped up, with Ilirska Bistrica being one of the border towns most affected by migratory pressure. In 2019, 130 human traffickers were arrested, mostly foreign nationals. According to the Slovenian Ministry of the Interior, the number of registered border violations increased by 47.1% in 2019 compared to 2018, i.e. 5,345 cases. The effects of the Covid-19 pandemic reduced the number in 2020. Going further, the country also tightened border controls on its common border with Italy, introducing mixed Italian-Slovenian patrols as planned (Brožič, 2020).

2   CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN MIGRATION ROUTE

By the end of October 2020, 25,900 people had arrived illegally across the sea from Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria to Italy, a decrease from 2019. Most cross this section of the very dangerous route with the help of human traffickers – mainly Ukrainian and

Russian citizens – but a few hundred have reached the southern Italian coast directly, by their own methods. (Human Rights Watch, 2021, A).

Libya remains a major gathering point for migrants from Africa and other Arab countries to Europe. According to international organizations, the level of care provided to people in reception centres/internment camps operated by state bodies is far below average. In order to leave the inhumane conditions as soon as possible, migrants[8] need the help of human traffickers to get to Europe. The route is extremely dangerous, not only because of the high rates of drowning, but also because the refugees are at risk of being trafficked in the North African region (Cusumano, Villa, 2019). The picture is further nuanced by the fact that the events of the civil war in Libya do not spare migrant camps; in July 2019 a bomb attack hit a centre in the suburbs of Tripoli, Tajura, killing 53 people and injuring 130 more. The recurrent conflict, which brought war conditions back with General Halifa Haftar's LNA (Libyan National Army) spring offensive, has already claimed the lives of 1,093 people, with nearly 6,000 wounded. The Prime Minister of the UN-backed Government of Libya's National Consensus is trying to take control of the situation, but will find it difficult to do so without international help.

Due to the above, the number of migrants arriving in Tunisia from Libya increased. As a result, the Tunisian coast has also become a starting point for migration to Europe. According to UNHCR migrants were prevented from leaving for Europe (Infomigrants, 2019).

Italy has taken effective action in the past to reduce migratory pressure, including deepening its cooperation with the Libyan Coast Guard, and is preparing to hand 10 new ships over to North Africa. In addition, the powers of the Minister of the Interior have been extended to restrict or even prohibit certain ships from entering, crossing or staying in waters under national control in the context of maritime and land border controls, if there are risks to public security or national security. Under the mandate, fines could also be imposed on civilian ships transporting migrants to Italy. The UNHCR sharply criticized the security package, which, according to their statements, »undermines the international rules of maritime rescue by criminalizing the ability of ships carrying people in distress at sea to sail in Italian waters.« According to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the restrictions introduced have led to an increase in deaths in the Mediterranean (Panebianco, 2019). On 5 August 2019, the upper house of the Italian parliament voted to further tighten migration laws, which made it possible to ban civilian ships arriving on the Italian coast with migrants on board. The package also increased the administrative fine from €150,000 to €1,000,000 and, as an alternative measure, made it possible to seize NGO vessels that transport migrants in the country's territorial waters despite a ban by the Italian authorities. If the captain of the ship did not comply with the prohibition of Italian official and

---

8   *In 2020 their number, according to IOM, was 46,247.*

military ships, he could be sentenced to 3-10 years in prison under the law.[9] The law also allowed authorities to eavesdrop on NGOs to expose their contact with human traffickers (Reuters, 2019). Subsequently in Italy, due to domestic political changes, attitudes towards irregular migration were reshaped, with the result that in 2019, under pressure from the European Union, the Ministry of the Interior opened the ports of Messina and Pozzallo in Sicily to Ocean Viking and Alan Kurdi German NGO ships.

Malta is also concerned about the influx of irregular migrants, which showed an large increase in 2019 (3,406) compared to 2018 (1,445). In 2020 the number – due to the Covid-19 pandemic – moderated to 2,281. The Italian restrictions were also in the background of the increase. Recognizing this, Valletta, unlike before, no longer allowed the civilian lifeboat Ocean Viking to refuel in the island nation (Aljazeera, 2019). This move also showed that the country is likely to take stronger action against migration in the future (Mainwaring, DeBono, 2021.

3   WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN MIGRATION ROUTE

By October 2020, 20,500 migrants had arrived in the administrative territory of Spain on the Western Mediterranean migration route. The refugees come primarily from Morocco, Mali, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, and Senegal. Nearly 1,400 people were registered on the land border between Ceuta and Melilla, and other refugees were registered on the peninsula (Human Rights Watch, 2021, B).

Spain signed a maritime rescue cooperation agreement with Morocco in February 2019, under which both countries' rescue boats will escort illegal immigrants apprehended at sea to a port in the nearest country (European Views, 2019). On 19 July 2019, the Spanish government approved a grant of €30 million for Morocco, which it could use to curb irregular migration. This complements the €26 million package in which Madrid provided Rabat with 750 vehicles, drones, cameras, radar and other technical equipment (Martín, 2019 B).

In addition, the European Union provided €140 million in aid to Morocco to make border control more effective. This has also paid off compared to 2018, as the number of migrants entering Spain illegally fell by 39%. Thanks to the subsidies, the authorities in the North African country are carrying out more and more raids and deportations, while the Royal Moroccan Navy is also involved in the return of migrants wishing to enter Europe by ship. The two countries have reactivated their agreement to repatriate as soon as possible the citizens of a third country that entered the two exclaves, Ceuta and Mellila, illegally by climbing the fence (European Commission, 2018).

---

[9]   *This measure was included in the package after the Italian authorities lifted the coercive measure against the captain of the civilian ship Sea-Watch 3 in early August 2019.*

This move has been urged by Madrid simply because, according to IOM research, barely half of the migrants arriving in Spain remain in the country, with the rest considering France as their destination. At the same time, the international organization believes that tougher action also carries a danger, as migrants are forced to find more dangerous ways to enter Europe (Martín, 2019, A).

In Spain, however, significant changes also took place in the areas of migration and the fight against irregular migration under the Spanish Socialist Workers Party's governance between 2019 and 2020. According to the new cabinet, the rights of people climbing over the fence are limited by the fact that they are physicly injured by the barbed wire fence. In addition, the new government's Minister for Social Security and Migration, Josè Luis Escrivá, told a roundtable discussion at the OECD Country Forum in 2019 that Spain will need 8-9 million new workers over the next thirty years. He considers acceptance by society necessary in order to prevent a huge shortage of people in the labour market, as has happened in Japan due to the aging of the country's society. According to some analyses (Hooper, 2019) the unemployment rate of migrants arriving in Spain is 15% higher than that of the indigenous population, so in 30 years not only lower but 2.5% higher unemployment figures are expected.

4 RISKS OF THE LACK OF INTEGRATION

The current European migration and social policy could pose a serious terrorist risk, not primarily to the present but to the future. What is meant here is mainly that second and third generation radicals, who are still causing daily trouble (Haider, 2015) will again be produced by society (Kymlicka, 2010). Immigrants and their descendants, whose number is now more than a million, will not always be satisfied with what Europe has to offer them. They will not be satisfied with their income from work, as human traffickers have fed them with false illusions (Holtgraves, 2012). This could be exacerbated by the relocation of European factories to the east, which, like in France (Aubert & Sillard, 2005), could lead to unemployment. Due to the segregation they face and lack of integration (Brommer, 2016), these people will drift farther and farther away from the majority of society, making them easily radicalized (Wattels, 2018). Some will only require a small push to commit acts similar to the terrorist attack in Brussels in 2016.

This is also supported by the analysis of the Migration Research Institute (Vargha, 2019) which stated that one of the most credible guidelines for integration is the employment rate of people from third-country nationals. Examining this, it can be stated that the indicators are significantly below the average (according to the survey, for example, the employment of Iraqi men in the year of arrival was 70% lower than that of Finnish men of the same age; 10 years later the difference is still 48%).

Islamic State has brought a significant change in the morphology of terrorism, which has been another milestone after Al Qaeda, an organization that globalized terrorism

and posed a greater threat, as it was previously a regional challenge. While Al Qaeda has led large-scale, precisely planned actions against Western targets that require huge attention and organizing skills, IS has simplified the attacks that could be linked to it. Thus, instead of hijackings – except in one or two cases – and the use of bombs, it has encouraged its adherents to acts committed with stabbing and cutting tools, firearms and transport vehicles.[10] While Al Qaeda sent or built terrorist cells, IS targeted easily radicalized, mostly second and third generation Muslims who were already living in the country they wanted to attack. These people have good local knowledge, contact systems, and travel opportunities (Besenyő, 2017).

However, the terrorist attack in Paris on 13 November 2015 also drew concern that there has been a change in the status of the perpetrators. According to the results of our previous research, only one of the 56 perpetrators of the terrorist attacks against the "West" was an irregular migrant, while two perpetrators were third-country nationals who were not legally resident during the Paris assassination (Böröcz, 2016).

This trend is further reinforced by the terrorist attacks in Brussels on 22 March 2016, where, in addition to perpetrators who were European citizens with migrant ancestry, foreign fighters also took part in the assassination, taking advantage of the migrant crisis. They were transported by Salah Abdeslam from Budapest to Western Europe.

In view of the above, it would be useful to set up an appropriate system which, on the one hand, provides adequate procedural guarantees for international protection for third-country nationals and, on the other, provides the authorities with the appropriate means to take action against abusers if necessary. Registers of countries of origin, including photographic and biometric data where possible, should be created, making them available to host countries, and developing an appropriate repatriation system. It would also be useful to develop a procedure that would start outside Europe. We should create a dignified environment throughout the whole process for migrants. In order to curb abuses and corruption, law enforcement forces should be subject to continuous and international scrutiny. It would be important to properly prepare migrants, which would require respect for the achievements of the citizens, cultures, religious freedom and democracy in host countries. It should also be possible to withdraw previous benefits from offenders, for example, legal residence permits. However, this is not possible in the absence of, among other things, a common legal basis supported by the Member States without exception.

Conclusion   Improper management of irregular migration will be a major concern for Europe in the future, an idea we have already set out in several studies. Lack of employment will result in financial backwardness for newcomers, leading to segregation, which reinforces the hopelessness of micro-communities. One of the best recruitment bases, according to the current trend of modern terrorism, is a multi-generational immigrant

---

[10] *Conference on Current Challenges in Counter-Terrorism, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, 2016.*

of Muslim descent living with a sense of rootlessness and unable to integrate into the majority society.

Effective control and management of external borders is an effective tool for curbing irregular migration and the human trafficking, prostitution and terrorism based on it. However, a high degree of respect for human rights, which sometimes seems excessive, may counteract this precautionary measure.

An important factor is that in several Member States, political forces have turned this into a domestic political issue. They did so because, in the run-up to the elections, they could also claim the votes of Muslim minorities with the right to vote, thus securing their victory. The issue can also be ideologized, as a number of studies have concluded that an aging Europe and the resulting future labour shortages will become unmanageable, as by 2050 it will have reached 15%. Experts have suggested the introduction of flexible forms of employment to solve this problem. In contrast, some Member States' policies seek to counteract this economic risk with foreign nationals.

My view is reinforced by the statement of Fabercie Leggeri, Director of FRONTEX. This expert believes that if the European Commission could conclude an agreement with the countries of the region, especially with regard to Libya, and build a new base, as in Albania, it could extend its mission to another continent in the Mediterranean. To do this, we must first create stability in civil war affected Lybia. The new FRONTEX centre could only be effective with the support of a strong local Coast Guard. The Agency intends to provide assistance not only in border protection, but also in border management, increasing the number of FRONTEX personnel from 1,500 to 10,000, while also trying to modernize border control capacities as planned (Bewarder, 2019).

In addition to the current immigration policy, I believe that there is a lack of appropriate state level actions to improve the integration of individuals, even by introducing various programmes with the involvement of society. The preparation, elaboration and introduction of these, which could steer the current bad trend in a new direction, are also invisible.

What has been explained above shows how much of a security risk is posed by irregular migration, and also that the community will have to work with this modern social phenomenon for many years to come

.

Bibliography

1. *Asylum Information Database, 2019. Country Report: Cyprus. https://asylumineurope. org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/report-download_aida_cy_2019update.pdf.*

2. *Asylum Information Database: Country Report: Cyprus, 2020. https://asylumineurope. org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/AIDA-CY_2020update.pdf.*

3. *Aubert, P., Sillard, P., 2005. Offshoring and job losses in French industry, INSEE, November 2005. Conference: WORKSHOP ON THE GLOBALISATION OF PRODUCTION, 15-16/11/2005At: OECD, Paris (La Muette).*

4. *Berkhout, E., Berg, E., 2010. Bridging the Gap. International database on employment and adaptable labour, Amsterdam.*

5. *Besenyő, J., 2016. The Islamic State and its human trafficking practice, Bucharest: Strategic Impact: 60:3; pp 15–21. http://real.mtak.hu/83721/1/the_islamic_state_and_its_ human_trafficking_practice.pdf.*

6. *Besenyő, J., 2017. Low-cost attacks, unnoticeable plots? Overview of the economical character of current terrorism, Bucharest: Strategic Impact, 62:1, pp 83–100. http://real. mtak.hu/83718/1/low_cost_attacks_unnoticeable_plots_overview_on_the_economical_ character_of_current_terrorism.pdf.*

7. *Bewarder, M. Die EU wird Jahrzehnte unter Druck bleiben, 2019. https://www.welt.de/ politik/ausland/plus194980355/Frontex-Direktor-Leggeri-Die-EU-wird-Jahrzehnte-unter-Druck-bleiben.html.*

8. *Böröcz, M., 2016. The terror risk of the migration crises, Terror and Response, Budapest: Counter Terrorism Centre (Hungary) 2016/2. Vol 6/1.   http://www.tek.gov.hu/ tt_pdf/5.%20%C3%A9vfolyam%202.%20sz%C3%A1m.pdf.*

9. *Bosnian Presidency Chairman rejects plan to send army to eastern border, N1 Sarajevo, 11. 6. 2019. http://rs.n1info.com/English/NEWS/a491088/Bosnian-Serb-Chairman-of-BH-Presidency-refuses-to-send-army-to-the-eastern-borders.html, 29. 8. 2019.*

10. *Brommer, V., 2016. Analyzing the Growing Islamic Radicalization in France, University of Mississippi. Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College. https://egrove.olemiss.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=1933&context=hon_thesis.*

11. *Brožič, L., 2020. Migration to the Republic of Slovenia as »A First Step« into the European Union. Sociology and Anthropology. Vol. 8, May 2020, pp 72–81. 10.13189/ sa.2020.080303. https://www.hrpub.org/download/20200430/SA3-19614580.pdf.*

12. *Croatia installing fence on borders with Bosnia, N1 Sarajevo, 11. 6. 2019. http:// ba.n1info.com/English/NEWS/a349625/Croatia-installing-fence-on-borders-with-Bosnia. html.*

13. *Cusumano, E., Villa, M., 2019. Sea rescue NGOs: a pull factor of irregular migration?, Policy Briefs, 2019/22, Migration Policy Centre Retrieved from Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/65024.*

14. *Dikov, I., 2019. Spain Strikes Deal with Morocco to Hand It Migrants Rescued at Sea. https://www.european-views.com/2019/02/spain-strikes-deal-with-morocco-to-hand-it-migrants-rescued-at-sea/.*

15. *European Commission, 2018. EU Trust Fund for Africa: new actions adopted to support vulnerable migrants, foster socio-economic development and improve border management in North of Africa, Press Release, Brussels. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/ detail/en/IP_18_6793.*

16. *EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ECHR 090, 2017. 14. 3. 2017, Border-zone detention of two asylum-seekers was unlawful and their removal from Hungary to Serbia exposed them to the risk of inhuman and degrading reception conditions in Greece. European Commission, 2020. Study on the Economic, Social and Human Costs of Trafficking in Human Beings within the EU, Luxembourg. http://doi:10.2837/3428.*

17. *Fire at Bosnia migrant camp injures 29, Euronews/Reuters, 1. 6. 2019. https://www. euronews.com/2019/06/01/fire-at-bosnia-migrant-camp-injures-29, 23. 5. 2019.*

18. *FRONTEX, Western Balkans, Quarterly, Q4.*

19. Garb, M., 2018. Coping with the refugee and migrant crisis in Slovenia: the role of the military, Defense & Security Analysis, 34:1, pp 3-15, DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2018.1421400.

20. Haider, H., 2015. Radicalisation of diaspora communities, Applied Knowledge Services, 16. 1. 2015. http://gsdrc.org/docs/open/hdq1187.pdf.

21. Hautzinger, Z., 2018. Migration and the criminal appearance of foreigners, Pécs: AndAnn Kft. Pécs, pp 20.

22. Holtgraves, L., 2012. The Roots of Radicalization and Home-grown Terrorism Amongst Second and Third Generation Immigrants in Europe, North Carolina: University of North Carolina, https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/concern/dissertations/m613mz09x.

23. Hooper, K., 2019. Spain's Labor Migration Policies in the Aftermath of Economic Crisis. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/spain-labor-migration-aftermath-economic-crisis.

24. Human Rights Watch: World Report 2021, A. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/italy.

25. Human Rights Watch: World Report 2021, B. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/spain.

26. Idemudia, E., Boehnke, K., 2020. Patterns and Current Trends in African Migration to Europe, In: Psychosocial Experiences of African Migrants in Six European Countries. Social Indicators Research Series, Vol 81. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48347-0_2.

27. In-cyprus: A fence in Astromeritis to keep migrants out, 2021. https://in-cyprus.philenews.com/a-fence-in-astromeritis-to-keep-migrants-out-photos/.

28. Italian government wins confidence vote on decree targeting migrant rescue ships, Reuters, 5. 8. 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-politics-migrants-idUSKCN1UV21Y, 23. 5. 2019.

29. Kymlicka, W., 2010. The rise and fall of multiculturalism? New debates on inclusion and accommodation in diverse societies, International Social Science Journal, Volume 61, Issue 199, March 2010. pp 97–112. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2451.2010.01750.x.

30. Lj. Spasov, A., 2016. Macedonian perspective on the migration crisis, EU Forum – Migration, Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of Internal Relations. https://www.clingendael.org/publication/macedonian-perspective-migration-crisis.

31. Lučka, D., Čekrlija, S., 2020. Refugees and migrants in the triangle of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia. Democracy and Human Rights. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/sarajevo/16597.pdf.

32. Mahoudeau, C., 2019. Ocean Viking migrant rescue ship 'not allowed' to refuel in Malta. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/8/8/ocean-viking-migrant-rescue-ship-not-allowed-to-refuel-in-malta, 8. 8. 2019.

33. Mainwaring, Ć., DeBono, D., 2021. Criminalizing solidarity: search and rescue in a neo-colonial sea. Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space. DOI: 10.1177/2399654420979314.

34. Martín, M., 2019 (B). Spain will give Morocco €30 million to curb irregular immigration. https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2019/07/19/inenglish/1563521682_999175.html.

35. Martín, M., 2019 (A). Irregular migrant arrivals in Spain fall by 39 %, https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2019/08/16/inenglish/1565939861_569323.html.

36. Migration data portal, Total number of international migrants at mid-year, 2019. https://migrationdataportal.org/data?i=stock_abs_&t=2017, 25. 7. 2019.

37. More Than 3100 Migrants Died Crossing Mediterranean In 2017. NPR. https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/06/576223035/more-than-3-100-migrants-died-crossing-mediterranean-in-2017?t=1608458227971, 7. 8. 2019.

38. Nedos, V., 2019. Funds green-lighted for Aegean surveillance system. https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/242104/funds-green-lighted-for-aegean-surveillance-system/.

39. Panebianco, S., 2019. The Mediterranean migration crisis: humanitarian practices and migration governance in Italy, Contemporary Italian Politics, 11:4, pp 386–400, DOI: 10.1080/23248823.2019.1679961.

40. Press Statement following the 54th meeting of the Association Council between the European Union and Turkey, Brussels, 15. 3. 2019. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/hu/press/press-releases/2019/03/15/press-statement-following-the-54th-meeting-of-the-association-council-between-the-european-union-and-turkey-brussels-15-march-2019/, 28. 10. 2019.

41. Sanderson, S., 2019. Tunisia sends more than 50 migrants back to Libya. https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/18646/tunisia-sends-more-than-50-migrants-back-to-libya, 18. 8. 2019.

42. Schapendonk, J., 2015. What if Networks Move? Dynamic Social Networking in the Context of African Migration to Europe. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.1860.

43. STA: Slovenian and Austrian police hold joint drone exercise, 2020. https://english.sta.si/2818802/slovenian-and-austrian-police-hold-joint-drone-exercise.

44. Tensions are high in Velika Kladusa in Bosnia and Herzegovina: migrants are walking around armed with rods after a mass fight, the police are on standby, Telegraf, 6. 6. 2019. https://www.telegraf.rs/english/3068869-tensions-are-high-in-velika-kladusa-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina-migrants-are-walking-around-armed-with-rods-after-a-mass-fight-the-police-are-on-standby, 23. 7. 2019.

45. Treszkai, Á., 2018. General Overview of the Consequences of African Water Conflicts, UKH Journal of Social Sciences, Vol 2. No 2. https://journals.ukh.edu.krd/index.php/ukhjss/article/view/64.

46. U.Z: A migrant was stabbed again in Belgrade, Délhír, 2019. https://delhir.info/2019/06/26/ismet-megkeseltek-egy-migranst-belgradban/.

47. Umek, D., Minca, C., Šantić, D., 2019. The Refugee Camp as Geopolitics: The Case of Preševo (Serbia). In: Paradiso M. (Ed.) Mediterranean Mobilities. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89632-8_4.

48. UNHCR Global Trends, 2018. https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/5d08d7ee7/unhcr-global-trends-2018.html.

49. UNHCR Global Trends, 2019. https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/5ee200e37/unhcr-global-trends-2019.html?query=global%20trends%202020.

50. UNHCR Spain Sea and Land Arrivals, 1. 1.–31. 12. 2019. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/73591.

51. Vargha, M., 2019. Snapshot of the migration situation in Finland, Budapest: Hungarian Migration Research Institute. https://www.migraciokutato.hu/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/MKI_Finn-migr%C3%A1ci%C3%B3s-helyzetk%C3%A9p.pdf.

52. Wattles, A., 2018. Islamist radicalization in France since the Algerian War, Master of Arts in International Studies, Washington: University of Washington. https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/42148/Wattles_washington_0250O_18995.pdf?isAllowed=y&sequence=1.

Liliana Brožič

RECENZIJA

KULTURNE ZNAČILNOSTI SLOVENSKE DRUŽBE IN NJEN ODNOS DO VARNOSTI TER VOJSKE

Konec maja 2021 je izšla znanstvena monografija dr. Janje Vuga Beršnak z naslovom **Kulturne značilnosti slovenske družbe in njen odnos do varnosti: vojska na stičišču zahtev države, pričakovanj družbe in lastne pohlepnosti**. Recenzije so napisali zaslužni profesor ddr. Rudi Rizman s Filozofske fakultete v Ljubljani, dr. Majda Hrženjak, višja znanstvena sodelavka na Mirovnem inštitutu v Ljubljani, in dr. Ljubica Jelušič s Fakultete za družbene vede v Ljubljani.

Monografija ima 180 strani in je izšla v knjižni zbirki Varnostne študije, ki jo ureja prof. dr. Anton Grizold in jo izdaja Založba Fakultete za družbene vede.

Metodološko je monografija razdeljena na tri vsebinske sklope: makro raven, mezo in mikro raven ter individualno raven. Na makro ravni avtorica najprej opiše slovensko kulturo, potem slovensko družbo in varnostno kulturo v kontekstu sprejemljivega »tveganja«, ki ga poimenuje varnostni mehurček, sledi poglavje o slovenski družbi in njeni vojski.

Mezo in mikro raven sta najprej namenjeni prihodnosti vojaških organizacij – kulturi in identiteti, sledi poglavje o spolni reprezentativnosti vojaške organizacije. Ta sklop avtorica sklene s poglavjem o motivaciji za vojaški poklic. V zadnjem delu se avtorica osredotoči na psihosocialni okvir delovanja pripadnic in pripadnikov vojaške organizacije ter na dejavnike tveganja in zaščite zanje ter njihove družine. Predstavljene teme nakazujejo napredek pri preučevanju vsebin iz vojaške sociologije v slovenskem prostoru, in sicer predvsem na področjih zdravja in dobrobiti.

Dr. Janja Vuga Beršnak je izredna profesorica in višja znanstvena sodelavka na Fakulteti za družbene vede. Že njena disertacija je bila posvečena kulturnim vidikom delovanja pripadnic in pripadnikov oboroženih sil v mednarodnih operacijah in

na misijah. Avtorica v tej znanstveni monografiji raziskuje redko predstavljene razsežnosti kulture varnosti, gre za raziskovanje odnosov med vojsko in varnostjo z vidika kulture.

Pri tem izhaja iz raziskav verjetno enega najbolj znanih avtorjev na področju raziskovanja interakcij med nacionalnimi in organizacijskimi kulturami Nizozemca Geerta Hofstedeja, ki je umrl lani v 91. letu starosti. Hofstede je Slovenijo vključil v eno svojih raziskav leta 1991, ko je raziskoval kulturo gospodarskih korporacij (IBM) in že takrat ugotovil to, kar sta potrdili leta 2021 dr. Andreja Terpotec v svoji doktorski disertaciji o nacionalni kulturi v Sloveniji v povezavi s korupcijo in dr. Janja Vuga Beršnak na primeru slovenske družbe in njenega odnosa do vojske. Slovenska kultura je pretežno žensko naravnana. To pomeni, da jo določajo ženske lastnosti, kot so skromnost, pomoč drugim in šibkejšim, skrbnost ter negovanje dobrih medosebnih odnosov, v primerjavi z moško determiniranimi kulturami, za katere so značilni samozavest, moč, odločnost, tekmovalnost in uspeh. Vojaška organizacija in njeno poslanstvo temeljita na moško naravnani kulturi. Njeni pripadnice in pripadniki morajo izkazovati moč, samozavest, odločnost in uspeh. Samo s tako kulturo je mogoče braniti domovino in odvračati različne pojavne oblike groženj. Na hitro bi lahko ocenili, da gre v Sloveniji glede na odnos države in družbe do svoje vojske za harmoničen odnos dveh partnerjev, bolj poglobljeno pa avtorica monografije ugotavlja, da imata ti dve različni kulturni determinanti značilnosti, ki jih je nujno treba razumeti, raziskovati in upoštevati pri številnih procesih ter javnih politikah vse z enim samim namenom, kako poskrbeti za varnost in učinkovitost vsakega posameznika v vojski, za družine teh posameznikov in varnost države kot celote.

Monografija prinaša dragocene ugotovitve in povsem drugačen, svež, dobrodošel, nov pogled na razumevanje nekaterih pojavov in značilnosti v širšem mednarodnem okolju, predvsem pa v Sloveniji. Vse od zadnje svetovne finančne krize, ko so se sredstva za Slovensko vojsko vztrajno zmanjševala, je bil vtis, da je vojska v dolgotrajnem krču, ki nikakor ne popusti. Zdelo se je, da gre v odnosu med slovensko državo in družbo do nacionalne vojske za odnos med mačeho in pastorkom, pri čemer prva samo zahteva in ničesar ne daje. Krč je postopoma in po dolgem času popustil. Z novo monografijo bomo bolje razumeli slovensko kulturo, svojo družbo, Slovensko vojsko in njene družine ter naše raznovrstne odnose. Prav pri tem razumevanju ima pomembno vlogo avtorica dr. Janja Vuga Beršnak, ki je v vsem spektru svojega raziskovanja dosledno upoštevala znanstveno metodologijo, zakonitosti, poglede ter različne literaturo in vire, hkrati pa ima sama izkušnjo, kaj je vojaška družina, kaj lepega prinaša in kaj vse zahteva kot pohlepna ustanova.

Liliana Brožič

REVIEW

CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SLOVENIAN SOCIETY AND ITS ATTITUDE TOWARDS SECURITY AND THE MILITARY

In June 2021, a scientific monograph by Dr Janja Vuga Beršnak was published, titled **Kulturne značilnosti slovenske družbe in njen odnos do varnosti: vojska na stičišču zahtev države, pričakovanj družbe in lastne pohlepnosti**[1]. It has been reviewed by Dr Rudi Rizman, Professor Emeritus, from the Faculty of Arts in Ljubljana; Dr Majda Hrženjak, senior research fellow at the Peace Institute in Ljubljana, and Dr Ljubica Jelušič from the Faculty of Social Sciences in Ljubljana.

The monograph has 180 pages and forms a part of the Varnostne študije (Security Studies) collection (ed. Dr Anton Grizold, Prof) published by the Faculty of Social Sciences publishing house.

Methodologically, the monograph is divided into three content sets: macro-, mezzo- and micro level, and individual level. At the macro level, the author first describes Slovenian culture. This is followed by the description of Slovenian society and security culture in the context of acceptable "risk", which she calls "the security bubble", and finally, by a chapter on Slovenian society and its armed forces.

The mezzo- and micro levels are first devoted to the future of military organizations: their culture and identity, followed by a chapter on the gender representativeness of the military organization. The author concludes this set with a chapter on the motivation for the military profession. In the last set, she focuses on the psychosocial framework of the functioning of members of a military organization, and on the risk and protection factors affecting them and their families. The presented topics indicate a step forward in the study of military sociology-related contents in Slovenia, specifically in the field of health and well-being.

---

[1] *Cultural characteristics of Slovenian society and its attitude towards security: the military at the crossroads of national requirements, society's expectations and its own greediness.*

Dr Janja Vuga Beršnak is Associate Professor and Senior Research Fellow at the Faculty of Social Sciences. She has discoursed the cultural aspects of the activities of members of the armed forces in international operations and missions as early as in her dissertation. In this scientific monograph, she explores the rarely presented dimensions of security culture, i.e. the relationship between the military and security from a cultural perspective.

Her work is based on the research by probably one of the most famous authors in the field of research of interactions the between national and organizational cultures, Geert Hofstede from the Netherlands, who died last year at the age of 91. Hofstede included Slovenia in one of his researches in 1991, when he researched the culture of business corporations (IBM). As early as in that period, he discovered, what was later confirmed in 2021 by Dr Andreja Terpotec in her doctoral dissertation on national culture in Slovenia in connection with corruption, and by Dr Janja Vuga Beršnak on the case of Slovenian society and its attitude towards the military. Slovenian culture is predominantly female-oriented, which means that it is determined by female qualities such as modesty, helping others and the weak, caring and nurturing good interpersonal relationships, compared to male-determined cultures, which are characterized by self-confidence, strength, determination, competition and success. The military organization and its mission are both based on a male-determined culture. Its members must demonstrate strength, self-confidence, determination and success. Only with such a culture is it possible to defend the homeland and deter various forms of threats. We could make a rough estimate that, considering the attitude of the state and the society towards its military, Slovenia is experiencing a harmonious relationship between two partners. In more depth, however, the author of the monograph notes that these two different cultural determinants have certain characteristics that should be understood, researched and taken into account in many processes and public policies; all with one single purpose – to ensure the safety and successful performance of each individual in the military and families of these individuals, and the security of the country as a whole.

The monograph brings valuable findings and a completely different, fresh, very welcome, new perspective of the understanding of certain phenomena and characteristics in the broader international environment, but especially in Slovenia. Ever since the last global financial crisis, when the funds for the Slovenian Armed Forces were steadily being cut, there has been an impression that the armed forces were experiencing long-lasting cramp twinges that were by no means easing away. There was an impression that the attitude of the Slovenian state and the society towards the national armed forces resembled a relationship between a stepmother and a stepchild, whereby the former only demands and never gives. Gradually and after a long time, the cramp twinges subsided. This new monograph will facilitate the understanding of Slovenian culture, our society, the Slovenian Armed Forces and its families, and our diverse relations. An important role in the understanding of all of the above is certainly played by the monograph's author Dr Janja Vuga Beršnak. She has consistently followed the scientific methodology, laws, views and various

pieces of literature and sources throughout her research, and at the same time has personal experience of what a military family is, what are its benefits, and what it requires, being a greedy institution.

Avtorji

Authors

Marko Mahnič je diplomiral iz ekonomije v Franciji. Je svetovalec za skupno varnostno in obrambno politiko v Sektorju za evropske zadeve na Direktoratu za obrambno politiko Ministrstva za obrambo Republike Slovenije. V okviru priprav na predsedovanje Svetu Evropske unije kot koordinator pokriva področja, kot sta na primer Evropski obrambni sklad in sodelovanje med EU in Natom. Je tudi član delovne skupine ministrstva za krepitev odpornosti in zoperstavljanje hibridnim grožnjam ter sodeluje pri delu istoimenske horizontalne delovne skupine v Bruslju.

Marko Mahnič, *holds a Bachelor's degree in Business Administration from France. He is an advisor for the Common Security and Defence Policy in the European Affairs Division at the Defence Policy Directorate of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia. As a coordinator for the upcoming Presidency of the Council of the European Union he is covering topics such as the European Defence Fund and EU-NATO Cooperation. He is also a member of the working group on enhancing resilience and countering hybrid threats, both at the Ministry and in Brussels.*

Marko Mahnič

Major dr. Damjan Štrucl je doktoriral s temo Pravni in institucionalni vidiki ureditve kibernetske varnosti in obrambe Republike Slovenije. V Slovenski vojski je zaposlen od leta 2000, opravljal je različne poveljniške in štabne dolžnosti. Od leta 2007 do 2015 je opravljal naloge častnika za informacijsko varnost. Leta 2015 je bil prerazporejen v odsek za kibernetsko varnost Slovenske vojske, ki ga je tudi nekaj časa vodil. Trenutno opravlja dela in naloge raziskovalca v Natovem Centru za kibernetsko obrambo v Talinu.

Major Damjan Štrucl, PhD, *wrote a PhD thesis on legal and institutional aspects of cyber security and defence regulation in the Republic of Slovenia. He joined the Slovenian Armed Forces in 2000, and has since then performed various command and staff duties. Between 2007 and 2015, he was an Information Security Officer. In 2015, he was assigned to the Cyber Security Detachment of the Slovenian Armed Forces, which he also headed for some time. He is currently working as researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn.*

Damjan Štrucl

Gregor Garb

Doc. dr. Gregor Garb je raziskovalec in svetovalec. Njegove raziskave se osredotočajo na varnostna in obrambna vprašanja, vključno s strategijami, politikami, vojaškimi operacijami, razvojem zmogljivosti, raziskavami in tehnologijo, sodelovanjem na področju oborožitve in industrijskimi vidiki. Osredotoča se tudi na aktualne novice na področju varnosti in obrambe, pogosto komentira v strokovnih razpravah.

Assoc. Prof. Gregor Garb, PhD *is researcher and consultant. His research focuses on security and defence issues, including strategies, policies, military operations, capability development, research and technology, armaments cooperation and industrial aspects. He also focuses on current news in the security and defence area, often commenting in various expert discussions.*

Nina Raduha

Podpolkovnica mag. Nina Rduha je diplomirana politologinja, smer obramboslovje. Magistrirala je iz kazenskopravne znanosti na Pravni fakulteti v Ljubljani. V Slovenski vojski je zaposlena od leta 2003. Sodelovala je na misijah v BiH in Libanonu. Leta 2016 je kot najboljša slušateljica končala višje štabno šolanje. Je pehotna častnica. Opravila je vse poveljniške dolžnosti do ravni čete, bila je častnica za odnose z javnostmi in za informacijsko delovanje. Na šoli za obrambno komuniciranje v ZDA je z odliko končala tečaj s področja odnosov z javnostmi.

Lieutenant Colonel Nina Raduha, MSc, *holds a bachelor's degree in Political Sciences (Defence Studies). She earned her master's degree in criminal law science from the Faculty of Law in Ljubljana. She joined the Slovenian Armed Forces in 2003 and has been deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Lebanon. In 2016, she completed the Senior Staff Course as valedictorian. She is an infantry officer and has performed commanding duties up to the company level and worked as a Public Affairs and Information Operations officer. She completed the Public Affairs Course at the Defence Information School, USA with distinction.*

David Humar

Brigadir mag. David Humar je diplomiral na Vojaški akademiji kopenske vojske. Magistriral je na National Defence University – ICAF v ZDA. Končal je slovenski generalštabni tečaj in mednarodni generalski tečaj italijanske vojske. Bil je svetovalec za obrambne reforme vojske BIH na vojaškem poveljstvu Nata v Sarajevu. Od leta 2006 do 2010 je bil slovenski vojaški predstavnik pri zavezniškem poveljstvu za operacije. Od leta 2020 je pomočnik načelnika Generalštaba Slovenske vojske. Pri nastajanju Vojaške strategije Republike Slovenije je bil namestnik vodje skupine.

Brigadier General David Humar *graduated from the Army Military Academy. He holds a master's degree from the National Defence University – ICAF, USA. He graduated from the Slovenian General Staff Course and the international General Staff Course of the Italian Army. He was an adviser on defence reforms of the Army of BiH at NATO HQ in Sarajevo. Between 2006 and 2010, he was the Slovenian military representative at the ACO. Since 2020, he has worked as Assistant Chief of the General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces. He was deputy head of the group developing the MIlitary Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia.*

Miklós Böröcz

Dr. Miklós Böröcz je doktoriral leta 2009 na Univerzi v Peči na Madžarskem iz skupne zunanje in varnostne politike EU. Univerzitetno izobrazbo je pridobil na isti univerzi na Fakulteti za pravo in politične vede. Ima dolgoletne izkušnje pri opravljanju različnih dolžnosti na področjih notranje varnosti, obveščevalne dejavnosti in zoperstavljanja terorizmu. Je avtor več prispevkov, v katerih združuje dolgoletne izkušnje iz prakse z novimi znanstvenimi spoznanji.

Miklós Böröcz, PhD, *earned his PhD in EU activities on CFSP from the University of Pécs, Hungary in 2009, and bachelor's degree from the Faculty of Law and Political Sciences of the same university. Throughout his career, he has performed various duties in the field of internal security, intelligence and counter-terrorism. He is the author of several articles where he combines his years-long practical experience with new scientific findings.*

Navodila za avtorje

Instructions to authors

NAVODILA ZA AVTORJE

Vsebinska navodila

Splošno

Sodobni vojaški izzivi je interdisciplinarna znanstveno-strokovna publikacija, ki objavlja prispevke o aktualnih temah, raziskavah, znanstvenih in strokovnih razpravah, tehničnih ali družboslovnih analizah z varnostnega, obrambnega in vojaškega področja ter recenzije znanstvenih in strokovnih monografij (prikaz knjige).

Vojaškošolski zbornik je vojaškostrokovna in informativna publikacija, namenjena izobraževanju in obveščanju o dosežkih ter izkušnjah na področju vojaškega izobraževanja, usposabljanja in izpopolnjevanja.

Vsebina

Objavljamo prispevke v slovenskem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v angleški jezik, in po odločitvi uredniškega odbora prispevke v angleškem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v slovenski jezik.

Objavljamo prispevke, ki še niso bili objavljeni ali poslani v objavo drugi reviji. Pisec je odgovoren za vse morebitne kršitve avtorskih pravic. Če je bil prispevek že natisnjen drugje, poslan v objavo ali predstavljen na strokovni konferenci, naj to avtor sporoči uredniku in pridobi soglasje založnika (če je treba) ter navede razloge za ponovno objavo.

Tehnična navodila

Dolžina prispevka

Praviloma naj bo obseg prispevka 16 strani ali 30.000 znakov s presledki (ena avtorska pola). Najmanjši dovoljeni obseg je 8 strani ali 15.000 znakov s presledki, največji pa 24 strani oziroma 45.000 znakov.

Recenzija znanstvene in strokovne monografije (prikaz knjige) naj obsega največ 3000 znakov s presledki.

Recenzije

Prispevki se recenzirajo. Recenzija je anonimna. Glede na oceno recenzentov uredniški odbor ali urednik prispevek sprejme, nato pa, če je treba, zahteva popravke ali ga zavrne. Pripombe recenzentov avtor vnese v prispevek.

Zaradi anonimnega recenzentskega postopka je treba prvo stran in vsebino oblikovati tako, da identiteta avtorja ni prepoznavna.

Končno klasifikacijo določi uredniški odbor.

Lektoriranje

Lektoriranje besedil je zagotovljeno v okviru publikacije. Lektorirana besedila se vrnejo avtorjem v avtorizacijo.

Navajanje avtorjev prispevka	Navajanje avtorjev je skrajno zgoraj, levo poravnano. *Primer*: Ime 1 Priimek 1, Ime 2 Priimek 2
Naslov prispevka	Navedbi avtorjev sledi naslov prispevka. Črke v naslovu so velike 16 pik, natisnjene krepko, besedilo naslova pa poravnano na sredini.
Povzetek	Prispevku mora biti dodan povzetek, ki obsega največ 800 znakov (10 vrstic). Povzetek naj na kratko opredeli temo prispevka, predvsem naj povzame rezultate in ugotovitve. Splošne ugotovitve in misli ne spadajo v povzetek, temveč v uvod.
Povzetek v angleščini	Avtorji morajo oddati tudi prevod povzetka v angleščino. Tudi za prevod povzetka velja omejitev do 800 znakov (10 vrstic). Izjemoma se prevajanje povzetka in ključnih besed zagotovi v okviru publikacije.
Ključne besede	Ključne besede (3–5, tudi v angleškem jeziku) naj bodo natisnjene krepko in z obojestransko poravnavo besedila.
Oblikovanje besedila	Avtorji besedilo oblikujejo s presledkom med vrsticami 1,5 in velikostjo črk 12 pik, pisava Arial. Besedilo naj bo obojestransko poravnano, brez umikov na začetku odstavka.
Predstavitev avtorjev	Avtorji morajo pripraviti kratko predstavitev svojega strokovnega oziroma znanstvenega dela. Predstavitev naj ne presega 600 znakov s presledki (10 vrstic, 80 besed). Avtorji naj besedilo umestijo na konec prispevka, po navedeni literaturi.
Struktu-riranje besedila	Posamezna poglavja v besedilu naj bodo ločena s samostojnimi podnaslovi in ustrezno oštevilčena (členitev največ na 4 ravni). *Primer*: 1 Uvod 2 Naslov poglavja (1. raven) 2.1 Podnaslov (2. raven) 2.1.1 Podnaslov (3. raven) 2.1.1.1 Podnaslov (4. raven)
Oblikovanje seznama literature	V seznamu literature je treba po abecednem redu navesti le avtorje, na katere se sklicujete v prispevku, celotna oznaka vira pa mora biti skladna s **harvardskim načinom navajanja**. Če je avtorjev več, navedemo vse, kot so navedeni na izvirnem delu. *Primeri:* *a) knjiga:* Priimek, ime (začetnica imena), letnica. Naslov dela. Kraj: Založba. Na primer: Urlich, W., 1983. Critical Heuristics of Social Planning. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

b) zbornik:

Samson, C., 1970. Problems of information studies in history. S. Stone, ur. Humanities information research. Sheffield: CRUS, 1980, str. 44–68. Pri posameznih člankih v zbornikih na koncu posameznega vira navedemo strani, na katerih je članek, na primer:

c) članek v reviji

Kolega, N., 2006. Slovenian coast sea flood risk. Acta geographica Slovenica. 46-2, str. 143–167.

Navajanje virov z interneta

Vse reference se začenjajo enako kot pri natisnjenih virih, le da običajnemu delu sledi še podatek o tem, kje na internetu je bil dokument dobljen in kdaj. Podatek o tem, kdaj je bil dokument dobljen, je pomemben zaradi pogostega spreminjanja www okolja.

Primer:

Urlich, W., 1983. Critical Heuristics of Social Planning. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, str. 45–100. http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213, 17. 10. 2008. Pri navajanju zanimivih internetnih naslovov v besedilu (ne gre za navajanje posebnega dokumenta) zadošča navedba naslova (http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si). Posebna referenca na koncu besedila v tem primeru ni potrebna.

Sklicevanje na vire

Pri sklicevanju na vire med besedilom navedite priimek avtorja, letnico izdaje in stran. *Primer:* … (Smith, 1997, str. 12) …

Če dobesedno navajate del besedila, ga ustrezno označite z narekovaji, v oklepaju pa poleg avtorja in letnice navedite tudi stran besedila, iz katerega ste navajali. *Primer*: … (Smith, 1997, str. 15) …

Če je avtor omenjen v besedilu, v oklepaju navedemo le letnico izida in stran (1997, str. 15).

Slike, diagrami in tabele

Slike, diagrami in tabele v prispevku naj bodo v posebej pripravljenih datotekah, ki omogočajo lektorske popravke. V besedilu mora biti jasno označeno mesto, kamor je treba vnesti sliko. Skupna dolžina prispevka ne sme preseči dane omejitve.

Diagrami se štejejo kot slike.

Vse slike in tabele se številčijo. Številčenje poteka enotno in ni povezano s številčenjem poglavij. Naslov slike je naveden pod sliko, naslov tabele pa nad tabelo. Navadno je v besedilu navedeno vsaj eno sklicevanje na sliko ali tabelo. Sklic na sliko ali tabelo je: ... (slika 5) ... (tabela 2) ...

Primer slike: Primer tabele:

Tabela 2: Naslov tabele

Slika 5: Naslov slike

Opombe pod črto	Številčenje opomb pod črto je neodvisno od strukture besedila in se v vsakem prispevku začne s številko 1. Posebej opozarjamo avtorje, da so opombe pod črto namenjene pojasnjevanju misli, zapisanih v besedilu, in ne navajanju literature.
Kratice	Kratice naj bodo dodane v oklepaju, ko se okrajšana beseda prvič uporabi, zato posebnih seznamov kratic ne dodajamo. Za kratico ali izraz v angleškem jeziku napišemo najprej slovensko ustreznico, v oklepaju pa angleški izvirnik in morebitno angleško kratico.
Format zapisa prispevka	Uredniški odbor sprejema prispevke, napisane z urejevalnikom besedil MS Word.
Kontaktni podatki avtorja	Prispevkom naj bo dodan avtorjev elektronski naslov.
Kako poslati prispevek	Avtor pošlje prispevek na elektronski naslov odgovorne urednice.
Potrjevanje prejetja prispevka	Odgovorna urednica avtorju potrdi prejetje prispevka.
Korekture	Avtor opravi korekture svojega prispevka v treh dneh.
Naslov uredniškega odbora	Ministrstvo za obrambo Generalštab Slovenske vojske Sodobni vojaški izzivi Uredniški odbor Vojkova cesta 55 1000 Ljubljana Slovenija Elektronski naslov Odgovorna urednica: liliana.brozic@mors.si

Prispevkov, ki ne bodo urejeni skladno s tem navodilom, uredniški odbor ne bo sprejemal.

INSTRUCTIONS TO AUTHORS

Content-related guidelines

General

Contemporary Military Challenges is an interdisciplinary scientific and professional publication publishing articles on topical subjects, research, scientific and professional discourse, technical or social-science analyses in the field of security, defence and military, as well as reviews of scientific and professional monographs.

What do we publish?

We publish articles in Slovene with abstracts in English and, based on the Editorial Board's decision, articles in English with abstracts in Slovene.

We publish articles, which have not been previously published or submitted to another journal for publication. The author is held accountable for all possible copyright violations. If the article has already been printed elsewhere, sent for publication or presented at a professional conference, the author must accordingly notify the editor, obtain the publisher's consent (if necessary) and indicate the reasons for republishing.

Technical guidelines

Length of the article

The length of articles should generally be 16 pages or 30,000 characters with spaces. The minimum length is 8 pages or 15,000 characters with spaces and the maximum length 24 pages or 45,000 characters with spaces.

Reviews of science or professional monographs should not exceed 3,000 characters with spaces.

Peer reviews

All articles undergo an anonymous peer review. Based on the reviewer's assessment, the editorial board or the managing editor accept the article, demand it be notified or reject it. The author is obliged to take the reviewer's comments into consideration and adjust the article accordingly.

Due to an anonymous review procedure, the first page of the article should be designed in a way that the author's identity cannot be identified.

The final classification is determined by the editorial board.

Proofreading

Proofreading is provided by the organizational unit responsible for publishing activities. Proofread articles are distributed to respective authors for authorisation.

Indicating the authors of the article

The name(s) of the author(s) should be indicated in the upper left corner and aligned left.

Example:

Name 1 Surname 1,

Name 2 Surname 2,

Title of the article	The title of the article is written below the name(s) of the author(s). The font of the title is bold, size 16. The text of the title is centrally aligned.
Abstract	The paper should include an abstract of a maximum of 800 characters (10 lines). The abstract should provide a concise presentation of the topic, particularly the results and the findings. General findings and reflections do not constitute a part of the abstract, but are rather included in the introduction.
Key words	Key words (3-5) should be bold with a justified text alignment.
Text formatting	The article should be formatted with 1.5 line spacing, font Arial, size 12. The text should have justified alignment, without indents.
About the author(s)	The author(s) should prepare a short text about their professional or scientific work. The text should not exceed 600 characters with spaces (10 lines, 80 words) and should be placed at the end of the paper, after the bibliography.
Text structuring	Individual chapters should be separated by independent subtitles and numbered accordingly.

Example:
1 Introduction
2 Title of the chapter (1st level)
2.1 Subtitle (2nd level)
2.1.1 Subtitle (3rd level)
2.1.1.1 Subtitle (4th level)

Bibliography	Bibliography should include an alphabetical list of authors referred to in the article. Each reference has to comply with the **Harvard referencing style**.

Examples:
a) book
Surname, name (initial), year. Title. Place. Publishing House.
E.g. Urlich, W., 1983. Critical Heuristics of Social Planning. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
b) journal
E.g. Samson, C., 1970. Problems of information studies in history. S. Stone, ed. Humanities information research. Sheffield: CRUS, 1980, pp 44–68. For individual articles in a journal, the pages where the article is located are also to be indicated at the end of each source, e.g.
c) article in a journal
Kolega, N., 2006. Slovenian coast sea flood risk. Acta geographica Slovenica. 46-2, pp 143–167.

Referencing from the internet

Internet sources are referenced the same as with printed ones, but are followed by the information about where on the Internet and when the document was obtained. The information when a document was obtained is important because of the frequent changes to the www environment.

Example:

Urlich, W., 1983. Critical Heuristics of Social Planning. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp 45-100. http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213, 17 October 2008.

When referencing interesting URLs in the text (not citing a particular document), only URL (e.g. http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si) can be indicated and a separate reference at the end of the text is not necessary.

Citation

When citing sources in the text, indicate the author's surname, the year of publication and page. *Example:* ….. (Smith, 1997, p 12) …

When quoting a part of the text, put the text in the quotation marks, and indicate in the parentheses the author and year followed by the page of the quoted text. *Example: ...*(Smith, 1997, p 15) …

Figures, diagrams, tables

Figures, diagrams and tables to be included in the article should be prepared in separate files which allow for proofreading corrections. The location in the text where the image is to be inserted should be clearly indicated. The total length of the article may not exceed the given limit.

Diagrams are considered figures.

All figures and tables should be numbered. The numbering of figures should be uniform and is not connected with the numbering of chapters. The title of a figure is positioned beneath the figure while the title of the table is positioned above the table.

As a rule, at least one reference to a figure or a table is made in the article. Reference to a figure or a table is made as follows: … (figure 5) ……… (table 2) ………

Example of a figure: Example of a table:
                              Table 2: Title of the table

Figure 5: Title of the figure

Footnotes

The numbering of footnotes is independent of the structure of the text and begins with number 1 in each article. Authors should note that footnotes are intended to explain the ideas mentioned in the text and not to refer to the literature.

Acronyms

Acronyms used in the article should be explained in parentheses when first used in the text. A separate list of acronyms is not necessary.

File format of the article	The editorial board accepts only texts edited using a MS Word text editor.
Author's contact	Each article should include the author's e-mail.
Submission of the article	An electronic version of the article should be sent to the email of the managing editor.
Confirmation upon receipt	Upon receiving the article via email, the managing editor confirms the receipt.
Corrections	The author makes corrections to the article within three days.

Editorial Board address

Ministrstvo za obrambo
Generalštab Slovenske vojske
Sodobni vojaški izzivi
Uredniški odbor
Vojkova cesta 55
1000 Ljubljana
Slovenia

Managing Editor's email:
liliana.brozic@mors.si

The Editorial Board will not accept articles, which are not in compliance with the above instructions.

Vsebina